[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


 .
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-45]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                    FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST

                        FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND

                        MISSILE DEFEAT PROGRAMS

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             JUNE 15, 2021


                                     
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
45-605                     WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
    Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
               Whitney Verrett, Professional Staff Member
                           Zach Taylor, Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     2

                               WITNESSES

Hill, VADM Jon A., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency.........     6
Karbler, LTG Daniel L., USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space 
  and Missile Defense Command....................................     9
Shaw, Lt Gen John E., USAF, Deputy Commander, United States Space 
  Command........................................................    10
Tomero, Leonor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 
  and Missile Defense Policy, U.S. Department of Defense.........     3
VanHerck, Gen Glen D., USAF, Commander, United States Northern 
  Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command...........     5

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    37
    Hill, VADM Jon A.............................................    67
    Karbler, LTG Daniel L........................................    87
    Shaw, Lt Gen John E..........................................   119
    Tomero, Leonor...............................................    38
    VanHerck, Gen Glen D.........................................    48

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Waltz....................................................   133

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Horsford.................................................   141
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   140
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   137
    Mr. Turner...................................................   140


FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFEAT 
                                PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                            Washington, DC, Tuesday, June 15, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:03 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Cooper. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to 
order.
    The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony on 
the 2022 budget request for missile defense programs.
    First, I would like to ask unanimous consent that 
nonsubcommittee members be allowed to participate in today's 
hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity 
to ask questions.
    Is there objection?
    Then, without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be 
recognized for the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
    I would also like to ask my colleagues--this is not a 
unanimous consent request--that we try to keep our public 
comments as brief as possible so that we will have a maximum 
amount of opportunity for the closed session, which will follow 
this one. Ideally, we will start that one at 4 o'clock, if not 
earlier, because the more time we have in that session the 
better.
    Today's distinguished witnesses are Ms. Leonor Tomero, well 
known to this subcommittee, who is now Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy; 
General VanHerck, Commander of the United States Northern 
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command; Vice 
Admiral Hill, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; 
Lieutenant General Karbler, Commander of the United States Army 
Space and Missile Defense Command; and Lieutenant General John 
Shaw, Deputy Commander of the United States Space Command.
    We have a breadth of experience with this panel, and I 
thank you for participating.
    In fiscal year 2022 budget request, this administration 
continued efforts across the missile defense enterprise to 
improve our U.S. missile defense capabilities. The 
administration has properly funded the Hypersonic and Ballistic 
Missile Tracking Space Sensor, a top priority for our INDOPACOM 
[United States Indo-Pacific Command], STRATCOM [United States 
Strategic Command], and NORTHCOM [United States Northern 
Command] commanders.
    I am concerned regarding the omission of the Homeland 
Defense Radar-Hawaii because we must ensure that the entire 
United States gets maximum advance warning against threats from 
rogue nations like North Korea. I am optimistic that the 
Pentagon and Missile Defense Agency are addressing issues which 
had led to the cancellation of the RKV [Redesigned Kill 
Vehicle] program as they pursue the Next Generation 
Interceptor.
    Lastly, I look forward to hearing from both Lieutenant 
General Karbler and Lieutenant General Shaw on how Space 
Command is affecting our missile defense requirements.
    I now turn to my ranking member, Mr. Turner, for his 
remarks.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the 
Appendix on page 37.]

  STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for all of 
our witnesses being here.
    This has certainly been an especially challenging year, 
even with COVID [coronavirus] and high deployment rates for our 
warfighters. We appreciate everything you have done to support 
our men and women in uniform.
    I am going to begin with just a brief comment on the 
Biden's fiscal year budget. I am very concerned in where it has 
placed us in that it is so late, having received it in June. It 
inevitably means that we are going to be operating in a 
continuing resolution. I would like you in your comments to 
please address how that might affect the importance of your 
operations. I think missile defense, research and development, 
and certainly our nuclear modernization are areas that are most 
particularly impacted by continuing resolutions.
    I continue to point out that the fiscal year is 
congressionally mandated. We have the ability to move the 
fiscal year. I would hope that Congress might take this up and 
we could look to move the fiscal year to the calendar year. We 
would save the Department of Defense 3 months every year of 
waste and shutdown in important programs.
    And, of course, as I expressed before, I am disappointed in 
the top line in the President's budget number.
    The missile defense budget is just one example of where the 
Biden defense budget comes up short. The Biden missile defense 
request is $8.9 billion, down from the $10.5 billion enacted 
last year, and is the lowest since 2016. Key programs are 
underfunded, such as missile defense for Guam, funding for the 
Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, the elevated radar for cruise 
missile defense of the homeland, and the proliferated low Earth 
orbit Arctic communications program. There are key budget 
priorities that should have been included in the fiscal year 
2022 Presidential request. In my opinion, we must protect the 
homeland with the next generation of missile defense 
technology.
    One of the things that I am struck by in reviewing the 
written testimony of our witnesses is the key partnerships that 
we build with our allies through missile defense. We have Aegis 
Ashore in Romania, and the Polish site is 90 percent complete. 
We also have partnerships with Japan and South Korea, two other 
great partners that live day in and day out with the threat 
posed by North Korea.
    Turning to the Middle East, just this past month, we saw 
our partnership with Israel pay dividends with the Iron Dome 
program. It is now clear that we must replenish the Iron Dome 
system and help advance next-generation missile defense 
technology developed by the United States and Israel.
    I always like to point out that, prior to the deployment of 
Iron Dome, the critics of missile defense used to say that it 
is too expensive, it is escalatory, and that it won't work. And 
what we have seen from Israel is that not only is it cost 
effective in the amount of damage that is avoided, it works, 
and it is actually deescalatory because it gave Israel the 
ability to weigh what its options and its responses are. I hope 
that we look to our own missile defense doctrine as we look to 
our missile defense review to understand how those proven 
concepts should affect U.S. policy.
    I want to thank the chairman again for holding this 
hearing, and I look forward to your presentations.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    We will now ask each of our witnesses to make their 
statements, which hopefully will be fewer than 5 minutes in 
length. Your written testimony will, of course, without 
objection, be entered into the record in its entirety.
    And by the way, I think this hearing may hold the record 
for the number of acronyms used in the testimony. So I 
congratulate all the witnesses for that. It might be an Olympic 
record.
    So the first witness will be Ms. Tomero.

   STATEMENT OF LEONOR TOMERO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
                           OF DEFENSE

    Ms. Tomero. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and distinguished 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify today before you in my previous home to speak about 
missile defense threat and the Department's missile policy----
    Mr. Cooper. Could you pull the microphone a little----
    Ms. Tomero. Sure.
    Mr. Cooper [continuing]. Closer? Thank you.
    Ms. Tomero. Sure. [continuing] And the Department's missile 
defense policy and priorities.
    It is an honor to--it is an honor to testify today with 
General VanHerck, Vice Admiral Hill, Lieutenant General Shaw, 
and Lieutenant General Karbler.
    Along with left-of-launch capabilities and our nuclear and 
conventional forces, missile defense plays a key role in U.S. 
defense. As missile technology matures and proliferates, the 
threat to the U.S. homeland, our allies and partners, and our 
deployed forces is increasing.
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK, continues 
development and deployment of more capable intercontinental 
ballistic missiles that have destabilized and reshaped the 
security environment in East Asia. Iran's short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles comprise the largest missile force in 
the Middle East. Additionally, Russia and China continue to 
develop and field increasingly advanced and diverse regional 
offensive missile capabilities as part of their anti-access 
[area] denial strategy intended to deny the United States 
freedom of action to [project] military power and to protect 
our allies and partners.
    To adjust these evolving challenges, the Department will 
review its missile defense policies, strategies, and 
capabilities to ensure that we have effective missile defenses. 
The review will nest within the National Defense Strategy and 
contribute to the Department's approach on integrated 
deterrence. We expect to complete this strategy in January of 
2022.
    The Department is committed to defending the United States 
against rogue states' missile threats. The Department recently 
initiated development of the Next Generation Interceptor. The 
NGI will increase the reliability and capability of missile 
defense of the United States. As this program moves forward, it 
will align with the administration's defense goals and 
priorities.
    With regard to regional missile defense, defenses will also 
remain central to maintaining the U.S. enduring advantage to 
flow forces into a militarily contested regional environment 
and to safeguard those forces should a conflict arise.
    Additionally, the Department will continue to ensure that 
we bring a more integrated approach to air and missile defense, 
to address various types of ballistic missile threats and 
enable defense against cruise missiles and unmanned aerial 
systems. IAMD [integrated air and missile defense] will field 
interoperable and integrated missile defense sensors, 
interceptors, and command and control to improve capability 
against a range of threats.
    With regard to enabling capabilities, in addition to 
improving today's operational systems, we are examining new 
enabling technologies. Secretary Austin has noted the 
importance of enhancing our global network of integrated 
sensors. Space-based and land-based sensors enable a variety of 
capabilities, such as detection, tracking, and targeting 
through all phases of flight for incoming missiles. U.S. 
commercial innovation is already transforming this field.
    In fiscal year 2022, we will continue to develop the 
prototype Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor that 
will allow the tracking of hypersonic threats and add 
resiliency to our sensor architecture. The Department's 
approach for regional hypersonic defense will first focus on 
defense in the terminal phase.
    Information superiority is critical to the future 
battlefield and necessary to enable rapid planning and 
employment in a joint operating environment. To that end, the 
Department is developing multi-cyber-hardened, advanced all-
domain awareness for our command and control architectures that 
will enable timely and accurate decision-making to address 
emerging threats. And we will continue to develop capabilities 
for left-of-launch and missile defeat that will play an 
important role in effectively countering limited missile 
defense--missile attacks. Sorry.
    Engaging and working with our allies and partners to 
enhance our collective missile defense efforts is a core focus 
area of the Department. Cooperative missile defense with strong 
allies, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and 
our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, will 
continue to be a strong priority. In the Middle East, U.S.-
Israeli missile defense collaboration demonstrates the mutual 
benefits of technology sharing with our allies and partners. 
And we continue our efforts to strengthen missile defense 
cooperation with key Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
    In this context, my office leads a series of dialogues to 
discuss modernization efforts and seek new opportunities for 
joint research, training, coproduction, and co-development.
    In conclusion, as the Department prepares for its strategic 
review, I assure members of this committee that we are 
steadfastly committed to key missile defense missions, 
priorities, and capabilities, including working with our allies 
and partners to meet the challenge of growing missile threats 
in a cost-effective manner that strengthens regional and 
strategic stability.
    I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Tomero can be found in the 
Appendix on page 38.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
    General VanHerck.

