[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                  BALANCING OPEN SCIENCE AND SECURITY
                     IN THE U.S. RESEARCH ENTERPRISE

=======================================================================

                                     
                                     

                             JOINT HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
                             AND OVERSIGHT
                SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
                             AND TECHNOLOGY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                            OCTOBER 5, 2021
                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-33
                               __________
                                     

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

                                     
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                                     
                                     
                                                                                                               
       Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
       
                              ___________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
45-647PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2023         
       


              COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

             HON. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas, Chairwoman
ZOE LOFGREN, California              FRANK LUCAS, Oklahoma, 
SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon                 Ranking Member
AMI BERA, California                 MO BROOKS, Alabama
HALEY STEVENS, Michigan,             BILL POSEY, Florida
    Vice Chair                       RANDY WEBER, Texas
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           BRIAN BABIN, Texas
JAMAAL BOWMAN, New York              ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
MELANIE A. STANSBURY, New Mexico     MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California             JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado              DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
JERRY McNERNEY, California           MIKE GARCIA, California
PAUL TONKO, New York                 STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
BILL FOSTER, Illinois                YOUNG KIM, California
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          RANDY FEENSTRA, Iowa
DON BEYER, Virginia                  JAKE LaTURNER, Kansas
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida               CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois                JAY OBERNOLTE, California
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania             PETER MEIJER, Michigan
DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina         JAKE ELLZEY, TEXAS
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin                VACANCY
DAN KILDEE, Michigan
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
                                 ------                                

              Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight

                  HON. BILL FOSTER, Illinois, Chairman
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado              JAY OBERNOLTE, California,
AMI BERA, California                   Ranking Member
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin                VACANCY
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois                VACANCY
                                 ------                                

                Subcommittee on Research and Technology

                HON. HALEY STEVENS, Michigan, Chairwoman
MELANIE A. STANSBURY, New Mexico     MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida, 
PAUL TONKO, New York                     Ranking Member
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin                ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana
BILL FOSTER, Illinois                JAKE LaTURNER, Kansas
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania             PETER MEIJER, Michigan
DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina         VACANCY


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                            October 5, 2021

                                                                   Page

Hearing Charter..................................................     2

                           Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Bill Foster, Chairman, Subcommittee 
  on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, 
  and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..................    10
    Written Statement............................................    12

Statement by Representative Jay Obernolte, Ranking Member, 
  Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on 
  Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..    13
    Written Statement............................................    14

Statement by Representative Haley Stevens, Chairwoman, 
  Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on Science, 
  Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...........    15
    Written Statement............................................    16

Statement by Representative Michael Waltz, Ranking Member, 
  Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on Science, 
  Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...........    17
    Written Statement............................................    18

Written statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, 
  Chairwoman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 
  House of Representatives.......................................    20

Written statement by Representative Frank Lucas, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 
  Representatives................................................    20

                               Witnesses:

Dr. Maria Zuber, Co-Chair, National Science, Technology, and 
  Security Roundtable, National Academies of Sciences, 
  Engineering, and Medicine; Vice President for Research and E. 
  A. Griswold Professor of Geophysics, Massachusetts Institute of 
  Technology
    Oral Statement...............................................    22
    Written Statement............................................    25

Ms. Allison Lerner, Inspector General, National Science 
  Foundation
    Oral Statement...............................................    36
    Written Statement............................................    38

Ms. Candice N. Wright, Director, Science, Technology Assessment, 
  and Analytics, U.S. Government Accountability Office
    Oral Statement...............................................    48
    Written Statement............................................    50

Dr. Xiaoxing Xi, Laura H. Carnell Professor of Physics, Temple 
  University
    Oral Statement...............................................    68
    Written Statement............................................    70

Discussion.......................................................    73

             Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. Maria Zuber, Co-Chair, National Science, Technology, and 
  Security Roundtable, National Academies of Sciences, 
  Engineering, and Medicine; Vice President for Research and E. 
  A. Griswold Professor of Geophysics, Massachusetts Institute of 
  Technology.....................................................    94

Ms. Allison Lerner, Inspector General, National Science 
  Foundation.....................................................    95
    Addendum--U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of 
      Investigation..............................................    98

Ms. Candice N. Wright, Director, Science, Technology Assessment, 
  and Analytics, U.S. Government Accountability Office...........   109

Dr. Xiaoxing Xi, Laura H. Carnell Professor of Physics, Temple 
  University.....................................................   114

            Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record

Document submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, 
  Chairwoman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 
  House of Representatives
    ``ASBMB statement on balancing open science and security in 
      the U.S. research enterprise,'' American Society for 
      Biochemistry and Molecular Biology.........................   116

Document submitted by Representative Bill Foster, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on 
  Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives
    ``New Research Shows Significant Racial Disparities Against 
      Chinese and Asians in Espionage Prosecutions,'' Committee 
      of 100.....................................................   118

Letter submitted by Representative Deborah Ross, Subcommittee on 
  Research and Technology, Committee on Science, Space, and 
  Technology, U.S. House of Representatives......................   122

Reports submitted by Representative Michael Waltz, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on 
  Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives
    ``The Chinese Communist Party's Military-Civil Fusion 
      Policy,'' U.S. Department of State (weblink)...............   128
    ``Military-Civil Fusion and the People's Republic of China,'' 
      U.S. Department of State...................................   129

 
                  BALANCING OPEN SCIENCE AND SECURITY
                    IN THE U.S. RESEARCH ENTERPRISE

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 2021

                  House of Representatives,
      Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
                        joint with the Subcommittee
                        on Research and Technology,
               Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
                                                   Washington, D.C.

    The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., 
via Zoom, Hon. Bill Foster [Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight] presiding.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Chairman Foster [continuing]. Come to order. Now, with--
now, a few pro forma statements. Without objection, the Chair 
is authorized to declare recess at any time. Before I deliver 
my opening remarks, I wanted to note that today the Committee 
is meeting virtually, so I wanted to announce a couple of pro 
forma reminders to the Members about the conduct of this 
hearing. First, Members should keep their video feed on as long 
as they are present in the hearing. Members are responsible for 
their own microphones. Please also keep your microphones muted 
unless you are speaking. And, finally, if Members have 
documents that they wish to submit for the record, please e-
mail them to the Committee Clerk, whose e-mail address was 
circulated prior to the hearing.
    Well, good morning, and welcome to our Members and to our 
panelists. Thank you all for joining us today. Collaboration is 
the lifeblood of scientific discovery. Scientists build on one 
another's work, across time and around the globe. Openness in 
science allows reproduction and replication of work, increasing 
the reliability of conclusions and building public trust. It 
fosters cooperation across disciplines, brings in new 
perspectives, and sparks ideas that wouldn't come from any one 
solitary lab, or even one country.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has driven home the importance of 
international collaboration in science. In those early months, 
before the virus had been detected on our shores, American 
scientists and health authorities around the world were 
dependent upon researchers in impacted countries to share what 
they knew about the virus, how it spread, and how it killed. 
Over a year in, the collaboration with international partners 
is still vital to detect emerging variants as early as possible 
and to assess vaccine efficacy. International problems require 
international solutions, and there are real costs to closing 
off your research from the rest of the world.
    In the House Science Committee, we recently held a 
Subcommittee hearing on the origins of the coronavirus. At the 
time, a potentially very significant fact was that the closest 
known relative of SARS-COV-2 was a bat virus from southern 
China which had been studied at the Wuhan Virology Lab. Since 
then, it appears that closer relatives have been identified, by 
an open international collaboration, in bats from caves in 
Laos. If that discovery had been made by an open collaboration 
with access to bat virus samples throughout the world, it would 
have been a triumph for international science that would have 
strengthened China's claim that their lab's activities were not 
the source of the pandemic. However, because of China's 
insistence that only a closed and controlled investigation of 
the pandemic's origin could take place, and rejecting 
participation by even the World Health Organization, then 
serious questions will remain, questions that can only be 
resolved by a full and open international collaboration.
    And beyond just the pandemic, we can thank the openness of 
the research enterprise for groundbreaking discoveries in many 
areas. At Fermi National Accelerator Lab, where I spent 22 
years working as a particle physicist, for most of that time we 
held the dominant position because of the technology of 
Fermilab's Tevatron, the world's first giant superconducting 
particle accelerator. But we did not keep that technology to 
ourselves. We shared it with the scientific public, and 
welcomed its use to build similar particle accelerators, first 
at DESY (Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron) in Germany, and then 
the CERN Large Hadron Collider, the current world record 
holder. We also benefited from the use of antiproton cooling 
technologies that were developed both in CERN and in Russia, 
and the experiments were performed with international 
collaborators from dozens of countries. Together we improved 
our understanding of the universe with the discovery, among 
other things, of the most massive elementary particle, the top 
quark. This work continues at the CERN particle collider, and 
CERN is making significant contributions to Fermilab's world-
leading LBNF (Long-Baseline Neutrino Facility)/Dune neutrino 
program.
    Fermilab and CERN were created in the depths of the cold 
war. Fermilab's founding director, Bob Wilson, was forever 
proud of the fact that the first experiment performed at 
Fermilab, in the depths of the cold war, included Russian 
collaborators. But politicians tend to see everything through 
the lens of international competition. When pressed by a 
Senator at a hearing to explain exactly what Fermilab's 
research into subatomic particles had to do with national 
defense, the issue for the cold war, Bob Wilson famously 
replied that Fermilab's research has nothing at all to do with 
national defense, except, perhaps, to make our Nation more 
worth defending. Words we could bear in mind today. But not all 
technology is created equal. While the discovery of the top 
quark and the Higgs particle do not seem to have any near-term 
military or commercial applications, the same is not true of 
the latest breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI), gene 
editing, or quantum cryptography.
    As we will hear today from our panelists, openness does 
come with risks. Foreign adversaries can take advantage of it, 
investing in programs that incentivize researchers to 
exfiltrate sensitive information to get a leg up on a 
competitive research or commercial environment. While 
classified research is protected through existing mechanisms, 
we still do not have a comprehensive understanding of what the 
risks are to fundamental research, and how to draw that line. 
Today's panelists will share their perspectives on the risk 
awareness within the scientific community, and how the Federal 
Government can do a better job of protecting taxpayer-funded 
research from improper exfiltration. It's a crucial discussion 
that must bring together the science, law enforcement, and 
intelligence communities to come to a common understanding of 
the threat and the appropriate response.
    And we must not let the solution be worse than the problem. 
International collaboration, and welcoming scientists from 
around the world, has long been key to the United States' 
scientific leadership. The United States attracts the largest 
share of international students worldwide, and 3/4 of them stay 
in the U.S. a decade after graduation and contribute to our 
economy. However, even before the COVID-19 pandemic, enrollment 
of international students was on the decline, and creating a 
hostile environment for foreign-born researchers will only 
exacerbate the problem.
    Asian-American advocacy groups, scientific societies, and 
universities have raised the alarm that prosecutions related to 
academic espionage seem to have disproportionately targeted 
researchers of Chinese descent. A recent white paper found that 
defendants with Chinese surnames were twice as likely not be 
found guilty, or to have all charges dropped, as compared to 
those with Western names. I'd like to ask unanimous consent for 
a summary of this white paper to be entered into the record. 
Hearing none, so ordered.
    And now we know China invests money in incentivizing 
researchers to hide connections to Chinese institutions, and to 
improperly use grant funding to benefit Chinese institutions. 
This behavior is wrong, and must be investigated and, where 
appropriate, punished. However, we must not create a hostile 
environment for scientists who want to relocate to the United 
States to work at our world-class institutions and bolster our 
national competitiveness.
    So I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel 
about the current landscape of threats to research security, 
and ideas for responding to it. I believe the Science Committee 
is the perfect place for this discussion, since I hope we 
understand the value of collaboration in science, and can take 
very seriously any threat to our national competitiveness.
    And I will now yield to Ranking Member Obernolte for his 
opening statement.
    [The prepared statement of Chairman Foster follows:]

