[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




 
     NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

       SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, ENERGY, THE ENVIRONMENT AND CYBER

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           NOVEMBER 16, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-89

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
        
        
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]        
        


       Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
                            docs.house.gov, 
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov
                       
                       
                        _____
 
              U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
46-092PDF           WASHINGTON : 2022                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                  GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey                  Member
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida          STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
KAREN BASS, California               SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    DARRELL ISSA, California
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island        ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California                 LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DINA TITUS, Nevada                   BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California                 BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             KEN BUCK, Colorado
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota             TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota                MARK GREEN, Tennessee
COLIN ALLRED, Texas                  ANDY BARR, Kentucky
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                 GREG STEUBE, Florida
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia         DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey           PETER MEIJER, Michigan
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina        YOUNG KIM, California
JIM COSTA, California                MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
JUAN VARGAS, California              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois

 
                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director

               Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                 ------                                

        Subcommittee on Europe, Energy,the Environment and Cyber

              WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia         BRIAN FITZPATRICK, 
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania                 Pennsylvania,Ranking Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey              ANN WAGNER, Missouri
THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida             ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois,
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island        BRIAN MAST, Florida
DINA TITUS, Nevada                   DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota             AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
JIM COSTA, California                NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas             PETER MEIJER, Michigan
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois

  

                      Leah Nodvin, Staff Director
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Zukunft, Admiral Paul F., USCG (Ret.), Former Commandant of the 
  United States Coast Guard......................................     7
Natali, Dr. Susan M., Arctic Program Director, Woodwell Climate 
  Research Center................................................    15
Dorough, Dr. Dalee Sambo Chairperson, Inuit Circumpolar Council..    21
Coffey, Mr. Luke Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for 
  Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation........................    27

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    54
Hearing Minutes..................................................    55
Hearing Attendance...............................................    56

              ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBITTED FOR THE RECORD

Additional materials submitted for the record....................    57


     NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC

                       Tuesday, November 16, 2021

                          House of Representatives,
  Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment, 
                                         and Cyber,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., 
via Webex, Hon. William R. Keating (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Keating. The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee will 
come to order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any point, and all members will have 
5 days to submit statements. Extraneous material and questions 
for the record will also be accepted during that period, 
subject to the length limitations in the rules. To insert 
something into the record, please have your staff email the 
previously mentioned address or contact full committee staff.
    Please keep your video function on at all times, even when 
you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible 
for muting and unmuting themselves, and please remember to mute 
yourself after you finish speaking. Consistent with House 
Resolution 965 and the accompanying regulations, staff will 
only mute members and witnesses as appropriate when they are 
not under recognition to eliminate background noise.
    I see that we have a quorum, and I will now recognize 
myself for an opening statement.
    Pursuant to notice, we are holding a hearing today 
entitled, ``National Security Implications of Climate Change in 
the Arctic.''
    Last week, I had the privilege to attend the 26th U.N. 
Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP26, 
in Glasgow, Scotland. The COP26 summit brought parties together 
to accelerate action toward the goals of the Paris Agreement 
and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change.
    After 2 weeks of intense--and they were intense--
deliberations, diplomats from nearly 200 countries reached a 
final deal to work together to stave off the worst effects of 
climate change for current and future generations. I personally 
was encouraged to see member States join forces with civil 
society, companies, and youth on the front line of climate 
change, to inspire climate action in all areas of the world.
    COP26 has provided global direction to the world. We must 
undertake to respond and mitigate the existential threat that 
climate change poses to our world. Now it is time to roll up 
our sleeves, get creative, and sometimes make tough decisions. 
And together, we must work to better understand some of the 
very real pressing national security challenges that global 
warming presents to strategically significant regions of the 
world. As such, we are here today to discuss the national 
security challenges that global warming is exacerbating in a 
region critically important to the U.S. and its Nordic 
partners, the Arctic.
    The United States is proud to be an Arctic Nation alongside 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the 
Russian Federation. As a member of the Arctic Council, with 
economic, diplomatic, military, and environmental interests in 
the region, we bear a responsibility to mitigate the effects of 
climate change in the Arctic's lands, oceans, and, most 
importantly, its peoples.
    For this reason, Ranking Member Fitzpatrick and I organized 
this hearing today to better understand the current state of 
the Arctic climate change and the implications on national 
security for not only the United States but for our Nordic 
partners as well.
    The Arctic is categorized by distinctively polar conditions 
in climate, plant life, and animal life. It is a region rich in 
distinction for its cultural traditions and is a key component 
of the global economy.
    International interests in the Arctic and the sub-Arctic 
regions has steadily increased during the 20th century for 
three major reasons: One, the advantages of the North Pole 
route as a shortcut between important centers of population; 
second, the growing realization of economic potentiality, such 
as minerals, especially petroleum, and forest resources and 
grazing areas; and third, the importance of the region in the 
study of global meteorology.
    Over the last two decades, Arctic surface air temperature 
has increased more than double--more than double--the global 
average. It is widely assumed that the Arctic will continue to 
warm more than the global surface temperature, which will 
almost certainly further amplify the loss of Arctic sea ice. 
The scientific community has even begun to predict that the 
Arctic Ocean will become practically sea ice-free in late 
summer by the end of the 21st century.
    As the climate changes, the Arctic and the communities that 
live there are experiencing increasingly catastrophic effects. 
Ongoing loss of Arctic sea ice has both local and remote 
impacts on the climate system, influencing the local surface 
energy budget as well as large-scale ocean and atmospheric 
circulation patterns and ecosystems.
    Reduced Arctic sea ice has been observed to have a range of 
impacts, including greater ocean transit through the region, 
expanding fishing and tourism activities, increased options for 
oil, gas, and mineral exploration in the Arctic offshore and 
onshore areas, and diminished Arctic marine mammal populations 
and the human communities that rely on these mammals for 
nutritional, cultural, and economic reasons.
    I believe that the protected access to resources and access 
to the sea lanes for transit are vital national security 
interests for the United States and the Arctic. Specifically, 
the diminishment of Arctic ice and potentially increased 
maritime access open the door for a race for Arctic resources 
between the United States and Arctic Council members, like 
Russia, or observers, importantly like China.
    The Arctic has significant resources, as we all know, but I 
cannot underscore enough that we must not allow global 
competition to disrupt the already fragile ecosystem that 
exists in the Arctic. Instead, I believe we need to focus on 
three main areas to preserve prosperity and stability in the 
Arctic and continue our decades-long cooperation with our 
Nordic partners:
    One, we need a governmentwide approach to the Arctic to 
make the Arctic a national priority. The United States needs to 
continue to strengthen its presence in the Arctic, both 
militarily and civilian. And we need the appropriate 
infrastructure in the Arctic to support that presence.
    Two, Arctic nations must deal with the consequences of a 
changing climate and the patterns that are developing. We have 
a number of areas that are vulnerable to a rising sea level, 
and we need to make investments now to address these long-term 
consequences.
    Third, preservation of indigenous communities and the 
ecologies of the Arctic must be a top priority for the United 
States and other Arctic nations.
    To elaborate on the many issues facing the Arctic and to 
offer their unique perspective, we have invited four expert 
witnesses to explain the national security, environmental, and 
societal impacts that global warming poses to the Arctic.
    I welcome and thank Admiral Paul Zukunft, former Commandant 
of the U.S. Coast Guard; Dr. Susan Natali of the Woodwell 
Climate Research Center, a venerated research institution in 
the congressional district that I represent; Dr. Dalee Sambo 
Dorough of the Inuit Circumpolar Council; and Mr. Luke Coffey 
from The Heritage Foundation for being here today.
    That is a lot of witnesses, but we are going to cover a lot 
of subject matter here.
    This is the first House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing 
on the Arctic in this conference, and I believe each witness' 
testimony is essential to better understand the climate, the 
people, and the geostrategic interests of the region.
    With that, I welcome an honest assessment where we need to 
go in our pursuit of a comprehensive Arctic strategy from our 
expert witnesses. And I want to thank them for being here, 
realizing that some of them are working out of a different time 
zone and it was a little more personally difficult in that 
regard.
    So I would like to recognize the ranking member now, Mr. 
Fitzpatrick, for his opening statement.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you. Good afternoon. Thank you, 
Chairman Keating, and thank you to all of our esteemed 
witnesses as we examine national security threats in the 
Arctic.
    And as one of the eight countries located within the Arctic 
Circle, the United States has the opportunity to lead in a 
global effort toward multilateral cooperation in a swiftly 
changing environment and, fortunately, we can do so in 
conjunction with our NATO partners in the region and through 
critical forums like the Arctic Council.
    The Arctic environment is undeniably changing. Ice is 
melting and waterways are becoming more navigable for longer 
periods of time each year. This increased accessibility also 
brings the potential for conflict to emerge in this 
traditionally peaceful region. And as such, the United States 
and our partners in the Arctic must insist on the integrity of 
our sovereignty. Clear expectations and proactive engagement in 
the region can allow for lowering of political temperatures and 
reduce the likelihood for future armed conflicts.
    Russia in particular, which maintains half of the world's 
Arctic territory within its borders, seems increasingly likely 
to test the limits of the United States and our allies in the 
Arctic. Authoritarians in the Kremlin have already shattered 
international norms through hostile and illegal occupation of 
nations like Ukraine and by weaponizing energy resources. And 
Russia's recent attempts to restrict access to the Northern Sea 
Route and their reinforcement of previously abandoned military 
installations are cause for concern and deliberate attention of 
the Biden administration. We must take steps to ensure that we 
are fully prepared should this aggression escalate in the 
Arctic.
    Moreover, as the current administration turns back and 
allows Nord Stream Two pipeline's completion, we must be under 
no illusion that Russia will take environmental precautions as 
it prospects unexploited oil and gas reserves in the Arctic.
    And given the importance of this region, I urge my 
colleagues to support investment in U.S. interests and assets 
in the Arctic by increasing our diplomatic security presence. 
And the opening of the U.S. consulate in Nuuk, Greenland, was a 
positive step for invigorated U.S. engagement in the region, 
but it cannot end there. Our Coast Guard installations, such as 
Barrow in Alaska, should warrant increased backing as well. And 
growing Arctic traffic will require expanded specialized search 
and rescue operations to face the brutal conditions of the high 
north.
    In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the United States must remain 
committed to bolstering military and scientific capabilities in 
the Arctic as the region takes greater focus on the world 
stage. And environmental changes and advancements in technology 
will require modernizing aspects of our national security 
operations to stay competitive. And it is my hope that my 
colleagues can come together to support this goal.
    Again, thanks to the panelists for being here with us.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Keating. I thank the ranking member for his opening 
remarks. And I would like to now call on our witnesses for 
their opening statements.
    First, I will introduce Admiral Paul Zukunft, who has 
served as the 25th Commandant of the United States Coast Guard 
from 2014 to 2018.
    Coming from my district, a coastal district, Admiral, I 
cannot tell you my great esteem and appreciation for the Coast 
Guard and their daily work. Welcome. And I now recognize you 
for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

   STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PAUL F. ZUKUNFT, USCG (RET.), FORMER 
          COMMANDANT OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

    Admiral Zukunft. Chair Keating, thank you for those kind 
remarks. And, Ranking Member Fitzpatrick and members of the 
subcommittee, I am truly honored to testify at today's hearing 
on a topic that has had and continues to have my laser focus, 
and that is the Arctic.
    Before I deliver my oral testimony, I request that my 
written testimony be entered into the record.
    Mr. Keating. Without objection. So moved. So done.
    And I will say this just to preempt the other witnesses. I 
will now make a motion that all their written testimoneys be 
submitted for the record.
    Any objection?
    Hearing none, all your written testimoneys will be moved 
for the record.
    You may continue, Admiral.
    Admiral Zukunft. OK. Thank you, Chair.
    The United States has been an Arctic Nation for the past 
154 years, after Secretary of State William Seward brokered the 
purchase of the Alaska territory from a then cash-strapped 
Russia at a cost of $7.2 million in then dollars or, roughly, 2 
cents per acre.
    It was then dubbed ``Seward's Folly,'' but it has proved to 
be strategic foresight. And not simply due to the vast natural 
resources in our 49th State, but for had it not been for such a 
``folly,'' the Russian republic and its military arsenal would 
currently occupy this region and the U.S. would, at best, be a 
near-Arctic Nation.
    So we have strategic foresight dating back to 1867, and 
what I will call strategic afterthought as it pertains to the 
Arctic over the past several decades. We have a Presidential 
Policy Directive, strategy, and memorandum released by the 
three previous administrations, respectively, but each of those 
were released at the trailing edge of those administrations and 
failed to carry the full weight from one administration to the 
next. And I will come back to that in my closing.
    Over the past half century, as the chair has mentioned, the 
Arctic has warmed at nearly twice the rate than the rest of the 
planet. I witnessed this firsthand when, in 2017, I visited the 
Jakobshavn Glacier in Greenland, that is moving at an 
accelerated pace into the North Atlantic Ocean. When I asked 
the Inuit elders in Ilulissat what I was witnessing, their 
response in two words was ``climate change.''
    Just as profound, sea ice is in retreat across the Arctic 
Ocean and great power competition is rapidly filling that void, 
particularly Russia. Russia operates a fleet of icebreakers 
that is nine times that of the United States, yet it has a GDP 
that is nearly one-tenth of that of the United States. Natural 
islands are being militarized. Icebreaking corvettes with a 
cruise missile package that can range the northern tier of the 
United States and beyond are being delivered, and its 
extraterritorial claims extend up to the North Pole.
    And then there is the Northern Sea Route, an international 
strait under the Law of the Sea Convention that connects the 
Asian and European markets while trimming one-third of the 
transit time by bypassing the Suez Canal for commercial 
shipping during the ice-free season. But Russia not only treats 
the Northern Sea Route as its internal waters, but has imposed 
draconian measures for any vessel, to include military ships 
and, yes, U.S. ships, to request permission to enter and 
procure the services of a Russian icebreaker and ship pilot 
before transiting the Northern Sea Route.
    Meanwhile, China deems itself a near-Arctic nation, 
although its northernmost extreme is some 900 miles south of 
the Arctic Circle. China has invested heavily in Russia's LNG 
facility on the Yamal Peninsula and in the economies of 
Greenland and Iceland.
    China gained observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013, 
and recently delivered its second icebreaker, with aspirations 
of launching a nuclear icebreaker to advance its Belt and Road 
Initiative in the Arctic.
    While I am pleased to see the U.S. Coast Guard has full 
funding for two heavy polar security cutters, it is clearly two 
decades behind in the acquisition and delivery schedule. I must 
emphasize that the Coast Guard's program of record requires 
three heavy and three medium polar security cutters. Our 
Nation's only heavy icebreaker, Polar Star, has been in service 
for over 45 years now, while serving in the harshest 
environments on the face of the planet.
    The U.S. lacks a deepwater port in the Arctic that 
compromises sustained at-sea operations in that domain, while 
bandwidth and maritime domain awareness above 70 degrees north 
are woefully inadequate.
    While I served as Commandant of the Coast Guard, I was 
fortunate to establish an Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 2016, 
comprised of the Coast Guards from the eight member Arctic 
Council nations that have been conducting combined exercises in 
the Arctic ever since.
    And where the U.S. lacks strength in numbers in the Arctic, 
there are strength in our alliances. Five of the eight Arctic 
Council nations are members of NATO, while Finland and Sweden 
are key contributors to NATO-led operations. Collectively, our 
alliances have an aggregate fleet of 35 icebreakers, to include 
Norway's Svalbard class icebreaking patrol vessels, to reduce 
the numbers gap with Russia.
    I close by stating that this administration has an 
opportunity to synthesize the Arctic initiatives of the three 
previous administrations where there is a commonality across 
all three of those administrations so that this Arctic roadmap 
can gain momentum now. The reactivation of the Arctic Executive 
Steering Committee this past September is clearly a step in the 
right direction.
    Finally, on the matter of maritime governments. The U.S. is 
not positioned to govern diplomatically in this realm until 
such time it ratifies the Law of the Sea Convention.
    Chair, I thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I 
look forward to your insights and questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Zukunft follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    

       
    Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Admiral, and thank you for 
that sobering testimony, and look forward to some questions.
    Second witness I would like to introduce is Dr. Susan M. 
Natali. She is the Arctic program director at the Woodwell 
Climate Research Center in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, and it is 
interesting, just a few miles from where I live.
    It is interesting too that it wasn't too long ago that we 
saw the Armstrong, the icebreaking vessel from NSI, as an asset 
set launch through there, and they are dealing directly on land 
with Woods Hole. So I look forward to your testimony.
    I now recognize Dr. Susan Natali.

  STATEMENT OF DR. SUSAN M. NATALI, ARCTIC PROGRAM DIRECTOR, 
                WOODWELL CLIMATE RESEARCH CENTER

    Dr. Natali. Thank you so much.
    I am going to share some slides, if we can get this to 
work, to give members of the committee who have not been to the 
Arctic an idea of what some of the changes that are happening 
look like. So can you see those slides now?
    Mr. Keating. Yes.
    Dr. Natali. OK. Great. OK.
    So thank you to the committee, in particular Representative 
Keating, for inviting me to provide testimony to this hearing. 
I am very honored to be here.
    I am Dr. Sue Natali. I am the Arctic program director and a 
senior scientist at the Woodwell Climate Research Center. I am 
an Arctic ecologist, and I study the effects of permafrost thaw 
in northern wildfires on Arctic lands in the global climate.
    So Woodwell Climate Research Center is a nonprofit 
organization. We are based in Falmouth, Massachusetts, made up 
of researchers who work with partners worldwide to understand 
and combat climate change.
    So while the world has already warmed 1.1 degrees Celsius, 
on average, above preindustrial levels, the Arctic is warming 
more than two times faster than this global average. In the 
coming years, Arctic temperatures are projected to continue to 
rise at an accelerated rate, further exacerbating climate 
hazards, including wildfires, sea ice melt, coastal erosion, 
and permafrost thaw.
    OK. So permafrost is ground that has been frozen for 2 or 
more consecutive years. It is also been frozen for many 
hundreds to thousands of years. Permafrost underlies about 15 
percent of the Northern Hemisphere land area and approximately 
85 percent of Alaska's land area.
    From a global climate change perspective, permafrost thaw 
is critically important because the permafrost region stores a 
vast amount of carbon. There is roughly twice as much carbon 
stored in permafrost as is currently contained in the entire 
Earth's atmosphere.
    Once thawed, this previously frozen carbon can be broken 
down by microbes and released into the atmosphere as greenhouse 
gasses, methane, and carbon dioxide. The release of greenhouse 
gasses from thawing permafrost can accelerate climate warming, 
leading to additional thaw.
    As stated in the International Panel on Climate Change 
recently released Sixth Assessment Report, the loss of 
permafrost carbon is irreversible on a human-relevant 
timeframe. The report projected that between 3 and 41 billion 
tons of carbon dioxide will be released by thawing permafrost 
per each 1 degree Celsius of warming by 2100. However, this 
range likely underestimates the potential of permafrost carbon 
emissions because, currently, no global models include some 
important thaw processes, such as thaw-induced ground collapse.
    When accounting for the full scope of thaw processes, 
cumulative permafrost carbon emissions by the end of the 
century could be on par with continued emissions from a country 
like Japan or as high as continued emissions from the United 
States. As a result, permafrost thaw emissions could take up 
between 25 and 40 percent of the remaining carbon budget to 
stay below 2 degrees Celsius. This means that we need to be 
cutting fossil fuel emissions even faster than is currently 
understood.
    The local and regional implications of permafrost thaw are 
also widespread and significant. Permafrost thaw can cause the 
ground to sink, a phenomenon known as subsidence. And when 
there is a large amount of ice in the permafrost, as seen here, 
the ground can abruptly collapse, which creates hazardous 
conditions for Arctic residents and contributes to the rising 
cost of climate change. These hazards are already being 
experienced across Alaska, endangering human health, destroying 
public infrastructure, threatening water, cultural resources, 
traditional food storage and ways of living, and access to 
subsistence resources.
    Additionally, foundations of military infrastructure in the 
Arctic are already cracking and becoming increasingly unstable 
due to ground thaw.
    The risk and severity of climate impacts are particularly 
high for coastal communities in Alaska, where loss of land-fast 
sea ice is increasing storm impacts and permafrost thaw is 
exacerbating coastal erosion rates. Almost a decade ago, the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office identified 31 Alaskan 
villages that face imminent threat from flooding, erosion, and 
permafrost thaw. At the time of the report, 12 villages were 
seeking relocation options. However, none of these villages 
have yet fully relocated, in large part because of a lack of a 
governance framework to facilitate relocation efforts.
    We are working with our partners in some of these 
communities to monitor the catastrophic and combined effects of 
permafrost thaw, flooding, and erosion, known as usteq, to 
support climate adaptation planning.
    Permafrost thaw is already occurring in Alaska and across 
the Arctic. Domestically, we need to act now to ensure that 
communities in Alaska and Federal agencies are prepared for 
these impacts, and put into place aggressive mitigation and 
adaptation policies to respond to these changes and to prevent 
further avoidable climate warming.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Natali follows:]