  STATEMENT OF GEN GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED 
 STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE 
                            COMMAND

    General VanHerck. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a 
privilege to be here in front of you again to testify. I am 
honored to serve as the commander of the United States Northern 
Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and I 
am grateful to appear alongside my colleagues as they are 
crucial partners in the defense of our homeland.
    United States Northern Command and NORAD are separate 
commands, yet we work seamlessly to accomplish the critical 
mission of defending North America against all threats, whether 
posed by our competitors, natural disasters, or a pandemic.
    We are in an era of renewed strategic competition, and this 
time we are facing two nuclear-armed near-peer competitors, 
both focused on circumventing our homeland defenses. 
Additionally, North Korea's recent unveiling of a new 
intercontinental ballistic missile capable of threatening 
Alaska, Hawaii, and the contiguous United States is meant to 
constrain our options in a crisis.
    I remain concerned about my ability to defend the homeland 
as our competitors continue to develop capabilities to hold our 
homeland at risk from all vectors and in all domains, 
kinetically and nonkinetically, and to exploit a perceived gap 
between our nuclear deterrent, which I believe is the 
foundation of homeland defense, and our conventional homeland 
defense capabilities.
    To close this perceived gap, we must accelerate efforts to 
transform our culture to think and operate globally and across 
all domains, and factor homeland defense into every strategy, 
plan, force management, force design, acquisition, and 
budgetary decision. United States Northern Command and NORAD 
are aggressively pursuing a left-of-launch framework to provide 
the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense 
decision space and deterrence in strategic competition by 
focusing on endgame defeat in conflict.
    With the Missile Defense Agency leading the effort, 
progress on the Next Generation Interceptor is on the right 
trajectory, but further delays will be detrimental to our 
defense and ``deterrence by denial'' capability. We must also 
capitalize on globally layered, multithreat detection systems 
such as over-the-horizon radar and Hypersonic and Ballistic 
Missile Tracking Space Sensors to adequately address both the 
capability and capacity of emerging threats.
    The additional capabilities United States Northern Command 
is pioneering, as demonstrated by our latest global information 
dominance experiment, are focused on prying data from existing 
stovepipe networks to enable global and all-domain awareness. 
By ingesting data into a cloud-based architecture where the 
power of artificial intelligence and machine learning is 
unleashed, we can drastically reduce processing times across 
the globe to rapidly enable information dominance and decision 
superiority. All 11 combatant commanders endorse fielding these 
capabilities as soon as possible.
    For United States Northern Command and NORAD, if we do not 
possess global all-domain awareness sensors and the network's 
data standards and infrastructure to share information quickly 
and efficiently, our ability to defend the homeland against 
emerging threats--such as improved ballistic missiles; 
hypersonics; long-range, low radar cross-section cruise 
missiles--will slowly degrade.
    The United States Northern Command and NORAD take solemn 
pride in executing the Secretary of Defense's top priority by 
standing watch to defend our Nation. I am grateful for the 
trust and responsibility you place in United States Northern 
Command and NORAD.
    Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General VanHerck can be found in 
the Appendix on page 48.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General.
    Now, Vice Admiral Hill.

 STATEMENT OF VADM JON A. HILL, USN, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE 
                             AGENCY

    Admiral Hill. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for your 
time today.
    For PB-22 [President's budget for fiscal year 2022], MDA 
[Missile Defense Agency] is requesting $8.9 billion to develop 
and deploy homeland defenses against the rogue state threat and 
to improve our regional defenses against existing and emerging 
threats.
    The evolving threat can be summarized as a less predictable 
ballistic threat with decoys and multiple warheads potentially 
with nuclear payloads. Hypersonic and cruise missile threats 
present high-speed and global maneuvering challenges to our 
sensor, command and control, and weapons architecture. Now, 
despite the pandemic restrictions, we have maintained momentum 
by advancing the program on several fronts this year, so I will 
go through a few of those.
    I will start with C2BMC, Command and Control, Battle 
Management and Communications. We continued our spiral upgrades 
to integrate sensors and weapons across the joint force, 
supporting our combatant commands and services with tracking, 
cueing, and discrimination data. The hardened network 
integrates with JADC2 [Joint All-Domain Command and Control].
    From a space global capability perspective to improve 
detection, tracking, cueing, and discrimination, Hypersonic and 
Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, or HBTSS, that development 
continues under two competitive awards focused on an on-orbit 
demo in fiscal year 2023 for tracking dim boosting ballistic 
missiles and hyper glides. And this is a critical part of the 
hypersonic defense architecture.
    Space-based Kill Assessment, or SKA, that is deployed 
today, full-up constellation, has participated in several 
flight tests, and we are on track to deliver operational hit 
assessment for the homeland in 2023.
    Moving up to Alaska to the Long Range Discrimination Radar, 
despite the pandemic, we have delivered both arrays. The light-
off is underway now, which means we are radiating, in 
coordination with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], to 
make sure that we take care of the local bush pilots. We will 
go to government acceptance this year, which is initial 
fielding in fiscal year 2022. Our focus will be integration 
into the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, and then we 
will transfer to the lead service of the Air Force for Space 
Force operations in fiscal year 2023.
    From a homeland perspective, continuing the GBI [Ground-
Based Interceptor] fleet reliability efforts through the 
service life extension program has been going very well. And 
what that means for us is we can harvest aged hardware from the 
silos for our Stockpile Reliability Program. We now have 
hardware-based analytical background to our reliability 
estimates, while expanding the missile field capacity in 
Missile Field 4. I am very proud of the soldiers of the 100th 
Missile Defense Brigade and the 49th Missile Defense Battalion.
    The next test for the GMD [Ground-Based Midcourse Defense] 
system is Boost Vehicle 203, BVT-03, developing capability to 
use our 3- and 2-stage GBI. What we will do is we will fly, 
instead of the full kinematic burn, we will burn only to the 
second stage so that we can increase our battlespace and 
enhance the timelines. That is on track for later this year.
    NGI development was mentioned. We are underway with two 
competitive contracts focused on round emplacement earlier than 
the 2028 government estimate.
    I am going to switch over to one of our regional systems, 
the Aegis Integrated Air and Missile Defense. We continue our 
deliveries of the SM-3 [Standard Missile 3] Block IB missiles, 
the workhorse of the fleet, through a multiyear procurement. 
SM-3 Block IIA missiles, developed in cooperation with Japan, 
we are now in production. And we continue our close 
coordination with the Navy to leverage the SM-6 missile for 
sea-based terminal, which I will talk about in just a second.
    I want to say a little bit about FTM-44, Flight Test 
Maritime-44, that we conducted last November, based on 
congressional direction to complete that test in 2020. We 
successfully intercepted a simple rogue state ICBM 
[intercontinental ballistic missile] with the mighty ship, USS 
John Finn, a new-construction IAMD [integrated air and missile 
defense] destroyer, with the SM-3 Block IIA missile. We 
leveraged the design robustness within Aegis and within SM-3, 
and what I mean by that is we are outside the requirement space 
and we are successful in that mission in a defense of Hawaii 
scenario.
    Back to the pandemic that affected nearly every 
construction project we had, to include the Aegis Ashore in 
Poland. But the great news today that I did not report last 
year is we have all four SPY [radar] arrays now in place in the 
site. We have the fire control system in place, and this is a 
forcing function to get us to install and check out the Aegis 
weapon system which we removed from storage. We did all the 
digital signal checks on it. We are doing hardware upgrades, 
and that site is on path to complete construction in 
coordination with the Army Corps.
    Aegis Sea-Based Terminal Increment 2 is deployed today, and 
it represents the first regional hypersonic missile defense 
capability. Increment 3 is underway and delivers in fiscal year 
2024.
    Now, based on real-world data collection and leveraging the 
proven Aegis engage-on-remote capabilities, PB-22 accelerates 
our hypersonic missile defense glide phase interceptor which 
allows us to intercept prior to terminal. We are evaluating 
industry proposals now, and we are going to make sure that that 
design is extensible to land-based batteries.
    Shifting over to THAAD, Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense, we continued our interceptor procurement, our 
production and training support, developing capabilities to 
address the evolving threat in very close coordination with the 
Army. We will go to the last of the Patriot integration testing 
this year.
    Now, for defense of Guam, in PB-22 it includes funding for 
the initial development of the survivable and operational 
effective IAMD, integrated air and missile defense, leveraging 
mature regional systems. I had a conversation with Admiral 
Aquilino last night, and his requirements are clear: Defend the 
people, defend the forces, and do it on a near-term timeline.
    He is system-agnostic, but when you look at the ballistic, 
the hypersonic, and the cruise missile threats, it drives you 
to mature proven systems integrated with the joint force and 
operational in the near term. So in coordination with INDOPACOM 
and CAPE [Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation], 
the technical merits of proven regional systems will point to 
the architecture for our PB-22 investments.
    So I will wrap up by saying space-, land-, and sea-based 
sensors, along with the network of weapons integrated through 
C2BMC that will tie the JADC2, set the stage for hypersonic and 
cruise missile defense capabilities.
    Thank you. I appreciate your time today.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Hill can be found in the 
Appendix on page 67.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Vice Admiral. You covered a lot of 
territory there. There is even more in your testimony.
    General Karbler.

 STATEMENT OF LTG DANIEL L. KARBLER, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL, 
          U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND

    General Karbler. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to 
testify before you today.
    Thank you, especially during the unprecedented health 
crisis of this past year, for supporting our service members, 
civilians, contractors, and their families, and your continued 
support to space and air and missile defense.
    I am here today as the commander of the Joint Functional 
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense and as the 
Army's proponent for air and missile defense forces and 
capabilities. I am responsible for providing General VanHerck 
the soldiers who stand ready to defend our Nation from an 
intercontinental ballistic missile attack, as well as the 
soldiers who provide critical missile warning to Army and joint 
warfighters. As air and missile threats become more diverse and 
numerous from adversaries worldwide, the Army air and missile 
defense enterprise continues to work hard to ensure that our 
warfighters and our homeland are protected.
    I would like to take this opportunity to briefly thank and 
highlight the mission accomplishments of our team of nearly 
3,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, guardians, and 
civilians in this challenging COVID environment that we 
continue to endure. During this past year, in support of 
STRATCOM, SPACECOM [United States Space Command], and NORAD/
NORTHCOM, these outstanding men and women provided the Army and 
joint force with satellite communications, space situational 
awareness, and missile warning and defense, and protected our 
homeland 24/7/365 from ballistic missile attack. Even in the 
pandemic environment they did not miss a beat.
    To outline one of the numerous examples of putting mission 
first and how Army families have sacrificed during the 
pandemic, members of our ground-based missile defense crews 
adhered to 12 consecutive months of stringent measures, 
ensuring the uninterrupted execution of their mission, 
including sequestering crew members from their homes and 
families. Essentially, our missile defense crews lived in a 
bubble throughout their operational rotations on this essential 
no-fail mission. While they and their families reside in 
Colorado Springs, Colorado, and Fort Greely, Alaska, the crew 
members were basically deployed away from their families for 
extended periods of time.
    A positive I have drawn from this pandemic is my daily 
realization that I have never been more proud and thankful of 
our greatest asset, our people. Every day, I am awed by their 
dedication and unwavering sacrifices to our Nation. I consider 
it an honor and a privilege to lead and serve alongside them. 
The continued support of Congress is critical to our ability to 
recruit, develop, retain, and resource such a highly qualified 
and mission-ready team.
    I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Karbler can be found in 
the Appendix on page 87.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General.
    General Shaw.

   STATEMENT OF LT GEN JOHN E. SHAW, USAF, DEPUTY COMMANDER, 
                  UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