    Good morning, and welcome to our members and our panelists. 
Thank you for joining us today.
    Collaboration is the lifeblood of scientific discovery. 
Scientists build upon one another's work, across time and 
around the globe. Openness in science allows reproduction and 
replication of work, increasing the reliability of conclusions 
and building public trust. It fosters cooperation across 
disciplines, brings in new perspectives, and sparks ideas that 
wouldn't come from one solitary lab, or even one country.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has driven home the importance of 
international collaboration in science. In those early months, 
before the virus had been detected on our shores, American 
scientists and health authorities were dependent upon 
researchers in impacted countries to share what they knew about 
the virus, how it spread, and how it killed. Over a year in, 
collaboration with international partners is still vital to 
detect emerging variants as early as possible and assess 
vaccine efficacy. International problems require international 
solutions. And there are real costs to closing off your 
research from the rest of the world.
    In the House Science Committee, we recently held a 
subcommittee hearing on the origins of the Coronavirus. At the 
time, a potentially very significant fact was that the closest 
known relative of SARS-COV-2 was a bat virus from southern 
China which had been studied at the Wuhan Virology Lab. Since 
then, it appears that closer relatives have been identified, by 
an open international collaboration, in bats from caves in 
Laos. If that discovery had been made by an open collaboration 
with access to bat virus samples throughout the world, it would 
have been a triumph for international science that would have 
strengthened China's claim that their lab's activities were not 
the source of the Pandemic. However, because of China's 
insistence on only a closed and controlled investigation of the 
pandemic's origin, rejecting participation by even the World 
Health Organization, serious questions will remain, questions 
that can only be resolved by a full and open international 
collaboration.
    And beyond just the pandemic, we can thank the openness of 
the research enterprise for groundbreaking discoveries. At 
Fermi National Accelerator lab where I spent 22 years working 
as a particle physicist, for most of that time we held the 
dominant position because of the technology of Fermilab's 
Tevatron, the world's first giant superconducting particle 
accelerator. But we did not keep that technology to ourselves; 
we shared it with the scientific public, and welcomed its use 
to build similar particle accelerators first in DESY in Germany 
and then the CERN Large Hadron Collider, the current record 
holder. We also benefited from the use of Antiproton Cooling 
technologies developed in both CERN and Russia. And the 
experiments were performed with international collaborators 
from dozens of countries.
    Together we improved our understanding of the universe with 
the discovery, among other things, of the most massive 
elementary particle: the top quark. The work continues at the 
CERN particle collider, and CERN is making significant 
contributions to Fermilab's world-leading LBNF/Dune neutrino 
program. Fermilab and CERN were created in the depths of the 
Cold War. Fermilab's founding director, Bob Wilson, was forever 
proud of the fact that the first experiment performed at 
Fermilab, in the depths of the cold war, included Russian 
collaborators.
    But politicians tend to see everything through the lens of 
international competition. When pressed by a Senator at a 
hearing to explain what Fermilab's research into subatomic 
particles had to do with National Defense, Bob Wilson famously 
replied that it had nothing at all to do with National Defense, 
except, perhaps, to make our nation more worth defending.
    But not all technology is created equal. While the 
discovery of the Top Quark or the Higgs particle do not seem to 
have any near-term military or commercial applications, the 
same is not true of the latest breakthroughs in Artificial 
Intelligence, gene editing, or quantum cryptography.
    As we will hear today from our panelists, openness does 
come with risks. Foreign adversaries can take advantage of it, 
investing in programs that incentivize researchers to 
exfiltrate sensitive information to get a leg up in a 
competitive research environment. While classified research is 
protected through existing mechanisms, we still do not have a 
comprehensive understanding of what the risks are to 
fundamental research.
    Today's panelists will share their perspectives on the risk 
awareness within the scientific community, and how the federal 
government can do a better job of protecting taxpayer-funded 
research from improper exfiltration. This is a crucial 
discussion that must bring together the science, law 
enforcement, and intelligence communities, to come to a common 
understanding of the threat and the appropriate response.
    We must not let the solution be worse than the problem. 
International collaboration and welcoming scientists from 
around the world have been key to the United States' scientific 
leadership.
    The United States attracts the largest share of 
international students worldwide, and three-quarters of them 
stay in the U.S. a decade after graduation, contributing to our 
economy. However, even before the COVID-19 pandemic, enrollment 
of international students was on the decline. And creating a 
hostile environment for foreign-born researchers will only 
exacerbate the problem. Asian-American advocacy groups, 
scientific societies, and universities have raised the alarm 
that prosecutions related to academic espionage have 
disproportionately targeted researchers of Chinese descent.
    A recent whitepaper found that defendants with Chinese 
surnames were twice as likely to not be found guilty or to have 
all charges dropped, as compared to those with Western names. 
I'd like to ask unanimous consent for a summary of this 
whitepaper to be entered into the record. Now, we know China 
invests money in incentivizing researchers to hide connections 
to Chinese institutions, and to improperly use grant funding to 
benefit Chinese institutions. This behavior is wrong and must 
be investigated and punished.
    However, we must not create a hostile environment for 
scientists who want to relocate to the United States to work at 
our world-class institutions and bolster our national 
competitiveness.
    I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel 
about the current landscape of threats to research security. 
And I believe the Science Committee is the perfect place for 
this discussion, since we understand the value of collaboration 
in science and take seriously any threat to our national 
competitiveness.
    I now yield to Ranking Member Obernolte for his opening 
statement.

    Mr. Obernolte. Thank very much, Chairman Foster, and 
Chairwoman Stevens, for holding this very important hearing on 
research security. It's been a little over 3 years since the 
House last held a hearing on this topic, and we've had some 
interesting developments in the field since then, and so I 
think it's very timely, very appropriate, that we're having 
this discussion.
    And this is something, I think, that is of fundamental 
importance to everyone on this Committee, because we're 
overseeing the advancement of the frontiers of human knowledge, 
which I think is one of the most important things that 
government can catalyze. But at the same time, the culture of 
openness and transparency in research that we've built here in 
the United States also opens us up to being manipulated by 
malign foreign influences, and I think we would not be doing 
our duty as stewards of the American taxpayer money, and as 
stewards of research integrity, if we were not cognizant of the 
fact that that was possible, and the guardians of the standards 
that prevent that kind of influence from occurring.
    We certainly want to continue to be the kind of atmosphere 
that welcomes students from foreign universities here to the 
Great American Melting Pot, and I think that the integrity of 
the research that's done in the United States is vitally 
dependent on this rich tapestry that we've created of 
researchers from all over the globe. But also, we need to be 
aware, and to be vigilant, about the fact that this 
transparency, the transparency of our research system, also 
opens us up to the possibility that the research could be 
manipulated or used in ways that are contrary to our national 
security.
    So the question here before the panel today is how do we 
balance these two ideas that are in tension? Now, the one idea 
that we want to maintain is openness in our research community, 
but also this idea that we also need to be stewards of the 
nearly $45 billion that we invest every year in research at 
academic institutions, and that we need to protect our national 
security. And certainly, you know, we want to do that in a way 
that's respectful to our research community, that doesn't 
unfairly discriminate on the basis of race, and that promotes 
the standards of openness and transparency that I think have 
made some of our research institutions the best in the world.
    So I thank again the Chair, and the--Chairwoman Stevens for 
holding this hearing this morning. I am very much looking 
forward to listening from our panelists, and participating in 
the discussion. I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Obernolte follows:]

    Good morning, Chairman Foster, Chairwoman Stevens, and 
Ranking Member Waltz - thank you for convening today's joint 
subcommittee hearing to examine the changing landscape of 
research security. It has been over three years since this 
Committee's first hearing on this topic.
    Academic institutions in the U.S. are valued for their 
openness, innovation, and collaboration with domestic and 
international scientists. Our nation has long been a leader in 
science and technology, and consequently, a destination for 
foreign scholars and scientists seeking to learn from and 
collaborate with the best.
    Unfortunately, not every government upholds these values of 
openness, transparency, and reciprocal collaboration. Over the 
past three years, this Committee has seen numerous examples of 
how adversaries have sought to exploit the openness of our 
research enterprise to steal American ingenuity and undermine 
our system.
    China has publicly proven itself to be the most aggressive 
country in targeting U.S. research over the past decade, 
particularly through talent recruitment programs that encourage 
dishonesty and incentivize behaviors that are inconsistent with 
scientific values.
    Between July 2018 and July 2021, the National Institutes of 
Health contacted 93 institutions about 214 scientists who have 
failed to be transparent with the agency, including through 
non-disclosure of financial support, conflicts of interests, 
and violations of peer review integrity rules. Over 90% of 
these cases involved activities based in the People's Republic 
of China.
    While much of the discussion in today's hearing may focus 
on the People's Republic of China, I want to be clear that this 
Committee is very concerned about all foreign nationals, 
American scientists, and agencies that inappropriately attempt 
to take advantage of taxpayer-funded research and development.
    I would also be remiss if I didn't clearly state that 
racial profiling is wrong and should never be utilized to 
identify malign foreign influence. Instead, enforcement must be 
based purely on a researcher's actions and transparency with 
their home institution and sponsoring agencies.
    We know the solution is not to shutter the doors of 
American universities and colleges to students, researchers, 
and professors from foreign nations. The vast majority of 
scholars who come to the U.S. do so to work with our citizens 
on scientific discoveries and breakthroughs based on an open 
exchange of ideas to benefit the world.
    But we must also do all we can to protect the investment 
that American taxpayers are making in academic research and 
development.
    The most recent data shows that the federal government 
spends nearly $45 billion in research and development at 
academic institutions.
    Finding an appropriate balance between scientific openness 
and security concerns is not new, nor is it easy. But a key to 
this is ensuring there is transparency and clear guidance for 
our researchers.
    I look forward to hearing the insights of our witnesses 
today so we may find the balance between open scientific 
collaboration and protecting America's research and 
development.
    Thank you and I yield back the balance of my time.

    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And the Chair now recognizes 
Ms. Stevens for an opening statement.
    Ms. Stevens. Well thank you so much, and thank you to our 
Chair of Investigations and Oversight, Congressman Foster, and 
Ranking Member Obernolte, not only for your leadership in 
helping to host today's hearing, but your dedication to the 
topic of discussion. And I also want to thank the Ranking 
Member of the Research and Technology Subcommittee Ranking 
Member, Michael Waltz, for his continued leadership on the 
topic of discussion, which is balancing open science and 
security in the U.S. research enterprise. And, of course, a big 
thank you to our very distinguished panel for appearing before 
the House Science Committee today.
    It's very clear that U.S. global leadership in research and 
development (R&D) has long been a point of national pride here 
in our country, and I'm certainly especially proud of the State 
of Michigan's rich history in being a leader in groundbreaking 
scientific research, particularly at the university level. As a 
country, we have built the world's most successful research 
enterprise based on the values of openness and transparency, 
closely aligned with our democratic principles. Maintaining our 
Nation's competitive edge in research depends on our commitment 
to equipping our greatest minds with the resources they need to 
continue to lead on the global stage.
    Our leadership also depends on our ability to identify, 
understand, and address emerging risks to our Nation's research 
enterprise. In recent years, certainly, concerns about the 
risks to the U.S. research enterprise from undue foreign 
influence have grown. Agencies at the Federal level have 
reached out to universities and research institutions across 
our country to raise awareness about this--about the threat of 
foreign misconduct. Federal agencies have sounded the alarm 
that some foreign governments, most notably from China, are 
carrying out a strategic and systematic campaign to undermine 
the integrity and security of U.S. research.
    For instance, the Chinese government has sought to boost 
its own research capabilities by exploiting America's openness 
to advance their own national interests, and the Chinese 
government sponsors numerous talent recruitment programs 
seemingly designed for the benign purpose of recruiting top 
talent. However, these programs often use coercive tactics that 
compel or incentivize U.S. researchers to be dishonest, maybe 
sometimes even commit grant fraud, or steal intellectual 
property for the benefit of a foreign entity. And it's 
sometimes even just written into the contract terms. As Chair 
of the Research and Technology Subcommittee, I am committed to 
ensuring that American taxpayer research is not stolen by 
foreign competitors, and I also share concerns raised by my 
colleagues about the potential collateral harm to scientists 
and students who have acted with integrity, and the harm done 
to our ability to continue to recruit talent from around the 
world.
    As we'll hear today from some of our witnesses, that--the 
impacts to the people who are a part of the U.S. scientific 
research enterprise are wide-ranging, and we certainly 
recognize that we are in a global competition. We feel this 
every day here in metro Detroit with our automotive industry, 
that we want to make and sell products all over the world, and 
I was raised in this climate, of trying to prevent that type of 
espionage, certainly in our auto industry with foreign 
competitors, and that we are also in a global race for foreign 
talent, for global talent, and we want to make sure that we 
have the best and brightest minds.
    So we don't necessarily have a lot of simple solutions, but 
this Committee has worked really closely with House Armed 
Services. The 2020 National Defense Authorization Act saw 
provisions establish an interagency working group focused on 
identifying and raising awareness of research security risks, 
and coordinating agency activities to address them. The Joint 
Committee on Research Environments, JCORE, has been very 
active, and recently released much needed guidance and best 
practices, which I hope we will be discussing today, for 
universities, and a set of agency policies and requirements.
    So we're certainly very proud of this Committee's work in 
this space. It is a rapidly evolving issue, and our work is not 
done, and we are glad to have the important thought leaders 
here today so that we can dig in further. And with that, Mr. 
Chairman, I'll yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Stevens follows:]

    Good morning and welcome to today's hearing. I want to 
thank our distinguished panel for joining us today.
    Our global leadership in research and development has long 
been a point of national pride for the United States, and I am 
especially proud of Michigan's rich history of being a leader 
in groundbreaking scientific research.
    We have built the world's most successful research 
enterprise based on the values of openness and transparency, 
which closely aligns with our democratic principles in the 
United States. Maintaining our nation's competitive edge in 
research depends on our commitment to equipping our greatest 
minds with the resources they need to continue to lead on the 
global stage. Our leadership also depends on our ability to 
identify, understand, and address emerging risks to the 
nation's research enterprise.
    In recent years, concerns about the risks to the U.S. 
research enterprise from undue foreign influence have grown. 
Agencies have reached out to universities and research 
institutions across the country to raise awareness about this 
threat of foreign misconduct. Agencies have sounded the alarm 
that some foreign governments, most notably China, are carrying 
out a strategic and systematic campaign to undermine the 
integrity and security of U.S. research. The Chinese government 
has sought to boost its own research capabilities by exploiting 
America's openness to advance their own national interests. The 
Chinese government sponsors numerous talent recruitment 
programs seemingly designed for the benign purpose of 
recruiting top science talent. However, these programs often 
use coercive tactics that compel or incentivize U.S. 
researchers to be dishonest, commit grant fraud, or even steal 
intellectual property for the benefit of a foreign entity. It's 
written right into the contract terms.
    As Chair of the Research and Technology Subcommittee, I am 
committed to ensuring that America's taxpayer-funded research 
is not stolen by competitors. I also share concerns raised by 
my colleagues about the potential collateral harm done to 
scientists and students who have acted with integrity, and the 
harm done to our ability to continue to recruit talent from 
around the world.
    These are not simple problems with simple solutions.
    Even so, working in close partnership with the House Armed 
Services Committee, this Committee has led the development and 
enactment of bipartisan legislation to provide agencies, 
universities, and researchers with the resources and the 
support they need. I commend Chairwoman Johnson, Ranking Member 
Lucas, and Ranking Member Waltz for their leadership in 
building consensus on measured and targeted responses to the 
threat of research security.
    In the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, we enacted 
provisions to establish an interagency working group focused on 
identifying and raising awareness of research security risks 
and coordinating agency activities to address them. This 
working group, called the Joint Committee on Research 
Environments (JCORE), has been very active and recently 
released much needed guidance on best practices for 
universities and a new set of agency policies and requirements.
    We also authorized a National Science, Technology and 
Security Roundtable at the National Academies to increase 
communication and collaboration between and among the 
government and universities.
    In this year's NDAA, we followed-up with amendments to 
equip researchers with much needed training, prohibit 
participation in problematic foreign talent recruitment 
programs, and lay the groundwork for a government-wide risk 
assessment center.
    I am proud of this Committee's work in this space, but this 
is a rapidly evolving issue, and our work is not done. I'm glad 
to have important thought leaders on this topic with us here 
today. We know that scientific creativity flourishes in a 
research ecosystem that encourages innovation and discovery. I 
look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how we can 
further improve our efforts to balance security with the 
openness that allows our research ecosystem to thrive.

