[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-18]

  NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             APRIL 15, 2021
                             


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                       





                           ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
45-430                WASHINGTON : 2021 
 



                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
Vacancy

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                       Barron YoungSmith, Counsel
                       Forrest McConnell, Counsel
                      Natalie de Benedetti, Clerk
                      
                            C O N T E N T S

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                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Cooper, Laura K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, Department of Defense............     4
Wolters, Gen Tod D., USAF, Commander, U.S. European Command......     7

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Cooper, Laura K..............................................    49
    Wolters, Gen Tod D...........................................    74

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Gaetz....................................................    99
    Mr. Garamendi................................................    99
    Mr. Langevin.................................................    99
    Mr. Wittman..................................................    99

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Brown....................................................   108
    Dr. Jackson..................................................   107
    Mrs. McClain.................................................   106
    Mr. Moore....................................................   108
    Mr. Morelle..................................................   109
    Mr. Moulton..................................................   105
    Mr. Scott....................................................   103
    
  NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                          Washington, DC, Thursday, April 15, 2021.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:01 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. Today the full Committee is hearing--the 
hearing is on national security challenges and U.S. military 
activities in Europe. We have Ms. Laura Cooper, who is the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and 
Eurasia. And we have General Tod Wolters, who is the Commander, 
U.S. European Command.
    As this is again a hybrid hearing, I will begin by reading 
the rules for said hybrid hearing.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen 
for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and 
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and 
voting. These members must continue to use the software 
platform video function while in attendance, unless they 
experience connectivity issues or other technical problems that 
render them unable to participate on camera.
    If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should 
contact the committee staff for assistance. Video of members' 
participation will be broadcast in the room and via the 
television internet feeds. Members participating remotely must 
seek recognition verbally, and they are asked to mute their 
microphones when they are not speaking.
    Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep 
the software platforms' video function on the entire time they 
attend the proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the 
proceeding.
    If members depart for a short while for reasons other than 
joining a different proceeding--I've never understood that part 
by the way, but I just, I keep reading it--they should leave 
the video function on. If members will be absent for a 
significant period or depart to join a different proceeding, 
they should exit the software platform entirely and then rejoin 
it if they return.
    Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
    With that, as I said, we are here to hear about the 
European Command and the issues in that area. And as with all 
parts of the world, there are of course many.
    I think top of the line for all members at the moment is 
what's going on in Ukraine, in Russian activities in that 
region in general. How we are working with Ukraine and our 
allies in the region to deal with the threat that Russia poses. 
What the best steps forward are and how we can best help the 
European command meet that threat.
    We also continue to be very concerned about our 
relationship with Turkey. Incredibly important relationship. 
They are a key ally in many respects, but still problematic in 
a number of other respects, most notably with the S-400 
purchase and the sanctions that have been levied on them as a 
result. So, curious to hear how that relationship is going 
forward.
    We've also bounced around a little bit in the last couple 
of years in terms of how to exactly posture our forces in 
Europe. I think we are now in a good place. Would be anxious to 
hear from both of you about how you see that going forward. Are 
there changes that are necessary, what support could we offer 
if those changes are required.
    In particular, there's the one issue of, as our 
relationships with Poland, Romania, Ukraine, other Eastern 
European countries go forward, how does that shift our focus 
from where our troops have traditionally been stationed. I know 
one big question has always been should they--should we have 
permanently stationed troops or rotational troops. And there's 
disagreement in the Pentagon about how best to handle that. 
Would be curious on your take.
    But the overarching issue that I want to leave you with is 
an issue that affects the entire DOD [Department of Defense] in 
all of the theaters that we're engaged in, and that is the 
changing nature of warfare. And I think the European Command 
is, you know, best suited to look at this because of Russian 
activities.
    What Russia did in Crimea a number of years ago, what they 
continue to do in the Eastern Ukraine, the information 
operations that they're engaged in across the frontier, is sort 
of--sort of cutting edge on where we're headed.
    And what this committee is really focused on is how can we 
make sure that we are purchasing the equipment and being in a 
position to deal with the world of warfare as it exists now. 
And what that means basically is the incredible importance of 
command and control information and technology. Whoever 
possesses the best information is in the best position to be 
successful.
    And there are a lot of technologies that are key to this. 
Certainly, artificial intelligence, because you also have to 
process whatever information is coming in. The better you're 
able to process that, the better you are.
    You also have to be able to protect your command and 
control and information systems. There are a number of 
different ways to do that. We are not ideally suited right now 
to protect those systems.
    [Off the record comment.]
    It's like being heckled at a comedy club.
    I'll grant you that wasn't my strongest point, but I'm 
working on it here, just taking it off the top of my head. So, 
the point is that transition, to my mind, is the single most 
important thing that we can do in terms of deterring our 
adversaries. Certainly Russia, but China as well, transnational 
terrorist groups.
    And we are beginning to make that transition. We've seen 
with the bottom-up review, the blank slate review, whatever you 
want to call it. What the Marine Corps is doing as it's trying 
to reposition itself, the Air Force as well.
    I think we're headed in the right direction, but we have to 
make intelligent purchases and put in place the right 
acquisition strategy to do that, to get where we need to be, to 
have the best information systems, to be able to protect them. 
And then ideally, be able to make vulnerable the information 
systems of our adversaries.
    And there's a lot we can learn from what the Russians have 
been up to, including their overall information campaign, or 
disinformation campaign, their effort to tear down 
representative government in the West in general through a 
series of very low-cost options that are advancing their 
agenda. We need to really get in that game.
    So I'm very curious as you watch and see what Russia has 
been doing in those instances that I mentioned, also in the 
fight that's been going on in Armenia and Azerbaijan, a lot of 
this played out as well.
    What does that mean for what we ought to be buying, for 
what we ought to be providing you to make sure that you meet 
your requirements. So, very curious to hear about that.
    With that, I will turn it over to Ranking Member Rogers for 
his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER. COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    European Command and our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization] allies are facing an increasingly belligerent 
Russia and a growing Chinese influence in their operations. 
Russia continues to modernize, investing in hypersonic, 
strategic capabilities, and information warfare. Russia's also 
rebuilding its Arctic presence to control emerging areas of 
resource exploitation and commerce.
    And they're turning to new tactics to achieve their goals, 
employing aggression below the level of armed conflict. These 
new capabilities and tactics are designed to deter the United 
States and their allies from defending democracies on Russia's 
periphery. From the Black Sea to the Baltics, President Putin 
abhors the notion of former Soviet territories charting their 
own course as free and democratic nations.
    I believe that the committee should continue its strong 
support for European Deterrence Initiative, the Ukraine 
Security Assistance Initiative, and other programs to build our 
capacity in Europe and empower our partners.
    Where we can, it also makes sense to equip our allies and 
partners with lethal weapon systems and domain awareness 
capabilities. Investments in critical facilities, prepositioned 
munition stockpiles, and rotational forces keep our deterrent 
capabilities credible.
    Every capability we build in a partner nation strengthens 
our ability to chart a course away from Russian intimidation. 
We should be more concerned about raising baseline of--raising 
the baseline of our partners' capabilities in Eastern Europe 
than about Vladimir Putin's ego. The flat truth is that he and 
his cronies won't be happy until they reclaim a portion of the 
Soviet Union's territorial glory.
    No amount of hand-wringing here in Washington will appease 
them. We owe our allies and partners nothing less than our full 
and forceful support. That being said, we should also be candid 
with our allies as we are with our enemies. Projects like the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline and NATO members' purchases of Russian 
military hardware amount to a huge economic, political, and 
propaganda victory for Putin.
    Our allies shouldn't be in the business of strengthening 
our adversaries. We should use a whole-of-government approach 
to address these issues before they become diplomatic pressure 
points.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how we 
can use diplomatic and military efforts to counter China's 
global ambitions in Europe. European nations are coming around 
to the threat of Chinese malign investment, hacking, and 
influence operations in their own backyard.
    We can use this opportunity to blunt China's advance, 
promote secure supply chains, and counter Chinese propaganda. 
European Command covers many of our most robust and 
longstanding international alliances. It is also responsible to 
assist in the defense of Israel, our steadfast ally.
    To overcome the modern threat posed by Russia and China and 
to ensure the protection of Israel, we need to provide the 
resources necessary to strengthen these alliances. 
Unfortunately, the budget proposed by President Biden will not 
do that. It cuts defense spending below the rate of inflation.
    If enacted, it will mean combatant commanders like General 
Wolters will not have the resources and capabilities they need 
to do their jobs. I look forward to working with the majority 
to pass a defense budget that supports modernization and 
ensures credible deterrence.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Cooper.

  STATEMENT OF LAURA K. COOPER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE FOR RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND EURASIA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Ms. Cooper. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify on policy matters related to the U.S. 
European Command, or EUCOM, area of responsibility in my 
capacity overseeing the Office of International Security 
Affairs today.
    It truly is a privilege to appear before you, and I would 
like to express my appreciation for the continued support from 
Congress, and this committee in particular, in shaping and 
resourcing the Department's efforts in this region. It is also 
absolutely an honor to appear beside General Wolters, an 
outstanding partner.
    Today, I will highlight the most important foundation of 
all--of all Department of Defense efforts in this theater: our 
alliances. Then, I will describe our strategic approach to 
Europe, the importance of NATO, and capability issues of note, 
followed by a brief discussion of regional threats and 
challenges.
    But first, I would like to briefly address two immediate 
issues of concern: escalating Russian aggression in Eastern 
Ukraine, and the President's decision to impose measures that 
will hold Russia accountable for its pattern of malign 
behavior.
    The United States is increasingly concerned about Russia's 
military buildup of forces along Ukraine's border and in 
occupied Crimea. Russia now has more troops on the border with 
Ukraine than at any time since 2014. The United States remains 
unwavering in its support for Ukraine's sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
    As such, we will continue to support Ukraine's long-term 
defense capacity and provide security assistance to enable 
Ukraine to more effectively defend itself against Russian 
aggression. We have also made clear in our engagement with 
Moscow that Russia needs to refrain from further escalatory 
actions.
    Additionally, this morning the United States informed the 
Russian Government of its intent to hold Russia accountable for 
a pattern of malign behavior that includes efforts to influence 
the outcome of the 2020 Presidential election; the Russian 
Foreign Intelligence Service, or SVR's, compromise of 
SolarWinds software; and the Main Intelligence Directorate, or 
GRU, efforts to encourage attacks on U.S. and coalition 
personnel in Afghanistan.
    The President is taking hard and fast action with 
appropriately tailored responses to provide a clear signal of 
our resolve without escalation. And I would welcome further 
discussion on these matters with this committee today.
    Russia's aggression in Eastern Europe--in Eastern Ukraine 
and its pattern of destabilizing behavior are examples of the 
increasingly challenging international security situation.
    To compete in this new landscape, the Department of Defense 
is heeding the call of the International Security--Interim 
National Security Strategic Guidance and engaging our trans-
Atlantic friends with renewed vigor, reclaiming our place in 
international institutions and revitalizing America's unmatched 
network of allies and partners.
    As President Biden and Secretary Austin have stated on 
numerous occasions, the U.S. commitment to NATO remains 
ironclad, and the trans-Atlantic alliance remains the 
foundation on which our collective security and our shared 
prosperity are built.
    To ensure NATO's deterrence and defense posture is fit to 
purpose to meet the security challenges of the alliance, the 
Department will continue to work with allies to reinvigorate 
and modernize the alliance, share responsibilities and 
investments equitably, increase allied speed of decision-
making, and improve military mobility across Europe to improve 
collective readiness.
    We are encouraged that we are now in our seventh year of 
steady NATO defense spending increases by our allies. We expect 
this trend to continue, and we continue to encourage strongly 
our NATO allies to increase their defense budgets.
    NATO's commitment to deterring nuclear attack remains a 
backstop of trans-Atlantic security. As Secretary Austin has 
stated, ``Nuclear weapons should remain in NATO countries for 
as long as nuclear weapons remain a threat.''
    Deterrence also requires combat-credible, forward-deployed 
conventional forces to bolster the alliance's deterrence and 
defense posture to prevent Russian aggression. To this end, the 
Secretary of Defense is conducting a comprehensive Department-
wide global posture review to best align U.S. overseas force 
presence with Presidential national security priorities.
    In this increasingly competitive environment, our security 
remains grounded in a whole, free, and at-peace Europe built 
upon a credible and strong NATO alliance.
    The Department is also working to improve the resilience of 
another frontline state in the face of Russian aggression, 
Georgia. The United States remains committed to assisting 
Georgia build its resilience and military capabilities in the 
face of Russia's malign efforts to undermine its sovereignty 
and disrupt its Euro-Atlantic integration.
    Poland and the Baltics remain central to deterring Russia. 
The Department is bolstering NATO's eastern flank allies 
through security cooperation and capacity-building initiatives 
targeted at improving defense and security infrastructure to 
strengthen national resilience.
    In Poland, the Department has increased its rotational 
presence to include the newly established Fifth Corps forward 
command post and a planned Aegis Ashore facility.
    In the Baltics, rotational forces supporting Atlantic 
Resolve continue to be a departmental priority.
    We continue to review our force posture to compete, to 
deter, and defend against Russian aggression and assertiveness 
in the Black Sea region and welcome the support of our NATO 
allies through their contributions not just to enhance forward 
presence in the Baltic Sea region, but also tailor forward 
presence in the Black Sea region, as well as their respective 
air policing missions.
    In the Balkans, the Department continues to strengthen our 
history of investment in the region, which includes now some of 
NATO's newest member states. The U.S. presence in NATO's Kosovo 
Force helps maintain a safe and secure environment in the 
Balkans.
    In Southern Europe, our presence provides a counterbalance 
to growing Chinese and Russian influence, whose efforts also in 
Africa and the Mediterranean have implications for our 
strategic access and freedom of movement.
    While Turkey remains an important ally buttressing NATO's 
southern flank, the United States has been clear in opposing 
Turkey's procurement of the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft weapon 
system. Turkey's procurement of the S-400 prompted its removal 
from the F-35 program, and we continue to press Turkey to 
remove the S-400 from its arsenal.
    Israel is a major strategic partner for the United States. 
On January 15, the United States announced that U.S. Central 
Command [CENTCOM] will assume responsibility for military-to-
military cooperation with Israel.
    This will open up additional opportunities for cooperation 
with our USCENTCOM partners while maintaining strong 
cooperation between Israel and our European allies and 
partners. We will continue to work with EUCOM and CENTCOM to 
ensure a thorough and deliberate transfer of authority.
    In conclusion, our objective is to ensure our broad and 
deep network of alliances and partnerships endures. The United 
States must continue to take an active role in the region by 
maintaining a ready and capable force, investing in NATO, and 
promoting a network of like-minded allies and partners.
    This work is only possible with consistent congressional 
backing and stable funding. Your support for our allies and 
partners in Europe and for Israel is indispensable.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I 
appreciate your continued support to the soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, Marines, coastguardsmen, guardians, and civilians in 
the Department of Defense who work every day in service of the 
American people. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Cooper can be found in the 
Appendix on page 49.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. General Wolters.

