[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-9]
MILITARY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE
ORGANIZATION REFORM
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
THE FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT
REVIEW COMMITTEE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 16, 2021
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-428 WASHINGTON : 2022
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
JACKIE SPEIER, California, Chairwoman
ANDY KIM, New Jersey JIM BANKS, Indiana
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas, Vice Chair LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas PAT FALLON, Texas
Hannah Kaufman, Counsel
Forrest McConnell, Counsel
Sidney Faix, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Banks, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Indiana, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Military Personnel............................. 2
Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel................. 1
WITNESSES
Bullard, Brig Gen Terry, USAF, Commander, Air Force Office of
Special Investigations......................................... 23
Lopez, Omar, Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service...... 24
Martin, MG Donna, USA, Provost Marshal General and Commanding
General, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command.............. 21
Swecker, Christopher, Chairman, Fort Hood Independent Review
Committee; accompanied by Carrie Ricci, Member, Fort Hood
Independent Review Committee; Andrew R. Bland III, Consultant,
Fort Hood Independent Review Committee; and Mary Counts,
Consultant, Fort Hood Independent Review Committee............. 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bullard, Brig Gen Terry...................................... 63
Lopez, Omar.................................................. 70
Martin, MG Donna............................................. 57
Speier, Hon. Jackie.......................................... 45
Swecker, Christopher, joint with Carrie Ricci, Andrew R.
Bland III, and Mary Counts................................. 47
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Letter to Acting Secretary of the Army....................... 83
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Banks.................................................... 89
Ms. Escobar.................................................. 89
Ms. Speier................................................... 87
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 93
Ms. Strickland............................................... 98
MILITARY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ORGANIZATION
REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Military Personnel,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 16, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:01 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jackie Speier
(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
Ms. Speier. Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the
Military Personnel Subcommittee.
Our hearing today is a hybrid one. We are going to be
looking at the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations
reform recommendations from the Fort Hood Independent Review
Committee. We have two panels today. The first panel are
members of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee who have
firsthand knowledge of the findings and recommendations made
and given to the Army. The second panel are the heads of each
of the services' investigative agencies who are here to tell us
how their agencies work and could be improved.
The Fort Hood report is required reading and continues to
reveal new challenges and problems, as well as demonstrate the
devastating impacts of problems that have gone unaddressed, but
also, and more importantly, new solutions. Ultimately, it is a
guidebook for how to create a smarter, safer, and more ready
force.
The Fort Hood Independent Review Committee's report is a
stinging repudiation of the Army Criminal Investigation
Division [CID]. The combination of woefully inadequate
experience among the investigators--in fact, 92 percent were
apprentice agents--coupled with understaffing created a doomed
operation that resulted in unsolved murders until civil law
enforcement stepped in; a disturbing sexual assault conviction
rate of 22 percent; and an installation in which soldiers felt
unsafe--a damning result.
What the Independent Review Committee found was startling.
Quote, ``The Fort Hood CID is a training ground. These young,
inexperienced agents were checklist-driven, focused on
developing a case file that simply checked the boxes rather
than identifying and working leads and suspects that are most
likely to resolve cases.'' Unquote.
Fort Hood CID investigations were extremely long. Quote,
``The yearly average days to complete an investigation between
2016 and 2020 ranged between a high of 214 days in 2016 to 115
days in 2020.'' Sadly, quote, ``Victims seldom saw the outcomes
of their cases and there was minimal deterrent value derived.''
Unquote. Perhaps most disconcerting is that, quote, ``A large
number of sexual assault cases were lost or dismissed at court
martial, partially due to investigations that were rote and
lacked essential evidence.'' Unquote.
And finally, the Fort Hood detachment was underresourced
and underexperienced. During 2018, 2019, and early 2021,
typically, one-third of CID positions at Fort Hood were
unfilled. There was a very limited in-house capability to
conduct cell phone tracking and exploit mobile phones, laptops,
and other electronic devices; an inability to maintain liaisons
with local police; and a failure to provide the proper
materials to support search warrants.
And none of this would have come to light without the
tragic deaths of so many individuals. Among them are Specialist
Vanessa Guillen, Private First Class Brandon Wedel-Morales,
Private First Class Scott Rosecrans, Sergeant Elder Fernandes,
and Specialist Freddy Beningo Delacruz, Jr.
For them, their families, friends, and soldiers in arms, we
must demand greater professionalism and accountability. We must
give the MCIOs [Military Criminal Investigation Organizations]
the tools they need to make sure investigations are done right,
the staffing to be able to complete cases in a timely manner,
and rigorous evidence-gathering capabilities sufficient to hold
criminals accountable at a court martial.
The military often says that it has zero tolerance for
sexual assault, but when criminal investigations are
haphazardly done, consisting of box-checking, it undermines any
hope of accountability and does a disservice to brave service
members who make an unrestricted report. And that in no way is
zero tolerance.
It is the job of this committee to ensure that the military
completes a fulsome, thorough, and competent criminal
investigation for every reported crime. While the Fort Hood
report focused on CID, I believe that all of the MCIOs--CID,
NCIS [Naval Criminal Investigative Service], and OSI [Office of
Special Investigations]--will benefit by doing an internal
review of their respective departments with an eye on the Fort
Hood Committee's findings and recommendations. I have said it
before; I will say it again and again--I am heartened that Fort
Hood leaders have already taken some action within their
authority to improve. But, until all the findings and
recommendations have been put in place and Fort Hood is well on
its way to being, quote, ``the great place,'' unquote, it
professes to be, we won't look away. We won't turn our backs on
our service members. I will ensure we keep our foot firmly on
the pedal until the Army turns itself around and our service
members and their families are safe.
I now would like to invite Ranking Member Banks to make an
opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Speier can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM BANKS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM INDIANA,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I share your concern about the conditions at Fort Hood and
look forward to hearing from our panelists today. The Fort Hood
Commission's deep dive into the Army's Criminal Investigative
Division on post highlighted very concerning issues. Rookie
agents were sent out on their own, leaders struggled to keep
their heads above water, and support functions were
nonexistent.
Just 12 of 76 uniformed agents at Fort Hood had more than 1
year of experience. These apprentice agents should, by
definition, have been mentored and supervised by experienced
agents to learn the ropes and keep investigations on track.
Instead, the lack of experienced agents and adequate resources
resulted in long case lead times and poor investigations.
Individual missteps added up to chronically lackluster
investigative work on suicides, homicides, and sex crimes on
and off post. Only 1 of 53 suicides in CID's jurisdiction
received a completed postmortem behavioral assessment. Sex
crime cases progressed slower than nearly all other comparable
posts and undermined a soldier's belief that allegations of
criminal wrongdoing would be taken seriously. For many victims
of crime at Fort Hood, justice delayed felt like justice
denied.
The Fort Hood leadership also failed to use a variety of
tools to connect with local law enforcement and disrupt hot
spots of known criminal activity. These tools are available to
every post commander, and they have been used successfully
elsewhere in the past. I am interested to know exactly why that
wasn't the case at Fort Hood. This is no way to handle serious
crimes.
I look forward to hearing today from the seasoned
investigators on the Review Commission about their impressions
of the situation at Fort Hood and what they believe could be
done to produce better investigations in the future. I am
especially interested in their findings about how the Army
could better resource CID offices with admin and support
personnel to keep agents in the field doing investigations
rather than behind a desk.
Our second panel includes representatives from each
service's criminal investigation division. Each service has a
different model for tracking this problem and it is designed to
fit their mission and deployment needs. Hopefully, we can learn
more about what builds strong military investigators and how
the Army plans to move forward in improving CID.
With that, thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. Speier. I would like to ask unanimous consent that non-
subcommittee members be allowed to participate and ask
questions after all the subcommittee members have had the
opportunity to ask their questions. Without objection, so
ordered.
Each witness will provide a brief introduction and their
focus on the committee. Then, Mr. Swecker will present a joint
statement on behalf of the Fort Hood Independent Review
Committee, and each member will have an opportunity to question
the witnesses for 5 minutes. We respectfully ask the witnesses
to summarize their testimony in 5 minutes. Your written
comments and statements will be made part of the hearing
record.
So, it is an opportunity now for me to welcome back both
Mr. Swecker and Ms. Ricci. For those of us that were able to
participate in the last hearing, you certainly wowed us with
your presentations, gave us lots of food for thought. And your
report has become a bible of sorts that I carry with me on my
plane rides, and find that every time I read it, I learn
something new and, unfortunately, something that dismays me
even more.
So, with that, let's welcome our first panel which includes
Mr. Chris Swecker, the chair of the Fort Hood Independent
Review Committee; Ms. Carrie Ricci, a member of the Fort Hood
Independent Review Committee; Mr. Andy Bland, consultant, Fort
Hood Independent Review Committee; Ms. Mary Counts, consultant
to the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee.
Thank you all for being here today.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER SWECKER, CHAIRMAN, FORT HOOD
INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE, ACCOMPANIED BY CARRIE RICCI,
MEMBER, FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE; ANDREW R. BLAND
III, CONSULTANT, FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE, AND
MARY COUNTS, CONSULTANT, FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE
Mr. Swecker. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Speier and Ranking
Member Banks, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss our findings, the findings of the Fort Hood Independent
Review Committee. In the interest of time, we are doing a
consolidated opening statement. I will try to summarize it and
get through it in the next 5 to 6 minutes, if possible, but, as
you have noted, the rest will be entered into the record.
As you know, the former Secretary of the Army appointed
five executive members of the Fort Hood Independent Review
Committee, but also we were supplemented by five subject matter
experts who assisted in various tasks associated with the
independent review. And I would just like to briefly introduce
the four members that are appearing here today.
Carrie Ricci is a retired Army JAG [judge advocate general]
officer who served 3 years at Fort Hood, including as trial
counsel; is now a senior executive serving as Associate General
Counsel for the Department of Agriculture.
Mary Counts served over 25 years as an FBI [Federal Bureau
of Investigation] special agent and supervisory special agent
in offices such as Honolulu; Washington, DC; El Paso; and FBI
headquarters. She has worked and supervised investigations of
drug cartels, gangs, crimes against children, and kidnappings.
In her role with the FHIRC [Fort Hood Independent Review
Committee], she conducted 157 face-to-face interviews with
female service members at Fort Hood, the majority of whom were
assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division and 3rd Cavalry Regiment.
She also summarized over 80 group interviews that we did that
encompassed over 1,800 service members of all ranks. She also
reviewed CID investigative files of sexual assaults and death
cases.
Andy Bland is a 23-year veteran of the FBI. His final
assignment was special agent in charge in Houston, but he also
served as the FBI legal attache in Baghdad. He was Deputy
Assistant Director of the Inspections Division of the FBI and
also served as the head of the FBI Training Academy at
Quantico.
As chair of the FHIRC, I am a former State prosecutor in
North Carolina. I spent 24 years with the FBI and retired as
the Acting Executive Assistant Director over eight FBI
divisions, including their CID, Cyber Division, International
Operations, and five other divisions. I currently practice law
in Charlotte, North Carolina.
It is absolutely critical to understand the basic mission
of CID in assessing its effectiveness. The fundamental
objectives of CID are set forth in Army Regulation 195-2,
Section 1-6, entitled, ``Objectives.'' The relevant portions
are in the opening statement, but I want to mention two of them
as areas where we had particular focus. And that is in the area
of serious felony investigations. That is one of their
mandates. The other is maintaining a proactive criminal
intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting cycle to alert
commanders to threats and criminal elements. Commanders who are
provided with validated criminal intelligence can initiate
appropriate force protection measures.
Members of this committee interviewed various members of
the 11th MP [Military Police] Battalion; relevant CID
commanders at Fort Hood; CID agents; dozens of CID stakeholders
on and off the base, including police chiefs, sheriffs,
district attorneys, JAG officers, Federal prosecutors,
community leaders; the Texas Department of Public Safety; the
Texas Rangers; and the FBI and other Federal agencies.
We reviewed all death and suicide cases and a broad
sampling of sexual assault files. Dozens of data research and
analysis products were conducted which provided highly relevant
insights into the CID operations and effectiveness.
As you know, our finding, one of nine findings in the
report, stated that the Fort Hood CID had various
inefficiencies that adversely impacted accomplishments of its
mission. We determined that the criminal detachments were
understaffed, underexperienced, overassigned, and poorly
supported, leading to inefficiencies that had an adverse impact
on investigations, especially the complex cases involving sex
crimes and soldier deaths.
We determined that these inefficiencies were the result of
staffing protocols and other policies and procedures that
transcend Fort Hood. But it is very important to note at the
outset that this finding does not challenge the competence,
motivation, work ethic, or onsite leadership at the Fort Hood
CID. The issue is one of inexperience, resources, staffing
methods, and the overall CID business model.
A significant portion of the report addressed the role of
CID in conducting prompt, thorough investigations of death,
felony, and sex crime cases. An important objective that we
looked at was the scope and role of CID in providing that
criminal intelligence, as I mentioned, to Fort Hood commanders
to enable them to adopt mitigations.
In essence, we found, as you mentioned, Chairwoman, that it
was a training ground. There were simply too few journeyman-
level agents to work the complex sex crime cases, death cases,
while still mentoring the large number of inexperienced and
uncredentialed special agents who were constantly transferring
in and out. There was minimal continuity in institutional
knowledge within CID. It also impacted law enforcement
relationships, as discussed in the report.
The inexperience of the CID special agents was evident in
our onsite file reviews that our members conducted of the
death, suicide, and sexual assault files from fiscal years 2018
to 2020. These reviews revealed some areas of concern as to
investigative attention to detail, completeness, and file
documentation, which increased with the complexity of the
investigation.
State and Federal prosecuting attorneys and local law
enforcement advised there was minimal interaction between their
offices and CID. Unlike other Army posts, there are no CID
agents embedded at any of the local police departments, and
they could not remember a true joint investigation.
We determined that serious crime issues on and off Fort
Hood were neither identified nor addressed proactively. There
was a conspicuous absence of an effective risk management
approach to crime incident reduction and soldier victimization.
In short, the staffing model, as it relates to Fort Hood,
did not effectively work to support their mission. There were
not enough experienced agents to provide continuity and
institutional experience to work complex cases or be proactive
in crime prevention.
The CID needs to have a balanced mix of apprentice,
experienced, and journeyman-level agents to provide stability
and ongoing expertise. There should always be a cadre of
experienced and highly experienced investigators to handle the
over 340 sex crime cases and 20 to 30 death cases per year at
Fort Hood. These are complex matters that involve forensic
evidence, evidentiary warrants, evidence analysis, and informed
judgment about investigative strategy. CID must be provided the
capability to work joint investigations with their State,
local, and Federal counterparts and not wait for a crisis
investigation, such as Vanessa Guillen, to do so.
Among the 11 recommendations we made were that the CID
command should evaluate its staffing model and personnel
movement protocols for high-tempo, high-turnover offices like
the Fort Hood CID to ensure they are staffed at a level where
they are capable of working complex cases on and off the
installation; engage in proactive crime suppression in
conjunction with department of emergency services and
commanders, especially drug suppression, as well as competently
handling the death and sex crime cases.
And just to wrap it up here, we asked the CID and the Army
Department of Administrative Services to evaluate whether this
requires a greater number of CID civilian special agents of the
1811 category for purposes of continuity and effectiveness in
handling these cases.
This concludes the opening statement. As chair of the
FHIRC, we welcome the opportunity to field any questions, and
with your concurrence, I will direct them to the appropriate
team member that is present.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Swecker, Ms. Ricci,
Mr. Bland, and Ms. Counts can be found in the Appendix on page
47.]
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Swecker. Does that complete,
then, the presentation of your panel?
Mr. Swecker. It does.
Ms. Speier. All right. So, we will move on to questions.
Let me start off by talking about drugs. In the report, you
indicated that the highest drug test failure rate per test
taken was at Fort Hood. You also said that the drug crime rates
for fiscal years 2015 to 2020 were almost 31 percent higher
than FORSCOM [United States Army Forces Command].
And it appears that in one case, in April of 2020, a
soldier overdosed on methamphetamine and fentanyl. There were
no interviews, no crime scene investigation, no apparent
attempt to determine who supplied the drugs. There was no
attempt to investigate the soldier's history of drug use or
identify the identity of associates. Can you speak to why that
is so wrong?
Mr. Swecker. Yes, ma'am. I mean, all we had to work with
was what was contained in the investigative file, in the four
corners of the file. We felt like, consistent with the CID
mission of gathering proactive intelligence, criminal
intelligence harvested from the cases that were worked, that
meaningful information could be provided to the commanders to
actually engage in mitigation and prevention. We just didn't
see that happening, and I think, by their own admission, CID
said they just didn't have the experience and the resources to
do proactive criminal intelligence.
We felt like death cases, particularly the one you are
talking about where there was a drug-related overdose, ought to
be fully investigated to determine if there were lifestyle
issues--where did the drugs come from; who supplied the drugs;
how did they get on the base--in order to try to engage in
proactive measures to prevent that from happening, if possible.
I mean, it certainly would have helped the commanders to be
armed with that kind of information. It is their responsibility
to conduct mitigation and look out for the health and safety of
their charges.
Ms. Ricci, do you have anything you want to add to that?
Ms. Ricci. No, that was basically what we found. I agree
completely.
Ms. Speier. So, for instance, in another setting,
deficiencies in failing to pursue all logical investigative
leads were also noted by the committee in another high-profile
case, a soldier who went missing and, ultimately, committed
suicide. ``Conspicuously absent in the CID file was any
documentation of a search for the soldier, nor was there any
indication that a key witness was contacted or interviewed. The
totality of the facts contained in the file led the FHIRC to
conclude that the initial underpinnings of what might be a
motive on the part of another to engineer the soldier's
disappearance existed''--which is a pretty profound statement.
I'm assuming this is the Hernandez case, is it not?
Mr. Swecker. I am going to try to be careful about specific
cases because some of them are ongoing, and I have been told
there are some issues associated with disclosing information in
a pending file.
But let me just say, generically, across all of the death
cases that we looked at, the more complex the case was, the
more striking it was the leads that weren't followed in many
cases and the incompleteness of the file. We are not saying
these investigative steps weren't taken. They just weren't in
the file. So, we couldn't see it.
Andy Bland conducted a couple of the relevant file reviews
that you are talking about, as well as myself and Mary Counts.
And I would like Andy to address the specific case that you are
mentioning.
Andy, I think you are on mute.
Mr. Bland. Okay. Can you hear me now?
Ms. Speier. Yes, we can.
