[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOME-
LAND SECURITY COUNTERING WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 16, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-23
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-763 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY
Val Butler Demings, Florida, Chairwoman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Kat Cammack, Florida, Ranking
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Member
Al Green, Texas Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
officio) John Katko, New York (ex officio)
Lauren McClain, Subcommittee Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
Aaron Greene, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Val Butler Demings, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Kat Cammack, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Gary C. Rasicot, Acting Assistant Secretary, Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Christopher P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Appendix
Questions From Chairwoman Val Butler Demings for Gary C. Rasicot. 41
Questions From Ranking Member Kat Cammack for Gary C. Rasicot.... 42
Question From Honorable Andrew Garbarino for Gary C. Rasicot..... 42
Questions From Chairwoman Val Butler Demings for Chris P. Currie. 43
Question From Honorable Andrew Garbarino for Chris P. Currie..... 47
EXAMINING THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY COUNTERING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE
----------
Friday, July 16, 2021
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. via
Webex, Hon. Val Butler Demings [Chairwoman of the subcommittee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives Demings, Payne, Cammack, and
Miller-Meeks.
Mrs. Demings. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
examining the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction Office.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the
subcommittee in recess at any point.
We are here today to discuss the state of the United States
Department of Homeland Security Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Office.
This September marks the 20th anniversary of the worst
terrorist attack on U.S. soil. Since that time, there has been
general agreement that we as a Nation must be prepared to
address terrorism and attacks on our country regardless of the
mode of attack. This means being prepared for low-probability,
high-consequence attacks involving chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear materials.
As we emerge from an extremely tragic year, where COVID-19
took the lives of over 600,000 Americans, it does not take a
lot of imagination to envision the damage that a chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear attack could do to our
country. In addition to the immediate health and safety
consequences, such an attack could imperil our Nation's
critical infrastructure and destabilize large swaths of the
country.
For its part within DHS, it falls to the CWMD Office to not
only prevent such attacks, but also partner with domestic and
international partners to safeguard the United States against
health security attacks. Unfortunately, since CWMD was
authorized in 2018, it has faced significant challenges and
persistent problems, some of which predate the office's actual
establishment that have undermined the office's ability to
successfully fulfill its very vital mission.
CWMD's challenges were not unforeseen. In August 2016, the
Comptroller General cautioned, 2 years prior to the Trump
administration's unilateral action to consolidate both programs
within a new CWMD office, that DHS quote was--and I quote--
``did not fully access and document potential problems that
could result from consolidation''.
Although the CWMD work force has performed laudable
activities during the pandemic, taking such actions as issuing
guidance, performing biosurveillance, and leading efforts to
vaccinate the DHS work force, numerous Governmental and non-
Governmental reports indicate that there are significant
structural and work force morale issues within CWMD. CWMD is at
a crossroads.
At this time, there are a number of proposals to spin off
major portions of the office, and there is a fair bit of
skepticism that the organization will have adequate resources
to deliver the promise of its most prominent and consequential
detection program.
For instance, DHW--DHS continues to struggle to deliver
biodetection capability that can effectively deploy in urban
and other high-risk areas. In 2003, DHS began installing
BioWatch, air samplers, and conspicuously at street level and
atop buildings in cities across the country to detect deadly
biological attack. But that program never quite delivered the
situational awareness that local responders needed.
So DHS shifted gears to the BioDetection for the 21st
Century, or BD21, Program. Unfortunately, that program is
struggling, too. In fact, a May 2021 report issued by the
Comptroller General found that the program faces technical
challenges due to inherent limitations and the technologies and
uncertainties with combining technology for use and
biodetection.
Then there is the Securing the Cities Program, which is
supposed to detect nuclear and radiological threats in urban
areas. In recent years, the Trump administration sowed
confusion and uncertainty among city officials participating in
the program, according to the Comptroller General, when the
then leader of CWMD communicated to stakeholders that DHS
wanted to reduce its participation and let other Federal
agencies play a larger role.
Around the same time, in 2019, there was reporting that the
Trump administration had quietly dismantled or cut back
programs such as CWMD's Red Team Program that carried out
dozens of drills and assessments around the country each year
to help Federal, State, and local officials detect potential
threats, such as improvised nuclear device concealed in a
suitcase or a cargo ship carrying a radiation-spewing dirty
bomb, as well as the operation support directorate, which had
helped lead up to 20 WMD-related training exercises each year
with State and local authorities.
Some of the challenges CWMD faces today are a by-product of
the way in which CWMD was formed by the Trump administration.
Other challenges are intrinsic in its mission.
Given all of these challenges, DHS leadership will have to
prioritize improvements to CWMD in order to enhance the
Department's counter-CBRN programs.
This subcommittee stands ready to assist CWMD and the
Department in their efforts to improve our Nation's ability to
protect the homeland against weapons of mass destruction.
I along with Members of this subcommittee are grateful for
the participation of our witnesses here today, the Acting
Secretary of CWMD, Gary Rasicot; and Christopher Currie,
director of the Homeland and Justice Division within GAO. We
look forward to your testimony.
[The statement of Chairwoman Demings follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Val Butler Demings
July 16, 2021
Good morning.
We are here today to discuss the state of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD).
This September marks the 20th anniversary of the worst terrorist
attack on U.S. soil.
Since that time there has been general agreement that we, as a
Nation, must be prepared to address terrorism and attacks on our
country--regardless of the mode of attack.
That means being prepared for low-probability, high-consequence
attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
materials. As we emerge from an extremely tragic year, where COVID-19
took the lives of over 600,000 Americans, it does not take a lot of
imagination to envision the damage that a Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) attack could do to our country. In
addition to the immediate health and safety consequences, such an
attack could imperil our Nation's critical infrastructure and
destabilize large swaths of the country.
For its part, within DHS, it falls to the CWMD Office to not only
prevent such attacks but also partner with domestic and international
partners to safeguard the United States against health security
threats. Unfortunately, since CWMD was authorized in 2018, it has faced
significant challenges and persistent problems, some of which predate
the Office's establishment, that have undermined the Office's ability
to successfully fulfill its vital mission.
CWMD's challenges were not unforeseen. In August 2016, the
Comptroller General 2 years prior to the Trump administration's
unilateral action to consolidate existing programs into a new CWMD
office--that DHS ``did not fully assess and document potential problems
that could result from consolidation.''
Although the CWMD workforce has performed laudable activities
during the pandemic--taking such actions as issuing guidance,
performing biosurveillance, and leading efforts to vaccinate the DHS
workforce--numerous Governmental and non-Governmental reports indicate
that there are significant structural and workforce morale issues
within CWMD.
CWMD is at a crossroads. At this time, there are a number of
proposals to spin off major portions of the office and there is a fair
bit of skepticism that the organization will have adequate resources to
deliver on the promise of its most prominent and consequential
detection programs.
For instance, DHS continues to struggle to deliver a biodetection
capability that can be effectively deployed in urban and other high-
risk areas. In 2003, DHS began installing BioWatch air samplers
inconspicuously at street level and atop buildings in cities across the
country to detect deadly biological attacks. But that program never
quite delivered the situational awareness that local responders needed
so, DHS, shifted gears to the ``Biodetection for the 21st Century'' or
``BD21'' program. Unfortunately, that program is struggling too. In
fact, a May 2021 report issued by the Comptroller General found that
the program faces ``technical challenges due to inherent limitations in
the technologies and uncertainties with combining technologies for use
in biodetection.''
Then there is the Securing the Cities program, which is supposed to
detect nuclear and radiological threats in urban areas. In recent
years, the Trump administration sowed ``confusion and uncertainty''
among city officials participating in the program, according to the
Comptroller General, when the then-leader of CWMD communicated to
stakeholders that DHS wanted to reduce its participation and let other
Federal agencies play a larger role.
Around the same time, in 2019, there was reporting that the Trump
administration had quietly dismantled or cut back programs such as--
CWMD's ``Red Team'' program that carried out dozens of drills and
assessments around the country each year to help Federal, State, and
local officials detect potential threats such as an improvised nuclear
device concealed in a suitcase, or a cargo ship carrying a radiation-
spewing ``dirty bomb'' as well as the Operations Support Directorate,
which had helped lead up to 20 WMD-related training exercises each year
with State and local authorities.
Some of the challenges CWMD faces today are a byproduct of the way
in which CWMD was formed by the Trump administration; other challenges
are intrinsic to its mission.
Given all of its challenges, DHS leadership will have to prioritize
improvements to CWMD in order to enhance the Department's counter-CBRN
programs.
This subcommittee stands ready to assist CWMD and the Department in
their efforts to improve our Nation's ability to protect the homeland
against weapons of mass destruction.
I, along with the Members of this subcommittee are grateful for the
participation of our witnesses here today, the acting assistant
secretary of CWMD, Gary Rasicot, and Christopher Currie, director of
the Homeland and Justice Division within GAO. We look forward to your
testimony.
Mrs. Demings. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member
of the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Cammack,
for an opening statement.
Mrs. Cammack. Well, thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Pleasure to see everyone here today.
Thank you to our witnesses.
In less than 2 months, our Nation will collectively mourn
the 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Following
those attacks, the Department of Homeland Security was created
to combat threats posed by al-Qaeda and other extremist and
terrorist groups. However, in the last 20 years, the terrorist
threat landscape has changed dramatically.
Terrorist groups and extremists have long strived to employ
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials as
part of their attacks. In 2001, anthrax attacks highlighted the
grim reality of a bioweapon. The powder was delivered through
the mail, ultimately killing 5 people, making ill 17, and
shutting down much of the Capitol complex.
In 2017, the Australian Government disrupted a plot
allegedly hatched by ISIS supporters that involved setting off
a device to release toxic gas in an enclosed public space. Even
now, when we are finally looking down at the downslope of
COVID-19, questions have been raised as to the origins of a
virus that has crippled not just the United States, but the
entire world, and has cost more than 600,000 American lives. It
is imperative that we stand ready to counter these types of
threats.
The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office was
authorized in December 2018 to elevate and streamline efforts
to prevent terrorism using weapons of mass destruction.
Unfortunately, CWMD has had its fair share of growing pains.
Media reporting in 2019 indicated that the CWMD Office
significantly scaled back or eliminated programs specifically
put in place to help protect the United States.
According to reports, subject-matter experts were removed
from their areas of expertise, vital risk assessments were
halted, and training exercises aimed at helping State and local
officials were minimized.
Similarly, the GAO has issued several reports highlighting
the many shortfalls that the office has encountered through its
various programs. I am happy that we will hear from them today.
For example, GAO recently found that CWMD had taken little
action on assessing and working with cities participating in
the Securing the Cities Program on sustaining their detection
capabilities. Securing the Cities aims at reducing the risk of
a successful deployment of a radiological or nuclear weapon
against major metropolitan areas within the United States.
Without analyzing risks related to sustainment and working with
cities to address these risks, radiological detection
capabilities around the country could and will deteriorate.
GAO and DHS's Office of Inspector General have both
reported on the long-standing challenges that CWMD has faced
with regard to its biodetection technologies and BioWatch
Program, a system intended to detect biological agents and
provide early warning in the event of a biological attack.
Most recently, in March, the OIG reported that the system
monitors and detects less than 50 percent of the biological
agents known to be threats because BioWatch had not updated its
biological agent-detection capabilities with their 2017 threat
assessment results.
Additionally, in July of just last year, DHS's OIG report
cited that CWMD, although required under the Securing Our
Agriculture and Food Act had, quote, limited awareness of DHS
and their on-going efforts and cannot ensure it is adequately
prepared to respond to a terrorist attack against the Nation's
food, agriculture, or veterinary systems.
Considering the supply shortages that we have faced both
last year and this year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I cannot
simply imagine the consequences if our food and agricultural
systems were attacked.
I would be remiss if I did not mention the low morale CWMD
has faced since the office's formation. In 2019, the CWMD
Office was ranked dead last amongst the like-sized agencies in
the Partnership for Public Service's Best Places to Work
rankings.
In 2020, while the office made slight progress, it ranked
403 out of 411 agencies, moving up only a handful of slots. A
dedicated and motivated work force is so important for the
success of this office and these programs that maintain our
Nation's readiness to detect, deter, and thwart a terrorist
attack.
As I have highlighted in my opening statement, the
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office has unfortunately
hit many roadblocks since its creation. I am hopeful, as is, I
am sure, the rest of our members of this committee, that this
hearing will bring to light the underlying issues that have
plagued the CWMD's success, and that we may have a fruitful and
candid discussion that puts us on a positive path forward.
I thank Chairwoman Demings for holding this very important
hearing, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses here
today.
With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Cammack follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Kat Cammack
In less than 2 months, our Nation will collectively mourn the 20th
anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Following those attacks, the
Department of Homeland Security was created to combat threats posed by
al-Qaeda and other extremist and terrorist groups. However, in the last
20 years, the terrorist threat landscape has changed dramatically.
Terrorist groups and extremists have long strived to employ
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials in their
attacks.
In 2001, anthrax attacks highlighted the grim reality of a
bioweapon. The powder was delivered through the mail, ultimately
killing 5 people, making ill 17, and shutting down much of the Capitol
Complex.
In 2017, the Australian government disrupted a plot allegedly
hatched by ISIS supporters that involved setting off a device to
release toxic gas in an enclosed public space.
And even now, when we are finally looking at the down slope of the
COVID-19 pandemic, questions have been raised as to the origins of a
virus that crippled, not just the United States, but the entire world
and cost more than 600,000 American lives.
It is imperative that we stand ready to counter these types of
threats.
The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) was
authorized in December 2018 to elevate and streamline efforts to
prevent terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately,
CWMD has had its fair share of growing pains.
Media reporting in 2019 indicated that the CWMD office
significantly scaled back or eliminated the programs specifically put
in place to help protect the United States. According to reports,
subject-matter experts were removed from their areas of expertise,
vital risk assessments were halted, and training exercises aimed at
helping State and local officials were minimized.
Similarly, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued
several reports highlighting the many shortfalls the Office has
encountered through its various programs. I am happy that we will hear
from them today.
For example, GAO recently found that CWMD has taken little action
on assessing and working with cities participating in the Securing the
Cities program on sustaining their detection capabilities. Securing the
Cities aims at reducing the risk of a successful deployment of a
radiological or nuclear weapon against major metropolitan areas in the
United States. Without analyzing risks related to sustainment and
working with cities to address these risks, radiological detection
capabilities around the country could and will deteriorate.
GAO and DHS's Office of Inspector General have both reported on the
long-standing challenges that CWMD has faced with regard to its
biodetection technologies and BioWatch Program--a system intended to
detect biological agents and provide early warning in the event of a
biological attack. Most recently, in March, the OIG reported that the
system monitors and detects less than 50 percent of biological agents
known to be threats because BioWatch has not updated its biological
agent detection capabilities with their 2017 threat assessment results.
Additionally, in July of last year, DHS's OIG reported that CWMD,
although required under the Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act,
``has limited awareness of DHS's on-going efforts and cannot ensure it
is adequately prepared to respond to a terrorist attack against the
Nation's food, agriculture, or veterinary systems.'' Considering the
supply shortages we faced last year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I
can't imagine the consequences if our food and agricultural systems
were attacked.
And I would be remiss if I didn't mention the low morale CWMD has
faced since the office's formation. In 2019, the CWMD Office was ranked
dead last among like-sized agencies in the Partnership for Public
Service's Best Places to Work rankings. In 2020, while the Office made
slight progress, it ranked 403 out of 411 agencies, only moving up a
few slots.
A dedicated and motivated workforce is so important for the success
of this office and these programs that maintain our Nation's readiness
to detect, deter, and thwart a terrorist attack.
As I've highlighted in my opening statement, the Countering Weapons
of Mass Destruction Office has unfortunately hit many roadblocks since
its creation. I am hopeful that this hearing will bring to light the
underlying issues that have plagued CWMD's success and that we may have
a fruitful discussion that puts us on a positive path forward.
I thank Chairwoman Demings for holding this important hearing and I
look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Mrs. Demings. I thank the Ranking Member for her statement.
Members are also reminded that the committee will operate
according to the guidelines laid out by the Chairman and
Ranking Member in their February 3 colloquy regarding remote
procedures.
Without objection, Members not on the subcommittee shall be
permitted to sit and question the witnesses.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an
opening statement.
Is Chairman Thompson on?
Is the Ranking Member on?
OK. We will move forward, and, if Mr. Thompson joins us, we
will go back to him.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
July 16, 2021
Good morning.
Thank you to Chairwoman Demings and Ranking Member Cammack for
holding this hearing.
I am glad to have Acting Assistant Secretary Rasicot and Director
Currie at today's hearing to discuss the status of the Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) at this critical time.
