[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                          [H.A.S.C. No. 117-8]

                    DISINFORMATION IN THE GRAY ZONE:

               OPPORTUNITIES, LIMITATIONS, AND CHALLENGES

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 16, 2021
                             

                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]




                           ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
45-429               WASHINGTON : 2021 
                                     
  


          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                    RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona, Chairman

RICK LARSEN, Washington              TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    SAM GRAVES, Missouri
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  DON BACON, Nebraska
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida, Vice   C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
    Chair

                Shannon Green, Professional Staff Member
               Patrick Nevins, Professional Staff Member
                           Zach Taylor, Clerk
                           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Gallego. Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     1
Kelly, Hon. Trent, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations....     9

                               WITNESSES

Maier, Christopher, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
  Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, U.S. Department 
  of Defense.....................................................     4
Sullivan, James, Defense Intelligence Officer for Cyber, Defense 
  Intelligence Agency............................................     3
Tipton, Neill, Director of Intelligence for Collections and 
  Special Programs, U.S. Department of Defense...................     6

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Gallego. Hon. Ruben..........................................    25
    Maier, Christopher, joint with Neill Tipton and James 
      Sullivan...................................................    27

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
    
   DISINFORMATION IN THE GRAY ZONE: OPPORTUNITIES, LIMITATIONS, AND 
                               CHALLENGES

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
       Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
                           Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 16, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:01 a.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ruben Gallego 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
  ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, everyone, for joining us. Please 
take a seat.
    Before I get going, I have to do some Webex instructions 
per House and admin. Here we go.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen 
for the purposes of identity verification, to establish and 
maintain a quorum, participate in the proceedings, and voting. 
Those members must continue to use the software platform video 
function while in attendance unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences 
technical difficulty, they should contact the committee staff 
for assistance. A video of members' participation will be 
broadcast in the room and via the telephone/television/internet 
feed.
    Members who are remote must seek recognition verbally and 
they are asked to mute their microphones when they are not 
speaking. Members who are participating remotely are reminded 
to keep their software platform video function on the entire 
time they attend the proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin 
the proceeding. If members depart for a short while for reasons 
other than joining a different proceeding, they should leave 
the video function on. If members will be absent for a 
significant period or depart to join a different proceeding, 
they should exit the software platform entirely and, then 
rejoin it if they return. Members may use the software platform 
chat feature to communicate with staff regarding technical or 
logistical support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member, if 
necessary, to mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel 
any inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the 
proceeding.
    Good morning. I call to order this first hearing of the 
Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee on 
``Disinformation in the Gray Zone: Opportunities, Limitations, 
and Challenges.''
    We are seeing unprecedented threats to our democracy and a 
disturbing rise of authoritarian actors. Anti-democratic forces 
have capitalized on the rapidly evolving information 
environment to spread disinformation and misinformation, and 
exploit fissures in our society. The only way to reverse these 
trends is through a whole-of-society approach working with 
partners and allies who share our values.
    After two decades of war fighting terrorists in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere around the Middle East and 
Africa, we have discovered an even greater threat inside the 
wire. Gone are the days when we could solely rely on the Armed 
Forces to fight our wars beyond our borders. The threats and 
attacks are now here. On American soil. And at home.
    The 2018 National Defense Strategy stated that the 
``homeland is no longer a sanctuary.'' Our adversaries' use of 
information and technology has proven that out. They craft and 
feed misinformation to our news outlets and social media about 
the safety of vaccines, for example, the efficacy of our 
institutions, and the depth of our differences, and then they 
weaponize our own reactions to that misinformation.
    So, we have a problem. So much so that last year nine--I 
repeat, nine--combatant commanders co-sent a letter to the 
Director of National Intelligence requesting immediate help to 
combat the pervasive and damaging influence by China and 
Russia. I want to hear what we are doing to help our 
commanders. How are we making sure that information about the 
malign activity of Russia and China is not overclassified, and 
how are you synchronizing with the State Department and with 
partners and allies to combat these threats?
    Information operations is one way that the United States 
can protect itself and its partners against dis- and mis-
information efforts by China and Russia. We should aspire for 
cohesion and breadth. We must develop a comprehensive influence 
strategy to truly protect our borders, our allies, and our 
interests.
    In that context, I look forward to hearing from our 
witnesses about the Department's efforts to support and build a 
whole-of-government construct. I want to introduce the three 
witnesses who will tell us a little about that.
    Mr. Christopher Maier, Acting Assistant Director of Defense 
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; Mr. Neill 
Tipton, Director of Defense Intelligence, Collections and 
Special Programs; and Mr. James Sullivan, Defense Intelligence 
Officer.
    Following this discussion, we will continue in a closed, 
classified session.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Gallego can be found in the 
Appendix on page 25.]
    Mr. Gallego. I understand that Ranking Member Kelly is on 
his way from the airport. So, we will get started with our 
opening statements from our witnesses, and once we are done 
with our witness statements, we will swing back to Ranking 
Member Kelly for his opening statement.
    And with that, let's start with Mr. Maier. Thank you.
    Mr. Maier. Chairman, we are actually going to start with an 
intel brief, if that is okay, quickly, and then, shift from 
there.
    Mr. Gallego. Go ahead.