    General Shaw. Is my mike on?
    Okay. That better? All right.
    Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you, Chairman 
Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and members of the House Armed 
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, for the 
invitation to join my fellow witnesses today in discussing 
critical national security issues.
    I am pleased to speak today on behalf of our commander, 
General Dickinson, and the 18,000 military, civilian, and 
contractor members directly engaged in and supporting the 
missions of United States Space Command.
    As directed in the Unified Command Plan, one of those 
missions as the Nation's global sensor manager requires us to, 
quote, ``plan, manage, and execute assigned Department of 
Defense space situational awareness, missile defense, and 
missile warning sensors,'' unquote. I am pleased to offer you 
the United States Space Command's perspective on that slice of 
our mission set, and I look forward to a discussion on how 
within the context of DOD's [Department of Defense's] 
overarching National Security Strategy our global sensor 
manager activities complement those of NORAD, Northern Command, 
the Missile Defense Agency, and the Space and Missile Defense 
Command in accomplishment of their respective missions.
    The Unified Command Plan outlines U.S. Space Command's 
tasks as a supported combatant command in a newly declared 
warfighting domain, with a clearly defined, if rather large, 
area of operations. It also outlines a series of supporting 
tasks through which U.S. Space Command enhances the mission 
effectiveness of our fellow warfighting combatant commands. It 
is in our global sensor manager role that you see one of the 
best examples of the confluence of our supported and supporting 
roles.
    Within the third of General Dickinson's key five tasks for 
the command, which is maintaining key relationships, exists the 
sub-task of enhancing interoperability. Our success at the 
strategic level in building the key relationships necessary for 
protection of the homeland depends on integrating weapons 
system operations at the tactical level. That is why U.S. Space 
Command works so closely with NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, MDA, and SMDC 
[U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command], among many 
others, to provide missile warning and missile defense 
capabilities, while simultaneously and seamlessly accomplishing 
our space domain awareness missions. It is an example of the 
classic aphorism that the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts.
    The ability to find synergies among these seemingly 
disparate missions, functions, and systems employed by distinct 
and separate combatant commands will significantly enhance our 
effectiveness in protecting and defending the United States and 
our allies.
    I look forward to your questions on this and other examples 
of the coordination and collaboration among the agencies 
represented here this afternoon.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of General Shaw can be found in the 
Appendix on page 119.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General.
    We will now have member questioning, and I am going to 
defer my questions for the closed session.
    Mr. Turner is now recognized.
    Mr. Turner. Good. Thank you.
    Admiral, I will start with you. Continuing resolutions, 
they impact missile defense or any program that is based on 
ingenuity and new starts and our nuclear modernization 
programs, I believe, more than even just basic continuing 
operations. Could you please describe some of the situations 
that you are placed in with continuing resolutions and its 
effects on your programs?
    Admiral Hill. Thank you for the question, Congressman 
Turner. It has got a broad impact across the program. Let me 
just kind of start where it really matters.
    When you get out to the fleet and you look for supports to 
get the ships underway, right, we will have to work very 
closely with the Navy. If we try to execute a flight test, we 
will often find that the test ranges are suffering from the 
same continuous resolution and everyone will have different 
budget cycles. So execution of tests is at risk.
    When you back----
    Mr. Turner. Okay. Could you explain why a test gets 
impacted more than just the general operations----
    Admiral Hill. Sure.
    Mr. Turner [continuing]. Of a facility?
    Admiral Hill. Yeah. So if you look at the way we fund our 
warfare centers, for example, on the Navy side and the way the 
ranges are funded, they will come to an all-stop with a 
continuing resolution. So we can get a ship out on station, an 
operational ship there, but we will not have the test support 
to do that. We can't get the sensors underway. We can't deploy 
the aircraft that are going to collect data. So that is a clear 
impact.
    Mr. Turner. So, frequently, you can be under a continuing 
resolution for a quarter of the year.
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Turner. So for 3 months out of the year, your schedules 
are set back. Your work product is set back.
    Admiral Hill. Well, and we will do our best to catch up on 
schedules and deconflict and reschedule where we can, but it is 
a significant impact when it comes there. Then if you back up 
even further to say production, normally we will be okay. We 
can carry production for some period of time. But if we start, 
you know, holding up payments to the contractor, you won't see 
us proceed in those areas. So there could be a, you know, a 
shortened gap there or something that cascades to the right. 
And that really translates to cost, right?
    So when you back up to development, now it comes to the 
stability of the team. Right? So just looking at the government 
team, you know, it casts a shadow, right, on the future of 
their careers, and oftentime, we find ourselves losing talent 
during that sort of phase. And then if you go, again, to 
warfare centers and government labs that are on reimbursable 
funding and those sorts of things, we put them at an all-stop 
and freeze them.
    Mr. Turner. Does it affect cost and time delivery?
    Admiral Hill. Absolutely. It will always have an effect on 
cost and time delivery.
    Mr. Turner. General Karbler, examples, ways in which 
continuing resolutions affect your operations?
    General Karbler. So, much like what Admiral Hill just 
talked about, we run the Reagan Test Site. So, again, it 
affects our ability to support those tests that we do for the 
DOD out of the Reagan Test Site in Kwajalein Atoll.
    Mr. Turner. General VanHerck, General Shaw, this is your 
chance at a commercial. Anything you--any anecdotal stories you 
want to provide, any information as to how you have seen 
continuing resolutions be detrimental?
    General VanHerck. It is about predictability, Congressman, 
and being able to move forward based on a plan to execute it 
strategically. For me, directly, in defending homeland defense, 
I will be able to continue that mission. The most direct 
impact, and as you heard in my opening statement, is keeping 
pace with potential threats and adversaries. And the programs 
that Admiral Hill and General Karbler talked about, if we 
further continue to delay those, the risk is we fall further 
behind in defending the homeland. Thank you.
    General Shaw. Congressman, I would just echo what General 
VanHerck said that combatant commands demand capability as soon 
as they can possibly get it. And any continuing resolution that 
delays that capability, whether it is testing or fielding or 
development, is a delay in our ability to sustain readiness 
against an adversary.
    Mr. Turner. Ms. Tomero, in the 2017 NDAA, fiscal year 2017 
NDAA, the Secretary of Defense was required to designate a 
single entity as a lead acquisition organization for defending 
the homeland. I am going to ask you this question in the 
general. You are in the unique position of playing catch with 
yourself. There is a bunch of things that happened while you 
were here that you now have over at the Pentagon, things that 
need to be completed that are not, that you even had a 
significant interest in in occurring.
    What are some of the priorities that you have to make 
certain that the Pentagon finishes and gets over to Congress 
things that you worked to compel them to do?
    Ms. Tomero. Ranking Member, thank you. Yes, it is an honor 
to--sorry. It is an honor to catch those congressional 
requirements now in my new position.
    With regard to designating the single authority for cruise 
missile defense of the homeland, that is something that the 
administration is going to look at. My understanding is that 
the previous administration looked at it and decided not to 
designate a single authority. We do understand that there are 
capability gaps. We need to look at where and how to prioritize 
cruise missile defense of the homeland.
    There are cost issues. I know the Congressional Budget 
Office identified significant costs ranging from $75 billion to 
$80--$180 billion over 20 years. So that would include 
acquisition, also operation--operationalization of the system, 
maintenance over the long term.
    But I think what we need to look at is, what is the 
viability of our capabilities, what are the costs, and how do 
we prioritize that defense?
    Mr. Turner. I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me 
okay?
    Mr. Cooper. Very good.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today.
    In particular, I want to welcome back and welcome to the 
committee, Ms. Tomero. And, Leonor, I enjoyed your work on the 
committee when we worked together, and it was really a big loss 
to the committee when you left but the Department's gain, and I 
wish you well.
    I want to thank everyone for your service to our Nation.
    I want to begin on a directed energy question. I have to 
say I am really disappointed that the President's budget 
canceled MDA's directed energy program. This program provides 
promising ballistic missile defense technology, and it really 
addresses costs and balances between offense and defense.
    Admiral Hill, who made the decision to cut the program and 
why?
    Admiral Hill. Congressman Langevin, thanks very much. Great 
question. I would say it was a Department effort to consolidate 
directed energy work within the Department. And so I will, you 
know, work closely with the Under Secretary for Research and 
Engineering, and when these capabilities reach the power levels 
and the sizing levels that we need, being control, stability, 
lethality capability, then we will adopt those technologies and 
bring them into the missile defense system.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. I am unclear. Was the decision made or 
recommended under this administration or the previous 
administration?
    Admiral Hill. It was prior administration. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Langevin. I see. Thank you.
    How much transparency and input will you have into this new 
arrangement to ensure the technology fits missile defense 
requirements?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. Thank you. I think that is on us to 
ensure that we stay close to the Under Secretary's lead for 
directed energy so that we can influence the requirement, so 
they understand what our powers are, what our concept of 
operations are, how we would leverage that technology. I don't 
see that that is an issue in terms of having access and 
transparency into the roadmaps that lead to those capabilities 
going to industry.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. It is my understanding that you would 
have very little transparency into the funding, though.
    Admiral Hill. That is true. I don't have a good look into 
the funding. All I know is that the funding was removed from 
the missile defense budget.
    Mr. Langevin. So I just want to say, I think that that 
decision from the last administration should be reevaluated. 
That is my assessment. If we move these programs out of your 
agency, I will--I believe we're going to keep them in the labs, 
the technology in the labs, to test them to death, and they 
will never get to the warfighter. At best, it is wasted money. 
At worst, our systems can't keep up with what adversaries are 
developing.
    So the decision also cut the diode-pumped alkali laser 
program, and I am concerned about that, but let me get to 
something else in another area.
    So our adversaries built electronic warfare systems that 
are specifically targeted to undermine our technological 
command and control advantages, especially overseas.
    General Karbler and Admiral Hill, how effective is our 
missile defense network in a contested spectrum environment, 
and what improvements do we need to make?
    General Karbler. Thanks, Congressman. So every day, within 
our missile defense systems that we have, we have got to 
practice--we have got to have cyber protection and we have 
resiliency of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. We collect, 
analyze, report digital data. We deploy and maintain our 
network defense tools. We are constantly evaluating our network 
defense operations and then we respond to incidents, and we 
work very closely with the Missile Defense Agency as any of 
those potential incidents come up.
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    Admiral Hill. And then from my perspective, you know, 
working closely with the combatant commands and with the 
operational forces and the services, because all of the--you 
know, when you look at the missile defense system writ large, 
it cuts across all of the above, and so we have to do a lot of 
coordination there. But we are doing the overall, you know, 
insider work. We are doing the adversarial assessments. We are 
just now starting to work with DOT&E [Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation] to do something called persistent cyber 
operations to where we will be 24/7 monitoring and healing the 
networks as we go.
    For me, I want to know where vulnerabilities are. So it 
becomes a very sensitive topic right away, but we have got 
great relationships with USCYBERCOM [United States Cyber 
Command], with Strategic Command's cyber group, and, of course, 
DOT&E.
    So I think we are in a much better place. If you had asked 
me this question about 3 years or so ago, we were learning how 
to crawl. We are definitely walking very fast right now and 
almost about ready to run as we go into persistent cyber 
operations.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's----
    Mr. Langevin. My time has expired. I have some questions I 
will submit for the record. I appreciate you responding. Thank 
you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank each of you for being here today and your service 
for our country.
    And, Ms. Secretary Tomero, Israeli families face the threat 
of larger, more sophisticated rocket and missile arsenals every 
day provided by Iran to Hamas and Hezbollah. To address this 
mounting threat, Israel and the United States are working 
together to develop and deploy a multitiered missile defense 
system. The U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding on security 
assistance provides for $500 million in funding for annual 
missile defense cooperation with Israel.
    Do you support the continued funding for the joint U.S.-
Israel missile defense programs, including Iron Dome, David's 
Sling, and Arrow? And can you speak on the progress of the 
development of Arrow-4?
    Ms. Tomero. Congressman, thank you very much for that 
question. Yes, there is strong support for continuing those 
programs. They have had a record of success over a long time, 
and we continue our very close collaboration and cooperation 
with Israel. I think on the details of the development of 
Arrow, I would like to defer to Vice Admiral Hill.
    Admiral Hill. Sir, Arrow-4 is going very well in terms of 
laying down the requirements for that system. In fact, as soon 
as the COVID-19 restrictions lifted, we had a team onsite, 
working very closely with IMDO [Israel Missile Defense 
Organization] to lay out requirements and to lay down the 
development path. So I think we are on a--in a good place with 
the Arrow-4.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    And, Secretary Tomero, another country that is under 
threat, and an inventory of short-range missiles will provide 
and improve Taiwan's ability to deter Chinese aggression by 
credibly disrupting, degrading, and interdicting Chinese 
command and control nodes, military airfields, supply depots, 
and reinforcements in response to an attack.
    Does the administration support Taiwan's ability to defend 
itself through layered deterrence by including enhanced missile 
capability?
    Ms. Tomero. Congressman, we strongly support deterrence and 