Mr. Bland. Okay. Thank you for allowing me some time this
morning. It is a pleasure to be here.
And specifically as it relates to the inquiry, yes, I had
the opportunity to review what, essentially, was probably the
top five most complex cases that CID has undertaken here of
late. And this particular case really represents a microcosm of
all those things, all of those observations that Chris
enumerated at the strategic level. And what it really
underscores, as I looked at the file, is not being prescriptive
or critical of the investigation and how it ensued, but what it
really underscores and really illustrates is that those of us
who have spent decades involved with and leading and
supervising investigations can look at a file retrospectively,
and we are able to ascertain quite quickly the steps that could
have been taken to run some of these leads to ground.
And so, for that to really be something that a person like
myself, or Mary, or others, can extrapolate just by reviewing a
black-and-white file months after the fact really goes to the
heart of what Chris described as there has to be, clearly, a
mix in terms of the experience level of agents. Because the
ability to provide insight and optics, and to conduct an
investigation of this complexity or of this ilk, it doesn't
happen by way of osmosis. It doesn't happen overnight. Those
instincts, that sort of visceral, experiential review, the
ability to know which way to go, that happens over time and it
happens with mentoring, and it happens with making mistakes.
And at the end of the day, it also happens by way of having
supervisors who have been there and done that, who have the
credibility necessary to understand what needs to be done when
they review the files of what their investigators have done.
So, hopefully, that answers the question.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Let me just ask one final question, Mr. Swecker. If you had
the Vanessa Guillen case file, and you were reviewing that as a
24-year veteran of the FBI, what would you do to the individual
who provided you that particular file? You referenced a number
of times during the investigation where it was perfunctory or
box-checking.
Mr. Swecker. I will maintain it is not the fault of the
inexperienced agents. They have 2 and 3 years of experience,
are assigned a very complex investigation. So, that is a
difficult question to answer in terms if you are asking is
anybody accountable or should be held accountable for some of
the shortcomings in the investigation. It was just a grossly--I
shouldn't say ``grossly''--but vastly inexperienced staff
there. You could tell from the interviews. They were two- or
three-question interviews. They were mostly done by phone,
particularly some of the key interviews. Some of the key
followup questions either weren't asked or they just weren't
documented in the files. And the dots just weren't connected.
There was an absence of what I would call a master case
agent coordinating everything, looking at forensics, looking at
prioritization of leads, looking at allocation of resources in
the hot-spot areas, instead of sort of running that checklist-
driven investigation.
So, I wouldn't lay the blame on the individual special
agents. I think it is more the system. They, themselves, are
victims of a system that--again, I mentioned it being analogous
to an FBI busy field office like the New York office being
staffed almost 80 percent of new agents right out of the FBI
Academy. You don't even hit your stride as an investigator, I
don't think, until about 6-7 years into it.
And unfortunately, I don't think that CID has a cadre of 5-
to 10- to 15-year agents. Many of them leave, I am told, by the
time they get some level of experience.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
Ranking Member Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
My first question is, what stood out to all of you most
about Fort Hood's CID's overuse of novice agents?
Mr. Swecker. So, I will take a stab at that, and then pass
it on to the other three members.
Ninety-three apprentice special agents in 2019 among the
enlisted ranks; 63 percent apprentice as special agents in the
warrant officer ranks, and the supervisors that were on the
scene were occupied with administrative duties and things that
took up a lot of their time; that takes away from mentoring.
So, it just jumped out at me. It is just I don't think any
investigative agency that I know of would staff their offices
that way when they have complex cases on the table, death
cases; suicide cases; the Guillen case, a very complicated case
involving all kinds of electronic evidence and forensic
evidence, and begging for coordination from some centralized
case agent. Having to get warrants, warrants are complicated.
Writing and articulating affidavits to communicate the probable
cause to obtain a warrant is difficult. I just don't know of
any other model out there that staffs offices that are that
busy with such inexperienced agents.
And let me pitch it to Carrie.
Ms. Ricci. Yes, I will just add that the judge advocate
general is in the middle of a military justice redesign that
focuses greater expertise and experience where it is needed.
And so, what struck me, as the JAG offices are in the middle of
this redesign, was that the investigators are not, and that
that type of redesign is needed as well among the investigative
force.
Mr. Banks. Anybody else?
Mr. Swecker. Andy.
Mr. Bland. I think it is probably appropriate to defer to
Mary at this point, Chris.
Mr. Swecker. Okay. Mary. You may be on mute. You are muted.
Yes, Mary, I think you are still muted.
Mr. Banks. Let me move on.
Mr. Swecker. Yes.
Mr. Banks. I don't have a lot of time.
Mr. Swecker. All right.
Mr. Banks. So, for both of you who are here, tell us, what
are the most effective ways for us to blend and integrate
junior and senior investigators?
Mr. Swecker. I think, first and foremost, it is a staffing
issue. It is a resource allocation issue that comes from higher
up. There have to be incentives for agents to stay and some
areas where they can actually promote up and develop their
careers as investigators. We don't see that. I mean, this is
anecdotal, but what we hear is, when agents get to a certain
level of experience, they go somewhere else. They go to an IG
[inspector general] office. They go to one of the Federal
investigative agencies.
But I would go back to this issue of staffing and resource
allocation. That is a fundamental duty of those higher up the
food chain, and it is a business--I talked about a business
model. I don't think there is any business out there where you
would staff a critical business function with primarily an
overwhelming number of inexperienced agents or agents that are
either not credentialed or just haven't hit that experience
level where they can be competent to act alone.
Mr. Banks. Any other thoughts on how we integrate junior or
more seasoned investigators?
Ms. Ricci. I would just say that training and mentorship is
critical in any profession. And so, it is no different here.
Having that mentorship and that ability to bring along the
junior agents is critical.
Mr. Banks. Okay. My last question, throughout your review,
what were the key skills that appeared to be lacking among the
CID agents?
Mr. Swecker. Primarily, investigative acumen, the kind of
knowledge and skill that comes from having at least 5 years of
experience; knowing what leads to prioritize; knowing how to
get your hands--what evidence is most relevant; where the hot
spots are in a special investigation; where you devote more
resources, for example, if you have a particular suspect,
devoting and allocating your most experienced agents to that
particular suspect and that line of inquiry, if you will.
Obtaining warrants for forensic, for electronic evidence, which
is ever-present in every investigation these days--cell phones,
cell phone tracking, pinging cell phones. Collection of
forensic evidence takes a certain skill, and then, interpreting
the forensic evidence, knowing where to go and what to look
for.
Mr. Banks. Okay. Thank you. My time has expired.
Ms. Speier. The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Escobar, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thanks again to our experts who have devoted so much
time and their expertise in helping us in this moment.
This issue, obviously, stretches far beyond Vanessa Guillen
and Fort Hood. I can tell you that in my district, Fort Bliss,
we have seen some really alarming stories, heartbreaking
stories, and not just those that have made the headlines and
made the news, but individuals who have reached out to me to
share their own personal experiences. And the knowledge that
this is just the tip of the iceberg, these are just folks who
are willing to tell their stories who have reached out to me
personally, is really deeply alarming. Thankfully, at Fort
Bliss, General Sean Bernabe has really--he is fairly new to the
installation and has made some great changes, but we have so
much work to do.
And just a couple of the cases that have really shined a
light for me on other issues that we have to address: Private
Asia Graham, she is a young woman who was found deceased. She
had accused someone of sexual assault, and later, two other
women came forward and alleged that this perpetrator had also
assaulted them. So, there was a pattern there that leaders
missed. There were things that were happening there repeatedly
that leadership did not see.
Another one of our military personnel at Fort Bliss,
Private Richard Halliday, disappeared. He was regarded as AWOL
[absent without official leave] until, finally, others were
sounding the alarm about him having gone missing for so long.
So, there is a number of different things that we have got
to change. Some things, obviously, are more challenging than
others. But, as we think about a transition that CID needs to
make, and everything that you all have brought to light about
CID, all of the deficiencies, the lack of experience, the lack
of resources, if we are to transition to something that is a
better functioning investigative arm, how do we make that
transition? If we, for example, are able to civilianize more of
those positions, or maybe civilianize the whole thing, how
would you recommend we begin to make that transition? How
quickly can we do it? What are some initial steps that you
might recommend? I am trying to think about what should be done
internally; what needs to be done legislatively. I just would
love your insights on how do we get where we need to be as
quickly as possible? What does that transition look like from
today into the future?
Mr. Swecker. Yes, thank you for that question.
Just to follow up on your early theme there about serial
offenders, one of the most disturbing things that we came
across during the interviews was, within 2 days, interviewers
like Mary and Andy and Carrie had already identified two or
three serial offenders, which goes to one of the main CID
missions was to convey/harvest that intelligence out of those
files and those investigations, and get that to the command, so
that they could act on it. And that, again, they didn't have
enough experienced agents onboard to actually connect the dots
and do the things that needed to be done to address that
intelligence function.
We said in the report that we would like to see more--we
think that there ought to be more 1811 investigators. There are
several advantages to that. One, they don't transfer around as
much. Two, they have powers off the base, fewer issues with
posse comitatus, and being able to work joint investigations
and actually have authority outside the military installation,
especially work joint investigations.
So much happens off the base that involves soldiers. And
what we saw was a big gap there in terms of working true joint
investigations, where they could actually elbow-to-elbow work
cases together and share information real time.
And nothing drew that out more than the interviews that
were conducted. I don't know if Mary is off mute. But, Mary,
during the course of the interviews, you made some observations
that I thought were fairly poignant as far as gathering
intelligence and getting that information to the command.
Ms. Counts. That is true.
I hope everyone can hear me now.
Ms. Speier. Yes, we can.
Mr. Swecker. Yes.
Ms. Counts. Thank you.
During the course of the interviews with the victims, as
well as interviews with witnesses and with other people who had
extensive knowledge of these incidents, we heard textbook
grooming, serial offender, repeat offender, predator over and
over again. So, as Mr. Swecker said, we were able to put
together a list and almost know, when that person came into the
interview, what case they were talking about.
And I think, whatever model CID goes to, there needs to be
an emphasis on focus and they need to be able to prioritize
their investigations. And it can't be one-size-fits-all. A gang
rape and a physical assault cannot be investigated as opposed
to another case. You have to be able to go after those people
that are not only victimizing soldiers, but could possibly
victimize others in the future. And I think they have to be
able to transition to those cases pretty rapidly.
Mr. Swecker. Thank you.
Ms. Speier. All right. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Carl, is recognized for 5
minutes. Mr. Carl, are you available? You need to unmute
yourself. Mr. Carl. Mr. Carl, you are recognized. And you are
muted. All right. Let's see if we can unmute you.
We will move on, then, to the gentlewoman from California,
Ms. Jacobs. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you to all of our witnesses for being here.
Finding No. 9 in the report was that the command climate at
Fort Hood has been permissive of sexual harassment and sexual
assault. And I was wondering if you could talk a bit about how
Fort Hood is different from other bases, since we know this is
a problem elsewhere. What was unique about Fort Hood, in
particular, and how worried are you that there are similar
cultures of impunity at other bases?
Mr. Swecker. It is hard to talk about other bases because
our focus was on Fort Hood, although we heard anecdotally in
the interviews. I think Carrie, Mary, and Andy, and others that
did the interviews, heard about places, other bases, where
accountability was more strict and there was quicker action
when an incident took place and a report was received. And more
aggressive steps were taken to protect the victim, pending the
case as it wound through the criminal justice or the military
justice system.
What we saw at Fort Hood--we don't think it was an
aberration--was a flawed SHARP [Sexual Harassment/Assault
Response and Prevention] structure itself, which we addressed
in the report. But we also saw priority placed on brigade
readiness for deployment as opposed to the health and welfare
of the soldiers, which we discussed at length in the first
hearing.
So, we don't know if that is an outlier, but I think,
anecdotally, we got stories during our 700 interviews and the
group interviews that encompassed 1,800 soldiers from soldiers
who had been stationed at other bases that in many cases Fort
Hood was an outlier.
We commissioned 49 research projects by a research group at
West Point. Their comment to us was they had never seen a
situation where one base stood out as an outlier in terms of
AWOL, in terms of deserters, in terms of drug usage and drug
arrests and positive drug tests, felony cases. I mean, of the
49, it was striking, they said, to see that one base was such
an outlier in terms of all the 49 different areas that we had
them look at.
Ms. Ricci. Sorry, I don't have anything to add.
Mr. Swecker. Mary, Andy, anything you want to add to that
from the interviews?
Mr. Bland. I would, Chris. I think it needs to be said
that, in many respects, we attributed it to a lack of
leadership, a lack of emphasis. As we have talked about, what
is important to the leaders is going to be important to their
subordinate leaders and the troops themselves.
And so, when you look at what they called special emphasis
programs, like SHARP and EEO [Equal Employment Opportunity
Program], and things of that nature, those are tools that were
available to the commanders to be able to emphasize those areas
that ended up being deficient in these types of cases. And so,
again, troops are going to go where they are led. And it is
necessary to have the requisite leadership in place from the
top down that are going to make sure that the priorities are in
place to ensure our soldiers are taken care of.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
And I guess my followup--and, Mr. Bland, since you talked
about this a bit--is, you know, I heard you say this was an
issue of leadership. And I guess what I am just trying to
figure out is, how much was the sexual assault climate problem
the result of poor command leadership or the problem with CID
being untrained, as you all have highlighted in your previous
answers? And I just want to know if you could expand on that
and talk about how the leadership issue bleeds into the CID
problems.
Mr. Bland. If I may, Chris, I mean, I think it is,
essentially, the manifestation of all those things in the
aggregate, right? So, it is kind of like a perfect storm all
coming together.
Chris had indicated in the report that only 3 percent of
the cases that are worked by MPs or by CID involved these types
of cases. Well, that 3 percent ended up being a bees' nest, a
hornets' nest, for the Army.
So, I think if you look at the totality of what we looked
at and the recommendations that were made, at the end of the
day, leaders have to be held accountable in some tangible, some
palpable way. You know, make it part of their review; make it
part of their report card, those types of things, so that you
can emphasize at the very top that those things are absolutely
categorically important. It all starts from the leaders.
Mr. Swecker. May I add that the leadership issue was an
issue of omission, not commission. It was not placing emphasis
on the SHARP program in general; placing emphasis and priority
in other areas, which you would expect an Army combat brigade
and command to place, which is readiness. But, during the
course of that, they completely, utterly neglected the emphasis
on the SHARP program and it never got down to the troop level,
the NCO [noncommissioned officer] level, to enlisted ranks,
where 80 percent of the victims and the subjects resided.
I, personally--and I think the other members of the
committee share this--we are not placing all this at the foot
of CID. We just made a note. That is one of nine findings, that
CID is not responsible for all of the issues at Fort Hood. What
we were saying was, in the course of the review, we saw that,
in the case of complex cases, that there was a lot of
inexperience. And we just felt like--and it wasn't even a close
call--that addressing complex cases was a problem. And without
that deterrent, and without all that good intelligence being
harvested and provided to the commanders to take mitigating
action, then that sort of added to the mix. As Andy described,
it was a perfect storm. That all came together.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
Ms. Speier. The gentlelady's time has expired and she
yields back.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Madam Chair. Can you hear me?
Ms. Speier. We can hear you.
Mr. Fallon. Wonderful. Thank you.
Mr. Swecker, my colleague just mentioned--and I saw the
same thing--Finding No. 9 I found alarming, the fact that it
was a problem with the command. And I also noticed that, on
that chart that we were given, that Fort Hood pretty much,
literally, every single category for violent felonies, violent
sex crimes, rapes, all the way down to drug crimes, drunk and
disorderly, larceny, even AWOL, was there were higher
incidences on average across the board, which I think really
illustrates that it is rather obvious it is a command problem.
I believe Fort Hood is the largest base we have as far as
Active Duty troops. Kind of like in a big city there is just
higher crime, do you think that the fact that it is such a
large base has something to play into the fact that they have
larger incidences on average of crime?
Mr. Swecker. That is part of it, but we were looking at
crime rates, not raw numbers, so per capita crime. And a lot of
the things, most of the things that we were looking at were on
a per capita basis. So, it wasn't the raw numbers. But we found
it an aggregating factor, if you will, that there were known
risks of all of these things because of all these reports that
have been done over the years. The fact that these were combat
brigades, that 80 percent of the victims and perpetrators were
in the enlisted ranks, that was well known; that these are 18-
to 23-year-old soldiers where women were the minority in these
brigades. I mean, the interviews bore that out, that there was
a serious risk there that was known, or should have been known,
by leadership from the top down.
Unfortunately, because of the lack of emphasis, the lack of
addressing these known risks, the NCOs, where the rubber meets
the road, became backers. They did not facilitate reporting.
They did not encourage reporting. In fact, many of them were
perpetrators, and many of them were part of the ostracism and
the shaming of the victims. So that there was a deterrent in
actually filing reports of sexual assault and sexual
harassment, et cetera.
Carrie, do you want to add to that?
Ms. Ricci. I would just add that there were regular
reports, such as IG reports, command climate surveys, that type
of information that was available to commanders, but that just
wasn't acted on.
Mr. Swecker. I mentioned in the first hearing that the
climate surveys, there were red flags throughout in all of the
key commands.
Mr. Fallon. Yes, it is incredibly troubling.
As far as CID, you, obviously, mentioned that it was lack
of training and mentorship and experience, resources, staffing,
that kind of thing. And instead of a tour, would there be a
value in, instead of maybe a typical tour being 3 years, and
then, a PCS, maybe making the Army, giving the option or
mandating maybe it is a 5-year tour? And then also coupled
with, as you said, some 1811 investigators. But do you think
that would add some value, to extend the tours for the military
investigators?
Mr. Swecker. Anything that allows a particular busy office
like Fort Hood to develop a cadre of experienced agents would
be a good thing. Whether it is more 1811s, slowing down the
transfers, restricting them from going off and doing protective
detail, which seems to us to be a distraction for special
agents that could have been spent doing investigations; we felt
like the MPs could handle that kind of detail as opposed to
pulling from the special agent ranks. But anything that
provides continuity in the office, experience--what jumped out,
as I said earlier, to all of us was just simply the lack of a
group of trained, experienced agents. Even in the 5- to 8-year
range, there just were very few of them, and if there were,
most of them were supervisors.
Mr. Fallon. Yes, I was shocked. I mean, when you said 12
out of 76 had 1-year experience or more, I can't even believe
that.
