[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


  
                          [H.A.S.C. No. 117-9]

                    MILITARY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE

                          ORGANIZATION REFORM

                          RECOMMENDATIONS FROM

                       THE FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT

                            REVIEW COMMITTEE

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 16, 2021

                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                              __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
45-428                     WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------   

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

                 JACKIE SPEIER, California, Chairwoman

ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 JIM BANKS, Indiana
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas, Vice Chair  LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas

                        Hannah Kaufman, Counsel
                       Forrest McConnell, Counsel
                           Sidney Faix, Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Banks, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Indiana, Ranking Member, 
  Subcommittee on Military Personnel.............................     2
Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, 
  Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel.................     1

                               WITNESSES

Bullard, Brig Gen Terry, USAF, Commander, Air Force Office of 
  Special Investigations.........................................    23
Lopez, Omar, Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service......    24
Martin, MG Donna, USA, Provost Marshal General and Commanding 
  General, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command..............    21
Swecker, Christopher, Chairman, Fort Hood Independent Review 
  Committee; accompanied by Carrie Ricci, Member, Fort Hood 
  Independent Review Committee; Andrew R. Bland III, Consultant, 
  Fort Hood Independent Review Committee; and Mary Counts, 
  Consultant, Fort Hood Independent Review Committee.............     4

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Bullard, Brig Gen Terry......................................    63
    Lopez, Omar..................................................    70
    Martin, MG Donna.............................................    57
    Speier, Hon. Jackie..........................................    45
    Swecker, Christopher, joint with Carrie Ricci, Andrew R. 
      Bland III, and Mary Counts.................................    47

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    Letter to Acting Secretary of the Army.......................    83

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Banks....................................................    89
    Ms. Escobar..................................................    89
    Ms. Speier...................................................    87

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Ms. Houlahan.................................................    93
    Ms. Strickland...............................................    98
             
             
             MILITARY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ORGANIZATION

 REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                        Subcommittee on Military Personnel,
                           Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 16, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:01 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jackie Speier 
(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
   CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

    Ms. Speier. Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the 
Military Personnel Subcommittee.
    Our hearing today is a hybrid one. We are going to be 
looking at the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations 
reform recommendations from the Fort Hood Independent Review 
Committee. We have two panels today. The first panel are 
members of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee who have 
firsthand knowledge of the findings and recommendations made 
and given to the Army. The second panel are the heads of each 
of the services' investigative agencies who are here to tell us 
how their agencies work and could be improved.
    The Fort Hood report is required reading and continues to 
reveal new challenges and problems, as well as demonstrate the 
devastating impacts of problems that have gone unaddressed, but 
also, and more importantly, new solutions. Ultimately, it is a 
guidebook for how to create a smarter, safer, and more ready 
force.
    The Fort Hood Independent Review Committee's report is a 
stinging repudiation of the Army Criminal Investigation 
Division [CID]. The combination of woefully inadequate 
experience among the investigators--in fact, 92 percent were 
apprentice agents--coupled with understaffing created a doomed 
operation that resulted in unsolved murders until civil law 
enforcement stepped in; a disturbing sexual assault conviction 
rate of 22 percent; and an installation in which soldiers felt 
unsafe--a damning result.
    What the Independent Review Committee found was startling. 
Quote, ``The Fort Hood CID is a training ground. These young, 
inexperienced agents were checklist-driven, focused on 
developing a case file that simply checked the boxes rather 
than identifying and working leads and suspects that are most 
likely to resolve cases.'' Unquote.
    Fort Hood CID investigations were extremely long. Quote, 
``The yearly average days to complete an investigation between 
2016 and 2020 ranged between a high of 214 days in 2016 to 115 
days in 2020.'' Sadly, quote, ``Victims seldom saw the outcomes 
of their cases and there was minimal deterrent value derived.'' 
Unquote. Perhaps most disconcerting is that, quote, ``A large 
number of sexual assault cases were lost or dismissed at court 
martial, partially due to investigations that were rote and 
lacked essential evidence.'' Unquote.
    And finally, the Fort Hood detachment was underresourced 
and underexperienced. During 2018, 2019, and early 2021, 
typically, one-third of CID positions at Fort Hood were 
unfilled. There was a very limited in-house capability to 
conduct cell phone tracking and exploit mobile phones, laptops, 
and other electronic devices; an inability to maintain liaisons 
with local police; and a failure to provide the proper 
materials to support search warrants.
    And none of this would have come to light without the 
tragic deaths of so many individuals. Among them are Specialist 
Vanessa Guillen, Private First Class Brandon Wedel-Morales, 
Private First Class Scott Rosecrans, Sergeant Elder Fernandes, 
and Specialist Freddy Beningo Delacruz, Jr.
    For them, their families, friends, and soldiers in arms, we 
must demand greater professionalism and accountability. We must 
give the MCIOs [Military Criminal Investigation Organizations] 
the tools they need to make sure investigations are done right, 
the staffing to be able to complete cases in a timely manner, 
and rigorous evidence-gathering capabilities sufficient to hold 
criminals accountable at a court martial.
    The military often says that it has zero tolerance for 
sexual assault, but when criminal investigations are 
haphazardly done, consisting of box-checking, it undermines any 
hope of accountability and does a disservice to brave service 
members who make an unrestricted report. And that in no way is 
zero tolerance.
    It is the job of this committee to ensure that the military 
completes a fulsome, thorough, and competent criminal 
investigation for every reported crime. While the Fort Hood 
report focused on CID, I believe that all of the MCIOs--CID, 
NCIS [Naval Criminal Investigative Service], and OSI [Office of 
Special Investigations]--will benefit by doing an internal 
review of their respective departments with an eye on the Fort 
Hood Committee's findings and recommendations. I have said it 
before; I will say it again and again--I am heartened that Fort 
Hood leaders have already taken some action within their 
authority to improve. But, until all the findings and 
recommendations have been put in place and Fort Hood is well on 
its way to being, quote, ``the great place,'' unquote, it 
professes to be, we won't look away. We won't turn our backs on 
our service members. I will ensure we keep our foot firmly on 
the pedal until the Army turns itself around and our service 
members and their families are safe.
    I now would like to invite Ranking Member Banks to make an 
opening statement.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Speier can be found in the 
Appendix on page 45.]

  STATEMENT OF HON. JIM BANKS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM INDIANA, 
       RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I share your concern about the conditions at Fort Hood and 
look forward to hearing from our panelists today. The Fort Hood 
Commission's deep dive into the Army's Criminal Investigative 
Division on post highlighted very concerning issues. Rookie 
agents were sent out on their own, leaders struggled to keep 
their heads above water, and support functions were 
nonexistent.
    Just 12 of 76 uniformed agents at Fort Hood had more than 1 
year of experience. These apprentice agents should, by 
definition, have been mentored and supervised by experienced 
agents to learn the ropes and keep investigations on track. 
Instead, the lack of experienced agents and adequate resources 
resulted in long case lead times and poor investigations. 
Individual missteps added up to chronically lackluster 
investigative work on suicides, homicides, and sex crimes on 
and off post. Only 1 of 53 suicides in CID's jurisdiction 
received a completed postmortem behavioral assessment. Sex 
crime cases progressed slower than nearly all other comparable 
posts and undermined a soldier's belief that allegations of 
criminal wrongdoing would be taken seriously. For many victims 
of crime at Fort Hood, justice delayed felt like justice 
denied.
    The Fort Hood leadership also failed to use a variety of 
tools to connect with local law enforcement and disrupt hot 
spots of known criminal activity. These tools are available to 
every post commander, and they have been used successfully 
elsewhere in the past. I am interested to know exactly why that 
wasn't the case at Fort Hood. This is no way to handle serious 
crimes.
    I look forward to hearing today from the seasoned 
investigators on the Review Commission about their impressions 
of the situation at Fort Hood and what they believe could be 
done to produce better investigations in the future. I am 
especially interested in their findings about how the Army 
could better resource CID offices with admin and support 
personnel to keep agents in the field doing investigations 
rather than behind a desk.
    Our second panel includes representatives from each 
service's criminal investigation division. Each service has a 
different model for tracking this problem and it is designed to 
fit their mission and deployment needs. Hopefully, we can learn 
more about what builds strong military investigators and how 
the Army plans to move forward in improving CID.
    With that, thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Ms. Speier. I would like to ask unanimous consent that non-
subcommittee members be allowed to participate and ask 
questions after all the subcommittee members have had the 
opportunity to ask their questions. Without objection, so 
ordered.
    Each witness will provide a brief introduction and their 
focus on the committee. Then, Mr. Swecker will present a joint 
statement on behalf of the Fort Hood Independent Review 
Committee, and each member will have an opportunity to question 
the witnesses for 5 minutes. We respectfully ask the witnesses 
to summarize their testimony in 5 minutes. Your written 
comments and statements will be made part of the hearing 
record.
    So, it is an opportunity now for me to welcome back both 
Mr. Swecker and Ms. Ricci. For those of us that were able to 
participate in the last hearing, you certainly wowed us with 
your presentations, gave us lots of food for thought. And your 
report has become a bible of sorts that I carry with me on my 
plane rides, and find that every time I read it, I learn 
something new and, unfortunately, something that dismays me 
even more.
    So, with that, let's welcome our first panel which includes 
Mr. Chris Swecker, the chair of the Fort Hood Independent 
Review Committee; Ms. Carrie Ricci, a member of the Fort Hood 
Independent Review Committee; Mr. Andy Bland, consultant, Fort 
Hood Independent Review Committee; Ms. Mary Counts, consultant 
to the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee.
    Thank you all for being here today.

     STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER SWECKER, CHAIRMAN, FORT HOOD 
  INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE, ACCOMPANIED BY CARRIE RICCI, 
MEMBER, FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE; ANDREW R. BLAND 
 III, CONSULTANT, FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE, AND 
MARY COUNTS, CONSULTANT, FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE

    Mr. Swecker. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Speier and Ranking 
Member Banks, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to 
discuss our findings, the findings of the Fort Hood Independent 
Review Committee. In the interest of time, we are doing a 
consolidated opening statement. I will try to summarize it and 
get through it in the next 5 to 6 minutes, if possible, but, as 
you have noted, the rest will be entered into the record.
    As you know, the former Secretary of the Army appointed 
five executive members of the Fort Hood Independent Review 
Committee, but also we were supplemented by five subject matter 
experts who assisted in various tasks associated with the 
independent review. And I would just like to briefly introduce 
the four members that are appearing here today.
    Carrie Ricci is a retired Army JAG [judge advocate general] 
officer who served 3 years at Fort Hood, including as trial 
counsel; is now a senior executive serving as Associate General 
Counsel for the Department of Agriculture.
    Mary Counts served over 25 years as an FBI [Federal Bureau 
of Investigation] special agent and supervisory special agent 
in offices such as Honolulu; Washington, DC; El Paso; and FBI 
headquarters. She has worked and supervised investigations of 
drug cartels, gangs, crimes against children, and kidnappings. 
In her role with the FHIRC [Fort Hood Independent Review 
Committee], she conducted 157 face-to-face interviews with 
female service members at Fort Hood, the majority of whom were 
assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division and 3rd Cavalry Regiment. 
She also summarized over 80 group interviews that we did that 
encompassed over 1,800 service members of all ranks. She also 
reviewed CID investigative files of sexual assaults and death 
cases.
    Andy Bland is a 23-year veteran of the FBI. His final 
assignment was special agent in charge in Houston, but he also 
served as the FBI legal attache in Baghdad. He was Deputy 
Assistant Director of the Inspections Division of the FBI and 
also served as the head of the FBI Training Academy at 
Quantico.
    As chair of the FHIRC, I am a former State prosecutor in 
North Carolina. I spent 24 years with the FBI and retired as 
the Acting Executive Assistant Director over eight FBI 
divisions, including their CID, Cyber Division, International 
Operations, and five other divisions. I currently practice law 
in Charlotte, North Carolina.
    It is absolutely critical to understand the basic mission 
of CID in assessing its effectiveness. The fundamental 
objectives of CID are set forth in Army Regulation 195-2, 
Section 1-6, entitled, ``Objectives.'' The relevant portions 
are in the opening statement, but I want to mention two of them 
as areas where we had particular focus. And that is in the area 
of serious felony investigations. That is one of their 
mandates. The other is maintaining a proactive criminal 
intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting cycle to alert 
commanders to threats and criminal elements. Commanders who are 
provided with validated criminal intelligence can initiate 
appropriate force protection measures.
    Members of this committee interviewed various members of 
the 11th MP [Military Police] Battalion; relevant CID 
commanders at Fort Hood; CID agents; dozens of CID stakeholders 
on and off the base, including police chiefs, sheriffs, 
district attorneys, JAG officers, Federal prosecutors, 
community leaders; the Texas Department of Public Safety; the 
Texas Rangers; and the FBI and other Federal agencies.
    We reviewed all death and suicide cases and a broad 
sampling of sexual assault files. Dozens of data research and 
analysis products were conducted which provided highly relevant 
insights into the CID operations and effectiveness.
    As you know, our finding, one of nine findings in the 
report, stated that the Fort Hood CID had various 
inefficiencies that adversely impacted accomplishments of its 
mission. We determined that the criminal detachments were 
understaffed, underexperienced, overassigned, and poorly 
supported, leading to inefficiencies that had an adverse impact 
on investigations, especially the complex cases involving sex 
crimes and soldier deaths.
    We determined that these inefficiencies were the result of 
staffing protocols and other policies and procedures that 
transcend Fort Hood. But it is very important to note at the 
outset that this finding does not challenge the competence, 
motivation, work ethic, or onsite leadership at the Fort Hood 
CID. The issue is one of inexperience, resources, staffing 
methods, and the overall CID business model.
    A significant portion of the report addressed the role of 
CID in conducting prompt, thorough investigations of death, 
felony, and sex crime cases. An important objective that we 
looked at was the scope and role of CID in providing that 
criminal intelligence, as I mentioned, to Fort Hood commanders 
to enable them to adopt mitigations.
    In essence, we found, as you mentioned, Chairwoman, that it 
was a training ground. There were simply too few journeyman-
level agents to work the complex sex crime cases, death cases, 
while still mentoring the large number of inexperienced and 
uncredentialed special agents who were constantly transferring 
in and out. There was minimal continuity in institutional 
knowledge within CID. It also impacted law enforcement 
relationships, as discussed in the report.
    The inexperience of the CID special agents was evident in 
our onsite file reviews that our members conducted of the 
death, suicide, and sexual assault files from fiscal years 2018 
to 2020. These reviews revealed some areas of concern as to 
investigative attention to detail, completeness, and file 
documentation, which increased with the complexity of the 
investigation.
    State and Federal prosecuting attorneys and local law 
enforcement advised there was minimal interaction between their 
offices and CID. Unlike other Army posts, there are no CID 
agents embedded at any of the local police departments, and 
they could not remember a true joint investigation.
    We determined that serious crime issues on and off Fort 
Hood were neither identified nor addressed proactively. There 
was a conspicuous absence of an effective risk management 
approach to crime incident reduction and soldier victimization.
    In short, the staffing model, as it relates to Fort Hood, 
did not effectively work to support their mission. There were 
not enough experienced agents to provide continuity and 
institutional experience to work complex cases or be proactive 
in crime prevention.
    The CID needs to have a balanced mix of apprentice, 
experienced, and journeyman-level agents to provide stability 
and ongoing expertise. There should always be a cadre of 
experienced and highly experienced investigators to handle the 
over 340 sex crime cases and 20 to 30 death cases per year at 
Fort Hood. These are complex matters that involve forensic 
evidence, evidentiary warrants, evidence analysis, and informed 
judgment about investigative strategy. CID must be provided the 
capability to work joint investigations with their State, 
local, and Federal counterparts and not wait for a crisis 
investigation, such as Vanessa Guillen, to do so.
    Among the 11 recommendations we made were that the CID 
command should evaluate its staffing model and personnel 
movement protocols for high-tempo, high-turnover offices like 
the Fort Hood CID to ensure they are staffed at a level where 
they are capable of working complex cases on and off the 
installation; engage in proactive crime suppression in 
conjunction with department of emergency services and 
commanders, especially drug suppression, as well as competently 
handling the death and sex crime cases.
    And just to wrap it up here, we asked the CID and the Army 
Department of Administrative Services to evaluate whether this 
requires a greater number of CID civilian special agents of the 
1811 category for purposes of continuity and effectiveness in 
handling these cases.
    This concludes the opening statement. As chair of the 
FHIRC, we welcome the opportunity to field any questions, and 
with your concurrence, I will direct them to the appropriate 
team member that is present.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Swecker, Ms. Ricci, 
Mr. Bland, and Ms. Counts can be found in the Appendix on page 
47.]
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Swecker. Does that complete, 
then, the presentation of your panel?
    Mr. Swecker. It does.
    Ms. Speier. All right. So, we will move on to questions.
    Let me start off by talking about drugs. In the report, you 
indicated that the highest drug test failure rate per test 
taken was at Fort Hood. You also said that the drug crime rates 
for fiscal years 2015 to 2020 were almost 31 percent higher 
than FORSCOM [United States Army Forces Command].
    And it appears that in one case, in April of 2020, a 
soldier overdosed on methamphetamine and fentanyl. There were 
no interviews, no crime scene investigation, no apparent 
attempt to determine who supplied the drugs. There was no 
attempt to investigate the soldier's history of drug use or 
identify the identity of associates. Can you speak to why that 
is so wrong?
    Mr. Swecker. Yes, ma'am. I mean, all we had to work with 
was what was contained in the investigative file, in the four 
corners of the file. We felt like, consistent with the CID 
mission of gathering proactive intelligence, criminal 
intelligence harvested from the cases that were worked, that 
meaningful information could be provided to the commanders to 
actually engage in mitigation and prevention. We just didn't 
see that happening, and I think, by their own admission, CID 
said they just didn't have the experience and the resources to 
do proactive criminal intelligence.
    We felt like death cases, particularly the one you are 
talking about where there was a drug-related overdose, ought to 
be fully investigated to determine if there were lifestyle 
issues--where did the drugs come from; who supplied the drugs; 
how did they get on the base--in order to try to engage in 
proactive measures to prevent that from happening, if possible. 
I mean, it certainly would have helped the commanders to be 
armed with that kind of information. It is their responsibility 
to conduct mitigation and look out for the health and safety of 
their charges.
    Ms. Ricci, do you have anything you want to add to that?
    Ms. Ricci. No, that was basically what we found. I agree 
completely.
    Ms. Speier. So, for instance, in another setting, 
deficiencies in failing to pursue all logical investigative 
leads were also noted by the committee in another high-profile 
case, a soldier who went missing and, ultimately, committed 
suicide. ``Conspicuously absent in the CID file was any 
documentation of a search for the soldier, nor was there any 
indication that a key witness was contacted or interviewed. The 
totality of the facts contained in the file led the FHIRC to 
conclude that the initial underpinnings of what might be a 
motive on the part of another to engineer the soldier's 
disappearance existed''--which is a pretty profound statement. 
I'm assuming this is the Hernandez case, is it not?
    Mr. Swecker. I am going to try to be careful about specific 
cases because some of them are ongoing, and I have been told 
there are some issues associated with disclosing information in 
a pending file.
    But let me just say, generically, across all of the death 
cases that we looked at, the more complex the case was, the 
more striking it was the leads that weren't followed in many 
cases and the incompleteness of the file. We are not saying 
these investigative steps weren't taken. They just weren't in 
the file. So, we couldn't see it.
    Andy Bland conducted a couple of the relevant file reviews 
that you are talking about, as well as myself and Mary Counts. 
And I would like Andy to address the specific case that you are 
mentioning.
    Andy, I think you are on mute.
    Mr. Bland. Okay. Can you hear me now?
    Ms. Speier. Yes, we can.
    Mr. Bland. Okay. Thank you for allowing me some time this 
morning. It is a pleasure to be here.
    And specifically as it relates to the inquiry, yes, I had 
the opportunity to review what, essentially, was probably the 
top five most complex cases that CID has undertaken here of 
late. And this particular case really represents a microcosm of 
all those things, all of those observations that Chris 
enumerated at the strategic level. And what it really 
underscores, as I looked at the file, is not being prescriptive 
or critical of the investigation and how it ensued, but what it 
really underscores and really illustrates is that those of us 
who have spent decades involved with and leading and 
supervising investigations can look at a file retrospectively, 
and we are able to ascertain quite quickly the steps that could 
have been taken to run some of these leads to ground.
    And so, for that to really be something that a person like 
myself, or Mary, or others, can extrapolate just by reviewing a 
black-and-white file months after the fact really goes to the 
heart of what Chris described as there has to be, clearly, a 
mix in terms of the experience level of agents. Because the 
ability to provide insight and optics, and to conduct an 
investigation of this complexity or of this ilk, it doesn't 
happen by way of osmosis. It doesn't happen overnight. Those 
instincts, that sort of visceral, experiential review, the 
ability to know which way to go, that happens over time and it 
happens with mentoring, and it happens with making mistakes. 
And at the end of the day, it also happens by way of having 
supervisors who have been there and done that, who have the 
credibility necessary to understand what needs to be done when 
they review the files of what their investigators have done.
    So, hopefully, that answers the question.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you.
    Let me just ask one final question, Mr. Swecker. If you had 
the Vanessa Guillen case file, and you were reviewing that as a 
24-year veteran of the FBI, what would you do to the individual 
who provided you that particular file? You referenced a number 
of times during the investigation where it was perfunctory or 
box-checking.
    Mr. Swecker. I will maintain it is not the fault of the 
inexperienced agents. They have 2 and 3 years of experience, 
are assigned a very complex investigation. So, that is a 
difficult question to answer in terms if you are asking is 
anybody accountable or should be held accountable for some of 
the shortcomings in the investigation. It was just a grossly--I 
shouldn't say ``grossly''--but vastly inexperienced staff 
there. You could tell from the interviews. They were two- or 
three-question interviews. They were mostly done by phone, 
particularly some of the key interviews. Some of the key 
followup questions either weren't asked or they just weren't 
documented in the files. And the dots just weren't connected.
    There was an absence of what I would call a master case 
agent coordinating everything, looking at forensics, looking at 
prioritization of leads, looking at allocation of resources in 
the hot-spot areas, instead of sort of running that checklist-
driven investigation.
    So, I wouldn't lay the blame on the individual special 
agents. I think it is more the system. They, themselves, are 
victims of a system that--again, I mentioned it being analogous 
to an FBI busy field office like the New York office being 
staffed almost 80 percent of new agents right out of the FBI 
Academy. You don't even hit your stride as an investigator, I 
don't think, until about 6-7 years into it.
    And unfortunately, I don't think that CID has a cadre of 5- 
to 10- to 15-year agents. Many of them leave, I am told, by the 
time they get some level of experience.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
    Ranking Member Banks.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    My first question is, what stood out to all of you most 
about Fort Hood's CID's overuse of novice agents?
    Mr. Swecker. So, I will take a stab at that, and then pass 
it on to the other three members.
    Ninety-three apprentice special agents in 2019 among the 
enlisted ranks; 63 percent apprentice as special agents in the 
warrant officer ranks, and the supervisors that were on the 
scene were occupied with administrative duties and things that 
took up a lot of their time; that takes away from mentoring.
    So, it just jumped out at me. It is just I don't think any 
investigative agency that I know of would staff their offices 
that way when they have complex cases on the table, death 
cases; suicide cases; the Guillen case, a very complicated case 
involving all kinds of electronic evidence and forensic 
evidence, and begging for coordination from some centralized 
case agent. Having to get warrants, warrants are complicated. 
Writing and articulating affidavits to communicate the probable 
cause to obtain a warrant is difficult. I just don't know of 
any other model out there that staffs offices that are that 
busy with such inexperienced agents.
    And let me pitch it to Carrie.
    Ms. Ricci. Yes, I will just add that the judge advocate 
general is in the middle of a military justice redesign that 
focuses greater expertise and experience where it is needed. 
And so, what struck me, as the JAG offices are in the middle of 
this redesign, was that the investigators are not, and that 
that type of redesign is needed as well among the investigative 
force.
    Mr. Banks. Anybody else?
    Mr. Swecker. Andy.
    Mr. Bland. I think it is probably appropriate to defer to 
Mary at this point, Chris.
    Mr. Swecker. Okay. Mary. You may be on mute. You are muted. 
Yes, Mary, I think you are still muted.
    Mr. Banks. Let me move on.
    Mr. Swecker. Yes.
    Mr. Banks. I don't have a lot of time.
    Mr. Swecker. All right.
    Mr. Banks. So, for both of you who are here, tell us, what 
are the most effective ways for us to blend and integrate 
junior and senior investigators?
    Mr. Swecker. I think, first and foremost, it is a staffing 
issue. It is a resource allocation issue that comes from higher 
up. There have to be incentives for agents to stay and some 
areas where they can actually promote up and develop their 
careers as investigators. We don't see that. I mean, this is 
anecdotal, but what we hear is, when agents get to a certain 
level of experience, they go somewhere else. They go to an IG 
[inspector general] office. They go to one of the Federal 
investigative agencies.
    But I would go back to this issue of staffing and resource 
allocation. That is a fundamental duty of those higher up the 
food chain, and it is a business--I talked about a business 
model. I don't think there is any business out there where you 
would staff a critical business function with primarily an 
overwhelming number of inexperienced agents or agents that are 
either not credentialed or just haven't hit that experience 
level where they can be competent to act alone.
    Mr. Banks. Any other thoughts on how we integrate junior or 
more seasoned investigators?
    Ms. Ricci. I would just say that training and mentorship is 
critical in any profession. And so, it is no different here. 
Having that mentorship and that ability to bring along the 
junior agents is critical.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. My last question, throughout your review, 
what were the key skills that appeared to be lacking among the 
CID agents?
    Mr. Swecker. Primarily, investigative acumen, the kind of 
knowledge and skill that comes from having at least 5 years of 
experience; knowing what leads to prioritize; knowing how to 
get your hands--what evidence is most relevant; where the hot 
spots are in a special investigation; where you devote more 
resources, for example, if you have a particular suspect, 
devoting and allocating your most experienced agents to that 
particular suspect and that line of inquiry, if you will. 
Obtaining warrants for forensic, for electronic evidence, which 
is ever-present in every investigation these days--cell phones, 
cell phone tracking, pinging cell phones. Collection of 
forensic evidence takes a certain skill, and then, interpreting 
the forensic evidence, knowing where to go and what to look 
for.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. Thank you. My time has expired.
    Ms. Speier. The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Escobar, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And thanks again to our experts who have devoted so much 
time and their expertise in helping us in this moment.
    This issue, obviously, stretches far beyond Vanessa Guillen 
and Fort Hood. I can tell you that in my district, Fort Bliss, 
we have seen some really alarming stories, heartbreaking 
stories, and not just those that have made the headlines and 
made the news, but individuals who have reached out to me to 
share their own personal experiences. And the knowledge that 
this is just the tip of the iceberg, these are just folks who 
are willing to tell their stories who have reached out to me 
personally, is really deeply alarming. Thankfully, at Fort 
Bliss, General Sean Bernabe has really--he is fairly new to the 
installation and has made some great changes, but we have so 
much work to do.
    And just a couple of the cases that have really shined a 
light for me on other issues that we have to address: Private 
Asia Graham, she is a young woman who was found deceased. She 
had accused someone of sexual assault, and later, two other 
women came forward and alleged that this perpetrator had also 
assaulted them. So, there was a pattern there that leaders 
missed. There were things that were happening there repeatedly 
that leadership did not see.
    Another one of our military personnel at Fort Bliss, 
Private Richard Halliday, disappeared. He was regarded as AWOL 
[absent without official leave] until, finally, others were 
sounding the alarm about him having gone missing for so long.
    So, there is a number of different things that we have got 
to change. Some things, obviously, are more challenging than 
others. But, as we think about a transition that CID needs to 
make, and everything that you all have brought to light about 
CID, all of the deficiencies, the lack of experience, the lack 
of resources, if we are to transition to something that is a 
better functioning investigative arm, how do we make that 
transition? If we, for example, are able to civilianize more of 
those positions, or maybe civilianize the whole thing, how 
would you recommend we begin to make that transition? How 
quickly can we do it? What are some initial steps that you 
might recommend? I am trying to think about what should be done 
internally; what needs to be done legislatively. I just would 
love your insights on how do we get where we need to be as 
quickly as possible? What does that transition look like from 
today into the future?
    Mr. Swecker. Yes, thank you for that question.
    Just to follow up on your early theme there about serial 
offenders, one of the most disturbing things that we came 
across during the interviews was, within 2 days, interviewers 
like Mary and Andy and Carrie had already identified two or 
three serial offenders, which goes to one of the main CID 
missions was to convey/harvest that intelligence out of those 
files and those investigations, and get that to the command, so 
that they could act on it. And that, again, they didn't have 
enough experienced agents onboard to actually connect the dots 
and do the things that needed to be done to address that 
intelligence function.
    We said in the report that we would like to see more--we 
think that there ought to be more 1811 investigators. There are 
several advantages to that. One, they don't transfer around as 
much. Two, they have powers off the base, fewer issues with 
posse comitatus, and being able to work joint investigations 
and actually have authority outside the military installation, 
especially work joint investigations.
    So much happens off the base that involves soldiers. And 
what we saw was a big gap there in terms of working true joint 
investigations, where they could actually elbow-to-elbow work 
cases together and share information real time.
    And nothing drew that out more than the interviews that 
were conducted. I don't know if Mary is off mute. But, Mary, 
during the course of the interviews, you made some observations 
that I thought were fairly poignant as far as gathering 
intelligence and getting that information to the command.
    Ms. Counts. That is true.
    I hope everyone can hear me now.
    Ms. Speier. Yes, we can.
    Mr. Swecker. Yes.
    Ms. Counts. Thank you.
    During the course of the interviews with the victims, as 
well as interviews with witnesses and with other people who had 
extensive knowledge of these incidents, we heard textbook 
grooming, serial offender, repeat offender, predator over and 
over again. So, as Mr. Swecker said, we were able to put 
together a list and almost know, when that person came into the 
interview, what case they were talking about.
    And I think, whatever model CID goes to, there needs to be 
an emphasis on focus and they need to be able to prioritize 
their investigations. And it can't be one-size-fits-all. A gang 
rape and a physical assault cannot be investigated as opposed 
to another case. You have to be able to go after those people 
that are not only victimizing soldiers, but could possibly 
victimize others in the future. And I think they have to be 
able to transition to those cases pretty rapidly.
    Mr. Swecker. Thank you.
    Ms. Speier. All right. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Carl, is recognized for 5 
minutes. Mr. Carl, are you available? You need to unmute 
yourself. Mr. Carl. Mr. Carl, you are recognized. And you are 
muted. All right. Let's see if we can unmute you.
    We will move on, then, to the gentlewoman from California, 
Ms. Jacobs. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And thank you to all of our witnesses for being here.
    Finding No. 9 in the report was that the command climate at 
Fort Hood has been permissive of sexual harassment and sexual 
assault. And I was wondering if you could talk a bit about how 
Fort Hood is different from other bases, since we know this is 
a problem elsewhere. What was unique about Fort Hood, in 
particular, and how worried are you that there are similar 
cultures of impunity at other bases?
    Mr. Swecker. It is hard to talk about other bases because 
our focus was on Fort Hood, although we heard anecdotally in 
the interviews. I think Carrie, Mary, and Andy, and others that 
did the interviews, heard about places, other bases, where 
accountability was more strict and there was quicker action 
when an incident took place and a report was received. And more 
aggressive steps were taken to protect the victim, pending the 
case as it wound through the criminal justice or the military 
justice system.
    What we saw at Fort Hood--we don't think it was an 
aberration--was a flawed SHARP [Sexual Harassment/Assault 
Response and Prevention] structure itself, which we addressed 
in the report. But we also saw priority placed on brigade 
readiness for deployment as opposed to the health and welfare 
of the soldiers, which we discussed at length in the first 
hearing.
    So, we don't know if that is an outlier, but I think, 
anecdotally, we got stories during our 700 interviews and the 
group interviews that encompassed 1,800 soldiers from soldiers 
who had been stationed at other bases that in many cases Fort 
Hood was an outlier.
    We commissioned 49 research projects by a research group at 
West Point. Their comment to us was they had never seen a 
situation where one base stood out as an outlier in terms of 
AWOL, in terms of deserters, in terms of drug usage and drug 
arrests and positive drug tests, felony cases. I mean, of the 
49, it was striking, they said, to see that one base was such 
an outlier in terms of all the 49 different areas that we had 
them look at.
    Ms. Ricci. Sorry, I don't have anything to add.
    Mr. Swecker. Mary, Andy, anything you want to add to that 
from the interviews?
    Mr. Bland. I would, Chris. I think it needs to be said 
that, in many respects, we attributed it to a lack of 
leadership, a lack of emphasis. As we have talked about, what 
is important to the leaders is going to be important to their 
subordinate leaders and the troops themselves.
    And so, when you look at what they called special emphasis 
programs, like SHARP and EEO [Equal Employment Opportunity 
Program], and things of that nature, those are tools that were 
available to the commanders to be able to emphasize those areas 
that ended up being deficient in these types of cases. And so, 
again, troops are going to go where they are led. And it is 
necessary to have the requisite leadership in place from the 
top down that are going to make sure that the priorities are in 
place to ensure our soldiers are taken care of.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
    And I guess my followup--and, Mr. Bland, since you talked 
about this a bit--is, you know, I heard you say this was an 
issue of leadership. And I guess what I am just trying to 
figure out is, how much was the sexual assault climate problem 
the result of poor command leadership or the problem with CID 
being untrained, as you all have highlighted in your previous 
answers? And I just want to know if you could expand on that 
and talk about how the leadership issue bleeds into the CID 
problems.
    Mr. Bland. If I may, Chris, I mean, I think it is, 
essentially, the manifestation of all those things in the 
aggregate, right? So, it is kind of like a perfect storm all 
coming together.
    Chris had indicated in the report that only 3 percent of 
the cases that are worked by MPs or by CID involved these types 
of cases. Well, that 3 percent ended up being a bees' nest, a 
hornets' nest, for the Army.
    So, I think if you look at the totality of what we looked 
at and the recommendations that were made, at the end of the 
day, leaders have to be held accountable in some tangible, some 
palpable way. You know, make it part of their review; make it 
part of their report card, those types of things, so that you 
can emphasize at the very top that those things are absolutely 
categorically important. It all starts from the leaders.
    Mr. Swecker. May I add that the leadership issue was an 
issue of omission, not commission. It was not placing emphasis 
on the SHARP program in general; placing emphasis and priority 
in other areas, which you would expect an Army combat brigade 
and command to place, which is readiness. But, during the 
course of that, they completely, utterly neglected the emphasis 
on the SHARP program and it never got down to the troop level, 
the NCO [noncommissioned officer] level, to enlisted ranks, 
where 80 percent of the victims and the subjects resided.
    I, personally--and I think the other members of the 
committee share this--we are not placing all this at the foot 
of CID. We just made a note. That is one of nine findings, that 
CID is not responsible for all of the issues at Fort Hood. What 
we were saying was, in the course of the review, we saw that, 
in the case of complex cases, that there was a lot of 
inexperience. And we just felt like--and it wasn't even a close 
call--that addressing complex cases was a problem. And without 
that deterrent, and without all that good intelligence being 
harvested and provided to the commanders to take mitigating 
action, then that sort of added to the mix. As Andy described, 
it was a perfect storm. That all came together.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
    Ms. Speier. The gentlelady's time has expired and she 
yields back.
    The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Madam Chair. Can you hear me?
    Ms. Speier. We can hear you.
    Mr. Fallon. Wonderful. Thank you.
    Mr. Swecker, my colleague just mentioned--and I saw the 
same thing--Finding No. 9 I found alarming, the fact that it 
was a problem with the command. And I also noticed that, on 
that chart that we were given, that Fort Hood pretty much, 
literally, every single category for violent felonies, violent 
sex crimes, rapes, all the way down to drug crimes, drunk and 
disorderly, larceny, even AWOL, was there were higher 
incidences on average across the board, which I think really 
illustrates that it is rather obvious it is a command problem.
    I believe Fort Hood is the largest base we have as far as 
Active Duty troops. Kind of like in a big city there is just 
higher crime, do you think that the fact that it is such a 
large base has something to play into the fact that they have 
larger incidences on average of crime?
    Mr. Swecker. That is part of it, but we were looking at 
crime rates, not raw numbers, so per capita crime. And a lot of 
the things, most of the things that we were looking at were on 
a per capita basis. So, it wasn't the raw numbers. But we found 
it an aggregating factor, if you will, that there were known 
risks of all of these things because of all these reports that 
have been done over the years. The fact that these were combat 
brigades, that 80 percent of the victims and perpetrators were 
in the enlisted ranks, that was well known; that these are 18- 
to 23-year-old soldiers where women were the minority in these 
brigades. I mean, the interviews bore that out, that there was 
a serious risk there that was known, or should have been known, 
by leadership from the top down.
    Unfortunately, because of the lack of emphasis, the lack of 
addressing these known risks, the NCOs, where the rubber meets 
the road, became backers. They did not facilitate reporting. 
They did not encourage reporting. In fact, many of them were 
perpetrators, and many of them were part of the ostracism and 
the shaming of the victims. So that there was a deterrent in 
actually filing reports of sexual assault and sexual 
harassment, et cetera.
    Carrie, do you want to add to that?
    Ms. Ricci. I would just add that there were regular 
reports, such as IG reports, command climate surveys, that type 
of information that was available to commanders, but that just 
wasn't acted on.
    Mr. Swecker. I mentioned in the first hearing that the 
climate surveys, there were red flags throughout in all of the 
key commands.
    Mr. Fallon. Yes, it is incredibly troubling.
    As far as CID, you, obviously, mentioned that it was lack 
of training and mentorship and experience, resources, staffing, 
that kind of thing. And instead of a tour, would there be a 
value in, instead of maybe a typical tour being 3 years, and 
then, a PCS, maybe making the Army, giving the option or 
mandating maybe it is a 5-year tour? And then also coupled 
with, as you said, some 1811 investigators. But do you think 
that would add some value, to extend the tours for the military 
investigators?
    Mr. Swecker. Anything that allows a particular busy office 
like Fort Hood to develop a cadre of experienced agents would 
be a good thing. Whether it is more 1811s, slowing down the 
transfers, restricting them from going off and doing protective 
detail, which seems to us to be a distraction for special 
agents that could have been spent doing investigations; we felt 
like the MPs could handle that kind of detail as opposed to 
pulling from the special agent ranks. But anything that 
provides continuity in the office, experience--what jumped out, 
as I said earlier, to all of us was just simply the lack of a 
group of trained, experienced agents. Even in the 5- to 8-year 
range, there just were very few of them, and if there were, 
most of them were supervisors.
    Mr. Fallon. Yes, I was shocked. I mean, when you said 12 
out of 76 had 1-year experience or more, I can't even believe 
that.
    Mr. Swecker. It was, actually, I think, somewhere around 90 
percent of the enlisted agents were apprentice agents and 63 
percent of the warrant officer special agents were apprentice. 
That didn't leave many to actually mentor these inexperienced 
agents. And then, a number of them were diverted for other 
duties--evidence custodians, cyber, et cetera. And they were 
chronically understaffed, somewhere around 60 percent 
throughout the time period that we looked at. So, you have got 
understaffing, inexperience, and then, we talked about 
underresourcing in areas of forensic exploitation of cell 
phones and other electronic evidence.
    They only had one license to exploit a cell phone. Those 
are proprietary software licenses that you have to have to 
extract evidence from a cell phone. During the Guillen 
investigation, two of them expired. So, they had one left for 
the pendency of the Guillen investigation, and that was a key 
avenue of inquiry for that investigation.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you. My time has expired.
    Ms. Speier. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Garcia, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you 
for holding this very crucial hearing and for allowing me to 
participate.
    It has been almost a year since the family of Vanessa 
Guillen first contacted my office for help. At our very first 
meeting, I listened to their concerns about the handling of the 
case by CID and could not believe what I was hearing. 
Throughout our work together in many meetings and visits to 
Fort Hood, I was consistently disturbed with the actions of CID 
and the negative impact it had had on the Vanessa Guillen case, 
from failing to look into claims of sexual harassment as a 
motive, not properly interviewing Vanessa's family members and 
friends, and the reassignment of a CID investigator in the 
middle of the investigation. I have seen firsthand, as have the 
Guillens, the problems that plague Fort Hood.
    I appreciate the work of this committee, the special 
independent review committee. Your findings and recommendations 
align with my experiences with CID, and I will continue to 
fight for a change to ensure that what happened to Specialist 
Guillen and her family never happens again.
    With that in mind, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask you, 
during my visit to Fort Hood, CID agents said that, while they 
were currently investigating the murder of Specialist Guillen, 
they were not looking further into the claims of sexual 
harassment, as that role would fall to her command. What can be 
done to ensure that CID is allowed to fully investigate a 
crime, including possible motives, just as any other law 
enforcement agency would?
    Mr. Swecker. That is a very good question. Andy and I 
discussed, and Mary had discussed, the narrow scope of some of 
these investigations when there were other issues that were 
relevant to the investigation, one of them being sexual 
harassment in that case. And we often were looking for that 
sort of thing in the file, and we couldn't find it.
    I don't think that is something that you have to--I mean it 
may be something that you have to address through Army 
regulations, but it seems to me to be a logical investigative 
avenue to pursue.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Well, it seemed logical to me, and I 
raised the issue when I was there on June 23rd, my first visit. 
And they started trying to give me a lecture about the 
difference between a CID investigation and sexual harassment 
claim. And finally, I had to stop them and remind them that I 
was a former judge and a lawyer, and that I knew a little bit 
about that.
    But let's go on. One of your findings was a concern that 
the Guillen family had brought up, that the lead investigator 
was transferred. Is that common practice? Or did you find any 
evidence of this happening in other investigations? I mean, it 
seems like he could have gotten a waiver or permission to stay 
on until the end of the investigation. It just doesn't make 
sense to me. So, is this the practice in the armed services to 
do this?
    Mr. Swecker. That was puzzling. Given the severity and the 
importance and the gravity of the investigation, it was just 
puzzling that this special agent in charge transferred out, 
particularly in the absence of what we thought was the role of 
case agent. So, it looked like the supervisors, the ASAC, the 
assistant special agent in charge, and special agent in charge, 
sort of functioned as the overall case agent, coordinating all 
aspects of the investigation. In most investigative agencies, 
they would have a case agent themselves doing that and the 
supervisors would be above that, looking at strategy and 
resources, and things like that. So, that made it even more 
puzzling.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. But is it common practice?
    Mr. Swecker. We don't know. We just saw it happen at Fort 
Hood, and we also know that just transfers in general, PCSes in 
general, are a major factor in the lack of experience and 
continuity, at least at Fort Hood, and we suspect at other 
offices that are busy.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. All right. You also said that 
resources were nonexistent; from the battalion, no guidance was 
given, and it was almost nonexistent until MG--which I guess is 
major general--Efflandt inquired into whether CID had 
sufficient resources and expertise. Do you recall when that 
happened?
    Mr. Swecker. It was about midway through the investigation.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Would you say it was June, July?
    Mr. Swecker. I would say June.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. June?
    Mr. Swecker. Somewhere about mid-June. It was really 
perplexing that the MP----
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. So, the major general hadn't even 
asked until then?
    Mr. Swecker. Right. But the lieutenant colonel who was over 
the 11th MP Battalion----
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Which was Colonel Overland.
    Mr. Swecker. No, this was someone else. Overland was the 
3rd Cavalry Regiment commander.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Okay.
    Mr. Swecker. This was someone that is responsible for the 
CID detachment there, as well as other CID detachments. 
Unfortunately, that commander, that lieutenant colonel, did not 
step in. First of all, we think that there should have been a 
recognition that they needed more resources, more people on the 
ground, more help with affidavits, more help with forensics, 
more help with evidence extraction, and that sort of thing, and 
analysis. And that didn't come from the chain of command within 
the CID detachment there, which would have been the 11th MP 
Battalion. It came from Major General Efflandt, who finally 
walked over and said, ``Do you need anything?'' to SAC [special 
agent in charge] Neff. And that's when they got more resources. 
Basically, this is at least what we were told, was the 
resources came when Major General Efflandt walked over and had 
a meeting and asked if they needed any help. And after that, 
help came.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Well, that seems to coincide with the 
call that I made to White House Chief of Staff Meadows and to 
Army Secretary McCarthy, because that is the first question I 
had. My first concern was that they had the resources and 
capacity to handle all that.
    Ms. Speier. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Thank you, sir.
    Ms. Speier. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Clark--no, Mr. 
Carl. Excuse me.
    Mr. Carl. Yes, it is so simple, it is easy to get confused.
    Madam Chair, can you hear me now?
    Ms. Speier. I certainly can, and I will never make that 
mistake again.
    Mr. Carl. That is fine. Don't worry about that. It is 
simple.
    I am not an attorney and I am not a judge. I am a 
businessperson. So, my question is, is this spike--I am going 
to call it a spike--in the drugs and all these different 
crimes, is there any way we can link that to management, when 
new management of the base may have come onboard? I know there 
would be a time lag there, but, to me, from a leadership 
standpoint, the buck stops here, and I have to take 
responsibility for it. And then, I will take care of it down 
the chain. It sounds like we are trying to identify, to me, we 
are trying to identify the criminals ourselves instead of 
trying to encourage the management, whatever rank that may be, 
to actually take responsibility for what is going on.
    So, my question is, is there any way or has anybody thought 
about trying to link the timeline with the people that are 
supposed to be responsible for the welfare of these soldiers?
    Mr. Swecker. I addressed one of the more important 
functions, we felt like, of CID was to inform the command of 
trends, patterns, criminal intelligence, et cetera, things that 
were part of reports, but these reports were compartmentalized. 
There was a monthly crime report, but it really didn't analyze 
the crime, identify hot spots, identify establishments, trends, 
patterns, and that sort of thing. There were reports on crime 
rates, you know, felony crime rates, all the different crime 
categories. They were high in some areas. Drugs were one of 
them.
    Those of us that have worked investigations over the years 
know that any kind of black market drives crime, whether it is 
drugs or something else. And drug suppression efforts, well, 
drugs themselves, usage and selling of drugs is not conducive 
to good order in the military. There is talk about 
legalization, and legalization is all around us, but it is not 
conducive to military readiness. And we felt like that was an 
area that should have been addressed by CID, the Department of 
Emergency Services, and the provost marshal, to arm the command 
with information about all of that. But we were told that drug 
suppression was a lost art, at least at Fort Hood.
    And let me open this up. I have been doing a lot of 
talking. I would like to open it up to the other panelist 
members to see if they want to address the question.
    Mr. Carl. My followup question would be, do we not have an 
established drug-testing program at Fort Hood?
    Mr. Swecker. There is, and there is at every military 
installation. And the drug results are reported. I don't know 
that anybody was really watching or highlighting those reports 
and interpreting what they really meant, nor were they 
harvesting any intelligence from the positive drug tests, or 
trying to develop, as we mentioned in the report, sources of 
information. So, you could interview every single person that 
tested positive and try to find out where they got the drugs, 
what do they know about drugs; try to develop some live sources 
of information and actively engage in drug suppression efforts. 
But, again, I was told that that is a, quote, ``lost art.''
    Andy? Mary?
    Mr. Bland. I just think, briefly, Chris, not only do I 
concur with everything that you have said, but it goes back to 
the fundamental aspects of what an investigator does. Being 
able to understand, you need to go that extra yard to do those 
types of things, to connect dots, to develop informants, to be 
able to drive some sort of indicia or analysis that will take 
you to where you may have criminal activity taking place. It is 
those things that your grassroots investigator does as part of 
their responsibilities and, quite frankly, it should be part of 
their passion for the job.
    Mary.
    Ms. Counts. Thank you.
    I would like to concur with my colleagues, but I would add, 
from the sexual assault standpoint, we also interviewed SHARP 
representatives. And the SHARP representatives that I 
interviewed, every one of them told me three out of four female 
soldiers who report to Fort Hood, within 8 months of being 
there, ages 18 to 23, it was almost an initiation to either be 
sexually assaulted or sexually harassed. That was unbelievable 
to me: one, that this was happening, but, two, that this was 
known by people who are in the program that is supposed to 
prevent this kind of behavior.
    And again, it goes to leadership. If you know this is 
happening, you have a responsibility to stop it. And we did not 
see that.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you so much for that.
    And, Madam Chair, I give my time back to you.
    Ms. Speier. I thank the gentleman.
    To follow up on the Congressman's question, if I recall 
correctly, your report said this was not an issue of leadership 
just in this narrow period of time. You suggested it dated back 
to 2013, if I am not mistaken, is that correct?
    Mr. Swecker. That is correct.
    Ms. Speier. So, it was the leadership under a number of 
generals or colonels that, basically, had their eyes off the 
ball. So, this has been going on for quite some time at Fort 
Hood, correct?
    Mr. Swecker. I think that is correct. I mean, it was a 
question of sort of malaise as it relates to the sexual assault 
program, or the SHARP program, and just sort of pushing it 
aside because there were other priorities.
    Ms. Speier. And then, there were 64 sexual assault cases 
per special agent at Fort Hood. How does a special agent handle 
64 cases?
    Mr. Swecker. So, let me clear that up a little bit. That 
was per special victims investigator, which is a higher 
category with more training. Because there was such a low 
number, the ratio was huge. That is not to mean that they were 
individually working or working 60 cases. Those were mainly the 
1811s. There were three, I think, or varying numbers of 1811s 
that were in that category. They were there to mentor and to 
sort of oversee all of the sexual assault cases, but it just 
seemed like a very low number. And you couldn't possibly, even 
if you were just overseeing and mentoring these inexperienced 
agents--we actually felt like they should have been working the 
investigations, but they weren't really working them. As we 
understood it, they were simply overseeing them and trying to 
create some direction and oversee the cases.
    Ms. Speier. So, the leadership at Fort Hood has changed. 
They have pulled out the entire team and replaced them. We had 
made a commitment in 6 months to return to Fort Hood and see 
what had transpired. What should we be looking for when we 
return?
    Mr. Swecker. I would be looking for active use of the 
Sexual Assault Review Board as a tool to manage the SHARP 
program and drive it, and monitor what is really going on. I 
would look for, are they looking at the life cycle of a sexual 
assault/sexual harassment complaint and tracking it from cradle 
to grave, if you will, from start to finish? Which nobody was 
doing and I am not sure they are doing it now.
    But it just seems like somebody ought to be monitoring 
these cases closely. Is there emphasis on the program at the 
NCO level? So that, if we were to do a survey today, would we 
get the same responses that we got when we did our survey and 
we did our interviews?
    I still think that there ought to be periodic, if the 
climate surveys show something as a red flag, that action ought 
to be taken on the climate surveys, which we did not see happen 
during the course of that. I would keep a close eye on the 
climate surveys because they are designed to identify red 
flags. Particularly, one of the areas is in the area of SHARP 
components and sexual assault reporting, fear of reporting, 
retaliation, and that sort of thing.
    I mean, there is a number of things that I think can be 
done. We know that the missing soldier protocol has changed. We 
know that monthly crime analysis reports are being provided to 
the command. That started. We think those are two effective 
remedies or mitigations that have taken place. But I am not 
sure what else has taken place since we left there.
    Ms. Ricci. Yes, I would say following the metrics. The Army 
is good at developing metrics and following them. The judge 
advocate general, for example, reported last year that half of 
all criminal cases involved a specification of sexual assault. 
Ten years ago, that was only 18 percent. Those metrics tell you 
where you need to focus your resources. So, in the same manner, 
commanders should be focusing on where the metrics are taking 
them.
    Ms. Speier. Anyone else on the panel want to convey final 
words to us?
    [No response.]
    Ms. Speier. All right. Once again, Mr. Swecker, Ms. Ricci, 
thank you for your extraordinary contribution to the soldiers 
at Fort Hood and, frankly, our service members throughout the 
military. I think this has been a very soul-searching moment 
for many and has caused many of our investigative units around 
the country to look deeply into whether or not they are doing a 
good job. So, again, our gratitude for all that you have done.
    Mr. Swecker. Thank you.
    Ms. Ricci. Madam Chair, can we thank you as well for 
keeping a focus on these important issues? We appreciate that.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you.
    Mr. Swecker. Ditto here.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you.
    We will now have the second panel, and we will take a 5-
minute recess.
    [Recess.]
    Ms. Speier. All right. We now welcome our second panel.
    Major General Donna Martin, the Provost Marshal General and 
Commanding General of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation 
Command; Brigadier General Terry Bullard, Commander, Air Force 
Office of Special Investigations; and Mr. Omar Lopez, Director 
of Naval Criminal Investigative Service.
    We welcome you all. You will each have an opportunity to 
provide a statement for 5 minutes, and then, we will accept 
your other comments as written comments. And we thank you all 
for being here.
    Major General Martin, would you like to begin?