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
   
    
    Mr. Keating. Thank you very much, Doctor, and I appreciate 
that. I will have some questions for you as we go forward.
    Dr. Dalee Sambo Dorough is the chairperson of the Inuit 
Circumpolar Council, fresh back from COP26 in Glasgow, where I 
also attended.
    Welcome back, and thank you for joining us. I now recognize 
you for 5 minutes.

   STATEMENT OF DR. DALEE SAMBO DOROUGH, CHAIRPERSON, INUIT 
                      CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL

    Dr. Dorough. Thank you very much, Representative Keating. 
And also thanks to the Commandant and also Dr. Natali for the 
comments that they have provided thus far.
    Very quickly, I just want to precede my written testimony 
with a couple of comments: that security from our perspective 
means something much more than national security. It is really 
the State of being free from danger or threat. But as you have 
already heard, we are facing dangers and threats presently to 
our culture security, our environmental security, our economic 
security, our food security, or essentially our overall 
security.
    It is not lost on any observer that Arctic matters have 
emerged in the way of high politics and, therefore, it is 
crucial for the international norms, rules, and 
responsibilities that have emerged by nation-States that these 
remain at the core of our understanding of Arctic relations.
    So, again, I am very pleased to make some comments on 
behalf of the Inuit Circumpolar Council. We represent 
approximately 180,000 Inuit across Inuit Nunaat, our 
traditional territories. And our traditional territories cover 
nearly half of the Arctic region throughout Chukotka, Alaska, 
Canada, and Greenland.
    The Arctic is our homeland. Over thousands of years, we 
have nurtured reciprocal symbiotic and respectful relationships 
between our peoples and the Arctic environment, and we have 
transferred our knowledge through countless generations. Our 
cultural identities, values, spirituality, livelihoods, and 
overall mental and physical wellness are tied to our total 
environment, of which we are an intimate part.
    Climate change is a primary concern. Its multiple impacts 
are adversely affecting our societies, threatening our overall 
cultural integrity, from threats to our food security and food 
systems, to relocation and displacement, to adverse impacts on 
our health and well-being, to the biodiversity of our 
ecosystems; essentially, our entire way of life. Climate change 
is damaging and disrupting the natural elements of our lands 
and territories, including our marine environment.
    Climate change impacts are also compounded by State-imposed 
laws and regulations that hinder our rights and access to 
resources, and exacerbate issues such as atmospheric pollution, 
substandard and unreliable infrastructure, increased vessel 
traffic and shipping, industrialized fishing, unsustainable 
development, and energy solutions that have been framed as 
green, all of which are driven by others far from our homelands 
and without our consent.
    Yet, we remain optimistic because we ourselves have 
solutions. We are prepared to contribute. We simply demand 
respect for and recognition of our distinct status, rights, and 
role, as well as our own governance structures, including our 
right to maintain, own, and control our knowledge systems to 
effectively contribute to research and the coproduction of 
knowledge. Upon this foundation, we can provide indigenous 
knowledge that will ensure that you, as policy-and 
decisionmakers, have the best available information to base 
your decisions upon.
    Regarding the subject matter of this hearing, our overall 
collective security is threatened. Our security includes 
diverse elements from the Arctic Ocean, its coastal seas, and 
the cryosphere, which are critical ecosystems that must be 
protected through partnership with Inuit. And our future 
security depends upon our distinct involvement in all matters 
concerning the dynamic relationship that we have with our 
homelands.
    We were organized in the midst of the cold war, to adopt 
Bernard Baruch's use of the term in 1947. Baruch's original 
interest is aligned with our hope that the world can renew 
itself physically or spiritually.
    As far back as 1977, we addressed Arctic security by 
adopting a resolution specific to the peaceful use of the 
Arctic. These actions are reflected in the ICC Arctic Policy, 
as well as a 1983 resolution and, more recently, within the 
2018 Utqiagvik Declaration adopted at our last general assembly 
in Utqiagvik.
    The latter directs ICC leadership to lay the foundation for 
diplomatic dialog on the establishment of an Arctic zone of 
peace. Indeed, the U.N. mechanism that crafted the Antarctic 
Treaty, the Seabed Treaty, and other nuclear weapon-free zones 
has been explored by the ICC. We urge all Arctic States, 
including the U.S., to consider this constructive mechanism.
    Furthermore, we have adopted the Circumpolar Inuit 
Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty, which underscores 
internationally affirmed human rights standards, including the 
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It also 
calls for close cooperation among Arctic States and Inuit on 
all matters of Arctic sovereignty. Significantly, the ICC chose 
to launch this declaration at the Foreign Ministers gathering 
that coincided with the MELTING ICE conference in April 2009.
    In conclusion, we view these matters as interrelated. We 
respectfully request that the U.S. adopt the same perspective 
and specifically seriously consider how climate change is 
impacting Inuit. We ask that you ensure that Inuit have the 
financial means to address adaptation and mitigation on our own 
terms, as well as the intellectual and political space to make 
substantive contributions in favor of ourselves and the United 
States.
    Our direct participation should be afforded in relation to 
every issue that impacts Inuit lands, territories, and 
resources, from national security to so-called green energy 
solutions, to priorities for development, to safeguarding the 
marine environment, and, ultimately, our pathway toward 
ensuring our own cultural integrity, our own cultural security.
    We are an essential force in all of these questions. In my 
estimation, we are the central bastion of protection of the 
Arctic, and we urge the whole of the U.S. Government to 
recognize the substantive contributions that we are willing to 
make.
    Quyanaq. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Dorough follows:]
    
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    Mr. Keating. Thank you very much, Doctor, and thank you for 
all your work in this regard.
    Next witness is Mr. Luke Coffey. He is the director of the 
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy at The 
Heritage Foundation.
    You are now recognized for 5 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF LUKE COFFEY, DIRECTOR, DOUGLAS AND SARAH ALLISON 
       CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

