[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-14]
EXTREMISM IN THE ARMED FORCES
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 24, 2021
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-011 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Seventeenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
Chair C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
Vacancy
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Hannah Kaufman, Counsel
Forrest McConnell, Counsel
Emma Morrison, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Berry, Michael, General Counsel, First Liberty Institute......... 8
Brooks, Lecia, Chief of Staff, Southern Poverty Law Center....... 6
Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Professor of International Security,
Director, Center for Security, Innovation and New Technology,
American University............................................ 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Berry, Michael............................................... 104
Brooks, Lecia................................................ 76
Cronin, Audrey Kurth......................................... 57
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Letter to Congress from The Leadership Conference on Civil
and Human Rights........................................... 135
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Morelle.................................................. 150
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 145
EXTREMISM IN THE ARMED FORCES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 24, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:00 p.m., via
Webex, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Go ahead and call the meeting to order.
Full Committee on Armed Services meeting today to discuss
extremism in the armed services. I will introduce our witnesses
in just a moment.
But first, this hearing is going to be mostly virtual. Mr.
Rogers and I and a few others are here in the room, but most of
our members are participating remotely. Two of our three
witnesses are here. One of them is participating remotely.
So I will read our little remote hearing statement here.
Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen
for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and
voting.
Those members must continue to use the software platform's
video function while in attendance unless they experience
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render
them unable to participate on camera.
If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should
contact the committee staff for assistance.
Video of members' participation will be broadcast [audio
interference] internet feeds. Members participating remotely
must seek recognition verbally and they are asked to mute their
microphones when they are not speaking.
Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep
the software platform's video function on the entire time they
attend the proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the
proceeding.
If members depart for a short while for reasons other than
joining a different proceeding, they should leave the video
function on.
If members will be absent for a significant period or
depart to join a different proceeding, they should exit the
software platform entirely and then rejoin it if they return.
Members may use the software platform's chat feature to
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical
support issues only.
Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
With that, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us and
for having this hearing. I think this is a very important
discussion, and to begin with one of my biggest goals for this
hearing is to better define our terms.
We have heard a lot recently about extremism within the
military. I think it's really crucially important that we drill
down and understand what that means and what we're really
trying to get at, and how we want to make sure that we remove
that from the--from the military.
It is not the case that extremism is simply anyone who
disagrees with your political views, and I think, increasingly,
I've seen some sort of take it to that level.
You know, we--you know, people who serve in the military
are entitled to have political views. Those views will
undoubtedly be different from each other, and we have to figure
out how to make that work.
But extremism itself is something that goes way beyond that
and something that we are concerned about, and I want to sort
of put it into two categories for the purpose of this hearing.
One is, you know, the concerns that we have with a rise in
white supremacy and white nationalism and racism, and this sort
of dovetails with another challenge that we're taking on in the
military and that is the need to increase diversity in the
military.
Secretary Austin gave very, very powerful testimony during
his confirmation hearing about his experience, you know, coming
up as a black person within the military and rising through the
ranks and some of the challenges that he faced.
And there is no doubt when you look at the military right
now, particularly in terms of our leadership, it does not
reflect the diversity of our country, and there is much more
work that needs to be done.
It is also unequivocally clear that racism continues to
occur within the ranks, and we must work to root out this
bigotry and deal with that problem in a comprehensive manner.
I applaud Secretary Austin for the steps he has taken since
becoming Secretary. As most of you know, he has ordered a
series of stand-downs where you take a day to talk about this
within the ranks.
I think that is an excellent place to start. But there is
much more work that needs to be done.
Lastly, there is a growing extremism that I am really
troubled by and that is sort of anti-government extremism, and
we hear this rhetoric constantly in many, many different
forums, that somehow because our political side is not
sufficiently winning that means that the entire system must be
torn down and rebuilt, that we need a revolution, that the
government is not legitimate, that it is fake, it is a fraud,
it is all manner of different terrible and awful things that
renders it illegitimate.
We cannot, under any circumstances, have that approach to
our government within the military.
Now, I do understand the United States Constitution and we
have free speech, and if people feel that way about their
government, they are absolutely entitled to express that
opinion. I disagree with it, strongly.
I think our republic is very strong. We have a system for
resolving our differences. We should honor and respect that
system and maintain the civil society that we have, and
understand that a fully functioning civil society does not mean
that you win every political argument.
It means that you have a chance to be heard and that when
you lose there is a system in place that will keep our republic
moving forward, and I wish people better understood that.
But within the military it is even more stark. If you serve
in the military you pledge an oath to the United States
Constitution and laws of this country.
If you disagree with that Constitution and you disagree
with the laws of this country so strongly that you think our
government is no longer legitimate, then you have no business
serving in the United States military and you should get out
now.
You pledge an oath to the Constitution and to these laws.
They must be upheld and you must respect them in order to
adequately serve within the military, and we have seen a rise
of people who don't believe that way.
So I think it is crucially important that we identify that
extremism, root it out, and get it out of the military, and
then, as importantly, counter radicalization, if you will.
Educate people along the way.
So why you--disagree without being disagreeable is a little
bit understatement. But the idea that, yes, you can disagree
with the laws but that doesn't mean that you think the whole
institution should be torn down.
Okay. You can disagree with them. You have to uphold them,
and I think it's crucially important, frankly, that we educate
the entire country on that point but, certainly, within the
military.
We have three witnesses with us today who are going to help
us explore these issues, and I will introduce them to speak in
a moment. But before I turn it over to Mr. Rogers, I will
introduce them briefly now.
Dr. Audrey Kurth Cronin, who is a professor of
international security and director of the Center for Security,
Innovation, and New Technology at American University. We have
Ms. Lecia Brooks, who is the chief of staff for the Southern
Poverty Law Center; and Mr. Michael Berry, who is the general
counsel for the First Liberty Institute.
I thank them all for being here. And before I turn over to
them for their statements, I will turn it over to Mr. Rogers,
the ranking member, for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also want to root out of the military those who actively
participate in vile and violent hate groups. We cannot ask
people to fight and die together under the shadow of racial
hatred.
But it's important to remember that extremist behavior is
already prohibited by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
[UCMJ] and by each service's own regulations. It's also
important to point out that we lack any concrete evidence that
violent extremism is rife in the military, as some commentators
claim.
Since the start of FY [fiscal year] 2020, nine soldiers
have been separated from the Army for misconduct where
extremism was a factor; 9 out of nearly 1 million. Since 2018,
17 Marines have been separated for extremism, gang, or
dissident activity. That's 17 over 3 years out of over 200,000.
While I agree with my colleagues that these numbers should
be zero, this is far from the largest military justice issue
facing our armed services. If this committee is going to
attempt to address this issue, we need to be clear about what
examining extremism means.
Over the past few years, other committees have grappled
with this issue of extremism and domestic terrorism. They run
into the same problem over and over--the First Amendment.
Service members are entitled to First Amendment rights when
speaking out of uniform and in compliance with regulations.
Frankly, service members have more free speech rights than most
people may realize. They may worship freely, peacefully
assemble, espouse political views, and engage with civic
organizations.
Legislative attempts to further crack down on domestic
terrorism is going to run headlong into the First Amendment
rights of our service members, and doing so may have other
consequences.
Earlier this year, over 150 overwhelmingly liberal
organizations, including Human Rights Watch, the ACLU [American
Civil Liberties Union], and SPLC [Southern Poverty Law Center]
Action, urged Congress not to expand domestic terrorism
charges.
And I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to enter that
letter into the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 135.]
Mr. Rogers. These organizations said, quote, ``We urge you
to oppose any new domestic terrorism charge, the creation of a
list of designated domestic terrorist organizations, or other
expansion of existing nonterrorism-related authorities,'' close
quote.
The letter went on to say that ample tools exist to
prosecute domestic terror and violent extremism, and that
proposed new tools would be used against the vulnerable and
political opponents in the name of national security.
So what should we do to address this issue? Now, online
hives of hate prey on socially isolated people. They exploit
fear and vulnerability with a radicalized ideology.
Fortunately, military life offers an unparalleled
opportunity to stop radicalization using model leaders and
peers to show the way. Empowering leaders to know their units
and speak face to face with soldiers is an exceptional method
to stop radicalization before it starts.
We should examine ways to encourage that interaction. I'm
not naive enough to think that everyone who needs to step off
the path toward violence or hatred will do so. That's why
enforcing the current UCMJ prohibitions through administrative
separations or court martials will remain an appropriate
response in some cases.
Each service should keep track of these separations and
examine them for patterns of conduct. If there's a better--if
there's better data to be had, then we should address that in
the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act].
But anecdotes and online polls should not be our guide, nor
should we rush to create large-scale political surveillance
programs to monitor service members' political leanings.
I hope our panel today can help us evaluate how the
military's unique structure presents opportunities to address
this issue within the framework of the Constitution.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. So we will start.
We'll turn it over to witness testimony and we'll start
with Dr. Cronin. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR SECURITY, INNOVATION AND NEW
TECHNOLOGY, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Ms. Cronin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished
members of the House Armed Services Committee, thank you for
your service to our country and for the honor of testifying
before you today.
I come from a proud U.S. Navy family whose father and three
brothers all served. My career has combined academic positions,
including now as a distinguished professor at American
University, and government service, including at the U.S.
National War College, the Congressional Research Service, and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy.
I speak from decades of experience working at the
intersection of the military, technology, and extremism, and
some of my testimony is based on my latest book, ``Power to the
People,'' which analyzes how nefarious individuals, groups, and
private militias use digital technologies.
The violent extremism that erupted during the January 6th
attack on the U.S. Capitol had a disproportionate number of
current or former members of the U.S. Armed Forces leading the
mob. Protecting patriotic service members who serve honorably
and deserve our support even as we mitigate violent extremism
in the ranks will be a long-term test. Educating and engaging
our veterans is also vital.
The speed at which people are radicalized and mobilized via
digital media has ramped up. This trend is heightening
extremism and will not reverse itself because it is part of a
new technological environment.
To meet this challenge, we must fully assess it, build a
plan to address it, and institute trackable policies tailored
to the digital age.
So what does this mean? The most immediate problem is an
absence of good data. The 2021 Capitol insurrection leaves the
impression that the number of extremists in the military is
increasing.
Yet, DOD [Department of Defense] officials repeatedly claim
that the number is small. No one truly knows. No serious plan
can be built without defining the scope of the problem.
Second, the Department of Defense needs to build common
standards and rules across all components. This means adopting
a consistent definition of domestic violent extremism,
identifying organizations that are dangerous, and developing a
discharge code that can be tracked across all services.
Third, the best way to address extremism is to put a
structure in place to ensure adequate oversight and follow-
through. This could either be a confirmable Assistant Secretary
of Defense or a senior-level civilian.
Fourth, digital literacy is a national security priority.
Active Duty military members should have regular training to
make them less susceptible to online manipulation. Veterans
should be offered it as well.
This is imperative, not just for the extremist threat, but
to defend against a broad range of information operations.
Finally, we must recognize and address the ongoing risks of
digital technology. This means better screening of open source
social media and website use while protecting the
constitutional rights of our members.
Permission to access that information is already provided
through the clearance process. The digital environment has
enhanced the ability to radicalize, project power, and
integrate tactical systems.
In the 20th century, it required a national army to do all
three of those things--mobilization, power projection, and
systems integration. Now terrorists, extremists, and militias
can do them all.
If we do not address the effects of our new digital
landscape, we will never get on top of this problem. Only two
things can truly defeat the United States Armed Forces:
undermining the American people's trust and cleavages within
the ranks.
Every other enemy can be met with unity, determination,
effectiveness, and success. Perhaps the silver lining of the
horrible specter of storming the U.S. Capitol will be the
resolve to address extremism in a profound and lasting way.
To do that, we need comprehensive information, planning,
and action to include measures that I've outlined in my
testimony.
Again, I thank you for the honor and privilege of being a
witness at this hearing and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cronin can be found in the
Appendix on page 57.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Brooks, you're recognized. I don't--is your microphone
on?
STATEMENT OF LECIA BROOKS, CHIEF OF STAFF, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW
CENTER
Ms. Brooks. Thank you.
Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
members of the committee.
My name is Lecia Brooks and I serve as the chief of staff
for the Southern Poverty Law Center. I'm also the proud
daughter of a veteran of the Korean War and the mother of a son
who served in the U.S. Army for 10 years. This issue is deeply
personal to me.
Let me begin with two distinct points. First, the vast
majority of those who serve in our Armed Forces have no
connection to white supremacy or extremism, and strive always
to uphold the best traditions of our Nation's democratic
ideals.
Second, the military has a growing problem with white
supremacy and extremism because our country does. The white
nationalist movement in the United States is surging and
presents a serious danger to our country and its cherished
institutions, threatening the morale and good order of those
serving in our Armed Forces.
This is not a new problem. SPLC has been documenting white
supremacists' infiltration of the military and urging officials
to take action since 1986. That year, we wrote Defense
Secretary Weinberger and exposed the fact that Active Duty
Marines at Camp Lejeune were participating in paramilitary Ku
Klux Klan activities and stealing military weaponry.
Today, we know one in five of those arrested in connection
with the deadly January 6th Capitol insurrection riots has
served or is serving in the military. This is a dramatic
illustration of the insufficient efforts we have made to
inoculate service members against acting upon extremist
ideologies.
Veterans and service members are high-value recruitment
targets for extremist groups. They bring social capital,
legitimacy, specialized weapons training, leadership skills,
and an increased capacity for violence to these groups.
Over the last several years, SPLC researchers and
journalists have identified dozens of former and active
military personnel among the membership of some of the
country's most dangerous and violent white supremacist groups.
Those groups include the Atomwaffen Division, a neo-Nazi
group, and the Boogaloo movement. In addition, The Base. A
number of individuals affiliated with this particular white
nationalist group have military ties.
SPLC has analyzed more than 80 hours of calls between Base
recruits and [the] group's leadership, and found that roughly
20 percent of the recruits claimed to have military experience.
SPLC has been sounding this alarm for over 30 years. Today,
we are here to sound the alarm again. But we are more
optimistic than ever that this President, this Secretary of
Defense, and indeed, this committee will devote the time and
attention needed to address this problem.
Our testimony includes a number of policy recommendations
for the Defense Department and Congress.
One, words matter. It is impossible to overstate the
importance of military leaders speaking out against hate and
extremism among their troops.
Two, rules matter. Consistent with the First Amendment, the
Department of Defense should expand and clarify existing
prohibitions against advocating for or involvement in
supremacist or extremist activity.
We must also expand and clearly define protections for
whistleblowers, chain of command oversight responsibilities,
and reporting requirements.
Three, who and what our military honor matters. The
Department of Defense should immediately rename the 10 U.S.
Army bases named for Confederate leaders. We're aware that a
study commission has begun its work, but there is no reason to
wait 3 years to rename these bases.
We applaud the current Marine Corps and Navy prohibitions
against the display of the Confederate battle flag and other
racist symbols in workspaces, offices, vehicles, and vessels.
We urge the Defense Department to uniformly apply these
regulations across all service branches.
And, finally, support for our troops and veterans matters.
We urge you to expand support services that work to
deradicalize our Active Duty service members and veterans
reentering civilian life.
As I said earlier, this issue is deeply personal to me. My
father joined a military that was desegregated before public
schools were. We had a Black Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff before we had a Black President. The military has always
represented our highest ideals. That is why I was so proud when
my son enlisted.
As long as there's racism in the larger society, it will be
incumbent upon leaders in the military to lead the way. SPLC
looks forward to being of service to you.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Brooks can be found in the
Appendix on page 76.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Berry.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL BERRY, GENERAL COUNSEL, FIRST LIBERTY
INSTITUTE
Mr. Berry. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and
committee members, good afternoon on behalf of First Liberty
Institute.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important
issue.
First Liberty Institute is a national legal organization
whose mission is to defend and restore religious liberty for
all Americans. I'm here today to urge this committee to
maintain a strong and diverse military while safeguarding our
service members' constitutional rights.
A truly diverse military is one that is open and welcoming
to all who meet the standards of service regardless of their
religious beliefs, worldview, or political persuasion.
We should reject any attempt to weaponize anti-extremism
efforts against classes of people simply because those in
authority disapprove of them. Instead, we should focus on
eradicating true extremism from the ranks.
By true extremism I mean those who would use, threaten, or
advocate violence to accomplish their objectives. I seriously
doubt anyone in this hearing disagrees with the notion that
there must be zero tolerance for true extremists in the Armed
Forces.
Indeed, nobody wants to see such people removed from our
military more than those of us who have sworn the oath of
service. But unless Congress and the Department of Defense take
adequate measures to ensure First Amendment rights are
safeguarded, there is a real risk that the military will fall
prey to partisan politicization and needlessly expose it to the
threat of litigation.
Our service members are more than capable of handling a
little diversity of opinion. I should know. When I joined the
U.S. Marine Corps, I was thrust into a strange new environment
in which I was surrounded by people who held attitudes,
beliefs, and ideologies very different from my own.
Some of them even voiced disapproval of my own lifestyle
choices. But I was reassured by my superiors that this is a
feature of military service, not a defect.
My exposure to different, even conflicting, beliefs and
ideologies actually made me a better Marine, and I wouldn't
trade my experiences for the world. I observed firsthand that
diversity really does make our military stronger and more
capable.
I would proudly serve alongside anyone who earned the title
of U.S. Marine, period. That is the beauty of America and of
our military. No matter what our background is, what unites us
is far greater than what divides us.
Our military truly personifies ``E pluribus unum.'' And
thankfully, those who threaten, use, or advocate violence to
accomplish their objectives are rare. First Liberty fully
supports efforts to remove them from the military.
And the good news is that the military has mechanisms to
accomplish that that are more than adequate. The Uniform Code
of Military Justice and our regulations and policies have
prohibited extremist conduct for decades. Our military justice
system routinely prosecutes violators.
But we do not and cannot criminalize thoughts or beliefs
just because we don't agree with them. To do so would be to
violate bedrock First Amendment principles. In fact, protecting
unpopular or disfavored beliefs is precisely why the First
Amendment exists.
Indeed, the First Amendment would be entirely unnecessary
if its only role would be to defend that which needs no
defense.
Expanding anti-extreme efforts to punish thought or belief
is risky for another reason. What is popular or favored today
might actually become tomorrow's thought crime.
For evidence of this, look no further than the Defense
Equal Opportunity Management Institute, or DEOMI. Several years
ago, DEOMI was embroiled in scandal because it published
training materials that compared those who believe in
individual liberties, states' rights, and making the world a
better place with the Ku Klux Klan, and the U.S. Army produced
training materials that labeled evangelical Christians and
Catholics as religious extremists alongside Hamas and al-Qaida.
