[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-8]
DISINFORMATION IN THE GRAY ZONE:
OPPORTUNITIES, LIMITATIONS, AND CHALLENGES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 16, 2021
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-429 WASHINGTON : 2021
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona, Chairman
RICK LARSEN, Washington TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JIM COOPER, Tennessee AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts SAM GRAVES, Missouri
FILEMON VELA, Texas DON BACON, Nebraska
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida, Vice C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
Chair
Shannon Green, Professional Staff Member
Patrick Nevins, Professional Staff Member
Zach Taylor, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Gallego. Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............ 1
Kelly, Hon. Trent, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations.... 9
WITNESSES
Maier, Christopher, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, U.S. Department
of Defense..................................................... 4
Sullivan, James, Defense Intelligence Officer for Cyber, Defense
Intelligence Agency............................................ 3
Tipton, Neill, Director of Intelligence for Collections and
Special Programs, U.S. Department of Defense................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Gallego. Hon. Ruben.......................................... 25
Maier, Christopher, joint with Neill Tipton and James
Sullivan................................................... 27
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
DISINFORMATION IN THE GRAY ZONE: OPPORTUNITIES, LIMITATIONS, AND
CHALLENGES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 16, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:01 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ruben Gallego
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, everyone, for joining us. Please
take a seat.
Before I get going, I have to do some Webex instructions
per House and admin. Here we go.
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they should exit the software platform entirely and, then
rejoin it if they return. Members may use the software platform
chat feature to communicate with staff regarding technical or
logistical support issues only.
Finally, I have designated a committee staff member, if
necessary, to mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel
any inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the
proceeding.
Good morning. I call to order this first hearing of the
Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee on
``Disinformation in the Gray Zone: Opportunities, Limitations,
and Challenges.''
We are seeing unprecedented threats to our democracy and a
disturbing rise of authoritarian actors. Anti-democratic forces
have capitalized on the rapidly evolving information
environment to spread disinformation and misinformation, and
exploit fissures in our society. The only way to reverse these
trends is through a whole-of-society approach working with
partners and allies who share our values.
After two decades of war fighting terrorists in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere around the Middle East and
Africa, we have discovered an even greater threat inside the
wire. Gone are the days when we could solely rely on the Armed
Forces to fight our wars beyond our borders. The threats and
attacks are now here. On American soil. And at home.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy stated that the
``homeland is no longer a sanctuary.'' Our adversaries' use of
information and technology has proven that out. They craft and
feed misinformation to our news outlets and social media about
the safety of vaccines, for example, the efficacy of our
institutions, and the depth of our differences, and then they
weaponize our own reactions to that misinformation.
So, we have a problem. So much so that last year nine--I
repeat, nine--combatant commanders co-sent a letter to the
Director of National Intelligence requesting immediate help to
combat the pervasive and damaging influence by China and
Russia. I want to hear what we are doing to help our
commanders. How are we making sure that information about the
malign activity of Russia and China is not overclassified, and
how are you synchronizing with the State Department and with
partners and allies to combat these threats?
Information operations is one way that the United States
can protect itself and its partners against dis- and mis-
information efforts by China and Russia. We should aspire for
cohesion and breadth. We must develop a comprehensive influence
strategy to truly protect our borders, our allies, and our
interests.
In that context, I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses about the Department's efforts to support and build a
whole-of-government construct. I want to introduce the three
witnesses who will tell us a little about that.
Mr. Christopher Maier, Acting Assistant Director of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; Mr. Neill
Tipton, Director of Defense Intelligence, Collections and
Special Programs; and Mr. James Sullivan, Defense Intelligence
Officer.
Following this discussion, we will continue in a closed,
classified session.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallego can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Gallego. I understand that Ranking Member Kelly is on
his way from the airport. So, we will get started with our
opening statements from our witnesses, and once we are done
with our witness statements, we will swing back to Ranking
Member Kelly for his opening statement.
And with that, let's start with Mr. Maier. Thank you.
Mr. Maier. Chairman, we are actually going to start with an
intel brief, if that is okay, quickly, and then, shift from
there.
Mr. Gallego. Go ahead.
STATEMENT OF JAMES SULLIVAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR
CYBER, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, Members, good morning. My name
is Jim Sullivan, Defense Intelligence Officer for Cyber. Thank
you for the invitation to come down here. I will provide you
some background on----
Mr. Gallego. Mr. Sullivan, please put the microphone closer
to your mouth. Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, sir.
I am here to provide the threat landscape of our two main
rivals, Russia and China, in the information sphere. I will
cover more specifics in the closed session.
I will begin with Russia. Russia sees the information
sphere as a key domain for modern military conflict. Russia has
prioritized the development of forces and means for information
confrontation in a holistic concept for ensuring information
superiority since at least the 1920s. Russia wages this
struggle for information dominance during peacetime and armed
conflict with equal intensity using combined electronic and
kinetic means and methods through information-technical,
information-psychological, and active measures. The Russian
government claims NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
countries, led by the United States, have created a powerful
information operations system and are expanding and improving
it.
Russia sees the information domain differently than the
United States and its allies and partners. Russian publications
and actions indicate its government maintains a holistic
concept of information confrontation. Specifically, information
confrontation seeks to dominate the information domain through
a combination of what it defines as information-technical
effects--or means which seek to manipulate networks, computers,
and data--and information-psychological effects, all intended
to target people or a population to influence behavior or
opinions. We are increasingly seeing the integrated use of
cyber-enabled psychological actions, distributed denial-of-
service attacks, propaganda disseminated through social media
and bots, strategic deception and disinformation, and
electromagnetic warfare to achieve strategic goals.