 STATEMENT OF JAMES SULLIVAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR 
               CYBER, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, Members, good morning. My name 
is Jim Sullivan, Defense Intelligence Officer for Cyber. Thank 
you for the invitation to come down here. I will provide you 
some background on----
    Mr. Gallego. Mr. Sullivan, please put the microphone closer 
to your mouth. Thank you.
    Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, sir.
    I am here to provide the threat landscape of our two main 
rivals, Russia and China, in the information sphere. I will 
cover more specifics in the closed session.
    I will begin with Russia. Russia sees the information 
sphere as a key domain for modern military conflict. Russia has 
prioritized the development of forces and means for information 
confrontation in a holistic concept for ensuring information 
superiority since at least the 1920s. Russia wages this 
struggle for information dominance during peacetime and armed 
conflict with equal intensity using combined electronic and 
kinetic means and methods through information-technical, 
information-psychological, and active measures. The Russian 
government claims NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 
countries, led by the United States, have created a powerful 
information operations system and are expanding and improving 
it.
    Russia sees the information domain differently than the 
United States and its allies and partners. Russian publications 
and actions indicate its government maintains a holistic 
concept of information confrontation. Specifically, information 
confrontation seeks to dominate the information domain through 
a combination of what it defines as information-technical 
effects--or means which seek to manipulate networks, computers, 
and data--and information-psychological effects, all intended 
to target people or a population to influence behavior or 
opinions. We are increasingly seeing the integrated use of 
cyber-enabled psychological actions, distributed denial-of-
service attacks, propaganda disseminated through social media 
and bots, strategic deception and disinformation, and 
electromagnetic warfare to achieve strategic goals.
    China seeks to influence domestic, foreign, and 
multilateral political establishments and public opinion to 
accept China's narratives and to remove obstacles that prevent 
China from attaining its goals, including the sustainment of 
the Communist Party regime. The People's Liberation Army [PLA] 
has developed the concept of ``Three Warfares''--which is to 
say, public opinion, legal, and psychological warfare--as key 
components of its psychological-cognitive warfare efforts. 
These efforts are designed to demoralize adversaries and to 
influence foreign and domestic public opinion.
    Similar to Russia, China also takes a broad approach, to 
include the establishment of cultural centers, taking control 
of Chinese language print media, and the employment of cyber 
techniques. China views the cyber domain, in particular, as an 
ideal platform for strategic influence and deception and 
disinformation operations. The PLA likely seeks to use digital 
influence activities to support its overall ``Three Warfares'' 
concept and to undermine an adversary's social cohesion, 
economy, morale, and governance. These operations are conducted 
with intensity in peacetime, and we anticipate they would be 
conducted with increased intensity during armed conflict. The 
PLA goals for social media influence activities fall into three 
broad categories: to promote a narrative favorable to China, 
undermine adversary resolve and social cohesion, and shape 
foreign governments' policies in favor of China's core 
interests.
    Sir, that concludes my opening statement.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
    And, Mr. Maier.

 STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER MAIER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
 DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, U.S. 
                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Maier. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Gallego, Ranking 
Member Kelly, and distinguished committee members, it is an 
honor to be with you here today.
    As is already stated, I am Chris Maier. I am the Acting 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict. In this capacity, I serve as the principal 
civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense on special 
operations and low-intensity conflict matters, including the 
employment of special operations forces. On behalf of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, I also provide oversight for 
information operations.
    Building on the brief laydown on the threat you received 
just now from the Defense Intelligence Agency, I am here with 
my colleagues from the Department of Defense to discuss our 
approach to adversary disinformation in the gray zone and the 
Department's efforts to gain and maintain the operational 
advantage in this evolving threat environment.
    Adversary use of disinformation, misinformation, and 
propaganda poses one of today's greatest challenges to the 
United States, not just to the Department of Defense. Russia 
and China, as well as non-state actors, understand that in 
today's information environment they have real-time access to a 
global audience. With first-mover advantage and by flooding the 
information environment with deliberately manipulated 
information--that is, mostly truthful with carefully crafted 
deceptive elements--these actors can gain leverage to threaten 
our interests.
    Although we are here today to discuss various DOD 
[Department of Defense] efforts, we recognize that we do not 
have a monopoly on U.S. Government capabilities to combat 
disinformation, nor should we. The Department of Defense is one 
of a whole-of-government approach to this challenge, and other 
civilian departments and agencies have critical roles and 
responsibilities which demand close interagency coordination 
and clear authorities. Coordinated interagency effects can 
complement the efforts of each department and agency to defend 
the Nation against disinformation and to reach and engage 
global audiences.
    As we strive to leverage DOD's information operations 
capabilities in competition with malign actors, we must first 
acknowledge, as reiterated in the recently published Interim 
National Security Strategic Guidance, that we will actively 
support elevating diplomacy as our tool of first resort. DOD 
directly supports the Department of State's Public Diplomacy 
teams and the Global Engagement Center, and complements the 
activities of the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
    Within DOD, we organize our efforts to combat 
disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda in four broad 
lines of effort, all supported by a foundation of intelligence 
support, interagency collaboration, and partnerships. These 
four areas are: countering propaganda by adversaries, force 
protection, countering disinformation and strategic deception 
abroad by adversaries, and deterring and disrupting adversarial 
malign influence capabilities. I will briefly touch on each one 
of these efforts.
    Countering propaganda. Propaganda, especially with a 
capable sponsor spreading it to susceptible audiences, can 
often drown out truthful information and create barriers to 
fact-based messaging. Public Affairs is the lead within DOD for 
countering propaganda that affects U.S. military objectives. 
Public Affairs also leads the Department's efforts to inform 
domestic and foreign audiences of adversaries' attempts to 
manipulate behavior in this domain. Other DOD capabilities 
support Public Affairs' effort to lead proactively with 
truthful, verifiable, fact-based messaging. DOD efforts to 
engage foreign audiences overseas support the Department of 
State's lead to inform foreign audiences.
    Next, force protection. Our soldiers, sailors, Marines, 
airmen, guardians, civilians, and their families are part of 
the American public directly targeted by malign actors' 
disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda. DOD views this 
as a critical force protection issue. The military services are 
proactive in building resilience against these threats. 
Enabling the force to recognize deceptive information tactics 
by adversaries' information operations, developing digital 
literacy, and employing critical thinking skills are a few key 
initiatives within the force protection line of effort.
    Third, countering disinformation abroad. At DOD, we also 
draw upon operational and informational capabilities, such as 
Military Information Support Operations, often better known by 
its acronym MISO, to generate narratives to compete against 
disinformation efforts directed at foreign audiences. These DOD 
capabilities can amplify and complement existing themes and 
messages to inform audiences that cannot be reached through 
traditional communications channels. To counter disinformation 
abroad, at DOD, we pursue a comprehensive and deliberate 
approach, working in close consultation again with State, to 
connect with audiences globally in real time to build 
communications that foreign audiences trust. Knowledge and 
trust by foreign audiences will reduce, and even suppress, the 
impact of malign influence activities.
    And then, finally, deterring and disrupting adversarial 
malign influence capabilities. Perhaps DOD's greatest strength 
lies in our ability to align narratives with actions in the 
domains of land, sea, air, cyber, and space, and information-
related capabilities against key weaknesses in the adversaries' 
information environment. Further, as we continue to seek to 
empower and work through partners, DOD draws on our knowledge, 
skills, and infrastructure to enable allies, partners, proxies, 
and surrogates to compete with malign actors, often near-peer 
competitors in the information environment, and for the benefit 
of their own populations, as well as our own. Our partners are 
force multipliers in deterring and disrupting adversarial 
disinformation.
    Through our ability to match words with deeds, we 
complement the efforts of our diplomats to deter malign 
behaviors, incentivize cooperation, and at times compel action. 
DOD's ongoing efforts to defend forward, to actively detect, 
assess, and, when directed, disrupt adversaries' 
disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda, bolsters our 
actions in the information environment.
    My colleague, Neill Tipton, Director of Defense 
Information, will speak in just a moment about intelligence 
support to these efforts. To foreshadow from policy and 
operational perspectives, intelligence support is essential to 
the whole-of-government partnerships that are key to our 
collective U.S. Government success against adversary 
disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda. And to 
reinforce once again, our international allies and partners are 
essential in reinforcing our collective efforts, often by 
contributing unique capabilities to countering adversaries' 
malign efforts. We are most effective when bolstered by their 
perspectives and their integration into our planning and 
execution.
    In sum, the Department continues to invest in our 
capabilities and capacities, so that we are best positioned to 
mitigate and defeat the disinformation efforts of our 
adversaries. We continuously aim to improve our speed, agility, 
efficiency, and effectiveness, and, most importantly, teamwork 
across the U.S. Government and internationally.
    We appreciate this subcommittee's attention to this 
critically important issue and your ongoing support to the 
Department's efforts in this information domain. Thank you for 
the opportunity to be here today.
    I will now turn it over to my colleague, Neill Tipton, who 
will address how intelligence supports these efforts. After 
that, we look forward to answering your questions.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Maier.
    Mr. Tipton.

