[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                TUNISIA: EXAMINING THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY 
                   AND NEXT STEPS FOR U.S. POLICY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
         MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            October 14, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-80

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                  GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California              MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey                  Member
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	      CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	      STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
KAREN BASS, California		      SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	      DARRELL ISSA, California
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	      ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California		      LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas	              ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DINA TITUS, Nevada		      BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California		      BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	      KEN BUCK, Colorado
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota	      TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		      MARK GREEN, Tennessee
COLIN ALLRED, Texas		      ANDY BARR, Kentucky
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		      GREG STEUBE, Florida
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	      DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	      CLAUDIA TENNEY, NeW York      
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey            AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
ANDY KIM, New Jersey     	      PETER MEIJER, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California	              NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina	      RONNY JACKSON, Texas
JIM COSTA, California 	              YOUNG KIM, California
JUAN VARGAS, California		      MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida      
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas		      
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois   

                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director

               Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                 ------ 
                                

 Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism

                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         JOE WILSON, South Carolina, 
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island            Ranking Member
TED LIEU, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
COLIN ALLRED, Texas		     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     LEE ZELDIN, New York
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina	     BRIAN MAST, Florida
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
BRAD SHERMAN, California	     GREG STEUBE, Florida
JUAN VARGAS, California		     RONNY JACKSON, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois	     MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida

                      Casey Kustin, Staff Director
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Abouaoun, Dr. Elie, DDS, Director, Middle East and North Africa 
  Programs, United States Institute of Peace.....................     7
Guellali, Dr. Amna, Deputy Regional Director for Middle East and 
  North Africa, Amnesty International............................    16
Arieff, Alexis, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional 
  Research Service...............................................    21
Acevedo, Eddy, Chief of Staff and Senior Advisor, Wilson Center, 
  Former National Security Advisor and Senior Deputy Assistant 
  Administrator for Legislative and Public Affairs at USAID......    36

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    60
Hearing Minutes..................................................    61
Hearing Attendance...............................................    62

 
   TUNISIA: EXAMINING THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY AND NEXT STEPS FOR U.S. 
                                 POLICY

                       Thursday, October 14, 2021

                          House of Representatives,
                   Subcommittee on the Middle East,
         North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:06 p.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Theodore E. Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.
    Mr. Deutch. The Subcommittee on the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Global Counterterrorism will come to order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the subcommittee at any point, and all members will 
have 5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and 
questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in 
the rules.
    As a reminder to members, please keep your video function 
on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair.
    Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, 
and please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. 
Consistent with H. Res. 8 and the accompanying regulations, 
staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate when 
they are not under recognition to eliminate background noise.
    I see that we have a quorum. We will now proceed. I will 
recognize myself for opening remarks.
    Pursuant to notice, we are holding a hearing on the current 
situation in Tunisia.
    In December 2010, the Arab Spring erupted in Tunisia. 
Mohamed Bouazizi, a young street vendor, resorted to self-
immolation to protest police harassment, and, within 10 days 
from that moment, President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, the 
country's longstanding authoritarian dictator, fled to Saudi 
Arabia. In the days and months following, democratic protest 
movements took hold across the Middle East and North Africa, 
from Egypt to Bahrain, Syria to Libya to Yemen.
    Unfortunately, the widespread hope for a democratic future 
that took root in 2011 has reverted to either continued 
authoritarianism or civil war in the decades since. Tunisia 
alone has stood as the bastion of success in the region. It was 
lauded for its first free election in October 2011 and has 
maintained peaceful transitions of power and democratic rule 
since then.
    As we approach the 11th anniversary of the start of the 
Arab Spring, it has become apparent that Tunisia's democracy is 
at risk. On July 25, President Kais Saied, a constitutional law 
professor elected in 2019, began asserting sweeping and 
troubling executive authorities by invoking a disputed reading 
of his constitutional emergency powers to freeze the 
Parliament, suspend parliamentary immunity, and dismiss the 
Prime Minister and some Cabinet members.
    On August 24, ahead of the anticipated 30-day deadline for 
lifting the current state of exception, President Saied 
extended it indefinitely. In September, President Saied 
announced plans to draft a new electoral code and appoint 
transitional leadership, all while maintaining the exceptional 
powers that he seized in July.
    Most recently, President Saied named the Arab world's first 
female Prime Minister, Najla Bouden, and swore in a new 
Cabinet. Yet Tunisian Parliament remains suspended, and many 
parliamentarians remain in detention on politicized charges, 
with no indication from Saied as to when or even if there is a 
plan to reopen Parliament or free detained MPs.
    Despite some positive movement in recent weeks, I remain 
deeply concerned about President Saied's actions. It is a 
slippery slope when leaders take action under the assumption 
that they alone can fix the problems that their nation is 
facing.
    We all know here in this deliberative body that progress 
does not move in a straight line. Democracy, government by and 
for the people, is not a destination or a box to check; it is a 
process, a form of government that must be worked on and fought 
for. We fight for our own democracy every day.
    Tunisia, the democratic example of the post-Arab Spring 
world, has made incredible gains over the past 11 years, but 
its people and leaders must continue to fight for the 
representative government that they want and that they deserve.
    I recognize that a democratic form of government does not 
nullify or mitigate the legitimate continued grievances of the 
Tunisian people, including corruption, political paralysis, 
economic stagnation, and inadequate COVID-19 response efforts.
    I stand committed and ready to support the Tunisian people 
in both endeavors: supporting Tunisia's democratic transition 
and constitutional reform process; and bolstering the 
international response to the political and economic challenges 
facing the country. Both are vital to Tunisia's success.
    It is important to note here that there is longstanding 
bipartisan support for Tunisia and the U.S.-Tunisian 
relationship in this Congress and here on this committee. We 
provide substantial support to Tunisia. We all want to see a 
stable, prosperous Tunisia, and we want to see the Tunisian 
people chart their own successful future.
    I am very grateful that we have with us this afternoon a 
distinguished panel of witnesses who are immensely qualified to 
help us understand the current political crisis in Tunisia, the 
root causes of the tension, and hopefully to offer suggestions 
that will protect U.S. interests while also promoting the long-
term well-being of the Tunisian people. And I want to thank 
them for their participation today.
    Unfortunately, Ranking Member Wilson is unable to be with 
us today, but I want to note his longtime interest in and 
support for Tunisia. And, in his absence, I am pleased to yield 
to my colleague, Vice Ranking Member Steube, for his opening 
remarks.
    Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
calling this hearing.
    The U.S. has helped the Tunisian people with generous 
development and security assistance to help grow Tunisia's 
institutions and improve its economy. However, we are not 
seeing the results of our significant U.S.-tax-dollar 
assistance today.
    While the U.S. has invested considerably in Tunisia in 
terms of foreign aid and assistance, U.S. policy never 
concentrated on promoting trade and free-market economic 
development in the country, which could have actually caused 
Tunisia's democracy to succeed.
    The United States poured millions of taxpayer dollars into 
foreign aid in Tunisia, but, without real free-market reforms, 
Tunisia's leftist unions continued to push for deepening State 
control of the economy and Socialism, which allowed the economy 
to stagnate.
    The Tunisian Constitution does not say that the President 
can suspend the Constitution or freeze Parliament. It does not 
say he can fire the Prime Minister, but to consult with him. 
However, that is exactly what President Saied did when he 
announced this summer a new Cabinet that will ultimately answer 
to him rather than Prime Minister Bouden. He swept aside much 
of the Constitution, similar to a coup.
    Tunisia's President is not our friend. He has pushed an 
anti-American, anti-Israel agenda since running in his campaign 
and since taking office. Rather than putting forward real free-
market reforms, the President has essentially announced that he 
will double down on a Socialistic agenda, and he has even 
threatened private businesses to lower prices or else. This 
does not bode well for Tunisia's future.
    The Tunisians' democracy and Constitution, as well as U.S. 
tax dollars, are now being tested. President Saied dismissed 
the Prime Minister and froze Parliament, triggering 
international concern that Tunisia could backslide away from 
democracy. However, these moves were supported by some 
Tunisians. Thus, Tunisia's friends face a conundrum in trying 
to identify what best serves the will of the Tunisian people.
    The recent appointment of a new Prime Minister and Cabinet 
was a good step to resolving this political crisis. However, 
there are still many outstanding issues that need to be 
addressed. I hope our witnesses today will offer some thoughts 
on the appropriate role that the United States and our partners 
can play in encouraging Tunisia to resolve these issues. I also 
hope our witnesses can help contextualize this discussion.
    I believe it is past time for us to revisit and reconsider 
our foreign assistance to Tunisia, what should be the goals of 
the U.S.-Tunisia relationship, and why the United States should 
be involved in helping Tunisians address the underlying 
challenges that created their current level of discontent with 
the government and the economy, especially when one can easily 
dismiss the Constitution, and with some Tunisians supporting 
this move.
    I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today to 
offer their insights. In particular, I would like to welcome 
back Eddy Acevedo, the former longtime Middle East Subcommittee 
staff director who is appearing before us as a witness today.
    And, with that, I yield back to the chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Steube.
    I will now introduce our distinguished witnesses.
    First, Dr. Elie Abouaoun is the director of the U.S. 
Institute of Peace Middle East and North Africa Programs, based 
in Tunis, Tunisia. He has previously served as the executive 
director of the Arab Human Rights Fund, as well as the acting 
country director and program manager of the Danish Refugee 
Council in Iraq. Dr. Abouaoun has been a visiting lecturer at 
Saint Joseph University in Lebanon on human rights, civil 
society, advocacy, and citizenship and is a doctor of dental 
surgery.
    Next, Dr. Amna Guellali is the deputy regional director for 
Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International. She 
previously served as senior Tunisia and Algeria researcher at 
Human Rights Watch, where she investigated human rights abuses 
in both countries; as an analyst at the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court of The Hague; 
and as a senior researcher in the department of international 
law at the Asser Institute. She has also served as legal 
officer at the regional delegation of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in Tunis. Dr. Guellali holds a Ph.D. 
from the European University Institute in Florence and was 
awarded POMED's Leaders for Democracy award in 2017.
    Ms. Alexis Arieff is a specialist in African affairs at the 
congressional Research Service, where her analysis focuses on 
North, West, and Central Africa. Before joining CRS 12 years 
ago, she previously worked as a researcher on Africa for the 
Committee to Protect Journalists, as well as a research fellow 
in the International Crisis Group's West Africa field office 
and as a contributing writer for Freedom House. Ms. Arieff has 
been detailed to policy offices at the State Department and 
Defense Department and has served as an international election 
observer in Tunisia and Guinea. She was a Fulbright scholar in 
Conakry, Guinea, in 2008-2009 and holds an M.A. in 
international relations from Yale University.
    And, finally, it is my great honor to present Mr. Eddy 
Acevedo. Mr. Acevedo serves as the chief of staff and senior 
advisor to the president and CEO, Ambassador Mark Green, at the 
Wilson Center. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Acevedo 
served as the senior director of communications and policy at 
the McCain Institute for International Leadership and in 
multiple senior management positions at U.S. Agency for 
International Development.
    But for those of us on this committee, most importantly, 
Mr. Acevedo, from 2011 to 2017, served right here on the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, first as the senior professional 
staff member overseeing the Western Hemisphere portfolio and 
then as the senior foreign policy advisor and subcommittee 
staff director for the Subcommittee on Middle East and North 
Africa, this very subcommittee, for then chair and my dear 
friend, Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. And we welcome Mr. 
Acevedo back to the subcommittee with open arms.
    Thanks to all of you for being here today.
    I will now recognize the witnesses for 5 minutes each. 
Without objection, your prepared written statements will be 
made a part of the record.
    Dr. Abouaoun, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF ELIE ABOUAOUN, PH.D., DDS, DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST 
  AND NORTH AFRICA PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