    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And the Chair will now 
recognize Ranking Member Waltz for an opening statement.
    Mr. Waltz. OK. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Foster, 
Chairwoman Stevens, Ranking Member Obernolte. You know, I'm 
really pleased that we're holding this hearing, and wanted to 
thank you for it. You know, we really need to examine the scale 
and scope of undue foreign influence on our research 
enterprise, and I look forward to a constructive discussion 
about how we ensure a balance, the balance that Ms. Stevens 
just mentioned, how we maintain the spirit of open and academic 
collaboration, but we have to protect our proprietary 
technology and scientific discoveries from undue foreign 
influence.
    Through my service on the House Armed Services Committee, 
and on this Committee, I've been highly engaged on this issue. 
As Ms. Stevens mentioned, in 2019 we worked to get the Securing 
American Science and Technology Act included in that year's 
National Defense Authorization Act, and it authorized the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy's (OSTP's) Joint 
Committee on Research Security, JCORE, as Ms. Stevens just 
mentioned, and we gave it the mission of standardizing Federal 
agencies' approaches to research security. It also established 
the National Academies' National Science, Technology, and 
Security Roundtable, which Dr. Zuber, with us today, co-chairs.
    In last year's NDAA I was again proud to have a provision 
included to ensure all Federal research agencies require 
applicants to disclose foreign funding when receiving Federal 
research awards, and by requiring grant applicants to disclose 
all sources of research support that they receive, this 
provision helps address a problem that GAO (Government 
Accountability Office) found regarding inconsistent conflict of 
interest policies across our agencies. Our agencies hopefully 
will now get on the same sheet of music with that provision. 
This year we're working to get researchers the tools and 
information they need to understand how to identify and address 
research security threats.
    Working from a provision included in the NSF For the Future 
Act, I was able to add language to the NDAA that the House just 
passed to develop online security training modules for the 
research community focused on international collaboration and 
international travel, on foreign interference, and on the rules 
for proper use of funds, proper disclosure, conflict of 
commitment, and conflict of interest. These training modules 
will ensure that individual researchers understand what makes 
an appropriate partnership, and the importance of accurate 
disclosures, and it sets a baseline for what is acceptable and 
unacceptable for future applicants, and, frankly, in my view, 
it will help eliminate any excuses of I didn't know, or I 
didn't understand.
    Working with Representative Feenstra, we also ensured this 
year's NDAA included a ban on any federally funded researcher 
participating in any malign foreign talent program. We know 
that most of these talent programs already violate Federal 
grant terms and conditions, but now there will be no question 
left for faculty members on whether or not participation is 
allowed. We carefully crafted the provision with stakeholders 
to ensure that legitimate international exchanges are still 
permitted.
    The open exchange of scientific ideas has long supported 
scientific progress, but some of these countries seek to 
exploit America's openness, as we've discussed already. The 
CCP, the Chinese Communist Party, has been the most aggressive, 
primarily through the use of talent recruitment programs, and 
notably of the 214 scientists the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) have contacted between 2018 and 2021 regarding undue 
foreign interference cases, 90 percent of those cases involved 
activities based on China.
    Chinese Communist leadership is targeting American 
scientists as a matter of State policy. That is clear. But, of 
course, that does not mean that any type of racial profiling 
should ever be utilized to address this threat. We are not here 
to target researchers based on their race, but based on the 
actions that they have taken, and their transparency, or lack 
thereof, with their federally funding agencies and sponsoring 
institutions. The U.S., I want to be clear, has absolutely 
benefited greatly from international scientific collaboration, 
and the contributions of foreign-born scientists, and I want 
the U.S. to remain a desirable place for brilliant minds to 
come and share their ideas, but we cannot continue to allow 
this theft, and I fear that historians may look back and say 
what we're doing now may be too little and too late.
    So I'd like to thank our witnesses for taking the time to 
join us today and share their expertise. I look forward to your 
testimonies, and I yield back the balance of my time.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Waltz follows:]

    Good morning, Chairman Foster, Chairwoman Stevens, and 
Ranking Member Obernolte. I am very pleased we are holding this 
hearing to examine the scale and scope of undue foreign 
influence on America's research enterprise. I look forward to a 
constructive discussion about how we ensure a balance of 
maintaining the spirit of open, academic collaboration while 
also protecting proprietary technology and scientific 
discoveries from undue foreign influence and theft.
    Through my service on both the House Armed Services 
Committee and this Committee, I have been highly engaged on 
this issue. In 2019 I worked with my colleagues to get the 
Securing American Science and Technology Act included in that 
year's National Defense Authorization Act, which authorized the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy's Joint Committee on 
Research Security (JCORE), giving it the mission of 
standardizing federal agencies' approaches to research 
security.
    It also established the National Academies' National 
Science, Technology, and Security Roundtable, which Dr. Zuber 
co-chairs.
    In last year's NDAA, I was again proud to have a provision 
included to ensure all Federal Research Agencies require 
applicants to disclose foreign funding when receiving federal 
research awards. By requiring grant applicants to disclose all 
sources of research support they receive, this provision helps 
address a problem the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
found regarding inconsistent conflict of interest policies 
across agencies.
    This year we are working to get researchers the tools and 
information they need to understand how to identify and address 
research security threats. Working from a provision included in 
the NSF For the Future Act, I was able to add language to the 
House-passed NDAA to develop online security training modules 
for the research community, focused on international 
collaboration and international travel, foreign interference, 
and the rules for proper use of funds, disclosure, conflict of 
commitment and conflict of interest.
    These training modules will ensure that individual 
researchers understand what makes an appropriate partnership 
and the importance of accurate disclosures, setting a baseline 
for what is acceptable and unacceptable for future applicants.
    Working with Rep. Feenstra, we also ensured this year's 
House-passed NDAA included a ban on any federally-funded 
researcher participating in any malign foreign talent program. 
We know that most of these talent program contracts already 
violate federal grant terms and conditions, but now there will 
be no question left for faculty members about whether or not 
participation is allowed. We carefully crafted the provision 
with stakeholders to ensure that legitimate international 
exchanges are still permitted.
    The open exchange of scientific ideas has long supported 
scientific progress. But some countries seek to exploit 
America's openness to advance their national interests. The 
People's Republic of China (PRC) has been the most aggressive, 
primarily through the use of talent recruitment programs. Of 
the 214 scientists the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
contacted between 2018 and 2021 regarding undue foreign 
interference cases, 90 percent of those cases involve 
activities based in the PRC.
    Chinese communist leadership is targeting American 
scientists - that is clear. But that does not mean that racial 
profiling should ever be utilized to address this threat.
    We are not here to target researchers based on their race 
but based on the actions they have taken and their transparency 
with their federal funding agencies and sponsoring 
institutions. The U.S. has benefitted greatly from 
international scientific collaboration and the contributions of 
foreign-born scientists.
    I want the U.S. to remain a desirable place for brilliant 
minds to come and share their ideas.
    I want to thank the leadership of this Committee, 
Chairwoman Johnson and Ranking Member Lucas, for working with 
me on a bipartisan basis on these important issues. We must 
strike the correct balance between keeping our research 
enterprise open, but also protecting it from adversaries who 
seek to take advantage of our open system.
    I'd like to thank our witnesses for taking the time to join 
us today their share their expertise. I look forward to your 
testimonies. And I yield back the balance of my time.

    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And the opening statements of 
Chairwoman Johnson and Ranking Member Lucas will be entered 
into the record at this point. If there are other Members who 
wish to submit additional opening statements, your statements 
will also be added to the record at this point.
    [The prepared statement of Chairwoman Johnson follows:]

    Good morning.
    There is an important conversation going on within the 
research enterprise about legitimate risks to U.S. research. 
Undue foreign influence compromises the integrity and security 
of taxpayer funded research. This Committee, on a bipartisan 
basis, has long been focused on how to mitigate these risks 
while preserving all that is best about our open research 
environment.
    One significant risk often cited is to our economic 
competitiveness. If another country gets a head start on 
commercializing a U.S. research breakthrough, the American 
public loses out. In critical technology areas, such as quantum 
and biotechnology, economic competitiveness and national 
security concerns go hand-in-hand. We have good reason to be 
particularly concerned about China, because they do not share 
our values when it comes to use of technologies. We must 
prevent undue foreign influence in research if we are to keep 
our competitive edge and help maintain our national security. 
However, in addition to that, I believe that if we are to 
maintain our leadership we also need to invest in our own 
research enterprise.
    While the United States is still in the lead, China has 
dramatically increased its investments in research.
    China accounts for 32 percent of global growth in R&D since 
2000, compared with 20 percent for the United States. We cannot 
continue down this path.
    I am proud of this Committee's bipartisan work to advance 
forward-looking, bold reauthorization bills for our major 
science agencies. The House-passed set of innovation 
legislation and elements of the Senate's United States 
Innovation and Competition Act represent a once in a generation 
opportunity to rightsize our investment in R&D. I am committed 
to working with our colleagues in the Senate to get those bills 
enacted this year.
    We must also continue our work to convince our colleagues 
outside of this Committee how crucial these investments are, so 
that real funding follows enactment of the authorization bills.
    Any steps we take to strengthen our research security 
ultimately will be irrelevant if we do not also invest in our 
nation's own research enterprise.
    I also want to raise the issue of unintended consequences 
of an overcorrection. We all support efforts to mitigate 
research security risks, but not at the expense of the Asian 
American and Asian immigrant science community. Our strength is 
our diversity, in society and in science. The value of foreign-
born researchers to U.S. preeminence in science is undeniable. 
We will only help speed the advancement of China's research 
enterprise if we push away talented researchers and students 
with Asian heritage. I sincerely hope we do not look back 5 or 
10 years from now with regret that we pushed away talent who 
wanted to help our country, not hurt it--and by pushing them 
away, only amplified the risk to our economic and national 
security.
    That is why, today, we invited an expert panel to address 
how we can achieve the balance that hopefully we all seek.
    Thank you and I yield back.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Lucas follows:]

    Thank you, Chairman Foster, Ranking Member Obernolte, 
Chairwoman Stevens, and Ranking Member Waltz, for holding 
today's joint subcommittee hearing on balancing open science 
with securing the U.S. research enterprise from foreign 
influence and theft.
    The foundation of U.S. competitiveness is our thriving 
scientific enterprise. The integrity of this system relies on 
the core principles and values of science: openness and 
transparency, accountability and honesty, impartiality and 
objectivity, respect, freedom of inquiry, reciprocity, and 
merit-based competition. While international collaboration and 
foreign contributions are critical to U.S. competitiveness, we 
must take steps to protect the integrity of its research and 
uphold these principles.
    This hearing continues the House Science Committee's 
leadership on this important issue. For more than three years, 
the Science Committee has led development of legislation to 
address the growing threat from the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) and other foreign actors who seek to exploit our open 
system of science. We have also worked to ensure that Congress 
doesn't take actions that have the unintended consequence of 
making the U.S. less competitive in the global marketplace.
    In early 2018, Congress was first warned of the growing 
threat of academic espionage in testimony by FBI Director 
Christopher Wray to the Senate Intelligence Committee. Wray 
testified, ``The use of nontraditional collectors, especially 
in the academic setting, whether it's professors, scientists, 
students, we see in almost every field office that the FBI has 
around the country. It's not just in major cities. It's in 
small ones as well. It's across basically every discipline. I 
think the level of naivete on the part of the academic sector 
about this creates its own issues. They're exploiting the very 
open research and development environment that we have, which 
we all revere, but they're taking advantage of it.''
    Following that warning, the Science Committee developed the 
Securing American Science and Technology Act, which became law 
as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2020. The legislation established an interagency committee 
within the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 
(OSTP) to coordinate research security across the federal 
government. The bill also established the National Science, 
Technology, and Security Roundtable at the National Academy of 
Sciences, to facilitate collaboration between universities, 
federal agencies, law enforcement, and other stakeholders.
    I'm pleased that in response to this legislation, OSTP 
released National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 in 
January 2021 to direct a national response to safeguard the 
security and integrity of America's R&D enterprise. I 
understand that the Biden Administration is currently 
undertaking a 90-day review of NSPM-33, and I hope that 
Administration will uphold the memorandum, while providing 
further refinement and clarify for stakeholders.
    Under this committee's bipartisan leadership, we continue 
to move legislation that ensures consistent policies for 
disclosure, training, and participation in talent programs 
across the federal government.
    While we are still trying to understand the full scope of 
the threat from the PRC, we do have some evidence that it 
continues to grow. Last summer, Director Wray disclosed that 
the FBI is opening a new PRC-related counterintelligence case 
about every 10 hours and that, of the nearly 5,000 active FBI 
counterintelligence cases currently underway across the 
country, almost half are related to PRC.
    While academic cases are only a small fraction of those, 
with criminal charges against college and university professors 
through the Justice Department making up only 3 percent of all 
economic espionage prosecutions, we will hear today from our 
witnesses about the growing case-loads at our federal research 
agencies and universities as it relates to grant fraud 
associated with the PRC. I look forward to hearing more about 
the complexities of the relationship between economic 
espionage, grant fraud, and foreign influence, and how we 
manage and mitigate them.
    In closing, I want to be clear - the Science Committee's 
focus on research security and the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) is about safeguarding the integrity of the U.S. research 
enterprise and ensuring that all scientists follow the U.S. 
principles of scientific fairness and integrity, not targeting 
researchers of a particular racial or ethnic background.
    We must do all we can to protect our innovation system and 
taxpayer-funded research from systematic attempts to exploit, 
degrade, and misappropriate our open system of science. But we 
do not want close off legitimate international collaboration or 
discourage students and researchers from coming to the United 
States to study or conduct their research here. We must 
continue to be a beacon for the freedom of thought and ideas 
that has led to some of the greatest scientific discoveries in 
the history of the world.
    I thank Chairwoman Johnson for being a partner with me on 
these issues, and I look forward to hearing from our expert 
panel of witness.