STATEMENT OF GEN TOD D. WOLTERS, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN 
                            COMMAND

    General Wolters. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and 
distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of the men, 
women, and families who serve our Nation in the Euro-Atlantic, 
we extend our heartfelt thanks for your steadfast support.
    It remains a privilege to serve alongside these dedicated 
patriots and our like-minded allies and partners. It's also 
great to be seated with Deputy Assistant Secretary Laura 
Cooper, a dedicated professional with strong ties to our valued 
European partners. She's been pivotal to generating peace in 
the Euro-Atlantic area.
    As we enter into the second year of the pandemic, we work 
closely alongside our allies and partners to ensure this health 
crisis does not transform into a security crisis. We'd also 
like to pass our condolences to those impacted by COVID-19. The 
battle against the virus continues, and we must remain 
vigilant.
    We're fully aligned with Secretary Austin's priorities to 
defend the Nation, take care of our people, and succeed through 
teamwork. Via NATO, we work closely with our allies and 
partners to address the evolving challenges posed by our 
adversaries to secure peace and protect our interests abroad.
    NATO remains the strategic center of gravity and the 
foundation of deterrence and assurance in Europe. Everything we 
do is about generating peace. We compete to win. We deter, and 
if deterrence fails, we're prepared to respond to aggression 
with the full weight of the trans-Atlantic alliance. The United 
States relationship with European allies and partners remains a 
key strategic advantage, and we must defend it.
    We live in an increasingly complex and contested world. 
Political uncertainty, energy competition, and diffusion of 
destructive technology are stressing the established, rules-
based international order. Threats and challengers seek to take 
advantage of these conditions through aggressive actions using 
all instruments of national power. And they're backed by 
increasingly capable military forces.
    Adversaries amplify these malign activities and foster 
instability with disinformation. Success in 21st century 
warfare demands we embrace competition and all of its 
associated activities below the level of armed conflict. This 
is actually as critical as preparations for crisis or conflict 
themselves.
    We're in an era of strategic competition, and winning in 
this era is all about ensuring that strategic competition does 
not morph into a global conflict. One notable example of 
operations, activities, and investments contributing to 
competition and deterrence is our robust EUCOM exercise 
program.
    This summer, when we execute our Defender series exercises, 
composed of USEUCOM'S Defender-Europe and NATO's Steadfast 
Defender, 30,000 U.S. service members, allies, and partners 
from all warfare domains will demonstrate their ability to lift 
and shift massive forces over large swaths of territory, at 
speed and at scale, from the eastern periphery of the European 
continent. And once on station, they'll sharpen their 
responsiveness, resiliency, and lethality.
    Our current security posture is strong, yet challenged, as 
evidenced with respect to the activities in Ukraine. We possess 
combat-credible capability across all domains: air, land, sea, 
space, and cyber. We will maintain and work to hone this 
capability to deter our adversaries in defense of partners and 
our interests.
    The soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, guardians, 
coastguardsmen, and civilians of USEUCOM appreciate your 
support to defend the homeland forward and preserve peace for 
the 1 billion citizens living in the Euro-Atlantic.
    Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, thank you again for 
this opportunity, and I look forward to taking your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Wolters can be found in 
the Appendix on page 74.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. Could both of you talk a little 
bit about the information operations issue in Europe? We know 
Russia has been very aggressive about spreading their message, 
which is basically to undermine the West, undermine NATO, 
undermine democracies, sow discord. And they've been very 
effective at it.
    And I know for a number of years now we have been looking 
at responding to that. I know the combatant commanders have 
been concerned about it. How are we doing on beginning to get 
into that fight and counter what Russia's doing and get our own 
message out? And I'd like to hear from both of you on that.
    General Wolters. Chairman, if I could, with the assistance 
of this committee, we were able to kick off with SOCOM [U.S. 
Special Operations Command], our Special Operations Command 
Combatant Commander Operation Influence Platform. And 
underneath that architecture is what's called WebOps [web-based 
operations], and it's specifically designed to go after 
disinformation. And it's now a funded program with--with 
milestones set for future years.
    The Chairman. And what's--sorry to interrupt, but what's 
our message? I described what Russia's message is, but what's 
ours?
    General Wolters. Promote democratic values and tell the 
truth. And when disinformation is on the streets, highlight it.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Cooper.
    Ms. Cooper. Sorry, I would point to the election, the 2020 
election, as an example of Russia's aggressive disinformation 
efforts to divide and sow confusion and chaos in another 
population. It's a tactic that they've used in other places in 
the world, around Europe, and it hit home here in 2020. But we 
also saw it in our previous election.
    And at the national level, we are working to deter such 
actions in the future and to impose costs on Russia. And that 
is why today, actually, the Biden administration announced a 
number of sanctions on specific actors within Russia that were 
involved in election interference.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you. General, what capabilities are you 
currently lacking in EUCOM that you've asked for in the past, 
and why are they important?
    General Wolters. Congressman, the two biggest have to do 
with improving our overall strategic indications and warnings 
in command and control. It starts with two destroyers to 
improve our ability to see undersea, and it also culminates 
with F-35s.
    Both are forecast to arrive on continent very soon. We 
anticipate receiving the first set of U.S. F-35s in the fall of 
2021. And we're programmed now with the United States Navy in 
the 2025 and 2026 timeframe to hopefully receive two additional 
destroyers.
    Mr. Rogers. As we do our pivot to INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command], do you see any resources or capabilities that 
you currently have being moved into that shift that would put 
you at a disadvantage?
    General Wolters. No, sir, not at this time.
    Mr. Rogers. Great. Are you happy with the progress of 
prepositioning capabilities and supplies in Eastern Europe, and 
do you need any additional prepositioning, and if so, where?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I'm very happy. And we're on 
course on glide slope to close all of our Army preposition 
stockpiles and our Deployable Airbase System to support aerial 
ports in the 2024 timeframe. And with this committee's 
assistance with the European Deterrence Initiative, if funding 
continues as forecast, we should make it.
    Mr. Rogers. And we talked yesterday about your interest in 
having some additional prepositioning in the southeastern part 
of Europe. Where in particular would you like to see that?
    General Wolters. Absolutely, Congressman. In the Romania 
area, we've put European Deterrence Initiative funds to improve 
infrastructure in those areas, and we've had great cooperation 
from Romania. And they also have the available ranges in 
multiple domains to be able to sharpen our readiness.
    Mr. Rogers. You know, we've heard that--both of you comment 
about the buildup of troops by Russia on the Ukrainian border. 
How can we improve our international partnerships in support of 
Ukraine and help our NATO partners recognize that they need to 
be prepared to help us act in the event of aggression?
    General Wolters. Congressman, just goes back to the 
information ops that was pointed out by the chairman. We have 
to continue to tell the truth. And the good news is as a result 
of this committee's support, we have a multinational joint 
commission in Ukraine that's assisting us with that, and we 
need to continue to support the joint military training group 
Ukraine, where we can put troops in country with military 
training team to allow the Ukrainian armed forces to improve 
their readiness. And that is ongoing.
    Mr. Rogers. Ms. Cooper, in that same vein, you know, you 
made reference to the fact that we've been pleased to see our 
NATO partners moving toward 2 percent for those who haven't 
made it so far. But do we still have others like very healthy 
economies like Germany who have not reached that threshold?
    Can you tell me what, if anything, the administration is 
doing to encourage them to continue on that path and not 
backslide?
    Ms. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman. I would say this is a 
consistent feature of our dialog with all of the NATO member 
states, but in particular those who have yet to meet their 
Wales commitment. So this is something that came up as recently 
as the Defense Ministerial that Secretary Austin attended, this 
was a theme. And it also is something that we raise in our 
bilateral conversations.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. And moving on here, just we have a 
5-minute limit going forward, and a lot of times you will be in 
the middle of answering a question when that 5-minute limit 
hits and I feel rude cutting you off, but nonetheless, I will 
do it. Because we want to get to as many members as possible. 
So if you see that clock ticking down to 5 minutes, if you 
could wrap up your answers, that would be great.
    And with that, I yield to Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes. Jim, 
are you with us? Well, Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    To start, just thanks for seeing us today. To start, Gerry 
Connolly, Representative Connolly from Virginia, has a bill, 
H.R. 922, it's the Crimea Annexation Non-Recognition Act. And 
he's also the president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
    The purpose of this act is to basically say no Federal 
agency in the U.S. Government can say explicitly, implicitly 
anything that would imply a recognition of Crimea--the 
annexation of Crimea by Russians. It's certainly--I support it, 
and I ask the committee members to support. But I do want to 
use that as an intro to talk about--ask about Ukraine.
    The Russians see Crimea as an annexation, we don't. The 
eastern oblasts are still within Ukraine, and they're seen as 
separatists. Are we treating them differently, are we 
approaching those region--those two areas of Ukraine 
differently? And if so, how can we help you support those 
approaches?
    Ms. Cooper. Congressman, I would say the nature of the on-
the-ground environment in both locations is different. In 
Eastern Ukraine, you actually have a hot war right now. Just 
within the past--since January, we've already had 30 Ukrainian 
service members killed in the east. Whereas Crimea is an 
illegal occupation. And so, so there's some realities on the 
ground that are different.
    A lot of our train and equip efforts are directed at 
improving the capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces to defend 
against the active war in the east. But in terms of overall 
policy, it absolutely is U.S. policy to reject this illegal 
annexation of Ukraine and to continue to impose the sanctions 
on Russia as long as they hold this.
    In fact, there were just a number of additional sanctions 
imposed today on the Russian Government, to include the 
builders of the Kerch Strait Bridge, which you may be familiar 
with, for Russia's continued occupation of Crimea.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah. General.
    General Wolters. Congressman, it's a great question. And 
having had the opportunity to visit from Kiev down to the 
Donbass area, just as you pointed out, the tone and tenor of 
soldiers in the vicinity of Kiev 2 years ago was a little bit 
different as you got further towards the southeast.
    But it's been my observation for the last 2 years as a 
result of good work on behalf of the multinational joint 
commission that that attitude, that support the whole-of-
government approach on behalf of Ukraine is improving the 
farther you get to the southeast.
    So there's--there's a changing environment, as evidenced by 
the comments from President Zelensky as he continues to look 
west and talked about accessions to NATO.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah, great. I want to make a pitch here. We 
cannot yet do CODELs [congressional delegations]. The--our 
leadership and the DOD is not yet allowing that. Let me ask you 
this: have you thought through how we could do a COVID-19 
socially distant, appropriate CODELs to EUCOM region, and have 
you provided that advice yet to the Secretary so we can break 
that loose?
    General Wolters. We will, Congressman, and we very much 
want the CODELs back. And we actually have a program of 
actionable milestones that talks about our proposal of when and 
where. We will get after that soonest.
    Mr. Larsen. That's excellent. We need to--I do know the 
parliamentarians, especially NATO parliamentarians, would like 
to see us again, if only to yell at us in person. But we'd like 
to return the favor sometimes as well, as well.
    I'll just make a note and then yield, that the Washington 
State National Guard now I think is headed to western Ukraine 
or in western Ukraine as part of the training mission. And it's 
another reason why it's important; I know other State and 
National Guards are in the Balkans.
    And just in terms of our presence, to send that message to 
Russia that we care about Europe as much as Russia cares about 
Europe is important. So I'll just leave it at that, and with 
that I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, you and I had an opportunity before the hearing 
began to talk about the COVID-19 vaccine rollout. Many of us 
are hearing from both the service members and family members. 
They're very concerned about service members and their 
dependents who are deployed overseas.
    The word we're getting is that there's been insufficient 
planning for the storage and transportation of Moderna and 
Pfizer vaccines. In many of our States, we're doing very well. 
Ohio's down to age 16 and above.
    But yet in many of the areas, our service members that are 
actually deployed in areas where COVID is a greater threat than 
it is in some of our home States are not having adequate access 
to the vaccine. Some areas have been provided the Johnson & 
Johnson vaccine, but of course there has now been a pause as a 
result of CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] 
recommendations. What can you tell us as to how this can be 
resolved?
    And obviously, Johnson & Johnson was a later approval. So 
the infrastructure and deployment for an ability to vaccinate 
our service members should have been undertaken well before 
Johnson & Johnson was even approved to give us some assurance 
that the people that we care about that are every day serving 
our Nation are going to be taken care of.
    General Wolters. Congressman, I couldn't agree more. And 
big DOD INCONUS [inside the contiguous United States] has 
recognized this issue. And combatant commanders, specifically 
myself and Phil Davidson from INDOPACOM, have both expressed to 
the Secretary the need to accelerate the flow of vaccines, 
mostly for the dependents of our military members in Europe, 
and for Phil Davidson in the Pacific. And up to this point, 
we've probably been a little bit off balance.
    Secretary Austin was key to point out that the percentage 
of those tier 1 military uniform members that have received the 
vaccine INCONUS should be equivalent to the same in Europe and 
the Pacific, and the same in--for the dependents. That has not 
been the case, so we're working to fix that.
    As we speak, Congressman, we are transitioning in Europe 
from receiving 3,500 vaccines a week to be able to receive 
18,000 vaccines a week and be able to store them and administer 
them, with a surge capacity to 23,000.
    Unfortunately, with the J&J [Johnson & Johnson] cutoff, 
there's probably going to be about a 20 percent reduction to 
those surges. And we're still working on the specifics. But the 
site picture from within Europe for the military members and 
certainly for the dependents will be significantly different by 
the end of May than it is today.
    Because we will actually triple our surge capacity. We have 
the storage capability, we have the medical treatment 
facilities, and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines who can 
administer the vaccines. And my biggest concerns is not 
necessarily the tier 1 military, but to get to the dependents 
soonest.
    Mr. Turner. Well, General, that doesn't provide me comfort, 
by the way, that you don't say tier 1 military. I mean, our 
service members need to be covered. And again, we knew this was 
coming. I mean, the Federal Government has been very active in 
the acquisition and distribution of vaccines.
    And so I just, I appreciate your words, but I certainly 
hope that this is addressed. Because this impacts people's real 
lives. And of course the concerns of their families.
    Shifting to the F-35, the--you mentioned it in your 
statements and when the ranking member was asking you about 
what else do you need in forward deployed. We now have the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway. Poland 
is apparently looking into entering the F-35. Italy, Finland, 
and of course we currently have the ongoing competition.
    Putin is going to be looking at a whole different world as 
we begin to deploy the F-35 and our allies begin fielding it. 
It is of course the plane this is going to be necessary to 
keep, as you referenced, deterrence, because it is the dual-
capable portion of our mission. Tell us about the F-35 and its 
importance in Europe.
    General Wolters. Congressman, the F-35 contributes to 
campaign momentum strategically for indications and warnings, 
command and control, and obviously lethality. We have 81 total 
in Europe right now that our NATO allies and partners are 
using. We're programmed to get our first two.
    It gives us access to be able to deter effectively anywhere 
on the European continent. And if called upon, to conduct 
interdiction. It allows us to put any target at risk, plus or 
minus a millisecond, with great accuracy, and allowing for 
access to do the same.
    Mr. Turner. How are allies reporting the plane?
    General Wolters. They're incredibly excited, incredibly 
happy with its performance.
    The Chairman. Thank you, the gentleman's time has expired.
    One other announcement I should have made. We have a 
classified version of this hearing at 2 o'clock over in the CVC 
[Capitol Visitor Center]. So in order to give people a little 
bit of a break in between, we are going to end this portion at 
1:20. So we'll go until then, get as many members as we can. 
And then break and reconvene at 2 o'clock in the CVC for the 
classified portion.
    With that, Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
witnesses for the testimony today.
    I want to turn my attention to UAVs [unmanned aerial 
vehicles] and the threats they pose because of swarming 
capabilities. I particularly want to focus on the lessons 
learned from the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war. We saw Azerbaijan 
use unmanned systems not as standalone weapons, but as complex, 
synchronized attacks against air defense networks' conventional 
units.
    Given the successful unmanned swarm that attacked Saudi 
Arabia in 2019, this isn't the first time that we've seen this. 
So General Wolters, how would our current integrated air 
defense system stand up in a similar situation, and who has the 
cost advantage?
    General Wolters. Congressman, we have designated the United 
States Army to be the lead DOD entity for counter small UAS 
[unmanned aerial systems]. More importantly in Europe, we have 
to ensure that from an indications and warning standpoint, our 
integrated air and missile defense programs take into account 
the capabilities of these systems.
    They do, it's not good enough. We have to continue to 
improve. It's a program that's funded, we know what the 
requirements are. But more importantly for me as a USEUCOM 
commander, it's an issue that many of our NATO allies and 
partners have the capability to deter against, and 
strategically our new strategies and our plans all take into 
account enforcing our NATO allies and partners to improve in 
this area.
    Mr. Langevin. As a follow-up, how would incorporating 
emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and directed 
energy improve our responses to asymmetric and near-peer 
threats?
    General Wolters. Enormous help. It allows us to see the 
battlespace earlier, it allows us to approach and neutralize a 
target at greater range with greater speed. So those are all 
very helpful.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Next, Russia aggressively invests 
in electronic warfare capabilities that are specifically geared 
toward negating our technological advantages, which is--which 
it successfully deployed, just by way of example, in Ukraine 
and Syria.
    General, what is your command doing to make your systems 
more resilient in a communications degraded or denied 
environment? And more importantly, how are you training your 
personnel to operate in this environment?
    General Wolters. We feel reasonably comfortable, 
Congressman, with the gear that we have in place. The biggest 
area is to ensure that the training keeps pace with the 
adversary's EW [electronic warfare] TTPs, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures. And my assessment at EUCOM is that we're in 
pretty good shape.
    We play close attention to advancing EW technologies that 
Russia utilizes. We're able to witness some of that in the 
battlespace that you're familiar with in the environment in the 
vicinity of Syria, and we'll continue to improve. But for us 
it's critical that when it comes to EW, you have to have very 
good indications and warnings and you have to have very 
protected command and control architecture, which we are 
working towards.
    Mr. Langevin. Yeah, it's essential to make sure that we're 
paying close attention to that so that our enemies and 
adversaries can't use that asymmetric advantage or capability 
against us.
    So let me just turn to something else. [Inaudible] cyber 
attack response [inaudible] coalition of partner nations is one 
of our most effective tools in deterring Russia, Russian cyber 
actions. Right now, our response speed has been in months and 
years, which is unacceptable, it's too slow.