Mr. Swecker. It was, actually, I think, somewhere around 90
percent of the enlisted agents were apprentice agents and 63
percent of the warrant officer special agents were apprentice.
That didn't leave many to actually mentor these inexperienced
agents. And then, a number of them were diverted for other
duties--evidence custodians, cyber, et cetera. And they were
chronically understaffed, somewhere around 60 percent
throughout the time period that we looked at. So, you have got
understaffing, inexperience, and then, we talked about
underresourcing in areas of forensic exploitation of cell
phones and other electronic evidence.
They only had one license to exploit a cell phone. Those
are proprietary software licenses that you have to have to
extract evidence from a cell phone. During the Guillen
investigation, two of them expired. So, they had one left for
the pendency of the Guillen investigation, and that was a key
avenue of inquiry for that investigation.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you. My time has expired.
Ms. Speier. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Garcia, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you
for holding this very crucial hearing and for allowing me to
participate.
It has been almost a year since the family of Vanessa
Guillen first contacted my office for help. At our very first
meeting, I listened to their concerns about the handling of the
case by CID and could not believe what I was hearing.
Throughout our work together in many meetings and visits to
Fort Hood, I was consistently disturbed with the actions of CID
and the negative impact it had had on the Vanessa Guillen case,
from failing to look into claims of sexual harassment as a
motive, not properly interviewing Vanessa's family members and
friends, and the reassignment of a CID investigator in the
middle of the investigation. I have seen firsthand, as have the
Guillens, the problems that plague Fort Hood.
I appreciate the work of this committee, the special
independent review committee. Your findings and recommendations
align with my experiences with CID, and I will continue to
fight for a change to ensure that what happened to Specialist
Guillen and her family never happens again.
With that in mind, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask you,
during my visit to Fort Hood, CID agents said that, while they
were currently investigating the murder of Specialist Guillen,
they were not looking further into the claims of sexual
harassment, as that role would fall to her command. What can be
done to ensure that CID is allowed to fully investigate a
crime, including possible motives, just as any other law
enforcement agency would?
Mr. Swecker. That is a very good question. Andy and I
discussed, and Mary had discussed, the narrow scope of some of
these investigations when there were other issues that were
relevant to the investigation, one of them being sexual
harassment in that case. And we often were looking for that
sort of thing in the file, and we couldn't find it.
I don't think that is something that you have to--I mean it
may be something that you have to address through Army
regulations, but it seems to me to be a logical investigative
avenue to pursue.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Well, it seemed logical to me, and I
raised the issue when I was there on June 23rd, my first visit.
And they started trying to give me a lecture about the
difference between a CID investigation and sexual harassment
claim. And finally, I had to stop them and remind them that I
was a former judge and a lawyer, and that I knew a little bit
about that.
But let's go on. One of your findings was a concern that
the Guillen family had brought up, that the lead investigator
was transferred. Is that common practice? Or did you find any
evidence of this happening in other investigations? I mean, it
seems like he could have gotten a waiver or permission to stay
on until the end of the investigation. It just doesn't make
sense to me. So, is this the practice in the armed services to
do this?
Mr. Swecker. That was puzzling. Given the severity and the
importance and the gravity of the investigation, it was just
puzzling that this special agent in charge transferred out,
particularly in the absence of what we thought was the role of
case agent. So, it looked like the supervisors, the ASAC, the
assistant special agent in charge, and special agent in charge,
sort of functioned as the overall case agent, coordinating all
aspects of the investigation. In most investigative agencies,
they would have a case agent themselves doing that and the
supervisors would be above that, looking at strategy and
resources, and things like that. So, that made it even more
puzzling.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. But is it common practice?
Mr. Swecker. We don't know. We just saw it happen at Fort
Hood, and we also know that just transfers in general, PCSes in
general, are a major factor in the lack of experience and
continuity, at least at Fort Hood, and we suspect at other
offices that are busy.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. All right. You also said that
resources were nonexistent; from the battalion, no guidance was
given, and it was almost nonexistent until MG--which I guess is
major general--Efflandt inquired into whether CID had
sufficient resources and expertise. Do you recall when that
happened?
Mr. Swecker. It was about midway through the investigation.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Would you say it was June, July?
Mr. Swecker. I would say June.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. June?
Mr. Swecker. Somewhere about mid-June. It was really
perplexing that the MP----
Ms. Garcia of Texas. So, the major general hadn't even
asked until then?
Mr. Swecker. Right. But the lieutenant colonel who was over
the 11th MP Battalion----
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Which was Colonel Overland.
Mr. Swecker. No, this was someone else. Overland was the
3rd Cavalry Regiment commander.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Okay.
Mr. Swecker. This was someone that is responsible for the
CID detachment there, as well as other CID detachments.
Unfortunately, that commander, that lieutenant colonel, did not
step in. First of all, we think that there should have been a
recognition that they needed more resources, more people on the
ground, more help with affidavits, more help with forensics,
more help with evidence extraction, and that sort of thing, and
analysis. And that didn't come from the chain of command within
the CID detachment there, which would have been the 11th MP
Battalion. It came from Major General Efflandt, who finally
walked over and said, ``Do you need anything?'' to SAC [special
agent in charge] Neff. And that's when they got more resources.
Basically, this is at least what we were told, was the
resources came when Major General Efflandt walked over and had
a meeting and asked if they needed any help. And after that,
help came.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Well, that seems to coincide with the
call that I made to White House Chief of Staff Meadows and to
Army Secretary McCarthy, because that is the first question I
had. My first concern was that they had the resources and
capacity to handle all that.
Ms. Speier. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Thank you, sir.
Ms. Speier. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Clark--no, Mr.
Carl. Excuse me.
Mr. Carl. Yes, it is so simple, it is easy to get confused.
Madam Chair, can you hear me now?
Ms. Speier. I certainly can, and I will never make that
mistake again.
Mr. Carl. That is fine. Don't worry about that. It is
simple.
I am not an attorney and I am not a judge. I am a
businessperson. So, my question is, is this spike--I am going
to call it a spike--in the drugs and all these different
crimes, is there any way we can link that to management, when
new management of the base may have come onboard? I know there
would be a time lag there, but, to me, from a leadership
standpoint, the buck stops here, and I have to take
responsibility for it. And then, I will take care of it down
the chain. It sounds like we are trying to identify, to me, we
are trying to identify the criminals ourselves instead of
trying to encourage the management, whatever rank that may be,
to actually take responsibility for what is going on.
So, my question is, is there any way or has anybody thought
about trying to link the timeline with the people that are
supposed to be responsible for the welfare of these soldiers?
Mr. Swecker. I addressed one of the more important
functions, we felt like, of CID was to inform the command of
trends, patterns, criminal intelligence, et cetera, things that
were part of reports, but these reports were compartmentalized.
There was a monthly crime report, but it really didn't analyze
the crime, identify hot spots, identify establishments, trends,
patterns, and that sort of thing. There were reports on crime
rates, you know, felony crime rates, all the different crime
categories. They were high in some areas. Drugs were one of
them.
Those of us that have worked investigations over the years
know that any kind of black market drives crime, whether it is
drugs or something else. And drug suppression efforts, well,
drugs themselves, usage and selling of drugs is not conducive
to good order in the military. There is talk about
legalization, and legalization is all around us, but it is not
conducive to military readiness. And we felt like that was an
area that should have been addressed by CID, the Department of
Emergency Services, and the provost marshal, to arm the command
with information about all of that. But we were told that drug
suppression was a lost art, at least at Fort Hood.
And let me open this up. I have been doing a lot of
talking. I would like to open it up to the other panelist
members to see if they want to address the question.
Mr. Carl. My followup question would be, do we not have an
established drug-testing program at Fort Hood?
Mr. Swecker. There is, and there is at every military
installation. And the drug results are reported. I don't know
that anybody was really watching or highlighting those reports
and interpreting what they really meant, nor were they
harvesting any intelligence from the positive drug tests, or
trying to develop, as we mentioned in the report, sources of
information. So, you could interview every single person that
tested positive and try to find out where they got the drugs,
what do they know about drugs; try to develop some live sources
of information and actively engage in drug suppression efforts.
But, again, I was told that that is a, quote, ``lost art.''
Andy? Mary?
Mr. Bland. I just think, briefly, Chris, not only do I
concur with everything that you have said, but it goes back to
the fundamental aspects of what an investigator does. Being
able to understand, you need to go that extra yard to do those
types of things, to connect dots, to develop informants, to be
able to drive some sort of indicia or analysis that will take
you to where you may have criminal activity taking place. It is
those things that your grassroots investigator does as part of
their responsibilities and, quite frankly, it should be part of
their passion for the job.
Mary.
Ms. Counts. Thank you.
I would like to concur with my colleagues, but I would add,
from the sexual assault standpoint, we also interviewed SHARP
representatives. And the SHARP representatives that I
interviewed, every one of them told me three out of four female
soldiers who report to Fort Hood, within 8 months of being
there, ages 18 to 23, it was almost an initiation to either be
sexually assaulted or sexually harassed. That was unbelievable
to me: one, that this was happening, but, two, that this was
known by people who are in the program that is supposed to
prevent this kind of behavior.
And again, it goes to leadership. If you know this is
happening, you have a responsibility to stop it. And we did not
see that.
Mr. Carl. Thank you so much for that.
And, Madam Chair, I give my time back to you.
Ms. Speier. I thank the gentleman.
To follow up on the Congressman's question, if I recall
correctly, your report said this was not an issue of leadership
just in this narrow period of time. You suggested it dated back
to 2013, if I am not mistaken, is that correct?
Mr. Swecker. That is correct.
Ms. Speier. So, it was the leadership under a number of
generals or colonels that, basically, had their eyes off the
ball. So, this has been going on for quite some time at Fort
Hood, correct?
Mr. Swecker. I think that is correct. I mean, it was a
question of sort of malaise as it relates to the sexual assault
program, or the SHARP program, and just sort of pushing it
aside because there were other priorities.
Ms. Speier. And then, there were 64 sexual assault cases
per special agent at Fort Hood. How does a special agent handle
64 cases?
Mr. Swecker. So, let me clear that up a little bit. That
was per special victims investigator, which is a higher
category with more training. Because there was such a low
number, the ratio was huge. That is not to mean that they were
individually working or working 60 cases. Those were mainly the
1811s. There were three, I think, or varying numbers of 1811s
that were in that category. They were there to mentor and to
sort of oversee all of the sexual assault cases, but it just
seemed like a very low number. And you couldn't possibly, even
if you were just overseeing and mentoring these inexperienced
agents--we actually felt like they should have been working the
investigations, but they weren't really working them. As we
understood it, they were simply overseeing them and trying to
create some direction and oversee the cases.
Ms. Speier. So, the leadership at Fort Hood has changed.
They have pulled out the entire team and replaced them. We had
made a commitment in 6 months to return to Fort Hood and see
what had transpired. What should we be looking for when we
return?
Mr. Swecker. I would be looking for active use of the
Sexual Assault Review Board as a tool to manage the SHARP
program and drive it, and monitor what is really going on. I
would look for, are they looking at the life cycle of a sexual
assault/sexual harassment complaint and tracking it from cradle
to grave, if you will, from start to finish? Which nobody was
doing and I am not sure they are doing it now.
But it just seems like somebody ought to be monitoring
these cases closely. Is there emphasis on the program at the
NCO level? So that, if we were to do a survey today, would we
get the same responses that we got when we did our survey and
we did our interviews?
I still think that there ought to be periodic, if the
climate surveys show something as a red flag, that action ought
to be taken on the climate surveys, which we did not see happen
during the course of that. I would keep a close eye on the
climate surveys because they are designed to identify red
flags. Particularly, one of the areas is in the area of SHARP
components and sexual assault reporting, fear of reporting,
retaliation, and that sort of thing.
I mean, there is a number of things that I think can be
done. We know that the missing soldier protocol has changed. We
know that monthly crime analysis reports are being provided to
the command. That started. We think those are two effective
remedies or mitigations that have taken place. But I am not
sure what else has taken place since we left there.
Ms. Ricci. Yes, I would say following the metrics. The Army
is good at developing metrics and following them. The judge
advocate general, for example, reported last year that half of
all criminal cases involved a specification of sexual assault.
Ten years ago, that was only 18 percent. Those metrics tell you
where you need to focus your resources. So, in the same manner,
commanders should be focusing on where the metrics are taking
them.
Ms. Speier. Anyone else on the panel want to convey final
words to us?
[No response.]
Ms. Speier. All right. Once again, Mr. Swecker, Ms. Ricci,
thank you for your extraordinary contribution to the soldiers
at Fort Hood and, frankly, our service members throughout the
military. I think this has been a very soul-searching moment
for many and has caused many of our investigative units around
the country to look deeply into whether or not they are doing a
good job. So, again, our gratitude for all that you have done.
Mr. Swecker. Thank you.
Ms. Ricci. Madam Chair, can we thank you as well for
keeping a focus on these important issues? We appreciate that.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Mr. Swecker. Ditto here.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
We will now have the second panel, and we will take a 5-
minute recess.
[Recess.]
Ms. Speier. All right. We now welcome our second panel.
Major General Donna Martin, the Provost Marshal General and
Commanding General of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation
Command; Brigadier General Terry Bullard, Commander, Air Force
Office of Special Investigations; and Mr. Omar Lopez, Director
of Naval Criminal Investigative Service.
We welcome you all. You will each have an opportunity to
provide a statement for 5 minutes, and then, we will accept
your other comments as written comments. And we thank you all
for being here.
Major General Martin, would you like to begin?
STATEMENT OF MG DONNA MARTIN, USA, PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL AND
COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND
General Martin. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking
Member Banks, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I am here to discuss the United States Army Criminal
Investigation Command, known as CID; its mission,
organizational structure, ongoing reform initiatives, and our
efforts to address the findings and recommendations of the Fort
Hood Independent Review Committee.
I serve the United States Army in two capacities: as the
Provost Marshal General of the Army and as the Commanding
General of CID.
As the Provost Marshal General, I am the principal military
advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of
the Army on all Army policing and law enforcement matters. This
includes law enforcement policy, criminal investigations,
criminal intelligence, Army corrections and confinement,
antiterrorism matters, and detention operations.
As the Commanding General of CID, I am responsible for
overseeing the U.S. Army's primary criminal investigative
organization. CID is responsible for conducting felony-level
criminal investigations in which the Army is, or may be, a
party of interest. For context, my special agents conduct
criminal investigations that range from murder to organized
crime, and they often partner with local, State, and other
Federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI and U.S.
Marshals Service.
I am also here to address the Fort Hood Independent Review
Committee findings regarding CID. The Secretary and the Chief
of Staff of the Army accepted the committee's findings in
whole, and based on the committee's findings and
recommendations, I am working with key stakeholders to reform,
restructure, and modernize CID to address the shortcomings
identified in the report, and to organize CID to better meet
today's law enforcement challenges.
While CID remains the Army's premiere law enforcement
organization, providing professional felony-level
investigations and simultaneously prepared to support large-
scale contingency operations, we are seizing this moment to
reform and strengthen CID. We can and we will do better.
Since the report was released, Fort Hood has taken
immediate actions on several of the Fort Hood Independent
Review Committee's recommendations. Some of these efforts
include creating a female mentorship program and several
improvements aimed to support crime prevention and enhanced
communication between Fort Hood law enforcement and local law
enforcement.
Fort Hood has also recently stood up the Supporting Warrior
Action Team, or SWAT. SWAT is a newly designed sexual assault
prevention training program with the goal to train soldiers on
how to recognize signs and early warnings of sexual misconduct,
how to intervene in incidents of sexual misconduct, and how to
advocate for vulnerable service members and the survivors of
sexual misconduct.
Additionally, we have collaborated with OSI and NCIS to
look at their organizations and consider some of their best
practices and how they could benefit CID. Our efforts extend
beyond just the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee's
findings. They incorporate a holistic and collective approach
with input from across the law enforcement enterprise.
And finally, I would like to address recent media reports
discussing proposed courses of action that are being considered
to restructure the CID. The courses of action reported in the
media have not yet been decided, and I am preparing to brief
Army senior leaders in the coming weeks. The report prematurely
discusses draft planning documents that cover options to
address improving CID capabilities. Ultimately, any decision
made by Army senior leadership will lead to an organization
with enhanced capabilities, organized and led by law
enforcement professionals.
In closing, the findings of the Fort Hood Independent
Review Committee were eye-opening to our Army, but particularly
to the law enforcement enterprise. I do not take this report
lightly, and reforming CID is my top priority. I acknowledge
the necessity of the task ahead and I am dedicated to the CID's
time-honored commitment to do what has to be done in order to
protect our soldiers, civilians, and family members.
I, along with the Army's leadership, look forward to the
opportunity to work with this committee to strengthen the
Army's law enforcement effort, and I welcome the opportunity to
answer your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Martin can be found in
the Appendix on page 57.]
Ms. Speier. General Bullard.
STATEMENT OF BRIG GEN TERRY BULLARD, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
General Bullard. Madam Chairman Speier, Ranking Member
Banks, and members of the subcommittee, I greatly appreciate
the opportunity to appear here before you today.
As the commander of the Department of the Air Force Office
of Special Investigations, or OSI, I join my colleagues here to
discuss aspects of our agency's law enforcement mission and our
continuous improvement processes, especially as they relate to
the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee report. I am very
proud to represent the civilian and uniformed men and women of
OSI who are supporting our United States Air Force and Space
Force from 303 units located across the globe.
As our Criminal Investigations Division colleagues have
learned from the Fort Hood report, we, too, leveraged the
report to assess our own policies and practices to identify all
applicable areas for review and possible improvement. In line
with our review, I would like to briefly cover the highlights
of our observations in the areas of resourcing, training,
currency, experience, collaboration, and the overall timeliness
and sufficiency of our investigations.
On overall resourcing of OSI to execute our mission, the
Department has sufficiently resourced the command to execute.
Over the last 2 to 3 years, the Department has significantly
enhanced the resourcing of OSI to help mitigate pre-identified
significant shortfalls, with more capacity projected to come
online soon specific to the areas of sexual assault, criminal
analysis, and digital forensics.
On the training of our OSI agents, all new agents attend
our OSI Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
for their initial training, along with over 90 other Federal
partners. Along with our initial accession training, agents
pursue additional training during their probationary period,
and then complete annual training in a number of law
enforcement related areas. Additionally, we provide advanced
specialized training in a number of areas, such as sexual-based
offenses and complex case management. While we believe our
training programs are effective, we can always improve and we
plan to. Specifically, while COVID has set us back on advanced
training, like our advanced sexual assault course, we are using
those lessons learned to explore offering more courses
virtually and on demand to afford more access.