are investing in capabilities to deter a Chinese attack in the 
area.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    And, additionally, General Karbler, I am grateful that the 
support, which has provided for funding Israel's combat-proven 
Iron Dome system in the FY [fiscal year] 2022 budget request. 
The Army has purchased two Iron Dome batteries. It has been 
reported that the Department is considering purchasing more.
    Has the Army determined where and when the batteries will 
be deployed? Is the Army not considering purchasing more 
batteries? Which parts of the system can be incorporated as 
part of an indirect fires force protection capability?
    General Karbler. Yes, sir. I had a chance to go visit the 
Iron Dome, the U.S. Army soldiers who are on the two batteries' 
worth of Iron Dome equipment up at White Sands Missile Range. 
So I visited them a couple of months ago as they go through 
their training.
    At the end of this month, we will see an Iron Dome live 
fire executed by those soldiers. They will wrap up their field 
training exercises and certifications with the goal that the 
first battery will be ready for worldwide deployment by 
September of this year and then the second battery shortly 
thereafter. Discussions about future deployment, I would like 
to take that in the closed session, if I could.
    Mr. Wilson. Absolutely. Gosh, that is very encouraging.
    And, Admiral Hill, the valued American territory of Guam is 
a key Western Pacific theater operations logistical hub for our 
Navy, making it a priority target for the Chinese Communist 
Party. The Missile Defense Agency's FY 2022 request includes 
$118.3 million to develop an architecture for defense of Guam. 
Your agency has not yet actually detailed what type of system 
this would be.
    Given China's increasing hostile pressure and the largest 
peacetime military buildup in the history of the world, when 
can we expect to have a detailed overview of the system and its 
deployment timeline?
    Admiral Hill. Thanks, Congressman Wilson. We are working 
that very actively. Last night, I mentioned in my opening 
comments, discussing this with Admiral Aquilino last night. You 
will see those details when we deliver the report to Congress. 
We are on path to deliver that from MDA to the CAPE and have a 
discussion with INDOPACOM within the next couple of weeks.
    I think we had promised June, but given the complexity of 
it, it is going take us a little bit longer to get there, but 
we will definitely outline with the detail based on the threat 
set, which is ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic. We are going 
to leverage mature systems, and we are going to procure those 
areas that we need for long lead in order to hit the timeline. 
It is a very aggressive timeline, given where we are at.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Wilson. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Chairman.
    Threat detection and reaction time are clearly key to 
effective missile defense, and both of those depend on 
software. But it seems that our current system of acquisition 
is designed to keep us a step behind, because we lock into 
contracts with a single company or single consortium for years 
at a time, assuming that that company has ability or incentive 
to update the software on the system at the speed of relevance, 
which often they don't. The world has long since become 
software-centric, but DOD is still stuck on hardware-determined 
development.
    So, Vice Admiral Hill, what is your organization doing to 
make sure that your system software can be upgraded regularly, 
will be upgraded regularly? Because I struggle to imagine an 
area where it would be more important to have the fastest and 
most accurate software running our defenses.
    Admiral Hill. Thank you, sir. Great question. And I will 
just highlight two programs and give you some hints in some 
other areas.
    We have adopted agile software processes across nearly 
every program within the Missile Defense Agency in coordination 
with the services. So we have got very strong linkages with the 
Navy on Aegis, for example. When you look at the command and 
control battle management, which is that hardened network that 
brings everything together, that is our all-domain networking 
that will be tied to JADC2 downstream. That is in a spiral 
upgrade.
    That program, early on we recognized because of the numbers 
of sensors that changed, the weapons that change along the way, 
that that one has to be a spiral and in constant evolution. 
That is another great example of very agile, quick software 
turns and delivery to the combatant command, because that 
happens to be where the warfighter touches the system, through 
C2BMC.
    And then the last thing I will mention is on the new 
contracts for Next Generation Interceptor, it is actually 
written into the contract and the program offices, two of them, 
because we have a competition here, are definitely tied into 
DevSecOps, the agile framework, and using digital engineering. 
That is a whole new thing. We have got the latest and greatest 
tools to go execute that, and that will become really the 
standard that we use across the agency.
    Mr. Moulton. But, Admiral Hill, if 10 years from now within 
the missile's lifetime a different company has a better--has 
better software or you simply have a company outside the 
consortium who has a better discriminating radar, some 
component like that, do you have the ability to go outside and 
pick this component to add to the missile system?
    Admiral Hill. Absolutely we do. And so by having modularity 
as a requirement in NGI, for example, that gives us the ability 
to go to those third parties, those innovation sites. In fact, 
I am going to visit the United States Navy's Forge, a new 
establishment that they have now for the Aegis system, and we 
are going to talk about modularity and the complexities of 
bringing in innovation and the third parties.
    I am not quite sold that we can do that right yet, but we 
are having very close conversations on incorporating exactly 
what you are talking about. How do we bring in the small 
business? How do we bring in, you know, different thinking? 
Now, you have to have a structure to that, but we are working 
our way through that.
    Mr. Moulton. Okay. Vice Admiral Hill, you have said we rely 
on nuclear deterrence to address more complex threats to 
include near-peer hypersonic missiles. But I am concerned we do 
not have a vision for managing this emerging threat that does 
not potentially increase the risk of a nuclear response. So 
far, I have asked this question a couple of times and have yet 
to receive a satisfactory answer on what the Department's 
vision is for how we approach the emerging threat from 
hypersonic missiles or pursue our own hypersonic capabilities 
in a way that deters rather than destabilizes.
    So, Vice Admiral Hill, is deterrence still sufficient in 
the face of this evolving capability?
    Admiral Hill. Congressman, I think Policy would be better 
to answer that. I will tell you, for hypersonic missile 
defense, we are targeting the regional threat and--but I will 
turn it over to Ms. Tomero to talk to you about the overall 
policy.
    Mr. Moulton. Great. Thank you.
    Ms. Tomero.
    Ms. Tomero. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman.
    Yes, this is something that we are going to take a close 
look at as part of the Missile Defense Review, the Nuclear 
Posture Review, and as they feed into looking at a more 
integrated approach to deterrence, looking at the threats 
across domains and looking at the risk of escalation. So the 
challenge you alluded to is one of the----
    Mr. Moulton. Ms. Tomero, look, I understand that this did 
not originate with this administration, that it is the last 
administration that has failed to develop any strategy here. 
But let me just point out how insane it is to be pouring 
billions of dollars into an advanced weapons system that we 
don't know how we are going to use and, worse, might actually 
make deterrence worse. So this has got to be an absolute top 
priority.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Ms. Tomero. Yes, it is. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Lamborn.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Hill, I am wanting to talk to you about the 44 
deployed Ground-Based Interceptors. And is there a point over 
the next few years in which we will be dipping below that 
number?
    Admiral Hill. Congressman Lamborn, thank you. Great 
question.
    When we had this conversation about a year or so ago, we 
saw reliability, you know, falling off a lot earlier than what 
I actually believe it will fall off to, and that is mostly 
because of the support from Congress and the service life 
extension program [SLEP]. So our ability to take those oldest 
rounds out of the ground--you know, there is three classes of 
the GBI. The oldest ones have never been de-emplaced. And so by 
taking them out, replacing the boosters, fixing one-shot 
devices, upgrading the processors, updating the threat 
libraries, that raises the capability from what we have today.
    So, in addition to keeping the number, we are now going to 
increase the capacity because the capability goes up. And that 
is something that NORTHCOM can then consider as they look at 
assessing their shot doctrine. So that the SLEP program, very 
important. If you were to ask me about that timeline to get the 
NGI, the criticality of that reliability program can't be 
stated more strongly than the fact that we have got to do that 
work so that we are hardware based and we really know, as 
opposed to the analysis that we showed you last year, which was 
based purely on analysis, now we have hardware by which to do 
that. And we have some number of those that we have removed 
already to do that replacement.
    So there is some period of time where we will have a little 
bit of a dip, but we will coordinate that with NORTHCOM before 
we do that. But, again, capability being increased is the 
offset.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    And I want to follow up briefly on something my friend and 
colleague, James Langevin, brought up, and that is funding for 
directed energy. Apparently, the money--there will still be 
money on this research and development in other parts of DOD. 
It is just the MDA segment that is being cut for this year. Is 
that correct?
    Admiral Hill. Yeah, that is correct. So, you know, because 
I am so focused on this mission, which is very discrete and has 
a totally unique requirement on how we would leverage directed 
energy, it just means I have to change the way I do business. 
Right? So rather than direct funding and transitioning to 
industry, I will rely on the Under Secretary's office to do 
that for me.
    And then I am working very closely with the services. One 
example would be that when the Navy deploys its based offense 
of a lower powered directed energy, we can take that and use 
that once it matures and raise the power even more to go do the 
ballistic missile defense mission. So it just changes the way 
we do business.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. That is reassuring and 
compared to how it first appeared.
    And then, second, along that line, just a comment I will 
make, not a question, and that is, we will continue to work on 
cooperative programs with the state of Israel on joint research 
and development of directed energy in the missile defense, 
especially short-term, short-range missiles and rockets.
    Ms. Tomero, I would like to ask you a question. It is great 
to have you in the--on, I guess, on that side instead of this 
side of the chairs here.
    But now that the new administration is working on a Nuclear 
Posture Review, do you anticipate any changes of policy 
pursuant to the results of that review when that comes out 
compared to the last administration?
    Ms. Tomero. I mean, I think there will be continuity in 
certain areas, change in other areas, and we are about to start 
the posture review in a couple of weeks, and so that will be--
you know, the analysis and reviews will be performed over the 
summer. And so what I can tell you is that we are going to look 
at where there might be some change, but that will be 
underpinned by analysis and thorough reviews.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I will be watching that with keen 
interest. Hopefully, more continuity than disruption and 
change.
    And, lastly, General VanHerck, you have previously 
testified that with regard to the current North Korean ICBM 
capabilities, you are comfortable with our present missile 
defense capabilities.
    A little glitch there. Please add time back to my clock.
    But, in your best judgment, do you still agree with the 
assessment that the North Korean threat will begin pacing our 
homeland defenses starting in 2025, and so we will need to 
supplement or enhance the current GMD system to maintain 
parity--or overmatch, actually?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I believe we should talk 
about that in a classified forum. I tell you, I am comfortable 
with the programs that we have in place right now for Next 
Generation Interceptor fielding by 2028 with incentitives--
incentives to pull further left, if able, between the two 
companies that are competing. Happy to discuss further in a 
classified environment.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
    Mr. Morelle.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all 
the witnesses for their expertise, their time, and certainly 
their service to the country.
    I had a couple of just brief questions, if I can, for 
General VanHerck. By the way, thank you, General, for engaging. 
I appreciated our offline conversation a great deal yesterday. 
I was reflecting on it, and I think you and I were talking 
about the nature of conflict having become a global engagement. 
And I was--I think I was commenting, as I am new to this 
committee, about sort of the combatant commands being more 
regional in nature, and we were having this conversation as I 
was reflecting on it.
    I wondered if I could ask you to just talk a little bit 
more about the nature of it and how it has really become a 
global engagement. I know our combatant commands are structured 
regionally, but could you talk a little bit more about how you 
see it and, specifically, of how having domain awareness is a 
critical element to the success of that global engagement, and 
then a little bit maybe about the challenges potentially that 
it poses for you?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, absolutely. So in today's 
global environment, what you see is all problems for the most 
part, especially with Russia or China, but even with the 
invention of the internet and nonkinetic capabilities, even 
rogue state actors or even non-state actors have the potential 
to have global influence through their activities, both in day-
to-day competition and in crisis.
    My homeland defense design doesn't start with defending the 
homeland inside the borders of North America or United States. 
It actually starts from a global perspective, relying on my 
fellow combatant commanders, other nations such as NATO 
nations, and our allies and partners around the globe to have 
domain awareness. They have sensors and capabilities. And if we 
share information from undersea to on-orbit, to include human 
information, to give us a global picture, we will be in a much 
better position. So our homeland defense design focuses that 
way. I hope that helps clarify.
    Mr. Morelle. Yeah. And I am just--any challenges that 
poses, or do you feel as though the design is sufficient, there 
is enough situational awareness that the regional combatant 
command approach can sufficiently meet those global challenges?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, from a domain awareness 
perspective, I still see challenges. That is why you will see 
in my unfunded priority list, after we saw the fiscal year 2022 
budget, is for--the top of it is over-the-horizon radar 
capabilities to give us that global domain awareness. The 
competitors have extended their range to be able to hold our 
homeland at risk.
    In addition to that, you see Arctic communications on my 
unfunded priority list, which gives us the ability to share 
data globally and to operate in the Arctic. The same thing, as 
Represent--or Ranking Member Turner mentioned, is the elevated 
radar as well here is an unfunded priority to give domain 
awareness against potential cruise missiles and, finally, over-
the-horizon polar radar capabilities.
    So I think there is room to grow. I am encouraged by the 
budget for ballistic missile defense--I think we have room to 
grow--cruise missile defense, domain awareness. I am also 