    STATEMENT OF NEILL TIPTON, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE FOR 
  COLLECTIONS AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Tipton. Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly, and 
distinguished committee members, thank you for the opportunity 
to be here today.
    So, as previously mentioned, I am Neill Tipton, Director 
for Defense Intelligence for Collection and Special Programs in 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
and Security.
    Today, I will speak to you about the intel support needed 
to ensure that the Department maintains the upper hand against 
the challenge of disinformation in the gray zone. I will focus 
my remarks today really on four key areas where we are 
prioritizing intel support to the various efforts we are 
discussing: partnerships in intel support; intelligence support 
to irregular warfare; intelligence support to operations in the 
information environment; and support to combatant commands, 
which gets at Chairman Gallego's comments about the 
colloquially known 36-star memo.
    I will start with partnerships in intelligence support. So, 
underpinning all these efforts is a strong commitment to a 
whole-of-government partnership and decision cycle that 
constantly assesses the effects of misinformation and 
propaganda, and seeks to attribute these efforts to the 
responsible parties. This requires active cooperation across 
the responsible departments and agencies, as well as direct 
support from the intelligence community. The DOD leverages its 
information capabilities to gain and maintain the information 
advantage and integrates with the tools of other departments as 
part of a broader and more comprehensive approach. Our 
international allies and partners----
    Mr. Gallego. Mr. Tipton, can you slow down a little?
    Mr. Tipton. Absolutely.
    Mr. Gallego. I don't have you on the clock. So, you are 
good to go.
    Mr. Tipton. Okay.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    Mr. Tipton. I can do that. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Yes, it may be that I am just a slow learner 
more than anything else.
    Mr. Tipton. Okay. Our international allies and partners 
also bring reinforcing and often unique capabilities in our 
endeavors to counter adversaries' malign efforts, and their 
capabilities will be integrated into our planning efforts as 
well.
    The recently signed Defense Intelligence Strategy 
prioritizes China and Russia. The strategy calls out a specific 
action to prioritize intelligence support to strategic 
competition and influence efforts. The Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise will help advance U.S. influence and counter-
coercive campaigns via robust and focused intelligence support 
to sensitive and special activities, influence, deception, and, 
more broadly speaking, operations in the information 
environment.
    We would like to highlight for the committee three specific 
examples of ongoing actions that OUSDI&S [Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security] is 
supporting through our role within DOD and our partnership with 
the broader intelligence community. So, those are, as 
mentioned, intel support to irregular warfare, intelligence 
support to operations in the information environment, and 
intelligence dissemination to support combatant command 
messaging and counteractivities.
    So, intel support to irregular warfare. In support of the 
Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 NDS [National Defense 
Strategy], OUSDI&S, in partnership with the Joint Staff J-2, is 
supporting specific lines of effort to enable DOD to improve 
understanding in what we all the multi-domain environment. The 
several lines of efforts focus on identifying indicators and 
warnings, integrating collection, leveraging big data, 
reinforcing intelligence-sharing best practices, and assessing 
all the policies and processes that support these efforts.
    Intelligence support to operations in the information 
environment. As I am sure you are aware, my colleague, Mr. 
Maier, has oversight for operations in the information 
environment. We have established, as part of that, a Defense 
Intelligence Support to Operations in the Information 
Environment Working Group that has got a variety of activities 
underway to increase and enhance that support, one of which is 
a new effort, working with ODNI [Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence], to focus the national intelligence 
community on collection efforts on assisting us in the conduct 
of influence-related activities against key adversaries. That 
work is still ongoing.
    Also, that group is focused on drafting and staffing a new 
DOD instruction for intelligence support to operations in the 
information environment that would codify recommendations that 
came out of a 2019 JROC memo--so the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council--that provided some specific recommendations 
to the Department on how we enhance these activities. Amongst 
other things, it will direct the DIE [Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise] to prioritize resources for intelligence support to 
OIE [operations in the information environment] in the next 
published Consolidated Intelligence Guidance and will help us 
shape and work, again, as I mentioned, with the DNI and the 
national intelligence focus groups to drive some of these key 
concepts into the broader prioritization framework that the DNI 
[Director of National Intelligence] manages for the IC 
[intelligence community].
    And finally, I will talk about combatant command support. 
Another line of effort, as you had mentioned, for which we are 
providing intelligence support to OIE has been through the 
joint DOD-Director of National Intelligence response to the 
intel demands from the combatant commands. As you mentioned, in 
January of 2020, nine combatant commanders signed that memo 
out--we referred to as the 36-star memo--which asked for 
increased support from the IC for messaging and countering 
disinformation operations, as part of great power competition.
    In response, we partnered in an ongoing effort to 
streamline processes for downgrading, declassifying, and 
disclosing intelligence in support of operations in the 
information environment. We look to complete the current 
efforts in response to that memo by September of this year, 
while continuing follow-on initiatives to increase the use of 
open-source intelligence and to determine policy and resourcing 
strategies to provide the most effective intel support to OIE 
going forward. And then, finally, we are working across the 
Department to improve our training of intelligence personnel in 
this space and to optimize our tradecraft as appropriate to 
support operations in the information environment.
    So, the DIE will continue to support these efforts and 
ensure the Department is postured for success in this area. We 
appreciate your attention to this very important matter. This 
concludes my remarks, and I look forward to your questions. 
Thank you.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Maier, Mr. Tipton, and 
Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 27.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Tipton.
    I recognize Member Kelly for an opening statement.

     STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
                       SPECIAL OPERATIONS

    Mr. Kelly. I apologize to you guys for being late. I 
literally came straight off a plane straight here. So, thank 
you for being here and I thank you for being patient.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for your opening remarks and your 
leadership in organizing this morning's important hearing.
    Today, we will hear from three professionals in our 
Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee for both an 
unclassified and classified conversation about the spread of 
disinformation from our adversaries. To highlight just how 
seriously we take this disinformation, Chairman Gallego has 
chosen it as the subject of the first official hearing of the 
new Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee.
    The subcommittee was recently briefed on the threatening 
activities of China. Just last week during a full committee 
hearing, we heard from Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander, 
INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command]. He described ways the 
Communist Party of China uses a whole-of-government approach to 
exert control over the regions.
    One of the ways China conducts this external aggression and 
coercion is via the perverse spread of disinformation. This is 
most clearly seen in China's information campaigns around the 
coronavirus pandemic. The spread of malign information has 
sought to spread panic and distrust within the U.S., and even 
alleged that the United States Army was responsible for 
bringing the virus to China.
    China is not alone in these efforts. State-backed accounts 
in Russia and Iran also constructed manipulative narratives 
about our vaccine efforts. In fact, Russia has repeatedly used 
the gray zone to spread disinformation. An article in The Wall 
Street Journal from March 7th describes activities of Russia's 
intelligence enterprise across multiple state-backed, online 
news sites. The article outlines specific actions taken to 
spread misleading and false narratives to discredit the 
efficacy of the Pfizer vaccine.
    The use of disinformation is not just linked to the current 
pandemic, however. Our adversaries have long used this gray 
zone to operate, push false narratives, and undermine the 
national security interests of the United States. A memo signed 
last year by nine combatant commanders drives home just how 
important this issue is. Recognizing the need for increased 
support from the intelligence community to combat this threat, 
they note, ``malicious efforts by Russia and China across the 
information domain to seed discontent, weaken trust, and 
undermine alliances.'' The threat is real and growing.
    I am interested to hear our witnesses' views on how to best 
train and equip our intelligence professionals to counter this 
threat. I want to thank our witnesses in advance for their time 
today. I look forward to continuing work with our intel and 
special operations professionals during the 117th Congress.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ranking Member Kelly.
    We will now go to questions. And again, for our members, we 
will be limiting it to 5 minutes. And when you are recognized, 
please make sure to unmute your microphone. And we will begin 
with me.
    Countering misinformation, while an important DOD function, 
also involves the State Department and intel [community]. How 
will ASD SO/LIC [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict] and the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Intelligence work across the defense 
intelligence communities to ensure coordination of effort in 
this space? We will start with you, Mr. Maier.
    Mr. Maier. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    So, I think, in the first instance, it is important for us 
to clearly articulate to our intelligence community colleagues 
the requirements. And there is a wide definition of what we do 
in the information operations space and there is a limited 
number of intelligence resources. So, it is really incumbent on 
us on the policy side, especially from the oversight 
perspective, to make sure that we are communicating clearly 
what those priorities are for intelligence support. Everybody 
needs intelligence in this day and age to do everything. And 
so, I think it is incumbent on us to really be clear in working 
with the intelligence community, beyond just the Department of 
Defense, what those requirements are.
    I imagine my colleague would be able to speak to the 
intelligence requirements piece and how he manages those.
    Mr. Tipton. So, Chairman, just a couple of thoughts. One is 
nothing we do is done in a vacuum, and USDI ensures we work in 
a very tight partnership with ODI.
    Mr. Gallego. Mr. Tipton, please bring the microphone closer 
to you.
    Mr. Tipton. Sorry. So, I would comment, first, by saying 
that nothing we do is executed in a vacuum. We work very 
closely with the Office of the DNI on all these kinds of 
activities. And this is a specific case where we are partnered 
very tightly with them as we respond to the 36-star memo and 
other kinds of activities that are necessary to operate in the 
information environment.
    And the same goes with our allies. We recognize that we 
have to operate as part of a greater whole, and we are very 
tightly lashed up, especially with our closest allies, as we 
develop new products, reshape the priorities, develop all the 
supporting processes and enabling activities that we have to 
design and implement in order to reshape the outputs of the 
intel enterprise, which for 20 years has been focused on other 
problem sets, to how do we refocus on this problem set and 
support customers like ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] 
Maier and other operators in this space.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you. I appreciate the necessity of 
activities conducted by the Department to mitigate or curtail 
nefarious actions by our adversaries' intent to undermine and 
counter the strength of our military. However, information 
operations are one small part of what should be a larger, 
whole-of-government approach to combat malicious Russian or 
Chinese behavior. Some of our allies and partners already do 
this, but they are much smaller than us and their problems and 
opportunities are different from ours.
    Given the proliferation of disinformation, misinformation, 
and propaganda, would it be appropriate to call for a whole-of-
government influence campaign and strategy to ensure nested and 
synchronized efforts to the benefit of our national security 
objectives? And to follow up with that--well, Mr. Maier, if you 
wanted to start with that?
    Mr. Maier. Mr. Chairman, yes, I think it is, and I think we 
endeavor to do so in a number of focused efforts. Obviously, 
China and Russia use, and Iran and other non-state actors use, 
this technique across the whole range of different issues. So, 