China seeks to influence domestic, foreign, and
multilateral political establishments and public opinion to
accept China's narratives and to remove obstacles that prevent
China from attaining its goals, including the sustainment of
the Communist Party regime. The People's Liberation Army [PLA]
has developed the concept of ``Three Warfares''--which is to
say, public opinion, legal, and psychological warfare--as key
components of its psychological-cognitive warfare efforts.
These efforts are designed to demoralize adversaries and to
influence foreign and domestic public opinion.
Similar to Russia, China also takes a broad approach, to
include the establishment of cultural centers, taking control
of Chinese language print media, and the employment of cyber
techniques. China views the cyber domain, in particular, as an
ideal platform for strategic influence and deception and
disinformation operations. The PLA likely seeks to use digital
influence activities to support its overall ``Three Warfares''
concept and to undermine an adversary's social cohesion,
economy, morale, and governance. These operations are conducted
with intensity in peacetime, and we anticipate they would be
conducted with increased intensity during armed conflict. The
PLA goals for social media influence activities fall into three
broad categories: to promote a narrative favorable to China,
undermine adversary resolve and social cohesion, and shape
foreign governments' policies in favor of China's core
interests.
Sir, that concludes my opening statement.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
And, Mr. Maier.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER MAIER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Maier. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Gallego, Ranking
Member Kelly, and distinguished committee members, it is an
honor to be with you here today.
As is already stated, I am Chris Maier. I am the Acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict. In this capacity, I serve as the principal
civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense on special
operations and low-intensity conflict matters, including the
employment of special operations forces. On behalf of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, I also provide oversight for
information operations.
Building on the brief laydown on the threat you received
just now from the Defense Intelligence Agency, I am here with
my colleagues from the Department of Defense to discuss our
approach to adversary disinformation in the gray zone and the
Department's efforts to gain and maintain the operational
advantage in this evolving threat environment.
Adversary use of disinformation, misinformation, and
propaganda poses one of today's greatest challenges to the
United States, not just to the Department of Defense. Russia
and China, as well as non-state actors, understand that in
today's information environment they have real-time access to a
global audience. With first-mover advantage and by flooding the
information environment with deliberately manipulated
information--that is, mostly truthful with carefully crafted
deceptive elements--these actors can gain leverage to threaten
our interests.
Although we are here today to discuss various DOD
[Department of Defense] efforts, we recognize that we do not
have a monopoly on U.S. Government capabilities to combat
disinformation, nor should we. The Department of Defense is one
of a whole-of-government approach to this challenge, and other
civilian departments and agencies have critical roles and
responsibilities which demand close interagency coordination
and clear authorities. Coordinated interagency effects can
complement the efforts of each department and agency to defend
the Nation against disinformation and to reach and engage
global audiences.
As we strive to leverage DOD's information operations
capabilities in competition with malign actors, we must first
acknowledge, as reiterated in the recently published Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance, that we will actively
support elevating diplomacy as our tool of first resort. DOD
directly supports the Department of State's Public Diplomacy
teams and the Global Engagement Center, and complements the
activities of the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
Within DOD, we organize our efforts to combat
disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda in four broad
lines of effort, all supported by a foundation of intelligence
support, interagency collaboration, and partnerships. These
four areas are: countering propaganda by adversaries, force
protection, countering disinformation and strategic deception
abroad by adversaries, and deterring and disrupting adversarial
malign influence capabilities. I will briefly touch on each one
of these efforts.
Countering propaganda. Propaganda, especially with a
capable sponsor spreading it to susceptible audiences, can
often drown out truthful information and create barriers to
fact-based messaging. Public Affairs is the lead within DOD for
countering propaganda that affects U.S. military objectives.
Public Affairs also leads the Department's efforts to inform
domestic and foreign audiences of adversaries' attempts to
manipulate behavior in this domain. Other DOD capabilities
support Public Affairs' effort to lead proactively with
truthful, verifiable, fact-based messaging. DOD efforts to
engage foreign audiences overseas support the Department of
State's lead to inform foreign audiences.
Next, force protection. Our soldiers, sailors, Marines,
airmen, guardians, civilians, and their families are part of
the American public directly targeted by malign actors'
disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda. DOD views this
as a critical force protection issue. The military services are
proactive in building resilience against these threats.
Enabling the force to recognize deceptive information tactics
by adversaries' information operations, developing digital
literacy, and employing critical thinking skills are a few key
initiatives within the force protection line of effort.
Third, countering disinformation abroad. At DOD, we also
draw upon operational and informational capabilities, such as
Military Information Support Operations, often better known by
its acronym MISO, to generate narratives to compete against
disinformation efforts directed at foreign audiences. These DOD
capabilities can amplify and complement existing themes and
messages to inform audiences that cannot be reached through
traditional communications channels. To counter disinformation
abroad, at DOD, we pursue a comprehensive and deliberate
approach, working in close consultation again with State, to
connect with audiences globally in real time to build
communications that foreign audiences trust. Knowledge and
trust by foreign audiences will reduce, and even suppress, the
impact of malign influence activities.
