[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT IN AFRICA
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
AND GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS
and
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA,
AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 28, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-77
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey Member
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
KAREN BASS, California
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
AMI BERA, California
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
DINA TITUS, Nevada
TED LIEU, California
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota
COLIN ALLRED, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
ANDY KIM, New Jersey
SARA JACOBS, California
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
DARRELL ISSA, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
LEE ZELDIN, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN MAST, Florida
BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
KEN BUCK, Colorado
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
MARK GREEN, Tennessee
ANDY BARR, Kentucky
GREG STEUBE, Florida
DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
PETER MEIJER, Michigan
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
RONNY JACKSON, Texas
YOUNG KIM, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights
KAREN BASS, California, Chair
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota Ranking Member
AMI BERA, California
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
SARA JACOBS, California
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
DARRELL ISSA, California
GREG STEUBE, Florida
DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
YOUNG KIM, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas
------
Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOE WILSON, South Carolina,
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island Ranking Member
TED LIEU, California
COLIN ALLRED, Texas
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRAD SHERMAN, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
LEE ZELDIN, New York
BRIAN MAST, Florida
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
GREG STEUBE, Florida
RONNY JACKSON, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
Casey Kustin, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Gonzales, Michael C., Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department
of State, Bureau of African Affairs............................ 10
Jenkins, Robert, Assistant to the Administrator, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and
Stabilization.................................................. 24
INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Information submitted for the record............................. 44
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 60
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 61
Hearing Attendance............................................... 62
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Additional information submitted for the record.................. 63
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 65
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT IN AFRICA
Tuesday, September 28, 2021
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global
Human Rights,
Joint with
Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and
Global Counterterrorism,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m.,
via Webex, Hon. Karen Bass (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
Ms. Bass. The Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and
Global Human Rights will come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the subcommittee at any point, and all members will
have 5 days to submit statements, extraneous materials, and
questions for the record subject to the length limitation to
the rules. To insert something into the record, please have
your staff email the previously mentioned address or contact
full committee staff.
As a reminder to members, please keep your camera--your
video function on at all times even when you are not recognized
by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and unmuting
themselves, and please remember to mute yourself after you
finish speaking. Consistent with H. Res. 965 and the
accompanying regulations, staff will only mute members and
witnesses as appropriate when they are not under recognition to
eliminate background noise.
I see that we have a quorum, and I will now recognize
myself for opening remarks. Pursuant to notice, we are holding
a hearing on understanding conflict in Africa. Today's joint
hearing entitled ``Understanding Conflict in Africa'' is held
by the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human
Rights along with the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North
Africa, and Global Counterterrorism, chaired by my colleague
and friend, Representative Ted Deutch. Representative Deutch, I
believe, will be on the floor and will be joining us a little
later.
I thank our witnesses for being here today, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Gonzales from the State Department and the
assistant to the administrator Robert Jenkins of the USAID. I
look forward to hearing our experts describe the various types
of conflict in Africa, the effectiveness of the U.S.
Government's mitigated responses to the conflicts, and what we
are doing to prevent future ones.
Ranging from violent extremism, armed conflict, and more
traditional warfare, these conflicts, though varied,
consistently require lawmakers to understand the drivers,
whether ideological, socioeconomic, or others; devise policy to
address underlying cause; and develop a framework to strengthen
African governments and bilateral and multilateral responses.
As our witnesses highlight solutions to conflicts in
Africa, I hope they will also list measures Congress can take
to strengthen current and future responses. My colleagues, and
I would like to know, what more the U.S. can do to assist
conflicts that are happening, for example, the conflict in
Ethiopia. Your answers will help inform legislation in the
future.
Again, violent extremism spurred on by local and
transnational actors for a variety of reasons include weak
governance and perceived injustice across government and
society, which has been on the rise since the 1990's. Extremist
activities in places such as North Africa, the Sahel, Nigeria,
Mozambique, and Somalia continue to make headlines, and my
colleagues and I would like to hear your thoughts as to why.
Although the origins and types of conflicts across Africa
vary, unfortunately they have similar results, civilian deaths,
longstanding humanitarian crises, population displacement,
unnecessary suffering, and regional instability. These outcomes
are often made more complex by other factors, such as severe
weather conditions and waning international support over time.
I am aware that the State Department, USAID, and DOD, have
longstanding programming in conflict response and stabilization
and mitigation and prevention, and would like the panel to
describe existing programs and activities to address the
drivers of violent extremism in Africa. I would also like to
hear how the U.S. Government can better cooperate with the
African Union and other multilateral organizations to assist in
peace and security efforts on the continent.
As the Biden Administration positions itself to engage
differently with Africa, I would like our witnesses to address
what the U.S. Government can do differently in our approach to
conflict on the continent, particularly in light of the major
global challenges caused by COVID-19, and now the situation in
Afghanistan. How will the U.S. change the narrative of its
engagement with Africa to one of mutual prosperity given these
complex security challenges?
My colleague, Mr. Deutch, will go into more detail on this,
but the situation in Afghanistan does have an effect on the
continent of Africa, particularly regarding conflict and
stabilization. The current takeover by the Taliban has lessons
for the continent, and I hope we can learn from these
developments and are able to apply them to the hot spots where
insecurity undermines longstanding partnership and investment.
I now recognize the chair of the subcommittee on the Middle
East--oh--North Africa--actually, I do not believe he is still
here. I think he is on the floor, so let me recognize Chris
Smith, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Africa.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Karen Bass.
Thank you for your leadership on this.
You know, as Deputy Assistant Secretary Gonzales notes,
almost half of the world's armed conflicts in 2020 were in
Africa, 15 at current count he will testify. So I want to thank
you, Chairwoman Bass, for convening this very timely hearing on
a very important topic, understanding the ongoing conflicts
that continue to plague Africa.
Among the conflicts, I think the two most pressing in Sub-
Saharan Africa at present are in Nigeria and in Ethiopia, in
part because of the outsize importance these two countries play
in the continent. This is not to minimize other areas of
conflict, such as the Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the
region of Mozambique, or the ongoing conflict in the Central
African Republic, or the ever-lurking potential for civil war
in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Moreover, while focusing on Nigeria and Ethiopia, we need
to, nonetheless, be aware of how cross border and interrelated
many of these conflicts are. Indeed, it may make more sense to
speak of regions, such as the Sahel or the Horn, rather than
confining ourselves to colonial Euro lines on the map. And
insofar as political leadership operates within dotted-line
jurisdictions, these two countries, nonetheless, stand out and
their potential disintegration could have an outsize impact on
the entire region.
Nigeria today, I believe, is on the verge of
disintegration, and I am concerned, deeply concerned that the
State Department may not fully understand the reasons why, and
is unprepared for what is unfolding. The State Department
repeatedly explains the conflict in Nigeria by referencing a
narrative of farmer-herder clashes exacerbated by climate
change. That narrative, while containing some elements of
truth, is nonetheless incomplete.
Prime responsibility for pushing Nigeria to the brink of
disintegration lies, in my opinion, with President Buhari. He
has failed to see himself as having a responsibility to protect
all Nigerians regardless of ethnic group or religious
background.
While parts of the conflict is attributable to the Salafist
armed groups, Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa, and
Ansaru, the main driver today of conflict comes from Fulani,
ethno-religious extremists who target non-Fulani. These could
be predominantly Christian farmers in the Middle Belt, Muslim
or Christian Yoruba in southwest, Christian Igbos in the
southeast, and Shia Muslims in Kaduna State.
It is the failure of President Buhari to curb members of
his Fulani ethnic group and organizations, such as Miyetti
Allah, which translated as the cattlemen's association, which
is pushing Nigeria to the brink.
He has also failed to stop the incursions of well-armed
Fulani from Niger and the Sahel, and, indeed, has seemed to
implicitly encourage it. Indeed, he has failed to stop the flow
of weapons to extremists, which comes not only from the Gulf
States, but also from Turkey.
He has also inserted Fulani into all key positions in
Nigerian institutions, especially the military and security
positions, such as the National Security Advisor, the Inspector
General of the Police, the head of the Drug Enforcement Agency,
and the Minister of Police Affairs, and the Chief of the Army
Staff.
This extends to other institutions as well, such as
Buhari's sacking of chief justice of the Nigerian Supreme
Court, Onnoghen, and his replacement by Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad.
In so doing, Buhari has marginalized other ethnic groups and
frayed the fabric of Nigeria's multiethnic society. He is
pushing the country toward civil war, and as Nigeria goes, so
goes West Africa.