Never mind the fact that evangelicals and Catholics continue to
comprise the majority of those serving in uniform today.
Labeling religious or political beliefs that are held by
tens of millions of Americans as extremist is to declare them
unwelcome and unfit to serve. It's to say Uncle Sam does not
want you.
It also creates a de facto--de facto hostile work
environment for the great many who are already serving who hold
fast to those beliefs.
This, in turn, has a detrimental effect on recruiting,
retention, and readiness. Put differently, protecting the First
Amendment is truly a matter of national security.
In conclusion, the threat of extremists infiltrating our
ranks is far outweighed by the threat to our Constitution if we
allow partisanship and popularity to dictate policy.
First Liberty encourages the Congress to hold the
Department of Defense accountable to the constitutional
requirements of free speech and religious freedom. We must
ensure that these paragons of American virtue are not only
protected but cherished.
Once again, I thank the committee for this opportunity to
present testimony on this issue of utmost importance.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berry can be found in the
Appendix on page 104.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And let me just say, I wanted to mention I agree very much
with what Mr. Rogers said. I don't think we need new domestic
terrorism laws and no excuses for the Federal Government to,
you know, violate people's individual rights.
But we do have a problem, and that becomes the challenge
here. What--as I said at the outset, what is extremism? What is
a legitimate political view? Certainly, being a Catholic is not
extremism in the United States of America.
But I want to ask, because this is something I've wrestled
with, is that is going to be in the eye of the beholder. In
fact, I was struck, Mr. Berry, by your comment that we should
accept people regardless of their worldview.
And that's not actually true. There are certain worldviews
which we're not going to accept. I mean, if your worldview is
completely in line with the Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan or
Hamas, we're not going to accept you.
So we do have to make a choice here. It's not simply free
speech, say what you want, believe what you want, it's all
good. We have to make a choice as a society what we will
tolerate and what we won't tolerate.
And that's where I think the debate sort of gets lost here.
You know, people are, like, well, intolerance is bad, you know,
or, no, discrimination is bad. Well, it depends on what you're
discriminating against and it depends on what you're being
tolerant of, and that's what we have to sort of walk through.
So I guess, Mr. Berry, I would ask, do you see what Ms.
Brooks has talked about? Do you see that there is still a white
nationalism problem, that there's a white supremacy problem
that must be addressed?
Mr. Berry. Mr. Chairman, I actually agree with Secretary
Austin when he said that 99.9 percent of our service members
are good, honorable people who love America, and we actually
have adequate laws, regulations, and policies in place to
address the .01 percent who are truly causing problems and have
no place in our military.
The Chairman. So you don't--you don't see a rise in white
nationalism or anything beyond? Because I'm not talking about
changing laws here. We're talking about using those laws to
address an issue that is in front of us.
Mr. Berry. Well, I am not aware of the actual data. I
assume that the Department of Defense has that data, and if
they do they haven't published it, to my knowledge.
So to the extent that the numbers are, you know,
increasing, if they are increasing, you know, then that becomes
a, I think, an enforcement problem but not a problem of simply
identifying who or what is an extremist or, more
problematically, expanding that definition.
The Chairman. Absolutely.
Dr. Cronin, I was really interested in your comments on the
digital world out there and this is--this is a nightmare for
all employers and for all individuals as well. How much are you
entitled to look at what the people who work for you are doing
online and then react to it?
So I'm curious if you could drill down a little bit on how
you see implementing that. If you're, you know, within the
military, you're trying to, you know, root out extremist views
or other things, you know, how does that work within the
context of the First Amendment if the United States military--
to look at the social media history of the people serving?
Ms. Cronin. Well, I think it is very important to protect
the First Amendment rights of our service members. So let me
just stipulate that. Nothing that I would support with respect
to social media would be impinging upon those rights.
But at the moment, I think that the Department of Defense
is finding itself less willing to look at open source material
than many employers are, many people who are just vetting
interns or students even at my university when they're going to
be accepted or at any university.
I think that there should be a consistent way to be on top
of what is open source information about military members and
that is not currently being consistently pursued.
There's an uneven degree to which our investigative
services vet what is happening on open source social media, and
I think that we could use more aggressive tools to be able to
at least have one single policy across the Department of
Defense that watches out for keywords, for example, or looks
for particular memes and keeps on top of the symbology.
I think the Department of Defense is falling behind, in
many cases, and doesn't necessarily have access to the most up-
to-date information that they need.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And, Ms. Brooks, I wanted to ask you sort of along the
lines of what I asked Mr. Berry, because that's the challenge
we have when we go after extremism.
You know, we--you know, those of us [audio interference]
Democrats are going to look at it and say, you know, if you're
part of, you know, white supremacist groups, the Ku Klux Klan,
and all that, that is what we're going after.
And then on the other side it's, like, well, no, you're
just going after people who disagree with liberal orthodoxy--
Catholics, evangelical Christians, or whatever.
How do you, when you're--when the Southern Poverty Law
Center is going after extremism, how do you draw that
distinction between what is legitimate extremism and what is
just sort of, you know, a legitimate conservative viewpoint?
Ms. Brooks. Thank you for the question. Let's be clear that
the Southern Poverty Law Center defines a hate group as an
organization that, based on their own official statements or
principles and the statements of their leaders, has beliefs or
practices that attack or malign an entire class of people,
typically based on their immutable characteristics.
So the Southern Poverty Law Center is also a proud defender
of the First Amendment. It's about the actions and the words of
the group or the association or its leadership.
To be clear, the Southern Poverty Law Center is not anti-
Christian at all, that we identify people with our hate group
lists based on what they say and what they do.
It has nothing to do with being against marriage equality.
Certainly, there are hundreds of churches and institutions that
are anti-marriage equality that are not on our hate group list.
And I would also offer that the Southern Poverty Law Center
recently did a staff survey and over 65 percent of the--of the
Southern Poverty Law Center staff identify as Christian. And in
addition, we have people who identify with other religions, of
course.
So it's not about thought. It really is about action. So I
think that Mr. Berry and I are in agreement. I'm certainly in
agreement with Dr. Cronin, that we support the First Amendment
but we do need to do something about extremism.
Let me offer a definition that we use. It's from a scholar,
J.M. Berger. Extremism refers to the belief that an in-group's
success or survival can never be separated from the need for
hostile action against the out-group.
That's our definition of extremism.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Berry, based on your law practice, what is it you
should look out for with any potential extremism policy from
the DOD?
Mr. Berry. Without an appropriate definition of extremism,
Mr. Rogers, then there's a real risk that we will do violence
to the First Amendment. That has been my experience in my legal
practice. And when that happens, when that occurs, the real
harm is to our troops and to our Nation, to our readiness.
The most recent available data indicates those who identify
as highly religious are the most likely to join the military.
And yet, if there are, as I indicated in my remarks, there
are publications produced and published by the Department of
Defense indicating that people who identify as evangelical
Christian or Catholic or of other faith groups are at least
considered possibly extremist, that you're essentially telling
those who are, according to data, most likely to join our
military that they're unwelcome, that they should look
somewhere else.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. What role do our leaders play in
identifying violent extremism? What should we expect from those
leaders?
Mr. Berry. Well, extremism does not grow in a vacuum.
Service members are actively recruited and preyed upon. Our
leaders are really the first line of defense because the
military--military service is first and foremost a human
enterprise.
And so our leaders must offer a superior alternative to
extremism, much in the same way that we must offer a superior
alternative to a lifestyle involved in criminal gang activity
and things of that nature.
And when we do that, when we actually place the emphasis on
the human enterprise aspect of the military, then--and our
leadership--excuse me, our leaders understand that their
position and roles as leaders is paramount, then those who--
those who are entrusted with special trust and confidence to
defend our Nation, they understand that they will be held to a
higher standard, and my experience in the military has always
been tell your young Marines or soldiers, sailors, airmen, et
cetera, that you have set a high standard of conduct and
expectations for them. They will rise up to that and meet that.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield the balance of my time
to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We're here to
determine truth and not--and that should be our aim. Not my
truth or your truth, but the truth. We're having a committee
hearing entitled ``Extremism in the Armed Forces.''
Now, why? Has this proven itself to be a major problem, and
if so, we should not just have this hearing today but we should
have many others, because if extremism is systemic then it
threatens not just the military, but our country, and it needs
to be rooted out.
Many people say follow the science. Okay. Then where is the
data and evidence that suggests that extremism in any form is
rampant, major, and systemic, and it's a problem in our
services?
Professor Cronin stated the 2021 Capitol insurrection
leaves the impression that the number of extremists in the
military is increasing. Also stated that of the 312 rioters
arrested on January 6th, she stated that 34 were veterans and 3
were reservists.
There are 18 million U.S. veterans. Thirty-four were
rioters. This means that 17,999,966 of us were not. One out of
529,000. And, you know, Professor Cronin, she attended
Princeton and Oxford and Harvard, and you would think an
infinitesimally small figure like nineteen one hundred
thousandths of 1 percent is an indication of extremism on the
rise? I mean, I can't believe that.
The service right now we have over 2.4 million Active Duty
and reservists serving. Three reservists were in the Capitol 2
months ago. Three. Literally, 1 out of 800,000. The Capitol
riot leaves--a learned person like the professor leave the
impression that the extremism is on the rise of the military. I
just--I can't--I can't fathom it.
And Ms. Brooks works for the Southern Poverty Law Center.
Ms. Brooks, just a yes or no question for you. Has your
organization named the American Legion as a hate group?
[No response.]
Mr. Fallon. You have to turn your mic on.
Ms. Brooks. I don't believe so. I don't have the full list,
sir, of the hate group list but----
Mr. Fallon. Okay. I found it and it did. And how about were
you aware that the organization named the VFW, the Veterans of
Foreign Wars, as a hate group?
Ms. Brooks. Not on our current census, no.
Mr. Fallon. You had in the past. The next----
Ms. Brooks. Yes, and I'm happy to--I'm happy to present you
with the research for the--for the record as to why these
groups----
Mr. Fallon. Okay. No, that's fine. It's just a yes or no
question.
The Southern Poverty Law Center's operations and motives
and credibility leave a lot to be desired. Recently, The
Washington Post, The New York Times, Politico, NPR [National
Public Radio], and The New Yorker magazine, just to name a few,
skewered the SPLC for, among other things, corruption,
harassment, racism, and a widening credibility gap.
These aforementioned media outlets aren't exactly known for
their conservative leanings either. And you've stated
emphatically in the written record that hate is on the rise.
Well, enter Bob Moser. He's a former employee of the SPLC.
Mr. Moser confesses he's a lifelong liberal, and in The New
Yorker he described working at the SPLC as a highly profitable
scam.
He worked there for 3 years and he went on to say, and I
quote, ``The hyperbolic fundraising appeals and the fact that
though the center claimed to be effective in fighting
extremism, quote, unquote, `hate' always continued to be on the
rise, more dangerous than ever with each year's report on hate
groups, the SPLC making hate pay.''
It sounds like without hate you all don't get paid.
Members, look, let's look at the data we do have. Our
office reached out to all four branches of the service and
asked one simple question: how many members of your branch were
separated last year due to extremist activities?
The Marine Corps gave us the data. Out of 222,000 current
and Active Duty--reservists and Active Duty Marines, a total of
4 were separated last year for extremist activity, leaving us,
once again, with an infinitesimally tiny figure of 1 out of
55,475.
This isn't a hearing about the readiness of our Armed
Forces. It's nothing more, unfortunately, than political
theater.
We should be addressing things we know the military needs:
maintaining and modernizing a nuclear triad that's falling
apart; whether or not we're going to match the 7 percent
increase that a resurgent and aggressive China is proposing;
how best to meet the threat of Russia, Iran, North Korea, to
name a few.
What about our posturing and the posture of forces in the
Middle East with a May 1st deadline fast approaching?
And personnel-wise, how about----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentleman's time has expired. And I will point out, we have had
hearings on all of those topics that the gentleman just listed,
just last week, as matter of fact.
So the false choice, the idea that because we pause for one
moment to have a hearing on extremism in the military we are
ignoring all of this other stuff is simply ludicrous. We have
had hearings on every single one of those issues just listed
and we will continue to have those hearings.
Second, I will just point out a couple of simple little
math issues. Twenty percent of the people that have been
arrested from the Capitol Hill riots had a history of serving
in the military one way or the other.
To then say that, well, those are the only people in the
military that could possibly be involved in extremism is simply
logically absurd and I'm sure the gentleman would recognize
that.
We don't know for sure how large the problem is. That's why
we're having the hearing. That's why we're having the
conversation. And part of this is also to bring people in who
have differing views.
We have Mr. Berry from his organization, we have Ms. Brooks
from her organization, because we want to have a robust debate
on the subject to determine how large the problem is.
So that's the purpose of a hearing. I guess the question
is, is there enough evidence out there to warrant a further
examination.
Well, I don't think we should have had 1 percent of the
people storming the U.S. Capitol having served in the military.
That we had 20 percent is cause to go, hmm, maybe we should
look and see what else is there.
That is the purpose of a hearing and the purpose of
political dialogue, and just because it doesn't 100 percent
line up with your worldview doesn't mean that we don't get to
talk about it. So we are going to talk about it.
Mr. Langevin, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'm glad you set
the record straight because I was troubled by the some of the
previous comments, and let me respectfully disagree with my
colleague who was speaking before Mr. Fallon.
I don't see any of this as political theater. It is a fact
that we have a problem with some of the actions and the views
expressed by members of the military are out there, and it can
have a very corrosive effect and we want to make sure that we
address this and nip it in the bud so that it doesn't spread or
corrode further.
So, you know, one of the few institutions of government
that still enjoy a high degree of respect among the general
population, the public, is our military and, thankfully, our--
the members of the public still have high confidence in our men
and women in uniform.
It's important to note that. In fact, obviously, there--it
is my understanding, everything I have seen, whether it's polls
or statistics, that service members are considered highly
credible sources on social media.
So Dr. Cronin, would you agree with that assessment? And,
you know, if--when service members spread misinformation
online, what impact does that have on society?
Ms. Cronin. I think that the views of service members are
always given much more weight than those of the general
population, largely, because they've gone through specialized
training.
They are an admirable subset of our American community. And
I think that they can have extra emphasis and extra weight to
the things that they put on social media.
I'd also like to say, sir, that terrorism is a danger that
arises from very small numbers, and so I think looking at the
entire number of people within any organization as any sort of
an indicator of what the threat of terrorism or extremism is
would not be a rigorous way to approach it.
Mr. Langevin. And what metrics can you use to measure the
impact of mis- and disinformation on service members?
Ms. Cronin. Well, we don't have very good metrics yet. This
is one of the reasons why I'm very grateful that this committee
is having this hearing, because I think that the Department of
Defense is not consistently tracking exactly what those metrics
are. So I cannot give you a good answer, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. And, Dr. Cronin, what tools or methods
can the Department of Defense adopt from other Federal
agencies, academic institutions, or counter-radicalization
organizations to make service members more resilient against
extremist information campaigns?
Ms. Cronin. I think that there's a wealth of new types of
tools that would be of great use to the Department of Defense.
We can go to the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and use
the FBI database across the entire Department.
There are allies who have engaged in excellent
deradicalization programs that we should be consulting in order
to learn how best to--not just to force people out of the
service. That should be the last resort.
But to make sure that they're resilient to the kinds of
approaches that are made to them. One of the problems, and it's
increasing in our current technological environment, is that
members of the military and former members of the military--we
must also talk about our veterans--they are particularly
valuable to extremist groups and they are targeted for
recruitment, and this is, indeed, becoming an increasing
problem.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. My next question--you know, I'm
encouraged by the recent steps the Department of Defense has
taken to address extremism in the ranks. But a one-time stand-
down or annual PowerPoint training isn't enough, in my opinion.
So Dr. Cronin, Ms. Brooks, how can the military implement a
program that avoids the pitfalls of check-the-box training to
produce sustained success in limiting extremism?
Maybe we start with Ms. Brooks.
Ms. Brooks. Thank you so much for the question.
We completely agree. It's not a one size fits all. It's not
a one-time one and done and, certainly, it's more than a
PowerPoint presentation.
We're encouraged by the Secretary of Defense's call for the
stand-down as an initial conversation, initial starting point.
We're also very grateful to the chairman and this committee for
what we understand is a full committee hearing has not been
done on this topic ever, if at all.
So we appreciate that, and we see this as the beginning of
an ongoing conversation, just like the rest of the country.
To be clear, the military, as Dr. Cronin has alluded to, is
no different than any other segment of society, as we continue
as a country to----
The Chairman. And I apologize, Ms. Brooks. The gentleman's
time has expired. I should have explained that up front.
Ms. Brooks. Oh.
The Chairman. A lot of times they throw questions at you
and there's 10 seconds left, and then you're--but we try to
keep the time because we have a lot of members who want to get
in.
Ms. Brooks. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the
panelists for being with us today. And, Mr. Berry, I greatly
appreciate your Marine JAG [judge advocate general] service.
It's critically important that our service members have one
overarching loyalty and that is to protecting the citizens of
the United States and her interest.
The DOD has various directives that guide the political
activity of its members and can punish extremist behavior under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which I appreciate as a
former JAG officer myself and also the father of a current JAG
officer.
I want your assessment as to whether we need additional
legislation or can we rely on the guidelines we have now and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice without additional
legislation?
Mr. Berry. Thank you. I believe that the existing
guidelines are adequate as long as we maintain an appropriate
definition of what extremism is and I, again, go back to my
earlier definition, which is anyone who uses, threatens, or
advocates violence to accomplish their objectives. There's
nobody that I'm aware of who wants to see those people serving
in our military.
But beyond that, we have Uniform Code of Military Justice
provisions that address violence, that address contemptuous
language towards superiors and official.
We have Uniform Code of Military Justice provisions that
address conduct unbecoming, and we also have DOD regulations.
DOD Instruction 1325.06 is one that comes to mind to address
prohibited dissident activity as well.
So, again, it's--the existing regulations and policies are
adequate, and if the--if the Congress decides that it wants to
amend that, then my strong encouragement would be to do so in a
manner that ensures robust protection for the First Amendment.
Nothing will erode public trust and confidence in our
military faster than the belief, whether perception or reality,
but the belief that the military no longer protects First
Amendment rights for its service members.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you for that response, and in
particular, thank you for citing the definition of violence. I
think that's so critical so that it's not too broadly
interpreted.