And then, finally, deterring and disrupting adversarial
malign influence capabilities. Perhaps DOD's greatest strength
lies in our ability to align narratives with actions in the
domains of land, sea, air, cyber, and space, and information-
related capabilities against key weaknesses in the adversaries'
information environment. Further, as we continue to seek to
empower and work through partners, DOD draws on our knowledge,
skills, and infrastructure to enable allies, partners, proxies,
and surrogates to compete with malign actors, often near-peer
competitors in the information environment, and for the benefit
of their own populations, as well as our own. Our partners are
force multipliers in deterring and disrupting adversarial
disinformation.
Through our ability to match words with deeds, we
complement the efforts of our diplomats to deter malign
behaviors, incentivize cooperation, and at times compel action.
DOD's ongoing efforts to defend forward, to actively detect,
assess, and, when directed, disrupt adversaries'
disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda, bolsters our
actions in the information environment.
My colleague, Neill Tipton, Director of Defense
Information, will speak in just a moment about intelligence
support to these efforts. To foreshadow from policy and
operational perspectives, intelligence support is essential to
the whole-of-government partnerships that are key to our
collective U.S. Government success against adversary
disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda. And to
reinforce once again, our international allies and partners are
essential in reinforcing our collective efforts, often by
contributing unique capabilities to countering adversaries'
malign efforts. We are most effective when bolstered by their
perspectives and their integration into our planning and
execution.
In sum, the Department continues to invest in our
capabilities and capacities, so that we are best positioned to
mitigate and defeat the disinformation efforts of our
adversaries. We continuously aim to improve our speed, agility,
efficiency, and effectiveness, and, most importantly, teamwork
across the U.S. Government and internationally.
We appreciate this subcommittee's attention to this
critically important issue and your ongoing support to the
Department's efforts in this information domain. Thank you for
the opportunity to be here today.
I will now turn it over to my colleague, Neill Tipton, who
will address how intelligence supports these efforts. After
that, we look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Maier.
Mr. Tipton.
STATEMENT OF NEILL TIPTON, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE FOR
COLLECTIONS AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Tipton. Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly, and
distinguished committee members, thank you for the opportunity
to be here today.
So, as previously mentioned, I am Neill Tipton, Director
for Defense Intelligence for Collection and Special Programs in
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
and Security.
Today, I will speak to you about the intel support needed
to ensure that the Department maintains the upper hand against
the challenge of disinformation in the gray zone. I will focus
my remarks today really on four key areas where we are
prioritizing intel support to the various efforts we are
discussing: partnerships in intel support; intelligence support
to irregular warfare; intelligence support to operations in the
information environment; and support to combatant commands,
which gets at Chairman Gallego's comments about the
colloquially known 36-star memo.
I will start with partnerships in intelligence support. So,
underpinning all these efforts is a strong commitment to a
whole-of-government partnership and decision cycle that
constantly assesses the effects of misinformation and
propaganda, and seeks to attribute these efforts to the
responsible parties. This requires active cooperation across
the responsible departments and agencies, as well as direct
support from the intelligence community. The DOD leverages its
information capabilities to gain and maintain the information
advantage and integrates with the tools of other departments as
part of a broader and more comprehensive approach. Our
international allies and partners----
Mr. Gallego. Mr. Tipton, can you slow down a little?
Mr. Tipton. Absolutely.
Mr. Gallego. I don't have you on the clock. So, you are
good to go.
Mr. Tipton. Okay.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
Mr. Tipton. I can do that. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego. Yes, it may be that I am just a slow learner
more than anything else.
Mr. Tipton. Okay. Our international allies and partners
also bring reinforcing and often unique capabilities in our
endeavors to counter adversaries' malign efforts, and their
capabilities will be integrated into our planning efforts as
well.
The recently signed Defense Intelligence Strategy
prioritizes China and Russia. The strategy calls out a specific
action to prioritize intelligence support to strategic
competition and influence efforts. The Defense Intelligence
Enterprise will help advance U.S. influence and counter-
coercive campaigns via robust and focused intelligence support
to sensitive and special activities, influence, deception, and,
more broadly speaking, operations in the information
environment.
We would like to highlight for the committee three specific
examples of ongoing actions that OUSDI&S [Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security] is
supporting through our role within DOD and our partnership with
the broader intelligence community. So, those are, as
mentioned, intel support to irregular warfare, intelligence
support to operations in the information environment, and
intelligence dissemination to support combatant command
messaging and counteractivities.
So, intel support to irregular warfare. In support of the
Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 NDS [National Defense
Strategy], OUSDI&S, in partnership with the Joint Staff J-2, is
supporting specific lines of effort to enable DOD to improve
understanding in what we all the multi-domain environment. The
several lines of efforts focus on identifying indicators and
warnings, integrating collection, leveraging big data,
reinforcing intelligence-sharing best practices, and assessing
all the policies and processes that support these efforts.
Intelligence support to operations in the information
environment. As I am sure you are aware, my colleague, Mr.
Maier, has oversight for operations in the information
environment. We have established, as part of that, a Defense
Intelligence Support to Operations in the Information
Environment Working Group that has got a variety of activities
underway to increase and enhance that support, one of which is
a new effort, working with ODNI [Office of the Director of
National Intelligence], to focus the national intelligence
community on collection efforts on assisting us in the conduct
of influence-related activities against key adversaries. That
work is still ongoing.
Also, that group is focused on drafting and staffing a new
DOD instruction for intelligence support to operations in the
information environment that would codify recommendations that
came out of a 2019 JROC memo--so the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council--that provided some specific recommendations
to the Department on how we enhance these activities. Amongst
other things, it will direct the DIE [Defense Intelligence
Enterprise] to prioritize resources for intelligence support to
OIE [operations in the information environment] in the next
published Consolidated Intelligence Guidance and will help us
shape and work, again, as I mentioned, with the DNI and the
national intelligence focus groups to drive some of these key
concepts into the broader prioritization framework that the DNI
[Director of National Intelligence] manages for the IC
[intelligence community].