encouraged with what the Navy did with regards to undersea 
domain awareness with almost $1 billion in their undersea 
domain awareness.
    Mr. Morelle. In just a little more than a minute that I 
have, General, we talk quite a bit about ballistic missile 
threats. Can you talk to me a little bit more about cruise 
missile threats, and has that changed over the last few 
decades? And is there anything we should be considered about, 
anything that you are concerned about?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, absolutely. Russia has 
developed the capability through long-range cruise missiles 
that provide a very low radar cross-section that are incredibly 
challenging to detect to our legacy North Warning System and to 
our platforms that exist today. That is why, again, domain 
awareness is a priority for me, to give us that longer range 
ability to detect that.
    In the not too distant future, 5 to 10 years, China will be 
in the same position. Russia has developed capabilities from 
undersea with their advanced, very quiet, nearly on par with 
our submarines to field that capability and their bombers, to 
include polar over-the-horizon capabilities and also surface 
vessels.
    So I am very concerned about the cruise missile defense of 
the homeland and something we could talk more about in the 
classified session.
    Mr. Morelle. Terrific. Well, look, I appreciate very much 
your insights.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to offer 
those questions. And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. Thanks. The gentleman is down to the final 
second. Congratulations.
    Mr. Brooks.
    Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Vice Admiral Hill, the Missile Defense Agency will be 
undertaking a new major development effort with the Next 
Generation Interceptor program while concurrently restructuring 
the existing Ground-Based Interceptor program going from a 
single contract to multiple contracts.
    What assurances can you give this committee that the MDA is 
approaching this program transition in a way that reduces risk 
while continuing to meet or exceed the current schedule?
    Admiral Hill. Thanks, Congressman Brooks. We did a top-
down, bottoms-up restructuring of Missile Defense Agency writ 
large at the beginning of 2020. A lot of folks call it MDA 2.0. 
And what we mean by that is when we stood up the two contracts 
as we prepared to make that award, we had to start early on 
constructing two separate program offices with the right 
certified board leaders that were going to be in charge of 
that, put all the conflict-of-interest issues on the table, 
make sure we had all the firewalls up.
    We brought in a technical direction agent, new for the GMD 
program, so that we can leverage the UARCs [university 
affiliated research centers] and FFRDCs [federally funded 
research and development centers], bring in that additional 
talent coming in. I mentioned before that we are moving to 
digital engineering and DevSecOps. That program to me is a 
model program within the Department of Defense in terms of how 
we are doing business. Two contracts competing, pressure on 
industry, reducing risk.
    We are seeing IRAD [independent research and development] 
investments being made in the critical areas that we were 
concerned about when we were dealing with the RKV [Redesigned 
Kill Vehicle] program. So I think we have got it right. Plus, 
we have got a great set of operational needs statements coming 
from the combatant command. We have got a strong set of 
requirements that were endorsed by the JROC. This is a new and 
different Next Generation Interceptor, and I think we are 
poised to take it on. We have got the right professional team 
in place.
    Mr. Brooks. Another question unrelated to the previous one. 
China is rapidly developing multiple hypersonic weapon systems. 
America is developing hypersonic missile defense programs at 
the speed of relevance is necessary to deter Chinese aggression 
and defend against future attacks.
    The Missile Defense Agency's unfunded priority list for 
fiscal year 2022 includes a request for additional funding for 
hypersonic missile defense efforts. Will you please share with 
this committee how the requested funding would accelerate 
development of this capability?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. And if we were to rewind and go to 
last year, we were focused on the science and technology [S&T] 
of operating in that very unique environment of the glide 
phase. But after viewing many of those real-world flight 
events, to include, you know, actual U.S. test events, we were 
able to show that with our models of the systems, which are 
very high fidelity, that we can, in fact, close the fire 
control loop.
    And so one of the reasons we are focused right now on the 
Aegis capability with its proven engage-on-remote capability is 
the fact that we can track in glide phase. We can have a ship 
upstream before you ever get the space constellation in place, 
pass that data to a ship, and close the fire control loop.
    So what is missing in that equation is the interceptor. And 
so we put out a broad area announcement earlier this year, and 
in PB-22 you see an acceleration of that program. So moving 
away from an S&T program that was focused in on the mid 2030s 
to a program that is focused on this decade, and so that is 
what we are doing. So when you look at the plus-up area, that 
will continue some of the parallel work to reduce risk in that 
program.
    Mr. Brooks. Can you update the committee on the status of 
the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor capability, 
which is absolutely necessary for tracking hypersonic missile 
threats from launch and throughout the missile's flight?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. Thank you for asking about the 
HBTSS, Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor. So as 
you know, we took a very measured approach to this. We started 
with a number of companies in the concept of development. Then 
we neck down to four companies that we put through what we call 
a clutter management demo, which meant we are coming from space 
looking down on a warm Earth at warm targets, you know, and 
could we develop the algorithms to extract those targets out of 
that scene, and we were very successful on the ground.
    So where we are now is we have down-selected to two 
contractors, so we have a competitive approach again. So two 
companies in NGI, we have got two companies on the glide phase 
interceptor program, and we have got two companies on HBTSS, 
that that competitive pressure, and we are going to put two of 
those up in orbit in fiscal year 2023, two different companies 
with a requirement to be interoperable, and we are going to 
connect them to our flight test in the INDOPACOM region, so 
HBTSS on path to get to demo on-orbit in fiscal year 2023.
    Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see I only have a 
few seconds left, so I will yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. We appreciate the extra 16 seconds there.
    Mr. Horsford.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to our witnesses for testifying today. It is 
really great to have your expertise and insight. It has been 
very informative.
    Vice Admiral Hill, in March of 2018, General Hyten 
testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that when it 
comes to hypersonic weapons, specifically China's DF-17, 
hypersonic boost glide vehicle, quote, ``We don't have any 
defense that would deny the employment of such a weapon against 
us.''
    Last week, you testified to the same committee that the 
Aegis Sea-Based Terminal is, quote, the first regional [brief 
audio malfunction].
    Okay. Last week, you testified to the same committee that 
the Aegis sea-based terminal is, quote, the first regional 
hypersonic missile defense capability that is deployed with the 
aircraft carrier strike groups today, and it is important that 
we have that capability now because the hypersonic threat is 
there now.
    So my understanding is that last operational test of the 
Aegis system and the SM-3 block IIA interceptor was conducted 
in November 2020 against a simple ballistic ICBM threat during 
FTM-44. So I am curious if any additional advancements have 
been made since General Hyten's 2018 testimony that have 
changed the DOD's assessment of the effectiveness of Aegis 
against the hypersonic threat?
    Admiral Hill. Okay. Congressman, thank you. So I am going 
to separate two things for you. FTM-44 with an SM-3 is a 
midcourse engagement of a ballistic missile, so that is 
separate and distinct. When I say Sea-Based Terminal, that is 
leveraging the SM-6 missile down in the atmosphere where it is 
maneuvering and going after a high-value unit. And I think that 
is what your question is really centered on.
    We are on what we call Increment 2 today with a upgraded 
version of SM-6, and we are testing that over the course of the 
next year. Increment 3 will bring in a broader set of those 
threats.
    So it was a true statement last year, because what we were 
really designing against in the early increments was against 
the maneuvering threat but it was still pretty much a ballistic 
missile. But when you actually take a look at the maneuver 
space of where we are today and with the Increment 2 
capability, that is a hypersonic threat because it is 
maneuvering at very high Gs [gravitational force] and it is 
going at a very high speed.
    So we are building upon that. That is that first layer. And 
when I talk about a glide phase interceptor, that is the 
layered defense to where we go after it earlier in the 
trajectory before it comes down into the atmosphere and becomes 
the maneuvering problem. Does that make sense?
    Mr. Horsford. So as a mission-capable kill vehicle for 
currently fielded hypersonic weapons, is the interceptor 
capable of performing this function?
    Admiral Hill. It is capable of performing that function in 
the atmosphere against a series of threats, and its limit would 
be the airframe, which I can't talk about today.
    Mr. Horsford. And a question for Ms. Tomero. Other than the 
deployed Aegis systems, how are we currently defending against 
or mitigating the hypersonic threat for our forces deployed in 
the Indo-Pacific?
    Ms. Tomero. Congressman, so we are, as mentioned, focusing 
the priority for hypersonic defense as a regional threat. We 
are also looking at increasing the defense of Guam as well, in 
the context of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
    And so those are all capabilities that are being further 
studied and looked at both from the Missile Defense Agency and 
also the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and 
so increasing those investments and prioritizing capabilities 
will feed into the fiscal year 2023 budget request.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I have a few other questions that I will ask 
and take offline of the official proceeding. Thank you, and I 
yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. He has given me back 19 
seconds. Very grateful.
    Mr. DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. I will try to do a little better because a 
lot of my questions have already been answered, and, General 
VanHerck, I think your opening statement laid out a lot of 
those. It is clear that the homeland defense is bearing the 
brunt of real-dollar defense cuts, and that is going to require 
to allocate some risk.
    So just briefly, General VanHerck and then Vice Admiral 
Hill, if you don't mind, can you each provide an assessment of 
the threat posed by our adversaries to homeland below the 
nuclear threshold, things like the Colonial Pipeline 
cyberattack, and then how comfortable are you with the current 
defense capabilities to address these threats?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, thank you for that. First of 
all, I believe the foundation of homeland defense is the 
nuclear deterrent. But right now what you see is after three 
decades of watching the way we project power forward, Russia 
and China specifically are developing capabilities to hold the 
homeland at risk below the nuclear threshold. Those 
capabilities would include very quiet submarines.
    They just fielded--Russia just fielded their second Sev-
class submarine, which is on par with ours. Within a 5-year 
period or so, they will have eight to nine of those submarines, 
which will be a persistent proximate threat off of our east and 
west coast that we haven't had ever in the past. China will be 
about a decade behind. Russia has upgraded all their bombers to 
include their nuclear bombers and nuclear capabilities. Russia 
has fielded already hypersonic glide vehicles launched off of 
ICBM capabilities to hold the homeland at risk.
    With regards to non-kinetic capabilities, I think if you 
just look at recent history that you will see that there are 
significant vulnerabilities in the non-kinetic, especially 
cyber, that we need to take a look at and probably look at--
more broadly at policy across the board and make sure that we 
are as efficient, effective with the limited resources we have 
for cyber defense, which includes homeland security as well as 
DOD. I hope that clarifies that.
    Dr. DesJarlais. That does. Thank you.
    Admiral Hill, do you have anything to add to that?
    Admiral Hill. So what I will do is I will just go down to 
the specifics of ballistic missile defense. I would say, what 
has changed over the last couple years, and you can read about 
it in the white press, you know, you look at some of those 
launches that occurred back in 2018, dogleg maneuvers, right, 
just right right off the bat, maneuvering in space, what I call 
range extensions. They are all hypersonic when they come back 
into the atmosphere.
    So what used to be a very predictable ballistic profile, 
that has now changed, and it is a challenge to the sensor 
architecture. It goes back to General VanHerck's comment about 
all-domain awareness, because it is very important that we 
continue to invest in the sensor capacity that we have against 
ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise, because they are converging 
and they are coming at us, you know, across that whole 
integrated air and missile defense domain.
    Dr. DesJarlais. All right. Thank you.
    And, Chairman, I think that is like real time there. I 
yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Well, Mr. DesJarlais is the prize winner. Two 
minutes returned. We are grateful.
    Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Really, a very 
important hearing.
    Thank you, gentlemen and lady, for participating today. I 
am going to take this in a slightly different way. I have been 
on this committee 10 years now, and we have spent billions upon 
billions trying to create a defense, and it seems the faster we 
go, the behinder we get.
    General VanHerck, you just mentioned getting behind on 
submarines, getting behind on hypersonic missiles, getting 
behind on intercontinental ballistic missiles, ground-based 
missile defense, and so forth.
    The President is going to be in Geneva tomorrow to talk to 
Putin. Should he be talking about arms control in the domain in 
which you are operating? Ms. Tomero first.
    Ms. Tomero. Chairman Garamendi, yes, we anticipate that 
there will be a focus on the need for increased strategic 
stability and building on the progress of arms control and 
building on the foundation of extending New START [Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty].
    And so within the Department of Defense, that will be part 
of the look at integrated deterrence, having arms control as 
part of that, but also, again, looking at across domains and 
the risk of escalation across domains including nuclear.
    Mr. Garamendi. So the quick answer is, yes. With regard to 
each of you, General, Admiral, General, General, what would be 
the first thing you would want discussed in an arms control 
negotiation?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, first of all, I think that 
in the arms control discussion these days should not be 
unilaterally with a single country with the two peer 
competitors that we have. It would be nice to have that 
discussion with both Russia and China.
    I do believe there is opportunities to discuss arms, 
including non-kinetic, such as cyber and space, where we can 
establish lanes in the road where I am very concerned about 
unintentional escalation in those areas. Ideally, I would love 
to get rid of all nuclear weapons. That genie is out of the 
bottle, and I don't think we can.
    So there ought to be a discussion on strategic stability 
with the three nations that we are talking about with regards 
to nuclear weapons, with regards to hypersonic capabilities, 