    Chairman Foster. And at this time I'd like to introduce our 
witnesses. Our first witness is Dr. Maria Zuber. Dr. Zuber is 
Vice President for Research and the E.A. Griswold Professor of 
Geophysics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
where she is responsible for research administration and 
policy. In this role she's responsible for intellectual 
property, research integrity, and compliance, as well as 
research relationships with the Federal Government. Dr. Zuber 
also serves as the Co-Chair of the National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's National Science, 
Technology, and Security Roundtable.
    Our second witness is Ms. Candice Wright. Ms. Wright 
directs the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) Science, 
Technology Assessment, and Analytics team. She oversees GAO's 
work on the management of federally funded research, 
intellectual property protection, and Federal efforts to help 
commercialize innovative technologies, and enhance U.S. 
economic competitiveness. She has led reviews on a wide variety 
of policy issues involving Federal contracting, risks to the 
defense supplier base, foreign military sales, and homeland 
security.
    Our third witness is Ms. Allison Lerner. Ms. Lerner is the 
Inspector General (IG) of the National Science Foundation 
(NSF), a position she's held since 2009. In this role, she 
recommends policies for promoting economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of NSF programs and operations. She leads efforts 
to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, improve the 
integrity of NSF programs and operations, and investigate 
allegations of misconduct in science. Ms. Lerner has chaired 
the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency since January 2021, and has served as its Vice Chair 
from January 2015 through December 2020.
    Our final witness is Dr. Xiaoxing Xi. Dr. Xi is the Laura 
H. Carnell Professor of Physics at Temple University. Prior to 
2009, he was Professor of Physics and Material Science and 
Engineering at Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Xi was the 
recipient of the American Physical Society 2020 Andrei Sakharov 
Prize. Since 2015 he has advocated for open fundamental 
research, and warned against the dangers of racial profiling.
    As our witnesses should know, you will each have 5 minutes 
to--for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony will be 
included in the record for the hearing. And when you've all 
completed your spoken testimony, we will begin with questions. 
Each Member will have 5 minutes to question the panel. And we 
will start with Dr. Zuber.

            TESTIMONY OF DR. MARIA ZUBER, CO-CHAIR,

                 NATIONAL SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,

                    AND SECURITY ROUNDTABLE,

                NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES,

                   ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE;

                  VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH

          AND E. A. GRISWOLD PROFESSOR OF GEOPHYSICS,

             MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

    Dr. Zuber. OK. Chairman Stevens, Chairman Foster, 
Congressman Waltz, Congressman Obernolte, and Members of the 
Subcommittees, thanks for inviting me to testify. I should say 
at the outset that the views I'll be expressing today are my 
own, and in particular I'm not expressing the views of the 
National Academies as an institution, or my co-chairs and 
participants in the National Science, Technology and Security 
Roundtable, unless otherwise noted.
    The topic of research security is important because how we 
handle our scientific and technological rivalry with China will 
determine how prosperous and secure the U.S. will be in the 
future. And it's complex because we need to guard against 
China's improper activities, without harming the U.S. 
scientific enterprise, or cutting off collaborations that 
benefit us. Striking that balance requires the Federal 
Government and universities to be as clear as possible about 
what we're trying to prevent, and what requirements are being 
imposed. Beyond outright theft and espionage, there are at 
least three kinds of activities that we should be trying to 
stop.
    First of all, China should not be allowed to pay U.S. 
faculty, especially not surreptitiously, to transfer work that 
is funded by Federal grants, or to recruit researchers for 
China, or to spend time in China that conflicts with 
commitments to U.S. institutions. Second, research 
collaborations with China should be structured so that they are 
transparent and reciprocal, where each party has clear, 
legitimate benefits from their work. Third, universities should 
not enter into collaborations that would harm U.S. national or 
economic security, or threaten human rights.
    To ensure that we focus on genuine concerns, Federal 
agencies need to clarify reporting requirements, which too 
often have been conflicting and inconsistent. Fortunately, the 
Administration is preparing guidance for implementing National 
Security Presidential Memorandum NSPM-33. I have provided input 
to that process, and I am confident that the guidance will be 
helpful. The government also needs to be clearer about what 
constitutes a foreign talent program. Not an easy task, but the 
definition cannot be so broad as to capture legitimate--or to 
prevent legitimate scientific work.
    What the government should not do is impose restrictions 
that will harm the U.S. more than it harms China. The 
government should maintain the presumption, enshrined in policy 
since the Reagan Administration, that research should generally 
be published openly. We should not have policies that broadly 
discourage Chinese graduate students from coming to the U.S. 
They strengthen our research capacity, and the vast majority 
remain after graduating. And policies should not broadly shut 
down collaboration with China at a time when they are getting 
ahead of us in some key fields, and where there are global 
problems, like climate change, that are best tackled 
collaboratively. Universities, for our part, need to have 
policies that ensure faculty abide by disclosure agreements, 
and ensure collaborations with China are reviewed. MIT put in 
place a strengthened review process in 2019 that I describe in 
my written testimony, and we have rejected proposed projects 
because of concerns, as I previously outlined.
    Each case has been different. While guidelines need to be 
clear, a sensible China policy still requires judgment. It's 
not a cookie cutter process. That's why it's so important that 
the government and universities communicate regularly about 
these competing and evolving issues. That's also why the 
National Academies' National Science, Technology, and Security 
Roundtable, which this Committee, helped create, is valuable. 
The Academies represent a neutral venue to have difficult 
discussions. One of the roundtable's priorities now is to get a 
better understanding of the scope and nature of the security 
problem in academia. The roundtable is working with law 
enforcement agencies to get the information needed to evaluate 
what percentage of faculty may be engaging in improper 
activities, and how big of a threat they represent.
    One final point, U.S. competitiveness depends less on 
defensive measures than on what we do to strengthen our own 
capabilities. Congress should increase research funding, and 
channel some of it through initiatives like ARPA-H (Advanced 
Research Projects Agency for Health), and the new directorate 
at the National Science Foundation. The heart of U.S. strategy 
must be to look ahead and invest in our future. We are likely 
to trip ourselves up if we devote too much time and attention 
instead looking over our shoulders at our competitors. Thank 
you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Zuber follows:]

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    Chairman Foster. Thank you. Inspector General Lerner, you 
are now recognized for 5 minutes.

                TESTIMONY OF MS. ALLISON LERNER,

         INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

    Ms. Lerner. Thank you, Chairman Foster, Chairman--
Chairwoman Stevens, Ranking Member Obernolte, Ranking Member 
Waltz, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I 
appreciate this opportunity to discuss the National Science 
Foundation Office of Inspector General's response to challenges 
posed to NSF by foreign government talent recruitment programs.
    My testimony today will focus on three points. First, it's 
essential for NSF to know when a researcher applying for a 
grant is a member of a foreign government talent recruitment 
program. Although membership in such programs is not illegal, 
NSF needs to know about a researcher's membership because some 
programs elicit unethical, and possibly criminal, behaviors. In 
exchange for funding, and possibly a lab, the government exerts 
control over the researcher through contracts that cover her 
intellectual property, the types of research she conducts, and, 
in some cases, where she conducts it, and who works in her lab. 
Some contracts also contain significant penalties if the 
researcher fails to live up to her obligations.
    NSF can't address the risk posed by these contracts if it 
isn't aware of a researcher's membership. The agency's policies 
contain broad disclosure requirements related to a researcher's 
current and pending support that clearly cover talent--
affiliations. A researcher's failure to provide all required 
information is not a minor matter. It destroys that competitive 
process, disadvantages applicants who play by the rules, and 
undermines the foundation's ability to make the best decisions 
about how to deploy its limited resources.
    Second, researchers who fail to disclose their membership 
in these foreign talent programs can commit grant fraud. My 
office has used its in-depth experience in combatting grant 
fraud to address this challenge. The failure to disclose a 
researcher's membership is a potential false statement, which, 
if it occurs within the statute of limitations, is a basis for 
opening an investigation. In the cases we've opened, we've 
encountered situations where researchers are using Federal 
funds to bring students at the foreign university they're 
affiliated with to this country, using Federal funds to travel 
abroad to do work required by their talent plan, or receiving 
salary from Federal awards while concurrently working for and 
being paid by their talent plan.
    Situations like these can result in criminal, civil, and/or 
administrative actions. We've also found situations where 
research have--researchers have actually provided accurate 
disclosures to their institutions, in which case we close our 
investigation. In deciding whether to open a case, we do not 
consider or track a subject's race or ethnicity. We focus on a 
researcher's conduct. Was he a member of a talent plan when he 
submitted a proposal? Did he disclose that membership during 
the proposal process? Was the proposal funded? A researcher's 
ethnicity is not relevant to any of these issues. This new line 
work has had a profound impact on our office's investigative 
portfolio. As of yesterday, such cases make up approximately 63 
percent of our case load.
    Finally, I'd like to discuss some opportunities and 
challenges I see in responding to threats posed by these 
programs. I see an opportunity in the application of data 
analytics to this challenge. Strategic use of analytics will 
help identify the magnitude of this problem, and enable all 
parties responding to this challenge to focus their efforts on 
cases with the highest risk. Ensuring that NSF has adequate 
resources to address this issue is a significant challenge. 
NSF's chief of research security strategy and policy has a very 
small office, with a very large mission, and the growth of 
allegations related to undisclosed foreign affiliations has 
overwhelmed my office's small investigative staff. We don't 
have the resources we need to investigate all the allegations 
we receive.
    The greatest challenge I see is the evolving nature of this 
threat we are facing. In response to the United States' efforts 
to address the risks posed by these programs, government 
sponsors are using encrypted apps, and implementing other 
changes to avoid detection of the true nature of their 
relationships with members. To succeed, our response to this 
challenge must be agile and creative. My office will use the 
full range of our investigative resources to respond to this 
challenge and safeguard the integrity of the foundation's 
operations and investments in science. We look forward to 
working with NSF management, the National Science Board, and 
Congress to achieve this goal. This concludes my statement, and 
I'd be happy to answer any questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Lerner follows:]

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    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And next is Ms. Wright.

         TESTIMONY OF MS. CANDICE N. WRIGHT, DIRECTOR,

         SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, AND ANALYTICS,

             U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Ms. Wright. Thank you. Chairman Foster, Chairwoman Stevens, 
Ranking Member Obernolte and Waltz, and Members of the 
Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to discuss foreign 
influence in federally funded research. University science and 
engineering research is vital to the country's national 
security and economic interests. Science progresses through 
open communication among scientists, and sharing knowledge and 
research results. However, law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies have warned that the openness of the U.S. academic 
research enterprise makes it a prime target for countries 
seeking to obtain access to U.S. research for their scientific, 
economic, and military gain.
    With Federal research funding amounting to over $40 
billion, safeguarding U.S. taxpayers' investment is critically 
important. While this issue is not new, today there is even 
greater international collaboration. At the same time, there 
are concerted and sophisticated efforts to access U.S. research 
and intellectual property, such as through foreign government 
talent recruitment programs. Participating in such programs is 
often seen as prestigious, and a way to advance research. Some 
countries can create conflicts of interest for researchers, 
regardless of their citizenship, by obligating them to divert 
information about U.S.-funded research in exchange for 
salaries, lab equipment, and other incentives. Agencies and 
university grantees face the difficult task of striking a 
sustainable balance between fostering collaboration and 
ensuring sufficient security. Conflict of interest policies and 
disclosure requirements are tools that, used effectively, can 
help achieve the balance between open science and safeguarding 
U.S. research.
    Last year GAO issued a report that examined conflict of 
interest policy and disclosure requirements. We looked at the 
Department of Defense and Energy, along with NSF, and NASA 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration), and NIH, which 
make up the five largest grant-making agencies. Today I will 
share three key insights from that work. First, NSF, as well as 
NIH and NASA, have agency-wide conflict of interest policies. 
These policies emphasize financial interests researchers should 
disclose to the university receiving the grant, however, 
agencies' policies do not fully address or define non-financial 
conflicts, sometimes referred to as conflicts of commitment. 
Such conflicts may include foreign academic appointments, or 
access to lab space provided by foreign entities. In light of 
this, we recommended the three agencies define and address non-
financial conflicts of interest in their policies, as this is a 
key stop to identifying and mitigating potential foreign 
influence. Agencies concurred with our recommendation, and 
since our report, they're taking various steps to address, but 
have not yet fully implemented the recommendations.
    Second, we looked at monitoring and enforcement. Here we 
found that the five agencies heavily rely on universities to 
monitor and mitigate financial conflicts. Agencies collect 
information, such as foreign collaborations, that could be used 
to identify potential non-financial conflicts. The five 
agencies noted instances where researchers failed to disclose 
financial or non-financial information. We identified that each 
agency had at least one instance of a conflict of interest case 
involving foreign influence. At the time, NSF estimated that it 
had taken administrative action against nearly 20 grant 
recipients who had failed to disclose foreign ties. NIH said it 
had identified over 400--concern, and referred some cases for 
criminal investigation.
    Third, we heard inputs from the research community on 
improving the response to foreign influence. Principal 
investigators emphasized the need for clear communications 
about the specific threats. A number of principal investigators 
said they were unaware of foreign talent recruitment programs, 
and wouldn't know how to identify such programs. While agencies 
like NSF have issued reports, provided guidance, and conducted 
webinars and training on foreign influence, university 
administrators called for better information sharing and 
actionable guidance about the specific threats and risks, 
especially for those working on high-target research involving 
5G, AI, and quantum computing.
    In closing, maintaining an open research environment that 
promotes collaboration and transparency will need to be 
balanced with considerations of foreign influence and countries 
seeking to undermine U.S. investment in leadership and R&D. 
Protecting U.S. research must begin with having a common 
understanding about the threat. An important first step is to 
start with clearly defining and communicating the types and 
conflicts--types of conflicts that may pose a risk. If agencies 
want, or expect, universities to be part of the solution to 
address risks of foreign influence, agencies must provide the 
necessary information and tools in a way that resonates with 
how the research community operates. Leaving researchers to 
guess the nature and extent of the threat, and how to identify 
and mitigate such threats, is simply not prudent, especially 
given the national security and economic implications. This 
concludes my statement. I'd be pleased to respond to questions 
you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Wright follows:]

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    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And next is Dr. Xi.