    Dr. Abouaoun. Thank you very much.
    Good afternoon, Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Steube, and 
members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle 
East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism. Thank you for 
the opportunity to testify on the unfolding political crisis in 
Tunisia.
    I am the director of the Middle East and North Africa 
programs of the U.S. Institute of Peace, based in Tunis. 
However, the views expressed here are my own.
    On July 25, following nationwide protests amidst a deep 
political, social, and public health crisis, the President of 
the Republic, Kais Saied, invoked Article 80 of the 
Constitution to lift parliamentary immunity, suspend the 
Parliament for 30 days, and dismiss the Prime Minister.
    The decision was greeted with jubilation on the streets of 
Tunisia. However, fears of democratic backsliding were 
exacerbated on August 24 when the President extended his 
extraordinary powers indefinitely.
    Finally, on September 22, Mr. Saied replaced much of the 
Constitution with a three-page decree that officially dissolved 
the Parliament and granted himself control over all executive 
and legislative functions, while renewing his pledge to bring 
about rule of law, end impunity, and restore the proper 
functioning of the State.
    A potentially positive development was the appointment days 
ago of Prime Minister Najla Bouden Ramadhane, but it remains to 
be seen how much influence she will have in decisionmaking.
    Even prior to July 25, Tunisia was not a consolidated 
democracy. The 2011 revolution resulted in more personal 
freedoms and political pluralism, but these elements alone did 
not constitute a consolidated democracy and did not necessarily 
portend economic prosperity. And, while far less frequent than 
pre-2011, the government's use of the security sector and the 
judiciary to suppress dissent continued post-revolution.
    After his September decision, the President has lost the 
support of the major civil society organizations, private 
sector, and nearly all of the political parties, including the 
largest elected party in the Parliament, Ennahda, an Islamist 
party distinct from the Muslim Brotherhood.
    In line with their President, there is a consensus among 
Tunisians that the expectations of the 2011 revolution have not 
been met yet. However, there is disagreement about what kind of 
intervention is necessary to put the country on a path to 
prosperity and democracy. The President's focus on remaking the 
political system overlooks the need for more structural 
economic and social change.
    In addition, the public's perception that the Tunisian 
State has unlimited resources creates unrealistic expectations 
that no political system can accommodate. A more reliable 
course of action for Tunisia to achieve political stability 
would be to focus on economic growth and to lay out a 
comprehensive and inclusive political roadmap emphasizing the 
return to normal institutional governance, including the 
democratically elected Parliament, that delivers justice and 
accountability for what happened since 2011.
    For the last 10 years, the U.S. has made several strategic 
investments in Tunisia, especially in the areas of security and 
justice, military assistance, financial support, economic 
growth, democratic governance, and civil society strengthening.
    While using its points of leverage carefully to decelerate 
Tunisia's slide toward autocracy, the U.S. must continue to 
proactively support Tunisia's stability and the promotion of 
plurality and democratic norms.
    In the current context, abandoning engagement with security 
forces would not be in the interests of the United States or 
Tunisia. Indicators of when security assistance should be 
considered include a deterioration of human rights, continued 
absence of a plan to restore democratic order, or other 
indications that Tunisia's old regime police State is being 
restored.
    One of the largest successes from U.S. investment in 
Tunisia since 2011 is a flourishing and professional of civil 
society. Now more than ever, the civil society and key public 
institutions need America's steadfast technical support and 
encouragement.
    Unlike other countries in the region, where similar power 
grabs did not trigger the same level of concern, it is 
promising that many Tunisians might realize that President 
Saied's decisions will likely be dangerous for the country.
    Furthermore, despite the polarization and tension in 
Tunisia, there has not been an outbreak of unrest. Notably, the 
government has not resorted to tactics of large-scale violence 
and intimidation, which is encouraging.
    Last, beyond some inflammatory media discourse, there has 
not been any action taken by Tunisia to downsize the 
partnership with the United States.
    The most constructive way to influence the President's 
actions is through concerted multilateral pressure, 
international and regional. As a democratic and friendly 
Tunisia is in the national security interests of the United 
States, pressure on the President must be targeted, firm, 
quiet, and multilateral.
    Thank you very much, and I am looking forward to any 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Abouaoun follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Dr. Abouaoun.
    Next, we will go to Dr. Guellali.
    You are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF AMNA GUELLALI, PH.D., DEPUTY REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR 
      MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

    Dr. Guellali. Sorry. It took me some time to unmute myself.
    Thank you very much, Chairman Deutch and members of the 
subcommittee. On behalf of Amnesty International, I would like 
to thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony and 
for convening this important hearing on the current 
circumstances in Tunisia, a country where I am residing right 
now, and I am also Tunisian.
    Since President Kais Saied claimed exceptional powers on 
July 25, Tunisia has been undergoing troubling political 
turmoil. However, one must not forget that the country's system 
of governance was increasingly dysfunctional long before then.
    For a significant number of Tunisians, the daily spectacle 
of a Parliament that was, at best, paralyzed and, at worse, the 
scene of violence and insults had become insufferable, and many 
considered that President Saied's move to suspend Parliament 
was a legitimate attempt to give a new impetus to the country's 
political transition.
    In issuing Decree 117 on September 22, President Saied has 
taken an even more radical turn, suspending most of the 
Constitution and formally granting himself nearly unfettered 
powers to legislate and govern. He has barred people from 
challenging his decrees and decisions. This absence of any 
supervisory powers, including any authority to review the 
President's decision, is an outright weakening of human rights 
protections in the country.
    Amnesty International has documented several violations of 
human rights since the announcement of these exceptional 
powers. In the name of fighting corruption and ensuring 
security, authorities imposed arbitrary travel bans against at 
least 50 Tunisians. They have also placed at least 12 others 
under abusive house arrest, including high-profile figures such 
as the former president of a State body to fight corruption.
    One particularly worrying incident concerns Slimane 
Bouhafs, an Algerian activist and U.N.-recognized refugee in 
Tunisia who was forcibly abducted by unknown men from his home 
in Tunis in August and forcibly returned to Algeria, where he 
is now imprisoned and faces persecution. President Saied has so 
far said nothing publicly about the incident, and authorities 
have not announced any formal investigation into it.
    However, while discussing these violations, we must also 
remember that Tunisia was not a paradise for human rights prior 
to July 25. Arbitrary travel bans and house arrests, violations 
of freedom of speech, and trials of civilians before military 
courts were already common under previous governments.
    Regarding freedom of peaceful assembly, Tunisia's security 
forces have responded unevenly to demonstrations since July 25. 
During recent protests against Saied, security forces 
restrained from carrying out dispersal or responding with 
force. This contrasts with the way security forces have 
conducted themselves during the socioeconomic protests that 
swept the country in 2021, when they arrested more than 2,000 
protesters and allegedly mistreated some of them.
    As a conclusion, I would say that Tunisia suffered serious 
human rights violations both before and after July 25. Despite 
recent positive steps, such as the lifting of some arbitrary 
house arrests, the long-term outlook is still troubling. Nearly 
all powers remain concentrated in the hands of President Saied. 
And, meanwhile, the economy crisis could swiftly transform into 
a political one, as ordinary Tunisians grow increasingly 
desperate, leading people to take to the streets and raising 
the chances of violent crackdowns by the authorities.
    So, in this situation, we hope that the United States will 
continue to support Tunisia's path toward the respect of human 
rights during this period of upheaval. And I would like to make 
the following recommendations to the Congress and to U.S. 
authorities in general: to urgently and publicly call on 
Tunisian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release 
all those who are detained solely for expressing their human 
rights; to halt investigations and prosecutions of civilians 
before the military justice system and to lift all arbitrary 
travel bans and house arrests; to also push for immediate--to 
urge the President to rein in security forces, who have long 
carried out abuses with impunity against Tunisians and might be 
emboldened by the State of emergency; and hold accountable all 
those reasonably suspected of committing crimes under 
international law; to push for the immediate opening of a 
thorough, impartial, and transparent investigation into the 
forced abduction and unlawful transfer to Algeria of a U.N. 
refugee and make the results of the investigation public; and, 
finally, to support and amplify the call by civil society 
organizations and activists on the ground for the government to 
commit to a reform agenda on all levels.
    So thank you again for allowing me to testify today, and I 
look forward to answering the questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Guellali follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Dr. Guellali.
    Ms. Arieff, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

