[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


.                                     
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-21]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

           FISCAL YEAR 2022 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE HEARING

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             APRIL 21, 2021


                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
45-431                     WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
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                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
    Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
Vacancy

                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
               Whitney Verrett, Professional Staff Member
                           Zach Taylor, Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     1

                               WITNESSES

Dalton, Melissa G., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense..     2
Dickinson, GEN James H., USA, Commander, United States Space 
  Command........................................................     6
Richard, ADM Charles A., USN, Commander, United States Strategic 
  Command........................................................     4

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    33
    Dalton, Melissa G............................................    35
    Dickinson, GEN James H.......................................    76
    Richard, ADM Charles A.......................................    46

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Brooks...................................................   105
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   104
    Mr. Moulton..................................................   102
    Mr. Turner...................................................    97
           
           
           FISCAL YEAR 2022 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE HEARING

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                         Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 21, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:26 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Cooper. The hearing will come to order.
    First, I apologize to the witnesses for the late start.
    I would like to thank each one of you for being here today.
    We look forward to hearing from the distinguished 
witnesses, Ms. Melissa Dalton, Acting Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities; Admiral Charles 
Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command; and General James 
Dickinson, Commander of U.S. Space Command.
    In view of the shortness of time, I will dispense with an 
opening statement, but let me just record my worry about the 
personnel impacts of moving the headquarters to Huntsville, 
Alabama, and the fact that some of our colleagues in Congress 
don't feel the urgency that I feel to recapitalize all three 
legs of our strategic triad.
    Let me turn to the ranking member, Mr. Turner.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the 
Appendix on page 33.]

  STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Turner. I am just going to make a few comments.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your statement concerning the 
triad. I know that our witnesses before us today will be 
echoing the same sentiment.
    As we enter into moving forward with the NDAA [National 
Defense Authorization Act], it is going to be incredibly 
important for your testimony today to help us lay a foundation 
for the work that is necessary in funding the modernization of 
our nuclear enterprise.
    As you know, we have allowed our nuclear deterrent to 
atrophy. There are those who would like to pursue stall-and-
delay alternatives. We need your understanding of the 
importance of the path that we have set in front of us and 
completing it.
    I know that you are going to give us some understanding of 
what we are seeing with our adversaries. China is more than 
doubling, according to reports, their nuclear inventory.
    We know that Russia has undertaken the exotics with 
Skyfall, the nuclear-powered cruise missile that is supposed to 
orbit the Earth; with Poseidon, that is supposed to pop up from 
the water; and with other hypersonics and other nuclear 
weapons.
    Your testimony of validating the threat, the diminishing 
nature of our deterrent, and the critical aspect of our 
pursuing modernization is going to be very important today, and 
I look forward to that testimony.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
    I ask unanimous consent that my and your opening statement, 
written statement, be inserted for the record.
    And now we will hear from our witnesses.
    Ms. Dalton.

 STATEMENT OF MELISSA G. DALTON, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
                           OF DEFENSE

    Ms. Dalton. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today.
    May I request permission to submit my written statement for 
the record and provide brief opening remarks?
    Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you.
    Today, the United States faces a complex global threat 
environment characterized by increasingly sophisticated and 
militarily capable strategic competitors, destabilizing 
regional dynamics, and accelerating technological changes that 
pose significant dangers.
    The U.S. capabilities that we will discuss today offer 
critical advantages that are essential to deterring adversaries 
so that we can protect the American people, our homeland, and 
our allies and partners.
    As Secretary Austin has stated, nuclear deterrence is the 
Department's highest priority mission. Our nuclear forces 
remain essential to ensure no adversary believes it can ever 
employ nuclear weapons for any reason, under any circumstances, 
without risking devastating consequences.
    As the Department undergoes a set of strategic reviews that 
will include its nuclear policy and posture, DOD [Department of 
Defense] is committed to maintaining a safe, secure, 
survivable, and effective nuclear deterrent that accounts for 
the challenges posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.
    These reviews will account for adversary nuclear forces and 
doctrine, possible strategy posture and policy adjustments, 
program execution risk, arms control opportunities, and 
strategic stability and nuclear risk reduction, all with the 
goal of maintaining a strong and stable deterrent. Importantly, 
the views of allies will inform these reviews.
    Secretary Austin has stated that we must sustain and 
modernize the nuclear triad to maintain credible deterrence in 
the face of today's threats. The President's FY [fiscal year] 
2022 discretionary request supports ongoing nuclear 
modernization programs while ensuring that these efforts are 
sustainable.
    As missile technology matures and proliferates, the threat 
to the U.S., our allies, partners, and deployed forces is 
steadily growing, both from intercontinental and regional 
missile developments in North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia. 
We will review our missile defense policies, strategies, and 
capabilities to ensure they align with our broader National 
Defense Strategy to protect the Nation and our interests abroad 
from missile threats.
    Recently, the Department initiated the development of the 
Next Generation Interceptor, which will improve the overall 
reliability and performance of the Ground-Based Midcourse 
Defense system.
    The Department will continue to bring a more integrated 
approach to air and missile defense that not only assists with 
the defense of our forces and allies against multiple types of 
ballistic missiles, but also addresses the evolving spectrum of 
airborne and missile threats that seek to inhibit U.S. 
operations.
    It will be critical to invest in the right missile defense 
technologies in a cost-effective and responsible manner to 
retain our regional and strategic edge long into the future.
    While space-based capabilities are an inextricable 
component of the daily workings of modern life, space is also 
an arena of strategic competition. The United States remains 
the world's leader in space, but we must recognize the growing 
role that space plays in enabling China's increasingly 
assertive challenges to the international system and in 
Russia's disruptive role on the world stage.
    The Department is grateful for this committee's strong 
bipartisan support for initiating and sustaining important 
organizational reforms and ensuring we have the necessary means 
to realize our Nation's strategic goals in space.
    For the United States, hypersonic strike systems are an 
emerging conventional capability that is central to the broader 
goal of modernizing the joint force to ensure it can deter and, 
if necessary, defeat competitors in a high-end conflict.
    China and Russia are making concerted efforts to develop 
capabilities that are increasingly eroding traditional U.S. 
warfighting and military technological advantages, including 
hypersonic weapon systems. Such systems, including those that 
are nuclear armed, are top national priority efforts for both 
states.
    In response, the Department has prioritized hypersonic 
strike weapons, all of which are strictly non-nuclear, to 
address these challenges. These capabilities offer operational 
advantages by allowing us the ability to destroy critical enemy 
infrastructure and anti-access systems, enhancing the U.S. 
capability to create strategic effects without crossing the 
nuclear threshold.
    We are ensuring proper oversight as the Department develops 
the concept of operations that will guide this capability's 
use. The Department is committed to continued transparency and 
dialogue with Congress on strategic stability and policy 
questions relating to hypersonic strike systems.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton can be found in the 
Appendix on page 35.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
    Before we hear from Admiral Richard, I am required to read 
this boilerplate about web access, because we have several 
members attending remotely.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen 
for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and 
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and 
voting.
    Those members must continue to use the software platform's 
video function while in attendance unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera.
    If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should 
contact the committee staff for assistance.
    Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the 
room and via the television internet feeds. Members 
participating remotely must seek recognition verbally, and they 
are asked to mute their microphones when they are not speaking.
    Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep 
their software platform's video function on the entire time 
they are attending the proceeding.
    Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If members 
depart for a short while for reasons other than joining a 
different proceeding, they should leave the video function on. 
If members will be absent for a significant period or depart to 
join a different proceeding, they should exit the software 
platform entirely and then rejoin it if they return.
    Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
    Sorry for that boilerplate.
    Now, Admiral Richard.

  STATEMENT OF ADM CHARLES A. RICHARD, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                    STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

    Admiral Richard. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, 
distinguished committee members, good afternoon. I am pleased 
to testify with General Dickinson and Ms. Dalton, whose 
leadership and strategic insights benefit my command.
    I thank the President, Secretary of Defense Austin, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley for their 
leadership and their support to the mission of strategic 
deterrence.
    I assure you the command is committed to the priorities set 
forth by the Secretary to defend the Nation, care for our 
people, and succeed through teamwork. And I remind the command 
it is our diversity, resilience, and professionalism that sets 
us apart and makes us even stronger. It is a privilege to 
represent them here today.
    I thank the committee for its enduring support to our 
national defense and active engagement and interest in the 
command's missions.
    Strategic deterrence enables every U.S. military operation 
around the world. Every operational plan and every other 
capability we possess rests on an assumption that strategic 
deterrence--and, in particular, nuclear deterrence--is holding. 
If it fails, nothing else in the Department works as planned.
    I submit, as a Nation, until recently, we have not 
considered the implications of engaging in competition through 
crisis and possible direct armed conflict with a nuclear-
capable adversary in nearly three decades. For the first time 
in our Nation's history, we are about to face two nuclear-
capable strategic peer adversaries at the same time, both of 
whom must be deterred differently.
    And in that context, I submit, China must no longer be 
considered a ``lesser included case'' in this context. Their 
remarkable expansion of nuclear and strategic capabilities are 
evidence of their drive to be a nuclear peer by the end of the 
decade.
    This is the strategic complement to the conventional 
capability growth reported by INDOPACOM [United States Indo-
Pacific Command]. They are at some kind of an inflection point 
and are rapidly expanding their strategic capabilities. They 
are well ahead of the pace to double their stockpile by the end 
of the decade, and the size of a nation's stockpile is a very 
crude measure of its strategic capabilities.
    In order to fully assess the China threat, it is necessary 
to consider the capability, range, and accuracy of the 
associated delivery systems, their command and control, 
readiness, posture, doctrine, training.
    They are rapidly expanding road-mobile intercontinental 
ballistic missile capability, rapidly expanding solid fuel 
silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, deploying a 
strategic bomber, and they now possess six second-generation 
Jin-class ballistic missile submarines, making them capable of 
continuous at-sea deterrent patrols. They are developing 
dedicated nuclear command and control capability, to include 
launch under warning and launch under attack.
    By these measures, China is capable of executing any 
plausible nuclear employment strategy regionally now, and soon 
will be able to do so at intercontinental ranges.
    For China, it is important to look at what they do, not 
what they say, and where they are going, not where they are.
    I have no choice but to view China as a significant 
strategic nuclear threat and share Secretary Austin's 
assessment that China is the pacing threat for the Nation and 
DOD at large.
    Russia, however, remains the pacing strategic nuclear 
threat. They have aggressively engaged in advanced conventional 
and nuclear capability development and modernization efforts 
and are roughly 80 percent complete, while we are at zero.
    It is easier to describe what they are not modernizing--
pretty much nothing--than what they are--which is pretty much 
everything--including several never before seen capabilities 
and several thousand non-New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] 
Treaty accountable systems.
    Nuclear-armed ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] 
hypersonic glide vehicle; nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed 
underwater vehicle; and Skyfall nuclear-powered and nuclear-
armed cruise missile are examples of asymmetric strategies and 
weapons designed to offset conventional inferiority.
    We can no longer assume the risk of a strategic deterrence 
failure in crisis or conflict will always remain low. The days 
of power projection in a permissive environment without regard 
for a possible nuclear response are over.
    And bottom line is we don't have margin. I will be happy to 
answer more questions about that when we get into this in the 
rest of the testimony. We simply cannot continue to 
indefinitely life-extend Cold War leftover systems, platforms, 
NC3 [nuclear command, control, and communications], and 
successfully carry out our national strategy.
    Of particular concern is the aging nuclear weapons 
stockpile and supporting infrastructure, and we could reach a 
point where no amount of money will adequately mitigate the 
operational risk the Nation will face due to infrastructure and 
human talent capability losses.
    Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for the opportunity to be 
here today, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Richard can be found in 
the Appendix on page 46.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Admiral.
    Now we will hear from General Dickinson.

  STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                      STATES SPACE COMMAND

    General Dickinson. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. 
Thank you, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and members 
of the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on 
Strategic Forces for the chance to speak with you today.
    I am honored today to join Admiral Richard and Ms. Dalton 
for this afternoon's discussion.
    In describing the accomplishments of our Nation's newest 
combatant command, I am pleased to represent the nearly 18,000 
military, civilian, and contractor personnel supporting United 
States Space Command.
    In United States Space Command, our power is our people.
    Having just finished the command's celebration of Women's 
History Month, we proudly recognize our many female 
warfighters. Yesterday, in my comments to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, I shared examples of three female heroes in 
my command, and today I would like to take the opportunity to 
share three additional examples.
    Major Kathryn Congdon, who recently transferred into the 
brand new U.S. Space Force, started as an ICBM crew member, 
worked next to missile warning at the 6th Space Warning 
Squadron, and just led our planning efforts for the Global 
Lightning 2021 Exercise.
    Major Elise Fitch-Freeberg, an Army air defense artillery 
officer, is currently working on one of our most critically 
assigned missions, global sensor management in our Operations 
Directorate.
    And a third, a young Air Force staff sergeant, Kiara 
Kastner, brings personal expertise to a command that is still 
building its warfighting force, and is currently providing 
outstanding support in the front office of my chief of staff.
    And there are countless others. But those are three that I 
would like to mention today.
    Our diverse force will continue balancing combat readiness 
and preparing for the future. We will provide our people a 
working environment and culture that allows them to thrive 
while reaching their full potential.
    Our ideals reflect those of our oath to the Constitution of 
the United States, and we remain committed to providing for the 
common defense, promoting the general welfare, and securing the 
blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.
    Today, I will offer you some insight into our plans for the 
future, which are aligned with the President's new Interim 
National Security Strategic Guidance.
    When I took command of U.S. Space Command last August, we 
were still filling out the structures of a new warfighting 
combatant command for space. As I outlined in my written 
statement, we have made tremendous progress since then, to 
include further development of our two functional component 
commands and the establishment of all of our service component 
commands.
    These developments have significantly advanced space 
warfighting capability, all while supporting the joint force 
with exquisite space capabilities.
    While largely focused from the geosynchronous belt to the 
largest tactical mile on Earth, we are expanding our focus to 
keep pace with our Nation's push into the cislunar region, our 
renewed activity on the Moon, and our future exploration of 
Mars and beyond.
    China's space enterprise continues to mature rapidly, 
presenting a pacing challenge. They invest heavily in space, 
with more than 400 satellites on orbit today, and based on 
their current launch rate, could have as many as a thousand on 
orbit by the end of the decade.
    China is building military space capabilities rapidly, 
including sensing and communication systems and numerous anti-
satellite weapons. All the while, China continues to maintain 
their public stance against the weaponization of space.
    Similarly concerning, Russia's published military doctrine 
calls for employment of weapons to hold U.S. and allied space 
assets at risk. For example, similar to the Russian space-based 
weapons test in 2017, Russia again conducted a test of a space-
based anti-satellite weapon.
    Additionally, the December 2020 test of a direct descent 
anti-satellite weapon demonstrates that, even as Russia aims to 
restrict the capabilities of the United States, they clearly 
have no intention of halting their own ground-based and on-
orbit counterspace weapon systems. Currently, Russia has about 
200 satellites on orbit and could double that by 2030.
    In addition to this activity on the part of our 
competitors, we are observing exponential growth in the 
commercialization of space. We currently track a challenging 
32,000 objects in space. Nearly 7,000 of those objects are 
active or retired satellite payloads.
    Among the roughly 3,500 active satellites, the three 
largest single constellations belong to commercial companies: 
SpaceX's broadband internet constellation, Planet Labs' Earth 
imaging constellation, and Spire Global's space-to-cloud data 
analytics constellation.
    Overlaying this new global security landscape on the 
already complex operating environment of space demands a new 
level of awareness on our part. Given that the President's 
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance calls for ensuring 
the safety, stability, and security of outer space activities, 
U.S. Space Command is focused on my priority of enhancing 
existing and developing new space domain awareness 
capabilities.
    Space domain awareness gives us insight into activity 
throughout the space domain, including potential adversary 
activities, but perhaps more importantly, into the insights and 
intent of those potential adversaries as well.
    Space domain awareness provides decision-quality 
information to combatant commanders and the National Command 
Authority to ensure we can provide viable military options with 
the appropriate decision space throughout the spectrum of 
operations, from deterrence to warfighting.
    In order to most effectively accomplish our assigned 
missions, U.S. Space Command has assessed our current 
capabilities and developed the requirements necessary to expand 
that capability where needed to meet our mission imperatives. 
We have passed those requirements along to the services and to 
the Department of Defense.
    Our intent is to build the appropriate space operational 
architecture designed to achieve full operational capability, 
backed by a team of warfighters who outthink and outmaneuver 
our competitors. While engaging in a daily competitive 
environment, our primary goal remains to deter a conflict that 
begins in or extends into space.
    With the help of this committee and all of Congress, we 
will achieve that ultimate objective and ensure that the United 
States and our allies will never have a day without space.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Dickinson can be found 
in the Appendix on page 76.]
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the witnesses.
    We will now begin member questioning, first in open 
session, which I hope we can conclude before we have to return 
to votes.
    I am going to withhold my questions for the classified 
session. And I am grateful to the witnesses for being able to 
stay with us until after votes, when we can resume and 
hopefully have an entirely classified session then.
    I am going to withhold my questions.
    Would the ranking member like to ask any?
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you also for your opening 
statement of your support for the triad.
    Admiral Richard, I greatly appreciate your honesty and the 
fact of which you speak with such passion about the threats to 
the United States from our adversaries who have nuclear 
weapons. You see today that the United States is increasingly 
putting itself in a disadvantage with its adversaries that have 
nuclear capabilities and are increasing those capabilities.
    Admiral Richard, unfortunately, there are prior 
administrations, and even Members of Congress, that wanted you 
to sit here with the angst and anguish that you have. They 
mistakenly believed that if they placed you and our nuclear 
assets at risk, that our adversaries would follow, that a great 
disarmament around the world would occur.
    But the opposite has happened. While we have delayed our 
modernization, Russia has modernized with what it is called 
exotics, people are referring as exotics, new nuclear weapons 
capabilities, and China is definitely increasing its 
capabilities, perhaps doubling its weapons.
    So what we are seeing is that the premise of, if the United 
States was restrained, that the world would be restrained, is 
dangerously not true.
    Admiral Richard, some people are talking, in addition to 
restraining the modernization plans that we have in place, of 
putting in place a no-first-use policy. I believe that you have 
been quoted before about China's no-first-use policy, that it 
has holes enough in it enough you could drive a truck through, 
or perhaps a mobile ICBM through.
    Could you please discuss for a minute what your views are 
of what it would do to the United States and our allies and how 
it would perhaps not have any effect in deterring our 
adversaries for the United States to adopt a no-first-use 
policy?
    Admiral Richard. So, Ranking Member, first, I want to offer 
that that is fundamentally a policy question. I am conscious I 
am sitting right beside a representative from OSD [Office of 
the Secretary Defense] Policy, and so what I am about to 
describe to you is my best military advice.
    Mr. Turner. That is what I am looking for.
    Admiral Richard. The comment about driving a truck through 
the no-first-use policy is I simply look at what China's 
capabilities are and what it enables them to do, and they are 
very inconsistent with a no-first-use policy and the implied 
minimum deterrent strategy that follows.
    I see a no-first-use policy as degrading the Nation's 
deterrence. It will remove a level of ambiguity that has 
deterrence value. That will be mitigated by the fact that the 
policy likely will not be perceived as credible by the people 
that it is intended to deter.
    This would only apply to about 10 nations or so. Most of 
the rest are already covered by our negative security 
assurance, and about half the ones I am describing are our 
allies.
    So it will be no more credible than our current missile 
defense policy is, that is also not given a lot of credit, and 
is no different than the no-first-use policy the Soviet Union 
had or the one that North Korea currently has.
    However, some of our allies might find it credible, and I 
think it will have a negative effect on extended deterrence and 
assurance.
    The Nation can have any policy that it would like. These 
would be the implications in my mission sets.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you.
    Ms. Dalton, we have been told and our staff have been told 
that there is a study that has been undertaken in OSD CAPE 
[Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation] and OSD 
Policy concerning the Minuteman III. The Minuteman III has been 
studied before, and it has been determined that it cannot have 
life extension, not merely just because of cost, but also 
because of capabilities.
    Admiral Richard was describing the capabilities that our 
adversaries are reaching to.
    So it was not merely just an accounting aspect. It was also 
a capabilities aspect.
    But we have been told that there is a study underway of 
looking at 200 Minuteman III missiles to maintain the land-
based leg of a deterrent while using the remaining missiles to 
support replacement parts, which of course, again, every time 
this has been studied it has been ill-advised to look at any 
extension of the Minuteman III, not just merely for cost, but 
also for capabilities.
    Ms. Dalton, are you aware of this study? Did you approve 
it? And what is in this study?
    Ms. Dalton. Representative Turner, thank you very much for 
the question and the opportunity to testify today.
    I myself have not read that study, but I am happy to follow 
up with further views on the matter.
    More broadly, when it comes to the Minuteman III program, 
this will certainly be a program that we examine in the course 
of our upcoming strategic reviews of our nuclear posture.
    I share Admiral Richard's concern in terms of our aging 
nuclear arsenal and the fact that, as you just noted, sir, that 
the capability as we get out to the 2030s grows quite worrisome 
in terms of our ability to deter effectively the range of 
threat actors that we have discussed here today already.
    So as we are looking ahead in our strategic reviews, 
looking at those threat factors, looking at what our current 
capabilities can afford us to address them, we will also, of 
course, be looking at cost and what is the right balance of the 
mix of programs that may be necessary to have a safe, 
effective, and secure nuclear deterrent well into the future.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Turner. Okay. So is the study that you just referenced 
ongoing, or is that something that has just occurred?
    Ms. Dalton. So as most administrations upon taking office 
will conduct a series of strategic reviews, to include the 
National Defense Strategy review, which we are----
    Mr. Turner. Yeah. I am well aware of that.
    Ms. Dalton. Yes.
    Mr. Turner. I am asking you solely about the Minuteman III, 
because this has been exhaustively studied and conclusively 
determined to be unable to be life-extensioned.
    And so I am asking you, are you aware of a different study 
that has been tasked, other than those that have been completed 
before?
    And do you have an opinion other than what the studies that 
have been previously concluded, that we need to move forward 
with a modernization program and not review once again a 
Minuteman III life extension program?
    Ms. Dalton. Representative, thank you for the question. I 
will have to take that question for the record, because I 
myself have not seen that particular study.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Turner. Okay. If you find that there is a new study 
going on, we would like it. So take this as our formal request 
for an understanding of, if it is ongoing, send us the scope, 
okay, and if it is completed, then please provide it to us.
    With respect to no first use, Admiral Richard was giving, I 
think, a great understanding of what our adversaries would view 
a no-first-use policy, and certainly the environment that he is 
operating in where Russia has a use--an escalate to deescalate. 
We understand the Nuclear Posture Review will be ongoing. Every 
administration, as you have said, has done one.
    But do you have an opinion on no first use, Ms. Dalton?
    Ms. Dalton. Representative Turner, thank you for the 
question.
    The question of our declaratory policy is a Presidential-
level decision. Our declaratory policy should reflect our 
strategic objectives, including our extended deterrence 
commitments to our allies.
    In the course of both interagency and Departmental-level 
strategic reviews that we are about to kick off, we will be 
assessing the security environment, consulting with our allies 
to inform these reviews, and to make a determination to inform 
Presidential decision making on what changes, if any, should be 
made to our current declaratory policy.
    Mr. Turner. Leonor Tomero reports to you, does she not?
    Ms. Dalton. She does.
    Mr. Turner. You are familiar with the article to the 
Japanese press concerning no-first-use policy and 
modernization? Did you approve this?
    Ms. Dalton. Representative Turner, I am aware of the 
article, and I have also read the transcript of the interview, 
which I think more fully captures DASD [Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense] Tomero's position, which was not well 
reflected in the article.
    Mr. Turner. Should she be having a position since you don't 
have an NPR [Nuclear Posture] Review completed yet?
    Ms. Dalton. She was reflecting the range of elements and 
aspects of the review that I just walked through in the context 
of the interview, and we would be happy to share the transcript 
of the interview with you.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you.
    I just want to thank Admiral Richard one more time, because 
you have been incredibly passionate, both in the House and the 
Senate, and we really need your help and support as we push 
forward for modernization.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. We have about 20 minutes left before we have to 