                 TESTIMONY OF DR. XIAOXING XI,

             LAURA H. CARNELL PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS,

                       TEMPLE UNIVERSITY

    Dr. Xi. Chairman Foster, Ranking Member Obernolte, 
Chairwoman Stevens, Ranking Member Waltz, and Members of the 
Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 
you today. My name is Xiaoxing Xi. I'm a Professor of Physics 
at Temple University. I--like many first-generation immigrants, 
I hail from a foreign country. I was born in China, and got my 
Ph.D. degree there. In 1989 my wife and I came to this country 
because America offered a vast opportunity to do science, and 
it was the most welcoming place in the world to foreigners. In 
the United States our career flourished, our family grew 
larger, and we became American citizens. We are as proud as any 
other citizens to call America our home.
    I remember vividly a fine spring day 6 years ago. I was 
busy with my teaching, research, and my duties as Chair of the 
Physics Department. At dinnertime I gave a public lecture for a 
science festival at an Irish pub, and then went to the airport 
to pick up my wife, who was returning from an overseas trip. My 
elder daughter was home from college for a few days, and my 12-
years-old daughter was anxious about her dental surgery the 
next morning. By the time we made a plan to visit a famous 
Korean fried chicken restaurant, it was way past midnight. 
Little did we know that a few hours later armed FBI (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation) agents would raid our house and take 
me away in handcuffs.
    Based on e-mails I had sent from my Temple University 
address, the Federal Government charged me for passing 
sensitive U.S. company technology, a device called pocket 
heater, to China. The charges were totally false. I had never 
shared the pocket heater information with anyone in China. 
Almost 4 months later, after leading experts in my research 
field provided affidavits saying that the e-mails I had sent 
were not about the pocket heater at all, but my own widely 
published research, the government dropped the case. But our 
life has been wrecked.
    On that fateful morning, when I answered the loud knocks on 
my door and the FBI agents put handcuffs on me, when the agents 
pointed their guns at my wife and two daughters, and ordered 
them to walk out of their bedrooms with their hands raised, I 
thought, why are they doing this to me? I haven't done anything 
that warrants this. This operation must cost taxpayers tons of 
money. Unfortunately, the exact same early morning raid scene 
was repeated for the University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
professor Anming Hu, who was acquitted by a Federal judge 
several weeks ago, and it was played out again for the 
Cleveland Clinic researcher Qing Wang, whose case was dropped 
by the DOJ (Department of Justice) in July. When the DOJ uses 
this much resource going after innocent Chinese scientists, we 
must ask, are they catching the real spies? Are they spending 
our tax money responsibly to protect our country?
    The problem is that law enforcement officials consider 
Chinese professors, scientists, and students non-traditional 
collectors, or spies, for China. We are presumed guilty until 
proven innocent. It is only a matter of time and chance that 
any scientist of Chinese descent may get the knocks at his or 
her door by FBI agents and be snatched away. Profiling Chinese 
scientists based on where they come from ruins people's lives. 
I know that personally. I am sure Professor Anming Hu knows it 
as well. I have no doubt Professor Qing Wang knows it too.
    All Chinese professors, scientists, and students are not 
spies for China. They are contributors to America's economic 
security and national security. Most professors do fundamental 
research. As the NIH director has said, most of what we do in 
science, we publish it. Without any evidence that they have 
stolen for China, academics are being charged for failure to 
disclose their activities in China. Academic collaborations 
with China was once encouraged by the U.S. Government and the 
universities. Selections into the Chinese government talent 
programs were celebrated just as selections into similar 
prestigious talent programs in other countries. Now academics 
face the possibility of criminal prosecution for having 
responded to these encouragements. This is not fair. It has not 
always been clear what professors are required to disclose. 
When the policy toward academic collaboration with China has 
changed so abruptly, it is only fair to communicate the new 
policy clearly to everyone before throwing people in jail.
    So let me be clear, a policy that targets Chinese 
scientists and cracks down on openness in fundamental research 
does not protect America's research security. It makes the U.S. 
less competitive in innovation, and less attractive to talents 
around the world. It threatens the U.S. leadership in science 
and technology. It must stop. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Xi follows:]

