[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING THE HOMELAND: REFORMING DHS TO
MEET TODAY'S THREATS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-22
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-751 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Ms. Carrie Cordero, Senior Fellow and General Counsel, Center for
a New American Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Thomas S. Warrick, Senior Fellow and Director of The Future
of DHS Project, Atlantic Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Ms. Katrina Mulligan, Acting Vice President, National Security
and International Policy, Center for American Progress:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, Director, McCrary Institute for Cyber and
Critical Infrastructure Security, Auburn University:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
For the Record
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Statement of Max Stier, President and CEO, Partnership for
Public
Service...................................................... 70
The Honorable Dan Bishop, a Representative in Congress From the
State of North Carolina:
Chart.......................................................... 47
SECURING THE HOMELAND: REFORMING DHS TO MEET TODAY'S THREATS
----------
Thursday, July 15, 2021
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:03 p.m., via
Webex, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin,
Payne, Slotkin, Cleaver, Green, Clarke, Titus, Demings,
Barragan, Gottheimer, Torres, Katko, Guest, Bishop, Van Drew,
Miller-Meeks, Harshbarger, Clyde, Meijer, Cammack, Pfluger, and
Garbarino.
Chairman Thompson. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``Securing the Homeland: Reforming DHS to Meet Today's
Threats.''
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the
committee in recess at any point.
Today the committee is meeting to discuss how the
Department of Homeland Security must refocus its mission to
best respond to the most serious threats facing our Nation.
This conversation comes at a timely moment as we approach the
20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.
DHS was established in 2003 to prevent and respond to
terrorist attacks within the United States. Since then, the
range of threats the Department must manage has expanded well
beyond foreign terrorism. Today, DHS is also tasked with
confronting the threats posed by the Coronavirus, cyber
attacks, violent domestic extremists, and climate change. It is
critical that the Department assess the full range of threats
facing the country and align its resources accordingly.
Unfortunately, under President Trump, the Department had a
myopic focus on immigration and border security at the expense
of its other missions. DHS also suffered grave reputational and
operational damage carrying out the last administration's
failed policies. Some have embraced the notion that DHS must
that be dismantled, but that is not the answer. Instead, we
must reform DHS to enhance accountability and transparency,
earn Americans' trust, and improve work force morale.
Earlier this month, I introduced the DHS Reform Act. The
bill seeks to ensure the Department has a strong and integrated
core to secure the homeland while ensuring accountability,
transparency, and protection of Americans' civil rights and
civil liberties. This legislation reflects recommendations made
by those who have closely examined the challenges facing DHS,
including the Center for a New American Society, the Atlantic
Council, and the Center for American Progress. All three
organizations identified the need for increased oversight of
the Department's law enforcement operations. For example, my
bill addresses that need by creating an ``associate secretary''
position to oversee such operations. Additionally, my bill
seeks a greater role for both the Office of Privacy and the
Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to strengthen
Constitutional protections in DHS policies, programs, and
activities. All three organizations also recognize that
improving morale among the DHS work force must be a top
priority.
The DHS Reform Act authorizes several programs aimed at
identifying and addressing the causes of low employee morale.
We have before us today representatives from these
organizations. I look forward to discussing in greater detail
their recommendations for transforming DHS. As the Department
looks to refocus its operations to address emerging threats and
long-standing challenges, the Committee on Homeland Security
stands ready to assist. Unfortunately, the committee lacks
jurisdiction to deliver a full DHS authorization bill or to
advance legislation that reflects its oversight findings beyond
a few narrowly-tailored areas.
Today, over 90 committees and subcommittees have
jurisdiction over parts of DHS, and no single committee is
involved in all measures relevant to the Department. I am
working to change that as I engage with House Leadership and
other committees. Fixing jurisdiction over DHS is one of the
only recommendations of the
9/11 Commission that has yet to be resolved. This issue has
hobbled both the committee and the Department for the last 15
years. It is long past time for it to be addressed.
For DHS to be successful in carrying out its wide-ranging
missions, it needs to have the confidence of the American
people and its partners in the homeland security enterprise. I
look forward to discussing with the witnesses and the Members
today how we can reform DHS to do just that.
With that, I recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Katko, for an opening statement.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
July 15, 2021
Today the committee is meeting to discuss how the Department of
Homeland Security must refocus its mission to best respond to the most
serious threats facing our Nation. This conversation comes at a timely
moment as we approach the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. DHS was
established in 2003 to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks within
the United States. Since then, the range of threats the Department must
manage has expanded well beyond foreign terrorism.
Today, DHS is also tasked with confronting the threats posed by the
Coronavirus, cyber attacks, violent domestic extremists, and climate
change. It is critical that the Department assess the full range of
threats facing the country and align its resources accordingly.
Unfortunately, under President Trump the Department had a myopic focus
on immigration and border security at the expense of its other
missions.
DHS also suffered grave reputational and operational damage
carrying out the last administration's failed policies. Some have
embraced the notion DHS must that be dismantled, but that is not the
answer. Instead, we must reform DHS to enhance accountability and
transparency, earn Americans' trust, and improve workforce morale.
Earlier this month, I introduced the DHS Reform Act. The bill seeks
to ensure the Department has a strong and integrated core to secure the
homeland while ensuring accountability, transparency, and protection of
Americans' civil rights and civil liberties. This legislation reflects
recommendations made by those who have closely examined the challenges
facing DHS, including the Center for a New American Security, the
Atlantic Council, and the Center for American Progress.
All three organizations identified the need for increased oversight
of the Department's law enforcement operations, for example. My bill
addresses that need by creating an ``associate secretary'' position to
oversee such operations. Additionally, my bill seeks a greater role for
both the Office of Privacy and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties to strengthen Constitutional protections in DHS policies,
programs, and activities. All three organizations also recognized that
improving morale among the DHS workforce must be a top priority.
The DHS Reform Act authorizes several programs aimed at identifying
and addressing the causes of low employee morale. We have before us
today representatives from these organizations. I look forward to
discussing in greater detail their recommendations for transforming
DHS. As the Department looks to refocus its operations to address
emerging threats and long-standing challenges, the Committee on
Homeland Security stands ready to assist.
Unfortunately, the committee lacks jurisdiction to deliver a full
DHS authorization bill or to advance legislation that reflects its
oversight findings beyond a few narrowly-tailored areas. Today, over 90
committees and subcommittees have jurisdiction over part of DHS, and no
single committee is involved in all measures relevant to the
Department. I am working to change that as I engage with House
Leadership and other committees. Fixing jurisdiction over DHS is one of
the only recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that has yet to be
resolved.
This issue has hobbled both the committee and the Department for
the last 15 years--it is long past time for it to be addressed. For DHS
to be successful in carrying out its wide-ranging missions, it needs to
have the confidence of the American people and its partners in the
homeland security enterprise. I look forward to discussing with the
witnesses and the Members today how we can reform DHS to do just that.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to echo your
sentiments with respect to jurisdiction. It is long past time
that we fix that and I thank you for raising that issue.
I also thank you for holding this timely hearing today to
discuss reforms for the Department of Homeland Security. I want
to thank our distinguished witnesses for taking time to appear
before the committee.
Amazingly, we are approaching the 20th anniversary of
September 11. As we do, this committee and the Department
stands at a crossroads. At this crossroads we can either choose
to work together and successfully enact meaningful changes that
will benefit this country or we can choose to go about business
as usual, leaving American communities vulnerable.
Nearly 20 years ago, Congress established Homeland Security
by combining 22 separate Federal agencies. The intent was to
ensure that Government would be able to connect the dots of the
many threats facing the American people and prevent another 9/
11 from happening. To this day, to its credit, Homeland
Security has been successful preventing many terrorist attacks
on our soil while consistently responding to new and evolving
threats to the homeland.
Given these successes, I have been astonished to hear
from--calls from some of my colleagues recently on the other
side of the aisle for radical changes and budget cuts that
would weaken or even abolish critical Homeland Security
missions that protect Americans' lives every day.
I cannot express enough how dangerous I believe this
rhetoric to be as it sends all the wrong messages to our
adversaries.
While there is no doubt the Department must continue to
evolve and mature, its functions that are truly critical to our
National security must be improved, not degraded. After 9/11,
Homeland was stood up in haste to address the fears and threats
facing a distressed Nation. As a result, it still faces growing
pains and often struggles to nimbly respond to challenges. For
example, since its inception the Department has struggled to
coalesce around a common vision and create a unified culture.
It is 22 separate agencies largely operating independently,
keeping their own policies and cultures intact.
Homeland Security has also struggled to support centralized
support functions for its components, such as acquisitions, IT
systems, and financial management, all of which are still on
the Government Accountability Office's high-risk list.
Although the Department has made some progress, there is
still more it needs to do. I am encouraged to hear that
Homeland Security's financial systems modernization is back on
track and key to ensuring that the homeland can support all the
components efficiently and are good stewards of taxpayer
dollars. However, Homeland Security is still working to
centralize other support functions necessary to put the
Department in the best position to achieve its many critical
missions.
Homeland Security has also made progress in anticipating
and addressing new and evolving future threats to the homeland,
such as those related to cybersecurity. In 2018 Homeland
Security and Congress took action to address cyber threats by
establishing the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency, of CISA, to act as the Nation's lead civilian
cybersecurity agency and primary conduit for information
sharing and partnership with the private sector.
Last week I held a round table with CISA on ransomware
issues in my district in central New York to discuss how we can
prevent future attacks and further coordinate the efforts
between Homeland Security and local businesses and governments.
An overwhelming takeaway was how much these stakeholders value
the free and voluntary services CISA provides. Now is the time
to double down on our CISA investment. With the threat
landscape we face, there is no other option.
I firmly believe that cybersecurity is the preeminent
National security and homeland security threat we face. It is
dizzying to think about the string of cyber incidents we have
just seen over the last several months. State-backed espionage
campaigns on Federal networks, devastating ransomware campaigns
against pipelines, our food supply, transit systems, and
critical IT services. The bad guys are emboldened and we must
continue the full court press to flip the paradigm.
Today, Homeland Security continues to make some human
capital progress. I applaud the Department for hiring nearly
300 cybersecurity professionals as part of its 60-day cyber
work force ``sprint''. Homeland Security also has said it has
exceeded its initial hiring goal of 200 new cybersecurity
personnel by 50 percent and is calling it the largest
cybersecurity hiring initiative in its history.
That said, the Department's authority to nimbly hire top
talent, particularly in the cybersecurity arena, remain too
inflexible. We cannot be boxed in by legacy mindsets or
bureaucratic inertia. To fully support CISA's work, the agency
needs sustained robust funding to carry out its mission and
respond to evolving threats. The Secretary has acknowledged
that CISA needs to be the quarterback of the .gov domain and I
fully agree. But CISA will be hard-pressed to do so without
more substantial funding.
To that end I firmly believe that CISA needs to be a $5
billion agency in the next 5 years.
Today our Nation faces vastly different threats from the
one that struck on 9/11. This means that we need a DHS that can
transform and adapt better than it does now. We need a homeland
security that can identify and mitigate and even prevent these
new threats, threats that range from China's push for global
power and influence to global political and economic
instability and organized crime. However, in recent years,
Homeland Security's operations have been hamstrung by a high
number of vacancies and turnovers in senior positions. This
also must change for Homeland to formulate strategic plans and
to prepare for the future security of the homeland.
Looking forward, the Department would benefit from a
thorough assessment of what it is doing now, whether it should
keep doing those things, and if there is something it should be
doing that it isn't, what should we do about that. This is
where another Quadrennial Homeland Security Review would be
invaluable. This is an exercise in strategy prepared by law
every 4 years, but one that DHS has not been able to accomplish
since 2014--7 years ago. That is unacceptable.
I urge the Secretary and the entire Homeland Security
leadership to commit to this effort. It is time for Congress
and the administration to commit to the Department by
instilling leaders that will buckle down, ask the hard
questions, and inspire its work force to contribute to making
Homeland Security into the Department the American people want
and need.
Homeland Security is effective and nimble in responding to
disasters, thwarting attacks of all kinds, and that is a
steward of the public's trust. Homeland Security plays a vital
role in keeping us safe as we travel, engage in commerce,
recover from major disasters, and navigate an increasingly
complex interconnected world. Despite this work, Homeland
Security has struggled to earn the trust of the American people
and the confidence of partners and stakeholders.
Integrating the disparate mission sets of the Department
and ensuring that it is nimble enough to respond to pressing
threats is paramount to providing comprehensive security to our
Nation.
So, let us roll up our sleeves and figure out what we need
to do to protect and safeguard the American people better than
we do right now.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Katko follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member John Katko
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this timely hearing to discuss
reforms for the Department of Homeland Security and thank you to our
distinguished witnesses for taking time to appear before the committee.
We are quickly approaching the 20th anniversary of September 11 and
as we do, this committee, and the Department, stand at a crossroads. At
this crossroads, we can either choose to work together and successfully
enact meaningful changes that will benefit this country, or we can
choose to go about business as usual, leaving American communities
vulnerable.
Nearly 20 years ago, Congress established DHS by combining 22
separate Federal agencies. The intent was to ensure that Government
would be able to connect the dots of the many threats facing the
American people and prevent another 9/11 from happening. To this day,
and to its credit, DHS has been successful at preventing many terrorist
attacks on our soil, while consistently responding to new and evolving
threats to the homeland.
Given these successes, I have been astonished to hear calls from
some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for radical
changes and budget cuts that would weaken or even abolish critical
homeland security missions that protect American lives every day. I
cannot express how dangerous I believe this rhetoric to be, as it sends
all the wrong messages to our adversaries. While there is no doubt the
Department must continue to evolve and mature, its functions are truly
critical to our National security and must be improved, not degraded.
After 9/11, DHS was stood up in haste to address the fears and
threats facing a distressed Nation. As a result, it still faces growing
pains and often struggles to nimbly respond to challenges.
For example, since its inception, the Department has struggled to
coalesce around a common vision and create a unified culture. Its 22
separate agencies have largely operated independently, keeping their
own policies and cultures intact.
DHS has also struggled to centralize support functions for its
components, such as acquisitions, IT systems, and financial management,
all of which are still on the Government Accountability Office's high-
risk list. Though the Department has made some progress, there is still
more it needs to do. I am encouraged to hear that DHS's financial
systems modernization is back on track and key to ensuring that DHS can
support all the components efficiently and are good stewards of
taxpayer dollars. However, DHS is still working to centralize other
support functions necessary to put the Department in the best position
to achieve its many critical missions.
DHS has also made progress in anticipating and addressing new and
evolving future threats to the homeland, such as those related to
cybersecurity. In 2018, DHS and Congress took action to address cyber
threats by establishing the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency to act as the Nation's lead civilian cybersecurity agency and
primary conduit for information sharing and partnership with the
private sector. Last week I held a roundtable with CISA on ransomware
issues in my district in Central New York to discuss how we can prevent
future attacks and further coordinate efforts between DHS and local
businesses and governments. An overwhelming takeaway was how much these
stakeholders value the free and voluntary services CISA provides. Now
is a time to double down on our CISA investment. With the threat
landscape we face, there is no other option.
I firmly believe that cybersecurity is the pre-eminent National
security and homeland security threat we face. It's dizzying to think
about the string of significant cyber incidents we have seen just over
the last 7 months--State-backed espionage campaigns on Federal
networks, devastating ransomware campaigns against pipelines, our food
supply, transit systems, and critical IT services. The bad guys are
emboldened, and we must continue the full court press to flip the
paradigm.
Today, DHS continues to make some human capital progress. I applaud
the Department for hiring nearly 300 cybersecurity professionals as a
part of its 60-day cyber workforce sprint. DHS also says it has
exceeded its initial hiring goal of 200 new cybersecurity personnel by
50 percent and is calling it the ``largest cybersecurity hiring
initiative in its history.'' That said, the Department's authorities to
nimbly hire top talent, particularly in the cybersecurity arena, remain
too inflexible. We cannot be boxed in by legacy mindsets or
bureaucratic inertia.
To fully support CISA's work, the agency needs sustained, robust
funding to carry out its mission and respond to evolving threats. The
DHS Secretary has acknowledged that CISA needs to be the quarterback of
the .gov, and I fully agree, but CISA will be hard-pressed to do so
without more substantial funding. To that end, CISA needs to be a $5
billion agency in the next 5 years.
Today, our Nation faces vastly different threats than the one that
struck on September 11. This means that we need a DHS that can
transform and adapt. We need a DHS that can identify, mitigate, and
even prevent these new threats--threats that range from China's push
for global power and influence, to global political and economic
instability and organized crime.
However, in recent years, DHS operations have been hamstrung by a
high number of vacancies and turnover in senior positions. This also
must change for DHS to formulate its strategic plans and to prepare for
the future security of the homeland.
Looking forward, the Department would benefit from a thorough
assessment of what it is doing now, whether it should keep doing those
things, and if there is something it should be doing that it isn't.
This is where another Quadrennial Homeland Security Review would be
invaluable. This is an exercise in strategy required by law every 4
years, but one that DHS has not be able to accomplish since 2014, 7
years ago. I urge the Secretary and the entire DHS leadership to commit
to this effort.
It is time for Congress and the administration to commit to the
Department by instilling leaders that will buckle down, ask the hard
questions, and inspire its workforce to contribute to making DHS into
the Department the American people want and need. A DHS that is
effective and nimble in responding to disasters, thwarting attacks of
all kinds, and that is a steward of the public's trust.
DHS plays a vital role in keeping us safe as we travel, engage in
commerce, recover from major disasters, and navigate an increasingly
complex, interconnected world. Despite this work, DHS has struggled to
earn the trust of the American public and the confidence of partners
and stakeholders. Integrating the disparate mission sets of the
Department and ensuring that it is nimble enough to respond to pressing
threats is paramount to providing comprehensive security to our Nation.
So, let's roll up our sleeves and figure out what DHS needs to do to
protect and safeguard the American people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Chairman, we are unable to hear you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I guess the
gremlins have gotten me too.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that under the
committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the
record. Members are also reminded that the committee may
operate according to the guidelines laid out by the Chairman
and Ranking Member in our February 3 colloquy regarding remote
procedures.
I now welcome our panel of witnesses.
Our first witness, Miss Carrie Cordero, the Robert M. Gates
senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, and
author of the report titled ``Reforming the Department of
Homeland Security Through Enhanced Oversight and
Accountability''.
Our next witness is Mr. Tom Warrick, director of The Future
of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. Mr. Warrick previously
served as the DHS deputy assistance secretary for counter-
terrorism policy.
Our third witness is Miss Katrina Mulligan, acting vice
president for the National Security and International Policy at
the Center for American Progress and author of ``Redefining
Homeland Security: A New Framework for DHS to Meet Today's
Challenges''.
Our final witness is Mr. Frank Cilluffo, who is the
director of Auburn University's McCrary Institute for Cyber and
Critical Infrastructure Security. He previously directed
President Bush's Homeland Security Advisory Council.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask Ms. Cordero to summarize her statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF CARRIE CORDERO, SENIOR FELLOW AND GENERAL COUNSEL,
CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY
Ms. Cordero. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko,
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today on the important topic of informing the
Department of Homeland Security.
For the past 2 years I have led a project at the Center for
a New American Security focused on reforming DHS with a
specific emphasis on selected law enforcement, intelligence,
border security, and immigration aspects of the Department's
work. I am grateful for the opportunity to share the insights
developed through this project and to work with this committee
going forward in connection with its important oversight and
legislative responsibilities.
I am particularly delighted to be joined today by my
friends and colleagues, Katrina Mulligan, Tom Warrick, and
Frank Cilluffo, all of whom have meaningful insights and
expertise to share with the committee.
As I mentioned in my written testimony, my grounding is a
9/11-era operational counter-terrorism and counterintelligence
lawyer. As a result of that formative experience, I have zero
interest in going backward and undoing nearly 20 years of
changes to the laws and institutions that kept the country safe
from an act of terrorism on the scale of September 11. However,
2021 is not 2001 and the threats that the country faces today
are not the same. Maligned foreign cyber aggression, domestic
terrorism, natural disasters, and pervasive domestic gun
violence are all affecting Americans on a daily basis. DHS must
adapt to current and emerging threats while improving its
internal oversight and accountability.
In short, I don't just want us to develop a DHS that can
meet today's threats, I want to see a DHS that has the
legislative framework, organizational capability, trained,
resourced, and expert work force that is ready to meet
tomorrow's threats. I am heartened by this committee's
willingness to take on this important work.
But our institutions are not keeping up. Although there
were advance warnings, our Nation was unprepared to respond to
the global pandemic that has killed over 600,000 Americans. As
someone who had a front-row view to the prompt, decisive,
bipartisan action that Congress and the Federal Government took
to respond to the 9/11 attacks, the insufficiency of the
Federal Government's response as it emerged in early 2020 is
impossible to ignore.
DHS in particular was created to protect the country from
foreign threats, yet it appeared to have played no meaningful
role in warning the country or mobilizing its response to the
pandemic in the early months of the virus spread across the
country.
As another example of the insufficiency of our institutions
to protect our democracy, it was not foreign terrorist but
domestic terrorists and insurgents who threatened the
Constitutional order and the personal safety of the Members and
staff of Congress on January 6. Although I don't subscribe to
the view that January 6 was an intelligence failure, our
homeland security apparatus could have done more.
DHS, through the Secret Service, leads National special
security event operations. Had the 6th been designated an NSSE
and been subject to its rigorous planning and preparation
protocol, the events we witnessed would not have reached the
level of severity that they did. The protection of our
Constitutional system and the effective transfer of power was
primarily thanks to the heroic actions of members of the
Capitol Police and the District of Columbia's Metropolitan
Police Department.
We still need to improve the physical security of the
Capitol and Members of Congress, as well as other public
officials, like election officials and judges in this
environment of political violence. A review of those protective
measures and recommendations for improvement will I hope be a
component of the newly-formed select committee under the
Chairman's leadership.
Turning to the DHS Reform Act of 2021, my written testimony
includes a selected set of recommendations, several which I am
grateful to see reflected in the bill. The DHS Reform Act will
pave the way for a better DHS. As you work to move it out of
committee, I hope that you will consider some of the additional
recommendations in my written testimony and underlying reports.
To highlight just a few quickly here, I strongly support
the proposal to create an associate secretary to bolster the
leadership capacity of the Department. That proposal was a key
recommendation of my May 2020 report and also by the other
independent reviews of my colleagues here today.
In addition, I recommend that Congress update the DHS
mission at Section 101 of the Homeland Security Act. DHS cannot
do its best work if its statutory mandate, organization, and
funding is inextricably tied to a threat of a prior era while
other threats present a growing menace. Updating the statutory
mission might also improve the persistent morale issues at the
Department that I know the committee is interested in.
Finally, the oversight and accountability for the
considerable law enforcement components of DHS need to mature.
