[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022
_______________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota, Chair
TIM RYAN, Ohio KEN CALVERT, California
C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio TOM COLE, Oklahoma
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas
DEREK KILMER, Washington ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
PETE AGUILAR, California JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
NOTE: Under committee rules, Ms. DeLauro, as chair of the full
committee, and Ms. Granger, as ranking minority member of the full
committee, are authorized to sit as members of all subcommittees.
Chris Bigelow, Walter Hearne, Brooke Barnard, Ariana Sarar, Jackie
Ripke,
David Bortnick, Matthew Bower, William Adkins, Jennifer Chartrand,
Hayden Milberg, Paul Kilbride, Shannon Richter, and Kyle McFarland
Subcommittee Staff
_____
PART 1
Page
Future Defense Spending, Pt. 1.............................. 1
U.S. Military Academies Overview............................ 69
Climate Change, National Security, and
the Arctic................................................... 169
Future Defense Spending, Pt. 2.............................. 233
U.S. Southern Command...................................... 333
_____
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-770 WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
----------
ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut, Chair
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio KAY GRANGER, Texas
DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
BARBARA LEE, California JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota KEN CALVERT, California
TIM RYAN, Ohio TOM COLE, Oklahoma
C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine CHUCK FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington
DEREK KILMER, Washington DAVID P. JOYCE, Ohio
MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
GRACE MENG, New York MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada
MARK POCAN, Wisconsin CHRIS STEWART, Utah
KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
PETE AGUILAR, California DAVID G. VALADAO, California
LOIS FRANKEL, Florida DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington
CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan
BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida
BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan BEN CLINE, Virginia
NORMA J. TORRES, California GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida MIKE GARCIA, California
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona ASHLEY HINSON, Iowa
ED CASE, Hawaii TONY GONZALES, Texas
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
JOSH HARDER, California
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
DAVID J. TRONE, Maryland
LAUREN UNDERWOOD, Illinois
SUSIE LEE, Nevada
Robin Juliano, Clerk and Staff Director
(ii)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022
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Wednesday, February 24, 2021.
FUTURE DEFENSE SPENDING
WITNESSES
MR. TODD HARRISON, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE BUDGET ANALYSIS, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
DR. THOMAS G. MAHNKEN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
MS. ELIZABETH FIELD, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Opening Statement of Chair McCollum
Ms. McCollum. Good morning.
This hearing is fully virtual, and so I am going to start
out with a couple of housekeeping matters.
For today's meeting, the chair or the staff designated by
the chair may mute participants' microphones when they are not
under recognition for the purpose of eliminating background
noise.
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves.
If you notice that you have not unmuted yourself when you are
talking, I will ask you to do that. If you can, indicate that
you need help by staff by just nodding. So if you want the
staff to unmute you, just nod.
I remind all members and witnesses that there is a 5-minute
clock and it still applies and it is located on the screen. And
if there is a technology issue, we are going to move right to
the next member until the issue is resolved. That member who
was interrupted, we will keep track of your time and you will
have your full time returned to you.
You will notice the clock on your screen and how much time
is remaining. At 1 minute, the clock will turn yellow. At 30
seconds remaining, I will gently tap the gavel to remind
members that their time has almost expired. And when your time
is expired, the clock will turn red and I will start to
recognize the other member.
In terms of speaking orders, we are going to follow the
order set by the House rules, beginning with the chair and the
ranking member. Then the members present at the time the
hearing is called to order, they will be recognized in order of
seniority. And, finally, members not present at the time of the
hearing is called to order.
Finally, the rules of the House require me to remind you
that we have set up an email address to which members can send
anything they wish to submit in writing to any of our hearings
or markups. The email address has been provided in advance to
your staff.
Now that I have got all the disclaimers out of the way, I
welcome everyone to our first official committee activity of
the year. So I am going to go right into my remarks and keep
them a little brief here.
Because of the delay in the release of President Biden's
fiscal 2022 budget, over the next few months we will be hearing
from a diverse number of viewpoints on emerging threats, on
regions that deserve more attention, and defense spending at
large. The information will help us later this year when we
analyze the budget request. This is the first of those hearings
that we will hold to examine the larger issues impacting this
subcommittee.
Today's hearing, we will focus on the possible future of
defense spending. We will not only look at the direction the
Pentagon may take us in the next 5 years, known as the Future
Years Defense Program, but we also stand to benefit by thinking
where we want to go, where we want to be in 10 or 20 years from
now. And that way, when we write the 2022 Defense
Appropriations Act, we will do so with medium and long-term
goals in mind.
This is a new era for our committee. We have a new
President in the White House and new leadership in the
Department of Defense, and in Congress 64 percent of the
Members of the House were elected after the Budget Control Act
was enacted, something which I didn't vote for. And this will
be the first time in 10 years we will be preparing a budget
without the caps and the firewalls on defense and nondefense
investment that the Budget Control placed on Congress.
So these hearings provide us a great opportunity to
reassess what our future national security priorities are both
on defense and nondefense side, because we know the investments
on domestic priorities, like education and workforce
development, directly impact America's national security and
America's workforce.
How do we know to work with the Biden administration in a
way that allows us to shape and be more diverse with the
workforce in the Department of Defense that reflects our
changing fabric of America? What kind of defense budget do we
want to see, not only in fiscal year 2022, but how do we shape
our national priorities 5 and 10 years out? And, yes, how do we
take a hard look or even cut strategically unnecessary,
outdated programs that just aren't working or just aren't
necessary?
As appropriators who make critical decisions on where our
tax dollars will be used, we have a responsibility to ask these
questions. That is the work of this committee, and we will
tackle it in the months ahead. I look forward to the
contributions of every member on the subcommittee as we do
that.
But today we have three witnesses. Elizabeth Field,
Director of Defense Capabilities and Management at the U.S.
Government Accountability Office. And we have Mr. Todd
Harrison, Director of Defense Budget Analysis at the Center for
Strategic Studies. And Mr. Thomas Mahnken, President and CEO of
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
They are going to kind of set up where the Pentagon is at
right now, today. And then we will have, as I said, future
discussions on where to go and ideas about what we can do
differently in the future.
I welcome all the testifiers today.
But first I want to give a few minutes to my good friend
and our ranking member, Chairman Calvert, for his opening
statement.
Mr. Calvert.
Opening Remarks of Mr. Calvert
Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
And first I would like to start off by congratulating our
new chair. Not only is she our new chair, she is a good friend
and a trusted partner over the years. And I am looking forward
to seeing what we all can accomplish in the subcommittee with
her at the helm.
Next, I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before us
today. Your input is invaluable as we consider the important
topics in great detail.
This hearing today couldn't come at a more critical moment.
As the 2018 National Defense Strategy tells us, we are in an
era of great power competition, primarily with China, who is
investing in military capabilities at an extremely alarming
rate.
This competition is largely the lens through which the
Department prioritizes its resources, and rightfully so. I
believe without question that we should continue to prioritize
key modernization and readiness efforts that equip and prepare
us decisively to win a war against a peer adversary.
However, we as a Nation continue to ask more of our
military than just preparing for this type of conflict. As we
are winding down our troops in the Middle East, we are still
engaged in counter-extremist operations, low-intensity
conflicts around the world that require significant manpower
and resources.
We are also in the age of rapidly evolving technology, like
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, capabilities that
will drastically change the nature of warfare in ways currently
inconceivable to us. Developments in cyber warfare and space
pose significant and expensive challenges to our Nation.
For years we have asked our military to do more and do it
with less. While Congress has provided significant funding for
the Department of Defense in recent years, it would be
shortsighted of us not to recognize that budget instability and
unpredictability is also a great threat to our military
readiness and modernization efforts.
While I believe that most Members of Congress understand
the important results yielded by current defense spending
levels, I also know that many of my colleagues are seeking to
significantly decrease defense spending.
Even with a flatline budget, we have to begin the hard work
of aligning budget priorities with the realities of the future.
This will mean divesting legacy systems, reforming the way that
DOD does business, making significant reforms to both civilian
and uniform personnel end strength, and preparing for the
conflicts of the future.
I look forward to hearing from our experts on these issues
and to begin the budget process for the upcoming fiscal year.
And again, Chair, I would like to thank you for bringing
these witnesses before us today, and I will yield back the
balance of my time.
Ms. McCollum. I thank you very much, Ranking Member
Calvert.
As of right now I am not seeing Chair Rosa DeLauro of the
full committee or Ranking Member Kay Granger of the full
committee, so we will get just right into testimony. And if
they join us, we will give them the courtesy of making any
statements.
So I am very happy to say that we are hearing first from
Elizabeth Field from GAO.
Thank you, Ms. Field, for being with us. I found reading
through the report a lot of questions that I now have for folks
when they come into the office from the Pentagon, some good,
hard ones.
So thank you for your testimony. Please begin.
Summary Statement of Ms. Field
Ms. Field. Thank you, Chair McCollum, Ranking Member
Calvert, and members and staff of the subcommittee. I really
appreciate this invitation, and it truly is an honor to testify
before you on this important subject today.
Today's hearing comes at a time of significant challenge
for our country. As you know, this week marked more than
500,000 Americans lost to COVID-19. This deadly pandemic has
exacerbated what is already an unsustainable long-term fiscal
path for our Nation, caused by an imbalance between revenue and
spending.
As the single largest category of discretionary spending,
the defense budget is likely to play a large role in any
discussion of future Federal spending. These discussions will
consider difficult questions about what our top priorities are
for national security, what tradeoffs we can and are willing to
make, and what our long-term vision is for defense spending.
It is not, of course, GAO's role to answer those policy
questions. So I would like to focus my remarks this morning on
a few key areas where we think DOD can and should improve its
management of defense spending, regardless of where the defense
top line lands in fiscal year 2022 and beyond.
First, DOD must improve its overall budgeting and execution
of funds. Each year DOD allows billions of dollars appropriated
by Congress to expire, and a lot of this funding ends up being
canceled. Between fiscal year 2013 and 2018, DOD canceled more
than $81 billion, returning those funds to the general
Treasury.
This problem indicates both that DOD needs to better
estimate its annual budget requirements and ensure that it has
better systems in place to use the funds it receives consistent
with congressional direction.
Second, DOD must more clearly define its future resource
requirements related to Overseas Contingency Operations, or
OCO. In its fiscal year 2021 budget request, DOD estimated that
$48.5 billion of its $69 billion request for OCO was for
enduring or base requirements, and DOD's long-range forecasts
reflect these enduring costs as part of the Department's base
budget. However, we know very little about what makes up these
enduring costs or how they were calculated.
Given the expiration of the 2011 budget caps, as you noted,
Chair McCollum, and the changing nature of contingency
operations around the world, it is imperative that the
Department bring greater transparency to its use of these
funds.
Third, DOD must continue efforts to reduce improper
payments. When we have examined DOD programs vulnerable to
improper payments, we have found substantial weaknesses that
needed to be addressed.
For example, in 2018, GAO identified problems with how DOD
was estimating improper payments in military pay, calling into
question the accuracy of its assessment and its usefulness in
developing corrective action plans.
DOD has since implemented all of the recommendations we
made as a result of this review. However, in the last fiscal
year alone, the Department estimated that it paid about $11.4
billion in improper payments, indicating that this continues to
be an area for improvement.
Strengthening the Department's overall financial
management, an area that has been on GAO's high-risk list since
1995, would undoubtedly help with this problem. DOD is, as you
know, the only major Federal agency that has been unable to
receive a clean audit opinion on its financial statement.
Last but certainly not least, DOD must pay serious
attention to strengthening and refining its Department-wide
business reform efforts. For more than a decade, the Department
has sought to find efficiencies. But many of these so-called
reform initiatives have fallen short of expectations.
The most recent such initiative, Secretary Esper's zero-
based review, did identify about $37 billion in savings, and
the fact that we could see those savings figures reflected in
the Department's budget documents was notable progress.
But we also found that some of these savings were not
really the result of reform. For example, some were the result
of delayed contracts, costs that will still be realized in
future years.
True business reform means fundamentally transforming the
way the Department does business across the board, and it will
take sustained senior leadership commitment. Given the recent
elimination of the Chief Management Officer position at DOD, it
remains to be seen how the Department will sustain recent
progress in this area.
In sum, DOD has key opportunities to better execute the
funds it has appropriated, to more reliably and transparently
determine its resource needs, to safeguard funds from waste by
reducing improper payments and strengthening financial
management practices, and to maximize efficiency through
meaningful business reform.
Taking these steps would give both DOD and Congress greater
assurance that as strategic choices are made about tradeoffs
and where to prioritize investments, those investments that are
made will be put to best use.
Thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to
your questions.
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Ms. McCollum. Thank you. Thank you so much for that. And
you made me make a whole list of questions to ask, as I said,
when we move forward.
Next we are going to hear from Mr. Harrison.
And I really, in reading what you put forward, really the
takeaway was how we are getting less for more.
So please address the committee. Thank you for being here.
Summary Statement of Mr. Harrison
Mr. Harrison. Thank you.
Chair McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for inviting
me to testify today on the future of the defense budget.
But to understand what lies ahead for the Department of
Defense, we must first look at how we got to where we are.
Adjusting for inflation, the defense budget today is higher
than it was at the peak of the Reagan buildup in 1985, but the
size of the force is smaller by nearly any measure. The number
of aircraft in the Air Force inventory today is 43 percent less
than in 1985, the number of the battle force ships in the Navy
is 46 percent lower, and the Army total force is 33 percent
smaller.
The trend is clear: We are spending more for less. The
driving factors behind this trend are higher personnel costs
and the steadily increasing costs of operating and maintaining
our weapon systems.
From 2000 to 2012, the average cost per Active-Duty
servicemember grew at a compound annual rate of 3.6 percent
above inflation, and that excludes war-related compensation
costs.
Since 2012, the cost per person has held relatively steady
thanks to reforms enacted by Congress to arrest the growth in
healthcare, retirement, and other personnel costs.
We see similar trends in operation and maintenance.
Excluding healthcare and war-related costs, the O&M cost per
person in the military has grown at a compound annual rate of
2.6 percent above inflation all the way back since the end of
World War II.
Over the past 20 years, the Air Force's O&M cost per plane
grew by 157 percent above inflation. The Army's O&M cost per
soldier grew by 117 percent. And the Navy's O&M cost per ship
grew by 99 percent.
When the committee hears senior civilian and military
leaders talking about the need for 3 to 5 percent real annual
growth in the defense budget, these are some of the reasons
why. A flat defense budget leads to difficult tradeoffs among
readiness, force structure, and modernization.
But this is a false choice. We should not accept steadily
growing O&M and personnel costs as a fact of life. It is an
unsustainable trend that over time will lead to a progressively
smaller and less capable force.
Increasing the defense budget without addressing this
underlying trend merely delays the day of reckoning. We must
attack the problem at its core, however painful and unpopular
that may be.
While there is no one answer or magic bullet that can fix
these problems that have been decades in the making, my
recommendation is to focus on three priorities going forward
that can bring us closer to the answers we need.
The first priority should be improving the way DOD measures
and reports readiness. Despite previous attempts at reforming
the readiness reporting system, the military continues to
measure readiness primarily in terms of the resources applied--
inputs--rather than the performance achieved--outputs.
DOD should instead develop performance-based readiness
metrics derived from the existing mission-essential task lists
for each different type of unit.
For its part, Congress should require DOD to submit more
detailed budget justification documents for O&M accounts. The
current O-1 documents do not provide sufficient detail to show
operating costs by platform or unit type, and they do not
include cost projections for future years. This lack of
transparency limits effective oversight.
A second priority should be to conduct a strategically
scoped roles and missions review. Without clearly assigned
roles and missions, gaps in capabilities can emerge where no
service claims responsibility and precious resources can be
wasted on redundancies among the services.
This review should be narrowly focused on the gaps,
overlaps, and areas of ambiguity that stem from the creation of
the Space Force, advances in new technologies, changes in
current military missions, and the emergence of new mission
areas that are strategically important to DOD.
A third priority is to identify and build consensus around
the crown jewels of the future force.
One of the key enablers needed to prevail in conflict over
the next 5 to 10 years is the ability to share data fluidly
across forces to provide a more complete picture of the battle
space, what has become known as JADC2, Joint All-Domain Demand
and Control.
The nodes and connectors of this network are critical to
making it a reality, and this is where I believe the crown
jewels of the future force can be found.
The future force requires stealthy long-range aircraft,
resilient communication links, robust space defenses, highly
proliferated constellations of satellites, long-range air and
missile defense systems, and light-footprint ground forces that
can operate within and on the edges of contested areas.
In conclusion, the budgetary and strategic challenges we
face today are significant. But I remain optimistic, because
the main obstacles to our success are within our control.
Making the hard choices now will prevent us from having to make
even harder choices in the future.
I thank you and look forward to your questions.
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Ms. McCollum. Thank you. Thank you very much.
And finally we are going to hear from Dr. Mahnken. And Dr.
Mahnken has kind of worked out some scenarios for what may or
may not be decisions the Pentagon would make with different
budget scenarios.
Dr. Mahnken, welcome. Thank you.
Summary Statement of Mr. Mahnken
Mr. Mahnken. Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for your
invitation to appear before you today to discuss future defense
spending.
Chairwoman McCollum, as you noted, my testimony today draws
upon the results of a recent series of budgetary exercises that
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the
Ronald Reagan Institute organized with a really distinguished,
bipartisan group of leading defense policy and budget experts
in October 2020.
We gathered a group of current and former policymakers,
current and former legislators, folks from industry, various
perspectives.
And these sessions assessed the impact of fiscally
constrained adjustments to U.S. defense strategy and military
forces over the coming decade. And each team used our Strategic
Choices Tool to implement changes in U.S. defense spending over
the next 10 years.
And here I would particularly like to acknowledge Todd
Harrison, who really developed the first iteration of the tool
during his time at CSBA. We are now in the third iteration of
that tool.
Essentially, what it does is it instantiates the Future
Years Defense Program, the FYDP, over the next 5 years, and
then a notional FYDP after that. So it allows users to make
choices, the types of strategic choices that we are talking
about, based on an overall level of budget. So you can add or
subtract programs from the budget and see what the implications
are.
Specifically, the teams were asked to use the tool to
adjust U.S. defense spending under two distinct budget
scenarios. The first was an immediate 10 percent cut to defense
spending, followed by annual inflation increases. And the
second was an annual 3 percent increase in defense spending, as
called for by former Defense Secretary Mattis, former Chairman
Dunford, and the congressionally mandated National Defense
Strategy Commission.
I am going to focus on the former scenario, the budget cut,
and just say briefly what we found.
In the 10 percent defense cut scenario, teams were required
to cut $444 billion in the first 5 years, the first FYDP, from
fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2026, and $200 billion more in
the second 5 years, fiscal year 2027 to 2031, relative to the
PB21 defense budget.
Now, this budgetary target forced participants to make some
heroic political and strategic assumptions. For example, teams
had to make large-scale cuts to personnel, force structure, and
modernization.
Moreover, the force that remained after these cuts was
incapable of carrying out the current National Defense
Strategy. It lacked the ability to respond to the range of
military contingencies that the United States could reasonably
expect to face and was too small and brittle to respond to
unforeseen challenges.
Let me start with the areas that participants chose to
invest in, even in this down-budget scenario.
Teams began by identifying their top strategic priorities,
things that were must-haves and even needed to be plussed up.
These included nuclear modernization. Nearly all teams
chose to preserve all elements of the nuclear triad.
Attack submarines was another area of emphasis. All teams
chose either to maintain or increase the size of the attack
submarine fleet, believing that these platforms are critical
for operating forward in the face of increasingly capable
adversaries.
All teams also emphasized unmanned assets, to include
attritable systems. Participants believed that unmanned sea and
air platforms should be procured in sufficient numbers for a
protracted conflict against a capable adversary.
And then, finally, teams maximized the joint force's
ability to deliver precise long-range fires from land, sea, and
air.
So those were areas where the teams believed we needed to
double down.
To generate the resources necessary for those priorities,
teams made some difficult offsetting cuts, including to
tactical fighter aircraft, aircraft carriers, ground force
structure, and personnel.
All teams reduced heavily planned procurement of tactical
aviation. Although most teams wanted to focus on legacy fourth-
generation aircraft, they were ultimately forced to reduce
fifth-generation aircraft to find needed cost savings.
All teams also chose to reduce the aircraft carrier fleet
by 2, bringing the total down from 11 to 9 ships. Although
partially driven by an effort to move towards a more
distributed fleet, this was also a budget-driven decision to
generate cost savings.
All teams also cut Army force structure, with average cuts
of four Armored Brigade Combat Teams, six Infantry Brigade
Combat Teams, and five Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.
And then, finally, teams made large reductions to civilian
personnel and military end strength. Now, about half of these
cuts were embedded in the divestment of platforms and force
structure, but teams also made standalone cuts to personnel.
All teams cut the contractor and civilian workforce,
resulting in reductions of approximately 10 percent and 30
percent, respectively.
So some pretty severe cuts, and the implications of those
cuts were several. One of the most important was that a 10
percent budget cut would jeopardize the Defense Department's
ability to maintain a force that can win one war while
deterring another, which is really the basis of our current
National Defense Strategy.
For example, the decision to cut force structure might lead
the United States to emphasize one great power competitor over
another, but with the conflict's outcome still highly
uncertain. All teams chose to accept the greatest risk in
Europe, while maintaining or expanding forward presence in the
Pacific.
The United States would thus face the possibility of not
merely having a one-war force, but a force designed for a
particular geographic region. And even there I think
participants questioned our ability to prevail in some of the
scenarios that we might encounter.
The cut would also force a real stark choice between force
structure and modernization, would result in increased strain
in the remaining force. And we also had concerns over the
economic impact of these cuts on the defense industrial base
and the broader national security innovation base.
I am happy to go into these results at greater depth. Also
happy to talk about the alternative scenario, the increase
scenario. But hopefully this has laid the table for a good
discussion with the committee.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
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Ms. McCollum. Great. Thank you.
I have got a couple of questions, but I am just going to
ask one for now and save one for later so we can get around to
other members. And this one is for Ms. Field.
Overseas Contingency Operations
So you in your testimony talked quite a bit about, when I
was reading through it, the Overseas Contingency Operations
account there. And you talked about how DOD and Congress needs
a clear determination of DOD's future resource requirements,
especially how they are going to incorporate the enduring
Overseas Contingency Operation.
When I was in the statehouse, we called those tails, you
know. We always said, you know, this is how much it is going to
cost. Now what are the tails?
So part of what you put out there are some scenarios of how
to have more transparency. So lots of times, I think, when
Members are voting on Overseas Contingency, they kind of tend
to think of it as a 1-year account, a 1-year expense, and quite
often sometimes it is. But other times it does have these
enduring costs to it.
So with fiscal year 2020 and 2021, with base and OCO
spending increased by $2.5 billion, and just looking at the OCO
part of it, what would be some of the things, if we are going
to have real, clear accounting as we look to make cuts and
changes in defense spending, for the committee tell a little
bit some of the concerns that GAO was raising to the Pentagon
so that there would be full transparency in the enduring costs
or tails of the Overseas Contingency Fund.
Ms. Field. Sure. So there are a lot of really important
issues there, and I think you hit on a lot of them.
I think fundamentally a concern that we had is transparency
and what exactly the Department intends to use these funds for.
A few years ago we made a recommendation to the Department
that they move enduring OCO costs into the base budget, and
they have started doing that, which is, I think, positive
because if there are costs that are expected to last for
several years it would make sense that they would be in the
base budget.
That said, when we look at the budget request and the
justification for the budget, there is not a lot of detail in
there about these funds. So a fundamental recommendation to the
Department would be use this opportunity of the budget cap
expiring to be more transparent and detailed about what these
funds are going to be used for.
You noted--and I will just very briefly cover this--you
noted that we have made or we have offered some options that
are open not just to the Department, but to Congress, for
ensuring better rigor in how the Department uses OCO funding.
And I will just mention a couple of them.
One would be for Congress to use legally binding language
in the annual appropriations act to very clearly specify the
purposes for which the funds could be used. There is right now
general language about how OCO funds can be used, but it is not
legally binding and it is certainly not very specific.
Another would be to create separate appropriation accounts.
Right now, even though they are called something different,
they are put into the same account, which can make it hard to
track them.
There are a lot of others issues here, but I will stop
there, and hopefully that was an answer to your question.
Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you.
Gentlemen, to our other testifiers, I will save my--I have
got a really good question for you, but I am going to, like I
said, because other people are attending hearings and that, I
am going to turn to Mr. Calvert for a question he might have.
Civilian Workforce
Mr. Calvert. Well, those of you who know me probably know
that the first thing I will delve into is cost figures.
Any time you have a large organization--and, of course,
this is probably the largest enterprise that we are involved
in, in the United States Government, is the Department of
Defense--and obviously the biggest cost is personnel, both
uniform and civilian.
And right now many of you already know that we have the
highest ratio of civilian employees relative to uniform
employees in the history of the Pentagon. And, obviously, that
is not something that can be sustained, and I suspect that--I
know a lot of thought has been put into this. But I think I
will ask the question for the panel.
How do we bring the civilian workforce back into a ratio
that has been historically what we have had? And by the way, I
think it would actually create much more efficiencies within
the Department if we could delve into that problem.
So I will just listen to the answers. Thank you.
Who would like to take it first?
Mr. Harrison. I would be happy to jump in there first.
You know, I think you are right that we do need to take a
very hard look at the size and scope and the use of the DOD
civilian workforce. I would urge some caution, though.
First of all, if you look at the average cost per DOD
civilian, it is actually lower than the average cost per
Active-Duty military personnel. So we need to be careful in
looking at are we eliminating civilian jobs and that work will
then be done by a more expensive military person, because that
is not going to save us money in the long run.
Also, we need to remember that about 95 percent of the DOD
civilian workforce is outside of the Pentagon, outside of the
DC area. Many of them are actually employed in the various
government owned and operated depots around the country where
they are performing essentially blue collar types of jobs.
Mr. Calvert. If I could interrupt just for a second. I am
not talking about depots. My friend, Mr. Cole, is probably
listening to this and jumping out of his chair.
I am talking about primarily the middle management
bureaucracy within the Department itself. And, by the way, not
just through the Department of Defense, through the
intelligence agencies and through the entire enterprise. And,
it is fast. It is at the historic high.
And I understand the value of civilian employees. But how
do we justify a ratio that is significantly higher than any
time in the history of the Pentagon?
Mr. Harrison. Well, I guess my point is that ratio, that it
is at the highest level relative to the Active-Duty force,
includes all of those blue collar, depot-related civilian
workers, right?
If you are just looking at that middle management--and I
agree with you----
Mr. Calvert. Let's just take the depot out of this. But it
is across--I am talking about across the enterprise.
Mr. Harrison. Yeah, if you look at that middle management,
it is actually a pretty small percentage of the overall DOD
civilian workforce. And absolutely we should look at ways to
reduce that. I don't think you are going to find the savings,
though, the magnitude of the savings that we need to address a
lot of our challenges going forward.
Mr. Calvert. The civilian, the Business Board disagrees
with you on that.
Mr. Harrison. Well, if you are referring to the Defense
Business Board report from I think it was about 5 or 6 years
ago, if you look carefully at their methodology, what they did
is they looked at all of the overhead-related functions in DOD,
they summed up the dollar amount, and then they made a massive
assumption.
They said that in the private sector they can generally
trim about 5 percent from overhead functions, and then they
applied that 5 percent to overhead functions at DOD. That is
how they arrived at their $25 billion-a-year savings estimate,
$125 billion over 5 years.
So they did not actually identify specific functions and
specific DOD civilian offices and head counts that could be
reduced. They just made a big assumption based on their
experience doing similar things in the private sector.
Now, with that said, I think there are significant savings
to be achieved----
Mr. Calvert. I know my time has expired. But I know that a
number of comptrollers in the Department of Defense that have
been in the past disagree. They believe that the civilian
workforce can be brought--you know, a cut of 5 percent, I am a
business guy, that is a doable thing in a large organization.
So with that, Madam Chair, I will yield the balance of my
time.
Ms. McCollum. To be continued, I am sure, Mr. Calvert.
And a lot of the folks that I found that were some of the
civilian employees, when we started mobilizing for Afghanistan
and Iraq were also dual-hatters, where they had a position
where they also were in the Guard or the Reserve as well.
Mr. Ruppersberger is having technical problems. We are
trying to work those out. And hopefully he just might be--he is
driving in and he is having problems with the video. And so we
just might go to audio. But we are going to skip Mr.
Ruppersberger just for a minute now.
And so I am going to go to Mr. Kilmer, and then Mr. Rogers
will be next.
Mr. Kilmer.
Climate Change Resilience
Mr. Kilmer. Thanks, Madam Chair.
For my first question, I was hoping to direct it to Mr.
Harrison.
I keep thinking about that old FRAM oil filter commercial,
``Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later.'' It seems like we have some
issues related to the resiliency of some of our infrastructure
that sort of fits that tagline.
I think about our Naval installations, including in my
district, Naval Base Kitsap and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in
my district. They are already facing climate-related
challenges, like sea level rise and coastal erosion and more
frequent and severe storms that really threaten the safety of
workers and, frankly, risk jeopardizing some of these critical
defense assets.
The shipyard at Puget is the Navy's only dry dock on the
West Coast that is capable of completing carrier repairs and
retrofits, and it plays a very outsized role in supporting our
Nation's defense posture in the Pacific.
So recognizing the threats that are facing not just the
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard but the other public shipyards, the
Navy released its Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan, or
SIOP, in 2018, which is a 20-year, $21 billion effort to
revitalize and modernize those shipyards to increase climate
resilience and improve resistance to seismic events.
Personally, I think it is really important for Congress and
the DOD to work together to keep SIOP on track to shore up that
critical infrastructure, to address any deficiencies at the
shipyards, to protect our defense posture in the face of any
sort of unpredictable and, frankly, an evolving climate or we
will pay later.
So my question, Mr. Harrison, as a budget analyst is, what
do you recommend Congress can do to ensure that that Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization now Program and other similar
resiliency plans can stay on track over not just the next 10-
year trajectory but also the 20-year proposed plan?
Mr. Harrison. Thank you, Representative Kilmer.
I think you raise an excellent point, and it is broader
than just the Navy and the shipyards. Since the Budget Control
Act was enacted and went into enforcement in 2013, the
Department of Defense has repeatedly and consistently
shortchanged funding for bases and maintenance and military
construction, and we continue to see that in the fiscal year
2021 request that was released last year.
It is an easy piggy bank to go to, because you can rob some
money from it now and promise to pay it back in the future. But
as you note, the longer you delay the critical maintenance that
is needed in a lot of these facilities, the more it will end up
costing in the long run. This is something we need to look at
Department-wide.
And I will raise an ugly word that the committee probably
doesn't want to hear: BRAC, Base Realignment and Closure. That
is something the Department has got to look at.
Now, if you look at the numbers produced by DOD, the Navy
is not the service that is in need of a BRAC. It is primarily
we see excess bases and facilities in the Air Force and in the
Army.
And so I think that should be part of the next defense
strategy, is taking a hard look at where can we consolidate,
where can we close some of our bases and facilities to reduce
the costs that we incur every year to maintain these facilities
that we don't actually need and are not critical to our force,
so that we can redirect those resources into more critical base
maintenance and military construction activities that are
needed.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.
Healthcare
With my remaining time, Ms. Field, I know that healthcare
costs are a strain for the DOD just like they are a strain for
everybody else. I have been hearing concerns from folks in my
district that DOD health facilities in our neck of the woods
won't have the capacity to treat retirees, both on TRICARE for
Life and TRICARE Prime insurance plans, as part of the Military
Health System reform due to a reduction in billets.
I am concerned about how staffing cuts, for example, again,
in my neck of the woods at Bremerton Naval Hospital, at Madigan
Army Medical Center, will impact access to care in the
communities I represent.
In fact, over the past year Bremerton Naval Hospital
reduced manning levels by about 100 personnel, with those
Active-Duty billets being removed from Bremerton's manning
document and those positions no longer being refilled when
members retire or transfer or separate.
And that is not unique to Bremerton Naval Hospital. Those
cuts are already impacting access to care for retirees who have
dedicated their life to defending our country.
So my question is, what steps would you recommend to ensure
that the Military Health System reform accomplishes its goals
of streamlining the system and enhancing medical force
readiness and providing access to quality care without
sacrificing services to people who have earned those services?
Ms. Field. Thank you.
So my colleagues in the defense group have looked quite a
lot at this issue of defense health reform, and as a result of
some of their reviews I think there has been a bit of a pause
in sort of how this reform is rolling out, and I think in large
part because of some of the same concerns that you just
identified.
My colleague, Brenda Farrell, and her team have an ongoing
review right now looking more closely at military treatment
facilities and what is going on with them. When that work comes
out, I think they will have some particular recommendations
focused on what you are interested in.
I am sorry that I don't have a more detailed answer for you
right now. But, bottom line, I think your question is well-
taken. The concerns are valid. And in general we would like to
see the Department have a more clearly defined strategic plan,
performance measures, ways to monitor how the reform effort is
being rolled out.
I would also very quickly say in response to your question
about climate resilience, we have, as you know, put the
government's fiscal exposure due to climate change on our High-
Risk List and DOD is a key player in that. Two things we have
seen.
First, the Department has not necessarily clearly
identified which of its installations and other parts of
infrastructure across the different services are most at risk
because of climate change. And so that would be an important
place for them to start.
We have also found that the Department has not done mission
assurance for commercial assets that have been deemed critical
to determine what their vulnerability is to climate change.
So I just wanted to add that point very quickly.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.
Thanks. I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Kilmer.
I was with the Acting Secretary of the Army yesterday and
healthcare came up. So we are going to take some time and do a
deep dive on healthcare. And we will work with GAO and see if
we can time it with the report, because sometimes they like to
wait until they are done before they comment. But we will work
with your office to make sure that that happens.
We are also going to be having in one of our future
hearings discussions, food for thought, we are going to talk
about climate change resiliency and energy use.
So all good things and things that we have to take in
account when we are doing our budget.
Mr. Rogers.
China
Mr. Rogers. Congratulations to you, Madam Chair, for
assumption of this heavy chore of leading this great
subcommittee.
Let me talk to you about China, which is on everyone's mind
these days.
In its first month, the Biden administration started a
review of its strategy toward China. The Department has
established a task force to provide a baseline assessment of
its policies and programs related to China.
A lot of our defense spending obviously is to counter our
adversaries' spending on programs. Consequently, we need to
know what our near-peer China is doing in its defense policies
and spending.
My question to any of the panelists. How do we know what
China is spending on what we would call defense? I mean, they
use PLA money for their trade policies, the Belt and Road
Initiative, around the world, which indirectly, I suppose,
could be considered defense. But in our definition of defense
it would not qualify.
So how are we determining what China is actually spending
on actual defense, what we would need to prepare to counter?
Mr. Mahnken. Congressman Rogers, I will take a first crack
at that, because I think that is an excellent question.
In the U.S. case not all defense spending is in the defense
budget, right? We have part of it in DOE with the nuclear
budget, for example.
And if we think about China's spending on national
security, the way they define it, I think actually a majority
of their spending is not on the People's Liberation Army, but
it is also--a majority of their spending is actually on
internal security, organizations like the People's Armed
Police. Plus, I think, yeah, they have spending in various
places.
So getting a good understanding of the Chinese defense
budget is a real challenge. We actually have an effort ongoing
right now to get a better understanding of that and to be able
to look at the strategic choices that China may face, just as I
briefed you on the U.S. side.
At one level, again, if you are talking about how much does
it cost China to procure a fifth-generation aircraft, that is
the type of thing that you can figure out, because we still in
the 21st century pay for aircraft by the pound, we still pay
for ships by the ton.
There may be some cost savings. There are definitely some
cost savings through their theft of our intellectual property.
But still there are things that they have to pay for.
And I would agree with you that getting a better
understanding of their costs, what they are spending on, can
give us a sense of what they value. Also, getting a better
sense of what they are spending can go give us maybe some
strategic options for dealing with them.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I mean, the expenditures that they are
using to fund their cybersecurity efforts against the U.S. and
others, that is a huge problem for us and for the world and for
the future of the economy of China and the U.S. And yet we
don't have any idea, I don't think, of how much money they are
actually spending trying to break through cyber matters.
What do you say to that?
Mr. Mahnken. I would agree. I think they--they are imposing
lots of costs on us. We should be thinking about how we can
impose costs on them.
You know, they are forcing us to do all sorts of things
that are expensive and difficult, and they have over the years.
We need to be thinking about how to do the same to them. Yeah,
I would agree with you.
Mr. Rogers. But at the moment they are cleaning our clock
economically, militarily, socially. So I welcome the commission
that the administration is establishing, focusing on the real
big problems our country faces in the near future.
Madam Chair, thank you.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Next, we have Mr. Cuellar.
Russia and China Influence
Mr. Cuellar. Chairwoman, thank you so much.
And to our witnesses, I want to thank you.
My issue has been how do we explain that the United
States--and I am very supportive of the military--but how do we
spend more money than China, Russia, and the other countries
combined and it still seems like they, with less money than we
spend--and I know a lot of it goes to our military benefits. I
understand all of that. But my issue is we spend more money
than they do, but they seem to be in more places than we are.
For example, one of the things that I am waiting for is I
am waiting for an assessment that I added on the National
Defense Authorization to see what we are doing in Latin
America. And I will be happy to share this with everybody
later.
My concern is that, as we are looking at other places of
the world, in our own backyard we have got--starting to get a
heavy influence of Russians, but mainly Chinese.
For example, out of the 31 countries in Latin America, 25
host Chinese infrastructure projects, 56 port projects. Weapons
that got sent have been sold. Seventeen out of the 31 countries
in Latin America are part of the One Belt, One Road loans that
China has provided since 2007, $155 billion.
And then the same thing, you know, what they have done in
Panama, they have done IT smart cities. They have done early
warning radars. They have sent out their Peace Ark hospital
ship.
In Argentina they have a space tracking station where they
have about 99 percent access and the Argentinians don't have
anything.
Mexico is buying a huge amount of vaccines from the Chinese
and the Russians. You know, this is just right across the
border itself.
So my question, as we look at the trends, is we are
spending all this money on our military, combined more than the
Chinese and the Russians and a couple of other countries, but
they seem to be all over the world and especially in my--in our
own backyard. I live on the border. So I told John Carter I
don't just go visit there for a few hours. I live there every
day. So I talk to folks that come in across the border.
How do we explain this as a trend, for any of the
witnesses, Elizabeth, Tom, whoever wants to take this on, and
especially what is happening in our own backyard? It is pretty
scary, guys.
Mr. Mahnken. Well, Congressman, if I could lead off. I
mean, I would agree with you. I was--now it is actually--it is
going on a year and a half, I was in Bolivia, in Cochabamba.
And just going through the airport in Bolivia, all of the
scanning equipment, all of the security equipment was donated
by the PRC, including facial recognition technology, all sorts
of things like that.
I think the United States needs to be very active. We need
to be active close to home and far from home.
Now, of course the military is just one instrument to do
that. And, frankly, the U.S. Government and government
assistance is only one set of instruments to do that. I think
our strength as a Nation is not just with the government, but
it is with private industry. We need to be working with private
industry to build those ties.
I think where government can help is that a lot of places
seek Chinese assistance because there is no strings attached.
We need to stick with our principles.
Or I think also the more that the Chinese are out and
about, the more resentment grows. I think America by and large
has a good reputation overseas because we have ethics, we have
laws, we stick to our laws.
And the complaints that I have heard in Central America, in
particular in El Salvador, where the government shifted its
recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, was a sense of betrayal on
the part of a lot of Salvadoran businessmen who had spent a lot
of time building relationships with businessmen on Taiwan and
had basically been sold out by their government.
So we need to be able to provide support for those people.
Mr. Cuellar. And thank you so much.
And let me just say thank you, my time is up, Chairwoman
and Mr. Calvert and members.
Yeah, the assessment I called for was not only the
military, but it also called the State Department, AID, and I
even had a conference with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that
they are also worried about the Chinese coming in, into Latin
America, because we as a country, we export about 40 percent of
all of our exports go into Latin America but our attention is
certainly not 40 percent to there. And even the private sector
are seeing the Chinese.
So I am just asking the committee. I know this is only
part. It still takes the other part, as you mentioned, Tom.
But we really need to start doing this because we are going
to wake up like they did back in the 1980s where they said,
``Oh, my God, look what has happened in Nicaragua. The
Sandinistas have taken over.'' Sent Oliver North and da, da,
da, all that.
We can't just wake up one day and find out that this
presence of the Chinese and the Russians, especially the
Chinese, are just right across the Rio Grande itself.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Cuellar. But, anyway, thank you so much. I appreciate
it.
Ms. McCollum. Yes. You are welcome.
Judge Carter, welcome. And it is your turn to ask a
question, please, sir.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, and good to hear from you. Thank
you. And congratulations. Well earned. We are looking forward
to your leadership. And thank you very much for recognizing me.
In your testimony, Mr. Harrison, you state that the future
force requires stealthy, long-range aircraft, resilient
communication links, robust space defenses, highly proliferated
constellations of satellites, long-range air and missile
defense systems, and special operations and light-footprint
ground forces.
Currently, the Army's six modernization priorities consist
of, one, Long-Range Precision Fires; two, Next-Gen Combat
Vehicles; three, future lifts; four, Army networks; five, Air
Force missile defense; and, six, soldier lethality.
Now, is the U.S. Army on the right trajectory to seamlessly
integrate into the Joint All Domain Command and Control--
JADC2--framework as a result of the concerted efforts of
initiatives filtered through the ArmyFutures Command? This
command is my neighbor, and I take great interest in it.
Mr. Harrison. Thank you, sir, for the question.
And, you know, I think that the Army's modernization
priorities may be right for the Army. They are not necessarily
the top priorities overall for the Department of Defense. And
that is true for each of the services, quite frankly.
I think where the Army can play a big role in the future
force, particularly looking at the challenges we face from
China and operating in the Pacific region, is helping to
develop longer-range air and missile defense systems.
I think that is an important role for the Army, the ground-
based air and missile defense that can be deployed and can
extend out coverage out over a much farther range than we are
capable of doing today.
I think that that would be an important contribution to the
future force. So that is why I consider it one of the crown
jewels that should be protected.
In terms of the Army's ability to integrate with this
larger battle network of the future that we are calling JADC2,
Joint All Domain Command and Control, I think they are taking
some initial steps with the Air Force now. They have a 2-year
partnering agreement to explore how the network the Air Force
is attempting to build can be integrated with the Army's future
battle network.
But it is not enough. And that is one of the reasons I
think we need a roles and missions review, is because this
battle network of the future, JADC2, it falls into gaps among
the services. And so we need a lead service designated to build
that overall architecture for JADC2, the network protocols, the
security standards, all of the details that everyone else can
plug into.
If we don't do that, if we allow it to continue along this
path where each service is doing their own thing and they may
have ad hoc temporary partnerships along the way, we are not
going to get to where we need to be. It is a recipe for
failure.
So I would urge the committee and the Department of Defense
to take a proactive look at this and assign a lead service for
JADC2 and then set up a joint program office, a program
executive agent for JADC2 that can coordinate all of those
efforts and enforce the architecture, network requirements, and
protocols across all the services to ensure we actually are
able to integrate in the future.
Mr. Mahnken. Let me agree with Todd and just say that there
are a whole series of areas, whether it is command and control,
whether it is sensing, whether it is strike, whether it is
logistics, that really are fundamental to modern warfare. And
none of the services acting alone are going to be able to do
what is needed. And so there really is some ownership needed in
each of those areas.
And on issues like base defense, for example, defense of
overseas bases or even domestic bases, there are gaps there.
And so there needs to be much more of a joint effort to solve
those problems.
Ms. Field. And if I could just----
Mr. Carter. I agree with you, too, and that is one of my
concerns, is that coordination has always been a concern, I
think, with our military to some extent, going back as far as
we can remember. And I thank you for the work you do.
Ms. McCollum. Ms. Field, you wanted to add something?
Mr. Carter, Ms. Field is going to add something to the mix,
too, so we will give her a few seconds.
Mr. Carter. Okay. Good.
Ms. Field. I will just be very quick. And I agree with Mr.
Harrison and Mr. Mahnken that part of the issue here is the
ability to rise up above the specific service level and look
across the board.
And one of the things that GAO has been recommending to DOD
is that it set readiness metrics for domains, not just
individual services. That still hasn't happened, but that is a
recommendation that is still on the books for us.
Mr. Carter. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Carter. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Oh, very good. And great question.
A-10
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair, for having this
hearing.
And thank you to Ranking Member Calvert.
I really appreciate your interest in this.
I have two questions, one for Mr. Harrison and one for Ms.
Field.
So I represent Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, which is home
of the A-10 Warthog, which has been highlighted for divestment
by the Air Force for many years as an offset for modernization
efforts.
However, the A-10 is one the least expensive fighters to
operate. Meanwhile, the cost of other fighters, with smaller
fleet sizes, has been increasing.
I am concerned about the risk associated with divesting
legacy systems that creates a capability gap while we wait for
a new platform to become operational.
With regards to the A-10, we have not seen evidence that
other platforms can perform the close air support and combat
search and rescue mission as effectively.
So, Mr. Harrison, my question for you is, what
recommendations do you have when it comes to balancing the need
to modernize for a high-intensive conflict with the need for
current or potential low-intensity conflicts?
Mr. Harrison. Thank you, ma'am. That is great question. And
it is one of those hard choices I talked about that we are
going to have to make to prioritize the capabilities we need
for the future force.
The A-10 has absolutely been a star of the Air Force for
many decades. But we also need to look at how we conduct close
air support today.
I think the burden here is actually on the Air Force to
better demonstrate to Congress how that close air support
mission that the A-10 is so adept at performing can and is
being performed by other platforms.
And a lot of this is enabled by capabilities in terms of
precision attack that did not exist at the time the A-10 was
developed, things like drones, like the MQ-9 Reaper, that are
able to loiter for long times and conduct very surgical strikes
close in to our troops.
And even if you look at platforms like the B-1 Bomber have
also been used for close air support because they now are
equipped with GPS-guided weapons that are extremely accurate
and so they can be used in this role.
The other factor we need to consider is that we have to
make hard choices, we have to prioritize in our strategy
between the capabilities that we need for high-end conflict,
the capabilities that we need for gray zone competition with
Russia and China, and the capabilities that we need for lower-
end conflicts, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency operations.
And I think at the end of the day, you are right in your
assessment that the A-10 on a per-plane basis is not that
expensive compared to other crewed fighter aircraft. But when
you compare it to the cost of operating drones, either a cost
per tail per year or a cost per flying hour, it actually is
still more expensive than the MQ-9 and the MQ-1s that can do
many of the functions of the A-10.