And finally, I will talk about combatant command support.
Another line of effort, as you had mentioned, for which we are
providing intelligence support to OIE has been through the
joint DOD-Director of National Intelligence response to the
intel demands from the combatant commands. As you mentioned, in
January of 2020, nine combatant commanders signed that memo
out--we referred to as the 36-star memo--which asked for
increased support from the IC for messaging and countering
disinformation operations, as part of great power competition.
In response, we partnered in an ongoing effort to
streamline processes for downgrading, declassifying, and
disclosing intelligence in support of operations in the
information environment. We look to complete the current
efforts in response to that memo by September of this year,
while continuing follow-on initiatives to increase the use of
open-source intelligence and to determine policy and resourcing
strategies to provide the most effective intel support to OIE
going forward. And then, finally, we are working across the
Department to improve our training of intelligence personnel in
this space and to optimize our tradecraft as appropriate to
support operations in the information environment.
So, the DIE will continue to support these efforts and
ensure the Department is postured for success in this area. We
appreciate your attention to this very important matter. This
concludes my remarks, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Maier, Mr. Tipton, and
Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 27.]
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Tipton.
I recognize Member Kelly for an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Mr. Kelly. I apologize to you guys for being late. I
literally came straight off a plane straight here. So, thank
you for being here and I thank you for being patient.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your opening remarks and your
leadership in organizing this morning's important hearing.
Today, we will hear from three professionals in our
Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee for both an
unclassified and classified conversation about the spread of
disinformation from our adversaries. To highlight just how
seriously we take this disinformation, Chairman Gallego has
chosen it as the subject of the first official hearing of the
new Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee.
The subcommittee was recently briefed on the threatening
activities of China. Just last week during a full committee
hearing, we heard from Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander,
INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command]. He described ways the
Communist Party of China uses a whole-of-government approach to
exert control over the regions.
One of the ways China conducts this external aggression and
coercion is via the perverse spread of disinformation. This is
most clearly seen in China's information campaigns around the
coronavirus pandemic. The spread of malign information has
sought to spread panic and distrust within the U.S., and even
alleged that the United States Army was responsible for
bringing the virus to China.
China is not alone in these efforts. State-backed accounts
in Russia and Iran also constructed manipulative narratives
about our vaccine efforts. In fact, Russia has repeatedly used
the gray zone to spread disinformation. An article in The Wall
Street Journal from March 7th describes activities of Russia's
intelligence enterprise across multiple state-backed, online
news sites. The article outlines specific actions taken to
spread misleading and false narratives to discredit the
efficacy of the Pfizer vaccine.
The use of disinformation is not just linked to the current
pandemic, however. Our adversaries have long used this gray
zone to operate, push false narratives, and undermine the
national security interests of the United States. A memo signed
last year by nine combatant commanders drives home just how
important this issue is. Recognizing the need for increased
support from the intelligence community to combat this threat,
they note, ``malicious efforts by Russia and China across the
information domain to seed discontent, weaken trust, and
undermine alliances.'' The threat is real and growing.
I am interested to hear our witnesses' views on how to best
train and equip our intelligence professionals to counter this
threat. I want to thank our witnesses in advance for their time
today. I look forward to continuing work with our intel and
special operations professionals during the 117th Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ranking Member Kelly.
We will now go to questions. And again, for our members, we
will be limiting it to 5 minutes. And when you are recognized,
please make sure to unmute your microphone. And we will begin
with me.
Countering misinformation, while an important DOD function,
also involves the State Department and intel [community]. How
will ASD SO/LIC [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict] and the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence work across the defense
intelligence communities to ensure coordination of effort in
this space? We will start with you, Mr. Maier.
Mr. Maier. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
So, I think, in the first instance, it is important for us
to clearly articulate to our intelligence community colleagues
the requirements. And there is a wide definition of what we do
in the information operations space and there is a limited
number of intelligence resources. So, it is really incumbent on
us on the policy side, especially from the oversight
perspective, to make sure that we are communicating clearly
what those priorities are for intelligence support. Everybody
needs intelligence in this day and age to do everything. And
so, I think it is incumbent on us to really be clear in working
with the intelligence community, beyond just the Department of
Defense, what those requirements are.
I imagine my colleague would be able to speak to the
intelligence requirements piece and how he manages those.
Mr. Tipton. So, Chairman, just a couple of thoughts. One is
nothing we do is done in a vacuum, and USDI ensures we work in
a very tight partnership with ODI.
Mr. Gallego. Mr. Tipton, please bring the microphone closer
to you.
Mr. Tipton. Sorry. So, I would comment, first, by saying
that nothing we do is executed in a vacuum. We work very
closely with the Office of the DNI on all these kinds of
activities. And this is a specific case where we are partnered
very tightly with them as we respond to the 36-star memo and
other kinds of activities that are necessary to operate in the
information environment.
And the same goes with our allies. We recognize that we
have to operate as part of a greater whole, and we are very
tightly lashed up, especially with our closest allies, as we
develop new products, reshape the priorities, develop all the
supporting processes and enabling activities that we have to
design and implement in order to reshape the outputs of the
intel enterprise, which for 20 years has been focused on other
problem sets, to how do we refocus on this problem set and
support customers like ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense]
Maier and other operators in this space.