Yet our State Department appears wedded to the incomplete
narratives. I understand the Department of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, in the last Administration, was set to do an
in-depth dive study of who was committing the killings in the
Middle Belt in Nigeria, yet this project was scuttled this past
January. Why was that? I hope they will take that up and begin
that probe.
Regarding Ethiopia, I think there has been a failure by the
State Department to call out the atrocities, regardless of who
commits them. Like Nigeria, Ethiopia is a multiethnic and
religiously diverse nation. Each major group sadly, both
victims and victimizers of the State Department, however, has,
for the most part, called out the atrocities by the Ethiopian
Government and Amhara Regional Forces while neglecting equally
reprehensible atrocities committed by the Tigrayan People's
Liberation Front which precipitated the immediate conflict last
November.
By doing so, by painting the Amhara solely as the
victimizers while neglecting to mention the atrocities
committed in Tigray against ethnic Amhara, such as happened in
the Mai Kadra last November, the question arises, has the State
Department, perhaps unwittingly, abetted a scapegoating
narrative which singles out one ethnic group as perpetrators of
violence and implicitly absolves other ethnic groups of the
same atrocities, thereby fueling additional tension and
conflict? What States should do is recognize who is committing
the atrocities, who is the victim, regardless of who that
implicates.
In contrast, Administrator Samantha Power at USAID has been
far more evenhanded in her approach, in my opinion, calling for
accountability for all those who commit atrocities and
recognizing victims regardless of their ethnic affiliation.
This, I think, is the correct way to address the conflict.
Finally, I want to recognize that amid the forces creating
division and discord in the Horn, in Ethiopia, and Somalia and
Eritrea, such as under Isaias Afwerki regime, is responsible
for so much suffering in both Eritrea as well as in Tigray.
There is one oasis of stability, and that is Somaliland,
which is a de facto independent area from Somalia. I would like
to hear comments from both State and USAID as to how to better
recognize Somaliland in the global community with an eye toward
building sustainable peace.
Again, I thank you for this hearing, and yield back to my
good friend the balance of my time.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith.
I now see that the chair of the Subcommittee on Middle
East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism, Representative
Deutch, is with us. I know that they have called votes, but I
think we have a few minutes and maybe we can get the chair and
ranking member.
Mr. Deutch. Great. Thank you very much, Chair Bass. Thanks
for holding today's joint hearing, and thanks to your ongoing
commitment to highlighting these issues and all the issues
facing Africa.
To our witnesses, thanks for being here.
We will examine today the conflict across the African
continent where terror groups and non-State actors have wreaked
havoc. Violent extremist groups, like Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab,
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and others have been inspired,
and, in many cases, actively recruited and funded, by al-Qaeda
and ISIS.
In the 20 years since 9/11, terror threats have morphed and
metastasized. Africa became fertile ground for training and
recruiting. Horrific human rights abuses have taken place at
the hands of these groups, and dire humanitarian crises have
arisen in the wake of their terror.
As the U.S. has funded humanitarian and development
programs across Africa, over the last 20 years, the majority of
our military footprint there has been rooted in
counterterrorism operations. Comparatively, military leaders
describe this footprint as light. But in the years of 9/11, the
U.S. has significantly increased its joint counterterrorism
operations with African forces. We recall the brutal 2017
attack by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara that killed
four U.S. troops in Niger.
So where has that led us? As we have decimated al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan and destroyed ISIS's physical caliphate, what has
the impact been on terror groups in Africa? We have not had the
same level of success assisting African partners in reclaiming
territory and pushing back against these violent actors. In
attempting to cutoff support for these groups through
sanctions, the many humanitarian crises across the continent
have also been impacted.
Chair Bass, I know this is an issue where you are focused.
I expect we will spend more on that on this hearing today. And
while I do not subscribe to the U.S. as the world's policeman,
I do believe that our counterterrorism partnerships are vital
to protecting not just our homeland, but our interest and our
partners abroad.
We must ensure these missions are able to adjust to
evolving threats. We must place the same level of importance on
our diplomatic and humanitarian missions. And as we continue to
see the great power competition with China manifest itself
across Africa, we must ensure that we are dedicating the
necessary resources to countering China's efforts. The U.S.
commitment may come with more strings attached, but the values
that we place on democracy and human rights are a moral
commitment that we stand firmly and proudly behind.
Chair Bass, again, I thank you for your leadership. I thank
our witnesses, and I look forward to today's discussion.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
We are going to go to the ranking member now and then we
will recess until after votes. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairwoman Karen Bass and Chairman
Ted Deutch, for calling this timely hearing to discuss
conflicts and terrorism trends in Africa.
With a young population and some of the fastest growing
economies in the world, there is no doubt of the strategic
importance of the continent. Unfortunately, progress toward
stability in some parts of the continent is undermined by weak
governance, corruption, and lack of economic opportunity.
Increasing external malign influence, particularly from
China and Russia, is undermining U.S. national security and
economic objectives. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies
reports a doubling of militant Islamic extremist groups in the
year 2019, a very concerning and sad trend.
As efforts to counter ISIS and al-Qaeda networks have made
some progress to the Middle East, new ISIS and al-Qaeda
affiliates have gained strength and legitimacy across the
continent. The U.S. must work with African partners to
effectively address these terrorist threats and target the
drivers of extremism and radicalization.
I appreciated the opportunity to highlight, in a hearing
last week, the importance of continued engagement with our
European partners and partners on the ground to combat
extremism and to maintain networks to advance counterterrorism
objectives. By extension, we must also have those efforts to
curtail the efforts of malign actors in the region, and seek to
keep civilians safe.
I was grateful to join Chairman Ted Deutch in the
bipartisan Libya Stabilization Act, which is to come up for
suspension today, to curb the foreign malign influence by
actors such as Russia. There is certainly more work to be done
in that regard, especially given China's interest and devious
investments, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
on any recommendations they may have.
We appreciate the witnesses for their expertise, and we
appreciate Chair Karen Bass, and I yield back.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much. If my partner, who is the
chair, agrees, I think we should recess until after votes?
Mr. Deutch. Agreed.
Ms. Bass. OK. Thank you. The committee is in recess. We
will be back as soon as we finish voting. Yes, I want to thank
our witnesses, Mr. Gonzalez and Mr. Jenkins. I am so sorry that
we need to do this. I would guess that we are talking about an
hour, an hour and a half.
Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Jenkins. We are at your disposal.
Ms. Bass. I appreciate that.
[Recess.]
[4:42 p.m.]
Ms. Bass. This hearing is back in session. And I see my--
the chair of the subcommittee is here, and I believe the
ranking member, Chris Smith, should be with us shortly.
But I wanted to go ahead and introduce our witnesses. So we
appreciate all of you being here today, and we look forward to
your testimony. Let me remind the witnesses that your written
statementss will appear in the hearing record. And under
committee rule 6, each witness should limit their oral
presentation to a brief summary of their written statements.
Our first witness is Deputy Assistant Secretary Mike
Gonzales. He joined the Bureau of African Affairs in October
2020. His portfolio includes West Africa and regional peace and
security. He previously served as the Director for Analysis of
Africa in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research.
As a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, he has
served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d' affaires at the
U.S. Embassies in Nepal and Malawi. Prior to joining the
Foreign Service, he was an economic analyst in the antitrust
division of the U.S. Department of Justice. And in 2009, he
received the W.R. Rivkin Award for Constructive Dissent from
the American Foreign Service Association. That is an
interesting name for an award.
Our second witness is the Assistant to the Administrator,
Robert Jenkins. Robert Jenkins serves as the assistant to the
Administrator for the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and
Stabilization. A career member of the Senior Executive Service,
he was previously a Deputy Assistant Administrator for the
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance,
and the Director of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives.
Prior to joining USAID in 1998, he designed and implemented
emergency relief and recovery programs with World Vision in
southern Sudan and Sierra Leone. As a Thomas J. Watson Fellow,
he worked under Archbishop Desmond Tutu in Cape Town, South
Africa, as a liaison between the church's peace and justice
office and township communities.
I would like to welcome our witnesses, and you may begin.
Mike Gonzales.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. GONZALES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Mr. Gonzales. Thank you so much. Chair Bass, Chair Deutch,
Ranking Member Smith, Ranking Member Wilson, and members of the
subcommittees, thank you for this opportunity to testify on
conflict in Africa.
Peace and prosperity in Africa directly benefit the United
States. Unfortunately, however, almost half of the world's 34
armed conflicts in 2020 were on the African continent. Beyond
the loss of life and livelihoods, conflicts take resources away
from critical public services and development efforts.