So I think that the Air Force needs to present that
analysis better to Congress. And I think Congress has got to
accept that and understand that this may be one of the hard
choices we have to make, is retiring the A-10 platform, because
we do have other multipurpose platforms that can take its
place.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Well, I agree with you, it is going to be
a really, really hard choice. We really depend on the A-10 in
southern Arizona. So my district borders Mexico, and the A-10
can make these low-flying flights over the border to monitor
what is going on. I just don't think there is any replacement
for that right now.
I talked with the A-10 pilots, and they like the A-10. They
feel like it is easy to fly, it is versatile, and it is going
to be tough to convert to something else. I don't know if our
pilots are ready to do that. But I think long-term that is
something we have to do. So thank you very much.
DOD and Climate Change
I would like to go to my second question, which is for Ms.
Field.
In Arizona we are already experiencing the effect of
climate change. The Department of Defense has acknowledged that
climate change is a national security priority, and the
changing environment will impact defense installations and our
ability to project power.
So my question is, how do we incentivize a transition in
the Department of Defense toward more sustainable environmental
stewardship, to include energy consumption and requirements
development?
Ms. Field. That is a great question, and I will be very
brief.
A number of years ago we made a recommendation to the
Department that each military service incorporate criteria in
their process for racking and stacking new MilCon projects, to
include criteria related to building resiliency to climate
change.
We heard when we went down to the military service level
that individuals were reluctant to bring forth MilCon projects
that were related to building climate resilience because they
didn't think that they would win out in the overall sort of
racking and stacking of potential MilCon projects.
So that is one small way, but potentially meaningful way
for the Department to incentivize the sort of behavior that you
are talking about. We have a number of other related
recommendations, but given the time, I will stop there.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you so much for your answer.
Madam Chair, I want to thank you for having this hearing
and thank Ranking Member Calvert. I have another hearing I am
going to have to jump on to.
Ms. McCollum. Okay.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. So I am going to excuse myself. Thank you
very much. This has been very productive.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Chairwoman, can you hear me?
Ms. McCollum. Good morning.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Let me start by congratulating you, but
also by thanking you. You have always been just amazingly
accessible and easy to work with, and I just appreciate working
with you.
A few questions. Let me go back to China.
China Research and Development
So my understanding is that China has basically tripled
their R&D spending in the last decade while, basically, our R&D
remained pretty constant.
So how do we keep up with the Chinese threat, understanding
where we have been going and where we may be going in R&D? I am
not quite sure who wants to deal with that.
Mr. Mahnken. I will take a first stab at that.
Look, I think we do it by not trying to emulate the
authoritarians and doing it in the way that China is doing it.
We do it the way democracies do it.
So I think we do it by trying to lower the barriers between
the tremendous innovation that is going on within our broader
economy and within our broader society, and figuring out better
ways to bring that in, more effective ways to bring that in to
the service of national defense.
I think there is enormous innovation going on. There is a
lot of very good. And government can play a role in terms of
the demand signal for the particular areas that would most
benefit defense. But I think there is a lot to be gained by
lowering those, the barriers, to get things from outside of
defense industry, outside of government in to serve our needs.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You know, it is interesting, I think you
make a valid point. But we also know that China steals a lot of
our intellectual property, right? And that is one of the
challenges when we have an open society that does go to the
private sector for a lot of R&D. And so that is also a bit of a
CHEOPS.
Mr. Mahnken. Absolutely. And I think we need to play a
strong defense on that front as well.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Let me go back very briefly--how much time
do I have?--to Mr. Cuellar's point on Chinese involvement
everywhere, including in this hemisphere.
So what strategic areas does the Chinese military, where do
they pose strategically the greatest challenge, the greatest
threat to the U.S., our interests, and our allies' interests,
like Taiwan? And where is your biggest vulnerability when you
are dealing with China now and in the near future?
China and Space
Mr. Harrison. If I could jump in here.
I would actually say that one of our biggest
vulnerabilities to China right now is in space, that we do have
much better space capabilities than China, thanks in part to
our robust commercial space industrial base.
But what we see is China is making large strategic
investments in counterspace weapons. And they are making
advances in counterspace weapons faster than we are advancing
our space defenses against those systems.
And so we still have very large vulnerabilities in space I
think are very concerning.
And just quickly, back to your earlier point about R&D
spending. The research and development part of our defense
budget is actually at a historic high right now. So I wouldn't
discount it too much.
But our concerns are, what is the trajectory of the R&D
budget in the future? And what are we doing to better leverage
the commercial investments that are being made in R&D right
now?
And in particular the DOD has got to figure out different
paradigms for working with commercial industry to leverage all
of the great R&D and intellectual capital that is being
developed there. And in a lot of cases, that means we need to
look at buying things as a service rather than a product.
And that is a big paradigm shift for DOD that is used to
buying weapon systems and operating them itself. There are many
cases where we can simply buy things as a service and leverage
what the commercial marketplace is already doing.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Chair, I have obviously a number of
different further questions, but I see that my time is running
short. And I will lead by example and actually give back a
little bit of time. So I yield back. Thank you very much.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you. We might have an opportunity to do
another round.
Mrs. Bustos, welcome.
Defense Manufacturing
Mrs. Bustos. Thank you, Madam Chair. And really appreciate
you and Ranking Member Calvert for holding this hearing today.
Very, very important.
I think we can all agree that investment in the Nation's
defense is absolutely critical to deterring future conflicts.
With that said, many on the committee have heard me talk
about the Rock Island Arsenal in the past, I usually have some
question that revolves around that, located literally on an
island in the middle of the Mississippi River. I have already
invited our new chair to come and visit, and I hope that we
will be able to make that happen.
So the Rock Island Arsenal is home to the Army's Additive
and Advanced Manufacturing Center of Excellence. We are very
proud of that. They are on the cutting edge of 3D printing
technology for future use, things like research and development
work on the Next-Generation Combat Vehicle, while also building
the vehicles and armament needed today.
Like every day, every workday there they are converting
Humvee chassis to ambulances. They are now converting those
Humvee chassis to make shop equipment vehicles.
And so I share this to say that the district that I
represent is an example of the larger defense investment
discussion, the fact that we need to smartly balance investment
in future needs and technology with modernization of the
existing force.
So that leads into the question that I would like to ask,
and I will direct this to any and/or all of the witnesses that
we have today, whoever would like to take this.
But I would like to get your thoughts on the importance of
advanced and additive manufacturing to the future of defense
spending.
As you all already acknowledged, and as we know, the
National Defense Strategy places tremendous emphasis on the use
of disruptive technologies to counter threats from near-peer
competitors.
So just a little bit deeper here. So additive and advanced
manufacturing is such a disruptive technology that it has the
potential to significantly change how we address supply chain
issues, completely rethinking how we develop certain weapon
systems, while saving significant funding.
So I am wondering if, similar to the creation of the Joint
Artificial Intelligence Center, it would make sense to create
an office to better coordinate advanced manufacturing
activities across DOD. Your thoughts on that.
Again, any and/or all of the panelists can answer that,
please.
Mr. Mahnken. I will take a first stab at it, which is,
look, I think it is a great idea. I think if we look at future
concepts, combat concepts, warfare concepts that the services
are developing, Joint Staff is developing, they place that
premium on mobility and agility, right? And having the ability
to do additive manufacturing, advanced manufacturing forward,
and to be able to serve the needs of forces, I think is going
to be a critical capability.
We are still in the 21st century. We are slowed down by the
need to haul food, water, supplies, and power. Well, the water
and food you are not going to get away from as human beings.
But the ability to lighten the logistical load, and through
things like advanced manufacturing, I think is a real promising
area. It is one of the reasons why I think the logistical piece
of warfare needs to get a greater attention and really does
need to have high-level advocacy and sponsorship.
Mrs. Bustos. I am glad to hear you say that.
Please.
Mr. Harrison. I would jump in and add to that. I think
additive manufacturing has a lot of potential to help with
military readiness.
And being able to print specialized tools in the field that
you may not want to have to carry with you because they are
rarely needed, and in some cases being able to print
specialized replacement parts, spare parts, that you would not
want to have to carry with you, that can be very valuable going
forward.
And so that is something that is definitely worth exploring
and looking at investments in.
I also would not want to discount the role of the private
sector here in leading the charge for additive manufacturing.
I have looked at a lot of companies that are figuring out
ways that they can build parts and components that go into
everything from rocket engines to jet engines to you name it,
things that they literally could not build without additive
manufacturing, that are greatly improving the performance, the
reliability of the systems they are building.
So there is a lot of work going on here in the private
sector we should not discount.
Mrs. Bustos. Thank you.
Ma'am, is there anything else you would like to add with 13
seconds left?
Ms. Field. No, thank you. I have nothing to add on this
particular topic.
Mrs. Bustos. Okay. Thanks very much.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Crist, you are next.
Missile Defense and Hypersonics
Mr. Crist. Great. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you so
much for holding this hearing.
And I appreciate you, Ranking Member Calvert, as well.
I think I want to direct it to Mr. Harrison.
You were talking about earlier the notion of getting less
while paying more. And I think at the conclusion of your
presentation you talked about the fact that this deals to some
extent missile defense.
And one of the concerns I have had, and I think several
members of the subcommittee, obviously, as well, deals with the
hypersonics.
And so my concern about that is if we are paying more for
getting a sufficient defense, if you could elaborate on that or
give us some insight. It is of grave concern to me, just what I
know about it from prior meetings that we have discussed this
topic and it seems like a vulnerability to me, frankly.
And if you can assuage that in my mind, that would be
delightful. But I am just searching for the truth and what the
facts may be. If you can be helpful that way, that would be
wonderful. I appreciate it.
Mr. Harrison. Sure. I will lead this off here.
I think that I outlined in my testimony I think one of the
crown jewels of the force in the future is actually air and
missile defense systems.
But you are right that the way that we have proceeded in
this area to date has been very costly, it has been very
expensive. The technology is expensive to develop.
And particularly if you look at the cost-exchange ratio,
how much it costs an adversary like China to build a ballistic
missile or a cruise missile or even a hypersonic weapon versus
how much it costs for us to defend against that capability,
which may require multiple interceptors being fired to achieve
a sufficient probability of intercept, it is prohibitive, and
it does not scale in our favor.
So I think that should be one of the focus areas in our
integrated air and missile defense systems, is how do we change
that cost-exchange ratio so that it is more affordable to field
missile defense systems that are sufficiently scalable to
counter the threats that we face from adversaries?
So I think we should prioritize those investments, in
particular looking at things like directed energy systems.
There is still a long road ahead. The technology is not
there today. Let's be honest. It is not quite there.
We have got to continue investments in directed energy
systems, particularly things like electric lasers, solid state
lasers that can achieve higher power levels to intercept
incoming warheads and missiles and munitions of various types
in a more affordable and scalable manner.
Mr. Crist. Thank you for that. But to follow up, I think
that if we don't have the technologies and other countries
apparently do, where is the deficiency? Where does it lie? Is
it just a matter of additional funding in order to achieve the
technological know-how in order to protect America? Or is there
something else at work here that we should be aware of?
Mr. Harrison. I think it is a combination of both time and
funding. Our adversaries don't have missile defenses that are
any better than ours. In fact, we are pretty far ahead when it
comes to missile defense.
Where they are making advances is in their missile
technology that can threaten us. And that is our concern. You
know, if they are building hypersonic weapons, it doesn't mean
that we need hypersonic weapons. It means we need defenses
against hypersonic weapons, right?
So this is an asymmetric competition here.
Mr. Crist. If I might, Mr. Harrison. Maybe it is both.
Maybe as a deterrent we should have the hypersonics available
to us, in addition to better defenses, of course. I couldn't
agree with you more on that point.
But I would like to be able to have the ability to strike,
which in many instances gives the adversaries the reticence to
strike us, because we can do what they can do and so they don't
want to do it at all, and neither do we.
Mr. Harrison. And where you can achieve symmetry and mutual
vulnerability, if you will, then, yes, those can be a very
effective deterrent.
I am looking at more of the asymmetric situations where
they can pose more of a threat to us with their missile forces
than we could actually pose to them. And so that is where we
need to be looking at better defenses.
And to your earlier question, I think it takes both more
funding and more time. We need both. This is not something
where you can leap ahead in technology. You actually have to do
the hard work of developing and maturing that technology over
time.
Mr. Crist. It sounds like we ought to do it.
I yield back, Madam Chair. Thank you so much.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Calvert. Madam Chair, this is Ken Calvert.
Ms. McCollum. Yes.
Mr. Calvert. I have a hard stop at 11. I had a commitment I
couldn't--it went a little longer than I thought. So I
apologize. It won't happen in the future. But I have got to
move on. So I will touch base with you later and see what
happens.
Ms. McCollum. Absolutely. So you are putting Judge Carter
in charge?
Mr. Calvert. Yeah. Is Judge Carter still on?
Ms. McCollum. He is still on.
Mr. Calvert. Good. Okay.
We will talk, Judge.
All right. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Ms. Kaptur.
Energy and the Defense Production Act
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Madam Chair, very much for this, and
for all of our guests and the members.
My questions are two. The first relates to energy, the
second the Defense Production Act.
In terms of energy, I have had a career-long interest in
this issue, initially because of our entire politics being
impacted by our oil imports, but over the years as we have
advanced in the energy field. Now, with climate change, we have
new challenges ahead of us.
I will just share with you that when I first got involved
in this issue I was shocked at how unconscious the Department
of Energy was about the energy that it consumed. It is the
largest energy user in the country. And as a result of work
over many years, we were able to get deputy assistant
secretaries focused in the different departments on this issue,
but it isn't really cohesive.
And as we look at trimming spending in all accounts really,
not just defense, I wanted to ask you, from what you know, how
could we better organize across the Department DOD's progress
in terms of their own energy expenditures, but then in terms of
DARPA and other research that are ongoing, breakthroughs that
could help us both on the defense as well civilian side?
So that is question one.
Question two really relates to the Defense Production Act,
and I, along with many of my colleagues, obviously, on this
call, am concerned about where we are falling behind.
Many years ago, Thomas Johnson outlined many areas in which
the United States was already losing edge. Those included lift
capacity for a number of our systems, silicon wafers of late.
Obviously, in cyber we are not doing as well as we would wish.
Rare earth, strategic metals.
And, of course, medicines, where we don't make penicillin
anymore, we don't make a lot of antibiotics in this country.
And I am worried about the ability to support military in
theater.
So we hear a lot from President Biden about the Defense
Production Act. But my experience is it is one of the weakest
parts of the Department. It has never been given the support
that it needs. And I am very concerned about meeting these gaps
where other countries are ahead of us.
If we put too much burden on the Defense Production Act--
which I support, I supported for 39 years. But I know how weak
it is. And, therefore, I am concerned about staffing and
capabilities there.
So the first deals with energy. How can we strengthen the
Department's own consciousness in reporting and advancements in
that field to better help our country in the world?
And then, secondly, Defense Production Act, in order to
make things in this country again. How do we strengthen that
particular arena of DOD, which has been underresourced for my
entire career, four decades?
Thank you.
Ms. Field. I will take a stab at your first question
related to energy.
You know, a number of years ago, I believe it was in 2014,
we examined what DOD was doing related to net zero and whether
there was a strategy in place. And there really wasn't much of
one at all, and I am sure that is not a surprise to you. And it
does not appear that a lot has happened over the last 4 or 5
years in that space.
We have been, GAO has been mandated to take a look at what
DOD is doing in the net zero space in the coming year. And so
one of the things we will be looking at is, is there a renewed,
reinvigorated effort at the Department to develop a sound
strategy for net zero?
So that is one area that I think should be examined.
The second, your question about structure. I believe that a
number of years ago there was a DASD(E) position at the
Department focused on energy, energy use, it was trying to look
sort of across the board. I do not believe that position exists
now or has existed in recent years.
But it would be interesting to see if the new
administration reinstitutes a position like that and at what
level. Some might argue that DASD(E) is not high enough.
So I will stop there on the energy piece and defer to the
other witnesses on your second question.
Ms. Kaptur. I appreciate that insight. I did not realize it
was still operational. Thank you.
Ms. Field. I believe it is not still operational, I should
say.
Ms. Kaptur. Unbelievable. Unbelievable
Mr. Mahnken. Just very briefly on your second question.
I mean, I do think that the Defense Department in recent
years has begun a serious effort to look at supply chain and
supply chain vulnerabilities. I know the Office of Commercial
and Economic Analysis, as part of the Air Force, has been doing
some work there.
And I think reducing that, that vulnerability, and whether
it is bringing things--on-shoring jobs in the United States, or
relying on our close allies who we know we can rely on, I think
that is extremely important.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Cybersecurity
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, Madam Chair, congratulations on
the assumption of this very important committee.
I appreciate you all being here today, the time that we are
talking about critically difficult strategic choices.
The recent SolarWinds attack demonstrated the
sophistication of our adversaries' cyber capabilities, and more
importantly, our inadequate defense against them. And it was
really I think shocking to a lot of us who do a lot in the area
of cyber about how inadequate our defenses were.
The attack impacted nine Federal agencies, like Cisco and
Belkin, two of the largest that we deal with, that we have in
our country, and by some estimates over 18,000 customers.
This was a really serious attack, and we really were
unprepared. We need to do a lot better in our defense of our
cybersecurity.
The issue that we have, we know that we need to do more.
And our adversaries, like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran,
their capability is getting stronger. And by the way, we are,
too, on the offense. But as SolarWinds demonstrates, we are not
that way when it relates to our defense.
And my question is--and, I guess, Mr. Harrison, I assume,
or anybody else that wants to pick up--if the defense budget is
reduced, what impacts do you see on our ability to keep pace
with these countries in areas like cyberspace and hypersonics?
Mr. Harrison. Well, I can begin there.
I think that the impact is up to us. It is how we choose to
implement a reduction in the defense budget will determine how
much we are impacted in these critical areas that I believe are
essential for the future force.
I think that we should prioritize our investments in
cybersecurity, cyber attack capabilities as well, and in space
security and being able to better defend our space systems from
attack.
So a reduction in the defense budget does not mean that we
have to reduce these areas.
I think it is also important that these are areas that need
to be addressed in a strategically focused roles and mission
review. Because if you go back to the Key West Agreement of
1948, space and cyber are not part of that. Those were not
areas, domains in which we operated at the time.
They are very important domains today, and I don't think we
have clear allocation of roles and responsibilities in these
areas to ensure we don't have gaps or redundancies across the
services.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yeah, I agree with you, too.
And I do want to get this in before my time or anybody else
who wants to speak.
We also have an issue with the authorities of NSA. We need
to maintain our privacy issues, and it is very important for
our country. But in this situation, NSA was not allowed to be
involved, even though they have--they do have the best
technology in the world, I think, and also in our country.
And so I think we, as Members of Congress, and the private
sector need to start working more together so that we can
defend ourselves. Because what is happening now, a lot of the
big companies aren't cooperating with each other. And teamwork
would have made a big difference for our defense, and it just
wasn't there now. And we need to look at the laws on what NSA
can and cannot do without violating our privacy.
Do you have any comments on that?
Mr. Harrison. I think you are exactly right on the point
that this needs to be--in some of these areas, like cyber and
space, they are areas that extend outside of just DOD and needs
to involve more interagency coordination across government.
And that is one of the reasons that, as I have written in a
recent paper on the need for a roles and missions review, that
this, the allocation of these responsibilities, probably needs
to happen at a level higher than a DOD instruction or a
decision from the SecDef.
This needs to come from the White House. This requires
overall executive branch leadership to clearly allocate what is
the NSA going to be responsible for, what is the NRO going to
be responsible for, what are the roles of Commerce and
Transportation and all the other areas of government that are
affected in some of these mission areas.
Mr. Ruppersberger. But I also would add, Congress needs to
be involved as far as making laws and to maintain our national
security, but also our privacy issues.
Thank you. I yield back.
Energy Resiliency and Climate Change
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Ms. Field, you wanted to make sure that we understood
something correctly?
Ms. Field. Yes, just very quickly. In response to
Representative Kaptur, I wanted to clarify. I said it was
DASD(Energy) that has gone away. It was Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Operational Energy. That is the position I think is
not currently encumbered. And that would suggest a place
potentially for the Department to look at this issue.
Ms. McCollum. Very good. And we will be having talking
about energy resiliency and climate change at a future hearing.
So thank you.
Mr. Carter, we could--it is you, myself, and Mr. Diaz-
Balart. We could do another question for 3 minutes if that is
okay with you?
Mr. Carter. That is okay with me.
Ms. McCollum. All right. So, Mr. Carter, I am going to let
you go next.
Conventional Forces Reduction
Mr. Carter. Well, thank you.
First let me comment. And I don't know whether Mr. Cuellar
is on, but Mr. Diaz-Balart is. I, too, have concerns about our
neighbors to the south and what is going on with the Chinese
down there. And I join them in saying that I have those
concerns.
The CSBA exercise concludes that the reduction in
conventional forces in a 10 percent cut scenario would limit
flexibility to manage a crisis and yield a force that could at
best win one war at a time and increase reliance on nuclear
deterrence as an alternative. The report states conflict may
become even more likely because adversaries can question
whether the U.S. posture is even credible.
With that said, a reduction in conventional forces does not
necessarily equate to a reduction in mission requirements.
Consider the fact that despite less deployment rotations to the
CENTCOM area of responsibility, approximately 15 percent of the
soldiers stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, have been deployed
during any month since 2011.
What happens when the attrition rate of near-peer threats'
conventional forces is slower than the U.S. and conflict arises
that requires the quick regeneration of conventional forces?
And for how long is the coinciding strain on existing
conventional forces tenable?
If anybody wants to answer that one.
Mr. Mahnken. No, I will take a cut at it. Which is, look, I
think, as unpleasant as it is to think about--and it is
unpleasant--but we are in a period of great power competition
and we face the prospect, however remote, of great power war.
And everything--all the signs point to a very costly, very,
very bloody conflict. And that unfortunate reality is something
that we haven't had to face in a quarter century.
And part of that is thinking about how to best array the
force, how to best array our infrastructure, how to best array
industry to prepare ourselves for such a conflict, if only to
deter it. And that includes attrition. That includes all sorts
of things.
And so I think your point is good one. And I think we as a
country need to realize that that is the world that we are
living in, however unpleasant that may seem.
DOD and Technical Capabilities
Mr. Carter. And I agree with that.
Finally, just to add something I just read recently. It is
kind of interesting. When Silicon Valley first arose a lot of
the work they were doing was related to our national defense.
Right now, the civilian side of technology has leaped leaps and
bounds forward, and yet our Defense Department's technology is
greatly lacking. And in fact, one of the comments was the
average soldier is carrying around more ability in his back
pocket than they have at the entire Defense Department.
Would either of you like to comment on that?
Mr. Harrison. Yeah, I think there is a lot of truth to
that. I also wouldn't want to discount the exquisite technology
that is being developed in the more traditional parts of the
defense industrial base.
But you are absolutely right, that in many areas where
there are dual-use capabilities, where things can be used for
commercial purposes or for military purposes, we do see
tremendous investment and innovation in the private sector.
I think that DOD needs to do a better job of figuring out
how to work with those companies and how to leverage that
innovation.
And as I said before, I think part of that is working with
commercial companies on their terms and buying things as a
service rather than a product. That is what a lot of these
commercial companies are looking to do, commercially oriented
firms.
Mr. Carter. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Chinese Military Modernization
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Again, I also want to continue to talk a little bit about
China. The Chinese military has done some significant
modernization efforts; one would argue rather successful ones.
And so, I kind of talked about this in a different realm in
my previous question, but can you talk a little about the
current Chinese capabilities and what poses the greatest threat
now to our men and women, to our servicemen and -women, who
might be on the field one day confronting a Chinese military?
The conversation right before was talking about what that
might look like. It is not a pretty thought.
So what are one of those capabilities that might threaten
our men and women more greatly?
Mr. Mahnken. Yeah. So I know Mr. Harrison talked being
threats to space. I would say also China has been focused on
denying our ability to project power in the Western Pacific.
So whether it is our air bases, our Naval vessels, our
soldiers, our marines, they have been focused squarely on us,
where they have had us in the crosshairs. And it is development
of ballistic and cruise missiles, development of hypersonics,
increasingly capable air and missile defenses on their end,
yeah, we are right in their crosshairs.
So I think our infrastructure, our basing, our bases in the
Western Pacific need defense. Our power projection forces need
defense. And we need to develop concepts to be able to project
power to defend our interests, defend our allies, and defend
our territory in the face of those threats.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I guess one of the most ambitious things
that China has done recently is this Chinese, the Belt and Road
Initiative. Again, going back to my friend and colleague Mr.
Cuellar, he mentioned about there is a lot of Chinese presence
in the Western Hemisphere. And so more than 60 countries have
signed on to projects linked to this initiative.
How can we do a better job countering them, particularly in
this hemisphere and elsewhere? And is it just a function of
money? How can we do a better job?
Mr. Mahnken. I think working together with our friends and
also providing an alternative to what the Chinese are offering.
I know, look, the Trans-Pacific Partnership had its supporters,
had its detractors on both sides of the aisle. I think that was
a good effort to try to bring people together in a vision that
is kind of in line with our values.
I think we need to be doing that. We need to provide a
democratic alternative to what China is offering and give the
countries that want to make the better choice the ability to
make the better choice.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I am out of time. Thank you, Madam
Chairwoman.
Focus on Diplomacy
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
So, Mr. Diaz-Balart, that is a perfect lead-in, how Mr.
Mahnken finished his question, for where I wanted to go.
I want to just kind of shift this a little bit, because we
have heard former Defense Secretaries talk about our power, our
soft power, the importance of having a strong State Department.
And lots is often given about what the Chinese and the Russians
are spending and what we are spending in an arms race. And so
the focus has been on military.
But you also know how important it is to our military to
have good diplomacy, and that helps develop enhanced security.
So my question is, what are some of the things that our
military should be leaning towards for our State Department
maybe to do to develop enhanced security and ideas on how we
could work smarter with our allies to address these great
powers concerns that we do have about China and Russia, and how
that could maybe have a great influence in an approach to be
more disciplined in the Department of Defense's top line
spending and maybe even see it decrease?
Mr. Mahnken. I will take a stab at it.
I mean, look, I worked for Secretary of Defense Bob Gates,
who I think believed in his bones about the importance of a
strong State Department and really the symbiotic relationship
between diplomacy and military force.
Diplomacy is more credible when undergirded by the threat
of military force. And, similarly, diplomacy can help avoid the
use of military force. So I think the two go hand in hand.
I do think when it comes to our allies, if I just focus on
the military part of it, though, being able to work closely
with our allies, interoperability with our allies, really is
key going forward. I think they are looking for us to have skin
in the game, and we are looking for them to have skin in the
game.
So I think the two really are inseparable, a strong
military and a strong diplomatic corps and strong State
Department.
Mr. Harrison. If I could jump in.
One specific area where I see there is a lot of potential
to leverage our soft power to help improve our security is
norms of behavior in space.
And that is one area where it needs to be an all-of-
government approach, not only to try to establish internally
within the U.S. Government what we believe are positive,
constructive norms of behavior that we are willing to follow
ourselves, and then put those forward in the international
community and start to build a consensus with our allies and
partners.
Norms of behavior in space help you identify what the
abnormal behavior is so you can call it out and you can work
against it. And we want to be at the forefront of setting those
norms in space because we want them to reflect our values and
our interests both in this domain and on Earth.
I would commend NASA for something it did within the past
year in setting up what they called the Artemis Accords, and
that is a set of agreements that other countries have to sign
onto with the United States in order to partner with us on our
mission to go back to the moon and establish a permanent
presence there.
And so those Artemis Accords are a good first step in
helping to establish norms of behavior and get international
agreement and buy-in among like-minded countries.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
And I realize I kind of asked a political question there
for Ms. Field from GAO. And I can read a report on State
Department from GAO.
I want to thank the three of you for your presentation. I
wanted to take this opportunity of waiting for the Biden
administration to prepare their first budget to present to
Congress for us to also look at the way we talk about defense
spending, to look at the programs, to ask some of the
questions, rather than just have the military folks come in and
we start doing line by line and this space and this program and
you know.
This gives us an opportunity to think about where we want
to be 5, 10 years from now and how we are going to have to
maybe make some really hard and tough choices to get to where
we want to be there.
So we are going to be moving forward, as I said to other
committee members, talking about resilience and climate change,
and look forward to a whole host of leaders from academia and
from some of the other think tanks all across the spectrum that
work and have opinions on defense spending and that.
So thank you for being the first three out the gate for us
to do that. And we might have a couple other questions we will
submit to you. As a former teacher, I promise it won't be a
deluge of homework, it just might be something here and there.
But thank you for so much for setting a wonderful tone for
this first hearing.
And so with that, Mr. Carter, I am going to adjourn the
meeting.
This meeting is adjourned.
Tuesday, March 2, 2021.
U.S. MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES OVERVIEW
WITNESSES
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DARRYL A. WILLIAMS, SUPERINTENDENT, UNITED STATES
MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT
VICE ADMIRAL SEAN BUCK, SUPERINTENDENT, UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD M. CLARK, SUPERINTENDENT, UNITED STATES AIR
FORCE ACADEMY
Ms. McCollum. So now we are officially to order here. This
meeting is going to be fully virtual, and so I am going to go
over a few housekeeping rules.
For today's meeting, the chair or the staff designated by
the chair may mute participants' microphones when they are not
under recognition for the purpose of eliminating background.
Everybody was really good last time, so I don't anticipate any
problems this time.
Members, though, you are responsible for unmuting yourself.
If we notice that you have not unmuted yourself, I will ask you
if you would like the staff to unmute you. If you can please
indicate by nodding your head, and staff will unmute your
microphone.
I remind all members and witnesses--they should see it on
the screen; if they don't, let us know--there is a 5-minute
clock and the 5-minute clock will apply. If there is a
technical issue, we will move to the next member until the
issue is resolved, and you will keep the balance of your time.
Once again, you will notice a clock on your screen, and it
is going to show how much time is remaining. At 1 minute, the
clock will turn yellow. At 30 seconds remaining, I will gently
tap the gavel to remind members that their time has almost
expired. When your time has expired, the clock will turn red,
and I will, when it turns red, recognize the next member.
In terms of speaking order, we are going to follow the
order set forth in the House rules, beginning with the chair
and the ranking member. Then members present at the time the
hearing is called to order will be recognized in the order of
seniority, and, finally, members not present at the time the
hearing is called to order.
Finally, House rules require me to remind you that we have
set up an email address to which members can send anything they
wish to submit in writing at any of our hearings or our
markups. So this email address has been provided to your staff.
One other piece of housekeeping. We are going to have votes
during this. When the votes take place, I will give a list of
order of members to speak, I will turn the gavel over to the
most senior member present, I will go vote, and then I will
come right back. So we will keep this meeting going forward so
everyone can ask their questions.
So, without further ado, I am going to make a few remarks
here.
Opening Statement of Chair McCollum
This morning, the subcommittee will receive testimony and
an update on military service academies.
And I welcome our three witnesses: Lieutenant Darryl
Williams, superintendent of West Point, founded in 1802; Vice
Admiral Sean Buck, superintendent of the Naval Academy, founded
in 1845; and Lieutenant Richard Clark, superintendent of the
Air Force Academy, founded in 1954. I do know the Air Force
Academy is 66 years old, because that is the year I was born
too, so we were established at the same time.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you all for being here today,
and I appreciate you being here to share the current state of
military service academies.
Each of the service academies house some of the best and
brightest of our young generation. Many of these young men and
women will hold leadership positions in their respective
services for the next 30 years. Given this fact, it is
imperative that they are all well-educated, not in only
executing military missions of the future but also grounded in
the ideals in which this Nation has been built and to the oath
that they take to serve.
Each of these topics we will discuss today will encompass
how effectively each one of the academies is striving to
achieve these goals. Some topics for today's hearing include
the admission structure at each of the service academies and
how our academies are reflecting the diversity of our country
in preparing cadets, midshipmen, and, I will add, doolies at
the Air Force Academy for the myriad challenges that they face
ahead; some of the social issues each academy is dealing with,
notably sexual assault, racism, diversity, character, and the
way forward for that to continue to progress.
Congress is here to support you in these efforts, but we
also know that you have been dealing with something new, the
impact of COVID-19 at each of the service academies. How has it
impacted learning, operations, and the well-being of the
student body, faculty, and campus workforce?
And then I would like to have a robust discussion on
maintenance, restoration, and resilience efforts for each of
these campuses. West Point and the Naval Academy have buildings
over 100 years old. And the Air Force Academy, its buildings
are on average 60 years old. The military service campuses have
not escaped the impacts of climate change, and we welcome each
of the superintendents to share their concerns and their ideas
to address these environmental calamities.
We also look forward to hearing what more we can do as
Members of Congress to help the service academies in their
nomination process. It is an honor and a privilege that we have
the ability to make these nominations.
Once again, I want to thank you for appearing before the
committee today to discuss these issues.
And now I want to recognize our distinguished ranking
member, Mr. Calvert, for any comments he might want to add.
Mr. Calvert.
Opening Statement of Mr. Calvert
Mr. Calvert. Thank you. Thank you, Chair McCollum.
Today, I am very pleased to welcome the superintendents of
our incredible service academies, Lieutenant General Clark,
Lieutenant General Williams, and Vice Admiral Buck. Thank you
all for taking time to testify to us today.
This subcommittee is responsible for ensuring our military
has the tools it needs to protect our Nation and carry out the
National Defense Strategy. We hear from service chiefs and
secretaries, combatant commanders, and other leaders in the
Department of Defense about critical resourcing requirements
and threats. We must never lose sight that these missions
cannot be carried out without capable, intelligent, and
prepared soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and now guardians.
That is why today's hearing is so important. As our
witnesses have noted in their respective testimonies, our
academies continue to thrive and produce the world's finest
leaders, but they also face a range of challenges that we must
confront with a unified vision.
COVID-19 has undoubtedly reshaped the way all education is
done in this country, as the chairman noted. This is no
different for our service academies. I am sure we will discuss
these impacts in great detail today.
I am aware how well the academies have adjusted their
curriculums to educate students in a new learning environment.
This was made possible by the incredible leaders before us
today and their experienced and professional staff.
So, first off, I would like to thank each of you.
I would like to commend the future leaders currently
studying at our academies. Your commitment to our Nation,
especially during a time such as this, it does not go unnoticed
or unappreciated.
As we continue the fight against COVID-19, the academies
are faced with challenges such as addressing aging
infrastructure, increasing inclusion, diversity, and preparing
our cadets and midshipmen for the wars of the future. I have
great confidence in the leaders before us today and their
students, as we work together to take on these challenges, and
I look forward to hearing from them in more detail today.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you very much. Well-said.
For everyone, your full written testimony that has been
provided by our service academies' superintendents will be
placed in the record, and members have copies at their seats.
So, in the interest of time, I strongly encourage each of you
to keep your summarized statement to 5 minutes or less, to be
complete but succinct in answering questions, because we will
have votes and we do want to get to your questions.
So we are going to go in this order: Vice Admiral Buck, you
will come after Lieutenant General Williams; and then, General
Clark, you will close it out.
So, thank you for your testimony. And I will defer my
questions to the end so I can go vote and we can keep this
moving.
I would like, at this time, to ask Lieutenant General
Williams to kick off the testimony, and then the rest of you
fall in the order I mentioned. Thank you.
Summary Statement of Lt. General Williams
General Williams. Chair McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the United States Military Academy, and
thank you for your continued support to its programs.
If you were at West Point today, you would see an academy
thriving as it develops leaders of character, despite the
constraints of the global pandemic. The Academy's mission is to
educate, train, and inspire the corps of cadets so that each
graduate is a commissioned leader of character, committed to
both Army values and the ideals of duty, honor, country, and
prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to
the Nation as Army officers.
Our vision is to be the Nation's premier leader development
institution. We do this through a process where cadets develop
the academic, military, physical, and character foundation
necessary for continued professional growth and service while
internalizing the values necessary to live honorably, lead
honorably, and demonstrate excellence.
Our faculty and staff model is deliberately focused on
developing leaders of character, and we have an outstanding
team of faculty, coaches, tactical officers, and
noncommissioned officers, all hand-selected--a blend of soldier
and civilian talent and expertise committed to our mission and
to cadet excellence.
We have operationalized our mission and strategy around
five lines of effort that constitute my priorities: one,
developing leaders of character who are prepared to fight and
win in the crucible of ground combat; two, cultivating a
culture of character growth necessary to build and sustain
cohesive teams built on trust, dignity, and respect; three,
building diverse and effective winning teams by leveraging the
talent of every member of the organization; four, modernizing,
sustaining, and securing our capabilities and infrastructure
and strengthening partnerships with academe, our alumni, the
American people, and our international partners while
continuing to contribute to the Army profession.
All five lines of effort ultimately support the Army's
mission, enhance Army readiness, and are aligned with Army
strategy and initiatives, including its ``people first''
mentality and ``winning matters'' attitude.
Over the past year, we successfully continued our mission
while adapting to the realities and overcoming the challenges
of the COVID-19 environment--challenges that have made our
entire community stronger, more resilient, and cohesive. This
was possible because of our deliberate, disciplined, and
comprehensive approach throughout the pandemic that ensured the
health and safety of the corps and the West Point community at
large.
We quickly regained the critical human interactions that
are essential to the success of our leader development
experience after our remote education last spring. Reluctantly,
over the past year, we had to contract our engagement with our
alumni, parents, and the local community on post to protect the
corps and the community. We look forward to reestablishing
connections as conditions allow.
Over the past year, we sustained Army readiness by
successfully graduating a thousand new officers into the Army;
executed our academic, military, physical, and character
programs; and competed in intercollegiate athletics.
Our cadets have excelled across the board, notably in our
Graduate Scholars Program. To date, West Point proudly boasts
13 winners of prestigious graduate scholarships, to include two
Rhodes scholars. Additionally, we have several semifinalists in
ongoing competitions, including 18 semifinalists for the
Fulbright scholarship. In fact, the Fulbright Commission has
recognized us as the top-producing institution for the 2021
academic year.
These inspiring young men and women are motivated and
demonstrating excellence every day. I am so proud to be their
supe, and you can be proud of them as well.
Character development is the most important thing we do at
West Point, because, ultimately, character development is
critical to building Army readiness. We meet cadets where they
are and immerse them in a culture of character growth. This
means that character development is ongoing throughout West
Point--in the classroom, during military training, on the
athletic fields, and in the locker rooms and barracks.
Character development is deliberately woven into every aspect
of the cadet experience to ensure we develop them into leaders
our Army and our Nation require: trained, disciplined, and fit
officers who lead by example, create cohesive teams built on
trust, dignity, and respect, and who take care of our Army's
greatest strength, its people.
Over the last 2 years, we mobilized academy resources to
better integrate our character development efforts throughout
all aspects of cadet leader development. We created the
Character Integration Advisory Group, which elevates character
development resources to my level of command for additional
emphasis and synchronization across all programs.
Additionally, aligned with the Army, we continue our
efforts toward eliminating the corrosive behaviors that
undermine trust, such as sexual assault and harassment, racism,
and extremism. We are making progress in this space but
recognize we still have a long way to go.
In closing, I remain confident we are preparing our cadets
well to lead in the 21st-century Army while cultivating the
culture that puts people first so that they are ready to build
and lead cohesive teams--teams made up of the sons and
daughters entrusted to our Army.
I thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the state
of our academy with you today. I look forward to your
questions.
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Summary Statement of Vice Admiral Buck
Admiral Buck. Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the
United States Naval Academy.
Our mission is to develop midshipmen morally, mentally, and
physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty,
honor, and loyalty. I am pleased to report to you today that
the Naval Academy is succeeding in its mission.
The COVID-19 pandemic has presented incredible obstacles to
achieving that mission over the last 12 months. We had to
rapidly adapt our organization to meet the threat of COVID and
continue to execute our mission safely and effectively.
However, despite these challenges and obstacles, our faculty,
staff, and coaches, and, most importantly, our brigade of
midshipmen have endured, often creating their own success.
This past year, we successfully graduated and commissioned
1,002 members of the class of 2020 into the fleet, and they are
now serving as ensigns and second lieutenants in our Navy and
our Marine Corps. We also brought aboard the class of 2024 for
an in-person Plebe Summer experience. We are proud of the
resilience and dedication displayed by our newest Naval Academy
class, who were inducted in the midst of a pandemic.
It is our firm belief at the Naval Academy that you cannot
develop leaders online. This is why we made it a priority and a
mandate to return the entire brigade to Annapolis this past
fall for the 2020-2021 academic year.
In order to do this, the Naval Academy reimagined how our
most basic operations are conducted in order to keep the entire
brigade, as well as our faculty, staff, and coaches, safe on
the Yard. This ran the gamut and included hybrid, socially
distanced learning; instituting a robust COVID-19 surveillance
and testing protocol; dedicating one of our eight dormitory
wings for quarantine and isolation; and shifting our meals to a
noncommunal grab-and-go format.
Because of our adherence to public health guidelines across
our entire Naval Academy community, our COVID-19 positivity
rates have remained very low throughout the majority of the
school year, well below those of our surrounding community.
While we have seen an uptick in the number of cases within the
brigade during this past week, we are confident that we will be
able to reduce our numbers using the same strict mitigation
protocols employed by our Navy's fleet units to contain the
spread of COVID-19.
We recently began the process of vaccinating volunteers
from our faculty and staff and hope to start our midshipmen
vaccination process soon--an imperative if we are to execute
fleet training this coming summer.
We are looking forward to when the COVID vaccine allows us
to regain a greater sense of normalcy here in Annapolis. In the
meantime, we will continue to prioritize our midshipmen's
physical and mental well-being during this difficult period.
In addition to the challenges posed by COVID-19, the Naval
Academy has not lost focus on our long-term and ongoing
priority of developing leaders of character. The racial justice
movement in America that rose this past summer impacted many
members of our Naval Academy community, and the associated
events have provoked important conversations regarding
diversity, equity, and inclusion on our campus.
The Naval Academy must be a visible cornerstone of a value-
based Naval culture of dignity and mutual respect. And that
includes improving sexual assault prevention efforts and
continuing to strengthen response support for victims.
There is continued work to be done at the Naval Academy so
that we can attract, retain, and develop a diverse cadre of
future Navy and Marine Corps officers who are resilient,
innovative, and equipped to lead in a highly diverse, socially
complex, and multigenerational workforce.
Lastly, we remain vigilant of the long-term existential
threat that climate change and sea-level rise pose to our
continued operations here in Annapolis. We have studied the
science, we have implemented several resiliency projects, and
we are in the process of formulating a military installation
resiliency plan that is due to be complete at the end of this
calendar year.
For 175 years, the Naval Academy has met its mission for
our Nation. However, we still face many challenges ahead. I
believe that our top-notch team of senior leaders, faculty, and
staff are prepared to meet these challenges using the same
ingenuity, flexibility, and adaptability that has allowed us to
continue our mission in the face of a global pandemic.
Thank you for your time today, and thank you for your
enduring support of all of our service academies. I am prepared
to answer your questions as they are posed. Thank you very
much.
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Summary Statement of Lt. General Clark
General Clark. Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert,
and other distinguished members of the committee, good morning
from the United States Air Force Academy. And thank you to my
fellow superintendents for your statements. I am grateful for
this opportunity to update you on some of our recent successes
and to share some of the obstacles we face in the coming years.
Thank you for all that you do to support our cadets and to
enable the mission success of not only our academy but our air
and space forces as well. The interest and support of this
committee is greatly appreciated, and I look forward to our
discussion today.
About 5 months ago, it was my great honor to take command
of the institution I am proud to call my alma mater. Nearly
four decades ago, as a cadet at the United States Air Force
Academy myself, I found my purpose and established a foundation
of character and service that I could not have built anywhere
else.
I have returned as superintendent to an academy on an
outstanding trajectory but also one facing great challenges,
some unique to our mission and others that we share with other
campuses, our fellow service academies, and communities across
our country.
In these initial months, I laid out priorities that seek to
recognize and overcome not only the challenges we face at our
academy but also those that our graduates will soon encounter
as decision-makers in an era of great-power competition and
rapid change.
My first priority is one that is fundamental and
unwavering, even as the world changes around us: We will
continue to develop leaders of character. Character is the
cornerstone of leadership and should be the hallmark of an
academy graduate. Each element of our mission must remain
aligned with the moral compass that character provides. Without
a commitment to character, the leadership foundation we build
here will not be strong enough to support the weight of our
goals and ambitions.
My second priority is our immediate tactical challenge and
one of the toughest our academy has ever faced: We must defeat
COVID-19. I am proud that our response to this crisis is
utilizing the amazing brainpower we have within our faculty,
our staff, and our cadets. Trusting the science, putting our
math skills to work, and strict adherence to guidelines will be
our continued approach. And the health and safety of our entire
community will remain at the center of our decision-making
process. Some of us may be done with COVID-19, but COVID-19 is
not done with us.
Third, we must prepare leaders who will fight and win in
future conflicts. These conflicts will look different than any
of those experienced by any of us today. We are in an era where
our freedom to operate in the air and space cannot be taken for
granted. As our Air Force chief of staff, General Charles
Brown, stated, we must accelerate change or lose. Our academy
will do just that, developing innovative, creative, and bold
thinkers and leaders prepared to solve the unknown problems of
tomorrow.
Finally, we must foster a culture of dignity and respect.
This will not only make our campus a better place to work,
live, and learn, but it also is a strategic imperative for our
Air Force and our Space Force.
The cadets on our campus form the most diverse classes we
have ever had at our academy, and they will lead increasingly
diverse airmen and guardians. They must enable and empower the
diversity of thought that can be derived from this uniquely
American strength. They must also be able to relate to and
thrive in partnerships with other cultures and allied nations
in increasingly collaborative combat operations.
If dignity and respect is not engrained in our culture, we
will not only fail in these collective efforts, but we will
also fail in the proper development of future leaders.
In the longer statement submitted for the record, I have
elaborated in greater detail on some of the programs,
initiatives, and actions that we have taken or will take to
implement these priorities. I am proud of our direction and am
fully confident in the skills and abilities of our cadets,
faculty, and staff, but there are areas where we still have
work to do to uphold the high standards that our society
rightfully expects of us.
Our 4,221 cadets, 206 preparatory school cadet candidates,
and the infrastructure that makes up our campus represent a
critical investment in the future of our national security. I
welcome the opportunity to discuss how we can ensure our
mission success together.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
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Ms. McCollum. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
For the first question, as I said, I had the opportunity of
speaking to the three of you over the past several days, so I
am going to reserve my question for the end, and I am going to
turn to Mr. Ruppersberger first for questions.
Climate Change
Mr. Ruppersberger. I want to thank all three for the job
that you do in preparing, you know, our future leaders of the
military. Excellent job.
I want to thank you, Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member
Calvert, for your leadership.
And my first question is going to be about climate change.