In 2018, the Office was created with the dual mission of preventing
a Weapons of Mass Destruction attack against the United States and
leading DHS's efforts to safeguard the United States against chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and health security threats.
By 2019, it was apparent that CWMD was in trouble. That is when we
learned of the Trump administration dismantling several of the Office's
programs.
In August 2019, I, along with then-Ranking Member Mike Rogers and
our Senate counterparts, wrote to DHS to express our concerns about the
changes under way at CWMD. The then-Assistant Secretary, James
McDonnell, responded by assuring us that the CWMD programs were
``realigned or restructured to better address threats, remove
bureaucratic redundancy, and fully align with the President's National
Security Strategy and our appropriation.''
Shortly thereafter, there were a series of abrupt changes in
leadership during the last year of the Trump administration. Mr.
Rasicot, I look forward to hearing why you came back to lead CWMD and
what you plan to do to get CWMD on a positive trajectory.
One area of major concern is CWMD's low workforce morale. In 2019,
morale within this Office was ranked the lowest among all subagencies
in the Federal Government, according to the Office of Personnel
Management.
It has been reported that CWMD's biological threat detection
system, BioWatch, which is deployed in 30 major metropolitan areas, is
unable to fulfill its primary task of detecting aerosolized biological
attacks. Confidence in the direction CWMD took the program hit a new
low when, in 2021, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense recommended
to eliminate the program from all future Presidential budget requests
until replacement technology is identified and confirmed to meet the
needs of the program.
Additionally, CWMD's nuclear and radiological defense efforts have
significant challenges. According to the Comptroller General, CWMD's
``Securing the Cities'' program, which is operated by local authorities
in metropolitan areas to prevent terrorist attacks and other high-
consequence events, does not collect information to fully track program
spending or performance and and has ``not addressed challenges to
sustaining the programs.''
At this time, it is critical that we hear from current CWMD
leadership about its plan to address the challenges identified by GAO
and others.
Given all the challenges inherited from the Trump administration,
the challenge before the Biden administration, at this time, is where
to focus its energies to position CWMD for success. I welcome the
testimony from our witnesses today and hope to learn about the
solutions to these many challenges.
Mrs. Demings. I now welcome our panel of witnesses. The
first witness is Gary Rasicot. Mr. Rasicot serves as the acting
assistant secretary for the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office. Mr.
Rasicot previously served as the acting assistant secretary of
CWMD from October 2019 to July 2020.
Prior to his role within CWMD, he assumed the duties of the
U.S. Coast Guard deputy commandant for support--for mission
support deputy for personnel readiness in 2018 and has
experience working within the Transportation Security
Administration.
Mr. Rasicot has also served as an active-duty Coast Guard
officer for more than 20 years, and this subcommittee
appreciates him for his service.
Mr. Rasicot, thank you so much for joining us today.
Our second witness is Christopher Currie.
Mr. Currie served as the director of homeland and justice
division within the U.S. Government Accountability Office. In
his role, Mr. Currie leads GAO's investigative work on
emergency management, disaster response and recovery, and
management of the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Currie
began his time with GAO in 2002.
Mr. Currie, thank you so much for joining us as well.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now give each witness the opportunity to summarize their
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Acting Assistant
Secretary Rasicot.
STATEMENT OF GARY C. RASICOT, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Rasicot. Chairwoman Demings, Ranking Member Cammack,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to speak with you today. I appreciate this
opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland Security
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, known as CWMD,
and our efforts to safeguard the Nation from chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and other health security
threats.
Additionally, I would like to thank the committee and its
Members for their on-going support of the CWMD Office;
specifically, Representative Payne, who was so helpful in
getting our authorization bill passed.
In accordance with the CWMD Act of 2018, CWMD is the hub of
the Department's CBRN and other health security activities,
providing coordination, strategy and policy guidance,
intelligence analysis, operation support, and developing and
deploying technologies that support operational partners.
The President's budget requests $427 million in fiscal year
2022 to support 309 Federal staff and the programs critical to
the CWMD mission.
I have had the privilege of leading the C--this office
twice, most recently since January 2021. My priorities for this
office have been, No. 1, to establish a safe, collaborative,
and productive work environment; No. 2, to ensure risk-based
mission capability across the broad spectrum of threats; and,
No. 3, to strengthen both our critical partnerships and support
to DHS operating components and our full range of Federal,
State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners.
Over the past 2 years, we have made notable progress in
strengthening our programs with invaluable input from our
colleagues in Congress, the Government Accountability Office,
and the Office of the Inspector General, as well as many first-
responder and other operational organizations we support.
Recent mission accomplishments include strengthening CWMD
flagship biodefense programs, including near-term actions with
BioWatch and the formal recapitalization acquisition program,
known as BD21; expanding the Securing the Cities Program;
reinvigorating the DHS Food, Agriculture, and Veterinarian
Defense Program; responding to the COVID-19 pandemic through
biosurveillance and supporting CDC in implementing public
health actions; strengthening the CWMD coordination role
through a three-part series of exercises that included over 300
DHS Federal, State, and local participants over the past
several months.
The DHS chief medical officer led the Operation Vaccinate
our Workforce, which has vaccinated more than 75,000 front-line
mission-critical and DHS employees.
Finally, we have focused extensively on improving employee
morale. CWMD established an employee engagement team to empower
staff at all levels to provide input and share ownership in the
organization's strategic decision-making process. Throughout
the pandemic, we have conducted over 70 weekly virtual town
halls, with an average of more than 250 of our staff
participating.
Additionally, I have personally held numerous small town
halls to engage the work force at multiple ladders. These and
other actions have played a significant role in CWMD being
reflected as one of DHS's most improved components in the
overall rankings in the recently released Partnership for
Public Service's Best Places to Work in the Federal Government.
The creation of CWMD through the CWMD Act of 2018 elevated
and streamlined the ability of DHS to successful resource and
execute this critical mission. But, as with any new
organization, there is certainly room for refinement and
improvement. We plan to work closely with the Members of this
subcommittee as we strive to improve the CWMD Office.
On the behalf of the CWMD staff, who work tirelessly to
keep the American people safe, I look forward to working with
each of you on the continued authorization of our office.
Finally, I am humbled to be here representing this office
and the Department of Homeland Security. To me, this hearing is
the Federal Government at work, just like we all learned about
in school as kids. Growing up, I did not think I could have
ever imagined that I would be afforded such a privilege, so
thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rasicot follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary C. Rasicot
July 16, 2021
introduction
Chairwoman Demings, Ranking Member Cammack, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak with
you today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
(CWMD)'s efforts to safeguard the Nation from chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear (CBRN), and other health security threats,
including highlights from our fiscal year 2022 budget request.
In accordance with the CWMD Act of 2018, CWMD is the hub for the
Department's CBRN and other health security activities: Providing
coordination, strategy and policy guidance, intelligence analysis,
operations support, and developing and deploying technologies through
our research, development, test, evaluation (RDT&E), and acquisition
initiatives. With your support, the creation of an Office solely
focused on CBRN and other health security threats has elevated and
streamlined the ability of DHS to successfully resource and execute
this critical mission. Our programs and responsibilities are much more
expansive than the sum of the legacy organizations from which we were
formed. While each CBRN and health security portfolio poses unique
threats and mitigation opportunities, overall, the Department and the
mission have benefited considerably by bringing together the elements
of the counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) portfolio.
I have been the acting assistant secretary for CWMD collectively
for more than 1 year, most recently since January 2021, and previously
serving in this same role from October 2019 through July 2020. Prior to
my time at CWMD, I served in various leadership roles with the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration. Throughout
my tenure at CWMD, my priorities for the Office have been to: (1)
Establish a collaborative, safe, and productive work environment; (2)
ensure risk-based mission capability across the broad spectrum of CBRN
and health security threats, including ensuring that CBRN detection
acquisition programs are informed by both intelligence and stakeholder
requirements; (3) strengthen CWMD's support and partnerships with DHS
operating components, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and
other support entities; (4) broaden partnerships across the Federal
Government; and (5) strengthen assistance to and the relationships with
State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners.
The President's budget requests $427 million in fiscal year 2022
funds to support 309 Federal staff and the programs critical to the
CWMD mission. This represents an increase of $25 million over the
fiscal year 2021 enacted amount for CWMD. CWMD allocates the $427
million across four appropriations: Research and Development,
Procurement, Federal Assistance, and Operations and Support.
The programs and activities I will specifically discuss today
represent a fraction of CWMD's work to mitigate the risk to the Nation
from these threats, which is performed in close collaboration with our
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial (FSLTT) partners.
risk-based approach to protect against cbrn threats
CBRN and other health security threats present dynamic challenges
to U.S. National and homeland security, whether from nation-states,
terrorists, lone actors, or groups of domestic violent extremists. In
our increasingly complex world, risks are evolving with the convergence
of technologies, spillover of animal pathogens to human populations,
access to dual-use material and information, and the degradation of WMD
norms.
Defending the homeland against CBRN threats requires a risk-based
approach, and we must prioritize activities that ``buy down'' the most
risk. Building on the previous work of legacy offices, CWMD is
revitalizing a rigorous, repeatable, and transparent process to
prioritize where the Office should focus its resources to have the
greatest impact. CWMD is requesting $15 million, which includes an $8
million increase, for capabilities and risk assessment activities to
counter enduring and emerging CBRN threats.
Related to this effort, CWMD is partnering with DHS S&T to
reinvigorate a strategic CBRN risk assessment that integrates the
findings of the intelligence and law enforcement communities with input
from the scientific, medical, and public health communities.
warning of biological threats and incidents in time to save lives
CWMD's flagship biodefense programs provide warning of biological
attacks or incidents with the goal of enabling a rapid response to save
lives.
National Biosurveillance Integration Center
The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) integrates,
analyzes, and distributes information about on-going and emerging
biological incidents to help ensure the Nation's responses at all
levels of Government are well-informed, save lives, and minimize
economic impact. NBIC is unique in the biosurveillance community in
that it looks across all biological threats--pandemic, accidents, and
bioterrorism--across multiple sectors--wildlife, human, agriculture,
and environmental. The Center also provides deep analysis on the impact
of these biological threats to homeland security.
In fiscal year 2020 through Quarter 2 of fiscal year 2021, NBIC
produced more than 950 biosurveillance products, and increased the
audience for the Center's biosurveillance products by more than 30
percent. Recipients represent 14 Federal departments and agencies,
including HHS who leads Federal public health and medical response, 589
SLTT agencies, and 11 Government information-sharing systems.
In fiscal year 2022, CWMD requests $15.8 million for NBIC, an
increase of $3.5 million over the fiscal year 2021 amount.
This funding will accelerate NBICs efforts to integrate new
biosurveillance systems to advance the capabilities of our partners and
the National biosurveillance enterprise.
BioWatch
As the Nation's primary biodetection capability, CWMD's BioWatch
Program gives warning of an airborne bioterrorist attack in over 30
major metropolitan areas across the United States. Outward signs and
symptoms of a biological attack may emerge slowly. BioWatch can detect
the presence of certain biological agents in the air after release by a
terrorist or other bad actor to marshal an earlier response.
Managed by the CWMD Office, the BioWatch program is locally
operated and supports coordination among scientists, laboratory
technicians, emergency managers, law enforcement officers, and public
health officials. Although labor-intensive, the BioWatch technology is
proven and reliable and uses the same technology, Polymerase Chain
Reaction, that is used in the most sensitive COVID-19 diagnostic
testing. DHS modeling has shown that BioWatch warning can reduce
casualties by 75 percent by enabling faster administration of medical
countermeasures. The President's budget requests $83.7 million for
BioWatch in fiscal year 2022.
In response to a recent Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
audit, CWMD required all jurisdictions to enhance the physical security
of portable sampling units (PSU) and developed a multi-year exercise
plan for routine full-scale exercises; these actions closed two OIG
recommendations. CWMD is addressing open recommendations by assessing
whether BioWatch can expand the number of biological threat agents
detected and assessing PSU location to maximize the protection of
American lives. To implement these improvements, the President's budget
request includes an additional $3.3 million within the BioWatch Program
for fiscal year 2022.
Biological Detection for the 21st Century (BD21)
CWMD is committed to protecting the American people from biological
threats through technology and collaborative partnerships. In 2019, DHS
began a major acquisition program entitled Biological Detection for the
Twenty-First Century (BD21), to move toward the next generation of a
National biodetection system.
BD21 is a Level 1 (i.e. major) acquisition program to address some
of BioWatch's limitations. For example, the BioWatch system produces
accurate and reliable results, but the detect-to-warn time line could
be shortened to more swiftly deploy life-saving countermeasures. BD21
seeks to design, develop, and deploy networked detection systems that
continuously monitor the air, collect real-time data, and employ data
analytics to detect anomalies that may indicate the presence of
biological agents. The faster anomalies are detected, the faster first
responders can address potential threats. The program is currently in
the development phase.
CWMD has conducted extensive stakeholder engagement with State and
local partners to maximize the impact of BD21 and ensure this
technology development is informed by local requirements and
operational constraints. Through BD21, CWMD will train and equip first
responders with the tools and information they need to take the fast,
initial actions to save lives. CWMD will also remain engaged with
laboratories, which are key partners in the effort to counter
biological threats, and coordinate with the public health community.
The President's budget requests a $6.2 million increase over fiscal
year 2021 enacted, totaling $9.7 million for BD21 R&D in fiscal year
2022.
Strategic Review of Biodefense Posture
CWMD has initiated a strategic review of its biodefense posture in
line with the President's January tasking under Executive Order 13987
to recommend actions to the President concerning emerging biological
risks and National biopreparedness policies. CWMD will review its
policy and programs, including environmental detection programs, to
determine how best to prepare the Nation to mitigate enduring and
emerging biological threats, incorporating the lessons from COVID-19.
detecting radiological and nuclear threats to prevent attacks
An act of radiological or nuclear (R/N) terrorism would have a
devastating impact on the United States. DHS began the Securing the
Cities (STC) Program to enhance the Nation's ability to detect and
prevent terrorist attacks and other high-consequence events using
nuclear or other radiological materials in high-risk urban areas. In
support of this mission, CWMD provides detection equipment, training,
exercise support, operational and technical subject-matter expertise,
and programmatic support through a cooperative agreement grant process
with eligible U.S. regions.
STC is currently operational in 13 high-risk urban areas across the
Nation, adding 8 additional high-risk urban areas since fiscal year
2020. The STC Program uses a regional approach to R/N detection that
allows for a layered defense posture to increase the probability of
detection. In addition, coordination with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and their specialized teams ensures a timely hand-off and
rapid response to a possible terrorism event. In order to continue to
support this effort, the President's budget requests $30 million in
fiscal year 2022, which represents an increase of $5.4 million over the
fiscal year 2021 enacted funding.
Beyond STC, CWMD's Mobile Detection Deployment Program (MDDP)
enhances CBRN detection and R/N interdiction capabilities by deploying
equipment and technical support for State and local surge operations
and events of National significance. To date, in fiscal year 2021, MDDP
has conducted 124 deployments in 22 States supporting 57 Federal, 18
State, and 28 local agencies. These deployments were scaled back in
fiscal year 2021 due to Federal, State, and local partners' internal
policies related to COVID-19. In fiscal year 2022 MDDP is expected to
conduct 144 deployments across the United States. This program
continues at $6.8 million for fiscal year 2022.
developing and deploying technologies to support operations
CWMD continues to ensure implementation of robust domestic CBRN
detection architectures through development and deployment of
technologies to our FSLTT operational partners.
CWMD's R&D program manages efforts to identify, explore, develop,
and demonstrate science and technologies that address gaps in the
detection architecture, improve performance of CBRN detection and
analysis, and reduce the operational burden of detection systems in the
field. In addition to developing new CBRN sensors, the R&D program also
improves detection through data analytics (advanced algorithms
employing machine learning/artificial intelligence).
CWMD works with first responders and other operators to ensure
transition of technologies to the field. For example, the Mobile Urban
Radiological Search system provides operators in U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) with the ability to detect, locate, and
identify anomalous radioactive materials through the data fusion of
directional radiation detectors with video cameras. Smaller fixed
Optical Warning & Localization systems with similar capabilities have
been used by the MDDP in support of local law enforcement to protect
venues at National Security Special Events, such as the Indianapolis
500, or at CBP checkpoints.
During fiscal year 2021, CWMD conducted two technology
demonstrations of advanced spectroscopic R/N detection technology at
two U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints to evaluate improvements in
detection effectiveness and efficiency over the current technology.
Additionally, CWMD procured R/N detection systems for DHS operational
components, including more than 16,000 Personal Radiation Detectors.