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    Chairman Foster. Thank you, Professor Xi. And at this point 
we'll now begin our first round of questions, and the Chair 
will recognize himself for 5 minutes.
    As we consider this rapidly evolving and complex issue, I 
think it's important to get a basic understanding of the many 
layers of accountability that we already have in the federally 
funded research ecosystems. The researchers themselves are 
expected to disclose all of their commitments to universities. 
We have the grant receiving institutions who must ensure their 
faculty are following all the disclosure requirements. We have 
the funding agencies themselves, who are reviewing grant 
applications, receiving tips on potential infractions, and 
making referrals to the inspector general. The inspector 
general handles case of waste, fraud, and abuse, and can 
recommend administrative remedies, disbarment or suspension, 
and can refer the case, if necessary, to the Department of 
Justice, and the Department of Justice can choose to move 
forward or not with criminal prosecutions.
    So there is a machine in place to do this job, and the 
question we're addressing is how well is it working, and 
whether it needs a tune-up. I imagine that there may be a lot 
of overlap in these responsibilities, and it's important for 
all parties to have a clear understanding of their roles in the 
avenues for communication between them, as well as sufficient 
technical knowledge and advice to do their very difficult jobs 
well.
    Dr. Zuber, now wearing your hat as the MIT Vice President 
for Research, how do universities, by and large, understand 
their responsibilities when it comes to ensuring the compliance 
of their faculty and researchers to Federal disclosure 
requirements? You know, do they see their roles primarily as 
shielding researchers from time consuming and annoying 
government meddling, or do they over-amplifying government 
reporting requirements out of fear of getting into hot water?
    Dr. Zuber. Yes, so--Chairman Foster, thank you for that 
question. So, speaking for MIT, and, you know, since I'm in 
communication with so many of my colleagues at other 
institutions, you know, we take this very seriously, and we 
want our faculty to comply, and I think faculty do want to 
comply. There has been, as you noted, a fair amount of, I'll 
say confusion, about what actually needs to be disclosed, and 
how it needs to be disclosed. So agencies have had different--
required the same--different information in different places. 
Some require disclosures on their CV. Some require disclosures 
in their current and pending support, and so there have been 
inadvertent errors in disclosures, and I think that's very, 
very separate, and we need to separate that from real intents 
to deceive.
    So we have been in a--we have added staff, and have really 
intensified our outreach to our faculty so that they can 
understand what the requirements are, and we have encouraged, 
and certainly within the National Academies Security 
Roundtable, have really encouraged trying to get the 
disclosures uniform to the extent possible across Federal 
agencies so that everybody can understand what their 
responsibilities are.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And, Inspector General Lerner, 
what type of issues might stay within the NSF for education, or 
what type of behavior might trigger an IG investigation? Is 
there enough clarity there as to where we should escalate?
    Ms. Lerner. I think NSF's disclosure requirements are very 
clear, including the need to disclose, you know, compensation, 
like labs, or other supplies that are non-monetary. We have a 
great partnership with the Chief of Research, Security, 
Strategy, and Policy. When situations are properly disclosed, 
the issue is there for NSF to manage the risks associated with 
a researcher's membership in a foreign talent plan to ensure 
that they can address any conflicts of interest, conflicts of 
commitment, or intellectual property considerations that arise 
out of that. When those matters have not been disclosed, then 
it becomes a discussion of possible fraud, and it is sent to my 
office for assessment. So we have a pretty clear vision of the 
two lanes of our offices, and we communicate well together to 
ensure that the--that she--that the--that Chris gets the 
information that is appropriate for her response, and my office 
receives the matters that we should be addressing.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And my time has expired, and I 
will now recognize Mr. Obernolte for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Obernolte. Thank you, Chairman Foster, and thank you to 
our witnesses. It's been very interesting testimony. I have a 
question for Dr. Zuber. I was interested in the framework that 
you set out of the three activities that any kind of disclosure 
should be required to stop, but I'm concerned that the nature--
you know, insidious nature of foreign influence over our 
domestic research might be a little bit more subtle and more 
difficult to stop, and let me give you kind of a hypothetical. 
And this is not based on anything in reality, but--I mean, say 
we're talking about, you know, some primary research into a 
physical phenomenon like superconducting magnetism. And say 
that, you know, there's a body of research that's in the public 
domain, there is a body of research that's been conducted 
outside of the public domain in a foreign country, and then 
there's a body of research that's being proposed to be done 
here in the United States.
    If you're that foreign country, I mean, you have a vested 
interest in finishing the picture, if you will. You know, that 
third piece of research that hasn't been done is of 
disproportionate benefit to you because you have this 
additional information that is not in the public domain. So 
that would seemingly violate the second of your requirements, 
where you say research activities should be structured to be 
transparent and reciprocal. Obviously that's not transparent 
and reciprocal, but we have no way of knowing that a foreign 
country what--you know, has access to that extra information 
because they've done private researched. So how do you go about 
policing something like that?
    Dr. Zuber. That's incredibly difficult to police, and this 
is--you know, there's a lot of nuance in this situation that we 
don't understand. You know, of course, you know, in the U.S., 
on the corporate side, there's research that goes on within 
industry that isn't known to the outside, but, you know, 
unless--you know, we should be looking for organizations that 
have sort of a history of publication. So unless, you know, 
unless an organization is publishing results, you know, that's 
the first way to do it. But if somebody isn't coming clean, 
then we just don't have a way to know that.
    Mr. Obernolte. Sure. Yes, I think it's an incredibly hard 
problem. I mean, maybe--because you're talking about intent, 
right? So maybe goes to the intent of these grant applications, 
and, you know, trying to assess whether or not there is a 
disproportionate benefit to someone outside the United States 
when this--when the taxpayers' money is spent on that kind of 
research.
    Dr. Zuber. No, it's incredibly difficult to tell, so--you 
know, and in a university, you know, the intention is openness, 
so it's--the--you know, everybody is going to take what they 
have, and the--they're going to put it in the public domain, 
and they're going to put it out there, you know, while, you 
know, trying to protect their intellectual property. So of 
course, you know, that's going to be taken care of. But if you 
have an entity on the other side that has things that it isn't 
releasing, that's just incredibly difficult to get a handle on.
    Mr. Obernolte. Um-hum. So let me ask about the science and 
technology risk matrix that's been developed by the Department 
of Energy. Do you think that that is a good model that might be 
able to be utilized more broadly by the research community to 
assess the risk level of the research that they're doing?
    Dr. Zuber. Yes. So I actually am a--I'm a big fan of that 
risk matrix. So in the Department of Energy, the way that 
they've gone about it is they got the chief technology officers 
of their national labs together to try to define narrow--as 
narrowly as possible, OK, so not saying everything in AI, OK, 
but to actually define technologies that have progressed far 
enough, or on the way of progressing to the point where they 
could raise concerns about either national or economic 
security, and to try to define them as being problematic. So I 
actually think that's a really good model, because it's--the 
people doing it are the people who understand the levels of 
technology that are problematic, and that's a good place to 
focus.
    Mr. Obernolte. Sure. Thank you. And let me go to Dr. 
Lerner. I was interested in your testimony that--when you said 
the NSF doesn't have the resources needed to effectively police 
this situation. So, in your opinion, what resources would the 
NSF need to police this?
    Ms. Lerner. I can only speak to--my statement was focused 
on the resources available to my office, and at this point--and 
I'll confine my answer to that. At this point I think even if 
we doubled the number of people in our investigative office, we 
would still be hard pressed to keep up with the number of 
allegations that are coming in. These cases tend to be complex, 
and time consuming, and we have--in responding to them, we have 
sorely tried our staff, who are doing their level best, but 
working beyond their capacity. So even doubling, I think, would 
be difficult for us to do this, and certainly would not enable 
us to get to a point where we could do proactive assessments.
    Mr. Obernolte. Sure. And I see I'm out of time. How many 
people on your staff, just quickly?
    Ms. Lerner. We have slightly over 20 total in our Office of 
Investigations, but some of those are investigative scientists 
who focus on research misconduct, so even fewer than that.
    Mr. Obernolte. OK, so 20 more bodies. All right. Thank you 
very much.
    Ms. Lerner. It's a start.
    Mr. Obernolte. I yield back.
    Ms. Lerner. Thank you.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And Chair will now recognize 
Chair Stevens for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Stevens. Great. And, as we've heard today, it's not 
certainly just the Chinese government being unique in its 
efforts to undermine the U.S. scientific research enterprise, 
however, it does appear that the Chinese are the most active, 
and best organized, and a major source of concern are the 
talent recruitment problems--or programs, rather, the talent 
recruitment programs sponsored by the Chinese government.
    And, Ms. Candice Wright, in your submitted testimony, you 
shared that government agencies rely on universities to monitor 
conflicts of interest, and then six of the eight universities 
that the GAO interviewed did not know what these talent 
recruitment programs are, or even how to identify them. And 
while a governmentwide prohibition for federally funded 
researchers participating in such programs was passed in the 
House NDAA for the next fiscal year, could you share just a bit 
more about what is being done to increase the understanding of 
these programs in the research community, and what impact you 
think this might have?
    Ms. Wright. Certainly. Thank you for the question, Chair 
Stevens. So I would say, for our work, we certainly heard from 
the research community, the researchers, that they didn't have 
an understanding of these foreign talent recruitment programs. 
Some of these programs have actually been around in other 
countries, you know, several countries around the world. And 
while some of them were not aware of it, they started to become 
aware when we started asking questions in our meetings with 
them, but then also through some of the outreach that agencies 
are conducting to build awareness around this broader issue of 
research security.
    There's certainly folks with whom we spoke with who noted 
that these programs sometimes can really be seen as 
prestigious. They're a way to advance research, advance 
careers, you know, similar to serving on a board, for example. 
So there are lots of, you know, professional benefits that come 
with it. And so what's really required now is to enlighten the 
community's awareness about the maligned behaviors that may 
exist, and using these programs as a way to get access to U.S. 
research. And so I think the continued training that is 
happening by the agencies sharing information, you know, with 
the--with universities is certainly a step in the right 
direction, again, to enhance awareness and put some sunlight on 
it.
    Ms. Stevens. Right, thanks. And would anyone else like to 
care--comment on this topic as well?
    Dr. Zuber. Yes. So----
    Ms. Stevens. Go ahead. Yes.
    Dr. Zuber. Chair Stevens, can I just add to that? Yes. So 
it used to be that these foreign talent programs were 
considered prestigious, you know, in the same way that some 
U.S. fellowships are, and now, you know, we're starting to find 
out that there's requirements associated with them. So, as we 
get information on these talent programs, we--you know, we have 
a website where we post all that information for our community, 
and we tell our students, you know, anything that requires, you 
know, providing information on what you're doing to somebody 
else, anything that requires signing a contract, you know, you 
have to be extremely wary of. And--but these--you know, 
there's--we now list them, the ones that are problematic, but 
new ones keep appearing, and they have to be vetted. So it's a 
matter of constant vigilance to really keep after these things, 
yes.
    Ms. Stevens. Yes. And Dr. Zuber, while I have you, could 
you give just an update on the status of the work--just to 
backtrack, in January the White House issued a National 
Security Policy Memorandum directing agencies to action to 
address research security risks. In August Dr. Eric Lander, 
President Biden's science advisor, and Director of the Office 
of Science and Technology Policy released a statement that 
additional guidance on implementation of the National Security 
Policy Memorandum would be available in 90 days. And, just in 
your role as Co-Chair of the President's Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology, you have provided input to and reviewed 
the forthcoming guidance. Do you happen to have any update on 
this?
    Dr. Zuber. Yes, sure. So they were open to--so the NSPM-33 
memo came out right at the very--the last waning days of the 
previous Administration, and there was--actually, there was a 
lot--there were a lot of really positive aspects for it, such 
as harmonizing disclosure requirements across agencies, and 
various things. And--but there was--you know, if I'd say there 
was a shortcoming, there was a lack of specificity. You know, 
universities were being asked to comply to certain things, and 
they weren't being told what they need to comply with in 
sufficient detail that they could actually tell that they were 
compliant.
    So I provided input, but many university associations 
provided input as well, in terms of what could help clarify 
that, and I reviewed the draft, let's see, shortly after Dr. 
Lander published his blog. And it's still a work in progress, 
but I think that the issues that I raised, and the 
recommendations that I raised, as well as those of the society, 
as far as I can tell, they were taken to heart, and I think----
    Ms. Stevens. Yes.
    Dr. Zuber [continuing]. That what you're going to see----
    Ms. Stevens. We're a little over time, but--yes, we can get 
back to you on that. But----
    Dr. Zuber. Absolutely.
    Ms. Stevens [continuing]. Thank you to the Chair for 
obliging the overage, and we can yield back----
    Chairman Foster. Thank you.
    Ms. Stevens [continuing]. The time at----
    Chairman Foster. Yes.
    Ms. Stevens [continuing]. This point. Thank you.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. I will now recognize Ranking 
Member Waltz for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I just want to 
say at the start, to Professor Xiaoxing, I am--want you to hear 
from me, certainly, I am deeply sorry for what has happened to 
your family, what happened to you, what happened to your 
reputation. It's just--it's absolutely unacceptable, you know, 
regardless of what mistakes were made, to have your family at 
gunpoint for--you know, for that type of even alleged 
infraction is just jaw-droppingly unacceptable. And I think I 
speak for a lot of my colleagues, and want you to hear from us 
how unacceptable that is.
    Mr. Chairman, I just want to read very quickly, and then 
submit for the record, from the State Department's website, the 
military--China's Military/Civil Fusion Program, which, ``is an 
aggressive national strategy of the CCP, a key part of which is 
to eliminate barriers between China's civil research, and its 
commercial research, and its military, by acquiring the world's 
cutting-edge research through theft in order to achieve 
military dominance.'' I'd like to submit that for the record, 
Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Foster. Yes. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Ms. Lerner, you mentioned to Mr. 
Obernolte your office is approximately 20, but not even every 
one of those 20 is dedicated to the type of grant theft and 
research fraud that we're talking about. I believe, correct me 
if I'm wrong, the security office is right now an army of one, 
one woman, God bless her. So, you know, while we may describe, 
you know, the needs here as kind of a tune-up, I think we need 
a massive overhaul, because--could you just elaborate on how 
the National Science Foundation IG caseload has changed over 
the last 4 years? Because I think there's a--there's--you know, 
I think we need to wrap our minds around the shifting gears 
that's happened under Xi, and under Xi-led CCP, particularly 
with some of the laws that he's put in place that, while these 
researchers may be fantastic individuals, great people, they 
are violating their law, and they are put in a no-win 
situation. And whenever the government taps them on the 
shoulder to give what they want, they have to do it. But just--
if you could talk to me about how your caseload has shifted in 
the last 4 years, and why or why not are you able to 
proactively pursue cases?
    Ms. Lerner. Thank you, I'd be happy to do that. We first 
became aware of the issues posed by foreign government talent 
recruitment programs very late in 2017. So, prior to that, we 
didn't have any cases that we knew had any relevance to that 
particular issue. It turns out that there was a very small 
number of cases that we had prior to late 2017 that turned out 
to have talent plan ramifications. That wasn't the basis that 
we worked them on. You know, it was just straight grant fraud, 
and we--the talent plan issue was not the source of the grant 
fraud there.
    But since becoming aware of the issues with talent plan 
memberships, our case load has increased to the point where, as 
of yesterday, it's 63 percent of our investigative portfolio, 
and that's a huge growth in a very short period of time. And as 
I noted, these are not easy cases, they're complicated, and we 
want to make sure we gather the information that we--that's 
necessary to prove or disprove an allegation----
    Mr. Waltz. Well, I appreciate the Committee's work in 
helping get the security office more resources. I think we 
need----
    Ms. Lerner. Um-hum.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. To get you more resources. But I 
believe in a previous conversation you said you had about 1,000 
percent increase in referrals from the FBI. Is that correct?
    Ms. Lerner. We did. I--we did, in fact, yes, and at this 
point, just keeping up with the referrals for--the requests for 
assistance from the FBI, which we, you know, we routinely 
receive, but never at this magnitude, you know, requires a 
full-time staff person.
    Mr. Waltz. Sorry, just for the--don't mean to interrupt 
you, for the sake of time, you've had 1,000 percent increase 
with things as they stand now. Now the Committee's looking at 
doubling, or if the Senate has their way, you know, tenfold 
increase in moneys and grants, which I certainly support, but 
are you looking at an increase in resources from that 
thousandfold increase, and then, on top of that, from the 
magnitude of what we're talking about? I mean, I just think 
this is a massive problem of scale that we're not fully dealing 
with here.
    Ms. Lerner. There--if--the legislation that would increase 
the size of the agency by about $11 billion that's in the House 
would offer--over 10 years would offer my office $50 million to 
focus on our work. So we are being considered, and we're very 
grateful for that.
    Mr. Waltz. That's fantastic. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we will now recognize the 
Chair of the Full Science Committee, Representative Johnson, 
for 5 minutes.
    Chairwoman Johnson. Well, thank you very much, and good 
morning to everyone. This is a very, very important hearing, 
and I thank the leadership for getting right to it. The U.S. 
research enterprise has benefited enormously from a culture of 
openness and collaboration. The U.S. has also had a--been a 
highly sought after destination for talented researchers and 
students around the world. What steps have agencies and 
universities taken to raise awareness and mitigate these risks? 
