    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                            [H.A.S.C. No. 117-17]

                          NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

                         AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN

                            NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 APRIL 14, 2021

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    44-983                       WASHINGTON : 2022

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                        One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                        ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
    JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
    RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
    FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
    JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
    MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
    JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
    ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
        Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
    JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
    SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
    KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
    MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
    MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
    JIMMY PANETTA, California
    STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
    STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                         Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                    Will Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                     Kyle Noyes, Professional Staff Member
                              Emma Morrison, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Faller, ADM Craig S., USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command......     6
    Salesses, Robert G., Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary
      of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, Office of
      the Secretary of Defense.......................................     4
    VanHerck, Gen Glen D., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and
      North American Aerospace Defense Command.......................     8

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Faller, ADM Craig S..........................................    84
        Salesses, Robert G...........................................    67
        VanHerck, Gen Glen D.........................................   108

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Carbajal.................................................   137
        Mrs. Luria...................................................   138
        Ms. Speier...................................................   137
        Mr. Waltz....................................................   138

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Bacon....................................................   149
        Dr. Jackson..................................................   152
        Mr. Moore....................................................   152
        Mr. Moulton..................................................   148
        Mrs. Murphy..................................................   153
        Mr. Norcross.................................................   148
        Mr. Scott....................................................   142
        Ms. Speier...................................................   141
        Mr. Waltz....................................................   151

     NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN NORTH AND
                                 SOUTH AMERICA

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                             Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 14, 2021.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
    of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
           WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        The Chairman. With that, I will call the meeting to order.
        The committee meets this morning on our ``National Security
    Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North and South
    America.'' We have the commanders of both NORTH- and SOUTHCOM
    [Northern Command and Southern Command] with us today.
        I must first, since this, again, is a hybrid hearing, read
    the statement that explains how the hybrid hearing will be
    conducted.
        Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen
    for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and
    maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and
    voting.
        Those members must continue to use the software platform's
    video function while in attendance unless they experience
    connectivity issues or other technical problems that render
    them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences
    technical difficulties, they should contact the committee staff
    for assistance.
        Video of members' participation is broadcast in the room
    and via the television/internet feeds.
        Members participating remotely must seek recognition
    verbally, and they are asked to mute their microphones when
    they are not speaking.
        Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep
    the software platform's video function on the entire time they
    attend the proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the
    proceeding. If members depart for a short while for reasons
    other than joining a different proceeding, they should leave
    the video function on. If members will be absent for a
    significant period or depart to join a different proceeding,
    they should exit the software platform entirely and then rejoin
    it if they return.
        Members may use the software platform's chat feature to
    communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical
    support issues only.
        Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
    necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
    inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings.
        Thank you.
        As I was saying at the start, our committee hearing is on
    ``National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in
    North and South America.'' We have with us today Mr. Robert
    Salesses, performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security; we have
    Admiral Craig Faller, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Southern
    Command; and General Glen VanHerck, U.S. Air Force, Commander,
    U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense
    Command.
        And I thank you all for being here. We look forward to the
    discussion. Obviously, there are a lot of challenges going on
    in the world right now, and, you know, the one that dominates
    is COVID [coronavirus]--its impacts, how it is impacting your
    commands, how it is impacting stability in your areas of
    responsibility.
        We are very interested to hear how it is going in terms of
    making sure that we protect our service members, maintain our
    ability to train and meet our readiness requirements, and, at
    the same time, how COVID may be impacting your areas of
    responsibility.
        Obviously, there is a great deal of instability, in
    particular in South America--two hurricanes, continued economic
    challenges. We have the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, and we
    have seen the impact in the flow of folks coming to the border.
        There are a lot of challenges in that region. We would be
    anxious to hear--are anxious to hear from Admiral Faller about
    the details of that and how best we should respond and work
    with partners in the region to meet those challenges as they
    impact that region and certainly as they impact us once you
    come further north.
        Also curious to hear from both of you about your thoughts
    on the border, what role you can play in helping us deal with
    that challenge, and what the best policy is going forward as we
    try to deal with what is undeniably a very challenging
    situation driven by the incredible instability in--well, in
    Mexico as well as, more so, in Central America. We need to
    figure out how to address that issue.
        One thing I am curious, as I mentioned yesterday, we don't
    yet have a budget, which is problematic and challenging. I do
    understand the transition to a new administration, but it is
    mid-April. So the sooner we get that, the better we will be
    able to meet our responsibilities in terms of passing the
    national defense authorizing act this year, and, of course, the
    appropriators would also like to see the budget. But I am
    curious about what your initial insights are on how that budget
    might impact you.
        I think one of the great challenges particularly in
    SOUTHCOM over the course of the last 20 years is there has been
    so much going on in the rest of the world that SOUTHCOM tends
    to be pretty far down the priority list. When you look at what
    has been going on in CENTCOM, the pivot to Asia, even a number
    of the challenges that have cropped up in Africa, you know, how
    do we meet all of those responsibilities and still do enough in
    SOUTHCOM?
        And, similarly, how this impacts NORTHCOM's budget. And I
    know, General VanHerck, you have been particularly focused on
    the Arctic. And that is something that, speaking for myself and
    for others, we don't understand that issue as well as we
    should. And I think, in part, because of all those other
    challenges that we have had, adding what seems like a new one
    is a challenge. But we have to understand what is going on up
    there. Obviously, Russia has been very active in that area.
        And I guess, lastly, based on our conversation before the
    hearing, I am very curious to get your take on how you perceive
    the threats to the homeland, the rise of both Russia and China
    in terms of their global capability. North Korea, as well, has
    introduced a level of threat to the homeland that we haven't
    seen before. How do we need to respond to that? What is the
    most intelligent spending we can do in the Department of
    Defense budget to meet those challenges?
        And then what is the whole-of-government response as well?
    Because obviously this is not just--none of the challenges that
    I just talked about are just the military. How do we work with
    the entire different pieces of our government to meet those
    challenges?
        I look forward to the testimony and to the questions and
    answers.
        And, with that, I will yield to the ranking member, Mr.
    Rogers, for his opening statement.

     STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA,
              RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
    holding this hearing today.
        The defense of the homeland and our security efforts in the
    Western Hemisphere are becoming increasingly more complex as
    China and Russia and other adversaries expand their reach and
    improve their capabilities to strike us.
        NORTHCOM is charged with defending our homeland against
    those threats. Operating our missile defense systems,
    countering increased Russian and Chinese activity in the
    Arctic, and supporting civilian response to emergencies are
    just a few of NORTHCOM's many mission priorities. Supporting
    these missions should continue to be a priority for this
    committee.
        In recent years, China and Russia have established an
    extensive military and economic presence in South and Central
    America. Their presence destabilizes the region and threatens
    our national security. SOUTHCOM is responsible for countering
    those threats.
        SOUTHCOM relies on security cooperation programs,
    humanitarian and disaster response assistance, and counter-
    narcotic capability building to promote security and counteract
    the influence of China and Russia. It is important for the
    committee to continue our bipartisan support of these programs.
        I have no doubt the men and women of NORTH- and SOUTHCOM
    can successfully carry out their critical missions, but they
    will only be able to do so if we provide them the resources
    they need. That is why I greatly was disappointed with the
    President's top-line budget number of $715 billion requested
    for DOD [Department of Defense], which constitutes a nearly $5
    billion cut in real dollars.
        It also completely disregards the recommendation of the
    bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission. To counter the
    growing threat from China, Deputy Secretary Hicks and the rest
    of the commissioners urged Congress to grow the defense budget
    each year by 3 to 5 percent. This budget doesn't even keep pace
    with inflation.
        My biggest concern is that this request fails to ensure our
    military can deter the growing threat from China and Russia.
    General VanHerck and Admiral Faller are dealing with these
    threats every day. I look forward to their best military advice
    on the impact of their operations from a budget that fails to
    keep pace with inflation.
        And, with that, I thank the witnesses for their service to
    our country and for being here, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Salesses, I believe you are first.

       STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. SALESSES, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF
    ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL
              SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Salesses. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify before you today on the national
    security challenges faced by the United States and the U.S.
    military activity in North and South America. I am honored to
    be here in the company of Admiral Faller and General VanHerck.
        Today, I would like to emphasize three key points. First,
    today's global security environment is more complex than ever
    before. Our adversaries are developing capabilities to
    challenge us in every domain and, increasingly, to hold the
    homeland at risk. Second, consistent with the President's
    strategic guidance and Secretary Austin's priorities, DOD is
    strengthening the multidomain defense of the Nation to maintain
    our competitive advantage. And, third, domestic emergencies and
    disasters are increasing in severity, causing DOD's Federal,
    State, and local partners to rely more and more on the
    Department of Defense.
        The increasingly complex and dynamic global security
    environment is driven by the accelerating strategic competition
    with Russia and China, where both are engaged in aggressive
    military modernization programs designed to target what they
    perceive as DOD's strategic vulnerabilities. China has become
    more capable in every domain and constitutes a significant
    long-term security threat to the U.S. China is our top
    priority, while Russia presents a near-term threat.
        Within the Western Hemisphere, to the north, Russia is
    expanding its Arctic posture, and China has classified itself
    as a near-Arctic nation, raising concerns with both nations'
    intentions. To the south, in Central and South America, a key
    strategic region, China and Russia are attempting to increase
    their influence within the region.
        As DOD confronts this competition with Russia and China in
    every domain, it must also ensure its ability to deter today's
    range of threats, including those posed by Iran and North
    Korea, while countering terrorism and violent extremists both
    abroad and here at home.
        DOD is committed to strengthening its decisive advantage in
    defending the U.S. homeland by reinforcing our defenses in the
    approaches to North America and by building stronger
    partnerships to advance freedom, prosperity, and security
    throughout the Western Hemisphere.
        DOD, as the region's partner of choice, is working closely
    with our hemispheric neighbors to address the region's shared
    challenges through security cooperation programs. DOD also
    continues its support of interagency efforts to disrupt
    transnational criminal organizations and to counter trafficking
    of illicit narcotics in the region.
        COVID-19 significantly challenged our hemispheric partners.
    With congressional support, DOD provided and will continue to
    provide medical assistance to our partners.
        In defense of the homeland, DOD must be ready for future
    conflicts that will likely include multidimensional targeting
    of critical infrastructure. The United States and Canada are
    jointly working to increase capabilities to provide enhanced
    indications and warning to detect aerospace threats and cue our
    air and missile defense systems against them. DOD is
    strengthening its homeland missile defenses through the
    development of next-generation interceptors and a new
    generation of ground- and space-based sensors.
        In defending the U.S. maritime approaches, DOD has taken
    steps to enhance its awareness of activities on and under the
    sea, provided early warning of approaching maritime threats.
        DOD is successfully competing with adversaries in
    cyberspace by defending forward to disrupt and degrade
    malicious cyber activity close to its origin and improving
    response options.
        As a DOD mission, DOD regularly provides defense support of
    civil authorities to Federal, State, and local partners. The
    COVID-19 pandemic has posed an unprecedented challenge on our
    Nation. Since the start, DOD has protected its people and
    supported the Nation's response by providing unparalleled
    support, to include medical assistance, supply and acquisition
    support, and the development, distribution, and administration
    of vaccines.
        Recent hurricanes and wildfire seasons have challenged
    response efforts and driven increased requests for DOD
    capabilities.
        Hemispheric challenges and events in the homeland have also
    led to increased requests for DOD support. At the southern
    border, DOD continues to support DHS's [Department of Homeland
    Security's] border security mission and HHS's [Department of
    Health and Human Services'] mission to shelter unaccompanied
    children.
        DOD also continues its support to the U.S. Capitol.
        In conclusion, DOD is strengthening its defense of the
    homeland, building stronger partnerships in the Western
    Hemisphere, and assisting more than ever our Federal, State,
    and local partners.
        It is an honor to serve alongside our Nation's military and
    civilian members of the Defense Department as they work every
    day to keep our Nation safe and secure.
        Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify today. I would also like to express my appreciation for
    the support of the Congress, and thank you for your continued
    commitment and support of the men and women of the Defense
    Department.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Salesses can be found in the
    Appendix on page 67.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Admiral Faller.

