[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-21]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2022 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE HEARING
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 21, 2021
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-431 WASHINGTON : 2022
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice MO BROOKS, Alabama
Chair ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
Vacancy
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Whitney Verrett, Professional Staff Member
Zach Taylor, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 1
WITNESSES
Dalton, Melissa G., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense.. 2
Dickinson, GEN James H., USA, Commander, United States Space
Command........................................................ 6
Richard, ADM Charles A., USN, Commander, United States Strategic
Command........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cooper, Hon. Jim............................................. 33
Dalton, Melissa G............................................ 35
Dickinson, GEN James H....................................... 76
Richard, ADM Charles A....................................... 46
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brooks................................................... 105
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 104
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 102
Mr. Turner................................................... 97
FISCAL YEAR 2022 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE HEARING
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 21, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:26 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. The hearing will come to order.
First, I apologize to the witnesses for the late start.
I would like to thank each one of you for being here today.
We look forward to hearing from the distinguished
witnesses, Ms. Melissa Dalton, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities; Admiral Charles
Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command; and General James
Dickinson, Commander of U.S. Space Command.
In view of the shortness of time, I will dispense with an
opening statement, but let me just record my worry about the
personnel impacts of moving the headquarters to Huntsville,
Alabama, and the fact that some of our colleagues in Congress
don't feel the urgency that I feel to recapitalize all three
legs of our strategic triad.
Let me turn to the ranking member, Mr. Turner.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. I am just going to make a few comments.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your statement concerning the
triad. I know that our witnesses before us today will be
echoing the same sentiment.
As we enter into moving forward with the NDAA [National
Defense Authorization Act], it is going to be incredibly
important for your testimony today to help us lay a foundation
for the work that is necessary in funding the modernization of
our nuclear enterprise.
As you know, we have allowed our nuclear deterrent to
atrophy. There are those who would like to pursue stall-and-
delay alternatives. We need your understanding of the
importance of the path that we have set in front of us and
completing it.
I know that you are going to give us some understanding of
what we are seeing with our adversaries. China is more than
doubling, according to reports, their nuclear inventory.
We know that Russia has undertaken the exotics with
Skyfall, the nuclear-powered cruise missile that is supposed to
orbit the Earth; with Poseidon, that is supposed to pop up from
the water; and with other hypersonics and other nuclear
weapons.
Your testimony of validating the threat, the diminishing
nature of our deterrent, and the critical aspect of our
pursuing modernization is going to be very important today, and
I look forward to that testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
I ask unanimous consent that my and your opening statement,
written statement, be inserted for the record.
And now we will hear from our witnesses.
Ms. Dalton.
STATEMENT OF MELISSA G. DALTON, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Ms. Dalton. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today.
May I request permission to submit my written statement for
the record and provide brief opening remarks?
Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Dalton. Thank you.
Today, the United States faces a complex global threat
environment characterized by increasingly sophisticated and
militarily capable strategic competitors, destabilizing
regional dynamics, and accelerating technological changes that
pose significant dangers.
The U.S. capabilities that we will discuss today offer
critical advantages that are essential to deterring adversaries
so that we can protect the American people, our homeland, and
our allies and partners.
As Secretary Austin has stated, nuclear deterrence is the
Department's highest priority mission. Our nuclear forces
remain essential to ensure no adversary believes it can ever
employ nuclear weapons for any reason, under any circumstances,
without risking devastating consequences.
As the Department undergoes a set of strategic reviews that
will include its nuclear policy and posture, DOD [Department of
Defense] is committed to maintaining a safe, secure,
survivable, and effective nuclear deterrent that accounts for
the challenges posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.
These reviews will account for adversary nuclear forces and
doctrine, possible strategy posture and policy adjustments,
program execution risk, arms control opportunities, and
strategic stability and nuclear risk reduction, all with the
goal of maintaining a strong and stable deterrent. Importantly,
the views of allies will inform these reviews.
Secretary Austin has stated that we must sustain and
modernize the nuclear triad to maintain credible deterrence in
the face of today's threats. The President's FY [fiscal year]
2022 discretionary request supports ongoing nuclear
modernization programs while ensuring that these efforts are
sustainable.
As missile technology matures and proliferates, the threat
to the U.S., our allies, partners, and deployed forces is
steadily growing, both from intercontinental and regional
missile developments in North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia.
We will review our missile defense policies, strategies, and
capabilities to ensure they align with our broader National
Defense Strategy to protect the Nation and our interests abroad
from missile threats.
Recently, the Department initiated the development of the
Next Generation Interceptor, which will improve the overall
reliability and performance of the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense system.
The Department will continue to bring a more integrated
approach to air and missile defense that not only assists with
the defense of our forces and allies against multiple types of
ballistic missiles, but also addresses the evolving spectrum of
airborne and missile threats that seek to inhibit U.S.
operations.
It will be critical to invest in the right missile defense
technologies in a cost-effective and responsible manner to
retain our regional and strategic edge long into the future.
While space-based capabilities are an inextricable
component of the daily workings of modern life, space is also
an arena of strategic competition. The United States remains
the world's leader in space, but we must recognize the growing
role that space plays in enabling China's increasingly
assertive challenges to the international system and in
Russia's disruptive role on the world stage.
The Department is grateful for this committee's strong
bipartisan support for initiating and sustaining important
organizational reforms and ensuring we have the necessary means
to realize our Nation's strategic goals in space.
For the United States, hypersonic strike systems are an
emerging conventional capability that is central to the broader
goal of modernizing the joint force to ensure it can deter and,
if necessary, defeat competitors in a high-end conflict.
China and Russia are making concerted efforts to develop
capabilities that are increasingly eroding traditional U.S.
warfighting and military technological advantages, including
hypersonic weapon systems. Such systems, including those that
are nuclear armed, are top national priority efforts for both
states.
In response, the Department has prioritized hypersonic
strike weapons, all of which are strictly non-nuclear, to
address these challenges. These capabilities offer operational
advantages by allowing us the ability to destroy critical enemy
infrastructure and anti-access systems, enhancing the U.S.
capability to create strategic effects without crossing the
nuclear threshold.
We are ensuring proper oversight as the Department develops
the concept of operations that will guide this capability's
use. The Department is committed to continued transparency and
dialogue with Congress on strategic stability and policy
questions relating to hypersonic strike systems.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
Before we hear from Admiral Richard, I am required to read
this boilerplate about web access, because we have several
members attending remotely.
Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen
for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and
voting.
Those members must continue to use the software platform's
video function while in attendance unless they experience
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render
them unable to participate on camera.
If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should
contact the committee staff for assistance.
Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the
room and via the television internet feeds. Members
participating remotely must seek recognition verbally, and they
are asked to mute their microphones when they are not speaking.
Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep
their software platform's video function on the entire time
they are attending the proceeding.
Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If members
depart for a short while for reasons other than joining a
different proceeding, they should leave the video function on.
If members will be absent for a significant period or depart to
join a different proceeding, they should exit the software
platform entirely and then rejoin it if they return.
Members may use the software platform's chat feature to
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical
support issues only.
Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
Sorry for that boilerplate.
Now, Admiral Richard.
STATEMENT OF ADM CHARLES A. RICHARD, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
Admiral Richard. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,
distinguished committee members, good afternoon. I am pleased
to testify with General Dickinson and Ms. Dalton, whose
leadership and strategic insights benefit my command.
I thank the President, Secretary of Defense Austin,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley for their
leadership and their support to the mission of strategic
deterrence.
I assure you the command is committed to the priorities set
forth by the Secretary to defend the Nation, care for our
people, and succeed through teamwork. And I remind the command
it is our diversity, resilience, and professionalism that sets
us apart and makes us even stronger. It is a privilege to
represent them here today.
I thank the committee for its enduring support to our
national defense and active engagement and interest in the
command's missions.
Strategic deterrence enables every U.S. military operation
around the world. Every operational plan and every other
capability we possess rests on an assumption that strategic
deterrence--and, in particular, nuclear deterrence--is holding.
If it fails, nothing else in the Department works as planned.
I submit, as a Nation, until recently, we have not
considered the implications of engaging in competition through
crisis and possible direct armed conflict with a nuclear-
capable adversary in nearly three decades. For the first time
in our Nation's history, we are about to face two nuclear-
capable strategic peer adversaries at the same time, both of
whom must be deterred differently.
And in that context, I submit, China must no longer be
considered a ``lesser included case'' in this context. Their
remarkable expansion of nuclear and strategic capabilities are
evidence of their drive to be a nuclear peer by the end of the
decade.
This is the strategic complement to the conventional
capability growth reported by INDOPACOM [United States Indo-
Pacific Command]. They are at some kind of an inflection point
and are rapidly expanding their strategic capabilities. They
are well ahead of the pace to double their stockpile by the end
of the decade, and the size of a nation's stockpile is a very
crude measure of its strategic capabilities.
In order to fully assess the China threat, it is necessary
to consider the capability, range, and accuracy of the
associated delivery systems, their command and control,
readiness, posture, doctrine, training.
They are rapidly expanding road-mobile intercontinental
ballistic missile capability, rapidly expanding solid fuel
silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, deploying a
strategic bomber, and they now possess six second-generation
Jin-class ballistic missile submarines, making them capable of
continuous at-sea deterrent patrols. They are developing
dedicated nuclear command and control capability, to include
launch under warning and launch under attack.
By these measures, China is capable of executing any
plausible nuclear employment strategy regionally now, and soon
will be able to do so at intercontinental ranges.
For China, it is important to look at what they do, not
what they say, and where they are going, not where they are.
I have no choice but to view China as a significant
strategic nuclear threat and share Secretary Austin's
assessment that China is the pacing threat for the Nation and
DOD at large.
Russia, however, remains the pacing strategic nuclear
threat. They have aggressively engaged in advanced conventional
and nuclear capability development and modernization efforts
and are roughly 80 percent complete, while we are at zero.
It is easier to describe what they are not modernizing--
pretty much nothing--than what they are--which is pretty much
everything--including several never before seen capabilities
and several thousand non-New START [Strategic Arms Reduction]
Treaty accountable systems.
Nuclear-armed ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]
hypersonic glide vehicle; nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed
underwater vehicle; and Skyfall nuclear-powered and nuclear-
armed cruise missile are examples of asymmetric strategies and
weapons designed to offset conventional inferiority.
We can no longer assume the risk of a strategic deterrence
failure in crisis or conflict will always remain low. The days
of power projection in a permissive environment without regard
for a possible nuclear response are over.
And bottom line is we don't have margin. I will be happy to
answer more questions about that when we get into this in the
rest of the testimony. We simply cannot continue to
indefinitely life-extend Cold War leftover systems, platforms,
NC3 [nuclear command, control, and communications], and
successfully carry out our national strategy.
Of particular concern is the aging nuclear weapons
stockpile and supporting infrastructure, and we could reach a
point where no amount of money will adequately mitigate the
operational risk the Nation will face due to infrastructure and
human talent capability losses.
Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for the opportunity to be
here today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Richard can be found in
the Appendix on page 46.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Admiral.
Now we will hear from General Dickinson.
STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SPACE COMMAND
General Dickinson. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
Thank you, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and members
of the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces for the chance to speak with you today.
I am honored today to join Admiral Richard and Ms. Dalton
for this afternoon's discussion.
In describing the accomplishments of our Nation's newest
combatant command, I am pleased to represent the nearly 18,000
military, civilian, and contractor personnel supporting United
States Space Command.
In United States Space Command, our power is our people.
Having just finished the command's celebration of Women's
History Month, we proudly recognize our many female
warfighters. Yesterday, in my comments to the Senate Armed
Services Committee, I shared examples of three female heroes in
my command, and today I would like to take the opportunity to
share three additional examples.
Major Kathryn Congdon, who recently transferred into the
brand new U.S. Space Force, started as an ICBM crew member,
worked next to missile warning at the 6th Space Warning
Squadron, and just led our planning efforts for the Global
Lightning 2021 Exercise.
Major Elise Fitch-Freeberg, an Army air defense artillery
officer, is currently working on one of our most critically
assigned missions, global sensor management in our Operations
Directorate.
