[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


            EXAMINING THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOME-
             LAND SECURITY COUNTERING WEAPONS OF 
             MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE

=======================================================================

                                 HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                        EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
                         RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                             JULY 16, 2021
                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-23

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                     

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
45-763 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2021                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------   

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

               Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
               
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas            John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island      Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey     Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California           Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan             Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri            Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas                      Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York           Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California            Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey    Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York           Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida          Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California    Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey          August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia            Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
                       Hope Goins, Staff Director
                 Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
                          Natalie Nixon, Clerk
                                 ------                                

     SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY

                Val Butler Demings, Florida, Chairwoman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas            Kat Cammack, Florida, Ranking 
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey         Member
Al Green, Texas                      Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey    Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex  Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
    officio)                         John Katko, New York (ex officio)
              Lauren McClain, Subcommittee Staff Director
          Diana Bergwin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                    Aaron Greene, Subcommittee Clerk
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Val Butler Demings, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Florida, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on 
  Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     3
The Honorable Kat Cammack, a Representative in Congress From the 
  State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency 
  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery:
  Oral Statement.................................................     4
  Prepared Statement.............................................     6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     7

                               Witnesses

Mr. Gary C. Rasicot, Acting Assistant Secretary, Countering 
  Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, U.S. Department of Homeland 
  Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     8
  Prepared Statement.............................................    10
Mr. Christopher P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and 
  Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
  Oral Statement.................................................    15
  Prepared Statement.............................................    16

                                Appendix

Questions From Chairwoman Val Butler Demings for Gary C. Rasicot.    41
Questions From Ranking Member Kat Cammack for Gary C. Rasicot....    42
Question From Honorable Andrew Garbarino for Gary C. Rasicot.....    42
Questions From Chairwoman Val Butler Demings for Chris P. Currie.    43
Question From Honorable Andrew Garbarino for Chris P. Currie.....    47

 
 EXAMINING THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY COUNTERING WEAPONS 
                       OF MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE

                              ----------                              


                         Friday, July 16, 2021

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                   Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
                                    Response, and Recovery,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. via 
Webex, Hon. Val Butler Demings [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] 
presiding.
    Present: Representatives Demings, Payne, Cammack, and 
Miller-Meeks.
    Mrs. Demings. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Response, and Recovery will come to order.
    The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on 
examining the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Office.
    Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the 
subcommittee in recess at any point.
    We are here today to discuss the state of the United States 
Department of Homeland Security Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office.
    This September marks the 20th anniversary of the worst 
terrorist attack on U.S. soil. Since that time, there has been 
general agreement that we as a Nation must be prepared to 
address terrorism and attacks on our country regardless of the 
mode of attack. This means being prepared for low-probability, 
high-consequence attacks involving chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear materials.
    As we emerge from an extremely tragic year, where COVID-19 
took the lives of over 600,000 Americans, it does not take a 
lot of imagination to envision the damage that a chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear attack could do to our 
country. In addition to the immediate health and safety 
consequences, such an attack could imperil our Nation's 
critical infrastructure and destabilize large swaths of the 
country.
    For its part within DHS, it falls to the CWMD Office to not 
only prevent such attacks, but also partner with domestic and 
international partners to safeguard the United States against 
health security attacks. Unfortunately, since CWMD was 
authorized in 2018, it has faced significant challenges and 
persistent problems, some of which predate the office's actual 
establishment that have undermined the office's ability to 
successfully fulfill its very vital mission.
    CWMD's challenges were not unforeseen. In August 2016, the 
Comptroller General cautioned, 2 years prior to the Trump 
administration's unilateral action to consolidate both programs 
within a new CWMD office, that DHS quote was--and I quote--
``did not fully access and document potential problems that 
could result from consolidation''.
    Although the CWMD work force has performed laudable 
activities during the pandemic, taking such actions as issuing 
guidance, performing biosurveillance, and leading efforts to 
vaccinate the DHS work force, numerous Governmental and non-
Governmental reports indicate that there are significant 
structural and work force morale issues within CWMD. CWMD is at 
a crossroads.
    At this time, there are a number of proposals to spin off 
major portions of the office, and there is a fair bit of 
skepticism that the organization will have adequate resources 
to deliver the promise of its most prominent and consequential 
detection program.
    For instance, DHW--DHS continues to struggle to deliver 
biodetection capability that can effectively deploy in urban 
and other high-risk areas. In 2003, DHS began installing 
BioWatch, air samplers, and conspicuously at street level and 
atop buildings in cities across the country to detect deadly 
biological attack. But that program never quite delivered the 
situational awareness that local responders needed.
    So DHS shifted gears to the BioDetection for the 21st 
Century, or BD21, Program. Unfortunately, that program is 
struggling, too. In fact, a May 2021 report issued by the 
Comptroller General found that the program faces technical 
challenges due to inherent limitations and the technologies and 
uncertainties with combining technology for use and 
biodetection.
    Then there is the Securing the Cities Program, which is 
supposed to detect nuclear and radiological threats in urban 
areas. In recent years, the Trump administration sowed 
confusion and uncertainty among city officials participating in 
the program, according to the Comptroller General, when the 
then leader of CWMD communicated to stakeholders that DHS 
wanted to reduce its participation and let other Federal 
agencies play a larger role.
    Around the same time, in 2019, there was reporting that the 
Trump administration had quietly dismantled or cut back 
programs such as CWMD's Red Team Program that carried out 
dozens of drills and assessments around the country each year 
to help Federal, State, and local officials detect potential 
threats, such as improvised nuclear device concealed in a 
suitcase or a cargo ship carrying a radiation-spewing dirty 
bomb, as well as the operation support directorate, which had 
helped lead up to 20 WMD-related training exercises each year 
with State and local authorities.
    Some of the challenges CWMD faces today are a by-product of 
the way in which CWMD was formed by the Trump administration. 
Other challenges are intrinsic in its mission.
    Given all of these challenges, DHS leadership will have to 
prioritize improvements to CWMD in order to enhance the 
Department's counter-CBRN programs.
    This subcommittee stands ready to assist CWMD and the 
Department in their efforts to improve our Nation's ability to 
protect the homeland against weapons of mass destruction.
    I along with Members of this subcommittee are grateful for 
the participation of our witnesses here today, the Acting 
Secretary of CWMD, Gary Rasicot; and Christopher Currie, 
director of the Homeland and Justice Division within GAO. We 
look forward to your testimony.
    [The statement of Chairwoman Demings follows:]
               Statement of Chairwoman Val Butler Demings
                             July 16, 2021
    Good morning.
    We are here today to discuss the state of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD).
    This September marks the 20th anniversary of the worst terrorist 
attack on U.S. soil.
    Since that time there has been general agreement that we, as a 
Nation, must be prepared to address terrorism and attacks on our 
country--regardless of the mode of attack.
    That means being prepared for low-probability, high-consequence 
attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
materials. As we emerge from an extremely tragic year, where COVID-19 
took the lives of over 600,000 Americans, it does not take a lot of 
imagination to envision the damage that a Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) attack could do to our country. In 
addition to the immediate health and safety consequences, such an 
attack could imperil our Nation's critical infrastructure and 
destabilize large swaths of the country.
    For its part, within DHS, it falls to the CWMD Office to not only 
prevent such attacks but also partner with domestic and international 
partners to safeguard the United States against health security 
threats. Unfortunately, since CWMD was authorized in 2018, it has faced 
significant challenges and persistent problems, some of which predate 
the Office's establishment, that have undermined the Office's ability 
to successfully fulfill its vital mission.
    CWMD's challenges were not unforeseen. In August 2016, the 
Comptroller General 2 years prior to the Trump administration's 
unilateral action to consolidate existing programs into a new CWMD 
office--that DHS ``did not fully assess and document potential problems 
that could result from consolidation.''
    Although the CWMD workforce has performed laudable activities 
during the pandemic--taking such actions as issuing guidance, 
performing biosurveillance, and leading efforts to vaccinate the DHS 
workforce--numerous Governmental and non-Governmental reports indicate 
that there are significant structural and workforce morale issues 
within CWMD.
    CWMD is at a crossroads. At this time, there are a number of 
proposals to spin off major portions of the office and there is a fair 
bit of skepticism that the organization will have adequate resources to 
deliver on the promise of its most prominent and consequential 
detection programs.
    For instance, DHS continues to struggle to deliver a biodetection 
capability that can be effectively deployed in urban and other high-
risk areas. In 2003, DHS began installing BioWatch air samplers 
inconspicuously at street level and atop buildings in cities across the 
country to detect deadly biological attacks. But that program never 
quite delivered the situational awareness that local responders needed 
so, DHS, shifted gears to the ``Biodetection for the 21st Century'' or 
``BD21'' program. Unfortunately, that program is struggling too. In 
fact, a May 2021 report issued by the Comptroller General found that 
the program faces ``technical challenges due to inherent limitations in 
the technologies and uncertainties with combining technologies for use 
in biodetection.''
    Then there is the Securing the Cities program, which is supposed to 
detect nuclear and radiological threats in urban areas. In recent 
years, the Trump administration sowed ``confusion and uncertainty'' 
among city officials participating in the program, according to the 
Comptroller General, when the then-leader of CWMD communicated to 
stakeholders that DHS wanted to reduce its participation and let other 
Federal agencies play a larger role.
    Around the same time, in 2019, there was reporting that the Trump 
administration had quietly dismantled or cut back programs such as--
CWMD's ``Red Team'' program that carried out dozens of drills and 
assessments around the country each year to help Federal, State, and 
local officials detect potential threats such as an improvised nuclear 
device concealed in a suitcase, or a cargo ship carrying a radiation-
spewing ``dirty bomb'' as well as the Operations Support Directorate, 
which had helped lead up to 20 WMD-related training exercises each year 
with State and local authorities.
    Some of the challenges CWMD faces today are a byproduct of the way 
in which CWMD was formed by the Trump administration; other challenges 
are intrinsic to its mission.
    Given all of its challenges, DHS leadership will have to prioritize 
improvements to CWMD in order to enhance the Department's counter-CBRN 
programs.
    This subcommittee stands ready to assist CWMD and the Department in 
their efforts to improve our Nation's ability to protect the homeland 
against weapons of mass destruction.
    I, along with the Members of this subcommittee are grateful for the 
participation of our witnesses here today, the acting assistant 
secretary of CWMD, Gary Rasicot, and Christopher Currie, director of 
the Homeland and Justice Division within GAO. We look forward to your 
testimony.

    Mrs. Demings. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member 
of the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Cammack, 
for an opening statement.
    Mrs. Cammack. Well, thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 
Pleasure to see everyone here today.
    Thank you to our witnesses.
    In less than 2 months, our Nation will collectively mourn 
the 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Following 
those attacks, the Department of Homeland Security was created 
to combat threats posed by al-Qaeda and other extremist and 
terrorist groups. However, in the last 20 years, the terrorist 
threat landscape has changed dramatically.
    Terrorist groups and extremists have long strived to employ 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials as 
part of their attacks. In 2001, anthrax attacks highlighted the 
grim reality of a bioweapon. The powder was delivered through 
the mail, ultimately killing 5 people, making ill 17, and 
shutting down much of the Capitol complex.
    In 2017, the Australian Government disrupted a plot 
allegedly hatched by ISIS supporters that involved setting off 
a device to release toxic gas in an enclosed public space. Even 
now, when we are finally looking down at the downslope of 
COVID-19, questions have been raised as to the origins of a 
virus that has crippled not just the United States, but the 
entire world, and has cost more than 600,000 American lives. It 
is imperative that we stand ready to counter these types of 
threats.
    The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office was 
authorized in December 2018 to elevate and streamline efforts 
to prevent terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. 
Unfortunately, CWMD has had its fair share of growing pains. 
Media reporting in 2019 indicated that the CWMD Office 
significantly scaled back or eliminated programs specifically 
put in place to help protect the United States.
    According to reports, subject-matter experts were removed 
from their areas of expertise, vital risk assessments were 
halted, and training exercises aimed at helping State and local 
officials were minimized.
    Similarly, the GAO has issued several reports highlighting 
the many shortfalls that the office has encountered through its 
various programs. I am happy that we will hear from them today.
    For example, GAO recently found that CWMD had taken little 
action on assessing and working with cities participating in 
the Securing the Cities Program on sustaining their detection 
capabilities. Securing the Cities aims at reducing the risk of 
a successful deployment of a radiological or nuclear weapon 
against major metropolitan areas within the United States. 
Without analyzing risks related to sustainment and working with 
cities to address these risks, radiological detection 
capabilities around the country could and will deteriorate.
    GAO and DHS's Office of Inspector General have both 
reported on the long-standing challenges that CWMD has faced 
with regard to its biodetection technologies and BioWatch 
Program, a system intended to detect biological agents and 
provide early warning in the event of a biological attack.
    Most recently, in March, the OIG reported that the system 
monitors and detects less than 50 percent of the biological 
agents known to be threats because BioWatch had not updated its 
biological agent-detection capabilities with their 2017 threat 
assessment results.
    Additionally, in July of just last year, DHS's OIG report 
cited that CWMD, although required under the Securing Our 
Agriculture and Food Act had, quote, limited awareness of DHS 
and their on-going efforts and cannot ensure it is adequately 
prepared to respond to a terrorist attack against the Nation's 
food, agriculture, or veterinary systems.
    Considering the supply shortages that we have faced both 
last year and this year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I cannot 
simply imagine the consequences if our food and agricultural 
systems were attacked.
    I would be remiss if I did not mention the low morale CWMD 
has faced since the office's formation. In 2019, the CWMD 
Office was ranked dead last amongst the like-sized agencies in 
the Partnership for Public Service's Best Places to Work 
rankings.
    In 2020, while the office made slight progress, it ranked 
403 out of 411 agencies, moving up only a handful of slots. A 
dedicated and motivated work force is so important for the 
success of this office and these programs that maintain our 
Nation's readiness to detect, deter, and thwart a terrorist 
attack.
    As I have highlighted in my opening statement, the 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office has unfortunately 
hit many roadblocks since its creation. I am hopeful, as is, I 
am sure, the rest of our members of this committee, that this 
hearing will bring to light the underlying issues that have 
plagued the CWMD's success, and that we may have a fruitful and 
candid discussion that puts us on a positive path forward.
    I thank Chairwoman Demings for holding this very important 
hearing, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses here 
today.
    With that, I yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Cammack follows:]
                Statement of Ranking Member Kat Cammack
    In less than 2 months, our Nation will collectively mourn the 20th 
anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Following those attacks, the 
Department of Homeland Security was created to combat threats posed by 
al-Qaeda and other extremist and terrorist groups. However, in the last 
20 years, the terrorist threat landscape has changed dramatically.
    Terrorist groups and extremists have long strived to employ 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials in their 
attacks.
    In 2001, anthrax attacks highlighted the grim reality of a 
bioweapon. The powder was delivered through the mail, ultimately 
killing 5 people, making ill 17, and shutting down much of the Capitol 
Complex.
    In 2017, the Australian government disrupted a plot allegedly 
hatched by ISIS supporters that involved setting off a device to 
release toxic gas in an enclosed public space.
    And even now, when we are finally looking at the down slope of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, questions have been raised as to the origins of a 
virus that crippled, not just the United States, but the entire world 
and cost more than 600,000 American lives.
    It is imperative that we stand ready to counter these types of 
threats.
    The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) was 
authorized in December 2018 to elevate and streamline efforts to 
prevent terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, 
CWMD has had its fair share of growing pains.
    Media reporting in 2019 indicated that the CWMD office 
significantly scaled back or eliminated the programs specifically put 
in place to help protect the United States. According to reports, 
subject-matter experts were removed from their areas of expertise, 
vital risk assessments were halted, and training exercises aimed at 
helping State and local officials were minimized.
    Similarly, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued 
several reports highlighting the many shortfalls the Office has 
encountered through its various programs. I am happy that we will hear 
from them today.
    For example, GAO recently found that CWMD has taken little action 
on assessing and working with cities participating in the Securing the 
Cities program on sustaining their detection capabilities. Securing the 
Cities aims at reducing the risk of a successful deployment of a 
radiological or nuclear weapon against major metropolitan areas in the 
United States. Without analyzing risks related to sustainment and 
working with cities to address these risks, radiological detection 
capabilities around the country could and will deteriorate.
    GAO and DHS's Office of Inspector General have both reported on the 
long-standing challenges that CWMD has faced with regard to its 
biodetection technologies and BioWatch Program--a system intended to 
detect biological agents and provide early warning in the event of a 
biological attack. Most recently, in March, the OIG reported that the 
system monitors and detects less than 50 percent of biological agents 
known to be threats because BioWatch has not updated its biological 
agent detection capabilities with their 2017 threat assessment results.
    Additionally, in July of last year, DHS's OIG reported that CWMD, 
although required under the Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act, 
``has limited awareness of DHS's on-going efforts and cannot ensure it 
is adequately prepared to respond to a terrorist attack against the 
Nation's food, agriculture, or veterinary systems.'' Considering the 
supply shortages we faced last year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I 
can't imagine the consequences if our food and agricultural systems 
were attacked.
    And I would be remiss if I didn't mention the low morale CWMD has 
faced since the office's formation. In 2019, the CWMD Office was ranked 
dead last among like-sized agencies in the Partnership for Public 
Service's Best Places to Work rankings. In 2020, while the Office made 
slight progress, it ranked 403 out of 411 agencies, only moving up a 
few slots.
    A dedicated and motivated workforce is so important for the success 
of this office and these programs that maintain our Nation's readiness 
to detect, deter, and thwart a terrorist attack.
    As I've highlighted in my opening statement, the Countering Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Office has unfortunately hit many roadblocks since 
its creation. I am hopeful that this hearing will bring to light the 
underlying issues that have plagued CWMD's success and that we may have 
a fruitful discussion that puts us on a positive path forward.
    I thank Chairwoman Demings for holding this important hearing and I 
look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