STATEMENT OF MG DONNA MARTIN, USA, PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL AND 
  COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND

    General Martin. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking 
Member Banks, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    I am here to discuss the United States Army Criminal 
Investigation Command, known as CID; its mission, 
organizational structure, ongoing reform initiatives, and our 
efforts to address the findings and recommendations of the Fort 
Hood Independent Review Committee.
    I serve the United States Army in two capacities: as the 
Provost Marshal General of the Army and as the Commanding 
General of CID.
    As the Provost Marshal General, I am the principal military 
advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of 
the Army on all Army policing and law enforcement matters. This 
includes law enforcement policy, criminal investigations, 
criminal intelligence, Army corrections and confinement, 
antiterrorism matters, and detention operations.
    As the Commanding General of CID, I am responsible for 
overseeing the U.S. Army's primary criminal investigative 
organization. CID is responsible for conducting felony-level 
criminal investigations in which the Army is, or may be, a 
party of interest. For context, my special agents conduct 
criminal investigations that range from murder to organized 
crime, and they often partner with local, State, and other 
Federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI and U.S. 
Marshals Service.
    I am also here to address the Fort Hood Independent Review 
Committee findings regarding CID. The Secretary and the Chief 
of Staff of the Army accepted the committee's findings in 
whole, and based on the committee's findings and 
recommendations, I am working with key stakeholders to reform, 
restructure, and modernize CID to address the shortcomings 
identified in the report, and to organize CID to better meet 
today's law enforcement challenges.
    While CID remains the Army's premiere law enforcement 
organization, providing professional felony-level 
investigations and simultaneously prepared to support large-
scale contingency operations, we are seizing this moment to 
reform and strengthen CID. We can and we will do better.
    Since the report was released, Fort Hood has taken 
immediate actions on several of the Fort Hood Independent 
Review Committee's recommendations. Some of these efforts 
include creating a female mentorship program and several 
improvements aimed to support crime prevention and enhanced 
communication between Fort Hood law enforcement and local law 
enforcement.
    Fort Hood has also recently stood up the Supporting Warrior 
Action Team, or SWAT. SWAT is a newly designed sexual assault 
prevention training program with the goal to train soldiers on 
how to recognize signs and early warnings of sexual misconduct, 
how to intervene in incidents of sexual misconduct, and how to 
advocate for vulnerable service members and the survivors of 
sexual misconduct.
    Additionally, we have collaborated with OSI and NCIS to 
look at their organizations and consider some of their best 
practices and how they could benefit CID. Our efforts extend 
beyond just the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee's 
findings. They incorporate a holistic and collective approach 
with input from across the law enforcement enterprise.
    And finally, I would like to address recent media reports 
discussing proposed courses of action that are being considered 
to restructure the CID. The courses of action reported in the 
media have not yet been decided, and I am preparing to brief 
Army senior leaders in the coming weeks. The report prematurely 
discusses draft planning documents that cover options to 
address improving CID capabilities. Ultimately, any decision 
made by Army senior leadership will lead to an organization 
with enhanced capabilities, organized and led by law 
enforcement professionals.
    In closing, the findings of the Fort Hood Independent 
Review Committee were eye-opening to our Army, but particularly 
to the law enforcement enterprise. I do not take this report 
lightly, and reforming CID is my top priority. I acknowledge 
the necessity of the task ahead and I am dedicated to the CID's 
time-honored commitment to do what has to be done in order to 
protect our soldiers, civilians, and family members.
    I, along with the Army's leadership, look forward to the 
opportunity to work with this committee to strengthen the 
Army's law enforcement effort, and I welcome the opportunity to 
answer your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Martin can be found in 
the Appendix on page 57.]
    Ms. Speier. General Bullard.