with regards to space capabilities as well. I will defer to 
give them some more time.
    Admiral Hill. And, Congressman, I am not a policy person so 
it is probably just not appropriate for me, but as a technical 
geek, I will tell you that the reality is the threat does 
evolve, it becomes more complex, and we are going to have to 
make a decision on whether or not we want to deal with that.
    Mr. Garamendi. You know I am not going to let you off the 
hook that easy, but let's move on.
    Mr. Karbler.
    General Karbler. Congressman, again, I am not a policy 
expert. I am an air and missile defense officer, and so----
    Mr. Garamendi. Wait, wait, wait, wait. The four of you know 
more about this than most anybody else. So I understand you are 
not policy; my question is, what would you want to be 
discussed?
    General Karbler. Any discussion on arms control we have got 
to make sure that the parties that participate, whatever is 
agreed to would be verifiable by both countries or whatever 
countries are parties to that.
    Mr. Garamendi. Trust but verify. I have heard that before, 
and it has worked before.
    General Shaw.
    General Shaw. Congressman, so the space domain is--it is 
not a global common; it is an exo-global common. And so I would 
echo what General VanHerck said, that whenever you talk about 
something in the space domain, you have to involve all the 
parties that are participating in that, so we have to be 
multilateral.
    I would think the first thing I would want to look at the 
space domain is norms of responsible behavior within that 
domain, expectations of what is professional behavior versus 
nonprofessional behavior, things that would help us to avoid 
escalation in that domain that could lead to a crisis globally.
    Mr. Garamendi. I think Putin has put that on the table 
already, and two of you, two of the four have already said that 
would be a good starting point.
    I appreciate your comments on this, Admiral Hill. You know 
I am coming back at you and going to get into detail, and 
General Karbler, the same. While you say you are not policy, 
there is nobody around that knows more about policy than the 
two of you or the four of you, five of you. Thank you very 
much. I will yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Waltz. They have called votes so we have four people 
remaining. We are going to end this public hearing in about 10 
minutes, so the shorter you go----
    Mr. Waltz. I will be quick.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General VanHerck, I just wanted to commend NORTHCOM for its 
Arctic strategy. It was pretty comprehensive, called for 
developing strategic partnerships in the region, enhancing 
Arctic operations, capabilities, infrastructure, and a credible 
defense presence.
    I noticed in your Senate testimony, in response to Senator 
Sullivan's question where the various services were 
implementing their respective Arctic strategies as part of the 
President's budget, your response was, we didn't move the ball 
very far this year in the budget with regards to resources in 
the Arctic. Can you flesh that out. What capabilities, what 
infrastructure would you like to see prioritized by the 
Congress that went unfunded in the budget?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I would point to my unfunded 
priority list first for domain awareness with over-the-horizon 
radar capabilities, Arctic communications capabilities, as well 
as polar over-the-horizon.
    You mentioned infrastructure. Infrastructure in the Arctic 
is crucial to be able to project power, not only during 
conflict or crisis but to campaign and create deterrence on a 
day-to-day basis. Additional infrastructure, I think that would 
be helpful.
    And when we talk about competing in the Arctic, what I am 
talking about is persistence. And to have persistence, you have 
to have the ability to remain in place, and that would include 
having a potential port north of Dutch Harbor for vessels to 
refuel, whether they be Coast Guard or Navy vessels as well.
    Additionally, some things I think we could do better to 
compete in the Arctic. I believe, in a crisis or conflict, with 
the forces that we have--and we are blessed to have significant 
forces in the Arctic that are assigned to INDOPACOM but in the 
NORTHCOM AOR [area of responsibility]--more than 100 fifth-
generation fighters, I believe those fighters will likely 
deploy especially to a European or an Indo-Pacific crisis.
    In that situation, I would love to have the ability to have 
forces that would backfill them, that are organized, trained, 
and equipped to operate in the Arctic. Unfortunately, we don't 
have that today, and we need to identify some of those forces. 
I hope that lays out a little bit of the picture.
    Mr. Waltz. That does. That does, General. Thank you. And 
just to be clear, we do not currently have a persistent naval 
presence or a persistent ground presence facing north in the 
Arctic, and I think that is something this committee overall 
should take a hard look at.
    I just wanted to very quickly follow up. Admiral Hill, what 
have your conversations been like with your Israeli counterpart 
with regards to their recent conflict? President Biden is 
committed to resupplying Israel with Iron Dome interceptors 
that were expended. Can you give us a status on that?
    Admiral Hill. I can tell you about our input to that. As 
you know, we have got the partnership co-production on Iron 
Dome, co-development work that we do with the Arrow system and 
with the David's Sling. The conversations that we had with IMDO 
were really to kind of back check, you know, costing of what we 
develop. So as they put together their submittal for that 
special appropriation, they kind of wanted a back check on 
that, and that is just part of our partnership.
    But it is better for Ms. Tomero to answer the question 
because it is really within the Department now for decision.
    Ms. Tomero. Yeah, that is being considered now, and, again, 
will feed into our reviews.
    Mr. Waltz. The President has made the commitment, so I am 
curious as to what the holdup is within the Department. If it 
has been costed out, the relationship exists. The Commander-in-
Chief has said we are going to do this. When do we expect this 
to free from the bowels of OSD?
    Ms. Tomero. Again, the Department is working through it, 
and we expect that this will be just as high a priority. It is 
being prioritized at the highest levels of the Department.
    Mr. Waltz. Weeks? Months? I don't know when the Israelis 
can expect another attack.
    Ms. Tomero. I will get back to you with an answer. I don't 
expect it will be months. Again, it is being----
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
    Ms. Tomero [continuing]. Prioritized at the highest level, 
and the Department is conducting meetings on it this week as we 
speak.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 133.]
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. Mr. Panetta. This will be the last questioner.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
    Just quickly, Lieutenant General Shaw, how is SPACECOM 
integrating new roles as the global sensor monitor?
    General Shaw. So, Congressman, I think what we are 
witnessing is a convergence of those mission sets that I 
mentioned in my opening remarks of space domain awareness, 
missile defense, and missile warning, meaning that as the 
threats diversify, the needs to track those at various stages 
all start to converge.
    A ground-launched antisatellite weapon, an anti-sat weapon 
in space, and a hypersonic or a hyper glide vehicle, they all 
start to occupy the same kinds of timelines and needs. And so 
what we are doing in our role as global sensor manager, is 
finding ways that we can network together sensors against all 
of those threats at speed.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. Great. Thank you. And just one final 
question so Elise Stefanik can get a question in there. I see 
her on the phone. One question though to deal with something 
that is important, near and dear to me, and that is the central 
coast and that is the Navy Postgraduate School [NPS]. How do 
you think other entities within the DOD enterprise like Navy 
Postgraduate School work with SPACECOM to develop new space-
based educational requirements?
    General Shaw. The programs I am already aware of at NPS are 
exceptional when it comes to space education. I think we would 
want to continue to be that part of our educational 
infrastructure.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. So do I. Look forward to working with 
you.
    Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Ms. Stefanik.
    Ms. Stefanik. Thank you so much, Chairman.
    Thank you, Mr. Panetta. I just wanted to make sure they 
knew that I was here on the Republican side.
    My question is simple: Section 1648 of the fiscal year 2021 
NDAA required a report on a layered homeland defense system, 
which was to be submitted no later than March 1, 2021. We are 
obviously past that deadline. The report has yet to be 
delivered to Congress after numerous delays.
    Admiral Hill, Congress is still awaiting this report on 
layered homeland missile defense required by the fiscal year 
2021 NDAA. Has MDA provided all of its input for this report to 
the Pentagon?
    Admiral Hill. Congresswoman Stefanik, the answer to that 
is, yes. It is really a policy question technically.
    Ms. Stefanik. Yes.
    Admiral Hill. I see no barriers, but it is a policy 
question that we----
    Ms. Stefanik. Yeah, but I just wanted to get you on record, 
Admiral Hill.
    Ms. Tomero, so we need this report to complete our work for 
the fiscal year 2022 NDAA. When will OSD submit this to 
Congress?
    Ms. Tomero. Let me get you a better answer on the timeline, 
but I can assure you that looking at what investments we make 
for layered homeland defense, what priorities are made are 
being--are the subject of studies, again, in consultation with 
the Missile Defense Agency, with the Office of Cost Assessment 
and Program Evaluation, CAPE, and so looking at what the 
options are, what the costs, some of it can be scaled, what can 
feed in to make improvements, and what can be done in terms of 
cost reduction.
    And so we have made an initial investment on this in fiscal 
year 2021--I am sorry, in fiscal year 2022, and so those 
studies are going to inform further investments in fiscal year 
2023, and so we will get you an answer on those studies.
    Ms. Stefanik. Great. That study is--it is not optional. 
That deadline is in law required by the fiscal year 2021 NDAA, 
so I will expect that answer from you and your office and OSD 
this week as to when we can expect that.
    My next question is regarding the threats and how they have 
intensified. We know, according to open-source reporting, that 
North Korea has capabilities for striking anywhere in the U.S., 
and there is also open-source reporting that Iran and North 
Korea are working in tandem on missile development.
    Additionally, open-source reporting talks about how the 
IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] oversees Iran's 
civilian space launch program, which is obvious dual-use 
benefits and capabilities. Do you believe that the missile 
threats to the United States increased during and since the 
Obama administration?
    And the reason why I go back to the Obama administration 
is, that administration said that we should build a third 
continental interceptor site if missile threats to the U.S. 
increased. So I want to know on record if you believe the 
threats to the homeland have increased since the Obama 
administration. That is for Ms. Tomero.
    Ms. Tomero. Yes, both North Korea and Iran are continuing 
to increase their missile capabilities and have increased them 
since 2010.
    Ms. Stefanik. And we know that the west coast has a more 
robust protection from missile threats from the Pacific. 
Relative to the west coast, is the east coast as protected from 
threats like a potential Iranian ICBM or an SLBM [sea-launched 
ballistic missile] from somewhere in the Atlantic?
    Ms. Tomero. Yes, all of the United States is protected with 
missile defense today.
    Ms. Stefanik. Switching gears to the NGI, there are reports 
that the MDA plans to buy 10 developmental interceptors as part 
of the NGI program. Would any of those interceptors go anywhere 
outside of the current GBI silo infrastructure sites at Fort 
Greely or Vandenberg Air Force Base? Specifically, could any of 
those interceptors go to an east coast missile defense site?
    Ms. Tomero. I will defer to Vice Admiral Hill on where 
interceptors could be placed.
    Admiral Hill. Yeah, ma'am, right now we are focused on 
getting to the production numbers and those initial test 
articles. It will be a global force management discussion on, 
you know, anything beyond Fort Greely. But right now we are 
planning for Fort Greely. We have got the room there, Missile 
Field 4. We have all 20 silos installed now. We are doing the 
integration work. So we can house them in Fort Greely. And if 
the Nation makes the decision to open up battlespace by having 
a third site, that conversation will come.
    Ms. Stefanik. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Mr. Kahele is recognized for 2 minutes.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    My question is for the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii. I was 
disappointed to see that it was zeroed out in the President's 
budget, a program, a sensor that the previous combatant 
commander had quoted as saying the best program solution to 
enable a credible in-depth underlayer defense for our forces in 
Hawaii.
    You know, in reviewing all the testimony, whether it is the 
Department's, the NORTHCOM commander, the MDA director, we all 
talk about North Korea, Kim Jong-un, and how increasing that 
threat is to the United States and the development of their 
ICBMs and nuclear missiles.
    So my question is for Ms. Tomero. What is the Department of 
Defense's current plan to protect Hawaii and address the gap in 
our ability to detect, track, discriminate, and defeat a 
ballistic missile for Hawaii and for Guam?
    Ms. Tomero. Thank you, Congressman. I just want to make 
clear that Hawaii is currently protected today.
    Mr. Kahele. How is Hawaii protected?
    Ms. Tomero. It is protected with the current capabilities 
we have.
    Mr. Kahele. What sensor protects Hawaii?
    Ms. Tomero. Well, we have SBX [Sea-Based X Band Radar].
    Mr. Kahele. SBX is in the northern Pacific. What sensor 
protects the State of Hawaii from a ballistic missile threat 
from the DPRK?
    Ms. Tomero. Well, we have a network of sensors, including 
the tracking sensors, OPIR [Overhead Persistent Infrared 
satellite], and then, as I mentioned, we have SBX that 
contributes to improved discrimination. So it does----
    Mr. Kahele. If we need to use the SBX for Hawaii, then we 
are unable to use the SBX for the homeland, is that correct, 
for NORTHCOM?
    Ms. Tomero. I would defer to Vice Admiral Hill or General 
VanHerck on the details of the capabilities for----
    Mr. Kahele. I think the fact is--and I know we need to 
adjourn--is that we do not have an adequate sensor for the 
Hawaiian Islands. If we are going to depend on our Aegis 
systems, that is a capability that Admiral Aquilino cannot use 
in the Western Pacific.
    If we are going to depend on SBX, that is a capability that 
NORTHCOM cannot use to defend the continental United States, 
and it is why we need a sensor in the Hawaiian Islands to 
defend against a ballistic missile threat from a rogue nation-
state like the DPRK.
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I would like to talk from 
the NORTHCOM perspective, if you don't mind, about that. Even 
without SBX, I am confident in my ability to defend against a 
threat from DPRK to Hawaii today. I support the Hawaii radar. I 
believe it gives us additional capability for an underlayer 
that would support defense of Hawaii, specifically given 
additional capability and capacity. But let's be clear, at this 
moment in time, I am comfortable with my ability to defend 
Hawaii. That doesn't mean I don't support the sensor though.
    Ms. Tomero. I would add that we are looking at how to best 
improve the defense of Hawaii. The defense of Hawaii----
    Mr. Kahele. I suggest we look at both the defense of Hawaii 
and the defense of the territory of Guam as we shift to the 
Pacific.
    Ms. Tomero. Yes.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Ms. Tomero. Yeah, both of those----
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time is expired.
    The subcommittee will be adjourned until about 5:00 or as 
soon as votes have ended, and we will meet in 2212 for the 
closed session. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]
    