  STATEMENT OF ALEXIS ARIEFF, SPECIALIST IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 
                 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

    Ms. Arieff. Thank you.
    Chairman Deutch, Congressman Steube, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for inviting the congressional Research 
Service to testify today.
    President Kais Saied's assertion of sweeping executive 
powers has fueled uncertainty about the future of Tunisia's 
young democracy, which successive U.S. administrations and 
Congress have sought to foster, as you know.
    Reactions within Tunisia have varied. Many Tunisians share 
the view that their political system and leaders have failed to 
deliver on the promise of the country's 2011 uprising. Economic 
hardships were severe even prior to the depredations of COVID-
19, while political disputes have impeded institutional reform 
and anti-corruption efforts.
    The extent of agreement on what should replace the status 
quo is less certain, however. Opposition to President Saied's 
approach may have grown in recent weeks, with some previously 
ambivalent political parties and Tunisia's powerful trade union 
federation voicing acute concerns about his intention to govern 
by decree and amend the Constitution and electoral law.
    Yet President Saied appears at present to enjoy greater 
popular support than many of his chief antagonists, and he 
faces few evident institutional constraints. His opponents are 
internally divided and mutually distrustful.
    In recent weeks, thousands of Tunisians have turned to the 
streets in rival protests for and against the President, and 
public opinion is likely to continue to evolve. The potential 
for broad coalition building or, conversely, escalating 
confrontation is in question.
    Even with his apparent control of the State security 
apparatus, President Saied's power and claim to legitimacy 
arguably rest on his assertion of popular backing. It remains 
to be seen whether the President can deliver on his pledge to 
improve people's daily lives and how he might respond if more 
of the public turns against his leadership. The President has 
not articulated a clear roadmap for political reforms or an 
economic plan amid stalled negotiations with the IMF over a new 
lending package.
    Among the issues that Congress may consider is whether 
recent developments undermine or strengthen the case for U.S. 
aid and engagement and whether a shift in scope or emphasis is 
warranted.
    Recent developments played out after the House 
Appropriations Committee reported its Fiscal Year 2022 aid 
appropriations measure, which would provide at least $197 
million in economic and security assistance for Tunisia. This 
is equivalent to the Biden administration's budget proposal 
earlier this year and would continue a practice in which 
Congress has annually provided a minimum floor of aid for 
Tunisia, with the practical effect of ensuring funds amid 
competing global priorities.
    The Defense Department has provided additional security 
cooperation in recent years. And the U.S. Millennium Challenge 
Corporation has approved, but not yet signed, a 5-year, nearly 
$500 million development aid compact to strengthen Tunisia's 
transportation, trade, and water sectors.
    The extent to which U.S. aid and security cooperation 
present opportunities for leverage is debatable. President 
Saied has shown little evidence of being open to external 
pressure or incentives. He campaigned as an anti-system 
candidate, won in a landslide, does not have a political party, 
and appears to rely on a small circle of advisors. He has 
castigated domestic critics as ``corrupt'' and ``treacherous.''
    Moreover, U.S. aid seeks to advance U.S.-stated policy 
goals, such as supporting civil society, local 
entrepreneurship, COVID-19 response, law enforcement capacity, 
and Tunisia's ability to provide for its own security.
    Encouragement of Tunisia's democracy has been one, but not 
the only, stated aim of U.S. engagement over the past decade. 
Nor is the United States the sole or necessarily most 
influential external actor. Tunisians, for their part, have 
engaged in much debate over the desirability of external 
pressure at this juncture.
    U.S. aid and diplomatic messaging may nonetheless be viewed 
as an expression of U.S. ideals and priorities. In the case of 
some countries, Congress has imposed legislative restrictions, 
or conditions, on certain types of U.S. assistance, often 
simultaneously granting the executive branch flexibility to 
waive or bypass them on humanitarian, national security, or 
other grounds. Congressional oversight represents an additional 
potential tool.
    Looking ahead. Over the past decade, Tunisians have 
repeatedly defied observers' expectations by navigating a 
peaceful way out of political crises, yet these crisis 
resolutions involved elite bargaining that arguably excluded 
the concerns of many ordinary people. Consensus on effective 
economic reforms and accountability has been much more elusive, 
presaging the desperation and frustrations that many Tunisians 
have voiced.
    Whether Tunisia can again deliver a course correction while 
also addressing deep-seated economic and institutional 
challenges, and what actions from the international community 
are most likely to help support such an outcome, is a pressing 
question today.
    This concludes my testimony. I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Arieff follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Arieff. I appreciate it very 
much. Thanks for the thoughtful and thorough presentation, what 
we have come to expect from CRS. And we are always grateful for 
all you provide to help us do our jobs better. Thank you very 
much.
    And, finally, our last witness--let me find--and there he 
is. It is really a pleasure to welcome back as a witness to the 
committee that he served so well for so many years Eddy 
Acevedo.
    Welcome back, Eddy. It is really great to have you. Sorry 
to call you that, but that is the way we feel about it.

 STATEMENT OF EDDY ACEVEDO, CHIEF OF STAFF AND SENIOR ADVISOR, 
  WILSON CENTER, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR AND SENIOR 
   DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LEGISLATIVE AND PUBLIC 
                        AFFAIRS AT USAID