    Mr. Coffey. Thank you.
    Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Fitzpatrick, and 
distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to speak 
before this esteemed committee today about Arctic security 
issues.
    As was already pointed out, the U.S. became an Arctic power 
on October 18, 1867, and with a stroke of a pen, the then-
Secretary of State William Seward ended Russian influence in 
North America and gave the United States direct access to the 
Northern Pacific and Arctic Oceans. In his retirement, Seward 
was asked what his greatest achievement was, and he said: ``The 
purchase of Alaska. But it will take another generation to find 
it out.''
    Melting ice has led to an increase in scientific, 
commercial, tourist, and energy exploration activity in the 
region. This in itself has led to a growing military presence 
in the Arctic, but not because there is a threat of war, but 
because many of the capabilities needed in the region, such as 
search and rescue, are more immediately and at least for now 
more effectively provided by militaries and Coast Guards.
    Mr. Chairman, today the U.S. has four primary security 
interests in the Arctic when it comes to national security. 
First, ensuring the territorial defense of the United States. 
In this sense, Canada, our northern neighbor, is vital. 
Relations with Iceland and Greenland are also important in this 
context.
    Second, enforcing U.S. sovereignty in the region. In the 
Arctic, sovereignty equals security and stability. Respecting 
the sovereignty of others while maintaining the ability to 
enforce one's own sovereignty ensures that the chances of armed 
conflict in the region remain low.
    Third, meeting treaty obligations in the Arctic through 
NATO. Five of the world's eight Arctic countries belong to 
NATO, but the alliance has no agreed policy on the region.
    Finally, ensuring the free flow of shipping and other 
economic activities in the region.
    Mr. Chairman, while the military threat in the Arctic 
remains low, U.S. policymakers cannot ignore Russia or China's 
role there. Both directly impact America's ability to meet its 
security interests.
    Russia's recent actions to bolster its military presence in 
the Arctic is concerning. Russia now has at least 34 military 
installations in or near the Arctic. It is optimizing those 
facilities for cold weather warfare, and it has expanded the 
variety and sophistication of the capabilities deployed to the 
region. And it is also increasing the range and tempo of the 
often very aggressive nature of its air and sea patrols in the 
Arctic region.
    There is also an economic aspect of Russia's activities in 
the Arctic. The Northern Sea Route, which runs along Russia's 
northern coast, connecting European with Asian markets, is 
often touted as a possible alternative and even a rival to the 
Suez Canal. However, some perspective is needed.
    Last year, only 32 million tons of goods were shipped along 
the routes, compared to the 1.2 billion tons that transited the 
Suez Canal. Of the 32 million tons of goods that shipped along 
the routes, only 1.2 million tons made the full journey between 
Europe and Asia, so this is one-tenth of 1 percent of the total 
volume shipped through the Suez Canal last year.
    And this route is not without risk. Shipping lanes are far 
removed from search and rescue facilities. Oil and gas make up 
about 82 percent of the volume of goods shipped along the 
Northern Sea Routes, increasing the odds of an ecological 
disaster in the region. And there are currently about 20 
vessels as we speak, as we meet here today, that are either 
stuck or they are struggling to make it across the icy waters.
    In simplest terms, China sees the Arctic region as another 
place in the world to advance its economic interests. But 
considering the problems that China has created in other places 
around the world, there are reasons to be worried by their 
activities in the Arctic.
    Beijing's Arctic strategy offers a useful glimpse of how it 
wants the rest of the world to see the role of China in the 
Arctic region. Writing 5,500 words long in the English language 
version, the strategy is littered with all the popular Arctic 
buzz phrases, such as common interests of all countries, law-
based governance, climate change, and sustainable development.
    Now, the irony is not lost on observers of the South China 
Sea, where China has shunned international norms to exert 
dubious claims of sovereignty, or by the fact that China is the 
world's largest emitter of greenhouse gasses.
    Even though China's closest point to the Arctic Circle is 
more than 800 nautical miles away, Beijing refers to itself as 
a near-Arctic State, which is a term that is completely made 
up. Extending Beijing's logic to other countries would mean 
that Kazakhstan, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Ireland are 
also near-Arctic States.
    In conclusion, I want to highlight some of the actions that 
we should take. We need to increase our freedom of navigation 
operations in the Arctic. We need to adequately invest in the 
U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy's Arctic capabilities. We need 
to continue to raise awareness of China's questionable 
ambitions in the region and make sure that China does not try 
exceeding what it is allowed to do under its status as an 
observer in the Arctic Council. We need to get NATO to finally 
acknowledge its role in the Arctic and perhaps even hold a 
future NATO Summit above the Arctic Circle.
    And finally, we need to increase America's diplomatic, 
economic, military, and scientific presence in Greenland, 
Iceland, Svalbard, and Jan Mayen. These four islands are 
essentially the foreign operating bases of the North American 
Continent and serve as what I like to call the Arctic chain of 
defense for the United States. Now, none of these actions are 
about preparing for war; they are simply about preparing for 
the future.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the 
committee. I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Coffey follows:]
    