    STATEMENT OF ADM CRAIG S. FALLER, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN
                                COMMAND

        Admiral Faller. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to be
    here with my shipmates General Glen VanHerck and Assistant
    Secretary Bob Salesses.
        Now more than ever, I feel a deep sense of urgency about
    the global threats we face, including in this region. The
    Western Hemisphere is our home, it is our shared neighborhood,
    and it is a hemisphere which is of vital national interest to
    the United States.
        Two of the most significant threats are China and
    transnational criminal organizations. As the INDOPACOM [Indo-
    Pacific Command] commander, Admiral Davidson, stated, China is
    the number one strategic threat of the 21st century.
        I would like to take a few minutes to do some myth-busting
    about these threats.
        Myth one: China's interests in the Western Hemisphere are
    purely economic.
        The Chinese Communist Party, with its insidious, corrosive,
    and corrupt influence, seeks global dominance. Our strategic
    approach to China must also be global.
        China is quickly growing its influence here in the
    hemisphere, working on more than 40 port deals, dishing out
    significant loans for political and economic leverage, pushing
    its IT [information technology] infrastructure, and engaging in
    predatory practices such as illegal, unregulated, and
    unreported fishing, all with little concern for human rights,
    the environment, or the rule of law.
        Myth two: Transnational criminal organizations are just
    drug-trafficking organizations and only a law enforcement
    problem.
        To be clear, transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs,
    pose a direct threat to our national security. They traffic in
    arms, humans, drugs, and claim tens of thousands of lives here
    in the United States each year. Their murderous tactics have
    resulted in 43 of the 50 most violent cities in the world in
    this hemisphere. They drive illegal migration, and they allow
    bad actors like China to gain influence.
        Myth three: The military has no role to play in this
    region.
        Our professional U.S. military men and women in the region
    serve as an example every day as we collaborate through
    education and training exercises and humanitarian assistance.
    DOD has established programs to help partner nations develop
    diverse and inclusive militaries that respect the rule of law
    and human rights. Our programs help develop the professional
    forces to secure and stabilize our hemisphere.
        Our security cooperation programs include institutional
    capacity building that make partner-nation forces resilient to
    corruption and external influences. Our exercise program
    develops readiness, interoperability, and the ability to
    respond regionally to threats. We provide not only positive
    role models but tools and strategies for our partner nations to
    implement that enhance their capacity, and they make us all
    stronger together.
        Underpinning those national security threats is growing
    fragility in the region. COVID-19 has hit the hemisphere hard.
    According to the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the
    economies of Latin America and the Caribbean shrank by 7.4
    percent in 2020. The impacts of the pandemic will alter the
    hemisphere for years to come.
        In the midst of this pandemic, back-to-back major
    hurricanes devastated Central America, creating even greater
    instability. The pandemic and these unprecedented storms struck
    on top of the already vicious circle of threats that I
    previously highlighted, creating strong push factors for the
    people of the region to head north in search of safety and
    basic needs.
        Despite an economy in a tailspin and more than 5 million
    refugees fleeing the country, the illegitimate Maduro regime
    continues to cling to power in Venezuela with support from
    Cuba, Russia, Iran, and China.
        We cannot face such daunting challenges on our own. The
    only way to counter these threats is to strengthen our
    partnerships in order to win the strategic competition. No one
    nation is as strong as all of us working together. And I am
    very impressed by the nations who have worked with us shoulder
    to shoulder to counter the threats.
        For example, last year, Colombia brought together more than
    two dozen nations to conduct Operation Orion VI, a countering-
    transnational-criminal-organizations operation. And, earlier
    this year, Brazil became the first Latin American country to
    send forces to our high-end U.S. Army training at Fort Polk,
    Louisiana.
        Good neighbors are there to help when you need them the
    most, especially during a crisis. We provided humanitarian
    assistance to our partners when COVID struck, and we did it at
    the speed of relevance, delivering field hospitals and critical
    PPE [personal protective equipment]. To date, we have executed
    498 projects in 28 countries with a total investment of $72
    million. This is making a difference.
        SOUTHCOM works every day to build readiness and
    professionalism of our trusted military and security partners.
    Modest investments in intelligence, security cooperation, and
    presence go a long way in this hemisphere and will help us and
    our partners counter these global threats.
        Finally, our success would not be possible without our most
    important resource: our people, our SOUTHCOM team and their
    families. And we are taking proactive steps to support them and
    to protect our force from unacceptable behaviors, like sexual
    assault and harassment, racism, and extremism. We take these
    threats seriously because it is key to readiness and it is the
    right thing to do.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers, on behalf of the
    SOUTHCOM team, thank you for the trust you place in us, and
    thank you for the opportunity to testify. And I look forward to
    the questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Faller can be found in
    the Appendix on page 84.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
        General VanHerck.