    Mrs. Demings. I thank the Ranking Member for her statement.
    Members are also reminded that the committee will operate 
according to the guidelines laid out by the Chairman and 
Ranking Member in their February 3 colloquy regarding remote 
procedures.
    Without objection, Members not on the subcommittee shall be 
permitted to sit and question the witnesses.
    The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the full 
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an 
opening statement.
    Is Chairman Thompson on?
    Is the Ranking Member on?
    OK. We will move forward, and, if Mr. Thompson joins us, we 
will go back to him.
    [The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
                Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
                             July 16, 2021
    Good morning.
    Thank you to Chairwoman Demings and Ranking Member Cammack for 
holding this hearing.
    I am glad to have Acting Assistant Secretary Rasicot and Director 
Currie at today's hearing to discuss the status of the Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) at this critical time.
    In 2018, the Office was created with the dual mission of preventing 
a Weapons of Mass Destruction attack against the United States and 
leading DHS's efforts to safeguard the United States against chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and health security threats.
    By 2019, it was apparent that CWMD was in trouble. That is when we 
learned of the Trump administration dismantling several of the Office's 
programs.
    In August 2019, I, along with then-Ranking Member Mike Rogers and 
our Senate counterparts, wrote to DHS to express our concerns about the 
changes under way at CWMD. The then-Assistant Secretary, James 
McDonnell, responded by assuring us that the CWMD programs were 
``realigned or restructured to better address threats, remove 
bureaucratic redundancy, and fully align with the President's National 
Security Strategy and our appropriation.''
    Shortly thereafter, there were a series of abrupt changes in 
leadership during the last year of the Trump administration. Mr. 
Rasicot, I look forward to hearing why you came back to lead CWMD and 
what you plan to do to get CWMD on a positive trajectory.
    One area of major concern is CWMD's low workforce morale. In 2019, 
morale within this Office was ranked the lowest among all subagencies 
in the Federal Government, according to the Office of Personnel 
Management.
    It has been reported that CWMD's biological threat detection 
system, BioWatch, which is deployed in 30 major metropolitan areas, is 
unable to fulfill its primary task of detecting aerosolized biological 
attacks. Confidence in the direction CWMD took the program hit a new 
low when, in 2021, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense recommended 
to eliminate the program from all future Presidential budget requests 
until replacement technology is identified and confirmed to meet the 
needs of the program.
    Additionally, CWMD's nuclear and radiological defense efforts have 
significant challenges. According to the Comptroller General, CWMD's 
``Securing the Cities'' program, which is operated by local authorities 
in metropolitan areas to prevent terrorist attacks and other high-
consequence events, does not collect information to fully track program 
spending or performance and and has ``not addressed challenges to 
sustaining the programs.''
    At this time, it is critical that we hear from current CWMD 
leadership about its plan to address the challenges identified by GAO 
and others.
    Given all the challenges inherited from the Trump administration, 
the challenge before the Biden administration, at this time, is where 
to focus its energies to position CWMD for success. I welcome the 
testimony from our witnesses today and hope to learn about the 
solutions to these many challenges.

    Mrs. Demings. I now welcome our panel of witnesses. The 
first witness is Gary Rasicot. Mr. Rasicot serves as the acting 
assistant secretary for the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office. Mr. 
Rasicot previously served as the acting assistant secretary of 
CWMD from October 2019 to July 2020.
    Prior to his role within CWMD, he assumed the duties of the 
U.S. Coast Guard deputy commandant for support--for mission 
support deputy for personnel readiness in 2018 and has 
experience working within the Transportation Security 
Administration.
    Mr. Rasicot has also served as an active-duty Coast Guard 
officer for more than 20 years, and this subcommittee 
appreciates him for his service.
    Mr. Rasicot, thank you so much for joining us today.
    Our second witness is Christopher Currie.
    Mr. Currie served as the director of homeland and justice 
division within the U.S. Government Accountability Office. In 
his role, Mr. Currie leads GAO's investigative work on 
emergency management, disaster response and recovery, and 
management of the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Currie 
began his time with GAO in 2002.
    Mr. Currie, thank you so much for joining us as well.
    Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be 
inserted in the record.
    I now give each witness the opportunity to summarize their 
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Acting Assistant 
Secretary Rasicot.

   STATEMENT OF GARY C. RASICOT, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
                      OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Rasicot. Chairwoman Demings, Ranking Member Cammack, 
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
inviting me to speak with you today. I appreciate this 
opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland Security 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, known as CWMD, 
and our efforts to safeguard the Nation from chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and other health security 
threats.
    Additionally, I would like to thank the committee and its 
Members for their on-going support of the CWMD Office; 
specifically, Representative Payne, who was so helpful in 
getting our authorization bill passed.
    In accordance with the CWMD Act of 2018, CWMD is the hub of 
the Department's CBRN and other health security activities, 
providing coordination, strategy and policy guidance, 
intelligence analysis, operation support, and developing and 
deploying technologies that support operational partners.
    The President's budget requests $427 million in fiscal year 
2022 to support 309 Federal staff and the programs critical to 
the CWMD mission.
    I have had the privilege of leading the C--this office 
twice, most recently since January 2021. My priorities for this 
office have been, No. 1, to establish a safe, collaborative, 
and productive work environment; No. 2, to ensure risk-based 
mission capability across the broad spectrum of threats; and, 
No. 3, to strengthen both our critical partnerships and support 
to DHS operating components and our full range of Federal, 
State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners.
    Over the past 2 years, we have made notable progress in 
strengthening our programs with invaluable input from our 
colleagues in Congress, the Government Accountability Office, 
and the Office of the Inspector General, as well as many first-
responder and other operational organizations we support.
    Recent mission accomplishments include strengthening CWMD 
flagship biodefense programs, including near-term actions with 
BioWatch and the formal recapitalization acquisition program, 
known as BD21; expanding the Securing the Cities Program; 
reinvigorating the DHS Food, Agriculture, and Veterinarian 
Defense Program; responding to the COVID-19 pandemic through 
biosurveillance and supporting CDC in implementing public 
health actions; strengthening the CWMD coordination role 
through a three-part series of exercises that included over 300 
DHS Federal, State, and local participants over the past 
several months.
    The DHS chief medical officer led the Operation Vaccinate 
our Workforce, which has vaccinated more than 75,000 front-line 
mission-critical and DHS employees.
    Finally, we have focused extensively on improving employee 
morale. CWMD established an employee engagement team to empower 
staff at all levels to provide input and share ownership in the 
organization's strategic decision-making process. Throughout 
the pandemic, we have conducted over 70 weekly virtual town 
halls, with an average of more than 250 of our staff 
participating.
    Additionally, I have personally held numerous small town 
halls to engage the work force at multiple ladders. These and 
other actions have played a significant role in CWMD being 
reflected as one of DHS's most improved components in the 
overall rankings in the recently released Partnership for 
Public Service's Best Places to Work in the Federal Government.
    The creation of CWMD through the CWMD Act of 2018 elevated 
and streamlined the ability of DHS to successful resource and 
execute this critical mission. But, as with any new 
organization, there is certainly room for refinement and 
improvement. We plan to work closely with the Members of this 
subcommittee as we strive to improve the CWMD Office.
    On the behalf of the CWMD staff, who work tirelessly to 
keep the American people safe, I look forward to working with 
each of you on the continued authorization of our office.
    Finally, I am humbled to be here representing this office 
and the Department of Homeland Security. To me, this hearing is 
the Federal Government at work, just like we all learned about 
in school as kids. Growing up, I did not think I could have 
ever imagined that I would be afforded such a privilege, so 
thank you. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Rasicot follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Gary C. Rasicot
                             July 16, 2021
                              introduction
    Chairwoman Demings, Ranking Member Cammack, and distinguished 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak with 
you today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office 
(CWMD)'s efforts to safeguard the Nation from chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear (CBRN), and other health security threats, 
including highlights from our fiscal year 2022 budget request.
    In accordance with the CWMD Act of 2018, CWMD is the hub for the 
Department's CBRN and other health security activities: Providing 
coordination, strategy and policy guidance, intelligence analysis, 
operations support, and developing and deploying technologies through 
our research, development, test, evaluation (RDT&E), and acquisition 
initiatives. With your support, the creation of an Office solely 
focused on CBRN and other health security threats has elevated and 
streamlined the ability of DHS to successfully resource and execute 
this critical mission. Our programs and responsibilities are much more 
expansive than the sum of the legacy organizations from which we were 
formed. While each CBRN and health security portfolio poses unique 
threats and mitigation opportunities, overall, the Department and the 
mission have benefited considerably by bringing together the elements 
of the counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) portfolio.
    I have been the acting assistant secretary for CWMD collectively 
for more than 1 year, most recently since January 2021, and previously 
serving in this same role from October 2019 through July 2020. Prior to 
my time at CWMD, I served in various leadership roles with the U.S. 
Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration. Throughout 
my tenure at CWMD, my priorities for the Office have been to: (1) 
Establish a collaborative, safe, and productive work environment; (2) 
ensure risk-based mission capability across the broad spectrum of CBRN 
and health security threats, including ensuring that CBRN detection 
acquisition programs are informed by both intelligence and stakeholder 
requirements; (3) strengthen CWMD's support and partnerships with DHS 
operating components, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and 
other support entities; (4) broaden partnerships across the Federal 
Government; and (5) strengthen assistance to and the relationships with 
State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners.
    The President's budget requests $427 million in fiscal year 2022 
funds to support 309 Federal staff and the programs critical to the 
CWMD mission. This represents an increase of $25 million over the 
fiscal year 2021 enacted amount for CWMD. CWMD allocates the $427 
million across four appropriations: Research and Development, 
Procurement, Federal Assistance, and Operations and Support.
    The programs and activities I will specifically discuss today 
represent a fraction of CWMD's work to mitigate the risk to the Nation 
from these threats, which is performed in close collaboration with our 
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial (FSLTT) partners.
          risk-based approach to protect against cbrn threats
    CBRN and other health security threats present dynamic challenges 
to U.S. National and homeland security, whether from nation-states, 
terrorists, lone actors, or groups of domestic violent extremists. In 
our increasingly complex world, risks are evolving with the convergence 
of technologies, spillover of animal pathogens to human populations, 
access to dual-use material and information, and the degradation of WMD 
norms.
    Defending the homeland against CBRN threats requires a risk-based 
approach, and we must prioritize activities that ``buy down'' the most 
risk. Building on the previous work of legacy offices, CWMD is 
revitalizing a rigorous, repeatable, and transparent process to 
prioritize where the Office should focus its resources to have the 
greatest impact. CWMD is requesting $15 million, which includes an $8 
million increase, for capabilities and risk assessment activities to 
counter enduring and emerging CBRN threats.
    Related to this effort, CWMD is partnering with DHS S&T to 
reinvigorate a strategic CBRN risk assessment that integrates the 
findings of the intelligence and law enforcement communities with input 
from the scientific, medical, and public health communities.
   warning of biological threats and incidents in time to save lives
    CWMD's flagship biodefense programs provide warning of biological 
attacks or incidents with the goal of enabling a rapid response to save 
lives.
National Biosurveillance Integration Center
    The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) integrates, 
analyzes, and distributes information about on-going and emerging 
biological incidents to help ensure the Nation's responses at all 
levels of Government are well-informed, save lives, and minimize 
economic impact. NBIC is unique in the biosurveillance community in 
that it looks across all biological threats--pandemic, accidents, and 
bioterrorism--across multiple sectors--wildlife, human, agriculture, 
and environmental. The Center also provides deep analysis on the impact 
of these biological threats to homeland security.
    In fiscal year 2020 through Quarter 2 of fiscal year 2021, NBIC 
produced more than 950 biosurveillance products, and increased the 
audience for the Center's biosurveillance products by more than 30 
percent. Recipients represent 14 Federal departments and agencies, 
including HHS who leads Federal public health and medical response, 589 
SLTT agencies, and 11 Government information-sharing systems.
    In fiscal year 2022, CWMD requests $15.8 million for NBIC, an 
increase of $3.5 million over the fiscal year 2021 amount.
    This funding will accelerate NBICs efforts to integrate new 
biosurveillance systems to advance the capabilities of our partners and 
the National biosurveillance enterprise.
BioWatch
    As the Nation's primary biodetection capability, CWMD's BioWatch 
Program gives warning of an airborne bioterrorist attack in over 30 
major metropolitan areas across the United States. Outward signs and 
symptoms of a biological attack may emerge slowly. BioWatch can detect 
the presence of certain biological agents in the air after release by a 
terrorist or other bad actor to marshal an earlier response.
    Managed by the CWMD Office, the BioWatch program is locally 
operated and supports coordination among scientists, laboratory 
technicians, emergency managers, law enforcement officers, and public 
health officials. Although labor-intensive, the BioWatch technology is 
proven and reliable and uses the same technology, Polymerase Chain 
Reaction, that is used in the most sensitive COVID-19 diagnostic 
testing. DHS modeling has shown that BioWatch warning can reduce 
casualties by 75 percent by enabling faster administration of medical 
countermeasures. The President's budget requests $83.7 million for 
BioWatch in fiscal year 2022.