While each conflict is different, there is a clear trend of
conflict being fueled by poor or deficient governance. In some
cases, weak capacity and limited resources prevent the State
from delivering the conditions or the opportunities that people
expect. With high rates of unemployment, these lapses
exacerbate instability and increase young people's
vulnerability to extremist messaging and recruitment under the
promise of a better life.
In less benign cases, more predatory government actions,
such as corruption, human rights abuses, ethnic favoritism, or
political oppression, inflame grievances, and they spur
conflict both among groups and against a State by exploiting
rather than serving the people.
Governments push communities toward conflict. Terrorists
and extremist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, exploit
these State weaknesses, igniting those grievances into
violence. Other external actors also exacerbate conflict in
parts of Africa. Russian mercenaries, such as the Wagner Group,
have fueled violence, resource exploitation, and human rights
abuses in Syria, Libya, and Central Africa. They now appear
poised to expand into Mali. They have a proven record of
leaving vulnerable African countries yet even weaker, poorer,
and less secure, while being paid handsomely in cash and
mineral concessions that are no longer available to benefit the
public.
Addressing conflict requires a comprehensive approach. We
cannot focus solely on the security aspects of conflict,
because too often, those are merely the symptoms of deeper
dynamics. Instead, the United States leverages our diplomatic
development and defense partnerships to bolster the
capabilities, responsiveness, and credibility of the African
institutions at national and local levels to enhance public
confidence in the State, improve service delivery, and foster
economic opportunity.
Diplomatic efforts are vital to prevent the spread of
violence and help to deescalate conflict. Our professional
diplomats engage government and societal leaders to mitigate
conflict. They provide conflict early warning. They support
prevention, conflict resolution, and humanitarian assistance
efforts.
Our role is not to come in as outsiders to fight
insecurity, but to enable our African partners to develop their
own security capabilities. By building partner capacity, we
promote sustainable impacts through comparatively limited
investments.
Whether through diplomatic engagement, or programs, such as
the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, State Department
initiatives support local-level conflict prevention and early
warning systems. We engage women and youth to build cohesive
communities that are resilient to extremism. We support
government efforts to manage defectors, we embed advisers
within host nation military elements, and we support community
networks to foster trust between civilians and authorities.
Moreover, we leverage America's flagship initiatives to
help our African partners achieve their full potential. Through
YALI, we invest in the next generation of African leaders who
will deliver brighter futures for their own countries. Beyond
saving millions of lives, PEPFAR and the President's Malaria
Initiative support health systems that enable governments to
deliver service to the people.
AGOA, Power Africa, Prosper Africa, and the Millennium
Challenge Corporation each offer catalytic investments to fuel
economic growth and opportunity. And I commend this committee
for your instrumental role in creating and ensuring the success
of these initiatives. We appreciate the committee's leadership
in addressing conflict in Africa, particularly you, Chair Bass
and other members, for traveling to the continent and
personally engaging. Your direct engagement with our African
partners amplifies our 3-D approach by adding a legislative
element to our partnerships.
As I wrap up, let me emphasize that the United States is a
committed partner with African peoples, governments, and
institutions. We work intently across agency lines to support
and enable them to stem violence, secure their citizens and
ours, and realize their full potential in an increasingly
interconnected community of nations.
We are under no illusions about the challenges associated
with addressing conflict, or the spread of violent extremism.
There are no quick fixes or magic solutions. Ultimately, it is
the responsibility of Africa's leaders to meet the needs and
the aspirations of their populations and to address the
conditions that fuel conflict.
The United States is, and remains committed, to support our
African partners in these efforts. I thank you, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Gonzales follows:]
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Ms. Bass. Thank you very much. Mr. Jenkins?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT JENKINS, ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, BUREAU FOR CONFLICT
PREVENTION AND STABILIZATION
Mr. Jenkins. Well, thank you. Chair Bass, Chair Deutch,
Ranking Member Smith, Ranking Member Wilson, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
No matter how you look at the problem of violent extremists
in Africa, the trends are going in the wrong direction. The
International Committee of the Red Cross recently tallied 296
non-State armed groups in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In the Sahel, there were more armed attacks between April
and June of this year than in any other 3-month period, and
violence has displaced over 2 million people in the Sahel, four
times as many people that were displaced in 2019.
Across Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad, extremists
challenged State authority, they recruit disaffected youth, and
they align themselves with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. They
prey upon communities and use long periods of simmering war and
violence to expand their influence.
But the problem is much broader than the Sahel. Looking
across a map of Africa, extremist violence is spreading. Places
like Cote dIvoire are now grappling with attacks from violent
extremist groups.
Northern Mozambique grabbed headlines this year when
insurgents claiming links with the Islamic State orchestrated
attacks in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. Mozambique
illustrates some important considerations. By attaching the
Islamic State brand, the insurgency guarantees international
headlines.
But the label obscures more than it reveals. Rather than a
group of committed fighters adhering to the Islamic State's
global goals, this insurgency recruits and thrives on local
conditions and grievances. Take away the Islamic State label,
and you still have those grievances based on exclusion and
violence.
Meanwhile, in Ethiopia, we are witnessing just how quickly
contentious politics can escalate and boil over into war. We
are all concerned about the prospects of extremist violence in
Somalia. Al-Shabaab is one of al-Qaeda's most successful and
well-financed branches. The current political standoff in
Somalia only benefits Al-Shabaab, and it presents the most
direct threat to Americans.
These conflicts, civil wars, and armed extremist groups
take a terrible human toll. That alone is enough to give us
pause, but the proliferation of violent extremist activity in
Africa has implications for American security. Ungoverned
spaces offer violent extremist groups room to grow, bide time,
and plot against Western targets.
So what is to be done? Success requires the right balance
of defense, development, and diplomacy, what we call the three
Ds. This means looking at how all of our foreign assistance
interacts and affects environments where armed extremists work.
We need the Department of Defense because we cannot ignore the
security aspect.
I discuss this frequently with our leaders at U.S. Africa
Command as part of our constant and collaborative civil
military dialog. But militaries and security services alone
cannot succeed. In a seminal 2017 report on extremism in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the U.N. found a majority of subjects who
joined violent extremist groups cited negative interactions
with authorities, particularly with military and security
forces.
This fact warns us of the dangers of seeing security
actions alone as an answer. I firmly believe U.S. development
assistance has a role to play in preventing the further
expansion of violent extremism in Africa. USAID's programs and
expertise challenge narratives legitimizing violence.
We know our programs build trust between marginalized
communities, State authorities, and security forces. Our
programs can improve governance where it is fragile, create
economic opportunity, and allow for freedom of religious
expression. The success of these programs will require the
right funds with the right flexibility. It also requires
reviewing the authorities around how and with whom we can work.
But still, development assistance alone will come up short.
Even the best designed and implemented development programs
cannot stop dozens of young men on motorcycles with AK-47s.
That is why I am happy to be here today with Michael, my
colleague from the Department of State. Success will require
diplomatic support to work with allies and build meaningful
partnerships with governments in the region.
Chair Bass, Chair Deutch, I will conclude today by thanking
you for calling this hearing. It is not always easy to get
attention on these issues amid so many fires in the world. I am
optimistic about our chances to make progress, in part because
of the support we have from Congress, most notably, the Global
Fragility Act. That Act, as you know, charges USAID, the State
Department, the Department of Defense, and others to take an
integrated approach to just these types of problems. To
succeed, USAID and other parts of our government must use the
GFA as a tool to prompt an unprecedented level of collaboration
across the U.S. Government to arrest this growing threat.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
Chairman Deutch, would you like to go ahead and ask
questions first?
Mr. Deutch. Sure. Thank you, Chair Bass. I appreciate that.
I thank the witnesses.
I also sit on the Europe Subcommittee, and last week, we
had a joint hearing with my subcommittee to address
transatlantic cooperation on counterterrorism, and countering
violent extremism. The fact that now half of the Foreign
Affairs Subcommittees have addressed some facet of this issue
in recent days is, I think, clear indication that CT and CV is
a global issue whose implications go far beyond regional
borders.
It is critical to engage closely with our allies and
partners to apply best practices across all of our CT efforts
worldwide, including the Sahel. The Biden Administration has
expressed its clear support for French counterterrorism
efforts, and the Sahel is reengaging direct diplomacy with both
our European allies and West African nations.
So with all of that as background, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Gonzales, you made reference to the Wagner Group
weakening African countries. You talked in particular about
mineral concessions. Can you put the Wagner Group in the
context of this broader effort and our engagement with our
European allies to help combat it?
Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, Chair Deutch, for that question.
Certainly, the Wagner Group has our attention, and for all the
wrong reasons. We see that they go in and exploit environments
that are vulnerable. Where there is a security need, they make
broad promises of what they can provide and they under-deliver.
Countries believe that they are going to maintain authority
and control over the security interventions, and in reality we
have seen, time and time again, that they absolutely lose that
authority. The Wagner Group we see in Central African Republic
and other places the gross and rampant human rights violations
that they are involved with, and how they complicate matters.
And so we certainly are engaging on a very active basis. As
recently as this morning, conversations between myself and a
colleague, another Sahel envoy from a European country, were
discussing just this issue. And, so, we engage with our African
partners directly to make sure that their eyes are wide open.
We engage also with our European and like-minded colleagues
around the world to understand the challenges and implications,
to see how we can better collectively partner with our African
partners to address the very real security challenges that they
face, but also, to put pressure to ensure that unintended
consequences and funds and resources that are desperately
needed by local populations do not get distracted and go to
supporting security and not undermining it.
Mr. Deutch. So I appreciate that. I want to followup.
Actually, let's--Mr. Jenkins, you referenced the 296 non-State
armed groups. And so following up on Mr. Gonzales' comments, to
what extent should our strategy plug into French multilateral
mechanisms versus our own direct diplomacy in the region? What
is the right approach here, if I can ask?
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, Chair Deutch. This is a problem for
the entire world, and it is going to be a problem that takes
partnership in all aspects. Last week, I met virtually with my
British counterpart; the week prior to that, met in person with
my German counterpart. We have plans for getting hopefully
together with the French as a group as we are looking
particularly at the Sahel right now, but as explained, this is
a problem that goes across the entire continent.
Whether it is the G5 countries and the Sahel, whether it is
our European allies, whether there is the burden sharing that
we are currently doing in West Africa with the French doing
much more on the military side, one could say, in Somalia, they
are looking to us and hoping that we can find some solutions;
all of us have to work together on this.
Obviously, we have not found the solution. We think we know
what works. We have to do that. We have to ramp things up. But
we have a lot to teach each other, and I am hoping that post
Afghanistan, at least the conversations I am having with other
government officials from other governments, people are in a
very positive mode of let's assess what we know works, what
hasn't worked, and moving forward together in a way that is
mutually supportive and not at odds with each other.
Mr. Deutch. Great. Thank you very much.
Madam Chair, I hope as we go forward we will have an
opportunity to probe a bit further into our efforts post
Afghanistan and whether our allies view us differently coming
out of that as we approach all of these really critically
important issues.
And I want to thank you, Chair Bass, for conducting the--
for holding this hearing and for giving us the opportunity to
participate. It is really important. I so admire, as you know,
your work in this area, and I am honored to be able to work on
this with you in this instance. And thanks very much, and I
yield back.
Ms. Bass. Well, absolutely, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate working with you. We should do this more often. We
have a lot of----
Mr. Deutch. Hear, hear.
Ms. Bass [continuing]. Subjects in common and we should
definitely do that.
Well, I want to follow your questions to Mr. Jenkins. You
know, as you mentioned the help that is being given in the
Sahel and all, and you mentioned the French and you mentioned
the G5, I just wonder, do we ever come together with our
European partners and talk about how to bolster the African
Union? Because at some point in the future, it would be nice to
think of when there are conflicts, that they are managed by
other African countries.
There was a great example where the countries of ECOWAS
intervened when a President refused to leave power. And so I
just want to know if that is ever a discussion that you are
aware of with our European partners?
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, Chair Bass. I will be quick,
because I believe that DAS Gonzales might have more on this
than I do. We currently have the partnership for peace program,
which works with the Executive Secretary of the G5 Sahel. We
also--we have done a lot of work directly with the African
Union through Women, Peace, and Security, helping them get both
a continental women, peace, and security strategy, but, also,
working on individual nation States with their own strategies.
But you mentioned ECOWAS as well, whether it is SADC or
ECOWAS, we look to regional partners, who--they are going to
have the better ideas than we do. We are there to help. We are
there to support where we can, but they often are the ones that
should be in the lead, because they know these issues more than
we do.
Ms. Bass. And Mr. Gonzales?
Mr. Gonzales. Great. Thank you. I would say that we
absolutely coordinate with our international partners, European
and beyond, in terms of collaborating on identifying ways how
we can bolster African institutions and support the efforts
that African institutions take the lead on.
Most recently, in terms of ECOWAS and their dynamic role in
supporting the post-coup dynamics in both Guinea and Mali, my
conversations with the Sahel envoys and counterparts from
Canada, the EU, France, and the U.K. and beyond, very much
focus on how can we best and optimally support them.
And we ask that question directly. We do not just divine
the answers, but we go directly to President Brou of the ECOWAS
Commission, or the representatives of the United Nations and
the African Union in the field of how can we best support you.
And the collaboration, the dialog has been robust. And,
fundamentally, this is at the core of the Biden
Administration's partnership with Africa is working very
closely and in very close coordination with African
institutions.
Ms. Bass. I hope for the day, when these conflicts happen,
that they are dealt with and resolved on the continent.
I wanted to ask you about a couple of them. Well, one, in
CAR, a big concern about the role of Russia and the mercenaries
who say they are independent, not affiliated with the Russian
Government, if you have a comment about that?
And then also, in terms of some of the violence that we
see, you know, how much of it is ideological? Just take
Mozambique, for example, that does not have a history of this.
How much of it is ideological, and how much of it is
opportunist, basically when people feel they have no other
alternative? Do you want to respond first, Mr. Jenkins, or Mr.
Gonzales, whichever one want to respond?
Mr. Gonzales. I will take that. In terms of Central African
Republic, we are very concerned about the human rights abuses
that are underway at the hands of the Wagner Group,
mercenaries, Kremlin-linked mercenaries, as well as the armed
forces of the Central African Republic, both in terms of their
direct dynamics, but frankly, also the lack of coordination of
various actors.
We have a very large robust and critically important
international U.N. peacekeeping operation on the ground there.
And the lack of coordination of what is going on by other
actors really puts the international efforts under stress,
particularly as humanitarian actors and the peacekeeping
operations tried to access areas where Wagner or others are
operating.
In terms of ideological versus other, frankly, I think,
often what we see are these are longstanding historical
grievances of communities against the center core periphery-
type issues. People feel that the State hasn't delivered for
them.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Gonzales. And when the extremists come in and offer
something brighter, shinier, more that they can aspire to, it
is appealing. And, frequently, it is that kind of dynamic as
well as opportunists and criminal groups that take advantage,
rather than its ideology that is driving it.
Ms. Bass. Well, thank you. And I think it is important that
we stay centered on that too, because really, the goal should
be to address the root causes versus just view it as a problem
of violence or ideology.
With that, I would like to go to the ranking member, Mr.
Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank you
for the hearing and to our witnesses for their insights in
testimony.
I wanted to ask, if I could, you know, I do not know if you
heard my opening comments, but, you know, the concerns that I
and many others have concerning the Fulani, and, really, an
international misperception, it would appear, including some at
State, about what they are all about. It is not about herdsmen
versus farmers. There may be some historical reasons to think
that, but today, particularly under Buhari, it would appear
that this is an all-out attempt to eradicate, to kill.
You know, I have met with many leaders in Nigeria,
including just a little while ago again today, who say when a
phone call goes out or a message goes out to send the police to
try to intervene, the police, the military are a no-show. In
one case, I was told how just 2 kilometers away from an attack
by the Fulani were the Nigerian army, and they refused to come.
And so people--and women were slaughtered, raped, and people
came in on motorbikes for a very fast blitzkrieg-type attack,
particularly at the churches, but also throughout the town.
And, you know, the Church of the Brethren has seen
something on the order of 48,000 dead people over these last 10
years. I mean, when you start adding it all up, I see no
difference frankly between the Fulani and Boko Haram, and
maybe, you know, Mr. Gonzales, you could speak to that, both of
our witnesses.
Because even when the aircraft were used, Tucano aircraft,
there were three instances where civilians were killed, you
know, are we assured--are we sure that this was a mistake or
were these individuals targeted? So it is--who happen to be
Christians, of course.
And, you know, they also go after Shia Muslims. So, you
know, there is animosity, if you will, toward people who happen
to be of Islam, but from a different perspective, and they get
hurt as well, or killed, but the predominance of it is against
the Christians.