STATEMENT OF BRIG GEN TERRY BULLARD, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE 
                OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

    General Bullard. Madam Chairman Speier, Ranking Member 
Banks, and members of the subcommittee, I greatly appreciate 
the opportunity to appear here before you today.
    As the commander of the Department of the Air Force Office 
of Special Investigations, or OSI, I join my colleagues here to 
discuss aspects of our agency's law enforcement mission and our 
continuous improvement processes, especially as they relate to 
the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee report. I am very 
proud to represent the civilian and uniformed men and women of 
OSI who are supporting our United States Air Force and Space 
Force from 303 units located across the globe.
    As our Criminal Investigations Division colleagues have 
learned from the Fort Hood report, we, too, leveraged the 
report to assess our own policies and practices to identify all 
applicable areas for review and possible improvement. In line 
with our review, I would like to briefly cover the highlights 
of our observations in the areas of resourcing, training, 
currency, experience, collaboration, and the overall timeliness 
and sufficiency of our investigations.
    On overall resourcing of OSI to execute our mission, the 
Department has sufficiently resourced the command to execute. 
Over the last 2 to 3 years, the Department has significantly 
enhanced the resourcing of OSI to help mitigate pre-identified 
significant shortfalls, with more capacity projected to come 
online soon specific to the areas of sexual assault, criminal 
analysis, and digital forensics.
    On the training of our OSI agents, all new agents attend 
our OSI Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
for their initial training, along with over 90 other Federal 
partners. Along with our initial accession training, agents 
pursue additional training during their probationary period, 
and then complete annual training in a number of law 
enforcement related areas. Additionally, we provide advanced 
specialized training in a number of areas, such as sexual-based 
offenses and complex case management. While we believe our 
training programs are effective, we can always improve and we 
plan to. Specifically, while COVID has set us back on advanced 
training, like our advanced sexual assault course, we are using 
those lessons learned to explore offering more courses 
virtually and on demand to afford more access.
    On the currency of our airmen to execute the mission, OSI 
has averaged executing over 3,000 law enforcement tied 
investigations annually over the past 5 years. This operations 
tempo teamed with field commands staffed with senior agent 
leadership and subject matter experts, as well as specialist 
squadrons with on-call expertise for traditional and digital 
forensics, among others, helps keep our agents' currency levels 
high.
    On the issue of experience levels of our force to conduct 
highly complicated cases, in October 2020 OSI launched a study 
to examine experience levels and explore ways to better posture 
our less experienced members across the command. 
Recommendations from this review will better distribute 
probationary agents and ensure units with broad mission 
application and a higher percentage of probationary agents will 
be augmented with newly established field training agents. We 
also reviewed the experience levels of our field leadership. 
Our region commanders, colonels who are themselves special 
agents, average 23 years of OSI experience, and subordinate 
commanders, captain through lieutenant colonel and GS-14s, who 
are also special agents, average 13 years.
    Specific to collaboration, the Fort Hood report reinforced 
three OSI partner-based initiatives with departmental entities 
to institutionalize best practices in criminal and fraud-
related matters. These initiatives are designed to drive deeper 
partnerships with our judge advocate and security forces 
teammates on investigations, as well as foster closer ties to 
agencies best placed to detect fraud.
    Every month, OSI reviews measures of sufficiency and 
timeliness of our investigations. Overall, we feel our 
timeliness is solid, but we are further reviewing to ensure our 
metrics most accurately capture the timeliness of the more 
complex sexual assault investigations we conduct. We also 
assess the sufficiency of our investigation is solid, both by 
our own monthly oversight program and independent reviews like 
those done by the DOD [Department of Defense] Inspector General 
and the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigations, 
Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces. 
These reviews routinely report OSI cases are overall 
sufficiently run, but we fully realize that there is always 
room for betterment, and we are dedicated to that continuous 
improvement. I recently requested a review of our oversight 
program to ensure it meets our needs for both rigor and 
sufficiency.
    Members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the men and women 
of OSI, thank you for the opportunity to provide insight into 
some of the exceptional work our members do every day to 
protect the Department. As an organization, OSI has never been 
satisfied with the status quo and has always sought to pursue 
improvement.
    I look forward to your questions and the dialog that they 
will drive among the panel, as we all work to improve our 
processes to best support the DOD. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Bullard can be found in 
the Appendix on page 63.]
    Ms. Speier. Thank you.
    Mr. Lopez.

STATEMENT OF OMAR LOPEZ, DIRECTOR, NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE 
                            SERVICE