Thank you.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you. I appreciate the necessity of
activities conducted by the Department to mitigate or curtail
nefarious actions by our adversaries' intent to undermine and
counter the strength of our military. However, information
operations are one small part of what should be a larger,
whole-of-government approach to combat malicious Russian or
Chinese behavior. Some of our allies and partners already do
this, but they are much smaller than us and their problems and
opportunities are different from ours.
Given the proliferation of disinformation, misinformation,
and propaganda, would it be appropriate to call for a whole-of-
government influence campaign and strategy to ensure nested and
synchronized efforts to the benefit of our national security
objectives? And to follow up with that--well, Mr. Maier, if you
wanted to start with that?
Mr. Maier. Mr. Chairman, yes, I think it is, and I think we
endeavor to do so in a number of focused efforts. Obviously,
China and Russia use, and Iran and other non-state actors use,
this technique across the whole range of different issues. So,
we need to be precise as we leverage those interagency efforts
and with our partners.
Mr. Gallego. And so, we recognize that we need to do it,
but trying to bring together different departments, different
agencies, with different goals, different missions, to be
focused requires at least someone to be a coordinator of that.
Who is coordinating that at this point?
Mr. Maier. Mr. Chairman, we would look to the National
Security Council [NSC] staff to lead those interagency efforts,
but the Department of Defense and State already organically
work together on a number of these. But the real quarterback in
this system of the interagency is going to be the NSC staff,
sir.
Mr. Gallego. Yes. Mr. Maier, what role does the ASD SO/LIC
play in information operations, specifically, the interplay of
big DOD, SOCOM [Special Operations Command], and the
interagency?
Mr. Maier. Mr. Chairman, I would answer your question in
two ways. First, as has been directed by [section] 922 in the
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] from 2017, it
reinforces the role that ASD SO/LIC plays as the service-
secretary-like or administrative chain of command. So, we have
responsibility/civilian oversight for ensuring the force is
equipped to do these operations, SOCOM, but also the
components--USASOC [U.S. Army Special Operations Command], Navy
SEALs [Sea, Air and Land teams], Air Force Special Operations
Command, a whole series of others.
And then, on the policy side of things, we are the direct
support to the Under Secretary for Policy for integrating
information operations and these types of disciplines into the
policy development process for the Department of Defense.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
Representative Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, I yield to Mr. Bacon, who is
prepared to move forward with questions.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, gentlemen, for sharing your
expertise. We sure appreciate it.
One of the things that I have noted, that our adversaries
often use our partisan political scenes for disinformation,
which makes it harder for us to counter. How do we overcome
that when, say, Russia in 2016 uses disinformation in a way
that makes it hard in a partisan environment to counter? I
would be curious for your thoughts on that. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego. Mr. Maier, is that a deepfake that we just saw
with the two Bacons?
Mr. Maier. I am not sure, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallego. All right. Okay, Mr. Bacon. Sorry.
Mr. Bacon. Could you hear me all right? I asked the
question.
Mr. Maier. So, I will take that broadly, and then, defer to
the intel community on the specifics of this. But I think it is
a well-recognized technique that these malign actors are using,
and I think some of this is, again, some of the points I made
in building resilience and ensuring that what is coming out, at
least from the U.S. Government's information sources, whether
it is Public Affairs or others, is truthful information.
As to how we best counter adversaries exploiting that, I
will defer to my intelligence colleague for how they are doing
that.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, Mr. Bacon, Jim Sullivan from DIA
[Defense Intelligence Agency].
So, it really does begin with making sure that we are
working across the spectrum of DIA, NGA [National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency], NSA [National Security Agency], CIA
[Central Intelligence Agency], FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation], and others, and enhancing our own capability
inside the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to, number one,
understand who the cyber actors are; what publications, what
social media platforms are they using; what is their strategy/
doctrine/intent at getting to the American public, and what
specifically is it that they are targeting. Once we have the
bubble on that, then we can work with others inside the
combatant command, other intel agencies, and be better equipped
to counteract that.
Mr. Bacon. One thing that I saw in France, I thought they
did a good job to say right upfront, candidly, this is what
Russia is doing and they are trying to play on partisan
divides. And I just think we have to be more candid with our
voters and with our citizens when this happens.
One other question for you before I yield. DOD's 2020 China
military power report identified how China uses its so-called
``50 Cent Army'' to, among other things, try to influence
public opinion towards the pro-China perspectives. They noted
how, in 2019, Facebook and Twitter had deleted some accounts
spreading disinformation regarding the protests in Hong Kong.
So, over the past year, have social media companies been more
effective at reducing the spread of disinformation, especially
from China and Russia? Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, I will go ahead and take that, Mr.
Bacon. So, I think, in the last several years, social media,
and also, too, commercial vendors, have operated quite
prolifically in this space and have gotten very, very capable,
both in determining/attributing where this activity is coming
from, and then, being able to use algorithms in order to delete
accounts.
Now I can't speak to what they are doing for China at this
moment, but the trend is I think moving in a positive
direction. When you take that in combination with what we are
doing in open source, I think we are getting a better handle on
at least false narratives, again, identification of the media
platforms that they are using. And I think, as time goes on, we
are better postured to do that.
Two years ago, I think it was quite difficult to be able to
understand what was a false account. But the tradecraft has
gotten much better; being able to identify it has gotten much
better. And I have every expectation that in the future that is
only going to improve.