       STATEMENT OF GEN GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
     NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

        General VanHerck. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
    distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to
    testify before you today.
        I am honored to serve as the commander of United States
    Northern Command [USNORTHCOM] and North American Aerospace
    Defense Command [NORAD]. And I am grateful to appear alongside
    Mr. Salesses and Admiral Faller, as they are crucial partners
    in homeland defense.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD are separate commands charged with the
    critical mission of defending North America. USNORTHCOM is the
    U.S. geographic combatant command responsible for defense of
    the homeland, defense support of civil authorities, and theater
    security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas.
    NORAD is the binational command that provides aerospace
    warning, aerospace control, maritime warning for the United
    States and Canada.
        Over the last year, NORAD fighters, tankers, and airborne
    early-warning aircraft responded to numerous incursions into
    our air defense identification zones; multiple ships sortied
    under USNORTHCOM operational control to defend our maritime
    approaches; and USNORTHCOM synchronized the Department of
    Defense's support to lead Federal agencies in the fight against
    coronavirus, multiple hurricanes, and wildfires. No matter the
    threat, we are always ready to defend the lives of our citizens
    and our homelands.
        As thousands of service members provide lifesaving
    vaccinations to our citizens, the threats we face and the pace
    of change in the geostrategic environment continue to advance.
    We have entered an era of renewed global competition, and this
    time we are facing two nuclear-armed peer competitors.
        Our competitors are focused on circumventing our defenses,
    both kinetically and nonkinetically, from all directions and in
    all domains, and exploiting a perceived gap between our
    foundational homeland defense--our nuclear deterrent--and also
    our conventional homeland defense deterrent capabilities.
        Concurrently, the rise of transnational criminal
    organizations and the subsequent instability they create has
    generated opportunities for our competitors to exploit.
        We must adapt to the challenges posed by this reality. We
    must outpace our competitors by accelerating efforts to
    transform into a culture that thinks and operates globally and
    invests early and often in relationships with our allies,
    partners, and other like-minded nations. Our culture must also
    adapt and cultivate talent within the ranks and counter
    extremists and destructive behaviors that oppose our values.
        In addition, we must factor in homeland defense into every
    strategy, plan, force management, force design, acquisition,
    and budgetary decision so we can deter in competition, de-
    escalate in crisis, and, if we must, defeat in conflict.
        To do this, USNORTHCOM is building capability to deter and,
    if needed, defend against increasingly advanced global all-
    domain threats. In concert with the other 10 combatant
    commands, the recent Global Information Dominance Experiment
    highlighted the effectiveness of operating without geographic
    seams to execute coordinated actions across all combatant
    commands.
        In coordination with the Missile Defense Agency, United
    States Strategic Command, United States Space Command,
    USNORTHCOM is maintaining and improving upon our Nation's
    ballistic missile defense capability. And together with the
    Canadian Armed Forces, NORAD is in the early stages of
    modernization and building additional military capabilities in
    the Arctic.
        In order to balance our readiness for crisis and conflict,
    we are also staying in global competition. We are placing
    significant emphasis on left-of-launch framework. This
    framework grants decisionmakers increased decision space and
    more deterrence and de-escalation options vice endgame kinetic
    defeat.
        Our priority effort is all-domain awareness that uses a
    layered, open-sensor data architecture, machine learning that
    enables information dominance and decision superiority. This
    framework provides flexible response options to deter, deny,
    or, if required, defeat every threat to the United States and
    Canada.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD service members and civilians take
    solemn pride in executing the Secretary of Defense's top
    priority by standing watch to defend our Nation against all
    threats, whether posed by competitors, natural disasters, a