    In response to a recent Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
audit, CWMD required all jurisdictions to enhance the physical security 
of portable sampling units (PSU) and developed a multi-year exercise 
plan for routine full-scale exercises; these actions closed two OIG 
recommendations. CWMD is addressing open recommendations by assessing 
whether BioWatch can expand the number of biological threat agents 
detected and assessing PSU location to maximize the protection of 
American lives. To implement these improvements, the President's budget 
request includes an additional $3.3 million within the BioWatch Program 
for fiscal year 2022.
Biological Detection for the 21st Century (BD21)
    CWMD is committed to protecting the American people from biological 
threats through technology and collaborative partnerships. In 2019, DHS 
began a major acquisition program entitled Biological Detection for the 
Twenty-First Century (BD21), to move toward the next generation of a 
National biodetection system.
    BD21 is a Level 1 (i.e. major) acquisition program to address some 
of BioWatch's limitations. For example, the BioWatch system produces 
accurate and reliable results, but the detect-to-warn time line could 
be shortened to more swiftly deploy life-saving countermeasures. BD21 
seeks to design, develop, and deploy networked detection systems that 
continuously monitor the air, collect real-time data, and employ data 
analytics to detect anomalies that may indicate the presence of 
biological agents. The faster anomalies are detected, the faster first 
responders can address potential threats. The program is currently in 
the development phase.
    CWMD has conducted extensive stakeholder engagement with State and 
local partners to maximize the impact of BD21 and ensure this 
technology development is informed by local requirements and 
operational constraints. Through BD21, CWMD will train and equip first 
responders with the tools and information they need to take the fast, 
initial actions to save lives. CWMD will also remain engaged with 
laboratories, which are key partners in the effort to counter 
biological threats, and coordinate with the public health community. 
The President's budget requests a $6.2 million increase over fiscal 
year 2021 enacted, totaling $9.7 million for BD21 R&D in fiscal year 
2022.
Strategic Review of Biodefense Posture
    CWMD has initiated a strategic review of its biodefense posture in 
line with the President's January tasking under Executive Order 13987 
to recommend actions to the President concerning emerging biological 
risks and National biopreparedness policies. CWMD will review its 
policy and programs, including environmental detection programs, to 
determine how best to prepare the Nation to mitigate enduring and 
emerging biological threats, incorporating the lessons from COVID-19.
     detecting radiological and nuclear threats to prevent attacks
    An act of radiological or nuclear (R/N) terrorism would have a 
devastating impact on the United States. DHS began the Securing the 
Cities (STC) Program to enhance the Nation's ability to detect and 
prevent terrorist attacks and other high-consequence events using 
nuclear or other radiological materials in high-risk urban areas. In 
support of this mission, CWMD provides detection equipment, training, 
exercise support, operational and technical subject-matter expertise, 
and programmatic support through a cooperative agreement grant process 
with eligible U.S. regions.
    STC is currently operational in 13 high-risk urban areas across the 
Nation, adding 8 additional high-risk urban areas since fiscal year 
2020. The STC Program uses a regional approach to R/N detection that 
allows for a layered defense posture to increase the probability of 
detection. In addition, coordination with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and their specialized teams ensures a timely hand-off and 
rapid response to a possible terrorism event. In order to continue to 
support this effort, the President's budget requests $30 million in 
fiscal year 2022, which represents an increase of $5.4 million over the 
fiscal year 2021 enacted funding.
    Beyond STC, CWMD's Mobile Detection Deployment Program (MDDP) 
enhances CBRN detection and R/N interdiction capabilities by deploying 
equipment and technical support for State and local surge operations 
and events of National significance. To date, in fiscal year 2021, MDDP 
has conducted 124 deployments in 22 States supporting 57 Federal, 18 
State, and 28 local agencies. These deployments were scaled back in 
fiscal year 2021 due to Federal, State, and local partners' internal 
policies related to COVID-19. In fiscal year 2022 MDDP is expected to 
conduct 144 deployments across the United States. This program 
continues at $6.8 million for fiscal year 2022.
      developing and deploying technologies to support operations
    CWMD continues to ensure implementation of robust domestic CBRN 
detection architectures through development and deployment of 
technologies to our FSLTT operational partners.
    CWMD's R&D program manages efforts to identify, explore, develop, 
and demonstrate science and technologies that address gaps in the 
detection architecture, improve performance of CBRN detection and 
analysis, and reduce the operational burden of detection systems in the 
field. In addition to developing new CBRN sensors, the R&D program also 
improves detection through data analytics (advanced algorithms 
employing machine learning/artificial intelligence).
    CWMD works with first responders and other operators to ensure 
transition of technologies to the field. For example, the Mobile Urban 
Radiological Search system provides operators in U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) with the ability to detect, locate, and 
identify anomalous radioactive materials through the data fusion of 
directional radiation detectors with video cameras. Smaller fixed 
Optical Warning & Localization systems with similar capabilities have 
been used by the MDDP in support of local law enforcement to protect 
venues at National Security Special Events, such as the Indianapolis 
500, or at CBP checkpoints.
    During fiscal year 2021, CWMD conducted two technology 
demonstrations of advanced spectroscopic R/N detection technology at 
two U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints to evaluate improvements in 
detection effectiveness and efficiency over the current technology. 
Additionally, CWMD procured R/N detection systems for DHS operational 
components, including more than 16,000 Personal Radiation Detectors. 
CWMD is also acquiring new enhanced Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) to 
replace the first 216 of approximately 1,400 aging RPMs protecting our 
borders.
    CWMD continues to expand beyond its legacy R/N RDT&E and 
acquisition programs to address chemical and biological threats in 
close coordination with our colleagues in DHS S&T and consistent with 
the CWMD Act of 2018. For example, in fiscal year 2021, CWMD delivered 
chemical detectors to 20 DHS Operational Field Units and unmanned 
ground vehicles equipped with chemical detection capabilities to DHS 
special mission units.
    Finally, CWMD chairs the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Requirements Oversight Council, composed of Senior Executives from 9 
DHS components, to facilitate the executive review, prioritization, and 
approval of capability needs and gaps of CWMD operational requirements 
across DHS components and work with the DHS Joint Requirements Council 
to validate counter-WMD requirements.
    In fiscal year 2022, the President's budget requests $65.7 million 
for Research and Development Activities, which is consistent with the 
enacted amount for fiscal year 2021 of $65.3 million. The fiscal year 
2022 request also includes $53.7 million to procure and deploy large 
scale detection systems and $15 million to acquire portable detection 
systems.
      ensuring a coordinated approach to counter chemical threats
    In response to a 2018 Government Accountability Office audit, CWMD 
established the DHS Chemical Coordination Group (CCG) in 2019 to meet 
the evolving threat from chemical attacks and incidents. This body is 
composed of representatives from DHS components with significant 
chemical defense equities and serves as the primary coordination 
mechanism for DHS chemical defense. The CCG has addressed issues such 
as current and emerging chemical threats, including coordinating DHS 
actions on pharmaceutical-based agents (e.g. fentanyl). The President's 
budget includes $1 million in the fiscal year 2022 Operations & Support 
appropriation to ensure that the CCG and related activities will 
integrate, align, and advance DHS chemical defense capabilities.
    The CCG developed the first-ever DHS Chemical Defense Strategy, 
published in December 2019. CWMD and the CCG also directed an in-depth 
analysis of Department-wide chemical capabilities, defense and 
preparedness equities, programs, activities, and lines of effort. The 
CCG has begun to use this analysis to improve program coordination, 
share information about current activities throughout the Department, 
and address operational gaps. To support these efforts, the President's 
budget requests an additional $2.0 million in the Federal Assistance 
appropriation for Chemical Defense activities in support of the 
Integrated Chemical Defense Assessment Toolkit to assist communities in 
building layered defenses against chemical threats.
    defending the nation's food, agriculture, and veterinary systems
    CWMD's mission encompasses more than traditional counter-WMD 
programs. The Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act (Public Law 115-43) 
requires that CWMD implement a program to coordinate the Department's 
efforts to defend the Nation's food, agriculture, and veterinary 
systems against terrorism and other high-consequence events. To meet 
this mandate, in fiscal year 2020, CWMD reestablished a formal Food, 
Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense (FAV-D) program under the DHS chief 
medical officer (CMO). In fiscal year 2022, the President's budget 
requests an additional $2.8 million above enacted funding ($5.8 million 
total) to protect against the intentional introduction or natural 
occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and zoonotic diseases.
    CWMD works closely with DHS components to enhance the resilience of 
the Nation across the food and agriculture sector. In fiscal year 2021, 
CWMD and DHS S&T jointly published a strategic plan to guide the future 
of FAV-D RDT&E activities. Last month, in collaboration with the 
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, CWMD led a 
roundtable with Federal Government, State, local, and private-sector 
partners to identify areas of improvement toward building a resilient 
food and agriculture sector.
                         responding to covid-19
    Since the earliest days of the pandemic, CWMD has provided expert 
biological and medical guidance and reports and enhanced support to DHS 
components, the Department of Health and Human Services, and other 
partners. CWMD's role in the COVID-19 response has been three-fold, 
focused on traditional biodefense actions, like biosurveillance; 
supporting the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 
implementing public health actions at our borders; and helping to 
ensure the health and safety of DHS's workforce. CWMD has also led 
policy coordination for DHS in the transportation sectors (land, air, 
and sea) to ensure CDC guidance is implemented and decisions are 
informed by operational constraints.
    NBIC began tracking COVID-19 in early January 2020 and continues to 
generate and distribute reports and analytic and modelling products to 
Federal, State, and local partners. Over the course of the COVID-19 
pandemic, NBIC has generated approximately 600 biosurveillance reports 
on COVID-19 and developed a COVID-19 daily briefing that reaches over 
200 DHS senior leaders.
    Beginning in early February 2020, before much was known about the 
transmission of COVID-19, DHS partnered with CDC to establish medical 
entry screening at designated airports for travelers returning from 
restricted countries to reduce the risk of COVID-19 importation.
    Finally, in coordination with DHS components and the Veterans 
Health Administration, the DHS CMO-led Operation Vaccinate Our 
Workforce (Operation VOW) to voluntarily vaccinate front-line and 
mission-critical DHS employees against COVID-19. Through both fixed 
facility and field and expeditionary vaccine events, Operation VOW has 
vaccinated more than 75,000 employees as of June 2021.
     providing expert health advice and operational medical support
    Per the CWMD Act of 2018, the DHS CMO resides within CWMD and 
serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
assistant secretary for CWMD, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
administrator, and DHS senior leadership on medical and public health 
issues related to natural disasters, border health, pandemic response, 
acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters.
    The CMO team provides operational medical support to DHS 
components. This support includes immigration health issues, public 
health preparedness and response, and the DHS Emergency Medical 
Services enterprise, which comprises over 3,500 emergency medical 
technicians across the Department. The CMO team implements critical 
medical programs such as the Department's forthcoming electronic health 
records system and the First Responder Vaccine Initiative Pilot 
Program, which makes expiring anthrax vaccine doses available on a 
voluntary basis to State and local emergency response providers. In 
fiscal year 2022, the President's budget requests $7.5 million to 
support the CMO, which reflects a $4.0 million increase over the fiscal 
year 2021 enacted funding.
    During his May 26, 2021 testimony before the House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Secretary Mayorkas committed to 
providing a plan to reform the Department's health and medical 
functions. CWMD, including the CMO, is assisting Department leadership 
in assessing the role, structure, and functions of the CMO in light of 
the lessons learned from COVID-19 and other recent health and medical 
responses. We look forward to working with this committee on that 
effort.
                            workforce morale
    The CWMD workforce is composed of the best and brightest in the 
Federal Government. From the scientists and doctors, to the individuals 
who work behind the scenes on the day-to-day tasks, the accomplishments 
of this team make the Nation safer.
    From the onset of the COVID-19 response, CWMD has recognized the 
importance of keeping our staff safe, informed, and mission-ready. With 
this premise in mind, CWMD senior leadership has conducted over 74 
weekly virtual town halls with an average of 280 of our staff 
participating. Additionally, I have personally held numerous small 
group town halls to engage with the workforce at multiple levels.
    CWMD established the Employee Engagement Team (EET) to focus on 
identifying barriers to and measures of success across the 
organization. The EET is an employee-driven effort to develop an action 
plan for strengthening CWMD, implementing changes, and monitoring their 
effectiveness.
    All of these actions played a significant role in CWMD being listed 
as the most improved DHS component, and fifth-most improved Government-
wide, in Overall Rankings in the recently released Partnership for 
Public Service's Best Places to Work in the Federal Government.
                               conclusion
    CWMD remains focused on countering CBRN and health-related threats 
and incidents. While we are a relatively new Office, we have matured 
quickly. CWMD performed a key role for DHS throughout the COVID-19 
pandemic. During that same time, we continued to coordinate DHS efforts 
in the WMD mission space, provide our FSLTT partners with CBRN 
detection equipment, and run programs to protect the Nation from CBRN 
and other health security threats. We have assessed the full mission 
space and expanded our counter chemical and biological capabilities to 
most efficiently and effectively execute our mission. We have also 
minimized certain functions that better align with other Federal 
Department missions, such as the technical nuclear forensics pre-
detonation materials program.
    On behalf of the CWMD staff who work tirelessly to keep the United 
States and the American people safe from CBRN and other health security 
threats, I look forward to working with you on the reauthorization of 
our Office.
    Chairwoman Demings, Ranking Member Cammack, and distinguished 
Members of this subcommittee, thank you again for your attention to 
this important mission and for the opportunity to discuss CWMD's work.

    Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much for your testimony.
    I now recognize Director Currie to summarize his statement 
for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER P. CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY 
       AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Mr. Currie. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Demings, 
Ranking Member Cammack, Chairman Thompson, if you are here, and 
other Members of the subcommittee. I really appreciate the 
chance to be here to discuss our past work and on-going work on 
the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office at DHS. I 
don't think I could have set up the importance of this topic 
any better than you--the Chairman did and Chairwoman did and 
the Ranking Member in their opening statements.
    CWMD faces an incredibly difficult mission. Chemical, 
biological, nuclear, and radiological threats are extremely 
unique challenges. Unlike cyber threats, mass shootings, 
disasters, border apprehensions, drug smuggling, and other more 
daily occurrences DHS faces, WMD threats are not as routine, 
and they are not always perceived as more likely, as you said 
in your opening, Ms. Chairwoman.
    CWMD has to compete within DHS for resources and attention 
with other DHS components dealing with these kind of daily 
events. However, the COVID-19 pandemic showed us that 
biological and other threats like this, while not routine, can 
create catastrophic and society-changing impacts. It also 
showed that pandemics are not just a public health issue but a 
National security issue requiring a huge role for DHS, and that 
is what happened.
    Our work has identified a number of challenges across 
CWMD's mission. One major challenge they face right now is both 
addressing many of the programmatic challenges that were 
mentioned in the opening while at the same time working to 
better define its role and transform itself.
    However, this shows what we have seen for decades in 
looking at Government programs. Mission results cannot be 
separated from organizational health and employee morale, and 
you can't have one without the other.
    In the biodefense area, since 2012, we have reported on 
challenges in implementing BioWatch, a system that is designed 
to detect an airborne bio attack. Just 2 months ago, we 
reported on challenges in the effort to upgrade and replace 
BioWatch, the third effort to do so, which is called BD21.
    We found that BD21 faces challenges, such as just inherent 
limitations in the available technology and uncertainties with 
combining technologies for use in the domestic environment, 
places like train stations, sporting arenas, things like that.
    For example, avoiding and reducing false alarms is still a 
difficult technical challenge that has to be overcome if DHS is 
to more quickly detect bio threats in these environments. I 
also think this shows how hard it is to employ technologies in 
DHS in our homeland versus, you know, overseas in the 
warfighter or military environments.
    We have also found that CWMD has struggled to develop an 
effective surveillance system to detect and share information 
on bio threats. For example, we have reported that the DHS 
National Biosurveillance Integration Center has struggled to 
really fulfill its mandate in law and provide value to Federal, 
State, and local partners.
    In chemical--the chemical security area, in 2018, we 
reported that DHS had not fully integrated and coordinated its 
chemical defense programs and activities across all the DHS 
components. We recommended that DHS develop a strategy and 
implementation plan, and the good news is that one has been 
completed, and an implementation plan is to be completed in the 
next couple of months, according to DHS.
    We have also identified challenges related to CWMD's 
nuclear and radiological efforts. We found challenges in their 
Securing the Cities Program, which were spelled out in the 
opening. This seeks to help cities basically detect and deter 
nuclear terrorism.
    We reported that they didn't fully track program spending 
and performance and haven't addressed challenges to sustaining 
the program at the local level, and we recommended they better 
do so. I know that they have made a lot of progress in this 
area, but there is still more to be made. It is also important 
to note this because DHS seeks to expand the program in the 
2022 budget.
    Now, I realize the key question--I think it is the right 
question for today--is what do we do moving forward to help 
this organization be successful?
    In addition to addressing the recommendations we have made, 
there are also actions that could be taken to help the 
organization mature and address morale and the other 
challenges. Four years ago, we testified for this same 
committee as DHS was first considering this reorganization. We 
stand by the same recommendations we made at that time.
    CWMD has to continue to implement best practices from past 
successful transformations in Government. For example, focusing 
on efforts to continue better defining its mission and focusing 
on what it does best, communicate with internal and external 
stakeholders, and involve employees in all of these efforts.
    This completes my statement. I look forward to the 
discussion and questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Currie follows:]
              Prepared Statement of Christopher P. Currie
                         Friday, July 16, 2021
                               highlights
    Highlights of GAO-21-105332, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, Committee on Homeland 
Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
    In December 2018, statute established the CWMD office, reorganizing 
several legacy offices, including the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
and Office of Health Affairs into one. The office manages programs 
intended to enhance the United States' ability to detect, deter, and 
defend against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. 
However, programs operated and managed by the CWMD office have faced 
long-standing challenges, some which predate the reorganization.
    This statement describes our 2016 work related to the CWMD office 
formation and findings from our past reports on CWMD programs from 2009 
through May 2021, including challenges and opportunities for the 
effective operations and implementation of key programs related to 
biodefense, nuclear security, and chemical security.
    To conduct our prior work, GAO reviewed relevant Presidential 
directives, laws, regulations, policies, strategic plans, and other 
reports and interviewed Federal, State, and industry officials, among 
others.
What GAO Recommends
    GAO made 16 recommendations designed to address the challenges 
discussed in this statement. As of July 2021, DHS has taken steps to 
address some, but not all of them. Of the 16 recommendations GAO made, 
10 remain open, and GAO continues to monitor DHS's progress to 
implement them.
   countering weapons of mass destruction.--opportunities for dhs to 
            better address long-standing program challenges
What GAO Found
    In April 2016, GAO evaluated Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
plans to consolidate chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
security programs into the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(CWMD) office. GAO recommended DHS use, where appropriate, the key 
mergers and organizational transformation practices identified in prior 
work, such as conducting adequate stakeholder outreach. DHS agreed with 
and addressed the recommendation by soliciting employee feedback on the 
transformation and formed a leadership team for the consolidation, 
among other practices. However, GAO observed that significant 
challenges remained at the CWMD office--such as low employee morale and 
questions about program efficacy. GAO has on-going work evaluating 
these issues and plans to issue a report in early 2022.
    Over the past decade, GAO has also conducted extensive work 
evaluating legacy and on-going programs managed by the CWMD office and 
has identified program management challenges and opportunities for 
improvement in the following program areas:
   Biosurveillance programs.--Since 2009, GAO has reported on 
        progress and challenges with two of DHS's biosurveillance 
        efforts--the National Biosurveillance Integration Center and 
        the pursuit of replacements for the BioWatch program (aimed at 
        detecting aerosolized biological attacks). For example, DHS 
        faced challenges defining these programs' missions and 
        acquiring suitable technologies. In December 2009 and September 
        2012, GAO highlighted the importance of following Departmental 
        policies and employing leading management practices to help 
        ensure that the mission of each program is clearly and 
        purposefully defined and that investments effectively respond 
        to those missions. DHS agreed with and addressed these 
        recommendations. Most recently, DHS agreed to a May 2021 GAO 
        recommendation that it should follow best practices for 
        conducting technology readiness assessments for a biodetection 
        effort and described planned efforts to conduct one before the 
        next key decision event.
   Nuclear/radiological detection.--In May 2019, GAO found that 
        the CWMD office lacked a clear basis for proposed changes to 
        the strategies of the Securing the Cities program, which is 
        designed to enhance the nuclear detection capabilities of 
        Federal and non-Federal agencies in select cities. GAO found 
        the strategies were not based on threats or needs of the 
        participating cities. DHS agreed with our recommendations aimed 
        at improving communication and coordination with participating 
        cities, but has not fully implemented them.
   Chemical defense.--In August 2018, GAO found that DHS had 
        not fully integrated and coordinated its chemical defense 
        programs and activities, which could lead to a risk that DHS 
        may miss an opportunity to leverage resources and share 
        information. Improved program integration and coordination 
        could lead to greater effectiveness addressing chemical 
        threats. DHS agreed to develop a strategy and implementation 
        plan to aid integration of programs, which it expects to 
        finalize in September 2021.
    Chairwoman Demings, Ranking Member Cammack, and Members of the 
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (CWMD) office. Our Nation faces a variety of homeland 
security threats that continue to evolve and present an array of 
challenges. Multitudes of Governmental and non-Governmental 
stakeholders are responsible for preventing and responding to these 
threats. In particular, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
weapons, also known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have the 
potential to kill thousands of people in a single incident.
    Chemical attacks abroad and the threat of using chemical weapons 
against the West by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria have raised 
concerns about the potential for chemical attacks occurring in the 
United States. Additionally, clandestine attacks using aerosolized 
biological agents could be carried out in urban areas, at sporting 
events, at transportation hubs, or at indoor facilities like office 
buildings.\1\ The United States also faces a continuing threat that 
terrorists could smuggle in nuclear or radiological materials to use in 
a terrorist attack. According to DHS, terrorist attacks using chemical, 
biological, or radiological material may lack overt warning signs, 
which limits opportunities for intervention.\2\ However, the 
consequences of such attacks are potentially high even though the 
likelihood of their occurrence is relatively low.\3\
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    \1\ GAO, Biodefense: DHS Exploring New Methods to Replace BioWatch 
and Could Benefit From Additional Guidance, GAO-21-292, (Washington, 
DC: May 20, 2021).
    \2\ DHS Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2020-2024.
    \3\ DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, (Washington, 
DC: June 2014).
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    In a June 2015 report to Congress, DHS proposed consolidating the 
agency's core chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
explosives functions.\4\ The CWMD office, formed by DHS in December 
2017 and established by statute in December 2018, is a reorganization 
of several DHS offices, including the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
and Office of Health Affairs.\5\ The office works to protect against 
the dangers posed by hostile state and non-state actors who seek to 
acquire and use nuclear, chemical, radiological, or biological 
materials in the form of weapons of mass destruction to harm Americans 
or U.S. interests.
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    \4\ During an initial review of chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosives functions at DHS, agency officials determined 
that the Office of Bombing Prevention should be included within the WMD 
consolidation option. Subsequent DHS consolidation planning did not 
include the Office of Bombing Prevention. The Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (CWMD) Act of 2018 does not affect the organizational 
placement of the Office of Bombing Prevention. Pub. L. No. 115-387, 132 
Stat. 5162.
    \5\ Pub. L. No. 115-387,  2(a)(2), 132 Stat. at 5162-63 
(classified at 6 U.S.C.  591).
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    The office manages programs intended to enhance the United States' 
ability to detect, deter, and defend against chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear threats. These programs include partnerships 
with non-Federal Governments designed to address the risk of nuclear 
and biological attacks in metropolitan areas and efforts to integrate 
and share information about those risks. The primary statutory missions 
of the CWMD office are coordinating with other Federal efforts and 
developing a strategy and policy for the Department to: (1) Plan for, 
detect, and protect against the importation, possession, storage, 
transportation, development, or use of unauthorized chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear materials, devices, or agents in 
the United States; and (2) protect against an attack using such 
materials, devices, or agents against U.S. people, territory, or 
interests.\6\
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    \6\ 6 U.S.C.  591g, 592. The Assistant Secretary for the CWMD 
reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Id. at  591.
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    Since August 2016, we have evaluated DHS efforts to consolidate 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security programs into 
the CWMD office.\7\ Moreover, over the past decade, we have conducted 
extensive work evaluating legacy and on-going programs managed by the 
CWMD office that address biological, nuclear, and chemical security 
issues.\8\ For example, we have conducted reviews of DHS's National 
Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC), the BioWatch and Securing 
the Cities Programs, as well as chemical defense programs.
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    \7\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS's Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives Program Consolidation Proposal 
Could Better Consider Benefits and Limitations. GAO-16-603. Washington, 
DC: August 11, 2016.
    \8\ GAO. Biosurveillance: Developing a Collaboration Strategy Is 
Essential to Fostering Interagency Data and Resource Sharing, GAO-10-
171 (Washington, DC: Dec. 18, 2009); Biosurveillance: DHS Should 
Reevaluate Mission Need and Alternatives before Proceeding with 
BioWatch Generation-3 Acquisition, GAO-12-810 (Washington, DC: Sept. 
10, 2012); Combating Nuclear Terrorism: DHS Should Address Limitations 
to Its Program to Secure Key Cities. GAO-19-327 (Washington, DC: May 
13, 2019); and Chemical Terrorism: A Strategy and Implementation Plan 
Would Help DHS Better Manage Fragmented Chemical Defense Programs and 
Activities, GAO-18-562 (Washington, DC: August 22, 2018), among others.
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    As such, this statement describes our prior work related to the 
CWMD office formation and findings from our past reporting on CWMD 
programs, including challenges and opportunities for the effective 
operations and implementation of key programs related to biodefense, 
nuclear security, and chemical security. This statement is based on our 
prior work issued from December 2009 through May 2021 on various CWMD 
efforts.\9\ It also includes updates on the status of recommendations. 
To conduct our prior work, we reviewed relevant Presidential 
directives, laws, regulations, policies, strategic plans, and other 
reports and interviewed Federal, State, and industry officials, among 
others. More information on our scope and methodology can be found in 
each of the reports cited throughout this statement. The work upon 
which this statement is based was conducted in accordance with 
generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives.
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    \9\ Specific reports are cited throughout the statement.
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                               background
CWMD Biodefense Efforts
            National Biosurveillance Integration Center
    The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
(9/11 Commission Act) established the National Biosurveillance 
Integration Center (NBIC) within DHS.\10\ The Act specifically tasked 
NBIC with integrating and analyzing information from human health, 
animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems across the 
Federal Government and supporting the interagency biosurveillance 
community. As defined in the July 2012 NBIC Strategic Plan, integration 
involves combining biosurveillance information from different sources 
and domains to provide partners and stakeholders with a synthesized 
view of the information, and what it could mean. The primary goal of 
integration includes creating a common understanding of potential and 
on-going biological events and providing insights across data sources 
that cannot be gleaned in isolation.
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    \10\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, title XI,  1101, 121 Stat. 266, 375-79 
(classified, as amended, at 6 U.S.C.  195b).
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            BioWatch and Biological Detection for the 21st Century
    In 2003, in response to the 2001 anthrax attack, DHS started the 
BioWatch program--designed to provide early indication of an 
aerosolized biological weapon. The BioWatch program uses routine 
laboratory testing designed to detect an aerosolized biological attack 
for 5 specific biological agents considered high-risk for use as 
biological weapons. The BioWatch program is a Federally-managed, 
locally-operated system. The CWMD office collaborates with more than 30 
BioWatch jurisdictions throughout the Nation to operate approximately 
600 aerosol collectors, primarily in outdoor locations. The 
determination of whether a public health threat exists based on 
information from the BioWatch program can take 12 to 36 hours after the 
aerosol collection unit initially captures an agent. This 36-hour time 
line consists of up to 24 hours for air sampling, up to 4 hours for 
retrieving the sample from an aerosol collection unit and transporting 
it to the laboratory, and up to 8 hours for laboratory testing.
    Since the program's inception, DHS has pursued enhancements and 
replacements to the existing BioWatch system without success. DHS 
designed these efforts to further reduce the time to detection, 
limiting morbidity and mortality from aerosolized biological attacks. 
Biological Detection for the 21st Century (BD21) is DHS's current 
effort to replace BioWatch. DHS describes this multi-year acquisition 
effort as a system-of-systems that will incorporate multiple technology 
components and use machine learning and data analytics to provide 
contextual information and indication that a biological attack may have 
occurred.\11\
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    \11\ A system-of-systems is a collection of technology elements 
that operate or function together within a larger system to create a 
new, more complex system, which offers more functionality and 
performance than simply the sum of the constituent technology elements.
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            National Biodefense Strategy
    DHS was 1 of 4 agencies required by law to jointly develop a 
National biodefense strategy and associated implementation plan.\12\ In 
September 2018, the White House issued the National Biodefense Strategy 
to promote a more efficient, coordinated, and accountable biodefense 
enterprise and established a governance structure to guide the 
strategy's implementation. In June 2019, we testified that the National 
Biodefense Strategy and its interagency governing leadership offer the 
potential for the Nation to better define the role of detection 
technologies in a layered, National biodefense capability to help those 
that pursue these technologies better articulate their mission needs 
and align requirements and concepts of operation accordingly.\13\ As 
part of the implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy, DHS and 
its interagency partners will have the opportunity to assess the role 
of and investment in biodetection of aerosolized attacks in a layered 
approach to mitigating risks of a variety of biological threats. CWMD 
officials represent DHS on the Biodefense Coordination Team--a working 
group of experts from agencies with biodefense responsibilities. CWMD 
officials are also responsible for leading the Strategy's 
implementation at DHS.
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    \12\ Signed into law on December 23, 2016, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 required the Secretaries of 
Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Agriculture 
to jointly develop a National biodefense strategy and associated 
implementation plan, which shall include a review and assessment of 
biodefense policies, practices, programs and initiatives. Such 
Secretaries shall review and, as appropriate, revise the strategy 
biennially. See Pub. L. No. 114-328, div. A, title X, subtitle G,  
1086, 130 Stat. 2000, 2423-24 (2016) (classified, as amended, at 6 
U.S.C.  104).
    \13\ GAO, Biodefense: The Nation Faces Longstanding Challenges 
Related to Defending Against Biological Threats, GAO-19-635T 
(Washington, DC: June 26, 2019).
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Nuclear and Radiological Detection
    In fiscal year 2007, DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
initiated the Securing the Cities program and implemented it for the 
program's first decade. Securing the Cities operates as a cooperative 
agreement between CWMD and eligible cities designed to enhance the 
nuclear detection capabilities of Federal, State, local, Tribal, and 
territorial agencies.\14\ Cities use the funds to purchase commercial 
radiation detection devices and other detection equipment. The program 
also provides detection training for up to 5 years. Securing the Cities 
has 3 primary goals: (1) Enhance regional capabilities to detect and 
interdict unregulated nuclear and other radiological materials, (2) 
guide the coordination of participating cities in their roles defined 
by the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, and (3) encourage 
participating cities to sustain their nuclear or radiological detection 
programs over time.\15\
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    \14\ A cooperative agreement is a legal instrument of financial 
assistance between a Federal agency and a non-Federal entity that is 
used to enter into a relationship with the principal purpose to 
transfer anything of value, such as money, to a non-Federal entity to 
carry out a public purpose authorized by law. In 2019, 5 cities 
participated in the program.
    \15\ The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is a multi-layered 
framework encompassing many different Federal programs, projects, and 
activities to detect and deter nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, 
at the U.S. border, and inside the United States.
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Chemical Defense Efforts
    DHS has a number of chemical defense responsibilities, programs, 
and activities spread across its various components. DHS's efforts to 
address a terrorist chemical attack also involve a wide range of 
components including the CWMD office.\16\ Upon formation of the CWMD 
office by DHS in December 2017, the office subsumed the majority of the 
Office of Health Affairs. CWMD took on the office's responsibility for 
the public health impact of National threats and hazards, including the 
impact of chemical releases. CWMD also took over as the advisor to the 
Secretary and other DHS leaders on medical and health security issues 
including chemical attacks.
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    \16\ Other components include the National Protection and Programs 
Directorate, the Science and Technology Directorate, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the 
Transportation Security Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard.
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dhs's initial plan for consolidation did not follow key transformation 
                               practices