Mr. Bacon. I will just close with two comments. First, we
have a long history in our country of being successful in this
area. In World War II, multiple examples where we can overcome.
So, we have it within our ability to win in this spectrum.
And I will just close, also, by saying thank you to each of
you for serving and defending our country, and I appreciate
what you do every day. With that, I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Bacon. Thank you,
Member Kelly.
I now recognize Representative Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Maier, given what we have heard today with regards to
SOCOM, does it--this is sort of a loaded question--but does it
imply a need for changing either who we recruit, the skills
they have, the skills we develop in SOCOM, and the structure of
the teams within SOCOM, in order to address these particular
challenges? Have you thought through that and can you give us
some idea of what you are thinking?
Mr. Maier. Yes, thanks, Congressman Larsen. That is, I
think, a very important question.
And I have the benefit in the role I play to support the
Secretary of Defense, who has made diversity one of his number
one challenges. I had the benefit of sitting in on a
conversation he had with General Clarke, the SOCOM commander,
and he made that abundantly clear, that diversity is an
operational imperative. It has the benefits that you
articulated in your question of being able to bring different
perspectives, different ways of communicating, knowledge of
culture--things that, if everybody looks the same, if everybody
thinks the same, are going to render us not particularly
effective in these challenging environments.
We are evolving, I think, as a country and a force from
heavy focus on the counter-VEO, violent extremist
organizations, to a much more diverse threat environment where
information is one of the tools they are using. And we have got
to be able to play their game against them and beat them in
some respects on their own playing field. That means the
ability to speak languages, the ability to draw on cultural
innuendos that aren't necessarily obvious to those that may
have been trained for other purposes.
Mr. Larsen. So, within SOCOM, do you think they are
evolving fast enough to support this?
Mr. Maier. I think, sir, that they would say they are not
evolving fast enough. As you know, in training special
operations forces, it really requires recruitment and training
far down the line, very early in the process. And that is
something that all the components, whether it is the SEALs, the
Air Force Special Operations components, or the Army
components, Marine Corps, are looking at how they get farther
downstream in their recruiting in order to do what you are
articulating.
Mr. Larsen. As Acting ASD SO/LIC, do you think you have
enough authority, and would you have enough authority as a
permanent confirmation, to push that along?
Mr. Maier. At this point, I think I do, sir. But a lot of
this is going to be just persisting, keeping on this. This is a
priority that is going to take, unfortunately, a long time to
actually see fruition, and we are going to have to stay on
this. It is a strong partnership, I think, with SOCOM and they
recognize this need and have prioritized it as well. That is
the best arrangement, I think, regardless of bureaucratic
standing, to get to a success.
Mr. Larsen. And on bureaucratic standing, I understand that
SECDEF, or the Secretary of Defense, is reviewing the changes
that former Secretary of Defense Miller put in place about the
role of ASD SO/LIC. Do you have any insight for where that is
now? My personal view is that, regardless of the outcome, we
need to have a stronger civilian oversight over SOCOM forces.
Mr. Maier. Congressman, thank you for that statement. It is
a decision that is before the Secretary of Defense now. I think
the options are fairly obvious. They are: do we keep it the way
it is with SO/LIC separate from all the other entities in the
Department or do we integrate it into policy pieces? But I
don't think there have been any options discussed in which ASD
SO/LIC does not--and I reiterate that, does not--continue to
report to the Secretary of Defense as a principal staff
assistant for that administrative piece of oversight and
civilian oversight of Special Operations Command, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks. I just don't want any confusion about
the letter that was sent a few weeks ago from members of the
subcommittee and others about the intent of the letter.
Back to sort of the broader--I have got 56 seconds left--
back to the broader issue of intelligence and intelligence
sharing. I am going to have to get caught up a little bit more
on all the letters. I mean, I understand all the lettered
agencies you talked about. And perhaps you can think about this
for the classified: if you think there are any gaps in how that
information gets communicated within the DOD and between
agencies, so that it can be most effectively used. I don't know
if there is something you can say about that now. Mr. Tipton,
you look like you are eager to answer that.
Mr. Tipton. Yes, Congressman, I will just comment that we
are rebuilding muscle memory that we haven't exercised really
since the Cold War, as we operate in this kind of information
domain. And so, clearly, there are gaps in how we do that and
we are working through that. We can talk a little bit more
about that in the closed session.
Mr. Larsen. I look forward to it. That is fine.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Larsen.
Representative Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman. I don't have a whole lot. I
will say that I was on one of our military installations the
other day and speaking about kind of the width and the depth of
the anger that I see out there. And one of the generals
suggested to me that they were seeing it in their ranks, too,
and that I should watch the documentary ``The Social Dilemma,''
and how people are able to use information against us.
And so, just a suggestion for the committee, and maybe
looking for comment from the people that are presenting, is:
are we discussing with our soldiers the potential for the use
of disinformation and misinformation through social media to
create bias in the ranks or dissent in the ranks of the
military? Do you know if we are actually having discussions
with our troops on that?
Mr. Maier. Mr. Scott, I can answer that question. So,
absolutely, and one of the main pillars that I mentioned in my
remarks, and that I can go into a little bit more depth on, is
the force protection concerns associated with intentional
misinformation and disinformation through social media.
A critical component of what Secretary of Defense Austin is
looking at, too, is extremism. And a key component of these
standdowns that we are all involved in, not just the uniformed
side, but the civilian side, is looking at the influences from
the outside that do contribute to extremism and, as one of your
colleagues said, attempts to divide not only the forces, but
us, as citizens.