And a third, a young Air Force staff sergeant, Kiara
Kastner, brings personal expertise to a command that is still
building its warfighting force, and is currently providing
outstanding support in the front office of my chief of staff.
And there are countless others. But those are three that I
would like to mention today.
Our diverse force will continue balancing combat readiness
and preparing for the future. We will provide our people a
working environment and culture that allows them to thrive
while reaching their full potential.
Our ideals reflect those of our oath to the Constitution of
the United States, and we remain committed to providing for the
common defense, promoting the general welfare, and securing the
blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.
Today, I will offer you some insight into our plans for the
future, which are aligned with the President's new Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance.
When I took command of U.S. Space Command last August, we
were still filling out the structures of a new warfighting
combatant command for space. As I outlined in my written
statement, we have made tremendous progress since then, to
include further development of our two functional component
commands and the establishment of all of our service component
commands.
These developments have significantly advanced space
warfighting capability, all while supporting the joint force
with exquisite space capabilities.
While largely focused from the geosynchronous belt to the
largest tactical mile on Earth, we are expanding our focus to
keep pace with our Nation's push into the cislunar region, our
renewed activity on the Moon, and our future exploration of
Mars and beyond.
China's space enterprise continues to mature rapidly,
presenting a pacing challenge. They invest heavily in space,
with more than 400 satellites on orbit today, and based on
their current launch rate, could have as many as a thousand on
orbit by the end of the decade.
China is building military space capabilities rapidly,
including sensing and communication systems and numerous anti-
satellite weapons. All the while, China continues to maintain
their public stance against the weaponization of space.
Similarly concerning, Russia's published military doctrine
calls for employment of weapons to hold U.S. and allied space
assets at risk. For example, similar to the Russian space-based
weapons test in 2017, Russia again conducted a test of a space-
based anti-satellite weapon.
Additionally, the December 2020 test of a direct descent
anti-satellite weapon demonstrates that, even as Russia aims to
restrict the capabilities of the United States, they clearly
have no intention of halting their own ground-based and on-
orbit counterspace weapon systems. Currently, Russia has about
200 satellites on orbit and could double that by 2030.
In addition to this activity on the part of our
competitors, we are observing exponential growth in the
commercialization of space. We currently track a challenging
32,000 objects in space. Nearly 7,000 of those objects are
active or retired satellite payloads.
Among the roughly 3,500 active satellites, the three
largest single constellations belong to commercial companies:
SpaceX's broadband internet constellation, Planet Labs' Earth
imaging constellation, and Spire Global's space-to-cloud data
analytics constellation.
Overlaying this new global security landscape on the
already complex operating environment of space demands a new
level of awareness on our part. Given that the President's
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance calls for ensuring
the safety, stability, and security of outer space activities,
U.S. Space Command is focused on my priority of enhancing
existing and developing new space domain awareness
capabilities.
Space domain awareness gives us insight into activity
throughout the space domain, including potential adversary
activities, but perhaps more importantly, into the insights and
intent of those potential adversaries as well.
Space domain awareness provides decision-quality
information to combatant commanders and the National Command
Authority to ensure we can provide viable military options with
the appropriate decision space throughout the spectrum of
operations, from deterrence to warfighting.
In order to most effectively accomplish our assigned
missions, U.S. Space Command has assessed our current
capabilities and developed the requirements necessary to expand
that capability where needed to meet our mission imperatives.
We have passed those requirements along to the services and to
the Department of Defense.
Our intent is to build the appropriate space operational
architecture designed to achieve full operational capability,
backed by a team of warfighters who outthink and outmaneuver
our competitors. While engaging in a daily competitive
environment, our primary goal remains to deter a conflict that
begins in or extends into space.
With the help of this committee and all of Congress, we
will achieve that ultimate objective and ensure that the United
States and our allies will never have a day without space.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dickinson can be found
in the Appendix on page 76.]
Mr. Cooper. I thank the witnesses.
We will now begin member questioning, first in open
session, which I hope we can conclude before we have to return
to votes.
I am going to withhold my questions for the classified
session. And I am grateful to the witnesses for being able to
stay with us until after votes, when we can resume and
hopefully have an entirely classified session then.
I am going to withhold my questions.
Would the ranking member like to ask any?
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you also for your opening
statement of your support for the triad.
Admiral Richard, I greatly appreciate your honesty and the
fact of which you speak with such passion about the threats to
the United States from our adversaries who have nuclear
weapons. You see today that the United States is increasingly
putting itself in a disadvantage with its adversaries that have
nuclear capabilities and are increasing those capabilities.
Admiral Richard, unfortunately, there are prior
administrations, and even Members of Congress, that wanted you
to sit here with the angst and anguish that you have. They
mistakenly believed that if they placed you and our nuclear
assets at risk, that our adversaries would follow, that a great
disarmament around the world would occur.
But the opposite has happened. While we have delayed our
modernization, Russia has modernized with what it is called
exotics, people are referring as exotics, new nuclear weapons
capabilities, and China is definitely increasing its
capabilities, perhaps doubling its weapons.
So what we are seeing is that the premise of, if the United
States was restrained, that the world would be restrained, is
dangerously not true.
Admiral Richard, some people are talking, in addition to
restraining the modernization plans that we have in place, of
putting in place a no-first-use policy. I believe that you have
been quoted before about China's no-first-use policy, that it
has holes enough in it enough you could drive a truck through,
or perhaps a mobile ICBM through.
Could you please discuss for a minute what your views are
of what it would do to the United States and our allies and how
it would perhaps not have any effect in deterring our
adversaries for the United States to adopt a no-first-use
policy?
Admiral Richard. So, Ranking Member, first, I want to offer
that that is fundamentally a policy question. I am conscious I
am sitting right beside a representative from OSD [Office of
the Secretary Defense] Policy, and so what I am about to
describe to you is my best military advice.
Mr. Turner. That is what I am looking for.
Admiral Richard. The comment about driving a truck through
the no-first-use policy is I simply look at what China's
capabilities are and what it enables them to do, and they are
very inconsistent with a no-first-use policy and the implied
minimum deterrent strategy that follows.
I see a no-first-use policy as degrading the Nation's
deterrence. It will remove a level of ambiguity that has
deterrence value. That will be mitigated by the fact that the
policy likely will not be perceived as credible by the people
that it is intended to deter.
This would only apply to about 10 nations or so. Most of
the rest are already covered by our negative security
assurance, and about half the ones I am describing are our
allies.
So it will be no more credible than our current missile
defense policy is, that is also not given a lot of credit, and
is no different than the no-first-use policy the Soviet Union
had or the one that North Korea currently has.
However, some of our allies might find it credible, and I
think it will have a negative effect on extended deterrence and
assurance.
The Nation can have any policy that it would like. These
would be the implications in my mission sets.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Ms. Dalton, we have been told and our staff have been told
that there is a study that has been undertaken in OSD CAPE
[Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation] and OSD
Policy concerning the Minuteman III. The Minuteman III has been
studied before, and it has been determined that it cannot have
life extension, not merely just because of cost, but also
because of capabilities.
Admiral Richard was describing the capabilities that our
adversaries are reaching to.
So it was not merely just an accounting aspect. It was also
a capabilities aspect.
But we have been told that there is a study underway of
looking at 200 Minuteman III missiles to maintain the land-
based leg of a deterrent while using the remaining missiles to
support replacement parts, which of course, again, every time
this has been studied it has been ill-advised to look at any
extension of the Minuteman III, not just merely for cost, but
also for capabilities.
Ms. Dalton, are you aware of this study? Did you approve
it? And what is in this study?
Ms. Dalton. Representative Turner, thank you very much for
the question and the opportunity to testify today.
I myself have not read that study, but I am happy to follow
up with further views on the matter.
More broadly, when it comes to the Minuteman III program,
this will certainly be a program that we examine in the course
of our upcoming strategic reviews of our nuclear posture.
I share Admiral Richard's concern in terms of our aging
nuclear arsenal and the fact that, as you just noted, sir, that
the capability as we get out to the 2030s grows quite worrisome
in terms of our ability to deter effectively the range of
threat actors that we have discussed here today already.
So as we are looking ahead in our strategic reviews,
looking at those threat factors, looking at what our current
capabilities can afford us to address them, we will also, of
course, be looking at cost and what is the right balance of the
mix of programs that may be necessary to have a safe,
effective, and secure nuclear deterrent well into the future.
Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Okay. So is the study that you just referenced
ongoing, or is that something that has just occurred?
Ms. Dalton. So as most administrations upon taking office
will conduct a series of strategic reviews, to include the
National Defense Strategy review, which we are----
Mr. Turner. Yeah. I am well aware of that.
Ms. Dalton. Yes.
Mr. Turner. I am asking you solely about the Minuteman III,
because this has been exhaustively studied and conclusively
determined to be unable to be life-extensioned.
And so I am asking you, are you aware of a different study
that has been tasked, other than those that have been completed
before?
And do you have an opinion other than what the studies that
have been previously concluded, that we need to move forward
with a modernization program and not review once again a
Minuteman III life extension program?
Ms. Dalton. Representative, thank you for the question. I
will have to take that question for the record, because I
myself have not seen that particular study.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Turner. Okay. If you find that there is a new study
going on, we would like it. So take this as our formal request
for an understanding of, if it is ongoing, send us the scope,
okay, and if it is completed, then please provide it to us.
With respect to no first use, Admiral Richard was giving, I
think, a great understanding of what our adversaries would view
a no-first-use policy, and certainly the environment that he is
operating in where Russia has a use--an escalate to deescalate.
We understand the Nuclear Posture Review will be ongoing. Every
administration, as you have said, has done one.
But do you have an opinion on no first use, Ms. Dalton?
Ms. Dalton. Representative Turner, thank you for the
question.
The question of our declaratory policy is a Presidential-
level decision. Our declaratory policy should reflect our
strategic objectives, including our extended deterrence
commitments to our allies.
In the course of both interagency and Departmental-level
strategic reviews that we are about to kick off, we will be
assessing the security environment, consulting with our allies
to inform these reviews, and to make a determination to inform
Presidential decision making on what changes, if any, should be
made to our current declaratory policy.
Mr. Turner. Leonor Tomero reports to you, does she not?
Ms. Dalton. She does.
Mr. Turner. You are familiar with the article to the
Japanese press concerning no-first-use policy and
modernization? Did you approve this?
Ms. Dalton. Representative Turner, I am aware of the
article, and I have also read the transcript of the interview,
which I think more fully captures DASD [Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense] Tomero's position, which was not well
reflected in the article.
Mr. Turner. Should she be having a position since you don't
have an NPR [Nuclear Posture] Review completed yet?
Ms. Dalton. She was reflecting the range of elements and
aspects of the review that I just walked through in the context
of the interview, and we would be happy to share the transcript
of the interview with you.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
I just want to thank Admiral Richard one more time, because
you have been incredibly passionate, both in the House and the
Senate, and we really need your help and support as we push
forward for modernization.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. We have about 20 minutes left before we have to
vote. The next four questioners in order are Garamendi, Wilson,
Carbajal, and Lamborn.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Richard, is it true that in 2019
your predecessor said that the Minuteman III could be life-
extended one more time in testimony to this committee?
Admiral Richard. I am not aware that he did or did not say
that.
Mr. Garamendi. You should be aware, because, in fact, it
was said that the Minuteman III could be extended one more
time.
In your argument for the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent], you assume that the Minuteman--in the issue of
cost, it is assumed by the Pentagon, by your organization, that
the Minuteman III would be life-extended, and then, following
that, the GBSD would go into place, and it too would be
extended. The dates are 2075.
That is your argument, is it not? You are assuming that the
Minuteman III could be extended as you compare the cost of the
two systems to the year 2075?
Admiral Richard. Congressman, we as a department have
reported several times to Congress, most recently in a
comparison of Ground Based Strategic Deterrent/Minuteman III
cost estimates back in October 2019, that it is not cost
effective to life-extend Minuteman.
The ultimate authority on whether it can be life-extended
or not is the Secretary of the Air Force as judged by the
Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Garamendi. Sir----
Admiral Richard. And I will defer to that.
Mr. Garamendi. If you will excuse me, sir.