On the currency of our airmen to execute the mission, OSI
has averaged executing over 3,000 law enforcement tied
investigations annually over the past 5 years. This operations
tempo teamed with field commands staffed with senior agent
leadership and subject matter experts, as well as specialist
squadrons with on-call expertise for traditional and digital
forensics, among others, helps keep our agents' currency levels
high.
On the issue of experience levels of our force to conduct
highly complicated cases, in October 2020 OSI launched a study
to examine experience levels and explore ways to better posture
our less experienced members across the command.
Recommendations from this review will better distribute
probationary agents and ensure units with broad mission
application and a higher percentage of probationary agents will
be augmented with newly established field training agents. We
also reviewed the experience levels of our field leadership.
Our region commanders, colonels who are themselves special
agents, average 23 years of OSI experience, and subordinate
commanders, captain through lieutenant colonel and GS-14s, who
are also special agents, average 13 years.
Specific to collaboration, the Fort Hood report reinforced
three OSI partner-based initiatives with departmental entities
to institutionalize best practices in criminal and fraud-
related matters. These initiatives are designed to drive deeper
partnerships with our judge advocate and security forces
teammates on investigations, as well as foster closer ties to
agencies best placed to detect fraud.
Every month, OSI reviews measures of sufficiency and
timeliness of our investigations. Overall, we feel our
timeliness is solid, but we are further reviewing to ensure our
metrics most accurately capture the timeliness of the more
complex sexual assault investigations we conduct. We also
assess the sufficiency of our investigation is solid, both by
our own monthly oversight program and independent reviews like
those done by the DOD [Department of Defense] Inspector General
and the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigations,
Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces.
These reviews routinely report OSI cases are overall
sufficiently run, but we fully realize that there is always
room for betterment, and we are dedicated to that continuous
improvement. I recently requested a review of our oversight
program to ensure it meets our needs for both rigor and
sufficiency.
Members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the men and women
of OSI, thank you for the opportunity to provide insight into
some of the exceptional work our members do every day to
protect the Department. As an organization, OSI has never been
satisfied with the status quo and has always sought to pursue
improvement.
I look forward to your questions and the dialog that they
will drive among the panel, as we all work to improve our
processes to best support the DOD. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Bullard can be found in
the Appendix on page 63.]
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Mr. Lopez.
STATEMENT OF OMAR LOPEZ, DIRECTOR, NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE
SERVICE
Mr. Lopez. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking
Member Banks, and distinguished committee members. Thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Naval Criminal Investigative Service and our efforts to address
the scourge of sexual assaults in the Department of the Navy. I
am honored to be representing the dedicated men and women of
the NCIS stationed throughout the world supporting our
warfighters on the Navy and Marine Corps team.
As the Director of NCIS, I am a career civilian special
agent and a member of the Senior Executive Service, who reports
directly to the Secretary of the Navy. This historical
alignment continues to ensure NCIS's independence from
perceived or actual undue command influence over investigative
decisions. I am proud to lead a comparatively small but elite
workforce located around the world in 19 field offices, 191
satellite locations, in 41 different countries. NCIS special
agents are also deployed to conflict areas around the world and
serve aboard all carrier strike and amphibious readiness
groups.
Since 1992, NCIS has organized itself in a manner similar
to the FBI with a civilian director who leads both a criminal
investigative and national security mission. NCIS special
agents also possess civilian arrest authority, can seek Federal
and State warrants, and are able to operate effectively and
seamlessly both on and off military installations.
The current NCIS manpower structure evolved in the early
2000s following the attack on the USS Cole, shifting heavily
toward force protection missions, supporting expeditionary
forces, and covering 100 percent of Navy ship visits to foreign
ports. In addition, NCIS, in consultation with Department and
congressional stakeholders, later focused efforts on protecting
critical Navy and Marine Corps technology and significantly
expanded efforts in cyberspace, and now in combating the threat
of domestic terrorism.
Over the last 8 years, sexual assault cases worked by NCIS
have more than doubled. Despite this increase, departmental
shifts and budget constraints have resulted in NCIS manpower
being reduced over this same time period. However, NCIS, in
coordination with Department and service leadership, has worked
to surge resources from other non-intelligence funded programs
to ensure that all allegations of sexual assault are fully
investigated in a timely and thorough manner.
In maintaining this surge, NCIS has focused heavily on two
key issues: improving the quality of investigations and
reducing investigative timelines. This has resulted in a very
robust case oversight system and significant reductions in
timelines over this same period.
Due to the expeditionary nature of NCIS support to Navy and
Marine Corps forces around the world, NCIS now requires that
all special agents receive mandated DOD sexual assault training
while attending our add-on academy at the Special Agent Program
for Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. This allows us to
leverage the full versatility of the criminal investigator job
series, ensuring an immediate response to allegations of sexual
assault anywhere in the world at any time, both at sea and
ashore.
This great agility comes with long-term risks associated
with this unrelenting operational tempo, the degradation of
support to other critical mission areas and the long-term
retention of these highly experienced investigators.
Departmental and service leadership is well aware of this and
is carefully working with NCIS to manage this risk.
Following the release of the Fort Hood Independent
Commission report, NCIS undertook careful examination of its
applicability to all parts of the NCIS enterprise. While this
review is still ongoing and the majority of the report did not
directly speak to NCIS structure, we did determine that there
were many recommendations and areas for our improvement and
focus.
Members of this committee, I thank you for the opportunity
to provide some insight into the exceptional work our members
do every day. Our solemn commitment to justice for all sexual
assault survivors continues to be one of my highest priorities
as director. Through strong partnerships with SAPRO [Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response] and service leadership, NCIS
will continue to seek the technology and manpower investments
needed to maintain its unwavering focus on thorough and timely
criminal investigations, particularly those involving
allegations of sexual assault and violence.
I welcome your questions and feedback, which will enable us
to continue making positive strides towards addressing reforms
within the military criminal investigative enterprise. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lopez can be found in the
Appendix on page 70.]
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Lopez.
Let me go to you first. How many civilians do you have
within NCIS?
Mr. Lopez. For inside of the special agent corps, 1811s who
are doing criminal investigations, we have 753.
Ms. Speier. And what percentage is that?
Mr. Lopez. Of the whole agency?
Ms. Speier. Of civilian versus military.
Mr. Lopez. Oh, they are all civilian, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. They are all civilian. And you, at one point,
had a structure that was very similar to the Army. What
triggered your change?
Mr. Lopez. Back in 1991, there was an incident called the
Tailhook incident that many people may be familiar with. As a
result of that, there were some legislative actions as well as
Department of Defense actions that resulted in separating NCIS.
We went from being the NIS [Naval Investigative Service] to the
Naval Criminal Investigative Service and a civilian director
was appointed to lead it and civilianize the entire structure.
Ms. Speier. And Tailhook dealt with sexual assault of
sailors, correct?
Mr. Lopez. That is correct, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
General Bullard, what is the percentage of civilian to
military within OSI?
General Bullard. Representative Speier, we have
approximately 475 civilians. My enlisted airmen are 1,053
special agents and my officers are 290.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
General Martin, what experience do you have conducting
criminal investigations?
General Martin. Chairwoman Speier, I am not a criminal
investigator. I am a military police officer by trade. I have
32 years of military service in a criminal military police
role.
Ms. Speier. All right. So, General, you indicated two
specifics in your opening remarks that you have taken as a
result of the Fort Hood report: one to create a mentoring
program for female soldiers and a new sexual assault training
program called SWAT. I must tell you, I am truly disappointed
that that is the extent of what you have gleaned from the
report.
Let me ask you this: have you established a system to track
the progress of specific and measurable goals, objectives, and
metrics as it relates to timely investigations, drug-crime
suppressions, crime reduction, task force and joint
investigative activities, staffing, and training?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 87.]
General Martin. So, Chairwoman Speier, I will tell you
that, first, let me correct the record. Those initiatives were
taken by Fort Hood and the Fort Hood leadership. As a result of
the Fort Hood independent findings, my command started a
bottom-up assessment of the entire command, looking at the
findings, and then, making an assessment of those capacities
and capabilities that we needed in order to build a----
Ms. Speier. Well, let me ask you this: what percentage of
the special agents at Fort Hood have less than 2 years
experience now?
General Martin. And so, as I look at those demographics, at
Fort Hood currently the number of agents with zero to 1 year is
12.
Ms. Speier. How about zero to two?
General Martin. Zero to three years, right, the category I
have, is 21.
Ms. Speier. Twenty-one percent or 21----
General Martin. Twenty-one total number.
Ms. Speier. Twenty-one. So, how does that relate to the 92
percent? All right. What I would like for you to do is provide
us separately a breakdown of what steps you have taken to
respond to the report request that no more than 50 percent be
journeymen or apprentices; what you have done to reduce the
number of apprentices providing special agent services; what
percentage are more than 3 years. Have you furnished mobile
phone tracking expertise, social application, licenses and
equipment specifically to that base?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 87.]
General Martin. So, Chairwoman Speier, yes, that is
complete.
Ms. Speier. So, there are now three licenses there?
General Martin. There are a total of seven licenses at Fort
Hood.
Ms. Speier. And they have been renewed?
General Martin. All of them were not expired.
Ms. Speier. Well, according to Mr. Swecker, of the three,
only one was operational at the time of disappearance of
Specialist Guillen.
General Martin. And so, Chairwoman, the difference is the
capability that was at the battalion level and the digital
forensic cell, and that cell was not used by the detachment.
Ms. Speier. And that is no longer the case then?
General Martin. No, it is not.
Ms. Speier. Have you established an MOU [memorandum of
understanding] and have begun embedding special agents with
local law enforcement in Killeen and other areas?
General Martin. And so, Chairwoman, the requirement for an
MOU is really not necessary. It is an inherent business
practice that we have those partnerships with local, State, and
Federal law enforcement.
Ms. Speier. Well, with all due respect, General, the
Killeen sheriff, I believe, said that he presented a PowerPoint
to the leadership at Fort Hood wanting to do more work
together, and they received no response to that. There are a
hundred soldier cases that Killeen has presently, or at the
time of this particular report, and many more who are victims
who are outside the base, but are soldiers at Fort Hood. And
there was no work being done together.
General Martin. And so, Congresswoman, I am happy to report
that that is being addressed currently. And so, with the new
89th MP Brigade commander on the ground now, he has established
those cells. CID is a part of those cells. And so, criminal
intelligence fusion is being done with State and local law
enforcement and with the law enforcement on the installation.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
Ranking Member Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General Martin, good to see you again.
You talked about the bottom-up review. Tell us about the
scope of the bottom-up review.
General Martin. So, thank you for the question,
Congressman. One of the things that we wanted to look at was we
wanted to look at experience of our agents. We wanted to look
at how long our agents were staying on station. And so, some of
the very immediate things that we did was extend our agents'
time on station. And so, agents can stay up to 5, 6 years on
station.
So, we also looked at those capabilities that our agents
needed in order to execute these crimes. And one of our
options--and the COAs, our courses of action, have not been
briefed yet to Army senior leaders, but one of our COAs would
add up to 300 1811s across our command to help fill some of
those capability gaps that we currently do not have.
Mr. Banks. So, was the bottom-up review just for Hood? Was
it other posts? Full of Army? What was the scope of it?
General Martin. The scope is the entire Army.
Mr. Banks. Okay. Fort Hood's number of open sex-crime cases
warranted three times the number of sexual assault
investigators than what they were allocated. What is the Army
doing to ensure that allocations for SAIs are representative of
caseloads in the future?
General Martin. So, for all of those cases, in our
assessment we did we found that those requirements for
investigators was much higher. And so, as a part of that
assessment, we will grant those offices more 1811 investigators
to execute those criminal investigations.
Mr. Banks. Okay. Tell me, in your opinion, what is being
done, or what have you seen, what effort is there to rebuild
relationships with the Fort Hood community and improve the
cooperation with local law enforcement?
General Martin. And so, as the Provost Marshal General, I
am in charge of law enforcement policy across the Army. And one
of the initiatives we are doing right now is a community
policing initiative. And what that does is it strengthens the
bond between the community and the policing force. And so, we
have done things like bicycle patrol to put police in the
presence, daily contact with the public. And so, we are using
those initiatives to help build trust locally.
Mr. Banks. At Fort Hood?
General Martin. At Fort Hood and many installations across
the Army.
Mr. Banks. Anything specific to Fort Hood that you can tell
us about that you have done to repair the relationships locally
there?
General Martin. And so, at Fort Hood, one of the things
that our agents are doing is participating in this criminal
fusion initiative that has been running at the installation. We
are improving our relationship with local/State law enforcement
every single day. And so, we are working hard to rebuild those
relationships and we are working hard to ensure that the
community feels that they are safe.
Mr. Banks. Okay. That all sounds good, and those are things
I would hope that we would be doing everywhere anyway. But I am
not hearing a specific answer about a specific effort at Fort
Hood to repair damaged relationships, that there should be an
extra effort or strategy. I hope that you will take that back
and give us more of a specific answer to that question. Do you
believe that tools like the Disciplinary Control Board could be
useful in preventing crime off-post?
General Martin. Yes, Congressman, and as a senior mission
commander at Fort Leonard Wood, I used that specifically for
that purpose.
Mr. Banks. And what has been done to systematically improve
case tracking, particularly for sex crimes?
General Martin. I will have to take that one back for the
record as well, Congressman.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 89.]
Mr. Banks. Okay. Then, a last question for all three of
you: What are the most useful field skills taught in each of
your training curriculums, and what is something that you wish
you could do more of that you aren't resourced to do right now?
Mr. Lopez, we will start with you.
Mr. Lopez. Thank you, Ranking Member Banks.
I think one of the biggest or most useful capabilities that
we have is our ability to direct hire. That gives us a very
critical capability to really look for diversity in our
workforce. We are able to go out and hire, for instance, expert
investigators. We have brought people over from different
agencies, local sheriffs. We bring over people from the Secret
Service, from FBI, from other locations.
And so, when they come to NCIS after they go through our
academy, they can kind of hit the ground and be a little bit
more seasoned and experienced investigator, because,
oftentimes, with the way in which we support the expeditionary
forces, we are out there alone. There may only be one or two
people or an agent afloat on a carrier. And so, they have to be
able to do everything. So, that is one piece I think is really
helpful for us.
The other, just in terms of resourcing, I think the threats
are becoming more and more asymmetric, and I think it is very
hard to define threats in the computer cyberspace, whether it
is terrorism, as being one type of threat or another. And I
think that we need to really continue to look at things in a
very multidisciplinary way and approaching it from kind of a
holistic government. I think task forces and working on
different environments, whether it is on the JTTF [Joint
Terrorism Task Force] or other types of task forces, really is
the key to combating the threats to the Navy and the Marine
Corps.
Mr. Banks. Okay. My time has expired. If both the Army and
the Air Force can respond on the record, we would appreciate it
very much.
The chairwoman has given me the liberty of allowing you to
answer that question on the record.
General Bullard. Absolutely. Thanks for the question,
Representative Banks.
So, I would say our strength is in the diversity of our
composition. I look at our civilian agents, our enlisted
agents, our officer agents, what they bring each day to the
composition at the detachment level, at the squadron level, and
up through the command level, and the various ways, the
background that they bring in to look at a particular
investigation. So, that is absolutely one of the things that I
have cherished as a detachment commander two times where I have
had that composition; I have had that mix of civilian agents
and military agents in the office to look at specific
investigations. And then, I would absolutely transition even to
our deployed mission set, where, again, that composition within
our team gives us the ability to really look at some things
through different perspectives and bring in different
experience when we are tackling these problems, which, of
course, problem solving is at the base of what it is we do.
From a challenge standpoint, I would absolutely agree with
Director Lopez that the cyber environment presents a very
unique, very complicated challenge, as we look at the
authorities that we have, as we look at the talent that we have
on hand, and how we tackle that problem with agents who have
that cyber experience and some of the unique ways we are
looking to get after that in partnership with the Air Force.
And bringing in our cyber operators to partner with our agents
is one way that we are tackling that, but it is definitely
something in the future we are going to have to keep our eye
on.
Mr. Banks. Thank you.
General Martin.
General Martin. Yes, Congressman, I believe our strength
lies in our people as well, their desire to execute crimes and
to give our family members/our soldiers a safe environment in
which to work. I believe that desire and that passion is there.
So, the strength is definitely our people.
I think we are very challenged by resources. We have not
had significant structural change inside of CID since pre-9/11,
and yet we have had significant quadrupling cases of sexual
assault. We have also had challenges and mission increase with
the number of years now that it is required to maintain and
retain evidence. We also have had a demise and a degradation of
our military police structure. And so, that effort to prevent
crime has been degraded over the years. And those present a
challenge to us.
Mr. Banks. Thank you. My time has expired.
Ms. Speier. Just a very brief question. Should CID or OSI
or NCIS be providing the protective services as part of their
function or should that be an MP function?
General Bullard. So, Chairwoman, I can start with that
question. I will tell you from our perspective, the way that
OSI is built with our civilian 1811s, with our Federal law
enforcement mandate, our engagement off-base, our level of
training, I believe that the mission set is properly set for
us.
However, what we have done is transition our model to OSI
agent-led, but security forces members providing most of the
manpower. So, the Air Force just recently approved 54 security
force member billets in order to allow us to flesh out those
details, still have agents in charge of the details themselves.
But that actually allowed us to recoup a number of special
agent positions back to the command in order to be able to put
them back against investigative duties.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Lopez.
Mr. Lopez. Thank you, Chairwoman Speier.
Similar to General Bullard's comments, we have been doing
it for a long time, the way he just described. We have 1811
special agents who are in charge of the details, whether it is
in theater or whether it is domestic. And then, we use Navy and
Marine Corps security forces, MAs [masters at arms], police
officers that we train to do the support to those details.
Ms. Speier. All right. General Martin, my understanding was
that there was actually someone pulled away at Fort Hood from
the investigation in the Vanessa Guillen case to do a
protective role for a period of a month. Maybe I am confusing
the cases. Maybe it wasn't Vanessa Guillen; maybe it was
another one. Are you changing that?
General Martin. Chairwoman, it is absolutely an option that
we will look at and we will ensure that, once investigators
start on a case, they are in that case from cradle to grave.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
Ms. Escobar, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Many thanks to our panel.
General Martin, I want to thank you for the work that has
been done, but I agree with our chairwoman, there needs to be,
in my view, a really robust effort. Because, as I mentioned to
the first panel, what we are seeing is the tip of the iceberg.