And I think we look at this through the lens of every
soldier is both a citizen and a member of the Armed Forces, and
having to look at both those perspectives is a critical piece
as they are looking at social media, and we look to, as much as
possible, make them resilient against what we know are
concerted efforts to attempt to divide and in some cases drive
them to extremism.
Mr. Scott. Well, I would finish with this: one is I think
it has been very effective, what they are doing, unfortunately.
And as this current generation comes out of high school and
college, the first generation where, basically, everything they
have done has been on the internet, I think we need to expand
beyond the scope of the military as fast as we can in advising
the American citizens what is happening with the ability of
outside influences who do not like our country to influence our
attitudes towards each other in this country and how damaging
it is to us.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Scott.
Representative Keating. Representative Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I heard my name.
I just want to thank the witnesses. This is an important
issue, and I am just pleased that, just more commentary, I am
pleased that the new Secretary of Defense is taking these
issues as seriously as he is. And we all have to work, and I
just want to continue to work, particularly in the other
committee I am on where we are dealing with some of the malign
actors in this field, with Russia and some of their activities.
So, that is all I had to say as a comment going forward.
But I thank you.
And thank you for having this as your first full hearing,
Mr. Chairman. I think it is an important one. I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Keating.
We have Representative Franklin.
Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen, for your time this morning. This is a very critical
topic.
I just have a couple of questions for Mr. Maier. In your
testimony, you referenced ongoing efforts to detect, assess,
and then, when directed, disrupt adversaries' disinformation,
misinformation, and propaganda. I am just curious, just for my
own edification, what is the trip line for when that takes
place? Who is the authority to direct that action? And then,
what would a response look like to that misinformation or
disinformation?
Mr. Maier. Yes, sir. So, this is going to be a ``it
depends'' answer a little bit here. And in open forum, what I
would say is that a key element of being flexible in the
information operations space is ensuring that authorities are
delegated down to the appropriate level with the appropriate
risk built into that.
And so, I think, if you are talking about activities that,
on one extreme, could be kinetic in nature--and that is not
outside the realm--those are going to be the purview, of
course, of the Secretary of Defense or delegated down. If you
are talking about the ability to go out and push back on a
narrative, in many respects that is at lower levels within
Public Affairs or even within the Military Information Support
Operation, generally, in support to the State Department Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs. So, it is going to depend in many
respects on what the action envisioned is and how that is
viewed from a risk perspective. But the success here is
predicated on delegating to the lowest level possible, sir.
Mr. Franklin. Okay. I appreciate that, and that sort of
feeds into my next question with regard to an overall strategy
for how we would approach this. In section 1239 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2020, it called for development of a comprehensive
strategy to counter the threat of malign influence by the PRC
[People's Republic of China] and Russia. And I think that was
due within 6 months, which would have been probably June or so
of 2020. Can you tell us where that stands, elaborate on the
status of that effort?
Mr. Maier. Congressman, I am going to have to take that as
a request to follow up. I don't know exactly where that is.
Mr. Franklin. Okay. All right then. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thanks.
Representative Sherrill.
Okay. We will come back to Representative Sherrill. In the
meantime, do you have anybody?
Mr. Kelly. No.
Mr. Gallego. No? Okay, we will move on to Representative
Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this
opportunity.
And, of course, thank you to all the witnesses for your
service, your preparation, your testimony especially. Thank you
very much.
I guess--and correct me if I am wrong--but the 1st Special
Forces down at Fort Bragg recently announced an information
warfare center just for these types of operations. I guess
their main goal is to deliver an ``influence artillery round,''
quote-unquote. Can you give me a little information about the
center? Can you give me a little information about what that
influence artillery round would look like?
Mr. Maier. So, sir, I am going to have to take that for
further follow-up to give you an exact answer. But I think it
is indicative of what we are trying to do across the force,
which is really elevate this issue to a point where I wouldn't
want to articulate or even speculate on what they mean by an
``information artillery round,'' but I think that it speaks to
the idea that information is a part of our warfighting concept,
and therefore, we bring this into the same series of options we
would bring, kinetic or other capabilities that might be more
traditional, sir.
Mr. Panetta. Understood. Understood. On that note, do you
think or do you know, or can you surmise, if there are plans
for other similar types of centers in the future for not just
special operations, but other parts of our military?
Mr. Maier. Yes, sir, I think not only do we envision those,
we have got a number of these that are up and operating. The
Joint MISO Center down at Special Operations Command is
actually an outgrowth of something that Central Command
developed. And the realization was we need to be doing this
globally. So, that is one that I know this committee has in the
past looked into, and we continue to be supportive of it in
concept. That is not just because it's at SOCOM, is in a
special operations thing; that is all the combatant commands.
And so, that brings, we hope, an economy of scale to those
efforts.
Mr. Panetta. Right. Thank you. So, kind of going from
looking inward to looking outward, how do you think--you know,
Russia, obviously, has kind of set the pace on this, and China
has followed. How do you think they are going to evolve with
their hybrid warfare going forward and using these types of
information/disinformation warfare?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, Congressman, I will take that one, from
DIA. So, it has been said in the past that, in the information
sphere, that Russia introduces bad weather, whereas China is
changing the climate. I would say that that is an accurate
statement, except to your point, it is reversed. I think it is
Russia that is changing the climate, and I think it is China
that is introducing bad weather.