vote. The next four questioners in order are Garamendi, Wilson, 
Carbajal, and Lamborn.
    Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Richard, is it true that in 2019 
your predecessor said that the Minuteman III could be life-
extended one more time in testimony to this committee?
    Admiral Richard. I am not aware that he did or did not say 
that.
    Mr. Garamendi. You should be aware, because, in fact, it 
was said that the Minuteman III could be extended one more 
time.
    In your argument for the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic 
Deterrent], you assume that the Minuteman--in the issue of 
cost, it is assumed by the Pentagon, by your organization, that 
the Minuteman III would be life-extended, and then, following 
that, the GBSD would go into place, and it too would be 
extended. The dates are 2075.
    That is your argument, is it not? You are assuming that the 
Minuteman III could be extended as you compare the cost of the 
two systems to the year 2075?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, we as a department have 
reported several times to Congress, most recently in a 
comparison of Ground Based Strategic Deterrent/Minuteman III 
cost estimates back in October 2019, that it is not cost 
effective to life-extend Minuteman.
    The ultimate authority on whether it can be life-extended 
or not is the Secretary of the Air Force as judged by the 
Secretary of Defense.
    Mr. Garamendi. Sir----
    Admiral Richard. And I will defer to that.
    Mr. Garamendi. If you will excuse me, sir.
    My question was, the assumption in the pricing, the cost 
differential, assumed that the Minuteman III could be extended. 
And, in fact, your predecessor to this committee in 2019 said 
that it could be extended one more time.
    That testimony is available, and we can provide it to you.
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, from an operational 
standpoint what I would ask is I do not see an operational 
reason to even attempt to do that.
    Mr. Garamendi. Okay.
    Admiral Richard. The Minuteman III is a 1970s-era weapon 
designed to go against Soviet analog defenses. I need a weapon 
that will work and make it to the target. And to expect that in 
the timeframes you are talking about to penetrate potentially 
advanced Russian and Chinese systems is going to be a 
challenge.
    Mr. Garamendi. Sir, we are talking here about the Minuteman 
III's viability long-term. Your office delivered to me all of 
the data about the Minuteman II and the Minuteman III. And in 
fact, the Minuteman II, poured in 1966, was viable in 2014.
    So with regard to the Minuteman II rocket, after all of 
those years, it was still viable.
    The Minuteman III, similarly, there is no evidence in your 
document that the Minuteman III is not viable, as it is today, 
nor is there any information that indicates that the Minuteman 
III cannot be extended one more time.
    Now, if that is wrong please----
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, again, I will defer to the 
Secretary of Defense. But I will remind you that it is about 
the entire weapon system----
    Mr. Garamendi. No, sir.
    Admiral Richard. It is.
    Mr. Garamendi. Sir, if you could, please stick to the 
debate that I am having with you, which is the viability of the 
Minuteman III.
    The viability of the Minuteman III to be extended one more 
time is clearly possible by the documents and the testimony of 
the Strategic Command. So I want to get that on the record.
    Now, don't go off talking to me about the Secretary of 
Defense. We are talking about the viability of the Minuteman 
III.
    If I am incorrect and it is not possible--not possible--to 
extend it one more time, then please provide the written 
documentation to that. That is a fundamental point in the 
debate that we are having here about the GBSD and the necessity 
for it.
    Secondly, why--or, thirdly--why did the Department of 
Defense and your organization choose the year 2075 rather than 
the year 2040 or 2050? What is the rationale for that?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, any information provided to 
you on the life expectancy, cost, or any performance on the 
Minuteman III or other weapon systems would have been the 
Department of the Air Force, not STRATCOM [United States 
Strategic Command]. That is why I say I am not the ultimate 
authority on that.
    I am the operational commander. I set the operational 
requirement. So I will defer to the Air Force to answer those 
questions. I can just report what I see. And an example is----
    Mr. Garamendi. You have reported to us that you cannot--are 
you reporting to us that you cannot extend the life of the 
Minuteman III? Is that your report?
    Admiral Richard. I am reporting that the Air Force has 
reported it is not cost effective to life-extend the Minuteman 
III. And from my own personal observation, with deference to 
the U.S. Air Force, I am not sure it can be life-extended at 
all.
    For example, the command and control system for that dates 
back to the 1970s. When it started, the word ``cyber'' hadn't 
even been defined.
    If you expect me to report back, I am going to get 
questioned on it in a second, on how I am maintaining the cyber 
defenses of a command and control system that was designed 
before the internet, I am not sure that that is possible.
    Mr. Garamendi. Why are you not sure? It is your business to 
be sure.
    Admiral Richard. Exactly, that is why I need a new one.
    Mr. Garamendi. And a new one was----
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Garamendi. When was--excuse me, but you are talking 
about the command and control system. When was it last updated 
for the Minuteman III?
    Admiral Richard. The Minuteman III system is currently 
being updated in one aspect right now.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Wilson, who is attending remotely.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Jim Cooper.
    And, Admiral Richard, I want to thank you for your clarity, 
determination, and professionalism.
    And, on pit production, Admiral Richard, I appreciate that 
you recently were quoted as saying, quote, ``I am apprehensive 
that, if we are not careful, we will make an irreversible 
decision that will leave the Nation without the capabilities it 
needs to defend itself and to execute its preferred strategies 
5 to 10 years from now, which we can't buy back,'' end of 
quote.
    Given that the NNSA [National Nuclear Security 
Administration] has a 2030 deadline for 80 pits at 2 sites that 
falls into that 5- to 10-year timeline, what concerns do you 
have if the NNSA fails to meet that deadline as it relates to 
our national security?
    Admiral Richard. So, Congressman, I will offer that the 
requirement for 80 pits per year is based on maintaining the 
age of the pits in the stockpile at an acceptable level.
    And so, if we are unable to meet 80 pits per year, the only 
alternative is to now start to accept pits that have aged past 
the point that we have a good analytical basis to have 
confidence in their operation.
    We don't have data that says they will work. We don't have 
data that says they won't work. But if we don't reach 80 pits 
per year, we are going to kind of find out the hard way how 
that works out.
    And if there is a delay in getting to 80, it will drive the 
requirement higher in the future in order to bring the overall 
age of the stockpile back to an analytically sound basis.
    Mr. Wilson. Additionally, in regard to pit production, most 
U.S. nuclear systems have been extended far beyond their 
intended cycles and require significant consistent investment 
over the next two decades to build the expert workforce and 
necessary facilities to sustain them or we risk critical 
capabilities.
    For example, the United States is the only nuclear weapon 
state that cannot develop currently a plutonium pit for 
deployment.
    This committee sought to address this in the bipartisan 
fiscal year 2021 NDAA by directing the modernization of our 
plutonium pits, including production of 80 pits per year at 2 
sites by 2030.
    How does this uncertain funding threaten the capability of 
our nuclear deterrent against Russia and China, who are 
building or updating their own triads?
    Admiral Richard. Well, fundamentally, sir, one thing that 
NNSA will need to achieve the capabilities that you describe to 
meet the requirements that DOD is asking for is stable funding.
    I think it is useful for us to remember that this effort at 
pit production I think is the fourth or fifth attempt in our 
Nation's history to reestablish it after we terminated pit 
production back in 1992 at Rocky Flats.
    And this is an example where, if we don't recapitalize the 
infrastructure, we will lose a key piece of what it means, what 
you have to have to be a nuclear weapon state, and we will not 
be able to buy it back at unlimited cost for a large number of 
years.
    Mr. Wilson. And thank you for restating that history.
    And, Secretary Dalton, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
emphasized the need to produce no fewer than 80 plutonium pits 
by 2030 to sustain our current warhead supply.
    The NNSA determined that a two-site approach--at least 50 
percent at the Savannah River Site and at least 30 percent at 
Los Alamos--is the best way to provide flexibility and 
redundancy towards such a vital modernization effort.
    Is that your view, that the recommendations of the 2018 NPR 
are still valid?
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Representative, for the question.
    For all the reasons that Admiral Richard laid out, this is 
a critical issue for us to examine in our upcoming strategic 
reviews. So we will be taking that into account over the next 
few months, and happy to come back and brief you as we have 
findings from the reviews.
    Mr. Wilson. And, again, thank you for your service as a UVA 
[University of Virginia] graduate.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Mr. Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    General Dickinson, I agree with your assessment that the 
United States commercial space program aids our mitigation 
efforts against threats.
    In a report to Congress on space launch infrastructure, it 
is noted that the ranges annually compete for facility 
sustainment, restoration, and modernization funds to sustain, 
repair, and construct requirements. A focus on these efforts is 
to sustain existing infrastructure rather than growing 
capability to meet the diverse user base of the launch ranges.
    With the U.S. commercial launch industry on the cusp of 60 
to 100 percent increase in launch rates over the next 5 years, 
we must be putting more resources towards growing capabilities.
    Is this just a matter of needing additional funds, or does 
it require a policy change?
    General Dickinson. Congressman, thank you for that 
question.
    As we look to the increase in the commercial use of those 
ranges, those ranges actually fall under the purview of the 
U.S. Space Force, so General Jay Raymond, the Chief of Space 
Operations. The funding and infrastructure piece of that 
belongs to the Space Force.
    I am happy to take that question for the record. But in 
terms of support to that activity, I do more along the lines of 
supporting NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] 
in their human space flight support activities that I can go 
into greater detail with you if you would like.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. That won't be necessary.
    Admiral Richard, I have concerns about cybersecurity and 
digital security of the modernization of nuclear command, 
control, and communications, NC3.
    What digital security and reliability metrics are used 
throughout the acquisition process for NC3 modernization?
    In addition, has STRATCOM taken any steps to improve 
visibility into the readiness of NC3 systems and mission?
    Admiral Richard. Thank you, Congressman, for that question, 
and I will answer it in my separate responsibility as the NC3 
enterprise lead for the Department of Defense. This is a 
separate organization that was established about 2 years ago, 
separate but aligned to STRATCOM, to put an enterprise-wide 
focus on improving the performance of NC3.
    I will start with your last question first. A number of 
steps have been taken. And the system was always operated to a 
very high standard. It just had a number of operators.
    We have now centralized that, and, in fact, published an 
operations order called Buoyant Link that standardized 
reporting, data acquisition, an otherwise much better 
understanding of the day-to-day status of the NC3 system.
    Second, on the acquisition side of the house, partnering 
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Sustainment, we have established many things, but one that 
would highlight the point I would like to make here is a 
cybersecurity scorecard, where we have de-bureaucratized a very 
complex process, dropped into a stack of 35 metrics that are 
key attributes you have to build into a system, both the ones 
that are operating and the ones that you are acquiring. Service 
providers, services and agencies, now report that.
    And we have a compliance mechanism where I, as the 
operator, judge the results of that, and then present it to the 
Vice Chairman and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, so that we 
can make either operational decisions or programmatic decisions 
designed to close those cybersecurity gaps.
    Let me say that I have full confidence in the cybersecurity 
of our nuclear command and control systems for a number of 
reasons, but I need to modernize NC3, just like we need to 
modernize the delivery systems and the weapons complex, so that 
we can pace the threat and retain that confidence moving in the 
future.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    I have limited time, but Admiral Richard, we have been 
hearing from you, the Department, that China is expected to 
double, triple, or quadruple the size of its nuclear stockpile 
in the next 10 years.
    Even if China quadruples its current nuclear warhead 
stockpile, it still would only put them at a thousand warheads. 
In addition, China has no first-use policy and a minimum 
deterrence strategy. The U.S. nuclear arsenal includes nearly 
4,000 deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons.
    With all this said, how do you understand the threat of 
China's arsenal in comparison to the United States much larger 
and advanced stockpile?
    Admiral Richard. So, Congressman, first, the entire 
stockpile for the U.S. is not available to me, to operations. 
As you know, we are treaty constrained with Russia to 1,550 
accountable weapons. That is what is available to me to 
actually conduct the mission.
    Second, you don't deter by accounting. I don't hold up a 
card, ``I have more. I win.''
    Third is I don't have the luxury of deterring one country 
at a time. I am required to deter all countries all the time. 
Right? So I have to be able to deter Russia at the same time I 
have to be able to deter China. And that is the point behind 
China is no longer a lesser included case.
    In our history, we sized our forces with margin and 
capacity for uncertainty that left us enough residual capacity 
to credibly deter any other threat that we had to face. That is 
about to be no longer true, and that is the point behind the 
statement that they are no longer a lesser included case, sir.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I am out of time. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. We have about a few minutes remaining. The 
committee will stand in a brief recess. I ask members to make 
both votes and then return promptly to this room, to continue 
the open session. Thank you.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Cooper. The subcommittee will return to order.
    Mr. Lamborn.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    General Dickinson, in your statement you said, quote, 
``Achieving the desired effects in the space domain requires 
close coordination with other combatant commands,'' unquote.
    There is currently great synergy that exists between 
USSPACECOM [United States Space Command], NORTHCOM [United 
States Northern Command], NORAD [North American Aerospace 
Defense Command], and the National Space Defense Center all 
being located in close proximity there in Colorado Springs.
    On the personnel side, eight of the nine Space Force 
Deltas, formerly called Space Wings, are located in Colorado; 