This is just what is being made visible to us, these cases. And
I think that we are in a state of crisis in many regards.
I am curious, did you, in your fact-finding role, did you
review Fort Bliss?
General Martin. Congresswoman, we reviewed every military
installation.
Ms. Escobar. Can you share with me what you discovered
about Fort Bliss, what your thoughts are, and anything that you
can share?
General Martin. So, as we looked at those installations
that were division or corps, or it had a division or a corps--
and Fort Bliss has a division--we recognized that they also
need additional resources. And so, our options would lead to
additional 1811s, civilian investigators; also, additional
assistant special agents in charge, or those ASACs, at division
installation level. We also looked at additional drug
investigators at our division installations.
And then, we also want to look at the prosecution and how
we support prosecutions. And so, one of the options that we are
looking at is actually building prosecutorial teams that
consist of dedicated agents that work with trial counsel to
bring cases to trial.
Also, across the board, we looked at that we needed about
30 civilian support agent personnel to take care of the
administrative and the logistics functions and the technology
functions that happen at the corps and the division
installations. And as well, to take away some of those
administrative burdens, we are going to put captains, military
police officers, in charge of our offices to lead those
administrative-type functions, to free up our investigators to
do investigations.
Ms. Escobar. Did you find--I mean, this is definitely the
case at Fort Bliss--but did you find, or actually, what did you
find with regard to backlogs, the backlog of cases? So, cases
that are ready to go, but just they are languishing.
General Martin. So, I don't have that data, Congresswoman,
but would be happy to provide that to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 89.]
Ms. Escobar. Okay. I really would like to better understand
how quickly those cases are moving. As the ranking member
mentioned, the feeling that justice delayed, it absolutely is
justice denied, especially when the women that I have been
hearing from feel like the inaction is a signal. It is a signal
that their leadership doesn't care. It is a signal that the
system doesn't care, and it is a signal that they remain
vulnerable.
And I feel almost as though the backlog issue is a major
red flag because, as we heard with the prior panel, one of the
issues, also, is those serial offenders, those offenders that
continue to prey upon our service members. And I have a
suspicion that a part of that, you know, part of why they feel
that they are able to do that is because they feel that there
is no accountability.
And so, if you could please share that information about
the backlog with us, I really do feel like that is one of those
areas where we need to do a deep dive and understand the
consequences of it, in addition to how we address it, and how
we prevent the backlog. I do believe that that is an issue at
Fort Bliss.
In my remaining 30 seconds, if you could just tell us a
little bit more about the female mentorship program. Every time
I visit an installation or talk to female soldiers, they are
hungry for this. But I want to know, will it be a meaningful,
sustained, resourced program?
General Martin. And so, the female mentorship program that
is currently being worked at Fort Hood is the brain child,
started, actually, at Fort Lee. And so, a group of female
officers developed a program called the FMMP. It is a Female
Mentorship Morale Program. And that program gave women a forum
in which they could get together and talk about some of these
concerns.
It also focused on professional development and other
things that were of concern to women. It was a safe space for
them to talk. And so, that brain child at Fort Lee has now
graduated and is actually spreading across the Army, and we
will start at Fort Bliss, actually, as well, in 1st AD [Armored
Division].
Ms. Escobar. Thank you.
Madam Chairman, I am out of time. I yield back.
Ms. Speier. The gentlelady yields back.
The gentlewoman from California is recognized for 5
minutes. Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you so much, Madam Chair.
In light of the criticism of CID, what would you tell a
young soldier looking to become an MP or a CID agent?
General Martin. Thank you for the question.
I would tell a young soldier that, if you have an
inquisitive mind, I would tell you that if you want to solve
crime or if you think that you want to make a difference, then
being a part of CID or being a part of the military police
regiment is for you.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
And can you tell us why military agents play such a
critical role in the CID?
General Martin. Military agents play a critical role,
especially in our deployed role. And so, part of our mission is
sensitive-site exploitation. We also do logistic security, and
logistic security ensures that equipment that is critical on
the battlefield moves from port to theater and is safely
transported for our warfighters.
And then, we also execute wartime crimes, the criminal
crimes during wartime. So, military agents help us and give us
the ability to execute that role.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
Could you talk a little bit more about how their agents
gain experience and what some recent CID success stories are?
General Martin. I would love to. So, our agents, about 45
percent of our agents have bachelor's degrees already before
they come in. But our CID agents go to the United States Army
Military Police School for a 14-week course there. And the
Military Police School is also accredited by the same board
that accredits the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
And they train agents in the subjects of criminal law,
crime scene processing, testimonial evidence, fraud,
investigative reports, special investigative techniques, crimes
against persons. And then, our agents, as they progress in
their careers, much like my fellow MCIOs, they also go to those
advanced training skills at FLETC [Federal Law Enforcement
Training Centers] as well as we go over to the Canadian law
enforcement agency, and we do other training in other schools.
Ms. Jacobs. And are your agents trained to handle same-sex
sexual assault investigations?
General Martin. Absolutely. Our agents are trained and they
are absolutely capable of investigating crimes against same-sex
persons.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
And my last question is just if the Fort Hood Independent
Review Committee sought your perspective or that of anyone in
senior CID leadership positions as they were working on their
report.
General Martin. And so, there were members of my agency
that were attached for providing records to the Fort Hood
Independent Review. But, as far as an interview with me, no,
there was no interview. Thank you.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Thank you so much.
And, Madam Chair, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Ms. Speier. The gentlewoman yields back.
The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Garcia, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I will start with Major General Martin. Major General,
I just want to be clear. I know that I asked a question of the
chairman of the previous panel, the question about the
continuity of investigation when that agent was pulled away.
And I think it says that he left his duties pursuant to his
permanent change of station to another post in the middle of
Guillen investigation. And then, in response to the
chairwoman's question, you said it would be an option for them
not to do that, to follow it from cradle to grave.
I mean, that doesn't sound like a commitment to change that
to me, when you are saying it will be an option. Wasn't it an
option before? I mean, can you commit to us today that that
will change and that an investigator [who] starts an
investigation, especially one as complex and critical as the
Vanessa Guillen case, that they will finish it through?
General Martin. Chairwoman, I will make that commitment to
you, that, yes, when an agent is involved in a complex criminal
investigation, they will remain on station.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. They will? All right.
And I want to ask the same question. Does the Air Force
have the same policy? And, of course, NCIS also.
General Bullard. Representative Garcia, I think it is a
very individual question by each unit, having been a detachment
commander two times and looking at turnover and what we do in
projecting for investigations, how they are going to be
handled. Is there going to be a transition? Do we stop that
agent from initiating new cases as a case agent?
Ms. Garcia of Texas. But do you have a policy or practice
in place that covers that?
General Bullard. We do not have a policy. It is a
leadership-driven----
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Is there a policy or practice that, if
they ask for a waiver, so that they could stay, that it would
be granted?
General Bullard. Representative Garcia, absolutely.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. All right.
General Bullard. Absolutely. That is a discussion with
leadership.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you.
NCIS.
Mr. Lopez. Thank you for the question. There isn't a
specific policy, but it wouldn't happen. They would stay and
work the case.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you.
The other thing that really troubled me was the case file
also revealed that off-post suicides and deaths were not fully
investigated by CID. I mean, it is just awful to think that CID
would not look at offsite suicides. And as we learned during
our last visit with some of the sheriffs and law enforcement
locally, as the chairwoman again pointed out, there didn't seem
to be a lot of cooperation. Is that normal?
General Martin. No, Chairwoman--I am sorry--Representative
Garcia, that is not----
Ms. Garcia of Texas. No, there is a chairwoman.
General Martin. I am sorry. That is not typical. So, that
relationship is a jurisdictional issue. So, if a suicide or a
case happens off the installation, we do a collaborative
investigation with the local law enforcement in every case. Our
1811s have that authority to conduct those cases. But our
military agents----
Ms. Garcia of Texas. I am sorry, I don't know what an 1811
is.
General Martin. Our civilian investigators.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. All right.
General Martin. So, they have those authorities off post.
Our military investigators do not.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. No, I know about jurisdiction, but you
still would not go out there and work together with the sheriff
or the constable or the police chief of that area?
General Martin. That is correct, we would go out and work
with them. And then, we would fulfill any requirements that
they have on the installation; for example, to conduct any
interviews with any service members at that time. That is what
we would do to help an investigation on the installation.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Is it normal in the Air Force?
General Bullard. Representative Garcia, we have policy in
place that we investigate all Active Duty deaths, regardless of
where they occur.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Regardless? So, you work together with
the law enforcement in the community if it is off base?
General Bullard. Absolutely.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. NCIS.
Mr. Lopez. We have the same policy as the Air Force.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. And is that a new policy or is it
longstanding? It just seems odd that the Army just was not
completely aligned with that.
Mr. Lopez. It is longstanding, ma'am.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Longstanding?
Well, that brings me to my last question. Do you all ever
get together to compare notes, best practices, to make sure
that, whether it is a post or a base, that no matter where the
soldier is, that they are safe? Because it just troubled us,
again, when we visited Fort Hood, when we asked people, when we
had the townhall with spouses and family members, how many felt
safe. Nobody felt safe. Remember, Chairwoman, nobody raised
their hand?
Ms. Speier. Will the gentlelady yield?
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. One case, in particular, a mother talked about
keeping a gun on a shelf in the kitchen because she was afraid
on base and needed it to protect herself.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. I mean, is that normal? All three of
you? I mean, their families have to feel safe. The soldiers
have to feel safe. Our families have to have a level of trust
and confidence that they are safe.
General Martin. No, that is not normal for a family to feel
unsafe on our military installations.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. A whole room full of families felt
unsafe, ma'am, at Fort Hood.
General Martin. I understand, and we are going to work
really hard to ensure that our families feel safe on the
installation.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Air Force.
General Bullard. Representative Garcia, that is not what I
would expect to hear from a military family on an Air Force
installation. And we certainly work with base leadership, with
our security forces partners, to make sure that that is not the
case.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you.
NCIS.
Mr. Lopez. Yes, ma'am, it is the same for NCIS. We work
closely with base leadership, and, in fact, we partner often
with Air Force and Army locations where they have a facility
and we will work out of their facility. So, we are in close
contact with each other in terms of working together. So, that
would not be something normal on any Navy base.
Ms. Speier. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. Speier. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, is
now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair. I do really appreciate
the courtesy of you allowing me to participate in this hearing,
and thank you for all your great work. I really do appreciate
it.
I thank the witnesses for their willingness to help the
committee with its work.
I represent Brockton, Massachusetts, and specifically, I
represent the family of Elder Fernandes. Sergeant Fernandes met
an untimely death by suicide at Fort Hood. His remains were
found on August 25th, 2020.
And CID was involved in an investigation prior to that
surrounding Sergeant Fernandes' claims of sexual assault on the
base, and obviously, remains involved in the overall case
surrounding Sergeant Fernandes' death.
And I want to tell you, Sergeant Fernandes filed a
complaint against his superior officer for sexual assault. And
when Sergeant Fernandes went missing, I had contacted the
family and expressed the willingness to travel to Fort Hood to
help them find their son. However, by the time I got there, his
body had been recovered. And so, even though I wasn't able to
help them in that respect, I tried to help them get answers
from CID.
And the day that I arrived, it was only a matter of days
really from when Sergeant Fernandes had made the complaint of
the sexual assault. But, in that short period of time--it might
have been over a week, but not 2 weeks--CID had conducted an
investigation of all relevant witnesses, all relevant
testimony. They had conducted a polygraph of the accused
officer. And the day that I arrived, they rendered a decision
that they did not sustain the complaint. They dismissed the
complaint against that superior officer.
But, to this day--to this day--we haven't received the
report of what happened to Sergeant Fernandes from CID. We have
got the report from the Temple Police Department, because that
is where he expired. And we have the investigation results from
Killeen, Texas. But, to this day--this is a young man whose
body was discovered on August 17, 2020--and we don't have the
report.
So, Madam Chair, if I could, I would like to enter into the
record a letter from the attorney for the Honorable--excuse me.
This is to the Honorable John E. Whitley, the Acting Secretary
of the Army, and it is from Attorney Lenny Kesten, who is with
Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, LLP, representing the family.
And they have some important questions there that I think need
to be answered.
And so, my question to you is, why----
Ms. Speier. Without objection, it will be admitted into the
record.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 83.]
Mr. Lynch. So, the investigation to exonerate the officer
was completed in days--days--including polygraph, which I
question the integrity of that process. We don't even allow
that in Federal court. But relying on a polygraph, you were in
a rush to determine that the superior officer was not held to
account. But when the family is looking for information about
the disappearance of their son, it is taking forever, even
though the local police have submitted their investigation and
their report. Temple/Killeen, Texas, have both been
forthcoming.
It is taking forever for CID to give the family the
information regarding the death of their son. And I don't know
if you are just trying to outwait us. I don't understand the
pace of discovery here. It has been a long, long time for that
family to be suffering and looking for answers for their son.
We have got to do better than this.
So, why has it taken so long to give the family the
information regarding their son's death?
General Martin. Representative Lynch, I don't believe that
there has been a request for those records, and if there has, I
would happily assist the family in receiving the report from
CID.
Mr. Lynch. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. When I was there,
we asked for information in person. I believe you are one of
the panel. I asked for the information. And then, the family
requested it in writing.
Do you think that a family should have to--I mean, let's
set aside the fact that we asked for the information and that
is on the record in writing and personally. And I brought the
family into the hearing, into the meeting, with CID at the
time. They had nine officers working on this from CID. We asked
for all that information.
But to suggest that the Army didn't know the family wanted
to know the details of their son's disappearance and death,
really? Is that a legitimate question?
General Martin. Representative Lynch, I will personally
look into that.
Mr. Lynch. Are you trying to say that the Army didn't know
or didn't imagine that the family would want information
regarding their son's death and disappearance? I mean, think
about that.
Ms. Speier. The gentleman's time has expired. We will allow
General Martin to respond.
General Martin. Representative Lynch, I will personally
take that and I will ensure that the family gets the CID
report.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, General. I appreciate that. Thank
you.
Ms. Speier. All right. Each of you has referenced the fact
that the caseload for sexual assaults has doubled, quadrupled.
The numbers are skyrocketing. Do you have enough revenue or
resources to provide the services necessary? And as the report
had indicated, special victims' counsels [SVCs], which has been
a huge success throughout the military, their caseload is like
at 60 cases, which is far too many for a special victims'
counsel to handle.
So, my question is, what resources do you need with the
exponential increase in sexual assault cases? And have you also
requested additional funding for SVCs? General Martin.
General Martin. Madam Chair, so our assessment would tell
us that we need 20 additional special victims investigators
inside of CID. We also are requesting in our reform effort to
look at eight major case response teams. And these teams would
be positioned at both of our groups, at Fort Lewis and at Fort
Hunter Army Airfield. And so, that would give us an additional
capability to surge capability on a major case with the
expertise that is required. So, that major case response team
would not only have special victims investigators, it would
also include digital forensics experts and forensic science
officers.
Ms. Speier. Special victims' counsels are a different
function.
General Martin. That is correct, and they are controlled by
the TJAG [The Judge Advocate General] of the Army.
Ms. Speier. And so, have you requested additional SVCs?
General Martin. I know that, currently, the TJAG is doing a
bottom-up assessment of those capabilities as well.
Ms. Speier. All right. General Bullard.
General Bullard. Representative Speier, we have identified
the need for additional agents, additional analysts in support,
individuals to be able to cover this increase in reporting that
we have seen. We are in dialog with our Department now about
obtaining those resources. So, that process is underway.
I cannot speak to the status of our special victims'
counsels within the United States Air Force, but I know that we
have a great partnership with them. But, just as General Martin
pointed out, they fall within the span of control of the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Lopez.
Mr. Lopez. Thank you, Chairwoman Speier.
To echo the Air Force, we have asked for manpower as well
as technology investments. There is technology that we can
utilize that would make some of these timelines even shorter; a
lot of digital forensic evidence capabilities that continue to
increase that I think would also help shorten timelines; tools
that could be used to get into phones and other things faster
than current technology. So, we are looking at that and
exploring those investments because we think those could have
direct correlation to timelines, as well as investing in
additional manpower to get after the problem.
Ms. Speier. So, for each of you, would you make this
subcommittee aware of what your requests are up the chain of
command? Because our role is slightly different, but we want to
make sure that these cases are promptly handled, that the
resources are not an impediment in you doing your jobs. And if
you need additional forensic tools, we need to know what they
are, so that we can make sure that you are able to ascertain
them.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 87.]
Ms. Speier. Ranking Member Banks, any other questions?
Mr. Banks. No.
Ms. Speier. There being none, all right, we want to thank
you for your service. Thank you for being here today. What you
do is incredibly important to the safety of our service
members. If they don't feel safe, if they don't feel that there
is the talent necessary to do the investigations, then we have
failed them. So, I thank you all for being here and for your
participation.
The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 16, 2021
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 16, 2021
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 16, 2021
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 16, 2021
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
General Martin. The following systems are currently in effect:
a. Timely investigations: Investigations are tracked at Fort Hood
during the monthly Battalion Operations synchronization meeting.
Programmatically, timely investigations are one of the investigative
standards defined in CID Regulation (CIDR) 195-1. Compliance with this
standard is part of the Battalion (BN)/Group (GP) Organizational
Inspection Program (OIP) as well as periodic Inspector General (IG)
inspections in accordance with Army Regulation 1-201 and CID Regulation
1-201. CIDR 195-1 contains a measurable standard that when applied
appropriately will reflect the unit's ability to keep investigations
from stagnating.
b. Drug crime suppression: Drug suppression is tracked at Fort Hood
during the Battalion Operations synchronization meeting.