My question was, the assumption in the pricing, the cost
differential, assumed that the Minuteman III could be extended.
And, in fact, your predecessor to this committee in 2019 said
that it could be extended one more time.
That testimony is available, and we can provide it to you.
Admiral Richard. Congressman, from an operational
standpoint what I would ask is I do not see an operational
reason to even attempt to do that.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay.
Admiral Richard. The Minuteman III is a 1970s-era weapon
designed to go against Soviet analog defenses. I need a weapon
that will work and make it to the target. And to expect that in
the timeframes you are talking about to penetrate potentially
advanced Russian and Chinese systems is going to be a
challenge.
Mr. Garamendi. Sir, we are talking here about the Minuteman
III's viability long-term. Your office delivered to me all of
the data about the Minuteman II and the Minuteman III. And in
fact, the Minuteman II, poured in 1966, was viable in 2014.
So with regard to the Minuteman II rocket, after all of
those years, it was still viable.
The Minuteman III, similarly, there is no evidence in your
document that the Minuteman III is not viable, as it is today,
nor is there any information that indicates that the Minuteman
III cannot be extended one more time.
Now, if that is wrong please----
Admiral Richard. Congressman, again, I will defer to the
Secretary of Defense. But I will remind you that it is about
the entire weapon system----
Mr. Garamendi. No, sir.
Admiral Richard. It is.
Mr. Garamendi. Sir, if you could, please stick to the
debate that I am having with you, which is the viability of the
Minuteman III.
The viability of the Minuteman III to be extended one more
time is clearly possible by the documents and the testimony of
the Strategic Command. So I want to get that on the record.
Now, don't go off talking to me about the Secretary of
Defense. We are talking about the viability of the Minuteman
III.
If I am incorrect and it is not possible--not possible--to
extend it one more time, then please provide the written
documentation to that. That is a fundamental point in the
debate that we are having here about the GBSD and the necessity
for it.
Secondly, why--or, thirdly--why did the Department of
Defense and your organization choose the year 2075 rather than
the year 2040 or 2050? What is the rationale for that?
Admiral Richard. Congressman, any information provided to
you on the life expectancy, cost, or any performance on the
Minuteman III or other weapon systems would have been the
Department of the Air Force, not STRATCOM [United States
Strategic Command]. That is why I say I am not the ultimate
authority on that.
I am the operational commander. I set the operational
requirement. So I will defer to the Air Force to answer those
questions. I can just report what I see. And an example is----
Mr. Garamendi. You have reported to us that you cannot--are
you reporting to us that you cannot extend the life of the
Minuteman III? Is that your report?
Admiral Richard. I am reporting that the Air Force has
reported it is not cost effective to life-extend the Minuteman
III. And from my own personal observation, with deference to
the U.S. Air Force, I am not sure it can be life-extended at
all.
For example, the command and control system for that dates
back to the 1970s. When it started, the word ``cyber'' hadn't
even been defined.
If you expect me to report back, I am going to get
questioned on it in a second, on how I am maintaining the cyber
defenses of a command and control system that was designed
before the internet, I am not sure that that is possible.
Mr. Garamendi. Why are you not sure? It is your business to
be sure.
Admiral Richard. Exactly, that is why I need a new one.
Mr. Garamendi. And a new one was----
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Garamendi. When was--excuse me, but you are talking
about the command and control system. When was it last updated
for the Minuteman III?
Admiral Richard. The Minuteman III system is currently
being updated in one aspect right now.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wilson, who is attending remotely.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Jim Cooper.
And, Admiral Richard, I want to thank you for your clarity,
determination, and professionalism.
And, on pit production, Admiral Richard, I appreciate that
you recently were quoted as saying, quote, ``I am apprehensive
that, if we are not careful, we will make an irreversible
decision that will leave the Nation without the capabilities it
needs to defend itself and to execute its preferred strategies
5 to 10 years from now, which we can't buy back,'' end of
quote.
Given that the NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration] has a 2030 deadline for 80 pits at 2 sites that
falls into that 5- to 10-year timeline, what concerns do you
have if the NNSA fails to meet that deadline as it relates to
our national security?
Admiral Richard. So, Congressman, I will offer that the
requirement for 80 pits per year is based on maintaining the
age of the pits in the stockpile at an acceptable level.
And so, if we are unable to meet 80 pits per year, the only
alternative is to now start to accept pits that have aged past
the point that we have a good analytical basis to have
confidence in their operation.
We don't have data that says they will work. We don't have
data that says they won't work. But if we don't reach 80 pits
per year, we are going to kind of find out the hard way how
that works out.
And if there is a delay in getting to 80, it will drive the
requirement higher in the future in order to bring the overall
age of the stockpile back to an analytically sound basis.
Mr. Wilson. Additionally, in regard to pit production, most
U.S. nuclear systems have been extended far beyond their
intended cycles and require significant consistent investment
over the next two decades to build the expert workforce and
necessary facilities to sustain them or we risk critical
capabilities.
For example, the United States is the only nuclear weapon
state that cannot develop currently a plutonium pit for
deployment.
This committee sought to address this in the bipartisan
fiscal year 2021 NDAA by directing the modernization of our
plutonium pits, including production of 80 pits per year at 2
sites by 2030.
How does this uncertain funding threaten the capability of
our nuclear deterrent against Russia and China, who are
building or updating their own triads?
Admiral Richard. Well, fundamentally, sir, one thing that
NNSA will need to achieve the capabilities that you describe to
meet the requirements that DOD is asking for is stable funding.
I think it is useful for us to remember that this effort at
pit production I think is the fourth or fifth attempt in our
Nation's history to reestablish it after we terminated pit
production back in 1992 at Rocky Flats.
And this is an example where, if we don't recapitalize the
infrastructure, we will lose a key piece of what it means, what
you have to have to be a nuclear weapon state, and we will not
be able to buy it back at unlimited cost for a large number of
years.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you for restating that history.
And, Secretary Dalton, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
emphasized the need to produce no fewer than 80 plutonium pits
by 2030 to sustain our current warhead supply.
The NNSA determined that a two-site approach--at least 50
percent at the Savannah River Site and at least 30 percent at
Los Alamos--is the best way to provide flexibility and
redundancy towards such a vital modernization effort.
Is that your view, that the recommendations of the 2018 NPR
are still valid?
Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Representative, for the question.
For all the reasons that Admiral Richard laid out, this is
a critical issue for us to examine in our upcoming strategic
reviews. So we will be taking that into account over the next
few months, and happy to come back and brief you as we have
findings from the reviews.
Mr. Wilson. And, again, thank you for your service as a UVA
[University of Virginia] graduate.
And I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Dickinson, I agree with your assessment that the
United States commercial space program aids our mitigation
efforts against threats.
In a report to Congress on space launch infrastructure, it
is noted that the ranges annually compete for facility
sustainment, restoration, and modernization funds to sustain,
repair, and construct requirements. A focus on these efforts is
to sustain existing infrastructure rather than growing
capability to meet the diverse user base of the launch ranges.
With the U.S. commercial launch industry on the cusp of 60
to 100 percent increase in launch rates over the next 5 years,
we must be putting more resources towards growing capabilities.
Is this just a matter of needing additional funds, or does
it require a policy change?
General Dickinson. Congressman, thank you for that
question.
As we look to the increase in the commercial use of those
ranges, those ranges actually fall under the purview of the
U.S. Space Force, so General Jay Raymond, the Chief of Space
Operations. The funding and infrastructure piece of that
belongs to the Space Force.
I am happy to take that question for the record. But in
terms of support to that activity, I do more along the lines of
supporting NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration]
in their human space flight support activities that I can go
into greater detail with you if you would like.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. That won't be necessary.
Admiral Richard, I have concerns about cybersecurity and
digital security of the modernization of nuclear command,
control, and communications, NC3.
What digital security and reliability metrics are used
throughout the acquisition process for NC3 modernization?
In addition, has STRATCOM taken any steps to improve
visibility into the readiness of NC3 systems and mission?
Admiral Richard. Thank you, Congressman, for that question,
and I will answer it in my separate responsibility as the NC3
enterprise lead for the Department of Defense. This is a
separate organization that was established about 2 years ago,
separate but aligned to STRATCOM, to put an enterprise-wide
focus on improving the performance of NC3.
I will start with your last question first. A number of
steps have been taken. And the system was always operated to a
very high standard. It just had a number of operators.
We have now centralized that, and, in fact, published an
operations order called Buoyant Link that standardized
reporting, data acquisition, an otherwise much better
understanding of the day-to-day status of the NC3 system.
Second, on the acquisition side of the house, partnering
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment, we have established many things, but one that
would highlight the point I would like to make here is a
cybersecurity scorecard, where we have de-bureaucratized a very
complex process, dropped into a stack of 35 metrics that are
key attributes you have to build into a system, both the ones
that are operating and the ones that you are acquiring. Service
providers, services and agencies, now report that.
And we have a compliance mechanism where I, as the
operator, judge the results of that, and then present it to the
Vice Chairman and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, so that we
can make either operational decisions or programmatic decisions
designed to close those cybersecurity gaps.
Let me say that I have full confidence in the cybersecurity
of our nuclear command and control systems for a number of
reasons, but I need to modernize NC3, just like we need to
modernize the delivery systems and the weapons complex, so that
we can pace the threat and retain that confidence moving in the
future.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
I have limited time, but Admiral Richard, we have been
hearing from you, the Department, that China is expected to
double, triple, or quadruple the size of its nuclear stockpile
in the next 10 years.
Even if China quadruples its current nuclear warhead
stockpile, it still would only put them at a thousand warheads.
In addition, China has no first-use policy and a minimum
deterrence strategy. The U.S. nuclear arsenal includes nearly
4,000 deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons.
With all this said, how do you understand the threat of
China's arsenal in comparison to the United States much larger
and advanced stockpile?
Admiral Richard. So, Congressman, first, the entire
stockpile for the U.S. is not available to me, to operations.
As you know, we are treaty constrained with Russia to 1,550
accountable weapons. That is what is available to me to
actually conduct the mission.
Second, you don't deter by accounting. I don't hold up a
card, ``I have more. I win.''
Third is I don't have the luxury of deterring one country
at a time. I am required to deter all countries all the time.
Right? So I have to be able to deter Russia at the same time I
have to be able to deter China. And that is the point behind
China is no longer a lesser included case.
In our history, we sized our forces with margin and
capacity for uncertainty that left us enough residual capacity
to credibly deter any other threat that we had to face. That is
about to be no longer true, and that is the point behind the
statement that they are no longer a lesser included case, sir.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I am out of time. I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. We have about a few minutes remaining. The
committee will stand in a brief recess. I ask members to make
both votes and then return promptly to this room, to continue
the open session. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Cooper. The subcommittee will return to order.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General Dickinson, in your statement you said, quote,
``Achieving the desired effects in the space domain requires
close coordination with other combatant commands,'' unquote.
There is currently great synergy that exists between
USSPACECOM [United States Space Command], NORTHCOM [United
States Northern Command], NORAD [North American Aerospace
Defense Command], and the National Space Defense Center all
being located in close proximity there in Colorado Springs.
On the personnel side, eight of the nine Space Force
Deltas, formerly called Space Wings, are located in Colorado;
the ninth is at Vandenberg. And seven of those eight are in
Colorado Springs, including all of our Guardians, who are
focused on space warfighting.
There are over 1,900 uniformed Space Force personnel in
Colorado, with over 1,500 in Colorado Springs alone. And there
are 32,000 total personnel who work or will work for Space
Force in Colorado.
Right now all of these units and people benefit from
working together in the same buildings with personnel from
SPACECOM, Space Force, and their intelligence community
counterparts working side by side.
How does it benefit our national security to rip out the
headquarters element of Space Command from this concentration
of national security, space, and intelligence community
professionals and move it someplace a thousand miles away?
General Dickinson. Congressman, your first comment about
the relationship with, in particular, like U.S. Northern
Command and NORAD, we do enjoy a great relationship. But I will
offer to you that I enjoy a great relationship with all of the
other combatant commands, and our ability to work closely with
those combatant commands is fundamental to what we do each and
every day.