we need to be precise as we leverage those interagency efforts 
and with our partners.
    Mr. Gallego. And so, we recognize that we need to do it, 
but trying to bring together different departments, different 
agencies, with different goals, different missions, to be 
focused requires at least someone to be a coordinator of that. 
Who is coordinating that at this point?
    Mr. Maier. Mr. Chairman, we would look to the National 
Security Council [NSC] staff to lead those interagency efforts, 
but the Department of Defense and State already organically 
work together on a number of these. But the real quarterback in 
this system of the interagency is going to be the NSC staff, 
sir.
    Mr. Gallego. Yes. Mr. Maier, what role does the ASD SO/LIC 
play in information operations, specifically, the interplay of 
big DOD, SOCOM [Special Operations Command], and the 
interagency?
    Mr. Maier. Mr. Chairman, I would answer your question in 
two ways. First, as has been directed by [section] 922 in the 
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] from 2017, it 
reinforces the role that ASD SO/LIC plays as the service-
secretary-like or administrative chain of command. So, we have 
responsibility/civilian oversight for ensuring the force is 
equipped to do these operations, SOCOM, but also the 
components--USASOC [U.S. Army Special Operations Command], Navy 
SEALs [Sea, Air and Land teams], Air Force Special Operations 
Command, a whole series of others.
    And then, on the policy side of things, we are the direct 
support to the Under Secretary for Policy for integrating 
information operations and these types of disciplines into the 
policy development process for the Department of Defense.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    Representative Kelly.
    Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, I yield to Mr. Bacon, who is 
prepared to move forward with questions.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, gentlemen, for sharing your 
expertise. We sure appreciate it.
    One of the things that I have noted, that our adversaries 
often use our partisan political scenes for disinformation, 
which makes it harder for us to counter. How do we overcome 
that when, say, Russia in 2016 uses disinformation in a way 
that makes it hard in a partisan environment to counter? I 
would be curious for your thoughts on that. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Mr. Maier, is that a deepfake that we just saw 
with the two Bacons?
    Mr. Maier. I am not sure, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Gallego. All right. Okay, Mr. Bacon. Sorry.
    Mr. Bacon. Could you hear me all right? I asked the 
question.
    Mr. Maier. So, I will take that broadly, and then, defer to 
the intel community on the specifics of this. But I think it is 
a well-recognized technique that these malign actors are using, 
and I think some of this is, again, some of the points I made 
in building resilience and ensuring that what is coming out, at 
least from the U.S. Government's information sources, whether 
it is Public Affairs or others, is truthful information.
    As to how we best counter adversaries exploiting that, I 
will defer to my intelligence colleague for how they are doing 
that.
    Mr. Sullivan. Yes, Mr. Bacon, Jim Sullivan from DIA 
[Defense Intelligence Agency].
    So, it really does begin with making sure that we are 
working across the spectrum of DIA, NGA [National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency], NSA [National Security Agency], CIA 
[Central Intelligence Agency], FBI [Federal Bureau of 
Investigation], and others, and enhancing our own capability 
inside the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to, number one, 
understand who the cyber actors are; what publications, what 
social media platforms are they using; what is their strategy/
doctrine/intent at getting to the American public, and what 
specifically is it that they are targeting. Once we have the 
bubble on that, then we can work with others inside the 
combatant command, other intel agencies, and be better equipped 
to counteract that.
    Mr. Bacon. One thing that I saw in France, I thought they 
did a good job to say right upfront, candidly, this is what 
Russia is doing and they are trying to play on partisan 
divides. And I just think we have to be more candid with our 
voters and with our citizens when this happens.
    One other question for you before I yield. DOD's 2020 China 
military power report identified how China uses its so-called 
``50 Cent Army'' to, among other things, try to influence 
public opinion towards the pro-China perspectives. They noted 
how, in 2019, Facebook and Twitter had deleted some accounts 
spreading disinformation regarding the protests in Hong Kong. 
So, over the past year, have social media companies been more 
effective at reducing the spread of disinformation, especially 
from China and Russia? Thank you.
    Mr. Sullivan. Yes, I will go ahead and take that, Mr. 
Bacon. So, I think, in the last several years, social media, 
and also, too, commercial vendors, have operated quite 
prolifically in this space and have gotten very, very capable, 
both in determining/attributing where this activity is coming 
from, and then, being able to use algorithms in order to delete 
accounts.
    Now I can't speak to what they are doing for China at this 
moment, but the trend is I think moving in a positive 
direction. When you take that in combination with what we are 
doing in open source, I think we are getting a better handle on 
at least false narratives, again, identification of the media 
platforms that they are using. And I think, as time goes on, we 
are better postured to do that.
    Two years ago, I think it was quite difficult to be able to 
understand what was a false account. But the tradecraft has 
gotten much better; being able to identify it has gotten much 
better. And I have every expectation that in the future that is 
only going to improve.
    Mr. Bacon. I will just close with two comments. First, we 
have a long history in our country of being successful in this 
area. In World War II, multiple examples where we can overcome. 
So, we have it within our ability to win in this spectrum.
    And I will just close, also, by saying thank you to each of 
you for serving and defending our country, and I appreciate 
what you do every day. With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Bacon. Thank you, 
Member Kelly.
    I now recognize Representative Larsen.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Maier, given what we have heard today with regards to 
SOCOM, does it--this is sort of a loaded question--but does it 
imply a need for changing either who we recruit, the skills 
they have, the skills we develop in SOCOM, and the structure of 
the teams within SOCOM, in order to address these particular 
challenges? Have you thought through that and can you give us 
some idea of what you are thinking?