the ninth is at Vandenberg. And seven of those eight are in 
Colorado Springs, including all of our Guardians, who are 
focused on space warfighting.
    There are over 1,900 uniformed Space Force personnel in 
Colorado, with over 1,500 in Colorado Springs alone. And there 
are 32,000 total personnel who work or will work for Space 
Force in Colorado.
    Right now all of these units and people benefit from 
working together in the same buildings with personnel from 
SPACECOM, Space Force, and their intelligence community 
counterparts working side by side.
    How does it benefit our national security to rip out the 
headquarters element of Space Command from this concentration 
of national security, space, and intelligence community 
professionals and move it someplace a thousand miles away?
    General Dickinson. Congressman, your first comment about 
the relationship with, in particular, like U.S. Northern 
Command and NORAD, we do enjoy a great relationship. But I will 
offer to you that I enjoy a great relationship with all of the 
other combatant commands, and our ability to work closely with 
those combatant commands is fundamental to what we do each and 
every day.
    We have had great success over the last 20 months with 
regard to our relationships with the other combatant commands. 
We have developed integrated planning elements, which are small 
groups of expert space planners and operators who are embedded 
in each of the combatant commands, and we are growing those in 
all of the 10 combatant commands at various levels right now.
    And so I tell you, those integrated planning elements have 
established a great relationship with each of the combatant 
commands in providing critical space warfighting expertise.
    Mr. Lamborn. So something that is working well, and within 
the Space Command they are side by side, thousands of people 
side by side, why rip it in half and send some across the 
country?
    General Dickinson. So, Congressman, so in terms of military 
type of operations, we have seen in the past and in the present 
where we can actually do operations when we are not 
geographically located with each of those elements.
    So there is synergy I think you gain by being in the same 
area, but I think there is equally synergy in terms of being 
able to do that in not a remote manner, but in a physically 
distant manner.
    So in terms of military type of operations, I believe you 
can do it in two different locations that wouldn't necessarily 
be directly there in Colorado Springs, for example.
    Mr. Lamborn. Well, if the military was told to put Space 
Command in a cornfield in Iowa, they could do it. We can do 
whatever we want. But why do it when it is working so well 
where it is right now?
    I am going to change subjects because of limited time.
    Would you agree with me--let me back up.
    It may surprise people that survivable communication 
networks were not required for SPACECOM by the Department of 
the Air Force when they did their, what I question, a highly 
questionable evaluation process.
    So survivable communications has to be added if we started 
a new command up somewhere; whereas, right now there are 
multiple secure command centers at Peterson, Schriever, and 
Cheyenne Mountain, which provide continuity of operations for 
Space Command.
    In fact, past commanders of Air Force Space Command have 
said their preferred warfighting command center would either be 
the National Space Defense Center at Schriever or Cheyenne 
Mountain Air Force Station, the latter of which was built to 
survive a 30-megaton nuclear explosion.
    So today what kind of continuity of operations facilities 
are there in Huntsville, Alabama?
    General Dickinson. Well, Congressman, I am not aware of any 
in Huntsville, Alabama. But I do know that in terms of the 
National Space Defense Center and my command out in Vandenberg 
Air Force Base that the secure communications that they have is 
satisfying the mission requirements now, and if we are directed 
to move, that that type of infrastructure would be built and 
operable to meet my mission needs.
    Mr. Lamborn. And we haven't even talked about the cost. 
That is going to be over a billion dollars. But we will maybe 
have a chance to talk about that at some time in the future.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me 
okay?
    Mr. Cooper. Yes. Uh-huh.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    I want to thank our witnesses for the testimony today, and 
thank you all for your service to the country.
    In January, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
said that before possibly reassigning responsibility for 
electromagnetic spectrum operations [EMSO] to a new entity we 
needed to fix it by properly resourcing Strategic Command.
    Admiral Richard, what resources do you need to effectively 
execute EMSO?
    Admiral Richard. So, Congressman, thank you for that 
question. And it might be worth a reminder to you and the 
committee, my responsibilities in electromagnetic spectrum 
operations are to advocate, input on joint requirements. And 
then I have some responsibility to execute the new 
Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority plan that DOD recently 
rolled out.
    So General Hyten was correct, STRATCOM is not fully 
resourced.
    There are two aspects to this, and both of these the 
Department is addressing, one of which is in the headquarters 
element.
    So this is some number of personnel to execute these. And 
it is a small number. It is on the order of 40 people to 
execute the headquarters functions. And then there will be a 
larger need for personnel more broadly inside the Department to 
provide sufficient electromagnetic spectrum operations 
expertise.
    That second number is still being determined. But we have a 
very good way ahead to address the deficiencies that you refer 
to from General Hyten.
    Mr. Langevin. And, Admiral, whether or not EMSO stays at 
Strategic Command, what authorities does the command need to 
effectively execute EMSO?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, the issue is not authorities. 
STRATCOM and the Department writ large have sufficient 
authorities to accomplish this mission.
    But what does need to happen--and this is specific to EMSO 
but also applies in some other mission sets--is we have gotten 
used to as a Nation adopting processes designed for permissive 
environments that are designed to minimize programmatic and 
technical risk at the expense of operational risk. We used to 
not do it that way.
    And so one of my big functions inside EMSO is to bring the 
operational risk component back into the Department processes 
so that our programmatic and other decisions are informed by 
operational risk as well as programmatic and technical risk.
    And that is the area, one of the areas, that we are 
concentrating on. I have sufficient authorities to do it. We 
just have to go get it done.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. And one other question.
    Going off of Mr. Carbajal's question, I want to follow up 
and ask if we should conduct similar fail-safe reviews of 
nuclear weapons and early warning systems, especially with 
regard to automation and implementing more AI [artificial 
intelligence]?
    Admiral Richard. So we are for implementation of artificial 
intelligence. We are just at the beginning stages to explore 
possible applications of AI inside nuclear command and control.
    The first place that we see is really on the intelligence 
side of the house. So enabling us to go through a much broader 
range of information than is now humanly capable or possible to 
do in an effort to determine much better situational awareness, 
and then the human processes, present that to senior 
decisionmakers.
    The second piece that we see some immediate application for 
AI is in cyber defense. And it gives us a better ability to 
understand what is happening inside our networks, understand 
that better, and make better operational decisions, again, 
adapting things that are beyond human capacity alone to 
address.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral.
    General Dickinson, how would you describe information 
sharing and cooperation between your command and other 
combatant commands? What are some of the challenges that still 
need to be addressed?
    General Dickinson. Congressman, I think we have got great 
information sharing between the different combatant commands. I 
mentioned earlier with Representative Lamborn that we have got 
integration in each of the combatant commands with small 
planning elements right now, as well as some of their elements 
within my command.
    In particular, Cyber Command has a cyber integrated 
planning element that works each and every day within my 
command that provides that integration. But over the course of 
the last 20 months with these IPEs [integrated planning 
elements], space IPEs, we have seen a lot of synergy in 
bringing integration to those combatant commands from U.S. 
Space Command and providing those space warfighting 
capabilities that they need.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much. My time is expired.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Dr. DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
    And thank you for your service, to our panelists.
    I want to associate myself with Mr. Turner's line of 
questioning, Admiral Richard, on the no-first-use policy. About 
an hour and a half ago, I got off the phone with Ambassador 
Wilczek from Poland, and he is very concerned and assures me 
that his neighbors up and down Eastern Europe share the same 
feelings that a no-first-use policy would erode our extended 
deterrent.
    Could it actually have an adverse impact of putting allies 
in the position of needing a deterrent or increasing their own 
capabilities?
    Admiral Richard. Again, sir, I think the commander of 
European Command addressed this well in terms of us getting a 
mixed reaction out of our allies.
    I do think in some cases it will diminish our extended 
deterrence and assurance commitments, and if that were to be 
diminished that would become their own decisions as to what 
steps they might need to take to address that.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay.
    Staying on the topic of first use, but turning to Russia 
specifically, do you believe there are circumstances in which 
Russia may opt to use nuclear weapons first?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, that is their doctrine.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah. And I have been kind of intrigued by 
the argument about low-yield nuclear weapons. What do you think 
the likelihood would be that the next nuclear attack we see 
would be of the low-yield nature?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, it is difficult to speculate 
on that. I do say that, one, it is Russian doctrine under 
certain conditions that they would contemplate an attack like 
that. That capability is certainly necessary for that.
    I think it is also useful for us to remember the U.S. has 
always had low-yield capability inside its arsenal. The only 
thing that was added with the recent addition of the low-yield 
ballistic is we simply now have a weapon system that is much 
more likely to actually make it to the target.
    Dr. DesJarlais. And the W76-2s, of course, have been 
deployed and critics had called this weapon destabilizing. Can 
you respond to these critics and explain how this weapon could 
deter Russia from an escalation-to-win strategy?
    Admiral Richard. I will offer that recently, within the 
last year, STRATCOM started formally measuring risk of 
strategic deterrence failure. I can give you the details on how 
we do that in the classified session.
    But this is a formal risk assessment that is designed to 
make sure that we are analytically rigorous in all the things 
that we do, acknowledging that it is just fundamentally trying 
to measure a subjective process, the decision making of another 
country.
    But our assessment is, is that deployment of a low-yield 
improved the risk of strategic deterrence, i.e., it lowered it 
because of the deterrent effect that it achieved.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And just in the last minute or so if 
you would like to, the time expired in the line of questioning 
for Mr. Garamendi, and I was going to ask you to speak to the 
importance of developing the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 
rather than extending the Minuteman III.
    So if you would like to take a minute and further your 
thoughts about what effect delaying or canceling development of 
GBSD would have on the nuclear deterrence and our allies' 
confidence in the U.S. extended deterrence and, frankly, your 
ability to do your job the way you see fit.
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, the Nation, one, has had a 
longstanding, can trace its lineage back to the Kennedy 
administration, flexible and tailored strategy for strategic 
deterrence. It has repeatedly, through every Nuclear Posture 
Review dating back to 1992, in that process reaffirmed that the 
best way to accomplish that mission is with a triad.
    That makes the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of 
that essential to be able to accomplish this mission. You need 
the total capability and capacity of the triad to do what the 
President has directed me to do. And inside that, I need an 
ICBM that will actually work and actually make it to the 
target.
    It is a remarkable accomplishment that we have been able to 
extend the Minuteman III as long as we have. Again, I will 
defer to the Air Force in terms of cost-effectiveness, that 
they have repeatedly reported to Congress that it is not cost-
effective. And I need it to be able to pace the threat.
    And so I don't see an upside to trying to life-extend the 
Minuteman when it is time to get a modern weapon system such 
that I have the ability to deter the never-before-seen-in-our-
history condition of facing two peer nuclear-capable 
adversaries.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Morelle.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to Ms. Dalton, Admiral Richard, and General 
Dickinson for being here today to share your expertise and 
obviously for your dedication and service to our Nation's 
safety and security.
    I wanted to ask the question of Admiral Richard, the NNSA's 
Inertial Confinement Fusion, or ICF, program maintains three 
world-leading experimental facilities, including the Omega 
Laser Facility at the University of Rochester's Laboratory for 
Laser Energetics, which is in my district in Rochester, New 
York.
    As I understand it, they are the only means for scientists 
to recreate the high energy density conditions found in an 
operating weapon without underground nuclear testing.
    In addition to the physical facilities, obviously they 
employ and use the talented workforce that is necessary to 
conduct the experiments which produce valuable scientific data 
and deter our adversaries.
    I also understand that the capabilities and the viability 
and their importance is demonstrated by large investments being 
made in new facilities under construction, both in Russia and 
in China.
    And I wonder if, Admiral, if you could comment on the 
importance of U.S. scientific capabilities in avoiding, first 
of all, technological surprise, and ensuring the safety, 
reliability, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent without 
a need to resume testing.
    I apologize, it is a long question, but very interested in 
understanding this.
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, you hit on, I think, the key 
point at the very end of your question, which is 
fundamentally--and I will defer to NNSA for the details--the 
way the U.S. today maintains confidence in the nuclear weapons 
stockpile is through the Stockpile Stewardship Program where 
efforts like you describe provide the analytical and scientific 
basis for us to have confidence that our weapons will meet the 
standards that we ask of them without having to go to explosive 
nuclear testing. So maintaining that scientific and technical 
base is critical for us to have confidence in our deterrent.
    But I will go on and point out, I mentioned human talent 
bases earlier. It takes a considerable amount of subject-matter 
expertise to take that test data that I am describing and then 
work it back to a confidence assessment as to whether or not 
the weapons are meeting standards. This is not like putting 
your car front end and checking the alignment and a green light 