    Mr. Acevedo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Deutch, Congressman Steube, and members of the 
subcommittee, I feel like I am returning home. I spent nearly a 
decade working in this body, in the people's House, as a former 
staffer, and the majority of that time, I had the honor of 
serving on this committee under Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
    So thank you for convening this timely and important 
hearing and inviting me to testify. I know all the work behind 
the scenes that goes on to prepare for these hearings, so I 
want to especially thank Gabriella Zach and Casey Kustin or, as 
Ileana used to call her, Deutchette, for all of their hard work 
and their friendship.
    Over 6 years ago, Mr. Chairman, this same subcommittee 
convened a hearing entitled ``Tunisia's Fragile Democratic 
Transition,'' where we collectively praised Tunisia for 
adopting a new Constitution, electing a new Parliament, holding 
elections, and even transferring power peacefully from one 
government to another.
    Now, however, Tunisia is on a slippery slope as we witness 
some democratic backsliding. Recent actions by President Saied 
call into question if Tunisia is still heading down a 
democratic path.
    We have seen this playbook before. A recent example is in 
Haiti, where Presidents have ended up ruling by decrees filled 
with empty promises and undemocratic norms, allowing the 
Haitian Parliament to become nonfunctional and failing to hold 
timely elections.
    In Tunisia, it is true that people feel let down by the 
democratic transition. Most expected their newfound freedoms to 
be tied to economic prosperity. Instead, Tunisians are 
witnessing high unemployment, a struggling economy, and find it 
difficult to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
    So, ultimately, why does Tunisia matter?
    One, we are friends with the people of Tunisia, who are 
yearning for a free, democratic, and prosperous future, which 
does not occur often in the Middle East.
    Two, a stable Tunisia is important to regional security, 
migration, and it counters ambitions of potential malign 
actors. Russia already has a port in Syria; another access 
point through Tunisia can threaten the stability of the 
Mediterranean. Tunisia has welcomed Huawei and wants stronger 
economic ties with China, even though its largest trading 
partner is the European Union. Further instability and chaos in 
Tunisia may lead to a migration crisis in North Africa and 
throughout Europe.
    Three, from a counterterrorism standpoint, we cannot forget 
Tunisia in the broader scheme of the fallout from the 
Afghanistan withdrawal if ISIS or its next iteration reemerges. 
Tunisia previously had the highest numbers per capita of ISIS 
foreign fighters heading to Syria or Iraq to fight for the 
caliphate. In addition, ISIS previously used training camps in 
Libya to carry out several attacks in Tunisia, and we also 
witnessed recently some suicide bombings throughout the country 
as well. So a less secure environment only makes it more 
difficult for the development professionals to operate.
    During my time at USAID, Tunisia was a top priority. Former 
Administrator Ambassador Mark Green elevated our presence in 
Tunisia to a full USAID mission. In 2020, Ambassador Green then 
traveled to Tunisia to help reaffirm how important it was not 
only for the Agency but to the furthering of overall U.S. 
interests in the region.
    This committee often faces many challenges in foreign 
policy and sometimes even questions what leverage we have to 
demonstrate our values and our principles, especially when they 
come to democracy and human rights. But, in Tunisia, we do have 
leverage. We can apply a carrot-and-stick approach to 
incentivize good behavior or be prepared to apply pressure in 
case the situation worsens.
    Here are just some recommendations.
    One, if democratic principles continue to be undermined, 
spaces for civil society organizations close, and there is no 
path to restore democratic order in Tunisia by reinstating the 
Parliament, then the U.S. should reassess the designation of 
Tunisia as a major non-NATO ally or reevaluate our INL security 
programs and our foreign military financing initiatives.
    Two, we can reexamine any future funds for Tunisia's 
sovereign loan guarantee program.
    Three, the Millennium Challenge Corporation has seemingly 
paused discussion of the nearly $500 million compact. Recent 
actions jeopardize Tunisia's eligibility, according to the MCC 
indicators and scorecard.
    Four, Tunisia is seeking a $4 billion loan from the 
International Monetary Fund. We should use our voice, vote, and 
influence to seek restoration of democratic and constitutional 
order.
    Five, our democracy networks need resources to bolster 
political parties, civil society, human rights defenders, 
independent media, and journalists. USAID, through the 
Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, 
also known as the CEPPS mechanism, State Department's own 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Bureau, and the National 
Endowment for Democracy should all be allocating additional 
resources to respond to the current crisis. USAID can also 
dispatch its Office of Transition Initiatives to assess the 
current environment and needs that can be addressed by the 
Agency's Conflict Prevention and Stabilization Bureau.
    In short, Mr. Chairman, we cannot wait to act any longer to 
determine whether or not President Saied is the democrat we all 
hoped for. Parliament must be reinstated, and the judiciary 
should be independent. Stability and prosperity in Tunisia is 
in our national security and foreign policy interests. If the 
U.S. does not step in now, we will leave the door open for our 
adversaries to potentially fill the void.
    Tunisians have proven that they have what it takes to turn 
this around, but we must lend a helping hand before the crisis 
becomes untenable. We can no longer have a wait-and-see 
attitude. We want Tunisia to succeed, and we need it to 
succeed, but we must act now before it is too late.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Acevedo follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Acevedo, for your 
outstanding testimony today.
    Thanks to all of the witnesses for being here and for 
sharing your important insight.
    I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. And, 
pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes 
of questioning our witnesses. Because of the virtual format of 
this hearing, I will recognize members by committee seniority, 
alternating between Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your 
turn, please let our staff know, and we will circle back to 
you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone 
and address the chair verbally.
    I will defer until the end of questioning, so we will start 
by recognizing Mr. Cicilline for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Deutch, and thank you to 
our ranking member for holding today's really important 
hearing.
    And this hearing is a reminder, really, of the continuing 
obligation that we have to help support emerging democracies 
around the world. And, as the chairman said, this is an 
evolving and continuous responsibility even in our own country. 
So thank you to all the witnesses for your extraordinary 
testimony.
    I would like to begin with you, Dr. Abouaoun. I hope I 
pronounced that correctly.
    A recent report from Freedom House shows democracy has now 
been on the decline around the world for more than 15 years in 
what has been described as a democratic recession.
    And, as we continue to see increased fragility in 
democratic institutions around the world, particularly what we 
are seeing in Tunisia, what can we learn from our foreign 
policy approach in Tunisia that might enhance our ability to 
support democracies around the world? Are there lessons that we 
should learn from this experience?
    That is for Dr. Abouaoun.
    Dr. Abouaoun. Yes. Thank you for the question.
    I think that the U.S. and others offered funding and 
supporting democratic transitions in this part of the world.
    If I take a few lessons learned from the region of which I 
have expertise, I think that one of the lessons learned is that 
this funding should aim for longer-term, transformative 
intervention.
    In most of the cases, the money was spent on mostly 
transactional interventions, and the democratic recessions that 
we likely pointed to is partly or causedby the fact that the 
democratic values are not [inaudible].
    And for this to happen, we need to work on transformative 
interventions that require a longer-term approach than the ones 
that we have seen.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
    Dr. Guellali, one of the primary causes, at least that has 
been reported, of the public discontent within Tunisia leading 
up to President Saied's announcement was the conduct of the 
police and the brutality. And I know you have spoken out a lot 
about that.
    Could you speak a little bit in the hearing today about the 
history of police violence? Does it raise concerns currently? 
What steps are the government taking to curtail it? And are 
there things that we should be doing, as the Congress of the 
United States, to support those efforts?
    Dr. Guellali. Thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline.
    I think that the history of police violence in Tunisia was 
really very important, because they played a central role, a 
pivotal role, during the years of dictatorship. And, while 
there were some efforts to reform the security services after 
the fall of the Ben Ali regime, security services still act in 
a very abusive way. And this has culminated, really, during the 
socioeconomic protests that swept the country in 2021, when the 
security forces really acted in a very brutal way to quell 
those protests and to halt them.
    So I think what is really needed right now in Tunisia is 
for the security services to act in an accountable way. I think 
fostering the transitional justice process that has been in 
place in the country for the past 5 years or so is really 
important. Calling on the Tunisian authorities to hold 
accountable those of the security forces who have committed 
crimes is really important.
    And I would like to bring your attention to the fact that 
President Saied, after the 25th of July, has appointed several 
security forces members to the high State security apparatus 
who are accused of perpetrating crimes against the people of 
Tunisia during the dictatorship. They have current trials 
before the transitional justice chambers, and they should be 
held accountable and----
    Mr. Cicilline. I just----
    Ms. Guellali [continuing]. Not promoted.
    Mr. Cicilline. I just wanted to get one last question 
before I run out of time.
    We saw firsthand in Afghanistan how corruption really can 
erode public confidence in government and ultimately jeopardize 
longtime stability.
    Do any of the witnesses have ideas of what we can do to 
make sure that the funding we are providing is being used 
responsibly and that we can provide some kind of better 
oversight? Because I think that remains of grave concern to 
many Members of Congress.
    Anyone who might have a thought?
    Dr. Guellali. I believe that, in terms of what are the 
mechanisms that the Congress should enforce in order to have a 
better system of accountability, including on corruption, I 
think supporting civil society is really important, because 
civil society plays right now the role of checks and balances 
on the work and decisions of the President.
    The President has barred Tunisian citizens from challenging 
his decisions by calling out any form of challenge, including 
through the judiciary. And so the fact that civil society is 
still able to play its role and hold him to account and play 
the role of checks and balances, I think it is really very 
important. And I believe that direct support for civil society 
can make a difference here.
    Mr. Cicilline. Thank you so much.
    My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the 