I also, for you, I'm grateful that I represent Fort
Jackson, which is the home of the Army's great Drill Sergeant
Academy. Every drill sergeant in the Army is trained at Fort
Jackson. They do an exemplary job and are an important first
step in shaping our new recruits with the wonderful
opportunities they have for military service.
Do you have any suggestions on how they can identify
extremism and address potential cases within the brief 2 to 3
months that they have to work with recruits?
Mr. Berry. Mr. Wilson, I did not have the privilege of
going through basic training at Fort Jackson, although I have
taught at the other fine institution you have there, the Army
Chaplain School.
But I will say, based on my own experience when I was on
Active Duty in the Marine Corps, two phrases that I heard
frequently were, protect what you've earned, and police your
own, right.
In other words, the institution of the military is one that
has a proud heritage, and it's when we begin to--I believe I
heard somebody use the phrase earlier ostracization or social
isolationism.
Those are the--I think those are when service members
become very susceptible to being recruited away to join, you
know, criminal gang activity or even radicalized via extremism.
In fact, that's what we saw in the wars on terror in
Afghanistan and Iraq. That's how local citizens became
radicalized as well, is they were isolated and eventually won
over by the extremists and the radicals.
The same thing can happen in our military. So I go back to
one of my earlier responses. It's a leadership issue. This is--
this is and always will be a leadership issue, and when you
combine good leadership with sound enforcement of existing law
and policy, I think we'll begin to see positive results and
outcomes.
Mr. Wilson. And I'm really grateful, Mr. Berry, too, that
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has made it a priority to
hold accountable anybody who broke the law on January the 6th.
We don't--we should not have people who support violence in
the military. Additionally, but I'm concerned that there may be
efforts to have a by name lists of prohibited organizations.
What is your view about developing lists?
Mr. Berry. I do believe that lists can be dangerous, as I
stated in my earlier remarks, or labeling evangelical
Christians and Catholics as extremists is opening Pandora's
box.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wilson. And I share your concern. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Speier is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing. I think it's really important for us to recognize that
we were looking at this issue long before January 6th.
In fact, last February, the Military Personnel Subcommittee
held a hearing entitled, ``Alarming Incidents of White
Supremacy in the Military: How to Stop It,'' and as part of the
NDAA last year, all of us supported an amendment to create a
UCMJ article on violent extremism and the amendment to create a
person within the Inspector General's office, a Deputy
Inspector General, to deal with the issue of both diversity and
extremism.
So this has more to do with just looking at this issue in
the cold light of day.
Let me go to you, Ms. Brooks. The DOD policy currently
prohibits active participation and active advocacy of white
supremacy and violent extremism, but it does not prohibit
membership in [audio interference] organizations.
Should the DOD revisit this policy and prohibit membership
in violent extremist organizations that seek to overthrow the
government or start a race war?
Ms. Brooks. I'm sorry, Congresswoman. There was a break in
the Zoom so I didn't get the question. But you're absolutely
right, that is the current prohibition against membership, and
that's interesting because what we're finding at the Southern
Poverty Law Center is that as groups become more and more
diffused, it's not as black and white to identify a member to
say whether or not membership constitutes actual activity.
And so we, certainly, support the current military
prohibitions against active participation in these groups. But
we don't know that it should just solely fall on membership or
not because, certainly, one can be--can actively participate
without being a member.
Ms. Speier. So there was a master sergeant, Cory Reeves,
who was a Colorado airman who was a member of the Identity
Europa group, which is a white supremacist organization.
He actually was a fundraiser in that organization and
actively sought members. When that was discovered, he was
reduced in rank but not actually removed from the military.
So in that case, there was active advocacy of white
supremacy and it violated the DOD policy, but there wasn't an
effort to remove him until it became publicly known as a result
of our hearing.
Ms. Cronin, let me move to you. The security clearance
adjudicative guidelines indicate that the Federal agency should
not be granting security clearances to people with associations
or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate,
threaten, or use force or violence, or use other illegal or
unconstitutional means to overthrow the government, prevent
government personnel from performing official duties, gain
retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the government, and
prevent others from exercising their constitutional rights.
This seems pretty clear to me. All service members are
supposed to be able to obtain a Secret or Top Secret security
clearance, and we expect cleared individuals to not sympathize
with violent extremists. Yet, we allow military service members
to be members of such organizations.
Do you agree that this is a contradiction and what should
we do about it?
Ms. Cronin. Yes, Ms. Speier, I strongly agree, and I think
the problem is that we don't have a joining up of the UCMJ and
the clearance process.
We don't have a consistent way of looking at exactly how we
are evaluating our service members. The degree to which these
rules are enforced across different services differs greatly,
and commanders tend to look on a case-by-case basis.
So it is a serious problem, I believe.
Ms. Speier. And you talked about a digital literacy. Do you
think it's appropriate that recruiters look at the Facebook
pages of potential members of the military, much like the
private sector looks at the social media pages of potential
employees?
Ms. Cronin. Yes, ma'am. I think that's an extremely
important step that we should take. It's no different from what
happened in the 1990s when there was a problem with gang
violence and there was an institution of examining tattoos, and
the military sent out a whole set of booklets about what those
tattoos were.
So I think we should be doing the same thing in our current
technological environment and looking at people's digital
behavior.
Ms. Speier. I thank the lady. My time has expired.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
our witnesses for joining us today.
Mr. Berry, I wanted to go to you. I know that as we talk
about the gravity of the allegations of extremism within the
ranks of the military, this is an extraordinarily serious
charge and I think it's good that we have the discussion about
this.
I want to emphasize that our military are highly
professional, highly trained, highly motivated, and highly
capable, and the overwhelming majority of people that are in
our United States military do so out of a sense of patriotism,
out of a sense of leadership. So I think we have to be very
careful about how we characterize this particular effort.
I want to make sure we get after extremism in the ranks. No
two ways about it. It is a corrosive force within our ranks,
wherever it exists.
And I want to make sure that as we look to root out
extremism, we don't fall into a self-fulfilling prophecy where
leaders look to quell freedom of expression within the ranks.
Ultimately, in doing that, I think you sow even, potentially,
more extremism.
So let me--let me get your your perspective on this. I want
to make sure that we look at having a carefully vetted and
curated effort that's done by a central nonpartisan authority
to make sure that we look at truly what is extremism--as you
point out, what is true extremism.
And I fear that if we do it any other way, we're going to
fall victim to the whims and be subject to the ideology of
local commanders, or worse, political appointees, where things
become a political measure metric.
Mr. Berry, I want you to give us your thoughts. As a Marine
yourself, you understand the very basic power of the command
structure and what that has on a service member's thought
processes if they start labeling wrong thoughts or wrong
beliefs.
Extremism, as you know, is a widely defined term. Who gets
to decide where we cross from personal or religious belief into
a disagreed upon extremist belief is the central mantra of what
has to be addressed with this.
It can be a slippery slope if we're not very careful that
we could, potentially, never undo. How, in your estimation, are
we ensuring that political ideology of our leadership doesn't
quell open and honest dialogue within the ranks?
Mr. Berry. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
I mean, that--I think that is the challenge that is before
us and before our leadership, and I do want to be clear that I,
certainly, can speak from my experiences but I am here speaking
in my civilian capacity and not on behalf of the Department of
Defense.
But I will say that my background is as a--as a litigator.
So I come from this--I come to this issue from that perspective
of having looked at and practiced many years of representing
service members and both in uniform and now in my civilian
capacity.
And I think if there's anything that the case law teaches
us, it is the importance, just how vital it is that we have a
good working definition. I think that's the starting point.
Because if you go--if we go all the way back to 1919,
during the height of what at that time was a socialism scare,
you had the Supreme Court of the United States saying that
somebody could be convicted for publishing literature that
urged people to resist the draft and they said because that was
unpatriotic un-American activity, and that's when we created
the clear and present danger test.
You fast forward to 2008, just a little over 10 years ago,
and an Active Duty service member actually had their conviction
reversed by the highest military court when they used the
internet to promote their white supremacist views, and the
court said that although they expressed those views, they did
not actively advocate for violence.
And then just a few years later, you had somebody, again,
post on a social media forum that they want to, quote/unquote,
``Kill the President,'' and that one was upheld because that
was advocating violence.
So there you start to see the case law is creating these
clear distinctions and differences, and I think that's where
the policy and the law needs to be is in reflecting those clear
divisions because, otherwise, as I've stated earlier, we risk
creating such a wide net that it begins to capture things that
the First Amendment and Constitution were never intended to
capture, which is what somebody believes, what God they
worship, or what they look like.
Mr. Wittman. Do you believe in using that case law to
define what is true extremism in that--in that understood
definition? How do you believe then that should be implemented?
Should it be through each individual commander or should it
be through a central nonpartisan authority? How do you think--
how do you think you actually apply that?
The Chairman. And you have slightly less than 10 seconds to
answer.
Mr. Berry. It should be implemented very carefully through,
I would prefer, a nonpartisan central authority.
Mr. Wittman. Mm-hmm. Very good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Norcross is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing and for gathering the information that we are not
always aware of, and thanking those who serve.
And as many people have mentioned, 99.9 percent isn't the
problem. But we do understand that one person can create some
tremendous issues and problems.
I grew up much of the time in Tennessee, and I remember
going to an amusement park called Rebel Railroad where we had
the flag and we were just thinking, as young children not
knowing, you know, this is about South and pride. Well, as an
adult, we learned something very different.
You speak about removing symbols across the military, in
particular, the Confederate flag. Why is that important? Give
us a historical perspective--here we are in 2021--why that's a
problem.
Ms. Brooks. Thank you for the question.
The Southern Poverty Law Center believes that monuments and
symbols to the Confederacy are harmful and prevent us from
moving forward together as a country.
As you know, the Confederacy stood against the Union and,
in addition, the Confederacy was formed to protect and prolong
the inhumane institution of chattel slavery in the United
States.
We believe that it is wrong for a military that embraces
all people to hold up as heroes those who fought to continue
the enslavement of African Americans.
Mr. Norcross. Can you touch base on the original reason why
many of these were adopted in terms of trying to bring the
country back as one? And why is it the right time now to remove
these?
Ms. Brooks. Well, I guess I would--say thank you for the
question--and as we understand it, it's important to put into
context the lost cause narrative, and as it--as the South was
being--well, former Confederate States were being brought back
into the Union, it was important that they be able to see
them--their efforts and themselves as heroic.
And so that began this kind of--this lost cause narrative
and creating heroes out of people who fought on the side of the
Confederacy. Now is the time because we understand, we have a
better and fuller understanding of our history. We're coming to
grapple with our history and our past, reckon with that past,
so that we can move forward together.
It is always the right time to recognize history in its
fullest sense and bring together all people. As Mr. Berry has
said, all people and all opinions should be valued.
When you have Confederate leaders or so-called Confederate
leaders venerated in public space, it is literally a slap in
the face to the ancestors of African Americans who were
enslaved by these--by these same folks. So I would say that.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you for your answer. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I do want to point
out that, you know, kind of the concern, I think, from our side
and with respect to the lady at the Southern Poverty Law
Center, Southern Poverty Law Center put out an extremist file
on Ben Carson and one of the key reasons that--my understanding
that you did that is because of his [audio interference].
The Chairman. I'm sorry, Austin, you're kind of breaking up
a little bit. Can you try that again?
Mr. Scott. Yes. So the Southern Poverty Law Center put out
a file on Ben Carson, naming Ben [audio interference].
The Chairman. Sorry. Zoom is not cooperating. We'll have to
try to get Mr. Scott back in just a minute so I'll go to the
next--hey, Austin, we're going to have to try to work on your
connection here because it's going in and out.
So I'm going to move on to Ms. Stefanik. I'll take the next
Republican on the list. Ms. Stefanik is recognized for 5
minutes and we'll try to get Mr. Scott back.
Elise, are you with us?
[No response.]
The Chairman. Okay. Well, strike two.
Mr. DesJarlais, are you on?
Dr. DesJarlais. Let me unmute now. Am I on?
The Chairman. Yes, we got you. You are recognized for 5
minutes. Please go ahead.
Dr. DesJarlais. Excellent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think I may be going in the same direction that Mr. Scott
was but trying to zero in--zero in on how we're defining
extremism, which is, as we know, a very subjective term in this
discussion.
I guess I would like to look a little further into some of
the opinions of the Southern Poverty Law Center.
Ms. Brooks, is it true that the American Family
Association, the Family Research Council, and the American
College of Pediatricians have all been labeled extremist hate
groups by your organization?
Ms. Brooks. Thank you, sir. Yes, that is true, and I will
just review, again, the definition for hate group. It's an
organization that puts out statements of principles by its
leaders that denigrate and malign an entire group of people
based on their identity characteristics.
It is not about being anti--just simply anti-LGBT [lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender] but it's about going out of
your way to vilify segments of the population. I would also
want to, for the record----
[Simultaneous speaking]
Ms. Brooks [continuing]. Earlier----
The Chairman. I'm sorry. Go ahead, Ms. Brooks. Finish your
thought.
Ms. Brooks. I just want to correct that we never--the
Southern Poverty Law Center never listed VFW [Veterans of
Foreign Wars] or the American Legion. That assertion appeared
as satire in a military satire blog known as Duffel Blog.
The Chairman. And if we could suspend Mr. DesJarlais' time
for just 1 second, I really want to emphasize that point.
That's why we have these hearings is to try to get to the
facts. Then we can debate what to do with them. But we can't be
throwing out a bunch of misinformation. That's why we try to
have these hearings to get to that point.
I'm sorry, Mr. DesJarlais. Your--it is your time. Go ahead.
Dr. DesJarlais. And I agree. Thanks for clarifying. That's
a relief to know that the American Legion and VFW were not
named.
But, you know, the American College of Pediatricians, if
they're going to be thrown in as a hate group or violent
extremism, certainly, that doesn't fit the definition Mr. Berry
gave. Is this because of their designation on their views on
transgender youth receiving hormone therapy and sex
reassignment surgery?
Ms. Brooks. Thank you for the question. It's not entirely
based on just that alone, sir. I'm happy to get the research to
you that we used to identify them as a hate group.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, let's move on. How about conservative
activist David Horowitz, the president of the conservative
think tank David Horowitz Freedom Center? You've designated him
as a hate group?
Ms. Brooks. Yes, sir. It's--let me just point out that
oftentimes people point out groups that sound patriotic, sound
religious, when in actuality those very groups who use these
names or these titles also promote very hateful rhetoric.
Let me clear up the radical traditionalist Catholicism
group that's named as a hate group because we're often thrown
that----
Dr. DesJarlais. Well, actually, let's not do that now, if
you don't mind. Let's not do that because we have limited time.
How about Antifa? Has your group designated them as a hate
group?
Ms. Brooks. Thank you, sir. No. The definition for the
Southern Poverty Law Center, again, is about hateful rhetoric
that maligns an entire group of people based on who they are.
It's important to note that Antifa is not--is a political
group that's loosely organized. They do not target any
particular group or marginalize any particular group in--in
that manner that's consistent with our hate group list.
Dr. DesJarlais. And I would argue that the American College
of Pediatricians has not either, and the whole point of this
discussion is, you know, I agree with my colleague, Mr.
Wittman.
As we're--as we're looking to sources to decide what
violent extremism is, we have to be very careful, and when I
see groups like Southern Poverty Law Center picking and
choosing, deciding what they accept is normal and abnormal and
using them as a source to define what's acceptable in our
military, I think that that creates a deep problem for moving
forward and we need to show consistency, because some of this
is opinion and it's not backed.
There's no room for violent extremism in our military
whatsoever. It seems like we all are in agreement on that. But
as we have this hearing to explore what these definitions
should be, I think we need to use sources that are fair across
the board.
And violent extremism, as defined by Mr. Berry, was very
good. But I think your organization kind of cherry picks and
chooses.
You have all right-wing groups listed as hate groups. You
have no left-wing groups, to my knowledge, and we need
consistency and bipartisanship as we move forward in this.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Brooks. May I, sir?
The Chairman. Please.
Ms. Brooks. The Center's listing does not require acts of
violence to land on the hate group list. I just want to be
clear. And we are in complete agreement with Mr. Berry's
definition about violent extremists.
You should not conflate the Southern Poverty Law Center's
hate census with a list of violent extremist groups, as it says
on the website.
The Chairman. Mr. Brown is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start by just really thanking you for elevating this
issue to a full committee hearing. I think important is so--the
issue is so important, and regardless of what percentage of the
Armed Forces, you know, subscribe or are members in extremist
organizations, the fact that there is one, I think, justifies
this hearing at this level. So thank you.
I appreciate this hearing. The topic is extremism in the
military. I think we can all agree that violent activity is
already prohibited under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
I think most of us will agree and accept that participating
in extremist organizations is also prohibited by most service
regulations, participating meaning things like attending
speeches or fundraising or recruiting.
But my concern goes to membership, and I recognize that
there are First Amendment issues. I recognize that service
members enjoy constitutional rights. But I also know that those
rights are applied differently in the military context.
First Amendment, for example, I cannot engage in political
speech when I'm in uniform. Fourth Amendment, a commander has
much more latitude in searching my living area on an
installation than the local police do my private residence in
Bowie, Maryland.
The Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has said that right
to jury trial doesn't apply.
And my concern with membership is twofold. One, if I'm a
member of an extremist organization, membership alone serves to
undermine the morale, the readiness, and unit cohesion, if not
even the discipline of that unit.
Membership is also a concern of mine because if I'm a
member of an extremist organization, I now get to benefit from
the skills training, the leadership training, the--that the
military provides.
So my question is really straightforward and I'll start
with Ms. Brooks. Does the First Amendment protect membership in
an extremist organization for a member of the military?
Ms. Brooks. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Brown, and thank you for
your leadership on the Confederate monuments issue. We
appreciate that.
Yes, they do have first First Amendment protections, as the
current prohibition against activities are stated kind of in
military regulations, it really--it really falls on whether or
not they're engaged actively or actively participating and
acting on that membership.
As you know, someone could sign up on a listserv and become
a member. So it really does require their active participation.
Mr. Brown. And, Dr. Cronin, your thoughts on that?
Ms. Cronin. Yes, sir. I agree completely about the
description of the limitations to rights that other people do
not experience. So if you're in the military you do have some
limitations upon your First Amendment rights. But the kind of
concerning activity that I'm talking about involves advocating
the overthrow of our government.