CWMD is also acquiring new enhanced Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) to
replace the first 216 of approximately 1,400 aging RPMs protecting our
borders.
CWMD continues to expand beyond its legacy R/N RDT&E and
acquisition programs to address chemical and biological threats in
close coordination with our colleagues in DHS S&T and consistent with
the CWMD Act of 2018. For example, in fiscal year 2021, CWMD delivered
chemical detectors to 20 DHS Operational Field Units and unmanned
ground vehicles equipped with chemical detection capabilities to DHS
special mission units.
Finally, CWMD chairs the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Requirements Oversight Council, composed of Senior Executives from 9
DHS components, to facilitate the executive review, prioritization, and
approval of capability needs and gaps of CWMD operational requirements
across DHS components and work with the DHS Joint Requirements Council
to validate counter-WMD requirements.
In fiscal year 2022, the President's budget requests $65.7 million
for Research and Development Activities, which is consistent with the
enacted amount for fiscal year 2021 of $65.3 million. The fiscal year
2022 request also includes $53.7 million to procure and deploy large
scale detection systems and $15 million to acquire portable detection
systems.
ensuring a coordinated approach to counter chemical threats
In response to a 2018 Government Accountability Office audit, CWMD
established the DHS Chemical Coordination Group (CCG) in 2019 to meet
the evolving threat from chemical attacks and incidents. This body is
composed of representatives from DHS components with significant
chemical defense equities and serves as the primary coordination
mechanism for DHS chemical defense. The CCG has addressed issues such
as current and emerging chemical threats, including coordinating DHS
actions on pharmaceutical-based agents (e.g. fentanyl). The President's
budget includes $1 million in the fiscal year 2022 Operations & Support
appropriation to ensure that the CCG and related activities will
integrate, align, and advance DHS chemical defense capabilities.
The CCG developed the first-ever DHS Chemical Defense Strategy,
published in December 2019. CWMD and the CCG also directed an in-depth
analysis of Department-wide chemical capabilities, defense and
preparedness equities, programs, activities, and lines of effort. The
CCG has begun to use this analysis to improve program coordination,
share information about current activities throughout the Department,
and address operational gaps. To support these efforts, the President's
budget requests an additional $2.0 million in the Federal Assistance
appropriation for Chemical Defense activities in support of the
Integrated Chemical Defense Assessment Toolkit to assist communities in
building layered defenses against chemical threats.
defending the nation's food, agriculture, and veterinary systems
CWMD's mission encompasses more than traditional counter-WMD
programs. The Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act (Public Law 115-43)
requires that CWMD implement a program to coordinate the Department's
efforts to defend the Nation's food, agriculture, and veterinary
systems against terrorism and other high-consequence events. To meet
this mandate, in fiscal year 2020, CWMD reestablished a formal Food,
Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense (FAV-D) program under the DHS chief
medical officer (CMO). In fiscal year 2022, the President's budget
requests an additional $2.8 million above enacted funding ($5.8 million
total) to protect against the intentional introduction or natural
occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and zoonotic diseases.
CWMD works closely with DHS components to enhance the resilience of
the Nation across the food and agriculture sector. In fiscal year 2021,
CWMD and DHS S&T jointly published a strategic plan to guide the future
of FAV-D RDT&E activities. Last month, in collaboration with the
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, CWMD led a
roundtable with Federal Government, State, local, and private-sector
partners to identify areas of improvement toward building a resilient
food and agriculture sector.
responding to covid-19
Since the earliest days of the pandemic, CWMD has provided expert
biological and medical guidance and reports and enhanced support to DHS
components, the Department of Health and Human Services, and other
partners. CWMD's role in the COVID-19 response has been three-fold,
focused on traditional biodefense actions, like biosurveillance;
supporting the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in
implementing public health actions at our borders; and helping to
ensure the health and safety of DHS's workforce. CWMD has also led
policy coordination for DHS in the transportation sectors (land, air,
and sea) to ensure CDC guidance is implemented and decisions are
informed by operational constraints.
NBIC began tracking COVID-19 in early January 2020 and continues to
generate and distribute reports and analytic and modelling products to
Federal, State, and local partners. Over the course of the COVID-19
pandemic, NBIC has generated approximately 600 biosurveillance reports
on COVID-19 and developed a COVID-19 daily briefing that reaches over
200 DHS senior leaders.
Beginning in early February 2020, before much was known about the
transmission of COVID-19, DHS partnered with CDC to establish medical
entry screening at designated airports for travelers returning from
restricted countries to reduce the risk of COVID-19 importation.
Finally, in coordination with DHS components and the Veterans
Health Administration, the DHS CMO-led Operation Vaccinate Our
Workforce (Operation VOW) to voluntarily vaccinate front-line and
mission-critical DHS employees against COVID-19. Through both fixed
facility and field and expeditionary vaccine events, Operation VOW has
vaccinated more than 75,000 employees as of June 2021.
providing expert health advice and operational medical support
Per the CWMD Act of 2018, the DHS CMO resides within CWMD and
serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security,
assistant secretary for CWMD, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
administrator, and DHS senior leadership on medical and public health
issues related to natural disasters, border health, pandemic response,
acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters.
The CMO team provides operational medical support to DHS
components. This support includes immigration health issues, public
health preparedness and response, and the DHS Emergency Medical
Services enterprise, which comprises over 3,500 emergency medical
technicians across the Department. The CMO team implements critical
medical programs such as the Department's forthcoming electronic health
records system and the First Responder Vaccine Initiative Pilot
Program, which makes expiring anthrax vaccine doses available on a
voluntary basis to State and local emergency response providers. In
fiscal year 2022, the President's budget requests $7.5 million to
support the CMO, which reflects a $4.0 million increase over the fiscal
year 2021 enacted funding.
During his May 26, 2021 testimony before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Secretary Mayorkas committed to
providing a plan to reform the Department's health and medical
functions. CWMD, including the CMO, is assisting Department leadership
in assessing the role, structure, and functions of the CMO in light of
the lessons learned from COVID-19 and other recent health and medical
responses. We look forward to working with this committee on that
effort.
workforce morale
The CWMD workforce is composed of the best and brightest in the
Federal Government. From the scientists and doctors, to the individuals
who work behind the scenes on the day-to-day tasks, the accomplishments
of this team make the Nation safer.
From the onset of the COVID-19 response, CWMD has recognized the
importance of keeping our staff safe, informed, and mission-ready. With
this premise in mind, CWMD senior leadership has conducted over 74
weekly virtual town halls with an average of 280 of our staff
participating. Additionally, I have personally held numerous small
group town halls to engage with the workforce at multiple levels.
CWMD established the Employee Engagement Team (EET) to focus on
identifying barriers to and measures of success across the
organization. The EET is an employee-driven effort to develop an action
plan for strengthening CWMD, implementing changes, and monitoring their
effectiveness.
All of these actions played a significant role in CWMD being listed
as the most improved DHS component, and fifth-most improved Government-
wide, in Overall Rankings in the recently released Partnership for
Public Service's Best Places to Work in the Federal Government.
conclusion
CWMD remains focused on countering CBRN and health-related threats
and incidents. While we are a relatively new Office, we have matured
quickly. CWMD performed a key role for DHS throughout the COVID-19
pandemic. During that same time, we continued to coordinate DHS efforts
in the WMD mission space, provide our FSLTT partners with CBRN
detection equipment, and run programs to protect the Nation from CBRN
and other health security threats. We have assessed the full mission
space and expanded our counter chemical and biological capabilities to
most efficiently and effectively execute our mission. We have also
minimized certain functions that better align with other Federal
Department missions, such as the technical nuclear forensics pre-
detonation materials program.
On behalf of the CWMD staff who work tirelessly to keep the United
States and the American people safe from CBRN and other health security
threats, I look forward to working with you on the reauthorization of
our Office.
Chairwoman Demings, Ranking Member Cammack, and distinguished
Members of this subcommittee, thank you again for your attention to
this important mission and for the opportunity to discuss CWMD's work.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much for your testimony.
I now recognize Director Currie to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER P. CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Currie. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Demings,
Ranking Member Cammack, Chairman Thompson, if you are here, and
other Members of the subcommittee. I really appreciate the
chance to be here to discuss our past work and on-going work on
the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office at DHS. I
don't think I could have set up the importance of this topic
any better than you--the Chairman did and Chairwoman did and
the Ranking Member in their opening statements.
CWMD faces an incredibly difficult mission. Chemical,
biological, nuclear, and radiological threats are extremely
unique challenges. Unlike cyber threats, mass shootings,
disasters, border apprehensions, drug smuggling, and other more
daily occurrences DHS faces, WMD threats are not as routine,
and they are not always perceived as more likely, as you said
in your opening, Ms. Chairwoman.
CWMD has to compete within DHS for resources and attention
with other DHS components dealing with these kind of daily
events. However, the COVID-19 pandemic showed us that
biological and other threats like this, while not routine, can
create catastrophic and society-changing impacts. It also
showed that pandemics are not just a public health issue but a
National security issue requiring a huge role for DHS, and that
is what happened.
Our work has identified a number of challenges across
CWMD's mission. One major challenge they face right now is both
addressing many of the programmatic challenges that were
mentioned in the opening while at the same time working to
better define its role and transform itself.
However, this shows what we have seen for decades in
looking at Government programs. Mission results cannot be
separated from organizational health and employee morale, and
you can't have one without the other.
In the biodefense area, since 2012, we have reported on
challenges in implementing BioWatch, a system that is designed
to detect an airborne bio attack. Just 2 months ago, we
reported on challenges in the effort to upgrade and replace
BioWatch, the third effort to do so, which is called BD21.
We found that BD21 faces challenges, such as just inherent
limitations in the available technology and uncertainties with
combining technologies for use in the domestic environment,
places like train stations, sporting arenas, things like that.
For example, avoiding and reducing false alarms is still a
difficult technical challenge that has to be overcome if DHS is
to more quickly detect bio threats in these environments. I
also think this shows how hard it is to employ technologies in
DHS in our homeland versus, you know, overseas in the
warfighter or military environments.
We have also found that CWMD has struggled to develop an
effective surveillance system to detect and share information
on bio threats. For example, we have reported that the DHS
National Biosurveillance Integration Center has struggled to
really fulfill its mandate in law and provide value to Federal,
State, and local partners.
In chemical--the chemical security area, in 2018, we
reported that DHS had not fully integrated and coordinated its
chemical defense programs and activities across all the DHS
components. We recommended that DHS develop a strategy and
implementation plan, and the good news is that one has been
completed, and an implementation plan is to be completed in the
next couple of months, according to DHS.
We have also identified challenges related to CWMD's
nuclear and radiological efforts. We found challenges in their
Securing the Cities Program, which were spelled out in the
opening. This seeks to help cities basically detect and deter
nuclear terrorism.
We reported that they didn't fully track program spending
and performance and haven't addressed challenges to sustaining
the program at the local level, and we recommended they better
do so. I know that they have made a lot of progress in this
area, but there is still more to be made. It is also important
to note this because DHS seeks to expand the program in the
2022 budget.
Now, I realize the key question--I think it is the right
question for today--is what do we do moving forward to help
this organization be successful?
In addition to addressing the recommendations we have made,
there are also actions that could be taken to help the
organization mature and address morale and the other
challenges. Four years ago, we testified for this same
committee as DHS was first considering this reorganization. We
stand by the same recommendations we made at that time.
CWMD has to continue to implement best practices from past
successful transformations in Government. For example, focusing
on efforts to continue better defining its mission and focusing
on what it does best, communicate with internal and external
stakeholders, and involve employees in all of these efforts.
This completes my statement. I look forward to the
discussion and questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Currie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher P. Currie
Friday, July 16, 2021
highlights
Highlights of GAO-21-105332, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2018, statute established the CWMD office, reorganizing
several legacy offices, including the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
and Office of Health Affairs into one. The office manages programs
intended to enhance the United States' ability to detect, deter, and
defend against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
However, programs operated and managed by the CWMD office have faced
long-standing challenges, some which predate the reorganization.
This statement describes our 2016 work related to the CWMD office
formation and findings from our past reports on CWMD programs from 2009
through May 2021, including challenges and opportunities for the
effective operations and implementation of key programs related to
biodefense, nuclear security, and chemical security.
To conduct our prior work, GAO reviewed relevant Presidential
directives, laws, regulations, policies, strategic plans, and other
reports and interviewed Federal, State, and industry officials, among
others.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made 16 recommendations designed to address the challenges
discussed in this statement. As of July 2021, DHS has taken steps to
address some, but not all of them. Of the 16 recommendations GAO made,
10 remain open, and GAO continues to monitor DHS's progress to
implement them.
countering weapons of mass destruction.--opportunities for dhs to
better address long-standing program challenges
What GAO Found
In April 2016, GAO evaluated Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
plans to consolidate chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
security programs into the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
(CWMD) office. GAO recommended DHS use, where appropriate, the key
mergers and organizational transformation practices identified in prior
work, such as conducting adequate stakeholder outreach. DHS agreed with
and addressed the recommendation by soliciting employee feedback on the
transformation and formed a leadership team for the consolidation,
among other practices. However, GAO observed that significant
challenges remained at the CWMD office--such as low employee morale and
questions about program efficacy. GAO has on-going work evaluating
these issues and plans to issue a report in early 2022.
Over the past decade, GAO has also conducted extensive work
evaluating legacy and on-going programs managed by the CWMD office and
has identified program management challenges and opportunities for
improvement in the following program areas:
Biosurveillance programs.--Since 2009, GAO has reported on
progress and challenges with two of DHS's biosurveillance
efforts--the National Biosurveillance Integration Center and
the pursuit of replacements for the BioWatch program (aimed at
detecting aerosolized biological attacks). For example, DHS
faced challenges defining these programs' missions and
acquiring suitable technologies. In December 2009 and September
2012, GAO highlighted the importance of following Departmental
policies and employing leading management practices to help
ensure that the mission of each program is clearly and
purposefully defined and that investments effectively respond
to those missions. DHS agreed with and addressed these
recommendations. Most recently, DHS agreed to a May 2021 GAO
recommendation that it should follow best practices for
conducting technology readiness assessments for a biodetection
effort and described planned efforts to conduct one before the
next key decision event.
Nuclear/radiological detection.--In May 2019, GAO found that
the CWMD office lacked a clear basis for proposed changes to
the strategies of the Securing the Cities program, which is
designed to enhance the nuclear detection capabilities of
Federal and non-Federal agencies in select cities. GAO found
the strategies were not based on threats or needs of the
participating cities. DHS agreed with our recommendations aimed
at improving communication and coordination with participating
cities, but has not fully implemented them.
Chemical defense.--In August 2018, GAO found that DHS had
not fully integrated and coordinated its chemical defense
programs and activities, which could lead to a risk that DHS
may miss an opportunity to leverage resources and share
information. Improved program integration and coordination
could lead to greater effectiveness addressing chemical
threats. DHS agreed to develop a strategy and implementation
plan to aid integration of programs, which it expects to
finalize in September 2021.
Chairwoman Demings, Ranking Member Cammack, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction (CWMD) office. Our Nation faces a variety of homeland
security threats that continue to evolve and present an array of
challenges. Multitudes of Governmental and non-Governmental
stakeholders are responsible for preventing and responding to these
threats. In particular, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
weapons, also known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have the
potential to kill thousands of people in a single incident.
Chemical attacks abroad and the threat of using chemical weapons
against the West by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria have raised
concerns about the potential for chemical attacks occurring in the
United States. Additionally, clandestine attacks using aerosolized
biological agents could be carried out in urban areas, at sporting
events, at transportation hubs, or at indoor facilities like office
buildings.\1\ The United States also faces a continuing threat that
terrorists could smuggle in nuclear or radiological materials to use in
a terrorist attack. According to DHS, terrorist attacks using chemical,
biological, or radiological material may lack overt warning signs,
which limits opportunities for intervention.\2\ However, the
consequences of such attacks are potentially high even though the
likelihood of their occurrence is relatively low.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Biodefense: DHS Exploring New Methods to Replace BioWatch
and Could Benefit From Additional Guidance, GAO-21-292, (Washington,
DC: May 20, 2021).
\2\ DHS Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2020-2024.
\3\ DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, (Washington,
DC: June 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a June 2015 report to Congress, DHS proposed consolidating the
agency's core chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
explosives functions.\4\ The CWMD office, formed by DHS in December
2017 and established by statute in December 2018, is a reorganization
of several DHS offices, including the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
and Office of Health Affairs.\5\ The office works to protect against
the dangers posed by hostile state and non-state actors who seek to
acquire and use nuclear, chemical, radiological, or biological
materials in the form of weapons of mass destruction to harm Americans
or U.S. interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ During an initial review of chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosives functions at DHS, agency officials determined
that the Office of Bombing Prevention should be included within the WMD
consolidation option. Subsequent DHS consolidation planning did not
include the Office of Bombing Prevention. The Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction (CWMD) Act of 2018 does not affect the organizational
placement of the Office of Bombing Prevention. Pub. L. No. 115-387, 132
Stat. 5162.