    pandemic. I am grateful for the trust and responsibility that
    you place in USNORTHCOM and NORAD, and thank you for the
    opportunity and support. In time, I look forward to answering
    your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General VanHerck can be found in
    the Appendix on page 108.]
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        This is our first hearing this year where we are going in
    reverse order, just to keep things interesting I guess. So we
    are starting at the bottom, working our way up.
        I will ask just one question before yielding to Mr. Rogers,
    and that is: General VanHerck, we talked a little bit about the
    Arctic, you know, what is going on up there. Can you give us
    just--what should we do? I know we are waiting to see the
    budget, what our investment is, but as the commander in this
    area, if you had, like, your three priorities for how we need
    to be responding to what is happening in the Arctic, what would
    they be?
        General VanHerck. Thanks, Chairman.
        First, to compete in the Arctic, you have to be on the
    field. And, currently, our capabilities, I would assess that we
    are in the game-plan development. We are not able to have the
    persistence that I need to compete day-to-day in the Arctic.
        My priorities start with domain awareness. It starts with
    the ability to communicate and provide data and information so
    that we can operate and have persistence in the Arctic.
        I am grateful for $46 million that have been provided
    towards this. We have 10 satellites currently on orbit, with
    approximately 100 more that will be in the future. And we will
    take that additional money and have two companies providing the
    satellite capability.
        But to be persistent, you also have to be on the playing
    field, and that requires fuel so that Coast Guard cutters, Navy
    destroyers and cruisers can remain persistent in the Arctic.
        And I have a requirement that is stated and validated for
    fuel north of Dutch Harbor, Alaska, and that would give us the
    persistence, as well as, also, additional infrastructure for
    our ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
    platforms and our fighter capabilities so that we can compete
    on a day-to-day basis and be close and present with the Russian
    activities. They have dramatically modernized and increased
    their capabilities in the Arctic.
        I am encouraged by the President and also the Prime
    Minister for discussing NORAD modernization, and I look forward
    to the Department putting a framework together with the
    ministry in Canada to move forward with continued
    modernization.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. And I share the chairman's concern about the
    Arctic, and I am glad to know that you are on top of it. And we
    want to make sure you have what you need to stay on top of
    that.
        To that end, I now would ask this of both Admiral Faller
    and General VanHerck: If your funding does not at a minimum
    keep pace with inflation, how does it impact your ability to
    meet these challenges from China and Russia that you described
    in your various AORs [areas of responsibility]?
        Admiral Faller, I would start with you. I know you and I
    talked a lot about what China is doing in South America.
        Admiral Faller. Certainly, prioritization is going to have
    to happen, always needs to happen, versus all the various
    needs. We will make our strong case for why winning the day-to-
    day competition, particularly in our neighborhood, given the
    proximity that we share--and proximity matters to threats--and
    given the people ties, why that matters. We will lay that out.
        It is a modest investment in this hemisphere. We have about
    1 percent of the intelligence assets assigned to United States
    Southern Command. Intelligence drives everything. And then add
    security cooperation, where we received great support from
    Congress last year. I think there are additional investments
    that could be made there to help partner capacity.
        And then, finally, assets. Being on the field is important.
    We must be heard and seen in order to win the competition. And
    winning the competition is so critical, globally, so that we
    don't have to go into confrontation and have a war.
        General VanHerck. I would say a couple things. First, I
    look forward to seeing the fiscal year 2022 budget, when it
    comes out, to actually get an understanding of where we are
    with regards to future funding.
        In the near term, we understand the top line of $715
    billion. We will be able to exist and work just fine in the
    near term.