DHS was not created to serve as a Federal police force, a
function reserved for the States and localities, nor is it an
internal security service or a domestic intelligence service,
concepts that were roundly rejected, even after the 9/11
attacks. The risks of not reforming the law enforcement
functions are substantial, and I outline them further in my
written testimony.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to participate
today. I look forward to your questions and to continuing to
work with this committee.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cordero follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carrie Cordero
July 15, 2021
i. introduction
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on
the important topic of reforming the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS or the Department). For the past 2 years, I have led a project at
the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) focused on reforming DHS,
with a specific emphasis on selected law enforcement, intelligence, and
border security and immigration aspects of the Department's work. I am
grateful for the opportunity to share the insights developed through
this project, and to work with this committee going forward in
connection with its important oversight and legislative
responsibilities.
Since this is my first appearance before this committee, I thought
it might be useful to provide some additional information about my
background and experience to give you a better sense of the perspective
I bring to these issues. My grounding is as a 9/11-era operational
counterterrorism and counterintelligence lawyer. I worked in the
National security components of the Justice Department pre- and post-9/
11 and was sent over to the FBI's Strategic Information Operations
Center the morning of 9/11 after the second tower was struck, where I
continued to work over the days, weeks, and months thereafter,
supporting the Justice Department's National security operations. Most
of my Government experience from 2000-2010 was at the intersection of
National security, foreign intelligence collection, and protecting
civil liberties and privacy, including matters handled under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. As the first Justice Department
National Security Division (NSD) detailee to the Office of General
Counsel in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from
2007-2009, I served as the primary legal advisor to the intelligence
community's Civil Liberties Protection Officer, and routinely provided
advice to intelligence community executive leaders on what we then
referred to as the ``domestic intelligence'' or, domestic security and
intelligence portfolio. I was integrally involved in developing
guidelines and interagency oversight processes related to National
security investigations. Upon returning to the NSD front office in
2009, I co-chaired an interagency task force focused on improving
processes related to intelligence, surveillance, and compliance. Since
leaving Government service in 2010, I have taught graduate-level law
seminars at Georgetown Law on intelligence community reform and
cybersecurity law and policy. Accordingly, I approach National and
homeland security legislative and policy issues with the eye of both a
practitioner and an academic.
As a result of these formative professional experiences, I have
zero interest in going backward, and undoing nearly 20 years of changes
to the laws and institutions that kept the country safe from an act of
international terrorism on the scale of September 11, 2001. However--
and this is important--2021 is not 2001. The threats to security and
safety the country faces today are not the same. While some threats of
the past have receded, they have not disappeared. Instead, threats to
American security, safety, and health appear to have compounded. And
our National and homeland security institutions which are designed to
protect Americans from the threats they actually face need to keep
pace. In short, I don't just want us to develop a DHS that can meet
today's threats, I want to see a DHS that has the legislative
framework, organizational capability, and trained, resourced, and
expert workforce that is ready to meet tomorrow's threats.
ii. recent homeland security challenges
There are indications that our institutions are not keeping up with
the current and emerging threat landscape, and DHS is, unfortunately,
an example. Although there were advance warnings by experts and
planning by prior administrations, by orders of magnitude, our Nation
was unprepared to respond to the global pandemic that has killed over
600,000 Americans and 4 million souls world-wide. As someone who had a
front-row view to the prompt, decisive, bipartisan action Congress and
the Federal Government took to respond to the 9/11 attack, the
insufficiency of the Federal Government's response to the greatest
public safety threat as it emerged in early 2020 is impossible to
ignore. DHS, in particular, was created to protect the country from
foreign threats. From an outside observer's perspective, however, it
has appeared to have played no meaningful role in warning or protecting
the country or mobilizing its response to the Coronavirus pandemic in
the early months of the virus' spread across the United States. As
Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas testified before this committee in March,
that has since changed.
As another example of the insufficiency of our institutions to
protect our democracy, it was not foreign terrorists but domestic
terrorists and insurgents who threatened the Constitutional order and
the personal safety of Members and staff of the U.S. Congress on
January 6, 2021. Although I do not subscribe to the view that January 6
was an intelligence failure, our homeland security apparatus should
have been mobilized to do more to protect against the destruction and
violence of that day. DHS--through the departmental component of the
Secret Service--leads National Special Security Event (NSSE)
operations. In my judgment, had January 6 been designated an NSSE and
been subject to its rigorous planning and preparation protocols, the
events we witnessed on that day would not have reached the level of
severity that they did. DHS had both an intelligence warning and a
protective coordination role that it could have leveraged in
anticipation of that day's violence; instead, the protection of our
Constitutional system and the effective transfer of power was primarily
thanks to the heroic actions of members of the Capitol Police and the
District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department.
The political dynamics that motivated the violent insurgency of
January 6, 2021, have not fully dissipated; continued work from
intelligence, law enforcement, and physical security perspectives must
continue. The administration's National Strategy for Countering
Domestic Terrorism, issued last month by the National Security Council,
is a good start and outlines how various agencies, including DHS, can
facilitate the sharing of information and development of programs that
raise awareness about warning signs for domestic terrorism. Meanwhile,
there remains important work to be done to improve the physical
security of the Capitol and Members of Congress, whether here in
Washington, DC, or at home in their districts, as well as that of other
public officials like election officials and judges, in this continued
environment of potential political violence. A review of those
protective measures and recommendations for substantial improvement,
will, I hope, be a significant component of the newly-formed Select
Committee, under the Chairman's leadership.
Meanwhile, malign foreign cyber aggression, additional
manifestations of domestic terrorism, natural disasters prompted by a
changing climate, and pervasive domestic violence facilitated by gun
proliferation are affecting all Americans on a daily basis. DHS is a
Department that could be capable of better protecting our citizens from
these types of threats. But in order to do so, DHS must adapt to
current and emerging threats while improving its internal oversight and
accountability. It needs Congress' attention, engagement, and action to
do so. I am heartened by this committee's willingness to take on this
important work.
iii. mission
As this committee recognizes by virtue of holding this hearing, it
is time to take a renewed look at the core mission of DHS. The
Department was created in 2002 to bring together capabilities of 22
different Federal Government entities with a wide array of functions,
primarily to protect against a future international terrorist attack.
From the outset, however, the nature of the day-to-day activities of
the DHS components included aspects that could relate to
counterterrorism, but that also covered a range of activities that had
nothing to do with terrorism. Areas like immigration, border security,
law enforcement, emergency management, and transportation security are
all ones that are relevant to the counterterrorism mission, but are
also functions that are far broader than just counterterrorism.
Accordingly, Congress should update Section 101 of the Homeland
Security Act to reflect the activities that DHS engages in on a day-to-
day basis, and to provide flexibility for the Department to shift
activities and priorities as the threat environment evolves. It's time
to provide the statutory grounding to enable this Department to move
beyond the post-9/11 era. This is not to say the international
terrorism threat does not exist. But the modern threat environment has
evolved. DHS cannot do its best work under the current threat
environment if its statutory mandate, organization, and funding is
inextricably tied to an international terrorism threat of a prior era,
while other threats present a growing menace to the United States'
society, economy, and safety.
Congress could take two different approaches to modernizing the
statutory mission. It could start from scratch and reimagine the
Department's mission. Alternatively, even a modest update to the text
could provide much greater flexibility for the Department to evolve in
closer alignment with current, emerging, and future threats to the
homeland. In my May 2020 report, Reforming the Department of Homeland
Security Through Enhanced Oversight & Accountability, I included
proposed text that provides a modest revision to the statutory mission
and would welcome the opportunity to work with this committee on
refining it further.
Updating the statutory mission might also contribute to rectifying
the persistent and dismal morale issues at the Department. As Members
of this committee are likely aware in the Partnership for Public
Service's 2020 rankings of the best places in the Federal Government to
work, DHS ranks dead last for large agencies. DHS is a Department where
many employees work on issues that are unconnected or have only
theoretical connections to the counterterrorism mission. One way to not
only improve the performance and functioning of the Department, but
also the morale of its valuable workforce, is to ensure that each and
every DHS employee is invested in the Department's mission. Based on my
experience in public service, I know that mission is what motivates
public servants. If we want to motivate the DHS workforce to feel pride
in their work, we need to do a better job of making sure that they see
their efforts reflected in the Department's mission.
iv. improving oversight & accountability for law enforcement functions
DHS currently houses the largest Federal law enforcement officer
capacity of any department in the Federal Government. There are law
enforcement components and activities spread across a wide range of the
Department's agencies and sub-components. DHS was not created, however,
to serve as a Federal police force, a function reserved for States and
localities. Nor is it an internal security service or a domestic
intelligence service, concepts that were roundly rejected, even after
the 9/11 attacks.
While the administration, as a practical matter, needs to focus on
the day-to-day management of the Department, solving problems, and
improving operational competency and morale, Congress needs to
seriously think about and take steps to future-proof this Department
against inappropriate political pressure or outright abuse of law
enforcement authority and power. From the implementation of the travel
ban, to the enactment of the family separation policy, to the
aggressive deployment of tactical units to Portland, Oregon, DHS has,
unfortunately, revealed itself as an institution that is not capable of
withstanding inappropriate political pressure. This state of affairs is
neither fair to the workforce of DHS or the people it serves and
interacts with in the course of performing its legitimate and lawful
functions.
The risks of not reforming the law enforcement functions are
substantial. First, the aggressive deployment of law enforcement
personnel into situations for which they are neither trained nor
prepared for places both officers and civilians at risk. Second, to the
extent DHS may deploy its law enforcement personnel beyond their
intended purposes, activities may be conducted outside the bounds of
laws, proper procedures, and each component's mission. These actions
harm public confidence in not just the Department, but law enforcement
Nation-wide. Today's environment is a difficult one for law enforcement
officers and police who do follow the law and serve the public interest
to the best of their abilities; heavy-handed local law enforcement
activity by DHS is not helpful to the efforts at the State and local
level to build public confidence in law enforcement personnel. Third,
DHS is a highly operational Department: Its officers and employees
interact with the public--both U.S. citizens and foreign persons--
daily, routinely, and at a high volume. Clear guidelines, sophisticated
and up-to-date training, and robust oversight structures are essential
to ensure that DHS law enforcement officers carry out their
responsibilities in accordance with the Constitution, laws, and rules,
especially those related to the protection of civil liberties and
privacy.
v. dhs reform act of 2021
The DHS Reform Act of 2021 is a positive step toward providing
greater oversight and accountability for the Department. In all, the
proposed legislation provides appropriate and needed reforms that will
pave the way for a better DHS. As you work to move it out of this
committee, I hope that there will be constructive efforts to build
bipartisan support for it. While I will not comment on each provision
of the proposed legislation in this written statement, I do wish to
highlight and offer constructive comments on certain aspects of the
proposed legislation:
I strongly support the proposal to create an associate
secretary to bolster the leadership capacity of the Department
in Section 102 of the bill. This proposal was a key
recommendation of my May 2020 report, and was also recommended
by the other independent reviews conducted since then. Given
the particular expertise needed to oversee law enforcement
activities, the portfolio designated in the bill makes sense
and will ensure that the Secretary has the needed space to give
sufficient attention to all aspects of the Department's work,
and not be unduly focused on immigration and border security,
which are important, but do not represent the full scope of the
Department's functions and responsibilities.
In order to ensure that the Department's leadership has the
needed flexibility to address not just today's homeland
security threats but tomorrow's, I would urge Congress not to
limit the organization of certain internal aspects of the
Department too narrowly. For example, Section 308 of the bill
designates ``no more than five Assistant Secretaries within the
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans with divided
responsibility'' for areas that the proposed legislation then
defines roughly as counterterrorism, border security and
immigration, cybersecurity and infrastructure security, law
enforcement, and trade and economic security. In the current
environment, for example, natural disaster emergency management
or public health emergency response might be areas that would
benefit from this designation. In another decade or two, other
areas might benefit from this policy leadership focus. Congress
may wish to allow a future Secretary or under secretary
slightly more flexibility in designating the functions of
assistant secretaries as the threat environment and the needs
of the Department change over time.
One area that I also urge the committee to consider
including in future debate or amendments is a requirement for
the promulgation of modernized operational guidelines for law
enforcement activities across the Department. While the bill at
Section 890c does provide for ``policies and guidelines'' to
better train on ``accountability, [and] standards for
professional and ethical conduct,'' given the substantial law
enforcement--including complex investigative activities--the
Department engages in, the Department should have operational
guidelines that establish the Constitutional floor for
operational activities and provide clear guidance for the scope
and conduct of those activities. Given the breadth of the
Department's law enforcement responsibilities and the nature of
its complex investigations, the guidelines should be developed
in consultation with the Attorney General, and should be made
publicly available, consistent with National security.
The bill proposes valuable provisions to bolster the work of
the chief privacy officer in Section 301 and officer for civil
rights and civil liberties in Sections 306, and requires
coordination with both those officials in Section 511 for
programs that affect their areas of expertise. I would go a
step further and create an under secretary for privacy, civil
liberties and transparency, as discussed in my May 2020 report.
Joining these offices under one high-level official and adding
transparency as an additional highlighted function would
provide a stronger voice and capability to coordinate these
important functions Department-wide.
vi. summary of recommendations
Over the past 2 years, I, along with colleagues internal and
external to CNAS, have made a variety of recommendations to modernize
the DHS mission and improve the Department's operations, oversight, and
accountability, particularly related to selected law enforcement,
intelligence, and border security and immigration functions. Launched
in 2019, the CNAS project on DHS oversight and accountability has
played a leading role in bringing greater policy community attention to
DHS and the need for modernizing and reforming the organization to meet
the threats of today and tomorrow. Research under this project has
drawn on a wide range of experts with operational, policy, and legal
expertise, including input and advice from prior DHS senior leaders who
have served in every administration since the Department's creation.
For ease of reference, a selected set of recommendations--several
of which are reflected in the DHS Reform Act of 2021--made as part of
this on-going project is provided below. These recommendations are
drawn from the following reports, policy briefs, and articles published
in connection with CNAS' umbrella project on DHS oversight and
accountability:
Carrie F. Cordero, Heidi Li Feldman, and Chimene Keitner,
``The Law Against Family Separation,'' Columbia Human Rights
Law Review, 51 no. 2 (2020).
Carrie Cordero, ``Reforming the Department of Homeland
Security Through Enhanced Oversight & Accountability,'' (Center
for a New American Security, May 2020), with photographs by
Ivan Pierre Aguirre.
Carrie Cordero and Katrina Mulligan, ``Modernizing the
Department of Homeland Security,'' Lawfare, December 9, 2020.
Carrie Cordero and Katie Galgano, ``The Department of
Homeland Security: Priorities for Reform,'' (Center for a New
American Security, March 11, 2021).
Christian Beckner, ``Reassessing Homeland Security
Intelligence: A Review of the DHS Office of Intelligence and
Analysis,'' (Center for a New American Security, May 25, 2021).
Carrie Cordero and Katie Galgano, ``From Mardi Gras to the
Philippines: A Review of DHS Homeland Security
Investigations,'' (Center for a New American Security,
forthcoming July/August 2021).
mission
Congress should update the Department's statutory mission at
Section 101 of the Homeland Security Act to reflect current and
emerging threats and facilitate the Department's ability to
adapt to tomorrow's threats.
The administration should recalibrate the Department's focus
on security and safety issues that most threaten Americans
today, and enable the Department to pivot to the threat
environment of tomorrow.
The administration should align the use of law enforcement
powers with intended purpose and prioritization, including
limiting the use and deployment of Border Patrol personnel for
border security purposes only.
organization
Congress should create the position of associate secretary
to provide more robust leadership capacity across the
Department's extraordinarily wide range of responsibilities and
activities.
Congress should create the position of under secretary for
privacy, civil liberties, and transparency, to ensure better
coordination across the Department of these important
portfolios at a higher profile leadership level.
The Secretary should direct the Office of Strategy, Policy,
and Plans to develop policies and procedures to better
coordinate oversight and compliance across the Department.
The administration should create a joint duty program across
DHS components and at DHS headquarters, and include joint duty
as a path to career advancement.
The administration and Congress should work together to
place the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) on
stronger, forward-looking footing, by either ``going big'' and
broadening the scope of I&A's authority and functions, or
``going small'' and focusing I&A's work on a tighter, more
discrete set of core issues that better serves Departmental
leaders and focuses on high-quality products with a tailored
utility and audience.
The administration and Congress should work together to
focus the operations, eliminate redundancies with other Federal
investigative law enforcement agencies, and improve oversight
over DHS Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), including
considering removing HSI from Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and creating a Senate-confirmed component
head.
The administration should create a Department Leadership
Council, consisting of the component and agency heads to meet
regularly with the Secretary and deputy secretary.
The administration should create a Departmental Oversight
and Accountability Council, which would bring together the
compliance and oversight personnel across the Department
responsible for legal, civil liberties, and privacy protection.
oversight
The Secretary should direct a review of law enforcement
operational guidelines across the components of the Department,
as well as a review of operational procedures and guidelines
governing detention practices.
Congress should mandate the development and issuance of
modernized law enforcement operational guidelines, in
consultation with the Attorney General.
Congress should direct the public release of newly developed
law enforcement operational guidelines, consistent with the
protection of National security.
Congress should conduct or direct the execution of an
oversight review of the number and function of political
appointees across the Department at non-leadership levels and
identify opportunities to recalibrate the balance of political
and career officials at non-leadership levels.
Congress should continue to enhance the authority of the
homeland security committees of Congress to serve as the
primary vehicles for conducting oversight of DHS.
With respect to family separation in the immigration
context, Congress should legislate requirements for the
reunification of families separated under the 2018 policy,
mandate an adequate Government tracking system for children who
enter the border security and immigration system, and legislate
adequate representation for children in immigration
proceedings.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate today. I look forward
to your questions and continuing to work with this committee.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I now ask Mr. Warrick to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. WARRICK, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF
THE FUTURE OF DHS PROJECT, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Warrick. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ranking
Member Katko and Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify here today.
It is clear that DHS today needs all of the good help it
can get. It is the third-largest Cabinet department in the U.S.
Government, has more than 200,000 employees, and its missions
include some of our country's most important challenges. There
are many DHS mission areas that need attention, it has
management challenges throughout the Department for most of
which is morale, with 2020 having been a particularly
tumultuous year.
At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I just say that the Atlantic
Council itself does not take positions on legislation. Views
expressed are those of individual experts. I do want to thank
our senior advisory board, our former secretaries and acting
secretaries and the more than 100 experts on homeland and
National security who contributed to our findings and
recommendations, and to technical support from Accenture
Federal Services and SAIC on how to support the DHS work force
and understand DHS's unique organizational challenges. But the
responsibility for the conclusions are mine.
So it is on that basis, Mr. Chairman, that I want to offer
my endorsement of H.R. 4357, the DHS Reform Act of 2021, which
embodies some of the best thinking about how DHS needs to be
reformed. I also urge the Members of this committee to continue
your efforts to make the Department more effective in
protecting the American people from non-military threats.
Mr. Chairman, any comprehensive assessment of DHS starts
with the need to refocus its mission. On this point, all of the
reports that you have been reading agree. Our report said that
the most urgent threat when we released it in September 2020
was the COVID-19 pandemic and the greatest long-term threat to
lives and infrastructure comes from climate change and that DHS
should prioritize its work in these areas. I am obviously very
pleased to see that the Biden administration has taken up both
of these challenges with the priority that it deserves.
But the one other important point I need to make is that
our report calls for DHS to take on the overall mission of
defending the United States and the American people from non-
military threats. DHS's missions currently include protecting
American democracy from cyber attacks, protecting critical
infrastructure, election security, countering foreign nation-
state misuse of our social media platforms, all of which I
group together under the umbrella of protecting American
democracy.
It is true that DHS needs to maintain its level of
resources and efforts on all of its other missions. One of the
hallmarks of the Department, as you said, Mr. Chairman, is it
keeps adding missions, but none of its current missions goes
away. Just as the United States is fortunate to have a
Department of Defense and men and women in uniform who lead the
Nation's defense against military threats, DoD is not the right
place to lead defense of the Nation against non-kinetic
threats. So if DoD's bumper sticker version of its mission is
we fight and win America's wars, DHS needs to think of its
mission as we lead the defense of the Nation against non-
military threats. This is what DHS needs to move toward.
DHS also needs to think of communications as a core mission
and win the trust of the American people by how it takes on
what it does. It also needs to modernize its approach to
public-private partnerships because that is the way DHS
contributes to tackling the dangers from climate change.
DHS morale is another important challenge. Let me ask the
Clerk to put up slide No. 2 for the committee to take a look
at. One of the things that we have all noted is that DHS has
ranked last in the annual surveys of employee morale since
2010. The data from the September-October 2020 shows DHS is
still last among large Cabinet departments and agencies in the
Federal Government.
But our analyses show that morale at DHS is not a hopeless
task--far from it. DHS has had numerous success stories. Frank
Taylor at the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, between 2014
and 2017, Sarah Saldana at Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Tex Alles and John Kelly at the U.S. Secret Service between
2017 and 2019.
If I could ask the Clerk to show slide 3. Thanks.
Unfortunately, in 2020 morale at one of DHS's two long-time
success stories, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services fell
off a cliff. USCIS fell from 90th of 420 sub-agencies to 339th
out of 411. The reasons for this drop is overhearing of their
own. DHS had other success stories. The components that were
most associated with the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and
protecting our 2020 election showed their morale improve
because I believe of a combination of good leadership and
commitment to the importance of their missions.
There are a number of other reforms that need to be made
that will obviously enhance morale. This committee's hearing on
May 4 on the rights of the TSA work force coincided with our
recommendation that TSA be the first project for reform and
that pay and work force issues need to be prioritized.
Secretary Mayorkas announced that this was his priority as well
on June 3. It is important now to ensure that DHS get the
necessary funding.
You can take the slides down. Thanks.
There are other management challenges DHS needs to address,
very quickly, strengthening headquarters, better coordination
of policy and resources and, in particular, as my colleague,
Carrie Cordero said, establishing an associate secretary to
coordinate law enforcement activities without micromanaging
what those law enforcement agencies need to do.
DHS needs to integrate more substantively civil rights,
civil liberties, privacy protections, and rotate people in and
out.
Mr. Chairman, what both you and Representative Katko said
about the importance of consolidating Congressional oversight
also needs to be a priority.
So, with that, I would be happy to answer any questions
that the committee may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Warrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas S. Warrick
July 15, 2021
When the Atlantic Council started developing The Future of DHS
Project in June 2019, no Washington-based think tank had done a
comprehensive study of the Department of Homeland Security since 2004.
Today, you have three: By the Atlantic Council's Future of DHS Project,
the Center for a New American Security, led by Carrie Cordero, and the
Center for American Progress, led by Katrinia Mulligan. True, there has
been a lot of expert thought and advice across the political spectrum
on the individual issues DHS is involved in, including from experts
like Frank Cilluffo--on issues like cybersecurity, borders and
immigration, counterterrorism, and climate change--but in the 15 years
since 2004, there had not been as much attention given to DHS as an
institution.