    Ms. Cooper, what is your information-sharing relationship 
with the State Department regarding cyber attribution and how 
could we improve it more effectively this time?
    Ms. Cooper. Congressman, thank you. If I understood the 
question correctly, it relates to working in a whole-of-
government context on Russia cyber attribution. Is that 
correct, sir?
    Mr. Langevin. To shorten the window for attribution too. 
Identifying and responding, real quickly.
    Ms. Cooper. I see, thank you, sir. On this I can say we've 
actually come a long way. We still have a ways to go. Today we 
are attributing formally the SolarWinds cyber intrusion to 
Russia's SVR, their foreign intelligence service. That 
represents a public attribution that we are making in 
coordination with allies and partners who have also been 
affected by SolarWinds.
    And you know, this is something that we initially were 
focused on in the past few months. Obviously we have to get 
this down to days, not just months. But we're also working on 
the process of quick release and declassification----
    The Chairman. And I do apologize, but the gentleman's time 
has expired. If there is further follow-up there, you can take 
it for the record and send it to Mr. Langevin.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 99.]
    The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'd like to ask you both about lethal aid to Ukraine. In 
recent years, Congress and this committee included has 
authorized that. It was way overdue in my opinion, but I'm glad 
we're finally doing it.
    General Wolters, how has lethal aid that we have provided 
to Ukraine helped ensure their security vis-a-vis Russia?
    General Wolters. Congressman, thanks for the question, it 
goes back to that military trust factor. When a fellow soldier 
shows up with gear that actually convinces the Ukrainian armed 
force military members that this will be effective against an 
enemy to protect our sovereignty, whether it's lethal or non-
lethal. But when they can see both it's a plus.
    And as you well know, with the assistance of this 
committee, since 2017 the Javelin has been a very productive 
program. And we've got approximately 360 missiles and a fair 
amount of launchers in storage. And today, Ukrainian soldiers 
know exactly how to grab those Javelins out of the storage 
site, get to the foxhole, and if called upon, to use that 
munition to defend themselves.
    They have the confidence that they can do this. Not only do 
we supply the munitions, but we rotate military training teams 
in to make sure that their proficiency is where it needs to be.
    And when I addressed earlier the mental disposition of the 
Ukrainian armed forces as you work from Kiev up in the 
northwest portion of Ukraine down towards the Donbass, that 
improvement in attitude of the soldiers is partly due to this 
increase in trust on behalf of these contributions.
    Mr. Lamborn. Excellent. Ms. Cooper, what is your view?
    Ms. Cooper. Congressman, we're very proud to be able to 
provide defensive lethal assistance. And in addition to the 
Javelin capability that General Wolters mentioned, I think it's 
very important that we have expanded our assistance to not just 
focus on the land domain, but also the maritime domain.
    So that means that the patrol boats that we're providing 
will have a defensive lethal capability on them.
    Mr. Lamborn. And are there additional steps that we should 
take? I don't know if that's been actually--if that has 
actually materialized yet or not. If not, we'd like to help, 
I'd like to help assist in that regard. Is there--are there 
additional steps that have not yet materialized that you would 
like to see?
    Ms. Cooper. Sir, from an authorities perspective, I think 
we have the right authorities, and we have been able to provide 
the right lethal assistance, again both on the land domain and 
the maritime domain at this point. And we appreciate the 
support of the committee.
    Mr. Lamborn. General Wolters, anything to add to that?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I think we're in good shape 
as we've--as we look at what DOD is doing right now with the 
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Those funds are looking 
to be targeted directly in these areas, and I don't see any 
obstacles at this point.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. And General Wolters, changing 
subjects, how would you characterize NATO support for the 
ongoing modernization of our nuclear enterprise, the nuclear 
triad, which each of those three legs are getting upgrades in 
different ways. How does NATO view that, our NATO allies?
    General Wolters. It's improving, Congressman. We actually 
for the first time in 67 years produced a NATO military 
strategy and a concept for the deterrence and defense of the 
Euro-Atlantic area. And we approached NATO with the opportunity 
to actually address this subject.
    It was well received, and as we speak, we've had many 
participants come into our NAC, North Atlantic Council, and 
entertain discussions on the nuclear enterprise and what we're 
actually doing.
    So the campaign momentum is in the right direction. And we 
now actually have plans that are being codified that address 
the value of a triad and what it does for strategic deterrence.
    Mr. Lamborn. Ms. Cooper, would you have anything to add to 
that?
    Ms. Cooper. Nothing to add, thank you, Congressman.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, and General Wolters, I would have to 
think that when the 30 or so countries that are under our 
nuclear umbrella see us modernizing, that gives them a lot of 
reassurance.
    General Wolters. Yes, Congressman.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, you alluded to the--one of your top needs to have 
two destroyers. And you cited the sort of undersea work that 
they would do. Can you talk about that in a little more detail?
    General Wolters. Yes, Congressman. For the last 3 years, 
we've seen an increase in under-the-sea activity on behalf of 
Russia in the vicinity of the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. [United 
Kingdom] Gap. And we--I would adore the opportunity to talk 
more to this in a different setting. But what I can say is a 
consistent increase in activity, and the destroyers' 
participation in the undersea warfare, C2 [command and 
control], and I&W [indications and warnings] is absolutely, 
positively critical.
    And as you well know, we have four of those in Europe, and 
they are the workhorses of deterrence, extending all the way 
into the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, all the way back 
around the Mediterranean, all the way up into the Arctic and 
the Barents. And as we continue to do the math for basic needs 
to cover down adequately, we believe that two more is what is 
required.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you. Again, before COVID, a 
number of us did a CODEL to sort of focus on anti-submarine 
warfare. We actually visited Keflavik Air Base up in Iceland, 
which the Bush administration had closed in the wake of, you 
know, the Cold War coming to an end, quote--air quotes. And now 
it's been reopened for P-8 flights.
    Admiral Gary Roughead, the former CNO [Chief of Naval 
Operations], used to testify before this committee that the 
best anti-submarine warfare platform is another submarine. Can 
you talk about, again, some of the work that, again, our 
submarine force is doing in that arena?
    General Wolters. So I certainly agree with Admiral 
Roughead's conclusion, because he certainly knows best. And I 
contend that our submarine fleet is performing admirably. But 
part of the command and control apparatus that is involved in 
this process involves other assets, to include maritime patrol 
aircraft like the P-8, as well as what a destroyer does.
    So to comprehensively defend in this area from undersea all 
the way to 25,000 feet with a P-8, we need to make sure that we 
have the right hardware and software involved. And we're 
traversing in that direction, and our sub force is performing 
admirably. But it's very challenging with respect to numbers.
    Mr. Courtney. Right. I thank you. And I think General 
Scaparrotti, your predecessor, described it as we're sort of 
playing zone defense as opposed to man to man. But we could 
probably get into that more in a classified setting.
    You know, when we talk about Russia's sort of malign 
activities, obviously the maritime domain. We saw it in the 
Ukraine, where they seized the three ships in international 
waters. The U.N. [United Nations] Convention just, you know, 
unanimously reprimanded that action.
    We've had other combatant commanders before this committee 
in recent weeks and I've asked them all about whether or not 
you think, given the fact that the, you know, we're in sort of 
a new era, whether it's Indo-Pacific or in the European 
theater, where countries, Russia and China, are trying to 
exercise maritime control, which really goes up against the, I 
think, norm of freedom of navigation, which has been basically 
the rule of the road since World War II.
    General, and I'm going to ask Ms. Cooper as well, I mean, 
do you support like your colleagues who testified that the U.S. 
should become a full participant in the U.N. Convention on Law 
of the Sea?
    General Wolters. Yes, Congressman.
    Mr. Courtney. And Ms. Cooper.
    Ms. Cooper. I would just say that the administration has 
not issued a formal review of this or opinion on this yet, so I 
would have to defer the question to General Wolters's military 
advice.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, again, we're, just so you know, 
in the House, even though we don't get to vote on that, we will 
have a bipartisan resolution with myself and Congressman Young 
from Alaska calling on the Senate to really, again, the world 
has been changing in the maritime sphere.
    And not being able to be an active party or even observer, 
which we found out in the Philippines's challenge to South 
China Sea, it's just, it's ridiculous.
    And we're in the company of, you know, North Korea, Libya, 
Syria, you know, in terms of not being full, ratified 
participants in this process. Which, again, worked in the case 
of Ukraine. The U.N.'s decision actually ended up having Russia 
release those ships and those sailors. But again, it shows it 
has important value to this country, which is a maritime 
country.
    So I'll get off my soapbox and yield back. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Wolters, Ms. Cooper, thanks so much for joining us 
today.
    General Wolters, I'm going to go to you and build upon the 
assertive efforts the United States has pursued in making sure 
that our NATO allies spend the 2 percent of the GDP [gross 
domestic product] on defense. I hope this administration 
continues what has been that assertive effort.
    But it's not only how much our allies spend, but it's how 
they spend it, to make sure that it's complementary to the 
assets within the theater, not things that are duplicative or 
things that don't add to our capacity to deter and defend 
within that particular region.
    You know, one of the elements I think is incredibly 
important is to look at, you know, how that's being done. Look 
at what's happening with Russia with the snap exercises.
    So are you seeing the spending by our allies there being 
complementary or duplicative? And are we generating the 
capacity to be able to surge and sustain if necessary, just as 
the Russians practice in a way that I think is meant to send a 
message, but also lets us look at their ability to sustain 
also? So I want to get your perspective on that.
    General Wolters. Congressman, I would say that the 
transparency in alignment of our expenditures across the 30 
nations is improving. And we've started by redoing a strategy 
that is geared towards the 21st century that is more whole-of-
government, whole-of-nation, to include military contributions, 
that takes into account all-domain awareness and winning in 
competition, not waiting for crisis or conflict to win, but win 
in competition.
    So with all this in mind, the new strategy has allowed us 
to go back and develop new strategic plans. And those plans 
ultimately call for requirements to deliver the appropriate 
competition effect in a particular area. And it allows nations 
to establish military requirements to go after what is needed.
    And that architecture had proven very, very worthy in the 
recent decision by the United Kingdom with respect to producing 
their military strategy. And what we've also done in the U.S. 
as an example of a better transparency and alignment from the 
plans to requirements standpoints to make sure that we can 
generate more peace in Europe.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Wolters. Let me switch 
gears a little bit and point to the political crisis that began 
in 2014 in Ukraine that sparked a war that continues today.
    Ms. Cooper, you pointed to the number of casualties that 
are there today. On that track, casualties will exceed in 2021 
what occurred in 2020. I think all those things are incredibly 
concerning.
    Another thing that's very concerning is to watch at what's 
happening with the Russian Black Sea Fleet. And you see what 
they are doing within that area and the capability that they 
are building. Modernization efforts there I think are very 
alarming, especially with the warmwater access that they have 
through that Black Sea now that creates a strategic challenge 
for the United States in many other ways.
    Do you see that the modernization effort for the Black Sea 
Fleet is disproportional to other Russian modernization 
efforts? Do you see that as being a strategic challenge for us 
within building that particular capability there?
    And do you believe that them taking Crimea and claiming 
that now gives them a strategic foothold in that area that 
helps them in that effort to modernize the Black Sea Fleet and 
to extend influence and create threats and uncertainty outside 
of that area to the United States?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I see a concerted effort on 
behalf of Russians' maritime forces in the Baltics, in the 
Barents, and in the Black Sea. Again, in all three of those 
areas fairly comprehensive and fairly equal. And I certainly 
agree with you. Our vigilance is sky high in all those areas 
from a military maritime perspective.
    And every point that you alluded to with respect to 
potential intentions, we are preparing for and planning for and 
expecting it to occur.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Ms. Cooper, any thoughts on that?
    Ms. Cooper. Congressman, I appreciate the question. On the 
Black Sea, I would say that this is an area of increased policy 
focus. And we're taking an approach that looks holistically at 
all of our allies and partners in the region. We've started 
with efforts to build maritime domain awareness capacity. This 
is in Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania.
    And I already earlier referenced some of the maritime 
capabilities that we're supporting the government of Ukraine 
with.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good, thank you. Quick question, I know I 
only have a few seconds left. Choke point, the Turkish Straits 
there at the Black Sea. Turkey being a NATO ally, the 
unfortunate greater alignment now it seems like with Russia 
than the United States. Is that a long-term issue for us in how 
we deal with Turkey, and also with them as a NATO ally?
    The Chairman. And sadly, that one will have to be taken for 
the record or come later. The gentleman's time has expired.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 99.]
    The Chairman. Ms. Speier is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both for 
your leadership.
    Ms. Cooper, I want to thank you for always being available 
to talk with me and others about many of the issues we have in 
the region. I'd like to talk to you today about the large-scale 
offensive that Azerbaijan engaged in against its neighbor 
Armenia with the coordination of Turkey over the disputed 
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
    It caused more than 5,000 deaths, displaced roughly 100,000 
people from their homes, and caused immeasurable suffering. 
Azerbaijan continues to hold over 200 Armenian prisoners of 
war. And there's been abuse and mistreatment that's truly 
shocking.
    The U.S. provided $100 million to Azerbaijan in violation, 
really in defiance, of nearly two decades' parity in U.S. 
security assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan. I think we're 
sending a terrible message to Armenia. And because we did not 
engage in terms of getting the parties to the Minsk Group table 
for negotiations, Russia stepped in and now has yet another 
foothold in that region.
    And you mentioned in your earlier comments how critical it 
was for us to engage in there. So my question to you is that 
are you clear now of the relevance of maintaining parity 
between the two countries in terms of aid? And what are we 
going to do in terms of providing humanitarian assistance to 
all those who've been displaced?
    Ms. Cooper. Congresswoman, thank you so much for raising 
this important issue set. The war this fall was a tragedy on so 
many levels and we deplore the loss of life. We have spent a 
lot of time trying to back then de-escalate the situation, and 
now continuing to talk with Azerbaijan and Armenia about what 
we can achieve in a peaceful way forward.
    In terms of our--also in terms of the aftermath of the 
conflict, we have been urging Azerbaijan specifically to 
release the detainees. This has been a line that not just my 
State Department colleagues have offered but also Defense 
Department, myself included.
    In terms of the paradigm for our assistance, we want to 
have very strong and stabilizing relationships with all of the 
countries in the region, with Armenia, with Georgia, and with 
Azerbaijan. We believe that we can exert a positive influence 
on all three countries.
    In terms of Azerbaijan specifically, our assistance has 
really been focused on areas that are important to U.S. 
national security. It's been focused on the Coast Guard domain, 
so Caspian Sea.
    Ms. Speier. I understand that, but in the end, it allows 
them money that they can then use as they did against Armenia. 
So I just think we've got to look long and hard at their 
conduct and not be rewarding them for bad behavior moving 
forward.
    Let me move on to General Wolters. Some organizations here 
in the United States, such as the Anti-Defamation League, have 
noticed an increasing connection between violent extremism, 
white supremacy groups in the United States, and groups in some 
of the European countries. We've looked at that in the Military 
Personnel Subcommittee as it relates to service members as 
well.
    So, given this problem with extremism in some parts of the 
military, what steps are you taking to combat this problem in 
your unique position in--at EUCOM?
    General Wolters. Thank you, Congressman. It's a--it's an 
imperative that we continue to improve good order and 
discipline and treat each other with dignity and respect. And 
as we start down this path of embracing extremism, for the 
duration of our military careers, and in USEUCOM I was quick to 
point out to our commanders, extremism won't go away. And when 
you take the oath and you put on the cloth, it will be a 
responsibility of yours to be intrusive with respect to finding 
it, getting rid of it, and finding ways to communicate with 
others what tactics, techniques, and procedures need to go 
forward to rectify it.
    So the--the one-day session that we had for feedback was 
very, very helpful. We've got a long ways to go. We're just to 
the start. But we're going to have to embrace this for the 
duration of our careers to fix it.
    Ms. Speier. I encourage you to use the opportunity you have 
within the Department to look at the social media of recruits 
before they enlist to make sure we are not augmenting the 
number of white supremacists within the military that already 
exist. And I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Hartzler is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much. Thank you to our 
witnesses. I'd like to cover questions about China and troop 
movements and Turkey. But I don't know if we'll have time for 
all of that. But I'll start off with General Wolters. You know, 
there's no question that Russia is our number one threat in 
Europe. They've shown time and again that they will invade a 
country and have malign influence. But while they're doing 
that, China also--it gives them an opportunity to expand their 
influence--their Belt and Road Initiative, their economic 
investments in the area. And I'm--really would like to get your 
feedback on what you're hearing from our European allies. First 
of all, do they recognize the threat of China? And what are 
their steps, or counter steps--are they taking? Do you see and 
do they see that 5G is a concern? And are--are the European 
allies concerned about the growing expansion and partnership 
with Russia in the Arctic and the Norwegian Sea? So a lot of 
questions there, but I'd appreciate your perspective.
    General Wolters. Congresswoman, first, the awareness of 
malign influence with respect to 5G, with respect to seaports, 
with respect to economic interest with aerial ports is--is 
markedly improving. I would have told you a year ago with 
respect to China, my number one concern was--was proliferation 
of 5G. What has happened over the course of the last year--5G 
with China Huawei and ZTE was--was spread into 15 separate 
nations. As a result of the U.K.'s position with 5G to reverse 
course and no longer go with China, other nations have followed 
suit. As we speak, 8 of those 15 nations have enacted 
restrictions against Huawei 5G and we're still working with the 
other 7.
    We're very concerned about the economic interest that China 
continues to display with respect to ports--and you're very 
familiar with the numbers with respect to what they--what they 
do to impact shipping capacity. So today our number one issue 
is proliferation with China economic interests with seaports 
and aerial ports, and we're still concerned about 5G. But the 
awareness on behalf of--of the NATO nations and our partners is 
improving.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Great. Well thank you for your work on that. 
For several years I've been concerned about the--the ability of 
our troops to move throughout Europe. You talked about the 
exercise that we're going to conduct again this summer. But 
specifically dealing with railroad track gauge size 
differences, and when you enter the--the parts--the Baltic 
areas and everything that used to be controlled by the Soviet 
era, they--they're not compatible and you have a stoppage of 
the movement of the equipment. So where are we at on that? And 
what do we need to do to get after that problem?
    General Wolters. We're improving. My goal was to improve 
the speed of road and rail from Central Germany to the Eastern 
European border with each passing day by at least a second. And 
that is certainly taking case--and this committee's 
contributions with EDI [European Deterrence Initiative] have 