Programmatically, this is one of the investigative support program
standards defined in CIDR 195-1, Appendix D-8e (Drug Suppression
Program), which provides criteria to evaluate an investigative unit's
drug suppression activities. Compliance with this standard is part of
the BN/GP OIP as well as periodic IG inspections in accordance with AR
1-201 and CID Regulation 1-201. CIDR 195-1 contains a measurable
standard that when applied appropriately will reflect the unit's
ability to counter installation drug problems. On February 16, 2021,
USACIDC updated Drug Suppression Team (DST) policy to include emphasis
on additional training for DSTs that includes source development, joint
training opportunities, fostering relationships with local law
enforcement drug enforcement units, trend analysis, and establishing
local goals and metrics to assess effectiveness.
c. Crime reduction: At Fort Hood, CID and DES collaborate monthly
on statistics being reported for the Crime Prevention Briefing and the
Garrison's Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board. Programmatically,
this is one of the investigative support program standards defined in
CIDR 195-1, Appendix D-8c (Crime Prevention Survey Program), which
establishes objectives to evaluate the investigative unit's crime
prevention efforts. Compliance with this standard is part of the BN/GP
OIP as well as periodic IG inspections in accordance with AR 1-201 and
CID Regulation 1-201. CIDR 195-1 contains a measurable standard that
when applied appropriately will reflect the unit's ability to meet
commander's crime prevention needs.
d. Task force and joint investigative activities: At the Battalion-
level, the Crisis Incident Response Plan (CIRP) encompasses Law
Enforcement Task Force creation, structure, and participation,
published March 24, 2021. USACIDC has also designed a major crimes
response team postured at the Group level to respond to complex crimes
and provide an on-demand Law Enforcement Task Force operations
capability to assist the SAC at the supported installation
Joint investigative activities are measureable requirements clearly
defined in CIDR 195-1, Chapter 4-9 (Joint Investigations) as it relates
to the initiation of joint investigations when an Army interest exists
and a coordinated effort is essential. Compliance with this standard is
part of the BN/GP OIP as well as periodic IG inspections in accordance
with AR 1-201 and CID Regulation 1-201. CIDR 195-1 contains a
measurable standard that when applied appropriately will reflect the
unit's ability to effectively participate in the investigation of off-
post incidents.
e. Staffing: Staffing is monitored by the battalion, the group, and
USACIDC. Criminal investigative operations are reviewed on a monthly
basis by the Battalion Command and Staff and it covers all detachments
and offices. In turn, this same monthly process is conducted at the
Group echelon for Battalions and at CID Command for Groups. Unit
readiness is measured through the Army Unit Status Report. The USACIDC
manages and re-allocates its structure as necessary through the Army
Command Plan process. The review measures the relative health of each
office based on investigative workload and manpower authorizations
within its structure.
Staffing is part of the overall organization and management
standards outlined in CIDR 195-1, Appendix D-7. These standards apply
to the investigative unit's organization, effectiveness of management
processes, and impact on mission. Compliance with this standard is part
of the battalion/group OIP, as well as periodic IG inspections. CIDR
195-1 contains measurable standards that when applied appropriately
will reflect the unit's ability to effectively staff, organize, manage,
and supervise investigative units below the battalion level.
f. Training: Battalion, Group, and USACIDC prioritized the Fort
Hood CID Office for Agent courses in the second quarter of FY21
(Special Victims Capability Course (SVCC), Advanced Crime Scene
Investigative Techniques Course (ACSITC), and Drug Suppression Team).
Agent training metrics are tracked at every echelon to USACIDC
headquarters. As of March 24, 2021, the Fort Hood CID Office is 80%
trained at the Special Victims Capability Course, 31% for the Advanced
Crime Scene Investigative Techniques Course, and 100% of the current
Drug Suppression Team members are trained to include additional
advanced training. Programmatically, training is one of the
investigative support program standards defined in CIDR 195-1, Appendix
D-8k (Training Program), which establishes objectives to evaluate the
investigative unit's training efforts. Compliance with this standard is
part of the battalion/group OIP, as well as periodic IG inspections in
accordance with AR 1-201 and CID Regulation 1-201. CIDR 195-1 contains
a measurable standard that when applied appropriately will reflect how
well the unit is accomplishing training to address investigative
deficiencies and agent experience.
Agent specific training guidance is outlined every other year in
USACIDC Command Training Guidance including training priorities for
resource allocation, professional military education, and most
importantly for primary investigative agents. To maintain Special
Victim Investigation and Prosecution (SVIP) teams, units were directed
to maximize attendance at SVCC, ACSITC, Domestic Violence Intervention
Training (DVIT), and Child Abuse Prevention Investigative Techniques
(CAPIT) courses to sustain the SVIP team requirements and increase
Basic and Senior SVIP qualified Agents across USACIDC. The SVIP Concept
of Operations (CONOP) establishes the selection, training, and
certification guidelines for SVIP positions. [See page 27.]
General Martin. When necessary, agents are afforded opportunity to
remain on station beyond three years (one year increments), or can be
moved earlier in order to fill critical shortages at locations in need
of experience/expertise. USACIDC relocated additional senior warrant
officers and enlisted agents to Fort Hood, which led to a net increase
in experienced agents.
Fort Hood CID Office specific statistics as of March 24, 2021:
-Current agent manning level is 100% (48 authorized/48 assigned)
-Current apprentice agent ratio is 22.9%(11/48)--FHIRC recommended
no higher than 50%
-Current % of SAs with over 5 years of experience is 29%(14/48);
FHIRC recommended at least 30%
-Current % of SAs with over 8 years of experience is 21%(10/48);
FHIRC recommended at least 20%
-Two Civilian Special Victim Investigators have been selected for
hire and are pending a start date.
Current staffing processes allow for the assignment of warrant
officer and enlisted agents that possess advanced training/education in
crime scene processing, various forensic processes, and the
investigation of all types of death and sex crimes. Additionally,
agents on station are afforded the opportunity to attend advanced
training at the US Army Military Police School (USAMPS), George Mason
University, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), FBI
National Academy, National Forensic Academy, the Armed Forces Medical
Examiners System, and numerous other local specialized training venues.
The following is a summary of additional 20 personnel for the Fort
Hood CID Office:
Add (1) MP CPTs
Add (12) 1811 Criminal Investigators
1 x Special Agent in Charge
6 x General Crime Special Agents
2 x Sexual Assault Investigators
2 x Trial Counsel Special Agents
1 x DST Special Agent
Add (1) 1801 Evidence Control Specialist
Add (2) Investigative Support Techs
Add (3) CIV Admin, IT, Logistics
Add (1) Civilian Digital Forensic Analyst at Battalion collocated
at Fort Hood
[See page 27.]
General Martin. The Army PMG led an intensive five-month structural
redesign to create an organization with enhanced capabilities and
capacity, organized with and led by civilian and military agents,
military officers and enlisted Soldiers. Based on that effort, a
civilian member of the Senior Executive Service with criminal
investigative experience will lead the restructured CID. While details
are still being finalized, the restructured CID will initially focus on
increasing civilian criminal investigators and restructuring our
protective services function. As we develop, evaluate, and adjust our
final design we remain committed to working with the Committee and
keeping it informed of our progress and necessary resources. [See
page 39.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
General Martin. CID continues to meet the FHIRC's recommendation to
improve case tracking. For example, at Fort Hood investigations are
reviewed during monthly CID Battalion Operations meetings to ensure
accurate tracking and to abide by investigative standards furnished in
CID regulation. Compliance with this standard is part of the
Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) as well as periodic Inspector
General (IG) inspections in accordance with Army and CID Regulations.
Additionally, CID maintains an electronic automated database named the
Army Law Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (ALERTS). This
database tracks all aspects of a CID case from initiation to closure.
It includes, but is not limited to, entries for: initiation of a case,
publication of reports, referral of a case to an attorney, publication
of a final report, and when and what action is taken against an alleged
offender. ALERTS documents all investigative activity related to the
case and contains numerous standard reports that can be queried and ran
at any time. ALERTS can produce quality assurance reports prior to the
dispatch of a final report to identify issues or data that is missing
or requires completion before a report can be published. It can also
provide data on how long investigations remain in an open status and
can provide investigative data for in-depth criminal intelligence
queries and analysis. [See page 29.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
General Martin. The Fort Bliss CID office continues to work their
cases in a timely and thorough manner. No cases are ignored once they
are opened by the investigators. Due to the nature of some cases,
investigative timelines can vary. Factors outside the control of the
Fort Bliss CID office have a direct impact on case timelines. These
factors include, but are not limited to, the need for forensic
laboratory reports, coordination with external agencies, and the delay
in receiving subpoenaed documents. [See page 32.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 16, 2021
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
Ms. Houlahan. The majority of the IRC panel at the hearing are
former FBI special agents. In your review of how Army CID handled the
investigation, was there an assessment of how the training for Army CID
compared to the FBI for similar investigations--sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and murder in this case? If so, what did you find? As the
FBI has a different training program than NCIS and the Air Force, was
there a comparison there? How is the training similar or different?
Mr. Swecker. The FHIRC did not do a deep dive into the CID training
program. We did note that the CID has its own training facility and 15
week new agent curriculum at FT Leonard Wood. Other federal law
enforcement agencies train at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA. The advantage to training at FLETC is the
sharing of best practices across the federal law enforcement community
and exposure to the most advanced law enforcement training methods. In
addition FLETC is an interagency training center that host training for
state, local, campus, tribal and international police agencies. This
affords an opportunity to develop liaison and relationships with other
agencies. There is continuity in the staff of professional instructors.
Agencies take part in the curriculum review and develop policies and
directives. The NCIS, DIA, DCIS and Airforce OSI train at FLETC. In
fact 105 federal agencies conduct their training at FLETC. The FHIRC
highly recommends that CID join these agencies and benefit from the
shared best practices and professional environment.
Ms. Houlahan. The majority of the IRC panel at the hearing are
former FBI special agents. In your review of how Army CID handled the
investigation, was there an assessment of how the training for Army CID
compared to the FBI for similar investigations--sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and murder in this case? If so, what did you find? As the
FBI has a different training program than NCIS and the Air Force, was
there a comparison there? How is the training similar or different?
Ms. Ricci. I defer to my FBI colleagues as I am not familiar with
FBI training.
Ms. Houlahan. The majority of the IRC panel at the hearing are
former FBI special agents. In your review of how Army CID handled the
investigation, was there an assessment of how the training for Army CID
compared to the FBI for similar investigations--sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and murder in this case? If so, what did you find? As the
FBI has a different training program than NCIS and the Air Force, was
there a comparison there? How is the training similar or different?
Mr. Bland. Background:
From the outset, FBI Agents are fundamentally trained, enabled and
deployed to assertively conduct investigations which ultimately
manifest the aggregation of requisite evidence to facilitate the
potential prosecution of violations of more than 200 different Federal
statute categories.
Given the level of sophistication and complexity which often
characterize these types of investigative matters, basic/core academic
training for FBI Agent Trainees at the FBI Academy located in Quantico,
VA primarily falls within the key areas of Investigative Methodologies
and Procedures; Interview and Interrogation Skill Development;
Sensitive Investigative Techniques; and Informant/Source Development.
After commencing with official duties at their first FBI field
office, newly-graduated Special Agents (SAs) begin to accumulate
valuable insight and experience regarding the initiation of cases,
conducting/documenting investigative steps and the aggregation of
evidence, most often under the stewardship of a seasoned, savvy and
respected SA with considerable time in the Bureau who has established a
record of success, achievements and investigative prowess. Key to this
crucial mentorship phase is the ongoing nurturing of those baseline
skills which must be systematically employed in a conventional case, as
well as assisting the new SA with developing and honing the necessary
degree of inquisitiveness, curiosity, logic, analytical thinking and
passion which will ultimately facilitate the identification of
beneficial, substantive leads and sustain consistent progress on behalf
of bringing these investigative matters to a desired conclusion.
As their body of knowledge, experience and investigative acumen
continues to expand over time, these SAs are also exposed to the myriad
specialized case support resources that can be accessed and are
frequently utilized to both augment and add additional precision to the
skills, techniques and technology which are already in play as their
investigations advance.
It should be noted that the majority of contemporary cases which
fall within the auspices of the FBI's federal jurisdiction do not
normally encompass crimes related to sexual harassment, sexual assault
or murder. However, exceptions to this provision do include those
matters which transpire within designated areas of Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction, such as U.S. military installations, federally-recognized
Indian reservations, U.S. Parks and similar locations, as well as with
respect to Federal Civil Rights allegations/violations. Moreover,
numerous FBI-sponsored/led Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF)
investigations are focused upon heinous, high-profile violent crimes
which often involve murders as a predication for major cases which are
initiated in conjunction with local/state LE agencies participating in
these joint/task force entities.
General Observations re U.S. Army CID investigations post-review of
pertinent files:
As was previously enumerated in the FHIRC report, the overall
number of interviews of relevant personnel were viewed to be
insufficient in terms of scope and quality. Moreover, interviews were
generally pro-forma, shallow and lacking in the degree of depth/
granularity re the identification and documentation of requisite
details during the initial stages of their cases that could have
generated viable, tangible leads to logically pursue on behalf of
achieving positive investigative outcomes.
With respect to training which should be afforded to Army CID
Agents as soon as feasibly possible in order to effectively address and
ameliorate the deficiencies noted above, opine that CID adopting a
comprehensive training curriculum/content and post-training mentoring
regimen which is consistent with the above-referenced process being
administered by the FBI relative to their new Agent trainees and
followed up upon when they become full-fledged SAs, would engender
palpable, measurable benefit relative to significantly improving the
overall quality of CID investigations.
Ms. Houlahan. In the Fort Hood report, you highlighted that the
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military reported that
sexual assault occurs most often between junior enlisted acquaintances
who are peers or near peers in rank. Additionally, the vast majority of
sexual assaults of service members occurred between people aged 17-24
who work, train, or live in close proximity. You also said that junior
enlisted showed the least amount of knowledge of the SHARP Program and
the various ways to report a sexual assault. How can we work on
educating the most at-risk service members?
a. What resources and tools are most helpful in making sure that
service members are aware of the what is available to them if they are
assaulted?
Mr. Bland. The solution to this phenomenon is squarely rooted
within what should be a top-down expectation, if not requirement, that
the officers and NCOs who are both responsible and accountable for the
welfare, safety and security of the soldiers whom they are privileged
to command are exercising the requisite degree of effective and engaged
leadership relative to personally ensuring that all of the Army's
available Special Emphasis Programs, to include SHARP, are being
appropriately administered, emphasized and communicated downward as a
critical rating component of their end-of-tour Officer and NCO
Evaluation Reports (OERs/NCOERs).
Ms. Houlahan. One of the problems that you recognized in your
report was the lack of professionalism in the overall SHARP force. This
is concerning because they are a vital contributor to military
readiness.
a. It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a career and it
doesn't come with advancement unlike many other qualifications. Can you
discuss the resources DoD would need to professionalize SHARP including
professional development, rewards for performance, in preserving
institutional knowledge?
Mr. Bland. Believe that it is imperative to reverse the unintended
consequences of SHARP's being frequently perceived by commanders as a
program which can be staffed by mid-level and senior NCOs who
oftentimes are those soldiers who are considered to be sub-par
performers who can fill these nominal/ancillary/temporary assignments
in order to minimize any impact on overall unit readiness. While
instituting more comprehensive SHARP training and educational
opportunities tied to career-enhancing incentives and bonuses, as well
as the promulgation of new policies and standard designed to address
this situation, would have an immediate and long-lasting positive
impact, nonetheless opine once again that any modicum of sustained
improvement and ultimately, success, relative to this program is
inexorably linked to measures that must be implemented on the part of
senior Army leaders at the highest general officer levels to hold
commanders at all subordinate levels personally accountable by way of
their OER/NCOER ratings to compel their adherence, emphasis and
leadership. In doing so, any lack of compliance on the part of these
individuals would be tantamount to career ruination.
Ms. Houlahan. The majority of the IRC panel at the hearing are
former FBI special agents. In your review of how Army CID handled the
investigation, was there an assessment of how the training for Army CID
compared to the FBI for similar investigations--sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and murder in this case? If so, what did you find? As the
FBI has a different training program than NCIS and the Air Force, was
there a comparison there? How is the training similar or different?
Ms. Counts. While investigative missions and jurisdictions may
differ, there are some universal skills that every investigator should
have. Integrity; professional courtesy extended to all; the ability to
talk to people from all walks of life with respect and dignity; the
willingness to accurately and thoroughly document every step of an
investigation; and, the adherence to the core values of the
investigative agency that the investigator represents.
FBI Special Agent Trainees currently undergo over 800 hours of
training in a variety of web based courses in four major
concentrations: academics, case exercises, firearms training, and
operational skills. Currently, New Agent training lasts approximately
20 weeks; and, all trainees receive the training regardless of what
they did before joining the FBI.
The general training of FBI agents is geared toward the development
of investigators. For the majority of Special Agents that is their
focus from day one. They continue to build on these investigative
skills upon graduation from the Academy until the day they retire.
Although each FBI field office may differ in investigative priorities
and tenure of the Special Agent population, most field offices have a
cadre of agents at the GS-10, 11, 12 and 13 levels with GS-14 or GS-15
supervisors--all with a primary focus on investigations and honing
their investigative craft throughout their career. How do they get
better? As they gain more experience, they begin to understand the need
to foster solid working relationships with other law enforcement and
investigative agencies. They begin to utilize more sophisticated
techniques to include electronic surveillance and the use of
intelligence and informants. And through it all, FBI Agents are
expected to meet measurable and articulable standards of performance
and conduct.
The same lack of professionalism and leadership found at Fort Hood
overall was the same that was found at CID. In a review of Army CID
files, Committee members found CID's investigative strategy was a
checklist driven, one size fits all strategy, regardless of the type,
or severity of the crime being investigated. Suspects were allowed to
keep their cell phones during their interview and/or interrogation; in
two murder cases, suspects were found to have deleted incriminating
texts during their time with CID Agents. In the case of a missing
soldier, later determined to be murdered, Agents failed to interview a
person of interest despite other witnesses reporting that this
individual may have potentially valuable information. Investigations
lagged and little, if any, contact with outside agencies could be found
documented in the files.
In the FBI, investigative experience is developed and gained over
time, allowing for experienced agents to be assigned the more complex
cases and to guide lesser experienced agents in the investigation of
those cases. There are benchmarks that must be met at every step of an
FBI Agent's career, beginning with New Agent training and ending with
that Agent's last annual performance review.
While the FBI commits considerable resources to recruiting,
training and preparing the absolute best people they can find, it is
the on the job training, or OJT, that has been the primary tool for
developing investigative skills. By the nature of the job it has to be.
This is the area where the FBI stands head and shoulders above CID.
This is the single, and strongest, argument that Army CID needs to be
completely reorganized. Serious consideration should be given to
converting CID's current model to a civilianized force with higher
entrance standards and a focus on investigations and career paths
geared to the development of investigative expertise.
Ms. Houlahan. What percentage of your current civilian work force
is formerly active duty military? With that percentage, how do you
ensure the culture can change and improve if there is a revolving door
of the same mentality?