Yet it's clear that DHS needs all the good help it can get. DHS is
the third-largest Cabinet department in the U.S. Government. It has
more than 200,000 employees. Its missions include many of our country's
most important security challenges. Many of DHS's mission areas need
more attention than they have been receiving. Since 2010, despite some
years of improvement, employee morale at DHS was consistently last
among large Cabinet departments. Management challenges abounded, with
2020 being a particularly tumultuous year.
Although our 3 reports differ in important ways, they have a number
of fundamental points in common. As I walk you through the conclusions
of the Atlantic Council's Future of DHS Project reports, I want to
recognize some of the progress to date, with special thanks to the work
of this committee and Chairman Thompson for leading the push for reform
at DHS. I will also note some of the points that the 3 respective
reports have in common. I want to offer my endorsement of H.R. 4357,
the DHS Reform Act of 2021, which embodies some of the best thinking
about how DHS needs to be reformed. I also want to urge the Members of
this committee to continue the effort and make the DHS Reform Act the
first of a series of Congressional efforts to make the Department more
effective in protecting the American people from non-military threats.
I should take a moment to note the Atlantic Council's policy of
intellectual independence. The Atlantic Council itself does not take
positions on legislation. Views expressed are those of individual
experts. I also want to credit our Senior Advisory Board of former
Secretaries and Acting Secretaries, who helped guide the project and
the more than a hundred experts who contributed to our findings and
recommendations. Of course, responsibility for the conclusions is mine,
as the lead author and director of The Future of DHS Project.
summary of the atlantic council's future of dhs reports from 2020
I. Re-Focus DHS's Mission on Protecting the Nation from Non-Military
Threats
Any comprehensive assessment of DHS must start with the need to re-
focus DHS's mission. On this foundational point, all 3 reports agree.
The Future of DHS Project report, released in August and September
2020, said that the most urgent threat facing the United States was the
COVID-19 pandemic. The greatest long-term threat that DHS needs to
focus on is the threat to lives and infrastructure from climate change.
The Biden administration has taken up both these challenges with the
priority they deserve.
On the threat of terrorism, we pointed out that while terrorism may
have been the reason DHS was founded, over the years DHS has had
missions added to it that leave terrorism one mission among many. I
agree with my colleague Carrie Cordero's conclusion that DHS needs a
new authorizing statute to replace the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in
a way that makes DHS's missions more clear.
Even the terrorism threat is changing. DHS needs to use the next 2
to 3 years to get ready to deal with a different terrorist threat than
we faced on 9/11. Our report said in September 2020 that DHS needs to
give more attention and resources to domestic terrorism, White
supremacism, and other ``home-grown'' causes. The January 6 attack on
the U.S. Capitol only reinforced this conclusion. The Atlantic
Council's ``After the Insurrection'' series has looked at what needs to
be done to address this threat. The Biden administration's domestic
terrorism strategy released in May was a good start, especially its
call for the domestic terrorism response to be ideologically neutral
while recognizing that White supremacists and other like-minded violent
extremists are unquestionably responsible for more lethal attacks than
any other ideological movement in the past decade--and as an attack on
American democracy, nothing comes close to the January 6 attack on the
Capitol. It was also good to see additional funding for domestic
terrorism programs at DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ). However,
the strategy needs more money and people to succeed. A good strategy
alone doesn't tell us victory's sticker price.
There is one very important point about re-focusing DHS missions
that I want to make. The Future of DHS report calls for DHS to take on
the overall mission of defending the United States and the American
people from non-military threats. DHS missions currently include
protecting American democracy from cyber attacks, protecting critical
infrastructure, election security, countering foreign nation-state
misuse of social media. I group all of these under the umbrella of
``protecting American democracy.''
DHS needs to maintain its level of resources and efforts on
counterterrorism, aviation security, border management and immigration,
maritime security, emergency management, disaster response, and
protecting U.S. continuity of governance. None of DHS's current
missions is going away, but this shows that DHS currently has most of
the stovepipes of non-military defense already under its umbrella.
The United States is fortunate to have the Department of Defense
(DoD) and our men and women in uniform leading the defense of the
Nation against military threats. However, DoD is not the right place to
lead the defense of the Nation against non-kinetic threats. However,
there does need to be a Cabinet department that can provide unity of
effort against non-military threats.
If DoD's bumper-sticker version of its mission is ``We fight and
win America's wars,'' DHS needs to think of its mission as ``We lead
the defense of the Nation against non-military threats.''
This is what DHS needs to move toward.
DHS also needs to think of communications as a core mission. This
means better communications with other parts of the Federal, State,
local, Tribal, and territorial governments, the private sector, and
especially the American people. DHS needs to have access to Classified
communications and a press office equal to that of other departments
for which communications with the public is a vital part of its
mission. DHS needs to be staffed resourced for all these things.
Currently, it's not.
DHS also needs the trust of the American people to succeed. DHS
needs to factor into its decisions how its actions affect the trust the
American people have in DHS. We need as a country to recognize that
DHS, like our uniformed military and intelligence community, needs to
be non-partisan. This point is one on which my colleagues and I
strongly agree.
II. Modernize DHS's Approach to Public-Private Partnerships
The Future of DHS report also urged DHS to modernize its approach
to public-private partnerships. DHS's role is unique among Federal
Cabinet departments in how it works with other Federal agencies, with
State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, with the private
sector, and with the American people. Other Federal departments do some
of these things--DHS does all of them.
As one example, for telecommunications and financial companies to
defend their networks against today's cyber threats will require a
closer partnership with DHS than ever before. Network operators need
higher-fidelity, often Classified intelligence to take action, and
increasing the speed of sharing is now vital, because cyber attacks
take place at network speeds, and the Federal Government needs to be
able to communicate relevant information, including attribution, in
real time. Adversaries from overseas--whether nation-states or cyber
criminals--will exploit any delays in defending computer and financial
networks. This will require a closer and more sophisticated partnership
in defense of our computer and financial networks.
The partnership that DHS has with State and local governments is
also going to be vital in defending American lives and infrastructure
from climate change and extreme weather. Other Cabinet departments are
involved in tackling ways to halt the rise in global temperature.
However, a vital part of our National defense against these changes has
to be action by DHS through FEMA and the CISA infrastructure protection
experts working with State and local governments and the private sector
to find ways to protect lives and infrastructure from climate change
and extreme weather. Our report offered a number of specific
recommendations how to do this. DHS needs to be one of the departments
at the center of our Nation's efforts to address climate change.
III. DHS's Morale Can Be Significantly Improved
DHS also has more than its share of management challenges. Foremost
among these is low morale. DHS has been last among large Cabinet
departments since 2010, according to the Federal Employee Viewpoint
Survey (FEVS) as analyzed by the Partnership for Public Service's Best
Places to Work in the Federal Government (hereafter, ``Partnership'').
I will now present several updates the results we released last year
that incorporates new data released from the 2020 FEVS survey taken
from September 14 to November 5, 2020. (As the Partnership made clear,
for 2020, they changed the way they calculated scores, so much of what
appears to be an across-the-board improvement in morale across the
Federal Government is actually due to this change in the methodology.)
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
As Figure 1 above shows, DHS still ranks last in overall morale of
large departments and agencies in the Federal Government. Our report
released last September showed that improving morale at DHS is not a
hopeless task--far from it. DHS has had numerous success stories
improving morale at the component levels. We cited the data showing
what Frank Taylor did at the Office of Intelligence & Analysis between
2014 and 2017, where his reorganization led to higher morale.
Similarly, what Sarah Saldana did at Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) between 2015 and 2017, and what Randolph ``Tex''
Alles and John Kelly did at the U.S. Secret Service between 2017 and
2019, all show that morale at DHS can be improved significantly, and
over a span of 2 to 3 years.
Unfortunately, in 2020, morale at one of DHS's two long-time
success stories--US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)--fell
off a cliff. Morale at the U.S. Coast Guard and USCIS have long been
among DHS's success stories. But between May 2019 and September-October
2020, USCIS fell from 90th out of 420 sub-agencies across the Federal
Government to 339th out of 411. The reasons for this deserve a hearing
of their own.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Interestingly, DHS still had success stories in 2020. Three of the
DHS components most involved in helping with the response to the COVID-
19 pandemic and the 2020 election--the Science & Technology Directorate
(S&T), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)--all saw their
morale improve because, I believe, of a combination of leadership and
commitment to the importance of the mission.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Another morale success story in late 2020 appears to have been the
Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A), which saw a sharp drop in
morale in May 2018, and opted out of the FEVS survey for 2019. I&A
underwent a change in leadership on August 3, 2020, and 2 months later,
survey data suggested that morale had increased back to the levels that
Frank Taylor left it in 2017. Some of this may be due to the change in
Partnership's calculation methodology, but the improvement over 2018
appears to be real.
Morale, of course, does not tell the whole story. The FEVS survey
concluded on November 5, just before the results of the 2020
Presidential election were known. We at the Atlantic Council have been
closely following the intelligence failures that led to the January 6
attack on the U.S. Capitol. My colleague Mitch Silber has documented
the intelligence failures that allowed the January 6 attack to surprise
the Capitol Police leadership and much of the country. I am sure that
the new acting under secretary, John Cohen, will tackle both the
substantive mission and morale of I&A together, because the two are
related.
However, overall morale in DHS continues to be dominated by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), which make up about 60 percent of the DHS workforce.
Both TSA and CBP have underlying factors that negatively affect morale,
and both need to be addressed.
Our report recommended making significant improvements at TSA,
especially to address the low pay of TSA's screening officers. In our
report and before a subcommittee of this committee, I showed this
slide, which makes it clear that low pay at TSA urgently needs to be
addressed:
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
This committee held a hearing on May 4 on H.R. 903, the Rights for
the TSA Workforce Act. On June 3, Secretary of Homeland Security
Alejandro Mayorkas announced that TSA would expand collective
bargaining, adopt better workplace standards and practices, and
increase pay for TSA's screening workforce. Secretary Mayorkas, TSA
Administrator David Pekoske, and everyone involved in this important
decision deserve the recognition for making this important change.
Knowing Secretary Mayorkas and Administrator Pekoske, I am confident we
are seeing the first steps to turning around employee morale at TSA and
DHS. It will be important to work to ensure that DHS gets the necessary
funding and support to fully implement the plans that Secretary
Mayorkas has directed TSA to prepare.
IV. Address DHS's Management Challenges
Let me turn briefly to the other management recommendations in our
report. While discussions of DHS's missions tend to get the most
attention, DHS needs to make significant changes to how it manages
itself if it wants to succeed at those missions. These changes need
more attention from the Congress and the American people.
First, DHS headquarters needs to be strengthened. This is a point
on which all the studies of DHS agree. Right now, component personnel
think headquarters does not understand component operational
practicalities. Headquarters personnel think components do not see the
big picture or appreciate that external factors sometimes require
changes in what components do, and sometimes how they do them. In fact,
there is truth in both viewpoints.
DHS needs to better coordinate policy and resources. The incoming
Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans Rob Silvers understands
this. There also need to be major changes in how DHS budgets for
tomorrow's threats.
DHS headquarters needs the right kind of oversight over the law
enforcement missions of the Department. The Atlantic Council developed
the recommendation of an associate secretary, based on the associate
attorney general who oversees significant parts of the Department of
Justice. I am very pleased to see this recommendation included in the
DHS Reform Act of 2021. Headquarters should not be in the business of
micromanaging DHS's law enforcement components. But neither should
headquarters be in the dark. One of the FBI's great strengths is the
ability to shift priorities--as they did after 9/11, or after Russian,
Chinese, and Iranian operatives started to interfere with American
democracy in the 2016 election. There are times when the Nation needs
DHS's law enforcement agencies to be able to change direction to
address new challenges. An associate secretary should be able to lead
these efforts.
In addition, DHS needs to more substantively integrate civil
rights, civil liberties, and privacy protections into all that it does,
but especially into its law enforcement missions. This is a point on
which all 3 of the major studies of DHS agree. The idea that DHS would
deploy to Portland, Oregon, elite forces designed to operate in rugged
terrain against heavily armed drug dealers and terrorists--against the
wishes of the Governor and mayor involved--violates the principles of
trust that are essential for DHS to succeed. The provisions of the DHS
Reform Act of 2021 should help here.
DHS also needs to learn from the experience of the Department of
Defense, embodied in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, and allow more
rotational details of personnel between headquarters and components.
I'm pleased to see the DHS Reform Act of 2021 include a number of
provisions that will allow these kinds of personnel details to take
place.
These provisions don't get the headlines, but they are invaluable
to building a Department of Homeland Security that deserves the trust
of the American people, and is able to defend the Nation from non-
military threats.
V. Strengthen and Consolidate Congressional Oversight of DHS
Finally, I want to note the importance of strengthening the
Congressional oversight of DHS. Ideally, DHS should have a single major
authorizing committee, just as the Department of Defense does.
Consolidating Congressional oversight over DHS is the last remaining,
unfulfilled recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Your efforts, Mr.
Chairman, and the efforts of others on this committee, have achieved
much progress for this idea in the past year. These efforts need to
continue, and I look forward to working with you and the other Members
of the committee to strengthen the Department of Homeland Security and
make it better able to protect the Nation from non-military threats.
I would be happy to answer any questions the committee may have.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Mulligan to summarize her
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KATRINA MULLIGAN, ACTING VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS
Ms. Mulligan. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished
Members of the House Committee on Homeland Security, I too
appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today.
Over the past year I have led a study on DHS focused
primarily on reexamining first order questions. What does
America need from a Department of Homeland Security today and
how has that changed in the last 20 years?
But rather than tell you about our conclusions, I'd like to
take 3 quick minutes to show you. So you can start the video
now.
[Video playing.]*
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* The video is available at this link: https://youtu.be/
8T84J0ytiro.
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Ms. Mulligan. Thank you.
So before I close I want to emphasize two things. First,
DHS has the potential to meet today's moment. Second, though
the panel today reflects a diversity of viewpoints we agree on
several areas for reform. I would encourage this committee to
focus closely on areas where we are speaking in unison. To
highlight just a few, we agree that DHS is critical to ensuring
the security and prosperity of Americans and should be reformed
rather than dismantled. We agree that DHS needs to take a
broader view of what it means to keep the Nation secure. We
agree that DHS should have a larger role in communicating with
States, the private sector, and the public, and that DHS needs
an elevated role for protecting the privacy and civil liberties
of Americans. We agree that more oversight and restraint is
needed for DHS's operational and law enforcement functions.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look
forward to hearing your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Mulligan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Katrina Mulligan
July 15, 2021
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members
of the House Committee on Homeland Security, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today. I commend this committee for
seeking to address long-standing challenges facing the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). I also want to thank my fellow panelists for
their scholarship on DHS reform, which I turn to often to inform my own
thinking.
I offer three general observations:
1. DHS has become seriously out of balance with America's needs.
2. A reimagined DHS should recalibrate its priorities, moving
toward a ``safety and services'' approach.
3. Though the panel today reflects a diversity of viewpoints, we
agree on several areas for reform that this committee is well-
positioned to undertake.
First, DHS has become seriously out of balance with America's
needs. Established in late 2002, the Department of Homeland Security
was largely defined by the
9/11 terrorist attacks, and the response to those tragic events
continues to shape the priorities and mission of the Department today.
Since its founding, there has been persistent confusion about DHS's
role as well as complaints about its structure, operations, and
oversight. Observers across the political spectrum have argued that, in
the rush to stand up a new Department, disparate components of the
Federal bureaucracy were shoehorned into DHS, with mixed results. As
Members of this committee know, since its founding, DHS's budget has
more than doubled in size, from roughly $30 billion in fiscal year 2004
to more than $64 billion in fiscal year 2018--not counting disaster
relief funds, which vary depending on emergencies that happen each
year.\1\ Today, DHS is the largest Federal law enforcement agency in
the Government, with more than 240,000 employees--more than twice the
size of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Congressional Research Service, ``Trends in the Timing and Size
of DHS Appropriations: In Brief'' (Washington: 2019), available at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44604.pdf; U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, ``FY 2021 Budget in Brief'' (Washington: 2021), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
fy_2021_dhs_bib_0.pdf.
\2\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ``About DHS,'' available
at https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs; Bureau of Human Resources, ``Facts
about Our Most Valuable Asset--Our People'' (Washington: U.S.
Department of State, 2019), available at https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/HR_Factsheet0319.pdf; U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, ``Department of Justice (DOJ),'' available at
https://www.eeoc.gov/federal-sector/department-justice-doj-0.
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DHS claims a role in most National security issues--and a number of
issues that fall outside of National security--but there are few areas
where DHS leads the Government's response and even fewer where it does
so well and without controversy. The Department's founding mission to
prevent another 9/11-style attack continues to influence its outsize
focus on counterterrorism--despite the fact that DHS's ability to
prevent terrorism is limited, and entities such as the FBI and National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) are often in the lead statutorily. The
dominating focus on counterterrorism comes at the expense of other
activities that DHS is uniquely positioned to execute among Federal
agencies such as providing efficient, safe, and respectful immigration
services; facilitating international trade and travel; serving as the
Nation's risk adviser for critical infrastructure; and proactively
responding to disasters that do not fall within the missions of other
parts of the Federal bureaucracy.
To remedy this imbalance, DHS should take a broader view of what it
means to keep the Nation ``secure'' and adapt its mission, priorities,
and activities accordingly. In doing so, DHS should address the
following unmet needs, which largely fall between the gaps in today's
Federal bureaucracy.
A leading Federal emergency response system. The United States
needs a proactive emergency preparedness and resilience
capacity and a flexible and capable response system that can
respond to a wide range of emergencies quickly and efficiently.
DHS should serve as the lead coordinator of U.S. Government
emergency preparedness and response efforts on the wide range
of emergencies that affect the country.
A better way of communicating threat information to and from the
public and private sectors. In a world where the public and
private sectors must take independent action to ensure
America's safety and security, the Government needs a trusted,
effective mechanism to communicate threat information with the
public and private sectors and between different levels of
State, local, and Federal Government officials. DHS already
plays an important role but should be designated the Federal
Government's lead for sharing information, advocating for
greater Government transparency, and for developing new
communications capacities that add value to the American
people.
A fair, workable, and humane approach to border management. Factors
such as devastating hurricanes and droughts due to climate
change, political unrest, and gang violence, especially in
Central American countries, have translated to a high number of
migrants, including large numbers of families and unaccompanied
children, seeking asylum in the United States. DHS should shift
toward a more service-driven approach that treats immigration
as an asset to be managed rather than a crime to be enforced.
A truly integrated cyber and critical infrastructure capacity.
Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure are increasingly
common and could grind the U.S. economy and daily life to a
halt. There is a clear need to build on the success of DHS's
Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) by expanding
the indicators and mechanisms for sharing cyber threat
information and more proactively sharing cyber threat
intelligence between businesses and Government agencies.
An effective response to domestic violent extremism. Threats from
domestic violent extremism are rapidly growing in the United
States and endanger our way of life, our values, and our
democracy. While law enforcement responses to domestic violent
extremism primarily fall within the FBI's authority, DHS should
be charged with taking the lead in countering disinformation,
coordinating Federal grant-making programs to promote
resilience, and providing support for risk-based prevention
responses.
core mission focused on protecting civil liberties and privacy.
DHS regularly interacts with--and collects information on--
Americans and U.S. persons in the routine course of its duties.
DHS has a responsibility to safeguard the information it
acquires but it could also play an important role in
safeguarding the security of personal or private information
from malicious cyber actors and foreign governments.
Establishing the protection of civil liberties and privacy as a
core DHS mission would fill a critical gap in Executive branch
roles that is not currently being comprehensively addressed by
other departments and agencies.
DHS has the potential to meet today's moment. There is no other
department with DHS's range of flexible authorities and unique capacity
to respond to these issues and others that fall between the gaps of
responsibilities of other Federal departments and agencies. There is no
other department better suited to coordinate effective Federal
emergency response; communicate threat information between the public
and private sectors; provide a working, humane approach to border
management; facilitate an integrated cybersecurity and infrastructure
capacity; and implement effective approaches to counter the threats
from domestic extremism fueled by white supremacy and the rise of anti-
Government militias. And there is no other department with the mandate
and track record of playing a bridging role between State, local,
Tribal, and territorial officials and the Federal Government. This
committee can ensure DHS is oriented to fill these critical gaps
through its oversight functions.
Second, as my colleagues and I have called for in a recent study by
the Center for American Progress (CAP),\3\ a reimagined DHS should
recalibrate its priorities, moving away from a threat-oriented model
and toward a ``safety and services'' approach. While the Department
must continue its efforts to protect, secure, prevent, and enforce,
these activities should be brought into balance with DHS's other
missions. DHS should organize--and articulate its mission--around 5 new
core values:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Mara Rudman, Rudy deLeon, Joel Martinez, Elisa Massimino, Silva
Mathema, Katrina Mulligan, Alexandra Schmitt, and Philip E. Wolgin,
``Redefining Homeland Security: A New Framework for DHS To Meet Today's
Challenges,'' (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2021),
available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/
2021/06/16/500642/redefining-homeland-security-new-framework-dhs-meet-
todays-challenges/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecting.--DHS should prioritize service and partnerships
and invest in efforts to connect State, local, Tribal, and
territorial officials with Federal resources and officials.
Communicating.--DHS should manage information sharing and
public disclosures of intelligence between Federal entities and
their local counterparts through a leading role that would be a
valuable public service.
Facilitating.--DHS should continue to facilitate lawful
international trade and travel, ensure that U.S. transportation
services are safe, and maintain U.S. waterways and maritime
resources.
Welcoming.--DHS should provide efficient and respectful
service to aspiring citizens and other immigrants and emphasize
its unique role in welcoming the people who immigrate to,
visit, or seek refuge in the United States.
Helping.--DHS should expand its existing capacity on
disaster relief and emergency management and invest in new,
flexible headquarters and regional capabilities that can
address a wide range of emergencies and situations.
DHS should dial down its strategic focus in the following areas,
bringing them into balance with its other priorities:
Protecting.--DHS should coordinate cybersecurity and
critical infrastructure to bridge the gap between public and
privately-owned infrastructure and ensure that Federal
protection efforts can effectively extend to all sectors across
the country.
Securing.--DHS should maintain its core objective of
securely, efficiently, and humanely managing our air, land, and
maritime borders.
Preventing.--DHS should focus on the increasing prevalence
of domestic challenges and borderless threats while maintaining
its important role in preventing attacks against the United
States at home and abroad.
Enforcing.--DHS should conduct a recalibration of its
enforcement activities within broader department goals of
safety and service and move law enforcement activities that are
not aligned to this mission to other areas of the Federal
Government that are better suited to these functions.