You know, I met with the bishop who came and testified at a
hearing last year, and he was roundly criticized by Buhari for
what he said. And when he talked, this bishop, you know, is all
about reconciliation, love, manifesting the love of Christ, but
also telling the truth. And he spoke very boldly, but very
compassionately and then said, the Fulani, you know, what is
the difference--this is me talking not him now--between other
terrorist groups and the Fulani.
You know, we all know that Buhari used to be the head of
the Fulani. The fact, and I said it in my opening comments,
virtually everyone around him, the whole military
infrastructure, the police infrastructure, all of it is packed
with Fulani, and they have axes to grind and they also look the
other way when these killings take place.
Finally, you know, Goodluck Jonathan had his flaws. I
thought, you know, all of us have flaws. But he at least had a
cabinet that was multiethnic, and it had people from all the
persuasions. I remember--and, Karen, I am sure you met with him
as well--you know, they really--they came from all different
perspectives, and that became a very positive strength for
them.
So if you could, Mr. Gonzales, speak to some of those
issues? Again, are we investigating the counter fighter jets,
and the fighter aircraft? Is there any thought of barring any
further spare parts if they do not, you know, come clean on--
that was three and there may be more where they have been----
Ms. Bass. And, Mr. Gonzales, if you could answer briefly,
and then, Mr. Smith, we will do another round after other
members have had. You could answer briefly, so I can go to Mr.
Phillips.
Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, Representative Smith. There is a
lot to unpack there. I think Nigeria has many challenges and
has over many years with many causes deep-rooted corruption,
lack of national identity, patronage-based politics. The list
can go on and on, and I would argue that those go well beyond
any one leader.
Nigeria fundamentally is core to our interests, our
economic interests, our stability interests, our security
interests, our regional and global interests and so we must
engage in support for a strong, stable, and prosperous Nigeria,
and we are committed to doing that.
I think at the local level, I take your point. I would
argue, however, that climate change is reducing resources, and
population growth is increasing demand for those. And so the
availability of resources is a dynamic that is driving some
degree of conflict, but conflict in Nigeria is
multidimensional.
So, too, are the Fulani community. The Fulanis are not a
monolith, and while President Buhari is a Fulani, so too Macky
Sall and numerous leaders across West Africa. And they are
Fulani herders and Fulani farmers. I would argue that a
nondifferentiated approach that identifies the Fulani, or
frankly any individual group has a major driver. It is not
particularly helpful in identifying the nuance, and ultimately
we need to respond with the nuance. But frankly it also risks
precipitating retaliation and further violence.
So I think at the local level, engagement with local
communities on conflict resolution is key. We are engaging on
that. And Rod, I am sure, Assistant Administrator Jenkins can
discuss some of that.
And at the national level, frankly, I think the approach
required is to help shape political discourse, to drive public
demand for issue-based, citizen-responsive, nationally
supportive policies, not only going into the elections in 2023,
but holding those who come out of those elections victorious,
accountable for delivering for the country.
I think you mentioned the Super Tucanos. Six of them have
arrived; six are still on route. They may be arriving around
now. They have not been in use. And so the U.S.-provided Super
Tucanos are not involved in the incidents that----
Mr. Smith. Do we know what was, Mr. Gonzales?
Mr. Gonzales. I can get back to you with that. And we saw
the strikes that hit civilians just in the past week. And the
change in doctrine because of our engagement with the Nigerian
Air Force has been instrumental in getting them to acknowledge,
put out a statements, and convene reported inquiry within 24
hours of that strike. And so there is a doctrinal shift.
But the threat to security of the Nigerian people is real,
and that is why the State Department, both the Africa Pol-Mil
and DRL Bureaus, are all unanimous in our support for providing
helicopter support that the Nigerians have asked for so that we
can help the Nigerian Air Force protect civilians and convoys
of humanitarian assistance.
Mr. Smith. I know I am out of time. Thank you.
Ms. Bass. Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass. Greetings,
colleagues. I want to salute our very interesting hearing timer
that we are using on this meeting. And also, I have got 3
percent left on my iPad; if I happen to drop, please go ahead
and move to the next--my next colleague.
But I want to focus my questions on Ethiopia. We all know
what is going on and how horrific. The U.N. estimates that 5.2
million people in Tigray need emergency food assistance. More
than 2 million have been displaced by violence. Of course, this
is extending to other regions, including Amhara. Hundreds of
thousands of people are being displaced, and food insecurity
worsening. And the worst is that humanitarian aid is being
blocked because of the conflict by both Ethiopian and Eritrean
militaries, as we all know.
So my question, first, is to you, DAS Gonzales. As we are
aware, the Administration announced a new sanctions regime that
allows the U.S. to impose financial sanctions on individuals
and entities in connection with the conflict. My question is,
have you seen any change at all in behavior from these actors
since the announcement was made?
Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, sir. At this point, we have not
yet seen the tangible action that we are looking to see, but
that is the point of the executive order is that it has gone
too long with too little action. And so, this is the effort to
step up the pressure on those who are responsible for
prolonging the conflict, for obstructing progress and hindering
humanitarian access and those who commit human rights abuses.
It is not targeted to one group or another. There is plenty
of blame to go around, and leaders on all sides have been quite
vocal in using their rhetoric for inflaming situations and
dehumanizing other communities. And the purpose of the
executive order is to exert that pressure so that we can try to
break this logjam.
Mr. Phillips. So we talk about pressure. You know, we have
hearings, we tweet, we issue press releases, we have press
conferences, we condemn. But what tools do we have available to
us that we might not be employing to push for humanitarian
access, let alone a cease-fire? What tools are we not
employing, if any?
Mr. Gonzales. I think it is a phased approach. The
restrictions on security assistance, the public statementss,
the--we just now have a new African Union lead negotiator for
the Horn of Africa, and so backing--going back to Chair Bass'
point of backing African institutions and putting our support
behind President Obasanjo.
So, I think the executive order is the next step, applying
names, naming and shaming and holding and squeezing people
responsible under that executive order will be follow-on, but
this is something that has the highest level of attention at
the State Department, and, frankly, across the Administration.
I know Administrator Power, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield,
Secretary Blinken are all seized with this issue in Ethiopia.
Mr. Phillips. And, of course, you are referring to
Ambassador Feltman. Perhaps with my remaining time, you could
speak to some of the activities that he has undertaken since
being named to that role and what roadblocks he is facing and
how he is adapting to these challenges.
Mr. Gonzales. So he shares the suite with me two doors
down, and he is more absent than present, because he is always
on the road leading U.S. engagements, whether it is in Ethiopia
or the region engaging with the African Union and other African
institutions, or, frankly, the international community of like-
mindeds and other partners who are also seized with this.
So he was up in New York engaging with the deputy prime
minister just last week and in Addis the week before and in
Khartoum currently. And so, he is very much engaged in trying
to explore every opening that we might have and helping the
Administration identify what might be those additional pressure
points that we can lean on to get progress.
Mr. Phillips. I appreciate it. The clock seems to have
stalled. If I do have a few seconds left, Mr. Jenkins, if you
might speak to any leverage or pressure points that the U.S.
Has with the Ethiopian Government or the TPLF to push for
increased humanitarian access in Tigray?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, thank you, Congressman. I think as you
know, our administrator, Administrator Power, is laser focused
on the issues in Ethiopia and Tigray, and seeking
accountability for the atrocities that have happened. As DAS
Gonzales says, there is enough blame to go around on all sides
in that terrible, terrible situation.
What we are also worried about, and I would like to draw
attention to, is we did an atrocity prevention analysis
internally that showed there are about 13 possible other fault
lines within Ethiopia, any one of which could ignite. Many of
them are already simmering.
And as we are all focused on Tigray right now, as we should
be, hopefully, the lid will not blow off what could be a far
more dire situation in Ethiopia. That is why we are very
supportive of Special Envoy Feltman's efforts. And hopefully
the bad situations that is going on now we will be able to
exert the leverage that does exist to open up humanitarian
access, quell the current violence, and, hopefully, prevent
that situation from spiraling into an even worse situation.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you both for being with us today. With
that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Bass. Representative Meuser? Representative Meuser?
Meuser?
Mr. Meuser. I am sorry, Madam Chair, yes, Meuser. Thank
you, Representative Bass. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Mr. Gonzales, Fulani violence against Christians in north
and central Nigeria is growing very violent on a daily basis.
It is apparent that President Buhari has exasperated this
decades-long conflict by eliminating accountability for
perpetuators of such violence. In fact, he has installed many
Fulani in high levels of government, especially in policing and
the judiciary.