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             June 15, 2021
      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             June 15, 2021

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             June 15, 2021

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              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ

    Ms. Tomero. The Department of Defense remains committed to working 
with Israel to ensure that the Iron Dome Defense System is capable of 
protecting Israeli civilians. The Department supports Israel's request 
for additional support for its Iron Dome Defense System. The Department 
of Defense has provided Congress with information in support of 
Israel's request, and stands ready to answer any questions, as needed. 
The Department also continues to consult closely with the Israeli 
Ministry of Defense on Israel's security needs.   [See page 28.]

     
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             June 15, 2021

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Mr. Langevin. General VanHerck, in your written testimony you 
mentioned that we need to review electromagnetic spectrum management 
policies. Can you elaborate on that?
    General VanHerck. Some of the most promising technologies for the 
denial and defeat of current and future competitor weapon systems 
utilize electronic attack. I believe installations in the United States 
need access to the full range of electromagnetic capabilities used for 
force protection at bases overseas, to enable an agile and effective 
response to evolving threats. However, use of these technologies in a 
homeland defense application will require careful consideration of 
collateral effects and a review of policies that govern our domestic 
electronic spectrum.
    Mr. Langevin. The decision to cut the MDA's directed energy program 
also cut the diode pumped alkaline laser project. This is especially 
frustrating since the program plans to transition the technology to 
industry next year. Given the lack of action at the OSD level on moving 
forward, how are you working with OSD leadership to ensure that recent 
progress leads to an industry transition next year?
    Admiral Hill. In collaboration with Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)), the Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA) used the FY 2021 Congressional Program Increase for the 
Diode Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL) to continue DPAL laboratory 
development with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and 
engage industry (General Atomics, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed 
Martin, and Raytheon). Using the current Congressional funding, DPAL 
will meet the 100kW-class goal with good beam quality in the 3rd 
quarter of FY 2022. At the 100 kW-class goal, DPAL is eligible for the 
OUSD(R&E) High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative (HELSI) funding for 
development to the 300 & 500kW-class. While MDA and R&E identified 
additional development needs, there is no additional R&E funding for 
DPAL because HELSI currently funds four 100kW-class lasers to the 
300kW-class level and anticipates funding one or more to the 500kW-
class level in FY 2023. MDA and R&E have collaborated to monitor DPAL 
progress and develop the next steps. Our plan keeps industry engaged 
while MDA, the Independent Assessment Team, and the Air Force Research 
Lab develop a risk reduction approach that includes developing an 
independent laser kinetics model. The cost of technology transition is 
expected to be reduced once the model is developed and the 100kW 
milestone is reached, however, further development is unfunded by 
industry, MDA or R&E. By FY 2023, R&E will have more knowledge of the 
progress of the HELSI vendors. Until then, R&E and MDA recommend 
continuing DPAL.
    Mr. Langevin. Your unfunded priority list includes cybersecurity 
efforts across a couple programs. What are the consequences of not 
funding those efforts?
    Admiral Hill. Please see the table and description below:

    Enabling PE 0603890C (MC30)--$25.3 million (M)