Fig. 1: DHS should move away from a threat-oriented model which is
principally concerned with protecting, securing, preventing, and
enforcing, and toward a ``safety and services'' model that brings those
activities into balance with 5 new core values: Connecting,
communicating, facilitating, welcoming, and helping.
Third, though the panel today reflects a diversity of viewpoints,
we agree on several areas for reform. We represent 3 distinguished
institutions and bring different perspectives to our analysis of DHS
reform. We offer divergent visions for what the future of DHS could
look like. It is therefore significant and worthy of the committee's
attention that despite these differences we agree on several areas for
reform.
We agree that DHS is critical to ensuring the security and
prosperity of Americans and should be reformed rather than
dismantled.
We agree that DHS needs to be more focused on today's most
serious threats, including pandemics, critical infrastructure,
the effects of climate change, cybersecurity, and foreign
interference.
We agree that DHS should have a lead role in communicating
with State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments and with
the private sector.
We agree that DHS needs an elevated role for privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties and we support this committee's
efforts to strengthen civil rights and civil liberties
protections in DHS policies, programs, and activities.
We agree that DHS has a unique responsibility to foster
trust among the American people and those who seek safety or
opportunity here.
Though our policy solutions differ, we agree that more
oversight--and restraint--is needed for DHS's operational and
law enforcement functions.
Though we differ on the details, we agree that DHS
headquarters needs to be strengthened--and increase in size--if
it is to effectively oversee the Department's activities.
Finally, we strongly agree that Congress should improve
oversight over DHS activities, ideally through concentrating
oversight responsibilities with the designated homeland
security committees, to the extent possible.
conclusion
DHS has the potential to meet today's moment, and is uniquely
positioned among other Federal agencies to address unmet needs and
pressing challenges the United States faces right now and in the years
ahead. As then-nominee Alejandro Mayorkas argued in his confirmation
hearing, DHS is and should be ``fundamentally, a Department of
partnerships.''\4\ He is right. Going forward, DHS should prioritize
service and partnerships, connecting people in the United States to
Federal services that reflect American values and are essential to
America's shared prosperity. The Department's threat-oriented roles
will, of course, remain, but this new framework will help DHS realign
its focus and priorities on those areas where it can be maximally
effective and provide value to the American people and those who live,
study, work, travel, and seek safety here.
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\4\ CNN, ``Excerpts from Biden's DHS pick Alejandro Mayorkas'
opening statement,'' January 19, 2021, available at https://
www.cnn.com/2021/01/19/politics/mayorkas-opening-statement-excerpts/
index.html.
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Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee and
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I now ask Mr. Cilluffo to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO, DIRECTOR, MC CRARY INSTITUTE
FOR CYBER AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY, AUBURN
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Cilluffo [continuing]. Ranking Member Katko and
distinguished committee Members. I too would like to thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you today.
As my colleagues have said, the array of threats to this
country has evolved substantially over time and therefore so
too must our National architecture for countering these
threats. I commend the committee for your proactive approach to
tackle some of these important reforms.
Allow me to begin with a little bit of history and context.
Unfortunately, nothing as fancy as my colleagues before me with
the cool videos and the like, but DHS was established, I think
as we have all now made clear, directly in response to the
horrific terrorist attacks of 9/11. We went through at that
time the largest reorganization of the Federal Government since
the National Security Act of 1947 and preventing, preparing
for, and responding to terrorism was the driving force behind
the Department.
At the same time, however, DHS had and continues to have a
wide set of important missions. The most prevalent and most
pressing threat today is cyber. The system is blinking red and
this is the area where we must work the hardest and double down
our efforts, not at the expense of other missions and threats,
but in addition to them.
Consider the events of the past 6 months alone in which we
have seen a rash of incidents from SolarWinds and the Microsoft
exchange hacks targeting the IT supply chain, to the Kaseya
ransomware incident only a few days ago, and a spate of other
significant ransomware attacks that preceded it, including U.S.
pipelines and the food supply. Ransomware attacks are hitting
epidemic proportions, targeting entities from schools to
businesses. No one and nothing is off limits.
I was pleased to see this morning the Government's new
ransomware campaign, since it is really important for the
Government to speak with one voice and bring everything
together. DHS must be well-structured and well-funded to meet
the cyber mission. Continuity of leadership is a vital first
step. Meaningful maturation of the Department requires the post
in these senior echelons be filled. I think Jen Easterly's
confirmation earlier this week was an important first step.
Next we ought to consider codifying the CISA director to a 5-
year term, elevating the role to ensure continuity across the
organization.
Fortunately, Congress and DHS have undertaken some
significant actions in response to the increase in cyber
attacks. Codifying the Cyber State of Distress and the Cyber
Response and Recovery Fund will ensure adequate preparation and
funding the ability to surge critical resources and coordinate
asset response.
DHS must continue to support their principal partners,
State, local, Tribal, territorial governments, and the private
sector. With cyber, as with the broader homeland security
enterprise, we can't forget it is ultimately about finding
meaningful ways to enhance and enable those on the front lines.
Reaching this far requires people, a skilled and deep bench to
meet the mission, building and sustaining a cyber work force so
that caliber and size needed by the Department and beyond is
truly an urgent priority.
The most effective way to get there is to proceed in a
multi-pronged approach, including in career training,
recruitment, retention efforts, plus K-12 and post-secondary
initiatives. A special emphasis in my eyes ought to be accorded
to upscaling veterans and recruiting a more diverse
cybersecurity work force.
To fulfill its potential as an inter-agency partner, CISA
must mature and be strengthened. To this end, the agency's
National Risk Management Center should be codified. I am happy
to get into some of that during Q&A.
Moreover, our current approach to .gov security is too
scattershot. CISA can and should play a more central role here.
The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act empowered CISA to
hunt for cyber threats on U.S. Government networks. This is a
good start, but more robust defense requires substantially more
visibility than presently exists.
Perhaps the area where we can have the greatest impact in
the near term is to finally translate the nouns into the verbs
when we talk about public-private partnerships. This is atop
the list of priorities for us on the Cyber Solarium Commission
this year, and I see Congressman Langevin has joined, so a real
driver with us on the Commission. I think the newly-created
Joint Cyber Planning Office, the JCPO, within CISA is a
positive development and should be stood up ASAP and serve as
the center of gravity for public-private coordination of
defensive cyber-based activities, priorities set by the new
National cyber director.
The Commission has also recommended that a joint
collaborative environment, with CISA at its center, be
established by law for the purpose of sharing cyber threat data
among Federal entities and between the U.S. Government and
private sector. Both National and economic security urgently
demand greater visibility across the entirety of our supply
chains. I am happy to get into that at greater length during
Q&A as well.
Just, finally, SICI. So the Commission proposed that the
most critical of our critical infrastructure, meaning
systemically important critical infrastructure, be subject to
enumerated benefits and burdens. The idea here is to impose
cyber incident reporting requirements at SICI companies in
return for some liability protection and direct intelligence
support from the U.S. intelligence community.
Happy to see a rash of good activity on the Hill and bills
around data breach notification and incident reporting. I'd
like to commend Ranking Member Katko for his five pillars. I
think this will get us a long way to where we need to be.
In closing, the Department must be calibrated to adapt to
the cyber imperative, which will continue to evolve. CISA needs
to be provided with the requisite authorities, accountability,
and resources to get the job done, especially in relation to
our most critical infrastructure.
Mr. Chairman, it is always a privilege to speak to this
committee and I look forward to any questions and trying to
answer them. So, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
July 15, 2021
introduction
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished
committee Members, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today. The array of threats to this country has evolved substantially
over time and therefore so too must our National architecture for
countering these threats. Your proactive approach to taking on this
challenge by examining the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
particular, is commendable and I hope to help you move the ball forward
in this statement and in my verbal remarks at this hearing.
evolution of the department's threat landscape
Allow me to begin with a bit of history and context. DHS was
established in 2002 in direct response to the horrific attacks of 9/11.
At the time, the principal threat to the country was from terrorists,
specifically al-Qaeda and like-minded (self-styled) ``jihadists''.
Counterterrorism was thus the animating purpose of the Department. At
the same time however, DHS had, and continues to have, a wide set of
missions including transportation security, border security, emergency
management and response to man-made and National disasters, protecting
U.S. economic security, and strengthening preparedness and resilience--
to name a few.
Today, all these missions and threats persist; and DHS continues to
be instrumental inpreparing for and responding to them. Having said
that, the most prevalent and most pressing threat now is cyber. The
ecosystem has evolved such that in 2021, cyber is the system's blinking
red light, the most imminent threat facing the country. Accordingly,
cyber is the area where we must now double down and work the hardest to
enhance our capabilities--not at the expense of other missions and
threats, but in addition to them.
The case for focusing on the cyber mission and ensuring that DHS is
both well-structured and well-funded to meet it, is so strong that it
practically makes itself. Consider the events of just the past 6
months, in which we have seen a rash of incidents from the SolarWinds
and Microsoft Exchange hacks targeting the IT supply chain, to the
Kaseya ransomware incident (only days ago) and a spate of other
significant ransomware attacks that preceded it--many directed against
critical National infrastructure and functions, including U.S.
pipelines and the food supply. While not necessarily the most
significant cyber threat, ransomware is perhaps the most prevalent. It
is hitting epidemic proportions, targeting entities from schools to
businesses; no one and nothing is off-limits.
The breadth of entities affected by cyber incidents has been
striking, as has the severity of the actual consequences, which
continue to be uncovered week by week. Perhaps most disturbingly, these
incidents have targeted and undermined the very trust upon which the
entire system is founded. For all these reasons, current circumstances
demand that DHS be postured robustly to reflect and respond to the
reality that the cyber threat is nothing short of front and central
today.
maturing the department to meet today's threats
Leadership.--In concrete terms, this means starting at the top,
literally. Meaningful maturation of the Department requires the posts
in its senior echelons (cyber and Department-wide) to be filled, and to
be occupied in a manner that supports the principle of continuity of
leadership. This crucial measure is in Chairman Thompson's recently
reintroduced DHS Reform Bill.\1\ In particular, the director of the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) should be
emphasized requisite with its importance. As the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission (on which I serve as a commissioner) recommended, codifying
a 5-year term for the director of the agency and elevating the role
would ensure continuity across the organization and attract the best
the Nation has to offer.
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\1\ ``Department of Homeland Security Reform Act of 2021'' https://
homeland.house.gov/imo/media/doc/DHS%20Reform%20Act%20of%202021.pdf
recruitment and retention efforts, plus K through 12 and postsecondary
initiatives. Special emphasis should be accorded to upskilling veterans
and recruiting a more diverse workforce.
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To be clear, many of those who took on key roles in an acting
capacity performed a true public service for the Nation at a critical
juncture in time. But to rely on these individuals over-much and over-
long is not fair, either to them or to DHS.
Congress and this committee.--Congress and this committee also have
an important role to play in moving the Department forward.
Specifically, there is a deep need for this body to reauthorize DHS and
be afforded the requisite authorities to oversee the Department.
Fulsome oversight is of course a crucial Congressional responsibility;
but it is not an either/or proposition, meaning that Congress must
authorize DHS in addition to oversee it. Unless we press ahead on both
fronts, the Department will not be able to reform itself to properly
meet today's threats.
Partners.--Though DHS is our focal point, we must look outward as
well as inward to understand and appreciate all that needs doing to
propel us from where we are, to where we need to be. To achieve our
cyber aims and ends, DHS must be able to support its full panoply of
principal partners: State, local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT)
governments, and the private sector. This means two-way flow of
information, shared timely and in a manner that facilitates action
(i.e., next steps) on both sides. With cyber as with the broader
homeland security enterprise, we need to find ways to enhance and
enable the front lines.
Workforce.--Reaching this bar requires more than technology. It
also requires people--a skilled and sufficiently deep bench to meet the
mission. Building and sustaining a cyber work force of the caliber and
size needed by the Department (and beyond) is a truly urgent priority.
The most effective way to get there is to proceed in a multi-track way
that encompasses both shorter- and longer-term measures, including in-
career training, recruitment, and retention efforts, plus K through 12
and post-secondary initiatives. Special emphasis should be accorded to
upskilling veterans and recruiting a more diverse workforce.
Interagency.--Precisely because the cyber threat is so pervasive
and complex, tackling it requires a whole-of-Nation approach. In turn,
providing the private sector and other levels of government with the
support they need from Federal entities must be a team effort. In this
regard, DHS and specifically CISA \2\ should work hand-in-glove with
NSA's Cybersecurity Division and FBI as a triad, that is powered by the
unique capabilities andauthorities that each element brings to bear.
Together with the National Cyber Director (NCD), a new position,
synergy and strategy should take on new salience, as everyone will
finally be working off the same sheet of music.
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\2\ CISA was established by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency Act of 2018, sponsored by Representative Michael
McCaul.
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Response.--There have been a number of great developments and
actions taken by Congress as of late to respond to the increase of
cyber attacks, including codifying the Cyber State of Distress and the
Cyber Response and Recovery Fund. In the event of a significant cyber
incident, the Government needs a mechanism to surge critical resources
to facilitate response, mitigation, and recovery. The Solarium
Commission therefore recommended the ability for the President or
designated Federal official to declare a cyber state of distress. Such
declaration would strengthen the Secretary of Homeland Security's
ability to ensure adequate preparation and coordinate asset response.
Coupled with the declaration authority, it is vital for the
Government to have available recovery funds. The cyber response and
recovery fund, another Solarium Commission recommendation, will be used
to augment U.S. Government response teams and their ability to assist
SLTT governments and the private sector in responding to and recovering
from an attack. In addition, the recommendations in Ranking Member
Katko's Five Pillar Plan will add to the success.\3\
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\3\ ``Ranking Member John Katko SolarWinds Campaign Response Five
Pillar Plan'' https://republicans-homeland.house.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2021/02/Katkos-5-Pillars.pdf.
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National Risk Management.--To fulfill its potential as an
interagency partner and beyond, CISA must mature and be strengthened.
To this end, the Agency's National Risk Management Center (NRMC) should
be codified. Elevating the NRMC in this way would help underscore and
advance the difficult and exceptionally important work that the Center
does. One example, which deserves far more attention than it has
received, is the NRMC effort to identify National critical functions.
The NRMC's work on National critical functions provides a strategic
foundation for prioritizing critical infrastructure and related risk
management measures, thereby delineating a targeted path to enhancing
the country's resilience. That ability to bounce forward after an
incident diminishes the returns that an adversary can expect to reap
from an attack on U.S. entities or interests and serves as a
disincentive to attack in the first place. The NRMC should therefore
continue and amp up its efforts to build out our understanding of
National critical functions, to better position the United States to
(simultaneously) remain resilient and deter foes.
A specific application of this recommendation relates to the
intersection of two domains: Cyber and space. Increasingly, space is
fundamental to continuity of a host of other critical National
operations and functions, such as positioning, navigation, and timing
(PNT). As cyber threats pose an ever-increasing risk to U.S. space
assets, the NRMC should redouble its focus on expanding and deepening
its understanding of National critical functions in this area.
However, the work of the NRMC and the Department on National cyber
risk reduction cannot and should not stop with identification. The
Department should be vested with a consistent, multi-year fund to
enable it to drive strategic investment aimed at reducing and
mitigating risk to critical infrastructure and enhancing the Nation's
resiliency.
Planning.--Industry and Government must work together to plan and
prepare for the cyber threats our Nation is facing. As recommended by
the Solarium Commission, the newly-created Joint Cyber Planning Office
(JCPO) within CISA should be stood up swiftly and serve as the center
of gravity for public-private coordination of defensive cyber
activities based on the priorities set by the National Cyber
Director.\4\ Cross-sector collaboration is key to the success of JCPO
and to creating comprehensive plans to respond to and recover from
future incidents.
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\4\ ``Gas pipeline hack reveals cyber vulnerabilities. But Biden
infrastructure plan doesn't fix them.'' https://www.nbcnews.com/think/
opinion/gas-pipeline-hack-reveals-cyber-vulnerabilities-biden-
infrastructure-plan-doesn-ncna1267021.
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Preparation Grants.--Local government partners require improved
defensive capabilities to protect themselves against emerging and ever
more frequent cyber threats and attacks. The DHS Homeland Security
Advisory Council (HSAC) SLTT Cybersecurity Subcommittee, which I co-
chaired, recommended the creation of a dedicated grant program to
improve local Government cybersecurity and create bulk purchasing
vehicles for vital cyber necessities.\5\ The use of grants will enable
SLTT partners to improve their preparation and capabilities
substantially.
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\5\ ``Homeland Security Advisory Council Final Report of the State,
Local, Tribal, and Territorial Cybersecurity Subcommittee'' https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
2._sltt_final_report_0.pdf.
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Deterrence.--While resilience supports deterrence, it does not
eliminate the need for a broader U.S. strategy to deter our adversaries
by imposing real costs and consequences upon them. For too long, China
and Russia (for example, but they are not alone) have been allowed to
engage in cyber behavior that has damaged U.S. National and economic
security, without corresponding effects being visited upon the
perpetrators.
Until we use all instruments of state-craft to influence the
decision calculus of our adversaries, bad behavior will go unchanged.
This means getting serious about even the more passive forms of hostile
behavior, such as nation-states (like China and Russia) stymieing the
long arm of the law by affording safe haven to cyber criminals
committing ransomware attacks that affect critical infrastructure in
this country and others. It is surely no accident, for instance, that
the enormous Kaseya ransomware/supply chain attack was powered by
malware designed to avoid Russian-language systems.\6\
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\6\ ``Code in huge ransomware attack written to avoid computers
that use Russian, says new report'' https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
national-security/code-huge-ransomware-attack-written-avoid-computers-
use-russian-says-n1273222.
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Unified Security.--Stepping up our offense must also be
complemented by a more comprehensive and coherent defense. Our current
approach to .gov security is too scattershot. CISA can and should
occupy a more central role here. The fiscal year 2021 National Defense
Authorization Act empowered CISA to hunt for cyber threats on U.S.
Government networks. This is a good start; but more robust defense
requires substantially more visibility than presently exists.
Amplified visibility, which feeds our understanding of threat and
underlies both response and resilience, requires genuine partnerships
within and outside Government. The imperative to turn the nouns about
public-private partnership into verbs has never been clearer. Both
National and economic security urgently demand greater visibility
across the entirety of our supply chains, as underscored in a recent
report of the HSAC Economic Security Subcommittee which I chaired.\7\
Yet, as things now stand, cyber incident reporting is not mandatory and
barriers to information sharing persist. This situation gives rise to
dangerous blind spots.
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\7\ ``Homeland Security Advisory Council Final Report: Economic
Security Subcommittee'' https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/final_economic_security_subcommit- tee_report_1.pdf.
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Information Sharing.--Against this concerning background, the
Cyberspace Solarium Commission has recommended that a joint
collaborative environment be established by law, for the purpose of
sharing cyber threat data among Federal entities and between the U.S.
Government and the private sector. The proposal further envisions CISA
at its center, as manager of the programs supporting the JCE.
In addition, the Solarium Commission proposes that the most
critical of the critical--meaning systemically important critical
infrastructure (SICI)--be codified and subject to enumerated benefits
and burdens, in service to the U.S. National interest. The idea is to
impose a cyber incident reporting requirement on SICI companies in
return for liability protection for such incidents and direct
intelligence support from the U.S. intelligence community.
More consistency in incident reporting is needed. Without
situational awareness, Government cannot properly support and defend
the Nation. Earlier reporting will allow the Government to provide more
tools and capabilities in this regard. Fortunately, Congress is now
moving in this direction with multiple bills on data breach
notification and incident reporting, including Ranking Member Katko's
leadership to identify and secure SICI, with CISA playing a lead role
in the designation process.
Industrial Control Systems.--The industrial control systems (ICS)
that power critical infrastructure merit special consideration.
Identifying and remedying vulnerabilities in ICS is crucial, in part
because ICS represent the interface where information technology and
operational technology intersect. Put differently, this is where cyber
domain and the physical world coincide. In this context, a breach on
the IT side can cause catastrophic effects in the real world.
The hybrid threat here demands that our ICS be shored up carefully.
A bipartisan bill sponsored by Ranking Member Katko and co-sponsored by
Chairman Thompson and other committee Members,\8\ H.R. 1883,\9\
intended to do just that. The proposed legislation would enhance U.S.
capabilities in this area and entrench in law CISA taking point on that
task, including by providing free tools and services to critical
infrastructure stakeholders.
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\8\ Rep. Cammack, Rep. Clarke, Rep. Garbarino, Rep. Gimenez, Rep.
Langevin, and Rep. Pfluger.
\9\ ``DHS Industrial Control Systems Capabilities Enhancement Act
of 2021'' https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1833/
text?r=11&s=4.
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conclusion
The threat landscape will continue to evolve as cyber domain brings
new challenges and opportunities for America and its adversaries alike.
Placing the country on a more solid footing to confront these pressing
threats is a must, especially in relation to our most critical
infrastructure. Today's hearing is a significant step in that
direction.
Moving ahead, the Department must be calibrated to adapt to this
cyber imperative while also retaining and advancing the ability to
counter the wide range of other threats and to fulfill the many
missions for which DHS was established.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.\10\ I
look forward to trying to answer any questions that you may have.
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\10\ Thank you also to Sharon Cardash and Matthew Edwards for their
skillful assistance in preparing this testimony.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony.
I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the witnesses.
I will now recognize myself for such questions.
You know, one of the problems we have long-standing with
DHS is the morale of the work force. All of you have done
studies on it. Can you suggest to the committee anything you
think we might do to get morale off the bottom? A lot of us are
concerned about that. The missions are important, but if your
work force is not where it needs to be in terms of morale,
there are some challenges with it.
So, Ms. Cordero, we will start off with you, if you don't
mind.
Ms. Cordero. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So morale has been, as the committee knows, a persistent
issue in the Department. I do think a couple of things. First,
with respect to the mission, as you know, I recommended that
Congress update the statutory mission of the Department. I
think there are operational reasons to do that. I also think
that there are morale reasons to do that. Right now 4 out of
the 7 main section 101 Homeland Security Act core mission sets
of the Department pertain to terrorism, and yet we know that
that is out of sync with the day-to-day activities of what many
of the work force engaged in. I do think that if the mission of
the Department as it is laid out in law, as it is mandated by
Congress, if employees could see their daily work reflected in
that mission, that would be a helpful thing.
I also think that one of the issues with the Department, I
think is all of us recognize is that the independent agencies
within the Department operate very autonomously with less
oversight structure and less common culture. There have been--
in the roundtables that I have conducted of experts, there have
been various former officials all who have said the different
Secretaries tried to do a unity of culture and then with the
next Secretary that effort sort of falled off. So it has never
been able to grow throughout the course of the Department. I
think a joint duty program would be useful in that respect so
that we could have individuals as they are rising in their
career rotate amongst the different components. They would get
a better understanding of their colleagues, of the other
mission sets of the Department. What we would do is we would
start to create a core of future leaders who have a better
appreciation for their colleagues, missions, operations,
throughout the rest of the Department.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Warrick.