We have had great success over the last 20 months with
regard to our relationships with the other combatant commands.
We have developed integrated planning elements, which are small
groups of expert space planners and operators who are embedded
in each of the combatant commands, and we are growing those in
all of the 10 combatant commands at various levels right now.
And so I tell you, those integrated planning elements have
established a great relationship with each of the combatant
commands in providing critical space warfighting expertise.
Mr. Lamborn. So something that is working well, and within
the Space Command they are side by side, thousands of people
side by side, why rip it in half and send some across the
country?
General Dickinson. So, Congressman, so in terms of military
type of operations, we have seen in the past and in the present
where we can actually do operations when we are not
geographically located with each of those elements.
So there is synergy I think you gain by being in the same
area, but I think there is equally synergy in terms of being
able to do that in not a remote manner, but in a physically
distant manner.
So in terms of military type of operations, I believe you
can do it in two different locations that wouldn't necessarily
be directly there in Colorado Springs, for example.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, if the military was told to put Space
Command in a cornfield in Iowa, they could do it. We can do
whatever we want. But why do it when it is working so well
where it is right now?
I am going to change subjects because of limited time.
Would you agree with me--let me back up.
It may surprise people that survivable communication
networks were not required for SPACECOM by the Department of
the Air Force when they did their, what I question, a highly
questionable evaluation process.
So survivable communications has to be added if we started
a new command up somewhere; whereas, right now there are
multiple secure command centers at Peterson, Schriever, and
Cheyenne Mountain, which provide continuity of operations for
Space Command.
In fact, past commanders of Air Force Space Command have
said their preferred warfighting command center would either be
the National Space Defense Center at Schriever or Cheyenne
Mountain Air Force Station, the latter of which was built to
survive a 30-megaton nuclear explosion.
So today what kind of continuity of operations facilities
are there in Huntsville, Alabama?
General Dickinson. Well, Congressman, I am not aware of any
in Huntsville, Alabama. But I do know that in terms of the
National Space Defense Center and my command out in Vandenberg
Air Force Base that the secure communications that they have is
satisfying the mission requirements now, and if we are directed
to move, that that type of infrastructure would be built and
operable to meet my mission needs.
Mr. Lamborn. And we haven't even talked about the cost.
That is going to be over a billion dollars. But we will maybe
have a chance to talk about that at some time in the future.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me
okay?
Mr. Cooper. Yes. Uh-huh.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
I want to thank our witnesses for the testimony today, and
thank you all for your service to the country.
In January, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
said that before possibly reassigning responsibility for
electromagnetic spectrum operations [EMSO] to a new entity we
needed to fix it by properly resourcing Strategic Command.
Admiral Richard, what resources do you need to effectively
execute EMSO?
Admiral Richard. So, Congressman, thank you for that
question. And it might be worth a reminder to you and the
committee, my responsibilities in electromagnetic spectrum
operations are to advocate, input on joint requirements. And
then I have some responsibility to execute the new
Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority plan that DOD recently
rolled out.
So General Hyten was correct, STRATCOM is not fully
resourced.
There are two aspects to this, and both of these the
Department is addressing, one of which is in the headquarters
element.
So this is some number of personnel to execute these. And
it is a small number. It is on the order of 40 people to
execute the headquarters functions. And then there will be a
larger need for personnel more broadly inside the Department to
provide sufficient electromagnetic spectrum operations
expertise.
That second number is still being determined. But we have a
very good way ahead to address the deficiencies that you refer
to from General Hyten.
Mr. Langevin. And, Admiral, whether or not EMSO stays at
Strategic Command, what authorities does the command need to
effectively execute EMSO?
Admiral Richard. Congressman, the issue is not authorities.
STRATCOM and the Department writ large have sufficient
authorities to accomplish this mission.
But what does need to happen--and this is specific to EMSO
but also applies in some other mission sets--is we have gotten
used to as a Nation adopting processes designed for permissive
environments that are designed to minimize programmatic and
technical risk at the expense of operational risk. We used to
not do it that way.
And so one of my big functions inside EMSO is to bring the
operational risk component back into the Department processes
so that our programmatic and other decisions are informed by
operational risk as well as programmatic and technical risk.
And that is the area, one of the areas, that we are
concentrating on. I have sufficient authorities to do it. We
just have to go get it done.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. And one other question.
Going off of Mr. Carbajal's question, I want to follow up
and ask if we should conduct similar fail-safe reviews of
nuclear weapons and early warning systems, especially with
regard to automation and implementing more AI [artificial
intelligence]?
Admiral Richard. So we are for implementation of artificial
intelligence. We are just at the beginning stages to explore
possible applications of AI inside nuclear command and control.
The first place that we see is really on the intelligence
side of the house. So enabling us to go through a much broader
range of information than is now humanly capable or possible to
do in an effort to determine much better situational awareness,
and then the human processes, present that to senior
decisionmakers.
The second piece that we see some immediate application for
AI is in cyber defense. And it gives us a better ability to
understand what is happening inside our networks, understand
that better, and make better operational decisions, again,
adapting things that are beyond human capacity alone to
address.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral.
General Dickinson, how would you describe information
sharing and cooperation between your command and other
combatant commands? What are some of the challenges that still
need to be addressed?
General Dickinson. Congressman, I think we have got great
information sharing between the different combatant commands. I
mentioned earlier with Representative Lamborn that we have got
integration in each of the combatant commands with small
planning elements right now, as well as some of their elements
within my command.
In particular, Cyber Command has a cyber integrated
planning element that works each and every day within my
command that provides that integration. But over the course of
the last 20 months with these IPEs [integrated planning
elements], space IPEs, we have seen a lot of synergy in
bringing integration to those combatant commands from U.S.
Space Command and providing those space warfighting
capabilities that they need.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much. My time is expired.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
Dr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
And thank you for your service, to our panelists.
I want to associate myself with Mr. Turner's line of
questioning, Admiral Richard, on the no-first-use policy. About
an hour and a half ago, I got off the phone with Ambassador
Wilczek from Poland, and he is very concerned and assures me
that his neighbors up and down Eastern Europe share the same
feelings that a no-first-use policy would erode our extended
deterrent.
Could it actually have an adverse impact of putting allies
in the position of needing a deterrent or increasing their own
capabilities?
Admiral Richard. Again, sir, I think the commander of
European Command addressed this well in terms of us getting a
mixed reaction out of our allies.
I do think in some cases it will diminish our extended
deterrence and assurance commitments, and if that were to be
diminished that would become their own decisions as to what
steps they might need to take to address that.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay.
Staying on the topic of first use, but turning to Russia
specifically, do you believe there are circumstances in which
Russia may opt to use nuclear weapons first?
Admiral Richard. Congressman, that is their doctrine.
Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah. And I have been kind of intrigued by
the argument about low-yield nuclear weapons. What do you think
the likelihood would be that the next nuclear attack we see
would be of the low-yield nature?
Admiral Richard. Congressman, it is difficult to speculate
on that. I do say that, one, it is Russian doctrine under
certain conditions that they would contemplate an attack like
that. That capability is certainly necessary for that.
I think it is also useful for us to remember the U.S. has
always had low-yield capability inside its arsenal. The only
thing that was added with the recent addition of the low-yield
ballistic is we simply now have a weapon system that is much
more likely to actually make it to the target.
Dr. DesJarlais. And the W76-2s, of course, have been
deployed and critics had called this weapon destabilizing. Can
you respond to these critics and explain how this weapon could
deter Russia from an escalation-to-win strategy?
Admiral Richard. I will offer that recently, within the
last year, STRATCOM started formally measuring risk of
strategic deterrence failure. I can give you the details on how
we do that in the classified session.
But this is a formal risk assessment that is designed to
make sure that we are analytically rigorous in all the things
that we do, acknowledging that it is just fundamentally trying
to measure a subjective process, the decision making of another
country.
But our assessment is, is that deployment of a low-yield
improved the risk of strategic deterrence, i.e., it lowered it
because of the deterrent effect that it achieved.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And just in the last minute or so if
you would like to, the time expired in the line of questioning
for Mr. Garamendi, and I was going to ask you to speak to the
importance of developing the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
rather than extending the Minuteman III.
So if you would like to take a minute and further your
thoughts about what effect delaying or canceling development of
GBSD would have on the nuclear deterrence and our allies'
confidence in the U.S. extended deterrence and, frankly, your
ability to do your job the way you see fit.
Admiral Richard. Congressman, the Nation, one, has had a
longstanding, can trace its lineage back to the Kennedy
administration, flexible and tailored strategy for strategic
deterrence. It has repeatedly, through every Nuclear Posture
Review dating back to 1992, in that process reaffirmed that the
best way to accomplish that mission is with a triad.
That makes the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of
that essential to be able to accomplish this mission. You need
the total capability and capacity of the triad to do what the
President has directed me to do. And inside that, I need an
ICBM that will actually work and actually make it to the
target.
It is a remarkable accomplishment that we have been able to
extend the Minuteman III as long as we have. Again, I will
defer to the Air Force in terms of cost-effectiveness, that
they have repeatedly reported to Congress that it is not cost-
effective. And I need it to be able to pace the threat.
And so I don't see an upside to trying to life-extend the
Minuteman when it is time to get a modern weapon system such
that I have the ability to deter the never-before-seen-in-our-
history condition of facing two peer nuclear-capable
adversaries.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Morelle.
Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to Ms. Dalton, Admiral Richard, and General
Dickinson for being here today to share your expertise and
obviously for your dedication and service to our Nation's
safety and security.
I wanted to ask the question of Admiral Richard, the NNSA's
Inertial Confinement Fusion, or ICF, program maintains three
world-leading experimental facilities, including the Omega
Laser Facility at the University of Rochester's Laboratory for
Laser Energetics, which is in my district in Rochester, New
York.
As I understand it, they are the only means for scientists
to recreate the high energy density conditions found in an
operating weapon without underground nuclear testing.
In addition to the physical facilities, obviously they
employ and use the talented workforce that is necessary to
conduct the experiments which produce valuable scientific data
and deter our adversaries.
I also understand that the capabilities and the viability
and their importance is demonstrated by large investments being
made in new facilities under construction, both in Russia and
in China.
And I wonder if, Admiral, if you could comment on the
importance of U.S. scientific capabilities in avoiding, first
of all, technological surprise, and ensuring the safety,
reliability, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent without
a need to resume testing.
I apologize, it is a long question, but very interested in
understanding this.
Admiral Richard. Congressman, you hit on, I think, the key
point at the very end of your question, which is
fundamentally--and I will defer to NNSA for the details--the
way the U.S. today maintains confidence in the nuclear weapons
stockpile is through the Stockpile Stewardship Program where
efforts like you describe provide the analytical and scientific
basis for us to have confidence that our weapons will meet the
standards that we ask of them without having to go to explosive
nuclear testing. So maintaining that scientific and technical
base is critical for us to have confidence in our deterrent.
But I will go on and point out, I mentioned human talent
bases earlier. It takes a considerable amount of subject-matter
expertise to take that test data that I am describing and then
work it back to a confidence assessment as to whether or not
the weapons are meeting standards. This is not like putting
your car front end and checking the alignment and a green light
comes out of the box.
And so that is one of the perishable skill sets, that if we
don't maintain that talent base and we lose it, it may take us
5 to 10 years to recreate it, sir.
Over.
Mr. Morelle. And I wonder, General, if you have any
thoughts or advice that you can give us on how to continue to
maintain it and make sure that we have a competitive advantage
here in that regard. Is there any advice you can give us on
things that we should be thinking about that in that space?
Admiral Richard. So I would encourage NNSA, through the
Department of Energy, to ask for the necessary level of
resources to maintain that particular program to do the weapons
programs that the Department of Defense asked for, as well as
maintain their infrastructure.
The ultimate authority on what is necessary there, at least
in the budget submission, is the Secretary of Energy. But I
would encourage NNSA to ask for the full measure of what they
think they need, not just what they think they can get.
Mr. Morelle. Very good.
Well, thank you again, Admiral, for your leadership and for
your service, as well as to General Dickinson and Ms. Dalton.
And with that, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman yields back.
Ms. Cheney.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all of our witnesses.