allowed us to improve infrastructure to put prepositioned 
stockpiles where they need to be to take off some of the 
pressure with respect to demand signals on road and rail until 
we can get those fixed. We've set up a much better command 
architecture. In NATO we established a three-star headquarters 
2 years ago. The Joint Support Enabling Command--their sole 
responsibility is to logistically cover down and tackle the 
number one strategic is, move at speed in all domains from west 
to east. So we're making gains.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Something that I have advocated for is the 
ability of the rail cars to be able to move and change very 
quickly when they get to that point--the--to move the actual 
wheels so that they can fit, rather than unloading everything 
onto--is there some discussion of doing something like that?
    General Wolters. Germany has some wonderful solutions in 
that area, and they are moving out to enact that. We're still 
challenged a little bit with some of the other nations. But--
but what we have today is a system in place that allows Estonia 
to have access to the same kind of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures, and advances that Germany sees. So we'll--we'll 
gain quicker improvement.
    Mrs. Hartzler. And very quickly, the--and I'll--I'll go to 
Ms. Cooper. Turkey, S-400--what is the Biden administration's 
policy with pushing back on Turkey in this realm? And what do 
you see can be done in relation to Turkey and NATO and all of 
our workings with them?
    Ms. Cooper. Just in the interest of time, I'll--I'll 
briefly just say that we do see S-400 as incompatible with F-
35. So they're out of the F-35 program. We have been urging 
Turkey to remove the S-400. That is a consistent point of, you 
know, diplomacy and in mil-mil [military-to-military] 
conversations. But at the end of the day, they're a NATO ally. 
And so we still work with them as a NATO ally and we value 
their contributions internationally--to include in Afghanistan.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Brown is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank our 
panelists for your presentations today and making yourselves 
available and your service to our country.
    General Wolters, I'd like to ask you about infrastructure. 
The United States, EU [European Union], and NATO have been 
focused on European infrastructure over the last several years. 
Everything from the EU committing 1.5 billion euros for 
military mobility, to streamlining cross-border movements, to 
adapting European transport networks for dual use to 
accommodate the military needs. Can you talk a little bit about 
your assessment about infrastructure to support our military 
mobility, and also how you're using Defense Europe 21, the 
exercise that began last month, to assess and to continue 
prioritizing--perhaps reprioritizing the infrastructure needs?
    General Wolters. Yes sir, thank you for the great question. 
We're able to take these large exercise, Congressman, and we 
can actually track a company and track a battalion. And when 
they hit the port in Bremerhaven, we can time how long it takes 
them to get to their foxholes on the eastern perimeter. And we 
look for improvements over time. And with this committee's 
great contributions with the European Deterrence Initiative, we 
have been able to get after that infrastructure--not only from 
a movement standpoint, but from a prepositioned stockpile 
standpoint. And for Defender-Europe 21, they've--there's four 
major exercises. The actual last portion is--is a C2 exercise 
that looks back and examines how well we did in joint forcible 
entry, how well we did at integrated air and missile defense, 
and how well we were able to shoot, move, and communicate with 
Army force elements--specifically timing their speed to get to 
their foxholes. So it's a--it's an area of great concern to me. 
Strategically I start with two initial concerns, speed and 
posture. And speed has a lot to do with the subject, sir, and 
we're making gains.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you. And you're [inaudible] you're 
comfortable with the level of coordination with our allies on 
prioritizing that infrastructure needs?
    General Wolters. I am, Congressman. And I am also 
comfortable with our NATO allies and partners' willingness to 
take the lead in this area.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you. My second question--on Tuesday 
Secretary Austin was in Berlin and he spoke to the expansion of 
our presence in Germany by 500 personnel. He went on to say 
that it's there to strengthen our deterrence and defense. And 
he identified space and cyber and electronic warfare 
capabilities as components of what those additional 500 
personnel would bring. Can you speak to whether or not that 500 
would be a permanent forward presence? Is it going to be a 
rotational presence? And maybe more broadly speak about the--
the mix of rotational versus forward presence and whether we've 
got the right balance today.
    General Wolters. Congressman, I'll start with the latter 
first. As you well know, the mix is always a--it depends--SOFA 
[status of forces agreement] agreements, type of domain, 
concerns for the service going forward. But right now I'm 
convinced that we've got the right mix in the ground domain 
with one rotational armored brigade combat team.
    With respect to your first series of questions, there are 
two elements to Secretary Austin's announcement, a multi-domain 
task force and a theater fires organization. And our plan for 
right now is for both of those to be permanently assigned 
forces at Wiesbaden in perpetuity.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the 
balance of my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, last month you 
moved us to WATCHCON 1, which is potential imminent crisis with 
regard to Ukraine. We saw NATO planes have to intercept as many 
as 10 Russian warplanes in a single day last March. And there 
were public reports--the word that is used is ``massive'' 
buildup of Russian troops and equipment near Crimea. Is--is 
massive the right word in your opinion to describe the buildup 
of Russian troops in--on the borders of Crimea?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I would adore the opportunity 
to get to specific numbers. But what I can say is there is a 
very large ground domain force that has moved from the Western 
Military District and the Southern Military District to the 
vicinity of--of Crimea and the Donbass. There is a sizable air 
force. And there is also a notable maritime force that has 
shifted as well. It is a----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    General Wolters [continuing]. Concern, our vigilance is 
high.
    Mr. Scott. And are they--are they pushing the supply lines 
forward as well to supply those troops and the equipment that 
is--that is moved into the area?
    General Wolters. Sir, that activity has plateaued. And 
again, I--I would like to talk more in a different environment. 
But I can tell you as of right now that activity has plateaued.
    Mr. Scott. Okay. I don't have any further questions, Mr. 
Chairman. General, as we get into the--you know, the classified 
briefing, my interest is in the number of NATO intercepts--
currently versus what they were over the last 6 to 12 months--
as well as what the size of the force is that we see from 
Russia today versus where it was over the last several months, 
and then what--what, you know, we're seeing from our NATO 
allies as far as the--the lethal support for--for the Ukraine. 
And I realize that all of those will have to be done in a 
classified setting. So I will, out of respect for time, yield 
the remainder of my time so that other members can ask their 
questions and look forward to those answers in the classified 
session.
    The Chairman. All right, thank you. Mr. Keating is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll try to get to 
three questions. First of all, just a quick follow-up, Ms. 
Cooper, on the Azerbaijan-Armenia war that was terrible 
[inaudible] but in my other capacity of chair of the committee 
of [inaudible] working to reenforce the position of [inaudible] 
release of those POWs [prisoners of war] that are there. And I 
just wanted to know how hopeful the prospects are regarding 
peace and stability in the region.
    The Chairman. Did you get a--sorry, Bill, you're breaking 
up a little bit. Did you get enough of that?
    Ms. Cooper. I believe so. If the question pertains to peace 
and stability in the Caucasus region, then I can--I can answer 
that. Is that--is that correct?
    Mr. Keating. Yes, specifically release of the POWs with 
Azerbaijan and Armenia in the wake of the--the terrible war 
that was there. And----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Keating [continuing]. Prospect for peace and stability. 
Can you hear? Am I breaking up still?
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    The Chairman. Yes, we got that. We got that, thank you. Go 
ahead, Ms. Cooper.
    Ms. Cooper. Yes thank you, Congressman. I would say the 
lead for the--the discussions on the release of the detainees 
is with the State Department, so I am less familiar with the 
day-to-day on that and would probably defer to them for their 
overall assessment. I would say more broadly I do have concerns 
about the peace and stability in the region. I do not see it as 
a positive development that at the end of this conflict Russia 
now has 2,000 peacekeepers--or so-called peacekeepers--in--on 
Azerbaijan soil. They already have forces in Armenia and of 
course they illegally occupy sovereign Georgia in both Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. So--so to me this is not a positive 
development. That said, we are kind of looking at how we can 
play a supporting role in the Defense Department to State 
Department led efforts to----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Keating. Okay. Thank you so much. I hate to interrupt, 
but I wanted to get to----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Ms. Cooper. Please.
    Mr. Keating [continuing]. Another question. The Wagner 
Group--I don't know if we touched on a lot of what's going on 
for [inaudible] will this curtail or help curtail the Wagner 
Group activities given his association with this? And in 
Europe, I know it's expanding in Syria into Africa--what's the 
status of the use of the Wagner Group? Did you----
    General Wolters. Congressman, I--I--this is General 
Wolters. I got the last portion in--what I can say in this 
setting is--is what we witnessed from--from the Wagner Group 
starting 2 years ago has persisted in those geographical 
regions that you addressed.
    Mr. Keating. All right, again--just the last area--the 
importance of the European Deterrence Initiative. You know, 
there were cuts made in that and the--and I don't think in my 
own discussions with people in Europe that that was well 
received, although diplomatically--they were very careful with 
what they said. What's the status of that? And would it require 
more funding and more support? General.
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    General Wolters. Congressman, this is General Wolters. We--
we've been very pleased with this committee's support for EDI. 
I don't know what exactly will unfold in 2022, but I suspect 
the EDI portion will be reduced. And I will tell you that every 
single cent that is part of that EDI is incredibly important to 
improve our campaign momentum in indications and warnings, 
command and control, and mission command. So with any reduction 
there are going to be challenges, but we certainly appreciate 
the funding that has been in place and we hope it continues in 
the future.
    Mr. Keating. It's an area of my concern and I hope that we 
can fund that to a greater amount. With that, Mr. Chairman, I 
yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. DesJarlais is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [Pause.]
    The Chairman. I apologize, he was there until--Mr. 
DesJarlais, can you hear me?
    Dr. DesJarlais. I can.
    [Pause.]
    The Chairman. It is not our day for technology. We're not--
we're not hearing.
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    [Pause.]
    The Chairman. Yes, buffering--which is not a good thing. 
Wow. We just pretty much lost everybody.
    Mr. Gallagher, we'll go ahead and let you give a shot and 
then we'll try to get folks back online here. Mr. Gallagher is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to--I guess to 
put it bluntly, what's the likelihood of an invasion of Ukraine 
in the next few weeks?
    General Wolters. Low to medium.
    Mr. Gallagher. Say again?
    General Wolters. Low to medium.
    Mr. Gallagher. Low to medium? Thank you. I hope to follow 
up in classified session as well. Russia has an assortment of 
intermediate-range missile systems, including the Iskander 
ballistic missile, which Janes reports is currently being 
deployed along the Ukrainian border. Given this deployment and 
the Russian threat, just how important are long-range precision 
fires to your ability to deter aggression in Europe?
    General Wolters. Tremendously important, and that multi-
domain task force that Secretary Austin just talked about is a 
key step towards improving our ability to fire from ground to 
ground.
    Mr. Gallagher. And how would programs like the Marine 
Corp's long-range precision fires program, or the Army's PRSM 
[Precision Strike Missile] system contribute to your 
operational flexibility as a combatant commander?
    General Wolters. Great contributions.
    Mr. Gallagher. And what would be the--some of the potential 
future consequences if Congress were to refuse to provide you 
with such a capability?
    General Wolters. It would impact our campaign momentum from 
a lethality standpoint.
    Mr. Gallagher. And--sorry to keep beating this horse, but--
the budget summary released by the Biden administration last 
week specifically calls out long-range fires and finds, quote, 
the safety and security of the Nation requires a strong, 
sustainable, and responsive mix of long-range strike 
capabilities. Do you agree?
    General Wolters. I do.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, sir. Now I will shift gears a 
little bit. Just last week an anti-mining political party 
blocked a Chinese-backed firm's access to some of Greenland's 
massive rare earth deposits. Given the critical importance of 
rare earths to the U.S. defense supply chain, it would benefit 
us to pay greater attention to Greenland, its security, and 
adversary activity there. I'd just be curious to get your 
thoughts on--on the importance of Greenland.
    Ms. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman. We--we agree that 
Greenland is a very important location and our conversations 
with the Kingdom of Denmark about the security of the broader 
region to include Chinese investments and Chinese concerns in 
the region have reflected that.
    Mr. Gallagher. And going forward, how do you intend to 
continue to ensure the security of Greenland and its resources 
given that our adversaries obviously recognize it's important 
economically? And where do you see Greenland's place in EUCOM's 
broader strategic picture?
    General Wolters. At the heart, Congressman, as you well 
know, Denmark never lets me forget about the equities that they 
represent in Greenland. And as we've developed that--that 
concept for deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, 
it specifically points out the comprehensive geographical 
approach that has to take place and identifies Greenland.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. I yield back the remainder of my 
time.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Crow is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by 
asking about Ukraine--just to follow on to Mr. Gallagher's 
comment. He had asked about the threat of a Russian invasion of 
Ukraine in the next few weeks. You had characterized that as 
low to medium, General Wolters and Ms. Cooper. Would that 
assessment be higher if I were to ask that and say, what is the 
risk between now and the end of the year?
    [Pause.]
    General Wolters. The answer is it depends. And I would have 
to take each and every second of the day from this point until 
tomorrow to give you a different answer. So I know that's not 
what you want to hear, but we continue to examine every single 
part of the environment in all domains to make sure that we----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Crow. Well let me ask it this way. You were able to 
make an assessment based on him asking over the next couple of 
weeks. Based on the current trajectory, and what we know now, 
does that threat continue to increase beyond the next 2 weeks?
    General Wolters. It depends, Congressman, on the 
disposition of the forces. My--my sense is, with the trend that 
I see right now, that the likelihood of an occurrence will 
start to wane.
    Mr. Crow. So when you say it depends--so you were able to 
make an assessment based on the next 2 weeks. You gave a--you 
get a concrete assessment, low to medium. So you are only able 
to give an assessment 2 weeks out, is that what you're telling 
me?
    General Wolters. In a different setting I can give you a 
deeper assessment based on----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Crow. Okay, that----
    General Wolters [continuing]. Strategic assets.
    Mr. Crow [continuing]. That's the answer I need, then. We 
can follow up this afternoon. Ms. Cooper, do you have any 
additional thoughts on that?
    Ms. Cooper. Congressman, no, other than to say we're 
watching this very closely at the highest levels.
    Mr. Crow. Okay. Next question is, Mr. Bacon and I are co-
chairs in the Military Resiliency and Energy Caucus and we are 
very concerned about energy resiliency for our installations 
around the world. We've had a lot of discussions about the 
reliance of some of our installations on Russian gas. Can you 
just talk about the risk that a reliance on that Russian fuel 
source poses to our installations in Germany in particular?
    General Wolters. It's a high risk for those nations' 
militaries that rely on Russian gas. As you know, Congressman, 
in the U.S. we work very, very hard with our reserves to ensure 
that we, to the max extent practical, do not as the U.S. DOD 
rely on Russian gas.
    Mr. Crow. But to our allies that we're integrated with, 
there is a high risk?
    General Wolters. It is.
    Mr. Crow. And last, General Wolters, regarding Russia's 
involvement in the Arctic--I have spent a fair amount of time 
in Svalbard, actually, and have been to places like Barentsberg 
and others. Is it your characterization--would love for Ms. 
Cooper maybe to start on this--that the Russians are pushing 
the boundaries of the Treaty of Svalbard to create logistical 
supply chains at facilities there to enhance their ability to 
project power into the Arctic?
    Ms. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman. I would say I can't 
give you a legal read of--of the treaty, but in general terms, 
we are concerned about what we see as Russia's attempts to--to 
control maritime traffic. And so this is something that has 
been the focus of our, you know, bilateral conversations with 
Russia. But also a topic of conversation among the Arctic 
powers--you know, U.S. and our allies and partners.
    Mr. Crow. General Wolters.
    General Wolters. I concur. What I will say, Congressman, is 
I am pleased with the strategic architecture by the European 
nations to place greater focus in the vicinity of the Arctic 
for the precise reasons that Laura Cooper talked about.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you. General Wolters, you know, we--we're 
limited in our ability during Defender-Europe to fully assess 
transportation ability and the ability to move forces because 
of the pandemic. What needs to be done going forward--I'd say 
the next year, in the near term to address those capability gap 
assessments because of the--the limited nature of that 
exercise?
    General Wolters. Great question, Congressman. We're going 
to have two large sample sizes--one from Defender-Europe 20 
that's already taken place--we're in the middle of it. We had 
to curtail some of our activity. But we did get a lot of lift 
and shift of massive forces. And then we'll take a sample of 
what takes place with Defender-Europe 21 and be able to point 
out after a good, constructive after-action review where some 
of our LIMFACS [limiting factors] are. And we've got a red team 
assigned in all domains to be an inhibitor of advancement. So 
we're--we're excited about the fact that we're placing a lot of 
emphasis in this area.
    Mr. Crow. So you're--it sounds like you're pretty 
confident. You have a plan in place to address those capability 
gaps and make those--make those assessments over the next year?
    General Wolters. Absolutely. And EDI is incredibly helpful 
for mitigation.
    Mr. Crow. Wonderful. Thank you. Well I thank you both for 
your service to the country and for doing this important work 
and look forward to the discussion in the closed session. I 
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. We will give Mr. DesJarlais 
another shot here. I believe we have the technical fixes. You 
are up, sir.
    Dr. DesJarlais. All right, thank you--thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. General Wolters, could you just briefly explain the 
importance of our nuclear weapons capability and how it serves 
to reassure our allies in deterring these strategic non-nuclear 
attacks from adversaries like Russia?
    General Wolters. Congressman, we've certainly had the 
nuclear triad in place as a strategic deterrence umbrella in 
Europe for well over six decades. And--and the prosperous peace 
that we've been able to enjoy is--is certainly attributed to 
that. So it's--it's very important from that standpoint.
    Dr. DesJarlais. If the United States were to adopt a no 
first use policy, how do you believe this would be perceived or 
received by our allies?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I think you would get a mixed 
return depending upon the ally's awareness of the nuclear 
enterprise. And I--I'm not equipped to give you a country-by-
country return on that, but I think you'd get some mixed 
responses.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. How do you feel about no first use 
policy?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I currently support the U.S. 
position on not adhering to the nuclear no first use policy in 
accordance with the Nuclear Posture Review of 2018.
    Dr. DesJarlais. If we were to adopt such a policy, do you 
believe that Russia in turn would restrict their own nuclear 
policy in any substantive way?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I'm not sure what Russia 
would do, but I do know we--we would probably be in a position 
to where we wouldn't trust the decision that they make.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I just have some concerns and I hope 
the Biden administration is tuning in to this hearing because 
in the past President Biden had expressed his support of a no 
first use policy, and I hope he would seriously rethink that 
position. And you know, look at what our allies would say. 