accommodation. I yield back.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
    I will now yield 5 minutes to the vice ranking member, Mr. 
Steube.
    Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    My questions are for Mr. Acevedo.
    Eddy, how can we best compete with Russia and China and 
Tunisia? And what are our best messaging points regarding the 
benefits of a relationship with the United States relative to 
others?
    Mr. Acevedo. Thank you, Congressman. That is a great 
question.
    I mean, I think, for us, we need more engagement. Right 
now, the U.S. Government has done a very good job in expressing 
concern over some of the actions occurring in Tunisia, but, at 
the same time, the U.S. Government hasn't really illustrated 
what are we asking from the Tunisian President and what are 
some of the democratic reforms that we would like, such as the 
reinstatement of the Tunisian Parliament.
    I think the Russia/China aspect is one of the things that I 
am extremely concerned about, because we have seen in other 
parts of the world that they will quickly swoop in if they see 
that the U.S. is kind of late to the game in jumping in.
    We have seen some of their recent actions in terms of: 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has traveled to Tunisia many 
times over the last few years; Huawei was just in the country 
as well, and they kind of got a big, red-carpet welcome by this 
President.
    So our engagement, it is what is needed, and us being able 
to articulate exactly what are the democratic reforms that we 
would like to see to ensure that stability in the country.
    Mr. Steube. And, I mean, that kinds of leads me to my next 
question. What is the appropriate role of the United States, as 
an outside party, in the Tunisian political crisis?
    Mr. Acevedo. So I can tell you, Congressman, from my 
personal experience, when I was at USAID, USAID had some really 
good programs in the country. We were working to decentralize 
the government as much as possible and push matters into the 
local level so that we can have a better representation from 
the people. We were able to work with the youth to try to 
prevent some radicalization that happened in the past. We were 
also able to support religious tolerance and religious 
liberties in the country.
    But I admit, Congressman, that we have done good work but 
we need new ideas. And I think that is where my recommendation 
regarding the OTI a USAID are really the tip of the spear for 
us in terms of foreign policy at USAID. And their, kind of, 
reassessment on the new challenges in Tunisia would be helpful.
    This office is one of the best-known secrets in our foreign 
policy apparatus. Right now, it is only appropriated about $92 
million from Congress. It really needs more funds than that, 
because they are very spread thin. And the more we can support 
these good professionals, the better it is for us and our 
foreign policy.
    Mr. Steube. So how are our European partners viewing the 
recent political developments in Tunisia?
    Mr. Acevedo. So, right now, the European Union is extremely 
concerned. Trade between the EU and Tunisia--Tunisian trade to 
the EU accounts for about 80 to 85 percent of their trade. So 
the EU is their biggest market, No. 1.
    No. 2, the Europeans are worried not only from an economic 
standpoint but obviously from the migration standpoint. We have 
seen a lot of, kind of, waves of migrants hitting the seas and 
trying to head north.
    But there is also a NATO component here, right? And, 
ultimately if China and Russia set up a foothold in Tunisia, 
that could be destabilizing for our NATO partners in the region 
as well.
    Mr. Steube. And what are the practical implications of the 
President disbanding the Parliament?
    Mr. Acevedo. Congressman, this really comes down to 
legitimacy. You know, he formed a new government just days ago. 
Many of the ministers that swore an oath, they swore an oath to 
a Constitution that he suspended. So one begins to question any 
decisions that these ministers make, is it legitimate or not?
    The MCC compact, for example, needs to be ratified by the 
Tunisian Parliament. Obviously, that cannot happen if the 
Parliament is disbanded.
    So I think, for us, we have to look at the legitimacy as 
one of the biggest impacts. Typically, when the Prime Minister 
forms the government, there is a little bit of a vote, so to 
speak, in the Parliament, and that is part of their 
Constitution. Obviously, that did not happen, because 
everything has been suspended.
    So all of these issues are extremely troubling, and 
hopefully we can nudge a little bit so that the right decisions 
are made and that the President shows an inclusive process on 
how to get out of this current crisis.
    Mr. Steube. My time has expired. Thank you for your time 
today.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Steube.
    We will now go to Ms. Manning.
    You are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you, Chairman Deutch, for organizing 
this very important hearing on the deeply concerning situation 
in Tunisia.
    And thank you to all our witnesses for joining us today.
    Mr. Acevedo, you have done a great job of laying out your 
recommendations that the U.S. use a carrot-and-stick approach 
to influence the future behavior of Tunisia.
    Can you talk to us about where has this sort of approach 
worked successfully? And what kinds of incentives do you think 
would most likely encourage the President to change the way he 
is behaving?
    Mr. Acevedo. Thank you, Congresswoman, for that question.
    So I will be honest; sometimes the carrot-and-stick 
approach works, and sometimes it doesn't, right? But I think, 
ultimately it is always good to give it the good old college 
try.
    And, for us being able to articulate, kind of, what our 
role needs to be in this process I think is helpful.Pressuring 
President Saied on the economic side, I think, is something 
that--we hold a lot of leverage. Part of the current crisis in 
Tunisia and a lot of the unrest that is happening in the 
country is because of the high unemployment and their economy 
is struggling.
    Through a lot of our efforts and our programs that we have 
in the country, whether it is the IMF program that needs to be 
redone, some of the economic reforms that need to happen, as 
well as one of--something that doesn't get much attention is, 
Congress in 2013 passed legislation and appropriated for 
something called the Tunisian American Enterprise Fund. And 
this is an entity that has been pretty successful in Tunisia to 
help small and medium-size businesses. And, right now, it is 
sort of the largest supporter of small and medium-size 
businesses in the country.
    So I think our leverage on the economic side is vital, and 
also on the security side. You know, we have a lot of leverage 
there, as well, through many of the DOD and State Department 
programs.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you.
    Ms. Arieff, since 2011, the United States has steered, as 
we just were talking about, significant financial assistance to 
Tunisia to help promote stability and improve prosperity. Can 
you tell us which USAID efforts have been the most effective?
    Ms. Arieff. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    As you note, there have been significant U.S. foreign 
assistance resources directed toward Tunisia in the last 
decade, including by bipartisan support in Congress for these 
provisions in annual--or in aid appropriations measures that 
have provided in just the past few years, for example, $85 
million annually in foreign military financing; $85 million 
annually in Economic Support Fund and development assistance, 
again, annually; as well as around $13 million to $15 million 
annually in additional internal security assistance for 
Tunisia's police and security apparatus.
    That economic assistance, as Mr. Acevedo has outlined, has 
supported a range of initiatives, including economic aid, 
entrepreneurship support, policy reforms, as well as democracy 
and governance.
    Ms. Manning. And is there----
    Ms. Arieff. I think the--sorry. I was going to say, the 
success is obviously mixed.
    Ms. Manning. That is what I was hoping for. Is there some 
investment that has worked that we want to continue or double 
down on?
    Ms. Arieff. It is a judgment call, in many cases, but I 
would say that there is some evidence of effectiveness for some 
programs, including both on the economic and security side.
    Ms. Manning. OK. Thank you.
    Dr. Guellali, do you see any reason for hope with the 
appointment of the first female Prime Minister, or was this 
solely aimed at placating critics? And can you also talk about 
the status of women's rights in Tunisia?
    Dr. Guellali. Thank you very much, Ms. Manning.
    When it comes to the new government, on paper, I think that 
this government has a great potential. It is, as you know, led 
by a woman, Mrs. Najla Bouden, and is composed of 26 highly 
qualified ministers, including 9 women.
    Unfortunately, the new Prime Minister does not have a lot 
of powers, unlike its predecessors, who used to have even more 
powers than the President. The reason is that, in Decree 117 
that the President enacted on the 22d of September, this decree 
declared that the President exercises all the executive powers 
and he is assisted by government.
    So the President may, for example, unilaterally dismiss any 
minister. He is the only one responsible for designating State 
policies and has the power to create or dissolve institutions. 
And, in this framework, the head of government, under this 
system, has only a secondary role and would be dependent on the 
President's will and whims.
    And so, in this situation, while it is really great that 
Tunisia has a new government--I believe that this was one of 
the demands and expectations from the various observers and 
analysts, including from Tunisian people. But, at the same 
time, it remains to be seen whether they will have all the 
powers that they need in order to enact those reforms leading 
to a new system of governance, which is one of the promises 
from President Saied.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you.
    My time has expired. I yield back.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Representative Manning.
    Representative Perry, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Perry. OK. I thank the chairman and the ranking member 
for the opportunity. I thank the witnesses.
    My first question is going to Ms. Arieff, so if you want to 
unmute now. First, thanks for providing your input, your CRS 
background, prior to the hearing.
    Given that the United States has provided hundreds of 
million of dollars over the years for the purpose of augmenting 
Tunisia's counterterrorism capabilities, their total investment 
in that goal is of reasonable, if not paramount, importance to 
the United States of America.
    Now, in 2016, news outlets, including The Jerusalem Post, 
reported that the Mossad had eliminated a Hamas operative, 
Mohamed Zouari, working with Tunisia within Tunisia.
    My objective here is not to figure out or to talk about or 
discuss who did what when, but, rather, pose the question to 
determine the motivation of the government in Tunis to prevent 
or otherwise marginalize the influence of Hamas, specifically 
and especially within its borders.
    When he won the 2019 Tunisian election, President Saied 
draped himself in a Palestinian flag, and he has frequently 
expressed anti-Semitic sentiment, particularly as he has tried 
to shield himself from his own shortcomings and those of his 
own domestic policies.
    Now, to quote him, and I quote: ``We know very well who the 
people are who are controlling the country today. It is the 
Jews who are doing the stealing, and we need to put an end to 
it,'' unquote.
    Now, for years, the United States and Tunisia have 
maintained a robust counterterrorism relationship, and, in 
fact, Tunisia is the largest beneficiary of State's Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.
    However, in speaking specifically about Hamas, I would like 