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    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Coffey.
    I think we hear from the four witnesses, when we are 
talking about our Nation's security in this region, we have to 
look at it through the lens of their testimony. Certainly, the 
scientific community is part of our security there. It is 
necessary to understand what is going on.
    The understanding and input from the indigenous population 
is important for our success. The navigational, economic, and 
military aspects, it is all intertwined. So thank you for your 
testimony.
    I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. And 
pursuant to the House rules, all time yielded is for the 
purposes of questioning the witnesses.
    Because of the virtual format of the hearing, I will 
recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between 
Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, please let 
our staff know and we will circle back to you. If you seek 
recognition, you must unmute your microphone and address the 
chair verbally.
    I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    I think I will start with Admiral Zukunft, because you laid 
out very clearly the strategic afterthought posture that the 
U.S. has had. And one of the reasons for having this hearing 
early in this administration is to try and see if we can 
accelerate the interest and involvement in the Arctic area on 
all the fronts we have discussed, because that is something 
that is critical to our economic and security interests.
    Now, our National Intelligence Estimate by the National 
Intelligence Council on Climate Change and International 
Responses that show there are increasing challenges to the U.S. 
national security was released just in October 2021. And it 
States the Arctic and the non-Arctic States almost certainly 
will increase their competitions in the area by 2040, and it 
says it is largely economic, but the risk of miscalculation, 
even modestly, could be great.
    So, Admiral, I would like to--you laid out a situation. Can 
you spend some more and give us more insight--some more time 
and give us more insight on the risk of miscalculating just how 
these involvements impact our security in all the ways we 
mentioned?
    Admiral Zukunft. Thank you, Chair. And I would just 
categorize that our presence in the Arctic is late to the game. 
Russia has de facto established itself as a regional hegemon. 
And we are hearing the same rhetoric coming out of Moscow as 
well, almost thumbing their nose at any effort we make.
    To its credit, and to followup on the testimony by Mr. 
Coffey, there was a large NATO exercise on the Greenland-
Iceland side of the Arctic in 2019. We are waking up, but we 
are a little bit late to that wake-up call. Clearly, the United 
States cannot influence this region unilaterally. We have got 
to do so through our trusted partners.
    At the same time, we cannot treat everything as an 
adversary in the Arctic. Economically is going to be a key 
driver in this region. And bad things can happen, search and 
rescue, which is why I established an Arctic Coast Guard Forum. 
We have the Arctic Council that puts out binding agreements but 
no teeth behind it. So the Coast Guards are filling that vacuum 
to address marine environmental protection, indigenous tribes, 
and as well as search and rescue in the region.
    So at least it builds some trust and confidence-building 
measures, especially when we add Russia to that mix, but we 
need to invest in this region, which is why we need a strategy 
at the onset and a strategy that isn't just a skeleton, but we 
can put flesh on those bones as well.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you.
    I just wanted to jump into an issue that was a curiosity to 
me. You know, in Russia, those massive fires that occurred in 
Siberia and through the areas, the magnitude is unbelievable.
    I would like to, you know, ask our panel, particularly 
probably Dr. Natali, how much do we know? How much scientific 
research into the magnitude of the permafrost effect there and 
those fires, how much have we been able to analyze, given so 
much of it occurred in Russia?
    Dr. Natali. Yes. Thank you for that question. So we can get 
information using satellites on fire extent and also emission, 
and we also do have scientific collaborations with many Russian 
scientists. So there are certainly--one of the challenges of 
doing scientific research in the Arctic is that it comprises 
multiple nations and data sharing is certainly a challenge.
    But there is also lots of uncertainties, because when we 
think about, you know, changes in Arctic lands, permafrost is 
below the ground. You cannot always often see that with 
satellites unless there is some pretty substantial ground 
collapse, and by that point, the impacts have already happened. 
And also, greenhouse gas emissions from the Arctic, we do not 
have the capacity, satellites, to view this across the Arctic 
via satellites. And so the Arctic is a pretty vast place. It is 
not accessible.
    Mr. Keating. Can you share with us too the magnitude of 
this? I think it is something that escaped a lot of people's 
attention, but the magnitude of those fires in Russia?
    Dr. Natali. Yes. I mean, those fires, you know, in the 
United States, there are lots of conversations about fires that 
are burning out West, and this is orders of magnitude higher 
emissions that are happening in these fires in Russia.
    And the reason that there is so much carbon greenhouse 
gasses coming out of these fires--it is not just the area of 
the fires--is because, in the Arctic, because there is so much 
carbon below ground, it does not just burn the vegetation and 
the trees aboveground; it actually burns the soil.
    And one of the things that is happening in the Arctic, 
because the ground isn't refreezing, these fires are continuing 
to last through the winter. So you are having fires from 1 year 
are causing more fires in the following year, because they can 
smolder below ground, just slowly burning this carbon that is 
below the soils.
    And, honestly, when we think about the carbon emissions 
that are coming as a result of permafrost out of these 
wildfires and what we can expect in the future, I would say the 
scientific numbers were, I would say, very likely 
underestimating.
    So when thinking about risk, personally, I would lean 
toward the high end of some of these ranges, because these 
processes currently are not incorporated into our models, into 
our full scientific understanding.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you so much. My time is expired for now.
    The chair recognizes Congressman Mast for 5 minutes.
    Congressman Mast, he was here a second ago.
    The chair recognizes Congressman Pfluger for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the 
witnesses for your contributions to this.
    I would like to start off with Mr. Coffey, talking about 
some of the resources that we see in the Arctic and some of the 
geopolitical challenges that we face right now with regards to 
control of Eastern Europe.
    And you can start in the Baltics and run all the way down 
through the countries that border Russia, and you can go all 
the way into the Balkans and see the number of countries that 
are in some ways being held hostage to energy that is produced 
by Russia and to the terms and conditions with which you have 
to sign up to use that energy.
    So, Mr. Coffey, can you kind of talk to us a little bit 
about the resources that are in the Arctic and how those can be 
used to diversify energy security for our European partners and 
allies, and how that may also contribute to stabilizing what we 
know is a competition--and maybe that is a generous word--but 
with Russia?
    So I will yield to you for a second.
    Mr. Coffey. Thank you. That is a very important question. 
The reality is that, although the region is rich in natural 
resources, accessing these resources in a financially viable or 
environmentally safe way is very difficult. And in the case 
of--one limiting factor is the advancement in technology to 
extract these resources in an economically viable and 
environmentally safe way has not kept pace.
    In terms of the alternatives that might be provided to 
Europe for alternatives to energy security coming from Russia, 
I would actually say that the Arctic is less important than, 
let's say, other regions of the Eurasian land mass, such as the 
Caspian region, the South Caucasus, where I think there is a 
lot of potential for Europe to seek alternatives to its oil and 
gas away from Russia.
    But that being said, there are suspected to be a large 
number of rare earth mineral deposits in the Arctic region. We 
heard about this debate when President Trump suggested the 
United States purchase Greenland, about the potential in 
Greenland for these resources.
    But, you know, take Greenland, for example. It is a very 
remote part of the world. No two cities in Greenland are 
connected by a road. So there is very little infrastructure. 
And right now, most of Greenland is covered by an icecap that 
is three times the size of Texas and at its deepest point is 
almost 2 miles thick. So it is impossible to really get these 
minerals.
    Mr. Pfluger. Let me ask a quick question here, as time is 
going to run out on us.
    I mean, how bad of a situation, energywise, is Europe in 
right now for this coming winter? I mean, kind of, you know, 
put some magnitude by it as to what our partners and allies in 
Europe, as this is the Europe committee and Energy committee. 
Tell us about the energy crisis they are facing and how bad it 
is going to be.
    Mr. Coffey. Yes. Europe is facing a major energy crisis, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where Russia, once 
again, uses the export of LNG--or of natural gas, excuse me, as 
a tool of foreign policy and a tool of aggression.
    This can be mitigated in the medium to longer term by 
focusing more on the Southern Gas Corridor, pushing for a 
trans-Caspian gas pipeline connecting Turkmenistan across the 
Caspian to the Southern Gas Corridor and pushing for more U.S. 
LNG exports to Europe.
    But I appreciate that this isn't the specific nature of the 
hearing today, but it is still all connected in a sense, 
because as Europe wants to minimize or reduce its greenhouse 
emissions, natural gas, of course, is considered a transition 
fuel. And if they are having difficulty paying the high prices 
for the transition fuel, then this could slow down Europe's 
ability to meet carbon emission reduction targets in the coming 
years.
    Mr. Pfluger. Well, I think it is absolutely connected, and 
I appreciate you making that point, because what we are doing 
by not allowing our partners and allies to use the cleanest 
burning LNG in the world, the cleanest burning natural gas in 
the world, which comes from the United States, is then pushing 
it to China and Russia, who will fill the void.
    And so, any concerns that we have regarding our Earth, our 
climate in the future need to take into account the fact that 
those two people, China and Russia, were not at the summit. 
They didn't participate and they do not care.
    So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you very much.
    Now, the chair recognizes the vice chair of the committee, 
Congresswoman Spanberger, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Chairman Keating. I appreciate 
everyone's willingness and comments here before the 
subcommittee on this particularly important topic.
    Admiral Zukunft, I would love to begin with you. First, 
thank you for your service. But I would like to focus my 
questions on Russia's role and interest in shaping the future 
of the Arctic.
    Mr. Coffey just spoke about the scope and size of ice in 
the Arctic, and so my question is really focused on, as that 
ice melts, the Russian military is really becoming more engaged 
in the high north, rebuilding military infrastructure along the 
coast, requiring military escorts for commercial vessels along 
the coast, and really reposturing their forces in the region.
    So could you--based on your experience, can you describe 
the extent of Russia's military modernization in the Arctic? 
And what risks do you think are created by the posture that 
they are taking on? And also, as a follow-on to that, how do 
you believe the United States should look at their actions and 
prepare and potentially react?
    Admiral Zukunft. A great question, Congresswoman. I will be 
glad to address those.
    So we have seen this movie before in the East/South China 
Sea, and Russia has taken a chapter--and maybe they wrote the 
book on this--when we start looking at the militarization of 
natural islands, not man-made, that have the ability to deny 
access to any military activity, but particularly that of the 
United States.
    When Russia is launching icebreaking corvettes that can 
carry a cruise missile that can range--and now we have very 
short windows of time of notification for NORTHCOM NORAD to 
have awareness that we now have an inbound conventional strike 
being launched from the Arctic by one of these ships. What is 
up with that?
    And so what we do not have is, you know, confidence, in 
terms of Russia's way ahead, you know, claiming all the way up 
to the North Pole as its expanded continental shelf. 350 miles 
is the limit under the Law of the Sea Convention, which Russia 
has thumbed its nose at. The same thing with the Northern Sea 
Route.
    Not today, but as we listen to Dr. Natali's brief and we 
look at CO2 methane releases, as we get more carbon dioxide, 
which, by the way, takes about a century to metabolize from the 
atmosphere, that drives temperature, which drives sea level 
rise.
    So is Russia looking at the long game, that not today but 
at some point in the near future that the Northern Sea Route 
will become a viable corridor for the Asia European markets, 
primarily to move LNG from the Yamal Peninsula. Huge economic 