comes out of the box.
    And so that is one of the perishable skill sets, that if we 
don't maintain that talent base and we lose it, it may take us 
5 to 10 years to recreate it, sir.
    Over.
    Mr. Morelle. And I wonder, General, if you have any 
thoughts or advice that you can give us on how to continue to 
maintain it and make sure that we have a competitive advantage 
here in that regard. Is there any advice you can give us on 
things that we should be thinking about that in that space?
    Admiral Richard. So I would encourage NNSA, through the 
Department of Energy, to ask for the necessary level of 
resources to maintain that particular program to do the weapons 
programs that the Department of Defense asked for, as well as 
maintain their infrastructure.
    The ultimate authority on what is necessary there, at least 
in the budget submission, is the Secretary of Energy. But I 
would encourage NNSA to ask for the full measure of what they 
think they need, not just what they think they can get.
    Mr. Morelle. Very good.
    Well, thank you again, Admiral, for your leadership and for 
your service, as well as to General Dickinson and Ms. Dalton.
    And with that, I will yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman yields back.
    Ms. Cheney.
    Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to all of our witnesses.
    Admiral Richard, I wanted to follow up on something one of 
my colleagues was asking you about. There is an idea from some 
on this committee and more broadly that, even though we are 
facing adversaries as you have described, a historic, 
unprecedented situation with respect to China and Russia, both 
of whom are undertaking massive modernization buildup and 
expansion programs, that somehow the solution is for us to risk 
our own security, to tie our own hands with no-first-use, to 
reduce our own capabilities, to delay, yet again, 
modernization.
    I wanted to remind the committee generally of something 
that President Truman said in NSC-68, which is timeless. He 
said, ``No people in history have preserved their freedom who 
have thought that by not being strong enough to protect 
themselves they might prove inoffensive to their enemies.''
    And I would like to ask you, Admiral Richard, if you could 
describe--give you a chance to describe in a little bit more 
detail what we are seeing from the Chinese, in particular. I 
don't think the American people fully recognize and understand 
the nature and the expanded nature of that threat.
    And also what it means when we say the Minuteman III is so 
old. What does that mean in terms of what is available, what is 
not available, what it would really mean if we were to ask you 
simply to extend the life of that program once again?
    Admiral Richard. Congresswoman, thank you for the question.
    So I ran through it very quickly in my opening statement, 
but I will elaborate that we are seeing this very rapid 
expansion of Chinese capabilities. I will give you the specific 
numbers in the closed session.
    But this is rapid expansion of their road-mobile 
capability. And this is an intercontinental ballistic missile 
that is on a very large truck. Russia and China have them. We 
do not. Those are very large countries, and they simply drive 
the missile around. It is a challenging thing to keep up with 
them.
    So they have this new capability expanding rapidly. They 
have many new solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missile 
silos. These are the same ICBMs, by the way, that we are 
talking about either life-extending or otherwise trying to use 
ourselves.
    A solid fuel rocket is very responsive, and that, coupled 
with their new nuclear command and control, gives them a launch 
under warning or launch under attack capability that right now 
only the U.S. and the Russians possess.
    They are about to complete a triad. And so they have a 
strategic bomber with an air-launched ballistic missile 
capability on that. So for the first time, they have a complete 
triad.
    They have six second-generation ballistic missile 
submarines, so they can do continuous at-sea deterrent patrols, 
i.e., a survivable second strike capability, and a missile that 
can range continental United States from protected bastion in 
the South China Sea.
    And you add all of this together and they can do any 
plausible nuclear employment strategy regionally. This will 
backstop their conventional capability and will constrain--
potentially constrain our options. In other words, we will be 
the ones that are getting deterred if I don't have the 
capability to similarly deter them.
    And the key point is, this is about to become additive to 
what the Russians can do.
    So that is the threat. More detail in the closed session.
    But this is a breathtaking expansion. I just gave an order 
at STRATCOM that if you have a China brief that is more than a 
month old, take it back to the intel people and get it updated 
because it is out of date. That is how rapidly they are moving.
    And remember, STRATCOM is not the source of this 
intelligence. The intelligence comes from the intelligence 
community. We are simply the ones that interpret it 
operationally like other commands.
    Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Admiral.
    And I think it is important to just reaffirm the words that 
you have used, that the Chinese are at an inflection point, 
this is a breathtaking expansion, accelerating rapidly. And we 
are asking you to be able to deter both China and Russia 
simultaneously.
    And I think from the perspective of this committee and our 
obligation to ensure that you have the resources you need, the 
notion that we are asking you simply to life-extend one more 
time technology from the 1970s is completely irresponsible. And 
I think we need to face the consequences of that choice if that 
is the path we choose to go down.
    Admiral Richard. Congresswoman, if I could just add--and, 
again, and I will defer to the U.S. Air Force and the Secretary 
of Defense as to whether or not Minuteman III can be life-
extended. They provide me the system.
    Here is why I say I am just not sure it can be done: They 
have a long list of parts that are in very short supply.
    For example, right now there are only two of these launch 
switches that go into every launch control center, there are 
only two in supply. You have got to have 45 of them for each 
launch control center.
    Nobody makes the inside of a switch anymore. No company is 
going to make the inside of the switch. This is like asking a 
company to make a dial-up modem. There is no profit in doing 
something like that.
    Air Force has been consistently pulling rabbits out of the 
hat to solve these problems. I am afraid there is a point where 
they won't be able to pull the rabbit out of the hat and the 
system won't work.
    Ms. Cheney. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Mr. Panetta.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Secretary Dalton and gentlemen. Thank you 
for your time today.
    And also thank you to both Admiral Richard and the General 
for stopping by my office and having the personal time that we 
did. I truly appreciate that.
    Admiral Richard, you were in my office this morning and I 
appreciate our brief conversation. But you also, yesterday and 
today, today you have testified extensively, and in the past, 
regarding the dangers of reliance solely on the submarine leg 
of the nuclear triad, which on a day-to-day basis is actually a 
dyad between the sea and the ground legs.
    And if we were to choose to delay modernization of the 
ground-based leg or not move forward with the Ground Based 
Strategic Deterrent, especially in the midst of ongoing 
modernization of the LRSO [Long-Range Standoff Weapon], we 
would be essentially fully reliant on the sea-based leg of the 
triad.
    Now, yesterday you testified to the Senate that you would 
request reactivation of bombers on alert if the ground leg were 
to be removed. You, yourself, are, as we talked about today, a 
career submariner, and I am sure are much more familiar than 
anyone else in the room today with the survivability and 
effectiveness of our submarine force and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles.
    Arguments against moving forward with the Ground Based 
Strategic Deterrent are largely based on the premise that the 
sea leg of the triad can maintain an effective deterrent now 
and into the future.
    Now, you have also testified that Russia is currently 
approximately 80 percent complete with nuclear modernization 
and recapitalization. While China is considered the 
Department's overall pacing threat, you have stated that Russia 
is the pacing nuclear threat. Russian modernization and 
innovation span hypersonic weapons, ICBMs, and nuclear-powered 
torpedoes.
    Now, yesterday you called the nuclear threat you expect the 
United States to face in 2030 as unprecedented, and you focus 
on the fact that the United States has never before had to 
deter two nuclear adversaries with separate interests at the 
same time.
    Now, in 2017 and 2018 there was reporting that identified 
Chinese efforts to develop a new satellite which would detect 
submarines using lasers and looking at disturbances in the 
water. They have also reportedly developed new magnetic 
detection devices and are actively pursuing new technology to 
be able to detect and neutralize our nuclear submarine forces.
    Regardless of the success of these individual Chinese 
efforts, it is clear that our adversaries are working extremely 
hard to degrade the survivability of our sea leg.
    So apart from the inherent risk of a reliance on one leg of 
the triad, are you aware of the specific modernization efforts 
being made by Russia and China to more effectively identify and 
neutralize our nuclear submarines in the future?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, thank you for that question, 
and I will try to address all the pieces of that.
    First, I will remind, respectfully, there is a fundamental 
design criteria inside the triad that we assume that we could 
lose any leg of the triad and still meet all Presidential 
objectives, albeit with reduced flexibility. So without getting 
into the individual risk, that was just a basic design 
assumption.
    And I should point out, yes, I said that yesterday, that if 
we do not have an intercontinental ballistic missile leg I 
would request to re-alert the bombers. I would do that.
    That would only get us through the day-to-day issue. There 
would still be an overall capacity issue that I would need to 
address in order to do all the things the President, via 
Secretary of Defense, has asked me to do.
    As to the survivability of submarines, yes, there are 
extensive efforts underway by Russia, China, and others to 
improve their anti-submarine warfare capability. This is 
historic. This has been the case. It is a classic hider-finder 
competition undersea like in other domains.
    We have equivalent efforts underway to attempt to find 
theirs. We have extensive programs designed to ensure the 
survivability of our submarine force in general, ballistic 
submarines specifically.
    So I have full confidence in our ability to maintain the 
survivability of the submarine leg. However, that is not the 
only reason or risk. There are also operational and technical 
things that have nothing to do with the opponent that have to 
be accounted for. And independent of that, we have always 
assumed that we could still lose a leg of the triad and still 
meet Presidential objectives.
    Mr. Panetta. Outstanding. Thank you, Admiral.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.
    It looks like Mr. Waltz is no longer here.
    Mr. Brooks.
    Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I have got some questions that also revolve around the 
Space Command headquarters being located at Redstone Arsenal 
and Tennessee Valley. And I want you to think about things in 
two different contexts. One is merit; the other is nonmerit or 
political. And let me run through the merit just for a moment.
    With respect to merit, as I understand the criteria or 
minimum requirements, there were three. One, you have to be 
within the top 150 largest metropolitan statistical areas; you 
have to be within 25 miles of a military base; and you have to 
score in the top 50 or above on the AARP's [American 
Association of Retired Persons'] Public Policy Institute's 
Livability Index.
    Quite clearly, I think everyone would agree that Redstone 
Arsenal and Tennessee Valley met those minimum criteria.
    So once you get past those minimum criteria, then you had a 
competition of sorts amongst other locales that met those 
minimum criteria, an evaluation of each site's score based on 
four criteria.
    Forty points was based on mission-related criteria. A 
subpart of that was workforce.
    By way of emphasis, Tennessee Valley/Redstone Arsenal has 
one of the highest concentrations of engineers in the world and 
certainly in the United States of America. We have 
mathematicians, scientists, physicists, a highly qualified 
workforce.
    We have, second subpart, mutually supporting space 
entities. Well, certainly, as General Dickinson knows, we have 
got a plethora of space-related military activities on Redstone 
Arsenal. We are also the home of the Marshall Space Flight 
Center, which is the birthplace of America's space program. 
Very hard for anyone else to compete with the attributes that 
we have there.
    So on the 40 points of mission-related criteria, I would 
submit that Redstone Arsenal did very, very well, as evidenced 
by what we provide in the Tennessee Valley and the Redstone 
Arsenal.
    Second criteria was infrastructure criteria--parking, land, 
communications. Some of you are familiar with what we provide 
at Redstone Arsenal, certainly General Dickinson is, family of 
military personnel, housing, health care. I would submit that 
we also score very, very well in that second criteria. So that 
is 70 of the points.
    Then you have got the third criteria, which is community 
support, which is 15 points. Schools. We have got excellent 
schools in the Tennessee Valley. You have got a lot of gifted 
parents. And of course, they demand high-quality schools for 
their children.
    Cost of living. A-plus score, in my judgment, there. We are 
one of the lesser expensive places to operate in the United 
States of America.
    Community support then, criteria, that was 15 points. I 
would submit Redstone Arsenal and the Tennessee Valley score 
very well.
    Then the fourth criteria, the cost to the Department of the 
Air Force. Granted that there is an initial startup cost, and 
at Redstone Arsenal that may be higher than at other places. 
However, there is also the long-term operational cost.
    Given the lower cost of living, the other things that we 
offer at Redstone Arsenal and Tennessee Valley, I would submit 
that we also score well according to the cost to the Department 
of the Air Force criteria.
    So all that merit-based stuff being cited very, very 
quickly, now I get to my question. This is with respect to each 
of you, and I will start with General Dickinson.
    Are you aware, personal or direct knowledge, of any 
political, nonmerit influence on the Space Command headquarters 
Redstone Arsenal location decision? Anything other than merit?
    General Dickinson, are you, any personal or direct 
knowledge?
    General Dickinson. I am not. I have no personal or direct 
knowledge.
    Mr. Brooks. Admiral Richard, are you aware, personal or 
direct knowledge, of anything that would suggest that the 
decision to locate Space Command headquarters at Redstone 
Arsenal in the Tennessee Valley of Alabama was based on 
political or nonmerit influence as opposed to merit?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, no, I am not.
    Mr. Brooks. Ms. Dalton, I know this might be outside your 
normal ballpark, but same question to you. Are you, with 
personal or direct knowledge, aware of any political or 
nonmerit influences on the Space Command headquarters Redstone 
Arsenal location decision? Anything other than merit?
    Ms. Dalton. No, I am not.
    Mr. Brooks. No further questions.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman yields back. That is the last 
question for open session.
    We will declare a brief recess so that we can make the last 
vote. And then we will return not to this room, but to 2212 for 
the closed session.
    [Whereupon, at 6:04 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]