Admiral Richard, I wanted to follow up on something one of
my colleagues was asking you about. There is an idea from some
on this committee and more broadly that, even though we are
facing adversaries as you have described, a historic,
unprecedented situation with respect to China and Russia, both
of whom are undertaking massive modernization buildup and
expansion programs, that somehow the solution is for us to risk
our own security, to tie our own hands with no-first-use, to
reduce our own capabilities, to delay, yet again,
modernization.
I wanted to remind the committee generally of something
that President Truman said in NSC-68, which is timeless. He
said, ``No people in history have preserved their freedom who
have thought that by not being strong enough to protect
themselves they might prove inoffensive to their enemies.''
And I would like to ask you, Admiral Richard, if you could
describe--give you a chance to describe in a little bit more
detail what we are seeing from the Chinese, in particular. I
don't think the American people fully recognize and understand
the nature and the expanded nature of that threat.
And also what it means when we say the Minuteman III is so
old. What does that mean in terms of what is available, what is
not available, what it would really mean if we were to ask you
simply to extend the life of that program once again?
Admiral Richard. Congresswoman, thank you for the question.
So I ran through it very quickly in my opening statement,
but I will elaborate that we are seeing this very rapid
expansion of Chinese capabilities. I will give you the specific
numbers in the closed session.
But this is rapid expansion of their road-mobile
capability. And this is an intercontinental ballistic missile
that is on a very large truck. Russia and China have them. We
do not. Those are very large countries, and they simply drive
the missile around. It is a challenging thing to keep up with
them.
So they have this new capability expanding rapidly. They
have many new solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missile
silos. These are the same ICBMs, by the way, that we are
talking about either life-extending or otherwise trying to use
ourselves.
A solid fuel rocket is very responsive, and that, coupled
with their new nuclear command and control, gives them a launch
under warning or launch under attack capability that right now
only the U.S. and the Russians possess.
They are about to complete a triad. And so they have a
strategic bomber with an air-launched ballistic missile
capability on that. So for the first time, they have a complete
triad.
They have six second-generation ballistic missile
submarines, so they can do continuous at-sea deterrent patrols,
i.e., a survivable second strike capability, and a missile that
can range continental United States from protected bastion in
the South China Sea.
And you add all of this together and they can do any
plausible nuclear employment strategy regionally. This will
backstop their conventional capability and will constrain--
potentially constrain our options. In other words, we will be
the ones that are getting deterred if I don't have the
capability to similarly deter them.
And the key point is, this is about to become additive to
what the Russians can do.
So that is the threat. More detail in the closed session.
But this is a breathtaking expansion. I just gave an order
at STRATCOM that if you have a China brief that is more than a
month old, take it back to the intel people and get it updated
because it is out of date. That is how rapidly they are moving.
And remember, STRATCOM is not the source of this
intelligence. The intelligence comes from the intelligence
community. We are simply the ones that interpret it
operationally like other commands.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Admiral.
And I think it is important to just reaffirm the words that
you have used, that the Chinese are at an inflection point,
this is a breathtaking expansion, accelerating rapidly. And we
are asking you to be able to deter both China and Russia
simultaneously.
And I think from the perspective of this committee and our
obligation to ensure that you have the resources you need, the
notion that we are asking you simply to life-extend one more
time technology from the 1970s is completely irresponsible. And
I think we need to face the consequences of that choice if that
is the path we choose to go down.
Admiral Richard. Congresswoman, if I could just add--and,
again, and I will defer to the U.S. Air Force and the Secretary
of Defense as to whether or not Minuteman III can be life-
extended. They provide me the system.
Here is why I say I am just not sure it can be done: They
have a long list of parts that are in very short supply.
For example, right now there are only two of these launch
switches that go into every launch control center, there are
only two in supply. You have got to have 45 of them for each
launch control center.
Nobody makes the inside of a switch anymore. No company is
going to make the inside of the switch. This is like asking a
company to make a dial-up modem. There is no profit in doing
something like that.
Air Force has been consistently pulling rabbits out of the
hat to solve these problems. I am afraid there is a point where
they won't be able to pull the rabbit out of the hat and the
system won't work.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Dalton and gentlemen. Thank you
for your time today.
And also thank you to both Admiral Richard and the General
for stopping by my office and having the personal time that we
did. I truly appreciate that.
Admiral Richard, you were in my office this morning and I
appreciate our brief conversation. But you also, yesterday and
today, today you have testified extensively, and in the past,
regarding the dangers of reliance solely on the submarine leg
of the nuclear triad, which on a day-to-day basis is actually a
dyad between the sea and the ground legs.
And if we were to choose to delay modernization of the
ground-based leg or not move forward with the Ground Based
Strategic Deterrent, especially in the midst of ongoing
modernization of the LRSO [Long-Range Standoff Weapon], we
would be essentially fully reliant on the sea-based leg of the
triad.
Now, yesterday you testified to the Senate that you would
request reactivation of bombers on alert if the ground leg were
to be removed. You, yourself, are, as we talked about today, a
career submariner, and I am sure are much more familiar than
anyone else in the room today with the survivability and
effectiveness of our submarine force and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles.
Arguments against moving forward with the Ground Based
Strategic Deterrent are largely based on the premise that the
sea leg of the triad can maintain an effective deterrent now
and into the future.
Now, you have also testified that Russia is currently
approximately 80 percent complete with nuclear modernization
and recapitalization. While China is considered the
Department's overall pacing threat, you have stated that Russia
is the pacing nuclear threat. Russian modernization and
innovation span hypersonic weapons, ICBMs, and nuclear-powered
torpedoes.
Now, yesterday you called the nuclear threat you expect the
United States to face in 2030 as unprecedented, and you focus
on the fact that the United States has never before had to
deter two nuclear adversaries with separate interests at the
same time.
Now, in 2017 and 2018 there was reporting that identified
Chinese efforts to develop a new satellite which would detect
submarines using lasers and looking at disturbances in the
water. They have also reportedly developed new magnetic
detection devices and are actively pursuing new technology to
be able to detect and neutralize our nuclear submarine forces.
Regardless of the success of these individual Chinese
efforts, it is clear that our adversaries are working extremely
hard to degrade the survivability of our sea leg.
So apart from the inherent risk of a reliance on one leg of
the triad, are you aware of the specific modernization efforts
being made by Russia and China to more effectively identify and
neutralize our nuclear submarines in the future?
Admiral Richard. Congressman, thank you for that question,
and I will try to address all the pieces of that.
First, I will remind, respectfully, there is a fundamental
design criteria inside the triad that we assume that we could
lose any leg of the triad and still meet all Presidential
objectives, albeit with reduced flexibility. So without getting
into the individual risk, that was just a basic design
assumption.
And I should point out, yes, I said that yesterday, that if
we do not have an intercontinental ballistic missile leg I
would request to re-alert the bombers. I would do that.
That would only get us through the day-to-day issue. There
would still be an overall capacity issue that I would need to
address in order to do all the things the President, via
Secretary of Defense, has asked me to do.
As to the survivability of submarines, yes, there are
extensive efforts underway by Russia, China, and others to
improve their anti-submarine warfare capability. This is
historic. This has been the case. It is a classic hider-finder
competition undersea like in other domains.
We have equivalent efforts underway to attempt to find
theirs. We have extensive programs designed to ensure the
survivability of our submarine force in general, ballistic
submarines specifically.
So I have full confidence in our ability to maintain the
survivability of the submarine leg. However, that is not the
only reason or risk. There are also operational and technical
things that have nothing to do with the opponent that have to
be accounted for. And independent of that, we have always
assumed that we could still lose a leg of the triad and still
meet Presidential objectives.
Mr. Panetta. Outstanding. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.
It looks like Mr. Waltz is no longer here.
Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have got some questions that also revolve around the
Space Command headquarters being located at Redstone Arsenal
and Tennessee Valley. And I want you to think about things in
two different contexts. One is merit; the other is nonmerit or
political. And let me run through the merit just for a moment.
With respect to merit, as I understand the criteria or
minimum requirements, there were three. One, you have to be
within the top 150 largest metropolitan statistical areas; you
have to be within 25 miles of a military base; and you have to
score in the top 50 or above on the AARP's [American
Association of Retired Persons'] Public Policy Institute's
Livability Index.
Quite clearly, I think everyone would agree that Redstone
Arsenal and Tennessee Valley met those minimum criteria.
So once you get past those minimum criteria, then you had a
competition of sorts amongst other locales that met those
minimum criteria, an evaluation of each site's score based on
four criteria.
Forty points was based on mission-related criteria. A
subpart of that was workforce.
By way of emphasis, Tennessee Valley/Redstone Arsenal has
one of the highest concentrations of engineers in the world and
certainly in the United States of America. We have
mathematicians, scientists, physicists, a highly qualified
workforce.
We have, second subpart, mutually supporting space
entities. Well, certainly, as General Dickinson knows, we have
got a plethora of space-related military activities on Redstone
Arsenal. We are also the home of the Marshall Space Flight
Center, which is the birthplace of America's space program.
Very hard for anyone else to compete with the attributes that
we have there.
So on the 40 points of mission-related criteria, I would
submit that Redstone Arsenal did very, very well, as evidenced
by what we provide in the Tennessee Valley and the Redstone
Arsenal.
Second criteria was infrastructure criteria--parking, land,
communications. Some of you are familiar with what we provide
at Redstone Arsenal, certainly General Dickinson is, family of
military personnel, housing, health care. I would submit that
we also score very, very well in that second criteria. So that
is 70 of the points.
Then you have got the third criteria, which is community
support, which is 15 points. Schools. We have got excellent
schools in the Tennessee Valley. You have got a lot of gifted
parents. And of course, they demand high-quality schools for
their children.
Cost of living. A-plus score, in my judgment, there. We are
one of the lesser expensive places to operate in the United
States of America.
Community support then, criteria, that was 15 points. I
would submit Redstone Arsenal and the Tennessee Valley score
very well.
Then the fourth criteria, the cost to the Department of the
Air Force. Granted that there is an initial startup cost, and
at Redstone Arsenal that may be higher than at other places.
However, there is also the long-term operational cost.
Given the lower cost of living, the other things that we
offer at Redstone Arsenal and Tennessee Valley, I would submit
that we also score well according to the cost to the Department
of the Air Force criteria.
So all that merit-based stuff being cited very, very
quickly, now I get to my question. This is with respect to each
of you, and I will start with General Dickinson.
Are you aware, personal or direct knowledge, of any
political, nonmerit influence on the Space Command headquarters
Redstone Arsenal location decision? Anything other than merit?
General Dickinson, are you, any personal or direct
knowledge?
General Dickinson. I am not. I have no personal or direct
knowledge.
Mr. Brooks. Admiral Richard, are you aware, personal or
direct knowledge, of anything that would suggest that the
decision to locate Space Command headquarters at Redstone
Arsenal in the Tennessee Valley of Alabama was based on
political or nonmerit influence as opposed to merit?
Admiral Richard. Congressman, no, I am not.
Mr. Brooks. Ms. Dalton, I know this might be outside your
normal ballpark, but same question to you. Are you, with
personal or direct knowledge, aware of any political or
nonmerit influences on the Space Command headquarters Redstone
Arsenal location decision? Anything other than merit?
Ms. Dalton. No, I am not.
Mr. Brooks. No further questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman yields back. That is the last
question for open session.
We will declare a brief recess so that we can make the last
vote. And then we will return not to this room, but to 2212 for
the closed session.
[Whereupon, at 6:04 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 21, 2021
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 21, 2021
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 21, 2021
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. In response to congressional direction originating in
the HASC FY2020 NDAA, the Institute for Defense Analyses conducted an
independent assessment of the implications of a U.S. no first use
policy. IDA concluded that U.S. adoption of a NFU policy would not
improve the international nuclear security situation; not change
Russian or Chinese perceptions of U.S. policy or encourage any change
in their policies; not lower the risk of miscalculation in a crisis;
undermine allied confidence in U.S. security guarantees; and likely
weaken current barriers to further nuclear proliferation. On what
points do you disagree with the IDA conclusions?