You mentioned that in your remarks, Admiral Buck. And I am
going to speak to the broader context of an infrastructure
budget.
Now, I am president of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors,
and we speak often about many of the challenges that we have
there, but I am particularly concerned with the issue of sea-
level rise. And I know that both Air Force and West Point don't
have that issue and have plenty of land there, while the Naval
Academy is surrounded by water, and it is getting worse and
worse.
Now, Admiral Buck, can you explain to us the magnitude of
this issue for the record and what steps that you are taking to
address these concerns, what your needs are?
And you might want to discuss also the new building, one of
the first new buildings that was built in the Naval Academy in
many years, the cybersecurity building, and how that was
designed to protect the interior of the building and the
equipment in the building, but how that can repel or save the
building from the sea-level rise that occurs on a regular
basis.
Admiral Buck.
Admiral Buck. Congressman Ruppersberger, thank you very
much for the questions. Great to see you at least two-
dimensionally and hopefully three-dimensionally sooner than
later.
With regards to the series of questions you asked, all
related to climate change, you have identified our greatest
vulnerability; it is our geographic location. We are built on a
lot of reclaimed land. We are at the confluence of one of
Maryland's major rivers and the Chesapeake Bay, large bodies of
water. And we are also affected throughout the entire day, 365
days of the year, by the prevailing winds that have existed for
centuries, easterly and southeasterly winds, which, when you
combine that weather with sea-level rise, with subsidence that
is pretty significant in the Chesapeake Bay area here on the
East Coast and in the mid-Atlantic, we are continually
experiencing the negative effects of high-tide flooding, almost
on a regular basis.
To touch on the one question you asked about the magnitude
of it, for an example, to kind of give a compelling statistic,
in the entire decade of the 1990s, the Naval Academy was
negatively affected by high-tide flooding 41 times in a decade.
Now we are experiencing 41 instances of high-tide flooding per
year.
And as we look at all of the projections from all of the
science and those that are looking at this, especially on the
East Coast and looking at it for Naval infrastructure, it is
projected by 2050 that we will see this high-tide flooding
negative effect every single day of the year.
What does that mean? It floods out some of our roads, some
of the key networks that we bring our workforce on the campus
day-in and day-out. It affects some of our parking lots where
they try to park. And it affects the entrances and exits to
some of our buildings.
So it is a reality, and I am very proud to tell you that my
predecessor formed the U.S. Naval Academy Sea-Level Rise
Advisory Council in 2015, and I have the pleasure, the honor,
and the imperative to carry on the work of that advisory
council. It is made up of scientists from the Naval Academy,
engineers, different stakeholders in my Naval Academy team, as
well as stakeholders from the city of Annapolis and the State
of Maryland.
It is informed by the Army Corps of Engineers and other
experts that we bring in to get after a study that they have
embarked on now that we intend to see, or expect to see, at the
end of this calendar year that will help us create a military
installation resiliency plan.
They are going to present to us different courses of
action, engineering solutions, that we can take around the
Yard. They might be building up cement seawalls higher and
better. It might be creating earthen berms or levies and
raising the level of roads to block different areas. And it may
be in combination with correcting some of our stormwater
drainage systems that maybe has not had a good look at a
modernization in a number of years.
We understand that, as we combine all of those recommended
engineering solutions and understand and appreciate their
associated costs that we can present to you, to Members of
Congress, and to my Navy for help, that if we do that very
deliberately over the next 30 years, very consistently,
deliberately, and with conviction, we can ensure that we not
only protect the infrastructure at the Naval Academy but also
with our host city, the historic city of Annapolis.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. I have to yield back. My time is
up. Thank you for those answers.
Ms. McCollum. It is a great question, and we will be
following up on it. And I think we need a different--in my
opinion, a different timeframe that is a little quicker than 30
years, because that is the best-case scenario, I think, that we
heard from that.
Mr. Calvert.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I wanted to say that.
Preparation of Future Leaders
Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
And I thank the superintendents for their testimony.
It has been pointed out that we are currently in the age of
rapidly evolving technology, unseen in human history, impacting
warfare domains in almost every single way imaginable. Of
course, Dutch has an installation that is in his district that
is involved in that every single day. I mean, cyber is a huge
issue that we have to face every single day--and, now, space
domains.
Can each of you give us examples of how your respective
institutions are preparing our future leaders to adapt to this
type of environment? Are you making curriculum changes that
focus more heavily on that technology?
I guess that is for all three or one of you, representing
each other.
General Williams. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. I
will start off. General Williams here at West Point.
Sir, we, as we talked yesterday--thank you for that
question--we absolutely are, here at West Point, thinking about
the future in very critical ways.
I would start with--and thanks to Congress--our Cyber
Engineering and Academic Center, which will transform how we
think about the future in very real ways. And it will also
allow us to continue to attract the best and brightest from our
country.
We just broke ground about 2 months ago, and thanks to
Congress, we have the ability to do that. So we look forward to
having the space to develop and provide a forum where, not only
will our cadets be able to interact with the best and brightest
around the world and invite folks to continue that discussion,
but also their daily conversation will be influenced and shaped
by this great facility.
And, sir, in terms of how we do our curriculum, in terms of
the Academy, we have new majors. We have a space science major
and a space science minor, just recently, that is under the
direction of our physics and nuclear engineering department.
They have made a lot of great inroads with that. I have been
there for some time. Currently, we have 70 cadets enrolled in
the major, 20 cadets enrolled in the minor.
We also have a geospatial information science major, where
we have 85 cadets currently enrolled.
So we are producing the young men and women who will be
leaders in this space, if you will, in the future, and we feel
very comfortable about that.
We also enjoy the Army's Cyber Institute, which is co-
located here. It is the Army's think tank to what we think
about. And that really is a nexus where we bring the best and
brightest. And they routinely provide to the literature about
what we should be thinking about to compete and defeat our
adversaries in the future and in the cyber domain.
So those are some of the things internal to West Point, the
brick-and-mortar projects which you all have helped fund, and
then, more importantly, the adjunct Army Cyber Institute just
outside the gate. And cadets are allowed to interface with the
Army Cyber Institute, so folks come in and out of that in their
classroom. And the instructors actually rotate on my staff as
well.
Thank you for your question, sir.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
Navy, Air Force, any addition to that?
General Clark. Yes, sir. Thank you for the opportunity.
And what I will start with is our National Defense Strategy
that tells us as a country that we have to be prepared to
compete in an environment of great-power competition. And our
chief of staff, General Brown, has charged us in his order to
``accelerate change or lose'' to develop airmen that are
prepared to compete in that environment.
So, at the Academy, much like West Point and Annapolis, we
are developing leaders that are looking to the future. And that
is one of my top priorities. We have 50 percent of our majors
are STEM majors; 50 percent of our core courses are STEM
courses.
But, beyond that, we are also developing leaders to think
boldly, to be innovative and solve problems that we don't even
know about. And we have recently stood up an Institute for
Future Conflict to help us to meet the needs and to prepare our
cadets so that they are not ready to meet challenges for 5
years from now but challenges 25 years from now.
And we are very excited about the direction that we are
taking and that we are moving. In fact, we have just hired a
new director of that institute.
So I think we are in a great place to have our leaders
ready to lead us into the future and compete well on the future
stage of our global environment.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Calvert. Well, thank you.
It looks like my time is just about up, Madam Chair, so I
will yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. McCollum. Well, that is good. Maybe we will have an
opportunity to catch up on the last service we didn't hear
from.
Ms. Kaptur.
Diversity and Culture at the Academies
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank you
for hosting us this morning with these really outstanding
leaders for our country, all the superintendents.
My two questions involve diversity and culture at the
academies.
The first is, could each of our guests please summarize
their progress in terms of diversity, which has been one of the
most challenging aspects of my work as a Congresswoman relative
to the academies? Despite the diverse district I respect,
getting young people to apply who would be more representative
of the district that I represent--and believe me, it isn't for
lack of trying. It has been very, very hard. So just talk to us
about, in each of the academies, your progress in terms of
recruitment for admission.
And then, secondly, in terms of culture, I was very
interested in Superintendent Williams' use of the word
``character,'' developing character. I am interested in your
views at the Academy of the types of students that are being
admitted and some of your challenges there.
I am familiar with some of the drug problems that have
occurred at West Point, but it is not the only place where
those have happened.
And I am interested in your talking about the cheating that
has occurred on many of the tests in each of the academies, and
how, in fact, you can educate to character. Do your admissions
not possess those traits? Do you have to teach to that? Has
this changed in the last 40 years?
I am very interested in your comments on diversity and on
developing cadets with character.
General Williams. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the opportunity
to talk about that.
Diversity, as I mentioned in my opening comments, is a line
of effort, it is a priority. I think it is very important for
young men and women that come here that we look like the United
States Army, we represent the country.
I actively am in this space. We have a very active outreach
program. I would love to reach out and help you in that effort,
ma'am, as we go forward. I actively--in this virtual space, it
is a little difficult, but we hold a number of online webinars.
I usually participate in them on Saturday, and I actually talk
and recruit people of different diversity.
Ma'am, we meet or exceed all of the officer percentages
here at West Point. So for African Americans, for Asians and
Hispanics, we are at or over the percentage that are actively
represented in the Active Duty Army officer corps right now at
West Point--24 percent women, 17 percent African American. And
I can share with you more of those details later.
So diversity is something that I think is critical to
winning. And, especially as we look at complex problems in the
future, you have to have folks that are of diverse backgrounds
and ethnicities, I think.
In terms of culture, I mentioned before how we have
elevated culture. It is a very deliberate effort. We have a
highly qualified individual who integrates across the
enterprise, not only in the academic departments but in my
physical department and in my military department, who answers
to me about culture.
And we have nine highly qualified--the Army allowed us to
have these folks to come in here, and they are a part of our
program. And it is a very deliberate way to take young men and
women who--right now, there is a set of high school seniors who
will be here in about 4 months. And we take them where they
are, and, over the 47-month experience, we develop them into
leaders of character. So it is a very deliberate effort. I can
talk to you about that in more detail.
And then, finally, ma'am, you asked about honor. Last
spring, our young men and women were in a remote learning
environment and were challenged--some were challenged in terms
of home life at home and a variety of issues, which I can go
into in more detail later if you would like. They were away
from their coaches, their teachers, their TACs, their TAC NCOs,
and the structures that provide the way ahead.
And, from my perspective, these young men and women had
only been here a semester, and there is no excuse for violating
United States Military Academy Honor Code, and I have all the
tools I need to hold them accountable for that, and we will.
And the ones that remain here, we will develop them into
leaders of character, and they will learn from this experience.
Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. General, what about drug use at West Point?
General Williams. Ma'am, I haven't seen--that we have some
small instance--it is not raging right now, to use that word.
There are the normal kinds of challenges that any commander
faces. This is not something that is a very high, currently,
raging at West Point in terms of----
Ms. Kaptur. Have you expelled anyone because of drug use?
General Williams. I have. Not this year, but in my past 3
years, yes, ma'am, I have.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.
General Williams. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers.
Pandemics on the Academies
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I thank the gentlemen for their appearance before our
subcommittee and for the great job you are doing in your
respective academies.
Let me ask you about something that is unpleasant, one
aspect, a big aspect, of the COVID-19 problem, and that is the
mental well-being of our world in these times, but, especially,
of course, at the academies, with your personnel, the mental
health.
In the spring of 2020, COVID-19 forced the academies to
change how they operated--locking down campus, quarantining
cadets and midshipmen, moving classes online, and ultimately
sending the student body home early for the school year.
While the cadets and midshipmen at West Point and the Naval
Academy were sent home in March, the Air Force Academy kept
senior cadets on campus. And, in March, two Air Force Academy
seniors were found dead in suspected suicides while under
strict lockdown because of COVID-19.
That led, of course, to conversations about the impact of
the pandemic on mental health. Both West Point and the Naval
Academy reported seeing indicators of mental health decline in
the cadets and midshipmen throughout the coronavirus pandemic.
How are the academies dealing with this obvious problem,
following COVID-19 safety protocols, as well as keeping your
campuses safe and the well-being of cadets and midshipmen in
good shape?
Admiral Buck. Congressman Rogers, Admiral Buck here from
Annapolis. I will take the lead on answering that from our
perspective here at the Academy.
Looking back chronologically, when we did shift very
rapidly to an online environment back in the spring, the spring
semester of 2020, I am very proud to tell you that our team
here, our collective team of people that can help midshipmen
develop their resiliency and respond to them in their times of
need, quickly converted every single service that we have to an
online environment. And I don't believe we missed a beat with
regards to making ourselves available to each and every
midshipman.
And it is a large cohort of folks. It is their shipmates,
their fellow midshipmen. It is their company leadership or the
commissioned officers and the enlisted leaders in the brigade
that usually see them on damn near an hour-by-hour basis each
day. It is our Chaplain Corps. It is our Midshipmen Development
Center, which is staffed by psychiatrists, psychologists,
nutritionists, social workers, and sexual assault folks that
can help. All of those people were able to immediately make
themselves available to the midshipmen during that distanced
environment in the spring and the summer.
What we saw was a rise in a request for services, not a
rise at all for specific appointments for therapists. And that
should be noted. It was a significant difference in their
request to try to learn to cope for themselves, to cope amongst
their family environment or wherever they were operating from
to take school online.
But, as I said in my opening statement, it is an imperative
to bring these young men and women back and develop them and
care for them in person. And we began that right near the end
of June with Plebe Summer, with some summer school, with a bit
of our summer training, and then the fall semester. And that
allowed all of those stakeholders to once again reach out and
help midshipmen in person. It is a very robust network.
And I also have differentiated to myself and to my senior
leadership team, it is one thing to talk about mental health,
it is another thing to talk about morale, and there is a very
big difference there.
We take their mental health of our midshipmen and even our
faculty and our staff, our whole Naval Academy family, we take
that very seriously and try to look out for one another and
address it when we can.
It is incumbent upon my commandant of midshipmen and myself
and other senior leaders to also work to improve morale when we
have to impose certain things like the lockdown to the campus
when we have spikes of COVID to try to mitigate it and knock it
down.
And we have seen success in addressing both a morale issue
as well as a mental health issue, sir.
Mr. Rogers. There is a huge stigma--with human beings in
general, but speaking now of military personnel--a huge stigma
about asking for mental health help. How are you able to
overcome that problem?
Admiral Buck. Sir, in my past, as a flag officer in the
Navy, I was given an assignment to lead the 21st Century Sailor
Office, which looked at all of destructive behaviors of Navy
sailors. And one of those was, I was the suicide prevention
officer for the United States Navy.
And I am proud to tell you that what we realized was we
needed to work diligently to reduce that stigma and to,
instead, advertise to Navy sailors, to all of us, that it is
okay to ask for help. In fact, the way we branded that was, it
is a sign of strength to ask for help. And what we are seeing
is, over 50 percent of the battle is just to be able to have an
ability to talk to somebody, to get some of your problems and
your demons off your chest by talking to someone.
So learning to be a good active listener, making yourself
available, and ensuring that everyone realizes that, the minute
you ask for help with a mental health issue, you are not going
to be thrown out of the Naval Academy or you are not going to
be tossed out of the Navy. We have made such a big investment
in you, we see such great potential in you, that we would like
to help you through your demons and help you through what is
stressing you, and then get you back up on that horse that
threw you off and make you a productive midshipman and then,
hence, a productive Naval officer out in the fleet.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much for that thoughtful
question, Mr. Rogers. And mental health is something in our
military we know we want to cut down on people feeling that
they can't ask. So thank you. And I am sure the committee
members appreciated the fact that we took an extra minute to
get that answer. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cuellar.
Efforts Takens for Diversity in the Academies
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you so much, Madam Chair.
I wanted to go back on the question of diversity that I
believe Representative Marcy Kaptur brought up. Can you tell us
a little bit about prep schools and how you all use prep
schools to get diversity into your academies?
I know there are some prep schools in different parts of
the country, but there are areas that there are really no prep
schools at all, and they have to travel a long way to get some
of those students, to get the diversity.
Could you all tell us what you all do and how you all set
up some of those prep schools, or is it all private-sector-
involved, or are there partnerships for the academies?
General Clark. Sir, this is Lieutenant General Clark from
the Air Force Academy, and I can address that.
Our prep school is significant in helping us to shape the
diversity and the makeup of our cadet population as they come
in. And they are on campus; it is about 200 prep school cadet
candidates that are there. But we also have opportunities at
other prep schools, as you mentioned, throughout the country
where we can garner cadet candidates from to bring into the
Academy.
And we have an organization called our Falcon Foundation,
which is comprised of a lot of graduates and volunteers who
help us to shepherd people into those other prep schools so
that we can have the opportunity to reach from all districts of
our country to bring them into the Academy, help them to
achieve.
If there are any shortfalls in their admissions or any
issues that they need to deal with to make them more
competitive for the Air Force Academy, we bring them into those
schools, and they really do help us to shape not only from an
ethnic and racial but gender perspective.
And our Falcon Foundation is that organization that I
talked about that helps us to do that. They really meet any
needs that we have. So if we see shortfalls in the makeup of
our cadet population, they are very responsive to us and help
us to shape it to make our class everything we want it to be.
And, frankly, it is working. Our current class of 2024, our
freshmen, is the most diverse class we have ever had at the Air
Force Academy. We continue to lean on external partners to help
us to shape our class.
Over.
General Williams. Sir, I will take a shot at it as well.
Much like Rich, we depend on the prep school, USMAPS. It is up
the hill. My son went to the prep school before he came here.
It is a vital part of how we build diversity here at the United
States Military Academy.
The purpose--like Rich, we have about 225 places up there
every year. As you know, sir, you apply to West Point, and if
you are lacking in some of the skills that you need to succeed
down the hill, as we call it here, that is a perfect year for
you to do better.
And we do use it, as well, to get at diversity, not only as
Rich mentioned but also from soldiers from the regular Army. We
have about 40 of that 225 soldiers from the regular Army. And a
lot of the things that were talked about earlier, they bring a
maturity to some of the things that were talked about earlier--
sexual assault, sexual harassment--because they have real-life
experience. And they are mentors down in the corps in that next
year.
I would add another, sort of, layer to that.
I don't know if my Navy shipmate has anything to add.
Admiral Buck. Very similar to my sister academies, our
magnitude, about 250 young men and women matriculate to the
Academy through the Naval Academy Prep School. Ours is not co-
located with Annapolis. It is up in Newport, Rhode Island. And
we also affiliate with 17 private prep schools around the
country. We call them foundation schools.
On any given year, sir, 300 midshipmen will have furthered
their academic skills and allow us to garner greater diversity
in the brigade by coming through either our prep school or our
foundation program. And the purpose of that is exactly as my
two colleagues have described to you.
Mr. Cuellar. All right.
Let me, before my time is over--I have about 30 seconds.
First of all, thank you. And I am really happy that we work
well, just like the other members, with your academies. So I
want to thank you for diversifying the academies.
Could I ask each of you all to provide--I don't know if
anybody else wants copies of this, but I would like to be
provided by all three of you all your work with prep schools,
the different schools you have, and the foundation, the Falcon
Foundation, and all that.
If you all can send that over to me, because there are
areas--my time is over, but let me just say this: There are
areas along the border, highly Hispanic areas--you know,
Laredo, for example, is 96 percent Hispanic, and I am sure some
other folks they have very high-minority areas. And I would
love to see if we can partner up with you all on some of those
prep schools on that.
So if you all can send to that over, I really would
appreciate it.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. McCollum. Yeah, that would be fabulous. I think the
whole committee would like that. And I also know there are some
high school programs too. So that would be wonderful, if you
would share that.
Thank you for asking that question. It was a great
question.
Mr. Womack, who took me to West Point, you are up.
Preparatory Academies
Mr. Womack. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks for
the hearing.
Thanks to the supes for what you are doing and for being
with us today.
Henry, you would be pleased to know--and they have spoken
to this. These prep schools are wonderful opportunities. I kind
of call them red-shirt years, because they do some things that
really prepare a lot of these young men and women for the
opportunity, without just throwing them in as direct admits and
putting them in a very difficult situation. I think, from a
diversity standpoint, these prep schools are great.
Also, General Williams, I don't know what we call it, but
there is also the ability to send some of these kids out to
other schools, like Marion Military Academy, those kinds of
places, for a freshman year and then recompete for a direct
admit the following year, kind of like prep school but in a
different setting. So, they are wonderful.
As a matter of disclosure, I chair the Board of Visitors at
West Point, so I own that, and that forms the basis for some of
my understanding of what goes on at these academies,
particularly up there on the Hudson.
And I want everybody on the call to know, on this Zoom
today to know, that the current holder of the Commander-in-
Chief's Trophy are the Black Knights of the United States
Military Academy at West Point.
Can I get a ``hooah'' on that, General Williams?
General Williams. Hooah, Congressman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Womack. All right.
Academy Cheating Scandals
I am going to go back to the issue that was brought up
earlier regarding the cheating scandals, and I am going to give
each one of the supes about a minute to fashion an answer. And,
Chair McCollum, we may go over just a little bit.
It is one thing to have an attrition model, where you make
a mistake, you are out of here. It is a whole another thing to
have a developmental model, where we take young men and women
from society, bring them in as freshmen, and then begin the
grooming process. Man, if all these kids were ready to be
lieutenants, we wouldn't spend 4 years trying to groom them. I
am a big believer that, when they come in, if they, you know,
skin their knee, they make some mistakes, that we work with
them.
And I am going to start with General Clark. Tell me what
you have at your disposal, what you do, to help kids--because
all the academies have had, you know, a bout with a cheating
scandal, many thanks to COVID. But tell me what you do in terms
of bringing these kids through an honor program and
reacquainting them with the values that we espouse at the
Academy.
General Clark. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question.
And I know that I can speak for my fellow superintendents
that we are all approaching a developmental model of honor
rather than a fear-based or a punitive model. Now, there are,
obviously, punitive elements to our honor systems, but, like
you said, we have to bring our cadets--when we bring them in,
it is a matter of developing them to that honorable-living
capacity or desire that we have.
So we have a very robust honor education system that starts
from the day that they walk into the Academy. And it consists
of instructional opportunities, different mentorship
opportunities. And it goes all the way throughout their time as
cadets.
Now, if they are found in violation of the Honor Code,
especially in the early years, we have a strong probationary
program, that we help them to develop, help them to recognize
where their shortfalls were, and to bring them to a place where
they understand how to continue to live honorably and abide by
our code.
We have had a 95-percent success rate, meaning cadets who
get into that probationary status, they never have another
incident or issue with the Honor Code. So we are very proud of
it.
The developmental aspects are key and critical, and we want
our cadets to respect, not fear, the Honor Code.
Over, sir.
Mr. Womack. Admiral Buck.
Admiral Buck. Likewise, sir, we have an honor concept at
the Naval Academy.
I will address that we sensed that we had a cheating issue
on a final exam that was administered just this last December,
a couple months ago. I am right near the end of concluding the
investigation of that to better understand the magnitude and
appreciate exactly what happened. It was with a younger cohort
of midshipmen, the sophomores, with the physics exam.
Like my colleagues, we completely embrace the developmental
model. I would suggest that you probably get a little bit more
understanding when you are a freshman or a sophomore, but as
you spend more time in your 47-month journey at the Naval
Academy immersed on a daily basis in a culture of character and
a culture of honor, that our expectations of you, as you get
closer to entering the fleet as a junior and a senior, that
there may not be as much of a look for remediation and second
chances.
But we do want to look at each case individually. If you
are found or alleged to have violated our honor concept, your
case goes in front of a midshipmen-led honor committee. They,
the midshipmen, your peers, make a determination of your guilt
or your innocence. And if it comes out that you are guilty, you
then go into consideration by the commissioned chain of
command, whether you are chosen for remediation and retained or
whether you are recommended to be separated from the Academy.
We share almost the exact same statistic as Air Force. We
have a 95-percent success rate of those that enter the honor
system for a violation once in their time here, they don't ever
enter it again. And they matriculate very well, and by the time
we release them to the fleet, we are confident that we have
some honorable young leaders and--you have heard us say--
leaders of character.
Mr. Womack. Yeah. Well, look, thank you, Admiral, and I am
going to--I never want to speak for the superintendent at West
Point, because he speaks well for himself, but I will save the
time on this one.
Let me just say this for the benefit of my colleagues: You
will hear from time to time from graduates of these academies.
We call them old grads, for the most part. And many times the
opinions of the old grads are more based on attrition models
than they are developmental models, because they have been
through it.
So I think we have to be very careful, Madam Chairwoman, to
be terribly judgmental, particularly when these kids come to
these academies as freshmen and particularly when they come
from some less-than-ideal circumstances.
And that is why I congratulate each of the superintendents
for what they are doing regarding this developmental model.
And I will yield back my time.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick.
Sexual Harassment
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member
Calvert.
I have a question about sexual harassment. So, when I look
through many of the programs built to combat sexual harassment
and assault, a lot of them focus on service provided to victims
after they suffer abuse. I agree it is absolutely critical that
we provide every possible resource to survivors, but I do
believe that we are overlooking opportunities in prevention.
Lieutenant General Williams, you discussed the lack of
relationship and interpersonal skills that have been in some
young cadets, which can enable corrosive behaviors to take
root.
Can you share with us how the academies are prioritizing
training focused on developing healthy relationships to prevent
sexual assault and harassment; and if you are looking outside
of these internal-created programs to civilian entities that
specialize in developing these skills in today's young adults?
And that is for everybody on the panel.
General Williams. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for your question.
I will tell you that leadership matters in this space. And
my secretary, the chief of staff of the Army, the sergeant
major of the Army have been very clear in terms of how do we
get at this.
When we brought our cadets back from winter leave in
January, I took a look at the Fort Hood independent review,
which I know many of the members are--all members probably are
aware of. And we talked to every single cadet when they came
back from the leave.
I led off the session, and then I had my experts, my SHARP
director and others, talk. And I said, this isn't about Fort
Hood, this could be any fort, this could be Fort West Point.
And we talked to them about personal courage and what it takes
to hold each other accountable as peers here at the United
States Military Academy.
So I think leadership matters--I know it matters. And I
know that all of the corrosives that the chief talks about and
the Secretary and the SMA and that we also take on here, the
only way to combat that, ma'am, is for peer leadership and for
leadership at the very top.
I will also tell you, we piloted last summer a relational
character course. We are going to expand it this summer to talk
exactly about what you mentioned in there, how do we relate
with each other.
When the cadets came back last summer, our cadets were
brilliant in this space. We have trust and peer leaders in the
cadet companies, and they are the ones that are at--they are
resources for young men and women to talk to.
So we allowed our cadets last summer--we will do the same
thing with the new classes that come in--a time, the space, to
talk about tough subjects. It really is about these young men
and women looking each other in the eye--I know it is difficult
during these COVID experiences here, but looking each other in
the eye and saying, ``Look, I care about you, and I expect you
to treat me with dignity and respect.''
And so that is what we do here at West Point. We provide
them the opportunity and the space to talk about it.
But I am in this space and I am not leaving this space, as
the superintendent of the United States Military Academy.
Thank you, ma'am.
Admiral Buck. Congresswoman Kirkpatrick, Sean Buck from
Navy.
Very like what General Williams just said, the number-one
way for us to get after preventing sexual assault or sexual
harassment is through peer leadership.
What we have found over and over again in the formal
surveys that are given at the Naval Academy and all of our
academies are that our midshipmen and our cadets, they trust
the commissioned leadership at the academies, they trust the
senior enlisted leaders, but they are having a difficult time
trusting their peer leadership. Most of the sexual assaults
over time at my academy have been midshipman-on-midshipman. And
that is very distressing, that it is blue-on-blue.
So, in our prevention efforts, which is now the
preponderance of the effort in the military across all the
services and across all three of our academies, is getting
after prevention and strengthening the confidence and the
ability of our midshipmen leaders to lead themselves, with
adult supervision. That is where we are going to nip it in the
bud.
You did ask one particular question, if any of us are
leaning on external resources and innovation and creativity
from maybe other university systems around the country or any
other asset that might be helping organizations get after
sexual assault. And, yes, ma'am, we are.
There is a very robust investment by the Department of
Defense and all of our services to allow us to do best
practices, wherever they may be, to get after this scourge and
make it go away from our academies, ma'am.
General Clark. And, ma'am, I don't know if--this is General
Clark. I don't know if--I know our time is up--if you would
like me to make a short statement?
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Yes, if you could, please.
Ms. McCollum. Yes, 30 seconds.
Admiral Buck. Yes, ma'am. I will just say that we are in
the same mode of thinking as both Navy and West Point.
And we look at a sexual assault prevention framework, where
we can actually address this issue with our cadets, both pre-
admission through programs that we have them involved in--we
work with parents on alcohol-related issues so that parents can
work with their young high school graduates before they come.
We work during their time here throughout. We have great
programs that address healthy relationship training, that
address personal skills, and that also address bystander
intervention skills for our whole cadet wing so that nobody
stands by just to let these horrible events happen.
And we also have a series of pilot programs that allow us
to assess each program that we implement so that we understand
exactly the type of effect we could expect, but also to use our
time wisely so that we can target exactly the problems that we
have to address in this space.
So I think all of us are committed to decreasing and, in
fact, defeating this scourge and making our academies and our
forces better.
Over.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much.
I am going to do a bit of housekeeping before we hear from
Mr. Aderholt's question.
Mr. Ryan, you are present. I am going to go and vote. The
staff will send you the list of the next speakers. It is
Aderholt, Aguilar, Carter, and then the rest are listed.
I know we are in good hands, and, with that, I will be
going to vote.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Aderholt.
COVID-19 Vaccines for Students
Mr. Aderholt. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thanks, everyone, for being before the subcommittee
today.
I have been in contact with my colleague, Congressman
DesJarlais of Tennessee. And one of the issues that has come up
is, I was just wondering if you could provide a little bit of a
timeline about the COVID-19 vaccines that will be available for
the academy members.
I know a couple of you may have mentioned that a little bit
in your comments earlier on. But as far as a timeline as to
when you foresee the members being able to actually receive the
shots, or if they have started receiving the shots, could you
please just give us a brief outline as far as what you are
looking at right now at your particular academy?
General Clark. Yes, sir. This is Lieutenant General Clark.
I can start with that one.
All of us, all three of us, General Buck, General Williams,
we talk regularly about our issues with COVID-19, and I believe
that we are all in very similar situations as far as the
impacts of it on our mission, how we are testing, and then,
now, vaccines which have come our way.
We are all adhering to the DOD schema, the Department of
Defense schema, that lays out the priorities of who should get
the vaccines when. So, it starts off with first responders; it
cascades down to mission-essential members and deployers; it
gets into medical beneficiaries; and then our cadets actually
fall into the lowest category because they are all healthy
others. They are the most healthy of our population, and they
fall into the lower level of that schema.
So we all get vaccines that are filtered to us. We get them
periodically, as is the rest of the installations in at least
the Air Force and the Space Force, and I think the Army and
Navy are the same. We fall into a system that, when they come,
we execute the vaccines and get them into arms as quickly as
possible but in accordance with the schema that the Department
of Defense has given us.
So, right now, for us at the Air Force Academy, it is
primarily our first responders, our staff and faculty who we
consider mission-essential who have been the folks that have
gotten the vaccine so far. Eventually, though, as we get more
vaccines into arms, our cadets will be recipients of that
vaccine.
And I will yield the floor to my other superintendent
colleagues. Over.
General Williams. Congressman, we are getting fantastic
support from the Army and DOD in this space. To date, we have
vaccinated just over 4,000 here at West Point. That is not the
corps of cadets. That is, much as Rich laid out, the framework
of first responders and such and folks that are in vulnerable
populations. I have 4,400 cadets here, but in the community
writ large at West Point, about 8,000 in the community and
such.
So we are on path. Rich laid it out in terms of, when it is
available, we will do it. As you know, we are under emergency
use, so we cannot mandate. But, sir, we have very high--the
cadets want this vaccination. It is well over 90 percent that
are going to--so when we get it and when it is available, I am
confident that we will be vaccinated here at the United States
Military Academy and contribute to Army readiness as we go
forward.
Mr. Aderholt. Thank you.
Admiral Buck. And, Congressman Aderholt, what I have is
done is--I have the same schema; it is a DOD schema. It is
going well. I would suggest it is slow and steady. We went
after the same prioritization as General Clark articulated to
you.
I have given my Navy a timeline for when I need to have the
midshipmen vaccinated, because the way we do our summer
training is I will send the vast majority of midshipmen out to
the fleet to embark on operational ships, submarines,
squadrons, Navy SEAL teams.
And our Navy has prioritized the operational forces first.
They are getting vaccinated. They have a very safe and healthy
bubble. And for them to be willing to accept our midshipmen
from the Academy as well as midshipmen from NROTC universities
around the country, we need to vaccinate them prior to the
summer training started.
So we are anticipating our summer training--it first opens
up around the 15th of May. I need to start vaccinating that
small cohort of midshipmen around the last week of this month,
March. And then I hope to be able to start vaccinating all the
rest of them in the first 3 weeks of April.
And that will allow them to get through the two-shot
schema, 4 weeks between them, and then develop the immunity
with 2 weeks after that second shot, and they will be an up-
and-ready round for the fleet. And all the captains of the
units out in the Navy fleet will be ready to accept them, and
we can conduct summer training, which is such an important
aspect of the development of a midshipman.
Over.
Academy Pledge
Mr. Aderholt. Mr. Chair, I know my time is up, but if I
could just ask for the--I wanted to ask about one other issue,
and they can respond on the record.
Of course, I believe in mutual respect. That is important
for all our cadets, no matter what service they are in. But a
little bit--this question about this pledge to respect the
intersexual identities of servicemembers at the Naval Academy.
Like I said, it is my understanding that mutual respect and
leadership traits and leadership principles, that is already a
part of the program and should already be well drilled in to
these cadets.
And I just want to just inquire about that. And since my
time is up, you can reply for the record.
Mr. Ryan [presiding]. I appreciate that, Mr. Aderholt.
Thank you.
Mr. Aguilar.
Composition of Faculty
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Mr. Ryan.
And I appreciate the chairwoman putting this hearing
forward and, superintendents, for your work.
Gentlemen, I wanted to ask a little bit about the faculty.
Could you describe the composition of your faculty at each
academy? What is the mix of civilian and military professors,
and how diverse is the population, and the types of
qualifications, and if tenure applies?
I just wanted to get a better understanding and hear that
with my colleagues. If we could start with Superintendent
Williams and then proceed, that would be appreciated.
General Williams. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
Yeah, so our staff and faculty here are diverse, about 70
military/30 civilian. We have been on that path for some time.
I will tell you that we have--at the core of it are our
great department heads. We have 13 department heads. And these
are men and women who are Army colonels who have devoted their
life to their particular discipline and spent some time here.
That is one part of the triumvirate here.
And then our great Army civilians, our senior Army
civilians, who have been recently tenured in the last few
years, who also add to the academics. They partner with those
department heads.
And then there is this rotational part of the faculty that
are young captains and majors who provide intellectual capital
back to our great Army. So, this is Captain Major Williams. You
know, they are midway through their career. They go back,
receive a Ph.D., teach here for 3 years in a utilization tour,
and then return intellectual capital back to our great Army.
And that is usually about a 5- and sometimes it could be a 6-
year tenure.
And so those are the different elements. You have more
senior tenured professors, civilian; you have senior tenured
colonels who have devoted their life to this academic
profession; and then our rotational faculty, who are younger
officers who will return also to the Army and be the battalion
brigade commanders for our cadets.
So the relationship and the sense of ownership that our
young faculty have with these cadets is a vital part of how we
go forward.
Thank you for your question, sir.
General Clark. And, sir, Lieutenant General Clark from Air
Force. I will add on.
We are about 60 percent military and 40 percent civilian in
our faculty. And, like General Williams stated, our military
faculty really bring an operational flavor to the academic
curriculum; and, of course, our civilians, many Ph.D's, many
from other areas of academia, who help us to bring that
perspective to our program.
I want to also highlight, though, we have coaches, we have
air officer commanding who are in charge of each cadet squadron
with our academy military trainers, our enlisted members, who
help to lead those squadrons, who also bring the perspectives
that our cadets need in their development.
I will say, one of the things that we are working very
diligently on is to increase the diversity of our staff and
faculty and to ensure that not only our cadets look like
America but that our staff and faculty represent that as well.
That will be a great benefit to our cadets' development, and we
will continue to work that.
Thank you, sir.
Admiral Buck. Congressman Aguilar, we at Navy are a little
bit different than my other two sister academies. We are
traditionally 50/50. Today, as I speak to you, we are 53
percent civilian/47 percent military professors. And it is a
total of 600 faculty here.
In that uniformed group of faculty, 19 percent of them are
women, 19 percent of them are men or women of minority. We
continue to look at our hiring practices across the whole
faculty to try to develop a diverse faculty workforce there so
that the young men and women that go to school here look and
see men and women that may look like them.
We have a tenure program here. So we have tenured
professors, full professors, associate professors. And then
each year, to fill the gaps, we hire a fluctuating number of
adjunct professors to fill in where we may have holes on one
particular year. And those professors come from a very diverse
background, sir.
Mr. Aguilar. I appreciate the answers, gentlemen, and would
just, you know, continue--and I specifically appreciate
Superintendent Clark talking a little bit about the continued
need to review hiring practices and to better reflect the
diverse population that we want the academies to serve.
So thank you, gentlemen. I know this is an evolving issue,
and I appreciate your openness to these questions on this
topic.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Aguilar. I appreciate you asking
those very important questions.
Judge Carter.
Mr. Calvert. Mr. Chairman, before that----
Mr. Ryan. Yes.
Mr. Calvert. Judge Carter is going to cover for me.
Unfortunately, I have a conflict. So the judge has got it from
here. Thank you.
Mr. Ryan. Okay.
Judge Carter, you are also up for your 5 minutes of
questions.
Mr. Carter. Thank you for recognizing me.
And thank you to the superintendents for being able to be
here and talk to us today. We are learning quite a bit.
I am going to ask a couple of things that go back when we
were back talking about cyber. With the concept of all joint
command and control, how are you attracting and retaining
qualified civilian faculty in the technical disciplines? And
what type of funding do you need to ensure that the U.S.
maintains a resilient cyber force within the Department of
Defense and with our intelligence partners? What kind of help
do you need?
General Clark. Yes, sir. I can start off with that.
Lieutenant General Clark.
We have majors and many classes throughout our entire
curriculum that address our cyber needs. And as both General
Raymond, our Space Force commander, who says that every
guardian has to speak digital as their language, they have to
understand the cyber domain if we are going to be able to
execute joint all-domain command and control, and General
Brown, in his charge for accelerating change or lose, has
emphasized that as well. So our majors in cyber, every course
that we teach in cyber is critical for us.
We are also breaking ground this month on our Cyber
Innovation Center, which is an opportunity for us to bring in
partners not only from the broader Air Force and Space Force
but also from industry so that our cadets can have the
opportunity not only to learn in academics but also to
experience the real-world needs and address real problems.
One of the areas that we could use help with, though, sir,
is in our information technology. Our IT is woefully behind
where we need to be to be, I think, a provider of cyber
excellence.
Right now, we have needs for immediate funding for this
year, funding unfunded requirements. Plus, we need money into
the POM, because our network is not the same network that the
broader Air Force uses. We are on a dot-edu, whereas the Air
Force is on a dot-mil. The dot-edu allows us to collaborate, it
allows us to innovate, and it connects us with researchers and
other universities that we need to be a world-class
organization.
So we don't fall under the normal IT funding that the rest
of the Air Force comes under. So that funding that we need not
only now but into the out-years is vital for us. In fact, it
threatens our accreditation.
During COVID, we have recognized our weaknesses as we have
gone to more virtual classes. So we have great needs, I think,
from a fiscal standpoint, to allow us to meet our aspirations
to be that school of cyber excellence.
So I will stop there, sir, but we appreciate any help that
you can provide to move us forward with our IT so that we are
the provider of cyber excellence.
Over.
Mr. Carter. Anyone else?
Admiral Buck. Congressman Carter, the Naval Academy, we are
proud to represent ourselves as a center of cyber excellence.
We aggressively got after this about 12 years ago and committed
ourselves to doing so.
And, just this year, on my tenure, we opened up, I believe,
one of the first cyber operations center buildings in the
country, and we brought the capability here to be able to teach
our midshipmen right from the ground floor at the Top Secret,
Specially Compartmented level. And, as you know, the topic of
cyber, it is very unremarkable to teach it at the unclass
level.
So, now, when these young men and women graduate from the
Naval Academy, having been exposed to cyber across their entire
journey here, they are much more capable, much more aware, much
more cognizant of how to fight and work and live within the
cyber domain.
We take on an all/many/few concept here. Every single
midshipman takes two courses in cyber. We present many
opportunities for many to be exposed to cyber through lectures
and conferences and research projects. And we now have a cyber
operations major, in which 75 midshipmen matriculate to each
time--each year entering class.
If I were to tell you what we have trouble with in
attracting the best faculty to teach in cyber, it is being able
to pay a cyber professor on a Federal pay scale. That is very
difficult to compete with what they can do out in private
industry, sir.
I am not so sure how to crack that nut other than to
present them a really, really rewarding experience teaching
fine young men and women at the Academy who are passionate to
learn. We now present world-class facilities. But you do know
that it would be very difficult to present a Federal pay scale
to someone steeped in cyber who can do a lot better on the
outside.
Over.
Mr. Carter. Anybody else?
General Williams. Yes, sir.
Sir, three components: the brick-and-mortar aspect, as I
mentioned earlier, the Cyber Engineering Academic Center, which
will transform the very face of West Point. I know when--we
look forward to welcoming you back again, sir; you were here 2
years ago. That will be transformational.
But I will tell you, while we are waiting for that to
mature, we enjoy efficiencies with the Army Cyber Institute,
which is just outside West Point. And we attract right now the
best and brightest from our civilian counterparts. So that
becomes a skunkworks for our cadets to work on their projects
that they are working on, but also to be informed by the best
and brightest in the cyber energy that we are realizing every
single day.
And in terms of our actual pedagogy, sir, we have six
academic majors--computer science, applied statistics and data
science, electrical engineering, information technology, and
system engineers--producing about 100 cadets each year who are
motivated, inspired to winning and defeating our adversaries in
cyberspace.
Mr. Carter. Well, thank you. That is all good information.
I know I have gone past my time. Just curious, and you
might send me some information, about any endowments you have
for graduate students in the area of STEM which would fit into
our concept of future warfighting. I think that is important.
Remember, we are the Appropriations Committee, and we are
interested in how we can help, and that is why I ask these
funding questions.
I will yield back.
Mr. Ryan. Appreciate it, Judge.
Mr. Crist.
Racism and Extremism
Mr. Crist. Thank you for being here, to the three of you.
You know, in the military, I have been reading news
accounts lately that the academies are grappling with White
supremacy, racism, and extremism. And I am curious what actions
the academies have taken to address any and all of these
issues.
Please. For any one of the three of you.
General Williams. Sir, General Williams at West Point. I
will start.
So, sir, we have, as a part of--back to my earlier comment
about what our chief refers to as our corrosives: sexual
assault, sexual harassment, racism, and extremism. So the
approach we have taken here, as I mentioned before, is how we
have elevated character.
What I don't want here at West Point is that we have sort
of this whack-a-mole approach. We have to approach this
comprehensively from an interdisciplinary standpoint. This is
about treating each other with dignity and respect. We start
there and we end there in our small squads, peer-to-peer
relationships.
And so, sir, what we do, to answer specifically your
question, what we have been doing, we are on our fifth
honorable living day. So, in 2 weeks, I will stand down the
entire Academy--the cadets, the community. There will be no
work, there will be no sports, no one will go to class. And we
will focus on this very subject. The Secretary of Defense has
given us some interim guidance on how these discussions will
ensue, and I know my wingmen are working on it as well.
But that, for us, is just a preliminary step. We will take
it much further. The key to this, sir, is that these young men
and women look each other in the eye and face this issue and
talk to each other about this. So we will provide the space and
the time for the Academy to come together and talk about
extremism.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Crist. General, if I could follow up--and thank you
very much. I appreciate that.
So when you stand down the entire Academy and you discuss
this, what is, sort of, the forum, format? How do you do that?
What do you talk about? Have you done one yet already?
General Williams. Yes, sir. Not specifically in an
extremism space, but in these other corrosives, we have done
it.
So the cadets actually demand them; they ask. They are a
vital part of it. The cadets help us design what it is going to
look like.
So it usually starts in our stadium, sir, with myself and
the other senior leaders. And I stand up and talk about our
values and what is important and why it is important to be in
this space. So I will start off the day.
And then, normally, what we found in the last one--we did
one on racism last fall--we will have a cadet panel. So the
cadets will be up there, and they will share their experiences
with their classmates.
Mr. Crist. Right.
General Williams. And there will be real, raw conversations
which will pull at the emotive strings a little bit.
And then, from there, we will bring in, sometimes, experts
from the field, sort of referring back to the earlier question.
But the most important, vital part, sir, is the small
group, not at the macro level but at the micro level, at the
squads and platoons, facilitated by our great TACs and TAC NCOs
and our professors facilitating those questions. Because our
young men and women are at different parts of their 47-month
journey, and they are going to need a little assist.
And so they will have these discussions, but then our folks
who have--our majors and our colonels and our generals and
sergeants and coaches will be part of this vital, active
conversation, which will help them fill in the gaps if we need
to, sir.
Mr. Crist. That is excellent.
It sounds like to me--I have these yellow wristbands that I
wear every day, and it says, ``Practice the golden rule every
day.'' And, of course, the golden rule is ``do unto others as
you would have done unto you.'' And, to me, that is the
ultimate in character, that you treat people with mutual
respect, with decency, and that you comport yourself that way.
I try to do it every day. I don't always succeed, but I try.
And it sounds like, to me, that that is sort of the road
you are going down when you stand down the Academy for a full
day--no class, no sports, no nothing, except talking about
character and decency and goodness.
General Williams. Yes, sir. If I could follow up,
absolutely, sir, that is exactly the heart of this. Nothing
else matters except this.
And then we have follow-on--we are not so naive to think
that that one day is going to make a difference. It is going to
send a clear and unambiguous signal to everybody on the post
that the leaders care, but then there is the follow-up action.
What is the action plan? What do we do after that day? And that
is what we are finding.
And we work with our cadets. And the cadets lead in this
space. Our trust in peer cadets absolutely champion this space.
And we look forward to talking to you more about that, sir, in
the future. They do really well in facilitating these tough
discussions.
Mr. Crist. General, I appreciate your answer. I am out of
time. I will yield back. But God bless you, and thank you.
Ms. McCollum [presiding]. I am back. And I understand it is
Mr. Diaz-Balart's turn to ask a question.
Character Development
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Chairwoman, thank you so much.
All of you have spent--and I think it has been very
productive--talking a lot about sexual assault, which is so
important, and also the instances of cheating, for the lack of
a better term.