Mr. Warrick. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
We took a look at a number of the specific components that
had the greatest morale problems and had in mind some of the
successes that other components have had, because there really
are lessons that can be applied in places in the Department.
In the case of TSA, addressing the low pay and the work
force issues where people perceived that promotions are handed
out unfairly and that good work is not recognized and rewarded,
is something that your committee and you and others have taken
a direct interest in with the TSA Workforce Act. So pushing
that through I think will be one of the most important steps
that this committee could take to help.
Obviously I welcome Secretary Mayorkas' efforts. We just
have to make sure he gets the resources he needs to implement
that.
The problems at Customs and Border Protection, CBP, are
going to be a bit more difficult. Chief Magnus, if confirmed by
the Senate, is going to have to take a number of steps to deal
with a legacy of an era in which CBP hired a great many people,
but the perception is that not all of them are up to the level
of professionalism that the Department really needs to have.
Some of the things that Carrie Cordero has identified in terms
of professionalization, I hope if done right will increase the
pride that CBP officers feel about the better mission.
We need to do something that we----
Chairman Thompson. All right. Thank you. Thank you very
much. I am going to have to try to get to Ms. Mulligan and Mr.
Cilluffo before my time runs out.
Ms. Mulligan.
Ms. Mulligan. So quickly, I agree that updating the mission
and instituting a joint duty-type program are excellent
suggestions. I think the one thing that I would focus on and
emphasize is the politicization of the Department is also a
driver here. One of the ways the committee can help address
that is by ensuring that there are more career civil servants
in leadership positions across the Department, because that is
what helps, you know, sort-of create a buffer and help reduce
the sort-of sharp political shifts between administrations that
end up impacting day-to-day what you think your mission is and
how well you think you are or aren't serving that mission.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cilluffo? Unmute yourself.
Mr. Cilluffo. Hi, Mr. Chairman. I was saying I will be
brief, which is very rare for me since I have never had an
unspoken thought.
But bottom line is I really thought that Carrie hit that
question out of the park. Agree with everything she said there.
The one thing I would add is the mission by definition, if
something bad happens, that is how people are sometimes
defining success. So if we can find ways to flip that equation,
I think that is critical.
I also think when it comes to cyber, I want to double tap a
couple of points that I raised. One, we need a more diverse
cybersecurity work force. We need more women, more people of
color. We need to bring in--the numbers are just staggeringly
low. I think there are ways that that can change in terms of
morale.
So bottom like is I know you are running out of time, I
just wanted to add that one point on cybersecurity.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
testifying today.
[Audio malfunction.]
Chairman Thompson. Ranking Member, I think we are having
some problems. I am not able to hear him. We will come back to
the Ranking Member.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Texas for 5
minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Good morning, Chairman, and good morning
to the witnesses.
I am glad to hear one of the witnesses highlight 9/11 since
those of us who are senior Members of the committee were here
and certainly it was a cause for the creation of Homeland
Security.
I want to ask, as we begin to look at reform, I think the
witness from the Atlantic mentioned COVID and one other issue,
but did not mention the actions of January 6, which is domestic
terrorism.
Whoever wants to answer, do you not believe that that issue
should be a crucial component of Homeland Security and any
reform should be focused on how quick a response Homeland
Security can offer because my disappointment was it was a
discombobulated unorganized response. The FBI was completely
absent, particularly the director of the FBI. The idea of a
National security or domestic security agency did not seem to
be present.
If someone wants to take that answer.
I also would appreciate the gentleman from the Atlantic as
to why domestic terrorism wasn't one of his top issues.
Mr. Warrick. It actually very much is one of my top issues.
It was an issue in our report that we highlighted even in
September 2020 needed more time and attention from DHS than it
had been getting. All of that was driven home by what happened
on January 6.
We have also taken a very detailed look at the events of
that day and DHS, while it is not responsible for collecting
the dots, it is very much responsible for connecting the dots.
DHS, INA in particular, should have done a much better job of
bringing that forcefully if necessary, to the attention of
leadership in the law enforcement agencies who found themselves
unexpectedly on the front line that day. So there was a lot
that DHS could have done better and differently.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Cordero--thank you. Our time is very
short. You had offered some reforms. Do you have any reform
that would relate to a quicker response and a greater presence
of DHS on a day like January 6, which we hope never in our life
to see again in America?
Ms. Cordero.
Ms. Cordero. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I think the DHS could have had two important roles in
mitigating the day of January 6. The first is as a warning
role. So this pertains to the role of intelligence and
analysis. We actually at the Center have a new report out that
is specifically on proposals for Congress to think about to
reform the Department of Intelligence and analysis in the
Department so that that office functions better. Right now it
is neither living up to its expectations nor is it doing the
job that folks expect it to do.
In addition, there is a physical security component. I
assess that had January 6 been designated a National Special
Security Event with the Secret Service as lead under the
leadership of the Department, that the physical security itself
would have been much improved on January 6.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Sorry, before my time is up. Are you
suggesting that should have been done ahead of time? Is that my
understanding?
Ms. Cordero. Yes, Congresswoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thanks so very much. Sorry for the time
shortage.
As it relates to the pandemic, there was multiple
confusion, layers of confusion, doctors, first responders using
plastic bags to cover themselves. When FEMA became involved, a
singular agency, things began to turn the corner.
Do we have any thoughts about the reinforcing of FEMA,
strengthening of FEMA, giving FEMA's administrator Cabinet
status? As well, the problems we had with the Stafford Act,
where FEMA cannot work directly with local communities.
Someone take that point up please.
Ms. Mulligan. Sure, I will go ahead and try.
I think you are absolutely right that the role that FEMA
has been playing, and is likely to play in the future, is going
to be bigger and more central than the role it has played in
the past.
One of the things that I think is actually a success story
of the existing DHS is how far FEMA has come in terms of
developing systems and processes. What I envision long-term is
a FEMA that functions almost like a Federal quarterback to
augment lead departments and agencies and to build kind-of
institutional capacity that can be used so that we aren't
constantly relying on our military to aid in non-military and
non-defense-related emergency response. If we can build more of
that capacity within FEMA I think it will be to the good.
In terms of whether FEMA needs to be a Cabinet-level agency
itself, I actually think a strengthened DHS central
headquarters component could be effective without a Cabinet-
level role. But I 100 percent agree that FEMA's role needs to
be larger in a re-imagined DHS.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Just last--let me get a response regarding
the diverse work force. We know that TSA and TSO officers may
be diverse, but across the board how valuable is it that we
have a more diverse work force with women and minorities?
If just someone can give a quick answer, Mr. Chairman, I
will be able to yield back.
Anyone who wishes up to take up that importance of
diversity. I know one point was made about cyber, but across
the board we found that to be very challenging.
Mr. Warrick. You are absolutely right. This is one of the
things that DHS has struggled in some areas to try to achieve.
It does need to be the priority that I think Secretary Mayorkas
and his team are now giving it to increase diversity in a
number of very important areas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think my----
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for the
technical difficulties and thank you for accommodating me.
Thank you all for your testimony today.
Ms. Cordero, I appreciate your comments very much on the
morale issue. I thank Mr. Cilluffo for his comments on a need
for diversity within CISA and really the Department as a whole.
So I do want to focus my precious time here on CISA. A few
years ago we would have never been able to anticipate how
important CISA is going to be going forward. Since my time as
Ranking Member I have really felt like we need to boost up
CISA's budget so they can be the things that we need them to
be.
So I will just say that we need it to be a $5 billion
agency within the next 5 years.
Mr. Cilluffo, if Congress were able to make such an
investment, what can we expect from CISA in return?
Chairman Thompson. You have to unmute yourself.
Mr. Cilluffo. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. Ranking Member
Katko, I just sang your praises ad nauseum. So I did want to
thank you in all sincerity for your leadership on recognizing
the significance of CISA and for your prioritization and
emphasis around cybersecurity. I genuinely believe this is the
crux of DHS's success going forward and the country expects
nothing less.
Basically, any policy recommendation I think has to meet
three different criteria, and that is the marriage of
authority--do we have clear lanes in the road, accountability--
is there the appropriate oversight, and in CISA's respect it is
both at the National cyber director and with obviously this
committee and Congress, and resources. After all, policy
without resources is rhetoric.
So I do think that the $5 billion number sounds good to me.
I couldn't give you a very empirically-based answer to that,
but we are going to need more resources. We expect CISA to do
more, we expect CISA to be the quarterback inside the Federal
Government, we expect them to be able to do more across the
.gov network. In reality--and I mentioned this in my oral
remarks--it is really about the public-private partnership. If
we are winning the battles in the beltway, that is great, but
at the end of the day it is about enabling and empowering those
on the--our cyber first defenders. This is where I hope we see
the most impact and I hope Congress will hold CISA to account
to achieve some of these objectives.
Mr. Katko. I agree with you very much about the public-
private partnership in general and the need to exchange the
information regarding malicious attacks in particular.
In fact, if time permits, I want to ask you one other thing
and that is about the Homeland Security Advisory Council. You
served on it for many years under both Democrats and
Republicans before the current Secretary disbanded it. Why do
you believe it is important to have a Homeland Security
Advisory Counsel made up of bipartisan security experts to
advise the Secretary on the homeland security?
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Congressman Katko.
I am certainly not going to make this about me, but at the
end of the day, an advisory council needs to be mission-driven,
and historically it has always been nonpartisan and I genuinely
hope that will continue to be the case.
Ultimately it needs to have a diverse set of views, not
just in the traditional sense, but those who look at the
homeland security enterprise from different perspectives as
well. So I think that that is important. It has had significant
impact.
So at the end of the day, any council is as good as the
Secretaries having trust in that and driving on the missions
that they hold near and dear, and obviously with people they
can confide in. But my big takeaway on all of this is that I
hope it remains as nonpartisan as it can be, because otherwise
it is going to be a show--it is not going to be all that it can
be.
So thank you, Congressman Katko.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
Last and real quick, but the Homeland Security Advisory
Council, have you heard any efforts by the Secretary to
reconstitute it? Has there been any signals from them yet?
Mr. Cilluffo. Since I am testifying before Congress and I
can't duck the--no, I have not heard anything, so--since the
initial letter went out to the entire Council.
Mr. Katko. OK. Well, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you for your
accommodation, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Glad we are able to
do it.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island for 5
minutes, Mr. Langevin.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Payne, for 5 minutes. Unmute yourself, Mr. Payne. We are still
not able to hear you. Well, Mr. Langevin----
Mr. Payne. Sir?
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. I see you are back.
Mr. Payne. Can you hear me?
Chairman Thompson. Well, we will go to Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Payne. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. We are going to Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. OK. Mr. Chairman, do you want me to defer to
Mr. Payne?
Chairman Thompson. We will be back later.
Mr. Langevin. Whatever you prefer.
Chairman Thompson. We will be back to Mr. Payne shortly.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank our witnesses for their testimony today. Let me start out
with Mr. Cilluffo if I could. Frank, it is great to see you
again. I appreciate your service on the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission. I am proud to have served with you and continue to
serve with you as the commissioner there. But unsurprisingly, I
agree wholeheartedly with your focus on cybersecurity as the
key emerging threat facing the country. Yesterday, the White
House announced it had formed a Ransomware Task Force to
address that scourge, which I think is important. But can you
expound on the role CISA and DHS, more broadly, should play in
protecting the Nation from ransomware, particularly, in the
context of our Solarium Commission recommendations?
Mr. Cilluffo. Well, thank you, Congressman Langevin. We
follow you in terms of all you have done for the commission to
advance our recommendations. Bottom line here is there were in
addition to CISA's critical role, one of the primary
recommendations we put forward and the NDAA translated into law
and is now, has its first National cyber director is the Office
of the National Cyber Director. Which I think serves as sort-of
the head coach to be able to finally get everyone talking on
the same sheet of music off of the same playbooks where
offensive, defensive coordinators can work together and we can
have full visibility.
CISA does play a key role. I think the first area it can
have greatest impact and translate a concept into reality is
around the JCPO or the Joint Cyber Planning Office. Which can
ultimately be the belly button between CISA and--for defensive
purposes, not taking away from NCI, JTF, and FBI's important
mission in law enforcement and scaling opportunities to claw
back ransomware bitcoin and the like. But CISA does play a big
role in being the belly button and center of gravity to be able
to interact with our private sector.
Congressman Langevin, as you well know, this is a big
emphasis for us going forward. If we want to see real progress,
it can't just be the alphabet soup and I don't mean that
pejoratively. It can't just be the inside the beltway sets of
issues. It really has to be about how we empower and enable our
front-line cyber defenders. The private sector is front and
center in all of this. They are the primary targets and not
many companies went into business thinking they had to defend
themselves against foreign intelligence services. But that is
what is precisely what we are dealing with today.
So, how do we square that circle will be priority 1, 2, and
3 and CISA plays a big role. I was pleased to see the Stop
Ransomware Campaign today because we are starting to see one
voice, one team.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. You encapsulated it perfectly.
That was a very insightful answer. Thank you. Let me ask this.
I wonder if you could comment also though on the human capital
challenges DHS is facing, especially with respect to
cybersecurity as we consider DHS reform. What should we be
keeping in mind to attract the cyber talent that we need?
Mr. Cilluffo. Well, Mr.--Congressman Langevin, obviously
the numbers are staggering and frightening if you think about
it in terms of the shortfall in terms of a skilled
cybersecurity work force. I think first and foremost, we need
to upskill and reskill and retain some of the best and the
brightest we have in place. But I do think we need to look to
ways to recruit more diverse--bring in more diversity into the
cybersecurity community. Women in particular make up less than
25 percent of the cybersecurity work force. That is just
unacceptable. We need to redouble those numbers in a big way.
Ultimately, I think K through 12 is--once you hit--and I am
speaking from a university, of course. I am going to say post-
secondary and college education is a priority and it is. But
ultimately, we have to get to the next generation when they are
a whole lot younger. Cybersecurity needs to be part of the way
they do cyber. Ultimately, we are talking about K through 12.
I think we have a lot we can learn from some of our allies.
Notably, Estonia and Israel in terms of how they are literally
bringing in at the kindergarten level, cybersecurity into the
curricula. So, I didn't give you a clean answer on that, but it
is all of the above,----
Mr. Langevin. Sure.
Mr. Cilluffo [continuing]. More of it, and faster.
Mr. Langevin. Yes, I couldn't agree more. Yes, focusing on
K through 12 essential and also diversity. Look, we are
stronger when we have varied and different points of view and
backgrounds that we can bring to the table to offer expertise
and talent and we have to work harder on the diversity part as
well.
I know my time has expired. I have other questions that I
will have to submit for the record. But thank you for those and
thank you to the rest of the panel. I am sorry I couldn't get
to you for questions. But thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Guest, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Frank, I want to visit
with you just a few minutes, kind-of highlight a few of the
things that you briefly testified in your opening statement and
also in the report that you provided prior to your testimony.
You say in your report that the most prevalent and most
pressing matter that we now face is cyber. You say cyber is the
area where we must double down and work the hardest to enhance
our capabilities. You go on and you talk about some of the more
recent attacks that we have seen, both late last year and this
year. The Solar Winds, the Microsoft Exchange. You mention the
U.S. pipeline, which I am assuming would be Colonial Pipeline,
the food supply, which would be the JBS cyber incursions. You
talk about ransomware and how ransomware is not just targeting
these large multinational corporations, but they are targeting
schools and businesses and hospitals.
Then as you go a little later into your report, you talk a
little bit about the deterrence factor. You say actually while
resilience supports deterrence, it must not eliminate the need
for a broader U.S. strategy to deter our adversaries by
imposing real costs and consequences upon them. You go on
specifically to mention China and Russia where many of these
cyber attacks are occurring and that for far too long they have
been allowed to engage in cyber behavior that has damaged the
United States and that damaged both our National security and
our economic security.
So, I would like, if you would, if you could take a few
moments to talk about this broader U.S. strategy of deterrence.
It seems like we are constantly playing defense and we are not
playing offense. That we are allowing these cyber attacks to
occur in China and Russia and other nations abroad, but it
seems that we are doing very little to engage many of those
individuals. I know that we are talking about sometimes law
enforcement challenges being unable to make arrests in foreign
countries. But for countries that shield cyber attackers, what
more can we do? What should that broader U.S. policy of
deterrence be? I think you may be muted again very briefly.
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Congressman Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you.
Mr. Cilluffo. I think you framed that exceedingly well. Not
my words, but yours. I mean, here is the bottom line. CISA has
a critical role to play, but we are never going to firewall our
way out of this problem alone. It would sort-of be like if you
are fielding a football team of only having a front line and
not having an offense. You need all of the above.
The reality is, is we need to induce changes in bad cyber
behavior. To do that, we need to start imposing costs and
consequences on bad cyber behavior. To do that, we need to be
willing to put some lines in the silicon. When those are
crossed, we have to have the political will, (A), signal and
(B), follow through on our ability to respond.
Here is, without getting into anything Classified, because
this is very public, we have got the greatest cyber capability
right now. That is something that shouldn't be lost on the rest
of the world. We also, though, need to be willing to deploy and
employ some of these capabilities to ultimately change bad
cyber behavior. For way too long, the bad guys have been
getting away with murder. This is unacceptable. That said, we
need to shore up our defenses. So, the last thing we want to do
is--because the initiative still remains with the attacker. Our
vulnerabilities are extreme. So, we got to bring all these
pieces together. I am confident that the creation of the new
National cyber director, which Congress passed last year in the
NDAA, can help us get to that point.
But here is the bottom line, not all hacks are the same.
Not all hackers are the same. Intentions vary. Capabilities
vary. At the very top of the list, peer nations are Russia and
China. Just beneath them, Iran, North Korea, what they lack in
capability they more than make up for with intent. They have
very little compunction to turn toward cyber to achieve their
objectives.
Cyber criminals, which 5 years ago were rare, now they are
at par with where nations were 3 to 5 years ago. So, we have
got a--we have got a witch's brew here we need to deal with.
The bottom line is, is we need to start imposing costs. We need
to start imposing consequence. We need to follow through and
bring all instruments of statecraft. Yes, that includes the
military instrument if done appropriately to achieve our cyber
objectives.
Mr. Guest. Let me ask you one follow-up question and then I
will be out of time. Do you think the administration is sending
a strong enough message to wit to our adversities--our
adversaries as it relates to cyber attacks in the response that
we will take to defend ourselves using some of our offensive
capabilities?
Mr. Cilluffo. You know, I have long been an advocate that
we need to do more. I have been critical of all administrations
in this particular space. I do think we saw some positive
developments in terms of raising this issue directly with
Vladimir Putin. But the proof is going to be in the pudding.
Are we going to actually follow through on some of our words
and make sure that they are not empty? The worst thing we can
do is say we take it seriously and not follow through. So, I
will be cautiously optimistic that we are moving in the right
direction, but more is needed and I don't mean to go on and on
and on. But China is the country we really need to be looking
at closely over the long haul. So much more there is needed and
too much to cover in this hearing. But thank you, Congressman
Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman--
thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey
for 5 minutes, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for
difficulty before. This question is to Ms. Cordero, Mr.
Warrick, and Ms. Mulligan. The Trump administration's abuse of
DHS authority over the last 4 years hurt the Department's
reputation and disseminated--decimated, actually the public
trust in DHS actions. As a Government agency that depends on
regular interactions with State and local communities, DHS is
uniquely reliant on its relationships with the public. I would
like Ms. Cordero and Mr. Warrick and Ms. Mulligan to answer the
following question. What are the biggest factors that affect
the public's trust in DHS and how can the Department rebuild
that trust?
Ms. Cordero. Thank you for the question, Congressman. So,
one of the reasons that I think DHS, in particular, is a
Department that needs this public trust is because it is so
operational and it touches people in a very personal way every
single day, whether it is citizens at the airport or whether it
is individuals, migrants trying to enter the country through
various means. So, it is up close and personal in a way that
many other Federal bureaucracies are not.
It also has an extraordinarily heavy law enforcement
component that has grown over time. It has been a very--become
a very robust part of its operations. Therefore, it is
essential because of these factors, that it be a Department
that operate according to the Constitution laws, rules,
procedures, and that the public have a good understanding of
what those rules are.
So, one of the set of recommendations that I have put forth
in several of the reports that I have written have been focused
on redeveloping and modernizing the operational guidelines that
the law enforcement components of the Department work through
increasing the transparency. So, once we have rules and updated
rules about how DHS officers and employees are interacting with
the public, put those rules out there so that people can see
them. They can understand them. Right now, what----
Mr. Payne. OK.
Ms. Cordero. Sorry, I will pause there. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Mr. Warrick.
Mr. Warrick. So, I agree with everything Carrie just said.
I won't resummarize it. DHS has extraordinary authorities. Also
in areas like cybersecurity, everything we see makes it clear
that there has to be even greater trust between DHS and the
American people. So, our recommendation is that DHS needs to
look at everything it does through the lens of is this going to
enhance public trust? That may not make everyone happy, but it
is going to be necessary because trust needs to one of the
greatest assets that DHS has going forward.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Ms. Mulligan.
Ms. Mulligan. So, I think that the reason that we are all
circling around the issue of DHS's law enforcement role is
because that really is the central place where the trust issues
reside, in my view. As we have concluded in our report, it is
one of the reasons why we really ought to reconsider whether
exclusively investigative law enforcement functions belong at a
reimagined DHS.
There will always be some role for law enforcement within
the Department because it will continue to need to protect,
secure, defend, and enforce. The question really for this
committee, I think, is are those the primary beliefs that the
Department adds value to the American people? Or is there an
expanded role for the view that it connects, communicates,
facilitates, helps, and welcomes people to this country? You
know, we argue that rebalancing those priorities and bringing
them into balance with each other is actually one of the first
things we can do to restore trust with the American people.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I was going try to
slide one more question in, but I will yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back and very
kindly. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Bishop, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ms. Cordero, I think it
is a fair summary to say you and Ms. Mulligan have sort-of been
on the same page, at least the two of you, maybe also Mr.
Warrick, on that deemphasizing the law enforcement functions of
DHS are a priority and you mentioned, I think, terrorism and
also immigration enforcement.
I think the Clerk has a chart that I have used a couple
times before. Let me see if the Clerk has that and we can put
it up real quickly.
[The information follows:]
Mr. Bishop. Yes, everybody is familiar with this chart, I
think. I think we are getting ready to see results for June
that will show that blue line to have ticked up yet again and
those are Southwest Border encounters by month. So, we are at
a, again, what I have understood to be a 20-year high and it
has reached--it is sort-of on a plateau and continuing
gradually to increase. You can take that chart down, Madam
Clerk. I just wanted to get everybody on the same page.