    In 2016, as DHS prepared to create the CWMD office, we evaluated 
the proposed reorganization.\17\ We compared available documentation 
related to DHS's consolidation planning efforts against key 
transformation practices identified based on our review of previous 
public and private-sector reorganizations.\18\ For example, key 
practices include dedicating an implementation team to manage the 
transformation process, soliciting employee views and gain their 
ownership for the transformation, and establishing a communication 
strategy to create shared expectations and report on progress.
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    \17\ GAO-16-603. In June 2015, DHS delivered a report to Congress 
which proposed consolidating the agency's core chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and explosives functions into a new office. 
According to DHS officials, this proposal was based on a 2013 
consolidation study.
    \18\ GAO, Streamlining Government: Questions to Consider When 
Evaluating Proposals to Consolidate Physical Infrastructure and 
Management Functions, GAO-12-542 (Washington, DC: May 2012).
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    We recommended DHS use the set of practices, where appropriate as 
part of the reorganization for the CWMD office. DHS agreed with the 
recommendation, and in October 2017 notified Congress that it planned 
to determine where to apply the key transformation practices and 
provided us with documentation demonstrating how it considered the 
practices. For example, at least 17 employee working groups were 
created to gather employee perspectives on the reorganization. 
Additionally, CWMD created a leadership team in January 2018 to manage 
the consolidation process. CWMD also created an internal communication 
strategy for the reorganization.
    The steps DHS took to consider key practices during the 
consolidation were consistent with our recommendation, and we have 
since closed the recommendation as implemented. However, at the time we 
closed the recommendation, we observed that significant challenges 
remained at the CWMD office, such as low employee morale and questions 
about the efficacy of some CWMD programs. As part of on-going work 
begun in September 2020, we are evaluating the extent to which the CWMD 
office continues to perform the missions of its predecessor offices, 
coordinates with its partners, and manages employee morale.
  opportunities remain to address long-standing challenges with cwmd 
                                programs
    Our prior work has highlighted challenges in programs operated and 
managed by the CWMD office, including those that predated its creation. 
We have identified opportunities for improvement to address the 
inherently fragmented nature of these kinds of security efforts, which 
require many Federal, non-Federal, and industry partners to execute. 
Specifically, we have identified challenges in the following program 
areas: Biodefense, nuclear/radiological detection, and chemical 
defense.
DHS's Biosurveillance and Detection Programs Have Struggled to Define 
        and Carry Out Their Missions
    Between 2009 and 2021, we have reported on progress and challenges 
with two of DHS's biodefense efforts--the National Biosurveillance 
Integration Center (NBIC) and the pursuit of replacements for the 
BioWatch program. These reports demonstrate the importance of following 
departmental policies and employing leading management practices to 
help ensure that the mission of each program is clearly and 
purposefully defined and that subsequent investments effectively 
respond to those missions.\19\ We have previously reported that the 
release of the National Biodefense Strategy in 2018 and establishment 
of the governance structure offer opportunities for DHS and partner 
agencies to consider how to address some of the challenges from a 
broader interagency and layered National security approach.\20\
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    \19\ GAO-10-171; GAO-12-810; GAO, Biosurveillance: DHS Should Not 
Pursue BioWatch Upgrades or Enhancements Until System Capabilities Are 
Established, GAO-16-99 (Washington, DC: Oct. 23, 2015); and GAO, 
Biosurveillance: Challenges and Options for the National 
Biosurveillance Integration Center, GAO-15-793 (Washington, DC: Sept. 
24, 2015).
    \20\ GAO-21-292; GAO, National Biodefense Strategy: Additional 
Efforts Would Enhance Likelihood of Effective Implementation, GAO-20-
273 (Washington, DC: Feb. 19, 2020); and GAO, Biodefense: The Nation 
Faces Longstanding Challenges Related to Defending Against Biological 
Threats, GAO-19-635T (Washington, DC: June 26, 2019).
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            National Biosurveillance Integration Center Collaboration 
                    Challenges
    In December 2009, we reported that NBIC faced a variety of 
collaboration challenges with its partners, including confusion on 
roles and responsibilities and incomplete policies and strategies for 
operating across agency boundaries. To help NBIC enhance and sustain 
collaboration, including the provision of data, personnel, and other 
resources, we recommended that NBIC develop a strategy for addressing 
collaboration challenges and develop accountability mechanisms to 
monitor these efforts. In August 2012, NBIC issued the NBIC Strategic 
Plan, which intended to provide NBIC's strategic vision, clarify the 
center's mission and purpose, articulate the value that NBIC seeks to 
provide to its partners, and lay the groundwork for setting interagency 
roles, responsibilities, and procedures. Because NBIC created the plan 
we recommended, we closed those recommendations as implemented.
    However, in follow-up work in 2015, we reported that a variety of 
challenges remained.\21\ Specifically, when we surveyed NBIC's 19 
Federal interagency partners,\22\ we found that:
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    \21\ GAO-15-793.
    \22\ Although NBIC has interaction with other stakeholders, we 
selected these 19 Federal agencies based on their biosurveillance roles 
and responsibilities and because they were Federal departments or 
components within Federal departments that have signed the NBIC 
Advisory Board charter.
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   Some partner agencies expressed uncertainty about NBIC's 
        value.--Some of NBIC's partner agencies--which include various 
        parts of the Departments of Health and Human services, Defense, 
        Agriculture, and others--expressed a lack of trust in providing 
        data to NBIC and NBIC's ability to interpret that data. 
        Partners were not sure how the information would be used and 
        cited barriers to sharing information they collect from non-
        Federal entities. The participation of member agencies and 
        their subject-matter expertise is needed to create 
        sophisticated meaning and interpretation of data in the proper 
        context from a variety of monitoring systems covering human, 
        animal, and plant health, and the environment.
   Some partner agencies reported difficulties providing 
        personnel to NBIC.--Despite the need for subject-matter 
        expertise from partner agencies, NBIC also faced challenges 
        getting partner agencies to participate in NBIC activities, 
        such as daily or weekly calls. Some partners felt the calls 
        were repetitive of information emailed from NBIC. Partner 
        agencies had difficulty in detailing subject-matter experts to 
        NBIC in a resource-constrained environment, although all 
        partner agencies do have a point of contact for NBIC. At the 
        time of our 2015 work, NBIC had started to partially fund other 
        agencies' liaisons, but on a very limited basis.
   NBIC was unable to secure streams of raw data needed to 
        conduct near-real-time quantitative analysis to reveal unusual 
        patterns and trends.--Because NBIC was unable to secure raw 
        data, it relied on publicly-available reports and global news 
        sources. This led to partner agencies not seeing much value in 
        NBIC's products, which generally repackage information with 
        which they are already familiar. However, we did find in 2015 
        that NBIC's partners from supporting agencies, such as members 
        of the intelligence community, who do not have the same level 
        of expertise on health issues find the reports NBIC provides 
        helpful context for emerging or on-going events.
    In September 2015, NBIC's interagency partners and other major 
stakeholders in the biosurveillance community acknowledged--and we 
agreed--that no single problem limits NBIC's mission to integrate 
biosurveillance data. Rather, over the years, several long-standing 
problems--such as data sharing across disparate missions--have combined 
to inhibit the achievement of this mission as envisioned in the 9/11 
Commission Act. We identified options in our 2015 report for policy or 
structural changes that could help better fulfill the biosurveillance 
integration mission.\23\ However, no significant change has occurred in 
NBIC's charge since that time. The options we outlined included:
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    \23\ We identified these options and their benefits and 
limitations, on the basis of the roles of a Federal-level 
biosurveillance integrator we identified in the 9/11 Commission Act, 
NBIC's strategic plan, and the perspectives of partners obtained during 
our structured interviews. These options are not exhaustive, and some 
options could be implemented together or in part. In developing these 
options, we did not evaluate the financial implications of implementing 
each option, to the extent they are knowable, but we acknowledge they 
are likely to result in an increase, decrease, or shifting of funding 
based on the changes described.
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   Reinforce NBIC's Analyzer Role.--Under this option, NBIC 
        would be provided with new authorities and resources designed 
        to access additional public and private data sources and 
        statistical and modeling tools to develop meaningful 
        information.
   Strengthen NBIC's Coordinator Role.--Under this option, NBIC 
        would be provided with greater authority for coordinating the 
        Federal biosurveillance enterprise.
   Expand NBIC's Innovator Role.--Under this option, NBIC would 
        be provided with new authorities and resources to lead research 
        and development investments of new tools and technology to 
        address gaps.
   Status Quo: Continue to Execute the 2012 NBIC Strategic 
        Plan.--In this option, NBIC would continue to implement the 
        mission, goals, and objectives detailed in the August 2012 NBIC 
        Strategic Plan or subsequent approved updates.
   Repeal the NBIC Statute.--In this option, National 
        biosurveillance integration would not be pursued through NBIC.
            Challenges Acquiring Biodetection Technologies
    Since 2012, we have assessed the BioWatch program and DHS efforts 
to upgrade or replace it.\24\ Since 2003, DHS has focused on acquiring 
an autonomous detection system to replace the current BioWatch system, 
but has faced challenges in clearly justifying the BioWatch program's 
mission and need and ability to reliably acquire technology to address 
that need. In September 2012, we found that DHS approved the 
acquisition of an autonomous detection capability (known as BioWatch 
Generation 3, or Gen-3) in October 2009 without fully developing 
critical knowledge that would help ensure sound investment decision 
making, pursuit of optimal solutions, and reliable performance, cost, 
and schedule information.\25\ Specifically, we found that DHS did not 
engage the early phases of its Acquisition Life-cycle Framework, which 
is designed to help ensure that the mission need driving the 
acquisition warrants investment of limited resources and that an 
analysis of alternatives systematically identifies possible alternative 
solutions that could satisfy the identified need.
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    \24\ See, GAO-12-810 and GAO-16-99.
    \25\ GAO-12-810.
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    In our September 2012 report, we recommended that before continuing 
the Gen-3 acquisition, DHS reevaluate the mission need and possible 
alternatives based on cost-benefit and risk information. DHS concurred 
with the recommendation and in 2012, directed the BioWatch program to 
complete an updated analysis of alternatives. In April 2014, DHS 
canceled the acquisition of Gen-3 because the analysis did not confirm 
an overwhelming benefit to justify the cost of a full technology 
switch.
    When DHS canceled the Gen-3 acquisition, it continued to rely on 
the current system for early detection of an aerosolized biological 
attack. However, in 2015 we found DHS lacked reliable information about 
BioWatch's technical capabilities to detect a biological attack, in 
part, because in the years since BioWatch's initial deployment in 2003, 
DHS had not developed technical performance requirements for the 
system.\26\ We reported in 2015 that BioWatch has been criticized 
because it was deployed quickly in 2003 to address a perceived urgent 
need, but without sufficient testing, validation, and evaluation of its 
technical capabilities.\27\
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    \26\ GAO-16-99. Technical performance requirements would help DHS 
better understand the types and sizes of attacks the system could 
detect.
    \27\ GAO-16-99 and Institute of Medicine and National Research 
Council, BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2011).
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    In our October 2015 report, we made recommendations to help ensure 
that biosurveillance-related funding is directed to programs that can 
demonstrate their intended capabilities, and to help ensure sufficient 
information is known about the current BioWatch system to make informed 
cost-benefit decisions about possible upgrades and enhancements to the 
system. We recommended that DHS not pursue upgrades or enhancements to 
the current BioWatch system until it: (1) Established technical 
performance requirements necessary for a biodetection system to meet a 
clearly-defined operational objective for the BioWatch program; (2) 
assessed the Gen-2 system against those performance requirements; and 
(3) produced a full accounting of statistical and other uncertainties 
and limitations in what is known about the system's capability to meet 
its operational objectives. DHS concurred and described steps to 
address these recommendations, but they remain open as DHS considers 
other options to replace BioWatch.
    In May 2021, we reported on DHS's current effort to replace the 
BioWatch program, known as BD21.\28\ BD21 intends to combine various 
technologies, such as biological sensors, data analytics, anomaly 
detection tools, collectors, and field screening devices to enable 
timelier and more efficient detection of an aerosolized attack 
involving a biological agent. We reported in May 2021 that the BD21 
program office was following the agency's acquisition policy and 
guidance, but that the program was early in the acquisition life cycle. 
Therefore, DHS had not yet selected the technologies to use and 
continued to analyze potential technologies to demonstrate that certain 
components of the overall concept are feasible, such as an anomaly 
detection algorithm.\29\
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    \28\ GAO-21-292.
    \29\ For BD21, an anomaly detection algorithm is intended to use 
data from biological sensors that continuously monitor the air, as well 
as other data sources, to determine if there is a departure or 
deviation from the baseline environmental data, known as an anomaly. 
Baseline environmental data is the characterization of background 
environments, which can vary by geography, climate, topography, and 
urban density, as well as by time of day, seasons, weather, animal 
population dynamics, farming patterns, construction, and manufacturing 
(emissions).
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    However, we also reported that BD21 faces technical challenges due 
to inherent limitations in the technologies and uncertainties with 
combining technologies for use in biodetection. For example, common 
environmental material such as pollen, soil, and diesel exhaust can 
emit a signal in the same range as a biological threat agent, thereby 
increasing false alarm rates in biological aerosol sensors that monitor 
the air and provide data on biological material in the environment. 
Program officials reported that the risk of false alarms produced by 
biological sensor technologies could be reduced by using an anomaly 
detection algorithm in addition to the sensor. However, it is too early 
to determine whether integration of an anomaly detection algorithm will 
successfully mitigate the false alarm rate--specifically, because the 
algorithms have never been developed and used for the purpose of 
biodetection in an urban, civilian environment.
    We also reported in May 2021 that the BD21 program office plans to 
conduct technology readiness assessments along the way as part of the 
acquisition life cycle. In 2020, DHS issued a technology readiness 
assessment guide. We found it lacked detailed information about how the 
Department will ensure objectivity and independence, among other 
important best practices identified in our technology readiness 
assessment best practices guide. To ensure decision makers and program 
managers have the information necessary to make informed decisions at 
key acquisition decision events, we recommended that, among other 
things, the BD21 program office conduct assessments that follow our 
best practices prior to the program's acquisition decision events. DHS 
concurred with our recommendations and provided additional information 
on the steps the agency has taken or plans to take to address them. We 
will continue to monitor its progress.
Securing the Cities Program Faces Management Weaknesses
    In May 2019, we identified several limitations in the CWMD office's 
efforts to implement the Securing the Cities program.\30\ We found that 
CWMD lacked a clear basis for proposed changes to the program's 
strategies--which were not based on threats or needs of the cities. 
CWMD officials told us that the agency is considering several potential 
changes to the Securing the Cities program that would broaden its 
geographic reach and scope, including establishing new goals for the 
program, expanding geographic coverage, centralizing acquisition of 
detection equipment, increasing the role of other agencies, and 
including chemical and biological weapon detection and deterrence 
within the program's scope.
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    \30\ GAO-19-327.
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    However, it had not: (1) Fully developed potential changes or 
documented a plan for making changes to the Securing the Cities 
program; (2) identified the basis for such changes; and (3) clearly 
communicated with the cities, raising concerns about how the changes 
will affect them. We also reported in 2019 that most of the officials 
we interviewed from the 5 cities in the program at the time said that 
DHS provided a high-level overview of potential changes in an August 
2018 meeting, but little detail on how such changes would be 
implemented or affect city operations. We determined that if DHS did 
not clearly communicate to cities how the program would operate under 
potential changes, these cities could face difficulties planning for 
the future and achieving the program's detection and deterrence 
objectives.
    Additionally, we reported in May 2019 that CWMD had not identified 
a clear basis for making program changes, and the extent to which these 
changes could be attributed to new priorities under DHS's 
reorganization was unclear. CWMD officials told us at the time that 
they had not conducted any studies or analyses that would justify 
making changes to the program. In DHS's fiscal year 2019 budget 
justification, CWMD noted the importance of using the Securing the 
Cities program to build capabilities far outside the immediate target 
areas, (i.e., cities) and the need to detect threats along the air, 
land, or sea pathways into and within the country that terrorists could 
potentially use to reach their targets. However, according to CWMD 
officials at the time of our 2019 review, the office had not identified 
a change in the nature or level of nuclear or radiological threats to 
explain its intent to move from its original city-focused model for the 
program to a more National approach. CWMD officials said that the 
uncertainty surrounding making changes reflected a program under 
transition within an agency under transition--that is, the 
reorganization from the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to CWMD.
    Further, we reported that the CWMD Act of 2018 required development 
of an Implementation Plan for Securing the Cities (due December 
2019).\31\ In 2019 we reported that the Act required that before making 
changes to the Securing the Cities program, the assistant secretary of 
CWMD brief appropriate Congressional committees about the justification 
for proposed changes. This briefing was to include, among other things, 
an assessment of the effect of changes, taking into consideration 
previous resource allocations and stakeholder input. We reported that 
this new requirement would provide DHS an opportunity to identify the 
basis for potential changes, and that assessing such changes could 
provide more reasonable assurance that they would strengthen the 
program and not result in unintended consequences, such as reducing 
capabilities in current cities. In June 2021, the CWMD office issued 
the Implementation Plan for the Securing the Cities Program, which we 
are currently reviewing. Additionally, as part of our 2019 report, and 
to address program management deficiencies for the Securing the Cities 
program, we made 4 recommendations to CWMD, including to work with 
cities to address risks to sustaining detection capabilities, which 
remain open at the time of this statement. We are monitoring CWMD's 
actions to address the report's recommendations.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Pub. L. No. 115-387,  2(a)(10), 132 Stat. at 5164-66 
(Classified at 6 U.S.C.  596b).
    \32\ GAO-19-327.
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DHS Chemical Defense Programs Not Fully Integrated
    In August 2018, we reported that DHS manages several programs and 
activities designed to prevent and protect against domestic attacks 
using chemical agents.\33\ Some DHS components have programs that focus 
on chemical defense, such as the Science and Technology Directorate's 
chemical hazard characterization. Others have chemical defense 
responsibilities as part of their broader missions, such as U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, which is responsible for interdicting 
chemical agents at the border. The establishment of the CWMD office 
aimed to consolidate some chemical defense programs and activities, but 
we found--and DHS officials acknowledged--that DHS had not fully 
integrated and coordinated its chemical defense programs and 
activities. As such, we reported in 2018 that several components--
including Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, the Office 
of Health Affairs, and Science and Technology Directorate--conducted 
similar activities, such as acquiring chemical detectors or assisting 
local jurisdictions with preparedness, separately, without DHS-wide 
direction and coordination. We determined that as components carry out 
chemical defense activities to meet mission needs, there was a risk 
that DHS may miss an opportunity to leverage resources and share 
information that could lead to greater effectiveness addressing 
chemical threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ GAO-18-562.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We also reported that it was too early to tell the extent to which 
the new CWMD office would enhance the integration of DHS's chemical 
defense programs and activities. In August 2018, to help guide the 
consolidation of these programs, we recommended that DHS develop a 
strategy and implementation plan to help the CWMD office: (1) Mitigate 
the risk of fragmentation among DHS programs and activities, and (2) 
establish goals and identify resources to achieve these goals, 
consistent with the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010.\34\ We also 
reported that CWMD officials agreed that the establishment of the new 
office was intended to provide leadership to and help guide, support, 
integrate, and coordinate DHS's chemical defense efforts and that a 
strategy and implementation plan could help DHS better integrate and 
coordinate its fragmented chemical defense programs and activities. DHS 
concurred with our recommendation, and CWMD issued a strategy in 
December 2019, but the implementation plan is in development and not 
expected to be finalized until September 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011). The GPRA 
Modernization Act of 2010 updated the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285. We 
reported this would also be consistent with a 2012 DHS effort, since 
abandoned, to develop a strategy and implementation plan for all 
chemical defense activities, from prevention to recovery. DHS officials 
stated the 2012 effort was not completed because of leadership changes 
and competing priorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thank you, Chairwoman Demings, Ranking Member Cammack, and Members 
of the subcommittee. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be 
happy to respond to any question you may have at this time.