to ask you if it is your assessment that the United States can 
trust--can trust--the Tunisian President and his government 
enough to prevent Hamas from growing in influence within 
Tunisia, or is the 2016 instance an aberration, so to speak?
    Ms. Arieff. Thank you, Congressman.
    I am afraid I don't have much insight into the incident 
that you mentioned beyond what was reported in the press. But I 
would note that 2016 was before President Saied was 
inaugurated, so it was under the previous government.
    The only other thing I would add is that U.S. 
counterterrorism assistance for Tunisia is primarily focused on 
countering U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations that 
are active in Tunisia and Libya as well as parts of Algeria, so 
local Islamic State affiliates, al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb, and its various offshoots.
    And what we have seen in the last 5 years is an improvement 
in Tunisia's internal security coordination and a decrease in 
the pace and scale of terrorist attacks within Tunisia.
    Mr. Perry. And do you think--so you can't really speak to--
I mean, let me phrase it another way.
    Based on at least the last part of what you just said, you 
think that, with President Saied, that that is continuing at 
the current pace that it was prior to his ascension to the 
Presidency?
    Ms. Arieff. I think that is a good question for the 
executive branch in some ways, whether military and 
counterterrorism cooperation have continued apace or whether 
there are new challenges under President Saied.
    But what I can observe publicly, in terms of public 
statements from USAFRICOM and others, is a fair amount of 
satisfaction with ongoing military cooperation.
    Mr. Perry. And, listen, I appreciate it, and I know that 
this is a hard question to answer. It is like asking ``how long 
is a string'' or something like that.
    But just based on what happened in Afghanistan and the 
information coming out that, for many, many years, we knew 
where al-Qaeda was headquartered in Quetta and things like 
that, after seeing trillions of dollars, tax dollars, go into a 
place like that, I think it is just important that we have to 
ask these questions.
    So I appreciate your answer, but I just have to keep asking 
this stuff.
    Dr. Abouaoun, in late 2017, a pro-Hamas leader in Tunisia's 
Islamist Ennahda Party met with the United States Institute of 
Peace. And when the Investigative Project on Terrorism 
organization asked about why a Federal-funded U.S. institution 
would willingly meet with individuals who embrace such a toxic 
concept as terrorism--which calls for the destruction of 
Israel, by the way, and expressing overwhelming anti-American 
sentiment--USIP responded by saying that it is important to, 
and I quote, ``engage and maintain relationships with a variety 
of actors, such as political parties, government officials, 
religious officials, and civil society groups, to ensure 
inclusivity,'' unquote.
    So I guess my overarching question is, does the USIP feel 
that by engaging in these meetings that they give individuals 
or organizations that espouse openly terrorism a platform that 
they should not otherwise have?
    And then, as a follow-on question, what other terrorist 
organizations or individuals has the USIP met with?
    Dr. Abouaoun. Thank you very much. I raised my hand before 
because I wanted to comment on the previous question 
regarding----
    Mr. Perry. Feel free.
    Mr. Deutch. Dr. Abouaoun, if you could--we are past 5 
minutes. So you can go ahead and answer, and if you could just 
be respectful of our time, I appreciate it.
    Mr. Perry. Thanks for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Abouaoun. Right. Thank you.
    So, very briefly, I can say with confidence that there is a 
steady and consistent will within all branches of the Tunisian 
Government to prevent the--to continue engaging in reform 
efforts. So this has not changed. And I don't think it's the 
President alone who can change this. There are different 
dynamics when it comes to this kind of activity.
    Back to your second question, I stick with the answer 
provided by USIP. Because of the nature of our work, we have to 
engage with different actors. The purpose of our engagement 
with these actors is not to promote a political position. There 
is a very specific purpose that has to do with our work on the 
ground, where if you want to be a facilitator and to prevent 
violence on the ground, there are a specific set of actors we 
have to work with.
    Whether you like them or not is another story. Whether you 
endorse their political positions is another story. But I can 
assure you that, in all cases, we make sure that we won't give 
agency to actors who act against what the interests of the 
United States.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
    Mr. Deutch. All right. Thank you, Representative Perry.
    Representative Malinowski, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much, Chairman Deutch.
    Let me start by defending USIP more explicitly than USIP 
just did.
    The individual and the political party that USIP met with, 
Ennahda, not only does not support terrorism, it is one of the 
strongest opponents of terrorism and extremism in the Tunisian 
political sphere. Mr. Ghannouchi has met with senior U.S. 
Government officials from multiple administrations and has been 
seen by Republican and Democratic administrations as a very 
positive force in that country.
    So let me just categorically reject what Mr. Perry 
suggested. There is nothing inappropriate about that meeting. 
We should all be meeting with--in Tunisia's democratically 
elected political parties.
    Look, I have been a very strong supporter of U.S. 
assistance to Tunisia. I think we should have done a lot more 
over the last 10 years. I traveled there multiple times when I 
was in the State Department.
    And let's face it: The reason why we have tried to pay 
attention to Tunisia--and, in part, it has been an important 
partner in counterterrorism, but largely it is because this 
small country has played an outsized role in the drama that has 
engulfed the Middle East since the Arab Spring. It is the only 
survivor of the Arab Spring--or it was until the recent coup 
against democracy. So it is important in the larger debate in 
the region between democracy and authoritarianism.
    And my first question goes to whether Tunisia has been 
important in that context not just to us but to others who may 
be on the other side of that struggle between democracy and 
authoritarianism. And I am thinking particularly about some of 
the Gulf countries that supported the coup in Egypt as well, 
that supported the anti-democratic Haftar movement in Libya, 
that see a Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy everywhere, that 
citizens in the Arab world push for more open and democratic 
systems of government and that are threatened by the rise of 
democracy.
    And I wonder, perhaps, Ms. Arieff, if you can adjust that 
question. There was a lot of rhetorical support for the coup in 
Tunisia from a lot of voices in the UAE and Saudi Arabia in 
particular. I wonder if you can comment on whether there is any 
evidence that that support has gone beyond just rhetoric.
    Ms. Arieff. Thank you, Congressman.
    It is true that some of the strongest rhetorical support 
that we have seen from government officials for President 
Saied's actions has come from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, and 
to a slightly lesser extent, Algeria.
    So that rhetorical support does suggest an interest in what 
is happening in Tunisia and perhaps a different view of 
President Saied's actions than what has been expressed by the 
Biden administration and many Members of Congress.
    Mr. Malinowski. And why are they so interested in this? 
What is their motivation?
    Ms. Arieff. You know, a range of motivations, no doubt, but 
I think, clearly, there is less concern for an erosion of 
formal democratic norms or checks and balances internally. 
There is an interest in stability and perhaps a perception that 
President Saied is well-placed to deliver that.
    I would say, you referred to resources. One thing that we 
might look to in the coming weeks and months--we have touched 
on Tunisia's economic and fiscal challenges--is whether we will 
see new pledges of direct financial support for Tunisia through 
bilateral assistance, for example, or grants or loans coming 
from some of these countries. And that would give, perhaps, a 
stronger indication of the level of stakes that these countries 
perceive in the outcome.
    Mr. Malinowski. OK.
    And then let me ask maybe you, Ms. Guellali: What should 
the United States do? What is to be done, is the ultimate 
question here.
    I mean, there is, I think, a broad consensus within the 
Biden administration that this was a coup. They may not use 
that language. I think there is a debate about the best way for 
the United States to use its leverage with respect to military 
aid, security assistance, assistance to the police and the 
military especially.
    The President's actions were popular, at least initially, 
in Tunisia, and that is a factor also weighing on the 
administration.
    What is your advice? What is the bottom line in terms of 
the primary leverage that the United States has to effect a 
return to parliamentary democracy?
    Dr. Guellali. Thank you very much, Congressman Malinowski.
    I would say that I can advise on what not to do rather than 
what to do, basically. Because that is really a very difficult 
question to answer to in terms of policy.
    But I believe that one thing that the U.S. should not do is 
cutting military and security aid to Tunisia to pressure the 
return to the democratic process. And I believe that this would 
be a misguided decision, as it will have really very bad 
repercussions on the security of the country and might lead 
also to the deterioration of the security environment not only 
in Tunisia but also in the entire region.
    It will be also inconsistent with U.S. policy in Tunisia 
for the past years. I believe I mentioned during the testimony 
that security forces have committed numerous and grave human 
rights violations during the transition. And, most recently, 
under the Mashishi government, they arrested thousands of 
people and mistreated allegedly hundreds of them. So cutting 
military aid or conditioning it right now to the return to the 
democratic process while the U.S. remained silent in the face 
of such human rights violations in the past would be really 
inconsistent, I believe.
    I think the U.S. should maybe use its leverage on Tunisia's 
security and armed forces to impose respectful human rights on 
all levels, including during the policing of demonstrations and 
fostering accountability.
    I think also that what is really needed right now in 
Tunisia is to impose checks and balances on the actions of the 
President, especially that, so far, he has shielded himself 
from any kind of challenges to his decisions. And that is 
something that could be done through the pushing of a reform 
agenda but also working with civil society in Tunisia.
    I think amplifying the voices of civil society is really 
important, because it is difficult, I believe, in this 
environment, where the President enjoys such a broad 
popularity, for the U.S. to cut ties with Tunisia, because it 
will be considered really as cutting ties also with the 
Tunisian people. And I think this is not the right moment to do 
that.
    Mr. Acevedo. Congressman, can I add something real quick?
    Mr. Malinowski. Well, my time is up, so it is up to the 
chairman.
    Mr. Deutch. Yes. Thanks, Mr. Malinowski.
    Mr. Acevedo, I am confident that you will have an 
opportunity to respond to that, but we are well past time, so I 
am going to keep this moving, as your old boss would have done 
in this same situation.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Malinowski.
    And, Mr. Mast, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mast. Yes, Mr. Deutch, I will let Mr. Acevedo respond 
right now. That is fine.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