The orange line that was on that was the 2019 fiscal year
and in your paper in March about sort-of the reorienting
Homeland Security Department, you suggested that the Trump
administration's policies on immigration have been unsuccessful
that there had been an increase. I think you were pointing to
that 2019 increase in particular. But what was notable about it
is that that orange line goes up and then it recedes. We are
now up at this, you know, unusual peak that has then continued
at a plateau. Does that not change your view about whether or
not immigration enforcement continues to be an important
priority for Homeland Security?
Ms. Cordero. Congressman, I am not sure if you were
directing that at me or at Ms. Mulligan. But let me start off
and then she may have more to add as well. So, perhaps we
have--let me explain a little bit what I mean when I am
describing drawing down a little bit in terms of the law
enforcement capacity of the Department. I understand the
concerns about border security and, obviously, there is a
continued challenge at the border with respect to immigration
enforcement. So, I have not suggested that we draw down on
Border Patrol or the manpower or resourcing for that at all.
What I am suggesting is that we make sure, No. 1, that the
law enforcement components of the Department do what their
mission is. So, for example, when it comes to Border Patrol, I
want to see Border Patrol agents working on border issues, not
being deployed into the interior of the country to do things
that are unrelated to Border Patrol.
Mr. Bishop. OK.
Ms. Cordero. A second piece that we focused on--that I
focused on in my writing has been on the investigative law
enforcement capacity of the Department. So, this is what we
call Homeland Security Investigations, which is a component of
ICE. That is an area where I do wonder where there are--whether
there are some duplicative actions between and duplicative
activities between that investigative function and perhaps some
other law enforcement components of the Federal Government----
Mr. Bishop. Let me----
Ms. Cordero [continuing]. Where I think it would be useful
to----
Mr. Bishop. Let me----
Ms. Cordero [continuing]. Refocus those efforts.
Mr. Bishop. Let me interject. Thank you. Let me interject
and this is a redirect. What is the most important and
imperative action at this point in time by Homeland Security
that would precipitate an attenuation in that high and
plateaued line of enforcement encounters at the Southwestern
Border? What does Homeland Security need to do to attenuate
that flow as much as the Trump administration--or was
accomplished in the Trump administration by seeing the thing
decline rather from a peak?
Ms. Cordero. So, Congressman, I appreciate the question. I
don't think there is a magic bullet for solving the challenges
at the border. I think when we talk about the border issues,
what we are really talking about is a wide range of policy
issues. We are talking the foreign policy as it relates to
Northern Triangle----
Mr. Bishop. Let me interject. I am sort-of just seeing if
anybody has got a magic bullet. Let me see if anybody who is
the witness would want to jump in and say--I am not saying it
has to be a magic bullet, but something that could
precipitously reduce that rate.
Mr. Warrick. Representative Bishop, we need to design an
immigration system that processes people fairly, justly, and
very quickly. If you tried to run the Supreme Court the way we
run traffic court, there would be chaos. The opposite is true.
Mr. Bishop. So, if you promise to get them through faster,
Mr. Warrick, that is what you are saying is the answer?
Mr. Warrick. But justly and in accordance with the law,
yes. But the entire system----
Mr. Bishop. Do you think it would attenuate the flow?
Mr. Warrick. You need to be able to have people's cases
heard so that they don't have to either wait around for a
result or be released awaiting a hearing. You ought to be able
to design a system that avoids border crises like you have
rightly pointed us to.
Mr. Bishop. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, for 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the
gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank our
Ranking Member and our witnesses for your insights today. The
Center for the New American Securities Report notes that DHS's
cybersecurity mission has grown over time. But the authorities
of its cybersecurity entity of its--the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, have not kept pace. The
National Defense Act of Fiscal Year 2021 includes several
provisions to align CISA's authorities with its current mission
including persistent threat hunting authority and the Joint
Cyber Planning Office. But our work is hardly done. Ms.
Cordero, how has Congress' failure to equip CISA with the
authorities necessary to effectively carry out its cyber
mission undermined our National security posture? How could
this mismatch between CISA's authorities and responsibilities
be best addressed?
Ms. Cordero. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. I
do recognize that this committee and Congress does have a
renewed attention on CISA and is considering proposals to be
able to strengthen it. So, I appreciate this committee's work
on that. Here is what I think when I think about what would be
a robust CISA that we want to have? It would be a CISA that has
the capability, resources, expertise, to warn both with respect
to the .gov and to private and public--private-sector partners
and other public-sector partners. It would have the ability to
significantly assist in the remediation of cyber events and it
would have the capabilities to protect our Democratic
institutions. For example, CISA has demonstrated that it is
capable of doing a lot when it comes to public-sector partners
to protect and strengthen electoral infrastructure. So, warn,
remediate, protect. Those are the things that I think would
make a robust CISA.
One of the things that I have recommended in the past with
respect to what Congress can do, one of the recommendations of
the Solarium Commission was to create a select committee in
order to take on cyber issues across the board. In a prior
report that I wrote with a colleague, Professor David Thaw, we
recommended that there at least be an interim select committee
on cyber so that we can take these Solarium Commission
recommendations, which Congressman Langevin and others have
participated in, and drive forward those recommendations so
that they continue to have an impetus behind them and a
legislative and oversight vehicle in Congress to make them
happen.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Cilluffo, is there anything you would add
or disagree with in that analysis?
Mr. Cilluffo. I think Ms. Cordero is gutsy bringing up the
Congressional oversight, but I do think that that is an issue
we need to look at. Quite honestly, your committee, the
Homeland Security Committee needs to have the wherewithal and
the oversight authorities to do its job across the Department.
But a couple of things I would raise. I brough up SICI, the
Systemically Important Critical Infrastructure. I do think
there is a time for incident reporting and making that required
for the most critical of our critical infrastructures. I do
think that the Joint Cyber Planning Office can get us a little
closer to where we want to be on the public-private
partnership. Because that is where the action should be.
Ultimately, I think can move the needle the furthest.
I am a big proponent of the National Cyber Director, but
there is one I want to bring up that I haven't discussed and
nor have I heard from anyone yet today. Supply chains are so
important here. We are so dependent from a component
perspective, we have got to start bringing onshoring some of
these key technologies and capabilities back to the United
States. While that is an issue across the board, the truth is
is we have a whole long way to go because we don't even have
visibility across our supply chains. After each incident, it is
like we are starting afresh and anew----
Ms. Clarke. Very well. I would love to talk to you more
about that. I want to get in one more question for our panel.
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Ms. Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. That is multiple administrations have struggled
to improve coordination between CISA and other Federal
agencies, and have tried to overcome turf battle to improve our
cybersecurity posture. Last year's National Defense
Authorization Act included language codifying the role of
Federal agencies that oversee critical infrastructure sectors
in establishing the National Cyber Director.
Among other things, despite efforts to clarify roles and
responsibilities of CISA and other agencies, coordination
within the Federal Government to promote the security and
resilience of the Nation's critical infrastructure is not where
it needs to be. What more do you think Congress will need to do
to ensure effective strategic interagency collaboration to
address cyber threats against critical infrastructure? Are
there other recommendations, for instance, for the Cyber
Solarium Commission--from the Cyber Solarium Commission that
you believe would help foster better collaboration? It is for
the entire panel, I am sorry. I know my time is up. Just
quickly any thoughts?
Mr. Warrick. I will go first. We would certainly agree with
what Frank is saying about the need to designate critical
infrastructure in cyber so that they have certain obligations
and get certain benefits. That is one of the most important
recommendations that needs to be adopted.
Ms. Mulligan. The one thing I would add----
Mr. Cilluffo. Ms. Clarke, can I----
Ms. Mulligan. The one last thing I would add is I do think
that one of the issues that we are--you know, we can build
capacity and we absolutely should in the ways that have already
been outlined. But we have to start creating an output out of
DHS that is fit for purpose. In other words, DHS is going to
need to do a better job, continue improving its ability to
understand what the critical infrastructure providers that are
outside of Government actually need to be informed about and
how to inform them in a timely way and with a level of
specificity that they can actually act upon.
Ms. Clarke. Very well.
Mr. Cilluffo. Congresswoman Clarke,----
Ms. Clarke. Yes.
Mr. Cilluffo [continuing]. Just one point I want to raise
because I think it is important. So, CISA, of course, is at the
center of a lot of this activity vis-a-vis our critical
infrastructure owner/operators. But it is also the sector risk
management agencies. So, what we used to call the SSAs, the
Sector Specific Agencies that are working. So, DOE, for
example, plays an important role with grid security and needs
to continue to do that. CISA can help enable that. So, I think
the new National cyber director, we finally have a head coach.
Someone who can bring together the offensive coordinator and
the defensive coordinator onto the same field with the same
playbook, and all I ask is that Congress enable Chris Inglis to
be able to do his job as National cyber director. So, thank
you.
Ms. Clarke. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I yield back
and I thank you all for your expertise today.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the
gentleman from New Jersey for 5 minutes, Mr. Van Drew.
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Katko, and thank you for having this hearing and I thank the
witnesses for testifying. As you all know, we are truly living
in extraordinary times. Threats of all sorts, whether cyber,
ransom, or physical, greatly threaten the safety and security
of our great Nation. In the past 6 months, we have seen
ransomware attacks like we have never seen before. Water
treatment plants, meat packing facilities, pipelines, you name
it, it has been attacked. Russia, China, Iran, and other
dangerous adversaries are working to undermine our critical
infrastructure which is why it is important now more than ever
for Congress to work with stakeholders to produce effective
solutions.
In addition to our cyber vulnerabilities, our border faces
serious threats as well. Unprecedented numbers of migrants have
entered the United States through our Southern Border. Yet, the
administration has done practically nothing to remedy the
situation. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers and
Custom and Border Protection agents are overworked by anything
we could even ever imagine and they have high, very high rates
of burnout. Like the witnesses have outlined in their
testimonies, it is no secret that the Department of Homeland
Security has its shortcomings despite a heightened threat
landscape.
It is ironic, however, that the Department is receiving
very small increase in funds at this very critical time. Ms.
Mulligan, in your testimony, you said that DHS should shift
toward a more service-driven approach that treats immigrants as
an asset to be managed rather than as a crime issue or anything
to be enforced. Do you believe--simple question--do you believe
in the rule of law?
Ms. Mulligan. Of course.
Mr. Van Drew. OK. Are you aware that the United States is
facing the highest level of migrants at the Southwest Border in
21 years? In fiscal year 2021, over 900,000 migrants have been
encountered along the Southwest Border. Are you aware that
under U.S. Code Section 135, it makes it a crime to unlawfully
enter the United States not at a port of entry? It is a crime.
Are you aware of that?
Ms. Mulligan. I am aware of persistently high rates of
migrants presenting at the Southern Border, yes, over time.
Mr. Van Drew. Are you aware that it is a crime?
Ms. Mulligan. Absolutely.
Mr. Van Drew. OK.
Ms. Mulligan. Not to present, but to unlawfully enter is a
crime.
Mr. Van Drew. In fiscal year 2021 to date, CBP has arrested
6,918 individuals with criminal convictions. How would you
ensure that criminals and gang members who are smuggled into
the country between ports of entry are actually caught because
of the extreme danger that they present?
Ms. Mulligan. I think its incredibly important to
understand that none of us today have argued for a dismantling
or, you know, a radical shift away from any of the protecting,
securing, defending, or enforcing missions of the Department. I
think bringing them into balance is what I have certainly
testified about.
In terms of safety and security at the border, I think it
is really important to differentiate between, you know, folks
who are trying to enter the country who have the kinds of
criminal records that you are talking about and folks who are
presenting at the border who don't. The overwhelming majority
do not. Now, it is the function of CBP to try to differentiate
between those things, but we shouldn't be treating them all the
same. And----
Mr. Van Drew. I understand that but, again, just going back
to the previous statement, how can we consider this an asset to
the country? I agree with you. We need new immigration laws. We
need to change the system. I believe in legal immigration. But
should we just open our borders everywhere or it is just in
that area in the Southern Border? How do we really approach
this? Why is it bad for a nation, a sovereign nation, to have
borders to protect the people who live in the nation and then
to actually put together a real legal immigration plan?
But how can illegal immigration when, in fact, as we know,
illegal immigration that we have now children are being used.
Children are being abused. Children and women are being used as
drug mules. They are being sexually attacked in order to get
more people into our country. How can that be a good thing? How
can that be right even for them? When before we had agreements
with the Northern Triangle, we had agreements with Mexico in
which those folks were held and they were treated decently
there and we were building an actual border in our country. How
can that be wrong? Countries have borders. Every country.
Mexico does. Canada does. Every country we know of pretty much
that speaks for itself at all has a border. How can we just let
this happen?
Ms. Mulligan. Thank you for the question. I think that we
absolutely should have a border and I am, you know, as a lawyer
myself, deeply respectful of the rule of law in this country.
But I do think that when we are talking about the threats
facing the Nation and we are prioritizing, you know, without
infinite resources, we do need to prioritize a range of threats
that are posing, in my view, significantly heightened risks to
American lives and prosperity. Things like the pandemic, the
cyber issues that we have been discussing. Those are threats
that are impacting America's lives and their pocketbooks in
ways that far exceed what is happening at the Southern Border.
Mr. Van Drew. Do you think fentanyl is a threat to America,
the drug fentanyl? Because the numbers----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's----
Mr. Van Drew [continuing]. Are geometrically growing----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time----
Mr. Van Drew [continuing]. With fentanyl. Do you believe
that that is a threat? It is all coming in on the ports of
entry.
Chairman Thompson. We will let--excuse me. We will let you
answer the question, but the gentleman's time has long expired.
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Mulligan. I think fentanyl is absolutely a threat.
Look, that is why it is tremendously important to have a
Department of Homeland Security that is focused on taking a
broader view of what it means to keep the Nation secure. One of
the things that I find really heartening about the conversation
that we are having, is that we are breaking out of, you know,
focusing exclusively on terrorism as the only mission of the
Department. This gets back to what Ms. Cordero and Mr. Warrick
have said earlier. We have to get to a place where we are
defining what it means to keep the Nation secure more broadly
so that it includes all of the issues that you are raising and
so that those become part of the core mission of the
Department.
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you for your time.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all of
the witnesses today. I have just a couple of questions that I
wanted to try to deal with if I could. One of them is, if it
has already been dealt with, Mr. Warrick, or anyone, frankly,
we have had this increase in the number of incidents on the
U.S. airlines with unruly passengers. If that has already been
dealt with, I will just, you know, get a response later from
some of my colleagues. But if it has not been addressed, I
would appreciate if any of you who might want to respond to
that if you can.
Mr. Warrick. So, Representative, the issue of security
aboard airlines is one that TSA takes very seriously. Federal
air marshals are trained in these. Airline flight crews are
trained in how to deal with the situations. I think all of us
have been a bit fraught about air travel over the last year.
But this is going to be an example of the kind of mission that
DHS will always have to undertake and is one of the reasons why
the law enforcement personnel, the Federal air marshals that
TSA have are an essential part of protecting our aviation
security system.
Mr. Cleaver. Yes, I guess--thank you. I appreciate your
response. You know, we are having people fighting on a plane,
you know, passengers are helping to control this, which is the
good news. You know, and people don't want to wear a mask
because I guess whatever side it is, but they hate the other
side more than they love their health. So, you know, it is a
big mess. But I guess that is going to happen like a lot of
other things for the time being.
But the Center for American Progress Report calls for DHS
to refocus its work based on a safety and services model rather
than a threat-oriented model. As I understand it, a safety and
service approach does not ignore or reduce or downplay the
risks that threaten American security and prosperity, but it
does focus--suggests that we focus DHS where it is most
effective and avoid duplicating the work of other Federal
agencies. Ms. Mulligan, can you describe how this safety and
service approach best addresses the foundational issues, long-
standing challenges, and expanding the DHS mission?
Ms. Mulligan. Absolutely. You are completely right that the
safety and services model doesn't downgrade or diminish the
importance of the protecting and securing and enforcing
missions that are sort-of central and have been central to DHS
since it was created. But as Ms. Cordero said earlier, DHS is
one of the parts of the Federal constellation of departments
and agencies that most Americans come into contact with more
regularly than any other Federal department. We rely on them
when we go through airport security, when we come back from a
vacation, you know, when disaster strikes in our home town and
we are relying on Federal resources for help in a time of need.
Those are missions that in my view are going to become more
important in the next 20 years than they have been in the past
20 years. It argues for a DHS that takes pride in those
missions and puts them in a--brings them into balance with the
other missions that it has been focusing on for the past 20
years. So, you know, our vision heading into the future is for
a reimagined DHS that moves away from the origin story of 9/11
and focuses on how it can meet America's needs.
Mr. Cleaver. I don't know how my time is, Mr. Chairman. I
clearly can't see the clock. But does FEMA pull down things? I
mean, FEMA is kind of a different part of this Homeland
Security portfolio that, you know, our Chairman is carrying
around. But should that be under HUD? I mean, HUD has a
Community Development Block Grant Disaster component and it
seems to me that that may be more appropriate for HUD than DHS.
Ms. Mulligan. So, I think FEMA definitely belongs in a
reimagined DHS that is focused more on safety and services. If
DHS, if the future vision is primarily, you know, a law
enforcement security provision department or agency, then
maybe, yes, I could see the kind of, you know, move that you
are describing. But in my view, there is something inherently
integral between what FEMA provides and what is, you know, what
the threats are that are facing the country. Having them
integrated within the Department of Homeland Security makes a
lot of sense as long as if those missions are not being
diminished as the headquarter's level focuses elsewhere.
You know, I think, you know, having seen first-hand
emergency preparedness and disaster response when I was at the
Department of Justice, I could say that, you know, FEMA's come
a long way since Hurricane Katrina what they do. They, in my
view, are one of the success stories within the Department.
When you think about FEMA and the conversations that we have
been having earlier in this hearing around CISA and the way
that CISA is acting as the Nation's threat advisor, there is a
threat advisory role that you see over and over again at DHS
that it does better than any other part of the Federal
departments or agencies and it needs to lean into those areas
where what it is doing is adding unique value that falls
between the cracks of where other departments and agencies act.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
There has never been a more important conversation having
served in the military for 2 decades. I don't think that there
has been a time since 9/11 that we have faced the number of
threats that we face right now. Cyber threats, the rise of
great power competition, the crisis that we have at our border,
economic threats. I mean, they are all over.
So, what I would like to start with being a Congressman
from Texas and representing a district that is very much
feeling the pain from this crisis, is specifically related to
the border. Mr. Warrick, in your--one of your testimonies or
questions, you talked about the morale of CBP officers. I
couldn't agree with you more that it is at an all-time low. I
mean, they are being asked to protect us and yet the resources
that they are being given and the policy that is being handed
down is anything but protective of the job that they are doing.
So, I am interested to know with DHS's inability to really
call the situation at our Southern Border a crisis, including
the funding for hiring additional people, you know, what are
the additional impacts that you see on morale? Mr. Warrick, if
I may, have you been the Rio Grande Valley or to the Southern
Border in the last couple of months?
Mr. Warrick. Not in the last couple of months because,
obviously, it is a lot easier to arrange travel as a Member of
Congress than in the private sector. The challenges that CBP
faces actually go back to something that predated a number of
the policies in the Obama administration. There was a decision
taken to change the way pay was--and overtime was administered.
That actually was started in the----
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Warrick, if I may, I would like to really
just kind-of focus on the policies we have right now and on the
morale----
Mr. Warrick. Right, and so----
Mr. Pfluger [continuing]. That we are seeing.
Mr. Warrick. Yes, and so,----
Mr. Pfluger. I was just recently at the border and talked
to a number of just, you know, agents that are right there
doing the National security mission. That is really what I
would like to kind-of understand from your perspective is.
Mr. Warrick. Oh, yes. No, I would agree that Chris Magnus,
if he is confirmed by the Senate, is going to have a challenge
equal to any other major law enforcement organization going
through some difficult times. So, it is going to take a lot of
help and it is going to take support from the Congress that
should be bipartisan in order to try to address CBP's problems.
But they are deep and they go back to the hiring that was done
when CBP felt it needed to increase its numbers and then there
were problems that have been well-documented by both Democrats
and Republicans in office.
Mr. Pfluger. Well, thank you for that. We are going to
enter an era where law enforcement is going to be--is going to
continue to scratch their heads wondering if the policies from
above are going to actually support the mission that they are
doing. We have a crisis at the Southern Border. The numbers do
not lie and yet nothing is being done to address it.
Let me ask another question that is completely unrelated to
the border. I would encourage everybody on this panel that we
have got to tackle this. There are more drugs. Fentanyl was
mentioned. It is impacting communities that are not on the
border. My community is not on the border. I am in Texas. It is
going to impact every single one of our communities, if not
already.
In some of your opening statements, it was mentioned that
the need of an associate secretary position is being required.
Somebody who concentrates on law enforcement issues and that it
would be a positive step in the reformation effort. I am very
interested in this because it sounds to me a little bit
bureaucratic, an additional layer of bureaucratic red tape.
What is this position really going to do? What is their
jurisdiction going to be? Anybody can answer.
Mr. Warrick. My view is it is going to solve the problems
that CBP and ICE and others have that they need solutions on
but haven't been able to get the support from headquarters and
with the Congress that they need. So, I hope it provides that
kind of leadership. Over to Carrie.
Mr. Pfluger. Anybody else want to comment on that quickly?
Ms. Cordero. Absolutely, Congressman. You know, this is the
model of the Justice Department as well where there is an
Attorney General, a deputy attorney general, and an associate
deputy attorney general. All it does is it helps the Department
be managed better because they can--the deputies and the
associate can split up portfolios across the Department so that
the Secretary can have a birds' eye view and then they can
focus more on particular components.
So, it is something that has worked in other departments.
When I roundtabled this with experts who had served across
administrations, bipartisan group of experts, everybody agreed
that this would be a productive thing for the Department.
Mr. Pfluger. Well, thank you for that. I am interested to
see that because the deputy to the assistant to the deputy as
somebody who served in the DOD, sometimes leads us into this
bureaucratic nightmare where clear vision, objectives, and
mission statements are completely clouded. What I think would
be helpful this time for ICE specifically, since you brought
that up, is for the priorities to be handed down. Because right
now they don't know the priorities and they are not able to do
their job to the full extent. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield
back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5
minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We have heard
a lot this morning about the serious problems within the work
force at DHS. We know that employees have low morale. They are
not a very diverse work force. Also, they are reluctant to
leave their regular jobs for a temporary position with FEMA to
go out and fight some of these disasters, especially if caused
by climate change, because unlike reservists, they don't have
job protection guarantees.
I am working on some of these issues with the help of the
Chairman. For example, earlier this year I introduced the
Homeland Security Acquisition Professional Career Program Act.
It has passed the House and that was last April, and it passed
out of Senate committee just yesterday. It would target
recruitment at HBCs, veterans' organizations, and minority-
serving institutions. I hope that our panel, especially Ms.