And so groups that advocate the overthrow of our
government, anyone who is involved in membership of those
groups cannot also be protecting the U.S. Constitution under
their oath.
So, to me, it seems to me that there's a very clear--a
contradiction there, and Congress needs to step into that part
of this story.
Mr. Brown. Mr. Berry.
Mr. Berry. Yes, sir, Mr. Congressman.
Membership in an organization alone establishes a strong
presumption, right? And I think the question then is, what does
that--what does that organization of which someone is a member,
what do they actually espouse or advocate, and as I've stated
before, if they're advocating violence to accomplish their
objectives, then the person who's a member has no place in our
military. If they're merely advocating ideas, then I think that
becomes a slippery slope.
We don't want to punish thoughts, ideas, or beliefs. We
want to punish conduct, and that's what our courts have
consistently held.
Mr. Brown. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, with what little time I
have left, I'll yield it back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We're going to give Mr. Scott another try. Austin, are you
with us?
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman. I hope this is better. I'm
actually on the WiFi now instead of a digital connection. Can
you hear me?
The Chairman. Yes, we can. We got you.
Mr. Scott. Okay.
So one is I do think that this is an important hearing. But
I don't think the problem is as big as some people make it out
to be. But it's kind of, you know, a little bit of poison in
the water is too much poison in the water, in my opinion.
My concern is, you know, what--what is the definition of
extremism. And as I was saying earlier, and this goes to Ms.
Brooks with the Southern Poverty Law Center, your organization
posted an extremist file on Dr. Ben Carson. Can you tell me why
the Southern Poverty Law Center labeled Ben Carson as an
extremist?
Ms. Brooks. Thank you for the question. Yes, the Southern
Poverty Law Center didn't initially identify Mr. Carson and
placed him on our extremist list. As you actually probably also
know, we removed him from the extremist list.
Mr. Scott. With all due respect, ma'am, you didn't
necessarily apologize to him. You put out a list of his
statements that, you know, he said marriage is between a man
and a woman.
It's a well established pillar of society and no group, be
they gays, be they North American Man Boy Association group, be
they people who they believe in--it doesn't matter what they
are. They don't get to change the definition.
I mean, he--but that--he believes that--he believes things
that you disagree with is the bottom line. Is that correct?
Ms. Brooks. Again, I could just point you back to our hate
group lists. So let me just be clear, that--that I appreciate--
we appreciate being a part of this hearing as we are discussing
the rise in white supremacy and white nationalism within the
U.S. military.
We are not here to debate the range of the Southern Poverty
Law Center's hate group lists. If we are focusing----
Mr. Scott. Madam, with all due----
Ms. Brooks. If we're focusing in on violent extremists in
the military, let us then do that and not take the opportunity
to----
Mr. Scott. Ma'am----
Ms. Brooks [continuing]. Have hits at the Center.
Mr. Scott. Ma'am, with all due respect, ma'am, the
definition of the hearing is extremism in the armed services is
my understanding, not white supremacy in the armed services. It
is that correct, Mr. Chairman? It is extremism in the armed
services?
The Chairman. That is correct, and I do want to make one
thing clear. I invited Ms. Brooks here. We invited Ms. Brooks
here to get her perspective.
I want to make it 100 percent clear we are not designating
the Southern Poverty Law Center as being in charge of deciding
what to do about extremism in the military.
We're taking their viewpoints, as we take many viewpoints.
They're not going to be running things or all of their
decisions are not what's going to be implemented.
So that why they're here is to have that conversation to
lend their expertise on the subject of extremism and----
Mr. Scott. Fair enough. Fair enough, Mr. Chairman. I'll
move on to another subject, and this is just something that I
point out to the committee as one of my primary concerns that
I'm seeing in--not just in the military but in a lot of areas.
You know, someone who, maybe they posted something when
they were angry 10 years past, and then that today is being
used as a reason to terminate them from their positions.
And so I just--again, I think we need to be very careful
that we don't take an individual statement or an individual
action that someone takes unless that action creates harm or
actually encompasses violence and cancel somebody's military
career and attack their character with an individual statement
or an individual action that somebody took or posted online.
And I'm--again, I'm very concerned that we're seeing people
through all walks of society lose their jobs and other things
simply because of a Facebook post or some other posts that, you
know, was made when somebody was mad.
And so with that, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield the remainder of
my time and thank you for giving me the opportunity to get to a
better WiFi connection.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, and I thank those
perspectives, and this is precisely why we're having this
hearing, and I am very sympathetic with the remarks that Mr.
Scott just made. We're doing this because this isn't easy.
That's exactly why we're doing this.
Yet, without question, extremism on the right and extremism
on the left has risen up and become an--become violent in both
instances and created problems, okay.
At the same time, yes, you have people who then dumb down
extremism to be that person disagrees with me, therefore, I'm
going to call them an extremist and try to make sure that they
don't get a chance to speak.
Okay, and how we walk between those two things in our
society right now is really difficult and it is, clearly,
impacting our military.
Clearly, whether you want to say, you know, you come from
the perspective there's too much extremism in the military.
White supremacy is rampant. It's making it difficult for
diversity. Or you want to come from the other side and say that
people are--the thought police are out there. You can't say or
do anything.
No matter which side you come at, you should acknowledge
this is a problem for the good order and discipline in our
military that we need to figure out how to better handle, and
that is what I'm hoping we'll be able to accomplish today.
I have Ms. Sherrill next on the list.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and this has
been a very interesting hearing and, certainly, I've not agreed
with every member but I do appreciate those who expressed their
opinions respectfully and thoughtfully, as we generally do in
this committee. It's something that I most like about this
committee, compared to some of my other ones.
I just want to talk a little bit and address something
quickly since we are talking about how to handle this, and
truth, and want to make sure that we are dealing with the
appropriate facts.
I'm afraid that Mr. Berry might have left a false
impression about some of the Army training. I think that, and
he's referred to it about three times in saying that the Army
had a doctrine against Catholics or evangelicals.
I think what he's talking about is a slide that was used
several years ago at a briefing for the Army Reserves Unit
Pennsylvania, and I know it was widely reported.
But I do just want to make sure people on this committee
are aware that an Army spokesperson said that the person who
created and presented that slideshow was not actually a subject
matter expert, that there was a complaint about it.
Upon receiving a single complaint, that person apologized
and deleted the slide, that the slide itself was not produced
by the Army. It's not part of policy or doctrine. The Army has
stated that, and the Archdiocese also said that that training
seems to have been an isolated incident.
So, certainly, it should never have happened but it is not
an Army policy or doctrine, as far as I understand it, to put
those groups out or compare those groups to hate groups.
I think--I think also, when we're looking at this, I agree
with the chairman, and I actually agree with the majority of
people who've spoken today that we have to be very, very
careful about what we call extremism and how we define it.
But we also--it is the military and we do have to make sure
that as people are taking an oath to our Constitution that they
can uphold that oath. And, certainly, there are groups, various
groups, that would undermine the beliefs of this Nation, the
beliefs of people in this country, and the values enshrined in
the Constitution, and you really cannot serve in our military
if you hold beliefs that really would support undermining our
Constitution.
So there are, of course, various military regulations and
directives that do place limits on service members' rights,
such as Article 88, contempt towards officials; Article 92,
failure to obey an order or regulation; Article 133, conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman; and Article 134.
So we do know that when you join the military you have
rights, but you also have responsibilities that you need to
uphold for our Nation.
I think this has been an important hearing, and I also
agree with those--I'm not sure; I suspect that some of the
extremist views are not widely held in our military. But it
does seem by some reporting that they are growing, that--up
from around 20 percent of military members for whom we see
evidence of extremist views now up in the 30s, and I certainly
think we do need more information to understand the threat.
However, in speaking to the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense]
and speaking to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, their opinion
is, and I think Representative Scott said it, you know, just a
little poison in the water is too much poison in the water.
So we certainly have to make sure we're rooting that out.
And I guess with that in mind, there's been a lot of discussion
about those with extremist views going on special social media
platforms or media outlets, particularly as they are banned
from more popular platforms like Twitter or Facebook.
So these extremist platforms are surely part of the problem
as they facilitate an indoctrination process into extremist
ideology that can culminate in violence, and the military has
been able to ban service members from accessing certain social
media platforms due to national security concerns related to
data being leaked to our adversaries.
Do you--I'd like to ask our panelists, do you see a benefit
in the military banning service members from accessing certain
social and media platforms favored by some of our extremist
groups on national security grounds, and can you discuss in
some detail, if you would, what you see as the First Amendment
issues?
Because I do think these are thorny problems and I do
appreciate the concerns presented today about First Amendment
issues. Thank you.
Ms. Brooks. Thank you for the question. I think that that's
an interesting, interesting proposition. Certainly, as you
know, there have been platforms or there are platforms that
currently exist for the express purpose of advancing violent
extremism.
So I think that that's very, very interesting and for the
committee to further contemplate or the military leadership to
contemplate whether or not that might be a line in the sand if
a platform was created for that express purpose.
Mr. Langevin [presiding]. The gentlelady's time has
expired.
Mr. Gallagher is recognized next.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. Thank you.
You know, honestly, I would say, based on my own experience
in the Marine Corps, it would shock me to learn that extremism,
whether it's Salafi jihadism or neo-Nazism, is endemic in the
military.
And, you know, when I was down range I served in diverse
units and all that really mattered, particularly in a combat
zone, was whether you as a Marine could do the job.
In other words, the Marine Corps seemed not to judge people
by the color of their skin but, rather, by actions that you
could actually quantify, like pull ups, marksmanship, or, you
know, a general ability to endure pain, which is a key part of
being a Marine.
So I guess--I guess I could be wrong. I guess the Marine
Corps could be filled with extremists on a level that I did not
appreciate before. But we have no DOD witnesses here to help us
make sense of that and I have not seen data from any of our
panelists that would help me make sense of this.
We seem to lack an agreed upon baseline, in fact, from
which we could even measure an increase or decrease in
extremism. We can't even agree on a definition of extremism.
And in the absence of data and in the absence of DOD witnesses,
I fear we're left making somewhat wild suppositions based on
our ideological priors, which is never a good place to be.
So some recent data that are worth paying attention to and
that do concern me, last month the Reagan Institute released
new polling that shows public trust in the military has
declined for the second consecutive year, down from 70 percent
in 2018 to 56 percent today.
So confidence in the military is down amongst all subgroups
including men, women, older and younger Americans, and
veterans, and in particular, since 2018, confidence in the
military is down 17 points for Republicans and 19 points for
independents.
So while we can all agree that violent extremism of any
kind has no place in our Nation and certainly no place in the
military, I am increasingly concerned that any popular
perceptions that the military is taking sides in political
disputes or targeting one particular political faction or the
other could exacerbate this trend of growing lack of confidence
in the military.
Moreover, it is a matter of fact that there's an active
propaganda campaign being prosecuted by the Chinese Communist
Party right now attempting to portray our entire country as an
evil racist hellscape with no authority to lecture them on
human rights.
And so I want to be sensitive about playing into our
competitors' hands on that front and sensitive to anything that
might undermine our ability to fight and win wars in the
future.
And with that in mind, Mr. Berry, could you please
elaborate on what, if any, long-term danger you see posed by
the loss of public confidence in the military? What could be
some of the consequences in terms of military readiness, for
example?
Mr. Berry. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
I mean, quite simply, the danger is if people lose trust
and confidence in the military, then America's mothers and
fathers stop sending their sons and daughters to join the
military.
And, you know, as someone who has served, I and you both
probably recognize the old saying that the military is a young
man's game.
Notwithstanding our ability to endure pain, it is very much
a young person's game and we have to have young people who are
willing to step up, make selfless service and sacrifice a part
of their lives and to be willing to, you know, to sacrifice
many of the freedoms that young people in this country enjoy in
order to serve our great Nation.
And if they start hearing the message that either that the
military has become a victim of partisan politics or that it
has become overly infiltrated with extremists and radicals,
then they'll--they will--they'll stop joining.
And one of--one more threat to that is simply telling
people of--entire classes of citizens that they're unwelcome to
serve in the military because of their beliefs and--or because
of, you know, their background.
So I think that's the real danger to readiness is people
will stop joining the military. We're going to start to see our
numbers plummet.
Mr. Gallagher. And in the few seconds I have left, Dr.
Cronin, is there an obvious fair data set we could draw upon to
get at this thorny issue? What makes the most sense, in your
opinion?
Ms. Cronin. Not yet, and that is one of the main reasons
why I think this is a very important hearing.
And let me just say that my many years of serving at the
National War College also gave me considerable insight and
considerable loyalty to the military and concern to make sure
that their image within the American public is not undermined
by things like the many indictments that are coming out against
current and former military who were involved on January 6th.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. I yield my 3 seconds.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
Ms. Houlahan is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you all for
joining us today.
I have a couple of questions and I do want to associate
myself with Mr. Gallagher's remarks about the importance of
data, and I hope that by having this sort of a conversation,
this kind of hearing, and exposing the fact that we need to all
be, you know, singing from the same hymnal and understanding
what the data is, that we end up with, as a consequence, having
a way to measure what matters, which is whether or not this is
an issue that we can get our teeth around and work to address.
My first question is for Dr. Cronin, and like many on the
committee and like you as well, I am disturbed about the
disruptive nature of our--of disinformation which definitely
has a corrosive effect on this democracy and on our service
members.
And in addition to being a veteran, I'm also a former
teacher, and so I believe that we need to invest in
foundational literacy but also in functional literacy, which
includes being able to figure out what is fact and what isn't
fact and to be able to ask critical questions about sourcing.
So I'm trying to understand what the possibilities are for
implementing an annual training of digital literacy and cyber
citizenship for our service members as an opportunity to teach
our forces how to analyze and evaluate sources to determine
whether that information is accurate or if it has been
manipulated.
I was hoping you could share what other types of training
methods the DOD might be able to benefit from to better educate
our service members and better equip them with the tools to be
able to be responsible cyber citizens.
Ms. Cronin. Yes, digital literacy is a serious national
security issue now, and we need to increase their ability to be
discriminating when they're on digital platforms and on social
media.
So I think this is an extremely important part of the
answer. Right now, there's very little training except with
respect to certain specific types of data. We spent a lot of
time understanding what ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
was doing and trying to look at the links between what radical
Islamic jihadists were doing.
And yet, we haven't looked at the kinds of things that can
be concerning when it comes to the same sorts of recruitment
techniques that the jihadists were using.
Now, I'm not drawing a parallel between them and the
problem we're talking about now, only about the means and the
digital means are very--I think, a very serious vulnerability
because they're undermining, I think, the strength of our
force.
Ms. Houlahan. And so are there any other sort of training
methods that you can think of that are maybe being effectively
used in other spaces that we could ask for and implement in the
DOD?
Ms. Cronin. Yes, ma'am. There are very good civic digital
training methods that are being put together in a number of
different--there's the New America Foundation has a new
initiative on this subject.
We can also go to our allies. The Scandinavians are
extraordinarily good at digital literacy. If we were to talk to
the Finns or the Swedes or the Norwegians and the Baltic
States, we would really learn a lot about practices that we
could help train our members with.
Ms. Houlahan. Really interesting and I appreciate that, and
my office will definitely take a look at that.
And with my remaining time I have a question for Mr. Berry,
a follow-up question. I really appreciated you doing--spending
some time going over the language and references in the UCMJ
regarding violence and various articles.
I'm not a lawyer, just a veteran. And I really appreciated
that you said that we should have good working definitions in
the UCMJ.
But in my cursory understanding and in taking a look, I saw
articles regarding mutiny and sedition and conduct unbecoming,
but I didn't see any specific references to domestic terrorism.
To your knowledge, does the UCMJ refer specifically to
domestic terrorism? If so, in what ways, and if so, why not, do
you think?
Mr. Berry. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I don't believe the UCMJ explicitly references the phrase
domestic terrorism. However, that is not to say that there are
not adequate measures that our military prosecutors can use to
get to any alleged acts of domestic terror.
We can actually incorporate Federal criminal offenses that
are defined by Congress for purposes of, you know, DOJ
[Department of Justice] prosecution, et cetera. Those can
actually be incorporated into a military prosecution if--you
know, if the elements are satisfied and if there's not a--you
know, a specific UCMJ provision that addresses that particular
crime or alleged crime.
So I guess the one--I know----
Ms. Houlahan. Is it--just to be clear, because I only have
20 more seconds, is it your position that because it's not
there that there are other things that cover it?
And I just am having a hard time reconciling the fact that
things are there for a purpose. I was--I was raised to
understand contracts exist so that, you know, you have a set of
understandings between you of what is under contract and what
is signed. Are the----
Mr. Langevin. I'm sorry. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Houlahan. No problem. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Gaetz is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I represent the district that has the highest concentration
of Active Duty military in the country and, respectfully, it is
on their behalf that I would categorize this hearing as total
nonsense.
Today, the Chinese Communist Party is building aircraft
carriers and jets that every member of this committee knows
threaten to close or eliminate the capability gap. North Korea
is perfecting the ability to strike the United States with
nuclear weapons. Cartels are hunting the next trafficking
routes. And here we are hunting, in the words of one of the
witnesses, memes and keywords.
Today, the House Armed Services Committee is engaged in a
review of constitutionally protected expression by our troops.
How utterly weak of us. No wonder the Chinese Communist Party
continues to gain ground.
The entire purpose of this hearing is not what the chairman
said. It is to gaslight the targeting of U.S. military patriots
who do not share pre-approved politics. This is not about
extremism.
It is not about white supremacy. It is about woke
supremacy. It is about converting the military from an
apolitical institution to an institution controlled by the
political left.
Today, instead of working together, we are gathered having
a hearing designed to tear us apart, to try to get us to view
our fellow countrymen and women who protect us as somehow evil
or dangerous or a cancer to be exorcised.
U.S. military is the most diverse organization in our
entire country. Men and women, Christians and Jews, Hindus,
Muslims, queer and straight, every last one of them patriots
with a united common purpose to protect and defend the United
States of America.
As we have noted, Secretary Austin said 99 percent of our
service members believe in the oath that they swore to and I
believe that, too.
But there is a difference between weeding out bad apples
who should be removed from the ranks and using the charge of
extremism to stigmatize different opinions, and, increasingly,
extremism is a euphemism the Democrats are using when they're
talking about conservatives, Republicans, and the group they
hate most, Trump supporters.
As one of our witnesses today we have a member of the
Southern Poverty Law Center. This group called the Family
Research Council a hate group for its opposition to same-sex
marriages.
The SPLC's designation of others caused a deranged leftist
to try to shoot up the Family Research Council's headquarters.