        But, long term, I would be concerned, if we don't keep up
    with the pace of inflation, of the potential for us not to keep
    pace with our peer competitors throughout the globe. So I think
    it is crucial that we maintain a funding pace within the
    inflation role.
        We are going to certainly be able to continue our
    modernization efforts. We will focus on sustainment. We will
    also need to focus on efficiencies and what capabilities and
    legacy capabilities that we may need to divest to enable us to
    go forward with the approach that I discussed in my opening
    statement and that is in my posture statement.
        Mr. Rogers. Would you describe the threat or the activity
    pace of China, in particular, as growing in your AOR, or is it
    static?
        Admiral.
        Admiral Faller. China is increasing their influence across
    all elements of their power, from IT, cyber, information.
    Particularly in the military, it is below--it is insidious, it
    is right below the threshold of what you would observe. But the
    gifts in tens of millions of dollars that they are offering,
    their expansion of the PME [Professional Military Education]
    program, mirroring what we do at Leavenworth and all our great
    schools, and then opening up even further, offering cyber
    engineering scholarships with full Mandarin immersion to second
    lieutenants at various forces, it has picked up at an alarming
    pace.
        Mr. Rogers. So it is an aggressively growing threat?
        Admiral Faller. It is aggressive.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay.
        General.
        General VanHerck. I share the same sentiment as Admiral
    Faller, Congressman. China is absolutely taking aggressive
    steps in the Western Hemisphere and in the NORTHCOM AOR through
    COVID diplomacy; additional actions with buying up businesses'
    capability, especially tourism industry in the Bahamas, trying
    to gain additional access; 5G, trying to stand up their 5G in
    the Western Hemisphere.
        Mr. Rogers. So am I hearing you correct, then, if the
    activity by the Chinese--and not to mention the Russians and
    the others you've got to worry about--is aggressively growing,
    if your funding is static or less than what you received last
    year, are you going to be able to effectively meet those
    challenges, Admiral?
        Admiral Faller. I believe the front line of competition is
    right here in this neighborhood, Chairman. We will have to come
    forward and determine what that means and ask ourselves tough
    questions about where the prioritization is. And I think modest
    investment here goes a long way to assuring the security of the
    United States.
        General VanHerck. Congressman, I believe we have to balance
    and balance back into the Western Hemisphere to focus on things
    going on right here in our neighborhood. We have a unique
    opportunity to do that right now. I look forward to seeing what
    the 2022 budget does and where the Department is going in the
    Western Hemisphere, but I do believe that we need to apply
    additional resources and funding here.
        Mr. Rogers. Yeah. And I do too. And that is the thing I am
    trying--the point I am trying to make is, this is not brain
    surgery. If the Chinese are increasing, as they have stated,
    their funding by 7 percent--and I think that is not true; I
    think it is more than that. But their declared increase in
    defense spending is 7 percent. If we do not fund you at least
    at the rate of inflation, and hopefully aligned with the
    National Defense Strategy Commission's recommendation of 3-5
    percent increase, then we are doing you and our country a great
    disservice.
        And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mrs. Murphy is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
    keeping it interesting by starting at the bottom of the virtual
    dais today.
        Thank you to the witnesses for your testimony and your
    service to our country.
        I find the conversation about the aggressive actions of
    China in our shared neighborhood to be very disconcerting. And,
    Admiral Faller, you put quite a bit of information both in your
    written and oral testimony today about the ways in which China
    is seeking to increase its influence in our shared
    neighborhood. And I want you to know that, as somebody who
    represents a district in Florida, I am a near neighbor. And so
    it is something that I am very concerned about and determined
    to do something about.
        And, yesterday, I introduced a bill to require the State
    Department, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence
    community and the National Security Council to jointly prepare
    a holistic assessment for Congress, containing both an