    Mr. Acevedo. Thank you, Mr. Mast. As a native Floridian, I 
appreciate that.
    Just two real quick things.
    One, to the Congressman: I think if the administration can 
send unequivocal messages that we would like the Parliament to 
be reinstated, it would be a very important message. I think 
that, while it is true, obviously, that the Tunisian Parliament 
is not popular, it doesn't mean you can just suspend it just 
because they are not popular. And I think sending that message, 
I think, is important.
    Second, I would say, we should be doubling down on our 
civil society programs. I think all of our democracy networks, 
whether it is at USAID or DRL, could be out there and 
allocating additional resources to help civil society right now 
during their time of need.
    Mr. Mast. I think your response to the previous question, 
it actually plays right into one of the things that I wanted to 
speak about.
    And let's be clear about Tunisia: It was the start, it was 
the starting point for the Arab Spring, really. I mean, just 
symbolically, very important.
    But there was a great Bloomberg article that I read a few 
weeks back on this, and I went back and looked up the quote for 
it, because I think it does sum up the administration's 
response to this very well. And I am going to quote this 
article.
    It says: ``Yet all the Biden administration managed was a 
neutral-sounding message from Secretary of State Antony 
Blinken--'encourag[ing]' Saied 'to adhere to the principles of 
democracy'--and a still weak, if slightly better message from 
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who 'called on' Saied 
to form a new government and 'ensur[e] The timely return of the 
elected parliament.' In the coded language of diplomacy, these 
messages basically told Saied to go ahead and do whatever he 
wanted.''
    That was how the article summarized the response of the 
administration to what had gone on there.
    You just called, Mr. Acevedo, for a strong response. We 
didn't see a strong response. That is a fact. We saw a very 
weak response, which is not surprising in the midst of 
everything that was going on with Afghanistan and the weakness 
that we saw being portrayed there.
    But I want to ask a slightly different question, and that 
is in terms of something that you talked about, and that was 
the fighters from Tunisia in Afghanistan over the course of the 
time that we have been fighting in Afghanistan.
    Do you have an idea, personally, of the path, whether a 
land path or through ports of entry from the air, on how 
Tunisians were getting into Afghanistan? Was it a land path 
going through Egypt and Jordan and Iran? Was it a path flying 
into Pakistan, flying into Iran, flying into other places? What 
was the path that fighters were making their way to 
Afghanistan?
    Mr. Acevedo. Congressman, to my knowledge, I think the 
majority of the path was through land, but perhaps my colleague 
from CRS may have more information on that.
    Mr. Mast. Yes, I would yield there.
    Ms. Arieff. I would have to get back to you, sir. And it is 
possible that the intelligence community could provide a more 
definitive answer on that question.
    Mr. Mast. No question about that; the intelligence 
community can. But certainly would look forward to you all 
getting back with a response, as well, on the most prominent 
paths for those fighters to make their way to the battlefield.
    I think that is something that is important for all of us 
to know as we look at future relationships with any of those 
nations that would allow fighters to move through their 
territories, as well as what is going on in Tunisia and those, 
whether in a dissolved Parliament or the President, now 
dictator, and what actions they were doing to allow fighters to 
move throughout those timeframes.
    With that, I have no further comments or questions, Mr. 
Chairman, and I yield my time back.
    Mr. Deutch. All right. Thank you, Representative Mast.
    Representative Keating, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It has been a few years since I have been in Tunisia. I was 
there after one of the suicide bombings that occurred. In our 
discussions with officials then, the primary concern they had 
was the economy, unemployment, particularly unemployment among 
young people.
    I had, subsequently, civilian conversations with Tunisians. 
And it wasn't as much that they were radicalized to these 
groups; they were given economic promises and promises to take 
care of their family that were really the precursor. They might 
have become radicalized later. But that explained, I think, a 
lot of the large increase pro rata of Tunisians engaging and 
being recruited here.
    Now, with President Saied, he is telling the world right 
now that he is not going to be affected by any external 
pressures, that he is going to make sovereign decisions, and 
external economic aid or assistance really won't be 
determinative. However, this is, I think, the best textbook 
example of how we can engage with the European Union, something 
I have talked about repeatedly.
    So what I would like for comments from the panel would be 
this: I think--I can't see another situation that cries out 
more for this--the EU is the leading trading partner with 
Tunisia. And if the U.S. and the EU together can calibrate more 
closely and hopefully even formalize the kind of assistance 
they have in an effort, I think that is our best case of trying 
to affect the process of backsliding that we are seeing occur 
now.
    So I would like to ask the panel, in the remaining time, to 
really comment on how our effectiveness can be multiplied by 
working more closely with the European Union in this respect; 
and on the President's comment, President Saied's comment, 
about not being affected by external forces or influence.
    Any member of the panel that wants to jump in.
    Dr. Abouaoun. Thank you very much.
    So I think that what you said, Congressman, is in line with 
what I suggest in my presentation, but any pressure or 
engagement with the President has to be multilateral. I think 
the effectiveness will be much higher in this case.
    But beyond the channel, beyond the form of the engagement, 
I think that a lot of money has been spent on economic--
supporting Tunisia economically and financially, but the area 
that has been somehow overshadowed and ignored is social 
mobility. Take what Tunisians are looking like, especially 
young Tunisians,, is prospects for social mobility--upwards 
social mobility, obviously.
    And one of the reasons why the President is so popular is 
that he embodies this. He is an example of someone who climbed 
the ladder, the social ladder, fromuniversity professor to 
President, without the support of the party leader and without, 
really, the financing----
    Mr. Keating. In the 1 minute that is left--I apologize----
    Dr. Abouaoun. Well, I would emphasize multilateralism and 
social mobility.
    Mr. Keating [continuing]. Want to comment on this?
    Well, thank you very much.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
    Representative Burchett, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you all hear me?
    Mr. Deutch. Yes, we can.
    Mr. Burchett. All right. Great.
    Since the European Union is Tunisia's top donor and since 
China and the Gulf States are looking to get more involved in 
the country, would scaling back our foreign aid even be 
effective in pushing President Saied back to more democratic 
norms?
    Anybody can answer that.
    Mr. Acevedo. Congressman, I think it is a little too early 
to tell, to be honest with you. But I think if we have these 
serious conversations with President Saied and potentially 
floating out there the conditioning of some of our foreign 
assistance, I think it is better for us to find out today where 
this relationship is going with the President as opposed to 
waiting 6 months or a year from now.
    Mr. Burchett. OK. We are on the same--did anybody else want 
to try that?
    No? OK.
    What is you all's take on the new government that President 
Saied recently approved?
    Anybody?
    Mr. Acevedo. I can jump in real quick, Congressman.
    You know, I think the new government under this apparatus, 
where the President is still ruling by decree and holds all the 
power, doesn't really have the effect we would like. So, while 
some may potentially spin this as a positive step forward, 
which it is, giving credibility to a government and ministers 
who are not abiding by the Constitution doesn't carry as much 
weight as it should.
    Mr. Burchett. OK.
    Anybody else want to take a shot at that?
    You all aren't talkative.
    Ms. Arieff. I can add one point.
    Others have illustrated the constraints, the institutional 
constraints, that are now placed on this new Cabinet, in 
contrast to the latitude that a head of government and Cabinet 
enjoyed under the Constitution. In addition, the decree that 
President Saied issued on September 22 defining those 
constraints States that the Cabinet is responsible for 
implementing the President's general policy.
    We still don't know, based on public statements, what the 
President's general policy is in many domains. So, as others 
have noted, it is very hard to predict at this point where 
things are going.
    Mr. Burchett. All right.
    President Saied apparently is very popular in Tunisia. I 
understand he might even be making the ranks of our own 
chairman, Ted Deutch, in his home district, but maybe not as 
much. I am not sure.
    How does this affect you all's--our strategy, I guess, to 
coax and/or push him back on the democratic track?
    Mr. Acevedo. Congressman, this is probably one of the most 
toughest questions, is the one you are asking, right? Because I 
think--I would assume that President Saied will say, ``Hey, I 
am doing what the people want me to do. Look at my popularity 
numbers.'' And I think, for us if you are going to be a 
democracy and a place where rule of law is respected, where the 
branches of government are respected, then you have to abide by 
those Constitutions.
    You know, the irony of this all is that, in 2014, as a 
former constitutional lawyer, he helped create this 
Constitution. And, now, here he is suspending it. And, so far, 
we have not seen a path on how he is going to get out of this.
    So I think we can help him get out of this mess. I think we 
definitely want Saied to succeed. It is in our national 
security and foreign policy interest. But, ultimately, just 
because some decisions may be popular or unpopular, it doesn't 
mean you can just sidestep the Constitution, in my opinion, 
Congressman.
    Mr. Burchett. All right.
    Anyone else?
    If not, I will yield back the remainder of time.
    But I would tell you, Eddy, that ``W'' up in your left-hand 
corner looks sort of like a ``WWE'' from the World Wrestling 
Enterprise. I know Congressman Deutch, being a semi-
professional wrestler himself, would have pointed that out to 
you if I hadn't already, so----
    Mr. Acevedo. Well, usually, Congressman, in Florida, we 
like to come off the top rope. So it is quite fitting.
    Mr. Burchett. I am a bionic-elbow man myself, but----
    Mr. Deutch. The gentleman has yielded the balance of his 
time. You are welcome in south Florida anytime, Mr. Burchett. 
And I am going to jump in before this hearing goes off the 
rails, some might say.
    Mr. Sherman, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
    We were all inspired by Tunisia in 2011, where a simple 
merchant, vegetable seller, started an Arab Spring. We all want 
to see all of the elements of democracy adhered to. But we are 
also cautioned by the success, on occasion, of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which believes in one person--actually, they 
probably just believe in one man--one vote, one time.
    And it is important that, as we coax Tunisia toward the 
full rule of law and constitutional principles, that we 
remember that the Muslim Brotherhood does indeed lurk, and, 
while they are willing to use democratic methods to take power, 
they are not willing to cede power.
    I was unable, for technical reasons, to hear one of our 