And, obviously, a big part of what you all do--and you do
it better than anyone in the Nation and, frankly, anyone in the
world--is instill, you know, character and character
development, but you do a lot of that through peer-to-peer
leadership. There was some conversation about that.
Right now, with COVID and everything else--and we have seen
the increase of incidents, for example, you know, of cheating,
et cetera--but how are you able to instruct, you know, get that
character development, when, in fact, you know, we are limited
on the peer-to-peer interaction?
And anyone who wants to deal with it, or maybe all of you.
General Clark. Sir, Lieutenant General Clark. I can start
with that.
The character development--and here at the Air Force
Academy, we have a leader-of-character development framework
that our whole program is focused on, because that is the core
of what we do. And we are able to actually do things virtually
that we haven't been able to do in a world where we weren't as
virtual.
For example, we just had a National Character and
Leadership Symposium, where we had dozens of leaders of
character from around our country, regardless of--some were
military, some from the civilian sector. And what they do is,
they are able to share with our cadets and other partners that
we invite into this symposium to give them examples and to help
them understand what it means to be a leader of character, what
it means to live honorably. And the theme for this year's
symposium was ``warrior ethos.''
And we not only reached our whole cadet population, but we
reached thousands of others outside of our population. But it
is these kinds of examples and stories and opportunities for
the cadets to see what that means.
But, also, in our internal programs and processes, like you
mentioned, peer-to-peer education is critical, but the virtual
world allows us to reach people in different ways. And I
believe that we are able to continue our program and still
focus on our leader-of character framework to develop those
leaders that are the core of our mission.
Over.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Is there a way to kind of know if that is
as effective, you know, the whole virtual world, as effective
as one-on-one, you know, human interaction when it comes to
character development?
And, actually, the same thing on, you know, obviously, you
know, sexual assault and sexual harassment, which is, you know,
the worst possible infraction, right?
So is there a way to know if--can we track how effective
this is, this new reality of virtual, you know, contact versus,
you know, human-to-human contact?
General Clark. I think it is hard to know, sir, what, you
know, the end results would be and is it as effective. My gut
tells me that person-to-person, face-to-face contact, in many
instances, is better. But when we are limited in the ways that
we are, we are doing the absolute best that we can.
And I think that at least the feedback from our cadets is
that they still have those opportunities. And we can't miss a
beat. We don't have time to rest just because COVID is here and
is a part of our lives now. We still have to develop these
leaders, because we still have to graduate these cadets when
their time comes so that they can go out and serve.
But I think your point is well-taken. Sometimes face-to-
face is just better. That human interaction helps us. But we
are working to overcome some of those challenges.
Over, sir.
Mental Health
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And, lastly, really, on the same issue, I
imagine that, also, you know, it is more difficult to kind of
find out, track, frankly, discover issues of mental health when
you don't have, again, the one-on-one interaction.
So I am assuming that those are all challenges that you all
are--I know that you are facing them, and I know that you are
doing the best job--probably the best job in the country. But
it would be interesting to kind of figure out what you are
looking at, what is working, what isn't working on this new era
that you all have kind of inherited of having to do this stuff
virtually.
General Williams. Sir, if I could comment, I will tell you
that a lot of what Rich talked about in terms of setting these
frameworks--my dean does a great job with our professors here
to set a framework that they can operate in. So she goes
through a very deliberate process of training up and
calibrating our leaders.
And I will give you an example. Last year, ``study of war
and the human condition'' were the threads that linked all,
whether you were on the STEM side or the humanities side. So
she sets the framework out, and our great officers and
civilians here move in that.
Next year, the theme for next year is ``ethical leadership
in a diverse world.'' So they now have the template, which they
can then spend the spring and the summer preparing that way.
And back to the metrics or measuring, I will tell you, one
technique we use in the honor thing--and Congressman Womack
mentioned it earlier--but our Special Leader Development
Program, allowing cadets--you measure on the front end of their
47-month experience, and then you measure on the aft end of
their 47-month experience, and you can see the maturity in
their writing in terms of how they think about what is
happening to them, what is happening in the world around them.
That is how you develop a lot of these metrics, which are
very hard to tease out and are things that are a little more
opaque.
Infrastructure Repairs
Ms. McCollum. I would like to talk about facilities for a
few minutes. So, when I reviewed the information from my staff
regarding the needs and repairs on some of the items, they have
been listed there for quite a few years. The committee had held
a service academy hearing 2 years ago, and it really appears
that items are still there from 2019. They haven't been
addressed. They have either been not funded or underfunded.
Let me give you an example. Support facility Camp Buckner,
where I was 2 years ago, we saw serious issues with mold. Mr.
Womack was there on that. Or the utility bridge at the Naval
Academy, that urgently needs to be replaced, and if we lose
that, that will be a catastrophe.
So I am going to press the secretaries of your services on
those questions, because these issues can't lay dormant. And,
you know, 10-, 20-, 30-year plans for some of this stuff is
putting a lot of hope and a lot of wishes that they are going
to move forward.
So I am going to ask you gentlemen to take a minute and,
you know, tell me why you think these delays remain and why
these projects haven't been addressed in a timely fashion.
Because I am going to ask your leadership why they aren't a
priority. I am not going to ask you why you don't think that
they are a priority with your leadership; I am going to ask
them. Because we think it is a priority.
So we are going to have some questions that we are going to
follow up on, but we just have a minute right now, and I have a
page of questions on these projects that the committee staff is
going to be sharing with you, and then I will share with the
whole committee when we get the answers back.
But what is the hold-up on these projects not getting done,
in your opinion? Because I think Mr. Womack and I and others
have made it very clear in our conversations with the service
heads that we are looking to see that these projects be
finished.
And maybe I will start with you, Mr. Buck. Because letting
that bridge wait too long is, in my opinion, a very
unprofessional, dangerous, and foolish thing to do.
Admiral Buck. Thank you, ma'am, for that question and the
opportunity to give a response. And I don't know whether my
response mirrors my colleagues, so this is just unique to the
Naval Academy and to our Navy.
Since 2010, my budgets for sustainment, renovation, and
modernization have remained pretty constant, without
recognizing the growth that we have had here of new
construction. And then, when we hit sequestration in 2013 and a
significant reduction in budgets, our Navy as a whole had to
reprioritize what was most important to the infrastructure for
the whole Navy. And we all were affected by that, no matter
what installation or where we were located in the world. And
the Naval Academy wasn't immune from that.
So we put on hold--as to use your word, we put on hold some
really important projects to either renovate, modernize, and we
began to focus just on sustainment, and sometimes sustainment
with Band-Aids, just to get us through with leaky roofs and
things like that, but not a whole frame-up restoration where it
might be needed.
You have mentioned one of my top three priorities. The
utility bridge is in need of replacement. MacDonough Hall,
which is the center of my physical fitness mission at the Naval
Academy, is on the chart right now to be renovated, and we hope
that funding remains that has been given to us.
Our Navy, in fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021 that we
are enjoying right now, revitalized our infrastructure budgets.
And we have been healthy and been able to begin to plan back
toward improving and addressing our infrastructure projects.
What I want to leave you with and the committee with is, we
need to be sure that we have a consistent budget in each of the
out-years. That would be really important to our planning
effort and our ability to know that we are going to get after
our highest-priority infrastructure projects.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Clark, if you take a minute, you were
impacted by the recent storms along with some other projects
that you had. Some of the issues with your pipes, is that being
considered a priority to be repaired now by the Air Force to
help you out with that?
Sir, you are on mute.
General Clark. Can you hear me, ma'am?
Ms. McCollum. I can hear you now, sir.
General Clark. Okay. I am sorry.
Yes, it is a priority for our Air Force. But I will say,
overarching, our enterprise is constantly sustaining,
restoring, modernizing across the entire Air Force. We do
receive, I think, priority commensurate with the rest of the
Air Force and Space Force mission, and we have been in a
steady, I think, restoration and modernization mode for some
time.
As you stated earlier, all of our buildings were built at
the same time, back, you know, in the sixties and the fifties.
So we are seeing a lot of the issues that are arising; they all
arise in about the same timeframe. And our Air Force is
responsive to help us with this. It is just the problem is
pretty significant and we have a constant drumbeat.
But I would say that we are right in line with the rest of
our Air Force as far as SRM goes. So we could always use more
help from a budgetary standpoint, because there is a lot to do
here, and we appreciate anything you can do for us.
Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Williams, I am going to let you have the
last word, because I mentioned your facility first, and Mr.
Womack and I have seen it firsthand.
Is that a 10-year, did you say, repair for those buildings?
Some of them have mold, they have water issues and that. Is
that a 10-year spread-out that they are giving you to replace
the buildings?
General Williams. Chair McCollum, thank you. And I
appreciate your continued focus, as you and Congressman Womack
were out here 2 years. We actually were helped a lot by you
coming out here to Camp Buckner.
The Army has fully endorsed and integrated all aspects of
our plan. We came up with a plan shortly after your visit, the
USMA 2035 plan. Fiscal year 2021-2030 facility investment plan,
which I worked very closely with AMC and senior Army leaders,
is fully endorsed.
And with respect to Buckner, we are working right now. In a
few weeks, we get after the barracks and the mold. It is a two-
phase project. The first part of the phase is focused on the
barracks that we took you in and you saw that mold. The second
phase is a 5-year MILCON plan that gets at both where the task
force that comes and participates with the summer training,
Camp Natural Bridge, and also Camp Buckner.
We feel very comfortable with what the Army has currently
given us with respect to funding associated with Camp Buckner,
ma'am.
Ms. McCollum. Well, we are going to follow up and make sure
that, you know--there is a reason why we became appropriators.
It is nice to have great ideas and want to do all the wonderful
things the authorizers have, but without the resources to do
it, they remain just great ideas.
General Williams. Thanks, Chair.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you. We will be following up on that.
Mr. Ryan, thanks again for helping me out.
Health and Wellness
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Madam Chair. I almost kept that gavel,
you know.
Ms. McCollum. You have your own.
Mr. Ryan. I appreciate it.
I just have one question. And thank you for all the answers
and thoroughness.
I want to talk to General Clark for a second about the
Academy, and you guys conducted a test of the new campus dining
card, if you are familiar with this.
And one of the issues that we have been working on a lot
really is combining the idea around health and wellness,
especially around diet, because we look at the cost of obesity,
diabetes. It is more than a significant cost for us around
healthcare for our Active Duty, and that makes its way into our
VA budget as well.
And, really, we want to try to get to the root issue there,
and that is really teaching our men and women in the academies,
you know, what to eat and how to eat and how to really function
at a peak level. And they are, in so many ways, not different
than many college kids, who--all of us who have been to college
know that it is not necessarily the best diet in college.
So I want to ask you about the Mitchell Dining Hall
facility. The cadets were allowed to use their meal entitlement
outside of the Mitchell Hall dining facility at venues offering
healthier offerings instead of going out-of-pocket for other
meals. It is generally known that, at the service academies,
they do not eat all their meals at the campus dining facility.
We have heard that your program, not surprisingly, was
extremely popular with the cadets who were fortunate to be a
part of this test, but we heard that the test was cut short.
And so if you could just speak in the next couple of minutes,
why was the program stopped, and what were the key findings
from the program, and will you be implementing any of those
changes into the program moving forward?
Sorry, you are still muted. There you go, General.
General Clark. Can you hear me, sir?
Mr. Ryan. I can hear you now, yep.
General Clark. Apologies. A little tech difficulty.
Mr. Ryan. That is all right.
General Clark. We need that IT funding. That is what is
going on there, sir.
But I will just say, sir, that your point is spot-on.
Healthy nutrition is key for peak performance here. At all of
our academies, the rigor of our programs demands that our
cadets are healthy, that their nutrition is solid.
And we have just hired a new dietician for Mitchell Hall,
we also hired an executive chef, with a focus on providing
nutritious and delicious meals to our cadets so that they do
have the desire to go into Mitchell Hall, into the dining
facility, to take part in that. And we are getting some good
results so far.
As far as the dining card project that we did, we started
that, and we, unfortunately, did have to cut it short due to
COVID. And COVID didn't allow our cadets to go to some of the
other options that they had for dining.
So we cut it short. We do want to reinvigorate that
program, though, in fiscal year 2022 so that we can provide
those other options for our cadets to take part in. But
regardless of how we do this, we want to ensure that it is
always, always about their nutrition and that it is healthy
options.
So we will monitor it. We will probably start off small
when we begin in fiscal year 2022 with on-base opportunities,
and then look to perhaps expand. But we are going to start with
our on-base options and provide them with healthy
opportunities.
Over, sir.
Mr. Ryan. Well, I appreciate that.
And, Madam Chair, as we have talked, you know, I want to do
what we can from this committee really across the academies and
across the military. We invest so much money into our men and
women, yet we seem to lack the kind of initiatives around diet
and nutrition. And we see it; the end result is around the
diabetes and obesity issues that we have with Active Duty.
And I believe that we have an opportunity with the
academies really to set these young people up to really
function at a very, very high level. You know, I watched with
great interest the pre-stories of the Super Bowl, with Tom
Brady and his diet and how he functions at such a peak level.
We are putting a lot of money into these academies, a lot of
money into these kids. We should try to get at least some level
of that to our academies and our military.
So, with that, I yield back the balance of my time, Madam
Chair. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you. And our last question--and it is
12:30 eastern standard time--had to do with lunch and food. So
perfect timing.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your accessibility to
the committee. I think you know that we are here to make sure
that our young men and women who go to our military academies
graduate with a great education, a great sense of
responsibility, a great sense of our appreciation for them. And
part of the way that we do that is by the faculty that we give
them and the facilities that they are attending. Because you
are competing, we are competing, America is competing with all
the other colleges and universities that are out there for
these, the brightest and the most talented that our country
has.
So I want to thank you so much for everything. And we will
follow up, especially on the maintenance and some of the
facility issues. I look forward to COVID ending so that some of
us can come out and visit your facilities and get to spend time
with the midshipmen as well as the cadets and those who are
serving at the Air Force Academy.
So that concludes today's hearing. And, with that, the
subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank you again.
Wednesday, March 17, 2021.
CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE ARCTIC
WITNESSES
SHERRI GOODMAN, SENIOR FELLOW, WILSON CENTER
VICE ADMIRAL DENNIS V. MCGINN (RET.), ADVISORY BOARD MEMBER, CENTER
FOR CLIMATE AND SECURITY
Ms. McCollum. This meeting will come to order.
This hearing is fully virtual. So I am going to address a
few things that Kyle did not talk about with housekeeping
matters.
For today's meeting, the chair or staff designated by the
chair may mute participants' microphones when they are not
under recognition for the purpose of eliminating background
noise.
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves.
If you notice or I notice that you haven't unmuted yourself, I
will ask you if you would like staff to unmute you. If you
would like, indicate by nodding your head, and staff will
unmute your microphone.
I remind all the members and witnesses that the 5-minute
clock still applies, and you can see the clock up in the screen
there.
If there is a technology issue, we will move to the next
member until the issue is resolved, and you will retain the
balance of your time.
You will notice, as I said, a clock on your screen. That
will show how much time is remaining. At one minute remaining,
the clock will turn yellow. At 30 seconds remaining, I will
gently tap the gavel, my mouse, to remind members that their
time is almost expired.
When your time has expired, the clock will turn red, and I
will begin to recognize the other member. I will just start
recognizing the other member once it turns red.
In terms of speaking order, we will follow the order set
forth in the House rules, beginning with the chair and ranking
member; and then members who are present at the time that the
hearing was called to order, they will be recognized in order
of seniority; and, finally, members not present at the time of
the hearing is called to order.
And I am going off script for a minute. We are going to try
to put the order on deck for speaking on the chat, so look at
your chat screen. And hopefully we will get some feedback, and
maybe if that works for members, then they will know when they
are up.
Finally, House rules require me to remind you that we have
set up an email address to which members can send anything they
wish to submit in writing at any of our hearings or markups.
That email address has been provided to your staff.
So that takes care of the housekeeping.
Opening Statement of Chair McCollum
Last month, the subcommittee held a hearing on budget
trends and potential trajectories of defense spending in the
next 10 to 20 years. As I mentioned, I want the subcommittee to
use our time before we see the fiscal year 2022 budget request
to think about larger themes, what priorities we want to direct
funds towards in the upcoming budget cycle to address future
challenges. This is another hearing in that series.
This morning, the subcommittee will receive testimony from
two of the foremost experts on the subject of climate change
and national security. Sherri Goodman is a senior fellow with
the Polar Institute and Environmental Change and Security
Program at The Wilson Center, and retired Vice Admiral Dennis
McGinn is an advisory board member at the Center for Climate
and Security. We look forward to both of their testimonies.
There can be no doubt--no doubt--that our climate is
changing. The Department of Defense and the entire Federal
Government must be prepared or suffer the consequences.
In the last few years, we have seen historic hurricanes,
catastrophic damage to Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, Camp
LeJeune in North Carolina. Those hurricanes seriously impacted
the Air Force and Marine Corps' operations and cost taxpayers
millions of dollars.
In 2019, the historic Mississippi floodwaters overflowed
onto Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, posing a threat to U.S.
Strategic Command operations. These are not isolated climate
incidences. Climate change is a national security threat to our
Nation now, and the threat is growing.
The largest Federal consumer of energy--the largest--is the
Department of Defense. It has a responsibility, then, to play a
leading role in making its systems more efficient and to curb
emissions in order to reduce these catastrophic events. And
that is why I am pleased, in his first week of office,
President Biden signed an executive order which requires the
following: the Director of National Intelligence to issue a
report on the national and economic security impacts of climate
change; the Secretary of Defense to develop a climate risk
analysis that could incorporate into modelling, simulation,
wargaming, and other analysis; and, finally, the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
consider security implications of climate change in developing
the National Defense Strategy, defense planning guidance, the
Chairman's risk assessment, and other relevant strategy
planning and programming documents.
These actions are long overdue, and I thank President Biden
for leading on this critical issue.
The change in climate will impact every corner of the
Earth, but nowhere is it more pronounced than in the Arctic. As
a former social studies teacher, I can say many Americans don't
realize that the United States is an Arctic nation, and I have
a map here, and you can look at it, and I handed out a map
before. This is my moment to be a social studies teacher. You
need to look at your map and look at Alaska, and look at how we
are part of the Arctic Council, folks.
We must ensure that the Arctic region plays an appropriate
role in our national security planning. Our adversaries, they
are active in the region, and we must be ready to respond from
issues relating to thawing permafrost affecting installations
or our ability to train and use equipment that can survive in
extreme environments. We must ensure the freedom--the freedom
of navigation through the Bering Strait, and these are just
some of the important topics to discuss.
With that, I want to thank everyone for participating at
today's hearing, and I would like to recognize our
distinguished ranking member, Mr. Calvert, for his comments.
Opening Remarks of Mr. Calvert
Mr. Calvert. Well, thank you.
Thank you, Chair McCollum. I appreciate that.
And happy Saint Patrick's Day. And I apologize for some of
our Republican colleagues who won't be on the conference this
morning because we have our Republican Conference meeting this
morning. Some of them won't make it or be on late.
But let me extend a warm with welcome to our distinguished
witnesses. As the United States continues to focus on our
National Security Strategy on great power competition,
specifically threats arising from a more assertive China and
Russia, it is important that we be attentive to other
nontraditional challenges.
Over the years, Department of Defense has periodically
assessed the effects of a changing climate on DOD missions,
operational plans, and installations. A report to Congress in
2019, for example, noted a range of severe related events
impacting our military installations; discussed how a change in
climate can create insecurity, increasing demands for
humanitarian assistance; and how it can create unanticipated
vulnerabilities through mission execution.
Perhaps the most notable impact of changing climate to our
strategic environment has been in the Arctic, as the chair
mentioned. According to a new report by the Atlantic Council, a
geopolitical friction over resources, territory, and
transportation channels suggest the Arctic is likely to be one
of the 21st century's most contested areas.
With that in mind, I welcome Secretary Austin's
announcement that the Department will take appropriate actions
to incorporate climate change considerations in DOD's
activities and risk assessments to mitigate this driver of
insecurity. I look forward to hearing from our experts on these
issues and begin our assessment of the Department of Defense
budget for the fiscal year 2022.
Again, thank you to our witnesses for appearing before us.
And, with that, chair, I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much, Mr. Calvert.
To the witnesses, your full written testimony will be
placed in the record, and members have copies at their desks.
In the interest of time, I would strongly encourage each of
you to keep your summarized statement to 5 minutes because we
are going to have to leave time for questions. And I want you
to be complete, as succinct as you can also, in responding to
our questions so we can get more in.
Ms. Goodman, we will start with you. Welcome, and thank you
for being here.
Summary Statement of Ms. Goodman
Ms. Goodman. Chair McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
I have over 30 years of experience as a national security
professional. I served as the first Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Environmental Security in the 1990s and for 14
years at the Center for Naval Analysis, now at The Wilson
Center, and the Center for Climate and Security. The views I am
presenting today are my own.
As my Navy colleagues like to say, give me the BLUF, the
bottom line upfront. Okay. Here is mine.
First, climate change presents a direct threat to U.S.
national security that must be integrated into defense
strategy, planning, and programs at all levels.
Second, the U.S. must prioritize climate change in its
security engagements with allies and partners.
And, third, the Department of Defense can lead by example
on clean energy, resilience, and climate predictive
capabilities in a way that both serves and supports our
military mission and enhances American leadership at home and
abroad.
I will focus my opening remarks on the first point. My
colleague, Vice Admiral McGinn, will address points two and
three.
Okay. A bipartisan Congress has already spoken to the
unprecedented threat of climate change to national security. In
the fiscal year 2018 NDAA, Congress stated that climate change
is a direct threat to the national security of the United
States and is impacting stability in areas of the world both
where the U.S. Armed Forces are operating today and where
strategic implications for a future conflict exists.
As far back as the 2008 NDAA, Congress directed that the
national security implications of climate change be included in
the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy,
and the Quadrennial Defense Review.
The CNA Military Advisory Board, which I founded in 2007,
comprised of senior U.S. retired generals and admirals,
including Vice Admiral McGinn, identified climate change as a
threat multiplier, recognizing that climate change can
exacerbate political instability where food, water, and
resource shortages already exist, often in the world's most
dangerous and fragile regions.
But it is also here at home. Impacts from extreme weather
and sea-level rise also pose threats to military installations
and strain our military readiness in the U.S. and around the
world. As you mentioned, Madam Chair, the losses at Camp
LeJeune and Tyndall Air Force Base from Hurricanes Florence and
Michael in 2018 are estimated by DOD to be approximately $3
billion to $5 billion each for each base, so we are already
paying for this.
And, as the ranking member noted, in 2019, a DOD report
identified 79 military installations facing climate-related
risks, including flooding, drought, and wildfire. The National
Guard now responds to humanitarian-type assistance, both at
home and health-related and around the world, and is straining
our military resources and readiness.
These factors have implications for our ability to project
power and influence around the world and can constrain our
capacity to effectively advance our interests abroad.
For example, China is exerting greater control over
resources and supply chains, from PPE to energy, both
domestically and to gain power and an influence over parts of
the world, including the Arctic, Latin America, and Africa.
In some cases, the U.S. will need to compete for influence
where China is taking advantage of climate change to improve
its military posture in the South China Sea or become the
relief provider of first resort to vulnerable Pacific Island
nations.
In the Arctic, China and Russia are exerting greater
influence in an open Arctic due to climate change, which is
emboldening their actions. China has declared itself to be a
near Arctic state with ambitions to build a Polar Silk Road
across the region. Russia envisions a toll road for shipping
and transit across its northern sea route and seeks to enforce
this maritime route as an internal waterway. As we see an
increase from commercial activity, the U.S. must increase its
preparedness and its search-and-rescue capability.
In sub-Saharan Africa, while not the sole factor, climate
change has contributed to political instability there as well.
Already, changes in precipitation patterns and droughts are
exacerbating existing tensions among farmers and herders in the
Sahel.
In the past year, climate-change-related flooding
contributed to instability in East Africa, a region already
strained by the pandemic, rising food insecurity, and a locust
plague. As the head of the World Food Program described the
events of 2020 in the region, it is shock upon shock upon
shock.
The DOD can lead by example, and Vice Admiral McGinn will
address those specific ways in which using resilience,
technology, predictive capability, and clean energy can help
address these challenges.
In closing, Congress has strengthened and should continue
to strengthen authorities, programs, and funding available to
the Department to address these threats. Climate proofing our
security is essential to protect America's 21st century near-
and long-term national security interests.
Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member Calvert. I look
forward to your questions.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you. It sounds like we are going
to have testimony that really is going to build and complement
one another, so thank you both for coordinating that.
Vice Admiral McGinn, you are next.
Summary Statement of Admiral McGinn
Admiral McGinn. Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member
Calvert, distinguished members of the subcommittee, first order
of business, happy Saint Patrick's Day. What a wonderful and
great day to have this important conversation.
I have over 35 years of experience in the uniform of the
United States Navy. I served for almost 4 years as the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 2013 to 2017 for Energy,
Installations, and Environment. And, importantly, I have over
15 years' experience in the private sector working challenges
and opportunities in energy and environmental issues, including
climate change.
Secretary Goodman very succinctly framed it with the three
bottom lines upfront and very effectively summarized that first
critical point that climate change indeed presents a direct
threat to U.S. national security. So I will pick up on the
second two that the U.S. must prioritize climate change in
global security engagements, and that the Department must lead
by example.
As Secretary of Defense Austin has stated, quote, ``There
is little about what the Department does to defend the American
people that is not affected by climate change.'' He referenced
specifically our national security strategies, operations, and
infrastructure.
When it comes to U.S. security engagements around the
world, we have stated in our own Center for Climate and
Security Plan for America that the Defense Department should
develop a security forces climate engagement plan to promote
regular military-to-military and civil-military international
engagement in order to enhance the operational resilience of
U.S. allies and partners and to enhance United States'
influence vis-a-vis its primary competitors.
Importantly, combatant commanders around the globe should
engage allied and partner nations' militaries in adapting to
climate change and working to mitigate the adverse effects to
military operations, energy resilience, infrastructure, and
readiness through a variety of pathways, everything from formal
intergovernmental negotiations under NATO, or regional--
regionally focused military and civil security planning forums.
The third point of framing our bottom lines upfront,
leading by example. As the Nation's largest user of energy, as
you have pointed out, Chair McCollum, DOD can lead by example
in key energy and climate technologies that align nicely with
the military mission. Here are just a couple of examples.
Electric vehicles. The Department of Defense leases 166,000
vehicles from the General Services Administration every year
according to the Fiscal Year 2020 Strategic Stability
Performance Plan. The Department can help diversify its
transportation energy sources, reduce operational costs and
carbon footprint and also help to scale up and accelerate the
transition to net-zero transportation through the use of
electric vehicles of all types, nontactical, and rapid
deployment of charging stations on DOD installations.
Micro grids and resilient transmission infrastructures. The
Department of Defense needs to be able to carry out its
critical military missions on key installations, despite the
growing threats of cyber-attack; severe weather, such as ice
storms, wildfires, hurricanes, floods; or even deliberate
terrorist attack. That is why military bases practice, quote,
``Black Start'' exercises to recover from a power outage and
maintain operations for extended periods, even if the grid is
down.
The technologies and practices needed to ride out these
threats, including micro grids, distributed energy systems, and
advanced energy storage methods, will have the added benefit of
promoting resilient infrastructure throughout our civilian
communities.
Climate predictive capabilities. From military operations
planning to resilient base infrastructure, a new generation of
Earth system observations and predictive capabilities that
provide asset-level climate data analytics for shorter term--
hours to weeks to months--planning is becoming increasingly
available both in government technical centers and in the
private sector. As DOD adapts these technologies for the
military mission, that will further reduce risk to both
operations and to our military infrastructure.
In conclusion, our Nation's energy, economic, and
environmental security are the critical foundations upon which
our overall national security and quality of life rest. The
essential leadership role of the Department of Defense in
facing the challenges of climate change can effectively turn
those challenges into great opportunities for America and for
our partners.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The information follows:]
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Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much.
The members on this committee, before I became chair, heard
me ask all kinds of questions about the Arctic and talk about
some of the challenges in Africa, so I am going to save my
questions now for the end of this round and let Mr. Ryan go
next.
Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you
for prioritizing this hearing. I think this is a critically
important issue. And, as our witnesses have testified, this has
far-reaching implications for our military, our economy, our
country. So I want to say thank you.
Happy Saint Patrick's Day to everybody. Glad we are getting
right to work here on Saint Patty's Day. We can celebrate
later.
I have got a couple of questions, and I would like Madam
Secretary Goodman and Admiral McGinn both to kind of take a
crack at this. You mentioned the electric vehicles,
electrification, and how important that is. I want to kind of
take a half a step back here, and I have had conversations with
the chairwoman about this.
The ability for the Defense Department to spend money, to
procure things, is an awesome amount of buying power and I
think can shift the market in significant ways, whether we are
talking about electrification or anything else. If you could
just talk to us about--we did a call a couple days ago with the
Energy Subcommittee with Bill Gates and his new book about, you
know, saving ourselves from climate disaster, and part of the
conversation was about moving into kind of green steel and
cement.
And have we done anything within the Department of Defense,
or have you looked at anything to say we are going to give
preference to--as we are building things, we are going to give
preference to those companies that are moving in that
direction? And I know we are not there yet, but can you see
that as a significant way to really begin to also be a part of
shifting the market towards a greener economy?
And the other one I would like you to touch upon, too, we
buy a--you know, billions of dollars' worth of food to feed our
military, and one of the more progressive ways of capturing
carbon is through sustainable and regenerative agriculture. So
is there a way that we can say we are going to give preference
to General Mills, for example, just to pick a random company
out of the country, but General Mills, who is buying farms to
do regenerative agriculture to supply their own food
production?
I just think, if we are going to do this, there are kind of
ways that maybe are one layer deep or two layers deep that
could really begin shifting the market. I mean, if the
Federal--if the Department of Defense said we are going to give
preference for food contractors for those food production
companies that participate 30 percent in regenerative
agriculture in the next however many years or whatever we would
do, we could significantly start capturing carbon and really
moving the market.
So, if you could just comment on that, steel, cement,
regenerative agriculture, how do we really do this in a big way
aside from the technology and the other things that you
mentioned?
Ms. Goodman. Okay. Thank you very much, Congressman Ryan,
for that question.
It was about a decade ago now that the Department of
Defense established energy as a key performance parameter in
its acquisition system, and that led to being able to
prioritize energy for the purpose of ensuring that there was
adequate energy in our weapons systems for performance. Prior
to that, at least we had always assumed we had energy at the
front.
The next step--and there have been a variety of efforts to
green the procurement chain--supply chain over the years. For
example, I remember fighting hard to have recycled paper at The
Pentagon back in the 1990s, and we were deploying the first
generation of hybrid vehicles in the vehicles DOD leases from
GSA. Now there are greater opportunities to advance that with
electrification.
As you note, in certain sectors--in certain sectors--DOD
does have substantial buying power because of its own mission
needs. So where those mission needs align--and I would say
that, given the President's executive order and the Secretary
of Defense's strong statement, and including the Climate
Working Group that has been now established in the Department
of Defense to look at various lines of effort, there will be an
effort to look at how appropriately to green the supply chain
across DOD.
And that would include potentially, where cost-effective
and meeting mission needs, the ability to, as you say, acquire
either more agriculture that is based on more regenerative
properties that conserves resources--as you say, conserves
water, as--and leads us to a next generation, as well as in the
energy supply chains.
As you know, DOD has been an exporter of technology for
many years, from the internet to GPS, and I see that that could
potentially happen again in some of these areas.
Mr. Ryan. Great. Admiral, any comment?
Admiral McGinn. I think your question is right on the mark,
Mr. Ryan, and I agree that the Department of Defense has
tremendous buying power; indeed, the entire Federal Government.
And using that buying power in a very careful way--we don't
want to spend money on much more expensive goods and services
for DOD or for--indeed, for the entire Federal Government. But
there are so many ways that we can put our thumb on the scale
towards more sustainable products, whether it is steel, cement,
agricultural products.
These are industries that, in many cases, are very, very
close to very economic scales. And, by using that buying power
to accelerate and extend the scale-up of these goods and
services, I think it is right on the mark.
We don't clearly want to waste any money. We want to make
sure that we are getting good value for every dollar. But we
can do that in a way that has the double goodness of providing
necessary materials to the Department of Defense and also
provides preferences for American industries and American
agriculture that can really have a beneficial effect across the
economy.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum. Great question, Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Calvert.
Military Installations and Climate Resilience
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I think this question, probably both our witnesses may want
to participate in an answer. As I mentioned in my opening
testimony, there are about 200 bases in the United States, and
the military maintains and operates hundreds of other
facilities abroad.
The need to climate-proof key military installations can be
readily handled by seawalls, improved infrastructure reliance,
and, as the worst case, relocation of bases to less vulnerable
locations.
What percent of our bases at home and abroad need to be
climate-proofed today, and what will that cost? Can the
military leverage the private sector to incorporate new
technology in future military construction projects?
So either Ms. Goodman or Admiral?
Admiral McGinn. I would like to have Ms. Goodman go first
because then I can say, ``I agree with everything that
Secretary Goodman says.''
Mr. Calvert. Okay. Fine.
Ms. Goodman. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Vice Admiral
McGinn.
Okay. Congressman Calvert, it is a great question. You
know, almost all of our bases really need to be climate-proofed
and made resilient. As was noted earlier, we are already paying
billions of dollars to rebuild Tyndall Air Force Base, Camp
LeJeune, and Offutt from the hurricanes that occurred in the
last few years. So we need to flood proof, hurricane proof. We
need to address permafrost at bases in the Arctic where it is
collapsing.
So, as we do this, if we do it smartly, we will invest for
the future. We will also be working with our communities in a
way that makes them more resilient, too. And, in programs that
Congress has authorized and appropriated to, there is
increasing collaboration among communities. And I would say
that is very important to continue because bases are part of
their communities, whether it is in Norfolk or Annapolis or all
around the country. And there are opportunities to do this in a
way that helps lift up and make our communities and our bases
and their military families stronger.
Admiral McGinn. I would add, Mr. Calvert, that we have to
have a prioritization system. Every installation in the United
States and around the world could use more climate-proofing, if
you will, or the additional of resilient design. But there has
to be, because of budgetary considerations, a keen sense of
priority.
It is not a question of if. It is a question of when.
Climate-driven severe weather is coming to an installation near
you. It can be any form. It can be wildfires out West. It can
be flooding. It can be severe weather, hurricanes, et cetera.
So the idea is to look at those installations that are most
vulnerable to the various types of threats and to try to invest
in resilience. In many cases, it is not a lot of money. It is
mostly being thoughtful about how you design a base, where you
put things.
For example, if I have a building on an installation that
is in a 100-year flood plain, probably be a good idea not to
put the computers in the basement of that building. Just locate
critical functions in areas that are going to be less
vulnerable to the flooding or other effects of wind or heat or
whatever.
I think, also, thinking about how we actually use
construction materials, cross-laminated timber is really,
really seeing a resurgence. It is as strong as steel for very,
very large buildings these days. So, using different materials
can really have a double effect of good strength and also
sourcing from very, very sustainable industries.
Ms. Goodman. And let me just add I think the private sector
will be doing most of this work because that is how DOD will
see technologies, whether it is climate-predictive capabilities
or new resilience infrastructure, and there are going to be
great opportunities for Americans at all levels across the
country through the private sector from firms big and small to
do the work of making more resilient our military
infrastructure.
Mr. Calvert. I know--I was over at Camp LeJeune shortly
after the hurricane damage, and a lot of those facilities,
which were built some time ago in a hurry during World War II
and other times, but they weren't built to the code that we
have today. And a lot of those facilities--certainly Tyndall is
the same, but that--so today's building techniques, I think,
more engages what we need to do, I would hope.
Military Bases and Energy Sources
One issue on energy are these new small nuclear reactors
that we are using more and more of around the country that have
exciting capabilities. I would hope we are looking at using
those as a small energy sources at various military bases----
Admiral McGinn. I would say, most emphatically, that
nuclear power has to have a future in global energy portfolio.
The development of small modular reactors of various sizes is
in fairly early development stage. I would say that the--
probably in the 10-year timeframe when we would actually have
them in a form with the kind of function that we would want to
have on various military bases.
They are part of a portfolio of energy choices, and--but I
think we should, as the United States, boldly look at, what is
the future of nuclear, and how can we make it a part? It is not
a silver bullet, but it is part of a whole array of energy
technologies that are emerging that can really, really help to
diversify our energy sources and provide a lot more resilience.
Ms. Goodman. I would add nuclear has a central role in our
energy future. And, also, Congressman, the Uniform Facility
Code that DOD uses to--is being updated to account for the
climate resilience it needs when it rebuilds its bases now.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you. Some of the same questions I had.
Good questions.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Arctic Security
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Well, first, thank you, Chairwoman
McCollum, for putting together this important hearing today.
As a Member who represents the Chesapeake Bay watershed in
Maryland, I am glad to have these distinguished panelists
before us today to help us and the Department of Defense be a
leader, not a laggard, on the issue of climate change.
Now, coastal communities like my district in Maryland are
home to 42 percent of our country's population and millions of
businesses that supply most of our country's populations and
millions of businesses that supply most of our gross domestic
product.
We must better position the Department to tackle this
problem. It is both a moral issue of protecting the planet for
future generations and a very real national security threat
that our panelists today have so eloquently highlighted.
Now the question is to both of the panelists. The security
posture balance in the Arctic region has me worried. As more of
the ice caps melt, the easier it is for nations to ignore the
norms of securing cooperation in the Arctic and employ a go-it-
alone strategy in a region that has historically thrived from
skilled political cooperation because of the operating
environment is so unforgiving.
Now, Ms. Goodman, in your testimony, you mentioned how
important it is for the U.S. to lead on this issue to better
enable our hand in geopolitical negotiations that concern the
Arctic.
In your opinion, how big of a role does access to the
region play? Does purchasing platforms that enable our access
to the Arctic show our commitment to enforcing norms, or does
it create a zero-sum game, or both?
Ms. Goodman. Congressman, thank you for that question.
I do think we need to up our game in the Arctic. We have a
plan now--the Coast Guard has got an approved plan by Congress
to build six new icebreakers to replace our aging one-and-a-
half fleet. We need to move forward expeditiously with that.
Our Department of Defense also needs to increase its Arctic
capability.
And, in the last year, all the services--the Air Force, the
Navy, and, just yesterday, the Army--have issued new Arctic
strategies. These are important to tie together now at the
overall Department of Defense level to have an integrated
approach to the set of Arctic capabilities that we need.
And I am hopeful that we will take a whole-of-government
approach because deterrence really is the best defense. By
increasing our ability to meet our potential adversaries in the
Arctic, that way we can hopefully continue to keep the peace
but, at the same time, reduce risk of miscalculation of an
accident that could require a search-and-rescue or a
misunderstanding.
What sometimes keeps me up at night is increased ship
traffic through the region. As you said, vast, still difficult
to operate in. If communication among vessels--and increasing
exercises have already led to tensions when U.S. fishermen were
found in areas where the Russians were exercising in the Bering
Strait last summer, and the U.S. and Russia are only 30 miles
apart at their narrowest point.
So it is important for us to increase our presence in the
region in order to keep the peace and keep stability.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
Admiral McGinn. I would add, Mr. Ruppersberger, that, in
addition to the traditional security threats that Ms. Goodman
just outlined, the Arctic is having other effects. We are--have
become familiar over the past few years with so-called polar
vortex and the tremendous harm that that can do, most recently
in Texas and in Oklahoma.
Another aspect that is, I guess, more scientific but
nevertheless ominous is the warming tundra in the Arctic tundra
is releasing a lot of methane hydrates from deep below. There
have even been explosions as this methane builds up, leaving
craters that are a 100 meters deep.
So the Arctic is very, very important, and it is just a
real indicator of the climate changing and the potential for
very, very bad effects coming from that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. And I was in Alaska with the
commandant of the Coast Guard about a year ago, and literally
right up to the--we could see the glaciers just melting away
right before our eyes, and that has got to affect sea--the sea
level issues that we are all dealing with right now in the
coastal areas.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Cole, I believe, has stepped out for a minute, so that
will lead us to you, Mr. Carter.
Department of Defense Installations Energy Consumption
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for
this very important hearing we are having today, and I really
appreciate our guests that have come to talk about this.
A number of critical energy projects of the U.S. military
almost tripled from 2011 to 2015. And the Army, which, as you
all know, I represent Fort Hood--its goal is to get to 25
percent energy consumed from renewables by 2025 and to be zero
by 2030.
Fort Hood, Texas, right now is getting 50 percent of its
power from renewable energy. 63,000 solar panels that are
onsite, and 21,000 offsite wind turbines are producing 65
milliwatts for power.
How could the Department of Defense further lower energy
costs in installations and lower its operational energy
consumption and costs?
Admiral McGinn. I have been impressed, Mr. Carter, by the
tremendous deployment of especially wind power and increasingly
solar power in Texas. It is a good example of us diversifying
our energy portfolio in what is effectively the energy capitol
of the world by getting less expensive, more sustainable
renewable power as part of that critical resilient energy
portfolio. And I think that not only the DOD but the entire
economy is benefiting from a combination of renewable energy--
solar, wind, and the addition of storage capabilities--
batteries, if you will--and pump hydro--that can really, really
help us to have sustainable and very, very much less expensive
sources of energy.
Battery Storage
Mr. Carter. And, as a backup question to you, you mentioned
storage. To developing countries, that has been the big
stumbling block over renewable energy.
Where are we on battery storage? Is DOD actively engaging
in the research it takes for battery storage because I know the
industry is trying and trying, but at least the last time I
looked, they weren't successful.
Admiral McGinn. Couple of things. Near term, yes, the DOD
is always doing good research related to energy storage, in
partnership sometimes with NASA, the space operations. But,
increasingly, as we deploy unmanned systems--surface, air,
subsurface--they are going to need better energy storage in
batteries. So that will contribute to the overall knowledge
base.
However, the cost of batteries, the capability, the energy
density of batteries is increasing significantly, and that is
good news for many, many applications, military and civilian.
A little bit further term--let's say 5 to 10 years, the
deployment of what is called green hydrogen is going to really
be making a difference to capture the energy from the sun, from
the wind, other renewable sources, and use it to maintain a
baseload effectively of energy power for our various major
grids as well as micro grids.
Electric Vehicles
Mr. Carter. And, if you had to convert to electric cars,
the range of electric vehicles right now is--I guess the--
probably the biggest range they have got is around 400 miles.
And the average of the--is around 200 miles. So, in that
situation, how does that fit the overall battle plan of
American warriors with the limited resources, and how do you
refuel on the battlefield?
Admiral McGinn. I believe that the focus on electric
vehicles initially for DOD will be primarily on nontactical--
what I call nontactical vehicles. The good news is the industry
is producing greater battery density and, therefore, greater
range of electric vehicles of all sorts, whether it is a bus, a
minivan, or a sedan, or even pickup trucks. I am personally
waiting for a good F-150 electric. If they can do a Mustang
that is electric, I think they can do a good pickup truck as
well.
But I think the news--the good news is that the
electrification of our transportation system is going to be
good for our economy, first of all, and it is really going to
be good for local, regional, and, of course, global
environmental quality.
Mr. Carter. Well, being from Texas, pickup trucks are
really important to me, too. And, when they said they were
going to have an F-150 out and then they backed off of it, it
was discouraging for me, too, but I hope they will be
victorious soon.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir.
Ms. McCollum. Well, as a granddaughter of a Ford mechanic
in Montana, all of this is very interesting from Mustangs to
pickup trucks.
Mr. Kilmer.
Shipyards Risk of Climate Change
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks for holding
this hearing today.
I have got a dozen questions, but I will try to keep it to
two. My first is for Ms. Goodman.
You know, we are seeing threats like rising sea levels and
seismic shifts and shoreline erosion and erratic weather
patterns that really have the capacity to compromise the
security of military bases across the country, including naval
installations. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in my district is
undeniably vulnerable to climate change and represents a single
point of failure for carrier maintenance in the Pacific.
In response to the growing need to counter threats brought
about by climate change and to shore up our public shipyards,
the Navy created an investment strategy called the Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Plan, or SIOP, which is a 20-year,
$21 billion effort to modernize these shipyards to increase
their climate resilience, to improve resistance to earthquakes
and other natural disasters.
That is one piece of a multifaceted solution necessary to
address a problem the size and scope of climate change. Another
that comes to mind, although maybe not directly created for
this purpose, is the Defense Community Infrastructure Program,
DCIP. That is a program created in 2019 that was designed to
address infrastructure deficiencies in communities surrounding
military installations.
And those grant funds can help to preserve military
readiness and security, and I am thinking of examples of, you
know, off-base infrastructure that may be vulnerable to climate
change. It strikes me that Congress needs to work in
coordination with the DOD to keep these programs like SIOP and
DCIP on track.
I would love to just get your sense. Do you think that the
effects of climate change will outpace these mitigation
efforts, and how important do you think it is for Congress and
the DOD to look for areas to accelerate programs like the SIOP
and like DCIP?
Ms. Goodman. Mr. Kilmer, thank you for that question. I
think it is absolutely essential. Those are two good programs
that you mentioned. They are critical. Only with that
investment and ambition and commitment of the Department of
Defense to these and other programs will we be able to ensure
that both our military infrastructure, for example, in your key
district and in many others, is--becomes resilient to these
climate threats, rising sea levels, extreme weather events,
ocean acidification in your region as well, as well as water
scarcity, flooding, drought in other regions.
And so those are two very important programs. And what is
particularly important about the second one you mentioned is
the opportunity to work with the community because I think that
is also essential.
And I am pleased that Congress has continued to broaden the
authorities for DOD to invest in conjunction with communities
because some of these investments are better done when there is
a cost sharing. For example, that program you mentioned has
cost sharing also. The REPI program, the Readiness
Environmental Protection Initiative, enables cost sharing
between communities and DOD. And that is also going to be
continually important in those areas and others in order to
maximize the benefit.
So thank you for raising that. I think these are very
important programs for our future.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.
Department of Defense Building Materials
Admiral, I wanted to follow up on Ranking Member Calvert's
question. It seems like another way in which the DOD can be
part of the solution is through innovative building materials.
You know, the Department is one of the largest builders on the
planet.
You mentioned cross-laminated timber. I think there is a
real opportunity there because it has a smaller carbon
footprint than steel and concrete. It comes from a renewable
resource.
CLT isn't alone. We have seen incredible uses of recycled
composite material. In my district, we have something called
the Composite Technology Recycling Center that incorporates
recycled carbon fiber into products to reduce weight and
increase strength and promote sustainability.
I want to get your sense, Admiral. What steps would you
recommend to ensure that the DOD is taking advantage of
innovative and alternative building materials? You know, are
there enough resources being invested into developing new
technologies, and how can Congress help on this front?