The Southern Poverty Law Center is a hate group. They'd even
smear Dr. Ben Carson.
So today we're literally being lectured on extremism by a
hate group and other witnesses who are looking to hawk their
books.
Recently, members of our Armed Forces have been threatened
with being chartered or chaptered out or detained by DHS for
possessing hate imagery.
Does having a Pepe the Frog meme somewhere on your phone
make you a dangerous extremist? Is it now included in the list
of hate symbols distributed right alongside neo-Nazi symbols?
How ludicrous.
But I guess it's to be expected. After all, the left never
finds blame in its own ranks. The FBI would rather investigate
garage polls than Antifa. Firebombing Federal courthouse is
small fries compared to Jussie Smollett.
In 2019, West Point concluded an investigation into whether
or not cadets were making white power hand gestures during the
Army-Navy football game.
It turns out they were not. They were playing something
called the circle game, but they were doxxed anyway, and after
an investigation was concluded the okay gesture was added to
the ADL's [Anti-Defamation League's] hate on display database.
How long until Make America Great Again hats are considered
an extremist symbol? How long until Catholic or pro-life groups
or those who believe in two genders are too extreme for the
ruling woketopians?
Today is about nothing more than cancel culture coming for
our military and it is disgusting. It is about power and we
ought to tread carefully, because our fellow Americans do not
take kindly to this type of tyranny.
I have no questions for the witnesses. This hearing is a
joke, and I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Well, I respectfully disagree with the
gentleman strongly. I think this is an important hearing and a
fact-finding hearing that we that we need to have. But the
gentleman certainly is entitled to his opinion.
With that, has Ms. Slotkin--has Ms. Slotkin returned?
[No response.]
Mr. Langevin. Okay. If not, then Ms. Escobar is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
just say a couple of words in response to my colleague who
really just tried to demean the purpose of this hearing. I'm
sure he's no longer on.
But I--and I also want to say to my--to some of my
Republican colleagues----
Mr. Gaetz. I'm still here. I'm still on.
Ms. Escobar. Sir, I have the floor. I'd also like to say to
some of my other Republican colleagues who expressed concern,
legitimate concern, about how we do this that I'm with you and
I do think it is really important that we do this carefully and
that we do this in a serious way.
You know, violent extremism is not a joke. Many of us
personally lived through the consequences of it on January 6th.
My community, El Paso, Texas, lived through it on August
3rd of 2019. This is taking people's lives. It is creating
incredible turmoil, and so it's very important that we approach
this with the seriousness that it deserves.
And so I--what I'd like to ask Ms. Cronin, you know, we've
talked a lot about the absence of data, and when we don't have
data then that frequently becomes an excuse for inaction.
And so I really would love just some very specific
suggestions from you on how you think we can begin to tackle
the absence of the data.
What are some things that Congress can do, some kind of key
steps, so that we can really wrap our arms around the depth of
the challenge that we have before us and identify opportunities
to do better and identify areas where we are really failing?
Ms. Cronin. Yes, ma'am. I think that the data is the most
important question. If we keep ping-ponging back and forth
between us as to what we mean and what's the status of the
problem, there's no way that you can answer that question
unless you have data.
So the kinds of data that the Department of Defense might
consider putting into place would be to use the Command Climate
Survey, for example, to pull out the data that may relate to
this question, to add an additional question to the Command
Climate Survey would be another way we could get around it, to
add a discharge code that includes extremism among the reasons
for discharge.
Right now, it's different for different services. So there
isn't any way to really know. The only kind of data that is
reported to Congress is data that arises in--you know, of its
own. So we don't have--you know, we don't have a way to
categorize it and to collect it rigorously.
But those are three ideas that I would have.
Ms. Escobar. And would you--you know, one of the things
that I and many of my other colleagues have been working on not
just within the services but across the board in government is
increasing diversity, because diversity matters.
And, you know, much of domestic terrorism and violent
extremism can be rooted and linked back to white nationalism,
racism, bigotry.
And so the lack of diversity at the very top of the
military, I believe, plays a role, unfortunately, in
perpetuating some, you know, the environment where it can
flourish.
Do you see a link there? I would love to know your thoughts
on that.
Ms. Cronin. I'm not sure about the link because we don't
have the data. I will say that I am very strongly in favor of
increasing diversity at the senior ranks within the Department
of Defense.
I'm a girl who wanted to join the Navy and there were no
opportunities at the time. So that was not a pathway that was
open to me. So I think that increasing diversity in the senior
levels of our services will help all of us and will help the
services as well.
Ms. Escobar. Wonderful. Thank you. I only have about 30
seconds left so I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. But I will
just once again say that I really do appreciate colleagues on
both sides of the aisle who are willing to tackle this issue
with the seriousness that it deserves.
I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Bacon is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank Ms. Cronin, Ms. Brooks, Mr. Berry for being
here today and the discussion we're having.
My question revolves around this. First of all, we should
make clear, and we do--we need to do it repeatedly--that white
nationalism is repugnant and some of the views of groups where
they're embracing anarchy or anti-government views are also
repugnant.
The way it comes across to me, though, the last 3 or 4
months, when we're talking about the military and extremism
that that is the only focus or that's the way it's perceived by
many and by myself as well.
Are we being selectively blind to other areas of extremism?
That's going to be my question. And I'll just give a couple
examples.
Just recently, we had two soldiers arrested for giving
information to ISIS to aid ISIS in attacking our forces. So
they're under arrest and will probably be court-martialed.
We see some of the worst cases of violence in military
garrisons from Islamic extremists. We have had a whole year of
Antifa [audio interference] in many our cities. I just don't
hear those aspects being talked about now.
So my question is, are we being too selective in this
discussion? Are we ignoring other areas of extremism?
Thank you.
Ms. Cronin. Mr. Bacon, I've studied extremism for decades
and I've studied jihadist extremism. I've studied anti-
technology extremism, left-wing extremism as well as right-wing
extremism and white nationalism and white supremacy and all of
those things.
So it is true that the word extremism includes more than
just anti-government or a white supremacist or white
nationalist extremism. I think that one of the key reasons why
we need a good strong definition that is passed through
Congress and that can be applied by our military and that is
fair in including the kinds of actions that extremists
advocate, that would help our ability to include all
extremists, not just a selective category of one or another.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
And, Ms. Brooks and Mr. Berry, I'll give you a chance to
answer too if you'd like.
Ms. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Bacon.
I would point the committee to the executive summary from
the Office of Director of National Intelligence agreeing that
there's not enough sufficient data.
But I will point that the military itself, the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, issued a report on March
1, ``Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in
2021.''
Though they recognize that there are a range of ideologies
that animate extremism, they identified racially and ethnically
motivated violent extremism and militia violent extremists as
presenting the greatest threat.
Now, this is--this is from the FBI, Department of Homeland
Security, and Central Intelligence. So and the--with the
limited data that we have, we have the report or survey results
from the Military Times last year that reported over 50 percent
of service members of color stated they witnessed racist or
white supremacist behavior within the ranks and to note that
only a half a percentage point identified Islamic terrorism or
al-Qaida or other foreign terrorist organizations as an ongoing
problem.
But you're absolutely right. We're looking at extremism
writ large. It just so happens to be, and the military agrees,
that the greatest threat, the most present threat, is from
racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists.
Mr. Bacon. Let me just respond to that, and I appreciate
your feedback, Ms. Brooks, because I'm not going to deny
there's issues here and we should be clear that it's--and
oppose it and call what it--what it is. It's repugnant.
But, yet, most service men murdered in acts of extremism
has not been from that. It's been from radical Islamism within
the ranks or from the outside attacking people on base.
So to say that when you look at fatalities and murders,
that it's not the case within the military ranks.
Mr. Berry, would you like to follow up at all?
Mr. Berry. Yes, sir, thank you.
Extremism is a cancer, right, period, and, at least as I've
defined it earlier, and I've never heard anyone say, ``I'm okay
with a little bit of cancer,'' or ``I'm okay with getting--you
know, with one type of cancer but not the other.''
And so I think that is part of the problem is that when
we're trying to eradicate extremism, we should not be picking
winners and losers in this effort to eradicate true extremism
from our military.
Mr. Bacon. With that, I have seconds--7 seconds left. Mr.
Chair, I'll yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Bacon.
Ms. Slotkin is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you. I appreciate everyone putting this
hearing together, and, you know, when I was at the Pentagon,
one of the things that really distinguished the American
military from lots of other militaries that we would partner
with across the world is we were willing to actually look at
ourselves and reflect.
We did after-action reviews. We criticized ourselves
internally if there was something that we didn't do right or on
the mark. And so I think it's important and a healthy thing for
us to look at this issue, particularly given the clearly high
proportion of those who came inside the Capitol during the
attack that had some sort of military background. I don't think
that's cherry-picking to just look at it. That's just straight
numbers and data.
Although I will say our data on almost anything else is,
indeed, really poor and it is hard to have a conversation about
this when we don't have the data and, frankly, we don't have
the Department of Defense here to talk through these issues.
And I would offer, Mr. Chairman, that if we're going to
talk about them we shouldn't talk without them, and that we
should be given them--giving them the opportunity to talk about
the breadth of the problem once they've had a full, you know,
chance to review it.
Secretary Austin has been excellent on these issues, and I
think it's super important that he's talking about his own
personal experience where he personally helped root out, you
know, a nest of skinheads that were in his unit.
So I would just put that as a long commentary. I would also
note that in the sort of 20 years since 9/11 we have worked
very hard to try and identify any service members that might
have links to foreign terrorist organizations.
I mean, we have hunted folks down as much as we were able
because of such a risk to the force. It's such a risk to our
country to have that, and we should put in at least the same
level of effort as we were on that threat, which, while it did
happen, was relatively small, and I think it--I hope it's the
same in this case.
I guess I would ask Ms. Cronin, you know, you've been--
you've mentioned this before, but walk us through what the
Defense Department should be tracking in order to deal with the
threat. I don't think that a lot of data exists out there. What
should they be tracking?
Ms. Cronin. Well, one of the difficulties, Ms. Slotkin,
that you've highlighted in comparing the chasing down of
foreign terrorists and those associated with foreign FTOs
[foreign terrorist organizations] and those that would be
associated with organizations in the United States is that
there is no objective consideration of what organizations
within the United States are beyond the pale for the military.
And it's very difficult for the military to know exactly
how to consistently, across all the services, execute a good
policy in the way that they did with respect to foreign
terrorist organizations because there is--there's no
identifying domestic terrorist organizations.
Now, I was responsible at the Congressional Research
Service for tracking that FTO list. I understand the
difficulties of that list. I also understand what the
difficulties are in developing a domestic list.
But I think we have to begin somewhere. Those organizations
that are most advocating for the overthrow of our government
should already be on some sort of a list that the military has
which is legally against the law for them to chase, and that
doesn't exist right now.
So that would be the first place to start to give them some
clear markers that help them to respond in a way that is--that
is consistent and fair to our military.
Ms. Slotkin. And if I could, and this is where my life on
the Homeland Security Committee in a hearing we had this
morning is colliding with the work that we're doing here.
Mr. Berry, you said that you had concerns about a list.
Does it not make sense to take those organizations that we
identify as using violence to further their political goals as
at least a starting point of groups to look at within the
service members?
Mr. Berry. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Yes, it, obviously, makes sense to identify any group that
advocates violence. Again, you know, my earlier comment was
simply meant to convey that we should be criminalizing conduct,
though, not their, you know, their thoughts or their beliefs
because that's nearly impossible to do.
But if a group----
Ms. Slotkin. But if someone affiliates with a group that
has--that has declared very clearly that they believe in using
violence to further their political goals, not a--short of
violence I agree with you, right.
If someone is angry with their government, if someone has
strong views about, frankly, about other people but they stop
short of advocating violence, I understand it.
I see my time is up but--and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to be clear from
the start that I certainly agree and associate myself with many
of the comments. All forms of extremism are repugnant. Whether
it is communism, fascism, white extremism, Islamic extremism,
they're repugnant. They should be rooted from the ranks.
But there has been a lot of discussion about data here and
what evidence we have that this issue is a significant issue
within the United States military, and I am struggling--I have
yet to hear any data, any evidence aside from anecdotal
reporting and one survey.
So, Ms. Brooks, you stated earlier--you said that we are
here today--you're here today to discuss the rise of white
extremism within the military.
So I want to be clear. Do you have data that shows that
white extremism is on the rise within the United States
military?
Ms. Brooks. Thank you, sir. Yes, the research on--the
Southern Poverty Law Center's research, other researchers,
journalists, have data that moves beyond anecdotal.
There are some clear patterns as to when we've seen
historical rise in white nationalism or white supremacy within
the military. We had one peak post the Vietnam War and again 9/
11, and we are seeing it once again. And so it's----
Mr. Waltz. So, Ms. Brooks, I'm sorry. In the interest of
time, what numbers? Give me some numbers.
Ms. Brooks. It's in a range. I said it's in a----
Mr. Waltz. How many? What services?
Ms. Brooks. It's in a range.
Mr. Waltz. Is it in the Army, Navy, Air Force?
The Chairman. I'm sorry. Mr. Waltz, she's attempting. Give
her just a second there. Go ahead.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. Sure.
Ms. Brooks. It's in the written testimony, sir.
So, I mean, I referenced the Atomwaffen Division. I
referenced the Boogaloo movement and I referenced The Base. And
so those would be some concrete examples, recent examples, of
infiltration into the military from white supremacists or white
nationalists. You'll find more details in our written testimony
that's a part of the record.
Mr. Waltz. No, I've looked over your testimony and,
frankly, it looks--I mean, it is--there are some surveys that
you make, but I'm looking at some holistic, across the
services, across the branches actual numbers, and I'm just not
seeing it.
And I want to be open-minded to see it. You know, Ms.
Slotkin, who I have enormous respect for, you know, referenced
the arrests from January 6th and every one of them should be
arrested.
But if we start extrapolating those numbers--look, at the
end of the day, we've talked a lot about misinformation. This
is exactly what the Chinese and the Russians, as we just saw in
Anchorage, Alaska, want the world and want us to believe, that
our military is systemically racist.
I can tell you from 24 years in the military, our military
is there to win wars. It is mission based. It is mission
focused. It is--of course, there are flaws that we should
always seek to improve. It is merit based and mission focused
on who can do the job.
And I was taught and every person of color that I've been
around receiving the same training teaches you that your skin
color is camouflage. It's just what color of green.
And I can tell you when I was pulling people out of fire, I
didn't care if they were black, white, or brown. The enemy's
bullets, certainly, didn't care. They just cared that we're
American.
And actually, I didn't even care if they were American. In
many cases, they were Afghan or they were Iraqi. They were
fellow soldiers and fellow Marines, fellow sailors, period.
And I would just--for my colleagues and for our witnesses
today, this notion is incredibly corrosive--can be incredibly
corrosive to morale and to good discipline and order and we
need to be incredibly careful.
So my next question is which part of the military
regulations that currently exist do you feel are not sufficient
and--or not being enforced in terms of extremism?
Ms. Sherrill referenced many of them, so I don't need to
repeat them.
Ms. Cronin. Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Sure.
Ms. Cronin. I'm not a lawyer. So I'm not going to be able
to reference specific parts of the UCMJ. I will say that we
share a desire to make sure that the military is strong in
being able to resist any impression that it is being undermined
by members within it.
And so if we were to gather much more rigorous data and it
were to show that there was very little extremism, that would
help us when it came to----
Mr. Waltz. Right.
Ms. Cronin [continuing]. And we were studying ourselves in
this way, that would help us for making the China connection.
Mr. Waltz. I fully--and I fully support that effort. I
fully support that effort. Just in the interest of time, Mr.
Chairman, with the--with the challenges that we're facing, with
ships being built five to one, more being launched into space
by the Chinese and the rest of the world combined, 70 percent
of our young people are now showing that they're too obese to
come into the military----
The Chairman. I'm sorry. Your time has expired.
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. I would--I would----
The Chairman. Wrap up.
Mr. Waltz. You get my point. Thank you. Appreciate it, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes, I do.
Mr.--I'm sorry. Mrs. Murphy is next. She is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate this
conversation that we're having. And while I recognize and agree
with my colleagues that there are a lot of issues that are
really important as far as our military is concerned and how
well we compete with our near-peer adversaries and I know that
we will have time in other hearings to address that, I also
understand, having worked at the Department of Defense, that at
the core of our strength as a military are the men and women
who are willing to serve.
And so having conversations about our force and who's
within it is important, and I also, without a doubt, agree that
the issue that we're talking about is not reflective of the
majority of our service members.
However, there are some issues that are of concern and I
think, primarily, we have gone around in circles about what it
is we're talking about and what type of extremists.
But for me, what I think we're trying to figure out is are
there people who are serving in the U.S. military who, through
actions or belief, believe and have acted on a set of extreme
ideology that would either interfere with their ability to
defend the U.S. Constitution or cause them to defy the civilian
orders of their political leaders and, therefore, not be able
to carry out their jobs as service members.
And if we are looking at that as the heart of what the
issue here is in defining what, you know, actions or extremist
ideology that we're concerned about, I'd like to ask the
witnesses what--how can we collect data on that type of, you
know, characteristic within the force so that we can have a
more informed conversation about how widespread this is?
Ms. Cronin. Well, as I was saying to Ms. Slotkin, I think
that a number of things could be done. One of them is to use
the Command Climate Survey to get a better sense of what the
problem is or is not, and I think we should have a consistent
discharge code that can be tracked, and that it's--and what is
reported to Congress.
There should be a regular report on this topic that
includes other than those cases that naturally rise
independently, but also include cases that are reported
through, through that discharge process.
So that would be where I would start in any case.
Mrs. Murphy. Great. And so having talked a bit about
getting a better feel and our arms around how widespread the
issue is within the active force, I'd like to turn to the
veteran force.
In the previous Congress, I worked in a bipartisan way to
improve the Transition Assistance Program, which prepares
service members for life after the service.
And I believe it was Mr. Brooks who said that the unity of
being a part of the military is a way to deter participation in
extremist groups. In the--after military service members
transition out, they are often disconnected from that unit.
So my question is, are there things that we can do in the
transition process that would ensure that there's more
resilience within the service member to reject or to be able to
not be brought into some of these extremist groups that then
use the skill sets that the U.S. military, using taxpayer
dollars, provided these individuals against the U.S.
Government?
Ms. Brooks. Yes, certainly. Thank you for the question.