General Martin. As of April 1, 2021, 61% of CID's current civilian
work force are former active duty military. This includes members from
the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. Culture change is made and
sustained by committed leadership. I can assure you that both CID and
Army leaders are dedicated to improving the investigative practices and
processes of CID.
Ms. Houlahan. Do you have timelines established for criminal cases
such as sexual assault investigations? If so, how often are those
timelines sufficiently met and cases closed?
General Martin. Every crime is unique. Factors including, but not
limited to the type of sexual assault, location of the occurrence,
identity and status of the victim and the alleged offender, the amount
of time between occurrence and reporting, presence or absence of
forensic evidence, presence or absence of witnesses, and the presence
or absence of electronic or digital evidence, all impact how quickly an
investigation can be successfully completed. The timeliness of
investigations are tracked during monthly Battalion Operations
synchronization meetings with subordinate units. Investigation
timeliness is part of the Battalion and Group Organizational Inspection
Program (OIP), as well as reviewed as part of periodic Inspector
General (IG) inspections. These updates, inspections, and leadership
involvement assist our unit's ability to keep investigations from
stagnating.
Ms. Houlahan. What are the average years of experience for your
agents? Of that, I understand that your agents often have different
investigative specialties such as fraud or counterintelligence, what
percentage of your experienced agents focus solely on criminal
investigations?
General Martin. As of March 10, 2021 (of 1,368 assigned Agents):
# of Agents with 1 year or less: 149/11%
# of Agents with 1 to 3 years: 444/32%
# of Agents with 4 to 7 years: 166/12%
# of Agents with 7+ years: 609/45%
Not including agents focused on criminal investigations involving
fraud and cybercrime, and agents performing protective service duties
for DOD senior leaders, there are approximately 900 CID agents focused
solely on general criminal investigations, which include sexual
assaults.
Ms. Houlahan. With incidents of sexual assault and sexual
harassment often being unreported, can you each describe what the
dynamics are between your investigative organizations and the SHARP/
Victim Advocate/SARC programs? Are you looking at reviewing those
relationships and potentially revamping them?
General Martin. CID agents work closely with representatives from
SHARP/Victim Advocate/SARC programs and the victim's and subject's
chains of command. CID is also active in the Army's People First Task
Force that is currently looking into ways to improve relationships
among Army agencies including CID and SHARP. Recently, the A/SA signed
Army Directive 2021-16 which improves the Sexual Harassment/Assault
Response and Prevention program by better protecting and informing
victims of sexual assault and sexual harassment. The new directive
immediately implements several SHARP-related findings and
recommendations from the FHIRC report, including provisions improving
the issuance of military protective orders, informing the Directorate
of Emergency Services or Provost Marshal's Office, and the process by
which sexual assault victims receive case notifications.
Ms. Houlahan. What percentage of your current civilian work force
is formerly active duty military? With that percentage, how do you
ensure the culture can change and improve if there is a revolving door
of the same mentality?
General Bullard. As of 24 Mar 21, OSI has 501 total civilian
agents; this includes 26 participating in the Palace Acquire (PAQ)
program, which is a centrally-funded and managed three-year program
targeted at recent college graduates with exceptional academic
achievement. Of the 501 total civilian agents, 201 (40.2%) have no
prior military experience. Among the 300 agents with military
experience (59.8%), these are split between 130 military retirees (123
prior-OSI) and 170 with some military service (96 prior-OSI). In total,
219 of OSI's civilian agents have previous OSI experience (43.72%) As
this data indicates, OSI civilian agents are only slightly tilted
towards those with prior military service. Former military personnel
who return to OSI as civilian agents are normally selected due their
possession of unique skills and experience which are in-demand among
our civilian agent force (e.g. cyber, language, technical operations,
etc.) Additionally, many of these former military personnel come from
specialties and backgrounds not affiliated with OSI. Overall, 43.7% of
OSI's civilian agent force is composed of former active duty agents,
meaning more than half of our civilian agents come to us with no or
differing military backgrounds. This infusion of new perspectives and
experiences, coupled with the constant addition of new active duty
agents, helps OSI to avoid groupthink or the perpetuation of unhelpful
assumptions or viewpoints. Additionally, OSI has dedicated offices
committed to diversity and inclusion, organizational development, and
total force development. Taken together, OSI remains on the leading
edge of cultural innovation and change, and constantly strives to
identify and inculcate new and creative methodologies, ideas, and
perspectives.
Ms. Houlahan. Do you have timelines established for criminal cases
such as sexual assault investigations? If so, how often are those
timelines sufficiently met and cases closed?
General Bullard. The timeliness standard for our criminal
investigations on adult sexual assault, narcotics, and general criminal
offenses is 75 days from case initiation to a published report of
investigation. Death and child sexual offense investigations are
expected to run no more than 180 days. Fraud investigations are
afforded 730 days for investigation. For adult sexual assault
investigations (as specified in the question), the 75-day standard is
applied to offenses ranging from sexual contact investigations to human
trafficking. Based on the varied complexity of these different
offenses, OSI is evaluating the merits of adjusting our timeliness
goals in the very near future to maintain a 75-day standard for less-
complex sexual offenses, and set a new standard of 120 days for
penetrative and aggravated sexual offense investigations. In reviewing
data for calendar years 2018, 2019, and 2020, OSI has averaged 114 days
to completion on all adult sexual assault investigations; the median
time to complete was 76 days. During that period, death and child
sexual assault investigations averaged 207 days with a 175 day median.
Fraud investigations ran an average of 590 days, and the median for
this category was 390 days.
Ms. Houlahan. What are the average years of experience for your
agents? Of that, I understand that your agents often have different
investigative specialties such as fraud or counterintelligence, what
percentage of your experienced agents focus solely on criminal
investigations?
General Bullard. Due to a variety of individual requirements and
differing career tracks, the average experience level of OSI agents
varies by category. At present, officer agents (total of 291 positions)
average 8.8 years of experience; enlisted agents (total of 1.032
billets) average 5.8 years of experience; and civilian agents (total of
591 positions) average 14.9 years of experience. These experience
levels reflect a number of realities which the OSI blended force faces,
notably that enlisted agents constitute the majority of our newest
personnel, and that civilian agents have greater latitude to remain in-
place in to obtain greater experience and longevity without the demands
of the traditional military ``up-or-out'' paradigm. Although OSI does
offer a number of opportunities for its agent personnel to specialize
in a wide range of skillsets, all OSI agents remain capable of
conducting criminal investigations when and as-needed. While OSI
employs a variety of funding streams in support of its investigative
mission, the interoperability of OSI agents means that the command does
not employ any specific individuals or positions ``solely'' for the
conduct of criminal investigations. Indeed, many agents have criminal
investigations as their primary mission focus, but remain capable of,
any often do, surge to meet other requirements such as counterterrorism
or counterintelligence matters. Nonetheless, each OSI subordinate wing
is assigned a criminal investigations subject matter expert (SME) to
assist in the oversight and management of investigations. These
individuals are among our most experienced and seasoned personnel in
the conduct of criminal investigations. Similarly, agents of equally
strong backgrounds in criminal investigations serve as command-wide
experts at OSI's headquarters, both from an operational and policy and
resourcing standpoint. OSI therefore recognizes the importance of
providing our field units and agents the best possible policy,
resources, and expertise to ensure the conduct of sufficient and timely
investigations.
Ms. Houlahan. With incidents of sexual assault and sexual
harassment often being unreported, can you each describe what the
dynamics are between your investigative organizations and the SHARP/
Victim Advocate/SARC programs? Are you looking at reviewing those
relationships and potentially revamping them?
General Bullard. Our field units maintain close relationships with
Special Victim's Counsel (SVC), SARCs, and Victim Advocates (VA).
Annually, and IAW DODI 5505.18 and DODI 5505.19, OSI agents conduct
joint training with the SARC. Additionally, OSI agents assist the SARC
by providing training to VAs on the investigative process and the roles
the VA, SARC, and SVC play in that process. When OSI agents need to
speak with a victim, they coordinate this step with the victim's SVC
and/or the SARC. If the victim so desires, their SVC or VA can be
present during the interview to provide support to the victim. In
addition to this, OSI units provide timely updates on investigations to
the Special Victims' Investigation and Prosecution team so they can
better perform their duties. Upon notifications of an Unrestricted
Report from the SARC, OSI assists the SARC in completing the Sexual
Assault Incident Response Oversight (SAIRO) Report. We believe our
relationship with these programs is strong and effective. The roles of
all entities are clearly defined and create an environment that
supports the needs of the victim, while working to forward criminal
investigations. OSI has not sought to review these relationships or
revamp them at this time.
Ms. Houlahan. What percentage of your current civilian work force
is formerly active duty military? With that percentage, how do you
ensure the culture can change and improve if there is a revolving door
of the same mentality?
Mr. Lopez. 40% of the NCIS civilian workforce is formerly active
duty military. In regards to cultural change, NCIS has not experienced
any collective issues with our former active duty personnel. Being a
civilian organization, having former military members in NCIS enhances
the diversity of our workforce and has had a positive impact on our
workplace culture.
Ms. Houlahan. Do you have timelines established for criminal cases
such as sexual assault investigations? If so, how often are those
timelines sufficiently met and cases closed?
Mr. Lopez.
NCIS must initiate a new sexual assault investigation
within 3 days of being notified of a sexual assault offense.
NCIS follows the timeline guidelines set forth in the
DODI 5505.19 for 24hr and 48hr Special Victim Investigation and
Prosecution (SVIP) notifications/collaborations.
NCIS agents provide a status report every 60 days while
the investigation is still active.
NCIS averages 118 days for DON sexual assault
investigations though some active investigations are completed sooner
while more complex investigations take longer.
Supervisory Special Agents review cases at a minimum
every 60 days.
Cases are closed when the commanding officer of the
service member(s) who are the subject of an investigation provide NCIS,
in writing, the final disposition, to include any administrative, non-
judicial punishment or judicial action taken as a result of the
investigation.
Ms. Houlahan. What are the average years of experience for your
agents? Of that, I understand that your agents often have different
investigative specialties such as fraud or counterintelligence, what
percentage of your experienced agents focus solely on criminal
investigations?
Mr. Lopez. NCIS tracks tenure with the agency vice years of
experience. The average tenure of NCIS special agents is 10 years. The
average tenure of NCIS special agents focusing on criminal
investigations is 9 years. While the average tenure is 10 years, it is
important to note the average years of law enforcement experience is
higher, as NCIS actively recruits personnel with prior law enforcement
experience for service as special agents.
Ms. Houlahan. With incidents of sexual assault and sexual
harassment often being unreported, can you each describe what the
dynamics are between your investigative organizations and the SHARP/
Victim Advocate/SARC programs? Are you looking at reviewing those
relationships and potentially revamping them?
Mr. Lopez. NCIS has a close relationship with DON Sexual Assault
Prevention Response (SAPR), Navy SAPR and Marine Corps SAPR at the HQ
level.
NCIS collaborated with DON SAPR in creating a sexual assault
prevention video on combating sexual assault (due out later this year).
NCIS doesn't view our relationships with the other Navy and DOD
groups as needing repair. We have a very strong relationship, which is
maintained via continuous communications. This includes collaborating
on briefings, sharing metrics, and developing policies at both the
field and the headquarters level. NCIS frequently provide briefs at
their relevant trainings and they also provide briefs to support NCIS.
Local NCIS offices routinely interact with SAPR/Victim Advocate (VAs),
SVIP, Case Management Group for Sexual Assaults (CMG) for briefings and
specific topic focused meetings.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STRICKLAND
Ms. Strickland. In the Fort Hood report, you highlighted that the
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military reported that
sexual assault occurs most often between junior enlisted acquaintances
who are peers or near peers in rank. Additionally, the vast majority of
sexual assaults of service members occurred between people aged 17-24
who work, train, or live in close proximity. You also said that junior
enlisted showed the least amount of knowledge of the SHARP Program and
the various ways to report a sexual assault. How can we work on
educating the most at-risk service members?
a. What resources and tools are most helpful in making sure that
service members are aware of the what is available to them if they are
assaulted?
Mr. Swecker. The FHIRC recommended that a strong centralized Corps
level SHARP Program Manager Office be established that reports to an
SES or general officer at the DA level while also functioning in direct
support of the CORPS Commander. This PM would centralize, implement and
track all SHARP training. The perfunctory nature of SHARP training was
pointed out as the greatest weakness of SHARP training at the Unit
level. The inherent weakness was that NCOs were tasked with delivering
a powerpoint or other very rote and non participatory training that
simple did not sink in with the key population of E-1 through E-5
levels. The training should be delivered at the PM training center and
attended by both officers and enlisted. Strong emphasis should come
from the command level concerning the critical nature of the training
and soldiers should be tested on their knowledge of the essential
elements of the SHARP Program. Substandard grades should place the
soldier into a remedial track until proficiency is gained.
Ms. Strickland. One of the problems that you recognized in your
report was the lack of professionalism in the overall SHARP force. This
is concerning because they are a vital contributor to military
readiness.
a. It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a career and it
doesn't come with advancement unlike many other qualifications. Can you
discuss the resources DOD would need to professionalize SHARP including
professional development, rewards for performance, in preserving
institutional knowledge?
Mr. Swecker. Per the FHIRC Report SHARP duties should be a
recognized Army MOS and the career track should be modeled after the
Army EO, IG and similar programs. The Army should eliminate collateral
duties and consolidate those duties into positions with the CORPS level
SHARP Program office. Serving in the The SHARP program should be career
enhancing and part of a defined career track.
Ms. Strickland. In the Fort Hood report, you highlighted that the
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military reported that
sexual assault occurs most often between junior enlisted acquaintances
who are peers or near peers in rank. Additionally, the vast majority of
sexual assaults of service members occurred between people aged 17-24
who work, train, or live in close proximity. You also said that junior
enlisted showed the least amount of knowledge of the SHARP Program and
the various ways to report a sexual assault. How can we work on
educating the most at-risk service members?
a. What resources and tools are most helpful in making sure that
service members are aware of the what is available to them if they are
assaulted?
Ms. Ricci. Numerous soldiers identified ``SHARP 360'' training as
very impactful and the best SHARP training they received. I visited the
SHARP 360 facility on Fort Hood, which consists of a large trailer
housing several different rooms that are furnished to allow soldiers to
role play given scenarios. This interactive training leaves a lasting
impression and equips soldiers with critical SHARP knowledge, as well
as trains soldiers to identify risky situations and possible methods of
intervention and assistance to prevent or react to incidents of sexual
assault. SHARP training can be integrated into newcomer orientations
and must be championed as a priority for every unit by unit commanders.
Ms. Strickland. One of the problems that you recognized in your
report was the lack of professionalism in the overall SHARP force. This
is concerning because they are a vital contributor to military
readiness.
a. It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a career and it
doesn't come with advancement unlike many other qualifications. Can you
discuss the resources DOD would need to professionalize SHARP including
professional development, rewards for performance, in preserving
institutional knowledge?
Ms. Ricci. The FHIRC review was of Fort Hood and to some extent the
Army, and not of the DOD program. With this in mind, as described in
the FHIRC Report (pp. 127-128) SHARP Military Professionals (SARCs and
VAs) should be selected, trained and assigned at the Department of the
Army level, which will ensure they are appointed, credentialed, trained
and ready to perform their duties when they hit the ground.
Additionally, SHARP should be established as a Special Qualifications
Identifier (SQI) and the program should be fully funded, in order to:
(i) enable interdisciplinary development of SHARP Military
Professionals across Military Occupational Specialties, (ii) encourage
the best to aspire to become SHARP Military Professionals, (iii) reward
these professionals for their service, and (iv) preserve institutional
knowledge through professional development.
Ms. Strickland. In the Fort Hood report, you highlighted that the
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military reported that
sexual assault occurs most often between junior enlisted acquaintances
who are peers or near peers in rank. Additionally, the vast majority of
sexual assaults of service members occurred between people aged 17-24
who work, train, or live in close proximity. You also said that junior
enlisted showed the least amount of knowledge of the SHARP Program and
the various ways to report a sexual assault. How can we work on
educating the most at-risk service members?
a. What resources and tools are most helpful in making sure that
service members are aware of the what is available to them if they are
assaulted?
Mr. Bland. The solution to this phenomenon is squarely rooted
within what should be a top-down expectation, if not requirement, that
the officers and NCOs who are both responsible and accountable for the
welfare, safety and security of the soldiers whom they are privileged
to command are exercising the requisite degree of effective and engaged
leadership relative to personally ensuring that all of the Army's
available Special Emphasis Programs, to include SHARP, are being
appropriately administered, emphasized and communicated downward as a
critical rating component of their end-of-tour Officer and NCO
Evaluation Reports (OERs/NCOERs).
Ms. Strickland. One of the problems that you recognized in your
report was the lack of professionalism in the overall SHARP force. This
is concerning because they are a vital contributor to military
readiness.
a. It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a career and it
doesn't come with advancement unlike many other qualifications. Can you
discuss the resources DOD would need to professionalize SHARP including
professional development, rewards for performance, in preserving
institutional knowledge?
Mr. Bland. Believe that it is imperative to reverse the unintended
consequences of SHARP's being frequently perceived by commanders as a
program which can be staffed by mid-level and senior NCOs who
oftentimes are those soldiers who are considered to be sub-par
performers who can fill these nominal/ancillary/temporary assignments
in order to minimize any impact on overall unit readiness. While
instituting more comprehensive SHARP training and educational
opportunities tied to career-enhancing incentives and bonuses, as well
as the promulgation of new policies and standard designed to address
this situation, would have an immediate and long-lasting positive
impact, nonetheless opine once again that any modicum of sustained
improvement and ultimately, success, relative to this program is
inexorably linked to measures that must be implemented on the part of
senior Army leaders at the highest general officer levels to hold
commanders at all subordinate levels personally accountable by way of
their OER/NCOER ratings to compel their adherence, emphasis and
leadership. In doing so, any lack of compliance on the part of these
individuals would be tantamount to career ruination.
Ms. Strickland. In the Fort Hood report, you highlighted that the
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military reported that
sexual assault occurs most often between junior enlisted acquaintances
who are peers or near peers in rank. Additionally, the vast majority of
sexual assaults of service members occurred between people aged 17-24
who work, train, or live in close proximity. You also said that junior
enlisted showed the least amount of knowledge of the SHARP Program and
the various ways to report a sexual assault. How can we work on
educating the most at-risk service members?
a. What resources and tools are most helpful in making sure that
service members are aware of the what is available to them if they are
assaulted?