\5\ Pub. L. No. 115-387, 2(a)(2), 132 Stat. at 5162-63
(classified at 6 U.S.C. 591).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The office manages programs intended to enhance the United States'
ability to detect, deter, and defend against chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats. These programs include partnerships
with non-Federal Governments designed to address the risk of nuclear
and biological attacks in metropolitan areas and efforts to integrate
and share information about those risks. The primary statutory missions
of the CWMD office are coordinating with other Federal efforts and
developing a strategy and policy for the Department to: (1) Plan for,
detect, and protect against the importation, possession, storage,
transportation, development, or use of unauthorized chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear materials, devices, or agents in
the United States; and (2) protect against an attack using such
materials, devices, or agents against U.S. people, territory, or
interests.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 6 U.S.C. 591g, 592. The Assistant Secretary for the CWMD
reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Id. at 591.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since August 2016, we have evaluated DHS efforts to consolidate
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security programs into
the CWMD office.\7\ Moreover, over the past decade, we have conducted
extensive work evaluating legacy and on-going programs managed by the
CWMD office that address biological, nuclear, and chemical security
issues.\8\ For example, we have conducted reviews of DHS's National
Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC), the BioWatch and Securing
the Cities Programs, as well as chemical defense programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS's Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives Program Consolidation Proposal
Could Better Consider Benefits and Limitations. GAO-16-603. Washington,
DC: August 11, 2016.
\8\ GAO. Biosurveillance: Developing a Collaboration Strategy Is
Essential to Fostering Interagency Data and Resource Sharing, GAO-10-
171 (Washington, DC: Dec. 18, 2009); Biosurveillance: DHS Should
Reevaluate Mission Need and Alternatives before Proceeding with
BioWatch Generation-3 Acquisition, GAO-12-810 (Washington, DC: Sept.
10, 2012); Combating Nuclear Terrorism: DHS Should Address Limitations
to Its Program to Secure Key Cities. GAO-19-327 (Washington, DC: May
13, 2019); and Chemical Terrorism: A Strategy and Implementation Plan
Would Help DHS Better Manage Fragmented Chemical Defense Programs and
Activities, GAO-18-562 (Washington, DC: August 22, 2018), among others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As such, this statement describes our prior work related to the
CWMD office formation and findings from our past reporting on CWMD
programs, including challenges and opportunities for the effective
operations and implementation of key programs related to biodefense,
nuclear security, and chemical security. This statement is based on our
prior work issued from December 2009 through May 2021 on various CWMD
efforts.\9\ It also includes updates on the status of recommendations.
To conduct our prior work, we reviewed relevant Presidential
directives, laws, regulations, policies, strategic plans, and other
reports and interviewed Federal, State, and industry officials, among
others. More information on our scope and methodology can be found in
each of the reports cited throughout this statement. The work upon
which this statement is based was conducted in accordance with
generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Specific reports are cited throughout the statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
background
CWMD Biodefense Efforts
National Biosurveillance Integration Center
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(9/11 Commission Act) established the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center (NBIC) within DHS.\10\ The Act specifically tasked
NBIC with integrating and analyzing information from human health,
animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems across the
Federal Government and supporting the interagency biosurveillance
community. As defined in the July 2012 NBIC Strategic Plan, integration
involves combining biosurveillance information from different sources
and domains to provide partners and stakeholders with a synthesized
view of the information, and what it could mean. The primary goal of
integration includes creating a common understanding of potential and
on-going biological events and providing insights across data sources
that cannot be gleaned in isolation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, title XI, 1101, 121 Stat. 266, 375-79
(classified, as amended, at 6 U.S.C. 195b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BioWatch and Biological Detection for the 21st Century
In 2003, in response to the 2001 anthrax attack, DHS started the
BioWatch program--designed to provide early indication of an
aerosolized biological weapon. The BioWatch program uses routine
laboratory testing designed to detect an aerosolized biological attack
for 5 specific biological agents considered high-risk for use as
biological weapons. The BioWatch program is a Federally-managed,
locally-operated system. The CWMD office collaborates with more than 30
BioWatch jurisdictions throughout the Nation to operate approximately
600 aerosol collectors, primarily in outdoor locations. The
determination of whether a public health threat exists based on
information from the BioWatch program can take 12 to 36 hours after the
aerosol collection unit initially captures an agent. This 36-hour time
line consists of up to 24 hours for air sampling, up to 4 hours for
retrieving the sample from an aerosol collection unit and transporting
it to the laboratory, and up to 8 hours for laboratory testing.
Since the program's inception, DHS has pursued enhancements and
replacements to the existing BioWatch system without success. DHS
designed these efforts to further reduce the time to detection,
limiting morbidity and mortality from aerosolized biological attacks.
Biological Detection for the 21st Century (BD21) is DHS's current
effort to replace BioWatch. DHS describes this multi-year acquisition
effort as a system-of-systems that will incorporate multiple technology
components and use machine learning and data analytics to provide
contextual information and indication that a biological attack may have
occurred.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ A system-of-systems is a collection of technology elements
that operate or function together within a larger system to create a
new, more complex system, which offers more functionality and
performance than simply the sum of the constituent technology elements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Biodefense Strategy
DHS was 1 of 4 agencies required by law to jointly develop a
National biodefense strategy and associated implementation plan.\12\ In
September 2018, the White House issued the National Biodefense Strategy
to promote a more efficient, coordinated, and accountable biodefense
enterprise and established a governance structure to guide the
strategy's implementation. In June 2019, we testified that the National
Biodefense Strategy and its interagency governing leadership offer the
potential for the Nation to better define the role of detection
technologies in a layered, National biodefense capability to help those
that pursue these technologies better articulate their mission needs
and align requirements and concepts of operation accordingly.\13\ As
part of the implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy, DHS and
its interagency partners will have the opportunity to assess the role
of and investment in biodetection of aerosolized attacks in a layered
approach to mitigating risks of a variety of biological threats. CWMD
officials represent DHS on the Biodefense Coordination Team--a working
group of experts from agencies with biodefense responsibilities. CWMD
officials are also responsible for leading the Strategy's
implementation at DHS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Signed into law on December 23, 2016, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 required the Secretaries of
Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Agriculture
to jointly develop a National biodefense strategy and associated
implementation plan, which shall include a review and assessment of
biodefense policies, practices, programs and initiatives. Such
Secretaries shall review and, as appropriate, revise the strategy
biennially. See Pub. L. No. 114-328, div. A, title X, subtitle G,
1086, 130 Stat. 2000, 2423-24 (2016) (classified, as amended, at 6
U.S.C. 104).
\13\ GAO, Biodefense: The Nation Faces Longstanding Challenges
Related to Defending Against Biological Threats, GAO-19-635T
(Washington, DC: June 26, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear and Radiological Detection
In fiscal year 2007, DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
initiated the Securing the Cities program and implemented it for the
program's first decade. Securing the Cities operates as a cooperative
agreement between CWMD and eligible cities designed to enhance the
nuclear detection capabilities of Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
territorial agencies.\14\ Cities use the funds to purchase commercial
radiation detection devices and other detection equipment. The program
also provides detection training for up to 5 years. Securing the Cities
has 3 primary goals: (1) Enhance regional capabilities to detect and
interdict unregulated nuclear and other radiological materials, (2)
guide the coordination of participating cities in their roles defined
by the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, and (3) encourage
participating cities to sustain their nuclear or radiological detection
programs over time.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ A cooperative agreement is a legal instrument of financial
assistance between a Federal agency and a non-Federal entity that is
used to enter into a relationship with the principal purpose to
transfer anything of value, such as money, to a non-Federal entity to
carry out a public purpose authorized by law. In 2019, 5 cities
participated in the program.
\15\ The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is a multi-layered
framework encompassing many different Federal programs, projects, and
activities to detect and deter nuclear smuggling in foreign countries,
at the U.S. border, and inside the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chemical Defense Efforts
DHS has a number of chemical defense responsibilities, programs,
and activities spread across its various components. DHS's efforts to
address a terrorist chemical attack also involve a wide range of
components including the CWMD office.\16\ Upon formation of the CWMD
office by DHS in December 2017, the office subsumed the majority of the
Office of Health Affairs. CWMD took on the office's responsibility for
the public health impact of National threats and hazards, including the
impact of chemical releases. CWMD also took over as the advisor to the
Secretary and other DHS leaders on medical and health security issues
including chemical attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Other components include the National Protection and Programs
Directorate, the Science and Technology Directorate, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the
Transportation Security Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
dhs's initial plan for consolidation did not follow key transformation
practices
In 2016, as DHS prepared to create the CWMD office, we evaluated
the proposed reorganization.\17\ We compared available documentation
related to DHS's consolidation planning efforts against key
transformation practices identified based on our review of previous
public and private-sector reorganizations.\18\ For example, key
practices include dedicating an implementation team to manage the
transformation process, soliciting employee views and gain their
ownership for the transformation, and establishing a communication
strategy to create shared expectations and report on progress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ GAO-16-603. In June 2015, DHS delivered a report to Congress
which proposed consolidating the agency's core chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and explosives functions into a new office.
According to DHS officials, this proposal was based on a 2013
consolidation study.
\18\ GAO, Streamlining Government: Questions to Consider When
Evaluating Proposals to Consolidate Physical Infrastructure and
Management Functions, GAO-12-542 (Washington, DC: May 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We recommended DHS use the set of practices, where appropriate as
part of the reorganization for the CWMD office. DHS agreed with the
recommendation, and in October 2017 notified Congress that it planned
to determine where to apply the key transformation practices and
provided us with documentation demonstrating how it considered the
practices. For example, at least 17 employee working groups were
created to gather employee perspectives on the reorganization.
Additionally, CWMD created a leadership team in January 2018 to manage
the consolidation process. CWMD also created an internal communication
strategy for the reorganization.
The steps DHS took to consider key practices during the
consolidation were consistent with our recommendation, and we have
since closed the recommendation as implemented. However, at the time we
closed the recommendation, we observed that significant challenges
remained at the CWMD office, such as low employee morale and questions
about the efficacy of some CWMD programs. As part of on-going work
begun in September 2020, we are evaluating the extent to which the CWMD
office continues to perform the missions of its predecessor offices,
coordinates with its partners, and manages employee morale.
opportunities remain to address long-standing challenges with cwmd
programs
Our prior work has highlighted challenges in programs operated and
managed by the CWMD office, including those that predated its creation.
We have identified opportunities for improvement to address the
inherently fragmented nature of these kinds of security efforts, which
require many Federal, non-Federal, and industry partners to execute.
Specifically, we have identified challenges in the following program
areas: Biodefense, nuclear/radiological detection, and chemical
defense.
DHS's Biosurveillance and Detection Programs Have Struggled to Define
and Carry Out Their Missions
Between 2009 and 2021, we have reported on progress and challenges
with two of DHS's biodefense efforts--the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center (NBIC) and the pursuit of replacements for the
BioWatch program. These reports demonstrate the importance of following
departmental policies and employing leading management practices to
help ensure that the mission of each program is clearly and
purposefully defined and that subsequent investments effectively
respond to those missions.\19\ We have previously reported that the
release of the National Biodefense Strategy in 2018 and establishment
of the governance structure offer opportunities for DHS and partner
agencies to consider how to address some of the challenges from a
broader interagency and layered National security approach.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ GAO-10-171; GAO-12-810; GAO, Biosurveillance: DHS Should Not
Pursue BioWatch Upgrades or Enhancements Until System Capabilities Are
Established, GAO-16-99 (Washington, DC: Oct. 23, 2015); and GAO,
Biosurveillance: Challenges and Options for the National
Biosurveillance Integration Center, GAO-15-793 (Washington, DC: Sept.
24, 2015).
\20\ GAO-21-292; GAO, National Biodefense Strategy: Additional
Efforts Would Enhance Likelihood of Effective Implementation, GAO-20-
273 (Washington, DC: Feb. 19, 2020); and GAO, Biodefense: The Nation
Faces Longstanding Challenges Related to Defending Against Biological
Threats, GAO-19-635T (Washington, DC: June 26, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Biosurveillance Integration Center Collaboration
Challenges
In December 2009, we reported that NBIC faced a variety of
collaboration challenges with its partners, including confusion on
roles and responsibilities and incomplete policies and strategies for
operating across agency boundaries. To help NBIC enhance and sustain
collaboration, including the provision of data, personnel, and other
resources, we recommended that NBIC develop a strategy for addressing
collaboration challenges and develop accountability mechanisms to
monitor these efforts. In August 2012, NBIC issued the NBIC Strategic
Plan, which intended to provide NBIC's strategic vision, clarify the
center's mission and purpose, articulate the value that NBIC seeks to
provide to its partners, and lay the groundwork for setting interagency
roles, responsibilities, and procedures. Because NBIC created the plan
we recommended, we closed those recommendations as implemented.
However, in follow-up work in 2015, we reported that a variety of
challenges remained.\21\ Specifically, when we surveyed NBIC's 19
Federal interagency partners,\22\ we found that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ GAO-15-793.
\22\ Although NBIC has interaction with other stakeholders, we
selected these 19 Federal agencies based on their biosurveillance roles
and responsibilities and because they were Federal departments or
components within Federal departments that have signed the NBIC
Advisory Board charter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some partner agencies expressed uncertainty about NBIC's
value.--Some of NBIC's partner agencies--which include various
parts of the Departments of Health and Human services, Defense,
Agriculture, and others--expressed a lack of trust in providing
data to NBIC and NBIC's ability to interpret that data.
Partners were not sure how the information would be used and
cited barriers to sharing information they collect from non-
Federal entities. The participation of member agencies and
their subject-matter expertise is needed to create
sophisticated meaning and interpretation of data in the proper
context from a variety of monitoring systems covering human,
animal, and plant health, and the environment.
Some partner agencies reported difficulties providing
personnel to NBIC.--Despite the need for subject-matter
expertise from partner agencies, NBIC also faced challenges
getting partner agencies to participate in NBIC activities,
such as daily or weekly calls. Some partners felt the calls
were repetitive of information emailed from NBIC. Partner
agencies had difficulty in detailing subject-matter experts to
NBIC in a resource-constrained environment, although all
partner agencies do have a point of contact for NBIC. At the
time of our 2015 work, NBIC had started to partially fund other
agencies' liaisons, but on a very limited basis.
NBIC was unable to secure streams of raw data needed to
conduct near-real-time quantitative analysis to reveal unusual
patterns and trends.--Because NBIC was unable to secure raw
data, it relied on publicly-available reports and global news
sources. This led to partner agencies not seeing much value in
NBIC's products, which generally repackage information with
which they are already familiar. However, we did find in 2015
that NBIC's partners from supporting agencies, such as members
of the intelligence community, who do not have the same level
of expertise on health issues find the reports NBIC provides
helpful context for emerging or on-going events.
In September 2015, NBIC's interagency partners and other major
stakeholders in the biosurveillance community acknowledged--and we
agreed--that no single problem limits NBIC's mission to integrate
biosurveillance data. Rather, over the years, several long-standing
problems--such as data sharing across disparate missions--have combined
to inhibit the achievement of this mission as envisioned in the 9/11
Commission Act. We identified options in our 2015 report for policy or
structural changes that could help better fulfill the biosurveillance
integration mission.\23\ However, no significant change has occurred in
NBIC's charge since that time. The options we outlined included:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ We identified these options and their benefits and
limitations, on the basis of the roles of a Federal-level
biosurveillance integrator we identified in the 9/11 Commission Act,
NBIC's strategic plan, and the perspectives of partners obtained during
our structured interviews. These options are not exhaustive, and some
options could be implemented together or in part. In developing these
options, we did not evaluate the financial implications of implementing
each option, to the extent they are knowable, but we acknowledge they
are likely to result in an increase, decrease, or shifting of funding
based on the changes described.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reinforce NBIC's Analyzer Role.--Under this option, NBIC
would be provided with new authorities and resources designed
to access additional public and private data sources and
statistical and modeling tools to develop meaningful
information.
Strengthen NBIC's Coordinator Role.--Under this option, NBIC
would be provided with greater authority for coordinating the
Federal biosurveillance enterprise.
Expand NBIC's Innovator Role.--Under this option, NBIC would
be provided with new authorities and resources to lead research
and development investments of new tools and technology to
address gaps.