Granted, you said there was a mixed response. Let's turn to 
Israel for a minute. General, in your statement you noted the 
tremendous strides Israel has made under the Trump 
administration normalizing relationships with Arab world and 
improving regional security. Do you foresee the momentum of 
these accomplishments carrying over into this administration?
    General Wolters. I do, Congressman.
    Dr. DesJarlais. What are some of the obstacles that you see 
in continuing these success--successes, and what can we do to 
help overcome them?
    General Wolters. I think the degree of cooperation for 
exchange of information is--is productive. I think that needs 
to continue. And if we wind up having obstacles in that area it 
would be of concern. Right now the ability to information share 
with Israel, mil to mil, is very, very effective.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Ms. Cooper, could you explain the current 
state of the Department of Defense's assessment regarding a 
transfer of Israel from European Command to the Central Command 
area of operations?
    Ms. Cooper. Yes, thank you Congressman. The--the current 
state of play is that there was a decision to affect the 
transfer, but that transfer is still in--in process in the 
sense that we are carefully analyzing every aspect to ensure 
that only when we are confident that it will be a seamless 
transition will that formal transition occur. And the concept 
here is to ensure that there's nothing that is impacted 
negatively in terms of Israel's tremendous relationship with--
with European allies and with European Command. But only that 
Israel will benefit from greater access to mil-to-mil 
relationships in the Central Command area of responsibility. So 
that's--that's the criteria we're looking at. Over.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And--thank you both for your service 
and for being here today. And I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Luria is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you. And General Wolters, I wanted to 
shift back to the discussion that some of my colleagues brought 
up earlier about naval presence in the EUCOM theater. And I had 
an opportunity to discuss this specifically a little bit 
yesterday with General VanHerck with--relative to the Arctic 
and kind of how the forces are allocated when we look at the 
Arctic. And having three combatant commanders whose geographic 
areas converge on that area.
    So essentially with USINDOPACOM, they have a large number 
of forces assigned, ``forces for'' [Forces for Unified 
Commands]. You have some naval forces assigned, but not 
particularly attributed to that mission, more in tune with 
conducting ballistic missile defense and operating in the 
Mediterranean. And USNORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] has zero 
naval forces assigned by the ``forces for'' document. Can you 
first describe any additional needs you feel that you have for 
naval forces? I know you mentioned two destroyers earlier. But 
specifically with regards to the Arctic. And then furthermore, 
do you have any concerns about the command and control--the 
operability for sort of a unified command when countering 
threats in the Arctic because of the three combatant commanders 
having geographic areas that intersect in basically one 
theater?
    General Wolters. Well, Congresswoman, with respect to the 
command and control between the three U.S. combatant 
commanders, I am very comfortable. We have operated for decades 
across unified command plan boundaries and we understand ADCON 
[administrative control], OPCON [operational control], and 
TACON [tactical control].
    As far as needs in the region are concerned, from a U.S. 
perspective, as you well know through many of your initiatives, 
we have worked with the Coast Guard and we plan on going the 
direction of the addition of six additional icebreakers in the 
future. And I think that is very, very important.
    And my request with respect to the two DDGs [guided-missile 
destroyers] has everything to do with the Arctic and what is on 
the periphery with respect to what happens in the Greenland-
Iceland-U.K. Gap. I am very pleased with the European nations' 
increase in involvement in the Arctic region. The Northern Sea 
Route is very precious to them. It is a treasure that--the 
nations understand that we need to protect it and they are 
getting very, very involved with respect to establishing 
military plans to assist in that cause. So I think the campaign 
momentum with respect to U.S. activities, all the plans that 
all the U.S. services have just recently completed for the 
Arctic strategy, as well as codifying plans on behalf of our 
allies and partners to assist, is very helpful.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you. And can you clarify, are you looking 
for two additional destroyers to be permanently assigned to the 
EUCOM AOR [area of responsibility] or are you looking for 
rotational forces that would deploy from elsewhere on the east 
coast?
    General Wolters. It is a request for permanent, ma'am.
    Mrs. Luria. Permanent. So then it wouldn't be two on 
station all the time, it will be a rotational force that is 
forward deployed to the European theater?
    General Wolters. We currently have a set number of four and 
the request is for two additional and we have infrastructure in 
place to be able to house all six in Rota, Spain.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. I understand that. So going back to the 
multiple combatant commanders who intersect in the Arctic 
theater. My question is about 2nd Fleet. So the Navy recently, 
you know, a few years back stood up 2nd Fleet again and when 
Admiral Richardson announced the re-establishment of 2nd Fleet, 
he said that this was a fleet that would operate seamlessly 
from the east coast of the United States to the Barents Sea. 
And that covers two theaters, so the NORTHCOM AOR and part of 
the EUCOM AOR. And then recently the Harry S. Truman operated 
above the Arctic Circle doing exercises and I understand that 
they were under USEUCOM command during that exercise.
    Does the current arrangement with 2nd Fleet being a 
numbered fleet that spans two combatant command AORs, do you 
see any operational concerns with that arrangement?
    General Wolters. We are very comfortable with that 
arrangement and it is done in other domains often. And 2nd 
Fleet coupled with JFC [Joint Force Command] Norfolk that I 
know you are familiar with Congresswoman, we've worked out the 
C2 relationships and supporting construct and I am very 
comfortable with the path that we are currently on.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay, and just with the little time remaining, 
other than the request for two additional DDGs, do you feel 
that you have received adequate naval presence in the EUCOM AOR 
to meet all of your missions on a regular basis?
    General Wolters. We could still use some more support in 
undersea activity and I would adore the chance to talk to that 
in a separate venue.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Thank you. I yield back the time 
remaining.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I wanted to give 
our witnesses the opportunity to just discuss the importance of 
air dominance in Europe.
    General Wolters. Congressman, I will take a stab at that 
because it is near and dear to my heart. It is a campaign 
imperative to ensure that we can comprehensively defend and 
share our responses and achieve effective deterrence in Europe. 
And it will dramatically improve with the addition of the 
United States F-35s that start coming in to the United Kingdom 
in the fall of 2021.
    Mr. Gaetz. And I know that when we make decisions about air 
platforms, we are often analyzing the entourage effect, how the 
F-35 can make the rest of the fighting force more capable. As 
the F-35 starts to really take its position as the dominant air 
platform in Europe with our allies, can we expect that they 
will be able to scale and do more in their own defense as a 
consequence of that entourage effect that we seem to analyze 
very closely in our own fighting force?
    General Wolters. Absolutely, Congressman. We have 81 F-35s 
in continent as we speak. We anticipate that we will get to 450 
by 2030. The F-35's contribution at the tactical level and its 
ability to achieve access is unequaled to anywhere in the 
world, but its contributions at the strategic level for 
indications and warnings, command and control, and lethality 
from a mission command standpoint are daunting.
    Mr. Gaetz. Obviously, the chairman mentioned we are all 
concerned about Turkey and their S-400 purchase. Is there 
another shoe that we expect to drop? Is there anything you 
picked up at the mil-to-mil level that should give us cause for 
concern that U.S. products, U.S. capabilities are diminished in 
the attractiveness to some of our partners?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I haven't. The mil-to-mil 
relationship that I have with Turkey at this moment remains 
very strong.
    Mr. Gaetz. With any other of our partner nations, are there 
any places where you see that we might ought to give particular 
focus or attention when it comes to ensuring interoperability 
and capability with U.S. warfighters in Europe?
    General Wolters. We work that every day, Congressman. I 
think that is a requirement 24/7/365 [24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week, 365 days a year]. I think what we have done recently with 
respect to the codification of actual plans at the strategic 
level and at the national level is a forcing function to allow 
nations to ultimately establish requirements. And that in 
itself has been very, very helpful so that we don't have 
unnecessary duplicity and the alignment of our hardware and 
software and troopers is what it needs to be to better generate 
peace. I think we are traversing in the right direction. And 
truthfully, Congressman, a big contributor in this area has 
been the Europe Deterrence Initiative to get after these 
issues.
    Mr. Gaetz. I appreciate that. I just would give you a 
chance if you thought there was any other area where we ought 
to have this focus because I know in Armed Services, we had a 
number of discussions about Turkey's decision before it arose 
and maybe we should have done more to ensure that that was the 
right decision. But it seems as though you are saying there is 
not something with that level of acuity that we ought to be 
concerned about. If there is, I would ask that you provide that 
to our office as part of the record.
    I thank the chairman, and I yield back.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 99.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Jacobs is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chair and thank you to the 
witnesses for being here.
    We are currently seeing a rise in illiberal and 
authoritarian states throughout Europe. I know there has been a 
lot of talk about Turkey, but we also have seen authoritarian 
cases in Poland and Hungary and some of these governments are 
no longer being reliable or helpful partners. I know we have 
already talked about the F-35 program with Turkey.
    But Ms. Cooper, I was wondering in your assessment, how 
does the Biden administration plan to update its military 
partnerships for alliances with states that take repeated 
actions that go directly against our core interests and are 
these authoritarian developments being considered as the 
Department works to implement its plan to realign the force 
posture in Europe?
    I am particularly interested in Poland where we have our 
rotating armored brigade combat team.
    Ms. Cooper. Thank you. I would say that the Biden 
administration's policies regarding democracy and regarding the 
promotion of U.S. values are very strong. And so this is 
something that we feel not just over at the State Department 
and Foggy Bottom, but at the Pentagon. So in general, this is 
an important focus for the administration.
    With respect to specific alliance relationships, we are 
still working very hard in the context of the NATO alliance to 
forge strong capabilities and a strong ability to deter Russian 
aggression and respond should Russia proceed with aggression. 
And that is where our NATO-related mil-to-mil investments 
occur. And in the case of Poland specifically, we do have this 
rotational presence that we are continuing with.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And on the question of Russia, the 
question for both Ms. Cooper and General Wolters is why you 
think sanctions are going to work on Russia since we have put 
them on in the past and it has not been effective in deterring 
Russian hacking. If anything, the problem has gotten worse.
    And I understand if we need to go into more detail in the 
classified briefing later, but just wondering what the 
rationale is for continuing a process of sanctions that seemed 
to me, at least, fairly ineffective to this point.
    Ms. Cooper. Thank you, Congresswoman. I would urge Members 
of Congress to take a close look at the specific sanctions that 
we are releasing today because the details in the package, I 
think, do speak to a level of clarity of purpose and clarity of 
messaging that perhaps we have not always had.
    In terms of the new Executive order that President Biden is 
signing, this will enable us to have a tool that we can use not 
just today, but also in the future to message our deterrence of 
future Russian malign activities, so I do think it is important 
to look at the specifics.
    But it is not just sanctions. I mean we are not just doing 
sanctions and it is coupled with other measures to include 
today we are proceeding with the expulsion of 10 Russian 
officers in the United States. And most importantly, it 
revolves around alliance unity. I was very encouraged to see 
that it wasn't just the voice of the United States today 
calling out Russian malign actions. It was also NATO, because 
we have a NATO statement that was issued today. So we are all 
standing together unified. This is something that Russia does 
notice and that can, I think, in the future deter their malign 
behavior.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. General, anything to add there?
    General Wolters. Congresswoman, anything we can do to 
continue to curb malign behavior on behalf of Russia and 
improve our deterrence posture, I am in support of.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And with that, Mr. Chair, I will 
yield back my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I appreciate you both 
being here and as a 30-year Air Force guy, I am real proud of 
General Wolters and all the great work you are doing.
    My first question is dealing with the Baltics. With what we 
are seeing with what the Russians are doing with Ukraine and 
Georgia, what can we do more to assure deterrence with our 
great allies in the Baltics? And part of that, would you 
consider having a permanent U.S. force in the Baltics to make 
that deterrence more assured? And I defer to either one.
    General Wolters. Sir, great question. Number one, I think 
the glide path that we are on with enhanced forward presence 
has been very successful. And I know you are familiar with it 
and I know you visited. It affords the NATO nations to lead 
from the front and participate to a greater degree.
    I believe that the current rotational presence that we have 
back and forth from a U.S. perspective with respect to Poland 
and what we do with the other nations, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, is about right. It continues to promote all 
involvement for many of our allies and partners and the success 
that we are having with those battalion-sized battle groups in 
each one of those four nations possessing the capability to 
inherit and input all-domain data is improving our ability to 
adequately deter in that region.
    Mr. Bacon. I am the co-chair of the Baltic Security Caucus, 
so we put a lot of time on this. I just fear, if we ever have 
conflict in Europe it is going to probably evolve around the 
Baltic States, so I just think we have to be so careful to 
ensure there is no miscalculation by the Russians there. So 
obviously I am for strengthening our deterrence capabilities 
there and leaving any ambiguity out when it comes to that.
    To the Russian gas question, there are some bases that are 
reliant on Russian gas. And the reason I know that, we put it 
in law that services have to ask for a waiver to do it and we 
know the Army has done that. So for example, the new hospital 
being built in Germany will be using Russian gas.
    Does it concern either one of you or what we can do about 
this? Because I think it is when the Russians can just turn off 
the gas, we have got a problem.
    General Wolters. It does, Congressman, and I am very 
familiar with Rhine Ordnance Barracks Hospital and the 
construction project, having commanded the air component at 
Ramstein being part and parcel to that equation.
    I think we have to continue with the demanding customer 
that we have been up to this point to purge it out of the 
system and our reliance on that should ultimately be a campaign 
that drives this to zero.
    Mr. Bacon. I know you have already talked to some F-35 
questions here, but I have got to follow up on it. I was just 
reading that some of the training, we are looking at 20 to 1 
kill ratios. I even saw one where it was 100 to 1.
    Would you say the F-35 is unmatched in its capability in 
your theater?
    General Wolters. Yes.
    Mr. Bacon. Now there have been some folks who want to cut 
the F-35 program. What is the impact to your theater if the F-
35 program is reduced in production?
    General Wolters. It will reduce our campaign momentum to 
more effectively see the environment from an indications and 
warning standpoint, command and control, and provide feedback 
as to what is taking place in the environment.
    And from a lethality perspective, the ability to put 
potential targets at risk will be weakened.
    Mr. Bacon. Have you flown in the F-35?
    General Wolters. I have flown the F-22. I have not flown 
the F-35.
    Mr. Bacon. I was just curious because you can compare and 
contrast it perhaps if you had.
    I have got a minute left, so I want to ask one other 
question on electronic warfare. Four years ago, we took stock 
over electronic warfare. We were behind Russia and China. We 
stepped away from it in the mid-90s. We put a lot of emphasis 
in this committee on trying to get this on track.
    Are you seeing the work bearing fruit over the last 4 
years? Are we rightsizing our electronic warfare program?
    General Wolters. Congressman, we are improving, probably 
not at a rate that pleases you or I. And the acquisition and 
the proliferation of the F-35 will actually help in that arena.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I yield back and I appreciate you 
both.
    The Chairman. I do apologize for this, but I'm going to use 
the chair's prerogative to follow up a little bit.
    What impact, I mean the F-35, $38,000 an hour. Right now, 
we wanted to get it at $25,000 an hour. Its mission-ready 
capability is sub 50 percent at the moment and by 2030, the 
engine is requiring so much repairs that roughly half the fleet 
won't be able to go just because we don't have the facilities 
to repair the engines because we won't have enough engines.
    If that is the capability that you are getting, $38,000 an 
hour, 33 percent to 40 percent capability rate, sinking down 
because it doesn't have a functioning engine, how will that 
impact your ability to do what you need to do in Europe?
    General Wolters. Congressman, that will certainly have an 
impact. We weigh it all together given what effect can be 
delivered in the battlespace, but obviously it would have an 
impact.
    The Chairman. So it would be helpful if this committee 
would put pressure on those making the F-35 to actually deliver 
the product that they told us they were going to deliver at the 
price that they told us that they were going to deliver it at. 
And it would not be helpful to simply give them a free pass on 
those important issues.
    General Wolters. Chairman, I applaud your efforts up to 
this point in that category and I don't argue with any of those 
points.
    The Chairman. I appreciate that. That was more rhetorical 
than anything, but that is what I hope this committee will do. 
The platform is fantastic. There isn't any question about that. 
We are right now not getting what we are paying for and that is 
not good for defense and it certainly isn't good for the 
taxpayer.
    With that, I will yield to Ms. Strickland for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Chairman Smith. I would like to 
talk a bit about protecting service members and their families 
when they are deployed, especially given how the Kremlin and 
other adversaries are targeting them with misinformation and 
disinformation.
    So I understand that when service members are deployed in 
EUCOM's AOR, the Russian disinformation campaigns are 
especially interested in service members and their families. 
Can you discuss, as much as you can in this open setting, what 
EUCOM is doing to combat disinformation, how we are educating 
service members, and how we are improving their awareness of 
this possibility? Thank you.
    General Wolters. Thanks, Congresswoman. That is a great 
question. Again, we have instituted programs with the 
assistance of Special Operations Command that start at the very 
top of the strategic level to go after malign influence and 
misinformation to Active Duty members, reservists, guardsmen, 
and their dependents.
    The operations influence platform is specifically designed 
to target misinformation at the strategic and operational 
levels from Russia. And we have got a follow-on program called 
WebOps that takes it even further to make sure that there is a 
heightened awareness on behalf of all of the military members 
and the dependents in the EUCOM AOR about the malign influence 
from the information domain with respect to Russia.
    Ms. Strickland. Thank you. Ms. Cooper.
    Ms. Cooper. Well, I can just add to this at the strategic 
level in terms of the whole-of-government effort that we have 
to counter Russian disinformation. And actually, this is 
something that General Wolters plays a leadership role in 
because he is the co-chair with the State Department of the 
Russia Influence Group. And so even as we are dealing with 
these issues at the local level, at the installation level, at 
the individual level, at the strategic level our focus is on 
improving whole-of-government coordination to address Russia 
disinformation.
    Ms. Strickland. Right, and can you talk a bit more about 
the families because sometimes they can be vulnerable, 
especially when their loved ones are deployed?
    General Wolters. We have had the luxury of hosting families 
in Europe for decades and decades and this is a constant 
challenge just to make sure that the military members conduct 
town hall meetings at the commander level and the lower levels 
to ensure that there is no degree of satisfaction when just the 
military member is informed. The mission isn't completed until 
the rest of the family members are. And we obviously use 21st 
century means to get that word out.