    
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 21, 2021

      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 21, 2021

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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 21, 2021

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

    Mr. Turner. In response to congressional direction originating in 
the HASC FY2020 NDAA, the Institute for Defense Analyses conducted an 
independent assessment of the implications of a U.S. no first use 
policy. IDA concluded that U.S. adoption of a NFU policy would not 
improve the international nuclear security situation; not change 
Russian or Chinese perceptions of U.S. policy or encourage any change 
in their policies; not lower the risk of miscalculation in a crisis; 
undermine allied confidence in U.S. security guarantees; and likely 
weaken current barriers to further nuclear proliferation. On what 
points do you disagree with the IDA conclusions?
    Ms. Dalton. I am familiar with IDA's report on No First Use policy 
and have reviewed this assessment. Our declaratory policy should 
support our strategic objectives, including credibly assuring allies 
and partners as to our continued extended deterrence commitments to 
them. As I testified, I anticipate our strategic reviews will determine 
whether the conditions exist today under which a change in declaratory 
policy could be safely adopted. This assessment will account for the 
views of the U.S. military and allies and partners, and as Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Hicks has made clear, any such decision will be 
made by the President.
    Mr. Turner. You committed to providing to the Committee by COB on 
April 23, 2021, any information on interactions between OSD and CAPE 
concerning a ``Best 200 MMIII'' SLEP approach. Please provide an update 
to the Committee on that proposal, as well as any supporting documents 
that have been produced to date.
    Ms. Dalton. OSD Policy has not asked CAPE to study, or to 
commission, fund, sponsor or otherwise support a study, regarding a 
``Best 200 MMIII SLEP'' approach.
    Mr. Turner. What have our U.K. counterparts communicated to you 
about the importance of the W93 program to their independent work on a 
replacement for their current warhead?
    Ms. Dalton. Our support to the United Kingdom and its Continuous-
At-Sea-Deterrent contribute to NATO's defense and has helped underwrite 
NATO's collective peace and security since the signing of the bilateral 
Mutual Defense Agreement in 1958. The United Kingdom's 2021 Integrated 
Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy confirmed 
its commitment to maintaining a minimum credible independent nuclear 
deterrent, and highlighted how ``nuclear cooperation remains an 
important element of the enduring Special Relationship between the 
United States and the United Kingdom, enhancing trans-Atlantic 
security.'' The United Kingdom has emphasized the importance of the W93 
program as the United Kingdom pursues its separate but parallel warhead 
development program. The United Kingdom further noted in its Integrated 
Review: ``We will continue to work closely with the United States to 
ensure our warhead remains compatible with the Trident Strategic Weapon 
System.'' We plan to continue our strong cooperation with the United 
Kingdom on nuclear weapons.
    Mr. Turner. Ms. Dalton, over the last year have any USG policy 
documents been updated related to U.S. test readiness? If so, can you 
please provide those to the Committee.
    Ms. Dalton. I am not aware of any documents of the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy related to U.S. test readiness 
that have been updated in the past year. A presidential guidance 
document was signed at the end of the previous administration, but as a 
classified presidential document, I am not authorized to release it. 
More generally, we will continue to evaluate nuclear deterrence 
requirements in the context of the nuclear posture review.
    Mr. Turner. In your opening remarks you state that ``Over the next 
ten years and in response to perceived threats, including potentially 
first strike capability from the United States, China plans to at least 
double the size of its nuclear stockpile and carry out a rapid 
expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal.'' Your statement 
for the record essentially blames the U.S. triad modernization effort, 
which has been around for eight decades, for the recent Chinese crash 
nuclear build-up. What specific first strike capabilities that we've 
deployed are you referring to? Do you have specific intelligence 
reporting to back up this statement (if so, please provide it to the 
Committee)? Can you please explain to the Committee why these 
``perceived threats'' are inaccurate?
    Ms. Dalton. The United States is not to blame for China's plan to 
expand and modernize its nuclear arsenal. China's rapid expansion of 
its nuclear arsenal is a very serious concern. Last year, DOD estimated 
that China had a nuclear warhead stockpile in the low-200s and 
projected that it would at least double over the next decade. Since 
then, China has accelerated its nuclear expansion and will almost 
certainly exceed the intelligence community's previous projection. It 
is important to identify the drivers of our adversary's nuclear 
modernization programs in order to understand how we can most 
effectively enhance nuclear deterrence and prevent a dangerous and 
costly arms race. China's nuclear strategy has long centered on the 
ability to provide an assured counterstrike against adversary's nuclear 
attack--which requires a sufficient portion of its nuclear force be 
able to survive such a strike. China's efforts to expand and diversify 
its nuclear arsenal are broadly aimed at improving the survivability, 
responsiveness, and effectiveness of its nuclear force while also 
providing China's leaders with additional strategic options. The 
factors driving China's nuclear efforts include its concerns about the 
survivability of its nuclear force in the face of advances in U.S.--and 
to a lesser extent Russian--strategic ISR, conventional precision 
strike, and missile defense capabilities. Other factors include China's 
desire to build a ``world-class'' military as part of its national 
strategy and broader intensifying U.S.-PRC tensions. For further 
details, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
provided intelligence reporting to both the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees and is planning to participate in a classified 
follow-up briefing describing those factors driving China's activities.
    Mr. Turner. The United Kingdom in their well-reasoned Integrated 
Review specifically rejected a NFU policy. Have your U.K. counterparts 
articulated to you their justification for doing so and what is your 
opinion of their rationale? Do you believe their rationale for doing so 
is sound?
    Admiral Richard. Yes, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MoD), 
Director General of the Nuclear Defense Nuclear Organisation, did 
contact me regarding the nuclear deterrent aspects of its Integrated 
Review. As the Director General labeled her letter ``official 
sensitive'' its contents cannot be publicly released. However, the 
statement in the Integrated Review regarding NFU is well phrased and 
consistent with current U.S. policy.
    I appreciated the Director General's letter and look forward to the 
continued close U.S.-U.K. cooperation in these matters.
    Mr. Turner. A 2020 strategy document issued by Vladimir Putin, 
states that Russia will consider using nuclear weapons first in a 
number of situations, clearly highlighting the importance of these 
capabilities in Russian strategy. Do you believe that either Russia or 
China would adopt a true and credible NFU policy if the United States 
did?
    Admiral Richard. China currently has a ``No First Use'' policy, yet 
it is rapidly improving its strategic nuclear capability and capacity, 
to include significant advances in intercontinental and medium range 
missiles. It is well ahead of pace to double their nuclear stockpile by 
the end of the decade. None of this is consistent with a NFU policy and 
as such, I and others doubt the credibility of such a pledge. Likewise, 
the Soviet Union adopted a NFU pledge in 1982 but it was seen as 
propaganda aimed at undermining Western political cohesion as the 
Soviet military continued to publish writings on nuclear preemption.
    In response to National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2020, Section 1673, and pursuant to an agreement with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) examined 
the issue of the U.S adopting a policy to not use nuclear weapons 
first. Among other things, the analysis concluded ``a policy 
pronouncement of NFU is unlikely to alter how Moscow or Beijing 
perceive that the U.S. will approach a crisis'' and ``the available 
evidence indicates that Russia and China will not view such a shift in 
U.S. policy as credible.''
    In light of the above, I will not speculate on potential Chinese 
and Russian reactions to hypothetical situations and, more 
specifically, on what ``a true and credible NFU policy'' from Russia 
and/or China would be.
    Mr. Turner. In your testimony on April 20 and 21, 2021, you stated 
that the Minuteman III is so old ``That in some cases the [technical] 
drawings don't exist anymore, or where we do have drawings, they're 
like six generations behind the industry standard''. ``And there's not 
only [no one] working that can understand them--they're not alive 
anymore.'' Also, there are ``switches that aren't produced or can't be 
produced anymore. It's like trying to get industry to produce dial-up 
modems.'' Are there other examples that STRATCOM can provide as to 
parts and components to extend the MMIII that are no longer available 
or difficult to acquire? Even assuming MMIII could be extended, would a 
system based on 1960s/70s-era technology be able to meet current and 
future military requirements?
    Admiral Richard. I will defer to the Air Force for more detailed MM 
III part and component sustainability challenges.
    Our legacy delivery systems, stockpile, and infrastructure are all 
well past their intended operational life and are not designed for, nor 
capable of keeping pace with the rapidly evolving threats. 
Specifically, MM III technology cannot keep pace or close existing 
capability gaps. A MM III Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) is not 
a viable option as it would incur substantial technical risk due to the 
system's tightly coupled, vertically integrated design that lacks a 
healthy supporting development or manufacturing base.
    Mr. Turner. At the end of the Obama Administration they considered 
an option of cannibalizing 200 Minuteman III ICBMs and using them to 
extend the ``Best 200'' MMIIIs currently in our inventory. This was 
ultimately viewed as unworkable do the costs, security, moving around 
of spare parts and missiles, and that we should not go down to 200 
missiles. What is your best military advice should a proposal like this 
be brought before you? Has STRATCOM conducted any analysis of this 
proposal or a proposal like it (if so please provide to the committee)?
    Admiral Richard. The 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews assessed 
our current ICBM force structure through a formal, methodical approach, 
and determined the current force structure, size and modernization/
replacement program of record fully supports our deterrent strategy.
    I do not support cannibalization of Minuteman III (MM III) to delay 
the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) in order to defer costs or 
mitigate MM III sustainment challenges. While ``cannibalizing'' the MM 
III force may defer the asset attrition problem, it does not halt the 
aging problems or address identified capability gaps, and significantly 
reduces capacity required to deter two peer nuclear adversaries. We are 
already at a point where nuclear modernization programmatic risk is 
transferring to me as operational risk. If this continues, MM III aging 
will inevitably impact my ability to meet strategic guidance. The AF 
has determined timely execution of GBSD is the most cost-effective way 
to maintain the ICBM force.
    Mr. Turner. On April 20, 2021, in a response to Senator Cotton, you 
stated that reducing the number of ICBMs or removing that leg of the 
triad would ``solve a critical problem for China.'' Can you elaborate 
how that would be the case? How would going below 400 to 200, or to 
even zero, be solving a ``big problem'' that China currently has?
    Admiral Richard. The triad must be considered as a whole because it 
functions as a whole, with each leg essential to overall effectiveness. 
The triad's complementary attributes ensure the enduring survivability 
of our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold 
a diverse range of adversary targets at risk throughout the spectrum of 
crisis or conflict. The ICBM force is the most responsive leg of the 
triad and ICBM geographic dispersion presents an intractable targeting 
problem, complicating China's (and Russia's) strategies. These missiles 
are capable of holding a wide range of targets, to include emergent and 
time sensitive targets, at risk. They are survivable to all but a 
massive nuclear exchange and possess the highest day-to-day readiness. 
Reducing the ICBM force by half would be a unilateral reduction in the 
face of a deteriorating security environment along with the detrimental 
messaging to our Allies and adversaries, and would facilitate China's 
rise as a strategic peer. China's currently intractable targeting 
problem would be significantly eased and they would be closer to 
possessing a credible counter-force strategy (i.e., the ability to 
directly attack our nuclear forces) for the first time in their 
history. For the case without any ICBMs, in addition to the above, the 
potential for a strategic attack on our homeland further increases. A 
conventional attack on our few (5) submarine and bomber bases would 
significantly degrade the Nation's remaining deterrent.
    Mr. Turner. If the LRSO were cancelled or delayed beyond the 
planned retirement of the legacy Air-Launched Cruise Missile, do you 
believe the air leg of the triad would still be viable?
    Admiral Richard. No. Even with the deployment of the B-21, the 
long-term viability of the air-leg is dependent on the fielding of 
LRSO. LRSO complicates adversary air defense strategies as it can be 
effectively employed to cover geographically dispersed targets from a 
single standoff bomber. Without LRSO, bombers would be forced to 
overfly the target, requiring a greater number of penetrating bombers 
and support aircraft while increasing crew risk. The air leg of the 
triad is viable as it provides visible, scalable, and flexible 
deterrence and assurance options for the President. The air leg is 
deployable to unanticipated locations; can evade air defenses; and it 
is the least expensive leg of the triad to adjust or recapitalize in 
the face of technical or geopolitical uncertainty. Cancelling LRSO puts 
this viability at risk.
    Mr. Turner. Can you explain the importance of LRSO given the New 
START Treaty bomber counting rule?
    Admiral Richard. New START (NST) attributes each deployed bomber as 
having one nuclear warhead, regardless of the actual number of weapons 
the bomber may be carrying. For example, a B-52H may carry up to 20 
nuclear LRSO weapons; but under NST counting rules, it would be counted 
as one weapon. LRSO complicates adversary air defense strategies as it 
can be effectively employed to cover geographically dispersed targets 
from a single standoff bomber. Without LRSO, bombers would be forced to 
overfly the target, requiring a greater number of penetrating bombers 
and support aircraft while increasing crew risk. Further, LRSO is the 