Status Quo: Continue to Execute the 2012 NBIC Strategic
Plan.--In this option, NBIC would continue to implement the
mission, goals, and objectives detailed in the August 2012 NBIC
Strategic Plan or subsequent approved updates.
Repeal the NBIC Statute.--In this option, National
biosurveillance integration would not be pursued through NBIC.
Challenges Acquiring Biodetection Technologies
Since 2012, we have assessed the BioWatch program and DHS efforts
to upgrade or replace it.\24\ Since 2003, DHS has focused on acquiring
an autonomous detection system to replace the current BioWatch system,
but has faced challenges in clearly justifying the BioWatch program's
mission and need and ability to reliably acquire technology to address
that need. In September 2012, we found that DHS approved the
acquisition of an autonomous detection capability (known as BioWatch
Generation 3, or Gen-3) in October 2009 without fully developing
critical knowledge that would help ensure sound investment decision
making, pursuit of optimal solutions, and reliable performance, cost,
and schedule information.\25\ Specifically, we found that DHS did not
engage the early phases of its Acquisition Life-cycle Framework, which
is designed to help ensure that the mission need driving the
acquisition warrants investment of limited resources and that an
analysis of alternatives systematically identifies possible alternative
solutions that could satisfy the identified need.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See, GAO-12-810 and GAO-16-99.
\25\ GAO-12-810.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our September 2012 report, we recommended that before continuing
the Gen-3 acquisition, DHS reevaluate the mission need and possible
alternatives based on cost-benefit and risk information. DHS concurred
with the recommendation and in 2012, directed the BioWatch program to
complete an updated analysis of alternatives. In April 2014, DHS
canceled the acquisition of Gen-3 because the analysis did not confirm
an overwhelming benefit to justify the cost of a full technology
switch.
When DHS canceled the Gen-3 acquisition, it continued to rely on
the current system for early detection of an aerosolized biological
attack. However, in 2015 we found DHS lacked reliable information about
BioWatch's technical capabilities to detect a biological attack, in
part, because in the years since BioWatch's initial deployment in 2003,
DHS had not developed technical performance requirements for the
system.\26\ We reported in 2015 that BioWatch has been criticized
because it was deployed quickly in 2003 to address a perceived urgent
need, but without sufficient testing, validation, and evaluation of its
technical capabilities.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ GAO-16-99. Technical performance requirements would help DHS
better understand the types and sizes of attacks the system could
detect.
\27\ GAO-16-99 and Institute of Medicine and National Research
Council, BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance (Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our October 2015 report, we made recommendations to help ensure
that biosurveillance-related funding is directed to programs that can
demonstrate their intended capabilities, and to help ensure sufficient
information is known about the current BioWatch system to make informed
cost-benefit decisions about possible upgrades and enhancements to the
system. We recommended that DHS not pursue upgrades or enhancements to
the current BioWatch system until it: (1) Established technical
performance requirements necessary for a biodetection system to meet a
clearly-defined operational objective for the BioWatch program; (2)
assessed the Gen-2 system against those performance requirements; and
(3) produced a full accounting of statistical and other uncertainties
and limitations in what is known about the system's capability to meet
its operational objectives. DHS concurred and described steps to
address these recommendations, but they remain open as DHS considers
other options to replace BioWatch.
In May 2021, we reported on DHS's current effort to replace the
BioWatch program, known as BD21.\28\ BD21 intends to combine various
technologies, such as biological sensors, data analytics, anomaly
detection tools, collectors, and field screening devices to enable
timelier and more efficient detection of an aerosolized attack
involving a biological agent. We reported in May 2021 that the BD21
program office was following the agency's acquisition policy and
guidance, but that the program was early in the acquisition life cycle.
Therefore, DHS had not yet selected the technologies to use and
continued to analyze potential technologies to demonstrate that certain
components of the overall concept are feasible, such as an anomaly
detection algorithm.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ GAO-21-292.
\29\ For BD21, an anomaly detection algorithm is intended to use
data from biological sensors that continuously monitor the air, as well
as other data sources, to determine if there is a departure or
deviation from the baseline environmental data, known as an anomaly.
Baseline environmental data is the characterization of background
environments, which can vary by geography, climate, topography, and
urban density, as well as by time of day, seasons, weather, animal
population dynamics, farming patterns, construction, and manufacturing
(emissions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, we also reported that BD21 faces technical challenges due
to inherent limitations in the technologies and uncertainties with
combining technologies for use in biodetection. For example, common
environmental material such as pollen, soil, and diesel exhaust can
emit a signal in the same range as a biological threat agent, thereby
increasing false alarm rates in biological aerosol sensors that monitor
the air and provide data on biological material in the environment.
Program officials reported that the risk of false alarms produced by
biological sensor technologies could be reduced by using an anomaly
detection algorithm in addition to the sensor. However, it is too early
to determine whether integration of an anomaly detection algorithm will
successfully mitigate the false alarm rate--specifically, because the
algorithms have never been developed and used for the purpose of
biodetection in an urban, civilian environment.
We also reported in May 2021 that the BD21 program office plans to
conduct technology readiness assessments along the way as part of the
acquisition life cycle. In 2020, DHS issued a technology readiness
assessment guide. We found it lacked detailed information about how the
Department will ensure objectivity and independence, among other
important best practices identified in our technology readiness
assessment best practices guide. To ensure decision makers and program
managers have the information necessary to make informed decisions at
key acquisition decision events, we recommended that, among other
things, the BD21 program office conduct assessments that follow our
best practices prior to the program's acquisition decision events. DHS
concurred with our recommendations and provided additional information
on the steps the agency has taken or plans to take to address them. We
will continue to monitor its progress.
Securing the Cities Program Faces Management Weaknesses
In May 2019, we identified several limitations in the CWMD office's
efforts to implement the Securing the Cities program.\30\ We found that
CWMD lacked a clear basis for proposed changes to the program's
strategies--which were not based on threats or needs of the cities.
CWMD officials told us that the agency is considering several potential
changes to the Securing the Cities program that would broaden its
geographic reach and scope, including establishing new goals for the
program, expanding geographic coverage, centralizing acquisition of
detection equipment, increasing the role of other agencies, and
including chemical and biological weapon detection and deterrence
within the program's scope.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ GAO-19-327.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, it had not: (1) Fully developed potential changes or
documented a plan for making changes to the Securing the Cities
program; (2) identified the basis for such changes; and (3) clearly
communicated with the cities, raising concerns about how the changes
will affect them. We also reported in 2019 that most of the officials
we interviewed from the 5 cities in the program at the time said that
DHS provided a high-level overview of potential changes in an August
2018 meeting, but little detail on how such changes would be
implemented or affect city operations. We determined that if DHS did
not clearly communicate to cities how the program would operate under
potential changes, these cities could face difficulties planning for
the future and achieving the program's detection and deterrence
objectives.
Additionally, we reported in May 2019 that CWMD had not identified
a clear basis for making program changes, and the extent to which these
changes could be attributed to new priorities under DHS's
reorganization was unclear. CWMD officials told us at the time that
they had not conducted any studies or analyses that would justify
making changes to the program. In DHS's fiscal year 2019 budget
justification, CWMD noted the importance of using the Securing the
Cities program to build capabilities far outside the immediate target
areas, (i.e., cities) and the need to detect threats along the air,
land, or sea pathways into and within the country that terrorists could
potentially use to reach their targets. However, according to CWMD
officials at the time of our 2019 review, the office had not identified
a change in the nature or level of nuclear or radiological threats to
explain its intent to move from its original city-focused model for the
program to a more National approach. CWMD officials said that the
uncertainty surrounding making changes reflected a program under
transition within an agency under transition--that is, the
reorganization from the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to CWMD.
Further, we reported that the CWMD Act of 2018 required development
of an Implementation Plan for Securing the Cities (due December
2019).\31\ In 2019 we reported that the Act required that before making
changes to the Securing the Cities program, the assistant secretary of
CWMD brief appropriate Congressional committees about the justification
for proposed changes. This briefing was to include, among other things,
an assessment of the effect of changes, taking into consideration
previous resource allocations and stakeholder input. We reported that
this new requirement would provide DHS an opportunity to identify the
basis for potential changes, and that assessing such changes could
provide more reasonable assurance that they would strengthen the
program and not result in unintended consequences, such as reducing
capabilities in current cities. In June 2021, the CWMD office issued
the Implementation Plan for the Securing the Cities Program, which we
are currently reviewing. Additionally, as part of our 2019 report, and
to address program management deficiencies for the Securing the Cities
program, we made 4 recommendations to CWMD, including to work with
cities to address risks to sustaining detection capabilities, which
remain open at the time of this statement. We are monitoring CWMD's
actions to address the report's recommendations.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Pub. L. No. 115-387, 2(a)(10), 132 Stat. at 5164-66
(Classified at 6 U.S.C. 596b).
\32\ GAO-19-327.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS Chemical Defense Programs Not Fully Integrated
In August 2018, we reported that DHS manages several programs and
activities designed to prevent and protect against domestic attacks
using chemical agents.\33\ Some DHS components have programs that focus
on chemical defense, such as the Science and Technology Directorate's
chemical hazard characterization. Others have chemical defense
responsibilities as part of their broader missions, such as U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, which is responsible for interdicting
chemical agents at the border. The establishment of the CWMD office
aimed to consolidate some chemical defense programs and activities, but
we found--and DHS officials acknowledged--that DHS had not fully
integrated and coordinated its chemical defense programs and
activities. As such, we reported in 2018 that several components--
including Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, the Office
of Health Affairs, and Science and Technology Directorate--conducted
similar activities, such as acquiring chemical detectors or assisting
local jurisdictions with preparedness, separately, without DHS-wide
direction and coordination. We determined that as components carry out
chemical defense activities to meet mission needs, there was a risk
that DHS may miss an opportunity to leverage resources and share
information that could lead to greater effectiveness addressing
chemical threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ GAO-18-562.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also reported that it was too early to tell the extent to which
the new CWMD office would enhance the integration of DHS's chemical
defense programs and activities. In August 2018, to help guide the
consolidation of these programs, we recommended that DHS develop a
strategy and implementation plan to help the CWMD office: (1) Mitigate
the risk of fragmentation among DHS programs and activities, and (2)
establish goals and identify resources to achieve these goals,
consistent with the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010.\34\ We also
reported that CWMD officials agreed that the establishment of the new
office was intended to provide leadership to and help guide, support,
integrate, and coordinate DHS's chemical defense efforts and that a
strategy and implementation plan could help DHS better integrate and
coordinate its fragmented chemical defense programs and activities. DHS
concurred with our recommendation, and CWMD issued a strategy in
December 2019, but the implementation plan is in development and not
expected to be finalized until September 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011). The GPRA
Modernization Act of 2010 updated the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285. We
reported this would also be consistent with a 2012 DHS effort, since
abandoned, to develop a strategy and implementation plan for all
chemical defense activities, from prevention to recovery. DHS officials
stated the 2012 effort was not completed because of leadership changes
and competing priorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you, Chairwoman Demings, Ranking Member Cammack, and Members
of the subcommittee. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any question you may have at this time.
Mrs. Demings [continuing]. Your testimony. Thank you so
much, and thank you to both of you for your testimony.
I will remind the subcommittee that we will each have 5
minutes to question the panel.
I will now recognize myself for questions.
As you all know, both of our witnesses today, the mission
of CWMD is to lead DHS efforts and coordinate with Federal,
State, local, Tribal, territorial, and international partners
to safeguard the United States against chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats. However, as we have already
talked about, the relatively new office has struggled to manage
its responsibilities, with biodetection being one of the most
prominent examples of the office's struggles. Previous
leadership issues within CWMD has led to, as we have already
mentioned, to low employee morale and high attrition rates.
Assistant Secretary, CWMD has only been authorized for 2.5
years, and, in that short time, the office has already sought
to spin off its responsibilities, including the National
Technical Nuclear Forensics Program and the Office of the Chief
Medical Officer.
What is your vision for CWMD, and how will you work to keep
the office intact?
Mr. Rasicot. Thank you for the question, Chairwoman
Demings.
My vision for CWMD is very much aligned with the CWMD Act.
We are the hub of coordination, policy, intelligence,
operational support, and deployment of technologies for this
critical mission throughout DHS and, quite honestly, throughout
major parts of the Federal Government. We are the link from
National policy to State and locals through our programs, such
as Securing the Cities and BioWatch and other programs, where
we have exceptional reach all the way down to the local level.
So it is my vision that, as we mature these programs--and I
just want to say, you know, we are taking into account all of
the GAO recommendations, all of the IG recommendations, and we
are trying as best as possible to incorporate them as we move
forward.
I look forward to discussing several of the questions on
the very specific programs. I am not sure that is where we are
going on this question, but I look forward to some of those,
Securing the Cities, BioWatch, BD21, as well as giving you a
good debrief on where we are on employee morale.
Mrs. Demings. We will have an opportunity to discuss those.
Thank you so much.
Director Currie, there are currently a number of proposals
to reorganize CWMD. They include proposals to move the chief
medical officer to the Office of the Secretary and to spin out
the nuclear forensics operation to the Energy Department and
moving CWMD's policy officials to DHS's Policy Office.
Given that CWMD is a relatively young organization and has
a diverse range of significant challenges, how should we be
thinking about reorganization?
Mr. Currie. The first thing I would say is that
reorganization or moving deck chairs around is often something
that is looked to when a problem is perceived. The challenge
is, is that it is understandable that it is a specific action
to take, but that doesn't always solve the problem.
As we have seen with CWMD's reorganization, oftentimes it
can create additional problems. When something reorganizes,
then they have to go through a transformation effort that can
often take multiple years. When that happens, the focus on the
internal transformation can take away from some of the mission
responsibilities they have outside, and some of the services
they provide can decline.
So we are not for or against those changes, but I think it
can't be looked at as the solution. The key with some of these
offices, if there are challenges--let's take the CMO, for
example. If you are going to move it, there has to be a clear
understanding and a reason why you are moving it to a different
place, and it has to be crystal clear what the responsibilities
and authorities of that office are going to do, or else,
frankly, it is just going to be another move.
Mrs. Demings. Assistant Secretary, what would your response
be to Director Currie's answer there or thoughts on
reorganization?
Mr. Rasicot. Yes, ma'am.
On the CMO side, the Secretary is looking across the
Department at various structural changes that might be
necessary, and he has asked myself and the chief medical
officer to provide him some options regarding the correct
placement of the chief medical officer.
You know, we have learned a lot in the last year, and it
has really highlighted the public health and medical aspects of
DHS. I think the review is warranted. I tell the staff all the
time: We have to reserve the right to learn, and, as we learn
more things, we may act differently. That is what we are--you
know, we--we have--no decision has been taken on the CMO.
If I could, if I could address the nuclear forensics piece,
we are still doing what we are required to do by law. I chair
the Nuclear Forensics Executive Committee. We just had a
meeting on May 13. What we are doing is that the Department of
Energy does the primary operational work. We don't have boots
on the ground doing nuclear forensics. That is Energy. Their
labs provide most of the analysis.
Now, through a construct, we were funding most of the R&D
for those labs. I think it is a good leadership practice to put
the funding decisions and the funding leadership closest to
what is being funded and what--and the operational piece. So
the interagency suggested that we move the actual funding and
the direction of the R&D for the DOE labs to DOE. DOE has been
funded in the last year to do that.
So, while our funding is going down, our role in
coordinating nuclear forensics for the Nation remains intact.
Like I said, I just chaired the Nuclear Forensics Executive
Committee. So I think--I agree with Director Currie. You don't
change for change sake. That is not going to get us out of any
problems.
You know, there is an old Government saying: When in doubt,
reorganize. Well, that is not what we are doing. We are
learning as we move along, and we have to take advantage of
what we have learned.
Thank you.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Assistant Secretary.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, the
gentlewoman from Florida, Mrs. Cammack, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Cammack. There we go. Now we are unmuted.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it.
Again, thank you to our witnesses for appearing here today.
You know, I know we are going to cover a lot here today,
specifically about the GAO report, so I am just going to--I am
going to touch very briefly on it, and then move on.
So, July 2020, the Office of Inspector General published a
report that found that CWMD had not yet carried out a program
to meet the Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act requirements.
As noted in your testimony, in fiscal year 2020, CWMD
established and reestablished a formal Food, Agriculture, and
Veterinary Defense Program to meet the standards and the
requirements.
Can you describe in detail exactly how CWMD is meeting the
requirements of this law, and were additional staff requested
for this program for the 2022 budget request? If not, why?