To further complicate it, though, China will grow into that
role. China will use technology. China will use machine
learning and AI faster than the Russians will do it. Russia is,
without question, ahead because they are a lot more prolific
and they are a lot more destructive, and they have a slightly
different intent, which is they are much more aggressive in
terms of trying to undermine U.S. democracy and enhance
social--or I am sorry--to degrade social cohesion in the United
States. China is not necessarily up to that.
But, to answer your question broadly, the threat in the
information domain is here to stay because it really comes down
to conventional military overmatch, of which neither country
has that against the United States. Cyber is a great equalizer,
in that nobody is 100 percent mature in this domain, and
information dominance is effective, it is cheap, and it is
quick.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you for that answer. I appreciate that.
Is there one theater, in particular, that each of those
near-peers are focusing on? Are they sticking to their areas of
influence? Or are you seeing that in other areas, Africa, or so
forth?
Mr. Sullivan. So, it all depends. It all depends on the
actor. Both are global. Russia has a much more massive global
presence. They are very much entrenched in Africa, very much so
in Eastern Europe. They still try to look at really sort of
sowing discord in areas in Europe in which we have a forward
presence. China, of course, is very interested in ASEAN
[Association of Southeast Asian Nations], in the South Pacific,
but it, too, also has a global narrative as well in terms of
trying to really present the Chinese Communist Party as an
alternative to the United States and Western democracy. I will
get more into that in the closed session. But, to Mr. Maier's
point, it depends. It really depends on the objective and it
depends on the actor.
Mr. Panetta. Understood.
And then, obviously, this may be something in the closed
session, but looking at either our friends or those who are not
so friendly to us, are you seeing other nations develop into
this area with a little more skill that you wouldn't think
coming from them? I mean, either allies, friends, or foes,
which ones are we watching when it comes to this type of
misinformation in gray zone warfare?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, everybody plays in this sphere to some
degree, including us. I don't see an enormous threat from any
of our allies or anybody who I would not consider to be China
and Russia. Certainly, the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic
of Korea] and the Iranians also play in this. And if I had to
stratify it, again, I would put Russia as number one, China as
number two, Iran as number three, DPRK as number four.
Mr. Panetta. Understood. Okay. Great. Thank you. Thank you
again to everybody.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego. Is Representative Sherrill available? One more
time, Representative Sherrill?
[No response.]
Mr. Gallego. Okay. If there are no more questions, we are
going to adjourn for 15 minutes.
And we have one question. Yes, Representative Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, this won't be long.
But, for Mr. Maier again, or anyone else, within SOCOM,
they have the MISO capability, the responsibility. And that is
supposed to be web-based, but there is a lot of non-web-based
information operations that occur. So, when we hear from you
about SOCOM's responsibility, is it limited to web-based
information operations, or how are you sharing across this
intelligence domain the totality of information operations? And
then, could you help me understand what you all mean by
information domain as well? So, it is a real short question,
but, like everything, it is always the answer that is long.
Mr. Maier. Congressman Larsen, yes, sir. So, maybe if it is
okay, I will take the last question first, and then, speak to
the SOCOM context.
So, I think--not to recite doctrine for information
operations, but what we really mean by that is those operations
that are in that operational sphere, informed by the strategic,
informed by the tactical, but really that connection between.
So, if there is strategic guidance, and we are implementing a
strategic approach, the information component of that is really
bringing that strategy down to tactical execution. That can be
Public Affairs. That can be Military Information Support
Operations. That can be a host of other things. And it is
really the discipline, as we would look at it doctrinally. What
I think this hearing has elicited is it takes on a lot of
different forms. I think there is a defensive and offensive
component to it. As we think of it from the Department of
Defense, we think of it in both contexts.
On your question of Special Operations Command and MISO,
they are the proponents, as we use the term, for Military
Information Support Operations. My citing the Joint MISO WebOps
Center was the entity that they built there to operate in the
free-flowing nature of cyberspace for MISO. But SOCOM is
supporting the global combatant commands, and the global
combatant commands are the ones actually executing MISO
operations in the far fletches of the world that we are
operating in. So, done so in conjunction with the chiefs of
mission approval in the country teams in the particular
countries they are operating.
Does that answer your question?
Mr. Larsen. Maybe we can get into it a little more in the
classified. You might help me understand with some examples on
that.
Mr. Sullivan, early on, you said Russia sees the
information domain differently than the U.S. sees the
information domain. Is there an answer you can give us about
what those differences are in this setting?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, Mr. Larsen. So, by and large, Russia
brings really the full spectrum. Russia does not differentiate
information confrontation and disinformation the way we do.
They look at it much more holistically than we do. They look at
it through the electromagnetic spectrum. They look through
active measures. They incorporate it into all aspects of cyber
warfare, to include intelligence collection and the like.
We tend to kind of parse it out a little bit here, as we
are doing in this hearing right now, talking specifically about
disinformation. If this was going on in Russia right now, the
conversation would probably be a little bit more overarching
and incorporate a lot more of the traditional, what we would
call old FSB [Federal Security Service] tactics as well. Again,
we kind of parse it a bit, but they look at it much more
holistically than we do.
Mr. Larsen. So, not so much better or worse, but it is kind
of based on how they have done it in the past; whereas, we have
important limitations in place, based in the written
Constitution, as a for instance, that say we can do certain
things and we cannot absolutely do other things. That is just
one example.
Mr. Sullivan. Sure. I will say this: in the United States,
okay, we are not going to fabricate or alter data and release
it publicly. The Russians would have no problem doing that, and
do do that quite often.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
If there are no other questions, we are going to adjourn
for 15 minutes and move to our classified briefing in Rayburn
2212. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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