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    .eps$12.0M: User Activity Monitoring--Funds provide the 
implementation of the Forcepoint modules on the Missile Defense System 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) classified enclaves 
to achieve compliance with Executive Order EO13587, National Insider 
Threat Task Force minimum standards for user activity monitoring. The 
impact of not funding this effort is the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
will be unable to effectively detect insider threats across critical 
Missile Defense System (MDS) cyber terrain, and provide relevant data 
for user behavior in support of authorized investigations. As 
established in the Executive Order, MDA implemented an insider threat 
detection and prevention program consistent with guidance and standards 
developed by the Insider Threat Task Force.
    $5.0M: Compliance Mandates--Funds provide the ability to mitigate 
system vulnerabilities in the areas of technical refresh, software 
updates, secure and standardized software development processes, and 
rogue system detection/data loss prevention, which strengthens MDA's 
cyber defenses and enables its ability to meet mission requirements. 
Cyberspace is a global enabler for information exchange affecting all 
aspects of life. Network-connected systems makes it easier for 
malicious cyber actors to access critical MDS information and disrupt 
vital operations from anywhere across the globe. The impact of not 
funding these efforts weakens MDA's defenses against possible cyber-
attacks, and prevents MDA from remaining compliant with Department of 
Defense (DOD) Chief Information Office (CIO) and United States Cyber 
Command mandates such as Zero Trust, Comply to Connect, and Four Lines 
of Effort. In addition, MDA would delay implementing the infrastructure 
required to support Zero Trust in the current telework environment.
    $3.5M: MDA Integration and Operations Center (MDIOC) 
Infrastructure--Funds provide the implementation of a Special Use Space 
(SUS) data center (DC) in support of an evolving need to execute MDS 
activities at the Top Secret Level. SUS DC supports programs and 
information at the Top Secret (TS) collateral classification level that 
is not available today. Currently, MDA has limited special processing 
space to execute the TS mission. The consequence of not funding this 
effort will severely limit the programs' ability to access TS networks, 
to have sufficient storage for data classified at the TS collateral 
level, and to support cyber operations.
    $2.5M: Data Center Recapitalization--Funds provide additional data 
server space and power distribution to support the expanding need for 
cloud services and rapid deployment of new capability supporting the 
MDS. The consequence of not funding this effort will negatively impact 
MDA's ability to rapidly support cloud-centered programs such as Next 
Generation Interceptor, Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, and 
Model-based System Engineering.
    $2.1M: Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI)--Funds provide 
unclassified Virtual Desktop Infrastructure accessible by the MDA 
teleworker and other remote stakeholder access to MDA RDT&E 
unclassified environments. VDI would further support the telework 
environment and provide remote access and a standardized desktop that 
is cybersecurity compliant and supports data loss prevention by 
retaining all MDA information in the MDA/DOD data center environment. 
System administrators apply software patches and updates to all virtual 
desktops across the MDA enterprise within the server environment. If 
funding is not available for this effort, management of the operating 
system and associated applications makes it difficult to properly and 
securely manage approximately 10,000 individual laptops used to support 
the telework environment. MDA is distributing computing for modeling 
and simulation and model-based system engineering to the Defense 
Industrial Base (DIB) partners where VDI adds additional information 
protection through centralized hosting of data in government data 
centers. Use of VDI is expected to avoid costs in excess of $23M to 
refresh the unclassified laptop fleet and to provide individual clients 
to the DIB partners.
    $.2M: Cyber Assistance Team (CAT) Threat Hunting--Funds provide 
Agency CIO office services to the Technical Intelligence Directorate 
and ensures technical and systems administration support for Cyber 
Threat Hunting systems, tools, users and capabilities. Not funding this 
effort would eliminate or reduce the Agency's ability to support 
numerous internal deployable Cyber Threat Hunt teams on active threat 
hunt missions with the objective of detecting and thwarting ongoing or 
future cybersecurity threats to MDA and DIB partners' data. It would 
also reduce the Agency's ability to centrally host, manage, and analyze 
technical data and information relevant to the threat hunting mission, 
and identify DIB preliminary indicators of compromise.
    Enabling PE 0603890C (MC31)--$19.5M
    Funds provide MDA the ability to conduct warfighter-engaged cyber 
table-top events (Cyber VISUM) to support cyber-risk assessments of the 
MDS in an operational scenario. This funding provides dedicated cyber 
engineering capability to ``design in'' cyber resiliency, 
survivability, and defensibility, and to verify the design's cyber 
effectiveness through developmental and operational test and 
assessment. MDA would also be able to centrally conduct independent 
software stress testing to improve security, resiliency, and 
reliability of MDS software under development. These capabilities will 
reduce opportunities, likelihood, impact, and severity of cyber threat 
risk to the MDS. Without the additional funding, MDA will be reactive 
to the cyber threat and will remain vulnerable to a potential cyber 
threat risk to the MDS.
    Advance Concepts and Performance Assessment PE 0603176C (MC71)--
$5.2M
    Funds provide continued currency of computing system SW/HW for Risk 
Management Framework requirements. The impact of not funding these 
efforts reduces the ability to maintain compliance with the Department 
of Defense Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation Plan and Risk 
Management for Advanced Concepts and Performance Assessments, and 
resources required to replace/upgrade hardware and software 
infrastructure components to protect the Missile Defense Agency's 
information technology systems in the highly contested cybersecurity 
threat environment.
    Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors PE 0603884C (MC11)--$3M
    Funds provide compliance testing for Army Navy/Transportable Radar 
Surveillance and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2), X-Band Radar (XBR), and 
Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) mission. The consequences of not 
receiving funding for compliance testing for AN/TPY-2, XBR, and LRDR 
missions creates a lack of subject matter experts (SMEs) available 
during and after cyber testing, and increases the risk for delayed 
responsiveness. Lack of funding for cybersecurity test support may 
limit Ground Sensors mission systems' participation in the FY 2022 
cybersecurity testing campaign, including the elimination of on-site 
Prime Contractor SME support during and after scheduled testing. This 
SME support is essential for risk reduction of the mission system 
associated with robust cybersecurity testing as well as the post-event 
analysis of all findings identified during testing.
    Ballistic Missile Defense Command and Control, Battle Management & 
Communication (C2BMC) PE 0603896C (MC01) ($2M)
    Funds provide compliance with the DOD Cybersecurity Discipline 
Implementation Plan. The impact of not receiving these funds is a 
potential two to four year delay of the C2BMC prime contractor 
implementation of Cybersecurity enhancements to the software 
development environment as well as support lab infrastructure 
(hardware/software) upgrades. These enhancements bolster DOD 
Cybersecurity Implementation Plan Lines of Effort 1 and 4, and automate 
the implementation, testing, and verification of cybersecurity 
requirements, which significantly reduces the time required to build 
and approve C2BMC software application development and test 
infrastructure, and get a secure, robust product into the hands of the 
war fighter rapidly. The reduction will also delay full implementation 
of MDA data-at-rest encryption requirements as well as implementation 
of current DISA Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) and Risk 
Management Framework technical requirements. Both activities, if not 
implemented, place risk on C2BMC to threats from hackers and other 
malicious actors, and delay C2BMC from meeting security and 
survivability requirements.
    Mr. Langevin. General Shaw, DHS is currently reviewing critical 
infrastructure sectors. In that vein, would you support designating 
space as a critical infrastructure sector? How would that designation 
improve space-based missile defense?
    General Shaw. ``Space-based missile defense'' is a small piece of 
the opportunities provided by operating in, from, and to space. Some 
DOD, as well as other sectors', assets in Space are critical to DOD. 
DOD is the Sector Risk Management Agency (SRMA) for the Defense 
Industrial Base (DIB) Critical Infrastructure Sector. As such, many 
space-related DOD equities are accounted for in the DIB Sector through 
the DIB SRMA working by, with, and though other Sectors, and through 
the DOD's Mission Assurance Process. Space contributes to defense and 
provides vital capabilities and opportunities in several critical 
infrastructure sectors, including communication, financial services, 
information technology, and transportation systems. DHS established a 
Cross-Sector Council for Space, a few years ago, because working in 
partnership with other sectors is essential to holistic risk management 
efforts. DOD does not, at this time, have a specific position on the 
establishment of a new critical infrastructure sector for Space. The 
most important thing is for critical infrastructure sectors to work 
together on threat sharing and risk management to ensure the continuity 
of National Critical Functions that are dependent on Space assets.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
    Mr. Turner. Does the NORTHCOM North Warning System line have 
capability to detect hypersonic weapons? If not, then what is being 
done to add or integrate this capability into our radar systems?
    Ms. Tomero. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 
North Warning System radar is not optimized for this class of missile 
threat and would not be able to provide complete coverage for detection 
of hypersonic threats. Hypersonic threats are designed to circumvent 
our current sensing and missile defense capabilities. The Hypersonic 
and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) prototype which is on track 
to enter orbit in late Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, is one component of the 
Department's National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA). The NDSA will 
initially consist of a few dozen satellites--a mix of commercial, Space 
Development Agency (SDA), and HBTSS satellites--launched into low Earth 
orbit (LEO) over the next two years. While this proliferated LEO 
architecture is in its initial stages, it will ultimately provide 
critical resilient tracking capability against hypersonic threats in 
all phases of flight. As we continue to prove this capability, the NDSA 
will expand and further bolster the nation's sensing capabilities and 
ability to protect U.S. and coalition forces deployed abroad.
    Mr. Turner. Does the NORTHCOM North Warning System line have 
capability to detect hypersonic weapons? If not, then what is being 
done to add or integrate this capability into our radar systems?
    General VanHerck. No, due to its age and technological limitations, 
the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) North Warning 
System (NWS) cannot reliably or consistently detect hypersonic weapons. 
Moreover, it is not possible to modify the NWS to ensure effective 
detection of emerging hypersonic threats.
    NORAD is working with the Air Force and Canada to begin acquisition 
of Over the Horizon Radars capable of detecting and tracking a broad 
range of air vehicle, missile, and hypersonic threats to North America. 
To date, the Air Force has funded initial site surveys and 
environmental impact studies, scheduled for completion in 2022, but has 
yet to program for acquisition of the radars.
    Mr. Turner. Does the NORTHCOM North Warning System line have 
capability to detect hypersonic weapons? If not, then what is being 
done to add or integrate this capability into our radar systems?
    Admiral Hill and General Karbler. The NORAD North Warning System 
radar is not optimized for this class of missile threat and would not 
be able to provide complete coverage for their detection. Hypersonic 
threats were designed in part to circumvent our current sensing 
capabilities. The Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor 
(HBTSS) which is on track to enter orbit in late Fiscal Year 2023, is 
one component of the Department's National Defense Space Architecture 
(NDSA). The NDSA will initially consist of a few dozen satellites, 
launched into low earth orbit (LEO) over the next two years. While this 
proliferated LEO architecture is in its initial stages, it will provide 
critical tracking capability against hypersonic threats in all phases 
of flight. HBTSS is unique in that it will provide fire control quality 
track data to the missile defense system. This will enable regional 
engagement of hypersonic threats. As we continue to prove this 
capability the architecture will expand and further bolster the 
nation's sensing capabilities and the defense of the United States and 
coalition forces deployed abroad.
    Mr. Turner. Does the NORTHCOM North Warning System line have 
capability to detect hypersonic weapons? If not, then what is being 
done to add or integrate this capability into our radar systems?
    General Shaw. NORDAD/USNORTHCOM is the operating agency for the 
North Warning System, and USSPACECOM defers to their expertise to 
answer this question.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
    Mr. Lamborn. General VanHerck, you've previously testified that 
with regard to the current North Korean ICBM capabilities, you are 
comfortable with our present missile defense capabilities. However, as 
their ICBM capabilities continue to develop, we will be assuming 
greater risk starting in 2025 as the North Korean ICBM threat begins 
pacing and potentially out-pacing our homeland defense capabilities.
    YES or NO: In your best military judgement, will the North Korean 
ICBM threat will begin pacing our current homeland defense capabilities 
in 2025 and beyond?
    General VanHerck. No. As I testified, I am comfortable with where 
the Department is today, and the plan to field the Next Generation 
Interceptor (NGI) in 2028, or sooner. However, going forward, rogue 
nations are developing additional capabilities with the intent to hold 
our homeland at risk. While intelligence assessments vary on the timing 
and scope of North Korea's ICBM program, North Korea certainly 
continues to advance its ballistic missile technology. The risk of 
being outpaced could increase if the homeland ballistic missile defense 
capabilities and capacity do not continue to evolve; the timeline for 
NGI fielding is critical for this continued evolution.
    Mr. Lamborn. To what extent and on which programs are you 
coordinating with the directed energy working group that was 
established in the FY20 NDAA?
    Admiral Hill. MDA is actively participating at the R&E level as a 
member of the FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
Directed Energy Working Group (DEWG). The DEWG is comprised of Senior 
Executive Service level membership from the Navy, Army, Air Force and 
MDA, to coordinate directed energy efforts, leverage shared research 
and development, eliminate redundant efforts, and expedite the 
operationalization of directed energy programs. DEWG was briefed on 
MDA's Boeing Fiber Combined Laser and DPAL programs. MDA provides 
direct support for R&E's HELSI and the Probability of Weapon 
Effectiveness Experiment efforts with R&E funding. MDA actively 
participates in R&E program reviews, provides technical support and 
receives R&E funding for projects of joint interest.
    Mr. Lamborn. Others have previously testified in open testimony 
that with regards to current North Korean ICBM capabilities they are 
comfortable with our present missile defense capabilities to protect 
the homeland. However, as their ICBM capabilities continue to develop, 
we will be assuming greater risk starting in 2025 as the North Korean 
ICBM threat begins pacing and potentially out-pacing our homeland 
defense capabilities.
    YES or NO: in your best military judgement, will the North Korean 
ICBM threat will begin pacing our current homeland defense capabilities 
in 2025 and beyond?
    Admiral Hill. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) defers to the 
military judgement of United States Northern Command and Defense 
Department leadership on the sufficiency of fielded and planned 
capabilities. The current Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, 
consisting of space-based, maritime, and terrestrial sensors, GMD fire 
control, Command and Control Battle Management and Communications, 
supporting communications, and 44 Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska 
and California provides protection for the United States against the 
rogue state ballistic missile threat. The DOD plans to commence the 
fielding of an additional twenty Next Generation Interceptors (NGI) in 
2028 to improve the capacity, capability, and lethality of the GMD 
system and to invest in a Stockpile Life Extension Program to maintain 
reliability and capability of the current Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle 
fleet until the NGIs are fielded. Additionally, the MDA continues to 
explore potential layered options for the Department's consideration to 
augment GMD by leveraging the capability of existing BMD systems.
    Mr. Lamborn. To what extent and on which programs are you 
coordinating with the directed energy working group that was 
established in the FY20 NDAA?
    General Karbler. Dr. Craig Robin, who heads up the Army directed 
energy development effort through Army RCCTO, is a member of the 
Directed Energy Working Group. He and the Group are specifically making 
sure that Army directed energy programs are well coordinated across the 
Services and the DOD.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
    Mr. Horsford. Can you describe the planned composition of the Guam 
Defense System if fully funded, and how it would effectively protect 
Guam in the face of hypersonic weapons fielding?
    Ms. Tomero. Within the Indo-Pacific region, China's growing anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) conventional missile capabilities threaten 
Guam, which remains a growing strategic hub for our presence in the 
region. The Department's ability to operate from Guam, including 
defenses that enable sustained operations during a conflict, will be 
central to implementing the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. Missile defense 
is one component of the U.S. capability to counter missile centric 
strategies. In this role, effective and affordable missile defense 
creates doubt for China and North Korea that it would be possible to 
quickly neutralize forward-deployed military capabilities at low cost 
or with low risk of escalation.
    The Department is nearing completion of in-depth analysis regarding 
missile defense options for the defense of Guam. This study will inform 
how the Department will build on the requested $118 million toward 
system foundational work to help pursue a strategy tailored to the 
threat and that is in alignment with this Administration's Policy. 
Hypersonic missiles are being developed, in part, to bypass U.S. 
missile defense capabilities. It is important to examine the means that 
might provide us a credible defense for Guam against emerging regional 
offensive systems. Initiatives are underway to provide first a point 
defense capability against hypersonic threats, and eventually a broader 
defensive architecture. These efforts will inform the missile defense 
of Guam architecture analysis and the broader strategy for integrated 
defense of island against the full spectrum of threats.
    Mr. Horsford. In this unclassified setting, can you roughly 
describe the probability of kill for Aegis against a hypersonic boost 
glide vehicle in the terminal stage?
    Admiral Hill. This requires a classified response and Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) will provide a response through proper channels.
    Mr. Horsford. Vice Admiral Hill, you also testified last week that 
the glide phase interceptor is being accelerated in the FY22 
Presidential budget request.
    Can you describe the nature of this acceleration? When do you 
anticipate a kill vehicle capable of interception in the glide phase 
will reach initial operating capability?
    Admiral Hill. The MDA has changed the hypersonic defense strategy 
from a Science and Technology (S&T) strategy to an Aegis-based 
prototype strategy. This accelerated strategy is based on encouraging 
results from partner flight tests and missile analysis. The previous 
S&T strategy would deliver capability in late 2030s; the FY22 
Presidential Budget request will accelerate capability delivery to 
early 2030s. The Agency continues to explore accelerating this critical 
capability into the late 2020's if appropriations allow.

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