The Southern Poverty Law Center does ask that the military
provide an off ramp and kind of an offboarding as people
separate from military service and prepare for reentry.
As you mentioned, sometimes, especially so when someone is
involuntarily separated, it's important that there be support
services that mitigate against that veteran thinking that they
were not valued, and then just kind of separated and thrown
out, because it's people like that, veterans like that, that
are soft targets or completely vulnerable to violent, hate, and
extremist groups.
We would say that there needs to be additional supports
across the board, something that is offered to all service
members as they--as they reenter civilian life just so--just so
that they're better prepared.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
[No response.]
The Chairman. I'm sorry. Who do we got next on our side
here?
Mr. Franklin is recognized for 5 minutes.
[No response.]
The Chairman. Mr. Franklin, are you hearing us?
[No response.]
The Chairman. Mr. Franklin? All right. We got any other--I
don't see any other Republicans on this.
Mr. Franklin is--Mr. Franklin? Not with us. I don't see
another Republican.
Mrs. Hartzler.
[No response.]
The Chairman. Mr. Moore, are you with us?
Mr. Moore. I am with--I am with you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. We have a winner. Go ahead.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Moore. I have the honor to be with [audio
interference].
The Chairman. Mr. Moore, sadly, we have lost you. You have
frozen on us. We cannot hear you.
So I'm going to give Mr. Keating a shot and we'll see if we
can work out the----
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Are we set, Mr. Chairman? Bill Keating.
The Chairman. Yes, we are, and I apologize, Mr. Moore.
We're going to have to get you back later.
Mr. Keating, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for your comments earlier in the hearing so that there's no
mistake what this hearing is about, and any attempt to recast
it and the reasons for it really aren't on point. So thanks for
keeping us on point here.
Let me just deal with something. There's been some back and
forth. But there's something I don't think there's any question
about, and that's the fact that these extremist groups have
been targeting our military groups at different stages, and
they're targeting them, encouraging them to enlist in some
instances.
They're targeting recruits. They're targeting active
service members. They're targeting retired service members. So
that is indisputable. And why are they doing it? They're doing
it because so many of these people have military training, so
they have that type of training, and it gives their
organizations more legitimacy.
So that is one way to, I think, to view this. So there
should be no question about the fact there's a problem.
And I'm just going to ask our witnesses, are there ways or
suggestions that we have where we can look more carefully at
those recruitment measures by these extremist groups? Target,
you know, what sites they're going after?
Target what groups of people they might be going after, so
we can combat that? Is that a great approach to take during
this? Is that something that could be useful?
Ms. Cronin. Yes, sir, Mr. Keating. I think that is
absolutely a wonderful suggestion and something that we should
prioritize, because remember that some of the extremist group
websites and social media are being accelerated by our
adversaries.
And this is proven. This is not a conjecture. So digital
literacy is a key element of protecting our force, and keeping
on top of that social media and website landscape is a key part
of our effectiveness of our force.
If you have an extremist group whose server, and there are
several, are actually posted within Russia, that should be a
concern for our force.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. Any other witnesses have any other
suggestions in that regard?
Mr. Berry. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for the question.
I agree that, you know, in a--in a previous duty assignment
when I was in the Marine Corps, I actually did what was called
information operations, and I think this is an opportunity for
us to--we should delegitimize these extremist groups and I
think one of the things our government, our society, our
military can do is to wage an information operations campaign
against extremist groups to delegitimize them in the eyes of
the American public and in the eyes of service members.
This is a good opportunity to also send a clear message to
our enemies, to America's enemies, that we are a strong nation
who will defend our Constitution, and to remind them that the
American service member does not fight because he or she hates
what is before them but the American service member fights
because they love what is behind them.
And that is a harrowing message. If I were an enemy of the
United States, I would not want to hear that message. That
would scare me.
Mr. Keating. Interrupt--I'm sorry, sir. But thank you for
that.
The other, given the time that's left, is more a comment
because I won't--I don't think you're going to be able to
respond directly. But also a reason to have this hearing and to
have this approach is for greater transparency.
You know, if you look at the inauguration itself, during
the inauguration there was a screening all of a sudden after
January 6th of some of the Guard and Active Duty members as
well that were there.
So that screening was there. Twelve people were removed.
There were statements from the Pentagon. Two were identified
with extremist groups. The others might have been in some gray
area or criminal area.
But the point is this. When we're dealing with this, there
should be acknowledgement of why and exactly what standards are
there--why someone, for instance, in this instance, was removed
from that duty at the inauguration.
And it should be clear to everyone as to why, because we're
going to have to deal with issues of trying to get to what
criterion we use to discuss it here, what's extremist, what
isn't.
The training effectiveness that's in place, is it working?
What responses are there, and other members of the military,
what are their obligations in reporting themselves? Is it a
mandatory obligation or not?
And these are the things we have to discuss at other
hearings. I bring that up as a comment. Due to time, I'm going
to have to yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having this
hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Keating. Appreciate that.
So here's what we're going to do. Ms. Brooks, first of all,
Ms. Brooks needs a couple minute break. You may take that. I'm
going to be wrapping some stuff up here. I've got three people
left on the list.
We have Mr. Panetta, who is going to be next on our side,
Mr. Moore, if we can get the Zoom thing fixed there. We'll then
come after--well, Mr. Moore will be next, actually, and then
Mr. Panetta. Then I have Ms. Jacobs. Those are the three people
I have left who have not asked questions who could ask a
question.
I have one--Mr. Rogers and I have to get to a 2:30
classified brief. So if the questioning takes us past that
point, those members who are left to ask questions will also
have the great honor of wrapping up the hearing at that point.
I do have one quick comment and then one question for Mr.
Berry, which I'm going to have to get in now because I have to
leave in a couple of minutes.
The most important comment is this hearing is really
important to have the discussion, and Mr. Keating, I think,
said it quite well. And the terrible thing is we've got
demagogues on both sides and, sorry, Mr. Gaetz is the best
example of the demagogue problem that we have today. You know,
he talks about the fear of, well, people are being silenced.
Then he says, we shouldn't be talking about this. Okay. So you
just differ on who you want to be silenced.
It's not so much a matter of whether or not silencing
people. We're having a hearing to have these discussions and I
think my Republican colleagues have contributed a great deal to
this discussion, because I am very concerned about
overreactions to this.
You know, I will not go into this in great detail because
my staff would pull their hair out if I did. But I am concerned
that we are--we are targeting people the blink of an eye and
shutting them off from jobs and everything because of something
they said, in some cases, 20 years ago.
Okay. You know, that's going on and there's no--there's no
reference point. There's no set of rules. There's no structure
to that. And it becomes just this, you know, excuse to jam your
views down somebody else's throat.
But for the members, and there's only been two that have
said this today, that have said there's no point in having this
hearing, that's just demagoguery. There is, obviously, 100
percent a point in having this hearing because we have so much
disagreement about how to handle this.
This is a problem. This is being discussed. This is being
dealt with. This hearing is not creating this issue in the
military. Okay? It is an issue in the military right now that
is being bitterly disputed by a lot of different people in
terms of how to handle it.
I would like us to stop bitterly disputing it and start
handling it in an appropriate and fair manner for all
concerned, and I think all three of our witnesses have brought
crucially important perspectives on how we do that. That's what
we're trying to do.
So let's stop shouting at the other side, saying we
shouldn't even be talking about this and, furthermore, it's
terrible that people are being silenced. That's just idiotic
and demagoguery, which we don't need.
Towards that end, I have a question for Mr. Berry. You've
talked about how if you can identify people who are advocating
violence, basically, we should shut them down. But that does
leave open the question what if you have people within the
military who are advocating white supremacy, openly advocating
white supremacy?
Not from a violent perspective, not saying we should kill
anybody, just saying, I think white people are superior and
people of color are inferior and we ought to build our society
around that principle. How should the military handle that?
Mr. Berry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I should start
by saying that as a first generation Asian American who served
in the military, I am acutely aware that there was a time in
our Nation's history when people of my ethnicity were viewed as
with suspicion, as potentially disloyal or even as enemies of
this country despite our efforts to prove our worth through
military service.
And even recent tragic events have now perhaps given me
pause to question whether there still might be some who
question my Americanness simply because of my ethnicity.
So to your question about what--you know, what should we do
when somebody is espousing one of these ideologies? I go back
to one of my responses to one of the very first questions,
which is, you know, this is a leadership challenge and that
this requires good sound leadership principles to address.
And I think one of the questions is, to me, it reminds me a
lot of, Mr. Chairman, when you said, did this person post this
20 years ago? You know, was it 10 years ago or was it last
week? And that, I think, raises the specter of rehabilitation
potential. You know, can a person be recoverable.
The Chairman. Absolutely. And it's not--it's not just
violence. I agree with you. If it's, like, 10 years ago, if
it's an offhand remark, whatever. But if you've got somebody
who's in there right now actively vocally advocating these
things, that is something the military should be concerned
about, even if it isn't necessarily linked to violence.
Mr. Berry. Yes, and I want to be clear that there are
already mechanisms in place to handle that, and we have got
fantastic prosecutors in the military that can and do address
that just as we do with Federal prosecutors from the Department
of Justice, FBI, et cetera.
So, you know, if somebody--but, again, you know, and I
just--again, as a litigator, I look to what is the--what does
the case law say? What is the jurisprudence from the Supreme
Court and the military court.
The Chairman. Thank you. You've--sorry, you've answered my
question and I know there's other members who want to get in
and Mr. Rogers and I have to go.
Mike, I want to give you a chance. Do you have anything you
want to say before we go to the order?
Mr. Rogers. No, I just reiterate what I said in my opening
statement. We need to tread very carefully here on First
Amendment rights. This is--this is dangerous territory.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Now, we will try to get Mr. Moore. Do we have you up and
working here?
Mr. Moore. Can you confirm that you can hear me?
The Chairman. We got you.
Mr. Moore. Okay.
The Chairman. Seems loud. Seems clear. You are recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Moore. Okay. I'll be brief. Thank you all for being
here. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member.
I hope that my question actually strikes the tone that the
chairman just laid out. I'm hosting [audio interference] many
airmen, pilots, and Active Duty folks and about this topic, and
the resounding piece that comes from them is very, very small.
I have not interacted with it. I have not had experience
with it. And I just--I'm concerned, and I communicate this. I'm
concerned that it gets blown up to too much. That's not me
saying I don't think we should talk about it and we should--we
should--we have to address this.
But my questions to the experts today is how do we make
sure to overemphasize morale so that this doesn't become a
resounding--a small, small minority of instances?
How does that not become way too prevalent, if you will,
that it hurts morale and it hurts the willingness for people to
go and serve their country?
That's my biggest concern with this--with this entire
topic. Is there--is there systems in place to make sure that,
you know, if it's a communication strategy or anything of the
like, how do we make sure that we do that for our men and women
serving so this--they don't get branded as this--as this
becomes more widely discussed?
Ms. Brooks. Thank you. If I could respond to that question.
I think that what's exciting about this stand-down that the
Secretary has called for and conversations around this, we need
to invite conversations around, you know, our differences and
commonalities.
I think that we need to normalize conversations about what
is going on in the broader society so that--I don't know if you
saw the recent ``60 Minutes'' piece where service members who
had been in for quite some time really welcomed the opportunity
to have these hard conversations.
And so once we begin to normalize that, I think it takes it
out of the--outside of the possibility of it being seen as
something that is happening or not happening in the military
and not in the broader society.
Ms. Cronin. I would also add, sir, that the morale is
extraordinarily important and your question is extremely
sensitive and it requires very great care.
But the--our armed services need to be concerned with good
order and discipline, and if you have members of that armed
services espousing ideas that attack and alienate other
members, you're going to have a dissipation of the strength of
the force overall.
So that's a morale problem, too. So, I think, in a very
sensitive way if we handle this and have these conversations,
we're actually going to be strengthening morale.
The Chairman. Mr. Moore, do you have anything further?
Mr. Moore. Nope. I'll yield back. I appreciate the
comments. I will yield back for time constraints.
The Chairman. Thank you. So here's what we're going to do.
I've got three people now. Mr. Panetta, Ms. Strickland has
returned, and Ms. Jacobs. So I have got to go to a classified
briefing. But what I'm going to do is I'm going to trust the
three of you.
Mr. Panetta, you are going to speak and in 5 minutes,
hopefully, you're done. And then you turn it over to Ms.
Strickland, and Ms. Strickland will then turn it over to Ms.
Jacobs, who will then wrap up the hearing. And, hopefully, we
won't have any glitches between here and there.
So Jimmy, I am turning--I'm turning the committee over to
you and you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Panetta [presiding]. I got it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate that. Obviously, thanks to you and to Ranking
Member Rogers for not only having this thing, but yes, for
discussing it, for dealing with it, and for leaning in on it
and, therefore, your leadership on it. So I appreciate this
opportunity.
Thanks to all the witnesses for being here and, obviously,
your preparation and your knowledge and your expertise on this
issue, and your willingness to take the time to come talk about
it and discuss it as well. So thank you very much.
I guess following up on a couple of questions that just
were posed to you. I didn't necessarily--in regards to the
chairman's question, Mr. Berry, in regards to what disciplinary
options are there, is it just UCMJ? Are there other ways to go
about it?
If somebody--you know, if there is some sort of, you know,
somebody owns a white supremacists sticker or clothing or
magazine or something like that, what are the options that the
commanders have at that point?
Mr. Berry. Thank you, Congressman.
Military leaders have a plethora of options available to
them to address disciplinary matters. It doesn't just have to
go to UCMJ. In fact, that would be the most drastic.
You know, a court martial would be the most drastic measure
taken. Less drastic measures could be administrative
separation. So that's, you know, separation from the military
that doesn't carry with it a Federal conviction and criminal
record and other collateral punishment.
It could be a reduction in rank or other forms of
administrative punishment or administrative discipline, or it
could just be counseling, you know, training--sort of some of
the rehabilitation efforts that we've discussed here
previously, and that--and so if you suspect that a service
member, that a junior service member, might be susceptible to
becoming a victim to radical and extremist ideology and then
begin down that path, then I think it's incumbent upon
leadership to--you have to know your troops, and then--and you
have to address it early and nip it in the bud as quickly as
possible. Otherwise, it can spread.
And so--but to answer your question, briefly, Congressman,
yes, there are any number of options that fall short of court-
martialing and federally prosecuting a service member.
Mr. Panetta. Okay. And, look, on that aspect of training, I
think, you know, if you've been in the [audio interference]
through those less than effective training programs that can
happen sometimes, apparently, I guess what the word was in
regards to the recent unit-led extremism stand-down that there
was a lot of boxes being checked was the feeling.
Is there any other DOD efforts that we have heard about to
not just standardize but to make better and more effective this
type of training for our military members who need it the most?
And all these----
Mr. Berry. Yes, Congressman. I'm aware of the article, I
think, to what you're referring about the--you know, sort of
the proverbial checking the box. And I think that is something
that DOD leadership should be concerned about is not being
perceived as merely checking the box.
One of the things that I've learned in my experience on
Active Duty is that nothing brings together service members to
truly--to truly form a bond and forge a bond like shared
adversity.
And once you have that shared adversity, you forge that
bond of unit cohesion and morale, then there really is a sense
of collective accountability.
And so I think instead of this being pushed down from a top
down approach----
Mr. Panetta. Reclaiming my time. Thank you. I'm just
running out of time.
Let me just take it to Ms. Cronin and give her an
opportunity to answer that as well.
Ms. Cronin. Okay. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, Mr.--yes, sir, Mr.
Panetta, I do wish we had someone here from DOD because I'm
sure they would have more ideas.
But I would say that the military is excellent at
developing people of character, and one of the ways that they
do that is through personal counseling and personal mentoring
of other military members.
So we need to have our leaders at the top levels, but also
our NCO [noncommissioned officer] leaders, who are able to
counsel those who show the signs. But in order for them to
counsel, they have to know the signs, and currently I'm not
convinced that they do.
Mr. Panetta. Fair enough. Fair enough. And basic on that, I
know Mr. Keating and I got just a little bit.
Ms. Cronin, what is the role of individual service members
and peers addressing other peers when they see that? Is there
any sort of training or mandate on that one?
Ms. Cronin. Sir, I don't know about the training or mandate
currently. But that would be an excellent question for DOD. I
will say that after the horrible tragedy at Fort Hood in 2009
with Major Hassan, one of the criticisms that was made of those
around him was that they did not report their concerns about
his behavior.
So we need to make it safer for people to report their
concerns in this kind of a situation and I think the military
knows how to do that, and they need to protect those who come
forward, too.
Mr. Panetta. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Cronin. I'm going to turn
the gavel over to Ms. Strickland.
Ms. Strickland [presiding]. Great. Thank you very much.
Well, thank you to all of our panelists who are here. So a bit
about my background--I shared this with Ms. Brooks--is that my
father served in military, fought in two wars, and he joined
the military when it was segregated, and he was stationed in
Korea where he met my mother. And so, you know, when I think
about extremism, I agree that we are not trying to suppress
anyone's right to express themselves or hold beliefs.
But we also know that extremism can have an effect on
morale. I also know that, you know, when people join the
military, they're really young and they're impressionable. And
so as we think about how we screen people for extremist
ideology, can you talk about how we can improve the screening
process and who is actually participating in a screening
process who will know to look out for extremism? And I will
direct that to all of our speakers but I'd like to start with
Ms. Brooks, please.
Ms. Brooks. Thank you, Ms. Strickland.
I would refer back to just what Dr. Cronin was sharing,
that it's important that the people who are doing the
interviewing or the recruiting also be trained on identifying
the signs. And so the recruitment officer, the people that are
working out in the field, the first commanders, they all need
to be able to recognize the signs of some exposure to extremist
thought.
And there's a whole kind of, you know [audio interference]
with respect to tattoos and this kind of thing.
There's a lot of screening that is done currently when a
recruit joins the military. We're--all what we're asking is
that being able to identify the signs of exposure to extremist
thought and behaviors that that be a part of that.
We're also looking at taking a closer look at what happens
in between, because we recognize that some people enter the
military already radicalized, some become radicalized while
they're in the service, and then again at reentry.
So thank you.
Ms. Strickland. Thank you.
Mr. Berry.
Mr. Berry. Congressman, I think it would be interesting and
important to study and perhaps try to distinguish between, as
Ms. Brooks just said, those who enter the military already
having been, quote/unquote, ``radicalized'' and then those who
become radicalized after joining the military.
I think that is an important distinction. I also think
there can be ways--our recruiters, our military recruiters, go
through a pretty robust training program to become recruiters.