driver, but that is also what drives Russia's economy, which 
they use to leverage and influence other nations as well.
    So all of this, it cuts across the full spectrum of 
diplomatic, Law of the Sea Convention, governance, our lack of 
awareness, which is information, because we have not invested 
in that infrastructure, the militarization of the Arctic, and 
economically. Russia is playing this on all four fronts.
    Ms. Spanberger. Admiral, when you say the lack of 
information because we have not invested there, could you 
explain a little bit more what you mean by that?
    Admiral Zukunft. Yes. So, you know, we send our icebreakers 
up there. And once they get much above 72 degrees north, our 
investment in satellite infrastructure is now on the horizon or 
nearly below it. So we do not have adequate space-based 
technology to improve awareness and, more importantly, to 
improve our bandwidth to move data. So that remains a challenge 
in the high latitudes for us right now.
    Ms. Spanberger. And is that a lack of prioritization, from 
your perspective or from your experience, a lack of real 
understanding of the potential threat? What would you attribute 
that to? I mean, certainly
    [inaudible].
    Admiral Zukunft. From my opening statement, we have great, 
great directives under three Presidential administrations that 
underscore this, but, you know, it came out time late in those 
administrations. As we say, you know, we have a strategic 
skeleton, but we have not put any flesh on the bone. And those 
tend to not carry forward from one regime to the next.
    So we have that opportunity right now. Maybe COP26 is that 
catalyst to say, hey, we need to double down on our effort here 
in the Arctic. I hope we do.
    Ms. Spanberger. Well, and I see Dr. Dorough shaking her 
head as well. In the remaining 30 seconds that we have left, 
putting the meat on the bones, if you could give us just a 
couple things that would put the meat on the bones in terms of 
our ability to really understand and track this right. What 
would you recommend we as Congress advocate for?
    Admiral Zukunft. A deepwater port in the Arctic; increased 
bandwidth for communications, and that also affects 
communications for indigenous residents as well. Investing in 
exerting U.S. sovereignty, which means icebreakers. And 
icebreakers mean they can also carry militarized equipment as 
well, so using the Norway-Russia model. And by the way, Canada 
is making those investments as well. You know, leveraging our 
partners, especially with our partners to the north. And, 
finally, ratifying the Law of the Sea Convention.
    Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much, Admiral Zukunft.
    And, Chairman Keating, thank you for your indulgence in 
letting me go over. And thank you to our witnesses.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you so much.
    As a matter of fact, if Dr. Dorough could do this quickly, 
you had attempted to answer that as well. Could you do that in 
30 seconds? Is that possible?
    Dr. Dorough. Yes, I think so. It is fairly clear--and I 
think the Commandant and others have said this--that 
infrastructure is one of the key elements here. It is a key 
element for research, it is a key element in terms of energy, 
it is a key element in terms of security, as well as a key 
element for the impacts of climate change upon our communities. 
And I think this shouldn't be underestimated. And the 
Commandant is right, we are late to the wake-up call as far as 
the United States is concerned. Our communities are already 
facing and living with substandard infrastructure.
    The final comment I want to make is the reference to the 
norms, the rules, and responsibilities under public 
international law. In terms of UNCLOS in particular, I think 
there are a whole host of issues that we have to be mindful of, 
especially against the backdrop of Russia's activity and the 
interests of China. These two are constantly scanning the globe 
for their energy security, their food security, their national 
security. What about our security?
    Mr. Keating. Thank you.
    The chair recognizes Congressman Peter Meijer for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our 
speakers who are here today on this important issue.
    I had the opportunity to visit Franz Josef Land in Svalbard 
on the Arctic Circle a couple of decades ago, and it was clear 
then that we had not a significant American military interest 
or presence. And just how far that needle has shifted with the 
icebreaker cap that we have that especially, Admiral, you have 
spoken to, and Mr. Coffey as well, has been very clear.
    And the recent--well, relatively recent but ramping up of 
use of Novaya Zemiya by the Russians for missile testing, you 
know, shows that they are taking advantage of the fact that we 
have cast our eye to, granted, incredibly important parts of 
the world, whether it is Asia Pacific or the CENTCOM AOR. At 
the same time, we cannot afford to ignore what is going on.
    So I appreciate that we are, A, having this hearing, but, 
B, that there has been a commitment across administrations in 
order to try to address that icebreaker capability gap.
    I am going to go to Mr. Coffey in a second, but, Admiral, 
in your view, is there anything that we in Congress can be 
doing to try to expedite--obviously, you know, for the past--
this administration, the past two administrations have also 
affirmed, you know, our commitment to engaging in the Arctic. 
Is there anything left in Congress' court or is this going to 
be flowing through executive policy and procurements on the DOD 
side and Coast Guard side that have already started to 
progress?
    Admiral Zukunft. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. And I will 
talk, first of all, what we need to do domestically and as we 
look at who was there, who was not there at COP26. We really 
need to double down our efforts, what are we doing to adapt to 
a changing climate.
    As we heard from Dr. Dorough, we have 31 villages. I was 
out in Shishmaref, which is literally washing into the sea. 
That is one of the 12 villages that is looking to relocate. 
Army Corps of Engineers sunk some money in there to build a 
revetment, but first and foremost, you know, we need to do the 
humanitarian thing for our first nations that reside in the 
Arctic region.
    And the second is, you know, we need to step up and be a 
global leader in this domain as well. I stepped up as 
Commandant of the Coast Guard because our military--I sit with 
the Joint Chiefs--are focused on, at that time, was Russia, 
China, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremism. There was 
nothing left on the plate to make room for the Arctic that 
says, OK, I will take the Arctic.
    We now have a defense strategy that came out in 2019 that 
now includes the Arctic as well. So, you know, we are making 
policy statements, we are writing strategies, but now it is 
time for us to, you know, peel those back another layer, and 
then where do we need to make smart investments. The immediate 
one is, we need to adapt to a climate change, and, two, we need 
to invest in our ability to exert sovereignty in this region.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Admiral.
    And, Mr. Coffey, you know, I think this is the first time I 
have heard in a committee hearing in quite a while the U.N. 
Convention on Law of the Sea. You know, I would be curious to 
hear your thoughts on what the benefits of the U.S. being 
formally a signatory to UNCLOS, the drawbacks, and just where 
we go from here.
    I mean, both in the Arctic and freedom of navigation 
operations with Russia expanding its continental shelf 
definition, and, you know, dropping little flags, you know, 
ever further away from what I think anyone would rationally 
call its territorial waters
    [inaudible] What we are seeing in China with, you know, 
many dashed plans in order to, again, just assert that control.
    You know, is it worth revisiting UNCLOS or should we focus 
on other methods in order of asserting a global standard around 
navigation operations?
    Mr. Coffey. Well, in terms of the enforcement of global 
norms and laws when it comes to maritime operations, the U.S. 
Navy, for many decades, has set the standard on what is the 
norm in terms of maritime law.
    And also, in addition, many of the maritime boundary 
disputes that the United States have--well, we only have two 
maritime boundaries in the Arctic, one with Canada, one with 
Russia. The one with Russia is a settled matter. The one with 
Canada is being worked out bilaterally.
    So in those two cases, the international norms and the 
boundary disputes, I do not see how U.S. ratification of the 
Law of the Sea Treaty would directly benefit the United States.
    And then on balance (ph), you have this issue of 
encroachment on sovereignty, especially when it comes to the 
extraction of deep seabed minerals and the mechanism that is 
involved in sharing certain profits from the extraction of 
these minerals with land-locked countries around the world. 
There are many good questions that need to be answered about 
how this might impact the United States going forward, when we 
have no idea how many potentially trillions of dollars could be 
generated from this process and how much the United States and 
the U.S. taxpayer would be forced to share.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you.
    And, Mr. Chairman, with that, my time is expired, but I 
hope someone can talk a little bit more about those manganese 
nodules that are sitting on that seabed.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you.
    The chair now recognizes Representative Susan Wild for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Wild. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to direct this question to the Admiral. 
Admiral, last month, the National Intelligence Council released 
an intelligence estimate on climate change and the challenges 
the climate crisis and responses to it posed to our national 
security. And it says--the intelligence report says: Contested 
economic and military activities will increase the risk of 
miscalculation, and deescalating tensions is likely to require 
the adaptation of existing or creation of new forums to address 
bilateral or multilateral security concerns among Arctic 
States.
    At the same time, as we continue actively working to 
protect our security and economic interests in the Arctic, 
could you discuss what you view as the most effective pathways 
for long-term deescalation of tensions.
    Admiral Zukunft. Thank you, Congressman. I will first 
address the deescalation component of that. In 2016--and this 
is while the United States chaired the Arctic Council--I worked 
with the White House and with State Department and was granted 
approval to invite Russia to Washington, DC.--my counterpart 
from the Russia Border Guard--which then led to the creation of 
an Arctic Coast Guard Forum.
    My counterpart from Russia literally gave me a bear hug, 
because their concern, our posture statements--you know, we 
have an adversarial relationship with Russia but not an enemy. 
And there is a distinction between the two, and we need to find 
areas where we can cooperate with one another.
    We do so on a regular basis with Russia on the maritime 
boundary line. Our 17th Coast Guard District in Juneau in real 
time shares information with Russia on incursions, and, 
likewise, they do the same with us as well. So there is an 
opportunity.
    And the other one is NATO. There was a significant NATO 
exercise that was conducted where the U.S. played a huge role 
in this. I am talking 250 aircraft, over 70,000 troops, doing 
an exercise in the Arctic, which is ice-free. We are talking in 
the North Atlantic, you know, not in the Chukchi Bering Sea in 
the North Pacific side.
    But that sends a signal to Russia. It is like, hey, we are 
paying attention. And we have gone through some fits and starts 
with our relationship with our NATO partners, but we have an 
opportunity right now to say----
    Ms. Wild. Well----
    Admiral Zukunft [continuing]. Hey, this is a focus area, 
and not just--they are not just our NATO partners, but Finland 
and Sweden are significant players as well.
    Ms. Wild. Well, good. Then you rendered the second part of 
that question moot, because I was going to ask you what does 
Russia's chairmanship of the Arctic Council mean for our 
interests in the Arctic and whether it presents challenges and 
could it also present any opportunities. But it sounds like you 
believe that the opportunities are there. Is that right?
    Admiral Zukunft. It is, Congresswoman. And the fact that 
Ambassador David Bolton, who was our envoy early on in the 
Arctic Council, is now the director of the Arctic Executive 
Steering Committee, we have good continuity in terms of 
strategic vision and direction at the highest levels in terms 
of our Arctic equities.
    Ms. Wild. All right. Great. Well, I am going to move on to 
Dr. Dorough and just ask, since I have a little more than a 
minute and a half left, in your testimony, Dr. Dorough, you 
describe the long-time aspiration for an Arctic zone of peace. 
Could you expand on this vision and explain how the ongoing 
threat of confrontation in the region threatens the way of life 
of indigenous communities?
    Dr. Dorough. Yes. As I said at the outset of my comments, 
we emerged in the midst of the cold war, and we see that 
reemerging through a host of different actions by much more 
powerful forces than ourselves.
    And everything that has been addressed thus far by all of 
the commentators here is that, presently, we have a level of 
cooperation and collaboration through the Arctic Council, 
through the Coast Guard Forum, through a host of different 
things. But in order to crystallize this region for purposes, 
not only of ourselves, the designation of the region as a zone 
of peace, and--I mean, the other examples and precedents are 
there--that this would then ensure that, at a minimum, we can 