Mr. Rasicot. Yes. So we were--we--November--November 2019,
we reestablished the Food, Ag, Vet Program within CWMD. We
brought some staff over and began leveraging some internal
resources to do that.
Our accomplishments thus far is we put together a
cooperative agreement with S&T to direct the research--their
research on the Food Ag Vet Program and have significantly
enhanced that research and development work. We have increased
the budget. In fiscal year 2019, it was $800,000. In 2021, it
was $2.4 million. In 2022, we are requesting another $2.7
million to take it to $5.1 million.
We have pushed out to both Agriculture and FDA. We meet
with them all the time. Those are our primary partners in
defending the Nation against a high-consequence event in the
food/ag/vet sector, and one of the things we really pushed the
interagency on was I feel like we have been in a full-scale
exercise over the past year on food/ag/vet as we have watched
the impact of COVID through meatpacking industry. We have read
all about that.
So what we did is we put together an industry listening
session and roundtable just the first week of June where we
brought in all the major industry leaders through--using our
system format for industry engagement through the agricultural
sector and really tried to capture the lessons learned that
they had over the last 4--last year in the COVID response to
see how we can do things better. As we adjust policy based on
that, we want to make sure we have industry input on that
because they are living on the front lines.
So that is--that is where we are heading, ma'am.
Mrs. Cammack. Well, I appreciate that.
As a follow-up, you know, we had a conversation a couple
days ago, and I am really glad to hear about the industry
listening sessions. I would love to get a work-up of some of
the findings that you have had from those discussions, and our
team can follow up with yours on that.
But, in the interest of time, I want to jump to the
strategy. So it states that the mission of this office is to
enable operational partners to prevent weapons of mass
destruction use against the homeland; to promote readiness for
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and health
security threats.
Now, this strategy notes that its ability to provide
operational capabilities and technical assistance to the State,
local, Tribal, and territorial front-line operators is a
crucial aspect of homeland security.
My own sheriffs don't even know about this office. So, if
they don't even know it exists, how are we executing on this
strategy, and what is the plan to engage with local law
enforcement?
Mr. Rasicot. So I will offer that we probably have not--
given all else that was going on within the office, as you have
noted some of the things--probably have not done our State and
local outreach outside of those jurisdictions already
participating in our programs. But it is my intention over the
next year to reach out to the chiefs of police, all the right
organizations, to let them know what we are offering and what
capabilities we can bring to them.
We were big players in the interagency board as a governing
board for interagency--you know, State and local organizations.
We funded that organization in the past, and we continue to
work with them.
We also--I look forward to any opportunity to let State and
locals know what we are doing. We have got a--we are pushing
people out in the field. I have got folks in our regional
medical operations centers to help with the public health in 5
locations over the--across the country. We have got BioWatch in
30 jurisdictions across the country. We just expanded Securing
the Cities to 13 major metropolitan areas across the country.
So we are out there, and we will do a better job in letting
people know. But it--Ranking Member, you hit the nail on the
head. If the people don't know what we are doing, how would
they know what to ask for, and how--now, I am with you. So we
will do a better job----
Mrs. Cammack. Right.
Mr. Rasicot [continuing]. In getting the word out.
Mrs. Cammack. I am looking very much--I know my time has
expired, but I just want to say I am looking very much forward
to working with you. In fact, as I speak to you, I am sitting
right now in McAllen, Texas, at the border. At 3:30 this
morning, 6 of my sheriffs and I were with National Guard and
Border Patrol pulling people out of the river.
Now, my fear is that, one day, someone is going to bring a
dirty bomb across our open border, and that is something we are
not prepared for. My local sheriffs are seeing this first-hand,
and they don't even know that this office exists.
So I am very much looking forward to helping you get the
word out about what you are doing for training to make sure
that our front-line guys and gals have the best resources
available. So thank you--thank you for that.
With that, I yield back.
Mrs. Demings. The Ranking Member yields back.
The Chair will now recognize other Members for questions
they may wish to ask the witnesses.
I will recognize Members in order of seniority, alternating
between Majority and Minority. Members are also reminded to
unmute themselves when recognized for questioning.
The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from New
Jersey, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Madam Chair.
It is good to be with you again for this very timely, as
usual, hearing. I say that because I--this is a follow-up for
me from a hearing that I had in October 2019, and--on the
biodefense. You know, at that hearing, I was attempting to get
answers from stakeholders with relation to their conversations
that were going on with CWMD.
So here we still are 2 or 3 years later, so this is kind-of
a follow-up for me.
So, Mr. Rasicot, as I stated in October 2019, the
subcommittee heard testimony on the Nation's preparedness to
confront bioterrorism. During the hearing, the witnesses spoke
about CWMD's lack of coordination and communication with State
and local, Tribal, and territorial as--really as the Ranking
Member just mentioned. To improve its programs, CWMD must
engage with SLTT partners.
Please describe the steps CWMD is taking to increase the
amount of engagement with SLTT and how CWMD's staff are able to
successfully partner with local governments.
Mr. Rasicot. Thank you for that question, Congressman, and
good to see you again.
We have--we--I came in later in October, and I know we have
met in your office several times, and I have heard you loud and
clear on that. It was especially true, I think, in the
BioWatch, BD21 arena, where I think initially when we were
working up that program, it was done a lot of--sort-of in the
basement of the Vermont Avenue building that I occupy.
We heard you. I went up to New York City. I met with
everyone up there on--because they were one of the primary
places we were doing some demonstration work, heard what they
were saying. But then the team has been out. The team has been
out to many of the jurisdictions seeking State and local input
as to what our operational requirements document should look
like, what our concept of operations should look like, because
we need to make sure this works for the State and locals.
As you know, the whole idea behind BD21 is to try to reduce
the time it takes for detection to be recognized so that we
can--if it is an actual detection of an actual agent, we can
quickly get to the medical countermeasures. That is--that
parameter is different in every city, so we have got to be out
there talking to folks.
My team has been out there, and they have held listening
sessions. We have also talked to our academic folks, and we are
working closely with the labs to understand what is technically
feasible. It is not in anyone's interest for me to try to buy
something that doesn't work. I get it.
Mr. Payne. Right. Good. Thank you for that.
Let me ask you one quick question.
Mr. Rasicot. Sure.
Mr. Payne. Are we still using that--are we still using that
1950's technology for BioWatch?
Mr. Rasicot. So, on the BioWatch, the sensors? Yes. The
sensors are there, and they are proven and reliable. The
problem with--we do need to expand, and we are looking with--we
are working with the National labs based on the GAO reports and
our own inspector general's reports to see how we can expand
the number of agents. I look forward to getting that report
this fall. We are also working with FBI, HHS, and CDC and
seeking their input in what agents we should be expanding to.
So we are looking to improve that system, and we have also
looked to--asked one of the National labs is, are we in the
right places to provide the most protection for the money to
the American public? So----
Mr. Payne. OK.
Mr. Rasicot [continuing]. We are taking some actions here,
sir.
Mr. Payne. All right. Thank you.
Let me quickly go to Mr. Currie. Mr. Currie, I think, you
know, I feel like you should be here to say, throughout this
whole process, it is like, ``I told you before,'' because it
seems like some of the same issues still are persistent here.
The global nuclear detection architecture is a framework
that was developed to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear
and other radioactive materials.
Director Currie, based on your work reviewing CWMD's
practice, do you believe CWMD is properly prioritizing its GNDA
responsibilities? If not, why? Please explain the implications
for your dereliction, or their dereliction. I am sorry.
Mr. Currie. Well, thank you, sir. Thank you for the
question.
It has been a little bit of time since we have issued a
full-scale report on the GNDA, but I will say this. One of the
interesting things that has happened with the reorganization is
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was merged into CWMD and
combined with other offices.
As you know, the DNDO Office was a very high-performing
office. The morale was very high. I think the global nuclear
detection architecture was a real success in the Government in
terms of their coordination with all the other Federal
agencies, and it was a very clear mission space.
One of the things that we have seen and happened since the
reorganization is there are some questions from partners and
stakeholders about some of the things that were happening under
that architecture. For example, some of the threat and risk
assessments that CWMD and DNDO before it were doing to identify
gaps in that architecture, which are so critical for components
like CBP and the Coast Guard to understand as they monitor, you
know, ports of entry and things like that.
So that is definitely an area I think where there are
questions about----
Mr. Payne. Uh-huh.
Mr. Currie [continuing]. What CWMD's role is going to be
moving forward.
Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you.
Madam Chair, thank you for indulging me, and I yield back.
Mrs. Demings. The gentleman yields back.
At this time, the Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from
Iowa, Mrs. Miller-Meeks, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you so much, Chairwoman Demings
and Ranking Member Representative Cammack as well.
Gentlemen, please don't interpret my questions as being
derogatory in any way. They come from a position where just
hoping that, just like you, that we can do the best for our
homeland. So I am a physician. I am the former director of the
Iowa Department of Public Health, and I am also a 24-year
military veteran. So I fully know, both as having been a
director of a State agency and in the military, how, year after
year, you are scrambling for your funding, validating the work
that you do, even when oftentimes the workload makes it
difficult to coordinate that and justify.
Also, in the military, I have participated in many ABCs and
also drills, tabletop drills, as actual drills for warning. So
I fully am understanding and comprehending how very difficult
[inaudible] homeland. It is extraordinarily difficult, and I
think the task that has been placed upon you is monumental.
So, as I read the reports and I understand some of the
failures and the criticisms, I am also very cognizant of the
fact it is so hard to detect.
So this question comes out of that. We have just faced, our
homeland--and not only our homeland, but, quite honestly, the
entire world has just faced the biggest threat to its security
through COVID-19. We have asked repeatedly for an investigation
into the origins of COVID-19. As a scientist, the scientific
evidence to me indicates that this has come from a lab--the
laboratory Wuhan Institute of Virology, in all likelihood a
leak.
But the reason why it is important to understand
[inaudible] we need to know for National security. As you
indicated, Mr. Currie. We need to know for public health and
how we respond to public health. We need an international
community that has standards for disclosure, transparency,
laboratory security, what type of research can go on in
laboratories, and gain of function of research.
But, as Representative Cammack had indicated earlier, her
sheriffs don't know of your existence, your Office of Weapons
of Mass Destruction. COVID-19-like pandemics, as I had
indicated when I was director of public health, my most top
concern and what kept me up at night was a virus or a bacteria
that would emanate from another country and invade the
homeland. This was just after H1N1 and after we had had
[inaudible]----
Mrs. Demings. The gentlewoman appears to be having some
connection problems. To our witnesses, if you could proceed
with responding.
Mr. Rasicot. Madam Chairwoman, I will go first, and I just
offer that, you know, President Biden has stated that he has
asked the intelligence community to redouble its efforts as
they look at the origins of COVID-19, whether it is from an
animal-borne transfer, accidental--the accident at the Wuhan
lab. That work is on-going, and we look forward to the results.
There is no denying the impact that the COVID-19 virus has
had on the United States, and we are all working hard to
mitigate its effects.
I am sorry. If there was more questions, I just couldn't
hear.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. My apologies. I just want to know if, to
you, it has the same importance as it does to me. I think this
is a critically important issue for National security and for
public health, and I think there are valid things that we need
to ask of the international community, and we as a Nation can
be a lead in that regard.
Mr. Rasicot. Ma'am, Gary Rasicot here.
I would agree with everything you said, that it is
important to ask those questions. It is also important, as we
look at global health security, to reinforce that system and
strengthen that system via--because, as you have heard the
administration and others say, this disease isn't over for
anyone until it is over for everyone.
Over.
Mrs. Demings. Director Currie.
Mr. Currie. Well, thank you for the question.
You know, as a former director of public health, I can use
the technical term of surveillance. I know surveillance is so
critical, and that is one really important thing that DHS has a
role in, and so does HHS. But, you know, having surveillance
systems work effectively domestically and other----
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Mr. Currie----
Mr. Currie. I am sorry. Yes, ma'am?
Mrs. Demings. No, go ahead. Proceed.
Mr. Currie. Oh, OK. Sorry. I thought she was trying to jump
in.
I was just saying that I think--the area of surveillance
has been an area we have been monitoring for over a decade, and
I think we have a number of findings and recommendations about
how we think DHS's role in the surveillance space could be
strengthened or improved.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So, if I have time, Chair Demings, per
your report, do you think that the biosurveillance should be
moved to another agency, or do you think that we need to
reconsider what our efforts are and what our expectations are?
Mr. Currie. Well, one challenge is there are so many
different surveillance efforts across agencies. DHS has them.
CDC has it. DOD has surveillance efforts. I don't think these
have been well-integrated.
In DHS's case, I don't think their specific role in the
surveillance space has been made as clear as it can be and
well-integrated.
For example, you know, DHS has struggled with getting data
and metrics it needs from CDC and State and local public health
departments to even provide surveillance information to the
community that provides, you know, a benefit.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Perhaps we need to help with the
definition of those and with information sharing across
agencies.
So I think, Chair Demings, my time is probably up. Thank
you so much, and I thank our witnesses for their testimony.
Mrs. Demings. The gentlewoman yields back. We thank you for
your line of questioning.
We are preparing for a second round of questions. So, if
Members have additional questions, please stay with us.
Along the same lines, you know, let's go back to
rearranging the deck chairs to our witnesses, you know, the
pros and cons of that. We know there is much discussion about
the location or where the chief medical officer is housed.
DHS officials have suggested transferring CMO to another
unit within DHS. Acting Secretary, I would love to hear--
Assistant Secretary, I would love to hear your thoughts on that
particular position as well as Director Currie's.
Acting Secretary, we will start with you.
Mr. Rasicot. Yes. Thank you, ma'am.
So the CMO and I work closely together every day,
literally, and I yield to the Secretary on, you know, we will
provide him the options. We have got to take a look at the
structure of DHS, see if we are doing it the most impactful
way, and I look forward to us finishing up--but no decision has
been made.
But I would offer that there is--that the collaboration
that he and I work together--and I am--I have never met a more
innovative doctor than Dr. Pritesh Gandhi, and the work he is
doing and the thoughts he brings to us has been refreshing
since he has gotten here in January. We are moving forward on a
number of programs under his leadership, Operation VOW being
just one of them, where we--you know, we went from zero to 60,
literally as--right after he got here and ended up vaccinating
75,000 of our front-line work force so that they could perform
their duties without the threat of, you know, catching the
COVID virus.
I do--if I could, I would--I was hoping maybe if I could
take a step back too on the biosurveillance piece and offer
something on that if----
Mrs. Demings. Before we go there, Director, if you could
just--I am sorry.
Mr. Rasicot. No, no.
Mrs. Demings. Assistant Secretary, if you can hold off for
just a second.
Director Currie, I would love to hear from you, your
thoughts on moving the position of CMO to another unit within
DHS.
Mr. Currie. Well, I don't have a strong position either
way. I think the role of the CMO over the last year-and-a-half
has just shown to be tremendous, and it is not just providing
biodefense expertise and support to leadership of the
Department, but DHS has 240,000 employees, many of which are on
the front lines and touching the public.
So their role has always been to, you know, address the
health and safety of the DHS work force. But, over the last
year-and-a-half, it has just been incredible what they have had
to do to make sure that we don't have any sort-of, you know,
reduction in mission because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
So, wherever it is, I just think it is critical that its
role be solidified and strengthened given their role.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Director.
Acting Assistant Secretary, please, BioWatch?
Mr. Rasicot. I just want to comment on the National
Biosurveillance Integration Center, or NBIC, which has been--I
think it was the subject of a 2015 report--GAO report. I have
to say that they have just jumped all over those
recommendations. We have expanded our reach into the Department
of Veterans Affairs; Interior with wildlife, so we can track
animal-borne illnesses that may transmit to humans. Really,
over COVID-19, they put out one of the first reports, December
31, 2019, on a pneumonia-like virus emanating from Wuhan, and
that was pushed out to our--all of our stakeholders.
So, I mean, they are on the forefront of doing this stuff.
Honestly, their number of reports has gone up significantly
over the last year. Their readership, if you will, their poll
factor, the people that want--has gone up 30 percent. We are
pushing this to clients as varied as the NORTHCOM Commander all
the way to State and locals. Over 500 State and local offices
get their reports.
So I think we have kind-of picked up the game there since
2015, and I just--you know, the folks working that shop are
dedicated. They scour all reports, do the analysis, and get the
word out for people, so I just wanted to sort-of update us from
maybe that 2015 report.
Over.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so very much. We are going to pause
for just a minute and see if Members have additional questions.
Are there any questions from the Ranking Member?
From the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.
From the gentlewoman from Iowa, Mrs. Miller-Meeks.
OK. Director, we have--or to both of you, we have already
talked somewhat about employee morale, and, you know, being 420
out of 420 had to be like a punch in the face to the employees.