    Mrs. Demings [continuing]. Your testimony. Thank you so 
much, and thank you to both of you for your testimony.
    I will remind the subcommittee that we will each have 5 
minutes to question the panel.
    I will now recognize myself for questions.
    As you all know, both of our witnesses today, the mission 
of CWMD is to lead DHS efforts and coordinate with Federal, 
State, local, Tribal, territorial, and international partners 
to safeguard the United States against chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear threats. However, as we have already 
talked about, the relatively new office has struggled to manage 
its responsibilities, with biodetection being one of the most 
prominent examples of the office's struggles. Previous 
leadership issues within CWMD has led to, as we have already 
mentioned, to low employee morale and high attrition rates.
    Assistant Secretary, CWMD has only been authorized for 2.5 
years, and, in that short time, the office has already sought 
to spin off its responsibilities, including the National 
Technical Nuclear Forensics Program and the Office of the Chief 
Medical Officer.
    What is your vision for CWMD, and how will you work to keep 
the office intact?
    Mr. Rasicot. Thank you for the question, Chairwoman 
Demings.
    My vision for CWMD is very much aligned with the CWMD Act. 
We are the hub of coordination, policy, intelligence, 
operational support, and deployment of technologies for this 
critical mission throughout DHS and, quite honestly, throughout 
major parts of the Federal Government. We are the link from 
National policy to State and locals through our programs, such 
as Securing the Cities and BioWatch and other programs, where 
we have exceptional reach all the way down to the local level.
    So it is my vision that, as we mature these programs--and I 
just want to say, you know, we are taking into account all of 
the GAO recommendations, all of the IG recommendations, and we 
are trying as best as possible to incorporate them as we move 
forward.
    I look forward to discussing several of the questions on 
the very specific programs. I am not sure that is where we are 
going on this question, but I look forward to some of those, 
Securing the Cities, BioWatch, BD21, as well as giving you a 
good debrief on where we are on employee morale.
    Mrs. Demings. We will have an opportunity to discuss those. 
Thank you so much.
    Director Currie, there are currently a number of proposals 
to reorganize CWMD. They include proposals to move the chief 
medical officer to the Office of the Secretary and to spin out 
the nuclear forensics operation to the Energy Department and 
moving CWMD's policy officials to DHS's Policy Office.
    Given that CWMD is a relatively young organization and has 
a diverse range of significant challenges, how should we be 
thinking about reorganization?
    Mr. Currie. The first thing I would say is that 
reorganization or moving deck chairs around is often something 
that is looked to when a problem is perceived. The challenge 
is, is that it is understandable that it is a specific action 
to take, but that doesn't always solve the problem.
    As we have seen with CWMD's reorganization, oftentimes it 
can create additional problems. When something reorganizes, 
then they have to go through a transformation effort that can 
often take multiple years. When that happens, the focus on the 
internal transformation can take away from some of the mission 
responsibilities they have outside, and some of the services 
they provide can decline.
    So we are not for or against those changes, but I think it 
can't be looked at as the solution. The key with some of these 
offices, if there are challenges--let's take the CMO, for 
example. If you are going to move it, there has to be a clear 
understanding and a reason why you are moving it to a different 
place, and it has to be crystal clear what the responsibilities 
and authorities of that office are going to do, or else, 
frankly, it is just going to be another move.
    Mrs. Demings. Assistant Secretary, what would your response 
be to Director Currie's answer there or thoughts on 
reorganization?
    Mr. Rasicot. Yes, ma'am.
    On the CMO side, the Secretary is looking across the 
Department at various structural changes that might be 
necessary, and he has asked myself and the chief medical 
officer to provide him some options regarding the correct 
placement of the chief medical officer.
    You know, we have learned a lot in the last year, and it 
has really highlighted the public health and medical aspects of 
DHS. I think the review is warranted. I tell the staff all the 
time: We have to reserve the right to learn, and, as we learn 
more things, we may act differently. That is what we are--you 
know, we--we have--no decision has been taken on the CMO.
    If I could, if I could address the nuclear forensics piece, 
we are still doing what we are required to do by law. I chair 
the Nuclear Forensics Executive Committee. We just had a 
meeting on May 13. What we are doing is that the Department of 
Energy does the primary operational work. We don't have boots 
on the ground doing nuclear forensics. That is Energy. Their 
labs provide most of the analysis.
    Now, through a construct, we were funding most of the R&D 
for those labs. I think it is a good leadership practice to put 
the funding decisions and the funding leadership closest to 
what is being funded and what--and the operational piece. So 
the interagency suggested that we move the actual funding and 
the direction of the R&D for the DOE labs to DOE. DOE has been 
funded in the last year to do that.
    So, while our funding is going down, our role in 
coordinating nuclear forensics for the Nation remains intact. 
Like I said, I just chaired the Nuclear Forensics Executive 
Committee. So I think--I agree with Director Currie. You don't 
change for change sake. That is not going to get us out of any 
problems.
    You know, there is an old Government saying: When in doubt, 
reorganize. Well, that is not what we are doing. We are 
learning as we move along, and we have to take advantage of 
what we have learned.
    Thank you.
    Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Assistant Secretary.
    The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, the 
gentlewoman from Florida, Mrs. Cammack, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Cammack. There we go. Now we are unmuted.
    Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it.
    Again, thank you to our witnesses for appearing here today.
    You know, I know we are going to cover a lot here today, 
specifically about the GAO report, so I am just going to--I am 
going to touch very briefly on it, and then move on.
    So, July 2020, the Office of Inspector General published a 
report that found that CWMD had not yet carried out a program 
to meet the Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act requirements. 
As noted in your testimony, in fiscal year 2020, CWMD 
established and reestablished a formal Food, Agriculture, and 
Veterinary Defense Program to meet the standards and the 
requirements.
    Can you describe in detail exactly how CWMD is meeting the 
requirements of this law, and were additional staff requested 
for this program for the 2022 budget request? If not, why?
    Mr. Rasicot. Yes. So we were--we--November--November 2019, 
we reestablished the Food, Ag, Vet Program within CWMD. We 
brought some staff over and began leveraging some internal 
resources to do that.
    Our accomplishments thus far is we put together a 
cooperative agreement with S&T to direct the research--their 
research on the Food Ag Vet Program and have significantly 
enhanced that research and development work. We have increased 
the budget. In fiscal year 2019, it was $800,000. In 2021, it 
was $2.4 million. In 2022, we are requesting another $2.7 
million to take it to $5.1 million.
    We have pushed out to both Agriculture and FDA. We meet 
with them all the time. Those are our primary partners in 
defending the Nation against a high-consequence event in the 
food/ag/vet sector, and one of the things we really pushed the 
interagency on was I feel like we have been in a full-scale 
exercise over the past year on food/ag/vet as we have watched 
the impact of COVID through meatpacking industry. We have read 
all about that.
    So what we did is we put together an industry listening 
session and roundtable just the first week of June where we 
brought in all the major industry leaders through--using our 
system format for industry engagement through the agricultural 
sector and really tried to capture the lessons learned that 
they had over the last 4--last year in the COVID response to 
see how we can do things better. As we adjust policy based on 
that, we want to make sure we have industry input on that 
because they are living on the front lines.
    So that is--that is where we are heading, ma'am.
    Mrs. Cammack. Well, I appreciate that.
    As a follow-up, you know, we had a conversation a couple 
days ago, and I am really glad to hear about the industry 
listening sessions. I would love to get a work-up of some of 
the findings that you have had from those discussions, and our 
team can follow up with yours on that.
    But, in the interest of time, I want to jump to the 
strategy. So it states that the mission of this office is to 
enable operational partners to prevent weapons of mass 
destruction use against the homeland; to promote readiness for 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and health 
security threats.
    Now, this strategy notes that its ability to provide 
operational capabilities and technical assistance to the State, 
local, Tribal, and territorial front-line operators is a 
crucial aspect of homeland security.
    My own sheriffs don't even know about this office. So, if 
they don't even know it exists, how are we executing on this 
strategy, and what is the plan to engage with local law 
enforcement?
    Mr. Rasicot. So I will offer that we probably have not--
given all else that was going on within the office, as you have 
noted some of the things--probably have not done our State and 
local outreach outside of those jurisdictions already 
participating in our programs. But it is my intention over the 
next year to reach out to the chiefs of police, all the right 
organizations, to let them know what we are offering and what 
capabilities we can bring to them.
    We were big players in the interagency board as a governing 
board for interagency--you know, State and local organizations. 
We funded that organization in the past, and we continue to 
work with them.
    We also--I look forward to any opportunity to let State and 
locals know what we are doing. We have got a--we are pushing 
people out in the field. I have got folks in our regional 
medical operations centers to help with the public health in 5 
locations over the--across the country. We have got BioWatch in 
30 jurisdictions across the country. We just expanded Securing 
the Cities to 13 major metropolitan areas across the country.
    So we are out there, and we will do a better job in letting 
people know. But it--Ranking Member, you hit the nail on the 
head. If the people don't know what we are doing, how would 
they know what to ask for, and how--now, I am with you. So we 
will do a better job----
    Mrs. Cammack. Right.
    Mr. Rasicot [continuing]. In getting the word out.
    Mrs. Cammack. I am looking very much--I know my time has 
expired, but I just want to say I am looking very much forward 
to working with you. In fact, as I speak to you, I am sitting 
right now in McAllen, Texas, at the border. At 3:30 this 
morning, 6 of my sheriffs and I were with National Guard and 
Border Patrol pulling people out of the river.
    Now, my fear is that, one day, someone is going to bring a 
dirty bomb across our open border, and that is something we are 
not prepared for. My local sheriffs are seeing this first-hand, 
and they don't even know that this office exists.
    So I am very much looking forward to helping you get the 
word out about what you are doing for training to make sure 
that our front-line guys and gals have the best resources 
available. So thank you--thank you for that.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mrs. Demings. The Ranking Member yields back.
    The Chair will now recognize other Members for questions 
they may wish to ask the witnesses.
    I will recognize Members in order of seniority, alternating 
between Majority and Minority. Members are also reminded to 
unmute themselves when recognized for questioning.
    The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from New 
Jersey, Mr. Payne.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    It is good to be with you again for this very timely, as 
usual, hearing. I say that because I--this is a follow-up for 
me from a hearing that I had in October 2019, and--on the 
biodefense. You know, at that hearing, I was attempting to get 
answers from stakeholders with relation to their conversations 
that were going on with CWMD.
    So here we still are 2 or 3 years later, so this is kind-of 
a follow-up for me.
    So, Mr. Rasicot, as I stated in October 2019, the 
subcommittee heard testimony on the Nation's preparedness to 
confront bioterrorism. During the hearing, the witnesses spoke 
about CWMD's lack of coordination and communication with State 
and local, Tribal, and territorial as--really as the Ranking 
Member just mentioned. To improve its programs, CWMD must 
engage with SLTT partners.
    Please describe the steps CWMD is taking to increase the 
amount of engagement with SLTT and how CWMD's staff are able to 
successfully partner with local governments.
    Mr. Rasicot. Thank you for that question, Congressman, and 
good to see you again.
    We have--we--I came in later in October, and I know we have 
met in your office several times, and I have heard you loud and 
clear on that. It was especially true, I think, in the 
BioWatch, BD21 arena, where I think initially when we were 
working up that program, it was done a lot of--sort-of in the 
basement of the Vermont Avenue building that I occupy.
    We heard you. I went up to New York City. I met with 
everyone up there on--because they were one of the primary 
places we were doing some demonstration work, heard what they 
were saying. But then the team has been out. The team has been 
out to many of the jurisdictions seeking State and local input 
as to what our operational requirements document should look 
like, what our concept of operations should look like, because 
we need to make sure this works for the State and locals.
    As you know, the whole idea behind BD21 is to try to reduce 
the time it takes for detection to be recognized so that we 
can--if it is an actual detection of an actual agent, we can 
quickly get to the medical countermeasures. That is--that 
parameter is different in every city, so we have got to be out 
there talking to folks.
    My team has been out there, and they have held listening 
sessions. We have also talked to our academic folks, and we are 
working closely with the labs to understand what is technically 
feasible. It is not in anyone's interest for me to try to buy 
something that doesn't work. I get it.
    Mr. Payne. Right. Good. Thank you for that.
    Let me ask you one quick question.
    Mr. Rasicot. Sure.
    Mr. Payne. Are we still using that--are we still using that 
1950's technology for BioWatch?
    Mr. Rasicot. So, on the BioWatch, the sensors? Yes. The 
sensors are there, and they are proven and reliable. The 
problem with--we do need to expand, and we are looking with--we 
are working with the National labs based on the GAO reports and 
our own inspector general's reports to see how we can expand 
the number of agents. I look forward to getting that report 
this fall. We are also working with FBI, HHS, and CDC and 
seeking their input in what agents we should be expanding to.
    So we are looking to improve that system, and we have also 
looked to--asked one of the National labs is, are we in the 
right places to provide the most protection for the money to 
the American public? So----
    Mr. Payne. OK.
    Mr. Rasicot [continuing]. We are taking some actions here, 
sir.
    Mr. Payne. All right. Thank you.
    Let me quickly go to Mr. Currie. Mr. Currie, I think, you 
know, I feel like you should be here to say, throughout this 
whole process, it is like, ``I told you before,'' because it 
seems like some of the same issues still are persistent here.
    The global nuclear detection architecture is a framework 
that was developed to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear 
and other radioactive materials.
    Director Currie, based on your work reviewing CWMD's 
practice, do you believe CWMD is properly prioritizing its GNDA 
responsibilities? If not, why? Please explain the implications 
for your dereliction, or their dereliction. I am sorry.
    Mr. Currie. Well, thank you, sir. Thank you for the 
question.
    It has been a little bit of time since we have issued a 
full-scale report on the GNDA, but I will say this. One of the 
interesting things that has happened with the reorganization is 
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was merged into CWMD and 
combined with other offices.
    As you know, the DNDO Office was a very high-performing 
office. The morale was very high. I think the global nuclear 
detection architecture was a real success in the Government in 
terms of their coordination with all the other Federal 
agencies, and it was a very clear mission space.
    One of the things that we have seen and happened since the 
reorganization is there are some questions from partners and 
stakeholders about some of the things that were happening under 
that architecture. For example, some of the threat and risk 
assessments that CWMD and DNDO before it were doing to identify 
gaps in that architecture, which are so critical for components 
like CBP and the Coast Guard to understand as they monitor, you 
know, ports of entry and things like that.
    So that is definitely an area I think where there are 
questions about----
    Mr. Payne. Uh-huh.
    Mr. Currie [continuing]. What CWMD's role is going to be 
moving forward.
    Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you.
    Madam Chair, thank you for indulging me, and I yield back.
    Mrs. Demings. The gentleman yields back.
    At this time, the Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from 
Iowa, Mrs. Miller-Meeks, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you so much, Chairwoman Demings 
and Ranking Member Representative Cammack as well.
    Gentlemen, please don't interpret my questions as being 
derogatory in any way. They come from a position where just 
hoping that, just like you, that we can do the best for our 
homeland. So I am a physician. I am the former director of the 
Iowa Department of Public Health, and I am also a 24-year 
military veteran. So I fully know, both as having been a 
director of a State agency and in the military, how, year after 
year, you are scrambling for your funding, validating the work 
that you do, even when oftentimes the workload makes it 
difficult to coordinate that and justify.
    Also, in the military, I have participated in many ABCs and 
also drills, tabletop drills, as actual drills for warning. So 
I fully am understanding and comprehending how very difficult 
[inaudible] homeland. It is extraordinarily difficult, and I 
think the task that has been placed upon you is monumental.
    So, as I read the reports and I understand some of the 
failures and the criticisms, I am also very cognizant of the 
fact it is so hard to detect.
    So this question comes out of that. We have just faced, our 
homeland--and not only our homeland, but, quite honestly, the 
entire world has just faced the biggest threat to its security 
through COVID-19. We have asked repeatedly for an investigation 
into the origins of COVID-19. As a scientist, the scientific 
evidence to me indicates that this has come from a lab--the 
laboratory Wuhan Institute of Virology, in all likelihood a 
leak.
    But the reason why it is important to understand 
[inaudible] we need to know for National security. As you 
indicated, Mr. Currie. We need to know for public health and 
how we respond to public health. We need an international 
community that has standards for disclosure, transparency, 
laboratory security, what type of research can go on in 
laboratories, and gain of function of research.
    But, as Representative Cammack had indicated earlier, her 
sheriffs don't know of your existence, your Office of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction. COVID-19-like pandemics, as I had 
indicated when I was director of public health, my most top 