Admiral McGinn. I think promoting--it is a great question.
Promoting interaction between the public and private sector--in
this case, DOD--and the building--advanced building industry is
really, really critical, so that we break free of the old model
of stick building on site, that we can move towards modular
construction, new materials like CLT, and really, really take a
look at how we actually design buildings, how we design
facilities so that they are, by design, very, very much more
efficient and effective and resilient.
So I think that what the Congress can do is, in guidance to
the Department of Defense, indeed to the Federal Government in
all procurement for our buildings, to look for opportunities
for private--public-private coordination and to try to remove
barriers that may exist from old legislation that prevents the
type of partnership that really shares risk, shares reward in
approaching our building industry in new ways.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick.
Lower Energy Cost
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I just have a couple of questions. My first question is for
both of the witnesses.
The Department of Defense is the single largest energy user
in the United States, and energy consumption is a significant
cost to the Department and the services. So this is just sort
of a follow-up question to Representative Kilmer's question.
Transitioning to green energy in the Department can
introduce efficiencies and reduce logistical requirements. So I
guess my question is, how can the Department further lower
energy costs at installations and--as well as operational
energy consumption and costs, and are there enough resources
being invested in energy innovation within the Department?
Admiral McGinn. Sherri.
Ms. Goodman. Okay. Thank you very, very much, Ms.
Kirkpatrick, for that question.
I think DOD has already invested a lot in recent years in
improving its energy posture, but it can do more today. And
there are many good--particularly in research and development
to meet the military mission, there are some good programs.
Among them, the Strategic Environmental Research and
Development Program, the Energy Services Technology
Certification Program, and a number of others also in the
services. They do the good basic RDT&E. They do the
demonstration validation. The challenge is to get over the
valley of death and now deploy many of these new technologies
for use.
In your district, of course, we have one of the largest
solar arrays, you know, at Davis-Monthan, and that is
important. We can do more of that now that the cost of wind and
solar has come down. But, as has been noted, there is more we
can do in batteries, in energy transmission infrastructure.
By setting the right targets, such as the Black Start
exercises, which set a goal of being able to go without power
from the grid for approximately 14 days, those increase--those
incentivize the right type of investment. And there will be
other goals, I am sure, that the Department of Defense will
work on to help incentivize investment, and I think we will
begin to see that R&D pay off as we also get some spinout into
the commercial sector and we allow technologies to come into
our work.
Admiral McGinn. I would add that an inherently efficient
military force, whether it is Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard,
Air Force, is a more effective force. You can go further, stay
longer, and carry more of your--whatever the payload you have
if you are inherently more efficient in an operational energy
sense.
Clearly, on the installation side, the same thing applies.
There was a great study about, I would say, 7 years ago by MIT
Lincoln Labs that took a look at the benefits of centralizing
emergency backup power so that you eliminate individual diesel
generator sets for--scattered across an installation for
emergency backup. They tend to be dirty, they tend to be
unreliable, and they tend to be expensive to own and operate
them and to procure them.
So centralizing backup power and improving installation
distribution is going to be a great contributor to greater
resilience.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Cuellar has stepped out. Mr. Cole has not returned, so
we are going to go to Mr. Crist next.
Flood Resiliency at Installations
Mr. Crist. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for holding
this very important hearing.
The Tampa Bay region in Florida, where my district is
located, is one of the most at-risk areas for storm surge from
hurricanes in the world, comparable, in fact, to Miami and New
Orleans in that regard.
It has been nothing short of a miracle that we have avoided
a direct hit for a very long time now since back before most of
the area was settled and before MacDill Air Force Base, home to
CENTCOM and SOCOM, was founded on the waterfront of Tampa Bay,
including in 2017 when Hurricane Irma struck Tampa Bay as a
major hurricane, while MacDill largely avoided damage from that
storm.
Admiral McGinn, what is the Department doing to improve
flood resiliency at installations like MacDill where they are
failing--falling short, rather--excuse me--and what can be done
to either help them or push to do even more? Please, sir?
Admiral McGinn. I think, Mr. Crist, the first thing that
they are doing is they are looking at where are their critical
assets, the most vulnerable ones? What are the single-point
failures for a mission? MacDill, of course, as you know, with
all of those Special Forces, Central Command operations,
absolutely critical that they can sustain any type of weather
and continue to do the mission.
I think that taking a look at where are their electrical
system vulnerabilities, where are the necessary pumps to reduce
or to mitigate flooding, where are critical buildings, can
there be a relocation, not writ large but selectively, to put
critical functions in better locations or raise them up on
upper stories of buildings, have methods of taking flooding in
lower floors but be able to remove it but still keep the lights
on and the function?
It is a very tough engineering challenge but one that we
have the ability to do, and I think our Navy Seabees and our
Corps of Engineers are very much up to the task, especially if
they work with the private sector and the good ideas and
innovations that are out there.
Mr. Crist. Great. Thank you very much.
There seems to be a misconception out there that the threat
of climate change poses to our facilities is only from storm
surge or hurricanes. And, while that may be the case in many
situations, the fires in California and the record-breaking
inland low pressure system that flooded Offutt Air Force Base
in Nebraska show that climate change can have consequences that
are beyond what first it was imagined.
For either of you, what have we learned over the past 5 to
10 years about the full effects of climate change on our
installations and defense infrastructure, and what is the
Department doing or not doing to respond thereto?
Ms. Goodman. Well, thank you, Mr. Crist.
Yes, the Department has learned that it needs to address
all the threat multipliers of climate change, from fires to
floods, as well as sea-level rise and extreme weather, and
drought in certain parts of the region which affect water
availability at bases and communities.
At Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, that severe flood
really showed what Vice Admiral McGinn just said, where the new
command headquarters--that was the newest building on the base
and was built on higher ground--rode out the storm fairly well.
It was the older, lower-lying buildings that were much more
subject to damage. We have learned that the hard way.
Now, the wildfire is a particular challenge out in the
West, and that is going to require both reducing, you know, the
fuel load, so changing how we manage energy overall, the fuel
load in the forests, and recognizing that conditions have
gotten hotter and drier but also looking at new building
materials, new energy systems, and being able to take further
preventive action being able to address these fires early on
and reduce the fuel load so they don't get as dangerous.
Admiral McGinn. I would add that we are in a race against
time. You know, the great author, Tom Friedman, said Mother
Nature always bats last, and she always bats a thousand. And I
think that we are seeing weather phenomena that are literally
unprecedented, certainly in modern history.
We really, really need to focus on resilience from all
sorts of things. It is ironic that last--late last summer,
California suffered widespread power outages due to a heat
wave. Yet, just a few weeks ago, Texas and Oklahoma suffered
terrible, terrible damage and suffering because of a polar
vortex. Hot, cold, the manifestations of severe weather are
quite varied, and we need to be prepared geographically for the
most likely ones.
Damage From Extreme Weather Events
Ms. McCollum. Thank you. I haven't asked a question yet. I
want to kind of follow up on a little bit of the theme we heard
here, especially from Mr. Crist.
So I am going to talk about Tyndall Air Force Base and kind
of what all happened there and paint a bigger picture.
So, in your written testimony, Admiral McGinn, you talked
about the Category 5 hurricane there in 2018. Could you expand
a little more about the type of damage the base infrastructure
went through and the F-22 squadron sustained there and then
just about how we had to move resources all over, the aircraft,
which has potential effect on our readiness? Can you kind of
paint a bigger picture of what one of these catastrophes really
looks like in the broad sense?
Admiral McGinn. Yes. Basically Hurricane Michael coming as
it did from due south of Tyndall in the Gulf of Mexico, very,
very rapid escalation to a Category 5 when it came ashore, did
not allow a lot of time for preparation, although given the
severity of the storm, the wind and surge, even more
preparation wouldn't have significantly altered the damage. The
wind force damaging buildings unbelievably. F-22s that were
stationed there at Tyndall, not all of them were in a
maintenance condition that allowed them to fly away to
hurricane evacuation, to inland bases. So those, because of the
damage to, literally construction of some of the hangers, were
also severely damaged.
So I think the lesson is we need to know that our
installations are in the path of various severe weather events.
In this case, along the Gulf, Florida, the Atlantic Coast,
hurricanes are clearly one of the most frequent and
significantly damaging phenomena. So we need to be prepared for
that.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
I am going to turn it over to Ms. Kaptur. We will have time
for a second round.
Ms. Kaptur.
Department of Defense Posture Towards Climate Change
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Madam Chair, very much.
And I thank our guests, Secretary Goodman for sure and
Admiral McGinn.
I am very interested. I was one of the people who in the
nineties that was fighting for an energy focus at the
Department of Defense, and we finally got one to some extent. I
have a few questions here. Do you think the Department has
taken this newest challenge, climate change, and the
initiatives it needed to seriously in the way the Department
itself has structured its operations? Which military service do
you believe has taken the lead?
And if the answer is Navy, is that because, Admiral, with
the warming oceans, you felt it first? I am just curious.
And then I would like both of your recommendations on where
to go in our country or world where you see real innovation
occurring at the Department of Defense? Because this issue of
climate change and energy gets lost in the mammoth nature of
the Department. Where can I go to look at real leadership in
innovation and application in overground transportation, number
one; number two, hydrogen fuel cells, current generation and
next generation, battery storage; and, finally, base energy
independence? I represent the first Guard base that flew a
biofueled plane almost 20 years ago and but it was an
exception, not the rule. It was on the cover of Guard Magazine
at the time. We were very proud of that as biofuels have come
online in our country.
I have found the Department laggard. I don't find the
Department a leader, and in the clean energy mandate and in the
area of innovation, it tends to get lost somehow. I am just
curious. Do you think that, again, the Department has really
taken this seriously? Are they structured to properly deal with
it in the way that they have handled the assignment of duties
inside the Department? Which department has taken the lead?
And, finally, could you name me the three locations on
overground transportation; hydrogen fuel cells, current and
next generation, battery storage; and then base independence,
where?
Admiral McGinn. I would start by saying that the entire
Department of Defense gets it. They see renewable energy and
various other forms of energy, including hydrogen, hydrogen
fuel cells, and other means as a key part of their mission.
In many cases, however, over the past years, the Department
has very wisely used commercial off-the-shelf energy
technology. I am reminded of the wonderful United States
Marines in Afghanistan deploying commercial solar panels to
forward operating bases in order to reduce the reliance on oil
convoys, which were very, very deadly to our young men and
women in uniform over there.
But I would start, of course, with the Department of the
Navy. We did do a lot there and continue to do a lot, but so
does the Air Force and the fuel research going on at Wright-
Patt, at the Air Force research lab, is really, really helpful.
It is done in many cases in coordination or certainly trading
technology stories with civilian aviation.
I think that the future for hydrogen is very, very bright
as a storage medium and as well as a producer of electricity
using fuel cells for both transportation as well as for onsite
power.
I would specifically point out that Secretary of Defense
has named a senior climate advisor directly reporting to
Secretary Austin, and his name is Joe Bryan. He is innovative.
He is smart. He is experienced. I know this because Joe was the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy when I was
the Assistant Secretary. He is a great example of the
recognition of the need for science and innovation and asking
the questions about why can't we move further, why can't we
move faster.
Ms. Kaptur. DARPA, are they doing anything that you are
aware of?
Admiral McGinn. I am sorry. Who was that?
Ms. Kaptur. DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency? I am looking for--where do I go for overground
transport? Do I go to the war and tank command? Where do I go
to see the future within DOD?
Admiral McGinn. Right. I would start with DARPA. That is a
good spot. I would also check in the Department of Energy with
the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy, ARPA-E, and
you would also want to take a look at some of the DOE
laboratories and how they are coordinating in some cases with
the Department of Defense laboratories and technology centers.
Ms. Goodman. I would also add, Congresswoman, as I have
stated in my testimony and I have said elsewhere, I think the
Department of Defense, in addition to the very good efforts
that are already being made under the current Secretary,
Secretary Austin, and the new current climate advisor, Joe
Bryan, could benefit from having a clean energy innovation
office that pulled together a lot of the work that is--some of
the work that is ongoing and that can be further magnified by
clear lines of investment and also a clean energy transition
fund to help us get over this valley of death. When there is
good research and development coming out of our labs, private
sector or government labs, sometimes there is a lag between
getting it actually into use because the demand signal isn't
always there at the buying level. And a transition office could
help get us beyond that.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you so much.
Ms. Goodman. Excuse me. A transition fund.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Secretary Goodman. And you think
that should be within the Department of Defense somehow, in its
contracting operations?
Ms. Goodman. I think it should be, and it should be modeled
on other things we have done when we wanted to spur innovation
in other types of technologies.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
So, Ranking Member Calvert, we are going to go to a second
round of questioning. I would like you to lead that off if you
have another question.
Climate Change Impact on Planning and Operations
Mr. Calvert. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Yes, it is an issue, as suggested, that increased
probability of droughts, floods, famine, disease, loss of
habitable land, other large-scale natural and humanitarian
disasters will create problems for communities and governments
abroad.
So to what extent do our geographic combat commanders need
to factor in the potential impact of climate change across
their spectrum of planning and operations? Secondly, if there
should be a core requirement of the GCCs in how they undertake
a cost-effective way without falling prey to institutional
overreach in owning an issue that may more properly be the
domain of the Department of State, USAID, and others in the
inner agency, how do you approach that?
Ms. Goodman. Well, thank you, Congressman.
I think it is vitally important that climate security be
integrated into our security engagements arrangements, security
engagements which are principally conducted by our combatant
commands.
You know, in the 1990s when I served as the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense in a different era, we were conducting
environmental security engagements with each of the combatant
commands to address the environmental challenges of that era,
which were largely cleanup of contaminated bases, complying
with air, water, and waste laws, conserving endangered species.
That, of course, all continues. Today we are in the climate
era. Those combatant commanders can use these same kind of
environmental security engagements addressing climate security
threats.
For example, Pacific island nations, many of them, you
know, who depend very much on American security see increased
approaches from China to being the provider of the first resort
when they have an extreme weather event, facing food and water
insecurities. The U.S. should be right there, working with them
and in other regions of the world and can do so, can integrate
climate security into its theater engagement plans. There are
new improved Earth system observation capabilities that can be
utilized to enable better planning and to be shared in some
cases with our allies and partners as well.
Admiral McGinn. I think the record of the U.S. military
throughout the world but especially in the India and Pacific
Ocean area is really remarkable, especially in terms of
humanitarian assistance, disaster recovery operations. You just
can't as a combatant commander or any of the subordinate
service commanders avoid that responsibility.
So I think, as Ms. Goodman pointed out, engagement with
other militaries, other nations, civilian and military, about
how can we do things together that will increase the resilience
in a particular region, whether it is an island nation or
coastal nation, that will help to mitigate the worst effects of
some of these typhoons and other phenomena that are coming our
way, increasingly in terms of intensity and frequency.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. McCollum. Oh, you are welcome.
Great. These questions have all been fabulous, and the
answers have been enlightening. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Combating Climate Change
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, firstly, I am going to go from the
Arctic now to more global and then district. My district is a
coastal community with many DOD entities including Army,
Aberdeen Proving Ground, and an Air National Guard base right
on what we call Middle River of east Baltimore. I am also the
chairman of the U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors in
Annapolis, which fights for funding every year to protect
itself against sea level rise. In our most recent hearing with
the Naval Academy about 2 weeks ago, Admiral Buck mentioned the
strategy to address sea level rise, but he said it could take
to 2035 to complete base on funding levels and that is just
totally unacceptable.
With the sea level rising and the aging of the Naval
Academy, they have real issues and problems with sea level. We
just built, the Naval Academy just built their newest building,
a cyber building, which was constructed with the sea level in
mind, rising in mind. It is a pretty unique building. Other
than that, there are a lot of other issues that are there.
I know that Ms. Goodman mentioned things that we can do for
sea level and one of those was to create, I think, at DOD a
clean energy office and a transition fund, but basically my
question, you know: How does the Department--do they have the
tools to assess global warming, sea level rise? In all of these
installations, I think, the last one I heard in your testimony,
billions of dollars it will cost and aging. So we really have
to deal with this, or it is going cost us a lot more money, and
an example of that is the United States Naval Academy.
So, if you could relay, again, what steps do you recommend,
I know some of them Ms. Goodman had mentioned, to better
address these issues on a defense-wide basis?
Ms. Goodman. Well, thank you, Congressman.
I mean, Congress has already directed DOD to integrate
resilience into its military installation resilience plans, and
Secretary Austin has said that work is already underway. I
believe the Department now will begin to accelerate that work
per the requirements both of the President's executive order
and its own direction. And the question for--the issue is going
to be first doing the planning but then, as you say, putting
the money on the project, sort of invest--the investments that
are needed.
As we all know, it is often the infrastructure accounts
that are underfunded in the Department of Defense
historically--historically. So that is going to have to be re-
prioritized within the way the Department does its investments.
I am pleased to say that I believe, you know, the Department is
looking at that right now, how to set those priorities, how to
ensure that critical facilities like the Naval Academy don't
have to wait until 2035 to become more resilient.
This is going to require some new ways of doing business
for the Department of Defense, to give greater priority to the
investments needed based on those resilient plans that will be
coming forward. As you say, at the Naval Academy, they already
have a plan. Other bases are coming forward in the coming year
or so. Then those investments will have to be prioritized. It
is my hope--go ahead.
Mr. Ruppersberger. The Naval Academy's plan is totally
inadequate going out to the year 2035. It is not going to work.
Ms. Goodman. Right. So there have to be some priorities set
to occur within the next several years probably and certainly a
substantial investment within what we call the FYDP, the 5-year
defense plan, and so the Secretary and the services are going
to have to make some choices about those important investments.
Admiral McGinn. One of the positive aspects, Mr.
Ruppersberger, is that you as the chair of the Board of
Visitors and Admiral Buck as the superintendent, you get it. It
isn't a question of, gee, I hope we don't have a hurricane here
or tidal surge of the Severn River. And knowing that it is
inevitable will motivate the kind of thinking and investment in
protecting these critical assets right along the river.
Mr. Ruppersberger. It seems the timing is right for global
warming, for dealing with these issues. You have the Secretary
of the Defense is making it a priority. Betty McCollum, our
chair, has made this a priority. This is the first hearing we
have had. I have been on this committee for a long period of
time. I think the chairman and I have talked about maybe going
to the Naval Academy so she can see some of these issues. We
will probably do that in the next 2 or 3 months.
So I think the timing might be right with all the players
that we have here is going to focus on this issue so we can
plan, including plan on what needs to be done from an
infrastructure point of view to prepare ourselves because the
Naval Academy is not going to move, but the water keeps rising.
Admiral McGinn. I talked to Professor Flack, who is a
professor at the mechanical engineering department at the Naval
Academy, doing wonderful things over the years with educating
midshipmen on energy and environment. That is Professor Flack.
Ms. McCollum. Okay. I think Mr. Calvert was trying to be
recognized.
Mr. Calvert. Yes. I just wanted to point out, Madam Chair,
the Naval Academy and other bases also, which is also a
problem, is a lot of these bases were built on fill and
certainly the Naval Academy a lot of it is on fill. You have
the subsidence that is occurring on ton of it. So these areas
are literally sinking.
So, you know, so sometimes you can throw a lot of money at
this problem in the seawalls and the rest, but if your
underlying foundation is weak or failing, you may have to look
at other considerations to fix it. I don't know. It is going to
be expensive. I know that.
Thank you. I just wanted to point that out.
Ms. McCollum. I think that is a good point, and we have got
a partner in Chairwoman Wasserman Schultz with MILCON. A lot of
these are MILCON projects, but we know that they are going to
affect our readiness and ability to move forward. So I look
forward to our committee on not only working with the
authorizers on this but working with MILCON. There are
certainly things we can do. There are other things that MILCON
does do, and I think this is a unique opportunity for the three
committees to, you know, really sit down. And we can tell the
story of what is happening. They can look at their budget for
what is planning and then work with the authorizers on how to
move forward, but we can't afford to waste any time.
With that, Mr. Carter.
Icebreakers' Importance for the Arctic
Mr. Carter. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman.
And being ranking member on MILCON myself, I can tell you
that is a pretty small budget as it compares to DOD, and we
have MILCON projects that are emergencies, and we have talked
about a couple of them today, and we have to have the deep
pockets of DOD involved in order for us to do this. I just have
to point that out because the MILCON budget is a small budget
as it compares even to the VA budget. So it is a challenge.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Carter, ranking member of MILCON, I
couldn't agree with you more. I am just not going to go in
somebody else's jurisdiction. So we will work together on that,
sir.
Mr. Carter. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Ms. McCollum. Your question.
Mr. Carter. The other thing I want to raise, going back in
history to when I was the chairman of Homeland, the
icebreakers. We don't have the money for those things in the
Homeland Security budget either, and we were trying, and I
think successfully, to partner with the Navy on that first one.
I don't know if anybody knows whether that is still going on or
not, but it is going to have to be a partnership with the big
boys to get seven icebreakers in the Arctic. If we don't, we
are going to literally lose jurisdiction in the Arctic.
Ms. Goodman. Congressman, you raise an important point that
adding six icebreakers into the Coast Guard's budget could be a
budget-breaking effort for the small service that it is. The
Navy has historically had a lot of other priorities in its
budget, other big-ticket items. I think it is going to take a
whole-of-government effort and a look from the top at overall
what we need in Arctic capabilities and to be able to set the
right overall level of investment and then decide how it is
going to be made across the Federal Government because we have
to be able to up our capability to have presence in the Arctic,
both across the Department of Defense and across the Coast
Guard and other agencies. Research in the Arctic continues to
be very important so we can understand those changing
conditions and plan and prepare our forces to be able to
operate there.
There are a variety of agencies across the Federal
Government that are very important, and thank you for pointing
that out. It is going to take an effort coordinated probably
through the White House with the relevant Federal agencies.
Mr. Carter. And with all the climate change issues we have
got in the Arctic and with the shipping that is now going into
the Arctic, the rescue mission of one icebreaker that can be
effective in heavy ice and should there be a disaster from what
we now calling the Northwest Passage, it could be a real Earth-
shaking disaster if it was some kind of cruise ship full of
people that got in big trouble. To reach them without an
icebreaker could be a real disaster, in addition to the climate
issues that are up there and the jurisdiction issues. I want to
keep emphasizing everybody has got to be thinking about
icebreakers. We need them.
Now back to my question and I still got a little time left.
The Biden administration has set national security objectives.
In those, their last security guidance, they mention near-peer
competition by non-state actors, infectious disease, cyber
attacks, and disinformation campaigns.
Where would you put a climate change initiative, which
General Austin and the Secretary have put forward, where would
you put that in the ranking of what the administration has
given? It is not concluded now, but it is one of those national
security guidances that probably should be. Where do you think
it should be put?
Ms. Goodman. I think it should be there with the others,
and I believe it is included in the President's interim
National Security Strategy, perhaps not quite in that sentence
but elsewhere in the direction, to address climate threats and
it should be included because it affects all those others.
Changing climate, drought, and food insecurities are increasing
the opportunities for extremists, violent extremists, across
North Africa, the Middle East, and in South Asia. That brings
our forces, your forces from Fort Hood and elsewhere are all
called up to serve when our Nation is threatened.
Mr. Carter. Right now. Right now.
Ms. Goodman. Correct.
Mr. Carter. They gave us a guidance, and there was a
conversation about climate change in there. That is correct. I
think we should prioritize it.
Ms. Goodman. I heartily agree.
Mr. Carter. Maybe it is being technical, but if you don't
make noise, you don't get things done.
Ms. Goodman. Exactly.
Mr. Carter. I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Ms. Kaptur.
Leadership on New Energy Systems
Ms. Kaptur. There is a disadvantage to a few minutes.
And I want to go back to my original questions from the
last round because I didn't get clarity on where in the U.S.
military you could look for a site visit to the place that is
doing the most on advancing overground transportation in new
energy systems. I heard what was said about ARPA and DARPA. I
know them well. I am asking, who is taking leadership?
In the same ways we have Blue Angels and they do shows, air
shows across the country, I really don't see the Department of
Defense being a leader publicly in some of these areas in which
we so desperately need advancements.
For example, the war and tank command, which is at the
doorstep of every major U.S. producer in Michigan, they don't
take a public lead in terms of new transportation systems. They
don't have a Blue Angels type show or anything like that that
would inspire the public. I don't really see any base energy
independence pride in the way the military presents itself. So
perhaps the gentleman you mentioned that has just been
appointed by Secretary Austin, perhaps he will be helpful in
this.
I have found a real resistance or just lack of
consciousness in the Department in general, despite your--both
of your--stellar efforts to make a difference. So, again, I
ask, are you aware of any place in the Department that is
showing direct leadership in moving these critical sectors of
overground transportation, new fueled flight, new energy flight
systems, some of the storage arenas where we know that we have
to make progress? Is there any base? Is there any person? Is
there any division that you can point to?
I know the Marine Corps has done an astounding job overall,
but, again, the Department hasn't really coalesced its progress
in any way that is understandable to most Members of Congress
and the American people.
Ms. Goodman. It is such a good question. Here is what I
would like to see. You know, the Department of Defense has
awards in many categories, and I am familiar with its
environmental and installation awards because, for 8 years, I
gave them out as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Environmental Security. We gave the awards out at the
installation and at individual level for cleaning up
contaminated sites, complying with air laws, complying with
water laws, complying with waste, conserving natural resources,
conserving cultural resources.
Vice Admiral McGinn may have more familiarity. I think we
should look at creating new award categories along some of the
lines you mentioned, and that will encourage the competition
and incentivize the Department. It is not to the exclusion of
certain funds that I mentioned earlier. By creating an award
and recognizing leadership in certain new categories, such as
the ones you have mentioned, I think we will give the
Department an opportunity to bring its best forward.
Culture Change
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Secretary Goodman. I am so glad to
hear you say that.
Let me just point out in the air shows, if I go to the Air
Force and look at them, the air shows come and always do a
preshow field display. Usually they have this giant truck that
shoots flames out the back. Okay? So, the military has figured
out how to do that. Why don't they bring forward new
technology, hydrogen fuel cell vehicles or new fuel advanced
biofuel vehicles? Why don't they teach the public? They don't
do that after all these years. So I am not yelling at you. I am
just frustrated as one Member who is tried to make a difference
in my little puddle, you know. I see this mammoth department,
and I don't see a rollout that is impressive. Thank you for the
suggestion.
Admiral McGinn. I would say the culture of the Department
is changing. I served in the Obama administration, second term,
and there was a lot of emphasis on renewable energy, energy
efficiency, sustainability, environmental care, and that
eclipsed somewhat over the past administration that is
unfortunate. Nevertheless, culturally, in the services, in the
Department of Defense people are still doing their job.
I would point to Marine Corps Air Station Miramar out in
San Diego as an example of an installation that has worked
very, very hard to try to get to net zero. The Marine Corps
down in Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, has done a tremendous
amount of work in terms of sustainability and energy
independence from the grid if it is needed. So there are many
pockets. I mentioned two Marine Corps bases. There are many
fine Navy bases: Naval Base San Diego; right down the
Chesapeake Bay from Washington, Patuxent River Naval Air
Station.
I think this culture of really highlighting how important
and essential sustainability and fighting climate change and
turning the challenges into opportunities will bring out, if
you will, the bragging rights of many of the services and many
of the installations that are doing some really, really good
stuff, including to your point about transportation.
Global Impact of Climate Change
Ms. McCollum. Thank you. I am going to wrap kind of--take
us back to the beginning of your testimony again and kind of
wrap around it. We talked about, you know, the effects of
climate change on our bases right here in the United States and
some of our bases around the world.
We talked about the effects of the climate change in the
Arctic and China and Russia and, you know, the extreme weather
and how there is so much more work to be done there.
In your statements, you also mentioned about climate change
just isn't happening here in the United States or in the
Arctic; it is happening all over the world. I have had the
opportunity to be in different parts of the world and
experience what is going on with climate change, whether it is
talking to political leaders or talking to people who live in
those communities.
Climate change can exacerbate environmental, social,
economic, political drivers of instability and conflict.
Climate change variability has intensified economic and
resource insecurity across the continent of Africa, throughout
the Middle East, leading to mass migration, the displacement of
vulnerable populations. That is part of what is happening in
our border is climate change with what we are witnessing with
some of the people who are fleeing the effects of climate
change in Central America.
In turn, these populations, though, especially in Africa
and the Middle East, are more susceptible to recruitment by
extremist groups and exploitation by terrorist groups.
I am going to give one example and then ask a question. So
I have been in the area of Africa. I have been in Chad, and
Lake Chad is a water source for more than 30 million people. It
has shrunk to less than one-tenth of its size compared to just
50 years ago. It has led to population displacement in a region
that is very volatile, and we know that extremist groups are
constantly trying to get a good foothold in there.
What role can the Department play in preparing for regional
and global instability to major climate change events? Maybe
you could give us an example either in the Sahel or something
that you have seen in Africa to round this off before I close
the hearing.
Thank you.
Ms. Goodman. Thank you. Well, if you overlay in Africa our
deployments in recent years to combat violent extremists, it
coincides almost perfectly where--the regions where we see the
severest climate threats, around the Lake Chad region, Mali,
and Nigeria, and a few other locations across Africa.
So, as part of our defense planning through Africa Command,
for example, in particular, understanding the underlying causes
of climate threats, the drought, the food insecurity, the
shrinking of Lake Chad that has enabled Boko Haram and others
on the Nigerian side to take advantage of vulnerable
populations that has sent herders, farmers, fishermen fleeing
the region because they can no longer support their livelihoods
and their families in that area.
The long-term solutions to the climate challenges are
primarily not through military action. They are going to be
through development and diplomacy, through local action. In
those parts of Africa, you mentioned, our European partners are
very deeply engaged. And climate insecurity activity in Europe
very much means working with development and diplomatic
agencies. I think we in the U.S. can be, should be doing more
of that ourselves to round out the totality of our approaches.
I think that is where this administration is headed in its
climate security, foreign policy, and national security
planning to integrate those approaches so we have an integrated
approach to the diplomacy and development that is needed in
these regions to enable sustainable livelihoods with military
forces using their tools, their tools that are reasonable,
whether it is security forces or combatant commander engagement
as a backup capability to support further sustainable action.
Admiral McGinn. Chair McCollum, I would also point to South
Asia as a critical area that is being affected by climate
change. With shrinking ice capping glaciers in the Himalayas
that feed or don't feed, in some cases, the four sacred rivers
that flow through India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, we have a
recipe for regional strife as it is alternating floods in some
years or drought in others, from those rivers that have been so
essential to sustaining the people in that region. We really,
really need to make sure we are engaging with those nations at
the combatant commander level and really at the head-of-state
level to make sure that there is some sense of unity to try to
recognize the common enemy of climate change and to try to do
some things that increase resilience and to reduce the adverse
effects on populations in that very, very critical region of
South Asia.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you. Thank you both for your testimony.
And that is a good note to land on because there is a role
for the Department of Defense, as Judge Carter pointed out.
There is a role for Homeland Security. There is a role for
MILCON. But there is a role for the whole of the United States
Government to be addressing climate change, and that is why I
am so glad we are back in the Paris climate accord because if
we are not looking at this through a whole of government and
working internationally with allies and finding new partners in
this, it is just going to increase the conflict, and that is
not anything that I have heard from our Joint Chiefs of Staff
that they want to see happen, that the Secretaries of Defense
have all said that that is the best thing that we can do is to
build towards more peace. That will help with their being able
to provide security.
Thank you both for your testimony.
And, with that, I will conclude today's hearing. This
subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.
[Answers to submitted questions for the record follow:]
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Tuesday, March 23, 2021.
FUTURE DEFENSE SPENDING
WITNESSES
DR. JAMES ACTON, CO-DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR POLICY PROGRAM AND JESSICA T.
MATHEWS CHAIR, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
NILOOFAR RAZI HOWE, SENIOR FELLOW, NEW AMERICA
MANDY SMITHBERGER, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION,
PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT
ROGER ZAKHEIM, DIRECTOR, RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL FOUNDATION AND
INSTITUTE
Opening Statement of Ms. McCollum
Ms. McCollum. This meeting will come to order.
This meeting, as fully virtual, and I am going to go over a
couple of the housekeeping matters again.
For today's meeting, the chair or the staff designated by
the chair, and that is Kyle, may mute participants' microphones
when they are not under recognition for purposes of eliminating
background noise. Members are responsible for muting and
unmuting themselves. If you notice that you have not unmuted
yourself, I will ask you if you would like the staff to unmute.
So if you are having problems I will ask you if the staff
should unmute you, and you just shake your head, yes, and Kyle
will do that.
If there is a technology issue, we will move to the next
member until that issue is resolved, but you will retain your
balance of time.
And I remind all members and witnesses that the 5-minute
clock still applies, and you can see it displayed in the
screen. At 1 minute remaining, the clock will turn yellow. At
30 seconds remaining, I will gently tap the gavel, aka, my
mouse here working my computer to remind you that your time has
almost expired. When your time has expired, the clock will turn
red, and I will begin to recognize the next member.
In terms of order of speaking, we will follow the order set
forward by the House rules, beginning with the chair and the
ranking member, then members present at the time the hearing is
called to order, and they will be recognized in order of
seniority, and, finally, members not present at the time that
the hearing is called to order.
Finally, House rules require me to remind you that we have
set up an email list to address which members can send anything
they wish to submit in writing to any of our hearings or
markups. This email address has been provided in advance to
your staff. I would just want to add one more item. The chat
function on this Microsoft WebEx, that is the happy face that
Kyle was talking about, I double-checked it out. So if you are
having problems, just click on the happy face there and we will
assist you.
So good afternoon, everyone. This subcommittee is holding
its third hearing in a series of emerging issue discussions
that are going to affect future defense spending. While
cybersecurity, nuclear modernization, and overseas contingency
operations funding sound like they are three unrelated topics,
the common thread that unites them is the significant impact
they all have had on our bill the last several years and how
they will continue to shape our work for the years to come.
Today, we will hear from three witnesses. Niloofar Howe,
senior fellow with a New America will discuss cybersecurity.
James Acton, the codirector of the Nuclear Policy Program at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will cover
nuclear modernization. Mandy Smithberger, the director of the
Center for Defense, Information, and the Project on Government
Oversight will detail problems and challenges with the OCO
spending. And Roger Zakheim, the Washington director of the
Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute will
address broad spending issues.
In the last decade, we have transitioned from thinking of
cybersecurity as primarily a function of protecting the
Department of Defense information networks to creating a
functional cyber integrating cyber effects into most of our
missions.
Our adversaries will continue to advance their techniques
and capabilities which will force our subcommittee and the
whole of government to evolve on the issue of cybersecurity.
Few efforts will have more budgetary impacts than nuclear
modernization. Aging systems, such as the Minutemen, Ohio-class
submarines, the B-1, and B-2 bombers necessitate modernization
of the nuclear triad.
In its most recent report projecting the 10-year cost for
nuclear forces, the CBO estimated the nuclear enterprise to
cost DOD $326 billion from 2019 to 2028. When these costs are
combined with the Department of Energy, the total was 23
percent greater than CBO's previous estimate.
And, finally, the budget control caps and discretionary
spending allowed us to have a more conversation about what is
going on with the overseas contingency fund. The last 10 years
Democratic and Republican administrations in Congress used OCO
as a budget gimmick. That is my opinion, but I think it bears
out in a lot of the reading that you will see. It was a budget
gimmick, and it was used to circumvent the budget control caps.
It is time that we correct those past mistakes. I would
like to remind my colleagues that on our fiscal year 2021 House
report we stated, and I quote from it, ``The OCO experiment has
been an abject failure. It has given the Department budgetary
relief valve that has allowed it to avoid making difficult
decisions.'' end of quote. And that is part of the--I totally
agree with that sentiment.
Our subcommittee will face a of serious difficult decisions
in the coming months. And I know our witnesses will provide
information that will help us in guiding, making some of those
hard choices.
I would now like to recognize our distinguished Ranking
Member Mr. Calvert for his comments.
Opening Remarks of Mr. Calvert
Mr. Calvert. Well thank you, Chairwoman McCollum. First, I
would like to thank our esteemed witnesses for appearing before
us today as we move closer to receiving the budget request for
fiscal year 2022. I hope that is pretty soon. It is important
that we take a strategic step back and consider the larger
questions. Of course, facing the Department of Defense in both
the long-term and short-term environments. As I said in the
first hearing on this topic, these hearings happening at a
critical time in our Nation's history.
Adversaries like China and Russia continue to challenge the
rules-based order that America and our allies have created over
the past century. The era of great power competition requires
smart, effective resourcing by the Department of Defense, our
industry partners, and ultimately this subcommittee.
In our hearing last month, we discussed some of the tough
choices we will have to make to ensure that the military
mission is aligned and properly funded to take on future
threats. This includes divesting legacy systems, restoring
critical infrastructure, and improving the way we develop and
field new advanced technologies.
We also discussed the adverse impacts that cutting the
defense budget would have on our war fighters and our
capabilities. I continue to be concerned by the efforts of some
in this body to significantly cut the Department of Defense
budget.
With our adversaries, particularly China, continuing to
close the gap on our capabilities advantage, now is not the
time to halt the progress made in rebuilding our military. As
just a little statistical fact, the Chinese have just passed us
this in a number of ships that are deployed throughout the
world.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses to discuss these
and other topics here today. I thank you again for the
witnesses who are appearing before us today, and I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you.
To our witnesses, your full testimony will be placed in the
record. In the interest of time, I strongly encourage each and
every one of you to keep your summarized statements to 5
minutes or less. Be complete but be succinct when we are in a
question and answer period.
With that, Ms. Howe, I would like turn it over to you to
lead us off.
Summary Statement of Ms. Howe
Ms. Howe. Thank you so much, Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking
Member Calvert, distinguished committee members, thank you for
inviting me to testify on the important topic of cybersecurity.
My name is Niloofar Howe, and I have spent close to three
decades focused on innovation in the technology and national
security in cybersecurity sectors.
Malicious actors operating in cyberspace are fast,
creative, persistent, and unconstrained by norms, laws, and
regulation. They have proved themselves extraordinary opponents
who study our weaknesses and are able to adjust, evolve, and
move with the sophistication and speed that evades our best
defenses and exploits our technical, human, legal and
regulatory vulnerabilities.
The SolarWinds supply chain operation by Russia and
exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Servers by China are just
the latest examples of how sophisticated these adversaries have
become, purposefully using U.S. infrastructure to launch
devastating attacks against thousands of organizations in a
short period of time.
No matter how sophisticated our defense is, no matter how
vigilant we are in training and educating, human error, coupled
with a complex entangled digital ecosystem will always leave a
door open for committed adversaries; a door we need Congress'
help to close.
Underpinning all of our struggles is the fact that the
internet was constructed in an environment of trust. And that
assumption has turned out to be a damaging flaw. Everything we
do is increasingly enabled by the internet. And the security of
our systems is inversely proportional to the number of notes,
the number of users, and the number of applications it
supports.
Over time, almost everything we have experienced in the
physical world will happen digitally, but with a speed and
severity that we are just starting to comprehend. At the same
time, cyber capabilities that enable attacks are becoming
commercialized offered as a service by groups that specialize
in specific aspects of the chain. Creating a fundamentally
asymmetric dynamic for defending against these attacks is
increasingly difficult.
Importantly, while there are no silver bullets, there are
solutions we can embrace to both deter malicious actors and
build resilience to their attacks. I propose 15 in my written
testimony. Almost all of them will be familiar to experts in
the industry because we have been advocating for them for
years. Progress against these solutions requires Congress'
support and action, and we need to move fast.
We must turn to the issue of ransomware. Ransomware attacks
are rising exponentially as are the accompanying extortion
demands. Criminal gangs carry out their ransomware operations
with impunity and little fear of retribution and prosecution.
Reducing the plague of ransomware should be a national priority
and requires us to impose costs on nations, like Russia, that
are knowingly harboring and perhaps encouraging these
activities.
We must also build resilience by, for example, creating a
voluntary cyber civilian corps that can respond to these
incidents, especially when they impact resource constraint
organizations and municipalities, much as our voluntary
firefighters do.
We must reduce supply chain risk. The security of our
digital ecosystem is directly correlated to the least secure
supplier. SolarWinds revealed that long-term campaigns focused
on supply chain vulnerabilities can be very difficult to detect
and by extension incredibly productive for the attacker.
SolarWinds is not a unique campaign. We must assume that
quiescence Malware resides throughout our infrastructure
waiting to be stealthily called into action at the right time.
To address this issue, we should subject software vendors
relied upon by our most critical organizations to risk
assessments and a certification process that creates a trusted
list of acceptable vendors.
Discovery of SolarWinds was voluntarily disclosed by one of
its victim's cybersecurity firm FireEye. Without their
voluntary disclosure, Russia would likely still be collecting
information from this operation. To this day, we neither know
the scope nor the scale of this intrusion as many victims have
not come forward with details.
Government agencies and especially the Department of
Defense can make real-time breach notification a condition of
contracts with penalties for noncompliance. Compelling
information sharing is table stakes. Both the Russian and
Chinese campaign leverage our intelligence blind spot and legal
constraints using U.S. infrastructure for their campaigns. We
must raise the bar for adversarial activity on U.S.
infrastructure and eliminate that blind spot.
Unless we change our approach, our adversaries will
continue to identify vulnerabilities for maximum impact with
little to no fear of retaliation. They will continue to advance
intrusion tools and trade craft faster than gaps in our cyber
defenses can be closed.
As we embrace new waves of technology such as Cloud and its
computing, autonomous vehicles, 5G microsensors, AI, low Earth
orbit satellites, IoT drones, autonomous weapons, quantum
computing, and synthetic Biology, we must reimagine how we
organize and defend against the threats each new technology
brings with it.
The first few months of 2021 should serve as a wake-up call
to take the actions we know we must take, to make the changes
we know we must make no matter how difficult the path and do it
with the agility, speed, and boldness of our adversaries.
I thank the committee and look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Howe follows:]
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Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you. And you packed a lot into
your time. Thank you so much.
Dr. Acton, we are anxious to hear from you.
Summary Statement of Dr. Acton
Mr. Acton. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I should
say, it is both a professional honor but also a personal honor
to testify before you today. As it happens, my wife was in
Congress on the Lowey staff for many years, including when she
chaired the Appropriations Committee. So, it has been well-
drilled into me that in Congress there are Democrats,
Republicans, and appropriators.
As you flagged in your opening remarks, Madam Chairwoman,
the United States currently stands at the beginning of a major
modernization weight. Almost every American nuclear delivery
system, missile, warhead, and command and control asset will
require some kind of modernization over the next 10 to 20
years. Through the momentous (ph) program, the Congressional
Budget Office estimates that annual spending on U.S. nuclear
forces will rise from about $34 billion in 2019 to about $63
billion in 2028 before peaking in the mid-2030s.
Now, some of this increase is inevitable and appropriate.
But I believe that the spending growth could be curtailed
without compromising U.S. or allied security, providing that
funds are allocated effectively. To this end, today, I would
like to highlight two programs that I believe are extraneous,
and one that I believe is actually underfunded.
First, the United States is set to spend approximately $95
billion on procuring the ground-based strategic deterrent, a
fleet of new intercontinental ballistic missiles. The
Department of Defense argues that ICBMs are needed because of
the quote, ``intractable targeting program'' unquote that they
present to Russia. This problem would be the same, however,
whether or not we acquire new ICBMs.
The feasibility of extending existing Minutemen III ICBMs
should be examined, therefore. DOD previously rejected this
option in a 2015 study. As I discuss in my written testimony, I
believe the assumptions behind this study were flawed. The fact
that the cost of GBSD has risen by almost 50 percent in the
last 6 years suggests that the study's conclusions may be
flawed too.
I suggest, therefore, that Congress pulls the GBSD program
by reducing fiscal year 2022 funding to the lowest level
consistent with preserving the program in its current state,
pending a full assessment by an independent commission of the
feasibility and cost of extending the service lives of
Minutemen III ICBMs.
Second, the United States should retain some low-yield
nuclear warheads. Indeed, we are currently modernizing relevant
capabilities. In addition, the Trump administration initiated
the development of a new $9 billion sea-launched cruise missile
with a lower-yield option. Given plans to modernize the nuclear
armed cruise missile however I believe that this new sea-
launched cruise missile is redundant. The air-launch cruise
missile carried by stealthy B-21 bombers should be highly
survivable before launch. And after launch, the two missiles
would have essentially identical flight profiles. For this
reason, I believe that Congress should refuse any further
funding for the nuclear arms Sea Launch Cruise Missile.
Third, the United States would be literally unable to
conduct any kinds of nuclear operations without a functional
nuclear command and control system. The development of a highly
resilient nuclear command and control system should, therefore,
be the single highest priority to nuclear modernization.
Unfortunately, it is not. A major and unappreciated challenge
is that most command and control assets support both nuclear
and nonnuclear operations.
In a conventional conflict, therefore, a U.S. adversary
might attack these assets in order to undermine our known
nonnuclear operations. So, to tax, however, would have the
effect of degrading our nuclear command and control
capabilities, producing potentially catastrophic escalation
risks.
I believe that the Department of Defense has not factored
this kind of risk into planning for the future nuclear command
and control architecture. And, indeed, the new generation of
U.S. early wanting satellites will actually have fewer
satellites in them than the current generation potentially
reducing their redundancy.
In response to this and other growing threats, I
respectfully suggest that Congress should increase funding to
nuclear command and control modernization and require the
Department of Defense to study fundamentally different and more
resilient architectures.
I hope these suggestions are helpful, and I very much look
forward to your questions. Thank you for the time.
[The statement of Mr. Acton follows:]
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Ms. McCollum. Thank you very much. Ms. Smithberger, please,
we are anxious to hear your testimony.
Summary Statement of Ms. Smithberger
Ms. Smithberger. Thank you so much, Chair McCollum, Ranking
Member Calvert, and esteemed members of the subcommittee for
inviting me to testify today on future defense spending plans
and the overseas contingency operations account. As I
mentioned, I am Mandy Smithberger, the director of the Center
for Defense Information on the Project on Government Oversight.
As you have noted in your opening statement, Chair
McCollum, the subcommittee knows better than most the many ways
the OCO account has been abused to circumvent spending limits
put in place by the Budget Control Act. We think that the
expiration of the Budget Control Act should be the end of using
OCO.
We agree with what the committee wrote last year about OCO
being an abject failure. And I agree with what you said,
Representative Calvert, that we have to be smart and strategic
about how we use our resources. Our work has found that the
misuse of OCO is bad for the Department, and it is bad for the
budget overall. We recommend ending its use to avoid creating
and to avoid creating or using supplemental funds for base
budget needs in the future.