    But it is like anything, Congresswoman, you have to rebrief 
the same subject about 10 times to convince yourself that the 
word is actually out and we find ourselves in situations to 
where we have to be comprehensive from a town hall perspective 
to make sure that we can go person-to-person to get the word 
and it has been a little bit challenging as a result of COVID-
19 conditions and I think this is driving a lot of your 
questions. And we have worked very hard to conduct town hall 
meetings with restrictions applied from a COVID perspective and 
are having success.
    Ms. Strickland. Well, great. Thank you for that. And we 
know that, in general, messages start the thinking when we do 
repeat them, so I appreciate your repetition strategy. That is 
all I have. I yield back my time, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I don't think your microphone is on.
    Mr. Waltz. How are we doing now? There we are. All right.
    Thank you for both being here. I want to talk to you about 
our European partners', our NATO partners' significant 
contributions to Afghanistan over the last couple of decades. 
And Ms. Cooper and I have spent many, many efforts working with 
them to live up to those contributions and live up to those 
pledges and fortunately, actually, had more troops on the 
ground than the United States until the announcement yesterday.
    I am hearing from many of my colleagues and then also 
reading about grumbling and discontent and concern, frankly, 
from--particularly from the Czechs, the Belgians, some of the 
Eastern European states and those that were affected so 
directly by the precipitous pullout of Iraq when ISIS [the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] then came charging to the 
fore. We had a caliphate the size of Indiana, attacks into and 
around Europe and the European capitals.
    The intelligence community has been clear that terrorism 
loves a vacuum. Al-Qaida is very likely to take advantage of 
that vacuum in the wake of our withdrawal. What are you hearing 
from a military standpoint and also to your military-to-
military contacts on the civilian side? Are those concerns 
mirroring what I am hearing in terms of Europe's safety, number 
one, but then number two, our ability to effect a CT 
[counterterrorism] fight over, when this term over the horizon 
noting the differences, our basing options in and around Iraq 
are very different and far greater than they are without Bagram 
in Afghanistan?
    General Wolters. First and foremost, Congressman, and I 
know you appreciate this. As the United States, we are 
incredibly grateful for the contributions of all the nations. 
And secondly, with this being an order, we will conduct a 
deliberate, very well synchronized, and very safe, from a force 
protection standpoint, withdrawal.
    Yesterday, as you may have heard, at the North Atlantic 
Council, the Secretary General convened all of the members of 
the alliance to include the partner nations that have an impact 
in the region and the support was resounding for enactment of 
the withdrawal.
    Ms. Cooper. And Congressman, I would just add that kind of 
at the policy level, for the feedback that I have heard from my 
colleagues who have been traveling with the Secretary and were 
there in Brussels for this meeting is a sense of appreciation 
by allies for the manner in which we have consulted with them 
since the beginning of this administration to take into account 
their perspectives, to have Secretary Austin and Secretary 
Biden personally engaging with them in person. And also, the 
sense that they also have been reflecting on the way ahead and 
concerned about the future of the mission even before this. And 
I think moving forward----
    Mr. Waltz. So Ms. Cooper, yes, go ahead. That is the part I 
want to talk about, moving forward.
    Ms. Cooper. I think moving forward, the expectation--and I 
think it is an expectation that we will absolutely meet--is for 
this very close consultation process to continue every step of 
the way so that we are working on this with all plans and we 
are executing it absolutely together as an alliance.
    Mr. Waltz. Our European partners will be the first to feel 
the consequences of this decision, if history bears true in 
what they felt with the withdrawal of Iraq and the ISIS 
caliphate. So I certainly hope those consultations are ongoing, 
but I do not see a plan in place and basing options for 
continuing the counterterrorism operations. Are the Europeans 
planning to participate in those operations with us as they 
have in Syria? What is the plan?
    General Wolters. We will start and conduct a synchronized 
withdrawal and the intention of the European nations is 
obviously by, with, and through those nations to be determined.
    Mr. Waltz. Okay, so the plan is TBD, to be determined. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Veasey is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. General 
Wolters, can you talk a little bit about Russia's military 
modernization program and what modernization efforts are most 
important for us to focus on to reduce operational risk in your 
command?
    General Wolters. The one that is of most concern, 
Congressman, is the long-range missile capability. And we at 
NATO are very focused on that. We certainly from a U.S. 
perspective are focused on that. And the key for us is to 
continue to improve our ability from an indications and 
warnings standpoint and from a command and control standpoint 
to make sure that we can characterize the environment and be 
able to respond. That is probably the biggest concern, 
Congressman.
    Mr. Veasey. Thank you very much. Last week, I was at a 
rollout ceremony in Fort Worth with the Danish military 
receiving F-35s and as you know, they are obviously one of our 
key allies and participants in the F-35 program. And I was just 
wondering what was your opinion on the F-35s and the impact 
that it has had both militarily and diplomatically with our 
allies in the region?
    General Wolters. Congressman, we are very fond of the F-35 
because of its contributions to indications and warnings, and 
command and control, and lethality. The nations in Europe have 
been very happy with the product. We actually have just over 80 
F-35s, non-U.S., in Europe as we speak. And we will soon get 
U.S. F-35s to the United Kingdom in the fall timeframe. And we 
are currently programmed to go up to approximately 450 F-35s by 
2030 throughout all of Europe. We are very pleased with its 
performance and we are very pleased with its contributions to 
deterrence.
    Mr. Veasey. And I hate to ask you to go back too far into 
the history vault, but with other platforms where there have 
been issues, and that the military has had to work with to 
perfect, whether it has been a plane, a helicopter, you know, 
battleship, regardless of what it is, for the mission that you 
need for F-35s to perform for you right now, and you go back 
and you look at other platforms where you have also had to work 
with them until they could, you know, perform at the rate that 
you wanted them to, where do you see this platform at right now 
versus, again, just other problems in the past that you had to 
correct?
    I mean I remember when I was at the beginning of the V-22, 
for instance, that there were some serious issues with that. 
But Bell Helicopter eventually got that right and it has gone 
on to become a good platform for the Marines and other 
branches. And so could you just sort of touch on that a little 
bit?
    General Wolters. Congressman, the other platforms that I 
have seen during my service in the military, we have had the 
same experiences. And if I were to rate the F-35 with others, I 
would just tell you that they are similar.
    Mr. Veasey. Okay, well, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, 
I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Bice is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The questions I have 
may be better served in the classified hearing, but I'll go 
ahead and just throw them out there now. I really want to hear, 
we've talked a lot about the F-35, and, certainly, I can maybe 
ask some additional questions, but I really would like to know 
about how you were battling the cyber issues that are happening 
with our adversaries, especially as it relates to what is 
happening in that part of the region.
    General Wolters. Congresswoman, I think the question had to 
do with malign influence on behalf of adversaries with respect 
to cyber; is that correct?
    Mrs. Bice. That is correct.
    General Wolters. I'll just start out by saying that the 
posture in Europe has improved significantly. As far as the 
organizations that we have, from a USEUCOM perspective, we have 
a Joint Cyber Center; I have an integrated planning element; 
and with my SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] hat, I 
have a SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Partners Europe] 
Cyber Operations Center. And those three organizations come to 
a total of about 150 individuals.
    On top of that, that we have cyber protection teams in the 
United States manned by the United States Army at Fort Gordon. 
And many of the nations in Europe today are forming cyber 
organizations from a military perspective. And I believe that 
because several years ago the United States made the decision 
to establish one military commander for cyber, the USCYBERCOM 
[United States Cyber Command] commander, our direction and 
guidance has been much clearer with much less ambiguity, and 
the command and control and the organization of our units is 
much better.
    So we're improving, and the NATO nations are watching that 
improvement and they are following in suit, and we are seeing a 
marked good improvement on behalf of our NATO militaries to 
improve our effectiveness, number one to better defend our 
network and then, number two, worry about the other aspects of 
cyber after that, once they're convinced that their nations and 
their militaries and their whole of governments have an 
effective network defense.
    Ms. Cooper. And if I may, I think it might be helpful to 
offer a national level perspective on this cyber question, and 
I think the SolarWinds response that we announced today is 
really a microcosm of how we handle cyber issues at the 
national level.
    There's a piece of this that relates to specifically 
disrupting and imposing costs on Russian cyber actors, so what 
you're seeing today is that we are sanctioning six specific 
Russian companies that support the Russian intelligence 
service. This is the SVR. So we're actually sanctioning these 
specific companies.
    Then you also see an element of this that relates to 
raising awareness and providing the private sector with the 
information and tools they need to be able to protect 
themselves, so there's an aspect of that with the SolarWinds 
response. And then there's building partner capacity piece 
where we're working with our allies and partners to help them 
become more resilient, and we have expanded our own Cyber Flag 
exercise that is one of our premier cyber exercises to include 
several allies as part of this response.
    Mrs. Bice. And a follow-up to that. Do you feel like it 
would be in our best interest to invest more in this specific 
space to help mitigate some of the [inaudible].
    Ms. Cooper. I would say this is, again, this is a whole-of-
government space, so I think we have to be looking at not just 
the Defense Department but at our civilian agency counterparts 
and their investments in this space.
    And then it's also about the private sector. We have to 
partner with the private sector, we have to share information 
with the private sector, and we also have to encourage the 
private sector to make themselves more resilient. That's also 
why today we are reaching out to the private sector and 
encouraging U.S. and international companies to not rely on 
Russian software providers, Russian IT [information technology] 
companies, because this can lead to a critical vulnerability.
    Mrs. Bice. We may want to add China to that, as well. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. We have four people left 
and 10 minutes. The math doesn't quite add up, but if those 
four people move through quickly, we hopefully will be able to 
get to all four. But we do have to stop at 1:20.
    With that announcement, Mr. Panetta is recognized.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 
that. And thanks to our witnesses for being here and, of 
course, your service.
    Look, in November of 2020, I got to say I and a number of 
other of my colleagues were absolutely disappointed by the 
withdrawal of the United States from the Open Skies Treaty, 
which, basically, we saw the consequences of Russia 
withdrawing, as well. I think some of the best examples of the 
benefits of the Open Skies Treaty were in 2014 when we were 
able to confirm the deployment of thousands of troops, Russian 
troops, near the Ukrainian border, as well as in 2018 when we 
conducted a flight following the unprovoked Russian attack of 
Ukrainian vessels in the Kerch Strait.
    I do believe that the treaty is worth it based not only on 
the images but to the value that our allies have in it, 
especially our Eastern European partners and friends. That's 
why I introduced the Open Skies Stability Act to let our allies 
know that we in Congress felt that way about the Open Skies 
Treaty and the value that it brings to the stability and peace, 
especially in Europe.
    My question to you is what do you feel the future is of the 
Open Skies Treaty for the remaining 32 members, and does it 
serve a purpose without the participation of the United States 
and Russia?
    Ms. Cooper. I will attempt to answer this quickly, 
Congressman, given the time, but this is actually a very 
complex subject. And since it was actually my office that led 
the charge on that flight that you mentioned over Ukraine after 
the Kerch Strait attack, this is near and dear to my heart.
    What I will say to you is that, first of all, we have been 
very open to consultations with allies and partners on the 
range of conventional arms control requirements and concerns, 
to include the Open Skies Treaty, and we have, the Biden 
administration has reached out to allies to open this dialogue 
as the administration considers the way forward on all arms 
control agreements. So I think that's very important to note, 
and I think that's something that allies have appreciated.
    I will say, though, that, from an intelligence value, the 
Open Skies Treaty does have very limited intelligence value for 
the United States. And even in that instance that I was very 
proud of actually where we had that imagery following the Kerch 
Strait attack, we haven't necessarily been able to capitalize 
on the benefits of those opportunities.
    So at this point, you know, we are in consultation with 
allies. We know that Russia values flying over the U.S. 
homeland as part of the treaty, and I certainly can't speak to 
whether Russia would actually come back into compliance, which 
is really the core issue here. Russia has given us no 
indication that it would be willing to come back into 
compliance.
    Mr. Panetta. General Wolters.
    General Wolters. Congressman, I concur with Laura Cooper's 
comments on the consultation with allies, and I've received the 
same reflections. Thank you.
    Mr. Panetta. Fair enough. Knowing that, I yield the 
remainder of my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Franklin is recognized.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 
witnesses here this morning. You covered a lot of ground on the 
UNCLASS [unclassified] level, and I do have some things I want 
to dive into deeper.
    But just quickly for General Wolters, we haven't discussed 
sealift, strategic sealift. It's often an area that gets 
overlooked. But could you talk a little bit about the role 
strategic sealift plays in our efforts to deter Russia, an 
assessment of our capabilities, and do we have the tools 
necessary for you to implement strategy in EUCOM AOR.
    General Wolters. We do, Congressman. But it relies on 
advanced warning, and, as you know, our TRANSCOM [United States 
Transportation Command] commander works these issues every 
second of the day. We were able to test sealift to a certain 
degree with Defender-Europe 20. We didn't get the full, 
complete test.
    We certainly have some challenges. But when we have good 
indications and warnings, and we can move our operations 
farther and farther to the left of supply, we can typically 
wind up putting ourselves in the position to where we can put 
resources where they need to be to be effective. And right now, 
for what is required on the European continent, we can be 
effective.
    General Wolters. Very good. Thank you General. Mr. 
Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, very, 
very good witnesses. Thank you for the testimony. Ms. Cooper, 
thank you. Particularly delighted to see the sanctions coming 
at a very, very important moment having to do with Ukraine and 
other things that Russia up to now, let alone what they've been 
doing in the past, a very good message.
    My recollection is that every year or every other year the 
Russians do an exercise in the western part of their country, 
north one year, south the next year. This is the south year?
    General Wolters. It is, Congressman.
    Mr. Garamendi. Okay. I want to--I don't expect an answer 
now, but I want in detail because of the work that we need to 
do in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], the 
posture in Europe with regard to EDI and the specific MILCON 
[military construction] and other issues. Some $1.7 billion was 
removed last year and the year before in that area. Do we 
replace it or not? It's a long answer, and I'll take it in--
yes, General.
    General Wolters. Thirty-six projects at $1.6 billion, and 
we're working very, very hard to execute 34 of the 36, but, 
obviously, it depends on future budget. We're on course to go 
that direction.
    Mr. Garamendi. Very good. We need the details.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 99.]
    Mr. Garamendi. Also, President Trump said he was going to 
move a whole lot of things out of Europe and into Europe and 
other places. Has that been reversed? If so, what do we do and 
where does the future go? Ms. Cooper.
    Ms. Cooper. Thank you very much, Congressman. I will just 
say that, on posture in general, there is the global posture 
review that is kicking off right now in the Pentagon. And so we 
will be studying all of these issues, global posture, and this 
summer we will have the Biden administration's conclusions. But 
with respect specifically to Europe, President Biden did lift 
the troop cap. In Germany, he announced that at the Munich 
Security Conference. And then we were talking earlier today 
about the 500 additional forces that Secretary Austin just 
announced for Germany.
    Mr. Garamendi. I understand there are many other things 
also in play, so your timing doesn't quite work out with our 
timing. So let's coordinate our timing with regard to these 
issues.
    Finally, the issue of NATO, it appears as though there is a 
sea change from disrespecting NATO to respecting NATO and 
working with NATO; is that correct?
    Ms. Cooper. The Biden administration has been very clear 
that NATO and alliances are central to its policy. And I think 
our allies have responded very appreciatively.
    Mr. Garamendi. General, would you like to comment?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I've seen no breakdown in 
trust of our NATO nations with the United States.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson is recognized.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General Wolters, 
it's an honor to be with you, and I particularly appreciate it. 
I'm the grateful son of a Flying Tiger who served in India and 
China during World War II, and I know the difference you can 
make on behalf of promoting freedom and liberty.
    Additionally, I'm very grateful that I had led a 
delegation, General, to Poland in 2017. I was there with, 
gratefully, with Congressman Garamendi. And in Poland visiting 
with our personnel in Operation Atlantic Resolve, it's been so 
inspiring. And that has a personal connection, too. My 
daughter-in-law, Jennifer Miskowicz, her heritage is Krakow, 
Poland. And so to see us working together with our Polish 
allies, how important it is.
    And what is the most recent progress that has been made 
with the joint declaration that we have with our headquarters 
and possibly to have a headquarters unit in Poland?
    General Wolters. Congressman, all those efforts with the 
enhanced defense cooperation agreement with Poland are in work. 
We've received tremendous contributions from Poland with 
respect to working some of our construction projects, and we're 
very excited about the status of the V Corps command post 
coming in and Poland's willingness to work on their 
infrastructure to receive our rotational forces and the 
improvements that they've made on their ranges.
    So we are traversing in a very good direction with Poland.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, it's so inspiring to be there and visit 
with our Polish allies.
    For Secretary Cooper, I'm so pleased with the Biden 
administration indicating a clear association with our allies 
of Ukraine and also Moldova. Additionally, Poland, Georgia, 
working with Romania and Bulgaria. I appreciate the President's 
restatement of our appreciation in all of these countries.
    And with that, what can we do to be more effective in our 
working with our allies of Eastern Europe?
    Ms. Cooper. Congressman, I think that we are on the right 
track to work with our allies, both to build their capacity to 
be able to be resilient against their near threat, Russia, but 
also to be interoperable with U.S. forces and with NATO.
    So I feel like we have the right mix of train-and-equip 
programs. We also need to be vocal in our support of them. 
Right now, with the pressure the Ukraine is facing, Ukraine has 
really appreciated not just the fact that we're providing them 
with tremendous high-quality equipment and high-quality 
training but the fact that we're publicly vocal in our support 
of their sovereignty.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you for your efforts. And it's been 
inspiring to visit Novo Selo, the joint NATO Bulgarian-American 
base. It's exciting to see our allies working together. Thank 
you for your service. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. We are a couple of minutes over 
time here, and we've got to get over for the classified 
briefing. So I just want to close with one quick thing, and 
that is I really want to thank the staff. You know, we've made 
a couple of jokes about the technological issues here. It's not 
easy, and the staff has really made this work in a way that has 
been enormously helpful. So I really appreciate the 
technological wizards who have enabled us to continue to do the 
hybrid hearings the way we've done them and appreciate you 
sitting through all that. And we'll give you just a brief 
little break before we reconvene at 2:00 in the CVC.
    With that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:21 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 15, 2021