Ms. Dalton. I am familiar with IDA's report on No First Use policy
and have reviewed this assessment. Our declaratory policy should
support our strategic objectives, including credibly assuring allies
and partners as to our continued extended deterrence commitments to
them. As I testified, I anticipate our strategic reviews will determine
whether the conditions exist today under which a change in declaratory
policy could be safely adopted. This assessment will account for the
views of the U.S. military and allies and partners, and as Deputy
Secretary of Defense Hicks has made clear, any such decision will be
made by the President.
Mr. Turner. You committed to providing to the Committee by COB on
April 23, 2021, any information on interactions between OSD and CAPE
concerning a ``Best 200 MMIII'' SLEP approach. Please provide an update
to the Committee on that proposal, as well as any supporting documents
that have been produced to date.
Ms. Dalton. OSD Policy has not asked CAPE to study, or to
commission, fund, sponsor or otherwise support a study, regarding a
``Best 200 MMIII SLEP'' approach.
Mr. Turner. What have our U.K. counterparts communicated to you
about the importance of the W93 program to their independent work on a
replacement for their current warhead?
Ms. Dalton. Our support to the United Kingdom and its Continuous-
At-Sea-Deterrent contribute to NATO's defense and has helped underwrite
NATO's collective peace and security since the signing of the bilateral
Mutual Defense Agreement in 1958. The United Kingdom's 2021 Integrated
Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy confirmed
its commitment to maintaining a minimum credible independent nuclear
deterrent, and highlighted how ``nuclear cooperation remains an
important element of the enduring Special Relationship between the
United States and the United Kingdom, enhancing trans-Atlantic
security.'' The United Kingdom has emphasized the importance of the W93
program as the United Kingdom pursues its separate but parallel warhead
development program. The United Kingdom further noted in its Integrated
Review: ``We will continue to work closely with the United States to
ensure our warhead remains compatible with the Trident Strategic Weapon
System.'' We plan to continue our strong cooperation with the United
Kingdom on nuclear weapons.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Dalton, over the last year have any USG policy
documents been updated related to U.S. test readiness? If so, can you
please provide those to the Committee.
Ms. Dalton. I am not aware of any documents of the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy related to U.S. test readiness
that have been updated in the past year. A presidential guidance
document was signed at the end of the previous administration, but as a
classified presidential document, I am not authorized to release it.
More generally, we will continue to evaluate nuclear deterrence
requirements in the context of the nuclear posture review.
Mr. Turner. In your opening remarks you state that ``Over the next
ten years and in response to perceived threats, including potentially
first strike capability from the United States, China plans to at least
double the size of its nuclear stockpile and carry out a rapid
expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal.'' Your statement
for the record essentially blames the U.S. triad modernization effort,
which has been around for eight decades, for the recent Chinese crash
nuclear build-up. What specific first strike capabilities that we've
deployed are you referring to? Do you have specific intelligence
reporting to back up this statement (if so, please provide it to the
Committee)? Can you please explain to the Committee why these
``perceived threats'' are inaccurate?
Ms. Dalton. The United States is not to blame for China's plan to
expand and modernize its nuclear arsenal. China's rapid expansion of
its nuclear arsenal is a very serious concern. Last year, DOD estimated
that China had a nuclear warhead stockpile in the low-200s and
projected that it would at least double over the next decade. Since
then, China has accelerated its nuclear expansion and will almost
certainly exceed the intelligence community's previous projection. It
is important to identify the drivers of our adversary's nuclear
modernization programs in order to understand how we can most
effectively enhance nuclear deterrence and prevent a dangerous and
costly arms race. China's nuclear strategy has long centered on the
ability to provide an assured counterstrike against adversary's nuclear
attack--which requires a sufficient portion of its nuclear force be
able to survive such a strike. China's efforts to expand and diversify
its nuclear arsenal are broadly aimed at improving the survivability,
responsiveness, and effectiveness of its nuclear force while also
providing China's leaders with additional strategic options. The
factors driving China's nuclear efforts include its concerns about the
survivability of its nuclear force in the face of advances in U.S.--and
to a lesser extent Russian--strategic ISR, conventional precision
strike, and missile defense capabilities. Other factors include China's
desire to build a ``world-class'' military as part of its national
strategy and broader intensifying U.S.-PRC tensions. For further
details, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
provided intelligence reporting to both the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees and is planning to participate in a classified
follow-up briefing describing those factors driving China's activities.
Mr. Turner. The United Kingdom in their well-reasoned Integrated
Review specifically rejected a NFU policy. Have your U.K. counterparts
articulated to you their justification for doing so and what is your
opinion of their rationale? Do you believe their rationale for doing so
is sound?
Admiral Richard. Yes, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MoD),
Director General of the Nuclear Defense Nuclear Organisation, did
contact me regarding the nuclear deterrent aspects of its Integrated
Review. As the Director General labeled her letter ``official
sensitive'' its contents cannot be publicly released. However, the
statement in the Integrated Review regarding NFU is well phrased and
consistent with current U.S. policy.
I appreciated the Director General's letter and look forward to the
continued close U.S.-U.K. cooperation in these matters.
Mr. Turner. A 2020 strategy document issued by Vladimir Putin,
states that Russia will consider using nuclear weapons first in a
number of situations, clearly highlighting the importance of these
capabilities in Russian strategy. Do you believe that either Russia or
China would adopt a true and credible NFU policy if the United States
did?
Admiral Richard. China currently has a ``No First Use'' policy, yet
it is rapidly improving its strategic nuclear capability and capacity,
to include significant advances in intercontinental and medium range
missiles. It is well ahead of pace to double their nuclear stockpile by
the end of the decade. None of this is consistent with a NFU policy and
as such, I and others doubt the credibility of such a pledge. Likewise,
the Soviet Union adopted a NFU pledge in 1982 but it was seen as
propaganda aimed at undermining Western political cohesion as the
Soviet military continued to publish writings on nuclear preemption.
In response to National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020, Section 1673, and pursuant to an agreement with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) examined
the issue of the U.S adopting a policy to not use nuclear weapons
first. Among other things, the analysis concluded ``a policy
pronouncement of NFU is unlikely to alter how Moscow or Beijing
perceive that the U.S. will approach a crisis'' and ``the available
evidence indicates that Russia and China will not view such a shift in
U.S. policy as credible.''
In light of the above, I will not speculate on potential Chinese
and Russian reactions to hypothetical situations and, more
specifically, on what ``a true and credible NFU policy'' from Russia
and/or China would be.
Mr. Turner. In your testimony on April 20 and 21, 2021, you stated
that the Minuteman III is so old ``That in some cases the [technical]
drawings don't exist anymore, or where we do have drawings, they're
like six generations behind the industry standard''. ``And there's not
only [no one] working that can understand them--they're not alive
anymore.'' Also, there are ``switches that aren't produced or can't be
produced anymore. It's like trying to get industry to produce dial-up
modems.'' Are there other examples that STRATCOM can provide as to
parts and components to extend the MMIII that are no longer available
or difficult to acquire? Even assuming MMIII could be extended, would a
system based on 1960s/70s-era technology be able to meet current and
future military requirements?
Admiral Richard. I will defer to the Air Force for more detailed MM
III part and component sustainability challenges.
Our legacy delivery systems, stockpile, and infrastructure are all
well past their intended operational life and are not designed for, nor
capable of keeping pace with the rapidly evolving threats.
Specifically, MM III technology cannot keep pace or close existing
capability gaps. A MM III Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) is not
a viable option as it would incur substantial technical risk due to the
system's tightly coupled, vertically integrated design that lacks a
healthy supporting development or manufacturing base.
Mr. Turner. At the end of the Obama Administration they considered
an option of cannibalizing 200 Minuteman III ICBMs and using them to
extend the ``Best 200'' MMIIIs currently in our inventory. This was
ultimately viewed as unworkable do the costs, security, moving around
of spare parts and missiles, and that we should not go down to 200
missiles. What is your best military advice should a proposal like this
be brought before you? Has STRATCOM conducted any analysis of this
proposal or a proposal like it (if so please provide to the committee)?
Admiral Richard. The 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews assessed
our current ICBM force structure through a formal, methodical approach,
and determined the current force structure, size and modernization/
replacement program of record fully supports our deterrent strategy.
I do not support cannibalization of Minuteman III (MM III) to delay
the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) in order to defer costs or
mitigate MM III sustainment challenges. While ``cannibalizing'' the MM
III force may defer the asset attrition problem, it does not halt the
aging problems or address identified capability gaps, and significantly
reduces capacity required to deter two peer nuclear adversaries. We are
already at a point where nuclear modernization programmatic risk is
transferring to me as operational risk. If this continues, MM III aging
will inevitably impact my ability to meet strategic guidance. The AF
has determined timely execution of GBSD is the most cost-effective way
to maintain the ICBM force.
Mr. Turner. On April 20, 2021, in a response to Senator Cotton, you
stated that reducing the number of ICBMs or removing that leg of the
triad would ``solve a critical problem for China.'' Can you elaborate
how that would be the case? How would going below 400 to 200, or to
even zero, be solving a ``big problem'' that China currently has?
Admiral Richard. The triad must be considered as a whole because it
functions as a whole, with each leg essential to overall effectiveness.
The triad's complementary attributes ensure the enduring survivability
of our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold
a diverse range of adversary targets at risk throughout the spectrum of
crisis or conflict. The ICBM force is the most responsive leg of the
triad and ICBM geographic dispersion presents an intractable targeting
problem, complicating China's (and Russia's) strategies. These missiles
are capable of holding a wide range of targets, to include emergent and
time sensitive targets, at risk. They are survivable to all but a
massive nuclear exchange and possess the highest day-to-day readiness.
Reducing the ICBM force by half would be a unilateral reduction in the
face of a deteriorating security environment along with the detrimental
messaging to our Allies and adversaries, and would facilitate China's
rise as a strategic peer. China's currently intractable targeting
problem would be significantly eased and they would be closer to
possessing a credible counter-force strategy (i.e., the ability to
directly attack our nuclear forces) for the first time in their
history. For the case without any ICBMs, in addition to the above, the
potential for a strategic attack on our homeland further increases. A
conventional attack on our few (5) submarine and bomber bases would
significantly degrade the Nation's remaining deterrent.
Mr. Turner. If the LRSO were cancelled or delayed beyond the
planned retirement of the legacy Air-Launched Cruise Missile, do you
believe the air leg of the triad would still be viable?
Admiral Richard. No. Even with the deployment of the B-21, the
long-term viability of the air-leg is dependent on the fielding of
LRSO. LRSO complicates adversary air defense strategies as it can be
effectively employed to cover geographically dispersed targets from a
single standoff bomber. Without LRSO, bombers would be forced to
overfly the target, requiring a greater number of penetrating bombers
and support aircraft while increasing crew risk. The air leg of the
triad is viable as it provides visible, scalable, and flexible
deterrence and assurance options for the President. The air leg is
deployable to unanticipated locations; can evade air defenses; and it
is the least expensive leg of the triad to adjust or recapitalize in
the face of technical or geopolitical uncertainty. Cancelling LRSO puts
this viability at risk.
Mr. Turner. Can you explain the importance of LRSO given the New
START Treaty bomber counting rule?
Admiral Richard. New START (NST) attributes each deployed bomber as
having one nuclear warhead, regardless of the actual number of weapons
the bomber may be carrying. For example, a B-52H may carry up to 20
nuclear LRSO weapons; but under NST counting rules, it would be counted
as one weapon. LRSO complicates adversary air defense strategies as it
can be effectively employed to cover geographically dispersed targets
from a single standoff bomber. Without LRSO, bombers would be forced to
overfly the target, requiring a greater number of penetrating bombers
and support aircraft while increasing crew risk. Further, LRSO is the
most cost-effective approach to ensure a credible and effective air leg
of the triad. Though extremely capable, we have a limited number of B-
2s with gravity bomb capability which are insufficient to hold the
required significant targets at risk. This capability must be protected
as it is vital to USSTRATCOM's ability meet mission requirements. LRSO
preserves an ability to increase bomber payloads as a key hedge against
unforeseen technical or geopolitical challenges.
Mr. Turner. Are there possibilities by which LRSO IOC could be
accelerated and what would your best military recommendation be?