    Mr. Lopez. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking 
Member Banks, and distinguished committee members. Thank you 
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service and our efforts to address 
the scourge of sexual assaults in the Department of the Navy. I 
am honored to be representing the dedicated men and women of 
the NCIS stationed throughout the world supporting our 
warfighters on the Navy and Marine Corps team.
    As the Director of NCIS, I am a career civilian special 
agent and a member of the Senior Executive Service, who reports 
directly to the Secretary of the Navy. This historical 
alignment continues to ensure NCIS's independence from 
perceived or actual undue command influence over investigative 
decisions. I am proud to lead a comparatively small but elite 
workforce located around the world in 19 field offices, 191 
satellite locations, in 41 different countries. NCIS special 
agents are also deployed to conflict areas around the world and 
serve aboard all carrier strike and amphibious readiness 
groups.
    Since 1992, NCIS has organized itself in a manner similar 
to the FBI with a civilian director who leads both a criminal 
investigative and national security mission. NCIS special 
agents also possess civilian arrest authority, can seek Federal 
and State warrants, and are able to operate effectively and 
seamlessly both on and off military installations.
    The current NCIS manpower structure evolved in the early 
2000s following the attack on the USS Cole, shifting heavily 
toward force protection missions, supporting expeditionary 
forces, and covering 100 percent of Navy ship visits to foreign 
ports. In addition, NCIS, in consultation with Department and 
congressional stakeholders, later focused efforts on protecting 
critical Navy and Marine Corps technology and significantly 
expanded efforts in cyberspace, and now in combating the threat 
of domestic terrorism.
    Over the last 8 years, sexual assault cases worked by NCIS 
have more than doubled. Despite this increase, departmental 
shifts and budget constraints have resulted in NCIS manpower 
being reduced over this same time period. However, NCIS, in 
coordination with Department and service leadership, has worked 
to surge resources from other non-intelligence funded programs 
to ensure that all allegations of sexual assault are fully 
investigated in a timely and thorough manner.
    In maintaining this surge, NCIS has focused heavily on two 
key issues: improving the quality of investigations and 
reducing investigative timelines. This has resulted in a very 
robust case oversight system and significant reductions in 
timelines over this same period.
    Due to the expeditionary nature of NCIS support to Navy and 
Marine Corps forces around the world, NCIS now requires that 
all special agents receive mandated DOD sexual assault training 
while attending our add-on academy at the Special Agent Program 
for Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. This allows us to 
leverage the full versatility of the criminal investigator job 
series, ensuring an immediate response to allegations of sexual 
assault anywhere in the world at any time, both at sea and 
ashore.
    This great agility comes with long-term risks associated 
with this unrelenting operational tempo, the degradation of 
support to other critical mission areas and the long-term 
retention of these highly experienced investigators. 
Departmental and service leadership is well aware of this and 
is carefully working with NCIS to manage this risk.
    Following the release of the Fort Hood Independent 
Commission report, NCIS undertook careful examination of its 
applicability to all parts of the NCIS enterprise. While this 
review is still ongoing and the majority of the report did not 
directly speak to NCIS structure, we did determine that there 
were many recommendations and areas for our improvement and 
focus.
    Members of this committee, I thank you for the opportunity 
to provide some insight into the exceptional work our members 
do every day. Our solemn commitment to justice for all sexual 
assault survivors continues to be one of my highest priorities 
as director. Through strong partnerships with SAPRO [Sexual 
Assault Prevention and Response] and service leadership, NCIS 
will continue to seek the technology and manpower investments 
needed to maintain its unwavering focus on thorough and timely 
criminal investigations, particularly those involving 
allegations of sexual assault and violence.
    I welcome your questions and feedback, which will enable us 
to continue making positive strides towards addressing reforms 
within the military criminal investigative enterprise. Thank 
you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Lopez can be found in the 
Appendix on page 70.]
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Lopez.
    Let me go to you first. How many civilians do you have 
within NCIS?
    Mr. Lopez. For inside of the special agent corps, 1811s who 
are doing criminal investigations, we have 753.
    Ms. Speier. And what percentage is that?
    Mr. Lopez. Of the whole agency?
    Ms. Speier. Of civilian versus military.
    Mr. Lopez. Oh, they are all civilian, ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. They are all civilian. And you, at one point, 
had a structure that was very similar to the Army. What 
triggered your change?
    Mr. Lopez. Back in 1991, there was an incident called the 
Tailhook incident that many people may be familiar with. As a 
result of that, there were some legislative actions as well as 
Department of Defense actions that resulted in separating NCIS. 
We went from being the NIS [Naval Investigative Service] to the 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service and a civilian director 
was appointed to lead it and civilianize the entire structure.
    Ms. Speier. And Tailhook dealt with sexual assault of 
sailors, correct?
    Mr. Lopez. That is correct, ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
    General Bullard, what is the percentage of civilian to 
military within OSI?
    General Bullard. Representative Speier, we have 
approximately 475 civilians. My enlisted airmen are 1,053 
special agents and my officers are 290.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
    General Martin, what experience do you have conducting 
criminal investigations?
    General Martin. Chairwoman Speier, I am not a criminal 
investigator. I am a military police officer by trade. I have 
32 years of military service in a criminal military police 
role.
    Ms. Speier. All right. So, General, you indicated two 
specifics in your opening remarks that you have taken as a 
result of the Fort Hood report: one to create a mentoring 
program for female soldiers and a new sexual assault training 
program called SWAT. I must tell you, I am truly disappointed 
that that is the extent of what you have gleaned from the 
report.
    Let me ask you this: have you established a system to track 
the progress of specific and measurable goals, objectives, and 
metrics as it relates to timely investigations, drug-crime 
suppressions, crime reduction, task force and joint 
investigative activities, staffing, and training?
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 87.]
    General Martin. So, Chairwoman Speier, I will tell you 
that, first, let me correct the record. Those initiatives were 
taken by Fort Hood and the Fort Hood leadership. As a result of 
the Fort Hood independent findings, my command started a 
bottom-up assessment of the entire command, looking at the 
findings, and then, making an assessment of those capacities 
and capabilities that we needed in order to build a----
    Ms. Speier. Well, let me ask you this: what percentage of 
the special agents at Fort Hood have less than 2 years 
experience now?
    General Martin. And so, as I look at those demographics, at 
Fort Hood currently the number of agents with zero to 1 year is 
12.
    Ms. Speier. How about zero to two?
    General Martin. Zero to three years, right, the category I 
have, is 21.
    Ms. Speier. Twenty-one percent or 21----
    General Martin. Twenty-one total number.
    Ms. Speier. Twenty-one. So, how does that relate to the 92 
percent? All right. What I would like for you to do is provide 
us separately a breakdown of what steps you have taken to 
respond to the report request that no more than 50 percent be 
journeymen or apprentices; what you have done to reduce the 
number of apprentices providing special agent services; what 
percentage are more than 3 years. Have you furnished mobile 
phone tracking expertise, social application, licenses and 
equipment specifically to that base?
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 87.]
    General Martin. So, Chairwoman Speier, yes, that is 
complete.
    Ms. Speier. So, there are now three licenses there?
    General Martin. There are a total of seven licenses at Fort 
Hood.
    Ms. Speier. And they have been renewed?
    General Martin. All of them were not expired.
    Ms. Speier. Well, according to Mr. Swecker, of the three, 
only one was operational at the time of disappearance of 
Specialist Guillen.
    General Martin. And so, Chairwoman, the difference is the 
capability that was at the battalion level and the digital 
forensic cell, and that cell was not used by the detachment.
    Ms. Speier. And that is no longer the case then?
    General Martin. No, it is not.
    Ms. Speier. Have you established an MOU [memorandum of 
understanding] and have begun embedding special agents with 
local law enforcement in Killeen and other areas?
    General Martin. And so, Chairwoman, the requirement for an 
MOU is really not necessary. It is an inherent business 
practice that we have those partnerships with local, State, and 
Federal law enforcement.
    Ms. Speier. Well, with all due respect, General, the 
Killeen sheriff, I believe, said that he presented a PowerPoint 
to the leadership at Fort Hood wanting to do more work 
together, and they received no response to that. There are a 
hundred soldier cases that Killeen has presently, or at the 
time of this particular report, and many more who are victims 
who are outside the base, but are soldiers at Fort Hood. And 
there was no work being done together.
    General Martin. And so, Congresswoman, I am happy to report 
that that is being addressed currently. And so, with the new 
89th MP Brigade commander on the ground now, he has established 
those cells. CID is a part of those cells. And so, criminal 
intelligence fusion is being done with State and local law 
enforcement and with the law enforcement on the installation.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
    Ranking Member Banks.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    General Martin, good to see you again.
    You talked about the bottom-up review. Tell us about the 
scope of the bottom-up review.
    General Martin. So, thank you for the question, 
Congressman. One of the things that we wanted to look at was we 
wanted to look at experience of our agents. We wanted to look 
at how long our agents were staying on station. And so, some of 
the very immediate things that we did was extend our agents' 
time on station. And so, agents can stay up to 5, 6 years on 
station.
    So, we also looked at those capabilities that our agents 
needed in order to execute these crimes. And one of our 
options--and the COAs, our courses of action, have not been 
briefed yet to Army senior leaders, but one of our COAs would 
add up to 300 1811s across our command to help fill some of 
those capability gaps that we currently do not have.
    Mr. Banks. So, was the bottom-up review just for Hood? Was 
it other posts? Full of Army? What was the scope of it?
    General Martin. The scope is the entire Army.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. Fort Hood's number of open sex-crime cases 
warranted three times the number of sexual assault 
investigators than what they were allocated. What is the Army 
doing to ensure that allocations for SAIs are representative of 
caseloads in the future?
    General Martin. So, for all of those cases, in our 
assessment we did we found that those requirements for 
investigators was much higher. And so, as a part of that 
assessment, we will grant those offices more 1811 investigators 
to execute those criminal investigations.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. Tell me, in your opinion, what is being 
done, or what have you seen, what effort is there to rebuild 
relationships with the Fort Hood community and improve the 
cooperation with local law enforcement?
    General Martin. And so, as the Provost Marshal General, I 
am in charge of law enforcement policy across the Army. And one 
of the initiatives we are doing right now is a community 
policing initiative. And what that does is it strengthens the 
bond between the community and the policing force. And so, we 
have done things like bicycle patrol to put police in the 
presence, daily contact with the public. And so, we are using 
those initiatives to help build trust locally.
    Mr. Banks. At Fort Hood?
    General Martin. At Fort Hood and many installations across 
the Army.
    Mr. Banks. Anything specific to Fort Hood that you can tell 
us about that you have done to repair the relationships locally 
there?
    General Martin. And so, at Fort Hood, one of the things 
that our agents are doing is participating in this criminal 
fusion initiative that has been running at the installation. We 
are improving our relationship with local/State law enforcement 
every single day. And so, we are working hard to rebuild those 
relationships and we are working hard to ensure that the 
community feels that they are safe.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. That all sounds good, and those are things 
I would hope that we would be doing everywhere anyway. But I am 
not hearing a specific answer about a specific effort at Fort 
Hood to repair damaged relationships, that there should be an 
extra effort or strategy. I hope that you will take that back 
and give us more of a specific answer to that question. Do you 
believe that tools like the Disciplinary Control Board could be 
useful in preventing crime off-post?
    General Martin. Yes, Congressman, and as a senior mission 
commander at Fort Leonard Wood, I used that specifically for 
that purpose.
    Mr. Banks. And what has been done to systematically improve 
case tracking, particularly for sex crimes?
    General Martin. I will have to take that one back for the 
record as well, Congressman.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 89.]
    Mr. Banks. Okay. Then, a last question for all three of 
you: What are the most useful field skills taught in each of 
your training curriculums, and what is something that you wish 
you could do more of that you aren't resourced to do right now? 
Mr. Lopez, we will start with you.
    Mr. Lopez. Thank you, Ranking Member Banks.
    I think one of the biggest or most useful capabilities that 
we have is our ability to direct hire. That gives us a very 
critical capability to really look for diversity in our 
workforce. We are able to go out and hire, for instance, expert 
investigators. We have brought people over from different 
agencies, local sheriffs. We bring over people from the Secret 
Service, from FBI, from other locations.
    And so, when they come to NCIS after they go through our 
academy, they can kind of hit the ground and be a little bit 
more seasoned and experienced investigator, because, 
oftentimes, with the way in which we support the expeditionary 
forces, we are out there alone. There may only be one or two 
people or an agent afloat on a carrier. And so, they have to be 
able to do everything. So, that is one piece I think is really 
helpful for us.
    The other, just in terms of resourcing, I think the threats 
are becoming more and more asymmetric, and I think it is very 
hard to define threats in the computer cyberspace, whether it 
is terrorism, as being one type of threat or another. And I 
think that we need to really continue to look at things in a 
very multidisciplinary way and approaching it from kind of a 
holistic government. I think task forces and working on 
different environments, whether it is on the JTTF [Joint 
Terrorism Task Force] or other types of task forces, really is 
the key to combating the threats to the Navy and the Marine 
Corps.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. My time has expired. If both the Army and 
the Air Force can respond on the record, we would appreciate it 
very much.
    The chairwoman has given me the liberty of allowing you to 
answer that question on the record.
    General Bullard. Absolutely. Thanks for the question, 
Representative Banks.
    So, I would say our strength is in the diversity of our 
composition. I look at our civilian agents, our enlisted 
agents, our officer agents, what they bring each day to the 
composition at the detachment level, at the squadron level, and 
up through the command level, and the various ways, the 
background that they bring in to look at a particular 
investigation. So, that is absolutely one of the things that I 
have cherished as a detachment commander two times where I have 
had that composition; I have had that mix of civilian agents 
and military agents in the office to look at specific 
investigations. And then, I would absolutely transition even to 
our deployed mission set, where, again, that composition within 
our team gives us the ability to really look at some things 
through different perspectives and bring in different 
experience when we are tackling these problems, which, of 
course, problem solving is at the base of what it is we do.
    From a challenge standpoint, I would absolutely agree with 
Director Lopez that the cyber environment presents a very 
unique, very complicated challenge, as we look at the 
authorities that we have, as we look at the talent that we have 
on hand, and how we tackle that problem with agents who have 
that cyber experience and some of the unique ways we are 
looking to get after that in partnership with the Air Force. 
And bringing in our cyber operators to partner with our agents 
is one way that we are tackling that, but it is definitely 
something in the future we are going to have to keep our eye 
on.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you.
    General Martin.
    General Martin. Yes, Congressman, I believe our strength 
lies in our people as well, their desire to execute crimes and 
to give our family members/our soldiers a safe environment in 
which to work. I believe that desire and that passion is there. 
So, the strength is definitely our people.
    I think we are very challenged by resources. We have not 
had significant structural change inside of CID since pre-9/11, 
and yet we have had significant quadrupling cases of sexual 
assault. We have also had challenges and mission increase with 
the number of years now that it is required to maintain and 
retain evidence. We also have had a demise and a degradation of 
our military police structure. And so, that effort to prevent 
crime has been degraded over the years. And those present a 
challenge to us.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you. My time has expired.
    Ms. Speier. Just a very brief question. Should CID or OSI 
or NCIS be providing the protective services as part of their 
function or should that be an MP function?
    General Bullard. So, Chairwoman, I can start with that 
question. I will tell you from our perspective, the way that 
OSI is built with our civilian 1811s, with our Federal law 
enforcement mandate, our engagement off-base, our level of 
training, I believe that the mission set is properly set for 
us.
    However, what we have done is transition our model to OSI 
agent-led, but security forces members providing most of the 
manpower. So, the Air Force just recently approved 54 security 
force member billets in order to allow us to flesh out those 
details, still have agents in charge of the details themselves. 
But that actually allowed us to recoup a number of special 
agent positions back to the command in order to be able to put 
them back against investigative duties.
    Ms. Speier. Mr. Lopez.
    Mr. Lopez. Thank you, Chairwoman Speier.
    Similar to General Bullard's comments, we have been doing 
it for a long time, the way he just described. We have 1811 
special agents who are in charge of the details, whether it is 
in theater or whether it is domestic. And then, we use Navy and 
Marine Corps security forces, MAs [masters at arms], police 
officers that we train to do the support to those details.
    Ms. Speier. All right. General Martin, my understanding was 
that there was actually someone pulled away at Fort Hood from 
the investigation in the Vanessa Guillen case to do a 
protective role for a period of a month. Maybe I am confusing 
the cases. Maybe it wasn't Vanessa Guillen; maybe it was 
another one. Are you changing that?
    General Martin. Chairwoman, it is absolutely an option that 
we will look at and we will ensure that, once investigators 
start on a case, they are in that case from cradle to grave.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
    Ms. Escobar, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Many thanks to our panel.
    General Martin, I want to thank you for the work that has 
been done, but I agree with our chairwoman, there needs to be, 
in my view, a really robust effort. Because, as I mentioned to 
the first panel, what we are seeing is the tip of the iceberg. 
This is just what is being made visible to us, these cases. And 
I think that we are in a state of crisis in many regards.
    I am curious, did you, in your fact-finding role, did you 
review Fort Bliss?
    General Martin. Congresswoman, we reviewed every military 
installation.
    Ms. Escobar. Can you share with me what you discovered 
about Fort Bliss, what your thoughts are, and anything that you 
can share?
    General Martin. So, as we looked at those installations 
that were division or corps, or it had a division or a corps--
and Fort Bliss has a division--we recognized that they also 
need additional resources. And so, our options would lead to 
additional 1811s, civilian investigators; also, additional 
assistant special agents in charge, or those ASACs, at division 
installation level. We also looked at additional drug 
investigators at our division installations.
    And then, we also want to look at the prosecution and how 
we support prosecutions. And so, one of the options that we are 
looking at is actually building prosecutorial teams that 
consist of dedicated agents that work with trial counsel to 
bring cases to trial.
    Also, across the board, we looked at that we needed about 
30 civilian support agent personnel to take care of the 
administrative and the logistics functions and the technology 
functions that happen at the corps and the division 
installations. And as well, to take away some of those 
administrative burdens, we are going to put captains, military 
police officers, in charge of our offices to lead those 
administrative-type functions, to free up our investigators to 
do investigations.
    Ms. Escobar. Did you find--I mean, this is definitely the 
case at Fort Bliss--but did you find, or actually, what did you 
find with regard to backlogs, the backlog of cases? So, cases 
that are ready to go, but just they are languishing.
    General Martin. So, I don't have that data, Congresswoman, 
but would be happy to provide that to you.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 89.]
    Ms. Escobar. Okay. I really would like to better understand 
how quickly those cases are moving. As the ranking member 
mentioned, the feeling that justice delayed, it absolutely is 
justice denied, especially when the women that I have been 
hearing from feel like the inaction is a signal. It is a signal 
that their leadership doesn't care. It is a signal that the 
system doesn't care, and it is a signal that they remain 
vulnerable.
    And I feel almost as though the backlog issue is a major 
red flag because, as we heard with the prior panel, one of the 
issues, also, is those serial offenders, those offenders that 
continue to prey upon our service members. And I have a 
suspicion that a part of that, you know, part of why they feel 
that they are able to do that is because they feel that there 
is no accountability.
    And so, if you could please share that information about 
the backlog with us, I really do feel like that is one of those 
areas where we need to do a deep dive and understand the 
consequences of it, in addition to how we address it, and how 
we prevent the backlog. I do believe that that is an issue at 
Fort Bliss.
    In my remaining 30 seconds, if you could just tell us a 
little bit more about the female mentorship program. Every time 
I visit an installation or talk to female soldiers, they are 
hungry for this. But I want to know, will it be a meaningful, 
sustained, resourced program?
    General Martin. And so, the female mentorship program that 
is currently being worked at Fort Hood is the brain child, 
started, actually, at Fort Lee. And so, a group of female 
officers developed a program called the FMMP. It is a Female 
Mentorship Morale Program. And that program gave women a forum 
in which they could get together and talk about some of these 
concerns.
    It also focused on professional development and other 
things that were of concern to women. It was a safe space for 
them to talk. And so, that brain child at Fort Lee has now 
graduated and is actually spreading across the Army, and we 
will start at Fort Bliss, actually, as well, in 1st AD [Armored 
Division].
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you.
    Madam Chairman, I am out of time. I yield back.
    Ms. Speier. The gentlelady yields back.
    The gentlewoman from California is recognized for 5 
minutes. Ms. Jacobs.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you so much, Madam Chair.
    In light of the criticism of CID, what would you tell a 
young soldier looking to become an MP or a CID agent?
    General Martin. Thank you for the question.
    I would tell a young soldier that, if you have an 
inquisitive mind, I would tell you that if you want to solve 
crime or if you think that you want to make a difference, then 
being a part of CID or being a part of the military police 
regiment is for you.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
    And can you tell us why military agents play such a 
critical role in the CID?
    General Martin. Military agents play a critical role, 
especially in our deployed role. And so, part of our mission is 
sensitive-site exploitation. We also do logistic security, and 
logistic security ensures that equipment that is critical on 
the battlefield moves from port to theater and is safely 
transported for our warfighters.
    And then, we also execute wartime crimes, the criminal 
crimes during wartime. So, military agents help us and give us 
the ability to execute that role.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
    Could you talk a little bit more about how their agents 
gain experience and what some recent CID success stories are?
    General Martin. I would love to. So, our agents, about 45 
percent of our agents have bachelor's degrees already before 
they come in. But our CID agents go to the United States Army 
Military Police School for a 14-week course there. And the 
Military Police School is also accredited by the same board 
that accredits the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
    And they train agents in the subjects of criminal law, 
crime scene processing, testimonial evidence, fraud, 
investigative reports, special investigative techniques, crimes 
against persons. And then, our agents, as they progress in 
their careers, much like my fellow MCIOs, they also go to those 
advanced training skills at FLETC [Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Centers] as well as we go over to the Canadian law 
enforcement agency, and we do other training in other schools.
    Ms. Jacobs. And are your agents trained to handle same-sex 
sexual assault investigations?
    General Martin. Absolutely. Our agents are trained and they 
are absolutely capable of investigating crimes against same-sex 
persons.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
    And my last question is just if the Fort Hood Independent 
Review Committee sought your perspective or that of anyone in 
senior CID leadership positions as they were working on their 
report.
    General Martin. And so, there were members of my agency 
that were attached for providing records to the Fort Hood 
Independent Review. But, as far as an interview with me, no, 
there was no interview. Thank you.
    Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Thank you so much.
    And, Madam Chair, I yield back the remainder of my time.
    Ms. Speier. The gentlewoman yields back.
    The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Garcia, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And I will start with Major General Martin. Major General, 
I just want to be clear. I know that I asked a question of the 
chairman of the previous panel, the question about the 
continuity of investigation when that agent was pulled away. 
And I think it says that he left his duties pursuant to his 
permanent change of station to another post in the middle of 
Guillen investigation. And then, in response to the 
chairwoman's question, you said it would be an option for them 
not to do that, to follow it from cradle to grave.
    I mean, that doesn't sound like a commitment to change that 
to me, when you are saying it will be an option. Wasn't it an 
option before? I mean, can you commit to us today that that 
will change and that an investigator [who] starts an 
investigation, especially one as complex and critical as the 
Vanessa Guillen case, that they will finish it through?
    General Martin. Chairwoman, I will make that commitment to 
you, that, yes, when an agent is involved in a complex criminal 
investigation, they will remain on station.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. They will? All right.
    And I want to ask the same question. Does the Air Force 
have the same policy? And, of course, NCIS also.
    General Bullard. Representative Garcia, I think it is a 
very individual question by each unit, having been a detachment 
commander two times and looking at turnover and what we do in 
projecting for investigations, how they are going to be 
handled. Is there going to be a transition? Do we stop that 
agent from initiating new cases as a case agent?
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. But do you have a policy or practice 
in place that covers that?
    General Bullard. We do not have a policy. It is a 
leadership-driven----
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Is there a policy or practice that, if 
they ask for a waiver, so that they could stay, that it would 
be granted?
    General Bullard. Representative Garcia, absolutely.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. All right.
    General Bullard. Absolutely. That is a discussion with 
leadership.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you.
    NCIS.
    Mr. Lopez. Thank you for the question. There isn't a 
specific policy, but it wouldn't happen. They would stay and 
work the case.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you.
    The other thing that really troubled me was the case file 
also revealed that off-post suicides and deaths were not fully 
investigated by CID. I mean, it is just awful to think that CID 
would not look at offsite suicides. And as we learned during 
our last visit with some of the sheriffs and law enforcement 
locally, as the chairwoman again pointed out, there didn't seem 
to be a lot of cooperation. Is that normal?
    General Martin. No, Chairwoman--I am sorry--Representative 
Garcia, that is not----
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. No, there is a chairwoman.
    General Martin. I am sorry. That is not typical. So, that 
relationship is a jurisdictional issue. So, if a suicide or a 
case happens off the installation, we do a collaborative 
investigation with the local law enforcement in every case. Our 
1811s have that authority to conduct those cases. But our 
military agents----
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. I am sorry, I don't know what an 1811 
is.
    General Martin. Our civilian investigators.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. All right.
    General Martin. So, they have those authorities off post. 
Our military investigators do not.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. No, I know about jurisdiction, but you 
still would not go out there and work together with the sheriff 
or the constable or the police chief of that area?
    General Martin. That is correct, we would go out and work 
with them. And then, we would fulfill any requirements that 
they have on the installation; for example, to conduct any 
interviews with any service members at that time. That is what 
we would do to help an investigation on the installation.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Is it normal in the Air Force?
    General Bullard. Representative Garcia, we have policy in 
place that we investigate all Active Duty deaths, regardless of 
where they occur.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Regardless? So, you work together with 
the law enforcement in the community if it is off base?
    General Bullard. Absolutely.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. NCIS.
    Mr. Lopez. We have the same policy as the Air Force.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. And is that a new policy or is it 
longstanding? It just seems odd that the Army just was not 
completely aligned with that.
    Mr. Lopez. It is longstanding, ma'am.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Longstanding?
    Well, that brings me to my last question. Do you all ever 
get together to compare notes, best practices, to make sure 
that, whether it is a post or a base, that no matter where the 
soldier is, that they are safe? Because it just troubled us, 
again, when we visited Fort Hood, when we asked people, when we 
had the townhall with spouses and family members, how many felt 
safe. Nobody felt safe. Remember, Chairwoman, nobody raised 
their hand?
    Ms. Speier. Will the gentlelady yield?
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. One case, in particular, a mother talked about 
keeping a gun on a shelf in the kitchen because she was afraid 
on base and needed it to protect herself.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. I mean, is that normal? All three of 
you? I mean, their families have to feel safe. The soldiers 
have to feel safe. Our families have to have a level of trust 
and confidence that they are safe.
    General Martin. No, that is not normal for a family to feel 
unsafe on our military installations.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. A whole room full of families felt 
unsafe, ma'am, at Fort Hood.
    General Martin. I understand, and we are going to work 
really hard to ensure that our families feel safe on the 
installation.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Air Force.
    General Bullard. Representative Garcia, that is not what I 
would expect to hear from a military family on an Air Force 
installation. And we certainly work with base leadership, with 
our security forces partners, to make sure that that is not the 
case.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you.
    NCIS.
    Mr. Lopez. Yes, ma'am, it is the same for NCIS. We work 
closely with base leadership, and, in fact, we partner often 
with Air Force and Army locations where they have a facility 
and we will work out of their facility. So, we are in close 
contact with each other in terms of working together. So, that 
would not be something normal on any Navy base.
    Ms. Speier. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Ms. Speier. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, is 
now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair. I do really appreciate 
the courtesy of you allowing me to participate in this hearing, 
and thank you for all your great work. I really do appreciate 
it.
    I thank the witnesses for their willingness to help the 
committee with its work.
    I represent Brockton, Massachusetts, and specifically, I 
represent the family of Elder Fernandes. Sergeant Fernandes met 
an untimely death by suicide at Fort Hood. His remains were 
found on August 25th, 2020.
    And CID was involved in an investigation prior to that 
surrounding Sergeant Fernandes' claims of sexual assault on the 
base, and obviously, remains involved in the overall case 
surrounding Sergeant Fernandes' death.
    And I want to tell you, Sergeant Fernandes filed a 
complaint against his superior officer for sexual assault. And 
when Sergeant Fernandes went missing, I had contacted the 
family and expressed the willingness to travel to Fort Hood to 
help them find their son. However, by the time I got there, his 
body had been recovered. And so, even though I wasn't able to 
help them in that respect, I tried to help them get answers 
from CID.
    And the day that I arrived, it was only a matter of days 
really from when Sergeant Fernandes had made the complaint of 
the sexual assault. But, in that short period of time--it might 
have been over a week, but not 2 weeks--CID had conducted an 
investigation of all relevant witnesses, all relevant 
testimony. They had conducted a polygraph of the accused 
officer. And the day that I arrived, they rendered a decision 
that they did not sustain the complaint. They dismissed the 
complaint against that superior officer.
    But, to this day--to this day--we haven't received the 
report of what happened to Sergeant Fernandes from CID. We have 
got the report from the Temple Police Department, because that 
is where he expired. And we have the investigation results from 
Killeen, Texas. But, to this day--this is a young man whose 
body was discovered on August 17, 2020--and we don't have the 
report.
    So, Madam Chair, if I could, I would like to enter into the 
record a letter from the attorney for the Honorable--excuse me. 
This is to the Honorable John E. Whitley, the Acting Secretary 
of the Army, and it is from Attorney Lenny Kesten, who is with 
Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, LLP, representing the family. 
And they have some important questions there that I think need 
to be answered.
    And so, my question to you is, why----
    Ms. Speier. Without objection, it will be admitted into the 
record.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 83.]
    Mr. Lynch. So, the investigation to exonerate the officer 
was completed in days--days--including polygraph, which I 
question the integrity of that process. We don't even allow 
that in Federal court. But relying on a polygraph, you were in 
a rush to determine that the superior officer was not held to 
account. But when the family is looking for information about 
the disappearance of their son, it is taking forever, even 
though the local police have submitted their investigation and 
their report. Temple/Killeen, Texas, have both been 
forthcoming.
    It is taking forever for CID to give the family the 
information regarding the death of their son. And I don't know 
if you are just trying to outwait us. I don't understand the 
pace of discovery here. It has been a long, long time for that 
family to be suffering and looking for answers for their son. 
We have got to do better than this.
    So, why has it taken so long to give the family the 
information regarding their son's death?
    General Martin. Representative Lynch, I don't believe that 
there has been a request for those records, and if there has, I 
would happily assist the family in receiving the report from 
CID.
    Mr. Lynch. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. When I was there, 
we asked for information in person. I believe you are one of 
the panel. I asked for the information. And then, the family 
requested it in writing.
    Do you think that a family should have to--I mean, let's 
set aside the fact that we asked for the information and that 
is on the record in writing and personally. And I brought the 
family into the hearing, into the meeting, with CID at the 
time. They had nine officers working on this from CID. We asked 
for all that information.
    But to suggest that the Army didn't know the family wanted 
to know the details of their son's disappearance and death, 
really? Is that a legitimate question?
    General Martin. Representative Lynch, I will personally 
look into that.
    Mr. Lynch. Are you trying to say that the Army didn't know 
or didn't imagine that the family would want information 
regarding their son's death and disappearance? I mean, think 
about that.
    Ms. Speier. The gentleman's time has expired. We will allow 
General Martin to respond.
    General Martin. Representative Lynch, I will personally 
take that and I will ensure that the family gets the CID 
report.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you, General. I appreciate that. Thank 
you.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Each of you has referenced the fact 
that the caseload for sexual assaults has doubled, quadrupled. 
The numbers are skyrocketing. Do you have enough revenue or 
resources to provide the services necessary? And as the report 
had indicated, special victims' counsels [SVCs], which has been 
a huge success throughout the military, their caseload is like 
at 60 cases, which is far too many for a special victims' 
counsel to handle.
    So, my question is, what resources do you need with the 
exponential increase in sexual assault cases? And have you also 
requested additional funding for SVCs? General Martin.
    General Martin. Madam Chair, so our assessment would tell 
us that we need 20 additional special victims investigators 
inside of CID. We also are requesting in our reform effort to 
look at eight major case response teams. And these teams would 
be positioned at both of our groups, at Fort Lewis and at Fort 
Hunter Army Airfield. And so, that would give us an additional 
capability to surge capability on a major case with the 
expertise that is required. So, that major case response team 
would not only have special victims investigators, it would 
also include digital forensics experts and forensic science 
officers.
    Ms. Speier. Special victims' counsels are a different 
function.
    General Martin. That is correct, and they are controlled by 
the TJAG [The Judge Advocate General] of the Army.
    Ms. Speier. And so, have you requested additional SVCs?
    General Martin. I know that, currently, the TJAG is doing a 
bottom-up assessment of those capabilities as well.
    Ms. Speier. All right. General Bullard.
    General Bullard. Representative Speier, we have identified 
the need for additional agents, additional analysts in support, 
individuals to be able to cover this increase in reporting that 
we have seen. We are in dialog with our Department now about 
obtaining those resources. So, that process is underway.
    I cannot speak to the status of our special victims' 
counsels within the United States Air Force, but I know that we 
have a great partnership with them. But, just as General Martin 
pointed out, they fall within the span of control of the Judge 
Advocate General of the Air Force.
    Ms. Speier. Mr. Lopez.
    Mr. Lopez. Thank you, Chairwoman Speier.
    To echo the Air Force, we have asked for manpower as well 
as technology investments. There is technology that we can 
utilize that would make some of these timelines even shorter; a 
lot of digital forensic evidence capabilities that continue to 
increase that I think would also help shorten timelines; tools 
that could be used to get into phones and other things faster 
than current technology. So, we are looking at that and 
exploring those investments because we think those could have 
direct correlation to timelines, as well as investing in 
additional manpower to get after the problem.
    Ms. Speier. So, for each of you, would you make this 
subcommittee aware of what your requests are up the chain of 
command? Because our role is slightly different, but we want to 
make sure that these cases are promptly handled, that the 
resources are not an impediment in you doing your jobs. And if 
you need additional forensic tools, we need to know what they 
are, so that we can make sure that you are able to ascertain 
them.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 87.]
    Ms. Speier. Ranking Member Banks, any other questions?
    Mr. Banks. No.
    Ms. Speier. There being none, all right, we want to thank 
you for your service. Thank you for being here today. What you 
do is incredibly important to the safety of our service 
members. If they don't feel safe, if they don't feel that there 
is the talent necessary to do the investigations, then we have 
failed them. So, I thank you all for being here and for your 
participation.
    The committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 5:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
    
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 16, 2021
      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 16, 2021

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                   DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             March 16, 2021

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             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