concern and what kept me up at night was a virus or a bacteria 
that would emanate from another country and invade the 
homeland. This was just after H1N1 and after we had had 
[inaudible]----
    Mrs. Demings. The gentlewoman appears to be having some 
connection problems. To our witnesses, if you could proceed 
with responding.
    Mr. Rasicot. Madam Chairwoman, I will go first, and I just 
offer that, you know, President Biden has stated that he has 
asked the intelligence community to redouble its efforts as 
they look at the origins of COVID-19, whether it is from an 
animal-borne transfer, accidental--the accident at the Wuhan 
lab. That work is on-going, and we look forward to the results.
    There is no denying the impact that the COVID-19 virus has 
had on the United States, and we are all working hard to 
mitigate its effects.
    I am sorry. If there was more questions, I just couldn't 
hear.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. My apologies. I just want to know if, to 
you, it has the same importance as it does to me. I think this 
is a critically important issue for National security and for 
public health, and I think there are valid things that we need 
to ask of the international community, and we as a Nation can 
be a lead in that regard.
    Mr. Rasicot. Ma'am, Gary Rasicot here.
    I would agree with everything you said, that it is 
important to ask those questions. It is also important, as we 
look at global health security, to reinforce that system and 
strengthen that system via--because, as you have heard the 
administration and others say, this disease isn't over for 
anyone until it is over for everyone.
    Over.
    Mrs. Demings. Director Currie.
    Mr. Currie. Well, thank you for the question.
    You know, as a former director of public health, I can use 
the technical term of surveillance. I know surveillance is so 
critical, and that is one really important thing that DHS has a 
role in, and so does HHS. But, you know, having surveillance 
systems work effectively domestically and other----
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Mr. Currie----
    Mr. Currie. I am sorry. Yes, ma'am?
    Mrs. Demings. No, go ahead. Proceed.
    Mr. Currie. Oh, OK. Sorry. I thought she was trying to jump 
in.
    I was just saying that I think--the area of surveillance 
has been an area we have been monitoring for over a decade, and 
I think we have a number of findings and recommendations about 
how we think DHS's role in the surveillance space could be 
strengthened or improved.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So, if I have time, Chair Demings, per 
your report, do you think that the biosurveillance should be 
moved to another agency, or do you think that we need to 
reconsider what our efforts are and what our expectations are?
    Mr. Currie. Well, one challenge is there are so many 
different surveillance efforts across agencies. DHS has them. 
CDC has it. DOD has surveillance efforts. I don't think these 
have been well-integrated.
    In DHS's case, I don't think their specific role in the 
surveillance space has been made as clear as it can be and 
well-integrated.
    For example, you know, DHS has struggled with getting data 
and metrics it needs from CDC and State and local public health 
departments to even provide surveillance information to the 
community that provides, you know, a benefit.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Perhaps we need to help with the 
definition of those and with information sharing across 
agencies.
    So I think, Chair Demings, my time is probably up. Thank 
you so much, and I thank our witnesses for their testimony.
    Mrs. Demings. The gentlewoman yields back. We thank you for 
your line of questioning.
    We are preparing for a second round of questions. So, if 
Members have additional questions, please stay with us.
    Along the same lines, you know, let's go back to 
rearranging the deck chairs to our witnesses, you know, the 
pros and cons of that. We know there is much discussion about 
the location or where the chief medical officer is housed.
    DHS officials have suggested transferring CMO to another 
unit within DHS. Acting Secretary, I would love to hear--
Assistant Secretary, I would love to hear your thoughts on that 
particular position as well as Director Currie's.
    Acting Secretary, we will start with you.
    Mr. Rasicot. Yes. Thank you, ma'am.
    So the CMO and I work closely together every day, 
literally, and I yield to the Secretary on, you know, we will 
provide him the options. We have got to take a look at the 
structure of DHS, see if we are doing it the most impactful 
way, and I look forward to us finishing up--but no decision has 
been made.
    But I would offer that there is--that the collaboration 
that he and I work together--and I am--I have never met a more 
innovative doctor than Dr. Pritesh Gandhi, and the work he is 
doing and the thoughts he brings to us has been refreshing 
since he has gotten here in January. We are moving forward on a 
number of programs under his leadership, Operation VOW being 
just one of them, where we--you know, we went from zero to 60, 
literally as--right after he got here and ended up vaccinating 
75,000 of our front-line work force so that they could perform 
their duties without the threat of, you know, catching the 
COVID virus.
    I do--if I could, I would--I was hoping maybe if I could 
take a step back too on the biosurveillance piece and offer 
something on that if----
    Mrs. Demings. Before we go there, Director, if you could 
just--I am sorry.
    Mr. Rasicot. No, no.
    Mrs. Demings. Assistant Secretary, if you can hold off for 
just a second.
    Director Currie, I would love to hear from you, your 
thoughts on moving the position of CMO to another unit within 
DHS.
    Mr. Currie. Well, I don't have a strong position either 
way. I think the role of the CMO over the last year-and-a-half 
has just shown to be tremendous, and it is not just providing 
biodefense expertise and support to leadership of the 
Department, but DHS has 240,000 employees, many of which are on 
the front lines and touching the public.
    So their role has always been to, you know, address the 
health and safety of the DHS work force. But, over the last 
year-and-a-half, it has just been incredible what they have had 
to do to make sure that we don't have any sort-of, you know, 
reduction in mission because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
    So, wherever it is, I just think it is critical that its 
role be solidified and strengthened given their role.
    Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Director.
    Acting Assistant Secretary, please, BioWatch?
    Mr. Rasicot. I just want to comment on the National 
Biosurveillance Integration Center, or NBIC, which has been--I 
think it was the subject of a 2015 report--GAO report. I have 
to say that they have just jumped all over those 
recommendations. We have expanded our reach into the Department 
of Veterans Affairs; Interior with wildlife, so we can track 
animal-borne illnesses that may transmit to humans. Really, 
over COVID-19, they put out one of the first reports, December 
31, 2019, on a pneumonia-like virus emanating from Wuhan, and 
that was pushed out to our--all of our stakeholders.
    So, I mean, they are on the forefront of doing this stuff. 
Honestly, their number of reports has gone up significantly 
over the last year. Their readership, if you will, their poll 
factor, the people that want--has gone up 30 percent. We are 
pushing this to clients as varied as the NORTHCOM Commander all 
the way to State and locals. Over 500 State and local offices 
get their reports.
    So I think we have kind-of picked up the game there since 
2015, and I just--you know, the folks working that shop are 
dedicated. They scour all reports, do the analysis, and get the 
word out for people, so I just wanted to sort-of update us from 
maybe that 2015 report.
    Over.
    Mrs. Demings. Thank you so very much. We are going to pause 
for just a minute and see if Members have additional questions.
    Are there any questions from the Ranking Member?
    From the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.
    From the gentlewoman from Iowa, Mrs. Miller-Meeks.
    OK. Director, we have--or to both of you, we have already 
talked somewhat about employee morale, and, you know, being 420 
out of 420 had to be like a punch in the face to the employees. 
Acting Assistant Secretary, you have talked about the steps 
that you have been taking to actually meet, hold these town 
halls, which I think is a wonderful idea. It gives you a way to 
hear directly from the employees.
    But I would like to start with you first to find out, No. 
1, and I have said before, you cannot motivate--I don't 
believe. This is my personal opinion, that you cannot motivate 
people to feel better about their jobs, but you sure can create 
that environment that allows them to.
    I would just like to hear from you your thoughts on how did 
we first get in this predicament with morale being so low. I 
think even in a survey, only 40 percent of the work force said 
that they would recommend the office as a good place to work. 
How did we get there? If you could expound a little bit more on 
the results of these town halls that you are having, specific 
recommendations that are coming from the employees, and where 
do we go from here?
    Mr. Rasicot. Yes, thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    So I think most people know that this office is a merger of 
two legacy offices, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and 
the Office of Health Affairs, two offices which probably had 
very--well, definitely did have very different cultures.
    As you, you know, bring things together, you know, the 
organizational behavior folks will tell you, as you try to do 
these things, you are going to have--you know, you are forming, 
storming, norming, then you are performing. Well, we were 
forming in 2017, 2018, and then, as the cultures came together 
and the law was passed in December 2018, Government shutdown. 
So, as people start to try to come together as an office, no 
one is in the office. So that was one of the--I think one of 
the underlying factors that probably complicated this.
    But there was just a lot of cultural issues that had to be 
worked through, and I am not certain that the mission clarity 
was there in the beginning of this office, and I was not here. 
I was asked to come in in October 2019, right after those 420 
out of 420 rankings were announced.
    One of the first things I did, as I told you the other day, 
is just hold listening sessions and just listened to the people 
and understand. What I did was I didn't hold it with like an 
office so that their boss was sitting right with the employees. 
We did it by sections of employees.
    We met with the scientists. We met with the public health 
officers. We met with the operations specialists. So there was 
peers telling me what--and I asked them, what do we need to do 
here? Because there are no--we have the best and brightest 
employees in DHS here, I would suggest in the U.S. Government, 
be it the scientists, the physicists, the biologists, our 
lawyers, our procurement specialists, our operations 
specialists. They are all top-notch.
    Some of their accomplishments that I went through that we 
have gotten in the last 2 years done, that doesn't happen with 
a disgruntled work force. So we are making progress. We have 
listened. We have put in standard operating procedures. All 
decisions are transparent. We have a great comms team. We put 
out a bulletin every week about what is going on, what I am 
hearing from the Secretary. My town halls are every week.
    As I told you, my mission is to keep people safe, informed, 
and mission-ready, in that order. It was very critical that we 
do that during that COVID-19. I think that we were one of the 
first offices to go to max telework, and we made sure everybody 
had what they needed, and our productivity stayed the same.
    As I told you and the Ranking Member, I actually had to 
make a rule because our folks were still working into the 
evening because we could. That is how dedicated they are to the 
mission, and it is my job to support that dedication. I am back 
for my second term because that is what I want to do. I was 
asked to come back; and I gladly came because I think they are 
mission-critical folks, they are the best and brightest within 
this Department, and they deserve all the support we can give 
them. I listen to everything they say. Why would I not listen 
to some of the world's foremost nuclear physicists and 
biologists on how to confront today's threats?
    Mrs. Demings. What can Congress do to better support the 
men and women?
    Mr. Rasicot. So we have got some requests here within the 
2022 budget, and we would appreciate your support there. 
Director Currie talked about the GNDA and the risk assessments. 
We are bringing that back. I think it is $5 million we are 
asking for to help us with that, but I want to expand it.
    DNDO really hit the nail on the head with that analysis. 
They basically tracked human behavior from aspiration to 
execution in sort-of a terrorist act, and then they looked at 
the gaps and where measures like detection and interdiction 
could stop that continuum of action. I want to expand that to 
chem and bio, and that is why we are asking for more money and 
a couple more people to do risk analysis the way they were done 
under DNDO.
    So that is one way--we got a request that we would like to 
enhance our work on chemical. I think that is an underserved 
area right now. We have got a budget request asking for $3 
million in chem. We are also looking to put another $3.5 
million into the NBIC as I described. Everybody wants their 
products, and I need to put more staff there to keep up with 
the demand. I have asked for $2.2 million to increase our 
exercise program. I want to be directly responsive to the State 
and locals who are asking for more exercises.
    I have got one more, $5 million in Securing the Cities 
because you offered some of the criticisms from I think 2018 
and 2019, and we took those to heart. We are doing sustainment 
now. We heard the State and locals. We were giving them this 
fantastic equipment, but in some of the smaller cities, it is 
tough to maintain that stuff. It is high-tech stuff.
    So we are going to start in 2022 giving them the money to 
sustain that equipment: $1.5 million per city as they start, 
building to $2.5 million a year sustainment. We just put in a 
Securing the Cities implementation plan. I just released it. It 
was later than I wanted it to be, but I wanted to solve the 
sustainment problem before we showed you how we were going to, 
you know, document implementing the program. Over.
    Mrs. Demings. Thank you.
    Director Currie, if we could go back to employee morale. As 
I said earlier, 420 out of 420 had to be like a punch in the 
face. So, based on your perspective of how we kind-of got 
there--the assistant acting secretary talked about kind-of the 
merger of the two departments and the town halls and all, 
talking directly to the employees. I think it is always a good 
thing to do, getting suggestions from them, but also the how do 
we maintain and retain and where do we go from here, your 
perspective, please.
    Mr. Currie. Thank you. Well, morale is such a complicated 
issue, and there is often--there is also--sometimes there is a 
lag between when you get the results to what is actually going 
on in the organization. So I think what we have seen in other 
organizations is that oftentimes when employee morale is really 
low, employees don't feel like they are being heard by top 
leadership, and they don't feel like they are being supported. 
Because of those things, you will often, you know, get 
responses like, ``We don't feel like we are accomplishing our 
mission as good as we could.'' So there are so many complicated 
things that go into it.
    On the positive front, I think if you look at the morale 
scores, they have gone up in the last year. One of the key 
questions that has gone up is about, you know, top leadership. 
So I think, you know, Assistant Secretary Rasicot deserves a 
lot of credit for that. Obviously something has really changed 
for the scores in that particular question to change.
    Everything I am hearing today and we have heard about the 
efforts aligns with the things we have talked about, about 
engaging employees, listening to employees, including 
employees, and then communicating with them about what is being 
done to address the challenges.
    You know, as he said, these are some incredible folks, and 
I think they work incredibly hard. It sounds to me like they 
just want the support and the recognition of those things 
moving forward. So I am cautiously optimistic that maybe they 
are going in the right direction.
    We have seen this in the past at DHS, by the way. The 
Science and Technology Directorate at DHS had some serious 
morale problems years ago, and they worked really hard to do 
some of these same things, and now their morale is some of the 
highest in the Department. So it is possible to turn this 
around.
    Mrs. Demings. This will be my final question, and, Director 
Currie, we will start with you. I would like to hear, based on 
GAO's reporting and the lead-up to and since the creation of 
CWMD, how confident are you in CWMD's ability to be able to 
successfully fulfill its mission and to guard the homeland 
against CBRN threats?
    Mr. Currie. I think that they are absolutely capable of 
performing their mission with the resources they have and that 
they are requesting. I think the CWMD Act of 2018 was very good 
because it actually authorized the office. One of the worst 
things that can happen in Government is when you have someone 
performing a mission and there is no authorization telling you 
what to do.
    I think the key is going to be though focusing in on the 
key responsibilities and the things it does well and really 
communicating and drilling down into those issues. For example, 
one of their primary missions is working--as we have heard 
today, is working with State and local partners and 
communicating with them.
    I think throughout the--at the beginning of the transition, 
maybe that had slipped a little bit, and some of the things 
they were doing were not being done quite as well. It sounds 
like there is going to be a lot more effort put into that, and 
I think that is a very good thing.
    So you also don't need to try to do more than you can do. 
With a budget of $400 million and 300 people, there is only so 
much that can be done, and so they really need to focus on 
those things they are good at and that they can achieve, and I 
think that will help the morale issue too.
    Mrs. Demings. Acting Secretary Rasicot, any comments from 
you?
    Mr. Rasicot. Well, we appreciate your support, Madam 
Chairwoman, and we appreciate the support of the committee, and 
we look forward to, you know, on-going discussions on renewing 
our authorization because I think this office is doing what it 
was asked to do. We probably had a couple of false starts as we 
have described, but we are really starting to hit our stride.
    COVID brought us through that norming phase, and we are now 
performing. You know, I talked a little bit about the exercise 
that we conducted, a series of three exercises, starting with 
CWMD, then across DHS, then across the interagency. Honestly, I 
will just--with the interagency one, we had at the deputy 
assistant secretary-level people from CDC, HHS, Department of 
State, FBI.
    I gave the kickoff speech at 9 o'clock; there is 116 people 
on the screen. I come back at 12:30 for the after-action; there 
is 116 people on the screen. That is must-see TV. People are 
interested in this mission. As we coordinate it and bring 
people back, that is what we are doing.
    We will--I think that we--I agree with Director Currie, we 
have most of the resources we need. We look forward to your 
support on the fiscal year 2022 budget as we try to address 
some of the areas that were brought up in the committee--excuse 
me, brought up in the hearing. But I think we are on the right 
path. I think we are doing what we were asked to do in the CWMD 
Act, and I look forward to keeping you updated.
    Mrs. Demings. With that, I want to thank the witnesses for 
their testimony and the Members for their questions.
    The Members of the subcommittee may have additional 
questions for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond 
expeditiously in writing to those questions. The Chair reminds 
Members that the committee record will remain open for 10 
business days.
    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