Admiral Richard. My requirement for LRSO is an Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) no later than 2030. Defer to the Air Force regarding
any specific options available to deliver IOC sooner.
Mr. Turner. Can you please explain STRATCOM's requirements for the
W93 and how that program, along with other efforts such as the Common
Missile Compartment, contributes to not only the U.S. triad, but also
the U.K. deterrent.
Admiral Richard. Our current 1970s/80s era warheads have been
extended to double their intended design lives; in the late 2030s, they
will begin reaching a point of uncertainty in both reliability and
effectiveness at nearly the same time. We cannot continue to cost
effectively sustain legacy weapons indefinitely and expect them to
remain militarily effective against evolving 21st century threats. The
W93 will allow us to take advantage of modern technologies and
manufacturing processes to hedge against technical risks in our current
SLBM warheads--and reduce current over-reliance on the W76--while
providing the opportunity to include modern technologies that improve
safety, security, and flexibility to address future threats. Without
W93, COLUMBIA will have weapons that may not be able to penetrate
adversary defenses, and if they do, may not deliver the intended effect
due to uncertainty in weapon degradation. In addition to being required
for U.S. modernization requirements, the W93 and the Common Missile
Compartment programs enable us to continue our longstanding support to
the U.K. and their warhead replacement program. As an Allied
independent nuclear power contributing to NATO's nuclear deterrence
posture, the U.K.'s continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent is critical to
strategic security.
Mr. Turner. The Russians have criticized the U.S. for planning to
develop a Nuclear Sea Launched Cruise Missile and have called it
destabilizing, even though the U.S. fielded a similar weapon for
decades before retiring it in 2013. Isn't it true that the Russians
have nuclear-capable SLCMs? If Russia has them, how can they say that
the U.S. having them would be ``destabilizing''?
Admiral Richard. Yes. Cruise missiles have been fielded on bombers
and other platforms (e.g., sea-launched) since the late 1960s, and I do
not view them as destabilizing. Russia currently employs both
conventional and nuclear-capable air- and sea-launched cruise missiles,
implying they do not view them as destabilizing. Moreover, Moscow
frequently describes U.S. systems as ``destabilizing'' to try and
undermine public support, even though Russia maintains similar
capabilities.
Mr. Turner. Please describe in detail the value a nuclear capable
SLCM would provide to the force.
Admiral Richard. The nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile
(SLCM-N) is intended to deny potential adversaries any mistaken
confidence limited nuclear employment would provide an advantage over
the U.S., its Allies and partners. SLCM-N will bring a needed non-
strategic regional presence and an assured response capability. It does
not require host nation support and provides additional diversity in
platforms, range, and survivability. The SLCM-N will provide assurance
to our Allies and partners through tailored response options in vast
operating areas where forward basing may not be possible. Limited U.S.
response options, such as the SLCM-N, is intended to provide a more
credible deterrent to limited attack against the U.S., Allies and
partners rather than relying primarily on the threat of large-scale
nuclear responses. It will enhance our ability to tailor deterrence and
assurance while expanding the range of credible U.S. options.
Mr. Turner. Some critics have called the U.S. low-yield W76-2
submarine launched ballistic missile warhead ``destabilizing.'' Can you
please explain how this weapon could deter Russia from using their
``escalation to win'' strategy?
Admiral Richard. The low-yield submarine launched ballistic missile
warhead (W76-2) is intended to strengthen deterrence by convincing
Russia that the U.S. has credible and effective options at any level of
conflict, and that Russia cannot coerce the U.S., its Allies and
partners through the limited use of nuclear weapons--the basis of their
``escalation to win'' strategy. The W76-2 provides deterrence and
assurance through tailored response options in vast operating areas
where forward basing may not be possible. The limited and timely U.S.
response options provided by the W76-2 ensure a more credible deterrent
to limited attack against the U.S., Allies and partners rather than
relying primarily on the threat of large-scale nuclear responses.
Without this capability, Russia may perceive an advantage at lower
levels of conflict that may encourage limited nuclear use.
Mr. Turner. In your opinion does the W76-2 make nuclear weapons use
more or less likely? What are the benefits of us having this weapon in
our arsenal?
Admiral Richard. Deployment of the W76-2 makes nuclear weapon use
less likely. Specifically, W76-2 deployment will raise the nuclear
threshold by helping to ensure that potential adversaries perceive no
possible advantages in limited nuclear use--making nuclear weapon
employment less likely. The W76-2 provides deterrence and assurance
through tailored response options in vast operating areas where forward
basing may not be possible. Further, the W76-2 provides additional
diversity in platforms, range, and survivability, and serve as a
valuable hedge against future nuclear ``break out'' scenarios. It also
offers a timely response option able to penetrate adversary defenses
and does not require host nation support to provide deterrent effect.
Limited U.S. response options, provided by the W76-2, ensure a more
credible deterrent to limited attack against the U.S., Allies and
partners rather than relying primarily on the threat of large-scale
nuclear responses. Without this capability, adversaries may perceive an
advantage at lower levels of conflict that may encourage limited
nuclear use.
Mr. Turner. You stated yesterday before the Senate Armed Services
Committee that ``any threat brief that is discussing China and more
than a month old is out of date and must be updated.'' As Intelligence
briefings are updated to incorporate this new intelligence, can you
please provide these materials to the committee.
Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM is a contributor to the Intelligence
Community via DIA. For a broader perspective and the most up-to-date
information regarding China's ongoing modernization activities we would
refer you to the Intelligence Community.
Mr. Turner. Earlier this year, several news outlets reported that
16 new ICBM silos had been discovered in a training area in Northern
China through the use of open source satellite imagery. Based on what
we understand about the size of China's silo-based ICBM force, this
seems like a large number of additional training facilities. What
reasons could China have for expanding its ability train silo-based
ICBM personnel in this way?
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3125699/china-
building-more-underground-silos-its-ballistic-missiles
Admiral Richard. China continues to invest in its ICBM program,
including a concept of operations to deploy solid fuel ICBMs such as
the DF-41 in silos. The training area silos are helping the PLA develop
this new concept of operations which will enable them to train
personnel for a very large number of operational silos. China is
expediting its military modernization with the intent of creating a
modern world-class military and achieving its goal of great power
status by 2049.
Mr. Turner. It's been nearly a decade since the Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States was completed.
The threat environment for example is something that is completely
different. Would you support the establishment of another such
bipartisan congressional commission to take a look at the current
threats and how they should be addressed (this would be in addition to
the Biden NPR)?
Admiral Richard. Should such a congressional commission be
established, USSTRATCOM would provide any necessary support as
requested.
Mr. Turner. As we talk about Russia and China, it's important not
to lose sight of the Iran and DPRK ICBM threats. Late in 2020 Janes
Defense reported that ``Iran and North Korea have resumed co-operation
on a long-range missile project, including the transfer of critical
parts'' How do you view the DPRK and Iran missile threat to the
homeland? How can we better protect the Homeland from this? Can you get
with your J2 shop and provide for the record an updated unclassified
and classified assessment(s) of DPRK and Iran missile cooperation and
what the implications might be?
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-official-says-
iran-has-restarted-missile-co-operation-with-north-korea
Admiral Richard. Iran and North Korea have a history of cooperation
with ballistic missile technology. North Korea poses a serious
challenge to the United States. Its leadership likely views expanding
its strategic nuclear and missile deterrents as essential to ensure
regime security against the U.S. Iran has launched multi-stage space
launch vehicles (SLVs) that could aid its development of longer-range
ballistic missiles, because SLVs use inherently similar technologies
and could serve as a test bed for developing ICBM technologies. To
protect the homeland from rogue nation threats, we require a space-
based sensor architecture to persistently detect, track and
discriminate advanced missile threats, including hypersonics. We must
improve interceptor reliability, capacity, and lethality, and pursue
next-generation capabilities such as directed energy, boost phase
intercept, and non-kinetic effects. USSTRATCOM is a contributor to the
Intelligence community via DIA. For a broader perspective on DPRK and
Iran threats and associated implications we would refer you to the
Intelligence Community.
Mr. Turner. Do you believe U.S. ICBMs are currently on ``hair-
trigger alert''? Follow up, do you believe taking ICBMs off alert would
increase stability?
Admiral Richard. No. The term ``hair trigger'' is an incorrect and
misleading characterization of the status of our ICBMs as it implies
automatic or near-automatic action during a crisis event. Our ICBM
force is controlled through secure, reliable, positive control measures
designed to ensure all actions are in response to a valid launch order
from the President. Further, these same procedures prevent unauthorized
or accidental launch, and keep our ICBMs locked day-to-day. The U.S.
maintains a portion of its nuclear forces on alert day-to-day, and
retains the option of launching those forces promptly if directed by
the President. Yet the U.S. would only consider the employment of
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests
of the U.S., its Allies, and partners. The diverse, flexible and
survivable nature of the overall Triad ensures there is no scenario
where the President's only option is to launch ICBMs. Over more than
half a century, the U.S. has established a series of measures and
protocols to ensure ICBMs are safe, secure, and under constant control.
This posture preserves the full range of response options and ensures
clear civilian control and Presidential decision-making. I do not
support the notion that de-alerting our ICBMs increases stability. Our
on-alert ICBM force presents a significant impediment to any
adversary's first-strike calculus--large geographic distribution, CONUS
locations, hardened targets, and responsive capability drives strategic
stability. De-alerting the ICBM force renders them vulnerable to a
potential first strike and would compel a destabilizing rush to re-
alert in a crisis or conflict.
Mr. Turner. Over the few years more has come to light about the
type of activities taking place at Novaya Zemlya (Russian test site)
and Lop Nur (PRC test site), to include the fact that they are likely
conducting supercritical tests in excess of the U.S. ``zero-yield''
standard. Why do you believe that Russia and China are conducting
super-critical hydro-nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya and Lop Nur?
Admiral Richard. Over the few years more has come to light about
the type of activities taking place at Novaya Zemlya(Russian test site)
and Lop Nur (PRC test site), to include the fact that they are likely
conducting supercritical tests in excess of the U.S. ``zero-yield''
standard. Why do you believe that Russia and China are conducting
super-critical hydro-nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya and Lop Nur?
Mr. Turner. Do you think that we should stop developing any weapons
systems based on PRC ``perceived threats'' of U.S. ``first strike
capability''?
Admiral Richard. No. Our policy is very clear--the U.S. would only
consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to
defend the vital interests of the U.S., its Allies, and partners. The
primary role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter potential adversaries
from nuclear attack. They accomplish this role daily. Other roles
include deterring significant non-nuclear strategic attack, assuring
Allies and partners, achieving U.S. objectives if deterrence were to
fail, and hedging against an uncertain future. Operationally effective
U.S. forces are required to achieve these priorities.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. I was pleased to see the White House extend New START,
as was recommended by the Future of Defense Task Force. Ms. Dalton, as
we move forward with modernizing our nuclear forces, how are we taking
into account future opportunities for additional arms control, rather
than reflexively reinvesting in the triad?
Ms. Dalton. As stated in the Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance, the President is committed to reestablishing our credibility
as a leader in arms control. President Biden has already demonstrated
this commitment by extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) for five years. As I testified, the Department is committed to
building on this foundation. With that said, it is not clear that
Russia and/or China will reciprocate this interest. Unfortunately,
neither Russia nor China has been forthcoming regarding nuclear force
expansion. Russia is growing and modernizing its non-strategic nuclear
weapons and is fielding new, so-called ``novel'' nuclear systems. China
lacks transparency as it has consistently shied away from disclosing
the exact size of its nuclear stockpile and has rejected any arms
control overtures. Although we remain hopeful for constructive
engagement, and we seek to head off costly arms races, we cannot avoid
recapitalizing our nuclear forces. As Secretary Austin has stated,
``U.S. nuclear weapons have been extended far beyond their original
service lives, and the tipping point, where we must simultaneously
overhaul these forces, is now here.'' Therefore, we must proceed with
our plans to modernize the nuclear Triad and our nuclear command and
control capabilities in order to ensure our strategic nuclear deterrent
remains safe, secure, and effective
Mr. Moulton. Hypersonic weapons have the potential to be highly
destabilizing, particularly if we pursue them blindly in a tit-for-tat
with Chinese or Russian development. Ms. Dalton, do we have a clear
vision for how we integrate hypersonic weapons into the U.S. arsenal in
a way that deters, rather than escalates, conflict?