Ms. Counts. The lack of discipline, institutional control, and
professionalism by the Command of Fort Hood is well documented in the
Fort Hood Independent Review Committee (FHIRC) report. With a laser
focus on the mission, the leadership at Fort Hood allowed all other
aspects of soldier life to suffer, to include the health, safety and
welfare of those charged with carrying out the mission. And, female
service members were expendable as long as the mission moved forward.
At Fort Hood, the Committee found little to no evidence of
educating service members who are most at risk for sexual assault/
harassment. Female service members reported that during their exit
briefings at other Army installations, they were told that they should
be aware and take some measures to protect themselves, as they ``could
expect and probably would be'' sexually harassed and or assaulted
shortly after reporting to Fort Hood. While a handful of service
members made reference to a Newcomers Brief and a Sponsorship Program
for service members upon their arrival at Fort Hood, these service
members characterized both the Brief and the Program as not being fully
implemented and never followed through.
Of the 308 E-1 to E-4 junior enlisted female service members
interviewed by the FHIRC, 183, or 59%, reported NOT feeling safe on
post. Female service members within this group, identified as the most
at risk, reported being attacked in their rooms; in laundry and storage
areas within their barracks, and in certain areas on post that were not
well lit. Many of these attacks were committed by their NCOs or by
their peers. Reports of NCOs ``requiring'' new female service members
to attend off post parties soon after their arrival to Fort Hood, only
for these female soldiers to wake up disoriented, naked and alone the
next morning, were commonplace. In a number of these cases, it was
reported that the NCOs were the ones who transported the female service
member to the off post party. Of this E-1 to E-4 group, 167, or 54%,
reported they were NOT confident in their commanders to take a report
of sexual assault and/or harassment seriously. And, 119, or 38% of this
group, reported they had seen or heard of someone who had been
retaliated against for ``raising a concern'' of sexual assault and/or
harassment. Add to these numbers the staggering response to an online
survey given to all units assigned to Fort Hood as part of the
Independent Review, when 1,339 service members responded ``yes'' to
whether they had ``observed a situation I believe was sexual assault''
in the past twelve months.
The Review Committee heard all too many times that the lines
between junior enlisted and the higher ranks are blurred at Fort Hood
to the point that in some units these lines no longer exist.
Fraternization is the norm and not the exception. In one unit, there
were several reports of Sergeants fathering children with junior
enlisted service members; ``everyone knows, but everyone is afraid to
say anything.''
Attitude is reflected in leadership. At every turn, the FHIRC found
a cavalier attitude and a total lack of leadership regarding sexual
assault and harassment. Fort Hood soldiers who had been assigned to
other Army Posts talked about zero tolerance policies regarding sexual
assault and harassment. Every one of these service members said the
zero tolerance installations had a visible and higher quality of
command and soldier than any they found at Fort Hood. Some of these
more experienced soldiers began to hold off duty meetings with the
younger female service members to educate them in ``what was ok
behavior and what was not.'' Two sergeants reported in their respective
units, several male service members asked to attend the meetings as
they were deeply disturbed as to how their female counterparts were
being treated. These initiatives were few and far between and the women
leading the groups readily acknowledged they were not ``high enough
up'' to make a difference.
The lack of confidence in leadership; the lack of confidentiality,
and the stigma attached to victims reporting and seeking help on post,
all work to ensure the victim remains a victim. Victims of sexual
assault who utilize on post resources following an assault found it
difficult to regain their sense of self as they continued to be
victimized through various forms of reprisal and retaliation.
In interviews with Carl A. Darnall Medical Center staff and
credentialed Victim's Advocates at Fort Hood, a number of resources are
available to service members who are victims of sexual assault and are
in place both on and off post. These off post resources meet monthly
and share a cohesive and cooperative approach to helping victims. Off
post resources allow for the victim to regain their sense of self once
rank and the uniform are not factors to deal with. The Committee found
little to no evidence of any Fort Hood SHARP personnel or Fort Hood CID
participating in these monthly meetings.
Ms. Strickland. One of the problems that you recognized in your
report was the lack of professionalism in the overall SHARP force. This
is concerning because they are a vital contributor to military
readiness.
a. It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a career and it
doesn't come with advancement unlike many other qualifications. Can you
discuss the resources DOD would need to professionalize SHARP including
professional development, rewards for performance, in preserving
institutional knowledge?
Ms. Counts. Of the thirty SHARP personnel I personally interviewed
as part of the Fort Hood Independent Review, 27, or 90%, had an
unfavorable opinion of the overall program. Some cited training as
lacking; some thought adequate training resources were available; but,
the training itself needed fine tuning. Many thought the overall
program was understaffed and not viewed as a priority. All agreed that
a more thorough vetting process is needed for SHARP personnel. One Fort
Hood Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) was arrested for
running a prostitution ring. In 2014, a Fort Hood Victim's Advocate
(VA) was accused of sexually assaulting multiple intoxicated victims
while the unit was deployed to Korea. In 2019, this individual was
allowed to reenter the SHARP Program as a VA after going five years
without an alcohol related incident. The service members reporting this
information summed it up succinctly by saying ``after seeing this, how
can anyone have faith in this program?''
Victims of sexual assault have two options to report assaults
through the Army Sexual Harassment and Assault Response Program, or
SHARP: the restricted report or the unrestricted report. A restricted
report allows SHARP personnel to provide a host of immediate, in
person, victim support services, including counseling, mental health
services and medical care follow up. This reporting option does not
initiate an investigation, unless there is a need to prevent or
mitigate a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety of the
victim or another. A restricted report can be ``converted'' to an
unrestricted report by the initial reporting victim. There have also
been some cases where the victim's identity has been compromised,
causing the reporting option to be converted. Of the 308 E-1 to E-4
female service members interviewed, (the group identified as the most
at risk), 256, or 83%, stated they were aware of the differences
between restricted and unrestricted reporting. However, a number of
these service members who were victims of sexual assaults were unclear
and upset as to why or how their initial restricted reporting option
became unrestricted. Many of the victims interviewed were not aware
that this conversion could occur.
An unrestricted report of sexual assault is the only type of
reporting that requires Command notification and the initiation of an
investigation by a military criminal investigative organization, such
as Army CID. An unrestricted report cannot be converted back to a
restricted report.
In late August of 2020, when the Fort Hood Independent Review
commenced on site, the installation reported 103 unrestricted reports
and 16 restricted reports. Of the 507 face to face interviews of female
soldiers conducted by the Review Team, 93 credible accounts of sexual
assault were identified. This number was based on victim reporting,
witnesses to the assault or individuals having significant details of
the assault. Of those 93 accounts, only 59 had been reported, either
using the restricted or unrestricted option.
The fact that a victim has to give up her identity and become
victimized over and over again in order to initiate an investigation of
sexual assault against her attacker is unacceptable. Conversely, it is
unacceptable that a victim is told no investigation will be conducted
UNLESS she chooses to have her identity revealed to her command.
In their interviews, two veteran service members, both close to
retirement and both serving in senior positions within SHARP, stated
that there is a total lack of respect for women by leadership at Fort
Hood. One of the service members who has been in a senior SHARP
position at the Brigade Level for several years noted ``leaders turn a
blind eye or they themselves are the offenders.'' Both service members
cited a one in three victimization rate of junior enlisted female
service members within the first eight months at Fort Hood; however,
both noted they suspected this rate was in fact much higher due to the
reluctance of victims to report. And, while both agreed SHARP could
only work if victims reported, both stated with the way the current
program is configured, coupled with the lack of leadership, they would
not encourage a victim who came to them to report the assault.
Training and indoctrination as to what is expected of soldiers
needs to occur on the very first day of service in order to begin
building a culture that has absolutely no tolerance for abuse among
soldiers--particularly any abuse of the most vulnerable soldiers. It
should be instilled in each soldier that in order to defend their
country they must first defend and support each other. This must be
reinforced every day.
Junior enlisted personnel look to their NCOs and superior officers
to determine how they should behave toward one another. They pay very
close attention to them; and, they behave accordingly. Any training
received by junior enlisted personnel will be undone if not exemplified
and supported on a daily basis by their NCOs and superior officers.
At Fort Hood, junior enlisted personnel ``learn'' from their fellow
soldiers, NCOs and superior officers that the weakest among them are
not to be valued. These ``weaker'' soldiers are not supported; and,
they can be abused at will. Moreover, this abuse would be tolerated and
accepted and in some units, encouraged by the higher ups; and,
depending on the rank of the abuser, the abuse would not only go
unpunished, but the abuser would often be rewarded.
One of the issues the FHIRC observed regarding SHARP was that it
was not highly regarded nor vigorously supported by the command
structure at Fort Hood. The Army did not make it a priority for the
command staff; there was neither reward for putting their best people
in SHARP, nor was there any penalty for ``just filling a slot.'' The
Command failed to commit whatever resources were necessary for its most
efficient and effective operation. Thus, the Command staff responded
accordingly and committed their resources and best people to support
the priorities the Army told them to support. Generals are like
everyone else; if you tell them what they have to do and back that up
with rewards and punishments; they will respond accordingly. At Fort
Hood--the command staff and even CID, were rewarded for their overall
performance while they were failing DAILY in their responsibilities to
SHARP, sexual assault prevention and investigations, simply because
their performance in these areas were not identified as priorities by
the Army and not directly tied to their evaluations and promotions.
By stating that ``It's not really possible to choose SHARP as a
career and it doesn't come with advancement unlike many other
qualifications,'' sums the problem up in a nutshell. If the Army cannot
or will not make service and/or leadership in SHARP career enhancing
for its NCOs and officers, then it needs to turn the program over to
professional civilian army employees.
Ms. Strickland. Sexual assault and harassment are a traumatic
experience and is unacceptable. While a lot of attention, rightly so,
is focused on sexual assault between members of the uniformed services
or committed by service members on civilians, I want to focus on what
resources are available for civilian military spouses. According to the
CDC about 1 in 4 women and nearly 1 in 10 men have experienced contact
sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate
partner during their lifetime and reported some form of Intimate
Partner Violence (IPV)-related impact. I am aware that domestic
violence cases around the country, including at Joint Base Lewis-
McCord, have increased and have been exacerbated by the coronavirus
pandemic. I am also aware that the Family Advocacy Program has victim
advocates available across JBLM for active duty service members, their
current or former spouses, those with whom they share a child in common
or have lived together as intimate partners. Military families make
enormous sacrifices for this country, leaving support networks when the
service member gets new orders and moving to unfamiliar environments.
Can you tell expand on what resources exist for civilian spouses of
service members who are experiencing domestic violence?
a. Do you think you have enough resources to support those are
experiencing domestic violence?
b. How are you proactively educating family members of their
rights?
c. Can you identify some challenges that exist for protecting
civilian spouses of service members?
General Martin. The Army is deeply committed to preventing and
responding to all acts of domestic violence and child abuse and neglect
regardless of whether the victim is military or civilian. The Army
Family Advocacy Program is resourced with healthcare professionals who
provide immediate and ongoing services to victims of domestic abuse,
specially trained and certified domestic abuse victim advocates at each
installation to support the victim and help coordinate services. The
installation Family Advocacy Program Manager ensures services are
available and coordinated for all beneficiaries.
Spouses of service members who experience domestic violence may
consult with an Army Legal Assistance attorney to discuss concerns
related to safety, financial support, and child custody and are
assigned a Special Victim Counsel (SVC) when the suspect's case is
postured towards an administrative or court-martial proceeding.
The Army recognizes that civilian spouses who live off-post may
experience added challenges accessing or even knowing about the Family
Advocacy Program. During the COVID-19 pandemic there were no service
interruptions as the installations shifted to virtual services until
health protection conditions allowed for a return to in-person support.
The Army has also initiated a study with the RAND Corporation in order
to better understand this challenge and develop solutions to improve
outreach with a study completion in 2022. Active prevention and rapid
response to domestic violence is critical for readiness and aligns with
the Army's number one priority--People.
Ms. Strickland. Sexual assault and harassment are a traumatic
experience and is unacceptable. While a lot of attention, rightly so,
is focused on sexual assault between members of the uniformed services
or committed by service members on civilians, I want to focus on what
resources are available for civilian military spouses. According to the
CDC about 1 in 4 women and nearly 1 in 10 men have experienced contact
sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate
partner during their lifetime and reported some form of Intimate
Partner Violence (IPV)-related impact. I am aware that domestic
violence cases around the country, including at Joint Base Lewis-
McCord, have increased and have been exacerbated by the coronavirus
pandemic. I am also aware that the Family Advocacy Program has victim
advocates available across JBLM for active duty service members, their
current or former spouses, those with whom they share a child in common
or have lived together as intimate partners. Military families make
enormous sacrifices for this country, leaving support networks when the
service member gets new orders and moving to unfamiliar environments.
Can you tell expand on what resources exist for civilian spouses of
service members who are experiencing domestic violence?
a. Do you think you have enough resources to support those are
experiencing domestic violence?
b. How are you proactively educating family members of their
rights?
c. Can you identify some challenges that exist for protecting
civilian spouses of service members?
General Bullard. The Family Advocacy Program (FAP) is the DOD's
designated social services entity independent of command and law
enforcement actions, to address domestic abuse and their services are
available to civilians as well as active duty members, to include
military spouses and their children, who are experiencing domestic
violence. Military dependents who are victims of sexual assault
committed by a non-intimate partner Service member are eligible for the
full range of advocacy resources provided by SAPR. All victims
regardless of affiliation to the military are eligible for assistance
through each installation's Victim Witness Assistance Program (VWAP)
team. Finally, all Airmen, Guardians and dependents who are victims of
sexual assault, stalking, or domestic violence are eligible for
representation from a military Special Victims' Counsel (SVC) attorney.
SVC staff are trained to advocate for the victim's rights and advise
them on the complexities of the military justice system. OSI works
closely with FAP to ensure available services are offered, and informs
victims of services available (both verbally and via a written
brochure); however, OSI does not itself provide these specific services
to victims of domestic violence.
a. Do you think you have enough resources to support those are
experiencing domestic violence? From an OSI investigative perspective
the answer is assessed to be yes, and OSI works closely with a number
of entities in our investigations, at every installation, to ensure
domestic abuse victim advocates (DAVAs) and SVCs are able to meet with
and support anyone reporting domestic violence. However, the FAP, DAVA,
and VWAP programs may be able to provide different, more involved
perspectives as that is their area of expertise.
b. How are you proactively educating family members of their
rights? Upon initial contact with any victim or witness reporting an
offense, OSI agents are trained to thoroughly inform them of their
rights regarding access to a SVC, and provide them the DD Form 2701.
c. Can you identify some challenges that exist for protecting
civilian spouses of service members? OSI would defer to representatives
of the DOD Family Advocacy Program, the OSJA's VWAP team, and the
respective services' Special Victim Counsel or Victim's Legal Counsel
Programs for their perspectives. Additional language if needed: OSI
does not provide victim services to service members and their
dependents; however, OSI does work closely with the Family Advocacy
Programs on base through close coordination in ongoing investigations
and monthly meetings to share relevant updates. Victims of domestic
violence are advised to contact their local Family Advocacy office
which can provide a myriad of services; OSI agents are trained to
provide that information to any victims of domestic violence and other
crimes so that victims may receive proper care. The Family Advocacy
Program clinicians as well as, the DAVA program provides a broad range
of services to military-affiliated victims of partner maltreatment.
Advocacy services are provided with the goal of increasing victim
safety and autonomy. Services include responding to victims' emergency
and ongoing safety concerns and needs; providing information on
programs and services available to victims and their children in both
civilian and military communities; and providing victims with ongoing
support and referrals. With the exception of mandatory state, federal,
and military reporting requirements (i.e. domestic violence, child
abuse, and duty to warn situations) the DAVA provides a private and
confidential service to encourage victims in seeking assistance.
Ms. Strickland. Sexual assault and harassment are a traumatic
experience and is unacceptable. While a lot of attention, rightly so,
is focused on sexual assault between members of the uniformed services
or committed by service members on civilians, I want to focus on what
resources are available for civilian military spouses. According to the
CDC about 1 in 4 women and nearly 1 in 10 men have experienced contact
sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate
partner during their lifetime and reported some form of Intimate
Partner Violence (IPV)-related impact. I am aware that domestic
violence cases around the country, including at Joint Base Lewis-
McCord, have increased and have been exacerbated by the coronavirus
pandemic. I am also aware that the Family Advocacy Program has victim
advocates available across JBLM for active duty service members, their
current or former spouses, those with whom they share a child in common
or have lived together as intimate partners. Military families make
enormous sacrifices for this country, leaving support networks when the
service member gets new orders and moving to unfamiliar environments.
Can you tell expand on what resources exist for civilian spouses of
service members who are experiencing domestic violence?
a. Do you think you have enough resources to support those are
experiencing domestic violence?
b. How are you proactively educating family members of their
rights?
c. Can you identify some challenges that exist for protecting
civilian spouses of service members?
Mr. Lopez. Can you expand on what resources exist for civilian
spouses of service members who are experiencing domestic violence?
NCIS works closely with Commands and civilian authorities who are
responsible for furnishing resources beyond an investigative response
to allegations of domestic violence.
a. Do you think you have enough resources to support those who are
experiencing domestic violence?
NCIS has submitted funding requests to enhance its capacity to work
family and sexual violence cases, which includes domestic violence.
Currently, NCIS is in the process of expanding its training program for
domestic violence, specifically on the topic of strangulation and
interpersonal violence (IPV). At present, domestic violence training
comes from NCIS' internal budget offsets. The DON PB22 submission
includes additional sexual assault resources focused on prevention and
response efforts across the DON, including critical shortfalls within
NCIS.
b. How are you proactively educating family members of their
rights?
NCIS conducts Crime Reduction Campaign briefing, which is also done
in coordination with DON SAPR. At the installations, NCIS participates
in joint briefs/campaigns with Family Advocacy Program (FAP). NCIS also
briefs Victim Witness Assistance Program (VWAP) to victims in NCIS
cases.
c. Can you identify some challenges that exist for protecting
civilian spouses of service members?
The involvement of Domestic Abuse Victim Advocates (DAVA) are
imperative in cases involving interpersonal violence (IPV). Victims of
IPV are less likely to follow through with the investigative/judicial
process, this is due to several reasons such as the psychology of the
cycle of violence, pressure from family/friends to ``drop the
charges,'' uncertainty related to finances, support for children,
access to facilities, and an overall lack of information of services
and support available to them from the FAP office. This is why DAVA
involvement is so important. Through our strong relationships with
Special SVIP and various local law enforcement we have relationships
with many local domestic violence shelters throughout the United
States.
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