The Department's reliance on supplemental and off-budget
funds has become so commonplace in the past 20 years; it can be
easy to forget just how usual the practice is. The usual
practice in the United States has been to only use supplemental
funding in the initial years of the conflict when the costs
were unpredictable. What was previously about 2 percent of DOD
spending has now become something closer to 10 percent in total
discretionary funding for DOD.
The reliance on OCO harms planning and management making it
easier to fund expensive and lower priority programs that
wouldn't normally make the cut. It also adds additional budget
instability and uncertainty for personnel and multiyear
programs, making it that much harder for the Pentagon to think
ahead. Our future security should not continue to rely on OCO.
Additionally, we would urge the committee to look at two
other policies that fuel unsustainable top-line spending by
reducing discipline and increasing the likelihood of wasting
taxpayer dollars.
The first are statutory requirements for unfunded
priorities list. By telling the Department's components that
they will have two bites at the apple, Congress is increasing
pressure and incentives to increase the Department's budget.
Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates discouraged the practice,
and through his leadership significantly curved the size and
cost of those lists. Eliminating those statutory requirements
would enhance discipline without jeopardizing Congress' ability
to conduct oversight and receive feedback from the executive
branch.
Second, we urge the committee to continue to examine
whether new authorities given to the Nuclear Weapons Council
will lead to wasteful spending. Allowing defense leaders to add
their own spending priorities to other agencies' budgets
without providing offsets is likely to crowd out other
agencies' own priorities and lead to more spending.
In conclusion, OCO reform has been one of the rarer issues
in Washington, garnering and continue to maintain bipartisan
support. Moving OCO to bases included in the recommendations of
both the Sustainability Defense Task Force and the National
Defense Strategy Commission. While the former saw this as part
of the strategy for necessary defense budget cuts, and the
latter argued the budget should increase, both agreed on the
need to stop using OCO.
Thanks to pressure from Congress and civil society, the
Department has already begun planning to draw down its reliance
on OCO. Both the Trump administration budget and the Future
Years Defense Program would significantly decrease OCO starting
this fiscal year.
The budget process should create clear priorities for
spending and program execution. To the maximum extent possible,
we should have a process that encourages the President and
Congress to set responsible fiscal goals and make tough choices
about national security priorities. OCO has enabled both
endless war and unsustainable top-line growth by discouraging
prioritization. We urge you to work with the Department by
ending the use of the OCO account. Thank you again for the
opportunity to testify, and I am happy to answer any questions
you may have.
[The statement of Ms. Smithberger follows:]
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Ms. McCollum. Thank you. And last but not, least Mr.
Zakheim, will you please share with us your thoughts on this
issue.
Statement of Mr. Zakheim
Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Chair McCollum, Ranking Member
Calvert, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am
grateful for this invite--invitation to testify today on future
defense spending.
The White House has recently released national security
guidance reaffirmed that the U.S. faces a growing rivalry with
the quote, ``more assertive and authoritarian China,'' while
they continue to face threats like Russia, Iran, cyber and
nuclear proliferation to name only a few. Though these
challenges have economic, diplomatic, and technological
dimensions, an adequately resourced military is critical to
successfully confront these challenges.
To that end, I want to highlight three overarching points.
Number 1, a 3 to 5 percent real growth per annum increase in
defense spending is needed for the DOD to execute its current
and likely future mission requirements.
Number 2, defense cuts seriously threaten the United
States' ability to win a high intensity war with a pure
adversary, yet alone simultaneously deter opportunistic
aggression in the second theater.
And, No. 3, below the top line, the Pentagon faces
critical, strategic choices regarding how to allocate its
resources to sustain and modernize the force and compete with
near peer competitors like China.
Defense budgets must be strategy-driven, not budget-driven.
Secretary Austin echoed this view during his Senate
confirmation hearing, saying, quote, ``our resources need to
match our strategy, and our strategy needs to match our
policy.''
The 2018 bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission,
which I was able to serve on, warned that even with its current
defense budget, quote, ``U.S. military could lose the next
state-versus-state war it fights.'' While the Trump
administration deserves some credit for launching an effort to
rebuild the military, this work is by no means complete. In
fact, much of the increased funding this committee appropriated
in the fiscal years 2018 through 2020 was allocated towards
restoring readiness, and only a small percentage focused on
modernization.
The Biden administration national security guidance
indicates that China will remain the pacing threat with Europe
and Middle East continuing to demand attention.
Even before the economic downtown triggered COVID-19, calls
to reduce defense spending emerged from elements in both
political parties. After examining the real consequences of
cuts to the Pentagon's resources through the Reagan Institute
and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
Strategic Choices Exercises, it was clear that one, a 10
percent cut can reduce the U.S. to a de facto hemispheric power
by 2030.
And, two, while flat budgets may appear to be sufficient to
maintain the status quo, readiness and modernization accounts
tend to shrink in a flat budget scenario. This would leave the
United States less able to either deter adventurism them by
adversaries or to secure allies that America will come to their
Defense.
Now, even with the top line that offers some budget growth,
the DOD cannot avoid difficult strategic choices to balance the
need to modernize the force for the future and the need to
maintain a force structure capable of meeting the national
challenges of today.
While some progress has been made DOD needs to continue
developing operational concepts that incorporate new
technologies and systems that are often the focus of future
force discussions, such as machine learning and artificial
intelligence and some of the other technologies my colleague
has offered in her testimony.
Congress has done well to mandate such priorities in recent
legislation. Yet, this will continue to be a challenge for the
Pentagon and is an area that will benefit from congressional
oversight. Calls to rapidly integrate new technologies need to
be accompanied with a radical approach to the Pentagon's
management practices, specifically, how the DOD acquires new
technology.
My testimony offered a number of specific recommendations
for the Defense Department on those points. I will just mention
one now. The DOD should measure progress in contracts awarded,
total dollars awarded, and speed of procurement.
Even amidst this shift to new technologies and procurement
processes, the Pentagon should not trade reliable capability
for systems that do not exist beyond a PowerPoint slide. The
temptation to trade real capability today for something new in
the future will require Congress to play a critical and careful
role in ensuring such legacy systems are indeed unneeded.
To that end, defense investments should be tightly linked
to and measured against specific war-fighting objectives. The
highest priority should be on investments that will make the
greatest impact in a reasonable timeframe in the most pressing
scenarios confronting our military, like the Taiwan scenario in
the Baltic states.
In 1984, President Reagan observed, quote, ``history
teaches that war begins when governments believe the price of
aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must
be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war
can bring no benefit, only disaster.'' The recently released
Reagan National Defense Survey revealed that support for
American leadership in the world, consistent with President
Reagan's, ``peace through strength'' philosophy remains strong.
Americans understand that what it will take to sustain the
peace and our prosperity and are willing to make the
investments necessary to support a strategy that will deliver
just that.
Thank you to committee for having me. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Zakheim follows:]
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Ms. McCollum. Will you please give us the first question
for our panel?
Russia and China Cyber Activities
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for having
this hearing, and I appreciate the panelists' time and
testimony.
Ms. Howe, we have heard a lot about SolarWinds and
Microsoft Exchange hacks a few months ago. Recently, we heard
the first about this breach. And then earlier in March,
Microsoft announced the vulnerabilities within its Exchange
Server and whether the fallout is still being measured. But,
can you give us a sense about how the amount of resources that
Russia and China dedicate to cyber activities has changed over
the past 10 years?
Ms. Howe. Thank you, Congressman Aguilar, I will be the
first to admit that I am not an expert on the resource
spending. What I can tell you is from a strategic priority and
a competitive strategic perspective, there is no question that
cyberspace is critically important to the priority that both
countries have.
And these operations, SolarWinds and the Microsoft Exchange
Servers are just one example of how quickly they move, how
purposefully they move, how stealthily they move, and how they
can stake advantage and understand what our weaknesses are and
use them for all of their priorities, whether they are
military, whether they are national security, whether they are
economic, whether they are societal.
There is no question that it is of competitive importance,
it is of strategic importance to both of them. Their operations
are very effective, and they have been able to carry them out
with very little fear of retribution or consequence. And that
is ultimately the problem. We are moving much slower.
Harvard sociobiology Professor E.O. Wilson has this great
quote which is, ``the problem with humanity is that we have
paleolithic emotions, medieval institutions, and God-like
technology.'' And today we haven't figured out how to organize
to make sure that that God-like technology, that for the most
part, we as a country has developed isn't used against us. And
right now our adversaries are using it against us. It is a
critical priority to both of them.
Responses to Cyber Activities
Mr. Aguilar. How should we respond to these types of
activities? You mentioned consequences. You know, what should
we be thinking through, and what types of investments should
the subcommittee be looking to make in the future moving
forward?
Ms. Howe. That is a great question. When we look at the
SolarWinds intrusion, at its core, as of today, it remains
fundamentally an espionage operation. And how we respond to an
espionage operation is probably very different than how we
would respond if the goal was something different.
What I would tell you is that Russia is--Russians are
behind most of their ransomware attacks that we suffer in this
country. Those attacks are overwhelming our security
professionals, and they are preventing us from focusing on more
strategic issues and more critical vulnerabilities like the
ones we have seen in SolarWinds and the Microsoft Exchange
Servers.
So, if we wanted to reduce the threat surface and enable
and empower our security professionals, responding to Russia
both harboring and potentially encouraging these criminal gangs
would be fully appropriate. And using our full arsenal of
national power, including economic tools such as sanctions,
from my perspective would be an appropriate thing to do.
As we think about funding, there has been a fair amount of
funding going to DHS and CISA, which is very important. Our
response, though, has to be a whole of government response. And
we have to ensure that we do not lose our technology edge. So
funding research and innovation, and, especially, how we
securely develop new technologies is critically important. We
have to learn from our 5G experience and make sure that we
never lose our seat at the innovation table. And as we look at
the sort of next generation of technology, but especially with
respect to the subcommittee superfast computing and next
generation encryption which is it cable stakes, we have to make
sure that we maintain that leadership position.
We need to make sure that cyber command and NSA which has
significant capabilities today continue to receive the funding
they need to support all the agencies as they go after cyber
actors.
CISA will require support as it operationalizes. And we
need to remain clear-eyed about the timeline and leadership is
going to take for CISA to fully be able to execute on its
mission, and the support it is going to need from agencies like
NSA to provide the technical depth that they need in order to
carry out their mission.
In the meantime, there has been other suggestions that have
been put out there, for example, creating something like a
cyber National Guard, or a cyber civilian corps. When we look
at ransomware attacks against our municipalities, they are
under resourced and unable to respond to them in a way that is
efficient.
I proposed 15 in my written testimony. I would be happy to
explore more.
Mr. Aguilar. Thanks, Ms. Howe. I appreciate it. I yield
back, Madam Chair.
Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you. Mr. Calvert.
Risk Mitigation
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Madam Chair. I just want to make a
quick point. Both the Republican and Democratic administrations
have found that a service life extension program for the
ground-based system ends up costing us more and without
enabling the system to be effective against current and future
threats. So, I just wanted to point that out before I ask my
question.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy states that the
department needs to focus its resources to counter China and
Russia. However, our military, we are still carrying out low
intensity missions throughout the world.
While I agree that we should prioritize our research and
development efforts on fielding capability, which is decisively
win a war against threats like China, I believe we must also be
realistic about the missions we are currently tasking the DOD
with. Even the best resource strategy inevitably allows for
some risk. Where should the United States be willing to absorb
that risk?
I guess for the whole panel, who is best prepared to answer
that? Maybe Roger, your since I asked Roger on here.
Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman. I am happy to take
that on. And you are right to mention the National Defense
Strategy had the focus on China and great power competition,
which includes Russia as well. I would say if there was any
area where we are supposed to absorb risk per the 2018 National
Defense Strategy is in those areas like the Middle East, low-
end conflict where the resources should be less intensive. The
platforms that we use in those theatres should be revisited to
make sure, for example, we are not using fifth-generation
platforms, fighter aircraft to deal with a deterrent mission
that doesn't require something like that.
So, less use of high-end capability, reduction of force
structure that can be applied against the threat posed by China
were the areas that both the National Defense Strategy and the
2018 National Defense Strategy Commission focused on.
I would highlight, though, Mr. Calvert that that was the to
say where we should absorb some risk, not that we should leave
those areas entirely. So some level of deterrence is required
to ensure that we don't find ourselves back in some form of
conflict there because we have talked away from the deterrence
that we have put in place there.
Department of Defense Budget
Mr. Calvert. With that, you would probably agree that to
sustain the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, if
Congress doesn't provide real growth to the budget, it will be
very difficult to do that.
Mr. Zakheim. Mr. Calvert, I do agree with that. And I think
really the point I am trying to convey which justifies the 3 to
5 percent real growth that I outlined in my statement is that
we still need to be present in multiple theaters around the
world. While we don't want to emphasize the Middle East or
central command theater like we had done a decade or so ago, we
are not going to walk away from it either.
And then to lead in Indo-Pacific, to lead in Asia with
NATO--excuse me in Europe with NATO, and then to also deter in
the Middle East, those three regions are animating our military
and required significant resources.
Mr. Calvert. All right. Let me question on----
Ms. Smithberger. If I may just add, I think the other thing
that the committee needs to look at is some of the weapons
systems that we are acquiring where we are learning that they
aren't serving the missions that they should be; that they are
too expensive to maintain; and in some cases where we need to
slow down production of those systems so that we can make sure
that we get things right so that they can be maintained and
effective, and we are not putting those costs on the force.
Mr. Calvert. Which system are you talking about?
F-35 Challenges
Ms. Smithberger. I think we are seeing increasingly
challenges with the F-35. I know that won't be a very popular
one to highlight, but that we already have increased
development costs incurring. That when you look at the report
of the National Commission on Aviation Safety that it is not as
reliable as we expected it to be. So it is important that we
get this program right so that it is going to be able to serve
us in the future.
Mr. Calvert. I hear that, and the problem is that we made a
determination to move to the F-35, retire the F-18, the F-15,
the F-16, and that we have gone to that platform. And,
unfortunately, those other aircraft are not survivable in a war
with a near peer competition such as China or Russia. They are
out of the air almost immediately.
And so really at this point, our only alternative is the F-
35 until we get to another level of aircraft, a generation six
aircraft, which we are not at yet.
So even though we have had some difficulties with these
platforms--we had problems with a C-17 when it first started.
But, unfortunately, we are involved with the F-16 whether we
like it or not at this point.
By that way, that brings up a question on innovation. All
of these systems have software problems. Your F-35 is no
exception to that. And it is because we don't have new
technologies capabilities that we should have to test and
retest that software quickly and to make sure that it is
capable. And so, the smaller companies, I think, have a better
understanding of that type of technology, medium and small
companies, which have a hard time working with the Department
of Defense.
And so, as we move forward, Madam Chairwoman, I hope we can
find ways to get these innovators in the Department so they can
help us with our national security.
And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, and that is a good thing to bring
up. And I want to make sure that we do talk about how we help
small and medium-sized businesses, and part of that is them
having access to classified space in which to work in, which is
sometimes not near where their production facilities and where
they are doing their work.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick.
Supply Chain Vulnerability
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for
having this hearing. My question is for Ms. Howe. Many of the
modernization efforts within the Department of Defense require
increased network capability, such as 5G to connect sensors and
process large amounts of data quickly. The Department of
Defense has acknowledged the importance of 5G but has only
fielded a few pilot projects. Additionally, we land--we lack an
end-to-end organic U.S. supply chain, which requires us to rely
on foreign suppliers, including China.
Is it too late to get ahead of our adversaries when it
comes to 5G and supply chains? And should the Department of
Defense be leading the effort in 5G considering its inherent
need? My other question is where should this subcommittee
invest to secure our technology supply chain in 5G
semiconductors and microchips to position us to compete better?
Ms. Howe. Thank you so much, Congresswoman, for that
important question. It is not too late, but we have to move
fast. Time is not on our side. The clock is ticking. We lost a
lot of time with 5G, but we can absolutely make up ground. And
we can't lose your leadership position either with respect to
5G or any future technology that comes up.
The future of our military, the future of our weapon
systems are all dependent on understanding the security risks
that are inherent in not only the technologies, but the
interdependence of these technologies. And that interdependence
is what SolarWinds is fundamentally about.
And so if we acknowledge that we live in a software-enabled
world today, in an IP-enabled world today, in a technology-
enabled world today, and understand that the best militaries
will be defined by access to the best software in these best
technologies, but a secure form of those software's, then it
becomes important to organize around that.
I do believe it needs to be important that we reward the
Department of Defense and program managers not just with
meeting time and costs but also meeting security requirements
with respect to the systems that they deployed. So, all of
that, I believe, can be done, and time is not--it is not too
late.
The question you raise around supply chain vulnerability is
one of the biggest issues we have today. And, again, the
SolarWinds intrusion by Russia was very indicative of how hard
it is to find supply chain vulnerabilities. And this one was
discussed almost by accident but by FireEye.
It underscores the fact that without mandated information-
sharing, which again the DOD can mandate information-sharing
within its contractor base, much more easily than we can do
that in the private sector, we would have never found out about
what is happening with SolarWinds.
There have been many recommendations from a number of
commissions of creating an organization that is responsible the
Europeans are doing this now for assessing supply chain risks
both with respect to the most critical piece of software that
we use, as well as with the most critical vendors that we use,
and to create trusted lists of suppliers.
This is hard. We should not be asking every organization to
do it for itself, every agency to do it for itself. It requires
for firmware level and code level inspection. And it is
important to have a centralized function that can do that. And,
again, I would just say if nothing else with respect to my
testimony, pace matters. Moving fast really matters.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you.
Mr. Zakheim. Can I just add?
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Okay.
Mr. Zakheim. Just one more piece to that, Congresswoman. I
think on-shoring manufacturing capability is critical here. I
mentioned Taiwan in my opening statement. You are talking about
technologies that rely on semiconductors that for the most part
are manufactured in Asia; many in Taiwan. That is precisely the
area that China is challenging. And so on-shoring that
capability in the United States and investment and
manufacturing will be a key area for this committee and the
Congress to look at.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you. I have some more questions,
but I don't know that we can get to them. My time is just about
expired.
But how does the United States government recruit, develop,
and retain the best cyber professionals when most of the
innovation and highest paying jobs in this area are in the
commercial sector?
Ms. Howe. The mission matters, and it matters in the
industry. I do believe that there is a compelling mission that
we can use to recruit the best. The authorities that exist,
especially within the Department of Defense in terms carrying
out cybersecurity mission is very compelling. If we have a
commitment to training people and create a way for
cybersecurity professionals to come and serve in the
government, take that training back out to the private sector,
and to be able to come in and out, we can do a lot to solve
that problem.
And I will say we have to recruit a much broader base of
people to our industry, and this is where diversity and equity
matters. There are some tremendous programs that are being run
by NSA, FBI, CISA, to encourage STEM education and
cybersecurity education with diversity and equity in mind. And
we have highlighted those programs. We need to fund their
rollout.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Madam Chair, do I have time for one more
question.
Ms. McCollum. We are going to have time to do another
round. Are you able to stay with us, Mrs. Kirkpatrick?
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Yes. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Oh, perfect. Mr. Womack.
Defense Spending Issues
Mr. Womack. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks to the
participants on this committee. Count me as a ``peace through
strength'' guy. Roger alluded to that, and as he should, with
the Reagan Institute. I believe in it. And with any strength
program, there comes a cost. And it is those costs that I think
are center point in our discussion today. And there is a lot of
things that we should be doing.
But, Roger, you said something in your testimony, and that
resonates with me, and that is that too often we are caught up
in trying to fit defense funding, defense spending, if you
will, in a budgetary box. It has got to fit some kind of a
number.
I have always believed that if you are going to have true
peace through strength, it has got to be based on--you said in
your testimony, the strategy. I am more referred to it as the
threat--the things that we are going to try to do that the
National Defense Strategy commands us to do to meet the threat,
known and perceived, near-term, long-term. And if it is a 3 to
5 percent real growth in defense spending that has to accompany
that, then I accept that. If it is less, even better.
But I would suspect that if we are going to continue to
meet a peace through strength objective, we have got to get
away from trying to fit it into some budgetary framework, even
though it is important, and fit it toward meeting what the
perceived--known and perceived threats are. Would you not
agree?
Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, I think that is elemental for any
strategy. The Congress has mandated that the Department of
Defense put forward a National Defense Strategy. And the
Congress should know what the cost is for that strategy. Going
ahead as the--as we have had before with the Budget Control Act
with the artificial cap, for example, which, of course, will
not apply going forward but do for a number of years, really
then, did not make the strategy impactful, because the Congress
has stated at the outset, here is as much we are going to pay,
and then much of that strategy became hollow.
So, yes, Congressman, I completely agree with your outlook
that the budget really has to come after the strategy. And that
does not mean we don't have to make important choices. Much of
what we are discussing and others testifying are talking about
are choices we are going to have to make. You can't do it all.
We have prioritized China. We prioritized great power
competition. That was a key element of National Defense
Strategy. Other areas will get less focus. But at the end of
the day, we have committed to strategy, and we ought to
resource it. That is what we owe the men and women in uniform.
Mandatory Spending
Mr. Womack. My colleague from California, Ken Calvert, said
it best in that we are always going to have to achieve a
certain amount of risk. We are going to have to balance the
needs of our defense strategy against the acceptable risk that
we need to take. And I think we need to narrow down our focus
on what is that acceptable level of risk, and that is what we
rely on our war fighters and our leaders to do.
My last question is also about resourcing, and it is what I
consider to be the biggest threat to our ability to do what we
are all hopeful of doing, and that is protecting and achieving
our constitutional objective of providing for the common
defense.
And it is mandatory spending. And we spend a whole lot of
time having major food fights over what we spend on national
defense and what we spend on Labor H and what we spend on all--
but if you look at the last 10 years of our Federal budget, the
Defense, and Labor, and Health and Human Services, and all of
the things that we have in our discretionary budget, they
haven't grown appreciably. I mean, they have grown but in small
percentages.
I mean, if you look at what we were spending on the
discretionary budget, say, in 2009, the year before I was
elected to Congress versus what we are spending today, I think
it fits into any reasonable category of reasonable growth over
time. It is the mandatory side it has.
And we spend no time, zero time in Congress talking about
what to do to wrestle mandatory spending to the ground. It is
growing exponentially. Ten thousand people a day are going to
age into these programs. And there is no end in sight to how
much more pressure it is going to put on us appropriators in
trying to meet the demands that are expressed in our
discretionary budget.
So to any of you, would you agree, or maybe to all of you,
do you agree that Congress needs to get about the task of doing
something about the mandatory side to spending to include net
interest on the debt which is going to exceed $300 billion this
year?
Anybody?
Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, I will jump at. I agree, and it
probably won't surprise you, and the reality is that if you
want to get after the debt and deficit, going after
discretionary spending, whether it is defense or nondefense is
not going to get you there.
Mr. Womack. To any of you?
Ms. McCollum. To the former chair of the Budget Committee,
the other witnesses I don't think came prepared necessarily to
do that.
Mr. Womack. Well, look, here is the deal, and then I am
going to yield back.
If we are going to have a meaningful conversation about
future years spending on defense or any other discretionary
item, we have to be honest with ourselves that the real
pressure on these programs is not the defense is spending too
much money, it is that we are all being constrained by how much
money is going out the door in the Federal budget versus our
revenues that is having to pay for the mandatory programs that
Congress has no appetite to solve, and we have to develop that
appetite.
I will get off my platform and yield back. And I do have
other commitment I have got to make and can't stay. But
Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, and to our
witnesses, thank you so much for your time today.
I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you. But we also don't want the
Ways and Means Committee to do what they did to us in
Interior--both Mr. Calvert and I had to deal with it--and that
is a payment in lieu of taxes. They decided not to make it
mandatory to our counties and governments for payment of lieu
in taxes, and instead just put it over in the Department of the
Interior. And then Mr. Calvert and I found ourselves having to
take that out of hide. So that is not a good solution either
sometimes.
Mr. Diaz-Balart, I am going to ask you, if you would, to go
next. So Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Threat Level From China and Russia
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, thank you. You are very kind. I want
to first kind of really add, agree with what my colleague, Mr.
Womack, just mentioned. And, you know, we always spend a lot of
time because we are appropriators on discretionary--obviously,
we spend so little time on, frankly, two-thirds of the spending
and what is really creating all of the issues.
I obviously hope that we don't add additional new issues to
discretionary because I think that not only is it a problem for
our fiscal future, but it is also potentially a national
security threat kind of adding to what Mr. Womack said.
To the panelists, does anybody believe that China is not a
real, you know, threat and national security threat in the
future of our--you know, for my child and for my kids' kids, is
China going to be less of a threat, and anybody believe that is
going to be less of a threat or potentially going to be a
threat?
Ms. Howe. Congressman, I am happy to start with that. I
believe that China is a long-term strategic threat on a number
of dimensions, and especially in my area of expertise which is
cybersecurity.
Russia is today's threats. But from a strategic perspective
as we look forward, and as we look forward at the new waves of
technology that are coming online, and how China is organizing
globally, there is no question that they are a long-term
strategic threat.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And, you know, thank you for also
mentioning Russia. Let me add that to my question. You already
answered it very succinctly. Anybody else? Does anybody think
that China is not a current or future threat? And that Russia,
while, you know, obviously, doesn't have the economy of China
is going to somehow stop being a threat in the near future?
Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, I believe that China is the
threat, our peer competitor. And I actually would put them even
today ahead of Russia in terms of what we have to deal with
both in terms of their capability and how they are challenging
us across the political, economic, and, of course, security
sphere.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Let me, since, you know, let me kind of
take back my time. If anybody disagrees that China is a threat,
does anybody believe--any of you believe that China is going to
be less of a threat in the future looking at how they are
investing, what they are doing, or are they going to be more of
a threat in the future?
Ms. Smithberger. Congressman, I think it is going to depend
a lot on what investments we make as a Nation across our
government to manage that competition----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I get that we do, but I am just asking
about them. Does anybody think that China is going to be less
of a threat, that they are going to change their posture, and
they are going to become, you know, I don't know, Switzerland?
Or do you believe--do any of you believe they are going
potentially less of a threat, or are they going to continue to
expand, increase their military's power, et cetera?
Mr. Zakheim. I think there is a consensus, Congressman,
that they are going to be more of a threat, and everything they
are doing reflects that.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, let me, again, if anybody disagrees
with that, please speak up. But if not, because I think that is
the consensus, I think, amongst most of us also.
Mr. Action. Congressman, can I----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, I am sorry. Go ahead.
Mr. Acton. Sir, just, I mean, speaking kind of from my
expertise of nuclear policy, I do worry enormously about
China's conventional modernization and its cyber forces.
I think nuclear policy is a bit of a different area there
in which the United States is going to continue to enjoy very
significant superiority in nuclear forces for what that is
worth for the foreseeable future.
And I don't think that China's steady slow nuclear buildup
is going to challenge that significantly for the foreseeable
future.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. But you do expect them to build up?
Mr. Acton. Yeah, I mean the Department of Defense projects
that China's nuclear forces will--sorry, China's nuclear
warhead stockpile will roughly double over the next 10 years or
so which would still make it round about 8 to 10 times smaller
than the United States even at the end of buildup.
Research and Development Spending
Mr. Diaz-Balart. No, and I get that. But I think that there
is an agreement, right, I would say that there is a consensus
that it is a threat, it is going to continue to be a threat, it
is going to continue to be a greater threat. And we also know
that China has tripled its research in R&D over the past decade
while our spending has remained constant.
And so, here is the question. Is there any way that we can
keep up, compete with a China--an emerging military,
potentially even nuclear superpower by keeping our R&D flat,
and also potentially by keeping our defense spending plat? How
do we do that?
I just don't see how we can do both things. We can stay
ahead of the curve while our adversaries, particularly China,
is according to, I think, everybody's understanding is getting
more dangerous and not less.
How can we do that while reducing spending, whether it is
in basic military spending or R&D? How do we do that? Can we do
that, or is it frankly just increasing our risk exponentially?
It is a rhetorical question, but I would like to hear it.
Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, we have looked at that in our
Project for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Dr. Macon
testified before this committee before. The answer is no. A
flat defense budget will make it very difficult to compete with
China. And even if you felt that you could compete with China,
you are inviting risk in other regions in the world. Russia,
for example, would be the prime spoiler in that scenario which
would further weaken our interest.
So even at flat levels and in making really great choices,
you are inviting significant risk.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Chairwoman, yeah, if anybody else
wants to respond to that, I just want to be conscious of our
time and be respectful to the chairwoman.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much.
So, you know, we need to be looking at a defense posture
against, you know, near peers China and Russia. But we also
have to realize that their governments work very different than
ours do, and they don't have the citizen input that we have.
And all of are us have traveled the world.
So, when they are talking about what they are doing with
their defense budgets and that, they are doing so at, you know,
not taking care of their population and not having public input
on it. So sometimes it is nice to just talk the dollars, but we
also have to remember the type of governments that our near
peers have, and if that is what they decide to do, the public
has and the people that they are supposed to be representing
have no side in it.
A lot has been talked about defense, but I also just want
to talk about the three Ds because whether it was Secretary
Gates or Colin Powell, when he was Joint Chief of Staff and the
Secretary of State always talked about development, diplomacy,
and defense. And sometimes their best defense is winning the
hearts and minds and building more allies around the world.
I am going to take my first and second round and combine
them. And then before I start asking my question, I just want
to let people know the order they are up in. It would be Mr.
Aguilar, Mr. Calvert, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, and then you again you
again, sir, Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Cyber Attack Response
Ms. Howe, my first question is for you. You mentioned in
your testimony that our cybersecurity adversaries, they are
fast, and they are creative, they are persistent, and they are
unconstrained by law or regulation. Unlike us, right, when we
compare governments to governments. The add deterrence in
building resilience, what is the tipping point for the DOD
should respond when our government and businesses are
constantly attacked? And I am putting that out because you
talked about a whole of government.
Do we need to have a conversation in our democracy on how
we respond as a whole of government on some of these attacks?
And when is an attack on our economic system or our healthcare
system or our public health--public service like water and
electricity, should we be having those conversations on how to
respond as a whole government?
Ms. Howe. Congresswoman, Chairwoman, you are absolutely
right, and this is a very important question. You highlight a
critical issue, which is we have not developed the appropriate
response deterrence policy, escalation policies with respect to
cyber activity. And every time we come across another event
that is where a nation state is behind it, we struggle with the
question of what the appropriate response is. We need to
develop those norms. We need to develop those policies. We
can't do them in a vacuum. There needs to be, you know, a
multilateral agreement with like-minded allies in terms of what
that appropriate policy would look like.
What I would tell you is that without restoring deterrence,
without using all of our tools of national power to respond to
these attacks in the right way, the private sector does not
stand a chance. We will not be able to keep committed nation
state adversaries at bay, out of our system, out of our
networks. Our governments don't stand a chance. Our critical
infrastructure does not stand a chance.
You are absolutely right to say that we have to--we do not
have the policies in place to--the deterrence policies in
place, the escalation policies in place. That is the
conversation that should be happening. And there is no question
that it is complicated, but we are running out of time to do
that, so it is--and this is where we need Congress' support.
Again, this is only something you can do, so we would be
grateful if that conversation would take place.
Ground Based Strategic Deterrents
Ms. McCollum. So I noticed Mr. Cole came back. So, Mr.
Cole, what I am doing is I combined my first and second round,
so you will be right after me and then we will go to Mr.
Aguilar.
I would like to direct my next question to Dr. Acton. Your
testimony calls for a pause in the ground based strategic
deterrent program, and looking at further alternatives. But at
the same time, you seem a little skeptical about the long-term
viability of the intercontinental ballistic, the ICBMs, in
general. Is there any scenario in which you would recommended
moving forward with GBSD?
Mr. Acton. Well, thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
And I am concerned about the long-term viability of ICBMs,
especially silo-based ICBMs, as all U.S. systems are. We have
spoken a lot in this hearing about Russia and China. I think it
is possible, indeed likely, that over the next 30 to 40, 50
years, Russia and China would develop large numbers of long-
range conventional weapons that could be used to attack U.S.
silos.
And the only concept we would have for then defending those
nuclear weapons would be to launch large numbers of nuclear
weapons in the event that Russia or China launch non-nuclear
attacks against our silos. I don't think that threat is
credible. I don't think we should want to put any President in
that position.
Now, look, let me be honest here. You know, I don't have
access to classified information. I haven't read the 2015
analysis of alternatives conducted by the Department of Defense
about the new ICBM. But based on what has been reported, I
think there is good reasons to want to see that analysis
reviewed by an independent body.
Just to give you one example, the 2015 analysis of
alternatives assumed that the United--reportedly assumed that
we should retain 450 ICBMs. That requirement has already
dropped to 400 ICBMs, and that matters because the fewer ICBMs
we keep the more we have that are available for testing and
hence the longer you can sustain the Minuteman-III force form.
So, you know, this is why I think this should be looked
over, reviewed by an independent body to look at some of the
options that weren't considered in the 2015 analysis of
alternatives, you know, including slightly reducing the size of
the Minutemen-III force as a way of keeping it viable for
longer.
Ms. McCollum. Okay. Thank you. My next--I am going to go--I
need to be respectful to the other members, and so I have a
question for both Ms. Smithberger and you, sir, Mr. Zakheim,
and it goes to OCO. So, Congress and the executive branch, how
do we use overseas contingency funds? Are they ever necessary?
And with, Mr. Zakheim, when you were also talking about
flat-line funding, cuts to funding, and inflationary and 3
percent and all that, when you were talking about that, how did
you calculate OCO into that? Because that becomes--that is
something I am looking at very seriously because some of the
OCO funding has actually now become baseline funding, and some
of the OCO funding then has tails that goes into the next year,
so how we account for all that is really important.
So, what should Congress and the executive branch be
looking at if we do anymore of these overseas contingency
accounts in the future? What should they look for? Should we
include tails, and how should they be strategically used? If
both of you could answer that question, and then I am going to
go to Mr. Cole.
Ms. Smithberger. Absolutely. Thank you for the question. I
think at the initial stages of a conflict when the costs are
unclear, something like OCO can be appropriate. As much as
possible though, Congress should be very clear about what they
want that to be used for, that there should--to the degree
there is a tail to that spending, they should be asking for
more transparency and reporting about what that is.
If we don't see a budget--or if we see a budget that
continues to support OCO, I think you should work with the
Department to let's make sure that that is only being
supported--supporting things that are unexpected costs. But
really the best way to improve planning and management is for
the Department to not be using this fund.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Zakheim. Madam Chair, I agree with that. In terms of
your specific question about OCO, the 3 to 5 percent growth is
talking about the base budget primarily. It didn't include OCO.
Ms. McCollum. It didn't include any of the tails of OCO
or----
Mr. Zakheim. So to the extent that OCO fixes in, right,
into the base budget, then it would be inclusive, and that is
part of my point I want to add on to OCO, which is as you
migrate away from OCO, which I think we should for the reasons
Ms. Smithberger outlined, we have to make sure that they are
migrating into the base budget and we are not just simply
cutting them off, because the Department has relied on it,
right, and therefore what you are essentially doing is further
shrinking the base budget if it wedges its way in without
seeing some top-line relief.
I also just want to add, Madam Chair, in terms of Mr.
Acton's point before, just simply that the 2018 National
Defense Strategy Commission did look at this issue with respect
to the third leg of the triad ICBM and GBSD and felt that the
Obama administration decision to move forward with the GBSD
program was sound. So that was an outside review I referred to
the committee.
Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you.
So, Mr. Cole, I am glad you were able to come back.
Welcome.
Mr. Cole. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I had been at
the Rules Committee on War Powers Act, so this is back to back
is the important set of----
Ms. McCollum. We appreciate your work, sir.
Competing With Adversaries
Mr. Cole. Well, thank you very much. I don't know what I
did to anger my leader, but I paid for it. Anyway, let me ask
the big picture question, if I may. I came in and I heard, of
course, my good friend from Arkansas' comments, which I agree
with very much, also with yours, Madam Chair, that we have a
different set of inputs into our defense decisions and our
potential adversaries do for sure. And we also maintain an all-
volunteer force, which honestly, for soldiers a lot more
expensive than either of our two adversaries, and that is
something we do by choice.
There is a third part of the equation we don't like to talk
about very much, and that is, in the past, when we dealt with
this sort of Chinese, Russian access aligned against us, we had
overwhelming economic advantage over those two economies
combined. That is not true anymore, and particularly, given the
growth of the Chinese economy and given its projected growth
going forward.
I want to ask all of our witnesses really sort of a big
picture question. Given the domestic demands we have, given the
manner in which we have chosen to fund our force with much
higher per-person cost, and given the fact that we don't have
the economic advantage over our peer competitors that we once
had, you know, how realistic is it for us to maintain
substantial advantage going forward over our competitors?
And I will just start, if I could, with Mr. Acton, Dr.
Acton, excuse me, with you and kind of work through the panel.
Mr. Acton. Well, thank you for the question, Congressman,
and to some extent, that is kind of above my pay grade, as it
were. But, you know, focusing on the nuclear aspect of this
specifically, I believe that the United States can retain a
very significant advantage over China and can continue to be in
a situation of strategic parity with Russia while spending--
while reducing the increase in expected spending on nuclear
weapons.
And, you know, as defense appropriators, you are one of the
few organs within the entire U.S. Government that can really
consider the tradeoffs between the nuclear and nonnuclear parts
of the budget, I mean, indeed, the Appropriations Committee as
a whole between the defense and non-defense parts of the
budget. But what I would just point out is that I don't view
reductions slowing the rate at increase in nuclear spending as
in any way compromising the strategic security of the United
States and its allies.
Mr. Cole. Thank you.
Ms. Howe.
Ms. Howe. Thank you, sir, for the question. From the
perspective of a cybersecurity person, we have to invest in
order to maintain our advantage. There is no question about
that. We have to invest in technology. We have to understand
the future of technology. We have to own the standards in order
to manage the supply chain risk.
Next-generation encryption, investments in super-fast
computing, those are table stakes, and nothing else matters if
we lose that competitive edge. So I don't know what tradeoffs
would need to happen in order to make the investments that are
required, but for us to maintain our competitive strategic edge
in cyberspace and to protect our Nation and to protect our
democracy, we have to invest.
Mr. Cole. Okay. Ms. Smithberger.
Ms. Smithberger. I think that we can maintain our
advantage. It is certainly going to be a challenge. The
pandemic has created no shortage of concerns. And I think it is
important to look back to comments that General Milley made
about how a lot of our strength is our national economy. So I
think as we look at how to fund each of our agencies in the
government, it is making sure that we are making smart
strategic investments.
And I think, particularly with the many ways that the
Department of Defense needs to reform, I think that it is going
to be more advantageous to those reforms if we see reductions
in spending. And I am concerned that if we see significant
increases that we are going to continue to fund boondoggle
programs that aren't going to make us safer.
Mr. Cole. Okay. And Mr. Zakheim.
Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman. I believe that our
political and economic system will ultimately lead us to the
prosperity we expect and desire, and that ultimately it is our
comparative advantage vis--vis China. What we need to do is, in
parallel with strengthening our economy and working with allies
because that is another comparative advantage, make sure that
we continue to invest in our national defense.
Relative to everything else we spend in this country, the
budget we are discussing here is a modest down payment to
ensure that the Chinese or the Russians don't exploit an
opportunity because they perceive us as weak or unwilling to
make the investments to secure our peace and prosperity that
ultimately our political system and economic system delivers.
I am bullish on us vis--vis China. It is the economic and
political system that will win the day. We just have to keep
pace with our security investments.
Mr. Cole. Okay. Well, thank you very much. Don't
misunderstand, I am very much a hawk and very much agree with
your sense of prioritization, all of you collectively, about
the importance of defense.
But I also was the chairman and ranking member of Labor-H,
and I can tell you, we used to use the line, ``You are a lot
more likely to die in a pandemic than a terrorist attack.'' It
used to be a great line, now it is true, half a million plus in
the last year.
So there are other areas of government that are going to
have to be invested in, and there are things like the National
Institutes of Health and CDC, and honestly, they are a fraction
of the cost of what we spend in defense.
So, again, I have approached this as a hawk, but I also
recognize that we have got some other challenges as well, and
there are limits to the resources we have.
I think that is where you are trying to take us, Madam
Chair, in terms of having a serious discussion about priorities
inside our overall budget.
With that, I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Cole, and that is what we need
to do. We need to balance everything, and we haven't even
talked--we have talked about China and Russia here, but there
is other adversaries that we haven't talked about, the uprising
of terrorism in Africa and other parts of the world and that,
and cyber fits into a lot of what those individuals are doing.
But how do we prepare for that if all of our focus is on
China and Russia? And it needs to be. They are our near-peer
adversaries. But we know after September 11 that people can do
things that are very disruptive and very hurtful to our
democracy, our Nation, and our people with a lot less expensive
weapons that they figure out how to use to them, and think of
all the money we have now spent on that.
Mr. Aguilar, you have been very patient to ask your second
question, and you are up.
Space Force
Mr. Aguilar. Thanks, Madam Chair. Appreciate it and
appreciate the discussion.
Ms. Smithberger, Space Force is going to play an important
role in protecting our vital infrastructure that we have made
investments in over the past few decades; however, there is a
concern that it will become another, you know, bloated and slow
part of our Defense Department.
What recommendations, what best practices, what should we
be looking at to avoid that type of outcome?
Ms. Smithberger. Thank you for the question. And, you know,
to be honest, we had had some concerns about the way that Space
Force was established, that we aren't setting them up to
succeed by creating a separate bureaucracy and just kind of
what inherently tends to come along with that.
But I think what we need to look at is making sure that we
are learning the lessons of some of these past risky
acquisition systems, so how are we making sure that we are not
pursuing immature technology, how are we making sure that we
are adequately funding cyber testing as well for these
different kinds of systems, how are we making sure that we have
just a healthy culture for the organization as well.
So I really appreciate the question. I think it is going to
take very vigorous congressional oversight to make sure that
the Space Force is working well with the goals of the
Department and being responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars.
Mr. Aguilar. How can we do that, you know, better? How can
we make sure that that connection is closer from the policy
side to the implementation side with respect to budgeting and
best practices?
Ms. Smithberger. That is a good question. So I think as
much as possible it is making sure that when we are getting--
when you are getting briefings about our space capabilities
that you have the various components of the Department that are
focused on these areas.
And this might be something where my colleague, Dr. Acton,
can weigh in on as well, but looking at--making sure that there
is coordination. Certainly, a slightly different issue, but we
have seen just this week on hypersonic weapons that there are
concerns about duplication that is going to occur.
A lot of it is just having very clear transparency about
what are we building, what are we doing, and having as much
coordination as possible.
Mr. Aguilar. Dr. Acton.
Mr. Acton. Well, thank you for the question. I mean, very
briefly, I think that everything Dr. Smithberger says about the
risk of duplication in hypersonics is very true. That is not so
much a Space Force issue as it is the Air Force has its
systems, the Navy has its systems, the Army has its systems. I
think there is cooperation between the services, but a number
of systems being developed that I think is disproportionate to
the potential military benefit.
On Space Force specifically, you know, look, my own area
here is on nuclear command and control. I don't know if there
is anybody else in the nongovernmental community who considers
themselves passionate about that subject, but I do. I would
just make a couple of points.
You know, firstly, I think that there are--we ought to be
looking to enhance the resilience and redundancy of these
systems. I think this is an area where we ought to be spending
more as a country not less, especially because of the threats
to these systems in a--the kind of conventional conflict that
might precede a nuclear war.
And, secondly, you know, both in terms of nuclear command
and control and in terms of nuclear forces more generally, I
want to emphasize that cooperation in the forms of reciprocal,
verifiable arms control is one of the most effective ways we
have to curtail spending without compromising security, not
only because it avoids getting into arms race, we have to build
fewer weapons, also in the savings on intelligence because we
have on-the-ground verification could be very, very
significant.
I think it was one of the three Ds that Chairwoman McCollum
mentioned, ``diplomacy.'' That has to be, in my view, part of
an integrated strategy as well here.
Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, could I just add two quick
metrics that you ought to consider?
First, the radical in management of the Department in terms
of the growth of the workforce supporting the Space Force. It
is supposed to be a lean and mean organization, and Congress
can, through its legislation, ensure it stays that way.
Second, rapid acquisition. We see what is going on in
commercial space. There is no reason why the same investments
on the government side can't see the speed and delivery that we
are seeing on the commercial side. This is not decades. It is
years at most. That is a second area to make sure you are
getting the bang for your buck when it comes to the Space
Force.
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Calvert.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Madam Chairman. That was an
interesting round of questions.
I just want to make a point, that our nuclear weapons are
old. We need to rework that arsenal. We have capped our number
of nuclear weapons. We have talked about the arms agreements.
You know, Russia never stopped in designing and building
nuclear weapons and weren't honest about what they are up to.
And their nuclear weapons arsenal is the largest in the world,
exceeds both the United States and China combined. And I would
point out that China is rapidly building a nuclear arsenal, so
it is nothing to sneeze at.
One other thing about what was brought up about Space
Command, which I am concerned about, and what was brought up
about the, you know, personnel within the Department of Defense
and, Madam Chair, you know what I am going to say----
The numbers of people in the Department of Defense civilian
workforce has never been higher relative to those in uniform,
and we need to get a hold of that bureaucracy. And as fear I
had with space is that they were going to change--go down that
same path, so we should not let that happen.
Department of Defense and the Space Domain
Getting back to space, that is the high ground, and if any
conflict happens, I think that that is something that we need
to maintain superiority at. China is rapidly gaining access to
space and, quite frankly, capability, and we are losing our
quantitative edge.
Last month, Todd Harrison from the Center of Strategic
International Studies told our subcommittee that China is
making advances in counter space weapons faster than we are,
advancing our space defenses against those systems. I would
ask, what is your assessment on DOD's progress in the space
domain, and how do we budget properly to be prepared for this
rapidly evolving threat? I would ask that for any of the
panelists.
Mr. Acton.
Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, I am happy to field part of that.
I think it is the acquisition speed, it is the redundancy that
Dr. Acton spoke about. And, I mean, you have done this on the
civilian workforce writ large, but it is also ensuring that it
is happening within the Space Force.
To me, those are the key areas that the Congress should be
focused on, and that will challenge China. Particularly, if we
are able to increase a number of satellites, smaller, cheaper,
that puts great--that is a competitive cost-imposing strategy
on the Chinese.
If I can on the GBSD, Congressman, just briefly, I agree
with you that you need to have nuclear weapons that work, and
that the problem with the service life extension on the
Minutemen is that we have heard from the commander that you
can't extend the life of this, that it doesn't work, and that
obviously creates great danger.
Particularly in this environment, the National Defense
Strategy, we lean on nuclear weapons more, as you know, in the
strategy. And if we are going to have them, we have got to make
sure they are going to work, and STRATCOM has told us it will
not.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
Mr. Acton. Congressman, if I could weigh in on the issue on
satellites. Our nuclear command-and-control satellites are in
very high orbit, and right now the threats to those orbits are
less than all of, you know, the low-Earth orbit satellites that
are in dire jeopardy. The threat to those higher-altitude
satellites is increasing, and our acquisition of antisatellite
weapons won't in and of itself negate Russian and Chinese
antisatellite weapons, that won't protect our satellites.