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 15, 2021

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]       

      
   

      
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             April 15, 2021

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             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Ms. Cooper. DOD continues to work with its partners within the U.S. 
Government to refine and improve the process for quickly attributing 
foreign malign cyber activities against the United States, including 
providing declassified evidence to support our attribution when that 
can be done without compromising intelligence sources and methods.   
[See page 15.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
    Ms. Cooper. We seek cooperation with Turkey on common priorities, 
including on countering Russian ambitions in the Black Sea region. We 
have a strong interest in keeping Turkey aligned with the transatlantic 
alliance on such critical issues. In the Black Sea, Turkey attempts to 
balance several competing interests. These include Turkey's regional 
ambitions, its NATO commitments, its desire to accommodate Russia in 
some cases and to counter Russia's growing military posture in other 
cases, and its long-term interest in promoting multilateral cooperation 
with other Black Sea states, including several NATO Allies and Turkey's 
growing bilateral cooperation with Ukraine. U.S. access, basing, and 
overflight in Turkey, including at Incirlik Air Base, remain important 
for supporting emergent U.S., NATO, and Coalition requirements and 
missions in the region, including the Bomber Task Force mission in 
Europe and the Black Sea region. On February 9, U.S. and Turkish forces 
conducted a bilateral joint maritime and air exercises in the Black 
Sea. The uptick in joint military efforts is a bright spot 
demonstrating our continued bilateral cooperation and the maintenance 
of our critical military-to-military relationship.   [See page 19.]
    General Wolters. Turkey remains a strategic U.S. Ally, critical to 
NATO and U.S. interests in Europe, Eurasia, North Africa, and the 
Middle East. Turkey possesses the Alliance's second largest military 
and contributes to NATO missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and the 
Mediterranean Sea. Turkey retains a pivotal role in countering Russia, 
and despite limited but high profile dealings, the two are competitors 
in multiple regions, whose relationship remains transactional. As 
reaffirmed by Turkey's President Erdogan in April 2021, Turkey is 
committed to impartially enforcing the 1936 Montreux Convention, which 
enshrined Turkey's control of maritime traffic through the Dardanelles, 
Bosporus, and Sea of Marmara.   [See page 19.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ
    General Wolters. We work every day to build a cooperative and 
cohesive approach so our mutual efforts result in increased 
transparency and alignment. NATO plays an important role in creating a 
unified framework to guide Allied force development programs and 
national investments. The European Deterrence Initiative enables EUCOM 
to meet U.S. national security requirements in concert with our Allies 
and Partners. We also particularly appreciate Congress's support to 
theater Security Cooperation programs that support allied and partner 
efforts to achieve critical capabilities, such as Integrated Air and 
Missile Defense in the Baltic region.   [See page 33.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
    General Wolters. Thirty-six (36) European Deterrence Initiative 
military construction projects were deferred. Restoring key projects, 
including strategic logistics storage, airfield upgrades, and staging, 
enhances our speed and posture to execute in crisis. We seek 
restoration for 15 projects. Eight projects ($143M) are ready to 
proceed within 3-6 months upon funding restoration. Two projects ($93M) 
continue with planning & design activities and will be ready in FY22. 
Five projects ($115M) in Norway and Slovakia are pending Defense 
Cooperation Agency resolution and are also expected in FY22. The 
remaining 21 of the original 36 projects are either being funded 
through reprograming, host nations, or are no longer required. The 
highest priority projects for restoration of funds are Airfield 
Upgrades to support P-8A aircraft at Sigonella Naval Air Station 
($23M), Deployable Air Base System-Facilities, Equipment, Vehicles 
Storage ($303M), and Munitions Storage/Handling Areas/Ammo holding area 
($125M).   [See page 43.]

?

      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 15, 2021

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                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