So I think that that can be incorporated into their training in
terms of--in the same way that they identify membership in
criminal gang activities and whatnot.
But I do want to caution that there is, I think, a
potential constitutional danger in asking service members or
would-be service members to essentially self-report. I think
that raises some First Amendment and Fifth Amendment
implications.
Ms. Strickland. Great. Thank you.
Dr. Cronin.
Ms. Cronin. I think I agree with what my fellow witnesses
have said. I would only add that I'm not necessarily talking
about self-reporting. I'm talking about those around the person
who is expressing extremist ideas or showing signs in terms of
tattoos or using websites inappropriately.
It's usually their buddies who know that first, so they
need to be safe enough to be able to report that to their--to
their leaders.
Ms. Strickland. Yeah, and, you know, and thank you for your
responses. And, again, I just--I will just emphasize, and I
have, you know, a good friend who attended one of the military
academies, and he just reminds me again you have people who
joined the service, they are young, they are impressionable,
and if they have contact with people with extreme views, it
wouldn't be a surprise if they started adopting them
themselves, and also, too, reminding us that the Commander in
Chief can set the tone for how people think about how we
interact with each other.
So thank you very much for this opportunity, and thank you
all for being here. And I'm now going to yield to my colleague,
Representative Sara Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs [presiding]. Well, thank you so much, Marilyn.
I actually want to follow up on your question. But before I
do that, I just want to say to some of my colleagues who have
expressed concern about this hearing that I'm hearing from
constituents very frequently.
[Audio interference] members--I represent San Diego, which
is a proud military community--who feel like the extremism that
they're seeing in the military denigrates their service, and
hearing from parents who are afraid about their children and,
in particular, their daughters' safety while they're in the
military.
So this is not about trying to go on a witch hunt. This is
about making sure our service members are safe and are not
surrounded by extremists when they join the military to serve
our country.
So I wanted to [audio interference] of people being
recruited into the military who are already radicalized, the
problem of people who are radicalized once in the military, and
the problem of people who, upon leaving the military [audio
interference] radicalized.
And I recognize that we need more data on all this, but
Professor Cronin, I was hoping you could talk a little bit
about if you think those three are the actual bucket, which one
of them poses the biggest problem or should we be focusing the
most on?
Ms. Cronin. Yes, ma'am, Ms. Jacobs.
Part of the time you were talking there was a pause in the
Zoom. So if I did not understand your question, please correct
me.
Of the three places--recruitment, in Active Duty, and then
leaving Active Duty--I think that the most dangerous is
probably leaving Active Duty on the basis of--this is just on
the basis of my impression because, again, we don't have that
data.
But I think we need to make sure that our veterans have
access to the kind of training and information and education
that will prevent them from falling into these kinds of
extremist ideas.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay, thank you. That's helpful.
And then [audio interference].
Voice. Ms. Jacobs, we're having a----
Mr. Moore. Rep. Jacobs--yeah, we're having a tough time
hearing you there.
Voice. Ms. Strickland, if you could take the gavel back if
this continues, that would be wonderful.
Ms. Strickland [presiding]. All right. So is there anyone
else who would like to speak at this time?
[No response.]
Ms. Strickland. All right. Seeing them, so I want to thank
our guests for being here. I hope I'm doing the right thing in
lieu of Chair Smith.
Thank you for this very robust conversation. I will just
say that, you know, this is a complicated issue that we
recognize. We never want to trample on rights but want to make
sure that we have morale that is strong, we have strong
recruitment and retention numbers, and that the general public
has trust in our institutions, including our military, that
they are going to be people who are going to uphold their oath
and keep us all safe and protected.
I know that on January 6th when there was the failed
insurrection at the Capitol and we heard that there were some
members of the military and veterans who were part of that, it
caused great alarm.
So we love our military, we respect them, and we want to
make sure that they have the tools they have to be successful
and rooting out extremism is one way to do that.
So thank you, everyone, for being here today, and we are
now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 24, 2021
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 24, 2021
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 24, 2021
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 24, 2021
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. Dr. Cronin, in your most recent book, Power to the
People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow's
Terrorists, you explore the risks and opportunities of emerging
technologies and their use by terrorists and extremists. Have you seen
any evidence of domestic extremist groups recruiting members of the
Armed Forces for their skills in new and emerging technologies
including robotics, 3-D printing, autonomous systems, or AI? What is
your assessment of the potential threat to national security if
domestic violent extremist organizations acquire these capabilities?
Ms. Cronin. The use of emerging technologies such as robotics, 3-D
printing, autonomous systems, or AI in the U.S. military is becoming
common and accessible among U.S. troops. There is always a lag time
between what the U.S. military does and what militia groups adopt, but
domestic violent extremist organizations are showing strong interest in
emerging technologies, especially 3-D printing and small UAVs. It is
only a matter of time before they recruit for and acquire these and
others, particularly as new technologies become fully integrated into
U.S. military tactics and training. The diffusion of emerging
technologies to extremist groups is a threat to national security and
domestic stability because two key drivers are in place: U.S. domestic
extremist demand and foreign terrorist incidents that U.S. groups will
copy.
First, regarding demand, groups such as the Boogaloo Bois, Oath
Keepers, and Atomwaffen (now called National Socialist Order) actively
recruit military members and push current members to enlist. They prize
training and expertise in surveillance techniques, counterintelligence,
the handling of explosives, the construction of IEDs, the use of
firearms, and small-unit tactics such as clearing rooms, stack
formations, and fire-and-movement. For example, Oklahoma City bomber
Timothy McVeigh learned how to construct and use explosives during his
U.S. Army service in the first Iraq War; he then killed 168 people in
the deadliest attack of domestic terrorism in U.S. history. Domestic
violent extremists in the military also gain access to weapons,
equipment, and other material that they can steal. For example,
Atomwoffen has specifically urged members to pinch night vision
goggles, explosives, and military gear. According to court records,
Oath Keepers member and Air Force veteran Jessica Watkins had in her
possession a small drone, alongside battle gear, radios, and numerous
firearms.
Second, regarding foreign connections, there's evidence of right-
wing groups abroad prizing skill in using 3-D printers and UAVs,
primarily for surveillance in advance of an attack. The Christchurch,
New Zealand attacker Brendan Tarrant used a UAV to conduct mosque
reconnaissance in advance of his attack. In the U.S., Atomwaffen has
used UAVs in propaganda videos. The Boogaloo Bois have used KeyBase, an
end-to-end encrypted site with file-sharing capabilities, to share 3-D
printed gun files and instructions on how to construct homemade
firearms and explosives. The last three chapters of my book, in
particular, have much more information about this threat.
Mr. Moulton. Dr. Cronin, in your written testimony, you advise that
``active-duty military members should have regular, periodically
updated digital literacy training aimed at making them less susceptible
to online misinformation, disinformation, and active recruitment''. Can
you please elaborate on this idea and describe what this training would
look like?
Ms. Cronin. Digital literacy for active-duty military members is as
vital as weapons training, military drill, physical fitness, technical
schooling, or effective tactical skills--indeed, in our current
historical context, perhaps more so. Influence operations from both
internal and external actors are targeting the Armed Forces. Our
failure to teach servicemembers at all ranks to recognize the threat
and to defend themselves undermines American strength from within,
without a shot being fired.
The training should first establish the facts and indicate why the
training is needed. For context, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks,
we had a series of educational activities that explained what Sunni
extremism was--the various groups, history, demographics, ideology,
symbols, etc.--to prepare our military members to recognize it. I know
this because I was involved in a great many of them. We armed our
servicemembers and DOD civilians with the facts they needed to
understand and respond to the threat. I should also note that we placed
a great deal of emphasis on distinguishing between the tiny number of
Sunni extremists who were in violent terrorist organizations such as
Al-Qaeda, and the vast number of innocent co-religionists who were
often victims of Al-Qaeda violence themselves and deserved protection.
Today we could begin by doing the same kind of analysis of the
threat of U.S. domestic extremism (or terrorism). Fact-based education
about the landscape of U.S. domestic violent extremism (right-wing,
left-wing, and others) can draw upon a deep history and ample widely
agreed evidence. Informative content might be presented in a series of
short videos covering key elements, including the characteristics,
symbols, ideologies, and evolution of various known domestic extremist
groups. The overview could end with the present day, including the very
small number of active-duty--and the larger number of veterans--
involved in extremist groups. Individual names would be anonymized,
ongoing cases avoided, individual rights carefully respected; however,
the state of play is not that difficult to draw together in an
apolitical way for the basic education of the force.
After establishing the what and the why, the focus should shift to
the how, and here is where the focus would be specifically on digital
tools. Of all the training that current military members and DOD
civilians are required to take, the most sophisticated is Information
Assurance Training, especially the ``Cyber Awareness Challenge.'' With
the facts established, digital literacy training might employ the same
``game-style'' approach, oriented toward recognizing, avoiding, and
resisting specific disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation
techniques.
Fortunately, we do not have to create this digital curriculum from
scratch. We can follow the lead of the Scandinavians, who have dealt
with disinformation campaigns for decades. In particular, the Swedes
have put in place digital literacy training called Countering
Information Influence Activities. It is designed to counter the
systematic use of deceptive techniques, especially online and via
social media. The first half includes practical ways to recognize
influence techniques, such as social and cognitive hacking, deceptive
identities, technical manipulation (bots, sockpuppets, deepfakes,
phishing), disinformation, malicious rhetoric, and symbolic actions
(hacking, orchestrated protests, boosted messaging). The second half
explains how to neutralize digital manipulation, including pre-bunking
specious arguments, responding with facts, checking sources, and
blocking or exposing those behind the disinformation.
Educational content might be delivered in small segments. Shorter
videos and targeted online courses are effective at changing behaviors
and reducing vulnerability. For example, in 2016, a RAND/IREX study
found that watching a 2-minute video about media literacy messaging
made users significantly less likely to engage with disinformation. The
National Association for Media Literacy Education and the New America
Foundation are both developing tools for digital media education that
could be adapted for the military. At New America, Peter Singer and
Eric Johnson have also suggested a range of self-study lessons,
including guided discussions at the platoon level and leadership
professional development courses for officers and NCOs.
A crucial element of digital literacy is ensuring that those at
every level of leadership--from commanders to recruiters to sergeants
training raw recruits--can recognize common memes, symbols, and slogans
of domestic extremists. In the 1990s, recruiters had a large reference
book that helped identify gang tattoos and symbols grouped according to
U.S. location. That kind of information should be readily available in
online databases, updated with FBI information and easily accessible,
especially to commanders, military lawyers, and military police.
Many of the newer groups, such as Proud Boys and Boogaloo Bois,
deliberately use ``whimsical'' memes and uniforms, such as Pepe the
Frog and Hawaiian shirts, that camouflage their violent intent and
avoid content moderation. Everyone knows what a Swastika or ``SS''
means; however, commanders or sergeants may be unaware of what ``6MWE''
or ``RWDS'' signify, to cite two examples. A game might include
pictures of people hanging out together, wearing t-shirts with logos or
showing off a new tattoo, etc. The trainee would need to identify
whether any of these memes or logos is dangerous? What does it stand
for? Which extremist group does it come from? Again, frequent updating
would be crucial.
A final point: Question-for-the-record #11 notes that the FY21 NDAA
(Sec. 589E, Training Program Regarding Foreign Malign Influence
Campaigns) requires the Secretary of Defense to establish a program for
training servicemembers and civilian employees about the threat of
malign foreign influence. A well-designed, effective digital literacy
program could make active-duty members less susceptible to online
targeting by both domestic extremists and malign foreign actors. Mainly
because there are overlaps in online targeting techniques, it might
make sense to combine efforts and have one extremely well-produced,
state-of-the-art digital training program that covers both. (The answer
to Question #11 also includes information relevant to this question.)
Mr. Moulton. What role should social media platforms play in
protecting our service members and veterans from nefarious actors like
domestic violent extremist organizations? Should social media companies
work with the Department of Defense to impose tighter controls on how
service member data is collected, stored, and shared with 3rd party
vendors? I welcome all witnesses to respond.
Ms. Cronin. In general, I do not think social media companies have
the necessary military expertise to protect service members from
domestic violent extremists--although that certainly does not eliminate
their responsibility for this problem. A better approach would be to
require social media companies and, even more critical, providers of
website forums such as Reddit, Parler, Clouthub, Rocketchat, Matrix and
others, to have greater accountability for policing and removing
violent, hateful insurrectionist material that is hosted on their
platforms. Doing so would protect former servicemembers, too. These
tech companies have ample resources to do that but either actively
resist or treat it as an afterthought, especially after a crisis draws
attention to the problem.
Concerning collecting, storing, and sharing data with third-party
vendors, yes, there should be tighter controls on how servicemember
data is handled. The fact that U.S. servicemembers can be tracked via
apps on their mobile phones, and that commercial data can then be
bought and sold in bulk by America's adversaries, is a glaring
vulnerability. The NSA has warned all military and intelligence-
community personnel about geolocation data and other digital exhaust
that reveals personal movement, search histories, locations of personal
residences, and so forth. Yet, it is treated as more of an independent
responsibility than a systemic liability. That approach is
insufficient.
This question of controlling American servicemember data is one
part of a much bigger problem. The hugely profitable commercial data
broker industry is unconstrained in the United States. Unlike in China
and even the European Union, the data of American citizens is virtually
unregulated and undefended. For reasons of U.S. national security, the
sale of U.S. commercial data badly needs regulation and oversight.
Mr. Moulton. I would like to draw the witnesses' attention to a
more insidious infection of extremism in the ranks, and it has reared
its ugly head in the shockingly high percentage of troops who are
refusing to take the COVID-19 vaccine: as many as one third of service
members have opted out. These troops may not be co-opted by domestic
terrorists, but they are clearly influenced by conspiracy theorists
online. And that is dangerous for U.S. national security as online
disinformation is directly threatening the United States military's
readiness. Russia and China know this. They have online campaigns to
sow doubt in our vaccines. The Pentagon clearly needs to develop a more
aggressive campaign to counter Russian and Chinese disinformation, but
that is not enough. I would like the witnesses' assessment of how we
can also insulate the force against domestic disinformation without
infringing upon the Constitutional freedoms of all Americans.
Ms. Cronin. The COVID-19 vaccine is still very new and has been
under emergency FDA authorization. I believe that once the FDA fully
approves the vaccine, it will be possible to mandate that all
servicemembers receive it (unless there is a mitigating medical
condition). Servicemembers are routinely required to receive many
vaccines--from tetanus to yellow fever to anthrax to flu. The COVID-19
vaccine could be added to the list of jabs they receive as a matter of
routine.
I agree that disinformation is a pernicious problem that undermines
confidence in the COVID-19 vaccine and reduces the United States
military's readiness. The best way to insulate the force against
domestic disinformation without infringing upon the Constitutional
freedoms of all Americans is to institute better education and digital
literacy training. I have explained what a digital literacy effort
might look like in my answer to question-for-the-record #6. Digital
literacy training does not teach participants what to think but how to
think critically about the information they encounter. Our
servicemembers must be better equipped to resist conspiracy theories
and misinformation. Fact-based digital literacy and education is a
proven way to do that.
Mr. Moulton. What role should social media platforms play in
protecting our service members and veterans from nefarious actors like
domestic violent extremist organizations? Should social media companies
work with the Department of Defense to impose tighter controls on how
service member data is collected, stored, and shared with 3rd party
vendors? I welcome all witnesses to respond.
Ms. Brooks. What role should social media platforms play in
protecting our service members and veterans from nefarious actors like
domestic violent extremist organizations?
SPLC believes that each of the military service branches must
address the problem of extremism at every stage of a servicemember's
career--better screening during the recruitment process, an updated,
expanded prohibition against advocating for, or involvement in,
supremacist or extremist activity for all active-duty military, and
more extensive efforts to help veterans transition into civilian life.
Social media and tech platforms are largely owned and managed by
the private sector, not the government. However, we strongly believe
these corporations must be part of the solution to address the
promulgation of hateful activities online. Far-right extremists have
seized upon new technologies--especially encrypted, decentralized, and
peer-to-peer services--to organize, spread propaganda, and recruit new
members. As the SPLC noted in our Year in Hate and Extremism 2020
report, far-right extremists' reliance on some of these platforms for
recruiting, organizing, and propagandizing is profound.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``The Year in Hate and Extremism 2020,'' Southern Poverty Law
Center, Feb. 1, 2021, https://www.splcenter.org/year-hate-and-
extremism-2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social media platforms have many of the tools they need to reduce
online hate activities, but they lack the will to do so. For decades,
the SPLC has been fighting hate and exposing how hate groups and other
extremists use the internet. Most tech companies have their own Terms
of Service, essentially rules of the road. We have lobbied internet
companies, one by one, to create and enforce policies and Terms of
Service to ensure that their social media platforms, payment service
providers, and other internet-based services do not foster hate,
discrimination, or extremism. Unfortunately, major tech platforms have,
time and time again, chosen profit over progress. Their intransigence
on robust content moderation has allowed hate speech, conspiracy
theories, and disinformation to flourish.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Hannah Gais, ``Has Accountability for Big Tech Come Too
Late?'', https://www.splcenter.org/news/2021/02/16/has-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the deadly January 6 insurrectionist riots at the U.S.
Capitol tested the will of tech companies to tackle extremism, it has
also underlined the importance of the ongoing discussion regarding
regulating these platforms as well. In particular, it has shored up
additional support for a conversation about the updating or reforming a
key piece of legislation regulating tech companies. This provision,
known as Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, has long
shielded companies from liability for users' content on their
platforms. In considering platform regulations and changes to Section
230, Congress must clearly define the problem it seeks to address and
then ensure that any proposed changes will not do more harm than good.
On Jan. 29, 2021, Representative Jackie Speier wrote to President
Biden, Secretary of Defense Austin, and Director of National
Intelligence Haines urging more extensive social media screening for
new recruits and servicemembers seeking security clearances for white
supremacist and violent extremist ties.\3\ We share Rep. Speier's view
that the Department of Defense must make more extensive efforts to
ensure that recruiters and commanders responsible for identifying and
addressing prohibited activities and discriminatory harassment have the
education and training to recognize behaviors (social media or chat
group activity), indicators (tattoos, symbols, or paraphernalia), or
other signs of involvement with supremacist ideology and activity. More
extensive background investigations--including social media
footprints--of individuals who seek security clearances is also
essential.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://speier.house.gov/_cache/files/9/2/9260a8a5-70e8-4a5a-
b803-63762ce719ee/0DC836C67 FFBB4841B15B7D7FE5295EB.2021-1-29-letter-
to-potus-secdef-dni--social-media-clearance-recruiting.pdf.