Cordero and I believe the two people who are employees formally
at TSA maybe can weigh in on this and if that will positively
help the work force. I think it would and I hope they will
agree and help us get it out of the Senate in a hurry.
Another problem that we have heard about and we have heard
a lot about the border today, is the lack of the latest
technology at DHS that we don't seem to be able to catch up and
deal with new and emerging threats. I am especially thinking
about unmanned aerial systems. We are seeing them more and more
at the border as they come across with illegal drugs and
weapons. I wonder if you know if we are working from DHS with
Department of Defense for the development of some kind of
countermeasure or some kind of technology to counter these
operations to prevent these kinds of occurrences at the border.
Because it seems like the Department of Defense does a lot of
research in this area and we don't want to get siloed. We want
to be able to reach across and partner and perhaps take
advantage of some of that research.
Mr. Warrick. Representative, that does in fact go on. The
instrument packages that DOD needs for its use of UAVs is
actually different from DHS's. But I am sure a technology brief
would be enormously beneficial to show you some of the things
that CBP professionals would like to see in future technology.
You are absolutely right. This is hugely important and very
leveraging and a far more effective use of scarce taxpayer
dollars than some other ideas I have heard.
Ms. Titus. Well, drugs seem to be a special problem. It is
not effective to shoot them down with a gun, but you can't
shoot them with a missile, and then you have got collateral
damage. So, we do need some kind of technology to deal with
that growing threat, I believe. Would you all comment about the
work force and how diversifying it and this bill might be
helpful? Anybody?
Ms. Mulligan. I certainly support all efforts to diversify
the work force. I think some of the ideas that you have laid
out in the bill are absolutely steps in the right direction.
You know, I think part of the problem with work force morale
also though stems from the politization of the Department. When
you, you know, are down at the Southern Border as we were just
hearing from a different representative, and you are talking to
folks who are living it day in and day out, part of the problem
isn't just what they are being asked to do. It is how it
changes over time. How these issues are prioritized and then
deprioritized. So, having stable civilian leadership within the
Department is also a critical role.
Ms. Titus. Well, we have certainly seen a number of people
rotate in and out of that position over the last 4 years. Many
of whom were not qualified and stayed for only a short period
of time and couldn't offer that kind of leadership that you
need. Also, I think if we rewarded the work that we ask TSA
employees to do, that might help with morale too. Not just in
salary, but in some benefits and bargaining powers.
Ms. Mulligan. Absolutely agree.
Ms. Titus. OK. Well, we will keep working on that and try
to get it through. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to
getting that technical briefing and maybe we can see how we can
work on the drone issue as well.
Chairman Thompson. Absolutely. The gentlelady----
Ms. Titus. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from Iowa for 5 minutes, Mrs. Miller-
Meeks.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chair. We have certainly
heard about the threats that are facing our homeland and we
have heard about the border. Like Representative Pfluger, I
have visited the border and to me, every State is a border
State. Last year, we predicted at the pandemic many people such
as myself that are both veterans and physicians predicted that
with our response to the pandemic that there would be an
increase in deaths from drug overdoses with increased drug
addiction as well as suicide. Just today, the Des Moines
Register published that 87 percent of opioid overdoses in Iowa
this past year as compared to 2016, 87 percent were related to
fentanyl. As we know, with the massive numbers of people coming
across our border illegally and CBP having to process those
individuals, our agents are pulled off of the border from
protecting the border. So, that is a tremendous problem that
has only worsened during the pandemic.
From the pandemic standpoint, and this for any of the
witnesses, during the response to COVID-19 this past year, it
has been painfully apparent that not even the Federal
Government has all the necessary resources to, you know,
respond to a true National emergency or disaster such as the
pandemic. We saw that there was failure on the part of the CDC
with testing and with the FDA as well. Every year Congress
appropriates billions of dollars in preparedness grants to
State and local emergency managers and public safety partners.
Even in this last COVID bill, unfortunately there was not
increased funding to non-competitive grants to our public
health work force, or public health grants, which are the
people that are on the front line of treating this pandemic.
Many say that these grants have become entitlement grants
focused on sustainment and maintenance resulting in crowding
out of important investments and innovation and the ability to
meet emerging threats and risk. In light of the National
response to COVID-19, should we overhaul these preparedness
grants to ensure we build capacity at every level of
government? More importantly, be able to measure the return on
investment to the Nation with this significant investment? Any
of the witnesses can respond.
Mr. Warrick. I would agree that there needs to be a
complete overhaul of how we prepare for future pandemics.
Indeed, just as there is now a January 6 Commission, I think at
some point, not to put too much of a burden on the Chairman, at
some point you all should think about a commission to
investigate what needs to be done to protect us from future
pandemics. Because as many people have said, the response to
COVID-19 in early 2020 was a National disaster with a number of
deaths exceeding that of many of our major wars. We need to
have you all in the Congress lead an effort to try to deeply
understand what went wrong because I can tell you from what I
know, it is a problem.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Warrick. I would
wholeheartedly agree. I am on the Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Task Force and I do think that our response to this
pandemic and future pandemics, in addition to supply chain
manufacturing coming back to the United States, the origins of
COVID-19, which seems to be an issue with our colleagues on the
other side of the aisle, we need to explore that. And use the
international community to set standards for disclosure and
laboratory safety, especially when you are biolevel 4. Just to
follow up on that, do you think States have the responsibility
to obtain and maintain a certain level of preparedness for
future pandemics and/or cyber attacks?
Mr. Warrick. Yes, but we can't turn upside down the Federal
responsibility. That also has to be part of the picture.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I yield
back my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs. Demings, for 5
minutes.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to all of our witnesses for being with us today. Ms.
Mulligan, multiple administrators--or administrations have
struggled to improve coordination. I am particularly interested
in a coordination, communication, transparency, between CISA
and other Federal agencies that share other responsibility. We
have already heard it said that we have talked about the
National, the appointment of the National cyber director. We
have heard it said just let him be able to do his job.
But despite efforts to clarify roles and responsibilities
of CISA and other agency coordination within Federal Government
to promote the security and resilience of the Nation's critical
infrastructure, is not where it needs to be. Ms. Mulligan, what
more do you think Congress will need to do to ensure effective
strategic interagency corroboration, or collaboration to
address cyber threats against critical infrastructure? I would
hope as we discuss so many issues today on this particular
committee, that we would not abandon our responsibility which
our primary responsibility is the safety and security of our
homeland in all areas of our Nation, whether it is an attack on
the United States Capitol or other areas. So, Ms. Mulligan, if
you could please talk about some of the challenges of
coordination and what can Congress do to help?
Ms. Mulligan. So, one of the biggest issues, you know, I
have served in multiple different departments in the Federal
Government, from the intelligence community, to the Department
of Justice, to, you know, part of the National Security Council
staff. One of the issues that you see is confusion surrounding
who is the lead Federal agency? So, one of the things that this
committee can be extremely helpful in doing, and as Ms. Cordero
discussed earlier, is sort-of relooking with fresh eyes at
DHS's mission and be very clear about where we want DHS to be
the lead Federal agency and where we want it to support.
When it comes, you know, our recommendations at the Center
for American Progress are that DHS should have the lead and be
the lead Federal agency in two really important areas that are
central to the question you have asked. One is in connecting
Federal resources and officials with State, local, Tribal, and
territorial officials and also with the public and private
sectors. What we find is that is often each department and
agency on their own trying to make those connections, it is
very confusing for the people who are the recipients of that
outreach. If you designate DHS as the lead for handling the
connecting mission, that is going to create a lot of clarity
and it is going to empower DHS to do what it does quite well.
CISA is a great example of this.
The other place where I think multiple folks on the panel
agree that DHS should have a larger role is around
communicating. What we mean by--what I mean by communicating is
communicating threat information and prophylactic actions that
the public and private sector can take with, you know,
companies, the American people. Being the lead communicator
about threat information is a really important way for DHS to,
you know, invest in the resilience that you were just talking
about.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Ms. Mulligan. Mr. Warrick,
climate change is driving the frequency, size, impact, and
complexity of a range of natural disasters including storms,
floods, droughts, wildfires. Of course, this places an
additional burden on FEMA, as you can imagine. As these
disasters become more complex, their cascading effect becomes
more unpredictable and thereby stresses the entire Homeland
Security enterprise. I do believe they are directly related.
Can you please describe the strategy DHS needs to use to
address the security implications of climate change?
Mr. Warrick. So, it is not DHS's mission, Representative
Demings, to lower global temperatures. But it is DHS's mission
to make sure that extreme weather, hurricanes, floods,
wildfires do not jeopardize American lives and American
infrastructure. That means working closely with State and local
governments to make sure that codes are up to spec, that they
have emergency assistance when they need it. But it especially
is important that we design for resilience. That all of the
things that Government does that touches our lives is done with
an effort to try to protect us so that when one of these kinds
of disasters occurs, it doesn't harm people. It doesn't destroy
the infrastructure of our country.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Warrick. Mr. Chairman,
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia for 5 minutes,
Mr. Clyde.
Mr. Clyde. Unmute myself. Oh, there we go. All right, thank
you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up on my colleague from
Texas' excellent comments. You know, we talk about morale
within DHS hitting the bottom and I would certainly agree. It
is completely clear that when an agency's important work
doesn't get support from top leadership, especially political
leadership, morale suffers. So, we can start by stopping the
negative comments about ICE, about Border Patrol, about CBP, et
cetera, when they are just trying to do their job and follow
the law.
When politicians purposely degrade them and threaten to
defund them, of course it is going to negatively impact morale.
We should be supporting DHS efforts to follow the law like
continuing the construction of the border wall, which was
written into the law by Congress. But instead, this
administration is countering that law by Executive Order and
the result is a Biden border crisis.
So, now, to Ms. Cordero, I have a question for you. In your
briefing paper published by the Center for New American
Security and called, ``The Department of Homeland Security
Priorities and Reform'', you suggested and I quote: ``DHS
border security and law enforcement activities should
correspond to components' authorized missions and refreshed
Departmental priorities driven by legitimate security and
safety threats and needs.''
House and Senate Democrats have repeatedly called for
defunding ICE and CBP, yet border agents have intercepted known
terrorists, gang members, sexual predators, and interdicted
thousands of pounds of illicit drugs and even some weapons.
According to data published in June by CBP, Nation-wide drug
seizures were up 18 percent in May 2021 over April 2021.
Seizures of methamphetamines increased 53 percent. Seizures of
heroin increased 7 percent. Seizures of fentanyl increased 9
percent. In addition, 7,450 pounds of fentanyl have been seized
so far this fiscal year as of the end of May, far surpassing
the 4,700 pounds seized at all of fiscal year 2020. So, a
question for you, Ms. Cordero, just yes or no, do you agree
that there is a legitimate security and safety threat at the
Southwestern Border?
Ms. Cordero. Thanks for the question, Congressman. I agree
that the border presents a current challenge for immigration
and border security. I think that there in the political dialog
surrounding the border issues that there has been a melding of
issues between those individuals who are seeking to cross the
border for--that present an actual security threat versus those
individuals who seek to enter the border for other reasons
fleeing the circumstances that they are in. That becomes a--
that is a law enforcement issue. So, I think there is a
distinction between----
Mr. Clyde. Ma'am, please. Please, so, yes. So, I am
assuming that is a yes. That you do agree there is a legitimate
security and safety threat at the Southwestern Border. So, it--
--
Ms. Cordero. I agree that border security can present
security issues. I don't necessarily agree that every
individual crossing the border is a National security threat.
Mr. Clyde. Ma'am, I asked if there was border threat and
so, OK. Now, I want to transition. I want to commend CISA on
launching their new website, stopransomware.gov. I believe that
launched today. I am very, very thankful for that. I think that
will do a lot for private enterprise. Now, I have got a couple
questions here, one for Mr. Warrick. Then also I don't want to
leave Ms. Mulligan out here. I would like you to answer this
question as well. What information do you think the Government,
both law enforcement and the intelligence community, could more
quickly share with the private sector on a regular basis that
could help disrupt ransomware or other cyber attacks?
Mr. Warrick. That would be information that people can
actually take action on, encouraging them to make sure they
have basic cyber hygiene in place. Making sure that they
understand what the minimal standards are for being a good
citizen and a responsible business owner. This especially needs
to be done for our small businesses. That is a resource-
intensive activity. But our small businesses need the help that
they can get from a place like CISA.
Mr. Clyde. OK, thank you. Ms. Mulligan.
Ms. Mulligan. I think CISA is doing a really exceptional
job trying to wrap its head around that right now. They have
had some notable successes. But I think the key building on
what Mr. Warrick said is identifying ways for the Federal
Government to share that are fit for purpose, that can be
actioned by the public and private sector, which isn't always
easy for the Federal Government to translate what it collects
into usable information for folks who are outside the
Government.
But I think the other key part is making sure that what
CISA is doing that there is clarity about its role as the lead
for communicating that information. Part of the issue that I
see playing out in the Federal Government right now is lack of
clarity about who is in the lead. Is it the FBI or others?
Making sure that CISA has a leadership role.
Mr. Clyde. OK, well, thank you. I want to get Mr.--if
pronounce this right, so----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired. The
Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Barragan,
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by
thanking Ms. Cordero for your response about distinguishing a
security threat at the border. I wish our politicians would
focus on the security threat posed by domestic terrorism. When
you have politicians degrading Capitol Hill police and what
happened at the Capitol and saying these insurrectionists and
these rioters were just another tourist visit at the Capitol,
it is hard to take seriously the conversations sometimes about
security threats at the border. So, let me just thank you for
your response in making that distinction from people who are
fleeing violence to what is actually a security threat. We
should look at ourselves, which is why I am proud that our
Chairman is going to be leading this effort on the January 6
Commission.
With that, let me move on to my first question. Ms.
Cordero, let's start with you. Since its inception, the border
security immigration enforcement and law enforcement functions
of DHS Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, in particular, have grown disproportionately large
and broad in scope, without the necessary oversight. Key
adjustments must be made in these areas to improve DHS's
safeguards and accountability in the next decade and beyond.
Ms. Cordero, starting with you, can you tell us more about your
proposed reforms in the areas of border security, immigration
enforcement, and law enforcement?
Ms. Cordero. Absolutely, and thank you. Thanks for the
question, Congresswoman. So, I will tick through them quickly
because we made a lot of recommendations. As I have mentioned,
updating the mission of the Department I think is really
important developing the direction of updated and modernized
operational guidelines for the Department.
I believe it was really sort-of an unintended consequence
that this enormous law enforcement capacity that really
actually is greater in terms of manpower than even the Justice
Department and all of its investigative agencies, has been
concentrated in the Department of Homeland Security. So, when
there is the responsibility of having all that law enforcement
power, there needs to be sufficient oversight structures that
exist across the entire Department. So, creating operational
guidelines, releasing them publicly. Creating an oversight
council that is headed by the head of policy in the Department.
Creating the associate secretary who can have a greater
management portfolio focused on the law enforcement capacities.
Then looking at things like transparency, training, hiring
standards for the law enforcement components and giving them
set priorities that reflect the current threat landscape. All
of those things together are things that I hope that the
Congress and the administration will take on in order to bring
this law enforcement capacity under appropriate oversight and
accountability.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you. Ms. Mulligan, is there anything
you would like to add to--any recommendations you may have in
this area?
Ms. Mulligan. So, I think that I really sort-of align
myself with many of the recommendations that Ms. Cordero has
already presented. I just think overall, the Department is
going to need to rebalance and have much more clarity about
where we want it to be prioritizing. Because as this hearing
demonstrates, there are so many different fronts in protecting
American security and prosperity that we are going to need to
help DHS understand where we want it prioritizing and where it
can free up resources for investment in other priorities.
Ms. Barragan. Great. Mr. Warrick, do you have anything you
want to add or?
Mr. Warrick. No, I think those are excellent comments.
There is obviously a lot that needs to be done and I think that
good leadership at DHS headquarters needs to set the right tone
without trying to micromanage or politicize what law
enforcement and Homeland Security does.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you. Ms. Mulligan, I want to say I am a
visual learner and I appreciated seeing your video in your
opening remarks. I think it was a great way to kind-of show
what is needed and the balance as was put in there. Can you
further in the last 30 seconds, explain your recommendations
for DHS to focus on a more public service-oriented model and
how it would fit within the larger role as the Federal
incidence response leader?
Ms. Mulligan. Great, well, thank you for that question. I
am very glad to hear that the video is useful. It has been a
labor of love for us to try to illustrate what a reimagined DHS
might look like. You know, I think the important thing to
remember about DHS is that many of the missions that we are
advocating for it to focus additional attention on are missions
the Department already has. They are things that the Department
is regularly engaging in the facilitation of goods and travel,
you know, goods and travel across the borders. It is regularly
involved in communicating threat information and, you know,
doing, you know, sort-of serving as the Nation's sort-of crisis
response through FEMA.
What we are arguing is that those missions are being
deemphasized and deprioritized or have been in the past, and a
disproportionate amount of headquarters-level focus has been
really on what are essentially political priorities.
Enforcement at the Southern Border and this focus on
counterterrorism that we think is a bit out of sync with
today's threat picture. So, it seems very ripe at this point
nearing the 20-year anniversary of DHS's creation to bring its
missions and priorities into better balance with what we
actually want it to be doing. So, it is those first-order
questions about what we need from DHS and how that has changed
in the last 20 years that we think is perfect for this
committee to be focused on.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you so much. My time has expired. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also thank you
to the Ranking Member for putting this hearing together. My
first question is for Mr. Cilluffo and we will see what the
other witnesses have to say after what you have to say. But
specifically, I want to know what you think about what overlap
do you see between the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and
the Office of Operations Coordination? How is DHS ensuring that
these offices are not duplicative and are performing worthwhile
functions? Do you think they would be better-equipped to
coordinate and information share as one integrated unit?
Mr. Cilluffo. Congressman Garbarino, first go Islanders, I
hope. That is my team from home, so. No, I think you raise a
great question there. I am little dated in terms of some of the
headquarter functions, but anywhere where you can see. So, one
big take-away in terms of DHS is they have not clearly
delineated and defined the Office of the Secretary. So, if you
were to compare say DHS with DOD or even Department of State,
there is a much greater awareness in terms of what the Office
of the Secretary can drive and work on.
Part of that is because it is a collage. Some called it the
Island of Misfit Toys. I don't look at it that way. It was
collage of 22 really different but unique agencies and
departments. So, I do think we need to be looking for any
opportunities where we can streamline. We can enhance
efficiency. Most importantly, coherence.
One of the things that I am pushing on which we haven't
discussed today is around economic security and DHS's important
role from a supply chain perspective. Here you have an
opportunity given every one of the components touches this
issue in one way or another to streamline that and focusing.
So, a long-winded way of saying, I mean, yes, but I would need
to look at it a little more closely.
Mr. Garbarino. Sure. I appreciate that. I guess we will go
to Ms. Cordero, if you have anything to add?
Ms. Cordero. I do, Congressman, thank you, on Intelligence
and Analysis in particular. So, under our project, we
commissioned earlier this year a paper that was written by
Adjunct Senior Fellow Christian Beckner and he took a deep dive
into I&A and basically proposed for Congress two different
models, either go big or go small. Because right now I&A is not
making anybody happy. There are expectations, but its
authorities don't match the expectations that we have for it as
far as assembling intelligence information and providing
warnings.
So, the go big model would be resource it more, give it
more authority to be able to conduct intelligence analysis
across a wider range of activities and threats. The other model
would be to go much smaller and have it perform more like I&R
at the State Department where it really is just services, the
Secretary, and other policy members, and have that
deconfliction with CISA. Let CISA do their own intelligence
reporting on cyber threats and I&A be more tailored to serving
the needs of the policy makers. They are very different
proposals, but our assessment is that Congress should take a
deeper look at this and pick one and then go with it so that we
help I&A move into its sort-of next iteration where it can be
more productive.
Mr. Garbarino. I appreciate that and I will have to take a
look at that study or that paper that you are talking about.
Ms. Mulligan or Mr. Warrick, anything further you want to add?
Mr. Warrick. Yes, so, I first want to thank you,
Representative, for being the first person who has mentioned
the Operations Coordination Office, which gets no attention. In
fact, it is I think one of the--even more than I&A, needs to be
either a go big or go small type of enterprise. It runs the
operations center that I&A staffs. That is what it is--that is
why they seem to have similar functions. But I&A is the classic
EO 12333 intelligence organization with special authorities and
capabilities that OPS does not have. Exactly as Carrie says,
I&A exists to serve not just the Secretary, but also the State
and local fusion centers, as well as all other DHS personnel
who need intelligence analysis.
Mr. Garbarino. I appreciate that and, Ms. Mulligan,
anything to add or did we beat this one--beat this horse----
Ms. Mulligan. Yes, I think we are----
Mr. Garbarino [continuing]. To death?
Ms. Mulligan. I think we are all speaking in unison here. I
mean, this is--this really is a place where it either needs to
be--have the bigger mission or it needs to be more tailored to
focus on filling a specific need that isn't being met elsewhere
in the Government. But trying to straddle both worlds isn't
working and I think it is an area that is ripe for a refresh.
Mr. Garbarino. I love when everybody agrees. This is great.
Mr. Cilluffo. Congressman, can I add one minor point just
because it is historically relevant? So, when we initially
stood up the Department of Homeland Security from the White
House, there was the intent to marry up the Office of
Intelligence with infrastructure protection. What was then NPPD
and is now CISA. So, it started on a different footing because
in between that there was the establishment of the National
Counterterrorism Center, which obviously played a much bigger
role, especially the DSOP function to be able to support some
of these missions.
So, in some ways, I&A started off in a very awkward kind of
way. Just in the for what it is worth. I think now is the time
where you can start looking to whether or not we need to right-
size it, grow it, but do it in a way that doesn't compete with
the FBI and the broader interagency. Because quite honestly,
they do some of this a lot better. Or narrowly focus it and
then let some of the components take on some of their unique
subject-matter areas. Whether it is CBP and the border or CISA
vis-a-vis the latest and greatest Chinese or Russian malware.
So, sorry, I just wanted to yield back----
Mr. Garbarino. I appreciate that and I yield back. I am out
of time. Thank you though.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. Typical New Yorker, take more
time, but I do appreciate it. The Chair recognizes another New
Yorker, Mr. Torres, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Torres. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Gottheimer is on. He
is more senior than I am, so I can defer to him.
Mr. Gottheimer. Are you sure, Mr. Torres?
Mr. Torres. Yes, happy to. Those are the rules.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thanks. Mr. Thompson, is that OK?
Chairman Thompson. Since he is the Vice Chair, I will let
him go with this one, but go ahead Mr. Gottheimer.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you, Mr. Torres. I thought you, Mr.