Nigeria is a rapidly growing country, on track to be the
third largest country by 2050, but is now on the verge of
serious violence. Does the State Department agree that Nigeria
is on the brink of disintegration, that President Buhari has
failed to uphold his responsibility to protect the rights of
all Nigerians? Mr. Gonzales?
Mr. Gonzales. We are incredibly concerned about security
instability in Nigeria. Again, I mentioned to Representative
Smith that it is multifaceted. Whether it is pirates or bandits
or Fulanis or religious or ISIS West Africa, the threats
against the people, the threats against the State are many.
I also look at, frankly, the numbers. We have 208 million
people who are protected by 375,000 or so police and about
100,000 troops who are making basically a ratio of the security
sector to civilians about one-ninth the global standard that is
optimal. And so, there is fundamentally inadequate resources
that have gone to security, and inadequate resources I would--
or attention, I would say, at the senior-most levels going
toward a security strategy that can stem the tide.
We are encouraged by President Buhari's replacement of the
entire slate of senior brass and security sector officials in
Nigeria. We are encouraged that the new Chief of Defense has
recognized responding to insecurity requires a whole-of-
government approach, and not just an approach by the army or
the armed forces, but all elements of the government.
We are encouraged that the chief of the Air Force is
commissioning a 9-month doctrine review to ensure that what the
government does to respond to insecurity does not further
inflame or fuel.
So, again, the challenges are many on the security side as
well as on the civilian side, and that is why our close
relationship with the array of actors across Nigeria is vital
to help try to shape and shift what is really a keystone
country in the region.
Mr. Meuser. It sounds like you know a lot about it; I am
trying to figure out what we are doing about it, however. By
chance, has the State Department yourself been to Nigeria
lately or met with any of its parliament members to discuss
this?
Mr. Gonzales. So, I guess the most recent would be about a
week ago, where I, as well as our Acting Assistant Secretary,
met with four representatives of the Nigeria Governors
Association who were in town. We have had about three intended
visits that for one reason or another, has fallen through.
Mr. Meuser. I doubt they told you that climate change was
their biggest concern, OK. I am not saying it is not a concern,
but targeted murders and assassinations of large numbers of
civilians within communities, and primarily Christians, not
just Christians but also Shia and others. So, you know, the
idea of President Buhari--you are not really answering my
question as far as failing to protect the rights of all
Nigerians. I am not sure--we are sort of making the problem
larger rather than just understanding that Buhari has some
responsibility here and as do we if we care about any
humanitarian efforts in Nigeria.
So I just have another question for you. The policing of
weapons trafficking into West Africa that is obviously
contributing to the heightened violence, is that something the
U.S. Government is policing?
Mr. Gonzales. I would not say the U.S. Government is
policing it. I would say that certainly elements of the State
Department, particularly my counterparts in the International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, are supporting, through
funds appropriated from Congress, a fair bit of support to
build the capacity of African institutions, African government
elements, for improving border security awareness of who and
what is crossing through borders.
Those borders are incredibly porous, and it is a big
challenge. But certainly it is something that we are seized
with, yes.
Mr. Meuser. All right. That is great.
Was there a fuller scale, deep study dive into the
contact--conflict in Nigeria in the previous Administration
that was terminated by the Biden Administration in January, or
was it deviated, or was it a different----
Ms. Bass. Excuse me.
Mr. Meuser. I am sorry, Madam Chair. I did not have the
timer. I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. Bass. OK. Thank you.
Let me move to Representative Manning.
Representative Manning?
Ms. Manning. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you so
much for having this hearing, along with Chairman Deutch and
the ranking members. This is really a critically important and
difficult issue.
Let me start with Mr. Jenkins.
Terrorist organizations continue to exploit inadequate
security and governance in many countries in Africa, recruiting
some of the most vulnerable people in these societies, as you
have talked about, and producing violence that furthers the
cycle of instability and poverty.
And several of these countries have also suffered droughts,
food insecurity, and civic unrest, creating more opportunities
for terrorist groups to grow and thrive.
Can you talk to us a little bit more about how the USAID
program seeks to break this vicious cycle, and can you point to
some success stories?
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, Representative.
I could try to go through what we are doing in Mali. I
could give you a description of what we are doing in Cameroon.
I could give you a description of what we are doing in Somalia.
A lot of those, when you talk about the objectives at the
top, high level sound very, very similar, because while all of
these crises and all of these conflicts are different and
context is extremely important, the underlying causes for them
are actually similar. It is a governance crisis. In every one
of these, it is a governance crisis.
So the violence we see, the exploitation, the recruitment
is a symptom of the underlying, more serious causes.
So our programs look different in different places, but
they are almost all trying to, one, give youth a reason to have
agency, the ability to have agency in their life. Give them
meaning is what they are looking for.
Two, bringing societies together, trying to heal the
divisions, opening up dialog.
Three, trying to get communities at the local level but
also at the national level to understand what is really
happening in their country, in their village.
Many of these problems are misdiagnosed. We easily say, oh,
this is ideological, this is religious, this is transnational
crime. It can be all of those things at the same time.
So where has it worked? Let's go to North Africa real
quick, Sirte. People forget that in Libya, Sirte, Libya, was
the largest place outside of Iraq and Syria where ISIS was in
control.
When that city was liberated in 2016, immediately we went
to work supporting the local government, $16 million over about
a year. 30,000 kids went back to school, 40,000 people got
healthcare.
Within 1 year, 90 percent of the population that was
displaced moved back, and year after year in annual polling,
people are more optimistic and feeling better about local
governance and about their life.
We forget about Liberia. Liberia in the 1990's was
synonymous with fragile States and failed States. 2006, we have
a new President, we get in there, get to work, the United
States in a very big way--other partners too--but supporting
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and Liberia is a success story today.
So I would last, in Kenya, where they are coming up to
elections again, and we always cross our fingers and hope that
things do not get bad like they have in the past, but in Kenya,
working with the Kenyan Government, we have helped them create
their own national counterterrorism center.
They are now training all of their civil servants on
looking for CVE and coming up with CVE solutions, and going
down to the county level, working on CVE plans that are
indigenous to those localities, so people are aware and finding
their own systemic solutions.
Ms. Manning. Thank you. That is very helpful.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Gonzales, I am concerned that
women and girls are often victimized by or at the root of the
outbreak of violence in conflicts throughout Africa.
Can you tell us how State is working to address gender-
based violence in Africa and how working with our partners in
the region has improved gender equality and protects women at
risk?
Mr. Gonzales. I completely share your concern, and I think
it starts with the engagements that we have, when we send our
Ambassadors in to talk to heads of State, when we flag this
very concern, that we recognize that gender-based violence is
one of the top flags for potential for atrocities in the
future.
But also the opposite, where gender equality yields
societies that are much less likely to go to war. It is why
women, peace, and security is a critical element of our
security assistance package.
I look at Niger, for example, a prime example, where
previously each year the Nigerien military would take in just
10 women. Now it is over 300, and still a long ways to go. But
by having women be the providers of security along with men,
they engage with societies, they engage with the vulnerable in
a different way and help provide that security.
And finally, because I see the time is up, just a month and
a half ago, when Under Secretary for Political Affairs Toria
Nuland and I met with President Bazoum in Niger, we were
thrilled to hear that his No. 1 priority is educating girls,
because ultimately that is going to be what delivers the
brighter future for the society.
Ms. Manning. Thank you very much. And I yield back.
Ms. Bass. Representative Omar?
Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass.
Mr. Gonzales, I wanted to see if you can tell us, has the
Administration finalized a strategic plan for our policies
toward Somalia, the Sahel, and the DRC?
Mr. Gonzales. I am not directly engaged with the Somalia
policy, but my understanding is that it is moving forward
through the interagency.
I am very much engaged day in and day out on the Sahel
strategy, and I am pleased to say that it is quite far along.
Certainly, there is consensus across the interagency in terms
of the theory of the case and the theory of change.
It is a big territory with disparate environments. And so
the key will be how we implement to respond to the specific
nuances in each location, recognizing that resources are
limited and we cannot do everything, and we cannot even do the
select things everywhere, and so we must prioritize.
But we are not going to succeed if we do not have a
strategy. And so we are--this Administration definitely is
focused on developing strategies that are not only pursued at
post, but are endorsed here in Washington, so that the totality
of the U.S. Government is pursuing it.
Ms. Omar. Yes. I asked because every time I have traveled
to Africa, I have been briefed on the need to balance the three
D's, but we haven't seen any evidence of that balance.
I have seen that the Pentagon has been calling the shots,
especially in Somalia, so it is really important that we get a
comprehensive strategy on all of these countries.