What does success look like, and what are the goals agencies 
and universities are working toward? And I guess I will start 
with Dr. Zuber.
    Dr. Zuber. OK. Thank you, Chairwoman Johnson, for that 
question. So we have--at my university, and peer institutions, 
we have done active outreach to faculty. We have held town 
halls and forums, we have gone to departments, we have had 
individual meetings, and in particular we have offered 
individual conversations and consultations with our Asian 
faculty, Asian and Asian-American faculty, who feel targeted, 
I'll be clear about that. So we have--so training has been a 
big part of it. We have also proactively been working with the 
Federal agencies, and providing them with our perspectives on 
how they could structure disclosures in a way that would make 
it easiest for our faculty to disclose.
    And so I just want to say here, though, universities aren't 
set up to be investigative. We don't--we're not investigative 
organizations. And so, while we have staffed up, you know, we 
don't have the sort of capacity that, say, Allison does. But 
those are the steps that we have--and what does success look 
like? It--we would understand well how to comply, and we would 
eliminate all these inadvertent non-compliances because we 
don't understand, and that--we would be able to focus on the 
cases, and we would understand what the real espionage threats 
are, and go after them, and let law enforcement prosecute 
those, but we wouldn't be making mistakes of confusing 
disclosures with actual intent to do harm.
    Chairwoman Johnson. Well, thank you very much. Ms. Lerner, 
can you comment?
    Ms. Lerner. Thank you. I think, you know, if we're going to 
succeed in fighting this challenge, a critical piece of 
information to all parties involved is having access to the 
contract a researcher signs with a foreign talent agency. It's 
the terms of those contracts that pose the real risks to an 
organization, and I think for--it--it's essential for 
universities, and for funding agencies, to have access to them, 
to be able then to determine, you know, which--what risks they 
pose, and whether they are insurmountable or capable of being 
managed.
    Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you very much. I have one more 
minute. Can anyone else comment?
    Ms. Wright. Sure. I'd like to jump in here, Chair Johnson. 
So I would say, for GAO's part, you know, we think what--
another key thing that really needs to be addressed is to 
strengthen these conflict of interest policies that agencies 
have so that the university community has a clear understanding 
about what the definitions are with regard to financial, as 
well as non-financial, conflicts, and what activities 
constitute those kinds of things, and how they may pose a risk. 
We've made recommendations to the agencies to take action to 
clearly define those conflict of interest terms. We've seen 
some guidance come out from OSTP that includes that 
information, however, it's not required for the agencies to 
adopt it, and I think that that's really something that's 
really important.
    It's actually an issue that, when GAO first started looking 
at this issue of foreign participation in U.S. research back in 
1992, we were talking about conflict of interest policies then, 
and the need to strengthen it, and here we are today in 2021, 
still having that same conversation, and making those kinds of 
recommendations.
    Chairwoman Johnson. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we will now recognize 
Congress's other Ph.D. scientist, Representative Baird of 
Indiana, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Chairman Foster, and Ranking Member 
Obernolte, and Chairwoman Stevens, and Ranking Member Waltz. I 
appreciate this opportunity, and I appreciate the witnesses 
being here today. I guess I'm going to start off with the 
relationship with law enforcement and academia, and in that 
vein I'd like to start with Dr. Xi, and ask him, given your 
traumatic experience, do you have thoughts on how law 
enforcement and the Department of Justice can work with 
academia in order to gain a greater technical expertise, and 
then hopefully avoid unnecessary situations like yours? So Dr. 
Xi?
    Dr. Xi. Thank you, Representative Baird. And--so I think 
what the law enforcement can do first is to abandon the 
assumption that all Chinese professors, scientists, and 
students are spies for China. And so--they're not. And so I 
think a lot of the problem, like failure to disclose, that has 
been discussed, you know, if you abandon the assumption that 
these people are spies, then the--you know, if they make 
mistakes in filling their disclosure forms, and that's--then, 
you know, they can correct it. And if--anything that is out 
of--you know, not in line with the principles of open research, 
of what, you know, Chinese government is doing, you can point 
it out, and then they can correct it. So, you know, this, I 
think, is the No. 1 thing they should be doing.
    And in terms of how to balance openness and security, I 
think that the JASON report, right, which is the--was 
commissioned and endorsed by the NSF, has presented a fact-
based solution that's very well balanced in openness and 
security. And, you know, it's recommended that these kind of 
problems should be dealt with within the framework of research 
integrity, and I think if a failure to disclose occurs, 
university and offending agencies should investigate, and deal 
with it, and--only when it's really--the case when law may be 
broken, then they should refer to the FBI. And so I think that 
would be, in my opinion, the right way to do it.
    Mr. Baird. Well, thank you for that. And I'm going to 
switch to all the witnesses on this question. The FBI has kind 
of shifted the way they collaborate with the universities to 
combat--in order to combat this foreign intelligence gathering. 
I speak--specifically they set up the Office of Private Sector, 
which is a contact point for universities and corporations. All 
56 of the FBI's field offices have at least one private sector 
coordinator. So, in your opinion, is this an effective means to 
handle the problem, and what else could be done? And I think 
we'll start with Ms. Lerner.
    Ms. Lerner. Thank you, Representative Baird, and I think 
any efforts on the part of the FBI and law enforcement to 
increase understanding of these challenges, and education about 
the risks, and build communication capabilities with the--with 
academic institutions is to be praised, and of value.
    Mr. Baird. Super. Thank you. Dr. Zuber?
    Dr. Zuber. Yes. So I agree with Allison, that this is a 
positive step. It's a work in progress. You know, there--what 
would really benefit is greater mutual understanding of how 
academia works versus how law enforcement works. They're 
different culturally, and--so in academia, it's a very data-
driven community, and they want to see evidence, whereas in law 
enforcement they tend to hold things tightly until there's an 
actual prosecution done or not. And--so there's a disconnect 
there, and, you know, we've certainly been--try to work with 
the FBI, and--making progress toward what kind of information 
can we actually provide the academic community with so that we 
can better understand the risks that are there? And as we 
continue these conversations, I think this continues to 
improve.
    Ms. Lerner. Representative Baird, if there's one more point 
I could make?
    Mr. Baird. Yes.
    Ms. Lerner. Thank you very much. I would just note that the 
inspector general community, especially IGs at research funding 
agencies, are a great kind of intermediary between the 
professionals at the FBI and the academic institutions, because 
we are embedded within agencies that have a research-focused 
mission, and we understand law enforcement. I think we have a 
vital role to play in, you know, in ensuring that those 
communications are at their--are as strong as they can be.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you. Ms. Wright?
    Ms. Wright. So I would just underscore what's been said in 
terms of making sure that law enforcement is providing 
information in a concrete way for the university community to 
understand, and presenting that information in a way that 
resonates and reflects the environment in which they operate. 
One of the things that we heard in the course of our work is 
that oftentimes law enforcement comes in, and they speak in 
generalities, which makes it really difficult for the 
universities to fully understand the scope and magnitude of the 
issue, but also, more importantly, to have enough information 
to share with their community, with their community of 
researchers, principal investigators, and such.
    And so I think that that's something that's--really needs 
to be--for them to be mindful of, is how to present information 
such that people can really understand what the scope of the 
issue is, and the nature of how these threats unfold, and what 
their role can be to help in combatting the issue.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you. I--you know, I can appreciate that, 
in many cases, the research being conducted by the researcher 
is so specific that it would be difficult and--to eliminate all 
of that to law enforcement, so I see the challenge, and I 
appreciate the work that's being done. And, Mr. Chairman, I 
yield back.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we will now recognize 
Representative Stansbury for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Stansbury. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
all of our Chairpersons today for convening this very important 
hearing. I want to start by saying that it's critical, as we 
move forward and continue the work of this community, to ensure 
that the programs and funds that we're creating rise to the 
challenges of our times, and continue to foster the kinds of 
international collaboration and research that really advance 
our science enterprise. Open data, international collaboration, 
multi-cultural exchange, and diversity in STEM (science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics) are all essential 
ingredients to innovation in our science and technology 
enterprise, and the social and economic well-being of our 
country and of our planet.
    In fostering these exchanges, it's paramount that we do not 
open our institutions to foreign influences and malign forces, 
and continue to protect the safety and security of our 
communities, but we must also ensure that these security 
measures do not lead to unintended consequences that 
unnecessarily hamper international collaborations, and lead to 
racial profiling and discrimination.
    My home State of New Mexico is a science and technology 
powerhouse, and home to numerous federally funded research 
institutions, including two National Laboratories, several Air 
Force research laboratories, and two public R-1 research 
universities. These institutions, and the researchers who make 
them up, come from across the country and across the planet, 
and are the cornerstones of our communities. The University of 
New Mexico and New Mexico State educate a diverse and talented 
student body, and attract researchers from across the planet 
who produce critical research that enriches our Nation and our 
competitiveness. And, in fact, just this last month, our 
President recognized New Mexico's research leadership by naming 
NMSU's (New Mexico State University's) Dr. Dan Arvizu, who's a 
friend to this Committee, to the President's Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology.
    Both of our universities are strengthened by their 
diversity, not just as Hispanic-serving institutions, but also 
by the international students and researchers who bring their 
talents, their perspectives, and their ideas to our State and 
our country. The majority of these students, and many of these 
researchers, stay in the U.S. after completing their time, and 
continue to contribute to research advances, and, of course, to 
the cultural fabric of our communities.
    Our National Labs and Air Force research labs also attract 
researchers from across the planet, and international exchanges 
are part and parcel of the work that they do every day. These 
labs, and the work that they do in our communities and for our 
Nation, are helping to tackle our biggest challenges, from 
national security to global climate change, and so continuing 
to foster those international exchanges is not only paramount 
to the security of our Nation, but also to our planet. So I 
look forward to continuing to supporting the Committee's work 
to ensure that we implement safeguards that allow us to work 
with the international community in developing new research and 
technologies, and continue to attract and welcome international 
students and researchers to come to our country, and work in 
our country, and to contribute to the scientific enterprise 
that will serve our national security, and our global well-
being.
    So, with all of that in mind, and especially because our 
universities are oftentimes strapped by having challenges to 
access resources, I want to ask Dr. Zuber a question about 
university security. You know, for smaller universities, or 
those with less resources, in your opinion, what are--what does 
the risk landscape look like, and are universities equipped to 
defend themselves, and how is the Federal Government helping to 
strengthen collaboration between universities to address these 
threats?
    Dr. Zuber. Yes. So, Congresswoman, thank you very much for 
that question. I was waiting for the opportunity to make this 
point. You know, making the most of research in the U.S. means 
getting everybody involved, and there are many, many, many 
institutions that are capable of participating in the research 
enterprise, and we need them all fully locked in. But it--all 
of the things that we've talked about, in terms of disclosures 
and cybersecurity, you know, all these safeguards, they require 
a level of sophistication, they require a lot of staffing, and 
they require a lot of resources. And so, by putting these in 
place, it's actually an impediment to all universities, but 
particularly the universities, such as in New Mexico, from 
participating in this.
    So the--you know, what--you heard a little bit about what 
the Federal Government is doing. By harmonizing among agencies 
what they require for disclosures, and by providing guidance 
and best practices for--so that universities have a clear idea 
of what they need to do to comply, that can be extremely 
helpful. And by setting up working groups that allow 
universities to share best practices, is another thing that's 
important.
    Ms. Stansbury. Thank you very much, and we look forward to 
continuing to work with you, and with that, Mr. Chair, I yield 
back. Thank you for the time.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we will now recognize our 
new colleague from Texas, Representative Jake Ellzey, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Ellzey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't need that 
long. As a new Member, I appreciate you holding this hearing. 
I'd like to thank the guests that we have, and their testimony, 
as well as the other Ranking Members. And, Chairman, this is an 
important topic to be looking at, and it's very timely, and I 
appreciate all your input today. I have no questions, and I've 
learned a lot from this, and I appreciate the opportunity to be 
recognized, and I yield back.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we will now recognize 
Representative Tonko for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I thank both 
Subcommittee Chairs and Ranking Members for holding this very 
important hearing, and thanks to the witnesses for being with 
us today. The U.S. Government relies on a robust federally 
funded research enterprise to inform our most important 
decisions, from how to combat climate change to overcoming a 
global pandemic, so international students are fundamental, I 
believe, to the success of that research, conducted at many of 
our Nation's esteemed colleges and universities. Universities 
such as RPI, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in my district, 
where international students make up 20 percent of undergrads, 
and almost 50 percent of graduate students. These students and 
scholars come to America to study, and work, obviously, but 
also hopefully stay to become Nobel laureates, and founders of 
startup tech companies, contributing billions to the national 
economy, supporting hundreds of thousands of jobs, and deeply 
enriching the quality of scientific research.
    Just this morning a Japanese-born American physicist at 
Princeton University was awarded a Nobel Prize for modeling 
Earth's climate and reliably predicting global warming. 
However, it is increasingly difficult for international 
students to get their education here, and there has been a 
decline in enrollment over the last several years. If we cannot 
attract that kind of talent, or if students and scientists 
don't feel comfortable engaging with their international 
colleagues, the U.S. leadership in science and innovation will 
indeed suffer. So while much of the discussion today is on 
maintaining the integrity and security of the U.S. research 
enterprise, we want to ensure we are not scaring away 
international scholars, or causing a brain drain of 
catastrophic proportions.
    So Dr. Xi's written testimony included preliminary data 
showing that 43 percent of international students and early 
career scientists in physics perceived the United States as 
unwelcoming. I am worried about the impact that has on the 
mental health of international students and scholars working 
and studying here in the U.S. Dr. Xi, have you gotten the sense 
that scientists and students of Asian descent feel under 
attack, or under increased scrutiny?
    Dr. Xi. Yes, that--thank you for the question. Absolutely. 
The policy to target Chinese scientists, and crack down on open 
fundamental research has created an atmosphere of fear in the 
scientific community. You know--the DOJ charged a Chinese 
scientist when she--he or she has done nothing wrong, or has 
made an error in disclosure forms, people are terrified, and 
they're afraid that they may be the next. And many are so 
terrified that they are afraid to talk about their fear, right? 
This is not just for Chinese scientists, but scientists from 
many other countries.
    So let me give you an example. We are now signing an open 
letter identical to the open letter that 177 professors from 
Stanford had sent to Attorney General Garland about the China 
Initiative, and some told me that they fully support the 
letter, but out of concerns of the possible consequences, they 
will not sign it. Right? So I--you know, as you mentioned, 
this--it--American Physical Society survey, you know, 40 
percent, that's a large percentage of--see America as an 
unwelcome country, and the--40 percent say they are less likely 
to stay in the U.S. long term. I mean, this is huge. This will 
cause the U.S. to lose its leadership in science and technology 
faster than anything Chinese government can do.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And, given your experience, how would 
you advise Asian-American or Asian immigrant students 
considering going into the sciences in the United States?
    Dr. Xi. Well, you know, we came to this country 30 years 
ago because this country, as I said, is the best place for 
science, and the most welcome country in the world. And now we 
know that there are people in this country who want to change 
that. So, I mean, the freedom of movement is a fundamental 
human right, so people should decide where they want to live 
and work based on their best interest. However, if they decide 
or consider to come to the United States, they should realize 
the risks that Chinese scientists do face in this country.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
    Dr. Xi. But on the other hand, you know, America is a 
democratic society, right? We have the opportunity to speak up, 
and to help, to make this country a more perfect union. So, you 
know, I have the opportunity to come here and speak to you, and 
tell you that, you know, the policy to crack down Chinese 
scientists, and to open science, is bad for this country, and 
an injustice. I mean, so, if they decide to come to this 
country, they should not just come here and do science, and 
nothing else. They should be prepared to participate in the 
democratic process, and, you know, participate in the civil--
you know, like voting and things like that, and try to help to 
make this country a better place, and change the policies that 
hurt this country.
    Mr. Tonko. And, Dr. Zuber, you discussed the importance of 
encouraging and enabling Chinese students to stay in the U.S. 
after graduating. Are you concerned that this unwelcoming 
perception of the U.S. might reduce our ability to retain these 
students, or fail to attract them to come in the first place?
    Dr. Zuber. Yes, I am, Congressman, and there is evidence 
that there have been decreases in Chinese students wanting to 
come to the U.S.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you. I believe my time is up, Mr. Chair--
--
    Chairman Foster. Expired.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we will now recognize 
Representative Meijer for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 
hearing. I think the title is very appropriate. Balancing an 
open society and security, it's about striking that right 
balance, and I appreciate all of our witnesses here today. I 