Acting Assistant Secretary, you have talked about the steps
that you have been taking to actually meet, hold these town
halls, which I think is a wonderful idea. It gives you a way to
hear directly from the employees.
But I would like to start with you first to find out, No.
1, and I have said before, you cannot motivate--I don't
believe. This is my personal opinion, that you cannot motivate
people to feel better about their jobs, but you sure can create
that environment that allows them to.
I would just like to hear from you your thoughts on how did
we first get in this predicament with morale being so low. I
think even in a survey, only 40 percent of the work force said
that they would recommend the office as a good place to work.
How did we get there? If you could expound a little bit more on
the results of these town halls that you are having, specific
recommendations that are coming from the employees, and where
do we go from here?
Mr. Rasicot. Yes, thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
So I think most people know that this office is a merger of
two legacy offices, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and
the Office of Health Affairs, two offices which probably had
very--well, definitely did have very different cultures.
As you, you know, bring things together, you know, the
organizational behavior folks will tell you, as you try to do
these things, you are going to have--you know, you are forming,
storming, norming, then you are performing. Well, we were
forming in 2017, 2018, and then, as the cultures came together
and the law was passed in December 2018, Government shutdown.
So, as people start to try to come together as an office, no
one is in the office. So that was one of the--I think one of
the underlying factors that probably complicated this.
But there was just a lot of cultural issues that had to be
worked through, and I am not certain that the mission clarity
was there in the beginning of this office, and I was not here.
I was asked to come in in October 2019, right after those 420
out of 420 rankings were announced.
One of the first things I did, as I told you the other day,
is just hold listening sessions and just listened to the people
and understand. What I did was I didn't hold it with like an
office so that their boss was sitting right with the employees.
We did it by sections of employees.
We met with the scientists. We met with the public health
officers. We met with the operations specialists. So there was
peers telling me what--and I asked them, what do we need to do
here? Because there are no--we have the best and brightest
employees in DHS here, I would suggest in the U.S. Government,
be it the scientists, the physicists, the biologists, our
lawyers, our procurement specialists, our operations
specialists. They are all top-notch.
Some of their accomplishments that I went through that we
have gotten in the last 2 years done, that doesn't happen with
a disgruntled work force. So we are making progress. We have
listened. We have put in standard operating procedures. All
decisions are transparent. We have a great comms team. We put
out a bulletin every week about what is going on, what I am
hearing from the Secretary. My town halls are every week.
As I told you, my mission is to keep people safe, informed,
and mission-ready, in that order. It was very critical that we
do that during that COVID-19. I think that we were one of the
first offices to go to max telework, and we made sure everybody
had what they needed, and our productivity stayed the same.
As I told you and the Ranking Member, I actually had to
make a rule because our folks were still working into the
evening because we could. That is how dedicated they are to the
mission, and it is my job to support that dedication. I am back
for my second term because that is what I want to do. I was
asked to come back; and I gladly came because I think they are
mission-critical folks, they are the best and brightest within
this Department, and they deserve all the support we can give
them. I listen to everything they say. Why would I not listen
to some of the world's foremost nuclear physicists and
biologists on how to confront today's threats?
Mrs. Demings. What can Congress do to better support the
men and women?
Mr. Rasicot. So we have got some requests here within the
2022 budget, and we would appreciate your support there.
Director Currie talked about the GNDA and the risk assessments.
We are bringing that back. I think it is $5 million we are
asking for to help us with that, but I want to expand it.
DNDO really hit the nail on the head with that analysis.
They basically tracked human behavior from aspiration to
execution in sort-of a terrorist act, and then they looked at
the gaps and where measures like detection and interdiction
could stop that continuum of action. I want to expand that to
chem and bio, and that is why we are asking for more money and
a couple more people to do risk analysis the way they were done
under DNDO.
So that is one way--we got a request that we would like to
enhance our work on chemical. I think that is an underserved
area right now. We have got a budget request asking for $3
million in chem. We are also looking to put another $3.5
million into the NBIC as I described. Everybody wants their
products, and I need to put more staff there to keep up with
the demand. I have asked for $2.2 million to increase our
exercise program. I want to be directly responsive to the State
and locals who are asking for more exercises.
I have got one more, $5 million in Securing the Cities
because you offered some of the criticisms from I think 2018
and 2019, and we took those to heart. We are doing sustainment
now. We heard the State and locals. We were giving them this
fantastic equipment, but in some of the smaller cities, it is
tough to maintain that stuff. It is high-tech stuff.
So we are going to start in 2022 giving them the money to
sustain that equipment: $1.5 million per city as they start,
building to $2.5 million a year sustainment. We just put in a
Securing the Cities implementation plan. I just released it. It
was later than I wanted it to be, but I wanted to solve the
sustainment problem before we showed you how we were going to,
you know, document implementing the program. Over.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you.
Director Currie, if we could go back to employee morale. As
I said earlier, 420 out of 420 had to be like a punch in the
face. So, based on your perspective of how we kind-of got
there--the assistant acting secretary talked about kind-of the
merger of the two departments and the town halls and all,
talking directly to the employees. I think it is always a good
thing to do, getting suggestions from them, but also the how do
we maintain and retain and where do we go from here, your
perspective, please.
Mr. Currie. Thank you. Well, morale is such a complicated
issue, and there is often--there is also--sometimes there is a
lag between when you get the results to what is actually going
on in the organization. So I think what we have seen in other
organizations is that oftentimes when employee morale is really
low, employees don't feel like they are being heard by top
leadership, and they don't feel like they are being supported.
Because of those things, you will often, you know, get
responses like, ``We don't feel like we are accomplishing our
mission as good as we could.'' So there are so many complicated
things that go into it.
On the positive front, I think if you look at the morale
scores, they have gone up in the last year. One of the key
questions that has gone up is about, you know, top leadership.
So I think, you know, Assistant Secretary Rasicot deserves a
lot of credit for that. Obviously something has really changed
for the scores in that particular question to change.
Everything I am hearing today and we have heard about the
efforts aligns with the things we have talked about, about
engaging employees, listening to employees, including
employees, and then communicating with them about what is being
done to address the challenges.
You know, as he said, these are some incredible folks, and
I think they work incredibly hard. It sounds to me like they
just want the support and the recognition of those things
moving forward. So I am cautiously optimistic that maybe they
are going in the right direction.
We have seen this in the past at DHS, by the way. The
Science and Technology Directorate at DHS had some serious
morale problems years ago, and they worked really hard to do
some of these same things, and now their morale is some of the
highest in the Department. So it is possible to turn this
around.
Mrs. Demings. This will be my final question, and, Director
Currie, we will start with you. I would like to hear, based on
GAO's reporting and the lead-up to and since the creation of
CWMD, how confident are you in CWMD's ability to be able to
successfully fulfill its mission and to guard the homeland
against CBRN threats?
Mr. Currie. I think that they are absolutely capable of
performing their mission with the resources they have and that
they are requesting. I think the CWMD Act of 2018 was very good
because it actually authorized the office. One of the worst
things that can happen in Government is when you have someone
performing a mission and there is no authorization telling you
what to do.
I think the key is going to be though focusing in on the
key responsibilities and the things it does well and really
communicating and drilling down into those issues. For example,
one of their primary missions is working--as we have heard
today, is working with State and local partners and
communicating with them.
I think throughout the--at the beginning of the transition,
maybe that had slipped a little bit, and some of the things
they were doing were not being done quite as well. It sounds
like there is going to be a lot more effort put into that, and
I think that is a very good thing.
So you also don't need to try to do more than you can do.
With a budget of $400 million and 300 people, there is only so
much that can be done, and so they really need to focus on
those things they are good at and that they can achieve, and I
think that will help the morale issue too.
Mrs. Demings. Acting Secretary Rasicot, any comments from
you?
Mr. Rasicot. Well, we appreciate your support, Madam
Chairwoman, and we appreciate the support of the committee, and
we look forward to, you know, on-going discussions on renewing
our authorization because I think this office is doing what it
was asked to do. We probably had a couple of false starts as we
have described, but we are really starting to hit our stride.
COVID brought us through that norming phase, and we are now
performing. You know, I talked a little bit about the exercise
that we conducted, a series of three exercises, starting with
CWMD, then across DHS, then across the interagency. Honestly, I
will just--with the interagency one, we had at the deputy
assistant secretary-level people from CDC, HHS, Department of
State, FBI.
I gave the kickoff speech at 9 o'clock; there is 116 people
on the screen. I come back at 12:30 for the after-action; there
is 116 people on the screen. That is must-see TV. People are
interested in this mission. As we coordinate it and bring
people back, that is what we are doing.
We will--I think that we--I agree with Director Currie, we
have most of the resources we need. We look forward to your
support on the fiscal year 2022 budget as we try to address
some of the areas that were brought up in the committee--excuse
me, brought up in the hearing. But I think we are on the right
path. I think we are doing what we were asked to do in the CWMD
Act, and I look forward to keeping you updated.
Mrs. Demings. With that, I want to thank the witnesses for
their testimony and the Members for their questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond
expeditiously in writing to those questions. The Chair reminds
Members that the committee record will remain open for 10
business days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairwoman Val Butler Demings for Gary C. Rasicot
cwmd's biodefense efforts
Question 1. The BioWatch Program within DHS's Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction Office was developed to support the Nation's
information-sharing capabilities needed to effectively prepare for,
detect, and respond to bioterrorism threats. However, a report from the
DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), OIG-21-22, released earlier this
year, found that the BioWatch Program has ``information-sharing
challenges that reduce Nation-wide readiness to respond to biological
terrorism threats.'' Considering the report from DHS OIG, what actions
are you taking to ensure our Nation prepares for, effectively detects,
and rapidly responds to bioterrorism threats?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. CWMD is in the process of advancing its efforts to
acquire new biodetection technology through its BD21 multi-year
acquisition effort. In a recent GAO report on the effort, GAO-21-292,
GAO found that, ``BD21 faces technical challenges due to inherent
technological limitations and uncertainties with combining
technologies.'' What is the current status of the BD21 acquisition
project?
When can we expect to have a fully operational BD21 system deployed
across to country guard against biothreats?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. Please provide the operational requirements
document(s) for BD21.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2c. Please provide the list of State and local entities
CWMD consulted with to develop the operational requirements document(s)
for BD21.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2d. Does CWMD have a contingency plan if BD21 technology
is unable to reach full maturity? If so, please provide this
contingency plan.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Speed is a crucial component to fighting the spread of
infectious diseases, like COVID-19. To that end, the Biden
administration has called for the creation of a National Center for
Epidemic Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics, ``to modernize global
early warning and trigger systems to prevent, detect, and respond to
biological threats.'' DHS may also be able to provide insight into this
project. In fact, with additional resources from Congress, the National
Biosurveillance Integration Center may provide a workable foundation to
develop such capabilities. To the extent it accords with the
administration's plans for a National Center for Epidemic Forecasting
and Outbreak Analytics, please explain how CWMD is developing
infectious disease forecasting capabilities.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
cwmd's chemical defense efforts
Question 4. In August 2018, GAO released a report, GAO-18-562, on
the need for a DHS strategy and implementation plan for the Department
to better manage its fragmented chemical defense programs and
activities. The report stated that a strategy and implementation plan
would help the CWMD office, ``mitigate the risk of fragmentation among
DHS programmers and activities, and establish goals and identify
resources to achieve these goals.'' GAO's report was released in 2018,
what has DHS, and in particular, CWMD, done to better manage the
fragmentation of DHS's chemical defense programs and activities? When
will CWMD produce an implementation plan, recommended by GAO years ago,
to help address the problem?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
cwmd's nuclear and radiological defense efforts
Question 5. As calls grow for our country to take the threat of
domestic nuclear terrorism more seriously, according to GAO, DHS's
nuclear and radiological weapons detection and deterrence efforts also
face significant challenges. For example, see GAO-19-327. There have
also been reports of a lack of communication between DHS and cities
within the CWMD's Securing the Cities program (STC). What is CWMD doing
to increase the Department's communication with STC cities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
cwmd's health security and food, agriculture, and veterinary defense
efforts
Question 6a. Detecting and protecting against biological threats is
supposed to be one of the key aspects of CWMD's mission, yet, during
the COVID-19 pandemic, CWMD's response role was limited. Other DHS
components took the lead in many facets of DHS's response to COVID-19.
What lessons did CWMD learn from its experience during the COVID-19
pandemic?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6b. Are you planning to formally compile lessons learned?
If so, will you commit to sharing such information with Congress?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6c. Is the Office considering reforms to potentially
increase the Office's role in the event of a future infectious disease
outbreak or pandemic?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
addressing recommendations
Question 7. GAO and DHS OIG have issued numerous recommendations to
improve CWMD and the Department's counter CBRN programs; however,
though CWMD concurs with many of these recommendations, many of them
remain open. Will you commit to implementing each of these
recommendations by this time next year?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Kat Cammack for Gary C. Rasicot
Question 1. Through the National Security Presidential Memorandum
(NSPM)-35, certain nuclear forensic capabilities held by CWMD are being
realigned to the Department of Energy. Are there any additional areas
within the office that CWMD is considering realigning to another
department? Is the current mission set of CWMD too broad?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United
States, the CWMD office assisted the U.S. Government's efforts to stop
the spread of the virus by providing enhanced screening operations at
airports. How else did CWMD contribute to COVID-19 response measures?
Given their overall mission with regards to biological threat detection
and biosurveillance activities through the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center (NBIC), what should their role be in future large-
scale health threats?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. In January 2020, you issued a report detailing the
fiscal year 2020 Implementation Plan for CWMD. Can you briefly discuss
any progress that has been made at CWMD as a result of this plan?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Hon. Andrew Garbarino for Gary C. Rasicot
Question. The United States Government needs to adopt a
comprehensive and integrated approach to the dangers that illicit
fentanyl and its many chemical analogues (collectively ``fentanyls'')
pose to the American people. Fentanyls are terrifyingly lethal. A
quantity of fentanyl equal in mass to a single packet of sweetener (1
gram) can kill 500 people. A similar amount of carfentanil, a fentanyl
analogue, can kill 50,000. Fentanyls can enter the body through
ingestion, inhalation, and absorption through the skin and kill
quickly, often before an antidote can be administered. Domestically,
fentanyls are treated as illegal narcotics yet fentanyl-related deaths
are skyrocketing. At the same time, the Department of Defense and other
agencies sharing responsibility for National security consider
fentanyls to be dangerous chemical weapons with the potential to cause
massive casualties. Both views are accurate. Approaching domestic
fentanyl policy solely as a narcotics issue, however, is placing
millions of Americans at risk. A WMD declaration for fentanyls could be
crafted to preclude any unintended interference with legitimate uses of
these chemicals. Legally manufactured, appropriately regulated, and
carefully distributed fentanyls have significant medical and veterinary
uses and present no extraordinary threat. The same cannot be said for
illicit fentanyl.
Based on those conclusions from Republican and Democrat
administrations alike, does the Department of Homeland Security support
a decision to declare these chemicals as potential Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD)?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairwoman Val Butler Demings for Chris P. Currie
Question 1. The BioWatch Program within DHS's Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction Office was developed to support the Nation's
information-sharing capabilities needed to effectively prepare for,
detect, and respond to bioterrorism threats. However, a report from the
DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), OIG-21-22, released earlier this
year, found that the BioWatch Program has ``information-sharing
challenges that reduce Nation-wide readiness to respond to biological
terrorism threats.'' Based on your reporting, is the BioWatch program
salvageable, or should the Federal Government redirect funds to other
biodetection technologies and research and development efforts?