Public reporting has indicated that the drone strikes we
have conducted this year in Somalia were approved by AFRICOM
rather than the White House. Is that your understanding too?
Mr. Gonzales. That would really be a question for the
Department of Defense. I am not sure about the protocols and
how they exercise those authorities.
Ms. Omar. OK. Do you know what the legal basis for these
strikes were?
Mr. Gonzales. My understanding is that they are based in
collective self-defense. But in terms of the specific
legalities, I am afraid I do not have that information. I am
not a lawyer.
Ms. Omar. I have a letter out to you all, so I hope you
will expedite some answers for me in that regard.
Do you know how many designated foreign terrorist
organizations that mainly operated in the sub-Saharan Africa
prior to 2001 before our war on terror began?
Mr. Gonzales. No, ma'am, I do not. I can certainly get that
for you.
Ms. Omar. It was zero.
Do you know how many are there now?
Mr. Gonzales. I just cleared off on the list a couple of
days ago, so I have seen it, but the number I do not have off
the top of my head.
Ms. Omar. There are ten at the moment.
So we went from zero to ten since 2001. I think it is very
hard to claim that our ``security first'' approach to
counterterrorism, including drone strikes and partnering with
security forces that violate human rights, is working.
Are you familiar with the 2017 report from the United
Nations Development Programme entitled ``Journey to Extremism
in Africa''?
Mr. Gonzales. I am. And, in fact, that is the--I believe
that is the report that Assistant Administrator Jenkins cited
in terms of the 71 percent figure in terms of why people go to
violent extremists, is because 71 percent of them had recently
experienced a case of abuse at the hands of State authorities.
Ms. Omar. Yes. And it is really important that we do
understand that that very context, right, that the root causes
of this might be very different, depending on where you are on
the continent, but that the flash point for most of these
people to join these organizations is a human rights violation.
So how is it that we are effectively combating terrorism in
Africa by supporting security forces that are enacting these
human rights violations, which is something that Mr. Jenkins
did not answer? And how can we say it is good for stability
when there have been two coups in Mali, one in Guinea, one in
Chad, all within a year?
Mr. Gonzales. So I will go back to your first question,
about strategy, and I think--because the Sahel strategy
captures this quite nicely.
At the core of our Sahel strategy is we recognize that the
cause is a governance deficiency, the remedy must be a
governance response.
And so it brings the U.S. Government in totality, focused
on supporting governance at the national level, in terms of
what are the capabilities fighting corruption, transparency,
accountability----
Ms. Omar. It seems like we are--I am sorry--it seems like
our strategy is to support the same governing bodies that
continue to cause instability and continue to cause human
rights violations, which, in turn, has increased the number of
people who are joining terrorism and has increased the level of
terrorism that exists in the continent.
I mean, we are currently involved heavily in all of these
countries, yet they continue to get destabilized every year. So
what are we doing that is different, and what have we learned
from our involvement?
Mr. Gonzales. So, again, I would argue that we cannot
counter the security threat or the governance threat if we are
not engaging with the government that is involved in both sides
of that. And so bolstering governance at the national level and
the local level, but also engaging with security and enabling
the security sector institutions to become more capable, more
responsible and responsive to the needs of the citizens.
And, frankly, more accountable. I am incredibly blunt with
my African counterparts in terms of the role that their forces'
activities in abusing civilians play in driving citizens into
the hands of extremists.
And not only do we need to support and protect and hold
accountable abuses of human rights because it is the right
thing to do and it is our values, but fundamentally it is
critical to providing security and stability and public
confidence back in the State.
Ms. Omar. Yes. I appreciate that.
Thank you, Chairwoman for your generosity. I think it is
really important that we also take accountability for the
policies that we are engaging in and how that is fueling some
of the things that are happening in the continent.
So thank you, and I look forward to following up with you,
Mr. Gonzales.
Ms. Bass. Representative Sherman?
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. And I want to thank the chairs for
convening this hearing.
The first question relates to the Nile and Ethiopia's new
dam. I wonder if Mr. Gonzales can tell us, what are the legal
constraints on Ethiopia in filling this dam, both under the
traditional international law of riparian States and according
to any treaty obligations that Ethiopia has assumed?
Mr. Gonzales. Great. Thank you, Congressman.
Again, not a lawyer and haven't reviewed the particulars of
Ethiopia's treaty obligations, but fundamentally as----
Mr. Sherman. Well, does the U.S. have a position on what
are the legal rights? I mean, this is one of the biggest
disputes in East Africa, the biggest international disputes? Do
we know whether Ethiopia says, ``Hey, the water goes through
our country, we get to dam it up''? Is that a legitimate
position legally or not?
Mr. Gonzales. We know that Ethiopia says that, and we know
that the downstream effects are there. Ultimately, the answer
needs to be a solution that is viable to the existence and the
needs of all three of the member States.
And that is why we have tried over and over to lend our
good offices both directly, as we have seen in recent years as
well as----
Mr. Sherman. Reclaiming my time. I will have to go to other
legal experts. But you would think that, in addition to just
believing that it would be great if everybody works things out,
we would know what the legal rights of the parties are, and
that we would be standing up not only for everybody getting
along, which is great, but also for international law.
Turning again to Ethiopia, without objection, I would like
to put into the record the September 2021 situation report
published by Omna Tigray.
Without objection?
Ms. Bass. Yes, without objection.
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Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
When you look at the casualties in conflicts, the enormous
casualties come from deprivation of food and medicine and
disease hitting civilian populations, and that is certainly the
case with regard to the dispute in Tigray.
We have 2.2 million people who have been internally
displaced. We have millions who face starvation. We have 70,000
Tigrayans who have fled to Sudan. However, the Ethiopian
Government continues to block humanitarian aid, including food
aid, from entering the region.
Is it our position that that is a gross deprivation of
human rights and/or a war crime?
Mr. Gonzales. We certainly perceive it as a gross
deprivation of human rights.
In terms of particular war crimes determinations, we are
looking at the totality of the information on the situation on
the ground with regard to any type of designation along those
lines.
Mr. Sherman. What are we doing to get food to the people
who need it?
Mr. Gonzales. We are engaging across the board with all
entities who play----
Mr. Sherman. We are talking to all the entities, but have
we gotten any food into the country in the last week? Are
trucks moving? Are planes landing?
Mr. Gonzales. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Sherman. OK.
And I know Mr. Jenkins is right beside you there visually,
or virtually, and I assume he confirms that unless he wants to
speak up.
Mr. Jenkins. I cannot confirm what has happened in the last
week, but we are seized with this issue. We have a disaster
assistance response team in country. And yes, we think that it
is a deprivation of fundamental human rights.
Mr. Sherman. OK, we are seized with the issue, but as far
as you know, we haven't been able to get in any significant
amount of food in the last week?
Mr. Jenkins. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Sherman. OK.
And then finally, Mr. Gonzales, we lost a war in
Afghanistan. To what extent will this inspire extreme Islamic
nationalist forces from engaging in terrorism both against the
United States but also among the African States that we respect
and work with?
Mr. Gonzales. I would expect that it would certainly
inspire them, and all the more reason for us to continue to
double down on our engagement with our African partners to
respond.
Mr. Sherman. Have we seen any particular increase in
recruitment just in the last few weeks, or is this we have got
to be aware of maybe a longer-term response?
Ms. Bass. If you could answer that quickly. I am sorry.
Mr. Gonzales. I would expect it is a longer-term response,
but we have not yet observed that on the ground.
Mr. Sherman. My time is expired.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
And I am sorry, members, our clock is off for a minute. So
I am using my phone to keep the time.
But let me go to Representative Jacobs right now.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you so much, Madam Chair.
And thank you, Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Gonzales, for coming
before our committee.
I think, as we have talked about, we really need to look at
conflict in a comprehensive way. Secretary Blinken said it best
earlier this year: The tactical counterterrorism tools just do
not cut it, and instability and violence are fueled by
historical social grievances, a lack of accessible public
services, and exclusion from political processes.
On top of that, we know that abuses by State security
forces actually fuel local recruitment into these groups. So we
need to make sure our counterterrorism operations are not
enabling these abuses. And thinking about these challenges
exclusively through the lens of counterterrorism is at best
insufficient and at worst counterproductive.
In 2018, Rand found that since 1990 our assistance in
Africa appears to have little or no effect on political
violence. It did, however, find that a more holistic, long-term
focus centered around governance and institution-building would
yield better results.