bring parties to the table, expand the table, if you will, 
especially when we look at the movements of the Russian 
Federation, we look at the movements of China. You know, very 
few have mentioned--actually, it hasn't been mentioned--the 
Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement and the desire to look 
at the viability of commercial or industrial fishing in this 
area.
    You know, we have to find ways to stave these activities 
off. So a zone of peace may lend itself to a level of dialog 
that we have not experienced thus far. Indeed, the Arctic 
Council is a constructive mechanism. It has spawned important 
international treaties. Many of those objectives are, in my 
assessment, unmet in terms of search and rescue, in terms of 
research and cooperation. But at the same time, in terms of the 
Arctic Council, there are no discussions about national 
security and defense issues. And so a full complement and an 
opportunity for a more frank discussion may be viable through 
exploring this effort to establish a zone of peace.
    It has been an objective since our inception in 1977, 
largely due to the cold war and the lack of participation of 
our Siberian Yupik relations, our direct blood relations on the 
other side of the Bering Strait. Sorry to be long-winded.
    Ms. Wild. Thank you so much, Dr. Dorough. Unfortunately, I 
am out of time, but it is a beautiful vision, and I hope it is 
accomplished.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for holding this very 
important hearing.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative.
    The chair now recognizes Representative Dan Meuser for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Meuser. Thank you, Chairman Keating. I appreciate being 
with you all. And thank you to our witnesses.
    So I think throughout this testimony, we have seen the 
Arctic has clearly increasingly become a focal point for great 
power competition. Russia has increasingly engaged in energy 
development in the region and regularly conducts military 
exercises at their, what we might be able to say is, many 
Arctic bases. China as well has made its Arctic interests 
known, seeing the potential for new trade routes.
    As an Arctic Nation, the United States must protect and 
advance our interests and push back against such interference 
from potentially malign actors such as Russia and China. The 
Arctic may hold as much as 13 percent--we do not know, but that 
is an estimate--of the world's undiscovered oil reserve, one-
third of undiscovered natural gas reserves, and critical 
minerals.
    So, Mr. Coffey, if I may, what role could Arctic oil, gas, 
and mineral resources play in global energy and resource 
security?
    Mr. Coffey. Well, thank you for that question. If you are a 
nation that is dependent on the goodwill of Russia providing 
your oil and gas, then I would say the opportunities for using 
the Arctic to diversify or become more energy-secure are not 
very good.
    Half of the world's land mass and half of the world's 
Arctic coastline is in Russia, and Russia has not shown a 
willingness in any meaningful way to be a trustworthy partner 
when it comes to energy matters, especially for Europe.
    Right now, China is the main country that benefits from 
Russia's oil and gas facilities in the Arctic region. And the 
reason why China benefits from this is because of the pressure 
that Western economic sanctions has placed on this sector 
inside Russia, which has forced Moscow to almost go to Beijing 
with a begging bowl.
    Right now, Russia is very much the junior partner when it 
comes to the bilateral Russian-Chinese relationship, and a lot 
of that is built on the oil and gas that is in the Arctic that 
China needs, and Russia needs money and investments to extract.
    Mr. Meuser. Mr. Coffey, who is--numerically, who is 
stronger, has got more knowledge, and more of a footprint in 
the Arctic: China, Russia, or the United States?
    Mr. Coffey. Without a doubt, Russia. China's main 
motivation in the Arctic is still one of economics and trade 
and energy. To the best of my knowledge, I do not believe that 
the PLAN, the People's Liberation Army Navy, has even operated 
in the Arctic Ocean. Certainly, civilian vessels, civilian 
scientific exploration vessels that could easily be dual-hatted 
have operated in the Arctic Ocean, but the Navy itself I do not 
think has, whereas Russia has spent a vast amount of money, 
time, and resources militarizing the Arctic region.
    And I just want to stress, as long as Russia does its 
militarization inside its own borders, that is Russia's 
prerogative; but it is when you look at Russia's activities in 
other places outside of its borders, such as Ukraine, Georgia, 
Syria, others, for example, that gives you reason to be 
concerned by Russia's activities in the Arctic region.
    Mr. Meuser. Certainly. We have to certainly anticipate that 
they will look after their interests, and the United States 
must look after ours and assure that their interests do not 
overcome our interests.
    So how would you assess, then, the State of U.S. readiness 
to enforce our interests in the Arctic and counter the 
increasingly, might be able to say, brazen Russian actions?
    Mr. Coffey. Well, we cannot do it alone, as was already 
mentioned. We need to work with our partners and allies, 
especially in NATO. And we also need to make sure that we have 
adequately resourced maritime capabilities and air and ground 
capabilities designed and equipped to operate in the harsh 
environments of the Arctic region.
    Are we there yet? No, we are not. Are we seeing increases 
in funding to get us to where we need to be? I would say yes, 
we are, but it is going very slowly.
    And as it pertains to NATO specifically, right now, the 
alliance is undergoing strategic concepts review where it is 
going to publish, next year, a document that is meant to guide 
the alliance for the future threats that it might face, and 
this would be a good time for the alliance to finally recognize 
the Arctic region, because NATO has the responsibility to 
defend Svalbard in the same way it has the same responsibility 
to defend Sicily.
    Mr. Meuser. All right. Are we, in your view, effectively 
managing, with our NATO partners, the interests of the NATO 
partners versus Russia and China, or do we need a far better 
plan and need to be more aggressive carrying it out?
    Mr. Keating. And if you could, if you could limit that to 
30 seconds, since time is over.
    Mr. Meuser. Oh, I am sorry, Chairman. I thought I had a 
minute left.
    Mr. Keating. It is OK. No, go ahead. Go ahead.
    Mr. Coffey. We need a better coordinated plan and more 
resources directed at the unique challenges that the Arctic 
region faces, for sure.
    Mr. Meuser. All right. Thank you.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative.
    The chair now recognizes Representative Dina Titus for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a very 
interesting hearing.
    You have talked a little bit about--Dr. Dorough did--about 
the impact of this increased traffic on indigenous people. I 
would like to carry that just a step further, and it might seem 
mundane, but if we do not get ahead of it, it will become 
increasingly a problem.
    So to Dr. Dorough and Dr. Natali, as we see more people in 
the Arctic, whether they are on scientific expeditions, it is 
military training, shipping of business interests--and I would 
venture to say you are going to have increased tourism there 
too as it becomes more accessible--what are we doing, who is 
responsible for, do we have the infrastructure to be sure the 
place does not just get trashed like we have seen in parts of 
the world where suddenly everybody wants to go there?
    Dr. Dorough. That is a really important question. Thank you 
very much. And before I get into any further details, I think 
this is the other element of UNCLOS that is significant. And 
many forget that UNCLOS isn't just about real estate. It is 
about numerous other chapters in terms of protection of the 
Arctic marine environment, for example.
    I think that the increased shipping, the increased vessel 
trafficking will--including tourism and not just commodities in 
and out of the Arctic region--has numerous effects, diverse 
effects.
    Interruption of marine mammal habitat threatens our food 
security. I mean, if we look at the Bering Strait alone and 
walrus and the reliance upon walrus, never mind whaling, 
sealing, and a host of other harvesting activities, at the 
moment, we do not have the infrastructure necessary even to 
enforce the Polar Code.
    We welcomed the Polar Code, IMO's efforts to not only 
address issues of protection of the marine environment, but 
safety of life at sea. The infrastructure isn't there. Who is 
going to provide the infrastructure to ensure that there is 
safe discharge of gray water, for example? Hence, my earlier 
comment about the lack of infrastructure. So this question is 
of central concern.
    I will note that, fortunately, through efforts of the Coast 
Guard and their dialog in consultation with Inuit communities 
that will be impacted by increased vessel traffic, 
identification of lanes, this exercise, I think, has to take 
place throughout the whole of the coastal areas that we as 
Inuit rely upon. So efforts across the whole of the Arctic 
should be taken to gain the input and the knowledge of our 
people as to safe passage, where there is less disruption.
    But I think your question is important in terms of ensuring 
protection of the Arctic Ocean and the coastal seas or 
essentially the marine environment overall, and in my 
estimation, that is some of the value of the provisions and the 
other chapters of UNCLOS that many do not pay attention to 
because we are more concerned about the high politics that have 
emerged in the region.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you.
    Dr. Natali?
    Dr. Natali. Yes. If I could just add, yes--and thanks for 
this question--if I could just add, talk a little bit about the 
impacts on Arctic lands. You know, in the Arctic, the ice is 
infrastructure, right? So we are building these structures on 
ice that is rapidly freezing. And so it is something to keep in 
mind that, both as, you know, increasing effects of climate 
change is putting the current infrastructure at risk, as we go 
in and build this infrastructure, though, we are also impacting 
the environment.
    And so the climate change can thaw the permafrost, but the 
infrastructure also can cause impacts, and it is not an impact 
that goes away the next year when the vegetation grows. When 
you thaw that ice and when that ground collapses, you have then 
committed yourself to a lifetime--many, many lifetimes of 
impact on that land that may not come back.
    And so this is something to be concerned about. It is 
extremely difficult to turn the clock once the land has started 
to erode and once the land has started to collapse.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you. Thank you very much. I think it is 
something we should make a priority as we talk about our 
involvement in the region and not just vis--vis Russia but 
maybe some collaboration.
    Admiral, could you just add to that? You were mentioning 
how we are going to keep the lanes safe as more and more 
traffic is there. Who is going to be our traffic cop in the 
Arctic to be sure we have safety with all this increased travel 
and traffic?
    Admiral Zukunft. Yes. Thank you, Congresswoman. The Coast 
Guard, working with IMO, we have established a traffic 
separation scheme that goes through the Bering Strait. So if 
you are northbound/southbound, it is like interState highway, 
you keep to the right to minimize a collision at sea.
    The bigger challenge is, well, what happens if we have a 
maritime incident, an oil spill? I was in charge of the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and at my disposal I had 49,000 
responders, 6,500 ships. I could maybe, at best, get 50 
responders in any of the villages that would be impacted by an 
oil spill in that part of the world in the most pristine 
environments, and yet the most unforgiving environment when it 
comes to doing any type of pollution response.
    So the more we can do on prevention, which includes safe 
ship routing, the better prepared we will be. But the human 
factor will always have a role in that.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much.
    I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative.
    The chair now recognizes Representative Dean Phillips for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Greetings to our 
witnesses. I think we all agree that the topic of today's 
hearing is of critical importance, and----
    Ms. Titus. It was great.
    Mr. Phillips [continuing]. And I believe we also all agree 
that we cannot go it alone. Arctic and non-Arctic actors are 
going to increase their provocative actions and activities, 
especially as the Arctic becomes more accessible because of 
warming temperatures and diminishing ice. That is something we 
have already covered today.
    So it is clearly more important than ever to find 
opportunities of common ground and cooperation and shared 
interests amongst our friends and even our foes. That is 
exactly why I introduced the Arctic Diplomacy Act of 2021, to 
establish a United States Ambassador at Large for Arctic 
affairs and increase U.S. strategic engagement in the region.
    I am proud that the legislation has been included in the 
EAGLE Act, which we, of course, passed out of committee, and 
that the Arctic diplomacy strategy from the bill was also 
included as an amendment to the recently House-passed NDAA.
    And, of course, with Russia currently chairing the Council, 
the U.S. has to be mindful about our diplomatic presence.
    So first question to you, Mr. Coffey. How will having a 
senior department official with the rank of Ambassador at the 
table be favorable to the United States and also to the free 
world?