    Mr. Maier. Yes, thanks, Congressman Larsen. That is, I 
think, a very important question.
    And I have the benefit in the role I play to support the 
Secretary of Defense, who has made diversity one of his number 
one challenges. I had the benefit of sitting in on a 
conversation he had with General Clarke, the SOCOM commander, 
and he made that abundantly clear, that diversity is an 
operational imperative. It has the benefits that you 
articulated in your question of being able to bring different 
perspectives, different ways of communicating, knowledge of 
culture--things that, if everybody looks the same, if everybody 
thinks the same, are going to render us not particularly 
effective in these challenging environments.
    We are evolving, I think, as a country and a force from 
heavy focus on the counter-VEO, violent extremist 
organizations, to a much more diverse threat environment where 
information is one of the tools they are using. And we have got 
to be able to play their game against them and beat them in 
some respects on their own playing field. That means the 
ability to speak languages, the ability to draw on cultural 
innuendos that aren't necessarily obvious to those that may 
have been trained for other purposes.
    Mr. Larsen. So, within SOCOM, do you think they are 
evolving fast enough to support this?
    Mr. Maier. I think, sir, that they would say they are not 
evolving fast enough. As you know, in training special 
operations forces, it really requires recruitment and training 
far down the line, very early in the process. And that is 
something that all the components, whether it is the SEALs, the 
Air Force Special Operations components, or the Army 
components, Marine Corps, are looking at how they get farther 
downstream in their recruiting in order to do what you are 
articulating.
    Mr. Larsen. As Acting ASD SO/LIC, do you think you have 
enough authority, and would you have enough authority as a 
permanent confirmation, to push that along?
    Mr. Maier. At this point, I think I do, sir. But a lot of 
this is going to be just persisting, keeping on this. This is a 
priority that is going to take, unfortunately, a long time to 
actually see fruition, and we are going to have to stay on 
this. It is a strong partnership, I think, with SOCOM and they 
recognize this need and have prioritized it as well. That is 
the best arrangement, I think, regardless of bureaucratic 
standing, to get to a success.
    Mr. Larsen. And on bureaucratic standing, I understand that 
SECDEF, or the Secretary of Defense, is reviewing the changes 
that former Secretary of Defense Miller put in place about the 
role of ASD SO/LIC. Do you have any insight for where that is 
now? My personal view is that, regardless of the outcome, we 
need to have a stronger civilian oversight over SOCOM forces.
    Mr. Maier. Congressman, thank you for that statement. It is 
a decision that is before the Secretary of Defense now. I think 
the options are fairly obvious. They are: do we keep it the way 
it is with SO/LIC separate from all the other entities in the 
Department or do we integrate it into policy pieces? But I 
don't think there have been any options discussed in which ASD 
SO/LIC does not--and I reiterate that, does not--continue to 
report to the Secretary of Defense as a principal staff 
assistant for that administrative piece of oversight and 
civilian oversight of Special Operations Command, sir.
    Mr. Larsen. Thanks. I just don't want any confusion about 
the letter that was sent a few weeks ago from members of the 
subcommittee and others about the intent of the letter.
    Back to sort of the broader--I have got 56 seconds left--
back to the broader issue of intelligence and intelligence 
sharing. I am going to have to get caught up a little bit more 
on all the letters. I mean, I understand all the lettered 
agencies you talked about. And perhaps you can think about this 
for the classified: if you think there are any gaps in how that 
information gets communicated within the DOD and between 
agencies, so that it can be most effectively used. I don't know 
if there is something you can say about that now. Mr. Tipton, 
you look like you are eager to answer that.
    Mr. Tipton. Yes, Congressman, I will just comment that we 
are rebuilding muscle memory that we haven't exercised really 
since the Cold War, as we operate in this kind of information 
domain. And so, clearly, there are gaps in how we do that and 
we are working through that. We can talk a little bit more 
about that in the closed session.
    Mr. Larsen. I look forward to it. That is fine.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Larsen.
    Representative Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman. I don't have a whole lot. I 
will say that I was on one of our military installations the 
other day and speaking about kind of the width and the depth of 
the anger that I see out there. And one of the generals 
suggested to me that they were seeing it in their ranks, too, 
and that I should watch the documentary ``The Social Dilemma,'' 
and how people are able to use information against us.
    And so, just a suggestion for the committee, and maybe 
looking for comment from the people that are presenting, is: 
are we discussing with our soldiers the potential for the use 
of disinformation and misinformation through social media to 
create bias in the ranks or dissent in the ranks of the 
military? Do you know if we are actually having discussions 
with our troops on that?
    Mr. Maier. Mr. Scott, I can answer that question. So, 
absolutely, and one of the main pillars that I mentioned in my 
remarks, and that I can go into a little bit more depth on, is 
the force protection concerns associated with intentional 
misinformation and disinformation through social media.
    A critical component of what Secretary of Defense Austin is 
looking at, too, is extremism. And a key component of these 
standdowns that we are all involved in, not just the uniformed 
side, but the civilian side, is looking at the influences from 
the outside that do contribute to extremism and, as one of your 
colleagues said, attempts to divide not only the forces, but 
us, as citizens.
    And I think we look at this through the lens of every 
soldier is both a citizen and a member of the Armed Forces, and 
having to look at both those perspectives is a critical piece 
as they are looking at social media, and we look to, as much as 
possible, make them resilient against what we know are 
concerted efforts to attempt to divide and in some cases drive 
them to extremism.
    Mr. Scott. Well, I would finish with this: one is I think 
it has been very effective, what they are doing, unfortunately. 
And as this current generation comes out of high school and 
college, the first generation where, basically, everything they 
have done has been on the internet, I think we need to expand 
beyond the scope of the military as fast as we can in advising 
the American citizens what is happening with the ability of 