So I am glad to hear you all talk so much about governance
during this hearing. When I worked at the State Department, it
wasn't always the case that our regional bureaus understood the
focus on governance needed to be so much. So I am very glad to
see that.
And thank you, Mr. Gonzales, for carrying that water.
And it is also why I am so excited about the implementation
of the Global Fragility Act and really looking forward to see
the selection of priority countries as soon as possible.
I know we have talked a lot about the Sahel and that the
strategy will focus on governance. We are very in support of
that. I was just wondering, Mr. Gonzales, if the Administration
plans to appoint a special envoy to the Sahel.
Mr. Gonzales. At this point, there is no specific plan to
do that. Once the Sahel strategy is finalized and we are
looking at the specific tactics, it would be most appropriate
to pursue it. That may be on the table.
For the time being, since January 20, I, as the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for both West Africa and Regional Peace and
Security, have effectively been serving the function. I engage
with the other international envoys for the Sahel as their peer
and counterpart and regularly engage with them.
Ms. Jacobs. Great. Thank you.
And I want to move on to the situation in Mozambique. I
know folks have brought up the situation in Cabo Delgado. We
know that it is not only a case of ideological issues but
exploited grievances of the local population that includes
exclusion from economic and political power, unemployment,
corruption, abuses by State security forces.
But so far our response has been counterterrorism and
security focused, which I think is very problematic.
So, Mr. Gonzales, what is the State Department's plan to
devise a comprehensive strategy to address these challenges
that actually addresses the underlying grievances of this
balance and conflict and not just more security assistance that
I personally think will actually fuel more conflict?
Mr. Gonzales. Yes. So thank you for that question.
I would just counter that, in fact, our approach on
Mozambique is not all about security. In fact, for the bulk of
this year, our campaign plan to counter ISIS-Mozambique
includes four lines of effort.
The first one is security assistance, because, again,
providing a response to the manifestation.
The second is related to strategic communications and
engaging the public so the public is aware of dynamics and has
insight into the threats that are coming, but also on counter
violent extremism messaging.
Targeted development humanitarian assessment is our third
line of effort.
And then the diplomatic engagement. And in fact, in terms
of our outreach to the Nyusi government, it has actually
yielded first the appointment of a coordinator for the
assistance part of responding to northern Mozambique and not so
much the coordinator for the security component.
So I think the security gets a lot of attention because,
sadly, the news that continues to reach us is dire, although
turning around in the past couple of weeks. But, fundamentally,
the core of our strategy really does look at this holistic
approach to address the underlying drivers.
Ms. Jacobs. I am glad to hear that. I will say it is hard
to message until you have--counter violent extremism messaging
is only useful when you actually have the governance reform to
go with it. So I hope you are working with the Government of
Mozambique to be more politically inclusive of the people of
the Cabo Delgado region.
In my last few seconds, Mr. Jenkins----
Ms. Bass. Yes, you have about 15 seconds,
Ms. Jacobs. I am sorry?
Ms. Bass. You have about 15 seconds.
Ms. Jacobs. Perfect.
In 15 seconds, Mr. Jenkins, what else can Congress do to
help USAID respond to peace-building and conflict prevention in
the continent?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, thank you. With 15 seconds, you took a
great step with the Global Fragility Act. Hold us accountable,
make sure that we implement that.
Second, we all need to have a conversation about more
prevention, not less, and a conversation about less directives,
less earmarks, and giving us flexible funding that allows us to
not have to plan 3 or 4 years out, but be able to react to
something like Cabo Delgado, be able to react to something like
the littoral States in coastal West Africa.
We need more flexibility and we need to work with you to
get a trust theory in there, that we know what we are doing, we
can work together. Exactly as you are saying, it cannot just be
a CT strategy. That is why we do not do CT today. We do
countering violent extremism, and it is all about the
governance.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Representative Vargas?
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And I want to
thank the other chair and, of course, our participants today,
especially our witnesses.
I want to start where we just left off: more prevention,
more flexibility, trust with the youth. So you think that under
some of the things that we are doing now, we are getting better
at that, but we are not good at it yet.
What more should we be doing in this aspect? What do you
need?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, thank you, Congressman.
We have learned a lot in the last 20 years. I would direct
people to the Stabilization Assistance Review, the SAR, that
was agreed to and written by State Department, Department of
Defense, and USAID in 2018. For the first time, we as a
government defined what we mean by stabilization. It is about
15 pages of very concise lessons learned not just from Iraq and
Afghanistan, but mainly from those two places.
Also, if you have the time, please read the SIGAR, Special
Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction report. The 20
year report just came out.
What have we learned? It is OK to be slow. In fact, slow is
better. It is OK to start small. Shut up and listen. Don't go
in with the answers. Just because we are the United States does
not mean we are going to solve a problem with more people and
more money.
We need to engage locals. We need to engage them with civil
society and their local government. We need to listen to them.
We need to stop doing things that aren't working. We need to
ramp up things that are working.
And all of that needs to be within a strategy where we
define what success is going to be. We need to be able to
resource that plan and be able to resource it in a way that we
can move with agility if things start to work better or stop
working the way we want to do.
We know these things. We have known them for a long time.
But we often do not execute them. That is the thing we have to
do more, as we are currently learning lessons way too slow. We
are acquiring the lessons. We just aren't learning them and
acting on them.
Mr. Vargas. One of the things it sounded like that you--
actually, I do not think you said it, I think Mr. Gonzales said
it--but the whole issue of governance, that it is tough working
with some of the governance when you know that there is
corruption, when there is abuse, and there is all these other
things.
I mean, how do you do that successfully, at the same time
making sure that U.S. money is going to the right place?
I mean, it is difficult. We just saw what happened in
Afghanistan, and I think the American people are not happy
about that and understandably. Of course, we spent so much
money there and because of the corruption, in my opinion, and
lack of focus, it really was a disaster at the end of the day.
Mr. Jenkins. We cannot let the objective blind us to the
reality on the ground. We say this a lot, but we need to mean
it. We cannot want to help them more than they want our help.
We can spend money. I can spend stupid money any day of the
week. That is not the objective.
The objective is, how do we work with these people, find
them where they are? Yes, we cannot tolerate any corruption,
any waste, fraud, and abuse. Find a partner at the national
level. If there is no proactive change agent there, find
someone at the provincial level, find them at the local level.
But slow down and realize this is not a short-term
endeavor. If it was easy and short-term, we wouldn't have these
problems. We have got to be in for the long haul. There is
going to be ups, there is going to be downs.
We need strategic patience. But we need to be realistic and
do not sell ourselves on 6-month to 12-month solutions.
These problems are generational. They are going to take
time, they are going to take patience, and they are going to
take grit.
That is what we have to dedicate ourselves to, not the
shiny object that we think we can achieve in a few months. If
that was the way to fix these things, they would all be fixed.
Mr. Vargas. I guess, last, I want to say this, that,
obviously, we have to be very, very concerned about security
and terrorism. Obviously, that is a great concern to us.
I agree, if we do not look at this thing holistically, that
is what we are going to get, I mean, if we do not figure that
out.
My niece was in the Peace Corps in Tanzania, and she was
there for 2 years, and, unfortunately, because of COVID, she
came back even though she applied to stay there longer. And she
is a wonderful young lady, that was the greatest experience of
her life, of course, and at the same time, she said, ``I just
loved being there, the people loved Americans. I mean, they
did.'' This is Tanzania, of course, it is a different area.
And the help that they were able to receive was development
help too. I mean, the chairwoman said this and it struck me the
other day. It is not really until development comes in a real
meaningful way and we intertwine all of our economies that a
lot of this will go away, because people need affluence, people
need the ability to take care of themselves, their family.
And when that happens, people feel that, OK, they are part
of the world, they have some ownership in their life, you can
call it agency or whatever you want to call it. But to really
have ownership over where they are going.
And we have got to figure that out. And I do not think we
have done a great job. And especially with all the problems we
are having in China and elsewhere, I mean, I do not understand
why we are not figuring out how to work deeply, in a deep
economic way, with Africa. We need to figure that out.
Again, I know my time is probably up. I do not know how the
clock works there. The clock is magical.
Ms. Bass. Yes. No, I am on my iPhone. You are almost at 6
minutes.
Mr. Vargas. But I thank the chair, and I thank everyone.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Bass. And I thank you, Mr. Vargas, for your instructive
comments, absolutely.
Well, members and our witnesses, I want to thank you for
your time today. I know we will have you back another time
because this is an issue that is ongoing. And how to focus and
target our authorizing legislation, as well as appropriation
legislation, I think, will be very important.
So I want to thank you very much. And the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]
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