most cost-effective approach to ensure a credible and effective air leg 
of the triad. Though extremely capable, we have a limited number of B-
2s with gravity bomb capability which are insufficient to hold the 
required significant targets at risk. This capability must be protected 
as it is vital to USSTRATCOM's ability meet mission requirements. LRSO 
preserves an ability to increase bomber payloads as a key hedge against 
unforeseen technical or geopolitical challenges.
    Mr. Turner. Are there possibilities by which LRSO IOC could be 
accelerated and what would your best military recommendation be?
    Admiral Richard. My requirement for LRSO is an Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) no later than 2030. Defer to the Air Force regarding 
any specific options available to deliver IOC sooner.
    Mr. Turner. Can you please explain STRATCOM's requirements for the 
W93 and how that program, along with other efforts such as the Common 
Missile Compartment, contributes to not only the U.S. triad, but also 
the U.K. deterrent.
    Admiral Richard. Our current 1970s/80s era warheads have been 
extended to double their intended design lives; in the late 2030s, they 
will begin reaching a point of uncertainty in both reliability and 
effectiveness at nearly the same time. We cannot continue to cost 
effectively sustain legacy weapons indefinitely and expect them to 
remain militarily effective against evolving 21st century threats. The 
W93 will allow us to take advantage of modern technologies and 
manufacturing processes to hedge against technical risks in our current 
SLBM warheads--and reduce current over-reliance on the W76--while 
providing the opportunity to include modern technologies that improve 
safety, security, and flexibility to address future threats. Without 
W93, COLUMBIA will have weapons that may not be able to penetrate 
adversary defenses, and if they do, may not deliver the intended effect 
due to uncertainty in weapon degradation. In addition to being required 
for U.S. modernization requirements, the W93 and the Common Missile 
Compartment programs enable us to continue our longstanding support to 
the U.K. and their warhead replacement program. As an Allied 
independent nuclear power contributing to NATO's nuclear deterrence 
posture, the U.K.'s continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent is critical to 
strategic security.
    Mr. Turner. The Russians have criticized the U.S. for planning to 
develop a Nuclear Sea Launched Cruise Missile and have called it 
destabilizing, even though the U.S. fielded a similar weapon for 
decades before retiring it in 2013. Isn't it true that the Russians 
have nuclear-capable SLCMs? If Russia has them, how can they say that 
the U.S. having them would be ``destabilizing''?
    Admiral Richard. Yes. Cruise missiles have been fielded on bombers 
and other platforms (e.g., sea-launched) since the late 1960s, and I do 
not view them as destabilizing. Russia currently employs both 
conventional and nuclear-capable air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, 
implying they do not view them as destabilizing. Moreover, Moscow 
frequently describes U.S. systems as ``destabilizing'' to try and 
undermine public support, even though Russia maintains similar 
capabilities.
    Mr. Turner. Please describe in detail the value a nuclear capable 
SLCM would provide to the force.
    Admiral Richard. The nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile 
(SLCM-N) is intended to deny potential adversaries any mistaken 
confidence limited nuclear employment would provide an advantage over 
the U.S., its Allies and partners. SLCM-N will bring a needed non-
strategic regional presence and an assured response capability. It does 
not require host nation support and provides additional diversity in 
platforms, range, and survivability. The SLCM-N will provide assurance 
to our Allies and partners through tailored response options in vast 
operating areas where forward basing may not be possible. Limited U.S. 
response options, such as the SLCM-N, is intended to provide a more 
credible deterrent to limited attack against the U.S., Allies and 
partners rather than relying primarily on the threat of large-scale 
nuclear responses. It will enhance our ability to tailor deterrence and 
assurance while expanding the range of credible U.S. options.
    Mr. Turner. Some critics have called the U.S. low-yield W76-2 
submarine launched ballistic missile warhead ``destabilizing.'' Can you 
please explain how this weapon could deter Russia from using their 
``escalation to win'' strategy?
    Admiral Richard. The low-yield submarine launched ballistic missile 
warhead (W76-2) is intended to strengthen deterrence by convincing 
Russia that the U.S. has credible and effective options at any level of 
conflict, and that Russia cannot coerce the U.S., its Allies and 
partners through the limited use of nuclear weapons--the basis of their 
``escalation to win'' strategy. The W76-2 provides deterrence and 
assurance through tailored response options in vast operating areas 
where forward basing may not be possible. The limited and timely U.S. 
response options provided by the W76-2 ensure a more credible deterrent 
to limited attack against the U.S., Allies and partners rather than 
relying primarily on the threat of large-scale nuclear responses. 
Without this capability, Russia may perceive an advantage at lower 
levels of conflict that may encourage limited nuclear use.
    Mr. Turner. In your opinion does the W76-2 make nuclear weapons use 
more or less likely? What are the benefits of us having this weapon in 
our arsenal?
    Admiral Richard. Deployment of the W76-2 makes nuclear weapon use 
less likely. Specifically, W76-2 deployment will raise the nuclear 
threshold by helping to ensure that potential adversaries perceive no 
possible advantages in limited nuclear use--making nuclear weapon 
employment less likely. The W76-2 provides deterrence and assurance 
through tailored response options in vast operating areas where forward 
basing may not be possible. Further, the W76-2 provides additional 
diversity in platforms, range, and survivability, and serve as a 
valuable hedge against future nuclear ``break out'' scenarios. It also 
offers a timely response option able to penetrate adversary defenses 
and does not require host nation support to provide deterrent effect. 
Limited U.S. response options, provided by the W76-2, ensure a more 
credible deterrent to limited attack against the U.S., Allies and 
partners rather than relying primarily on the threat of large-scale 
nuclear responses. Without this capability, adversaries may perceive an 
advantage at lower levels of conflict that may encourage limited 
nuclear use.
    Mr. Turner. You stated yesterday before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee that ``any threat brief that is discussing China and more 
than a month old is out of date and must be updated.'' As Intelligence 
briefings are updated to incorporate this new intelligence, can you 
please provide these materials to the committee.
    Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM is a contributor to the Intelligence 
Community via DIA. For a broader perspective and the most up-to-date 
information regarding China's ongoing modernization activities we would 
refer you to the Intelligence Community.
    Mr. Turner. Earlier this year, several news outlets reported that 
16 new ICBM silos had been discovered in a training area in Northern 
China through the use of open source satellite imagery. Based on what 
we understand about the size of China's silo-based ICBM force, this 
seems like a large number of additional training facilities. What 
reasons could China have for expanding its ability train silo-based 
ICBM personnel in this way?
    https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3125699/china-
building-more-underground-silos-its-ballistic-missiles
    Admiral Richard. China continues to invest in its ICBM program, 
including a concept of operations to deploy solid fuel ICBMs such as 
the DF-41 in silos. The training area silos are helping the PLA develop 
this new concept of operations which will enable them to train 
personnel for a very large number of operational silos. China is 
expediting its military modernization with the intent of creating a 
modern world-class military and achieving its goal of great power 
status by 2049.
    Mr. Turner. It's been nearly a decade since the Congressional 
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States was completed. 
The threat environment for example is something that is completely 
different. Would you support the establishment of another such 
bipartisan congressional commission to take a look at the current 
threats and how they should be addressed (this would be in addition to 
the Biden NPR)?
    Admiral Richard. Should such a congressional commission be 
established, USSTRATCOM would provide any necessary support as 
requested.
    Mr. Turner. As we talk about Russia and China, it's important not 
to lose sight of the Iran and DPRK ICBM threats. Late in 2020 Janes 
Defense reported that ``Iran and North Korea have resumed co-operation 
on a long-range missile project, including the transfer of critical 
parts'' How do you view the DPRK and Iran missile threat to the 
homeland? How can we better protect the Homeland from this? Can you get 
with your J2 shop and provide for the record an updated unclassified 
and classified assessment(s) of DPRK and Iran missile cooperation and 
what the implications might be?
    https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-official-says-
iran-has-restarted-missile-co-operation-with-north-korea
    Admiral Richard. Iran and North Korea have a history of cooperation 
with ballistic missile technology. North Korea poses a serious 
challenge to the United States. Its leadership likely views expanding 
its strategic nuclear and missile deterrents as essential to ensure 
regime security against the U.S. Iran has launched multi-stage space 
launch vehicles (SLVs) that could aid its development of longer-range 
ballistic missiles, because SLVs use inherently similar technologies 
and could serve as a test bed for developing ICBM technologies. To 
protect the homeland from rogue nation threats, we require a space-
based sensor architecture to persistently detect, track and 
discriminate advanced missile threats, including hypersonics. We must 
improve interceptor reliability, capacity, and lethality, and pursue 
next-generation capabilities such as directed energy, boost phase 
intercept, and non-kinetic effects. USSTRATCOM is a contributor to the 
Intelligence community via DIA. For a broader perspective on DPRK and 
Iran threats and associated implications we would refer you to the 
Intelligence Community.
    Mr. Turner. Do you believe U.S. ICBMs are currently on ``hair-
trigger alert''? Follow up, do you believe taking ICBMs off alert would 
increase stability?
    Admiral Richard. No. The term ``hair trigger'' is an incorrect and 
misleading characterization of the status of our ICBMs as it implies 
automatic or near-automatic action during a crisis event. Our ICBM 
force is controlled through secure, reliable, positive control measures 
designed to ensure all actions are in response to a valid launch order 
from the President. Further, these same procedures prevent unauthorized 
or accidental launch, and keep our ICBMs locked day-to-day. The U.S. 
maintains a portion of its nuclear forces on alert day-to-day, and 
retains the option of launching those forces promptly if directed by 
the President. Yet the U.S. would only consider the employment of 
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests 
of the U.S., its Allies, and partners. The diverse, flexible and 
survivable nature of the overall Triad ensures there is no scenario 
where the President's only option is to launch ICBMs. Over more than 
half a century, the U.S. has established a series of measures and 
protocols to ensure ICBMs are safe, secure, and under constant control. 
This posture preserves the full range of response options and ensures 
clear civilian control and Presidential decision-making. I do not 
support the notion that de-alerting our ICBMs increases stability. Our 
on-alert ICBM force presents a significant impediment to any 
adversary's first-strike calculus--large geographic distribution, CONUS 
locations, hardened targets, and responsive capability drives strategic 
stability. De-alerting the ICBM force renders them vulnerable to a 
potential first strike and would compel a destabilizing rush to re-
alert in a crisis or conflict.
    Mr. Turner. Over the few years more has come to light about the 
type of activities taking place at Novaya Zemlya (Russian test site) 
and Lop Nur (PRC test site), to include the fact that they are likely 
conducting supercritical tests in excess of the U.S. ``zero-yield'' 
standard. Why do you believe that Russia and China are conducting 
super-critical hydro-nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya and Lop Nur?
    Admiral Richard. Over the few years more has come to light about 
the type of activities taking place at Novaya Zemlya(Russian test site) 
and Lop Nur (PRC test site), to include the fact that they are likely 
conducting supercritical tests in excess of the U.S. ``zero-yield'' 
standard. Why do you believe that Russia and China are conducting 
super-critical hydro-nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya and Lop Nur?
    Mr. Turner. Do you think that we should stop developing any weapons 
systems based on PRC ``perceived threats'' of U.S. ``first strike 
capability''?
    Admiral Richard. No. Our policy is very clear--the U.S. would only 
consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to 
defend the vital interests of the U.S., its Allies, and partners. The 
primary role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter potential adversaries 
from nuclear attack. They accomplish this role daily. Other roles 
include deterring significant non-nuclear strategic attack, assuring 
Allies and partners, achieving U.S. objectives if deterrence were to 
fail, and hedging against an uncertain future. Operationally effective 
U.S. forces are required to achieve these priorities.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
    Mr. Moulton. I was pleased to see the White House extend New START, 
as was recommended by the Future of Defense Task Force. Ms. Dalton, as 
we move forward with modernizing our nuclear forces, how are we taking 
into account future opportunities for additional arms control, rather 
than reflexively reinvesting in the triad?
    Ms. Dalton. As stated in the Interim National Security Strategic 
Guidance, the President is committed to reestablishing our credibility 
as a leader in arms control. President Biden has already demonstrated 
this commitment by extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START) for five years. As I testified, the Department is committed to 
building on this foundation. With that said, it is not clear that 
Russia and/or China will reciprocate this interest. Unfortunately, 
neither Russia nor China has been forthcoming regarding nuclear force 
expansion. Russia is growing and modernizing its non-strategic nuclear 
weapons and is fielding new, so-called ``novel'' nuclear systems. China 
lacks transparency as it has consistently shied away from disclosing 
the exact size of its nuclear stockpile and has rejected any arms 
control overtures. Although we remain hopeful for constructive 
engagement, and we seek to head off costly arms races, we cannot avoid 
recapitalizing our nuclear forces. As Secretary Austin has stated, 
``U.S. nuclear weapons have been extended far beyond their original 
service lives, and the tipping point, where we must simultaneously 
overhaul these forces, is now here.'' Therefore, we must proceed with 
our plans to modernize the nuclear Triad and our nuclear command and 
control capabilities in order to ensure our strategic nuclear deterrent 