outside influences who do not like our country to influence our 
attitudes towards each other in this country and how damaging 
it is to us.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Scott.
    Representative Keating. Representative Keating.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I heard my name.
    I just want to thank the witnesses. This is an important 
issue, and I am just pleased that, just more commentary, I am 
pleased that the new Secretary of Defense is taking these 
issues as seriously as he is. And we all have to work, and I 
just want to continue to work, particularly in the other 
committee I am on where we are dealing with some of the malign 
actors in this field, with Russia and some of their activities.
    So, that is all I had to say as a comment going forward. 
But I thank you.
    And thank you for having this as your first full hearing, 
Mr. Chairman. I think it is an important one. I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Keating.
    We have Representative Franklin.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 
gentlemen, for your time this morning. This is a very critical 
topic.
    I just have a couple of questions for Mr. Maier. In your 
testimony, you referenced ongoing efforts to detect, assess, 
and then, when directed, disrupt adversaries' disinformation, 
misinformation, and propaganda. I am just curious, just for my 
own edification, what is the trip line for when that takes 
place? Who is the authority to direct that action? And then, 
what would a response look like to that misinformation or 
disinformation?
    Mr. Maier. Yes, sir. So, this is going to be a ``it 
depends'' answer a little bit here. And in open forum, what I 
would say is that a key element of being flexible in the 
information operations space is ensuring that authorities are 
delegated down to the appropriate level with the appropriate 
risk built into that.
    And so, I think, if you are talking about activities that, 
on one extreme, could be kinetic in nature--and that is not 
outside the realm--those are going to be the purview, of 
course, of the Secretary of Defense or delegated down. If you 
are talking about the ability to go out and push back on a 
narrative, in many respects that is at lower levels within 
Public Affairs or even within the Military Information Support 
Operation, generally, in support to the State Department Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs. So, it is going to depend in many 
respects on what the action envisioned is and how that is 
viewed from a risk perspective. But the success here is 
predicated on delegating to the lowest level possible, sir.
    Mr. Franklin. Okay. I appreciate that, and that sort of 
feeds into my next question with regard to an overall strategy 
for how we would approach this. In section 1239 of the NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2020, it called for development of a comprehensive 
strategy to counter the threat of malign influence by the PRC 
[People's Republic of China] and Russia. And I think that was 
due within 6 months, which would have been probably June or so 
of 2020. Can you tell us where that stands, elaborate on the 
status of that effort?
    Mr. Maier. Congressman, I am going to have to take that as 
a request to follow up. I don't know exactly where that is.
    Mr. Franklin. Okay. All right then. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Thanks.
    Representative Sherrill.
    Okay. We will come back to Representative Sherrill. In the 
meantime, do you have anybody?
    Mr. Kelly. No.
    Mr. Gallego. No? Okay, we will move on to Representative 
Panetta.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this 
opportunity.
    And, of course, thank you to all the witnesses for your 
service, your preparation, your testimony especially. Thank you 
very much.
    I guess--and correct me if I am wrong--but the 1st Special 
Forces down at Fort Bragg recently announced an information 
warfare center just for these types of operations. I guess 
their main goal is to deliver an ``influence artillery round,'' 
quote-unquote. Can you give me a little information about the 
center? Can you give me a little information about what that 
influence artillery round would look like?
    Mr. Maier. So, sir, I am going to have to take that for 
further follow-up to give you an exact answer. But I think it 
is indicative of what we are trying to do across the force, 
which is really elevate this issue to a point where I wouldn't 
want to articulate or even speculate on what they mean by an 
``information artillery round,'' but I think that it speaks to 
the idea that information is a part of our warfighting concept, 
and therefore, we bring this into the same series of options we 
would bring, kinetic or other capabilities that might be more 
traditional, sir.
    Mr. Panetta. Understood. Understood. On that note, do you 
think or do you know, or can you surmise, if there are plans 
for other similar types of centers in the future for not just 
special operations, but other parts of our military?
    Mr. Maier. Yes, sir, I think not only do we envision those, 
we have got a number of these that are up and operating. The 
Joint MISO Center down at Special Operations Command is 
actually an outgrowth of something that Central Command 
developed. And the realization was we need to be doing this 
globally. So, that is one that I know this committee has in the 
past looked into, and we continue to be supportive of it in 
concept. That is not just because it's at SOCOM, is in a 
special operations thing; that is all the combatant commands. 
And so, that brings, we hope, an economy of scale to those 
efforts.
    Mr. Panetta. Right. Thank you. So, kind of going from 
looking inward to looking outward, how do you think--you know, 
Russia, obviously, has kind of set the pace on this, and China 
has followed. How do you think they are going to evolve with 
their hybrid warfare going forward and using these types of 
information/disinformation warfare?
    Mr. Sullivan. Yes, Congressman, I will take that one, from 
DIA. So, it has been said in the past that, in the information 
sphere, that Russia introduces bad weather, whereas China is 
changing the climate. I would say that that is an accurate 
statement, except to your point, it is reversed. I think it is 
Russia that is changing the climate, and I think it is China 
that is introducing bad weather.
    To further complicate it, though, China will grow into that 
role. China will use technology. China will use machine 
learning and AI faster than the Russians will do it. Russia is, 
without question, ahead because they are a lot more prolific 
and they are a lot more destructive, and they have a slightly 
different intent, which is they are much more aggressive in 
terms of trying to undermine U.S. democracy and enhance 
social--or I am sorry--to degrade social cohesion in the United 
States. China is not necessarily up to that.