I believe that DOD should be looking at fundamentally
different, more resilient architectures to defend these most
valuable satellites. Just to give you one example, one of the
systems we used to have for nuclear communications, something
called ASATCOM involved dispersing communication transponders
on very large numbers of satellites being used for other
purposes, 20, 30, exact numbers are classified. That was a much
more resilient system than building a few absolutely exquisite
but relatively vulnerable satellites.
When I say we should be looking at new architectures, that
is the kind of example of programs that I mean that I think DOD
is very resistant to changing the way it has done nuclear
command and control because that is actually quite difficult to
make that change.
And on GBSD, all I would say simply is that the assumptions
on which previous studies into replacing the Minutemen--into
Minutemen-III life extensions were an extremely restrictive set
of assumptions. And I think everybody recognizes that the--you
know, you can predetermine the outcome of a study by the
assumptions you choose to put into it.
Mr. Calvert. Yeah. Thank you for that.
And the last point I want to make, Madam Chair, is that
Mike Griffin, our former R&D guy at the Department, made a
point that our turnaround time on new satellite development
sometimes is 20 years.
The Chinese are doing it in 2 years. We have to cut the
time in which we start a program and launch the program
enormously in order to make sure we keep up. And we are not
doing that right now. We need to change the culture, and that
is a difficult thing to do.
Thank you. Yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Diaz-Balart and then Mr. Cole for a
second question.
Semiconductor Production
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chair.
A little while ago, I think, Roger--and, again, I apologize
for using your first name--I think you talked about on-shoring,
you know, semiconductors and that kind of thing.
So I just recently read, and I may be wrong, if I read it
wrong, that I think Ford automobiles is--they are building--I
don't know if it is their F, you know, 150 pickup trucks
without the semiconductors, because they don't have enough of
them, and then they are going to put them on later.
Now, that is bad enough, but when you are dealing with
defense national security that is catastrophic. And so, you
know, any ideas as to what we should be doing to on-shoring,
you know, national security, defense-like semiconductors, which
is obviously something I think you talked about, you know, the
vulnerability of having a lot of them being built in places
like Taiwan?
If you care to kind of expand as to some ideas as to how do
we do on-shore, incentivize companies to build those
semiconductors, those national security semiconductors here in
the United States.
Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman. Happy to talk about
that. You are right that cutting-edge semiconductors are not
manufactured in the United States. They have one foundry. As
you go from 14 animators and down, you really have to look into
Asia.
So the previous administration and this administration and
this Congress has made significant investments--I am thinking
of the CHIP Act here, at least it requires appropriations, so
it is quite relevant to this committee, but at least the
authorization to on-shore some of this capability.
And we have seen this with some of the U.S. semiconductor
companies, as well as the one that gets discussed the most is
Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturing company, which there is a
move to invest in a foundry, I believe, in Arizona.
But the other slice of it is that we are going to have to
continue working with allies. We are going to have to continue
working and getting semiconductors from Korea and Taiwan, and
that gets back to this committee's jurisdiction, which is to
demonstrate to the Chinese that the United States is committed
to the defense of Taiwan, that that is not only necessary
because we are both democracies and we should support
democracies, but also it is vital to the supply chain for our
security and our economy.
And that is pretty much where we are at right now and why
this is so critical. And we are seeing it, as you reference,
outside the security context, just economically right now, Ford
is having difficulty getting their semiconductors.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And I agree with you, and I think, you
know, about your--you know, the posture towards Taiwan and to
others. But should we treat semiconductors--I mean, you know,
obviously, we want to--I would like to on-shore everything,
right.
But there is, I believe, a difference between
semiconductors, hugely important for pickup trucks, and
semiconductors for our national defense.
So should we treat those differently and have a different
way to, you know, to more aggressively treat those differently
than we do with, you know, other semiconductors, or for that
matter anything that is not defense, directly defense related?
Mr. Zakheim. Well, it is interesting when it comes to the
fab support to smaller semiconductors, and I don't know what
size the Ford F-150 uses, but generally this is viewed as
something that is needed on the commercial side as well on the
security side. So it is actually a twofer when you come to
think of it.
And given the capital-intensive requirements to support
high-end manufacturing like a foundry for semiconductors, you
are going to need a commercial market to support it. So vital
to getting our security and defense needs met when it comes to
semiconductors, we actually have to make it part of the supply
chain for the commercial sector as well.
And that is really reflective of the overall environment we
are in right now where so much of what the military needs in
terms of technology are things that the private sector, the
commercial sector is leading on. Semiconductors is one that
gets a lot of focus because we simply have to look to Asia to
source it.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Appreciate that.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Cole.
Nuclear Modernization and Hypersonic
Mr. Cole. Thank you.
Mr. Zakheim, I understand you are part of the 2018 National
Defense Strategy Commission. Obviously, one of the things you
looked at was nuclear modernization, so a couple questions.
One, do you think there is any reason to think we need to
do anything different than that commission outlined.
Two, do you have any concerns--and this may be a very
elemental question--about the fact that both Russia and China
still continue to manufacture nuclear weapons? We seem to just
simply rework the nuclear weapons that we have. And I know Mr.
Calvert touched on this a little bit.
I understand from a previous hearing, it would be very
difficult for us to actually make from scratch, if not
impossible right now in any short period of time, a nuclear
weapon. Does that give you any pause for concern looking
forward?
Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman Cole. And, yes, I think
the 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission language on
nuclear weapons, in particular the triad and GBSD stands. The
strategy demands it. Because we are simply focused so much on
China, we have to rely even more than previously on the
deterrent.
We have our limitations. We have our reasons why we don't
test, for example, nuclear weapons. The Commission didn't say
we should revisit that. What it did say is that we should
reinvest in the design, understanding, and modernizing.
And it is simply dangerous to rely on something that was
put out there in 1970. That people understand the designs,
should they actually have them, are not alive.
I think the rationale for the triad remains strong. We do
need the GBSD, the ICBM because there are vulnerabilities that
it addresses that the other legs of the triad do not.
And we should go ahead and modernize for the safety of the
American people and the cities in which these silos reside and
for the deterrence it brings us and our allies in Europe and
Asia.
Mr. Cole. Okay. Thank you.
Dr. Acton, I know you know a great deal about hypersonics.
It is an area that I think we have allowed ourselves to get
behind in. But I am particularly interested in not just the
offensive capability, but, you know, you have raised the danger
of hypersonic attack on land-based silos.
What kind of defensive possibilities do we have in dealing
with hypersonics? I know I have seen--Fort Sill is in my
district, the air defense artillery station there. There has
been some--at least beginning work on lasers. How close are we
to having any kind of reasonable defense against a hypersonic
attack?
Mr. Acton. Thanks for the question, Congressman. I would
distinguish here between point defenses and area defenses. So,
area defenses are systems like the ground-based midcourse
system deployed in California and Alaska. Those are--you know,
those are intended to defend very wide areas. Conceptually,
they are a bit like defensive linemen in football trying to
knock down the ball just after it leaves the quarterback's
hand.
You know, those kind of area defenses against hypersonic
weapons are extraordinarily difficult. I would point out, they
are also extraordinarily difficult against normal ballistic
missiles. You know, our defenses are not designed to intercept
Russian or Chinese ICBMs. They wouldn't have the ability to
intercept Russian or Chinese hypersonic weapons. Obviously, if
those hypersonic weapons were conventionally armed, that would
represent a qualitatively new threat facing us.
The good news is, I am a lot more bullish about point
defenses. This is like your cornerbacks at football trying to
intercept the ball just before it lands in the wide receiver's
hands. They can only intercept a small area. They are expensive
as a result.
But, you know, systems like that have been shown to have a
pretty good effectiveness against ballistic missiles.
Hypersonic weapons generally move slower than ballistic
missiles of the same range.
You know, you can't just point that at a hypersonic weapon
and hope it would work. You have to modify the system. But the
very, very intent heat signature of a hypersonic weapon is
something that an infrared seeker interceptor can lock on to.
So, yeah, I am moderately bullish about this. I think this
is an area in which DOD is already spending quite a lot on
hypersonic defense. I think for point defense is that
investment is a worthwhile one.
It is not going to be a silver bullet, but when you combine
it with hardening, dispersal, you know, my net assessment is
that Russian and Chinese conventional regional hypersonics
don't really increase the threat we face relative to the
ballistic missiles that they already have, especially if we
make good investments in defenses, active and passive.
Mr. Cole. Well, thank you, Dr. Acton, for speaking in
football analogies. That is something those of us in Oklahoma
actually grasp and understand much more quickly, so that was
very helpful to me.
Mr. Acton. Yeah, I have to thank my wife for that. You can
probably tell by my accent, I didn't grow up with that.
Mr. Cole. Well, I was going to compliment you. You clearly
have mastered it.
Chair, I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Well, we could always do hockey from my part
of the world. I just want to thank the panelists. We had you
here today to make us think about us and some of the tough
decisions we are going to have to make, and you put a lot of
homework on our plate.
So here is some of the things that my takeaway from this
is: One, we need to really work with the authorizers and with
the Department of Defense and with this administration for this
upcoming budget cycle to get a clear focus on the mission of
the Space Force and make sure that there is transparency in it.
When it comes to the overseas contingency accounts, and
this is something we have all hungered for, I think, as
appropriators, transparency, clean accounting, and
understanding where the tails are that bind us up into the
future.
When it comes to workforce, working with maybe Mr. Cole's
committee on how we get a workforce in cybersecurity and how we
get the whole-of-government working on it and understanding
when an attack on cybersecurity is an attack on us as a nation
state.
Coming up with this idea of like a new DARPA where we can
have people from cybersecurity both come in and come out and
use their talent and everything. It was just great. Now, some
of this isn't necessarily in appropriations; it is working with
authorizers and people in whole-of-government.
The whole supply chain, I mean, the pandemic, again,
brought this up. So, whether it is semiconductors or PPE,
right, that puts a vulnerability here at home.
And then the discussion on nuclear from everybody has been
fascinating. It is how many, what kind, and what really
resonates as a deterrent, and what do we do to defend ourselves
against these issues. But for me, there is also tails on that,
and maybe that is in the Department of Energy's account, but I
think it also starts falling in the Department of Defense,
storage, maintenance.
These are not, you know, weapons that you can just put
down, put in a locker, lock it up and guard it. There is a lot
that goes into this that has a lot of expense for future
generations. It is the tails that we live for future
generations.
I just want to thank you again, Ms. Howe, Mr. Acton, Ms.
Smithberger, and Mr. Zakheim. It was a fascinating discussion,
and I think it is one that we need to have because we are going
to be making, as Mr. Cole and others pointed out, some really
tough decisions. So I thank and each and every one of you for
giving us a lot, a lot to think about.
And with that, Mr. Calvert, I am going to conclude the
hearing unless there is anything you want to add really quick
at the end?
Mr. Calvert. I just want to thank you for the hearing,
Madam Chair. Obviously, we have near-term, long-term
challenges, and this is a good hearing to try to understand
that better. I can't think of anything more important. Thank
you.
Ms. McCollum. Yes. Thank you.
So, with that, thank you again to each and every one of the
panelists and for the committee members who were able to come
in and out.
And with that, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Answers to submitted questions follow:]
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Thursday, April 15, 2021.
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
WITNESS
ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
Opening Statement of Ms. McCollum
Ms. McCollum. Good morning. This subcommittee is going to
be receiving testimony from the U.S. Southern Command. Our
witness is SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral Craig Faller.
Admiral Faller, welcome back to the subcommittee. We look
forward to hearing your testimony.
Today's hearing is the first of several this subcommittee
will hold with geographic combatant commanders to discuss
national security challenges we face around the world and to
look to see how each command is postured and has the resources
it needs to the meet these challenges.
The President--and it is called the ``skinny'' budget,
right? It describes the need to counter the pacing threat from
China as the Department's top challenge. As we await the full
budget, though, we are going to continue to move forward with
these hearings.
In the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, influences of
foreign actors and drug cartels has increased. Russia and
China, with their meddling in Venezuela, have also created
challenges. China has taken advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic
to gain influence. I want to hear from our witness about the
destabilizing activities in the region and SOUTHCOM's response.
At the same time, we need to be mindful that many of the
challenges we face may require diplomatic or economic responses
rather than a military one. We need to be smart about using all
the tools that are at our disposal--development, defense, as
well as, I think most importantly, diplomatic.
One of the things that makes the SOUTHCOM area of
responsibility different than other combatant commands is the
proximity to the United States. Events in the region can have a
direct impact on the United States and our friends and allies.
And there are numerous examples of this. Venezuela has
completely broken down. That country's economic and political
system has displaced millions and created instability in the
region. Thousands of Venezuelans have fled to the United
States. Last month, the Biden administration recognized this
humanitarian situation and extended temporary protective status
to thousands residing here.
The turmoil in Venezuela has created a haven for
transnational criminal organizations, who thrive in a lack of
government and security. Criminal organizations continue to
traffic record numbers of drugs into the United States while
also engaging in human smuggling and trafficking.
In Central America, economic and security conditions,
combined with extreme weather events made worse by climate
change, continue to cause thousands to migrate north. And, as
we know, the region has been hit hard by COVID-19, straining
healthcare systems and economies and creating instability,
particularly in Brazil.
We will be looking forward to hearing today how Southern
Command is postured and resourced and is ready to play its part
in addressing all these issues. We also look forward to hearing
how SOUTHCOM is working with partner countries to address our
common challenges.
And, finally, we will discuss the detention facility at
Guantanamo, Cuba. We know that the Biden administration has
launched a formal review of the detention facility, with the
aim of finally closing it before President Biden leaves office.
And that is something I strongly, very strongly, support.
So, with that, I want to thank everyone for participating
in today's hearing, and I will now recognize the distinguished
ranking member, Mr. Calvert, for his remarks.
Opening Remarks of Mr. Calvert
Mr. Calvert. Well, thank you, Chair McCollum. I appreciate
that introduction.
Admiral Faller, welcome back to what we understand will be
your last appearance before the subcommittee. We deeply
appreciate your service and all the men and women who serve
under your command.
I appreciate the chair calling this hearing. As the Admiral
knows, SOUTHCOM AOR is of keen interest to me and members of
both sides of the aisle, especially since I am from a border
State and understand some of your challenges.
Many of us have felt that your command has been under-
resourced relative to your needs, particularly my colleagues
Mario Diaz-Balart and Henry Cuellar, which is an issue that we
sought to address in last year's bill.
More broadly, the chaos on our southern border reminds us
of the perils of taking our eye off the ball and allowing our
own hemisphere to become a victim of strategic neglect here in
Washington. I hope your testimony will be a needed correction
to that mindset.
For example, I am struck by your stark assessment that the
hemisphere is under assault from criminal organizations and
that imminent action is needed if we are to effectively discuss
China's corrosive but growing influence there. Much of this
task will fall to others in the interagency, particularly the
State Department and USAID, but SOUTHCOM has a critical role to
play in countering threats to the homeland and helping to
strengthen the security of our partners in the region.
In your testimony, I hope you will identify SOUTHCOM's most
serious resource constraints, including with respect to your
longstanding requirement for persistent ISR.
I look forward to the testimony and dialogue to follow.
And, with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Well, today, we have the honor and the privilege of being
joined by Ms. Granger, who is the full ranking member of the
Appropriations Committee.
And, Ms. Granger, I believe you were the first woman ever
to lead this Subcommittee on Defense.
Welcome.
Remarks of Ms. Granger
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much. Thank you.
And thank you, Admiral Faller, for being here. It is good
to see you.
SOUTHCOM is an extremely important area of operation that
frequently doesn't get the priority it deserves because of
conflicts in other areas of the world. It has been and will
continue to be a priority of mine.
The crisis on our southern border is just the most recent
reminder of how critically important the region is to the
security of our own country. I have seen for myself on many
visits to the border and to the region that this is not a new
problem we are trying to solve.
We have tried many times to address the reasons why people
decide to make the dangerous journey from Central America to
the United States. Despite well-meaning efforts going back
decades, we have not found the right formula for lasting
success. And, unfortunately, some of the changes made by the
previous administration to stem the flow of migration have now
been reversed.
I hope this administration will consult with our partners
in the region, as well as this committee, to understand the
lessons that have been learned in the past to ensure that our
efforts produce better results.
I look forward to your views on other pressing challenges,
including China's growing influence in the region. I also hope
you can speak to some of our successes in your area of
responsibility, including expanding and deepening our key
partnerships in the region, such as Costa Rica and Colombia.
This hearing is typically classified so that we can gather
the full picture of what is going on in the region. While this
hearing today is open to the public, I hope it will not prevent
you from giving us full answers. I encourage you to provide
classified responses in writing if you can't respond to the
questions members ask today.
And I thank you again for your service, and I look forward
to your testimony.
And I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you. Thank you, Ranking Member Granger.
I was going to mention the fact that this is an open
hearing. If something is classified, Admiral, please let us
know and we will arrange to have those answers done. Because we
are living in the age of COVID, we needed to keep these
combatant command hearings moving forward as we await the full
budget. There is no time to waste. And a lot of what we can
discuss can be done in open session.
The staff, both Democratic and Republican staff, are
working together to figure out how we can do classified
briefings. I spoke with Chair Schiff yesterday. They had their
first classified briefing in the Intel Committee, and it was a
little bumpy, as they all can't be in the room together. We are
working that out.
And if somebody has something that is of a classified
nature for an answer, sir, feel comfortable in saying so, and
the staff will work to accommodate that those answers are not
only provided to the member but to everyone on the full
committee.
So, with that, I am going to ask a question on climate
change before we turn to the ranking member. The reason why I
am going with climate change is that it affects not only what
we need to be doing to secure our assets and build resiliency
into them but also through the response that you have in facing
issues with responding to disasters and the instability that
climate change causes.
We know in Key West, for example, it is particularly
vulnerable to climate change, and you do have some plans moving
forward down there. Guantanamo Bay is another area that is out
there, very vulnerable, as well as some of the response that
you have now had to focus things on and missions on because of
climate change.
Could you talk about climate change as a national security
issue, not only for the immediate effects of your command but
for the disruption it causes in the area?
Admiral Faller. Well, thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking
Member Calvert and distinguished members of the committee. And
we will get right into questions. In the interest of time, I
had an opening statement that I will just submit for the
record. You wanted to proceed, I am ready to dive in. Whatever
you want to do, Madam Chair.
Ms. McCollum. We would like to hear your opening statement.
We do have time. If you want to redact a little bit, that is
fine. And that is on me. That is my apology--
Summary Statement of Admiral Faller
Admiral Faller. It is quite all right.
But thank you all. Madam Chair and Ranking Member Calvert
and distinguished members, it is a real honor to testify today.
Now more than ever, I feel a deep sense of urgency that our
region is under assault from a vicious circle of threats. And
these are global threats, and they are right here, right now,
in our neighborhood.
And the Western Hemisphere is our home. It is our shared
neighborhood. And a number of you have talked about that
proximity and how it matters. And in the Interim National
Security Strategy, we saw that it was designated as a
hemisphere of vital national interest to the United States.
The INDOPACOM commander recently testified that China is
the number-one strategic threat of the 2lst century, and we see
that in this hemisphere every day.
I would like to address a few myths that I hear and do some
myth-busting at the start of this hearing.
One myth that I often hear is that China's interests in the
Western Hemisphere are primarily economic. The Chinese
Communist Party, with its insidious, corrosive, and corrupt
influence, seeks global dominance. And that runs from Taiwan
right here into our neighborhood. And our strategic approach
for China as a nation and as a whole of nations together must
be global as well.
They have over 40 port deals in work. They are dishing out
significant loans for political and economic leverage. They are
pushing IT infrastructure. And they are engaged in an array of
predatory practices, such as illegal, unregulated, unreported
fishing, all with little or no concern for human rights, the
environment, or the rule of law.
The second myth is that transnational criminal
organizations are just drug traffickers and only a law
enforcement problem. To be clear, it is our assessment that the
transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, pose a direct
threat to our national security. They traffic in arms, humans,
drugs, and they claim tens of thousands of lives each and every
year here in the United States and in our partner nations. They
undermine democracy. Their murderous tactics have resulted in
43 of the 50 most violent cities being in our hemisphere. And
they drive illegal immigration and allow bad actors like China
to gain influence.
Myth three is that the United States military or partner-
nation militaries have no role to play with these threats. Our
role is a supporting role for sure, but the professionalism of
our United States military men and women is an example that our
partners seek to model each and every day. And we do that
through our education and training programs, our exercise
programs, and our humanitarian assistance, to name just a few.
We have established programs that help partner nations
develop and implement respect for the rule of law and human
rights. And our programs, as is our equipment, are corruption-
free. And when you work with the United States, you work on a
relationship, not a client relationship. We provide not only
positive role models but the tools and strategies for them to
implement them, enhancing their capacity and making us all
stronger together.
Underpinning these national security threats is growing
fragility in the region. COVID-19 has hit the hemisphere hard.
According to the IMF, the economies of Latin America and the
Caribbean shrank by 7.4 percent in 2020. The impacts of the
pandemic will alter the hemisphere for years to come. And in
the midst of the pandemic, two back-to-back major hurricanes
devastated Central America, creating even greater instability.
The pandemic and these unprecedented storms struck on top
of the vicious circles of threats that I have highlighted,
creating strong push factors for the people of the region to
head north in search of safety and basic needs for their
families.
In Venezuela, despite an economy in tailspin and more than
5 million refugees that have fled the country, the illegitimate
Maduro regime continues to cling to power, with support from
Cuba, Russia, Iran, and China.
We can't face these daunting challenges on our own. The
only way to counter these threats is to strengthen our
partnerships, and that is how we will win the strategic
competition. No one nation is as strong as all of us working
together.
And I have been impressed by the nations who have worked
shoulder-to-shoulder with us in countering threats to our
neighborhood. For example, last year, Colombia brought together
more than two dozen nations in Operation Orion VI to conduct a
counter-transnational-criminal-organization operation. And
earlier this year, Brazil became the first Latin American
country to send forces to our high-end U.S. Army training in
Fort Polk, Louisiana.
Good neighbors are here to help when you need them most,
especially during a crisis, and during this pandemic the United
States Southern Command stepped up. We provided humanitarian
assistance to our partners when COVID struck, and we did it
with the speed of relevance, delivering field hospitals and
critical PPE. To date, we have executed 498 projects in 28
countries, with a total investment of more than $70 million.
And this investment, thanks to your support, is making a
difference.
SOUTHCOM works every day to build the readiness and
professionalism of our trusted military partners and security
partners. Modest investments in intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, security cooperation, and presence go a long
way in the hemisphere and will help us and our partners counter
these global threats.
Finally, our successes would not be possible without our
most important resource: our people, our SOUTHCOM team. And we
are taking proactive steps to protect our people from
unacceptable behaviors like sexual assault and harassment,
racism, and extremism. We take these threats seriously because
it is the key to readiness and it is the right thing to do.
Madam Chair, Ranking Member Rogers, on behalf of the
SOUTHCOM team, thank you for your trust. I look forward to the
questions and discussion today.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Climate Change
Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much. And your full testimony
has been submitted for the record, and members have a copy of
it. Thank you so much for that overview.
You heard my questions on climate change. You touched a
little bit about some of the challenges that you are facing in
your opening statement. Would you please elaborate on that?
Admiral Faller. Our main line of effort, our main
engagement, is to work with our partners on their ability to
respond rapidly.
And the science is there; the climate is more violent. And
I will give you an example, Madam Chair. In the fall of 2019, I
went on an extensive tour to different base locations in
Guatemala. And as we flew around the country and talked about
how they could improve their security and how we could partner
together, it struck me that the rivers were dry, the fields
parched, and the crops that should have been ready for harvest
were withering. And they had been in a drought condition for
some number of years.
One year later, those same fields were flooded and washed
out by the two most violent storms to hit that region in rapid
succession. Category 4 hurricanes right around the beginning of
November rolled in on the same track 15 days apart. And, today,
all three nations in the Northern Triangle have declared
national food emergencies, and there is a significant portion
of their populations that don't have the basic food to eat.
So that is an example. And then where we come to play is to
help our partners determine the best way to respond. Their
response, their department of militaries is necessarily in
support of their interagency, but just as we look inward in a
disaster, they do. We work on rapid response.
We are very fortunate--as was mentioned in some of your
opening statements, posture is key. We are very fortunate to
have a security cooperation location in Soto Cano, Honduras.
And there we have Army helicopters, lift, around 14 of them. We
immediately deployed those helicopters during that hurricane to
save lives and help our partners. We deployed them in support
of our embassies, our ambassadors, and the USAID, and we had
them in constant operation for about a month's time last
November.
And I think it points to, when partners are in need and the
United States steps forward and extends an outstretched hand,
we build trust and we further strengthen that relationship for
the long term, and it can be a force for good.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Calvert.
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And, Admiral, thank you for your service.
Admiral, it is my understanding that SOUTHCOM uses less
than 1 percent of the DOD's ISR resources. Is that correct?
Admiral Faller. Yes, sir. It is about 1 percent of the
resources for ISR.
And as I mentioned in my opening statement, that is
absolutely critical. Our intel drives everything we do. You
know, we turn it into knowledge. We share it where we can,
particularly with our own U.S. Government agencies. It helps us
understand about what is on the field and how to best respond
long term.
Mr. Calvert. But if you had additional ISR to counter
transnational organized crime, other critical objectives, that
would be very, very helpful. You need additional platforms to
make that mission succeed?
Admiral Faller. Yes, sir. We really appreciate the support
of this committee, in particular, in the past. We had an ISR
transfer fund that was critical to meeting those needs, a very
cost-effective fund that was not included in last year's
budget. And while we have not seen the full budget for 2022, I
would anticipate that at the top of my unfunded requirements
list will be the need for additional ISR, to include what we
call nontraditional ISR.
It is using machine learning and artificial intelligence to
look through the vast amount of commercially available foreign
data, data on foreign adversaries. We have used that ISR
transfer fund money to do work in that environment, and we have
uncovered a considerable amount of useful information that we
have been able to pass to host nations for their action, our
law enforcement partners. And, in some cases, it has been used
to be able to illuminate malign Chinese and Russian behavior.
Global Posture Review
Mr. Calvert. Regarding the global posture review and the
new National Defense Strategy--I guess they are reevaluating
that at the Pentagon now, as you are aware--and our existing
security relationships with key partners in the SOUTHCOM AOR,
what focus do you think we need to change in regards to the
great-power competition, especially China?
Many have questioned the utility, by the way--and I will
just bring that up because I only have a little bit of time--of
putting more littoral combat ships in your AOR to give you some
more flexibility in that operation. What is your comment on
that?
Admiral Faller. To start with, the global posture review,
it is welcome, always welcome, to look at our global footprint.
I think our approach needs to be truly global. The front
line of competition with China is in our neighborhood, in this
hemisphere. And in order for us to win that competition, which
would be far more cost-effective than a confrontation, we have
to compete with our strengths where we can get the best
leverage. And, in this hemisphere, a small amount of time and
presence and resources has a high rate of return on investment.
We need Navy ships to be in that mix. Up until 2019, we
would get an occasional United States Navy ship. We made the
case during the combatant command review for additional assets.
And we had, on average, about three United States Navy ships
over the past year to augment our very robust Coast Guard
presence.
Those Navy ships participated in transnational criminal
organization operations, worked with partners, worked with the
Coast Guard, and made a difference--significantly put pressure
on the transnational criminal organizations, sent a message to
would-be competitors that the United States values the region
and is here. We were able to conduct exercises with partners
from Ecuador to Colombia, to Peru--partners with capable
navies.
And so, for me, it is about the capability. It is about
having built-in-the-U.S. Navy ships working with Joint
Interagency Task Force-South and our Navy South component from
Florida. So whatever capability that the United States Navy can
source to that I welcome.
But I would note that our littoral combat ships,
particularly the Freedom's recent deployment and the Gabby
Giffords, perform quite well. And I know that the Navy is
committed to overcoming the challenges associated with the
maintenance on those ships.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Admiral.
And, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Next, we have Mr. Cuellar.
Latin and South America Influences
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much, Madam Chair and Ranking
Member, for holding this meeting.
Admiral, I want to talk about your sense of urgency of what
is happening in Latin America. As all of us on the committee
have said, we are so used to looking at the Middle East and
looking at other parts of the world that we keep forgetting our
own backyard.
And I think the maps that you have provided to us to show
where the criminal organizations are coming from and how they
are affecting us, whether they are bringing in drugs or people,
they are there. And many times, as you have said and as we all
know, sometimes those organizations are stronger than some of
the state security forces that we have.
And then, on top of that, it is not only those
transnational organization groups that we have, but we have the
influence of Iran in South America. Not only do we have the
influence of them, but we also have the Russian influence in
countries. But the one that we have been talking about is the
one with the Chinese.
The last time you provided these reports, Admiral, you
know, we had X amount of countries in South America, 19--I
mean, there were less than that, but now we have 19 out of the
33 countries that have joined the One Belt One Road Initiative.
There are now 25 out of the 33 countries that host Chinese
infrastructure projects, including Mexico, Belize, or even,
outside of that, the Bahamas, Panama, where the canal is at,
and then so many other ones.
Then we talk about, even now, eight countries that are
producing and using and testing or interested in purchasing
Chinese COVID-19 vaccines.
Then we look at--and this is what is very interesting. We
know the major Chinese IT footprints and space tracking
stations in Argentina. You have some in Peru, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Brazil, and, of course, Venezuela. And, you know,
all of that worries me, because, from the last time you
provided this, the numbers keep going up, the investments keep
going, and they keep getting closer and closer to the U.S.-
Mexico border, where I live at.
I want you to talk to us about this sense of urgency and
what this committee can fund. I know there is an assessment
that you all are working on with the Department of State,
USAID, and I think the RAND Corporation is going to be involved
to do that study. And it should have been done by this last
December, but COVID had something to do with that, but I think
it should be ready by the 3lst of this year.
Tell us what we need to invest. Because I agree with you,
we should have a sense of urgency. I mean, we keep looking at
everywhere, but it is our own backyard that worries me. Tell us
about your sense of urgency and what we ought to be investing
in and what this committee should be doing.
Admiral Faller. Well, thank you for emphasizing that sense
of urgency that we certainly feel at United States Southern
Command. And the Department has been supportive, as has your
committee. By last year, your committee, in particular, was
supportive in establishing additional funds in our security
cooperation.
I mentioned the 1 percent of ISR. Intelligence drives
everything, and the more we know and understand what the
threats are up to, the better we can participate in a whole-of-
government and a whole-of-nation response. The National Defense
Strategy certainly nails it in talking about that global
competition and the competition with China.
We looked at ISR. We talked about ISR. Security cooperation
is key. That is what builds partner capacity. That is how we
become more interoperable with partners. The U.S. has the best
equipment in the world, and partners want our equipment, and it
is a long-term relationship.
As the budget is unveiled, I believe that will be at the
top of my unfunded priorities. There is more that could be
invested in the capacity. We sit at about $120 million for 28
countries to help them build. It is a good investment long term
for both the United States and our partners. It keeps them
close. It is a relationship.
And then on the presence, posture matters. We were very
supportive of Congress asking tough questions about some of the
intended cuts to the defense attache. Those are our front lines
in our embassy. We should look at the manning of our
embassies--it is very, very lightly manned for today's
competition--and then look at where we are postured as a
military and where is the United States postured. In this
hemisphere, it is the right thing to not have permanent bases;
have light locations where we can come in and out and work with
our partners on their training and readiness.
Thank you for the question.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers.
Trafficking in South America
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Admiral, welcome to the subcommittee. Welcome to the Hill
again. At one point in your career, I understand you were on
the staff of Senator Ted Kennedy. So welcome back to the Hill.
Let me ask you and follow up on Mr. Cuellar's line of
questioning about the role of the Chinese in the drug traffic
in South America, Latin America.
China adversely affects the region through drugs, human
trafficking, guns, and illegal mining, all of which are
underwritten through Chinese money laundering. And here is how
I understand that works. Historically, drug cartels have
struggled to get their illegal profits back within their
borders. However, recently, Chinese--what do we call them--
money brokers have emerged as vital partners for Latin American
drug cartels. Those cartels will bring proceeds from U.S.
illegal drug sales to these Chinese brokers, who then launder
those proceeds back to the drug cartels here in Latin America.
That has resulted in Chinese crime groups increasing their
presence in places like Colombia. In fact, I spoke on the phone
just yesterday with President Duque of Colombia--who, by the
way, I think his administration is doing great work--and I
welcome your comments--on eradicating coca, which is a main
source of the opium in the U.S.
Thank you, Admiral, for being here today.
Let me ask you what you are doing about the drug problem--
the drug cartels and the Chinese brokers. Tell us how that
works and what we are doing about it and what we need to do on
the up and up.
Admiral Faller. Thank you for recognizing Colombia. They
are a trusted partner. They exceeded all their goals in the
counter-narcotics fight last year despite the pandemic. I would
trust them to be alongside me and our team in any fight, as
professionals that adhere to human rights and all the standards
that we expect of our U.S. Armed Forces men and women. And
thank you.
With respect to transnational criminal organizations, in
this hemisphere, we have 8 percent of the global population and
more than 60 percent of cryptocurrency. It is clear that
entities, threat entities, are working around ways to strangle
their money supply.
As I have met with key law enforcement partners, like NYPD
Counter Narcotics Strike Force, FBI, DEA, and others,
consistently they cite the significant and consequential role
of Chinese banks in money laundering. And it is very hard to
crack into that, with technology barriers, language barriers.
And so, when you look at the corrosive and corrupt
influence of transnational criminal organizations--because
corruption really fuels them, their ability to undermine
officials and use extortion--it is the same sort of principles
that the Communist Party of China thrives on. They could shut
this down if they wanted to, but it is not in their interest to
do so. It is in their interest to undermine the democracies so
that they can gain more influence for their version of a future
world order.
Mr. Rogers. Well, it is a huge item. I am told that
transnational criminal organizations are generating around $90
billion in profits just from cocaine. And a lot of that cocaine
and the drugs out of South America lands in my district. And we
have been fighting that fight with an organization called UNITE
now for a dozen years, but it is being flooded by the drugs
coming out of South America.
Thank you for your service, your lifetime of service,
Admiral. And thank you for your present duties. A tough chore.
Somebody has to do it, and you are doing great. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
We are going to hear from Mr. Aguilar, and then we will go
to full committee Ranking Member Granger.
Drug Interdictions
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Chairwoman.
Admiral, good to see you again, and thank you for your
service.
We have talked a little bit about drug interdiction, and if
I could just ask a follow-up question on that. You talked with
Mr. Calvert about some of the ISR capabilities. And, you know,
through the briefings we have had, we know that our ability to
identify drug smuggling in the Pacific is far greater than our
capacity to interdict.
What more can we do to help you in these efforts? What
resources are needed? And if you can touch on specifically some
of the work that you have been doing with the Coast Guard in
aiding those drug interdictions in SOUTHCOM AOR.
Admiral Faller. Thank you.
The area that we are looking at, where the principal routes
run, is larger than the United States. And, on any given day,
we are covering that area with about 10 U.S. ships, a mix of
Coast Guard and U.S. Navy, an innovative vessel called the MMSV
that you all have appropriated, which has been very successful.
And then we do that with partners. When the Coast Guard and
the United States Navy are there, partners step up. And we saw
last year that partners increased their participation in the
counter-transnational-criminal-organization operations, the
pressure, by 10 percent in interdictions. And that is
significant in 1 year, especially given the pandemic. It is an
example of, when the Coast Guard and the Navy are there, others
will come out.
We cited the success of Colombia. Costa Rica is another
partner that has done extremely well. Panama just stood up a
fusion center. The key here, long term, is getting a network of
partners together to keep pressure on the source, the supply
lines, all aspects of the business model.
Another key in the last year as part of our surge in this
threat space has been the development of a targeting process
with the interagency here in the U.S. So, learning from what we
have done in the counterterror ops and then working as a part
of a U.S. Government interagency process, we have been able to
improve that targeting process by using machine learning,
artificial intelligence, and really increase the speed of which
we can build a target package and then hand off to a partner
nation's law enforcement. So that is significant.
We will never interdict our way out of this. We have to
look at these organizations as an organization and determine
where their key nodes are, centers of gravity, if you will, and
then crush that. We talked about money laundering as part of
that. There is a cyber piece of this; there is an information
piece of this.
Bringing all elements of power and all domains is the way
forward for us to make a lasting difference on this threat.
Mr. Aguilar. I appreciate the answer. Thanks so much,
Admiral.
China in South America
Mr. Aguilar. Can you talk a little bit more about China and
what keeps you up at night, as far as their activities within
the AOR and the relationships in some of these countries?
Admiral Faller. When we sit down with our partners, it is
part of the conversation that we talk about the Chinese economy
and the U.S. economy. It is undeniable that China is the
number-one trading partner with the United States, number-one
trading partner with most of our partner nations. Now they are
number-one trading partner with South America writ large and
soon, I think, will be a larger trading partner with the
hemisphere.
We have to determine as a Nation how we win the competition
without ever going to conflict. And when China is able to come
in and gift militaries in our region significant quantities of
money with very little or no strings attached, that concerns
me.
Some of our key partners have turned those gifts down, and
I applaud that and thank them for turning it down. Others say
to me, ``We are drowning, we feel like we are drowning,
Admiral, in a lifeboat, and we are going to take that life ring
because we need it.'' And I say, ``hey, watch where the cord is
attached and what happens on that cord.''
We recently hosted a security conference with our allies--
U.K., Canada, French, the Dutch--that have interests here. And
one of the Canadian members to that conference, from their
foreign ministry, a citizen, a civilian, said to me, ``we see
the region--the threats of the region as a whirlpool and the
nations in a lifeboat that are getting sucked down by the
various pressures.''
It does add to that sense of urgency that has been a theme
here, and that is really what keeps me up at night.
Mr. Aguilar. Thanks, Admiral. Appreciate your service, and
thanks so much for being here today with us.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
And with no disrespect mentioned, trying to do things from
distance to distance here, we will now hear from Ms. Granger.
Thank you.
Littoral Combat Ships
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Admiral, President Biden indicated during the campaign that
he intended to devote as much as $4 billion to address the root
causes of Central American migration. And the budget framework
released last week includes the first year of this funding,
$850 million, to address the matter.
We have talked so much about the issues in your area and
the drug trade and particularly the drug trade and the help we
need when they are going by water.
Recently, I was in a meeting and was very, very concerned
and disappointed to hear that there was an attempt to mothball
all littoral combat ships. And I would ask you--you mentioned
those ships. Have you found them helpful, particularly in the
area you are in and in the drug control?
Admiral Faller. The Navy's presence has been essential, and
it has increased the capacity of our partners. And, frankly, I
have been on board the ships, destroyers and littoral combat
ships, and talked to the Navy crews. They have really improved
their readiness. It is a win-win.
On that program that you mentioned for the Northern
Triangle, it is a welcome program. We need a long view for the
region. And Plan Colombia was a good model because we stuck
with it for 10 years and we didn't have fits and starts
annually with the plan. This is a generational problem,
developing the sustainable economies and the type of
democracies that can take care of themselves so that we don't
have this crisis in Central America that drives people to walk
thousands of miles to save their kids and save their lives.
And I think, ma'am, that the military does have a role
here, a very focused supporting role. Because our track
record--we have learned from our past. We know how to abide by
the rule of law and human rights. And we have a human rights
program at SOUTHCOM, and we have worked with our partner
nations to professionalize them. And they are part of the
solution. And, in order to help going forward, we have to be
present to help influence good behavior to be part of the long-
term, sustainable solution.
We welcome a long-term plan. And so far, the discussions
and the involvement of my command with Chairman Milley and the
Secretary of Defense have been very transparent, very
iterative, and they have been listening to us.
Ms. Granger. Good. I hope you will speak out for the
littoral combat ships, because part of that was going into
shallow water, being quiet, almost silent, the speed. And all
the other indications I have is they are still helpful, so I
was surprised at that.
I want to make sure that you have--are there other
resources that--in this pandemic time, are there other
resources you need to change or add to help you?
Assistance Programs
Admiral Faller. Our humanitarian assistance program and the
authorities we have there are the best tool I have. It is
responsive. It is scalable. We can meet partners' needs, short
and long term.
With the support of Congress, we received additional
money--and the Department of Defense--additional money at the
beginning of the pandemic. We have applied that to good use.
It is an authority that we are able to apply to partners'
health agencies or civil agencies. I would like to see an
expansion of that authority and the appropriation of the money
to be able to work with partner militaries. And I think we
could get enough oversight on it that we would ensure it did
the right thing. That would be in the humanitarian assistance
realm.
Similarly, given the competition we are in and our need to
be able to flex to a partner's needs, when I visited the region
in October, I found that our partners were just exhausted and
running out of fuel and basic necessities. Yet I lack a near-
term relevant mechanism to provide some assistance in that
manner.
We have 2-year funding, which is greatly appreciated, a
long view, which is what we need, but I think we need a
military assistance program for small-dollar amounts--I am
talking $15,000, $50,000--that would be real game-changers to
build near-term trust and respond to partners' needs mil-to-
mil.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much. Appreciate that.
I yield.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick and then Mr. Womack.
Transnational Criminal Organizations
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks for
having this hearing.
Admiral, I represent a border district in Arizona, and I am
very focused on how we ensure our border communities are
protected from illicit drug activity and violence from
transnational criminal organizations.
While the Department of Defense does not have the lead in
many aspects of the counter-drug efforts, the Department is the
lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and
maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.
My question is this: Can you provide an update on efforts
to counter transnational criminal organizations? And how does
the U.S. measure success or failure in this area?
Admiral Faller. We appreciate the work that Air Force South
in Tucson has done in the aerial part of this detection and
monitoring. And they work hand-in-hand with Joint Interagency
Task Force-South in Key West, which is a team of teams that is
led by a Coast Guard two-star, Rear Admiral Doug Fears, that
each and every day focuses on this very problem set.
In JIATF, we have every relevant agency in the U.S. that
works in a counter-narcotics, counter-transnational-criminal-
organization space, as well as partner nations from 24
different partner nations. And that is the real key. And we
have made progress.
So, using the additional resources that the Department
supplied in terms of Navy ships last year, we put more pressure
on the networks. That kept our partners in the game. These
security cooperation programs do have long-term payback for the
United States. And, as I mentioned previously, our partners
stepped up and increased their participation and their
interdiction.
We were able to increase our targeting, so we were able to
get on more targets last year, disrupt more flow, put more
pressure on the networks, which generates more opportunity for
partner nations and law enforcement partners to capture,
detain.
And so we are on the good glide slope, but clearly not
enough, when we still have tens of thousands dying in the
United States and we still have organizations that have budgets
larger and bigger than many of the security forces they face,
and organizations that control territory, frankly.
And so more pressure, sustained pressure; and more focus on
the source; and more focus on, as was mentioned in some of your
opening comments, diplomacy and development as a way for people
to have other models.
Human Rights Office
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you. I appreciate that.
I have one other question here. You also have the only
human rights office throughout the combatant commands. Do you
see meaningful progress in these areas? And what support do you
need from Congress to strengthen these programs?
Admiral Faller. We could have the best equipment, and we
do, in the United States; we could have the best women and men
in our force, and we do; but we could still lose the
competition that we are in or the next war that we fight
because we don't have legitimacy with our people. We can never
take that for granted.
When I joined the military 42 years ago, it was not a
foregone conclusion that we would have the trust of the United
States population. And we do this by adhering to the rule of
law, human rights, respect, those unacceptable behaviors that I
talked of at the beginning--relentless pursuit of all of that.
Our command recognized over 20 years ago that key to
sustainable security in this hemisphere was improving the human
rights record of all aspects of our engagement mil-to-mil. And
we invested in a human rights team, and we have increased that
investment. It is something we fund out of hide; it is not a
program of record with the Department of Defense.
We have been able to install human rights advisors in our
partner-nations' security force, conduct workshops with our
partner nations, ensure that it is embedded in their training
programs, that it is embedded in their doctrine. And we have
offered that into all the U.S. schoolhouses as a key element of
building that professionalism and legitimacy.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you for the good work that you are
doing. I, as representing a border district in Arizona, really
appreciate your efforts.
And, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Womack.
Drugs and Migration
Mr. Womack. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And, Admiral Faller, it is great to see you again.
You know, of all the COCOMs that we are going to get
posture briefings from, I consider this, as it concerns the
direct impact on my constituents, to be one of the most
important, if not the most important. To be clear, what is
going on in INDOPACOM or in Eastern Europe and some of the
other trouble spots around the globe pose existential threats
to our country; there is no question about that. But as it
concerns my constituents, there is not another combatant
command AOR that has such an immediate impact on my people than
yours. And we are going to beat this TCO issue again, because I
think it is of critical importance.
And I just recently came back from the border. Went down
with Whip Scalise to McAllen, Texas. I know that is a little
north of your AOR. But I am reading from a slide right now that
was given to us by the Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol folks.
``In the period of time between March 4 and April 1, there
were 14-plus pounds of cocaine''--so this is less than a month,
14 pounds of cocaine--``3,251 pounds of marijuana, $1 million
in currency, 24 firearms, 8 gang member arrests, 622 criminal
arrests.'' That is in less than a month. And I know that a lot
of this stuff is coming up into my district.
Thank you for your leadership in trying to bang the drum on
the transnational criminal organizational piece.
But there is one part about it that we have only kind of
glossed over, and that is the tremendous migration that is
happening in a lot of your AOR into our area. And I know you
have some numbers on it, how many people have actually migrated
out of those areas because of the safety concerns. Can you
speak to that and how incredibly important these numbers are?
Admiral Faller. The threats hitting your home of
Bentonville, Arkansas, and my home of Fryburg, Pennsylvania, it
is killing people and it is stressing economies and governments
and it is undermining security.
Just as an example, Congressman, when you look at this--
yesterday, the intelligence agencies published an annual
report. It is unclassified. And they looked at the scope of the
migration over a 5-year period: 40 million. Forty million have
migrated in this hemisphere. And they are looking at Haiti,
Cuba, Venezuela, and Central America. Forty million people.
And that is the insecurity, the lack of ability to get
healthcare for your children, lack of ability to find something
to eat. And it has to be a whole-of-government, whole-of-
nation, regional kind of approach, sustained, to put these
numbers and give folks some hope.
Mr. Womack. Yes. Well, look, again, I appreciate your
willingness to bring this to the attention of not only the
Congress but other military leaders. And even though you are
going to be retiring sometime this fall, I sure hope that you
will continue to be outspoken on it.