witnesses, Dr. Elie--well--A., so I read his testimony. And he 
said, in part--and those of you with the same technical issues 
may not have heard this--``Some have advocated for the removal 
of President Saied, but that would only embolden the Ennahda 
Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as remnant forces of 
the old regime, which has its own dangers and implications.''
    That may explain why the Biden administration has not 
labeled this as a coup, has not cut our relationship with 
Tunisia. It is easy to say that if there is any departure from 
exactly the way we would like to run things that we slam the 
table and we show how strong we are. But I think our witness 
from the Institute of Peace shows that strength without wisdom, 
while occasionally describing American policy, is not the 
policy that the Biden administration has pursued or should 
pursue.
    Mr. Acevedo reminds us that Tunisia has been a source of 
Islamic terrorists. We have talked about even how they get to 
Afghanistan. The U.N. said 5,800 were there just half a decade 
ago. And they were fighting for the Islamic State, rather, not 
necessarily in Afghanistan, more in Syria and Iraq. And, of 
course, these people have mostly gone back. So, as we work for 
all of the democracy that we would like to see, we certainly 
don't want to see those forces.
    It is interesting that President Saied is a constitutional 
lawyer. He has invoked Article 80--I don't know if he wrote 
it--which allows the President to take pretty much the measures 
he has taken if there is an imminent threat against the 
country's security and independence.
    Of course, that envisions a constitutional court that would 
oversee that process. Of course, for 7 years prior to Saied and 
under his opponents, they failed to form the constitutional 
court.
    The article also requires that the President guarantee as 
soon as possible a return to normal functioning of State 
institutions.
    So, Mr. Acevedo, some of the Tunisian Americans in my 
district have talked to me, and they envision that they would 
be a plebiscite for a new Constitution. This would, in a way, 
be a plebiscite on President Saied. But they would envision a 
Constitution more modeled after that of the United States than 
of France, with a strong President rather than a Prime 
Minister/Parliament system.
    It is hard to say that any system of government is 
undemocratic if it is modeled after ours. Had I been at the 
Constitutional Convention, I would have proposed a 
parliamentary system. But, then again, I would have been 
wearing a wig, and that would have been a benefit as well.
    So, Mr. Acevedo, what do you know about the possibility of 
a plebiscite on a Constitution that reflects President Saied's 
desire for more of a Presidential system?
    Mr. Acevedo. Thank you, Congressman.
    I think you hit a really good point, which is the question 
that I would ask, which is, what is it that President Saied--
and where does he want to go from here? And that is what we are 
missing in this equation.
    I think, from my standpoint we need the President to 
articulate a plan that is inclusive, a plan that does not 
exclude the political parties. And we need to ensure that 
during the reconciliation process he is talking to those who 
may support him and those who may oppose him, right? That is 
part of the democratic process.
    And I think it is also important to note that the message 
that we should be sending from the U.S.--obviously, President 
Saied is an important factor, but there is a whole political 
class in Tunisia that goes far beyond just one individual.
    And I just have to reiterate how important this hearing is, 
because I think the more we shine a spotlight on what is going 
on in Tunisia and especially the parliamentarian issue--of 
course, the U.S. Congress speaking about a parliamentarian 
issue in another country really sends a very strong message. So 
even after this hearing, I look forward to working with all of 
you to continue that pressure, because I think it is very much 
needed to help the Tunisian people.
    Mr. Sherman. Democracy, yes; Brotherhood, no.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman.
    And I now yield myself a time for questioning.
    I think I want to start with, Dr. Abouaoun, what would the 
Constitution and the government look like if President Saied 
implemented his longstanding beliefs?
    Dr. Abouaoun. Thank you.
    I guess the vision of unimpeded, I mean he did not flesh 
out very clearly. But, in general, what is known about the 
President is that he prefers a more popular direct democracy 
where there is a very strong emphasis on how much local 
structures (ph) have power versus how much central structures 
have power.
    And, obviously, he is using the dysfunction of the last ten 
years and the grievances of the people resulting from these 
dysfunctions to push for a Presidential regime, combined with 
this direct popular democracy.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Deutch. Ms. Arieff, do you have anything to add to 
that?
    Ms. Arieff. I agree that he has said different things at 
different times. I would note that he was not necessarily a 
direct actor in the drafting of the 2014 Constitution; he was a 
big critic, even at that time, of the direction that things 
took.
    He has, over the many years that he has been a professor 
and then public persona and then Presidential candidate, he has 
talked about a vision of local councils which would, in turn, 
select parliamentarians, so not through direct election of the 
legislature. And so he describes this as kind of power flowing 
upward from the ground instead of downward from a unified 
executive.
    At the same time, earlier this year, prior to his actions 
on July 25, he expressed support for returning to something 
like the 1959 Constitution, which is Tunisia's Constitution 
after independence, which was a strongly Presidentialist system 
with few checks and balances, so a very different political 
vision.
    I am curious if Amna has additional insight, but it is 
difficult to say.
    Mr. Deutch. Well----
    Dr. Guellali. I think----
    Mr. Deutch. Let me actually--I am going to turn to you, Dr. 
Guellali, but I want to put something else on the table first.
    Tunisian General Labor Union, UGTT, which is the main trade 
union federation, reportedly the country's largest independent 
organization, has been an influential organization in Tunisian 
society. It won a Nobel Peace Prize alongside other Tunisian 
civil society groups. It served as a channel for ordinary 
Tunisians' economic grievances and mediator of political 
disputes.
    And so UGTT President Tabboubi expressed qualified support 
for President Saied's actions after July 25, but the 
organization came out in opposition to his increased 
consolidation of power in September and referred to his actions 
as a ``danger to democracy.'' Nevertheless, President Saied 
says he is acting out of the will of the Tunisian people.
    So, Dr. Guellali, let me go to you now. How has civil 
society, more broadly, felt about President Saied's actions? 
And to what extent do you feel civil society is empowered to 
speak out and continue to play a role in what may come next?
    Dr. Guellali. Thank you very much, Chairman Deutch, for 
this question.
    I think civil society had a very diverging and varied 
reaction to the President's move on the 25th of July. Some, 
such as the powerful UGTT, the workers' union you were 
mentioning, considered that the move was necessary to put an 
end to the political paralysis, but they called on the 
President to initiate a negotiated and quick return to the 
democratic process. Other civil society groups condemned the 
decision to suspend the Parliament and considered that the 
President has acted outside of his constitutional powers.
    However, all civic forces in Tunisia today have expressed 
their desire to participate in the elaboration of the roadmap 
for the country. They have urged the President to create an 
open, inclusive, and consultative dialog with all stakeholders 
and with a timeframe for the next steps and the next stages for 
this situation.
    And, so far, the President has not responded to these 
demands and has even mocked calls for a roadmap. He has 
recently voted to have a dialog with the youth, especially in 
the forlorn regions of Tunisia, but has not so far unveiled a 
timeline or the forms of this dialog.
    So this is really--for civil society groups, it is really 
very important that they can participate in this dialog and can 
be part of forging the new system of governance. I believe that 
none of the civic groups in Tunisia has called for the 
reinstatement of the Parliament as it was, but they are calling 
for a new democratic--new parliamentary democracy, basically.
    Mr. Deutch. That is very helpful. Thank you very much.
    And one last question.
    Mr. Acevedo, Tunisia was a top local source of IS foreign 
fighters from 2014-2015, at the height of the group's 
territorial influence in Iraq and Syria. U.N. estimates that, 
in 2015, over 5,800 Tunisians were fighting for ISIS across the 
Middle East and North Africa. Many of these actors are now 
returning to Tunisia with no intention of giving up the fight.
    How could current political instability in Tunisia impact 
counterterrorism operations in the country? And if you would 
care to comment on how that might impact the rest of the 
region, especially Libya.
    Mr. Acevedo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It really comes down to recruitment. On the security side, 
my concern with Tunisia is, we have different elements in this 
pot that are exactly what we have seen before: a struggling 
economy; we have a youth bulge that cannot find jobs, so they 
have to find where to go to feed themselves and feed their 
families. And if the people start losing hope, then it could 
become a hotbed for recruitment for terrorist activities.
    Now, because of Tunisia's history and, kind of, where we 
were in 2013, 2015, on the recruitment side, all the elements 
are still there, which is why I am concerned that either the 
spillover effect from Libya or any potential consequence from a 
potential reemergence on the Afghanistan front can once again 
pop up in Tunisia and further destabilize the region.
    And we usually talk about the migration crisis kind of 
going north toward Europe, but let's not forget, we also have a 
security crisis on the Sahel, on the south of Tunisia, and that 
could be jeopardized, as well, if more recruitment is happening 
in that region.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Acevedo.
    And I want to thank all the witnesses for an important and 
robust discussion today about the situation in Tunisia.
    This isn't easy, obviously, but I think it is really 
important to recognize the United States can and, I think, 
really must stand firm in supporting the continued democratic 
transition in Tunisia, calling attention to concerning actions 
that President Saied has taken since July, and has demonstrated 
no intention of changing course of action, despite vocal 
concern from civil society and the international community.
    It is also our responsibility to not disregard the 
continued legitimate grievances of the Tunisian people and to 
use our voice and our vote and our assistance to strengthen 
Tunisia's ability to respond to the economic stagnation and 
terrorism challenges that they face. We all want to see a 
stable, prosperous Tunisia. We want to see the Tunisia in which 
people chart their own successful future.
    And, in sum, the purpose of this hearing is to talk about 
the importance of continuing to see Tunisia move forward in 
democratic fashion. Again, this is not easy, but all of our 
witnesses have offered really helpful and insightful analysis 
of what is happening now.
    We are grateful to you for your participation.
    I want to thank all the members for participating today.
    And, with that, this subcommittee hearing is now adjourned. 
Thanks very much, everyone.
    [Whereupon, at 2:46 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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