    Mr. Coffey. Well, it would be very welcome because it would 
put the United States at equal level in terms of diplomatic 
status with other Arctic nations around the world. And I think 
it would be a beneficial way for the U.S. to exert diplomatic 
influence when we debate issues related to the Arctic.
    Mr. Phillips. I appreciate it.
    Admiral, to you, how can the DOS and DOD complement each 
other relative to priorities in the Arctic?
    Admiral Zukunft. Yes, Congressman, well, we are already 
doing that, and I think the platform we used was the Arctic 
Coast Guard Forum, to build trust-building measures, doing at-
sea operations with the Coast Guards of all eight Arctic 
Council nations.
    To your previous question, we need to revisit the Arctic 
Executive Steering Committee, which went into hiatus for a 
period of about 4 or 5 years. It was reactivated in September 
2021. As I said earlier, chaired by career Ambassador David 
Bolton, who has the bona fides that you alluded to in terms of 
ocean policy and Arctic awareness, and is also our envoy when 
Russia last chaired the Arctic Council. So we have good 
continuity there.
    And so there may be an opportunity, as we look at, you 
know, do we have the right breadth and depth in the Arctic 
Executive Steering Committee as--you know, so we do not create, 
you know, competing frameworks with a focus area on the Arctic 
domain.
    Mr. Phillips. I appreciate that too.
    And, Mr. Coffey, any thoughts on that response?
    Mr. Coffey. Sorry. My--I had a bit of delay in the 
connection.
    No, I think that we are seeing more synergy between the 
two, and I think that is a positive thing. And we are only now 
starting to understand some of the--we are only now starting to 
understand why many of the challenges we face in the Arctic 
require not only this multilateral approach that we talk about 
on the international stage, but more of an interagency approach 
inside the U.S. Government, but also more coordination with the 
States at the State level and subState level, like with 
indigenous communities, and also local authorities and 
municipalities and counties in Alaska.
    Mr. Phillips. Thank you. Thank you both.
    Last, to Dr. Natali, of course, COP26 just wrapped up. I 
would welcome your thoughts relative to the Arctic-related 
outcomes and commitments on the heels of the summit. Any 
perspective you want to share, I would welcome it.
    Dr. Natali. Yes. So the last IPCC report, AR6 did account 
for carbon emissions from permafrost but not appropriately. So 
I think that is something that really needs to happen. I think 
in our conversations about, you know, whether we are going to 
make it to 1.--or keep temperatures below 1.5 and 2 C, we need 
to start accounting for--fully accounting for carbon emissions 
from the Arctic, which currently still is not happening.
    And then I think the other thing I would like to see more 
conversations on is just about loss and damage of Arctic lands 
as a result of erosion and permafrost, and I think that the--
you know, there was more voices of Arctic indigenous people, I 
think, at this COP, but I think that needs to be stepped up 
quite a bit more.
    Mr. Phillips. I thank you.
    And I want to thank all our witnesses for elevating--
helping us elevate this important issue and for all the work 
you do.
    With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative.
    The chair now recognizes Representative Brad Schneider for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 
the committee for holding this important hearing. I want to 
thank the witnesses for making your time and sharing your 
perspectives and views on this important issue.
    As I read the testimony last night, as I listened to the 
questions and answers today, it seems like we are facing a lot 
of dichotomies, not just the dichotomy of freeze versus thaw, 
but you have got the issues of climate change leading to 
challenges preserving a pristine wilderness versus utilizing 
the opportunities presented. You have challenges of 
opportunities presented, but the threats coming from both 
climate change and global competition, mutual shared interests 
of the countries bordering the Arctic and the challenges to 
sovereignty. And ultimately it comes down to the balance of 
stewardship, how do we preserve and deal with these threats 
versus global competition.
    And I think those are some of the challenges, and I 
appreciate the input you all have had here.
    If I can turn to Admiral Zukunft, and thank you for your 
service and the perspective you bring to this conversation. You 
know, given--if I take it even a step further, the biggest 
challenge, purpose of this hearing is to talk about climate 
change and the impact of security.
    You have experience both in the Pacific, Atlantic, Gulf of 
Mexico. How will climate change affect not just the Coast 
Guard's ability, but our national ability achieving our 
mission, operating--you have touched on some of that, but at 
the end of this hearing, if you could just wrap it up very 
briefly.
    Admiral Zukunft. Well, thank you, Congressman. I think as 
we heard earlier, due to the challenges of just accessing the 
Arctic, to begin with, almost defaults to a military role, be 
it search and rescue, an oil spill response.
    We have 31 villages, 12 of which are looking at moving to 
higher ground. All of those would fall under what we call the 
defense support to civil authorities, yet another mission for 
the Department of Defense to look at.
    So often we just look at the Arctic as pure competition, 
but we also have a responsibility to the residents in the 
Arctic domain as well, to some of the most prescient threats 
that they face right now.
    Everything I look at, as greenhouse gases go up, there is a 
linear relationship between that, temperature, and sea level 
going up. What happens when sea ice retreats, it is that 
natural breakwater for these coastal communities that no longer 
exist, and now they have harsh storms that are literally 
washing these villages into the sea.
    The whale hunting, walrus harvesting, they have to go 
further offshore. The Coast Guard now seasonally places a 
squadron of aircraft in Kotzebue, which we never did before, 
because these villagers have to go much further and are at 
greater risk out there as well.
    We did put three CubeSat satellites into space that pick up 
search and rescue transponders to improve our, you know, where 
are they, but the response times are still significant, 
hundreds of miles from the nearest deep water port, Dutch 
Harbor, to the north slope of Alaska. So challenges still 
remain in terms of any sustained presence in the high 
latitudes.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    And maybe if I can turn to Dr. Natali. You know, from a 
preservation standpoint, the ecology of the Arctic, the idea of 
stewardship versus competition, how does that play out?
    Dr. Natali. Yes. I mean, I would prioritize stewardship. I 
feel like the long-term security risks are much higher, both in 
the Arctic and globally, if that is not prioritized.
    In terms of the different interests in the Arctic, it seems 
to me--and I think the Admiral has brought up a couple times 
about remote sensing. I do think many interests can be met with 
increased prioritization of satellite remote sensing, both at 
increased spatial and temporal resolution in the Arctic, 
because, yes, there are some satellites now and we do have a 
lot of information that is coming out of them, but because the 
Arctic is so far north and it is dark and it is cloudy a lot of 
the time, I think there is a lot of information and increased 
information we can get for all of these security needs that 
have come up in this conversation so far.
    So thank you.
    Mr. Schneider. And in the last 2 seconds, Dr. Dorough, you 
represent the people living in this area. I would welcome your 
thoughts as well.
    Dr. Dorough. Well, I think that there are a host of 
different perspectives. I just quickly wanted to point to some 
resources that may be helpful and, in particular, the Status of 
Tribes in Climate Change [STACC] report that has recently come 
out. I think this is a useful resource that helps to qualify 
the impacts of climate change.
    I think, bottom line, inclusion of the voices of Inuit, I 
think this is a really, really important matter that hasn't 
been fully explored, and potentially this Arctic Diplomacy Act 
and the opportunity for focused and coherent and coordinated 
efforts would really assist not only the U.S. Government and 
all of its branches, including all of the military branches, 
but inclusion of our voices in relation to all of these 
relevant and pertinent questions that have been raised in the 
course of this particular hearing.
    Mr. Schneider. Well, thank you.
    And, Mr. Coffey, I am sorry, I am out of time, but I yield 
back to the chairman. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative.
    I just want to have one question in conclusion for a brief 
answer as a followup, and that is this, that--particularly with 
Admiral Zukunft and with Mr. Coffey, from the security 
standpoint, the emphasis was the advantage the U.S. has in the 
Arctic is the strength of our allies.
    So I want to ask Dr. Natali and I want to ask Dr. Dorough, 
what about the strength of our allies and our cooperation in 
dealing with the indigenous community and the scientific 
community, is that as strong as it has to be? Is that on par 
with what we have discussed in terms of our security alliances? 
Is that kind of cooperation and information sharing and 
coordination there for those important communities?
    Just the two doctors, if we could.
    Dr. Dorough. I think that more could be done in a 
substantive way. For example, the Inuit Circumpolar Council has 
become an observer to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. We are shaping ways in which we can coproduce knowledge 
through our understanding of what we see and feel and hear on 
an everyday basis out there and on the sea ice and on the land.
    And I greatly appreciate Dr. Natali's reference to 
infrastructure and ice being infrastructure. This aligns with 
our perspectives. But I think that more could be done in order 
to recognize and respect our right of self-determination in 
research, meaning an embrace of indigenous knowledge holders, 
an embrace of indigenous knowledge generally.
    And we presently have a project to identify the ethical and 
equitable fair and just engagement of Indigenous Knowledge 
holders, and we look forward to sharing the outcomes of that 
particular project with all of those interested, not just in 
the United States, but indeed in a host of different 
intergovernmental fora across the globe.
    So we have much to contribute, including assessments and 
guidelines and protocols such as those emerging in this 
particular project. So more can be done.
    Mr. Keating. Great. Thank you.
    Finally, Dr. Natali.
    Dr. Natali. Yes. I think because of the way scientific 
research is funded, there tends to be many, many individual 
projects, and there certainly is coordination amongst the 
scientific community, the permafrost world. The Permafrost 
Carbon Network is one of them. But there is no strategic plan 
for addressing some of these issues, and there is no strategic 
plan for Western scientists and indigenous scientists and 
knowledge holders to work together. So there is definitely 
examples of that happening, and there is definitely examples of 
collaboration with U.S. and Russian scientists, say, but there 
is challenges, and they are challenges that individuals 
overcome.
    But I feel like there could be some more top-down support 
if this is a priority to make this happen, and I think we can 
advance the science and advance the protection of the Arctic 
and sort of sharing of knowledge, of both Western and 
indigenous knowledge, if this was prioritized in some strategic 
way.
    Mr. Keating. Great. Well, thank you so much. I suspected in 
those two areas it is something perhaps in Congress we could 
try and encourage greater cooperation in those fields.
    It is clear from our security standpoint, as the Admiral 
said, as Mr. Coffey said, shockingly so, we have a lack of 
assets to deal with these issues. And we have a great deal of 
work to do from the security front as well. But the cooperation 
with our allies, particularly our NATO allies, is there.
    So thank you for this important testimony. We tried to make 
this one of our earlier hearings to highlight this and try and 
move the ball forward from this committee. It is an 
extraordinarily demanding time for our colleagues, and I just 
want to make note of the fact and thank, we had 11 
congressional members participating in this subcommittee 
hearing at a time when we are all being pulled in all kinds of 
different directions.
    And I think that speaks to the importance that we are 
placing on Congress and in this committee on the Arctic and the 
strategic and environmental when they all overlap. I failed to 
put it into--I failed miserably at trying to just categorize 
it, because I think our witnesses, as a whole, have 
demonstrated the comprehensive importance of this. So 
strategically we have a long way to go.
    Thank you so much for your testimony. I thank the members 
of the committee for participating.
    The members will have 5 days to submit statements, 
extraneous materials, and questions for the record subject to 
the length and limitations of the rules.
    Again, thank you so much. Thank you for, you know, bearing 
out the time zone differences, many of you, and thank you for 
your important testimony. And you are welcome to continue to 
communicate with this subcommittee on this important matter.
    With that, I would declare this hearing closed.
    [Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX
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             ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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