want to second Ranking Member Waltz's, you know, expression of 
apology to Dr. Xi for that treatment. I mean, obviously that is 
what happens when that balance is not being struck, when we err 
on the side of security, without appreciating that we need to 
be balancing those--that imperative to make sure that we're 
providing for our national security with recognizing that 
scientific collaboration and research cannot be done in 
isolation, it needs to be done in a collaborative fashion. We 
need to have appropriate guardrails, and I also appreciate, 
Director Wright, the GAO report along those lines.
    Here in West Michigan, in Grand Rapids, just about a half 
mile from where I'm standing, we have the Van Andel Research 
Institute, which is a fantastic medical, and specifically 
cancer, research institute. This has been a concern that was 
raised to me very early on in my time in Congress, how we can 
ensure that, while ensuring that we are protecting for American 
security, and ensuring that research being done here is not 
supporting, you know, international actors, but is being done 
to benefit the medical and research community writ large, how, 
in that balance, we don't ultimately cutoff supply of talented 
academics, of talented researchers, who may be able to 
contribute to that ultimate goal. So I think it's critical that 
we strike that right balance.
    And on that note, you know, Dr. Zuber, you know, this was a 
bit covered in the GAO report, but when it's left up to the 
universities, you know, the universities are not experts in 
counterintelligence. They may not be experts in the Thousand 
Talents Plan. This is not a capacity that they have on an 
individual basis. So, you know, what are your recommendations 
to universities or research institutions on how to best conduct 
due diligence on potential Chinese or other foreign partners?
    Dr. Zuber. So universities themselves are not in a position 
to do this due diligence. You know, we depend--you know, 
whereas--we assume that if a student gets a visa, or a 
researcher gets a visa, that they have been vetted by 
authorities who have experience in doing that. It's our 
responsibility, as universities, to inform our faculty and our 
students about what the rules are for disclosure, and the 
issues associated with foreign talent programs, that we explain 
to them, and train them, but ultimately, you know, we're going 
to assume and require--people need to tell the truth. You know, 
if--you know, we don't go in and--we do--you know, we do do 
spot checks on people, but mostly we're there to educate, to 
have individual discussions, and go through people's background 
and CV, and grant applications to make sure that they're doing 
things the right way, but we depend on honesty.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you. And, Dr. Zuber, I guess, on that 
same point, when it comes to collaboration with law enforcement 
or with the FBI, I think of that old expression, if all you 
have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. If we're coming 
from the lens of solely focusing on the counterintelligence 
angle, then, you know, what could be a simple clerical error, 
or a lack of understanding of what required disclosure--and, to 
your point, that's why the education component's important, but 
how do we have that right balance where something can get 
elevated, but doesn't automatically fall into pure 
intelligence, counterintelligence, you know, that elevated 
level of concern and attention, but can be mitigated at a more 
appropriate level to what's been demonstrated?
    Dr. Zuber. Well, I just want to agree with what Dr. Xi said 
before.
    Mr. Meijer. Um-hum.
    Dr. Zuber. The law enforcement should be called in when a 
law is broken, not for filling out a form wrong, OK? Our 
researchers are desperately afraid that if they fill out a form 
wrong, that the FBI's going to show up at their doorstep, and 
that's not a winning strategy for us.
    Mr. Meijer. All right. Thank you, Dr. Zuber. And then, Ms. 
Lerner, you know, obviously China's been the focus of much of 
this, but could you speak to any other threat actors that 
you've seen in your experience that we have concerns about them 
utilizing our research apparatus for their own, you know, 
foreign policy goals?
    Ms. Lerner. I'm aware that there are other nations of 
concern that have foreign government talent recruitment 
programs. Again, our focus has been strictly on the contracts, 
the nature of the contractual relationships, and I think that's 
why failure to disclose a relationship like that is not just a 
paperwork error. It--when a university is not aware of that 
relationship, and when a funding agency is, it doesn't have the 
opportunity to assess, and be aware of, and grapple with the 
risks posed by that, and that undermines the competitive 
process, and that puts funds at risk. So I--with all due 
respect, I want to counter the idea that failure to disclose is 
simply a paperwork error.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Ms. Lerner. With that, my time's 
expired. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Dr. Xi. Can I add a word?
    Chairman Foster. Yes, yes, briefly.
    Dr. Xi. Yes. No, I think it's definitely important to have 
a clear rule about disclosure, however, overemphasize on 
disclosure send a message that--don't collaborate with foreign 
scientists, right? Foreign scientists, they will say, well, why 
do I want to risk legal problem by collaborating? So according 
to the same American Physical Society survey, one in five 
physicists have either chosen, or been directed, to withdraw 
from international engagement, and that is bad for this 
country.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we will now recognize 
Representative Ross for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Ross. Thank you very much, Chairman Foster and 
Chairwoman Stevens, for holding this hearing, and for all the 
panelists for joining. I represent a district in North Carolina 
that includes much of the Research Triangle Park, which is the 
largest research park in the United States, and a premiere 
global innovation center that has been dependent on people from 
other countries, and companies from other countries, coming to 
North Carolina, and finding a welcoming environment. Wake 
County, where I represent, is also the home to several world 
class research institutions, like NC State, doing 
groundbreaking research into clean energy technology, more 
flexible and adaptive 5G network, and much more. And these 
research institutions benefit from the ingenuity and creativity 
of foreign-born individuals.
    At the same time, I know that the government has an 
obligation to ensure that our research enterprise is free from 
undue influence, but striking the balance is not an easy one, 
and it is important that we work together, and include the 
private sector in how to implement guidelines to promote open 
science that do not discriminate against foreign 
collaborations. In July, I, along with 90 of my colleagues in 
the House and Senate, sent a letter to Attorney General Merrick 
Garland requesting an investigation into repeated wrongful 
targeting of individuals of Asian descent, and we asked the 
Attorney General to specifically review the China Initiative, 
and see if it unfairly targets individuals based on their race 
and ethnicity, and I ask unanimous consent to enter the letter 
into the record.
    Chairman Foster. Without objection, so ordered.
    Ms. Ross. Thank you. Dr. Xi, I'd like to hear just a little 
bit more about your career path. You shared quite a lot with 
Congressman Tonko that was very helpful, but I'd like to know, 
why did you want to come to the United States, and become a 
citizen, and raise your family here? What made this country 
attractive to you? You're on mute.
    Dr. Xi. Yes, thank you for the question. And, as I said, we 
came to this country because America is indeed the best place 
to do science, and it's welcoming to foreigners. And so--of 
course, as I said, in this country, we all have the right to 
speak up for our own interests. And, of course, we also have 
the duty to be--participate in the democratic process. And I'm 
happy I made the decision, because, you know, as I said, our 
career really flourished, and I personally--I reached the level 
in my profession that I would never have imagined when I was, 
you know, young in China.
    And so that's why, you know, after my case, I really felt 
that we need to do something, because, you know, the three 
lessons that I learned from my case, one, when DOJ charge 
somebody for crime, it's not necessarily true. What they said 
in my case was totally wrong. And two, Chinese scientists are 
being unfairly targeted, and, No. 3, the routine academic 
activities are being criminalized. So when I saw--actually, 
even today, most scientists are not aware of these problems. 
Now, of course, these facts were unimaginable to me before my 
case, and now I understand it, and I saw people are still not 
aware, and it's a big concern to me. So I--you know, I was 
thinking, if I can help people to realize this problem, bring 
people to action, then my contribution to science will be much 
bigger than if I publish some more high-impact journal papers.
    So that's really my hope, is that scientists, scientific 
community, can speak up, and tell the public, and tell the 
policymakers, about the fact, right? Because we have a lot of 
untruths flying around, like, you know, Chinese--China sent 
400,000 students to the U.S. to steal American technology. 
That's simply not true.
    Ms. Ross. Well, Dr. Xi, thank you so, so much. I want to 
just ask a very quick question of Dr. Zuber about the China 
Initiative. And I don't want to minimize the fact that there 
are bad actors out there who do want to steal our research, but 
I want to ask, with such a particular focus on one country, do 
you think we might be keeping our eye off the ball, and not 
looking into some other countries that might be using the fact 
that we're focusing on China to engage in nefarious 
enterprises?
    Dr. Zuber. Yes, I think looking more broadly would be--
would have some benefit, certainly in the cyber area. Without 
question there are other serious, serious players on that front 
that are--that present a real risk.
    Ms. Ross. Many thanks, and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you, and we will now recognize 
Representative Casten for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Casten. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our 
witnesses. I really appreciate having this hearing, you know, 
and I'm--if you'll forgive me for a little bit of 
philosophizing, we have always had a challenge in our country, 
maybe in every country, between, you know, people who embrace 
change and people who are afraid of change. And that's been 
manifest in our immigration policy through the years, you know, 
the--you know, from Japanese internment camps to the Chinese 
Exclusion Act, we've certainly seen plenty of anti-Asian bias 
when Asians represented a form of change in the status quo. 
And, of course, that's still ongoing. Last year I had to 
organize a town hall after an Asian-American constituent of 
mine was attacked and beaten on the run by people who felt 
empowered by the fact that the President of the United States 
was using racist terms to describe COVID. We are still dealing 
with that. So I'm glad we're having this hearing.
    That said, I want to focus on a different issue raised in 
this report that I feel has gotten too little of--attention, 
which is that academic institutions that are pushing the limits 
of knowledge, overturning existing paradigms, are also 
frightening to those who see their job as to stand athwart 
history yelling stop, as the saying goes. And so, as long as 
academic research and academic institutions are being 
politicized, there's also a risk of overfocus there. And in the 
specific report that was shared, of the 186 cases of theft or 
attempted theft that were identified in the Economic Espionage 
Act, only 3 percent of those were at academic or government 
research institutions, and the overwhelming majority of our 
conversation today has been about academia. And so, Dr. Zuber, 
I'd like to turn over to you, what are we missing in that other 
97 percent? And let me just start with that, and then followup.
    Dr. Zuber. Yes. So it's puzzling to many of us why so much 
of the focus is on academia, when most of the cases, especially 
as it relates to economic security, are not there. I think 
because the focus has been on non-traditional collectors, and 
the spirit of openness in U.S. universities, but what are we 
missing? Well, the 97 percent, you know, industry doesn't have 
the same openness as universities do, and cybertheft is quite a 
big deal, and intellectual property theft as well in industry 
are also a big deal, so I would say that those are the two 
areas where we're obviously losing.
    Mr. Casten. So if we focus on this solely in the--sort of 
the more public ends of our research institutions, what does 
that do to academia? What does that do to the type of research 
that gets done, the people who do it, the quality of research?
    Dr. Zuber. Well, it's--you know, I mean, academia has to do 
its part to follow the rules, but ultimately, in academia, 
academics want to be publishing things, and getting information 
out to the world. So what--you know, another effect of this is, 
if we put a chill on academia, you know, that's a loss of 
talent that's going to go out to these industries, so it's 
ultimately negatively affecting U.S. industry as well.
    Mr. Casten. Well, I mean, clearly we want to protect U.S. 
intellectual property. I just have a concern that, if we're 
ignoring 97 percent of the problem, we may be overburdening our 
resources in the wrong area. Would--did any of the other 
witnesses have any comments on that?
    Dr. Xi. No, if I can, I can add a word, and--you know, you 
are absolutely right. University is where all research is 
published, and there is no need for people to steal anything. 
They can just read journal publications. And--for example, 
the--you know, when asked about the reported Russian stealing 
of COVID research, the NIH Director said, I'm not exactly sure 
what serious risk is involved here. Mischief? Yes. Serious 
risk? I'm not sure. You know, the former CIA (Central 
Intelligence Agency) Director John Deutch has said the risk of 
losing of technology to China is minor compared to the losses 
that will be incurred by restricting inquiry on university 
campuses. So that's why I was asking the question, are they 
catching the real spies?
    Mr. Casten. That's an excellent question, and I'm out of 
time, so I'll yield back, but really appreciate your thoughtful 
responses.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you. And, finally, we will recognize 
Representative Beyer for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Question for 
Inspector General Lerner, you suggest in the testimony that one 
of your responsibilities is to work closely with the FBI on 
cases that may prevent conflict. When we listen to Professor 
Xi's concerns, not only his arrest, but a number of the other 
FBI cases that resulted in arrests that turned out not to be 
true, how confident are you that the FBI's going at the in the 
right way? That--why are we continuing to get arrests of people 
who later turn out to have done nothing wrong?
    Ms. Lerner. I can't, unfortunately, speak to the specifics 
of those cases because our office wasn't engaged in them. I 
know we have done our--and made many offers to work with the 
FBI to help them have a better understanding of the academic 
research environment, and how to engage with that community, 
and we're happy to show them the approaches that we use that 
do--are--wherein we do our best to protect the privacy of the 
people that we're investigating during the course of those 
investigations, especially if ultimately it turns out that 
allegations are not, you know, substantiated.
    Mr. Beyer. Thank you. Dr. Zuber, I very much appreciated 
your testimony about finding the right balance, that--well, my 
youngest graduated from Rice a few years ago, and I think most 
of her closest friends in her dorm were children born in China 
who'd come to--there to get their undergraduates, and then 
their Ph.D.'s, and stay, and were getting wonderful job offers 
in the United States, with no intention of going back. You 
know, this wonderful reverse brain drain from China that is--
serves the American public very well, and probably is not that 
helpful for China. How do we make sure that we keep our science 
open, and what percentage of all the research and work that 
they're doing really represents a national security threat to 
us, if somehow it's--were it got into the hands of, say, the 
Communist Party in China?
    Dr. Zuber. So let me answer the question of what can we do 
to encourage international individuals to stay in the U.S. 
after they've gotten their degree. So the first thing that we 
really need to do is that--on our campuses, and we do open 
research, that we can't restrict university grants to 
participation only by U.S. citizens, and there's a move to do 
more and more of that. So you--imagine you have a situation 
where you've got a research group, but only the U.S. citizens 
can work on parts of it, and then--you know, it makes the non-
U.S. citizens feel like second class, OK? So if something is 
problematic, it shouldn't come to a university for research, 
OK, with minor, minor exceptions.
    The other thing that we can do is accelerate the green card 
for anybody who gets a Ph.D. in a STEM field. So you get your 
diploma, you get a green card stapled to it, or coming by, 
certainly, so that we make it clear that we want these 
individuals to stay in the United States because--for all the 
reasons that you've mentioned, and that others have mentioned 
here.
    Mr. Beyer. Great. Thank you.
    Dr. Zuber. And the fraction that presents a national 
security concern, actually, I wouldn't begin to know the answer 
to that, so I think I'd better steer clear of that one.
    Mr. Beyer. Well, I'm saving my hardest question for Ms. 
Wright, because she is a GAO specialist, right, so you know 
everything about how government works. I've been hearing about 
the STAPLE Act for at least 25 years. Every Democrat and every 
Republican talks about--willing to keep these great new Ph.D.'s 
in our physical sciences here. How come we can't pass the 
equivalent of the STAPLE Act in the U.S. Congress?
    Ms. Wright. Representative Beyer, I would have to say that 
that's something that I'm not familiar with, and not--haven't 
looked at that in our work. But certainly, with regard to some 
of the work force issues, you know, that GAO covers, there 
continues to be a growing need, and an ever-increasing need, to 
make sure that we have the right STEM work force in place to 
meet the challenges of our time. That might include, you know, 
looking at not just talent here domestically, but certainly 
also taking into account, you know, foreign talent that comes 
to our universities.
    Mr. Beyer. You might have to ask our Chairman for a GAO 
report on why we can't get the STAPLE Act passed. Mr. Chairman, 
I yield back.
    Chairman Foster. Thank you, Representative Beyer, and I 
have to--I can't avoid this opportunity to give a shoutout to 
an act that we've been introducing for the last several 
Congresses, I believe, the Keep STEM Talent Act, to basically 
staple a green card to Ph.D. diplomas.
    And, before we bring this hearing to a close, I want to 
thank our witnesses for testifying before the Committee today, 
and to thank our Committee Members on both sides of the aisle 
for their thoughtful questions on this complex issue. I'd also 
like to echo our special gratitude to Dr. Xi for--despite his 
experiences, and those of his family, for his continuing 
commitment to making our scientific enterprise, and our 
country, a better, more secure, more just, transparent, and a 
more welcoming place for researchers from around the world. And 
as someone whose wife is a first generation Korean-American, 
and a Ph.D. physicist, I personally appreciate your integrity 
and courage.
    The record will remain open for 2 weeks for additional 
statements from Members, and for any additional questions the 
Committee may ask of the witnesses. The witnesses are excused, 
and the hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the Subcommittees were 
adjourned.]

                               Appendix I

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                   Answers to Post-Hearing Questions




                   Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. Maria Zuber

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Responses by Ms. Allison Lerner

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Responses by Ms. Candice N. Wright

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Responses by Dr. Xiaoxing Xi

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                              Appendix II

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                   Additional Material for the Record



       Document submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson

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            Document submitted by Representative Bill Foster

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            Letter submitted by Representative Deborah Ross

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           Reports submitted by Representative Michael Waltz

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