    But, to answer your question broadly, the threat in the 
information domain is here to stay because it really comes down 
to conventional military overmatch, of which neither country 
has that against the United States. Cyber is a great equalizer, 
in that nobody is 100 percent mature in this domain, and 
information dominance is effective, it is cheap, and it is 
quick.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you for that answer. I appreciate that.
    Is there one theater, in particular, that each of those 
near-peers are focusing on? Are they sticking to their areas of 
influence? Or are you seeing that in other areas, Africa, or so 
forth?
    Mr. Sullivan. So, it all depends. It all depends on the 
actor. Both are global. Russia has a much more massive global 
presence. They are very much entrenched in Africa, very much so 
in Eastern Europe. They still try to look at really sort of 
sowing discord in areas in Europe in which we have a forward 
presence. China, of course, is very interested in ASEAN 
[Association of Southeast Asian Nations], in the South Pacific, 
but it, too, also has a global narrative as well in terms of 
trying to really present the Chinese Communist Party as an 
alternative to the United States and Western democracy. I will 
get more into that in the closed session. But, to Mr. Maier's 
point, it depends. It really depends on the objective and it 
depends on the actor.
    Mr. Panetta. Understood.
    And then, obviously, this may be something in the closed 
session, but looking at either our friends or those who are not 
so friendly to us, are you seeing other nations develop into 
this area with a little more skill that you wouldn't think 
coming from them? I mean, either allies, friends, or foes, 
which ones are we watching when it comes to this type of 
misinformation in gray zone warfare?
    Mr. Sullivan. Yes, everybody plays in this sphere to some 
degree, including us. I don't see an enormous threat from any 
of our allies or anybody who I would not consider to be China 
and Russia. Certainly, the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea] and the Iranians also play in this. And if I had to 
stratify it, again, I would put Russia as number one, China as 
number two, Iran as number three, DPRK as number four.
    Mr. Panetta. Understood. Okay. Great. Thank you. Thank you 
again to everybody.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Is Representative Sherrill available? One more 
time, Representative Sherrill?
    [No response.]
    Mr. Gallego. Okay. If there are no more questions, we are 
going to adjourn for 15 minutes.
    And we have one question. Yes, Representative Larsen.
    Mr. Larsen. Yes, this won't be long.
    But, for Mr. Maier again, or anyone else, within SOCOM, 
they have the MISO capability, the responsibility. And that is 
supposed to be web-based, but there is a lot of non-web-based 
information operations that occur. So, when we hear from you 
about SOCOM's responsibility, is it limited to web-based 
information operations, or how are you sharing across this 
intelligence domain the totality of information operations? And 
then, could you help me understand what you all mean by 
information domain as well? So, it is a real short question, 
but, like everything, it is always the answer that is long.
    Mr. Maier. Congressman Larsen, yes, sir. So, maybe if it is 
okay, I will take the last question first, and then, speak to 
the SOCOM context.
    So, I think--not to recite doctrine for information 
operations, but what we really mean by that is those operations 
that are in that operational sphere, informed by the strategic, 
informed by the tactical, but really that connection between. 
So, if there is strategic guidance, and we are implementing a 
strategic approach, the information component of that is really 
bringing that strategy down to tactical execution. That can be 
Public Affairs. That can be Military Information Support 
Operations. That can be a host of other things. And it is 
really the discipline, as we would look at it doctrinally. What 
I think this hearing has elicited is it takes on a lot of 
different forms. I think there is a defensive and offensive 
component to it. As we think of it from the Department of 
Defense, we think of it in both contexts.
    On your question of Special Operations Command and MISO, 
they are the proponents, as we use the term, for Military 
Information Support Operations. My citing the Joint MISO WebOps 
Center was the entity that they built there to operate in the 
free-flowing nature of cyberspace for MISO. But SOCOM is 
supporting the global combatant commands, and the global 
combatant commands are the ones actually executing MISO 
operations in the far fletches of the world that we are 
operating in. So, done so in conjunction with the chiefs of 
mission approval in the country teams in the particular 
countries they are operating.
    Does that answer your question?
    Mr. Larsen. Maybe we can get into it a little more in the 
classified. You might help me understand with some examples on 
that.
    Mr. Sullivan, early on, you said Russia sees the 
information domain differently than the U.S. sees the 
information domain. Is there an answer you can give us about 
what those differences are in this setting?
    Mr. Sullivan. Yes, Mr. Larsen. So, by and large, Russia 
brings really the full spectrum. Russia does not differentiate 
information confrontation and disinformation the way we do. 
They look at it much more holistically than we do. They look at 
it through the electromagnetic spectrum. They look through 
active measures. They incorporate it into all aspects of cyber 
warfare, to include intelligence collection and the like.
    We tend to kind of parse it out a little bit here, as we 
are doing in this hearing right now, talking specifically about 
disinformation. If this was going on in Russia right now, the 
conversation would probably be a little bit more overarching 
and incorporate a lot more of the traditional, what we would 
call old FSB [Federal Security Service] tactics as well. Again, 
we kind of parse it a bit, but they look at it much more 
holistically than we do.
    Mr. Larsen. So, not so much better or worse, but it is kind 
of based on how they have done it in the past; whereas, we have 
important limitations in place, based in the written 
Constitution, as a for instance, that say we can do certain 
things and we cannot absolutely do other things. That is just 
one example.
    Mr. Sullivan. Sure. I will say this: in the United States, 
okay, we are not going to fabricate or alter data and release 
it publicly. The Russians would have no problem doing that, and 
do do that quite often.
    Mr. Larsen. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
    If there are no other questions, we are going to adjourn 
for 15 minutes and move to our classified briefing in Rayburn 
2212. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]



      
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