Ms. Dalton. The Department is concerned that China and Russia are
aggressively fielding hypersonic strike systems as part of their larger
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks, and we must not cede a
military edge in this capability area. However, we do not need to and
are not seeking to match them one-for-one on hypersonic missiles. U.S.
hypersonic missiles are not intended to negate those of potential
adversaries, but rather they provide the Joint Force with another
credible, long-range strike capability to strike key targets through
and within A2/AD--targets such as air fields, air defenses, vessels,
and other key assets. That is the DOD vision--that this new capability
will be integrated with and augment other U.S. conventional strike
capabilities. To ensure we are maximizing deterrence and warfighting
effectiveness, the Department is developing hypersonic weapons
capabilities informed by scenario-based planning and internal war
gaming. Military Department hypersonic plans and programs will also be
informed by new joint and Military Department/Service warfighting
concepts that are currently in development.
Mr. Moulton. I was pleased to see the USSPACECOM mission statement
include allies and partners, as the Future of Defense Task Force, which
I co-led last year, highlighted the importance of strengthening and
modernizing our security partnerships for a changing defense
environment. Nowhere is this more vital--or more challenging--than
operating in space, which has until recently been the perquisite of
great powers. A persistent challenge to strong relationships regarding
space has been an overclassification of space capabilities and
operations. General Dickinson, does overclassification remain an
impediment to your ability to communicate and develop interoperability
with our partners and allies in space, and if so, what changes would
you propose?
General Dickinson. Overclassification of space programs and
capabilities is a tremendous impediment to strengthening alliances and
attracting new partners. Intelligence and information sharing
restrictions stymie interoperability and integration of partners into
our operations centers. Overclassification hinders USSPACECOM's ability
to integrate allies and partners into our Operation Plans (OPLAN) as
well. We continue to work with the Office of Director of National
Intelligence and the Intelligence Community to facilitate the release
of unclassified information to support attribution and `strategic
messaging, as well as the release of intelligence to Allies and
Partners. Since the beginning of the year, our J2 shared more than 300
intelligence products in recurring exchanges and normalized daily
processes with our Allies and partners. We also fully integrated a
United Kingdom intelligence officer in our Joint Intelligence
Operations Center (JIOC), with four more FVEY intelligence officers
expected to join in the future, including the Deputy JIOC Commander.
Additionally, we have used the Combined Space Operations forums and
working groups to develop common Priority Intelligence Requirements
(PIR) among seven countries and are working on a Program of Analysis
that will fully integrate those Allies and partners into SPACECOM
analytic enterprise.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Earlier this year you stated that the Minuteman III is
so old ``That in some cases the [technical] drawings don't exist
anymore, or where we do have drawings, they're like six generations
behind the industry standard,'' he said. ``And there's not only [no
one] working that can understand them--they're not alive anymore.''
How difficult would it be would it be to extend the MMIII?
GBSD is the least-expensive leg of the triad, correct?
In your assessment, would you agree that GBSD is one of the best-
run A category programs in DOD?
We have already awarded contracts to GBSD: is it accurate to say
that if we extend MMIII it will actually cost *more* money than
continuing forward with GBSD?
Will a MMIII SLEP provide the same capabilities as GBSD in an
increasingly complex threat environment?
So, if we SLEP MMIII, it will cost tax payers more money, we will
get less capability, and that capability we get is inadequate to
address the threats we need our modernized triad to counter. Is that
all accurate?
Admiral Richard. While I will defer to the Air Force on the
detailed analysis on MM III life extension, their findings are clear:
Completing GBSD is more cost effective than a MM III Life
Extension;
A MM III SLEP would incur substantial technical risk due
to its tightly coupled, vertically integratedsystem design which lacks
a healthy supporting development or manufacturing base; and
GBSD will address the current and emerging threats (a MM
III SLEP cannot respond to a technologicallyadvanced threat
environment).
The ICBM force is our most cost effective deterrent capability;
GBSD will continue this attribute. GBSD is setting the standard for
future major DOD program development through model based systems
engineering, strong cost control, and outstanding schedule performance.
Mr. Lamborn. Do you believe a strategic mission like SPACECOM's
should have survivable communications that protect from HEMP and other
threats, as STRATCOM does?
General Dickinson. Yes, the critical command and control functions
of warfighting combatant commands require survivable communications
that withstand a variety of natural hazards and adversary threats.
USSPACECOM is looking at survivability requirements that will be
included in our permanent headquarters command and control facility,
and we are currently designing a contingency of operations plan to
provide another layer of resiliency.
Mr. Lamborn. In your best military judgment, would you get the same
level of survivability for $1.4 billion in Huntsville as you currently
have in Colorado Springs?
General Dickinson. Our facility and infrastructure designs are not
complete, so I cannot speak to cost estimates at this time. I can
confirm that USSPACECOM is analyzing survivability requirements that
will be included in our permanent headquarters command and control
facility. I welcome the opportunity to discuss costs, timelines, and
impacts to mission and personnel when the final basing decision is made
by the SECAF and analysis is completed.
Mr. Lamborn. How would an 80% loss of USSPACECOM's current civilian
and contractor personnel proficient in space operations specifically
affect mission readiness?
Have you identified the monetary cost of moving all those
personnel, both uniformed and civilian?
General Dickinson. My intent is to reach full operational
capability at our permanent location as expediently as practicable,
without essential mission degradation, all within the guidance,
direction, and authority of the Department of Defense leaders involved
in the ongoing establishment of United States Space Command. Mission
readiness depends on the availability of both people and equipment;
therefore, I directed my staff to posture the command for transition to
the permanent location as soon as practicable, without degradation to
our missions, after the SECAF completes the basing decision process. We
will not know what percentage of civilian employees may choose to
transfer locations until after the SECAF's confirms the outcome of the
basing decision process, and without that information, we cannot
calculate an accurate cost of relocation.
Mr. Lamborn. General Dickinson, as you aware, the Arctic is an
increasingly contested domain both militarily and economically. There
are many U.S. Space Force strategic facilities and assets above the
Arctic Circle which play a vital role in the USSPACECOM mission of
deterring aggressive behavior by our competitors while also playing a
key role in protecting the homeland. It is critical that the U.S.
maintain a viable and capable industrial base to support, and
potentially surge, operations in the unique and challenging High North
environment. What is USSPACECOM's plan to ensure we maintain a
competitive U.S. industrial base capable of supporting our objectives
and presence above the Arctic Circle?
General Dickinson. The Arctic is unique, and with climate change,
passages and maneuverability previously nonexistent are emerging with
new opportunities and challenges. We are engaging our Science,
Technology, and Advanced Concepts with the space community and
leveraging the Combatant Command requirements process to emphasize
Arctic support capabilities. In all mission areas, we put a premium on
solutions demonstrating leap ahead manufacturing technologies and
processes building lower cost, higher volume, and far better
capabilities for our warfighters, while reinvigorating the American
industrial base and trusted foundries. This ongoing effort will inform
our industrial based capability requirements to support our mission
needs. The Arctic is a unique vantage point for space. This makes
places like Thule Air Base, Greenland, and Clear AFS, Alaska critical
bases as we perform our Space Domain Awareness and other missions.
Additionally, building and leveraging our international partners and
specialized commercial entities are key to securing and maintaining our
prominence and presence above the Arctic Circle.
Mr. Lamborn. Question #1: China and Russia recently announced that
they have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on
establishing a lunar International Research Station. Although this was
publicized as a scientific effort, this could also be perceived as a
thin veil for military corporation on the moon. In General Dickinson's
posture statement he stated that USSPACECOM is committed to assuring
the safe exploration of space and is supporting the planned lunar
missions. Can you please describe at the unclassified level any new
capability requirements that you've identified that extend beyond our
traditional orbits and near the lunar region?
Question #2: What requirements has USSPACECOM set to establish
lunar ISR capabilities to monitor the lunar surface for peer adversary
activity? We understand that the answer will be classified.
General Dickinson. The traditional orbits of focus range from Low
Earth Orbit, starting around a few hundred kilometers in altitude, out
to Geosynchronous orbit at 35,000+ kilometers altitude. We understand
those orbital regimes well and are building upon the considerable
assets dedicated to monitoring activity in those and other traditional
orbits.3 There remains the need for additional sensors to close any
gaps in coverage and provide better space domain awareness of all
activities by all countries. The problem compounds significantly when
we extend operations to Cislunar space, with a tenfold increase in
range, one-thousand times the volume, and more complex orbital
dynamics. To cover such a vast volume of space, we need significantly
more capable and more numerous sensors. We need sensors that are
terrestrially-based, space-based in existing orbital regimes, based in
Cislunar space, in lunar orbit, and in halo orbits around one or more
of the Earth-Moon Lagrangian points. While these challenges are great,
they are not insurmountable. We continue to work with industry and
friendly partner nations to seek solutions to meet the challenge and
allow us to gain and maintain space domain awareness out to Cislunar
altitudes and beyond.
To date, USSPACECOM has not set specific lunar surface ISR
capability requirements. Consistent with operations in any other orbit,
my primary aim is to establish and maintain responsible military
behaviors in space and ensure space remains a peaceful domain for the
benefit of all. This requires the ability to characterize activity in
Lunar and Cislunar space, similar to our abilities in Low Earth Orbit,
Medium Earth Orbit, Highly Elliptical Orbits, and Geosynchronous Orbit.
Lunar and Cislunar ISR capability will require significant resource and
policy support from Congress to pace Russian and Chinese efforts.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. One of the challenges of defending against hypersonic
threats is being able to track these weapons for the duration of their
flight. How are we doing with respect to getting the right sensors in
place--including as part of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space
Sensor constellation--that will provide us with the capability to track
and set a response to hypersonic threats?
Ms. Dalton. The Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor
(HBTSS) constellation, which is on track to enter orbit in late Fiscal
Year 2023 as a prototype capability, is one component of the
Department's National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA). The NDSA will
initially consist of a few dozen satellites, launched into low-Earth
orbit (LEO) over the next two years. Although this proliferated LEO
architecture is in its initial stages, it will provide critical
tracking capability against hypersonic threats in all phases of flight.
HBTSS is unique in that it will provide fire-control-quality track data
to the missile defense system, enabling enhanced defense against
regional hypersonic threats in the terminal and glide phases of flight.
As we continue to prove this capability, the architecture will expand
and further bolster the nation's sensing capabilities and the defense
of U.S. and coalition forces deployed abroad.
Mr. Brooks. Can you please contextualize the role of our hypersonic
weapons in the spectrum of conflict?
Admiral Richard. Hypersonic weapons (HSWs) provide a highly
responsive, long-range, conventional strike capability for distant,
defended, or time-critical threats when other forces are unavailable,
not responsive enough or not preferred. Fielding hypersonic strike
capabilities allows for tailored strategies and operational plans with
an expanded range of conventional options. While not a replacement for
nuclear weapons, HSWs will complement and enhance strategic deterrence
and can deliver surgical strikes to provide effects or be integrated
into larger campaigns, increasing the effectiveness of our traditional
warfighting advantages.
Mr. Brooks. One of the challenges of defending against hypersonic
threats is being able to track these weapons for the duration of their
flight. How are we doing with respect to getting the right sensors in
place--including as part of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space
Sensor constellation--that will provide us with the capability to track
and set a response to hypersonic threats?
Admiral Richard. Holistically, DOD is modifying/upgrading existing
sensors to enhance layered defense, and improving reporting and display
tools to support senior leader decision making. Additional efforts
include MDA's selection of two industry partners for an on orbit
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor demonstration launching
in FY23, with a full constellation deployment decision to come at a
later date. To protect against hypersonic threats, we must continue
initiatives to develop a space-based sensor architecture to
persistently detect, track and discriminate advanced missile threats,
including hypersonics. To set a response, we must develop an
interceptor capability and pursue next-generation capabilities such as
directed energy, boost phase intercept, and non-kinetic effects.
[all]