Answer. We have previously reported that funds should go to
programs that can demonstrate performance. However, as we reported in
2015, DHS lacks reliable information about BioWatch's technical
capabilities to detect a biological attack and therefore lacks the
basis for informed cost-benefit decisions about upgrades to the
system.\1\ Specifically, while DHS had commissioned several tests of
the technical performance characteristics of the current system, it had
not developed performance requirements that would enable it to
interpret the test results and draw conclusions about the system's
ability to detect attacks. Therefore, we recommended in 2015 that DHS:
(1) Establish technical performance requirements; (2) assess the
BioWatch system against these performance requirements; and (3) produce
a full accounting of statistical and other uncertainties and
limitations in what is known about the system's capability to meet its
operational objectives. DHS has not yet addressed our 2015
recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Biosurveillance: DHS Should Not Pursue BioWatch Upgrades
or Enhancements Until System Capabilities Are Established, GAO-16-99
(Washington, DC: Oct. 23, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS is currently pursuing options to replace the BioWatch program
with Biological Detection for the 21st Century (BD21), and we continue
to monitor the extent to which these efforts are consistent with our
recommendation. However, as a replacement to BioWatch, BD21's detection
capability will narrowly address the threat of an aerosolized
biological attack and does not cover the broader biological threat
landscape. In June 2019, we testified that the National Biodefense
Strategy and its interagency governing leadership offer an opportunity
to better define the role of detection technologies within a layered,
National biodefense capability. We stated that this would help those
that pursue these technologies better articulate their mission needs
and align requirements and concepts of operation accordingly.\2\ As
part of the implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy, DHS and
its interagency partners will have the opportunity to assess the role
of and investment in biodetection of aerosolized attacks in a layered
approach to mitigating risks of a variety of biological threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Biodefense: The Nation Faces Longstanding Challenges
Related to Defending Against Biological Threats, GAO-19-635T
(Washington, DC: June 26, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. CWMD is in the process of advancing its efforts to
acquire new biodetection technology through its BD21 multi-year
acquisition effort. In a recent GAO report on the effort, GAO-21-292,
GAO found that, ``BD21 faces technical challenges due to inherent
technological limitations and uncertainties with combining
technologies.'' Given these challenges, it is beginning to seem like
BD21 is heading toward the same problems and inefficiencies within
BioWatch. What level of confidence should Congress place in CWMD to
successfully acquire technology capable of detecting biological threats
across the country?
Answer. As we found in our May 2021 report, DHS has shown
improvement in conducting its acquisition efforts.\3\ Specifically,
regarding DHS's on-going acquisition of biodetection technology to
replace BioWatch, we found CWMD was following DHS's acquisition policy
and guidance. In addition, to help mitigate risk in the acquisition,
the program office conducted an alternatives analysis and was testing
the basic proof of concept of the anomaly detection algorithm in a
technology demonstration. In our prior work evaluating the current
BioWatch program and other acquisition efforts to replace BioWatch, we
identified issues related to requirements development, stakeholder
involvement, testing, cybersecurity, and accounting for uncertainty.\4\
DHS agreed to implement our prior recommendations to address these past
problems and said the steps they are taking during the BD21 acquisition
are designed to address them, but their work is on-going.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Biodefense: DHS Exploring New Methods to Replace BioWatch
and Could Benefit from Additional Guidance, GAO-21-292 (Washington, DC:
May 20, 2021).
\4\ GAO-16-99 and GAO, Biosurveillance: DHS Should Reevaluate
Mission Need and Alternatives before Proceeding with BioWatch
Generation-3 Acquisition, GAO-12-810 (Washington, DC: Sept. 10, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our May 2021 report regarding BD21 we noted challenges DHS faces
due to the inherent limitations in the technologies and uncertainties
with combining technologies for use in biodetection. Unlike efforts to
detect chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents, which have specific
structures that can be used in designing a detection system, developing
biological detection technologies faces unique challenges, because of
the variability and unpredictability of biological agents. As such, DHS
has faced challenges in acquiring biodetection capabilities to replace
BioWatch. For the BD21 acquisition, DHS intends to use biological
aerosol sensors that monitor the air to provide data on biological
material in the environment, but common environmental material such as
pollen, soil, and diesel exhaust can emit a signal in the same range as
a biological threat agent, thereby increasing false alarm rates.
Program officials reported that the risk of false alarms produced by
biological sensor technologies could be reduced by using an anomaly
detection algorithm in addition to the sensor. However, it is too early
to determine whether integration of an anomaly detection algorithm will
successfully mitigate the false alarm rate, specifically because the
algorithms have never been developed and used for the purpose of
biodetection in an urban, civilian environment. To ensure decision
makers and program managers have the information necessary to make
informed decisions at key acquisition decision events, we recommended
that, among other things, the BD21 program office conduct technology
readiness assessments that follow our best practices prior to the
program's acquisition decision events. DHS concurred with our
recommendations and provided additional information on the steps the
agency has taken or plans to take to address them. We will continue to
monitor their progress.
Question 3. In August 2018, GAO released a report, GAO-18-562, on
the need for a DHS strategy and implementation plan for the Department
to better manage its fragmented chemical defense programs and
activities. The report stated that a strategy and implementation plan
would help the CWMD office, ``mitigate the risk of fragmentation among
DHS programmers and activities, and establish goals and identify
resources to achieve these goals.'' Please describe the current
chemical defense fragmentation within DHS and describe why it's
important for DHS to produce the implementation plan.
Answer. As we reported in August 2018, DHS officials acknowledged
that DHS had not fully integrated and coordinated its chemical defense
programs and activities.\5\ Several components--including CBP, U.S.
Coast Guard, the Office of Health Affairs, and S&T--conducted similar
activities, such as acquiring chemical detectors or assisting local
jurisdictions with preparedness, separately, without DHS-wide direction
and coordination. As components carry out chemical defense activities
to meet mission needs, there remains a risk that DHS may miss an
opportunity to leverage resources and share information that could lead
to greater effectiveness addressing chemical threats. Given the breadth
of DHS's chemical defense responsibilities, we found that a strategy
and implementation plan would help the CWMD Office: (1) Mitigate the
risk of fragmentation among DHS programs and activities, and (2)
establish goals and identify resources to achieve these goals,
consistent with principles outlined in the GPRA of 2010.\6\ We
recommended that DHS develop a strategy and implementation plan for
chemical defense. In December 2019, CWMD issued its chemical defense
strategy, which included overarching goals to drive CWMD's mission in
protecting American safety and security from chemical threats and
incidents. However, a strategy is only as good as its implementation.
CWMD has yet to issue an implementation plan for chemical defense, but
reported to us in July 2021 that it plans to do so by September 2021.
Without implementation specifics defined, we do not have assurance that
the state of DHS's fragmented chemical defense programs has changed
since we reported on the issue in August 2018, and DHS remains at risk
of these programs conducting highly similar activities in an
uncoordinated manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO, Chemical Terrorism: A Strategy and Implementation Plan
Would Help DHS Better Manage Fragmented Chemical Defense Programs and
Activities, GAO-18-562 (Washington, DC: Aug. 22, 2018).
\6\ The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), as
updated and expanded by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA),
requires agencies to establish annual performance goals with target
levels of performance to measure progress toward those goals. See Pub.
L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011) (updating Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107
Stat. 285 (1993)). While GPRAMA is applicable to the department or
agency level, performance measures and goals are important management
tools at all levels of an agency, including the program, project, or
activity level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 4. The President's fiscal year 2022 DHS CWMD budget
proposal is roughly $428 million and is roughly $25 million larger than
the fiscal year 2021 enacted figure. Based on GAO reporting, which area
of CWMD's portfolio do you believe CWMD should invest significant
portions of the Office's budget? Please explain.
Answer. GAO is not in a position to opine on CWMD's budget
allocation across its mission areas. Nonetheless, we have on-going work
looking at CWMD management and morale issues that we expect to issue in
early 2022. That work may have recommendations or findings that could
be helpful to Congress in setting priorities for CWMD's budget. In
addition, GAO's priority open recommendations to DHS include areas for
CWMD to address that may also help inform Congressional decision
making, such as issuing an implementation plan for coordinating
chemical defense programs across DHS.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO-21-377PR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 5. Detecting and protecting against biological threats is
supposed to be one of the key aspects of CWMD's mission, yet, during
the COVID-19 pandemic, CWMD's response role was limited. Other DHS
components took the lead in many facets of DHS's response to COVID-19.
What actions should DHS take to ensure CWMD is prepared to respond to
possible future infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics?
Answer. Effectively preparing for and responding to biological
incidents, including infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics,
requires engagement and commitment from the entire biodefense
enterprise. Unlike, for example, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, CWMD is not an operational component of DHS, and therefore it
does not have the same kind of responsibility, authority, and resources
to provide incident command in a response. Among other things, CWMD
leads DHS's efforts to develop and enhance capabilities to defend
against biological weapons and combat naturally-occurring bio-threats
and pandemics. As the DHS lead for developing biodefense strategy and
policy, and coordinating the Department's efforts to defend U.S. food,
agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and other high-
consequence events, CWMD plays an important role not only for DHS, but
among interagency partners as well.
Specifically, within CWMD, the chief medical officer is the
principal advisor on medical and public health issues to the Secretary
and other DHS officials.\8\ As such, the chief medical officer
coordinates with other Federal agencies with respect to medical and
public health matters, such as the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at
the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as with non-
Federal partners. The chief medical officer is to provide operational
medical support to all components of DHS and coordinate with the under
secretary for management to oversee activities within DHS related to
the human and animal health personnel. For example, as part of DHS's
on-going work during the pandemic, the chief medical officer has led an
internal effort to voluntarily vaccinate more than 75,000 front-line
and mission-critical DHS employees against COVID-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Specifically, since December 2018, the role and
responsibilities of the Department's chief medical officer resides
within the CWMD. This official serves as the principal advisor to DHS
leadership on medical and public health issues related to natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. The chief
medical officer also provides operational medical support to DHS
components and coordinates with Federal and non-Federal stakeholders on
medical and public health matters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CWMD officials are also responsible for leading the National
Biodefense Strategy's implementation at DHS, and CWMD officials
represent DHS on the Biodefense Coordination Team, which consists of
experts from agencies with biodefense responsibilities. The Biodefense
Coordination Team helps carry out the strategic goals and objectives of
the National Biodefense Strategy on behalf of the secretaries of
participating departments and agencies, including the Secretary of
Homeland Security. As a cross-disciplinary, interagency body, the
Biodefense Coordination Team has the opportunity to help shape the
direction of the Nation's biodefense efforts. At the highest level,
National strategies, such as the National Biodefense Strategy, are
designed to help guide preparedness activities by providing long-range
strategic vision to guide policy making. DHS was one of four agencies
required by law to jointly develop a National biodefense strategy and
associated implementation plan.\9\ The strategy outlines a whole-of-
Government approach intended to help the United States actively and
effectively assess, prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from
all types of biological threats, whether they are natural, accidental,
or deliberate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Signed into law on December 23, 2016, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 required the Secretaries of
Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Agriculture
to jointly develop a National biodefense strategy and associated
implementation plan, which shall include a review and assessment of
biodefense policies, practices, programs, and initiatives. Such
Secretaries shall review and, as appropriate, revise the strategy
biennially. See Pub. L. No. 114-328, div. A, title X, subtitle G,
1086, 130 Stat. 2000, 2423-24 (2016) (classified, as amended, at 6
U.S.C. 104).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In August 2021, we reported that the Biodefense Coordination Team,
of which CWMD is a key part, is uniquely positioned to carry out
activities to enhance preparedness and response for future biological
incidents.\10\ For example, based on our analysis of after-action
reports for selected interagency biological incident exercises and
real-world incidents, as well as findings from the COVID-19 response,
we found that the biodefense enterprise has gaps in its capabilities-
based approach to response planning. Specifically, we found the
biodefense enterprise lacked elements necessary for preparing for
Nationally significant biological incidents, including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response
Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen Preparedness, GAO-21-513
(Washington, DC, Aug. 4, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a set of defined capabilities that account for the unique
elements specific to responding to Nationally significant
biological incidents;
a process at the interagency level for agencies to assess
and communicate priorities for exercising capabilities;
a process to consistently report on those capabilities in
after-action reviews; and
routine monitoring at the interagency level of exercises and
real-world incidents in order to evaluate lessons learned
across the Government, identify patterns and possible root
causes for systemic challenges, and make recommendations to
address these challenges.
We made four recommendations to DHS to help ensure the Biodefense
Coordination Team develops ways to address the above-stated
deficiencies. We reported that the ability to monitor and assess the
outcomes of interagency biological incident exercises and real-world
events could be instrumental in identifying persistent challenges and
their root causes before they become systemic, intractable problems.
Identifying these issues could also help agencies prioritize which
capabilities need further development or exercising. As part of the
Biodefense Coordination Team, CWMD officials should play a key role in
ensuring the Nation develops the capabilities necessary for the next
biological incident that requires a whole-of-Nation response.
At the time we concluded our review, an interagency after-action
report for the COVID-19 pandemic was a topic of conversation among
Biodefense Coordination Team members, but because of the on-going
nature of the pandemic, such a report had not been prepared. After-
action reviews can be an important means to identify how to close
capability gaps. After-action reviews can also help to identify
corrective actions and assign responsibility for ensuring those actions
are implemented. This was a key element we built into our fourth
recommendation to DHS and its partners in our August 2021 report to
help ensure accountability for addressing corrective actions. As a
member of the Biodefense Coordination Team, CWMD is well-positioned to
engage in an after-action review, along with its interagency partners,
for the whole-of-Nation response to COVID-19.
CWMD can also take steps to evaluate its own actions during the
COVID-19 pandemic by conducting an after-action review of its
activities and policies. For example, one of CWMD's responsibilities
during the pandemic has been to help ensure the health and safety of
DHS's workforce--many of whom interact with the public daily, such as
Transportation Security Officers and Customs and Border Protection
Officers. Determining what went well and identifying areas for
improvement can help CWMD better prepare DHS for biological incidents
in the future.
Question 6. Despite its food, agriculture, and veterinary defense
responsibilities, according to a DHS OIG 2020 report, ``CWMD has not
yet carried out a program to meet [statutory] requirements . . . [and
therefore,] CWMD has limited awareness of DHS's on-going efforts and
cannot ensure it is adequately prepared to respond to a terrorist
attack against the Nation's food, agriculture, or veterinary systems.''
Shoring up our country's food, agriculture, and veterinary defense
programs is critical. Why do you believe CWMD has been unable to
fulfill its statutory requirements and improve homeland food,
agriculture, and veterinary defenses?
Answer. To date, we have not evaluated CWMD's fulfillment of
statutory requirements to improve food, agriculture, and veterinary
defenses. However, we have previously reported that biodefense is a
shared endeavor among multiple partners at the Federal and non-Federal
level.\11\ Many of the activities and responsibilities for conducting
biosurveillance of food, agriculture, and veterinary health are shared
among the Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and
Interior, in addition to DHS.\12\ As part of DHS's responsibilities to
implement the National Biodefense Strategy, opportunities exist for the
Department to work with its partners to identify biodefense
capabilities, identify gaps, and to facilitate enterprise-wide
decision-making and budget trade-off decisions to help ensure the most
efficient use of the Nation's biodefense resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GAO, Biosurveillance: Efforts to Develop a National
Biosurveillance Capability Need a National Strategy and a Designated
Leader, GAO-10-645 (Washington, DC: June 30, 2010); and National
Biodefense Strategy: Additional Efforts Would Enhance Likelihood of
Effective Implementation, GAO-20-273 (Washington, DC: Feb. 19, 2020).
\12\ Biosurveillance, as defined by the July 2012 National Strategy
for Biosurveillance, is the on-going process of gathering, integrating,
interpreting, and communicating essential information related to all-
hazards threats or disease activity affecting human, animal, or plant
health, for the purpose of: (1) Achieving early detection and warning,
(2) contributing to overall situational awareness of the health aspects
of the incident, and (3) enabling better decision making at all levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question From Hon. Andrew Garbarino for Chris P. Currie
Question. The United States Government needs to adopt a
comprehensive and integrated approach to the dangers that illicit
fentanyl and its many chemical analogues (collectively ``fentanyls'')
pose to the American people. Fentanyls are terrifyingly lethal. A
quantity of fentanyl equal in mass to a single packet of sweetener (1
gram) can kill 500 people. A similar amount of carfentanil, a fentanyl
analogue, can kill 50,000. Fentanyls can enter the body through
ingestion, inhalation, and absorption through the skin and kill
quickly, often before an antidote can be administered. Domestically,
fentanyls are treated as illegal narcotics yet fentanyl-related deaths
are skyrocketing. At the same time, the Department of Defense and other
agencies sharing responsibility for National security consider
fentanyls to be dangerous chemical weapons with the potential to cause
massive casualties. Both views are accurate. Approaching domestic
fentanyl policy solely as a narcotics issue, however, is placing
millions of Americans at risk. A WMD declaration for fentanyls could be
crafted to preclude any unintended interference with legitimate uses of
these chemicals. Legally manufactured, appropriately regulated, and
carefully distributed fentanyls have significant medical and veterinary
uses and present no extraordinary threat. The same cannot be said for
illicit fentanyl.
Based on those conclusions from Republican and Democrat
administrations alike, does the Department of Homeland Security support
a decision to declare these chemicals as potential Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD)?
Answer. This question was included in questions for GAO, but is
directed to the Department of Homeland Security. However, DHS's 2019
Chemical Defense Strategy lists identifying current, emerging,
nontraditional, and forecasted chemical threats as one of the
strategy's primary objectives. Consideration of illicit fentanyls as a
chemical threat could potentially be considered under that strategic
objective.
[all]