State Partnership Program
By the way, speaking of partnerships, as everybody on this
committee knows, I am a big advocate of the State Partnership
Program. And I would be remiss if I didn't give you an
opportunity to talk about how incredibly important the SPP
program is in your AOR.
Admiral Faller. The State Partnership Program is the
number-one assigned force that we have in order to help our
partners build capacity in the United States Southern Command.
And we are blessed to have the most robust partnership lineup,
with 24 partners. Arkansas is aligned with Guatemala.
It is a long-term relation, as our Guard gets to develop
and build that. And we really appreciate Congress's support in
that. And I am constantly in communication with the TAGs of the
various States as we look to how to help the partners build
capacity.
And, frankly, training is good for the Guard too. I get the
feedback. It is a two-way win as we move forward.
I think, as we look forward, if the Guard had some
flexibility on this for 2-year money, things that could meet
the partners' speed--they often have difficulty budgeting
inside of our cycle and being able to do things--that might be
one thing to look at.
Thank you.
Mr. Womack. Yeah. Thank you.
Madam Chairwoman, before I yield back, I just want to
associate myself with the remarks of Ken Calvert and others
that have talked about the ISR needs of SOUTHCOM and the ISR
transfer fund that was lost. But critically important.
Leveraging that kind of technology with the mission going on in
SOUTHCOM I think is pretty important, and I sure hope that we
can continue to make the arguments for it.
And I will yield back. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
We are going to hear from Ms. Kaptur and then Mr. Diaz-
Balart. Thank you.
Ms. Kaptur.
Latin and South America Country Governments
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And, Admiral Faller, thank you for your service to our
country.
This has been a rather grim hearing in the way I view the
world. I am reminded, 60 years ago John Kennedy launched the
Alliance for Progress. And I am glad he did, but it doesn't
seem like we have made a lot of progress over the decades. So
maybe the architecture of what we are doing isn't integrated in
the proper way.
What percentage of the territory in your AOR would you say
is ungovernable?
Admiral Faller. Thanks for mentioning the success of past
historical models. We have spent a lot of time looking at what
has worked and what hasn't worked, and the key is often the
consistency over time and then getting at all aspects of our
partners' needs, not just a couple points here or there. And
the places where we have been able to make that work, we have
turned chaos into democracy.
So, while there is a sense of urgency and some amount of
grimness, as you suggest, Congresswoman, in the 1990s and the
1980s many of our partners in Central America were in civil
wars. And so, from that respect, their democracies are fragile
and young, and we have to hang with them as we get this right.
And I think there is hope. I have met the people. We have
values in common to get this right.
In terms of the threat and, as we discussed, the
transnational criminal organizations that are in many cases
better funded, their end strength is larger than the police, in
some cases the police and the militaries combined in some
countries, some 200 different organizations. And they do
control territory. It ebbs and flows and----
Ms. Kaptur. Take a stab, Admiral. What percent? What
percent is not under normal civil----
Admiral Faller. I would have to take that one for the
record and come back with a more detailed analysis----
Ms. Kaptur. Is it more than a third? Is it more than a
third?
Admiral Faller. I don't think it is more than a third,
ma'am. But there are swaths that are very concerning.
And we would have to look at this holistically with my
shipmate from NORTHCOM to look at the impacts from Mexico.
Mexican cartels have grown their market share and moved south,
which is a concerning trend.
Ms. Kaptur. Well, I was extremely troubled when Mexico's
President released Caro Quintero, the number-one drug lord on
the DEA's list. I thought, ``So Mexico is gone.'' And I won't
go into all my experiences with Mexico. My experiences with
people are very good; my experiences with the government are
horrendous.
And I think, my sense is, that we are talking about narco
states. And I am interested in your assessment, if not publicly
now, privately, as to what is happening in these different
countries and which of them are absolutely ungovernable.
And that is at the basis of so much what is causing
disturbance in this country, certainly with the narcotics
trade. And I would recommend a book--you have probably read
it--by Sam Quinones, ``Dreamland.'' Because after the collapse
of the white corn market in Mexico, displaced by corn grown in
my region, yellow corn, the drug trade began to lock down the
opium fields in the very places where the white corn market
disappeared. We have never solved that problem. And all those
people in those villages, from Oaxaca and everything, started
to move north. They left their parents in those provinces, and
then the kids came up north. A lot of them got involved in the
drug trade.
And I really--I sense it is out of control. You may not
feel that way. You are closer to the ground than I am. But I
know in my region up in northern Ohio, because of drugs and the
routes that are coming from Mexico to Columbus, Ohio, and then
like a spoke out around the entire State, it is frightening.
And my own neighbor is involved in some of that drug trade.
It is just--it is a continental scourge. And it doesn't
seem to me that, the way we are structured, we are being
maximally effective.
And you have given a great share of your life to this, so I
am very interested in the map of what is ungovernable. I am a
city planner by training; I like to look at maps, and I like to
understand.
I also know that, after World War II, Britain created new
towns, safe places.
I think we need a different strategy that is more cosmic,
less--because the current system isn't working. It is getting
worse. And China is an added complexity. But if you really look
at what is going on there, I don't think that our approach
addresses the magnitude of what we are facing.
My time has probably expired, but I am very interested, in
another setting, to look at the map that you might have. You
are a Navy man, but I think you like land. And very interested
in what is ungovernable and other alternatives to create safe
havens for people, how do we do that. And I mean villages.
And what do we do about those places that are raising the
plants that produce the cocaine, from an agricultural
standpoint? I have never heard one person from the State
Department, or any department talk about that massive
transformation that occurred after 1993 that completely turned
Mexico upside-down.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
We now have Mr. Diaz-Balart, then Mr. Ruppersberger, and
then Mr. Carter.
Combating Illicit Drugs
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Chairwoman, thank you very much.
Admiral Faller, first and foremost, you know, words don't
suffice to thank you for your decades of honorable service to
our country. I have the privilege to have Southern Command in
my district, and I will tell you, we have had over the years,
over the decades, some outstanding leaders of SOUTHCOM, but,
Admiral, no one has done a better job than you have. So, again,
thank you so very much.
In your testimony, you mentioned how many Americans die
from illicit drugs. I think it is 87,000 in 2020 alone. And
that is a result of the drug trade that originates in Latin
America.
And so, very specifically, what kind--and I know that, you
know, SOUTHCOM interdicts more drugs than, I believe, all of
the police departments in the entire country combined. But what
specifically, what resources do you need to be able to do even
more? Because you literally are saving American lives.
Admiral Faller. We do interdict, in accordance with the
statute provided, the bulk of the drugs for about 1 percent of
the overall budget that is associated with that effort across
all the U.S. agencies. And it is indicative of being able to
try to push it to the source before it gets divided into so
many little packets that can ease into south Florida or Ohio or
all the other places.
And the key, I think, to go back to the last question, the
key is that there are good people. And our ability to leverage
our values, which is our strength as Americans, and values that
are common to some of these good people and create stronger
institutions in our partner nations that are resilient to
corruption.
And that has to be a whole-of-government effort. We have to
focus on a corruption-free, strong military and police and
judicial systems. And when we leave off the pressure or don't
incentivize our partners to do better in a certain area, it
creates a gap or a hole.
I hear from partner nations that, hey, look, we wish we had
a stronger judicial system, because when the criminals get to
the end in the judicial system, to quote a phrase from Costa
Rica, they say, ``Pura vida,'' which is, ``Don't worry, be
happy.'' They fear the U.S. judicial system. They respect the
U.S. military, they respect our Customs and Border Protection,
they respect our State Department INL. Staying consistent and
investing in the institutions.
A couple programs that are important that are under-
resourced: Institutional Capacity Building. It is a program,
and I have enough for about three advisors for the whole
hemisphere. It is funded through Section 333 security
cooperation money out of an institute in California, Monterey,
California, where the ministries of our partners will agree to
put an advisor in there--and these are experienced, savvy,
usually retired military personnel--to help them develop
transparent, accountable, corruption-free budget systems. That
is a small investment for a good rate of return if we fund it
and if we stay with it.
There are more examples like that where we can get results.
I will give you one more. A partner nation, Guatemala, their
special naval forces, working with other U.S. Government
agencies, we have developed a very capable, corruption-free,
trustworthy special naval force that gets it done on the sea.
There are areas of that that we can spread the trust and
spread the accountability, but we have to stay with it over
time. And that small, focused investment does have a rate of
return for a safer U.S. in every one of our cities.
National Security
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Admiral, you also talked about--and this
is not a classified briefing, so I don't expect--as a matter of
fact, let me just ask a couple of specific questions about
state actors and nonstate actors, as far as are they a threat
to our national security interests in this hemisphere or are
they not. Let me just--very briefly.
China. Is it a threat to our national security interests in
the region?
Admiral Faller. As I stated in the opening, China is the
pacing threat for----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yeah.
Admiral Faller [continuing]. The 21st century and----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. One more. How about Russia?
Admiral Faller. Absolutely.
And I would be remiss, on the transnational criminal
organizations, one of the gaps, Congressman, is that it is not
reflected in our higher-level documents. So, you know, that is
a decision that will be made by policymakers, and I respect
that----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. All right.
Admiral Faller [continuing]. But it is hard to compete if
we don't respect something as a threat to our national
security.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. How about Cuba?
Admiral Faller. Cuba's malign influences are felt
throughout the hemisphere. I wish it were different, but they
undermine democracies. They are currently the--they are a de
facto [inaudible] To keep the illegitimate Maduro in power.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And, lastly--and I am running out of
time--Iran. Are they also a player in this hemisphere?
Admiral Faller. The long arm of Iranian malfeasance is felt
around the globe. They are the number-one state sponsor of
terrorism in the world.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Admiral, again.
Madam Chairwoman, thank you. My time has run out, so I
yield back.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Carter, and Mr. Ryan will be after
Mr. Carter.
China and Iran
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, thank you, Congresswoman McCollum
and also Ranking Member Calvert.
Admiral, you have served your country well. I have always
felt, the amount of years that I have been in Congress--and I
was on the Intelligence Committee for 12 years--that we, from a
resource point of view, have not given the resources to South
America, Central America, and I think we are paying for it in a
lot of different ways.
And I will say that, from your perspective and your
leadership, you have been able to bring the team together. You
mention in your statement that intel drives everything we do,
and that gives you the ability to do the things you need to do.
And part of what I like from your style is the teamwork. And I
am going to call out the DEA as an example. A very small
organization, and they are in a very dangerous situation, but
they have done a good job. Now, with the support of the
military, FBI, I think we are on the right road. Thank you for
what you have done.
China's influence in Latin America continues, outside of
Mexico, to be really the reason and the involvement in South
America, Central America. And I am very concerned about where
we are with respect to China.
And I want to give you some numbers here, that China's
trade with the region overtook the United States in 2018 and
extended that in 2019 to more than $22 billion, versus U.S.
trade of $198 billion, according to analysis of the trade
figures from the U.N. Comtrade database.
Now, I know that throughout the pandemic in the United
States, we have had a great partner with the different
countries that we are working with. But, in the end, we are
looking at a situation that is getting worse and worse as it
relates to China.
Now, from your perspective, what do you need to do to
counter China in the region? Do you see any changes in the
diplomatic front with the new administration?
And, also, to what degree do you see insecure technology
offerings from China, like Huawei, or bad loan terms driving
relationships between your AOR, your area of responsibility,
and China? And do countries truly want to work with the
Chinese, or do they want them as a piggy bank?
Now, outside of our near-peer, what type of Iranian
activity are you also seeing in the region? I think you
answered that question before. And I have always been concerned
about their potential to stir up conflicts in our backyard.
Admiral Faller. The focus of our National Defense Strategy
on strengthening partnerships and of our SOUTHCOM strategy of
strengthening partnerships is exactly the best approach to
outcompeting China.
So focus, first and foremost, by looking in the mirror
every day and asking ourselves, are we the best, to use a
sports analogy, athletes on the field, morally, physically,
mentally, and ready to take that forward to engage with our
partners? And I can say we are. Now, we are not the perfect
people, but we work hard at all aspects of that to get it right
in the United States military and in SOUTHCOM in particular.
And partners want to partner with the world champions. And that
is our standard to never lose. And we appreciate your support
in that.
So, when I sit with partners, they want to work with the
U.S., absolutely. And we have so much in common--values in this
hemisphere being at the top of that list, the great U.S.-built
equipment. And we look for areas of commonality and how we move
that forward.
We have to be present to do that, physically and with some
level of resources. As I say, you have to be on the field to
compete, and you have to be seen and heard to compete.
And I don't ask partners to choose, because that puts them
often and publicly in a very cumbersome and tough situation.
But I do point out, what system do you want, and do you have
and do you want your children and grandchildren to grow up
under, a democracy or an autocracy? And it is really an easy
question to answer as we move forward.
Our best way to compete is to be the best and folks will
want to partner with us. But we have to be consistent and we
have to stay with them in that respect.
China, they are growing in their boldness. You mentioned a
number of things, Congressman. We see it with the vaccines. The
U.S. is the largest contributor to the COVID health response in
this hemisphere, but you wouldn't know that by some of what you
hear coming out of Chinese and Russian information and
disinformation. We just have to stay the course and make sure
the truth is told.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Carter and then Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Carter.
Migration Housing on Military Bases
Mr. Carter. Thank you for being patient with me. I have
another hearing I am trying to take care of too.
Admiral, I had a great conversation with you yesterday.
Sorry to have to cut it off to go vote, but we had a great talk
and I enjoyed it.
The transnational criminal organizations has been a subject
that we have been talking about a lot. It is reported that over
200 violent TCOs control territory in Central and South
America, and they influence government and the governance of
those countries. Additionally, China and Russia are involved in
the region and spreading their influence out.
As these TCOs traffic guns, drugs, money, and people into
the United States, basically through Mexico, illegal aliens are
being housed on military bases, such as Fort Bliss, Texas, and
Joint Base San Antonio. Do you see any inherent risk to
national security in housing those people on active military
posts?
Admiral Faller. Congressman, I will leave the policy of
where we put them to Department of Defense and others that are
looking at that.
The underlying driver, though, here--the violence, the
murderous violence, the ability of these groups to use
corruption to undermine governance and capture territory--is
critically at the center of gravity, the center of this perfect
storm. And that is what we are really trying to get after,
working with all the U.S. Government agencies.
And, as we stated, the absolute criticality of intel to
drive that as a way to better understand what levers need to be
applied and pulled.
Mr. Carter. Well, the way I look at it, I am concerned
national security issues, but, in turn, I am also very
concerned about placing children on live-fire military posts
like Fort Hood, where live-fire ranges are within walking
distance of where they would be housed. And most of these
children are teenagers, and teenagers are very curious. And
when tanks start shooting, they are going to want to go see.
And I am worried about somebody getting killed. But I know that
is not what your purpose is.
What you are doing on the border, though, has an influence
on what is pushing this massive migration, basically, into my
State. And now we are moving them to other States as they
require, but it is a gigantic problem for the State of Texas.
Countering Influence of Adversarys
The One Belt One Road program that the Chinese are doing,
we are doing some things to counter those things. Are the
things that we are doing to counter them as effective or at
least somewhat effective in changing the influence that they
are imposing on our Central and South American friends?
Admiral Faller. The security and all the insecurity that
you cite, Congressman, has got to be part of the economic
solution. And so, when One Belt One Road and its promise of
Chinese investment and access to Chinese economies, the best
way to outcompete that is to use U.S. companies, incentivize
their business and incentivize supply chains for the Americas,
secure supply chains, that take advantage of that proximity to
our country and take advantage of the tremendous hardworking
labor that comes with the migration.
And so that has to be--and I think it was mentioned a
number of times today: Getting development right, with the
diplomacy and the security, has to be key.
And we are focused on that. We routinely meet. And we have,
in our headquarters, members of the interagency groups, and we
look for ways to help enable them as a small piece of the
security solution to get the work done. Development Finance
Corp., which was part of Congress's BUILD Act, is one such
lever that shows promise, I think. And I know that our
ambassadors, as I interact with them, in the region are focused
on these types of things.
Mr. Carter. You mentioned in our conversation yesterday the
idea of maybe a Central and South American country Marshall
Plan. And with all the money we are throwing around these days,
we would have to figure out how to fund all that. But would you
like to talk about that concept?
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Carter, we are going to have time for a
second round, so that will give the Admiral time to think that
over.
Mr. Carter. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Ms. McCollum. And I am interested to hear the answer.
Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Madam Chair. Appreciate the
opportunity.
Thank you, Admiral.
United States Coast Guard Cutter Stone
One of the questions I had--I read with great interest
about what happened in March with the United States Coast Guard
Cutter Stone, which was deployed to the South Atlantic to help
curb illegal Chinese fishing. And this was the Coast Guard's
first such deployment in over a decade. And the mission, we are
told, was primarily a success, and the crew was able to conduct
some training with several countries.
And evidently the mission hit a snag when the Argentine
Government refused to provide dock services for the Stone. And
we know that that would normally be pretty routine. And we know
that Argentina has been one of the largest recipients of funds
from the Chinese Government for their Belt and Road Initiative.
And I am just interested in your opinion, if you believe
that that deepening relationship with China was the reason that
we were refused to be able to dock the Stone there.
Admiral Faller. Coast Guard Cutter Stone, a national
security cutter--and those are awesome ships, well-built. I
have been aboard them. They are built to do a range of
missions--had a very successful patrol, as you point out,
Congressman, and was aimed at getting after a significant
source of insecurity, which is this idea of illegal,
unregulated, unreported fishing. Admiral Schultz and our
Homeland Security Department have put forward a strategy for
that. We are participating with them; they are in the lead.
This patrol was part of that.
Last year, we saw off Ecuador a tremendously large fleet,
primarily of a state-owned, Chinese, distant-water fleet, that
would every day turn off their transponders and go into the
ecological zone of the Galapagos. And we can only wonder what
was happening when you turn those off. It is for two reasons
only: You are trying to mask illegal behavior, or it is broken.
And you don't have half a fleet broken at the same time.
This was meant to get after that. Argentina has had their
share of issues with illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing,
and we worked with their coast guard successfully.
I was in Argentina last week, had a very excellent series
of meetings with the Minister of Defense and their Chief of
Defense about a whole range of areas that we can cooperate on
together. They want to partner with us. We talked about the
Coast Guard ship Stone's work and exercise. It is a right
level. And we got into the issue with the port. It was
approved, and then we had to try to find another port at the
last minute because of some port safety concerns that were
raised by our Coast Guard.
So, after speaking with Argentinian authorities, I actually
think it was more of a misunderstanding than any slight. They
clearly want to partner with us.
They point out that China is their largest economic
partner, as it is with the U.S. We have to figure out how to do
that going forward and provide an incentive for U.S. business,
industry, and our defense establishment to be able to sell in a
competitive manner with Argentina.
Mr. Ryan. It was a safety issue, that we determined it was
a safety issue?
Admiral Faller. We canceled the first port visit based on
concerns raised by the cutter's skipper. I am confident, I
trust in what I heard from the Minister of Defense, the Chief
of Defense there, that it was the right decision. And I look
forward to the next time we can come down and do a port visit
in Argentina.
Mr. Ryan. ``Safety'' as far as just safety of the ship or
terrorism or some kind of attack?
Admiral Faller. No. There are a number of factors. As a
ship driver myself, you assess the water depth, the pier, the
weather, all kind of things. And it was a decision made at the
commanding officer level. I have done the same thing before a
port visit, as you assess what is best for your ship.
Certainly not terrorism or any physical-threat safety to
that ship. Argentina has very capable security forces, and that
would have been taken care of, I am assured.
Illegal Fishing
Mr. Ryan. What are the international laws governing the
illegal fishing? Is there a body of law, a regime that we are
relying on to try to stop it?
Admiral Faller. Absolutely. And within nations' exclusive
economic zones, they have a right to that by international law.
And we see that there are nations that have distant high seas
fleets that routinely violate that international protocol.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Ryan.
We have an opportunity to do another round of questions, so
I am going to ask--as you can see, the timer has been set to 3
minutes. And we will start with Mr. Cuellar.
Funding Inventory
Mr. Cuellar. Especially. Thank you.
Admiral, just give me an inventory of what we can do to
address the issues that I asked on the first round of
questions. Just quickly give me an inventory of items that you
think we ought to fund or put the language in there. Just a
quick inventory.
Admiral Faller. Thank you.
First, I haven't seen the details of the next year's
budget. Once we do, we will come forward, as you all have asked
and as we have done in the past, with an unfunded requirements
list. I am confident that our department has a prioritization
system that is fair. We will make our case. But intel is one
area and, in particular, support for ISR platforms and the ISR
transfer fund.
In security cooperation, we greatly appreciate the
committee's support last year to restore which had been about a
32-percent cut over the previous 3 years. And at that, at about
a $120 million level, I think we need to all ask in the
Department of Defense, with that being my main muscle mover,
where the money is best spent to win the competition. And I
think we will make the case in our unfunded requirements based
on what we see in the level for additional funds there.
And then in terms of security cooperation, locations, and
presence, continued support to ensure that we have the right
level of people and the right level of presence. That would
include access to locations like Comalapa and Soto Cano.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Good.
And, again, thank you for what you do. I am going to yield
back the balance of my time. But if you can follow up with the
committee on my question, we want to be very helpful. Again, I
think the committee shares--I don't want to speak for
everybody, but I think we share the sense of urgency of what we
are seeing with those actors in South and Central America.
Admiral Faller. If I could just add, sir, the report that
you asked for is very important, because it will provide, from
a respected think tank, an analysis of the needs that we can
compare to our own analysis and, I think, would really inform
the work of your committee and Congress to help look at the
global balance of resources that we have, recognizing we will
never have enough for all the needs that we have, but where is
it best applied to get the leverage we need to be competitive
today and tomorrow. And I welcome that.
And I also appreciated your initiative on the Western
Hemisphere Initiative. It really is the seeds for what would be
a Marshall Plan-like initiative as we move forward.
Thank you.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Madam Chair and Ranking Member, members of the committee,
yeah, I was hoping this would have been ready on December 31st
of 2020, but COVID hit, so it will be ready on July 31st. And
this will give us a comprehensive of what we need to do with
the Department of Defense, State Department, USAID, a whole-of-
the-government approach for Central America. So maybe we could
put a placeholder there and work on it.
But my time is up. Thank you so much, Admiral, and thank
you, Madam Chair. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum. Absolutely. And I look forward to seeing the
report. And this needs to be a whole-of-government approach. We
need to be relying on diplomacy and development, and defense
should always be our last resort.
Would Mr. Calvert--and, Mr. Calvert, could you find out if
Ms. Granger is going to be able to join us back and let our
staff know? I know your staff is listening, so they could just
email.
Mr. Calvert.
Guantanamo
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Chair.
You brought up Guantanamo, Chair, and I wanted to get into
that a little bit with you, Admiral.
I know that you recently closed Camp Seven. The chair and I
were out there about, I guess--how long has that been? About a
year ago, I guess. And you consolidated everything into the
Camp Five, and we took a look at that when we were down there.
Could you describe the reason for this change? I think I
know that. It was obviously financial, along with the daily
operations related to costs. Is that working?
Admiral Faller. I certainly appreciated visiting there with
you and the chair. It was very productive, and it actually
helps us to see it through your eyes.
It was principally a safety issue. That camp you referenced
was never built to last, and it was in need of a number of
safety upgrades. And my mission is the safe treatment of the
detainees, and that is what we take very seriously. There will
be manpower efficiencies associated with that, so it is good in
that respect as well, but that is why we did it moving forward.
I would note, too--and you saw this when you were there,
sir--is the importance of that Naval station as the only base
we have in the hemisphere. Earlier I mentioned some security
cooperation locations, but that is the base that reports
directly to the Department of the Navy. It is a strategic
location. And the detention facility that is under my command
is just a small tenant of that overall strategic location and
Naval station.
Mr. Calvert. I understand that, Admiral.
One thing I wanted to bring up: As you know, the people
that are left there are the worst of the worst, and that is why
they are there. What, you have approximately 40 people there,
including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind behind the 9/
11 attack on the United States. Is that about the right number,
about 40 of them?
Admiral Faller. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Calvert. Now, the President has indicated a desire, as
the chair mentioned, to close the detention facility at some
point. Have you received any tasking orders or otherwise have
any information that a policy decision has been made to close
that facility?
Admiral Faller. That will be a policy decision, and we will
flex to however it goes forward, and we are looking forward to
being part of that process. But no decision has been made, to
my knowledge.
Mr. Calvert. Finally, obviously, you have the most, in my
mind and in a lot of people's mind, one of the most evil men on
the planet at Guantanamo, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
We were supposed to set up trials for some of these folks,
which never took place. Do you want to comment on what is going
on with the legal process there on Guantanamo?
Admiral Faller. The commission process is important. It is
important, as a Nation of laws, that we get this right and see
this to fruition. My role in this is to ensure that the
commissions get the right support logistically and with
security.
The commissions themselves report directly to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. And I know everybody in the
Department of Defense is committed to moving forward on this
line. COVID, of course, set us back some as we have worked
through the protocols associated with ensuring that we don't
introduce any COVID-19 at all on the island.
Mr. Calvert. Well, you can understand, it has been over 20
years, or almost 20 years, since 9/11, and a lot of Americans
are frustrated that the final justice has not been submitted to
that individual. I appreciate your concern. Thank you.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Ms. Kaptur.
Risk to Latin and South
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Admiral, how difficult would it be for me to get a briefing
listing every one of the countries that you have responsibility
for under your command and to get them ranked?
So, for example, you mentioned Guatemala and the
significant challenges of Guatemala. They would be underwater
on such a chart, in terms of the way you look at the world. You
said good things about Colombia, so they would be above the
watermark. Could you do that for all the nations in Latin
America to give me a better sense of which ones are deeply
troubled?
And then, in those countries, how much of the land is
really ungovernable, where people's lives are at risk, they are
leaving? You talked about the millions of people who have fled
different countries. Where can I get that information so I can
gain a more granular understanding?
Admiral Faller. We would be happy to set up a classified
briefing and go through all the factors.
But I wouldn't characterize Guatemala as underwater, other
than what we saw as the impacts of the hurricanes last year.
There are good people and there are aspects of the Guatemala
security team that I work with that are really good and working
hard to make a difference. I cited one, their Special Naval
Force. Their new Minister of Defense is committed to doing the
right thing. He is a trusted partner. Their new Chief of
Defense is the same.
And there are many reasons to be concerned about the sense
of urgency with which we have to get after the threats, but we
also need to recognize and play to our strengths too, which is
democracy and values. And I see real rays of light with respect
to Guatemala in that case, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. We have a lot of people who are escaping from
Guatemala and don't want to go back there. And, you know, you
could blame it on the hurricane, but I think there are other
reasons as well.
And in terms of the actual out-migration, does your office
calculate that from these various countries, or is that some
other--State Department or something?
Admiral Faller. That is other agencies, State Department
and the United Nations, that work on that data, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. Do we have good maps of where opiates are being
grown in the region under your command?
Admiral Faller. Absolutely. The DIA and the CIA have the
best data available and the best analysts in the world.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. If you help me gain a better
understanding, you could access that data?
Admiral Faller. Ma'am, we can set up a classified briefing,
and we will do that as soon as your availability supports.
Thank you.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. Thank you very much. Appreciate your
service. God bless you. Thank you.
Admiral Faller. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. McCollum. Ms. Kaptur, we will also work with the staff
to get you the information that the CIA World Factbook has. And
the World Bank has great statistics on everything from economic
development to stunting, to land title and everything else to
help you be prepared for when you have your classified
briefing. I found those to be excellent resources.
So, Mr. Rogers?
Venezuela
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
In my conversation yesterday that I mentioned, on the
telephone with President Duque of Colombia, one of the biggest
topics that he brought up was the border problem they have with
Venezuela--skirmishes that are taking place along the border of
Venezuela, fueled in large degree, they say, by the drug
traffic from Colombia through Venezuela and to the rest of the
world.
Maduro, President Maduro, in Venezuela has driven 1.7
million Venezuelans to abscond to Colombia. They are dealing
with 1.7 million refugees on top of all the other problems that
Colombia is facing.
Is there any indication, Admiral, that the reported
skirmishes with Venezuela will escalate? And do we have any
presence in that matter?
Admiral Faller. It is a credit to the Colombians and their
humanity and their heart that they have been able to accept
this large influx of migrants in a way that has respected them
and human rights in the midst of COVID. And it hasn't been
easy, and I commend President Duque and his team and their
leadership in this matter and their adherence to democracy in a
really tough situation, tough times.
Because right next-door, you have Maduro and his cronies,
enabled by tens of thousands of Cubans, hundreds of Russians,
Chinese and Iranians, including, you know, Iranian security
assistance, including cyber assistance by Russia, Russian
Spetsnaz, that have created a virtual narco-trafficking
paradise.
And so the significant influx of narco trafficking into
Venezuela by the ELN, FARC dissidents, and other groups, the
ease with which they can use that now as a base of operation to
distribute into Europe, into the Caribbean islands, to the
United States via Central America has complicated all of our
efforts to get after the problem set.
And you cite specifically the recent clashes, which, on the
face of it, would look like Maduro has turned against the narco
traffickers, but it is, as in all these things, much more
complicated. And then they quickly pointed and tried to blame
this on Colombia, when the facts of the matter are it is more
of a drug war/turf war between the Maduro security forces,
which are, for the most part, led by corrupt leaders, and the
narco traffickers, which share a similar values systems.
Colombia has held the line on the border.
Our role, the DOD's role, and our interagency role, with
this crisis, we have used it to strengthen our relationship
with Colombia, particularly in sharing intel. It is a two-way--
we get some of our best intel from their teams, and we share
what we know. And we have developed great protocols and systems
using our security cooperation authorities in this regard.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Ryan, and then we have Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Support for Latin and South America
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I have a question. I know we were talking about some of the
issues around human trafficking and stemming the flow of
migrants north on that very dangerous journey that we keep
hearing about.
What are we doing to help train some of our partners that
are involved, you know, along the way, along that journey? Are
we doing anything to help them deal with it?
And are you involved in those countries at all, helping
with some of the security issues that are there? I know there
is a lot of work going on with trying to, you know, build the
economy, but nothing is going to happen with the economy in
those countries until we get the security piece straight. If
you can enlighten us on that, that would be great.
Admiral Faller. You are absolutely right; we have to have
sustainable security to support the democracies and the
prosperity. The three of it goes together like the three legs
of a well-balanced stool. And INL and State Department and
others--DEA, CVP, and others--have the principal role, working
with the police, which need to be at the front line. In many of
these countries, though, the police are the most likely to be
corrupted and the ones that need the most help.
They are backstopped by their partner-nation militaries.
And what we have seen is the growing credibility of partner-
nation militaries that turned from the insurgencies of the
1980s and 1990s to professional forces that still have a long
way to go but that have made progress.
Our role in this is that professional development. It
starts with education programs. The IMET program, which is
congressionally appropriated through the Foreign Ops, is our
main game-changer there. We bring people to U.S. schools. We
are funded at about the $11 million range. When you all ask for
what more we could do, there is more that could be invested
there to come to U.S. schools.
Another great program that was mentioned is our human
rights program, funded out of our own budget at five people for
a whole hemisphere. More could be done there if resources were
available.
Women, Peace, and Security. You would say, how does that
matter? But it matters a lot. And it is a nascent program that
we have started, and it has proven to help our partners see how
they can better leverage the 50 percent of their population to
get involved in sustainable security. We have a small amount of
funds, and what we have seen is it resonates with our partners
as we go forward.
Noncommissioned Officer Development. Here in the United
States, we value our enlisted team. Our partners sometimes see
that differently. Getting them to value officers and enlisted
as one team working together inclusively is key. And we are
really investing, along with our State partners, in that.
So, going forward, DOD has a role to play, and we look
forward to playing that role, as we work on a sustainable
solution under the new $4 billion multiyear project that is
being conceived.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Ryan. I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you. And, Mr. Ryan, what you brought up
on the fishing is something that we need to be addressing with
the international community on that. I look forward to working
with you more on that.
Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Cartel Relationships
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Admiral, you have talked a lot and there have been
questions about the TCOs, about these organizations. Talk to me
about, is there any relationship between the cartels that, you
know, import arms, that traffic in arms, the cartels that
traffic in humans, the cartels that traffic in drugs? What
relationship do they have? Is that all they do? Like, if there
is a cartel that traffics in humans, is that all they do? Or
are they also the same ones or related to, have any
associations with ones that traffic in drugs and other things?
And, also, do they have any association or potential contacts
with cartels that not only are in this hemisphere?
So, you know, talk to us a little bit about: are they a
threat, who are they, why are they a threat. I understand this
is not a classified briefing, but whatever you think you can
share.
Admiral Faller. When COVID struck with a vengeance and just
tore at all of us, frankly--I am sure everyone here on this
screen has been impacted in some way, a family member,
personally--what we saw, the murderous nature of the cartels,
is they expanded their business model to include PPE and COVID
supplies and social services as they tried to gain influence
with the population.
So there are over 200 different narco-trafficking groups,
and one of the key efforts going forward has got to be to map
them in rank and rack-and-stack the most important and the
strongest to the less and determine the sorts of things that
each one thrives on.
And it changes and changes over time. So illegal mining,
business extortion, human trafficking, narco trafficking, the
distribution of medical supplies, corruption and undermining of
public business. Their business model revolves around basically
whatever they can do to make money and keep themselves in
power.
That has got to be part of how we get after it going
forward, and that has been a key part of our renewed efforts.
Intelligence Capabilities
Mr. Diaz-Balart. All right.
And you have had some questions about ISR. And I just want
to make sure that we kind of understand not only the importance
of it, but--you talked about it before, I think it was to Mr.
Calvert's question, about, you know, what percentage of ISR you
get.
Are you getting enough? And I understand that nobody has
enough, right? I mean, there is no command that will tell you,
oh, we have too much of it. Right? But I am saying, how
deficient is the level that you are getting? Is it, you know,
very deficient, or are you kind of scraping by but you would
like a little bit more? Where are you there?
And, actually, Madam Chairwoman, I just realized that my
time may have run out, so maybe if we have a second round.
But, if not, Admiral, if you can maybe just, you know, get
some information to me on that when you can.
I apologize, Madam Chairwoman, for going over.
Ms. McCollum. All right. Well, that is okay.
If you can answer that quickly.
So, if you can answer maybe in 30 seconds and then give the
committee back a fuller response.
Admiral Faller. Eight percent of our requirement was met
last year, and that was before the cut of the transfer fund.
And that transfer fund represented about 38 percent of our
overall budget for ISR. We will be even less than that as we
move through the execution here this year.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Carter.
Mr. Calvert. You know, Madam Chair, before the judge asks
his question, I am going to apologize. I have to go chair my
California delegation meeting, the few of us that are left. I
appreciate the judge taking over for a while.
Thank you.
Ms. McCollum. He is most welcome to do that.
Mr. Carter, for 3 minutes.
Marshall Plan
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Admiral, you mentioned an idea that you had of a Marshall
Plan for Central and South America. Do you want to talk a
little bit about that?
Admiral Faller. I am very encouraged, sir, by the efforts
of the administration to apply resources to Central America and
look at a longer-term plan, $4 billion over time, as I
understand it, as it moves forward.
I mean, I think as we look globally at the challenges and
then where are the opportunities, there is so much opportunity
here in this hemisphere, with the people--we share so much
values, democracies--the proximity, the resources, the
tremendous resource-rich hemisphere. It has a positive water
ratio--water is so important in the global future--and so much
arable land, access, important sea lines of communication, deep
harbors.
And so, if we look at the promise of the hemisphere and the
resources, I think, as a Nation, is it time to look at a big
idea for the hemisphere along the lines of some that we have
seen in the past? And, you know, I certainly get very excited
about the opportunity. The challenges and the sense of
urgencies are real, but we can leverage these opportunities to
make strength for the Americas, a hemisphere of promise and
prosperity.
Mr. Carter. Thank you. I like that challenge. With the
spending we are doing, it is going to be interesting, how we
would fund such a thing.
But one of the things the Marshall Plan did was rebuild the
existing industries of the countries that had been destroyed in
the war. Our challenge would be more to strengthen their
existing various factories and so forth, but, in turn, our
industry going down and participating in that area. And that
requires a safe harbor for them to be able to do it, including
a legal system that gives them recourse to protection under the
law, which is one of the real weaknesses I know about in
Central America. You just can't get protection from the legal
system.
It is going to be a real challenge. And it will take a lot
of people to go down there and straighten things out. But I
like the idea that we are thinking about it. So thank you,
Admiral, for doing that.
Madam Chairwoman, thank you.
Climate Changes Impact
Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you, Mr. Carter.
Sir, I have one follow-up on climate change. Due to time
limitation, we talked a little bit about it yesterday, but we
did touch on resilience and what we needed to do to be prepared
for future storms for our assets, especially in Key West--
housing back-up, emergency generators, all those kinds of
things, because you are interconnected with everyone on the
island as well.
I know you have some of that available. Anything you want
to add to that later, please provide to the committee.
Brazil
I have two questions. One is on Brazil. In 2019, President
Trump designated Brazil as a major non-NATO ally after he
visited the Brazilian President. Last month, Brazil's President
fired the Defense Minister. And, more recently, the three
branches of Brazil's Armed Forces all jointly resigned after
meeting with the new Defense Minister of Brazil.
Can you provide us a little bit of an update on the
situation in Brazil and how this has affected your relationship
with the new Defense Minister, who was a celebrated military
dictator, part of a dictatorship? 1964 through 1985, they
killed and tortured thousands of Brazilians. Could you maybe
enlighten us as to, well, what we are doing about that now?
Admiral Faller. The designation of Brazil as a major ally,
a non-NATO partner, was exactly the right thing to do to
recognize the progress that has been made and the
professionalism of their force. We have a great history and a
foundation to work forward from, with their participation with
us in World War II.
I have been to Brazil on multiple occasions, gone to their
schools, met with their Armed Forces. And that is what we do;
we work with their institutions. And the core of their
institutions are professional and are doing the right thing and
have responded in a professional manner.
I am very confident in my conversations with their Chief of
Defense and others that they are going to stay that
professional course. And I think that is what militaries do as
the ebb and flow of politics occurs, and I think we are seeing
some of that now in Brazil.
If I could just touch on that resilience question with
JIATF too. So important----
Ms. McCollum. I don't have enough time, because I have one
more question, so if you----
Admiral Faller. Okay.
Ms. McCollum [continuing]. Could get back to us on that,
because I want to be respectful of your time.
I am going to, in my capacity as a Member of Congress, talk
to State about what is going on with the Defense Minister. I
understand you have a different role that you play with that.
Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian assistance. Last year, Congress provided $90
million--that is 15 more than requested--for humanitarian
assistance. That was under the CARES Act for the COVID
response.
Before COVID, the USS Comfort and Mercy hospital ships were
often deployed to do humanitarian assistance in the region. Has
there been any discussion about bringing back a hospital ship
to the region later this year?
Admiral Faller. The Comfort deployments were extremely
successful with the hearts and minds and helping our partner
nations with their health services, which have been really
stressed.
We are actively planning in the right opportunity to do
medical engagement. It may be via the Comfort or a scalable air
mobile concept that we are working on called Heart. We are
looking at the right time for that. Many of our forces for
that, our Guard and our NGO partners, play heavily in that,
and, as we know, the Guard and our military is very engaged
right now supporting our domestic COVID response.
So, as we plan forward, we are looking, along with the
Department of Defense, of when the best window is. We certainly
think there is more opportunity there for that really important
program, the humanitarian assistance being coupled with that
medical support. And it shows the best of who we are here in
the United States with an outstretched hand of help.
Ms. McCollum. Well, I want to thank you for your emphasis
and for what you discussed with me with humanitarian assistance
and the role that the Department of Defense can play in
development and diplomacy in that engagement.
I also, when going through with your bio--I am going to
thank you for your years of service. You understand
humanitarian assistance in a way that really brought it home to
me: You worked on the USS Shiloh when the tsunami hit
Indonesia. You know how important our military can be showing
in professionalism, in the way that we can deliver aid, in the
way that we can deliver service. And we do that in a way that
our near-peer competitors can't.
And so, anything you would like to say in closing about
humanitarian assistance would be appreciated, if you want to
give this chair a little more direction on how to use the
Department of Defense for that.
And, once again, thank you so very much for your years of
service. We wish you good health and a wonderful retirement.
Admiral Faller. Thank you, Chair.
And thank you for representing that experience I had on
Shiloh. It really made an impression to the whole crew and all
of us that winning the competition is so important and so less
costly, really, than the conflict that we never want to have.
And we have to invest in winning this day-to-day
competition globally, not just regionally but globally. And the
modest investment in things like humanitarian assistance,
hospital ships, engagement, training and education, are really
key to doing that.
And we have to have that capability to bring it, but we are
best when we bring it with a handshake and, when we can in the
future, a hug. And thank you for recognizing that.
Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you again. We all, as you can
tell from the accolades early on, you know, thank you for your
service and wish you the best.
I want to thank all the committee members for their time.
So, Mr. Carter, we are going to adjourn at this time, you
standing in for the ranking member.
This concludes today's hearing, and the subcommittee stands
adjourned. Thank you all.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Cole and the
answers thereto follow:]
Economic and Developmental Aid
Question. Admiral, in your written testimony, one of the ways you
highlighted the importance of this region to U.S. national security
interests was by outlining the attention and presence paid to it by
some competitive and/or adversarial states. The threats and
opportunities on the continent are multidisciplinary. They encompass
the interests, and require the attention of, a number of federal
agencies and programs in a cooperative manner. Most of that we won't
get into in this forum, but I will ask further about the cooperation
with State and USAID in particular. For example, the U.S. role in
helping to train foreign forces is about as much a diplomatic
engagement as military. Can you speak to the value of that supplemental
engagement and also to intersections of your mission with the role of
U.S. economic and developmental aid in the region? Are we leveraging
these interagency efforts with each other as effectively as some of the
other nations challenging for influence in the region?
Answer. The benefits of training with the U.S. military are far
greater than just increased technical capability for the partner. Every
engagement builds trust with our partners and reassures them that the
United States wants to partner in meaningful ways, and at the speed of
relevance. When the U.S. military is present, we bring with us our
values and we model professional behavior--we show our partners what
``right'' looks like. We have programs in place to build the
institutional capacity of our partner nation forces and make them
resilient to all external influences and threats; programs to help
partner nations develop diverse and inclusive militaries that respect
the rule of law and human rights.
The military institution does play an important role in stabilizing
many countries. As we have seen throughout the COVID-19 response,
several partner nation militaries have been a lead and responsible
actor under complex conditions.
I do believe that economic and developmental aid are more likely to
have a positive and lasting impact if there is a basic level of
security in place. All military engagements with partner nations are
coordinated with the Chief of Mission and Country Team to ensure
alignment across U.S. Government (USG) and public and private sector
efforts. I do believe that interagency coordination is strong at
various levels of the USG, to include at the Country Team, and this
close coordination is key to leveraging all elements of U.S. national
power in a partner nation. However, there is always room for
improvement and, frankly, it is always going to be more difficult for a
democratic country like the U.S. to fully coordinate its efforts
compared to an authoritarian government that can fully control all
elements of its government and other sectors.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Question. Admiral Faller I certainly understand how important ISR
is for many missions in your theater of operation, and I suspect we
share a belief that ISR availability is not only critical, but probably
a nearly universal problem for U.S. forces. SOUTHCOM has raised this
issue with the Committee before. I also believe manned ISR platforms
continue to have an important place, along with unmanned.
So, I am also pleased this is a bicameral interest, as the Senate
Armed Services Committee encouraged the Department of Defense in their
FY21 report to explore enhancing ISR capabilities through modifications
or increased maintenance of current ISR assets or through possible
leasing of such systems. Do you anticipate support from the Department
in this area? How are things progressing?
Answer. SOUTHCOM is facing a critical shortfall of Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) this year due to the loss of the
ISR Transfer Fund, which has made up 47% of our total ISR funding over
the last five years. We have conveyed our concern about this ISR
shortfall within the Department and look forward to seeing funding
levels for ISR when the President's FY22 Budget Request is released.
National Guard Role
Question. I was very pleased your testimony highlighted the
significant role Guard and Reserve forces play in achieving your
mission. These men and women are very highly trained and capable of
stepping into critical roles seamlessly. I'm proud to note that
components of our own Oklahoma NG/ANG have supported important SOUTHCOM
missions in recent years. This may be less of a question than a
shameless plug for the hard work and training put in by these men and
women from my district--they are absolutely on par and professional in
their occupation specialties, but I will ask if you've found in your
experience that we are adequately resourcing them to be fully
operational from an equipment standpoint with your active duty
components?
Answer. I, too, am very proud of the significant role the National
Guard and Reserve plays. These forces are outstanding partners in
assisting us in meeting U.S. strategic objectives in our region. While
I would defer to the National Guard Bureau on specific resourcing
information, I can tell you that when they participate in our
partnership events, operations, or exercises, they always arrive ready
to successfully execute as needed. Their equipment has been deployable,
sustainable, and interoperable with our active duty forces, as well as
with our partners in many cases.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Cole.
Questions submitted by Mr. Womack and the answers thereto
follow:]
State Partnership Program
Question. The National Guard's State Partnership Program focuses on
building partner military capacity and defense capability in 82
countries, adding more partners each year. These partnerships support
COCOM, embassy, and partner nation objectives by providing or
facilitating things like cooperative training and exercises, disaster/
emergency response, leadership development, aviation operations, cyber
defense/communications security, military medical support, and counter
terrorism activities to name a few. These partnerships build enduring
relationships with an effective ``whole of society'' approach. One
critical component of these partnerships is the Bilateral Affairs
Officer (BAO), which are permanent National Guard billets located in
the partner nations. Can you please explain the overall importance of
the SPP in your AOR and specifically address the importance of having a
present Bilateral Affairs Officer in each of your partner nations? What
challenges have you experienced with having the BAO billets filled?
Finally, if you are funding any of these billets out of pocket, how
many are you funding and why are you doing so?
Answer. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is an integral part of
our engagement capability with our partners and a force multiplier in
the SOUTHCOM region. The State Partnership Program enables the exchange
of tremendous expertise resident in our citizen Soldiers and Airmen and
fosters long-term relationships with partner nation military and
security forces. SOUTHCOM fully leverages this value with 24 State
Partnerships--the most of any region. Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAOs)
are National Guard Bureau assigned personnel within our security
cooperation offices in partner nations that assist the State and
SOUTHCOM in managing and executing requirements associated with the SPP
and facilitate regular contact with the partner nation. This frequent
interface is a key component of building enduring relationships with
our partners. They are absolutely critical to the outstanding working
relationships between our partner nations, SOUTHCOM, and States
coordinating program events. While I defer to the National Guard Bureau
on specific issues with filling the various BAO positions around the
globe, I can tell you that NGB has been very supportive in filling our
BAO billets and they fund the majority of those billets as well.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Womack.]