    General Martin. The following systems are currently in effect:
    a. Timely investigations: Investigations are tracked at Fort Hood 
during the monthly Battalion Operations synchronization meeting. 
Programmatically, timely investigations are one of the investigative 
standards defined in CID Regulation (CIDR) 195-1. Compliance with this 
standard is part of the Battalion (BN)/Group (GP) Organizational 
Inspection Program (OIP) as well as periodic Inspector General (IG) 
inspections in accordance with Army Regulation 1-201 and CID Regulation 
1-201. CIDR 195-1 contains a measurable standard that when applied 
appropriately will reflect the unit's ability to keep investigations 
from stagnating.
    b. Drug crime suppression: Drug suppression is tracked at Fort Hood 
during the Battalion Operations synchronization meeting. 
Programmatically, this is one of the investigative support program 
standards defined in CIDR 195-1, Appendix D-8e (Drug Suppression 
Program), which provides criteria to evaluate an investigative unit's 
drug suppression activities. Compliance with this standard is part of 
the BN/GP OIP as well as periodic IG inspections in accordance with AR 
1-201 and CID Regulation 1-201. CIDR 195-1 contains a measurable 
standard that when applied appropriately will reflect the unit's 
ability to counter installation drug problems. On February 16, 2021, 
USACIDC updated Drug Suppression Team (DST) policy to include emphasis 
on additional training for DSTs that includes source development, joint 
training opportunities, fostering relationships with local law 
enforcement drug enforcement units, trend analysis, and establishing 
local goals and metrics to assess effectiveness.
    c. Crime reduction: At Fort Hood, CID and DES collaborate monthly 
on statistics being reported for the Crime Prevention Briefing and the 
Garrison's Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board. Programmatically, 
this is one of the investigative support program standards defined in 
CIDR 195-1, Appendix D-8c (Crime Prevention Survey Program), which 
establishes objectives to evaluate the investigative unit's crime 
prevention efforts. Compliance with this standard is part of the BN/GP 
OIP as well as periodic IG inspections in accordance with AR 1-201 and 
CID Regulation 1-201. CIDR 195-1 contains a measurable standard that 
when applied appropriately will reflect the unit's ability to meet 
commander's crime prevention needs.
    d. Task force and joint investigative activities: At the Battalion-
level, the Crisis Incident Response Plan (CIRP) encompasses Law 
Enforcement Task Force creation, structure, and participation, 
published March 24, 2021. USACIDC has also designed a major crimes 
response team postured at the Group level to respond to complex crimes 
and provide an on-demand Law Enforcement Task Force operations 
capability to assist the SAC at the supported installation
    Joint investigative activities are measureable requirements clearly 
defined in CIDR 195-1, Chapter 4-9 (Joint Investigations) as it relates 
to the initiation of joint investigations when an Army interest exists 
and a coordinated effort is essential. Compliance with this standard is 
part of the BN/GP OIP as well as periodic IG inspections in accordance 
with AR 1-201 and CID Regulation 1-201. CIDR 195-1 contains a 
measurable standard that when applied appropriately will reflect the 
unit's ability to effectively participate in the investigation of off-
post incidents.
    e. Staffing: Staffing is monitored by the battalion, the group, and 
USACIDC. Criminal investigative operations are reviewed on a monthly 
basis by the Battalion Command and Staff and it covers all detachments 
and offices. In turn, this same monthly process is conducted at the 
Group echelon for Battalions and at CID Command for Groups. Unit 
readiness is measured through the Army Unit Status Report. The USACIDC 
manages and re-allocates its structure as necessary through the Army 
Command Plan process. The review measures the relative health of each 
office based on investigative workload and manpower authorizations 
within its structure.
    Staffing is part of the overall organization and management 
standards outlined in CIDR 195-1, Appendix D-7. These standards apply 
to the investigative unit's organization, effectiveness of management 
processes, and impact on mission. Compliance with this standard is part 
of the battalion/group OIP, as well as periodic IG inspections. CIDR 
195-1 contains measurable standards that when applied appropriately 
will reflect the unit's ability to effectively staff, organize, manage, 
and supervise investigative units below the battalion level.
    f. Training: Battalion, Group, and USACIDC prioritized the Fort 
Hood CID Office for Agent courses in the second quarter of FY21 
(Special Victims Capability Course (SVCC), Advanced Crime Scene 
Investigative Techniques Course (ACSITC), and Drug Suppression Team). 
Agent training metrics are tracked at every echelon to USACIDC 
headquarters. As of March 24, 2021, the Fort Hood CID Office is 80% 
trained at the Special Victims Capability Course, 31% for the Advanced 
Crime Scene Investigative Techniques Course, and 100% of the current 
Drug Suppression Team members are trained to include additional 
advanced training. Programmatically, training is one of the 
investigative support program standards defined in CIDR 195-1, Appendix 
D-8k (Training Program), which establishes objectives to evaluate the 
investigative unit's training efforts. Compliance with this standard is 
part of the battalion/group OIP, as well as periodic IG inspections in 
accordance with AR 1-201 and CID Regulation 1-201. CIDR 195-1 contains 
a measurable standard that when applied appropriately will reflect how 
well the unit is accomplishing training to address investigative 
deficiencies and agent experience.
    Agent specific training guidance is outlined every other year in 
USACIDC Command Training Guidance including training priorities for 
resource allocation, professional military education, and most 
importantly for primary investigative agents. To maintain Special 
Victim Investigation and Prosecution (SVIP) teams, units were directed 
to maximize attendance at SVCC, ACSITC, Domestic Violence Intervention 
Training (DVIT), and Child Abuse Prevention Investigative Techniques 
(CAPIT) courses to sustain the SVIP team requirements and increase 
Basic and Senior SVIP qualified Agents across USACIDC. The SVIP Concept 
of Operations (CONOP) establishes the selection, training, and 
certification guidelines for SVIP positions.   [See page 27.]
    General Martin. When necessary, agents are afforded opportunity to 
remain on station beyond three years (one year increments), or can be 
moved earlier in order to fill critical shortages at locations in need 
of experience/expertise. USACIDC relocated additional senior warrant 
officers and enlisted agents to Fort Hood, which led to a net increase 
in experienced agents.
    Fort Hood CID Office specific statistics as of March 24, 2021:
    -Current agent manning level is 100% (48 authorized/48 assigned)
    -Current apprentice agent ratio is 22.9%(11/48)--FHIRC recommended 
no higher than 50%
    -Current % of SAs with over 5 years of experience is 29%(14/48); 
FHIRC recommended at least 30%
    -Current % of SAs with over 8 years of experience is 21%(10/48); 
FHIRC recommended at least 20%
    -Two Civilian Special Victim Investigators have been selected for 
hire and are pending a start date.
    Current staffing processes allow for the assignment of warrant 
officer and enlisted agents that possess advanced training/education in 
crime scene processing, various forensic processes, and the 
investigation of all types of death and sex crimes. Additionally, 
agents on station are afforded the opportunity to attend advanced 
training at the US Army Military Police School (USAMPS), George Mason 
University, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), FBI 
National Academy, National Forensic Academy, the Armed Forces Medical 
Examiners System, and numerous other local specialized training venues.
    The following is a summary of additional 20 personnel for the Fort 
Hood CID Office:
    Add (1) MP CPTs
    Add (12) 1811 Criminal Investigators
      1 x Special Agent in Charge
      6 x General Crime Special Agents
      2 x Sexual Assault Investigators
      2 x Trial Counsel Special Agents
      1 x DST Special Agent
    Add (1) 1801 Evidence Control Specialist
    Add (2) Investigative Support Techs
    Add (3) CIV Admin, IT, Logistics
    Add (1) Civilian Digital Forensic Analyst at Battalion collocated 
at Fort Hood
[See page 27.]
    General Martin. The Army PMG led an intensive five-month structural 
redesign to create an organization with enhanced capabilities and 
capacity, organized with and led by civilian and military agents, 
military officers and enlisted Soldiers. Based on that effort, a 
civilian member of the Senior Executive Service with criminal 
investigative experience will lead the restructured CID. While details 
are still being finalized, the restructured CID will initially focus on 
increasing civilian criminal investigators and restructuring our 
protective services function. As we develop, evaluate, and adjust our 
final design we remain committed to working with the Committee and 
keeping it informed of our progress and necessary resources.   [See 
page 39.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
    General Martin. CID continues to meet the FHIRC's recommendation to 
improve case tracking. For example, at Fort Hood investigations are 
reviewed during monthly CID Battalion Operations meetings to ensure 
accurate tracking and to abide by investigative standards furnished in 
CID regulation. Compliance with this standard is part of the 
Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) as well as periodic Inspector 
General (IG) inspections in accordance with Army and CID Regulations. 
Additionally, CID maintains an electronic automated database named the 
Army Law Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (ALERTS). This 
database tracks all aspects of a CID case from initiation to closure. 
It includes, but is not limited to, entries for: initiation of a case, 
publication of reports, referral of a case to an attorney, publication 
of a final report, and when and what action is taken against an alleged 
offender. ALERTS documents all investigative activity related to the 
case and contains numerous standard reports that can be queried and ran 
at any time. ALERTS can produce quality assurance reports prior to the 
dispatch of a final report to identify issues or data that is missing 
or requires completion before a report can be published. It can also 
provide data on how long investigations remain in an open status and 
can provide investigative data for in-depth criminal intelligence 
queries and analysis.   [See page 29.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
    General Martin. The Fort Bliss CID office continues to work their 
cases in a timely and thorough manner. No cases are ignored once they 
are opened by the investigators. Due to the nature of some cases, 
investigative timelines can vary. Factors outside the control of the 
Fort Bliss CID office have a direct impact on case timelines. These 
factors include, but are not limited to, the need for forensic 
laboratory reports, coordination with external agencies, and the delay 
in receiving subpoenaed documents.   [See page 32.]

     
=======================================================================


              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 16, 2021

=======================================================================

      