\4\ Meghann Myers, ``STRATCOM boss clarifies comments on `zero'
extremism in his organization,'' Military Times, https://
www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/04/22/stratcom-boss-
clarifies-comments-on-zero-extremism-in-his-organization/, April 22,
2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, an October 2020 report mandated by the FY 2020 NDAA
examined the security and effectiveness of existing screening for
individuals who seek to enlist in the military. Among other things, the
report recommended closer cooperation with the FBI, including expanded
use of its database of extremist tattoos and more attention to
potential recruits' social media presence.\5\ Consistent with First
Amendment and appropriate privacy concerns, we support more extensive
use of easily accessible public source internet information about
potential military recruits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Reports to Armed Services Committees on Screening Individuals
Who Seek to Enlist in the Armed Forces,'' https://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/20486018-congressional-report-hasc-
study-regarding-screening-individuals-who-seek-to-enlist-in-the-armed-
forces_pl_-92-14-oct-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, as we stated in our March 24 testimony before the
Committee, SPLC believe that, consistent with the First Amendment, the
Department of Defense should expand and clarify existing prohibitions
against active duty personnel advocating for, or involvement in,
supremacist or extremist activity,\6\ including updating and revising
the provisions of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ In its December 2020, report, ``Recommendations to Improve
Racial and Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in the U.S. Military,'' the
Department of Defense Board on Diversity and Inclusion, at 51, included
a recommendation to prohibit extremist or hate group activity,
emphasizing that ``[t]his recommendation sends a clear and forceful
message that DoD is committed to improving inclusivity. Service member
participation in hate groups not only erodes the public's trust in
their defense institution but also compromises our organization's
lethality.'' https://media.defense.gov/2020/Dec/18/2002554852/-1/-1/0/
DOD-DIVERSITY-AND-INCLUSION-FINAL-BOARD-REPORT.PDF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Defense Instructions Number 1325.06.\7\ To the
greatest extent possible, these extremism-related institutional reforms
should be made uniform from service to service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ DoDI 1325.06, ``Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among
Members of the Armed Forces,'' Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Defense, Nov. 27, 2009, Incorporating Change 1, Feb. 22, 2012. https://
www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/132506p.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Should social media companies work with the Department of Defense
to impose tighter controls on how servicemember data is collected,
stored, and shared with 3rd party vendors? I welcome all witnesses to
respond.
SPLC has no policy position on this question.
Mr. Moulton. I would like to draw the witnesses' attention to a
more insidious infection of extremism in the ranks, and it has reared
its ugly head in the shockingly high percentage of troops who are
refusing to take the COVID-19 vaccine: as many as one third of service
members have opted out. These troops may not be co-opted by domestic
terrorists, but they are clearly influenced by conspiracy theorists
online. And that is dangerous for U.S. national security as online
disinformation is directly threatening the United States military's
readiness. Russia and China know this. They have online campaigns to
sow doubt in our vaccines. The Pentagon clearly needs to develop a more
aggressive campaign to counter Russian and Chinese disinformation, but
that is not enough. I would like the witnesses' assessment of how we
can also insulate the force against domestic disinformation without
infringing upon the Constitutional freedoms of all Americans.
Ms. Brooks. SPLC has not done a lot of work in this arena. But we
are impressed with reports and studies emerging from Finland that
evidence how impactful an empirically-guided, well-structured program
of digital and media literacy can be for inoculating a society to the
harms of disinformation and misinformation, extremism, and
radicalization. The Guardian reported in January of 2020 that Finland
``top[s], by some margin, an annual index measuring resistance to fake
news in 35 European countries, adding that ``the programme aims to
ensure that everyone, from pupil to politician, can detect--and do
their bit to fight--false information.''\8\ Finland demonstrates how
civil society and government may play an ethical, cutting-edge role in
helping citizens safeguard their families and communities to such harms
through education.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Jon Henley, ``How Finland starts its fight against fake news in
primary schools,'' The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2020/jan/28/fact-from-fiction-finlands-new-lessons-in-combating-fake-
news January, 29, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Moulton. What role should social media platforms play in
protecting our service members and veterans from nefarious actors like
domestic violent extremist organizations? Should social media companies
work with the Department of Defense to impose tighter controls on how
service member data is collected, stored, and shared with 3rd party
vendors? I welcome all witnesses to respond.
Mr. Berry. Social media platforms should be treated no more or less
favorably than any other entity with which the government interacts.
The Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs should maintain their
primary focus on service members' and veterans' conduct. But due to the
enormous influence and common carrier-like status social media
platforms wield, if a social media platform has credible evidence that
a service member or veteran is engaged in violent extremist conduct, it
is reasonable to expect them to report it. I do not have a professional
opinion as to whether the Department of Defense should impose tighter
controls on how service member data is collected, stored, and shared.
Mr. Moulton. I would like to draw the witnesses' attention to a
more insidious infection of extremism in the ranks, and it has reared
its ugly head in the shockingly high percentage of troops who are
refusing to take the COVID-19 vaccine: as many as one third of service
members have opted out. These troops may not be co-opted by domestic
terrorists, but they are clearly influenced by conspiracy theorists
online. And that is dangerous for U.S. national security as online
disinformation is directly threatening the United States military's
readiness. Russia and China know this. They have online campaigns to
sow doubt in our vaccines. The Pentagon clearly needs to develop a more
aggressive campaign to counter Russian and Chinese disinformation, but
that is not enough. I would like the witnesses' assessment of how we
can also insulate the force against domestic disinformation without
infringing upon the Constitutional freedoms of all Americans.
Mr. Berry. Due to some of my recent military assignments, I am
acutely aware of the role information operations plays in matters of
national security. I am not aware of any foolproof method to insulate
the force against disinformation campaigns. As long as we have access
to information, we will be susceptible to disinformation and
information operations. I am also unaware of any documented link
between service members who refuse to receive the Covid-19 vaccine and
such disinformation campaigns. It is important to note that there is a
significant percentage of the service member population that objects to
vaccinations due to sincerely held religious beliefs. These religious
objections to vaccines have long pre-dated Covid-19. Any attempts or
efforts to compel or coerce service members to take a vaccine contrary
to sincerely held religious beliefs raises serious constitutional
questions. One possible approach might be for the Department of Defense
to undertake its own positive information operations campaign;
highlight the positives of military service, patriotism, etc., while
rebuking violent extremism and casting it in a negative light. In this
manner, we can reinforce positive perceptions about the American
military, while receiving the collateral benefit of sending a message
of strength, unity, and cohesion to America's adversaries.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
Mr. Morelle. FY21 NDAA includes language (Sec. 589E, Training
Program Regarding Foreign Malign Influence Campaigns) requiring the
Secretary of Defense to establish a program for training service
members and civilian employees regarding the threat of foreign malign
influence. What are best practices you would recommend the Secretary of
Defense apply when implementing this program in 2021?
Ms. Cronin. Unfortunately, we are already in a kind of ongoing
``war'': information operations playing out in the cognitive dimension
have tangible effects on our Armed Forces' fitness, readiness, and unit
cohesion. For that reason, we should think of our response more as
active defense or ``war-gaming'' rather than yet another mandated
training exercise that ticks a box. This is about the fundamental
integrity of the force. I recommend that the department not use
PowerPoint briefings, lengthy handbooks, and multiple-choice tests.
Instead, employ fact-based short videos, interactive first-person
games, and state-of-the-art simulations that match the sophistication
of the threat we face. We must ensure the training is updated at least
annually, including proven, up-to-date and well-researched examples of
foreign actor interference or influence, drawn from material produced
by people with dedicated, in-depth expertise. The Department has
excellent FFRDC organizations such as RAND, IDA, and CNA, with
outstanding analysts who could create this kind of state-of-the-art
product. Or you could support peer-reviewed research at private
universities and Centers like my own, or perhaps at Stanford University
or Carnegie Mellon University, using public-private partnerships to
produce excellent work that treats this problem with the seriousness it
deserves. The threat of malign foreign influence is not entirely
separate from the domestic violent extremist threat. We do have a long-
standing, deep, historical problem with domestic violent extremism at
home, especially anti-government and white supremacist terrorism, but
at various times also left-wing terrorism. On top of this, state
adversaries are interfering directly or using proxies to accelerate
U.S. domestic polarization and extremism. Foreign actors are
facilitating overseas contact and training, amplifying extreme voices
on social media (e.g., through bots or fake accounts), providing
cryptocurrency to groups, and hosting extremist chat rooms on foreign
servers, for example. We are well behind the curve in addressing this
problem and need to devote more of our cognitive resources to solving
it. It is a serious threat to U.S. national security.
Mr. Morelle. Dr. Cronin, the total numbers of extremists in the
military appear small, yet their impact can be enormous. Can you
explain that impact?
Ms. Cronin. We do not know whether the numbers are small or large.
As I mentioned in my testimony, the most important thing the Armed
Forces can do is to collect rigorous data that will help us respond.
You cannot fix what you cannot measure, and no serious plan can be
built without defining the scope of the problem.
If we assume that the number of extremists in the military is
small, their impact can nonetheless be significant because they
undermine the trust upon which military effectiveness relies. Even a
few extremists affect: 1) unit cohesion and morale; 2) the integrity of
the chain of command; and 3) the faith of the American people.
Unit cohesion and morale are threatened when servicemembers hate,
threaten, and harass each other. Servicemembers are free to hold their
own political views. Still, they are not free to act illegally on
extreme political beliefs whether their motivations are white
supremacist, racist, left-wing, nationalist, populist, libertarian,
authoritarian, or anything else. Unit cohesion depends on trust. Trust
disappears when there are cleavages within the ranks instead of a
united front against an adversary.
Second, extremists in the military undermine the chain of command.
Servicemembers who either follow or decline to follow orders based on
their extremist ideas weaken the fighting ability and integrity of the
U.S. Armed Forces.
Third, as mentioned in my testimony, Americans' trust in the U.S.
Armed Forces is declining. Any hint of violent extremism among those to
whom the American people entrust sensitive secrets and deadly weapons
is alarming. Members of the Armed Forces must be held to a higher
standard of integrity than the general public is.
Mr. Morelle. FY21 NDAA includes language (Sec. 589E, Training
Program Regarding Foreign Malign Influence Campaigns) requiring the
Secretary of Defense to establish a program for training service
members and civilian employees regarding the threat of foreign malign
influence. What are best practices you would recommend the Secretary of
Defense apply when implementing this program in 2021?
Ms. Brooks. SPLC has no policy position on this question.
Mr. Morelle. Ms. Brooks, the total numbers of extremists in the
military appear small, yet their impact can be enormous. Can you
explain that impact?
Ms. Brooks. It is true that the vast majority of those who serve in
our Armed Forces have no connection to white supremacy or extremism and
uphold the best traditions of our nation's democratic ideals. Though
the overall number of extremists associated with the Armed Forces who
engage in hate crimes and criminal extremist activity is relatively
small, there are many reasons to take this threat seriously and ensure
that the problem is effectively addressed.
First, servicemembers capabilities and specialized weapons training
make them prime targets for extremist propaganda and recruitment.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Kristy N. Kamarck, ``Military Personnel and Extremism: Law,
Policy, and Considerations for Congress,'' Congressional Research
Services, CRS Insight IN11086, May 16, 2019, https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11086.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, veterans and servicemembers bring social capital,
legitimacy, specialized training, and an increased capacity for
violence \10\ to white power groups and other extremists.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ``Having members with military backgrounds may increase a
group's propensity towards violence in several ways. First, former
members of the military may have particular technical and leadership
skills that can be used by the group to commit violence. . . . This
skill set includes extensive training in the use of weapons,
explosives, and combat strategies. Second, military veterans turned
activist may have specific grievances directed at the government. Thus,
we hypothesize that groups that have members with previous military
training will be more likely to be involved in violence.'' See Steven
M. Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich and Michael Suttmoeller, ``The
Organizational Dynamics of Far-Right Hate Groups in the United States:
Comparing Violent to Non-Violent Organizations,'' National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Dec. 2011.
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/944_OPSR_TEVUS_
Comparing-Violent-Nonviolent-Far-Right-Hate-Groups_Dec2011-508.pdf.
\11\ ``Extremist leaders seek to recruit members with military
experience in order to exploit their discipline, knowledge of firearms,
explosives, and tactical skills and access to weapons and
intelligence.'' FBI Intelligence Assessment, ``White Supremacist
Recruitment of Military Personnel since 9/11'' (unclassified), July 7,
2008, https://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/
White%20Supremacist%20Recruitment%20of%20Military%20Personnel%20Since%20
9-11-ocr.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, when servicemembers and veterans do engage with extremist
groups and individuals, they frequently take on leadership roles. For
example, analyses of two terrorism crime databases show that
``rightwing terrorists'' are significantly more likely to have military
experience than any other category of terrorists indicted in U.S.
federal courts.'' Between 1980 and 2002, 18% of far-right terrorists
indicted in federal courts had military experience. The same study
showed that ``over 40% of rightwing terrorists with military experience
assumed some position of leadership within their organization,'' making
them more than twice as likely to end up in leadership than someone
without military training.\12\ A study by Pete Simi and Bryan Bubolz
found that, in a sample of far-right extremists (FRTs) gathered from
the American Terrorism Study database, open sources, and interviews, at
least 31% had military experience--as compared to 10% of the U.S.
population at large. ``More specifically,'' they wrote, ``we found 17
percent of the FRTs with military experience were founders of their FRT
organizations, 22 percent were leaders in their FRT organizations, and
the remaining 43% were core members of their FRT organizations.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Brent L. Smith, Kelly Damphousse, Steven Chermak, and Joshua
Freilich, ``Right Wing Extremism and Military Service,'' in Andrew J.
Bringuel, Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.), Jenelle Janowicz,
Abelardo C. Vilida, and Edna F. Reid, eds., Terrorism Research and
Analysis Project (TRAP): A Collection of Research Ideas, Theories and
Perspectives (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011),
361-362.
\13\ Pete Simi and Bryan Bubolz, ``Military Experience, Identity
Discrepancies, and Far Right Terrorism: An Exploratory Analysis,''
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, https://www.research gate.net/
publication/
260780820_Military_Experience_Identity_Discrepancies_and_Far_Right_
Terrorism_An_Exploratory_Analysis, August 2013, 660.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fact that one in five of those arrested in connection with the
deadly Capitol insurrection on January 6 has served, or was serving, in
the military is partly a legacy of the military's long- running failure
to adequately monitor for extremist links, address the presence of
extremists in its ranks and inoculate veterans against adopting
extremist ideologies.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Tom Dreisbach and Meg Anderson, ``Nearly 1 in 5 Defendants in
Capitol Riot Cases Served in the Military,'' NPR, Jan. 21, 2021.
https://www.npr.org/2021/01/21/958915267/nearly-one-in-five-defendants-
in-capitol-riot- cases-served-in-the-military
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, as was repeatedly raised at the March 24 hearings--by both
Democratic and Republican Committee members--there is a paucity of
reliable data collected on both the number of extremists and the extent
of white supremacist influence in the Armed Services.
According to a 2019 poll conducted by Military Times, 36% of
active-duty servicemembers who were surveyed reported seeing signs of
white nationalism or racist ideology in the Armed Forces--a significant
rise from the year before, when 22% reported witnessing these extremist
views.\15\ In the same survey, more than half of servicemembers of
color reported experiencing incidents of racism or racist ideology, up
from 42% in 2017.\16\ These numbers jumped again in 2020, when a
Military Times poll conducted in the midst of nationwide racial justice
protests last summer found that 57% of servicemembers of color said
they had witnessed these incidents in their ranks. Likewise, of all the
troops who participated in the survey, 48% listed white nationalists as
a major national security threat--a mere half of a percentage point
below the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and other foreign terrorist
organizations.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Leo Shane III, ``Signs of White Supremacy, Extremism Up Again
in Poll of Active Duty Troops,'' Military Times, Feb. 6, 2020. https://
www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/02/06/signs-of-white-
supremacy-extremism-up-again-in-poll-of-active-duty-troops/.
\16\ Leo Shane III, ``One in Four Troops Sees White Nationalism in
the Ranks.'' Military Times, Oct. 23, 2017. https://
www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2017/10/23/military-times-
poll-one-in-four-troops-seeswhite-nationalism-in-the-ranks/.
\17\ Leo Shane, III, ``Troops: White nationalism a national
security threat equal to ISIS, al-Qaida,'' Military Times, Sept. 3,
2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/09/03/
troops-white-nationalism-a-national-security-threat-equal-to-isis-al-
qaeda/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We should not have to rely on Military Times for this information.
Instead, we urge each service branch to institute annual voluntary,
confidential climate surveys to enable military personnel to
anonymously report their exposure to white supremacy and extremist
views during their service. A report based on the surveys, focused on
the erosion of unit cohesion and the impact exposure to white supremacy
and extremism has on good order, discipline, morale, and readiness,
should be made available to the public annually.
Mr. Morelle. FY21 NDAA includes language (Sec. 589E, Training
Program Regarding Foreign Malign Influence Campaigns) requiring the
Secretary of Defense to establish a program for training service
members and civilian employees regarding the threat of foreign malign
influence. What are best practices you would recommend the Secretary of
Defense apply when implementing this program in 2021?
Mr. Berry. In my personal experience, the most effective and
memorable training has been through the use of case studies. Instead of
discussing the threat of foreign malign influence as academic concepts,
the Department might observe better results through the use of
declassified, real-world examples. Service members, like all of us, are
more likely to retain information that is presented in a manner that is
relatable to the world with which we are familiar.
Mr. Morelle. Mr. Berry, the total numbers of extremists in the
military appear small, yet their impact can be enormous. Can you
explain that impact?
Mr. Berry. It cannot be overstated that nobody wants to see true
extremists removed from our military more than those who serve. Those
of us who consider it an honor and privilege to wear the uniform of the
United States are repulsed by the notion of violent extremists in our
ranks. The impact that true extremists--even if they comprise only a
fraction of the total force--have can indeed be enormous. They can
negatively affect a military unit's moral and cohesion. Perhaps worse,
they can erode the public's trust and confidence in the military and
its service members. But the same negative consequences and impact
result from mislabeling those who hold to different, even unpopular,
religious and political beliefs as extremists. That is why it is
inappropriate and constitutionally dubious to attempt to regulate
thoughts and beliefs, as opposed to conduct.
[all]