    Mr. Scott. Major General Timothy C. Hanifen, U.S. Marine Corps 
(Retired), wrote an article in the February 2021 edition entitled 
``Revitalize Fleet Search, Rescue, and Recovery Operations.'' Is U.S. 
European Command prepared for mass survivor search, rescue, and 
recovery at sea?
    General Wolters. Yes, through our maritime component Naval Forces 
Europe (NAVEUR), we are capable of responding to mass casualties at sea 
and we are bound to render aid and rescue at sea. We empower our ships 
and aircraft commanders to assist those in distress and take prompt 
action to save human lives. Under the existing international structure, 
we coordinate responses via the regional Maritime Search and Rescue 
Coordination Center, leveraging available NATO, European Union, and 
Partner Nation military and Coast Guard units to provide assistance.
    Mr. Scott. If the U.S. Coast Guard decided to equip their cutters 
with ASW capability, would that be welcomed by EUCOM?
    General Wolters. We welcome ASW capability on any platform in our 
theater. ASW capability enhances our operational readiness and assures 
our Allies and Partners. USEUCOM periodically incorporates Coast Guard 
vessels throughout Europe, and would leverage every capability those 
ships bring into theater.
    Mr. Scott. What would the advantages be to EUCOM if the United 
States paired the Navy's P-8s with the Air Force's B-1s to wage long-
range anti-submarine and surface warfare strikes?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM benefits from the joint efforts by the 
Services when able to conduct multi-domain tactical operations. We 
defer to the Services to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures 
and any option to improve our speed and ability to deter at range in 
the maritime domain would add value in generating peace.
    Mr. Scott. How is EUCOM addressing the emerging threat of drones 
and drone swarming tactics?
    General Wolters. Service components deploy Counter-small Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems in the Area of Responsibility at select locations 
coordinated with host nations. We engage host nations to obtain 
appropriate permissions and coordinate to protect host nation and U.S. 
assets and personnel. Additionally, USEUCOM provides updates on 
information, intelligence, tactics, techniques, and procedures to the 
Joint Staff Joint Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Office Working 
Group.
    Mr. Scott. What are EUCOM's capabilities against a drone swarm 
attack? Do we currently have the ability to defeat a drone swarm attack 
and ensure we do not take out our drones?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM deploys Counter small-Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems across the Area of Responsibility to detect, track, and defeat 
small Unmanned Aircraft Systems. We continue enhancing capabilities 
with host nations to defeat drone swarm attacks. USEUCOM works with 
country teams, Offices of Defense Cooperation and Embassy teams to 
refine host nation authorization for enhanced protections against small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems threats.
    Mr. Scott. What is EUCOM working on to defeat adversary drones, 
singles and swarms, today and in the future?
    General Wolters. The USEUCOM team is engaged with the Joint 
Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft System Office (JCO) as the Executive 
Agent for Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft System on technology updates, 
training, and industry advancements to detect, defend and defeat small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Additionally, we continue to engage our host 
nations to coordinate authorizations through spectrum management and 
local laws and regulations.
    Mr. Scott. What are the factors limiting your ability to deploy 
counter-UAS systems in EUCOM?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM deploys Counter small-Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems across the Area of Responsibility to detect, track, and defeat 
small Unmanned Aircraft Systems. We continue enhancing capabilities 
with host nations to defeat small Unmanned Aircraft Systems. We work 
with country teams, Offices of Defense Cooperation and Embassy teams to 
coordinate spectrum management authorizations and refine host nation 
authorizations to better align and enhance protections against small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems threats.
    Mr. Scott. General Wolters, you've noted before that ISR is 
critical to both monitor and deter Russian activity within your AOR. 
How do you assess your current and future ISR needs?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM's ISR allocation executes National Defense 
Strategy priority missions to deter and compete below the threshold of 
armed conflict with moderate risk. We request continued support for 
funding and modernization of airborne and space-based ISR capabilities 
and capacity. Specific regions and capabilities can be amplified in a 
classified venue.
    Mr. Scott. What do you need from Congress to ensure you have the 
ISR resources you need to succeed in your mission?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM benefits with continued support for 
funding and modernization of airborne and space-based ISR capabilities 
and capacity. Sufficient allocation of ISR to meet validated 
requirements supports unambiguous indications and warnings against 
adversary activity, provides critical force protection and threat 
warning to USEUCOM operations, activities, investments, and supports 
overall mission command. Robust policies and technology to support 
imagery and automated data sharing between the U.S. and Allies and 
Partners supports NATO convergence and interoperability.
    Mr. Scott. In 2020, Congress responded to the combatant commanders' 
call for more ISR resources by appropriating $250M for the ISR transfer 
fund, which funded additional ISR activities in the EUCOM AOR. How did 
you leverage these additional resources in 2020? For 2021, the Pentagon 
did not request any funds for the ISR transfer fund and Congress did 
not appropriate any additional funds. How will the lack of ISR transfer 
funds in 2021 impact your mission?
    General Wolters. We leveraged 2020 funds to enhance near-term 
tactical and operational level theater ISR capabilities and modernize 
unmanned systems with greater speed than the PBR cycle affords. These 
efforts improve indication and warning intelligence and support our 
deterrence efforts. Success in 21st century warfare demands that we 
embrace competition and its activities below the threshold of armed 
conflict. In order to win in competition, we must be laser focused in 
maximizing investments in indications and warning, feedback and command 
and control capabilities.
    Mr. Scott. Do you think ABMS and Joint All Domain Command and 
Control will have enough operational capability to fill the ISR gaps 
that JSTARS will not be able to fulfill once it is parked?
    General Wolters. In this era of global power competition, we 
continue to adapt to changes in the operational environment to maintain 
a combat-credible force. Under Joint Staff coordination, Joint all-
domain command and control connects distributed sensors, shooters, and 
data from and in all domains, to all forces, enabling distributed 
mission command at the speed and scale 21st century warfare demands. 
USEUCOM joint and allied warfighters continue to train and demonstrate 
the Advanced Battle Management System's ability to converge assets from 
all domains across the Euro-Atlantic region.
    Mr. Scott. I am a strong supporter of the National Guard's State 
Partnership Program. My home State of Georgia is partnered with the 
country of Georgia in your AOR. Can you talk about the value added by 
the Georgia National Guard to this partnership with the country of 
Georgia?
    General Wolters. Georgia is a friend and key strategic partner of 
the U.S., strengthened by the Georgia National Guard's partnership, 
over 25 years strong. Years of deploying together side-by-side in Iraq 
and Afghanistan have only strengthened our mutual trust and respect. 
The Guard is instrumental in strengthening Georgia's capacity to train 
and operate with our Allies and Partners in exercises such as our Noble 
Partner and Allied spirit as well as in key areas like explosive 
ordnance disposal, cyber-security, and professional development. Future 
partnership activities will continue supporting bilateral efforts 
focused on enabling Georgia to effectively defend its territory, resist 
malign Russian influence, build interoperability with NATO forces, and 
institute defense reforms which further its Euro-Atlantic integration.
    Mr. Scott. Do NATO members have significant security interests in 
the Taiwan Strait?
    General Wolters. Each NATO member state has its own relationship 
with China, with a variety of different concerns and interests, to 
include the status of Taiwan. For U.S. policy, I defer to the 
Department of State and the USINDOPACOM Commander.
    Mr. Scott. Are you satisfied with the level of cooperation between 
the United States and the other 29 NATO countries to deter Communist 
Chinese aggression against Taiwan? If not, what more could our NATO 
allies do to deter Communist Chinese aggression against Taiwan?
    General Wolters. NATO is adopting a global approach and developing 
closer relations with its four Asia-Pacific partners, namely Australia, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. In December 2020, the 
four Asia-Pacific partners participated for the first time in a NATO 
Foreign Ministerial Meeting, discussing the shift in the global balance 
of power and the rise of China. Political dialogue enhances mutual 
situation awareness on security developments in the Euro-Atlantic and 
Asia-Pacific regions. In today's complex security environment, 
relations with like-minded partners across the globe are increasingly 
important to address cross-cutting security issues and global 
challenges, as well as to defend the rules-based international order.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
    Mr. Moulton. While Russia is the most immediate threat in USEUCOM, 
we cannot take our eye off PRC influence in the region. General Wolters 
and Ms. Cooper, you both referred in your testimony to PRC efforts to 
expand access to European infrastructure, including through expanding 
5G networks, and growing awareness about the risks of PRC state-backed 
firms and investment. Where are we still losing ground to China in 
Europe, or not getting that message of risk across? What additional 
tools or efforts does the Department need to properly address this 
threat in Europe?
    Ms. Cooper. The Department regularly engages its allies and 
partners across Europe on the importance of securing sensitive supply 
chains, infrastructure, and technologies from undue influence by malign 
actors, which is critical for our collective security. We have seen 
progress among our European allies and partners, including strengthened 
laws and processes for foreign investment reviews, Memorandums of 
Understanding on 5G security, and other activities. The Department is 
eager to work with our European allies and partners to accelerate 
innovation and support the competitiveness of alternative suppliers. In 
addition, the Department supports focusing controls and restrictions on 
entities that further People's Republic of China (PRC)'s Military-Civil 
Fusion strategy and encourages publicly sharing information about these 
PRC entities with our European allies and partners.
    Mr. Moulton. This administration has made it clear that rebuilding 
international partnerships is a top priority, and this emphasis clearly 
aligns with the Future of Defense Task Force recommendations I made 
last year. In Europe, we have the opportunity to build common ethical 
and responsible standards for tech use with like-minded partners. Ms. 
Cooper, what steps are we taking right now to build those partnerships 
and common standards, and what steps should we take going forward to 
make progress on this topic?
    Ms. Cooper. The United States and its European allies and partners 
are making strides to build common ethical and responsible standards 
for technology use. In February 2021, NATO Defense Ministers endorsed 
NATO's Coherent Implementation Strategy on Emerging and Disruptive 
Technologies, which promotes the development of new technologies to 
maintain our technological edge within the confines of robust 
principles of responsible use. This is a first step in building common 
standards, and we will continue to work with our individual allies and 
partners as well as through multinational institutions like NATO to 
ensure that new technologies are developed and used in a manner 
consistent with our shared values.
    Mr. Moulton. Both the Kremlin and Beijing have subjected NATO 
allies to regular cyber attacks in an effort to undermine our alliance, 
and NATO's response thus far has clearly been insufficient to deter 
further malicious cyber activity. What steps do we need to take to 
modernize NATO in order to sufficiently address this threat to 
infrastructure, operations, IP, and information access and to ensure 
the relevance of the alliance in a contemporary security environment?
    Ms. Cooper. NATO recognizes that cyber threats to the Alliance are 
becoming more frequent and complex, disruptive, and coercive and that 
the Alliance must continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat 
landscape. NATO has taken steps in recent years to recognize cyberspace 
as a domain of operations and to integrate cyber effects, provided 
voluntarily by allies, into Alliance operations and missions. Through 
the Cyber Defense Pledge, NATO Allies undertook to invest in better 
national cyber defenses, which will enhance deterrence through denial. 
In the recent case of the SolarWinds public attribution, NATO issued a 
statement of support for the United States in attributing this 
malicious cyber activity in order to promote accountability for those 
who carry out such actions. NATO is also in the process of updating its 
governance and cybersecurity procedures through a process known as 
``Cyber Adaptation'' to focus on cybersecurity responsibility and 
accountability. Finally, NATO is in the process of updating its 2014 
Enhanced Cyber Defense Policy to enable the Alliance to do more 
collectively to address malicious cyber activities.
    Mr. Moulton. While Russia is the most immediate threat in USEUCOM, 
we cannot take our eye off PRC influence in the region. General Wolters 
and Ms. Cooper, you both referred in your testimony to PRC efforts to 
expand access to European infrastructure, including through expanding 
5G networks, and growing awareness about the risks of PRC state-backed 
firms and investment. Where are we still losing ground to China in 
Europe, or not getting that message of risk across? What additional 
tools or efforts does the Department need to properly address this 
threat in Europe?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM highlights our shared values, interests, 
and equitable business practices with our Allies and Partners and 
distinguish the U.S. as a partner of choice. European nations are 
becoming increasingly aware of, and concerned about, the risks 
associated with Chinese capital investments from the People's Republic 
of China (PRC). We must hold the PRC accountable for its predatory and 
unfair practices and make sure that our technologies are not 
facilitating the PRC's military buildup or human rights abuses. A 
whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, whole-of-alliance approach to 
addressing a free and open globe are critical to sustaining peace in 
the Euro-Atlantic.
    Mr. Moulton. I recently published an op-ed with Dr. Tammy Schultz 
in Time about the vulnerability of our troops to online disinformation, 
much of which stems from Russia, and its impacts on mission readiness, 
in particular the high rate of troops declining the COVID-19 vaccine. 
General Wolters, what are you doing to ensure that troops in USEUCOM 
are able to protect themselves from malicious disinformation, both in 
their ability to recognize information campaigns and ensuring personal 
discipline in what information they share online?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM Operations Security (OPSEC) program and 
annual training requirements provide cyber training and threat 
awareness and response training to enable members to protect themselves 
from potential adversaries and disinformation. USEUCOM, its components, 
and commanders at all levels use installation websites, direct email 
notification, commander led town-halls, social media engagements, and 
unit-led discussions to relay truthful COVID-19 information that is in 
line with both CDC and Department of Defense guidance. This ensures our 
service members and families have access to factual, evidence based 
scientific information to make informed decisions.
    Mr. Moulton. Both the Kremlin and Beijing have subjected NATO 
allies to regular cyber attacks in an effort to undermine our alliance, 
and NATO's response thus far has clearly been insufficient to deter 
further malicious cyber activity. What steps do we need to take to 
modernize NATO in order to sufficiently address this threat to 
infrastructure, operations, IP, and information access and to ensure 
the relevance of the alliance in a contemporary security environment?
    General Wolters. NATO continues to adapt to the evolving cyber 
threat landscape. In 2020, NATO released the Concept for the Deterrence 
and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area. To support this effort, NATO 
bolstered deterrence efforts in cyberspace by establishing a cyberspace 
operations center at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in 
Mons, Belgium. Integrating cyber and information effects in joint U.S.-
NATO exercises enhances transparency and alignment and advances 
security cooperation. These combined efforts contribute to the 
Alliance's ability to address malicious cyber activity in a 21st 
century security environment.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
    Mrs. McClain. ISIS fighters are being repatriated to their home 
countries in Europe from the Middle East. In your view, should our 
European allies take back these ISIS fighters and their families? If 
so, what steps is the administration taking in working with our 
European allies to ensure these fighters will not commit acts of 
violence or radicalize others in the future?
    Ms. Cooper. Repatriating ISIS fighters and their associated family 
members is an important long-term solution to ensure the enduring 
defeat of ISIS. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) shoulder the 
responsibility of the international community by detaining 
approximately 10,000 ISIS fighters, including approximately 2,000 third 
country nationals (neither Syrian nor Iraqi) at great cost to its 
economy and local security. The United States maintains that countries 
of origin should repatriate their citizens from northeast Syria, 
prosecute the foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), as appropriate, and 
rehabilitate and reintegrate their associated family members. The 
continued presence of ISIS fighters in northeast Syria imperils 
military gains achieved by the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS working 
by, with, and through the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Off the 
battlefield, the SDF shoulders the responsibility of the international 
community by detaining approximately 10,000 ISIS fighters, including 
approximately 2,000 third country nationals (neither Syrian nor Iraqi). 
DOD is also concerned about displaced persons--especially juveniles--
living in humanitarian camps such as al-Hol, which also place undue 
burden on our local Syrian partners. Most camp residents are children 
and some may be particularly susceptible to radicalization. In Syria, 
the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development 
provides humanitarian assistance, including some education and 
psychosocial support, to the residents of these camps. The Department 
of State is also working with European allies, by providing logistical 
support on repatriations when appropriate, along with improving their 
capabilities to rehabilitate and reintegrate individuals back into 
their local communities, and collaborates with Coalition partners to 
confront ISIS messaging globally via the Coalition's Communications 
Working Group.
    Mrs. McClain. As we begin to reexamine our involvement in the 
Middle East, what steps are we taking to ensure that young men and 
women are not radicalized in Europe and an ISIS 2.0 does not emerge to 
fill any power vacuums that may be created?
    Ms. Cooper. ISIS seeks to exploit local grievances, lack of 
stabilization support, and security gaps to reconstitute and recruit in 
territory it formerly held, as well as to execute and inspire attacks 
outside the Middle East. To prevent the conditions for ISIS' 
resurgence, the United States and Coalition partners must continue 
stabilization efforts in areas liberated from ISIS. In concert with 
Coalition partners, the Department of State directed programming to 
further community resiliency, social cohesion, and reintegration for 
liberated areas in Iraq and Syria. In Europe, the Department of State 
leads efforts to encourage governments to implement policies that build 
resilience to terrorist narratives, enhance the capacity of youth to 
think critically, and challenge the influence of terrorist ideologies. 
Because communication is now globalized, stabilization efforts in the 
Middle East will help prevent radicalization elsewhere, including in 
Europe.
    Mrs. McClain. ISIS fighters are being repatriated to their home 
countries in Europe from the Middle East. In your view, should our 
European allies take back these ISIS fighters and their families? If 
so, what steps is the administration taking in working with our 
European allies to ensure these fighters will not commit acts of 
violence or radicalize others in the future?
    General Wolters. The Department of State is more suited to discuss 
specifics on the Administration's actions to prevent radicalization and 
violence in countries who repatriate ISIS fighters and their families.
    Mrs. McClain. As we begin to reexamine our involvement in the 
Middle East, what steps are we taking to ensure that young men and 
women are not radicalized in Europe and an ISIS 2.0 does not emerge to 
fill any power vacuums that may be created?
    General Wolters. The Department of State is more suited to discuss 
steps the Administration is taking to prevent radicalization.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
    Dr. Jackson. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom, and of course 
the United States participate in the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training 
Program. This is the world's only internationally manned and managed 
flying training program, and it was founded with the specific goal of 
producing combat pilots for the NATO alliance.
    General Wolters, could you speak to the value that these 
international partnerships, like the one I just described at Sheppard 
Air Force Base, provide and then elaborate how these partnerships 
improve our ability to combat malign Russian aggression?
    General Wolters. The Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program 
(ENJJTP) is a long term success story, soon celebrating the 40th 
anniversary of its official opening which trains over 50 European 
fighter pilots a year. In addition to sharing a common airframe, 
sharing best practices and common understanding of employment enhances 
our transparency and alignment to train and operate alongside our 
Allies and Partners.
    Dr. Jackson. The Future Long Range Assault Aircraft program seeks 
to modernize the vertical lift fleet by delivering the most modern, 
versatile, and lethal power projection platform to ensure success on 
the modern battlefield.
    General Wolters, can you speak to the importance of the Future Long 
Range Assault Aircraft program in deterring Russian aggression in 
eastern Europe and in the Arctic?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM benefits from the effort the Services take 
in developing versatile power projection capabilities to meet 
warfighting requirements. Any option to improve our speed and ability 
to deter aggression at range in the air domain would add value in 
generating peace.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
    Mr. Moore. What message should the U.S. give European allies that 
are considering adopting Chinese 5G technology?
    Ms. Cooper. 5G is transformative and will touch every aspect of our 
lives, including critical infrastructure, such as transportation, 
electricity distribution, healthcare, and more. DOD wants to ensure 
that information and communications technology (ICT) networks around 
the world remain secure, resilient, and reliable. It is important that 
European allies and partners consider the risks of using equipment from 
Chinese providers in 5G, undersea cables, and other strategic ICT 
areas--particularly where there are risks to how U.S. and allied forces 
operate. We encourage further collaboration on vendor diversity, open 
networks, and transparent standards. However, the United States must 
and will protect its own information and networks, including by 
reassessing how it shares information with countries that allow 
untrustworthy vendors on their networks.
    Mr. Moore. Since the Russian violations which led to the 
termination of the INF Treaty, what steps has EUCOM taken to fill the 
void of U.S. small-to-medium range missile deterrence?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM benefits from the effort the Services take 
in developing versatile power projection capabilities to meet 
warfighting requirements. Any option to improve our speed and ability 
to deter aggression at range in the air domain would add value in 
generating peace.
    Mr. Moore. What steps have our NATO allies taken to confront 
Chinese aggression and increase their cooperation to guarantee a free 
and open Indo-Pacific?
    General Wolters. NATO is adopting a global approach and developing 
closer relations with its four Asia-Pacific partners, namely Australia, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. In December 2020, the 
four Asia-Pacific partners participated for the first time in a NATO 
Foreign Ministerial Meeting, discussing the shift in the global balance 
of power and the rise of China. Political dialogue enhances mutual 
situation awareness on security developments in the Euro-Atlantic and 
Asia-Pacific regions. In today's complex security environment, 
relations with like-minded partners across the globe are increasingly 
important to address cross-cutting security issues and global 
challenges, as well as to defend the rules-based international order.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
    Mr. Brown. It is clear that the rising threat of white nationalism 
and far right extremism is not just a threat here in the United States 
but also overseas in Europe. What is your assessment of these threats 
to both the security of the United States and Europe, and how are we 
coordinating with our allies in addressing these threats? How can we 
leverage our partnerships with European allies to share lessons learned 
to identify and address these threats within both European and American 
forces?
    Ms. Cooper. Extremist violence/terrorism is not a new phenomenon in 
Europe and the United States, but increasing incidents are a cause for 
concern. Extremist movements have a long history, but now they have 
additional tools at their disposal--namely social media and the ability 
to propagate disinformation at a significant rate. The United States 
works very closely with European allies and partners to counter 
disinformation on a daily basis and regularly shares best practices via 
NATO and bilateral mechanisms. The United States also works to lead by 
example in addressing extremism within our own ranks, as evidenced by 
the Secretary of Defense directing a ``stand-down'' day to ensure a 
concerted effort to educate the military and civilian workforce about 
the scope of this problem and to develop sustainable ways to eliminate 
the corrosive effects that extremist ideology and conduct have on the 
workforce. During this ``stand-down,'' with the goal of recognizing and 
addressing extremism now and in the future, the Department reviewed 
issues such as the importance of our oath of office; identification of 
impermissible behaviors; and procedures for reporting suspected, or 
actual, extremist behaviors. Several European allies and partners 
sought information about curriculum used, and we will continue 
willingly to share best practices to encourage continued attention to 
this issue.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
    Mr. Morelle. Ms. Cooper, how are the policies and budget priorities 
of the Department of Defense (DOD) shifting to support the Biden 
Administration's increased focus of deterrence against Russia? What 
does DOD intend to do differently as part of this policy, if anything?
    Ms. Cooper. The United States has sought to deter Russian 
aggression through the credible demonstration of strength, in close 
coordination with NATO Allies and partners. The Department advances 
this aim through the effective use of military forces to strengthen our 
deterrence and defensive posturing and protect our core interests by 
building resilience and reducing vulnerability--including among Allies 
and partners. We will continue these efforts along with our Allies and 
partners to counter Russia's aggressive actions. The Department will 
leverage existing capabilities, build new ones where required, and 
employ them in new and networked ways--alongside our Allies and 
partners--to help ensure that Russia knows the costs and risks of 
aggression remain far greater than any conceivable benefit. The 
Department will pursue the right mix of technology, operational 
concepts, and capabilities to create advantages for ourselves and 
dilemmas for Russian planners.
    Mr. Morelle. General Wolters, can you expand on the impact of 
COVID-19 on competition with Russia and China in the European Command 
area of operations, and any measures you believe would better allow us 
to compete given the pandemic?
    General Wolters. COVID-19 has presented challenges for nations 
across the globe, including those in Europe, and our deepest 
condolences are offered to all those impacted by this pandemic. In 
USEUCOM, we continue working diligently alongside Allies and Partners 
to ensure this health crisis does not become a security crisis. Thus 
far, our collective team has been successful, and we are buoyed through 
recent developments in vaccine production and distribution across the 
USEUCOM Area of Responsibility.