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN

    Ms. Houlahan. The majority of the IRC panel at the hearing are 
former FBI special agents. In your review of how Army CID handled the 
investigation, was there an assessment of how the training for Army CID 
compared to the FBI for similar investigations--sexual assault, sexual 
harassment, and murder in this case? If so, what did you find? As the 
FBI has a different training program than NCIS and the Air Force, was 
there a comparison there? How is the training similar or different?
    Mr. Swecker. The FHIRC did not do a deep dive into the CID training 
program. We did note that the CID has its own training facility and 15 
week new agent curriculum at FT Leonard Wood. Other federal law 
enforcement agencies train at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA. The advantage to training at FLETC is the 
sharing of best practices across the federal law enforcement community 
and exposure to the most advanced law enforcement training methods. In 
addition FLETC is an interagency training center that host training for 
state, local, campus, tribal and international police agencies. This 
affords an opportunity to develop liaison and relationships with other 
agencies. There is continuity in the staff of professional instructors. 
Agencies take part in the curriculum review and develop policies and 
directives. The NCIS, DIA, DCIS and Airforce OSI train at FLETC. In 
fact 105 federal agencies conduct their training at FLETC. The FHIRC 
highly recommends that CID join these agencies and benefit from the 
shared best practices and professional environment.
    Ms. Houlahan. The majority of the IRC panel at the hearing are 
former FBI special agents. In your review of how Army CID handled the 
investigation, was there an assessment of how the training for Army CID 
compared to the FBI for similar investigations--sexual assault, sexual 
harassment, and murder in this case? If so, what did you find? As the 
FBI has a different training program than NCIS and the Air Force, was 
there a comparison there? How is the training similar or different?
    Ms. Ricci. I defer to my FBI colleagues as I am not familiar with 
FBI training.
    Ms. Houlahan. The majority of the IRC panel at the hearing are 
former FBI special agents. In your review of how Army CID handled the 
investigation, was there an assessment of how the training for Army CID 
compared to the FBI for similar investigations--sexual assault, sexual 
harassment, and murder in this case? If so, what did you find? As the 
FBI has a different training program than NCIS and the Air Force, was 
there a comparison there? How is the training similar or different?
    Mr. Bland. Background:
    From the outset, FBI Agents are fundamentally trained, enabled and 
deployed to assertively conduct investigations which ultimately 
manifest the aggregation of requisite evidence to facilitate the 
potential prosecution of violations of more than 200 different Federal 
statute categories.
    Given the level of sophistication and complexity which often 
characterize these types of investigative matters, basic/core academic 
training for FBI Agent Trainees at the FBI Academy located in Quantico, 
VA primarily falls within the key areas of Investigative Methodologies 
and Procedures; Interview and Interrogation Skill Development; 
Sensitive Investigative Techniques; and Informant/Source Development.
    After commencing with official duties at their first FBI field 
office, newly-graduated Special Agents (SAs) begin to accumulate 
valuable insight and experience regarding the initiation of cases, 
conducting/documenting investigative steps and the aggregation of 
evidence, most often under the stewardship of a seasoned, savvy and 
respected SA with considerable time in the Bureau who has established a 
record of success, achievements and investigative prowess. Key to this 
crucial mentorship phase is the ongoing nurturing of those baseline 
skills which must be systematically employed in a conventional case, as 
well as assisting the new SA with developing and honing the necessary 
degree of inquisitiveness, curiosity, logic, analytical thinking and 
passion which will ultimately facilitate the identification of 
beneficial, substantive leads and sustain consistent progress on behalf 
of bringing these investigative matters to a desired conclusion.
    As their body of knowledge, experience and investigative acumen 
continues to expand over time, these SAs are also exposed to the myriad 
specialized case support resources that can be accessed and are 
frequently utilized to both augment and add additional precision to the 
skills, techniques and technology which are already in play as their 
investigations advance.
    It should be noted that the majority of contemporary cases which 
fall within the auspices of the FBI's federal jurisdiction do not 
normally encompass crimes related to sexual harassment, sexual assault 
or murder. However, exceptions to this provision do include those 
matters which transpire within designated areas of Exclusive Federal 
Jurisdiction, such as U.S. military installations, federally-recognized 
Indian reservations, U.S. Parks and similar locations, as well as with 
respect to Federal Civil Rights allegations/violations. Moreover, 
numerous FBI-sponsored/led Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF) 
investigations are focused upon heinous, high-profile violent crimes 
which often involve murders as a predication for major cases which are 
initiated in conjunction with local/state LE agencies participating in 
these joint/task force entities.
    General Observations re U.S. Army CID investigations post-review of 
pertinent files:
    As was previously enumerated in the FHIRC report, the overall 
number of interviews of relevant personnel were viewed to be 
insufficient in terms of scope and quality. Moreover, interviews were 
generally pro-forma, shallow and lacking in the degree of depth/
granularity re the identification and documentation of requisite 
details during the initial stages of their cases that could have 
generated viable, tangible leads to logically pursue on behalf of 
achieving positive investigative outcomes.
    With respect to training which should be afforded to Army CID 
Agents as soon as feasibly possible in order to effectively address and 
ameliorate the deficiencies noted above, opine that CID adopting a 
comprehensive training curriculum/content and post-training mentoring 
regimen which is consistent with the above-referenced process being 
administered by the FBI relative to their new Agent trainees and 
followed up upon when they become full-fledged SAs, would engender 
palpable, measurable benefit relative to significantly improving the 
overall quality of CID investigations.
    Ms. Houlahan. In the Fort Hood report, you highlighted that the 
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military reported that 
sexual assault occurs most often between junior enlisted acquaintances 
who are peers or near peers in rank. Additionally, the vast majority of 
sexual assaults of service members occurred between people aged 17-24 
who work, train, or live in close proximity. You also said that junior 
enlisted showed the least amount of knowledge of the SHARP Program and 
the various ways to report a sexual assault. How can we work on 
educating the most at-risk service members?
    a. What resources and tools are most helpful in making sure that 
service members are aware of the what is available to them if they are 
assaulted?
    Mr. Bland. The solution to this phenomenon is squarely rooted 
within what should be a top-down expectation, if not requirement, that 
the officers and NCOs who are both responsible and accountable for the 
welfare, safety and security of the soldiers whom they are privileged 
to command are exercising the requisite degree of effective and engaged 
leadership relative to personally ensuring that all of the Army's 
available Special Emphasis Programs, to include SHARP, are being 
appropriately administered, emphasized and communicated downward as a 
critical rating component of their end-of-tour Officer and NCO 
Evaluation Reports (OERs/NCOERs).
    Ms. Houlahan. One of the problems that you recognized in your 
report was the lack of professionalism in the overall SHARP force. This 
is concerning because they are a vital contributor to military 
readiness.
    a. It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a career and it 
doesn't come with advancement unlike many other qualifications. Can you 
discuss the resources DoD would need to professionalize SHARP including 
professional development, rewards for performance, in preserving 
institutional knowledge?
    Mr. Bland. Believe that it is imperative to reverse the unintended 
consequences of SHARP's being frequently perceived by commanders as a 
program which can be staffed by mid-level and senior NCOs who 
oftentimes are those soldiers who are considered to be sub-par 
performers who can fill these nominal/ancillary/temporary assignments 
in order to minimize any impact on overall unit readiness. While 
instituting more comprehensive SHARP training and educational 
opportunities tied to career-enhancing incentives and bonuses, as well 
as the promulgation of new policies and standard designed to address 
this situation, would have an immediate and long-lasting positive 
impact, nonetheless opine once again that any modicum of sustained 
improvement and ultimately, success, relative to this program is 
inexorably linked to measures that must be implemented on the part of 
senior Army leaders at the highest general officer levels to hold 
commanders at all subordinate levels personally accountable by way of 
their OER/NCOER ratings to compel their adherence, emphasis and 
leadership. In doing so, any lack of compliance on the part of these 
individuals would be tantamount to career ruination.
    Ms. Houlahan. The majority of the IRC panel at the hearing are 
former FBI special agents. In your review of how Army CID handled the 
investigation, was there an assessment of how the training for Army CID 
compared to the FBI for similar investigations--sexual assault, sexual 
harassment, and murder in this case? If so, what did you find? As the 
FBI has a different training program than NCIS and the Air Force, was 
there a comparison there? How is the training similar or different?
    Ms. Counts. While investigative missions and jurisdictions may 
differ, there are some universal skills that every investigator should 
have. Integrity; professional courtesy extended to all; the ability to 
talk to people from all walks of life with respect and dignity; the 
willingness to accurately and thoroughly document every step of an 
investigation; and, the adherence to the core values of the 
investigative agency that the investigator represents.
    FBI Special Agent Trainees currently undergo over 800 hours of 
training in a variety of web based courses in four major 
concentrations: academics, case exercises, firearms training, and 
operational skills. Currently, New Agent training lasts approximately 
20 weeks; and, all trainees receive the training regardless of what 
they did before joining the FBI.
    The general training of FBI agents is geared toward the development 
of investigators. For the majority of Special Agents that is their 
focus from day one. They continue to build on these investigative 
skills upon graduation from the Academy until the day they retire. 
Although each FBI field office may differ in investigative priorities 
and tenure of the Special Agent population, most field offices have a 
cadre of agents at the GS-10, 11, 12 and 13 levels with GS-14 or GS-15 
supervisors--all with a primary focus on investigations and honing 
their investigative craft throughout their career. How do they get 
better? As they gain more experience, they begin to understand the need 
to foster solid working relationships with other law enforcement and 
investigative agencies. They begin to utilize more sophisticated 
techniques to include electronic surveillance and the use of 
intelligence and informants. And through it all, FBI Agents are 
expected to meet measurable and articulable standards of performance 
and conduct.
    The same lack of professionalism and leadership found at Fort Hood 
overall was the same that was found at CID. In a review of Army CID 
files, Committee members found CID's investigative strategy was a 
checklist driven, one size fits all strategy, regardless of the type, 
or severity of the crime being investigated. Suspects were allowed to 
keep their cell phones during their interview and/or interrogation; in 
two murder cases, suspects were found to have deleted incriminating 
texts during their time with CID Agents. In the case of a missing 
soldier, later determined to be murdered, Agents failed to interview a 
person of interest despite other witnesses reporting that this 
individual may have potentially valuable information. Investigations 
lagged and little, if any, contact with outside agencies could be found 
documented in the files.
    In the FBI, investigative experience is developed and gained over 
time, allowing for experienced agents to be assigned the more complex 
cases and to guide lesser experienced agents in the investigation of 
those cases. There are benchmarks that must be met at every step of an 
FBI Agent's career, beginning with New Agent training and ending with 
that Agent's last annual performance review.
    While the FBI commits considerable resources to recruiting, 
training and preparing the absolute best people they can find, it is 
the on the job training, or OJT, that has been the primary tool for 
developing investigative skills. By the nature of the job it has to be. 
This is the area where the FBI stands head and shoulders above CID. 
This is the single, and strongest, argument that Army CID needs to be 
completely reorganized. Serious consideration should be given to 
converting CID's current model to a civilianized force with higher 
entrance standards and a focus on investigations and career paths 
geared to the development of investigative expertise.
    Ms. Houlahan. What percentage of your current civilian work force 
is formerly active duty military? With that percentage, how do you 
ensure the culture can change and improve if there is a revolving door 
of the same mentality?
    General Martin. As of April 1, 2021, 61% of CID's current civilian 
work force are former active duty military. This includes members from 
the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. Culture change is made and 
sustained by committed leadership. I can assure you that both CID and 
Army leaders are dedicated to improving the investigative practices and 
processes of CID.
    Ms. Houlahan. Do you have timelines established for criminal cases 
such as sexual assault investigations? If so, how often are those 
timelines sufficiently met and cases closed?
    General Martin. Every crime is unique. Factors including, but not 
limited to the type of sexual assault, location of the occurrence, 
identity and status of the victim and the alleged offender, the amount 
of time between occurrence and reporting, presence or absence of 
forensic evidence, presence or absence of witnesses, and the presence 
or absence of electronic or digital evidence, all impact how quickly an 
investigation can be successfully completed. The timeliness of 
investigations are tracked during monthly Battalion Operations 
synchronization meetings with subordinate units. Investigation 
timeliness is part of the Battalion and Group Organizational Inspection 
Program (OIP), as well as reviewed as part of periodic Inspector 
General (IG) inspections. These updates, inspections, and leadership 
involvement assist our unit's ability to keep investigations from 
stagnating.
    Ms. Houlahan. What are the average years of experience for your 
agents? Of that, I understand that your agents often have different 
investigative specialties such as fraud or counterintelligence, what 
percentage of your experienced agents focus solely on criminal 
investigations?
    General Martin. As of March 10, 2021 (of 1,368 assigned Agents):
    # of Agents with 1 year or less: 149/11%
    # of Agents with 1 to 3 years: 444/32%
    # of Agents with 4 to 7 years: 166/12%
    # of Agents with 7+ years: 609/45%
    Not including agents focused on criminal investigations involving 
fraud and cybercrime, and agents performing protective service duties 
for DOD senior leaders, there are approximately 900 CID agents focused 
solely on general criminal investigations, which include sexual 
assaults.
    Ms. Houlahan. With incidents of sexual assault and sexual 
harassment often being unreported, can you each describe what the 
dynamics are between your investigative organizations and the SHARP/
Victim Advocate/SARC programs? Are you looking at reviewing those 
relationships and potentially revamping them?
    General Martin. CID agents work closely with representatives from 
SHARP/Victim Advocate/SARC programs and the victim's and subject's 
chains of command. CID is also active in the Army's People First Task 
Force that is currently looking into ways to improve relationships 
among Army agencies including CID and SHARP. Recently, the A/SA signed 
Army Directive 2021-16 which improves the Sexual Harassment/Assault 
Response and Prevention program by better protecting and informing 
victims of sexual assault and sexual harassment. The new directive 
immediately implements several SHARP-related findings and 
recommendations from the FHIRC report, including provisions improving 
the issuance of military protective orders, informing the Directorate 
of Emergency Services or Provost Marshal's Office, and the process by 
which sexual assault victims receive case notifications.
    Ms. Houlahan. What percentage of your current civilian work force 
is formerly active duty military? With that percentage, how do you 
ensure the culture can change and improve if there is a revolving door 
of the same mentality?
    General Bullard. As of 24 Mar 21, OSI has 501 total civilian 
agents; this includes 26 participating in the Palace Acquire (PAQ) 
program, which is a centrally-funded and managed three-year program 
targeted at recent college graduates with exceptional academic 
achievement. Of the 501 total civilian agents, 201 (40.2%) have no 
prior military experience. Among the 300 agents with military 
experience (59.8%), these are split between 130 military retirees (123 
prior-OSI) and 170 with some military service (96 prior-OSI). In total, 
219 of OSI's civilian agents have previous OSI experience (43.72%) As 
this data indicates, OSI civilian agents are only slightly tilted 
towards those with prior military service. Former military personnel 
who return to OSI as civilian agents are normally selected due their 
possession of unique skills and experience which are in-demand among 
our civilian agent force (e.g. cyber, language, technical operations, 
etc.) Additionally, many of these former military personnel come from 
specialties and backgrounds not affiliated with OSI. Overall, 43.7% of 
OSI's civilian agent force is composed of former active duty agents, 
meaning more than half of our civilian agents come to us with no or 
differing military backgrounds. This infusion of new perspectives and 
experiences, coupled with the constant addition of new active duty 
agents, helps OSI to avoid groupthink or the perpetuation of unhelpful 
assumptions or viewpoints. Additionally, OSI has dedicated offices 
committed to diversity and inclusion, organizational development, and 
total force development. Taken together, OSI remains on the leading 
edge of cultural innovation and change, and constantly strives to 
identify and inculcate new and creative methodologies, ideas, and 
perspectives.
    Ms. Houlahan. Do you have timelines established for criminal cases 
such as sexual assault investigations? If so, how often are those 
timelines sufficiently met and cases closed?
    General Bullard. The timeliness standard for our criminal 
investigations on adult sexual assault, narcotics, and general criminal 
offenses is 75 days from case initiation to a published report of 
investigation. Death and child sexual offense investigations are 
expected to run no more than 180 days. Fraud investigations are 
afforded 730 days for investigation. For adult sexual assault 
investigations (as specified in the question), the 75-day standard is 
applied to offenses ranging from sexual contact investigations to human 
trafficking. Based on the varied complexity of these different 
offenses, OSI is evaluating the merits of adjusting our timeliness 
goals in the very near future to maintain a 75-day standard for less-
complex sexual offenses, and set a new standard of 120 days for 
penetrative and aggravated sexual offense investigations. In reviewing 
data for calendar years 2018, 2019, and 2020, OSI has averaged 114 days 
to completion on all adult sexual assault investigations; the median 
time to complete was 76 days. During that period, death and child 
sexual assault investigations averaged 207 days with a 175 day median. 
Fraud investigations ran an average of 590 days, and the median for 
this category was 390 days.
    Ms. Houlahan. What are the average years of experience for your 
agents? Of that, I understand that your agents often have different 
investigative specialties such as fraud or counterintelligence, what 
percentage of your experienced agents focus solely on criminal 
investigations?
    General Bullard. Due to a variety of individual requirements and 
differing career tracks, the average experience level of OSI agents 
varies by category. At present, officer agents (total of 291 positions) 
average 8.8 years of experience; enlisted agents (total of 1.032 
billets) average 5.8 years of experience; and civilian agents (total of 
591 positions) average 14.9 years of experience. These experience 
levels reflect a number of realities which the OSI blended force faces, 
notably that enlisted agents constitute the majority of our newest 
personnel, and that civilian agents have greater latitude to remain in-
place in to obtain greater experience and longevity without the demands 
of the traditional military ``up-or-out'' paradigm. Although OSI does 
offer a number of opportunities for its agent personnel to specialize 
in a wide range of skillsets, all OSI agents remain capable of 
conducting criminal investigations when and as-needed. While OSI 
employs a variety of funding streams in support of its investigative 
mission, the interoperability of OSI agents means that the command does 
not employ any specific individuals or positions ``solely'' for the 
conduct of criminal investigations. Indeed, many agents have criminal 
investigations as their primary mission focus, but remain capable of, 
any often do, surge to meet other requirements such as counterterrorism 
or counterintelligence matters. Nonetheless, each OSI subordinate wing 
is assigned a criminal investigations subject matter expert (SME) to 
assist in the oversight and management of investigations. These 
individuals are among our most experienced and seasoned personnel in 
the conduct of criminal investigations. Similarly, agents of equally 
strong backgrounds in criminal investigations serve as command-wide 
experts at OSI's headquarters, both from an operational and policy and 
resourcing standpoint. OSI therefore recognizes the importance of 
providing our field units and agents the best possible policy, 
resources, and expertise to ensure the conduct of sufficient and timely 
investigations.
    Ms. Houlahan. With incidents of sexual assault and sexual 
harassment often being unreported, can you each describe what the 
dynamics are between your investigative organizations and the SHARP/
Victim Advocate/SARC programs? Are you looking at reviewing those 
relationships and potentially revamping them?
    General Bullard. Our field units maintain close relationships with 
Special Victim's Counsel (SVC), SARCs, and Victim Advocates (VA). 
Annually, and IAW DODI 5505.18 and DODI 5505.19, OSI agents conduct 
joint training with the SARC. Additionally, OSI agents assist the SARC 
by providing training to VAs on the investigative process and the roles 
the VA, SARC, and SVC play in that process. When OSI agents need to 
speak with a victim, they coordinate this step with the victim's SVC 
and/or the SARC. If the victim so desires, their SVC or VA can be 
present during the interview to provide support to the victim. In 
addition to this, OSI units provide timely updates on investigations to 
the Special Victims' Investigation and Prosecution team so they can 
better perform their duties. Upon notifications of an Unrestricted 
Report from the SARC, OSI assists the SARC in completing the Sexual 
Assault Incident Response Oversight (SAIRO) Report. We believe our 
relationship with these programs is strong and effective. The roles of 
all entities are clearly defined and create an environment that 
supports the needs of the victim, while working to forward criminal 
investigations. OSI has not sought to review these relationships or 
revamp them at this time.
    Ms. Houlahan. What percentage of your current civilian work force 
is formerly active duty military? With that percentage, how do you 
ensure the culture can change and improve if there is a revolving door 
of the same mentality?
    Mr. Lopez. 40% of the NCIS civilian workforce is formerly active 
duty military. In regards to cultural change, NCIS has not experienced 
any collective issues with our former active duty personnel. Being a 
civilian organization, having former military members in NCIS enhances 
the diversity of our workforce and has had a positive impact on our 
workplace culture.
    Ms. Houlahan. Do you have timelines established for criminal cases 
such as sexual assault investigations? If so, how often are those 
timelines sufficiently met and cases closed?
    Mr. Lopez.
      NCIS must initiate a new sexual assault investigation 
within 3 days of being notified of a sexual assault offense.
      NCIS follows the timeline guidelines set forth in the 
DODI 5505.19 for 24hr and 48hr Special Victim Investigation and 
Prosecution (SVIP) notifications/collaborations.
      NCIS agents provide a status report every 60 days while 
the investigation is still active.
      NCIS averages 118 days for DON sexual assault 
investigations though some active investigations are completed sooner 
while more complex investigations take longer.
      Supervisory Special Agents review cases at a minimum 
every 60 days.
      Cases are closed when the commanding officer of the 
service member(s) who are the subject of an investigation provide NCIS, 
in writing, the final disposition, to include any administrative, non-
judicial punishment or judicial action taken as a result of the 
investigation.
    Ms. Houlahan. What are the average years of experience for your 
agents? Of that, I understand that your agents often have different 
investigative specialties such as fraud or counterintelligence, what 
percentage of your experienced agents focus solely on criminal 
investigations?
    Mr. Lopez. NCIS tracks tenure with the agency vice years of 
experience. The average tenure of NCIS special agents is 10 years. The 
average tenure of NCIS special agents focusing on criminal 
investigations is 9 years. While the average tenure is 10 years, it is 
important to note the average years of law enforcement experience is 
higher, as NCIS actively recruits personnel with prior law enforcement 
experience for service as special agents.
    Ms. Houlahan. With incidents of sexual assault and sexual 
harassment often being unreported, can you each describe what the 
dynamics are between your investigative organizations and the SHARP/
Victim Advocate/SARC programs? Are you looking at reviewing those 
relationships and potentially revamping them?
    Mr. Lopez. NCIS has a close relationship with DON Sexual Assault 
Prevention Response (SAPR), Navy SAPR and Marine Corps SAPR at the HQ 
level.
    NCIS collaborated with DON SAPR in creating a sexual assault 
prevention video on combating sexual assault (due out later this year).
    NCIS doesn't view our relationships with the other Navy and DOD 
groups as needing repair. We have a very strong relationship, which is 
maintained via continuous communications. This includes collaborating 
on briefings, sharing metrics, and developing policies at both the 
field and the headquarters level. NCIS frequently provide briefs at 
their relevant trainings and they also provide briefs to support NCIS. 
Local NCIS offices routinely interact with SAPR/Victim Advocate (VAs), 
SVIP, Case Management Group for Sexual Assaults (CMG) for briefings and 
specific topic focused meetings.
                                 ______
                                 