Chairman, you were going to call me a New Yorker, which would
of course been deeply insulting. As long as you compared me to
Mr. Garbarino that would even be worse. But, you know, but I
just appreciate you organizing this important hearing to
discuss how we can strengthen the Department of Homeland
Security to better confront new and emerging threats and
challenges.
As we know, the Department was established in 2002 in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11 as was just
mentioned with the necessary focus on countering threats mostly
from foreign terrorist groups. Today, nearly 2 decades later,
the threat landscape looks quite different. For instance, we
have seen the rise of a diffuse domestic and home-grown
terrorist movement, especially White supremacists and other
racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, which as
Director Ray has testified, ``With a primary source of
ideologically motivated lethal incidents.''
Mr. Warrick, if I can ask you a question. How prepared is
today's DHS to address the serious threats of domestic
terrorists and members of violent extremist groups like those
including members of groups like the Oath Keepers and Three
Percenters and Proud Boys involved in the January 6 attack on
the Capitol?
Mr. Warrick. It needs to be understood, Representative,
that DHS has very specific limited statutory roles in this
area. Lead investigative agency for criminal violations is the
FBI. That needs to stay that way. But DHS needs to be able
through its Intelligence and Analysis Office to connect the
dots to put together warnings for senior leadership. There
needs to be greater clarity on whose job is it to look at
social media and be aware of what people are saying. I saw the
FBI director and my good friend Jill Sanborn kind-of fumble
that question a little bit in a hearing a few weeks ago. This
is something that it really needs to have Congress clarify
whose authority it is to do what with respect to social media
because there are significant privacy and other challenges in
this area.
Mr. Gottheimer. Related to that, is there something that
you would change the way DHS is structured to help protect us
from this threat? Is there----
Mr. Warrick. We have a detailed report my colleague Mitch
Silber has put together that I will make sure is sent to your
staff. But basically, there needs to be an intelligence and
warning officer within the director of National intelligence
whose job it is to make sure that nothing escapes notice and
that nothing gets politicized. This is especially important in
domestic terrorism.
Mr. Gottheimer. Is that a Classified report or un-
Classified?
Mr. Warrick. Our report is a think tank report written by
the former head of New York police intelligence for more than a
decade. It is one of the more scholarly papers in addition to
the one that Chris Beckner also put out, which is also worth
reading. But you should talk to those two authors because they
have got some really interesting things to say.
Mr. Gottheimer. Without objection, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to put that in the record, if that is OK.*
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* The information can be found at https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/reassessing-homeland-security-intelligence and
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/FINAL-
5.20.2021-Domestic-Violence-Extremism-Report.pdf.
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Mr. Gottheimer. Ms. Cordero, could you describe where DHS's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis fits into the various
National security-focused agencies conducting intelligence
analysis and how does DHS rank compared with the FBI, for
example, in equity increased DHS intelligence capacity?
Ms. Cordero. Thank you, Congressman. So, I&A, Intelligence
and Analysis is the component in the Department of Homeland
Security that is a part of the intelligence community. So, that
way, it is able to both glean information from its intelligence
community affiliation and disseminate it and share it with
other Federal, State, local, Tribal partners in a way that they
can receive that information. At the same time, it also can
receive information from the State and local network and the
activities of the Department itself and feed that information
if its relevant back to the intelligence community. So, it
provides an important link there.
I&A does not do what the FBI does in terms of its
investigative authorities to disrupt and pursue criminal
prosecution of domestic terrorism activities, which oftentimes
are prosecuted as other violent crime or weapons-related or
other types of criminal violations. So, the Department of
Homeland Security never has and it would not be appropriate for
it to have that investigative authority that disrupts potential
terrorist activity. That resides still with the FBI.
So, I think the question for I&A is does Congress want to
expand its ability to conduct more intelligence analysis or
does it want it to narrow and not be duplicative of what the
FBI or the intelligence community is doing? I think the reason
these different reports that Mr. Warrick mentioned are
important, including the one that we put out, is because I&A is
at that inflection point right now.
Mr. Gottheimer. OK. Well, thank you. I yield back my 1
second left to the Vice Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Torres, again
for yielding again. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair
recognizes the Vice Chair of the full committee, the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Torres.
Mr. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chair. You know, it has been
said that there is a crisis of public trust in DHS. I am
wondering if--and this question is specifically for Ms.
Mulligan--do you share my concern that continuing the 287(g)
Program, which expanded exponentially under the Trump
administration would only serve to perpetuate that crisis of
public trust in the agency?
Ms. Mulligan. Thank you for your question. I do. I do.
Mr. Torres. You know, if DHS is not effective at policing
abuses among its own law enforcement officials, what reason is
there to think that DHS would be effective at policing abuses
among State and local law enforcement officials who have been
deputized to enforce Federal immigration law?
Ms. Mulligan. You know, I think that--I think that there is
an incredibly important set of issues in the question that you
raise that really gets at the heart of how important it is that
we root out extremism within members of the Federal and State
law enforcement for that matter, who are in positions of trust.
It is particularly important in the law enforcement context.
I think the numbers that we are seeing and the connections
that we are seeing in the indictments out of the January 6
events are very concerning. I think--I have actually been
pleased to see the Department take some immediate actions as
well as the Secretary of Defense because I think we have a
problem both in our active-duty military and in our veterans'
communities.
Mr. Torres. You know, I served on the New York City Council
and we had oversight over the NYPD, which is a paramilitary
force unto itself. What we often found was there was a small
subset of officers who drove a disproportionate share of abuse.
I am wondering if that same dynamic exists within the ranks of
DHS law enforcement and whether DHS has a system in place for
tracking abuses among officers and a system for early detection
and intervention? This question is for anyone who has insight
into the subject matter of that question.
Mr. Warrick. There were significant studies done by CBP
under both Democratic and Republican administrations that
declared the internal discipline system to be broken. If you
talk to former CBP officials regardless of their party, they
will tell you that not all of those things that were broken
have yet been fixed. This is one of the reasons I think it is
extremely important that Chris Magnus get confirmed as
commissioner of CBP because he is going to have to take charge
and make sure that many of these things are addressed. Exactly
as you say, Representative Torres, the good men and women of
CBP know that there are a small number of bad apples among them
and this has to be addressed. This is going to be one of the
greatest challenges that I hope Commissioner Magnus is able to
tackle right away.
Mr. Torres. I know we often speak of the need for an
independent Justice Department, an independent Attorney
General. I don't often hear people speak of the need for an
independent DHS or an independent DHS Secretary. It seems to me
there is less of an expectation of institutional independence
when it comes to DHS even though it is fundamentally a law
enforcement agency. Is that a fair assessment? How do we change
it? How do we create an expectation of independence?
Mr. Warrick. Secretary Chertoff and Secretary Johnson have
both spoken out very strongly that DHS needs to be as far as
possible non-partisan. In the spirit that we have our uniform
military and our intelligence community be non-partisan, that
same ethic needs to be deeply baked into DHS. Secretary
Napolitano was famous for joking that when she became
Secretary, she had her partisan bone removed. The point she
made to the work force was this was her expectation that the
Department needs to be outside of politics as much as possible
especially in its law enforcement missions.
Mr. Torres. I am wondering, you know, how much of DHS's
challenges is a function of mismanagement and how much of it is
a function of just the youth of DHS? You know, compared to--it
has far less institutional memory than agencies that have been
around for decades, in some case, centuries. It is simply going
through the growing pains of a new agency. What is the main
cause of the dysfunction in DHS? Is it simply growing pains or
is it deeper than that?
Ms. Mulligan. I think it is something else. I mean, to be
sure, every young department or agency, certainly one with the
scope of size and responsibility that DHS has is going to have
management challenges and that is why the oversight rules are
so important. But the cultural problem that exists at DHS in my
view stems from its origin story as an agency that is really
about countering terrorism and going, you know, protecting
America from others. That mission and origin story has seeped
into kind-of what people think they are there to do and what
attracts them to it in the first place.
What we have now is we have heard throughout the day is an
organization that we need to be doing a whole lot of other
things besides countering terrorism and going after bad guys,
protecting, you know, a lot--protecting and providing services
that Americans really depend on. Yet, it has a work force that
is disproportionately drawn to kind of this militaristic, you
know, military cosplay kind-of role that I think is inherently
problematic.
One of the things that I think Congress can really do that
sort-of gets back to something Ms. Cordero said earlier is by
adjusting its missions, there is actually a lot that flows from
that. Because people need to see what they are actually doing
reflected in the missions of the Department and they need to
see those missions being elevated and prioritized and praised
and incentivized. If the only incentives are to engage in
activity that is, you know, sort-of hostile to the people that
you serve, then you are going to have a culture that looks an
awful lot like the culture at DHS.
Mr. Torres. My time has expired, but thank you, Mr. Chair,
for the accommodation.
Chairman Thompson. Yes, sir, anything for the Vice Chair.
Well, let me thank our witnesses. All four of you have been
excellent. You absolutely have a real grasp of knowledge about
the subject matter. One thing I didn't talk about and we will
circle back. I mentioned it in my opening statement. The
jurisdictional challenges for the Department in responding to
some mini committees and subcommittees. No other agency in
Government has that reach to respond to. It makes it very
cumbersome. So, we plan to continue to work at that.
But let me again just thank you for the breadth of
knowledge. We understand CISA and its important role in part of
the new DHS. Our challenge for more than any other is: How do
we marry CISA with more mature agencies who don't like the new
kid on the block? The Colonial Pipeline is a good example of
what I am talking about there. I won't go into it.
But I do see the need for some regulatory review on a lot
of what we do on pipelines and other things because so much of
it right now is voluntary. Unless you put some teeth behind the
regulation, then it is not going to be taken very seriously in
my humble opinion. So, we will be moving forward around that
subject and I guess I am trying to tease you all on your next
report that you go back and make an argument for.
But now let me thank you for your testimony, and the
Members for their questions. The Members of the committee may
have additional questions for the witnesses, and we ask that
you respond expeditiously in writing. Before adjourning, I ask
unanimous consent to submit a statement for the record from the
Partnership for Public Service outlining the importance of
employee engagement and morale to overcome DHS's challenges.
Without objection, so admitted.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Max Stier, President and CEO, Partnership for Public
Service
July 15, 2021
introduction
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to share the views of the
Partnership for Public Service as you consider the steps needed to help
the Department accomplish its varied and difficult missions. This past
year the Federal Government overcame unprecedented challenges in order
to serve and protect the American people during the COVID-19 pandemic.
This is especially true of the workforce at the Department of Homeland
Security. Our statement will highlight the importance of employee
engagement and morale for overcoming present and future challenges
facing the agency and the rest of our Government.
The Partnership for Public Service is a nonpartisan, nonprofit
organization that strives for a more effective Government. We work to
improve the performance of the Federal Government and those who serve
through an array of programs, research and policy initiatives. One of
the ways we promote these values is through the annual Best Places to
Work in the Federal Government rankings we produce in collaboration
with the Boston Consulting Group (BCG). The rankings are based on the
results of the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) administered by
the Office of Personnel Management.
We rank agencies by size and analyze the key drivers of employee
engagement--in other words, the factors that have the biggest impact on
how employees view the agencies in which they work. The rankings shed
light on how agencies fare in different categories that define the
employee experience, including effective leadership, pay, teamwork,
innovation, and recognition.
the importance of employee engagement and morale
Employee engagement and morale are essential to the overall
performance of an agency. Higher scores in employment engagement lead
to higher productivity, less absenteeism, greater retention and overall
better performance.\1\ An engaged workforce also equates to higher-
quality service. For example, in an analysis of performance data from
nearly 150 VA hospitals across the country, the Partnership for Public
Service found that higher patient satisfaction, better call center
performance and lower nurse turnover were all associated with a more
satisfied and committed workforce.\2\
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\1\ Gallup, ``State of the American Workplace Employee Engagement
Insights for U.S. Business Leaders.'' 2013. Retrieved from https://
www.gallup.com/workplace/238085/state-american-workplace-report-
2017.aspx. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, ``Federal Employee
Engagement: The Motivating Potential of Job Characteristics and
Rewards.'' 2012. Retrieved from https://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/
viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=780015&version=782964.
\2\ Partnership for Public Service, ``A Prescription for Better
Performance: Engaging Employees at VA Medical Centers.'' 2019.
Retrieved from https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
BPTW18_VA-issue-brief.pdf.
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With such an impact on the Federal workforce and the people it
serves, it is critical for leaders--both career and political--to be
focused on engagement. The Best Places to Work rankings serve as a
mechanism for holding agency leaders accountable for the health of
their organizations, serve as early warning signs for agencies in
trouble, and shine a spotlight on agency successes that can be
replicated elsewhere.
employee engagement and morale at dhs
Overall, the Department of Homeland Security's 2020 Best Places to
Work employee engagement score is 61.1 points out of 100. That is 7.9
points lower than the Government-wide engagement score in 2020, 8.8
points below the median score for large agencies, and 15.9 points below
the private-sector engagement score. While DHS ranks 17 out of 17 among
large agencies and has been the lowest-ranking large agency since 2012,
there are signs that the agency has made progress in engaging its
employees in an especially challenging year.
bright spots
Despite its last place ranking among large agencies, there are
several bright spots that should be celebrated. Although DHS trailed
the Government-wide Best Places to Work engagement score by 7.9 points
in 2020, the gap has narrowed in recent years. In 2019, DHS trailed the
Government-wide score by 9.4 points. Further, in 2020 the agency
received many high marks from its employees on how it navigated the
COVID-19 pandemic. For example, 77.5 percent of survey respondents at
DHS agreed that their supervisors supported employee efforts to stay
healthy and safe while working, 83 percent of respondents said their
work unit met the needs of its customers during the pandemic, 82.1
percent agreed that their work unit adapted to changing priorities, and
82.1 percent believed that their work unit achieved its goals.
Other successes from DHS subcomponents include:
Employees gave FEMA a score of 90.3 out of 100 in a new
workplace category measuring how effectively agencies supported
employees and navigated the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally,
FEMA moved up 36 places in the Best Places to Work subcomponent
rankings in 2020. The Partnership's profile of FEMA's
engagement efforts during the pandemic is attached to this
testimony.
The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) saw its 2020
Best Places to Work engagement score ranking improve by 150
spots. In the COVID-19 employee well-being subcategory--which
measures the extent to which employees felt their organization
supported their mental and physical well-being during the
pandemic--S&T was ranked number 33 out of 393 subcomponents.
The United States Coast Guard registered a Best Places to
Work engagement score of 77.1, toping both Government overall
and the private sector. Engagement scores at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center and the Science and Technology
Directorate also exceeded the Government-wide score in 2020.
Several DHS subcomponents saw big jumps in their 2020
engagement score ranks. Customs and Border Protection and the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency both climbed
52 spots; the Office of Operations Coordination rose 60 places;
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement climbed 33 spots in the
subcomponent rankings.
areas of concern
There is still much more work to be done. Explanations for why DHS
morale is low could include a range of nuanced factors, such as the
size of the agency, its disparate components, a workforce that operates
under stressful conditions, and recent high turnover and vacancy rates
in key appointee positions.
Areas of concern for DHS in 2020 include:
The Department of Homeland Security trailed Government in
all 8 workplace categories in the 2020 Best Places to Work
rankings. DHS's largest deficit came in the innovation
category, registering a score 12.4 points below the Government-
wide tally. In the employee recognition category, DHS trailed
Government by 10 points, and in the effective leadership
workplace category, DHS lagged Government by 7.1 points.
Just 54.2 percent of survey respondents at DHS agreed that
they feel encouraged to come up with new and better ways of
doing things; 53.3 percent believe that employees are
recognized for providing high-quality products and services;
and 41.4 percent believe that the results of the Federal
Employee Viewpoint Survey will be used to make their agency a
better place to work.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, which ranked 90
of 420 subcomponents in 2019, is now ranked 339 out of 411 with
an engagement score of 62.9 out of 100.
Customs and Border Protection ranked 392 out of 393
subcomponents in the COVID: Employee Well-Being subcategory,
which assesses how employees feel about their organization's
efforts to support their mental and physical well-being during
the pandemic.
The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office's 2020
engagement score (45.7 out of 100) ranks 26.2 points below the
subcomponent median (71.9 out of 100). The office no longer
ranks dead last in Government subcomponents, though, now
ranking 403 out of 411 subcomponents. (In 2019 it ranked 420
out of 420).
looking forward
Both the Department and Congress have a role to play in efforts to
improve employee engagement and satisfaction.
Since the Best Places to Work rankings began in 2003, leadership
has consistently been identified as the No. 1 driver of employee
engagement. Leaders must be held accountable through oversight, and the
Department's senior political leaders should be individuals who have
experience managing large organizations and accept responsibility for
the performance and operations of the Department. They should be held
accountable for management, including employee engagement.
For these reasons, we applaud the recent passage of the DHS MORALE
Act in the House and encourage the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs to quickly approve this measure on a
bipartisan basis. This legislation takes steps to hold the Department's
leaders accountable for strengthening and investing in leadership
development and employee engagement, which can improve the skills of
existing leaders and develop the next generation of leaders.
Also, the work that this committee is doing to revisit DHS's
authorizing statute to clarify roles and responsibilities of leaders,
improve the accountability and transparency of agency oversight, and
strengthen the management of the Department generally is very important
to helping the Department attract and retain the workforce it needs to
carry out its missions.
Finally, we note that the Department should also be commended for
its Employee and Family Readiness Initiative, which is a suite of
programs to address employee needs in areas such as stress, mental
health, personal relationships, and financial concerns.\3\ DHS's
Inclusive Diversity Strategic Plan \4\ also shows the Department's
commitment to ensuring an inclusive workforce that prioritizes the
well-being of all employees. Many DHS employees face extremely
challenging circumstances in the workplace, which can also create
challenges in their personal lives. Helping both employees and their
families cope with these challenges should help improve engagement and
retention.
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\3\ Testimony of Angie Bailey, Chief Human Capital Officer,
Department of Homeland Security. Hearing on ``Solutions to Improve
Federal Hiring,'' Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal
Management, July 30, 2019.
\4\ Department of Homeland Security, ``Inclusive Diversity
Strategic Plan.'' 2020. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/20_1230_ochco_dhs-inclusive-diversity-
strategic-plan_fy21-24_1_1.pdf.
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conclusion
We know from our research that employees who are engaged in their
work add tremendous value to their organization. As the Federal agency
tasked with the mission as critical as protecting and securing the
homeland, it will be important for DHS to recruit and retain a highly
engaged and motivated workforce that can ensure future safety of the
American people.
Thank you for the opportunity to share the Partnership's views on
strengthening DHS employee engagement.
APPENDIX: FEMA AGENCY PROFILE
fema employees weathered the pandemic, the hurricanes and the wildfires
with strong backing from the agency \5\
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\5\ See the on-line profile here: https://bestplacestowork.org/
analysis/profiles/Federal-emergency-management-agency/.
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Federal Emergency Management Agency employees received strong
backing from their agency in 2020 as they responded to the worst public
health crisis in a century and simultaneously dealt with a record
number of natural disasters and the most active Atlantic hurricane
season in history. Employees gave FEMA a 2020 Best Places to Work in
the Federal Government score of 90.3 out of 100 in a new workplace
category measuring the support they received during the height of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
FEMA exceeded the Government-wide COVID-19 response score of 86.1
and outperformed the Government average on pandemic-related issues
dealing with employee well-being, the provision of job resources,
agency performance and supportive leadership. The agency also far
outpaced its parent, the Department of Homeland Security, which
registered a COVID-19 score of 80.0, and it did better than all but two
of the DHS subcomponents on this issue.
At the onset of the pandemic, FEMA moved to a hybrid work model,
held daily videoconference calls to communicate important information,
sent telework kits to every employee and steadily increased usage of
virtual collaboration tools.
Ray Acurso, the senior director in FEMA's Office of the Chief
Administrative Officer, said the agency was able to ``give people a
feeling of connectivity even though we were further apart. We were
actually communicating more.''
At the regional level, FEMA officials said communication with staff
members scattered across the country and with State and local partners
was critical to keep employees engaged, informed, and prepared to
handle a never-ending string of public emergencies.
``We utilized our technology and our screens. Our connectedness to
our FEMA Integration Teams--what a success that was for us,'' said
Bonnie Garfias, FEMA's Region VIII senior advisor. The FEMA Integration
Teams provide on-site technical and training assistance to State
partners.
FEMA also quickly ensured that workers on the front lines felt
supported and safe. The agency was one of the first to implement COVID-
19 testing, and it organized responder lodging camps with medical
support and quarantine areas on-site.
During 2020, there were 230 Presidentially-declared emergencies,
passing the previous high of 128 declarations in 2011. FEMA's National
Response Coordination Center was activated for a record 314 days, and
more than 5,300 staff members were deployed to support the pandemic
response activities that included the Nation-wide delivery of critical
medical supplies.
In addition, FEMA deployed more than 5,000 employees to support
both Atlantic and Pacific hurricane responses while also dealing with
the largest wildfire in Colorado's recorded history and 5 of the 10
largest wildfires in California's history.
Although FEMA received high marks for its COVID-19 response, it's
2020 Best Places to Work engagement score measuring employee overall
satisfaction with their jobs and organization was 66.9 out of 100, 2.1
points below the Government-wide score of 69.0. This gave FEMA a
ranking of 286 out of 411 agency subcomponents, an improvement of 36
spots from 2019 when it ranked 322. DHS, FEMA's parent agency, remained
in last place among 17 large agencies with a Best Places to Work
engagement score of 61.1.
On the specific workplace issue of effective leadership, employees
gave FEMA a score of 63.6 out of 100, with senior leaders rated at just
57.6.
Nonetheless, 85.7 percent of FEMA employees surveyed agreed or
strongly that their agency is successful at accomplishing its mission,
85.1 percent said the people they work with cooperate to get the job
done and 87.6 percent said they know how their work is related to
agency goals.
``If you can tie someone's day-to-day action to the purpose of
FEMA's mission, it gives them a feeling of accomplishment when they are
done. It gives them a sense of drive and purpose while they're going
through the actions,'' Acurso said.
Deanne Criswell, confirmed in April as the new FEMA administrator,
said she is committed to improving employee job satisfaction and
commitment, putting ``people first'' and capitalizing on some of the
lessons learned during the pandemic.
Criswell said FEMA's leadership team is ``taking actions that will
contribute to an environment where people want to come to work and
where they feel like they have a safe environment to not just do their
work, but to be innovative, creative, and contribute to helping people
before, during, and after disasters.''
She said this includes a commitment to employee career advancement,
recognition for good work and diversity and inclusion.
``I think that we have the most amazing workforce in the Federal
Government,'' Criswell said. ``It's the most dedicated group of
professionals that are truly committed to our mission.''
This profile was written by Partnership for Public Service staff
member Heather Gunter.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair reminds Members that the
committee record will remain open for 10 business days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank
you very much, again.
[Whereupon, at 2:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[all]