remains safe, secure, and effective
    Mr. Moulton. Hypersonic weapons have the potential to be highly 
destabilizing, particularly if we pursue them blindly in a tit-for-tat 
with Chinese or Russian development. Ms. Dalton, do we have a clear 
vision for how we integrate hypersonic weapons into the U.S. arsenal in 
a way that deters, rather than escalates, conflict?
    Ms. Dalton. The Department is concerned that China and Russia are 
aggressively fielding hypersonic strike systems as part of their larger 
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks, and we must not cede a 
military edge in this capability area. However, we do not need to and 
are not seeking to match them one-for-one on hypersonic missiles. U.S. 
hypersonic missiles are not intended to negate those of potential 
adversaries, but rather they provide the Joint Force with another 
credible, long-range strike capability to strike key targets through 
and within A2/AD--targets such as air fields, air defenses, vessels, 
and other key assets. That is the DOD vision--that this new capability 
will be integrated with and augment other U.S. conventional strike 
capabilities. To ensure we are maximizing deterrence and warfighting 
effectiveness, the Department is developing hypersonic weapons 
capabilities informed by scenario-based planning and internal war 
gaming. Military Department hypersonic plans and programs will also be 
informed by new joint and Military Department/Service warfighting 
concepts that are currently in development.
    Mr. Moulton. I was pleased to see the USSPACECOM mission statement 
include allies and partners, as the Future of Defense Task Force, which 
I co-led last year, highlighted the importance of strengthening and 
modernizing our security partnerships for a changing defense 
environment. Nowhere is this more vital--or more challenging--than 
operating in space, which has until recently been the perquisite of 
great powers. A persistent challenge to strong relationships regarding 
space has been an overclassification of space capabilities and 
operations. General Dickinson, does overclassification remain an 
impediment to your ability to communicate and develop interoperability 
with our partners and allies in space, and if so, what changes would 
you propose?
    General Dickinson. Overclassification of space programs and 
capabilities is a tremendous impediment to strengthening alliances and 
attracting new partners. Intelligence and information sharing 
restrictions stymie interoperability and integration of partners into 
our operations centers. Overclassification hinders USSPACECOM's ability 
to integrate allies and partners into our Operation Plans (OPLAN) as 
well. We continue to work with the Office of Director of National 
Intelligence and the Intelligence Community to facilitate the release 
of unclassified information to support attribution and `strategic 
messaging, as well as the release of intelligence to Allies and 
Partners. Since the beginning of the year, our J2 shared more than 300 
intelligence products in recurring exchanges and normalized daily 
processes with our Allies and partners. We also fully integrated a 
United Kingdom intelligence officer in our Joint Intelligence 
Operations Center (JIOC), with four more FVEY intelligence officers 
expected to join in the future, including the Deputy JIOC Commander. 
Additionally, we have used the Combined Space Operations forums and 
working groups to develop common Priority Intelligence Requirements 
(PIR) among seven countries and are working on a Program of Analysis 
that will fully integrate those Allies and partners into SPACECOM 
analytic enterprise.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
    Mr. Lamborn. Earlier this year you stated that the Minuteman III is 
so old ``That in some cases the [technical] drawings don't exist 
anymore, or where we do have drawings, they're like six generations 
behind the industry standard,'' he said. ``And there's not only [no 
one] working that can understand them--they're not alive anymore.''
    How difficult would it be would it be to extend the MMIII?
    GBSD is the least-expensive leg of the triad, correct?
    In your assessment, would you agree that GBSD is one of the best-
run A category programs in DOD?
    We have already awarded contracts to GBSD: is it accurate to say 
that if we extend MMIII it will actually cost *more* money than 
continuing forward with GBSD?
    Will a MMIII SLEP provide the same capabilities as GBSD in an 
increasingly complex threat environment?
    So, if we SLEP MMIII, it will cost tax payers more money, we will 
get less capability, and that capability we get is inadequate to 
address the threats we need our modernized triad to counter. Is that 
all accurate?
    Admiral Richard. While I will defer to the Air Force on the 
detailed analysis on MM III life extension, their findings are clear:
      Completing GBSD is more cost effective than a MM III Life 
Extension;
      A MM III SLEP would incur substantial technical risk due 
to its tightly coupled, vertically integratedsystem design which lacks 
a healthy supporting development or manufacturing base; and
      GBSD will address the current and emerging threats (a MM 
III SLEP cannot respond to a technologicallyadvanced threat 
environment).
    The ICBM force is our most cost effective deterrent capability; 
GBSD will continue this attribute. GBSD is setting the standard for 
future major DOD program development through model based systems 
engineering, strong cost control, and outstanding schedule performance.
    Mr. Lamborn. Do you believe a strategic mission like SPACECOM's 
should have survivable communications that protect from HEMP and other 
threats, as STRATCOM does?
    General Dickinson. Yes, the critical command and control functions 
of warfighting combatant commands require survivable communications 
that withstand a variety of natural hazards and adversary threats. 
USSPACECOM is looking at survivability requirements that will be 
included in our permanent headquarters command and control facility, 
and we are currently designing a contingency of operations plan to 
provide another layer of resiliency.
    Mr. Lamborn. In your best military judgment, would you get the same 
level of survivability for $1.4 billion in Huntsville as you currently 
have in Colorado Springs?
    General Dickinson. Our facility and infrastructure designs are not 
complete, so I cannot speak to cost estimates at this time. I can 
confirm that USSPACECOM is analyzing survivability requirements that 
will be included in our permanent headquarters command and control 
facility. I welcome the opportunity to discuss costs, timelines, and 
impacts to mission and personnel when the final basing decision is made 
by the SECAF and analysis is completed.
    Mr. Lamborn. How would an 80% loss of USSPACECOM's current civilian 
and contractor personnel proficient in space operations specifically 
affect mission readiness?
    Have you identified the monetary cost of moving all those 
personnel, both uniformed and civilian?
    General Dickinson. My intent is to reach full operational 
capability at our permanent location as expediently as practicable, 
without essential mission degradation, all within the guidance, 
direction, and authority of the Department of Defense leaders involved 
in the ongoing establishment of United States Space Command. Mission 
readiness depends on the availability of both people and equipment; 
therefore, I directed my staff to posture the command for transition to 
the permanent location as soon as practicable, without degradation to 
our missions, after the SECAF completes the basing decision process. We 
will not know what percentage of civilian employees may choose to 
transfer locations until after the SECAF's confirms the outcome of the 
basing decision process, and without that information, we cannot 
calculate an accurate cost of relocation.
    Mr. Lamborn. General Dickinson, as you aware, the Arctic is an 
increasingly contested domain both militarily and economically. There 
are many U.S. Space Force strategic facilities and assets above the 
Arctic Circle which play a vital role in the USSPACECOM mission of 
deterring aggressive behavior by our competitors while also playing a 
key role in protecting the homeland. It is critical that the U.S. 
maintain a viable and capable industrial base to support, and 
potentially surge, operations in the unique and challenging High North 
environment. What is USSPACECOM's plan to ensure we maintain a 
competitive U.S. industrial base capable of supporting our objectives 
and presence above the Arctic Circle?
    General Dickinson. The Arctic is unique, and with climate change, 
passages and maneuverability previously nonexistent are emerging with 
new opportunities and challenges. We are engaging our Science, 
Technology, and Advanced Concepts with the space community and 
leveraging the Combatant Command requirements process to emphasize 
Arctic support capabilities. In all mission areas, we put a premium on 
solutions demonstrating leap ahead manufacturing technologies and 
processes building lower cost, higher volume, and far better 
capabilities for our warfighters, while reinvigorating the American 
industrial base and trusted foundries. This ongoing effort will inform 
our industrial based capability requirements to support our mission 
needs. The Arctic is a unique vantage point for space. This makes 
places like Thule Air Base, Greenland, and Clear AFS, Alaska critical 
bases as we perform our Space Domain Awareness and other missions. 
Additionally, building and leveraging our international partners and 
specialized commercial entities are key to securing and maintaining our 
prominence and presence above the Arctic Circle.
    Mr. Lamborn. Question #1: China and Russia recently announced that 
they have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 
establishing a lunar International Research Station. Although this was 
publicized as a scientific effort, this could also be perceived as a 
thin veil for military corporation on the moon. In General Dickinson's 
posture statement he stated that USSPACECOM is committed to assuring 
the safe exploration of space and is supporting the planned lunar 
missions. Can you please describe at the unclassified level any new 
capability requirements that you've identified that extend beyond our 
traditional orbits and near the lunar region?
    Question #2: What requirements has USSPACECOM set to establish 
lunar ISR capabilities to monitor the lunar surface for peer adversary 
activity? We understand that the answer will be classified.
    General Dickinson. The traditional orbits of focus range from Low 
Earth Orbit, starting around a few hundred kilometers in altitude, out 
to Geosynchronous orbit at 35,000+ kilometers altitude. We understand 
those orbital regimes well and are building upon the considerable 
assets dedicated to monitoring activity in those and other traditional 
orbits.3 There remains the need for additional sensors to close any 
gaps in coverage and provide better space domain awareness of all 
activities by all countries. The problem compounds significantly when 
we extend operations to Cislunar space, with a tenfold increase in 
range, one-thousand times the volume, and more complex orbital 
dynamics. To cover such a vast volume of space, we need significantly 
more capable and more numerous sensors. We need sensors that are 
terrestrially-based, space-based in existing orbital regimes, based in 
Cislunar space, in lunar orbit, and in halo orbits around one or more 
of the Earth-Moon Lagrangian points. While these challenges are great, 
they are not insurmountable. We continue to work with industry and 
friendly partner nations to seek solutions to meet the challenge and 
allow us to gain and maintain space domain awareness out to Cislunar 
altitudes and beyond.
    To date, USSPACECOM has not set specific lunar surface ISR 
capability requirements. Consistent with operations in any other orbit, 
my primary aim is to establish and maintain responsible military 
behaviors in space and ensure space remains a peaceful domain for the 
benefit of all. This requires the ability to characterize activity in 
Lunar and Cislunar space, similar to our abilities in Low Earth Orbit, 
Medium Earth Orbit, Highly Elliptical Orbits, and Geosynchronous Orbit. 
Lunar and Cislunar ISR capability will require significant resource and 
policy support from Congress to pace Russian and Chinese efforts.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
    Mr. Brooks. One of the challenges of defending against hypersonic 
threats is being able to track these weapons for the duration of their 
flight. How are we doing with respect to getting the right sensors in 
place--including as part of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space 
Sensor constellation--that will provide us with the capability to track 
and set a response to hypersonic threats?
    Ms. Dalton. The Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor 
(HBTSS) constellation, which is on track to enter orbit in late Fiscal 
Year 2023 as a prototype capability, is one component of the 
Department's National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA). The NDSA will 
initially consist of a few dozen satellites, launched into low-Earth 
orbit (LEO) over the next two years. Although this proliferated LEO 
architecture is in its initial stages, it will provide critical 
tracking capability against hypersonic threats in all phases of flight. 
HBTSS is unique in that it will provide fire-control-quality track data 
to the missile defense system, enabling enhanced defense against 
regional hypersonic threats in the terminal and glide phases of flight. 
As we continue to prove this capability, the architecture will expand 
and further bolster the nation's sensing capabilities and the defense 
of U.S. and coalition forces deployed abroad.
    Mr. Brooks. Can you please contextualize the role of our hypersonic 
weapons in the spectrum of conflict?
    Admiral Richard. Hypersonic weapons (HSWs) provide a highly 
responsive, long-range, conventional strike capability for distant, 
defended, or time-critical threats when other forces are unavailable, 
not responsive enough or not preferred. Fielding hypersonic strike 
capabilities allows for tailored strategies and operational plans with 
an expanded range of conventional options. While not a replacement for 
nuclear weapons, HSWs will complement and enhance strategic deterrence 
and can deliver surgical strikes to provide effects or be integrated 
into larger campaigns, increasing the effectiveness of our traditional 
warfighting advantages.
    Mr. Brooks. One of the challenges of defending against hypersonic 
threats is being able to track these weapons for the duration of their 
flight. How are we doing with respect to getting the right sensors in 
place--including as part of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space 
Sensor constellation--that will provide us with the capability to track 
and set a response to hypersonic threats?
    Admiral Richard. Holistically, DOD is modifying/upgrading existing 
sensors to enhance layered defense, and improving reporting and display 
tools to support senior leader decision making. Additional efforts 
include MDA's selection of two industry partners for an on orbit 
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor demonstration launching 
in FY23, with a full constellation deployment decision to come at a 
later date. To protect against hypersonic threats, we must continue 
initiatives to develop a space-based sensor architecture to 
persistently detect, track and discriminate advanced missile threats, 
including hypersonics. To set a response, we must develop an 
interceptor capability and pursue next-generation capabilities such as 
directed energy, boost phase intercept, and non-kinetic effects.

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