                 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STRICKLAND
    Ms. Strickland. In the Fort Hood report, you highlighted that the 
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military reported that 
sexual assault occurs most often between junior enlisted acquaintances 
who are peers or near peers in rank. Additionally, the vast majority of 
sexual assaults of service members occurred between people aged 17-24 
who work, train, or live in close proximity. You also said that junior 
enlisted showed the least amount of knowledge of the SHARP Program and 
the various ways to report a sexual assault. How can we work on 
educating the most at-risk service members?
    a. What resources and tools are most helpful in making sure that 
service members are aware of the what is available to them if they are 
assaulted?
    Mr. Swecker. The FHIRC recommended that a strong centralized Corps 
level SHARP Program Manager Office be established that reports to an 
SES or general officer at the DA level while also functioning in direct 
support of the CORPS Commander. This PM would centralize, implement and 
track all SHARP training. The perfunctory nature of SHARP training was 
pointed out as the greatest weakness of SHARP training at the Unit 
level. The inherent weakness was that NCOs were tasked with delivering 
a powerpoint or other very rote and non participatory training that 
simple did not sink in with the key population of E-1 through E-5 
levels. The training should be delivered at the PM training center and 
attended by both officers and enlisted. Strong emphasis should come 
from the command level concerning the critical nature of the training 
and soldiers should be tested on their knowledge of the essential 
elements of the SHARP Program. Substandard grades should place the 
soldier into a remedial track until proficiency is gained.
    Ms. Strickland. One of the problems that you recognized in your 
report was the lack of professionalism in the overall SHARP force. This 
is concerning because they are a vital contributor to military 
readiness.
    a. It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a career and it 
doesn't come with advancement unlike many other qualifications. Can you 
discuss the resources DOD would need to professionalize SHARP including 
professional development, rewards for performance, in preserving 
institutional knowledge?
    Mr. Swecker. Per the FHIRC Report SHARP duties should be a 
recognized Army MOS and the career track should be modeled after the 
Army EO, IG and similar programs. The Army should eliminate collateral 
duties and consolidate those duties into positions with the CORPS level 
SHARP Program office. Serving in the The SHARP program should be career 
enhancing and part of a defined career track.
    Ms. Strickland. In the Fort Hood report, you highlighted that the 
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military reported that 
sexual assault occurs most often between junior enlisted acquaintances 
who are peers or near peers in rank. Additionally, the vast majority of 
sexual assaults of service members occurred between people aged 17-24 
who work, train, or live in close proximity. You also said that junior 
enlisted showed the least amount of knowledge of the SHARP Program and 
the various ways to report a sexual assault. How can we work on 
educating the most at-risk service members?
    a. What resources and tools are most helpful in making sure that 
service members are aware of the what is available to them if they are 
assaulted?
    Ms. Ricci. Numerous soldiers identified ``SHARP 360'' training as 
very impactful and the best SHARP training they received. I visited the 
SHARP 360 facility on Fort Hood, which consists of a large trailer 
housing several different rooms that are furnished to allow soldiers to 
role play given scenarios. This interactive training leaves a lasting 
impression and equips soldiers with critical SHARP knowledge, as well 
as trains soldiers to identify risky situations and possible methods of 
intervention and assistance to prevent or react to incidents of sexual 
assault. SHARP training can be integrated into newcomer orientations 
and must be championed as a priority for every unit by unit commanders.
    Ms. Strickland. One of the problems that you recognized in your 
report was the lack of professionalism in the overall SHARP force. This 
is concerning because they are a vital contributor to military 
readiness.
    a. It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a career and it 
doesn't come with advancement unlike many other qualifications. Can you 
discuss the resources DOD would need to professionalize SHARP including 
professional development, rewards for performance, in preserving 
institutional knowledge?
    Ms. Ricci. The FHIRC review was of Fort Hood and to some extent the 
Army, and not of the DOD program. With this in mind, as described in 
the FHIRC Report (pp. 127-128) SHARP Military Professionals (SARCs and 
VAs) should be selected, trained and assigned at the Department of the 
Army level, which will ensure they are appointed, credentialed, trained 
and ready to perform their duties when they hit the ground. 
Additionally, SHARP should be established as a Special Qualifications 
Identifier (SQI) and the program should be fully funded, in order to: 
(i) enable interdisciplinary development of SHARP Military 
Professionals across Military Occupational Specialties, (ii) encourage 
the best to aspire to become SHARP Military Professionals, (iii) reward 
these professionals for their service, and (iv) preserve institutional 
knowledge through professional development.
    Ms. Strickland. In the Fort Hood report, you highlighted that the 
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military reported that 
sexual assault occurs most often between junior enlisted acquaintances 
who are peers or near peers in rank. Additionally, the vast majority of 
sexual assaults of service members occurred between people aged 17-24 
who work, train, or live in close proximity. You also said that junior 
enlisted showed the least amount of knowledge of the SHARP Program and 
the various ways to report a sexual assault. How can we work on 
educating the most at-risk service members?
    a. What resources and tools are most helpful in making sure that 
service members are aware of the what is available to them if they are 
assaulted?
    Mr. Bland. The solution to this phenomenon is squarely rooted 
within what should be a top-down expectation, if not requirement, that 
the officers and NCOs who are both responsible and accountable for the 
welfare, safety and security of the soldiers whom they are privileged 
to command are exercising the requisite degree of effective and engaged 
leadership relative to personally ensuring that all of the Army's 
available Special Emphasis Programs, to include SHARP, are being 
appropriately administered, emphasized and communicated downward as a 
critical rating component of their end-of-tour Officer and NCO 
Evaluation Reports (OERs/NCOERs).
    Ms. Strickland. One of the problems that you recognized in your 
report was the lack of professionalism in the overall SHARP force. This 
is concerning because they are a vital contributor to military 
readiness.
    a. It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a career and it 
doesn't come with advancement unlike many other qualifications. Can you 
discuss the resources DOD would need to professionalize SHARP including 
professional development, rewards for performance, in preserving 
institutional knowledge?
    Mr. Bland. Believe that it is imperative to reverse the unintended 
consequences of SHARP's being frequently perceived by commanders as a 
program which can be staffed by mid-level and senior NCOs who 
oftentimes are those soldiers who are considered to be sub-par 
performers who can fill these nominal/ancillary/temporary assignments 
in order to minimize any impact on overall unit readiness. While 
instituting more comprehensive SHARP training and educational 
opportunities tied to career-enhancing incentives and bonuses, as well 
as the promulgation of new policies and standard designed to address 
this situation, would have an immediate and long-lasting positive 
impact, nonetheless opine once again that any modicum of sustained 
improvement and ultimately, success, relative to this program is 
inexorably linked to measures that must be implemented on the part of 
senior Army leaders at the highest general officer levels to hold 
commanders at all subordinate levels personally accountable by way of 
their OER/NCOER ratings to compel their adherence, emphasis and 
leadership. In doing so, any lack of compliance on the part of these 
individuals would be tantamount to career ruination.
    Ms. Strickland. In the Fort Hood report, you highlighted that the 
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military reported that 
sexual assault occurs most often between junior enlisted acquaintances 
who are peers or near peers in rank. Additionally, the vast majority of 
sexual assaults of service members occurred between people aged 17-24 
who work, train, or live in close proximity. You also said that junior 
enlisted showed the least amount of knowledge of the SHARP Program and 
the various ways to report a sexual assault. How can we work on 
educating the most at-risk service members?
    a. What resources and tools are most helpful in making sure that 
service members are aware of the what is available to them if they are 
assaulted?
    Ms. Counts. The lack of discipline, institutional control, and 
professionalism by the Command of Fort Hood is well documented in the 
Fort Hood Independent Review Committee (FHIRC) report. With a laser 
focus on the mission, the leadership at Fort Hood allowed all other 
aspects of soldier life to suffer, to include the health, safety and 
welfare of those charged with carrying out the mission. And, female 
service members were expendable as long as the mission moved forward.
    At Fort Hood, the Committee found little to no evidence of 
educating service members who are most at risk for sexual assault/
harassment. Female service members reported that during their exit 
briefings at other Army installations, they were told that they should 
be aware and take some measures to protect themselves, as they ``could 
expect and probably would be'' sexually harassed and or assaulted 
shortly after reporting to Fort Hood. While a handful of service 
members made reference to a Newcomers Brief and a Sponsorship Program 
for service members upon their arrival at Fort Hood, these service 
members characterized both the Brief and the Program as not being fully 
implemented and never followed through.
    Of the 308 E-1 to E-4 junior enlisted female service members 
interviewed by the FHIRC, 183, or 59%, reported NOT feeling safe on 
post. Female service members within this group, identified as the most 
at risk, reported being attacked in their rooms; in laundry and storage 
areas within their barracks, and in certain areas on post that were not 
well lit. Many of these attacks were committed by their NCOs or by 
their peers. Reports of NCOs ``requiring'' new female service members 
to attend off post parties soon after their arrival to Fort Hood, only 
for these female soldiers to wake up disoriented, naked and alone the 
next morning, were commonplace. In a number of these cases, it was 
reported that the NCOs were the ones who transported the female service 
member to the off post party. Of this E-1 to E-4 group, 167, or 54%, 
reported they were NOT confident in their commanders to take a report 
of sexual assault and/or harassment seriously. And, 119, or 38% of this 
group, reported they had seen or heard of someone who had been 
retaliated against for ``raising a concern'' of sexual assault and/or 
harassment. Add to these numbers the staggering response to an online 
survey given to all units assigned to Fort Hood as part of the 
Independent Review, when 1,339 service members responded ``yes'' to 
whether they had ``observed a situation I believe was sexual assault'' 
in the past twelve months.
    The Review Committee heard all too many times that the lines 
between junior enlisted and the higher ranks are blurred at Fort Hood 
to the point that in some units these lines no longer exist. 
Fraternization is the norm and not the exception. In one unit, there 
were several reports of Sergeants fathering children with junior 
enlisted service members; ``everyone knows, but everyone is afraid to 
say anything.''
    Attitude is reflected in leadership. At every turn, the FHIRC found 
a cavalier attitude and a total lack of leadership regarding sexual 
assault and harassment. Fort Hood soldiers who had been assigned to 
other Army Posts talked about zero tolerance policies regarding sexual 
assault and harassment. Every one of these service members said the 
zero tolerance installations had a visible and higher quality of 
command and soldier than any they found at Fort Hood. Some of these 
more experienced soldiers began to hold off duty meetings with the 
younger female service members to educate them in ``what was ok 
behavior and what was not.'' Two sergeants reported in their respective 
units, several male service members asked to attend the meetings as 
they were deeply disturbed as to how their female counterparts were 
being treated. These initiatives were few and far between and the women 
leading the groups readily acknowledged they were not ``high enough 
up'' to make a difference.
    The lack of confidence in leadership; the lack of confidentiality, 
and the stigma attached to victims reporting and seeking help on post, 
all work to ensure the victim remains a victim. Victims of sexual 
assault who utilize on post resources following an assault found it 
difficult to regain their sense of self as they continued to be 
victimized through various forms of reprisal and retaliation.
    In interviews with Carl A. Darnall Medical Center staff and 
credentialed Victim's Advocates at Fort Hood, a number of resources are 
available to service members who are victims of sexual assault and are 
in place both on and off post. These off post resources meet monthly 
and share a cohesive and cooperative approach to helping victims. Off 
post resources allow for the victim to regain their sense of self once 
rank and the uniform are not factors to deal with. The Committee found 
little to no evidence of any Fort Hood SHARP personnel or Fort Hood CID 
participating in these monthly meetings.
    Ms. Strickland. One of the problems that you recognized in your 
report was the lack of professionalism in the overall SHARP force. This 
is concerning because they are a vital contributor to military 
readiness.
    a. It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a career and it 
doesn't come with advancement unlike many other qualifications. Can you 
discuss the resources DOD would need to professionalize SHARP including 
professional development, rewards for performance, in preserving 
institutional knowledge?
    Ms. Counts. Of the thirty SHARP personnel I personally interviewed 
as part of the Fort Hood Independent Review, 27, or 90%, had an 
unfavorable opinion of the overall program. Some cited training as 
lacking; some thought adequate training resources were available; but, 
the training itself needed fine tuning. Many thought the overall 
program was understaffed and not viewed as a priority. All agreed that 
a more thorough vetting process is needed for SHARP personnel. One Fort 
Hood Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) was arrested for 
running a prostitution ring. In 2014, a Fort Hood Victim's Advocate 
(VA) was accused of sexually assaulting multiple intoxicated victims 
while the unit was deployed to Korea. In 2019, this individual was 
allowed to reenter the SHARP Program as a VA after going five years 
without an alcohol related incident. The service members reporting this 
information summed it up succinctly by saying ``after seeing this, how 
can anyone have faith in this program?''
    Victims of sexual assault have two options to report assaults 
through the Army Sexual Harassment and Assault Response Program, or 
SHARP: the restricted report or the unrestricted report. A restricted 
report allows SHARP personnel to provide a host of immediate, in 
person, victim support services, including counseling, mental health 
services and medical care follow up. This reporting option does not 
initiate an investigation, unless there is a need to prevent or 
mitigate a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety of the 
victim or another. A restricted report can be ``converted'' to an 
unrestricted report by the initial reporting victim. There have also 
been some cases where the victim's identity has been compromised, 
causing the reporting option to be converted. Of the 308 E-1 to E-4 
female service members interviewed, (the group identified as the most 
at risk), 256, or 83%, stated they were aware of the differences 
between restricted and unrestricted reporting. However, a number of 
these service members who were victims of sexual assaults were unclear 
and upset as to why or how their initial restricted reporting option 
became unrestricted. Many of the victims interviewed were not aware 
that this conversion could occur.
    An unrestricted report of sexual assault is the only type of 
reporting that requires Command notification and the initiation of an 
investigation by a military criminal investigative organization, such 
as Army CID. An unrestricted report cannot be converted back to a 
restricted report.
    In late August of 2020, when the Fort Hood Independent Review 
commenced on site, the installation reported 103 unrestricted reports 
and 16 restricted reports. Of the 507 face to face interviews of female 
soldiers conducted by the Review Team, 93 credible accounts of sexual 
assault were identified. This number was based on victim reporting, 
witnesses to the assault or individuals having significant details of 
the assault. Of those 93 accounts, only 59 had been reported, either 
using the restricted or unrestricted option.
    The fact that a victim has to give up her identity and become 
victimized over and over again in order to initiate an investigation of 
sexual assault against her attacker is unacceptable. Conversely, it is 
unacceptable that a victim is told no investigation will be conducted 
UNLESS she chooses to have her identity revealed to her command.
    In their interviews, two veteran service members, both close to 
retirement and both serving in senior positions within SHARP, stated 
that there is a total lack of respect for women by leadership at Fort 
Hood. One of the service members who has been in a senior SHARP 
position at the Brigade Level for several years noted ``leaders turn a 
blind eye or they themselves are the offenders.'' Both service members 
cited a one in three victimization rate of junior enlisted female 
service members within the first eight months at Fort Hood; however, 
both noted they suspected this rate was in fact much higher due to the 
reluctance of victims to report. And, while both agreed SHARP could 
only work if victims reported, both stated with the way the current 
program is configured, coupled with the lack of leadership, they would 
not encourage a victim who came to them to report the assault.
    Training and indoctrination as to what is expected of soldiers 
needs to occur on the very first day of service in order to begin 
building a culture that has absolutely no tolerance for abuse among 
soldiers--particularly any abuse of the most vulnerable soldiers. It 
should be instilled in each soldier that in order to defend their 
country they must first defend and support each other. This must be 
reinforced every day.
    Junior enlisted personnel look to their NCOs and superior officers 
to determine how they should behave toward one another. They pay very 
close attention to them; and, they behave accordingly. Any training 
received by junior enlisted personnel will be undone if not exemplified 
and supported on a daily basis by their NCOs and superior officers.
    At Fort Hood, junior enlisted personnel ``learn'' from their fellow 
soldiers, NCOs and superior officers that the weakest among them are 
not to be valued. These ``weaker'' soldiers are not supported; and, 
they can be abused at will. Moreover, this abuse would be tolerated and 
accepted and in some units, encouraged by the higher ups; and, 
depending on the rank of the abuser, the abuse would not only go 
unpunished, but the abuser would often be rewarded.
    One of the issues the FHIRC observed regarding SHARP was that it 
was not highly regarded nor vigorously supported by the command 
structure at Fort Hood. The Army did not make it a priority for the 
command staff; there was neither reward for putting their best people 
in SHARP, nor was there any penalty for ``just filling a slot.'' The 
Command failed to commit whatever resources were necessary for its most 
efficient and effective operation. Thus, the Command staff responded 
accordingly and committed their resources and best people to support 
the priorities the Army told them to support. Generals are like 
everyone else; if you tell them what they have to do and back that up 
with rewards and punishments; they will respond accordingly. At Fort 
Hood--the command staff and even CID, were rewarded for their overall 
performance while they were failing DAILY in their responsibilities to 
SHARP, sexual assault prevention and investigations, simply because 
their performance in these areas were not identified as priorities by 
the Army and not directly tied to their evaluations and promotions.
    By stating that ``It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a 
career and it doesn't come with advancement unlike many other 
qualifications,'' sums the problem up in a nutshell. If the Army cannot 
or will not make service and/or leadership in SHARP career enhancing 
for its NCOs and officers, then it needs to turn the program over to 
professional civilian army employees.
    Ms. Strickland. Sexual assault and harassment are a traumatic 
experience and is unacceptable. While a lot of attention, rightly so, 
is focused on sexual assault between members of the uniformed services 
or committed by service members on civilians, I want to focus on what 
resources are available for civilian military spouses. According to the 
CDC about 1 in 4 women and nearly 1 in 10 men have experienced contact 
sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate 
partner during their lifetime and reported some form of Intimate 
Partner Violence (IPV)-related impact. I am aware that domestic 
violence cases around the country, including at Joint Base Lewis-
McCord, have increased and have been exacerbated by the coronavirus 
pandemic. I am also aware that the Family Advocacy Program has victim 
advocates available across JBLM for active duty service members, their 
current or former spouses, those with whom they share a child in common 
or have lived together as intimate partners. Military families make 
enormous sacrifices for this country, leaving support networks when the 
service member gets new orders and moving to unfamiliar environments. 
Can you tell expand on what resources exist for civilian spouses of 
service members who are experiencing domestic violence?
    a. Do you think you have enough resources to support those are 
experiencing domestic violence?
    b. How are you proactively educating family members of their 
rights?
    c. Can you identify some challenges that exist for protecting 
civilian spouses of service members?
    General Martin. The Army is deeply committed to preventing and 
responding to all acts of domestic violence and child abuse and neglect 
regardless of whether the victim is military or civilian. The Army 
Family Advocacy Program is resourced with healthcare professionals who 
provide immediate and ongoing services to victims of domestic abuse, 
specially trained and certified domestic abuse victim advocates at each 
installation to support the victim and help coordinate services. The 
installation Family Advocacy Program Manager ensures services are 
available and coordinated for all beneficiaries.
    Spouses of service members who experience domestic violence may 
consult with an Army Legal Assistance attorney to discuss concerns 
related to safety, financial support, and child custody and are 
assigned a Special Victim Counsel (SVC) when the suspect's case is 
postured towards an administrative or court-martial proceeding.
    The Army recognizes that civilian spouses who live off-post may 
experience added challenges accessing or even knowing about the Family 
Advocacy Program. During the COVID-19 pandemic there were no service 
interruptions as the installations shifted to virtual services until 
health protection conditions allowed for a return to in-person support. 
The Army has also initiated a study with the RAND Corporation in order 
to better understand this challenge and develop solutions to improve 
outreach with a study completion in 2022. Active prevention and rapid 
response to domestic violence is critical for readiness and aligns with 
the Army's number one priority--People.
    Ms. Strickland. Sexual assault and harassment are a traumatic 
experience and is unacceptable. While a lot of attention, rightly so, 
is focused on sexual assault between members of the uniformed services 
or committed by service members on civilians, I want to focus on what 
resources are available for civilian military spouses. According to the 
CDC about 1 in 4 women and nearly 1 in 10 men have experienced contact 
sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate 
partner during their lifetime and reported some form of Intimate 
Partner Violence (IPV)-related impact. I am aware that domestic 
violence cases around the country, including at Joint Base Lewis-
McCord, have increased and have been exacerbated by the coronavirus 
pandemic. I am also aware that the Family Advocacy Program has victim 
advocates available across JBLM for active duty service members, their 
current or former spouses, those with whom they share a child in common 
or have lived together as intimate partners. Military families make 
enormous sacrifices for this country, leaving support networks when the 
service member gets new orders and moving to unfamiliar environments. 
Can you tell expand on what resources exist for civilian spouses of 
service members who are experiencing domestic violence?
    a. Do you think you have enough resources to support those are 
experiencing domestic violence?
    b. How are you proactively educating family members of their 
rights?
    c. Can you identify some challenges that exist for protecting 
civilian spouses of service members?
    General Bullard. The Family Advocacy Program (FAP) is the DOD's 
designated social services entity independent of command and law 
enforcement actions, to address domestic abuse and their services are 
available to civilians as well as active duty members, to include 
military spouses and their children, who are experiencing domestic 
violence. Military dependents who are victims of sexual assault 
committed by a non-intimate partner Service member are eligible for the 
full range of advocacy resources provided by SAPR. All victims 
regardless of affiliation to the military are eligible for assistance 
through each installation's Victim Witness Assistance Program (VWAP) 
team. Finally, all Airmen, Guardians and dependents who are victims of 
sexual assault, stalking, or domestic violence are eligible for 
representation from a military Special Victims' Counsel (SVC) attorney. 
SVC staff are trained to advocate for the victim's rights and advise 
them on the complexities of the military justice system. OSI works 
closely with FAP to ensure available services are offered, and informs 
victims of services available (both verbally and via a written 
brochure); however, OSI does not itself provide these specific services 
to victims of domestic violence.
    a. Do you think you have enough resources to support those are 
experiencing domestic violence? From an OSI investigative perspective 
the answer is assessed to be yes, and OSI works closely with a number 
of entities in our investigations, at every installation, to ensure 
domestic abuse victim advocates (DAVAs) and SVCs are able to meet with 
and support anyone reporting domestic violence. However, the FAP, DAVA, 
and VWAP programs may be able to provide different, more involved 
perspectives as that is their area of expertise.
    b. How are you proactively educating family members of their 
rights? Upon initial contact with any victim or witness reporting an 
offense, OSI agents are trained to thoroughly inform them of their 
rights regarding access to a SVC, and provide them the DD Form 2701.
    c. Can you identify some challenges that exist for protecting 
civilian spouses of service members? OSI would defer to representatives 
of the DOD Family Advocacy Program, the OSJA's VWAP team, and the 
respective services' Special Victim Counsel or Victim's Legal Counsel 
Programs for their perspectives. Additional language if needed: OSI 
does not provide victim services to service members and their 
dependents; however, OSI does work closely with the Family Advocacy 
Programs on base through close coordination in ongoing investigations 
and monthly meetings to share relevant updates. Victims of domestic 
violence are advised to contact their local Family Advocacy office 
which can provide a myriad of services; OSI agents are trained to 
provide that information to any victims of domestic violence and other 
crimes so that victims may receive proper care. The Family Advocacy 
Program clinicians as well as, the DAVA program provides a broad range 
of services to military-affiliated victims of partner maltreatment. 
Advocacy services are provided with the goal of increasing victim 
safety and autonomy. Services include responding to victims' emergency 
and ongoing safety concerns and needs; providing information on 
programs and services available to victims and their children in both 
civilian and military communities; and providing victims with ongoing 
support and referrals. With the exception of mandatory state, federal, 
and military reporting requirements (i.e. domestic violence, child 
abuse, and duty to warn situations) the DAVA provides a private and 
confidential service to encourage victims in seeking assistance.
    Ms. Strickland. Sexual assault and harassment are a traumatic 
experience and is unacceptable. While a lot of attention, rightly so, 
is focused on sexual assault between members of the uniformed services 
or committed by service members on civilians, I want to focus on what 
resources are available for civilian military spouses. According to the 
CDC about 1 in 4 women and nearly 1 in 10 men have experienced contact 
sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate 
partner during their lifetime and reported some form of Intimate 
Partner Violence (IPV)-related impact. I am aware that domestic 
violence cases around the country, including at Joint Base Lewis-
McCord, have increased and have been exacerbated by the coronavirus 
pandemic. I am also aware that the Family Advocacy Program has victim 
advocates available across JBLM for active duty service members, their 
current or former spouses, those with whom they share a child in common 
or have lived together as intimate partners. Military families make 
enormous sacrifices for this country, leaving support networks when the 
service member gets new orders and moving to unfamiliar environments. 
Can you tell expand on what resources exist for civilian spouses of 
service members who are experiencing domestic violence?
    a. Do you think you have enough resources to support those are 
experiencing domestic violence?
    b. How are you proactively educating family members of their 
rights?
    c. Can you identify some challenges that exist for protecting 
civilian spouses of service members?
    Mr. Lopez. Can you expand on what resources exist for civilian 
spouses of service members who are experiencing domestic violence?
    NCIS works closely with Commands and civilian authorities who are 
responsible for furnishing resources beyond an investigative response 
to allegations of domestic violence.
    a. Do you think you have enough resources to support those who are 
experiencing domestic violence?
    NCIS has submitted funding requests to enhance its capacity to work 
family and sexual violence cases, which includes domestic violence. 
Currently, NCIS is in the process of expanding its training program for 
domestic violence, specifically on the topic of strangulation and 
interpersonal violence (IPV). At present, domestic violence training 
comes from NCIS' internal budget offsets. The DON PB22 submission 
includes additional sexual assault resources focused on prevention and 
response efforts across the DON, including critical shortfalls within 
NCIS.
    b. How are you proactively educating family members of their 
rights?
    NCIS conducts Crime Reduction Campaign briefing, which is also done 
in coordination with DON SAPR. At the installations, NCIS participates 
in joint briefs/campaigns with Family Advocacy Program (FAP). NCIS also 
briefs Victim Witness Assistance Program (VWAP) to victims in NCIS 
cases.
    c. Can you identify some challenges that exist for protecting 
civilian spouses of service members?
    The involvement of Domestic Abuse Victim Advocates (DAVA) are 
imperative in cases involving interpersonal violence (IPV). Victims of 
IPV are less likely to follow through with the investigative/judicial 
process, this is due to several reasons such as the psychology of the 
cycle of violence, pressure from family/friends to ``drop the 
charges,'' uncertainty related to finances, support for children, 
access to facilities, and an overall lack of information of services 
and support available to them from the FAP office. This is why DAVA 
involvement is so important. Through our strong relationships with 
Special SVIP and various local law enforcement we have relationships 
with many local domestic violence shelters throughout the United 
States.

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