    Questions From Chairwoman Val Butler Demings for Gary C. Rasicot
                       cwmd's biodefense efforts
    Question 1. The BioWatch Program within DHS's Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Office was developed to support the Nation's 
information-sharing capabilities needed to effectively prepare for, 
detect, and respond to bioterrorism threats. However, a report from the 
DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), OIG-21-22, released earlier this 
year, found that the BioWatch Program has ``information-sharing 
challenges that reduce Nation-wide readiness to respond to biological 
terrorism threats.'' Considering the report from DHS OIG, what actions 
are you taking to ensure our Nation prepares for, effectively detects, 
and rapidly responds to bioterrorism threats?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2a. CWMD is in the process of advancing its efforts to 
acquire new biodetection technology through its BD21 multi-year 
acquisition effort. In a recent GAO report on the effort, GAO-21-292, 
GAO found that, ``BD21 faces technical challenges due to inherent 
technological limitations and uncertainties with combining 
technologies.'' What is the current status of the BD21 acquisition 
project?
    When can we expect to have a fully operational BD21 system deployed 
across to country guard against biothreats?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2b. Please provide the operational requirements 
document(s) for BD21.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2c. Please provide the list of State and local entities 
CWMD consulted with to develop the operational requirements document(s) 
for BD21.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2d. Does CWMD have a contingency plan if BD21 technology 
is unable to reach full maturity? If so, please provide this 
contingency plan.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. Speed is a crucial component to fighting the spread of 
infectious diseases, like COVID-19. To that end, the Biden 
administration has called for the creation of a National Center for 
Epidemic Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics, ``to modernize global 
early warning and trigger systems to prevent, detect, and respond to 
biological threats.'' DHS may also be able to provide insight into this 
project. In fact, with additional resources from Congress, the National 
Biosurveillance Integration Center may provide a workable foundation to 
develop such capabilities. To the extent it accords with the 
administration's plans for a National Center for Epidemic Forecasting 
and Outbreak Analytics, please explain how CWMD is developing 
infectious disease forecasting capabilities.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
                    cwmd's chemical defense efforts
    Question 4. In August 2018, GAO released a report, GAO-18-562, on 
the need for a DHS strategy and implementation plan for the Department 
to better manage its fragmented chemical defense programs and 
activities. The report stated that a strategy and implementation plan 
would help the CWMD office, ``mitigate the risk of fragmentation among 
DHS programmers and activities, and establish goals and identify 
resources to achieve these goals.'' GAO's report was released in 2018, 
what has DHS, and in particular, CWMD, done to better manage the 
fragmentation of DHS's chemical defense programs and activities? When 
will CWMD produce an implementation plan, recommended by GAO years ago, 
to help address the problem?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
            cwmd's nuclear and radiological defense efforts
    Question 5. As calls grow for our country to take the threat of 
domestic nuclear terrorism more seriously, according to GAO, DHS's 
nuclear and radiological weapons detection and deterrence efforts also 
face significant challenges. For example, see GAO-19-327. There have 
also been reports of a lack of communication between DHS and cities 
within the CWMD's Securing the Cities program (STC). What is CWMD doing 
to increase the Department's communication with STC cities?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
 cwmd's health security and food, agriculture, and veterinary defense 
                                efforts
    Question 6a. Detecting and protecting against biological threats is 
supposed to be one of the key aspects of CWMD's mission, yet, during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, CWMD's response role was limited. Other DHS 
components took the lead in many facets of DHS's response to COVID-19. 
What lessons did CWMD learn from its experience during the COVID-19 
pandemic?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6b. Are you planning to formally compile lessons learned? 
If so, will you commit to sharing such information with Congress?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6c. Is the Office considering reforms to potentially 
increase the Office's role in the event of a future infectious disease 
outbreak or pandemic?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
                       addressing recommendations
    Question 7. GAO and DHS OIG have issued numerous recommendations to 
improve CWMD and the Department's counter CBRN programs; however, 
though CWMD concurs with many of these recommendations, many of them 
remain open. Will you commit to implementing each of these 
recommendations by this time next year?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
     Questions From Ranking Member Kat Cammack for Gary C. Rasicot
    Question 1. Through the National Security Presidential Memorandum 
(NSPM)-35, certain nuclear forensic capabilities held by CWMD are being 
realigned to the Department of Energy. Are there any additional areas 
within the office that CWMD is considering realigning to another 
department? Is the current mission set of CWMD too broad?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United 
States, the CWMD office assisted the U.S. Government's efforts to stop 
the spread of the virus by providing enhanced screening operations at 
airports. How else did CWMD contribute to COVID-19 response measures? 
Given their overall mission with regards to biological threat detection 
and biosurveillance activities through the National Biosurveillance 
Integration Center (NBIC), what should their role be in future large-
scale health threats?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. In January 2020, you issued a report detailing the 
fiscal year 2020 Implementation Plan for CWMD. Can you briefly discuss 
any progress that has been made at CWMD as a result of this plan?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question From Hon. Andrew Garbarino for Gary C. Rasicot
    Question. The United States Government needs to adopt a 
comprehensive and integrated approach to the dangers that illicit 
fentanyl and its many chemical analogues (collectively ``fentanyls'') 
pose to the American people. Fentanyls are terrifyingly lethal. A 
quantity of fentanyl equal in mass to a single packet of sweetener (1 
gram) can kill 500 people. A similar amount of carfentanil, a fentanyl 
analogue, can kill 50,000. Fentanyls can enter the body through 
ingestion, inhalation, and absorption through the skin and kill 
quickly, often before an antidote can be administered. Domestically, 
fentanyls are treated as illegal narcotics yet fentanyl-related deaths 
are skyrocketing. At the same time, the Department of Defense and other 
agencies sharing responsibility for National security consider 
fentanyls to be dangerous chemical weapons with the potential to cause 
massive casualties. Both views are accurate. Approaching domestic 
fentanyl policy solely as a narcotics issue, however, is placing 
millions of Americans at risk. A WMD declaration for fentanyls could be 
crafted to preclude any unintended interference with legitimate uses of 
these chemicals. Legally manufactured, appropriately regulated, and 
carefully distributed fentanyls have significant medical and veterinary 
uses and present no extraordinary threat. The same cannot be said for 
illicit fentanyl.
    Based on those conclusions from Republican and Democrat 
administrations alike, does the Department of Homeland Security support 
a decision to declare these chemicals as potential Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD)?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Questions From Chairwoman Val Butler Demings for Chris P. Currie
    Question 1. The BioWatch Program within DHS's Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Office was developed to support the Nation's 
information-sharing capabilities needed to effectively prepare for, 
detect, and respond to bioterrorism threats. However, a report from the 
DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), OIG-21-22, released earlier this 
year, found that the BioWatch Program has ``information-sharing 
challenges that reduce Nation-wide readiness to respond to biological 
terrorism threats.'' Based on your reporting, is the BioWatch program 
salvageable, or should the Federal Government redirect funds to other 
biodetection technologies and research and development efforts?
    Answer. We have previously reported that funds should go to 
programs that can demonstrate performance. However, as we reported in 
2015, DHS lacks reliable information about BioWatch's technical 
capabilities to detect a biological attack and therefore lacks the 
basis for informed cost-benefit decisions about upgrades to the 
system.\1\ Specifically, while DHS had commissioned several tests of 
the technical performance characteristics of the current system, it had 
not developed performance requirements that would enable it to 
interpret the test results and draw conclusions about the system's 
ability to detect attacks. Therefore, we recommended in 2015 that DHS: 
(1) Establish technical performance requirements; (2) assess the 
BioWatch system against these performance requirements; and (3) produce 
a full accounting of statistical and other uncertainties and 
limitations in what is known about the system's capability to meet its 
operational objectives. DHS has not yet addressed our 2015 
recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ GAO, Biosurveillance: DHS Should Not Pursue BioWatch Upgrades 
or Enhancements Until System Capabilities Are Established, GAO-16-99 
(Washington, DC: Oct. 23, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DHS is currently pursuing options to replace the BioWatch program 
with Biological Detection for the 21st Century (BD21), and we continue 
to monitor the extent to which these efforts are consistent with our 
recommendation. However, as a replacement to BioWatch, BD21's detection 
capability will narrowly address the threat of an aerosolized 
biological attack and does not cover the broader biological threat 
landscape. In June 2019, we testified that the National Biodefense 
Strategy and its interagency governing leadership offer an opportunity 
to better define the role of detection technologies within a layered, 
National biodefense capability. We stated that this would help those 
that pursue these technologies better articulate their mission needs 
and align requirements and concepts of operation accordingly.\2\ As 
part of the implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy, DHS and 
its interagency partners will have the opportunity to assess the role 
of and investment in biodetection of aerosolized attacks in a layered 
approach to mitigating risks of a variety of biological threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ GAO, Biodefense: The Nation Faces Longstanding Challenges 
Related to Defending Against Biological Threats, GAO-19-635T 
(Washington, DC: June 26, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Question 2. CWMD is in the process of advancing its efforts to 
acquire new biodetection technology through its BD21 multi-year 
acquisition effort. In a recent GAO report on the effort, GAO-21-292, 
GAO found that, ``BD21 faces technical challenges due to inherent 
technological limitations and uncertainties with combining 
technologies.'' Given these challenges, it is beginning to seem like 
BD21 is heading toward the same problems and inefficiencies within 
BioWatch. What level of confidence should Congress place in CWMD to 
successfully acquire technology capable of detecting biological threats 
across the country?
    Answer. As we found in our May 2021 report, DHS has shown 
improvement in conducting its acquisition efforts.\3\ Specifically, 
regarding DHS's on-going acquisition of biodetection technology to 
replace BioWatch, we found CWMD was following DHS's acquisition policy 
and guidance. In addition, to help mitigate risk in the acquisition, 
the program office conducted an alternatives analysis and was testing 
the basic proof of concept of the anomaly detection algorithm in a 
technology demonstration. In our prior work evaluating the current 
BioWatch program and other acquisition efforts to replace BioWatch, we 
identified issues related to requirements development, stakeholder 
involvement, testing, cybersecurity, and accounting for uncertainty.\4\ 
DHS agreed to implement our prior recommendations to address these past 
problems and said the steps they are taking during the BD21 acquisition 
are designed to address them, but their work is on-going.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ GAO, Biodefense: DHS Exploring New Methods to Replace BioWatch 
and Could Benefit from Additional Guidance, GAO-21-292 (Washington, DC: 
May 20, 2021).
    \4\ GAO-16-99 and GAO, Biosurveillance: DHS Should Reevaluate 
Mission Need and Alternatives before Proceeding with BioWatch 
Generation-3 Acquisition, GAO-12-810 (Washington, DC: Sept. 10, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In our May 2021 report regarding BD21 we noted challenges DHS faces 
due to the inherent limitations in the technologies and uncertainties 
with combining technologies for use in biodetection. Unlike efforts to 
detect chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents, which have specific 
structures that can be used in designing a detection system, developing 
biological detection technologies faces unique challenges, because of 
the variability and unpredictability of biological agents. As such, DHS 
has faced challenges in acquiring biodetection capabilities to replace 
BioWatch. For the BD21 acquisition, DHS intends to use biological 
aerosol sensors that monitor the air to provide data on biological 
material in the environment, but common environmental material such as 
pollen, soil, and diesel exhaust can emit a signal in the same range as 
a biological threat agent, thereby increasing false alarm rates. 
Program officials reported that the risk of false alarms produced by 
biological sensor technologies could be reduced by using an anomaly 
detection algorithm in addition to the sensor. However, it is too early 
to determine whether integration of an anomaly detection algorithm will 
successfully mitigate the false alarm rate, specifically because the 
algorithms have never been developed and used for the purpose of 
biodetection in an urban, civilian environment. To ensure decision 
makers and program managers have the information necessary to make 
informed decisions at key acquisition decision events, we recommended 
that, among other things, the BD21 program office conduct technology 
readiness assessments that follow our best practices prior to the 
program's acquisition decision events. DHS concurred with our 
recommendations and provided additional information on the steps the 
agency has taken or plans to take to address them. We will continue to 
monitor their progress.
    Question 3. In August 2018, GAO released a report, GAO-18-562, on 
the need for a DHS strategy and implementation plan for the Department 
to better manage its fragmented chemical defense programs and 
activities. The report stated that a strategy and implementation plan 
would help the CWMD office, ``mitigate the risk of fragmentation among 
DHS programmers and activities, and establish goals and identify 
resources to achieve these goals.'' Please describe the current 
chemical defense fragmentation within DHS and describe why it's 
important for DHS to produce the implementation plan.
    Answer. As we reported in August 2018, DHS officials acknowledged 
that DHS had not fully integrated and coordinated its chemical defense 
programs and activities.\5\ Several components--including CBP, U.S. 
Coast Guard, the Office of Health Affairs, and S&T--conducted similar 
activities, such as acquiring chemical detectors or assisting local 
jurisdictions with preparedness, separately, without DHS-wide direction 
and coordination. As components carry out chemical defense activities 
to meet mission needs, there remains a risk that DHS may miss an 
opportunity to leverage resources and share information that could lead 
to greater effectiveness addressing chemical threats. Given the breadth 
of DHS's chemical defense responsibilities, we found that a strategy 
and implementation plan would help the CWMD Office: (1) Mitigate the 
risk of fragmentation among DHS programs and activities, and (2) 
establish goals and identify resources to achieve these goals, 
consistent with principles outlined in the GPRA of 2010.\6\ We 
recommended that DHS develop a strategy and implementation plan for 
chemical defense. In December 2019, CWMD issued its chemical defense 
strategy, which included overarching goals to drive CWMD's mission in 
protecting American safety and security from chemical threats and 
incidents. However, a strategy is only as good as its implementation. 
CWMD has yet to issue an implementation plan for chemical defense, but 
reported to us in July 2021 that it plans to do so by September 2021. 
Without implementation specifics defined, we do not have assurance that 
the state of DHS's fragmented chemical defense programs has changed 
since we reported on the issue in August 2018, and DHS remains at risk 
of these programs conducting highly similar activities in an 
uncoordinated manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ GAO, Chemical Terrorism: A Strategy and Implementation Plan 
Would Help DHS Better Manage Fragmented Chemical Defense Programs and 
Activities, GAO-18-562 (Washington, DC: Aug. 22, 2018).
    \6\ The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), as 
updated and expanded by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), 
requires agencies to establish annual performance goals with target 
levels of performance to measure progress toward those goals. See Pub. 
L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011) (updating Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 
Stat. 285 (1993)). While GPRAMA is applicable to the department or 
agency level, performance measures and goals are important management 
tools at all levels of an agency, including the program, project, or 
activity level.
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    Question 4. The President's fiscal year 2022 DHS CWMD budget 
proposal is roughly $428 million and is roughly $25 million larger than 
the fiscal year 2021 enacted figure. Based on GAO reporting, which area 
of CWMD's portfolio do you believe CWMD should invest significant 
portions of the Office's budget? Please explain.
    Answer. GAO is not in a position to opine on CWMD's budget 
allocation across its mission areas. Nonetheless, we have on-going work 
looking at CWMD management and morale issues that we expect to issue in 
early 2022. That work may have recommendations or findings that could 
be helpful to Congress in setting priorities for CWMD's budget. In 
addition, GAO's priority open recommendations to DHS include areas for 
CWMD to address that may also help inform Congressional decision 
making, such as issuing an implementation plan for coordinating 
chemical defense programs across DHS.\7\
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    \7\ GAO-21-377PR.
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    Question 5. Detecting and protecting against biological threats is 
supposed to be one of the key aspects of CWMD's mission, yet, during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, CWMD's response role was limited. Other DHS 
components took the lead in many facets of DHS's response to COVID-19. 
What actions should DHS take to ensure CWMD is prepared to respond to 
possible future infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics?
    Answer. Effectively preparing for and responding to biological 
incidents, including infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics, 
requires engagement and commitment from the entire biodefense 
enterprise. Unlike, for example, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, CWMD is not an operational component of DHS, and therefore it 
does not have the same kind of responsibility, authority, and resources 
to provide incident command in a response. Among other things, CWMD 
leads DHS's efforts to develop and enhance capabilities to defend 
against biological weapons and combat naturally-occurring bio-threats 
and pandemics. As the DHS lead for developing biodefense strategy and 
policy, and coordinating the Department's efforts to defend U.S. food, 
agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and other high-
consequence events, CWMD plays an important role not only for DHS, but 
among interagency partners as well.
    Specifically, within CWMD, the chief medical officer is the 
principal advisor on medical and public health issues to the Secretary 
and other DHS officials.\8\ As such, the chief medical officer 
coordinates with other Federal agencies with respect to medical and 
public health matters, such as the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at 
the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as with non-
Federal partners. The chief medical officer is to provide operational 
medical support to all components of DHS and coordinate with the under 
secretary for management to oversee activities within DHS related to 
the human and animal health personnel. For example, as part of DHS's 
on-going work during the pandemic, the chief medical officer has led an 
internal effort to voluntarily vaccinate more than 75,000 front-line 
and mission-critical DHS employees against COVID-19.
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    \8\ Specifically, since December 2018, the role and 
responsibilities of the Department's chief medical officer resides 
within the CWMD. This official serves as the principal advisor to DHS 
leadership on medical and public health issues related to natural 
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. The chief 
medical officer also provides operational medical support to DHS 
components and coordinates with Federal and non-Federal stakeholders on 
medical and public health matters.
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    CWMD officials are also responsible for leading the National 
Biodefense Strategy's implementation at DHS, and CWMD officials 
represent DHS on the Biodefense Coordination Team, which consists of 
experts from agencies with biodefense responsibilities. The Biodefense 
Coordination Team helps carry out the strategic goals and objectives of 
the National Biodefense Strategy on behalf of the secretaries of 
participating departments and agencies, including the Secretary of 
Homeland Security. As a cross-disciplinary, interagency body, the 
Biodefense Coordination Team has the opportunity to help shape the 
direction of the Nation's biodefense efforts. At the highest level, 
National strategies, such as the National Biodefense Strategy, are 
designed to help guide preparedness activities by providing long-range 
strategic vision to guide policy making. DHS was one of four agencies 
required by law to jointly develop a National biodefense strategy and 
associated implementation plan.\9\ The strategy outlines a whole-of-
Government approach intended to help the United States actively and 
effectively assess, prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
all types of biological threats, whether they are natural, accidental, 
or deliberate.
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    \9\ Signed into law on December 23, 2016, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 required the Secretaries of 
Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Agriculture 
to jointly develop a National biodefense strategy and associated 
implementation plan, which shall include a review and assessment of 
biodefense policies, practices, programs, and initiatives. Such 
Secretaries shall review and, as appropriate, revise the strategy 
biennially. See Pub. L. No. 114-328, div. A, title X, subtitle G,  
1086, 130 Stat. 2000, 2423-24 (2016) (classified, as amended, at 6 
U.S.C.  104).
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    In August 2021, we reported that the Biodefense Coordination Team, 
of which CWMD is a key part, is uniquely positioned to carry out 
activities to enhance preparedness and response for future biological 
incidents.\10\ For example, based on our analysis of after-action 
reports for selected interagency biological incident exercises and 
real-world incidents, as well as findings from the COVID-19 response, 
we found that the biodefense enterprise has gaps in its capabilities-
based approach to response planning. Specifically, we found the 
biodefense enterprise lacked elements necessary for preparing for 
Nationally significant biological incidents, including:
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    \10\ GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response 
Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen Preparedness, GAO-21-513 
(Washington, DC, Aug. 4, 2021).
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   a set of defined capabilities that account for the unique 
        elements specific to responding to Nationally significant 
        biological incidents;
   a process at the interagency level for agencies to assess 
        and communicate priorities for exercising capabilities;
   a process to consistently report on those capabilities in 
        after-action reviews; and
   routine monitoring at the interagency level of exercises and 
        real-world incidents in order to evaluate lessons learned 
        across the Government, identify patterns and possible root 
        causes for systemic challenges, and make recommendations to 
        address these challenges.
    We made four recommendations to DHS to help ensure the Biodefense 
Coordination Team develops ways to address the above-stated 
deficiencies. We reported that the ability to monitor and assess the 
outcomes of interagency biological incident exercises and real-world 
events could be instrumental in identifying persistent challenges and 
their root causes before they become systemic, intractable problems. 
Identifying these issues could also help agencies prioritize which 
capabilities need further development or exercising. As part of the 
Biodefense Coordination Team, CWMD officials should play a key role in 
ensuring the Nation develops the capabilities necessary for the next 
biological incident that requires a whole-of-Nation response.
    At the time we concluded our review, an interagency after-action 
report for the COVID-19 pandemic was a topic of conversation among 
Biodefense Coordination Team members, but because of the on-going 
nature of the pandemic, such a report had not been prepared. After-
action reviews can be an important means to identify how to close 
capability gaps. After-action reviews can also help to identify 
corrective actions and assign responsibility for ensuring those actions 
are implemented. This was a key element we built into our fourth 
recommendation to DHS and its partners in our August 2021 report to 
help ensure accountability for addressing corrective actions. As a 
member of the Biodefense Coordination Team, CWMD is well-positioned to 
engage in an after-action review, along with its interagency partners, 
for the whole-of-Nation response to COVID-19.
    CWMD can also take steps to evaluate its own actions during the 
COVID-19 pandemic by conducting an after-action review of its 
activities and policies. For example, one of CWMD's responsibilities 
during the pandemic has been to help ensure the health and safety of 
DHS's workforce--many of whom interact with the public daily, such as 
Transportation Security Officers and Customs and Border Protection 
Officers. Determining what went well and identifying areas for 
improvement can help CWMD better prepare DHS for biological incidents 
in the future.
    Question 6. Despite its food, agriculture, and veterinary defense 
responsibilities, according to a DHS OIG 2020 report, ``CWMD has not 
yet carried out a program to meet [statutory] requirements . . . [and 
therefore,] CWMD has limited awareness of DHS's on-going efforts and 
cannot ensure it is adequately prepared to respond to a terrorist 
attack against the Nation's food, agriculture, or veterinary systems.'' 
Shoring up our country's food, agriculture, and veterinary defense 
programs is critical. Why do you believe CWMD has been unable to 
fulfill its statutory requirements and improve homeland food, 
agriculture, and veterinary defenses?
    Answer. To date, we have not evaluated CWMD's fulfillment of 
statutory requirements to improve food, agriculture, and veterinary 
defenses. However, we have previously reported that biodefense is a 
shared endeavor among multiple partners at the Federal and non-Federal 
level.\11\ Many of the activities and responsibilities for conducting 
biosurveillance of food, agriculture, and veterinary health are shared 
among the Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and 
Interior, in addition to DHS.\12\ As part of DHS's responsibilities to 
implement the National Biodefense Strategy, opportunities exist for the 
Department to work with its partners to identify biodefense 
capabilities, identify gaps, and to facilitate enterprise-wide 
decision-making and budget trade-off decisions to help ensure the most 
efficient use of the Nation's biodefense resources.
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    \11\ GAO, Biosurveillance: Efforts to Develop a National 
Biosurveillance Capability Need a National Strategy and a Designated 
Leader, GAO-10-645 (Washington, DC: June 30, 2010); and National 
Biodefense Strategy: Additional Efforts Would Enhance Likelihood of 
Effective Implementation, GAO-20-273 (Washington, DC: Feb. 19, 2020).
    \12\ Biosurveillance, as defined by the July 2012 National Strategy 
for Biosurveillance, is the on-going process of gathering, integrating, 
interpreting, and communicating essential information related to all-
hazards threats or disease activity affecting human, animal, or plant 
health, for the purpose of: (1) Achieving early detection and warning, 
(2) contributing to overall situational awareness of the health aspects 
of the incident, and (3) enabling better decision making at all levels.
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        Question From Hon. Andrew Garbarino for Chris P. Currie
    Question. The United States Government needs to adopt a 
comprehensive and integrated approach to the dangers that illicit 
fentanyl and its many chemical analogues (collectively ``fentanyls'') 
pose to the American people. Fentanyls are terrifyingly lethal. A 
quantity of fentanyl equal in mass to a single packet of sweetener (1 
gram) can kill 500 people. A similar amount of carfentanil, a fentanyl 
analogue, can kill 50,000. Fentanyls can enter the body through 
ingestion, inhalation, and absorption through the skin and kill 
quickly, often before an antidote can be administered. Domestically, 
fentanyls are treated as illegal narcotics yet fentanyl-related deaths 
are skyrocketing. At the same time, the Department of Defense and other 
agencies sharing responsibility for National security consider 
fentanyls to be dangerous chemical weapons with the potential to cause 
massive casualties. Both views are accurate. Approaching domestic 
fentanyl policy solely as a narcotics issue, however, is placing 
millions of Americans at risk. A WMD declaration for fentanyls could be 
crafted to preclude any unintended interference with legitimate uses of 
these chemicals. Legally manufactured, appropriately regulated, and 
carefully distributed fentanyls have significant medical and veterinary 
uses and present no extraordinary threat. The same cannot be said for 
illicit fentanyl.
    Based on those conclusions from Republican and Democrat 
administrations alike, does the Department of Homeland Security support 
a decision to declare these chemicals as potential Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD)?
    Answer. This question was included in questions for GAO, but is 
directed to the Department of Homeland Security. However, DHS's 2019 
Chemical Defense Strategy lists identifying current, emerging, 
nontraditional, and forecasted chemical threats as one of the 
strategy's primary objectives. Consideration of illicit fentanyls as a 
chemical threat could potentially be considered under that strategic 
objective.

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