    unclassified and a classified section, on China's efforts to
    expand its influence in South America, Central America, the
    Caribbean, and Mexico and how these efforts could compromise
    U.S. interests.
        You know, I think it goes to what--we need this assessment
    so that we can answer the question that the ranking member is
    posing about precisely what military, diplomatic, and economic
    activities China is conducting in the region and then how we
    prioritize our response.
        For my part, I am particularly concerned about the CCP's
    [Chinese Communist Party's] relationship with the authoritarian
    regimes in Venezuela and Cuba and the security implications of
    these investments in the deepwater ports that were mentioned
    already, as well as their export of technology to governments
    that could use it to monitor and repress their citizens, their
    exportation of their autocratic, dystopian technology.
        But, you know, budget aside, what are three specific things
    that you think the U.S. should be doing which we are not
    currently doing to combat China's malign activities?
        Admiral.
        Admiral Faller. Thank you for the question. And,
    importantly, thanks for visiting with SOCOM [Special Operations
    Command] and Special Operations Command South this week to hear
    up front their concerns and challenges and opportunities.
        Whole-of-government solutions, whole-of-nation solutions
    are so important here. And there is more to do, working
    together, both in prioritization and coming up with actionable
    steps. And you highlighted the importance of whole-of-
    government steps.
        Within the Department, I cite the 1 percent intelligence.
    We have to leverage data, big data, machine learning, and AI in
    an innovative way that recognizes that the threats are stealing
    that, and as a nation of laws, we rightly have to buy it and
    protect it. But we need to leverage it in a way that represents
    the 21st century within the Department.
        And it goes along with my shipmate Glen VanHerck's comment
    about all-domain awareness and how we tie this all together
    holistically so we can make decisions based on what the threat
    is doing, not what the threat did years and years ago.
        And then, finally, back to being on the field to compete,
    the right level of presence. Recent trip to Guyana--massive
    untapped oil reserves. ExxonMobil is in there in a big way. It
    is a complicated partnership with China. China is leveraging
    it, a country with a 50 percent disputed border. Florida is the
    main--Florida National Guard, State partner, is the main muscle
    mover for things that we are doing in Guyana.
        And so how do we best leverage all our elements in the DOD
    with the right authorities. I think there is more that we could
    offer our Guard and Reserve in that regard to help us get in
    there and compete day in and day out.
        Mrs. Murphy. Thank you.
        And speaking of whole-of-government approaches, with
    regards to the rise in transnational criminal organizations,
    are there lessons that can be learned from our decades in CVE
    [countering violent extremism]?
        And then do you believe that we are approaching the
    transnational criminal organizations in the right way, with law
    enforcement in the lead? Are there other ways in which DOD
    could play a more robust role?
        Admiral Faller. Transnational criminal organizations are a
    national security imperative. They are driving the insecurity
    across the hemisphere, particularly in the Northern Triangle
    Central America region. There is a crisis, and it is the crisis
    of insecurity that is driving people to find safety elsewhere.
        And our approach has been one of interdiction at the source
    and in transit. We are never going to interdict our way out of
    this. We have to adopt and adapt some of the lessons that we
    have learned the hard way over a generation in the
    counterterrorism fight to model the networks and then take a
    network approach to get after the centers of gravity. And DOD
    is a supporting element----
        The Chairman. I am so sorry, Admiral. The----
        Admiral Faller. Thank you.
        The Chairman [continuing]. Gentlelady's time has expired.
        And I should warn the witnesses, once we get to the end of
    time, I don't want to cut you off, but if you could wrap up as
    quickly as possible once we hit zero, that would be great.
        Mr. Moore, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I share
    Representative Murphy's appreciation for the switch-up in the
    order today. None of my questions have been asked yet. I don't
    know what to do with all this power.
        I want to thank the witnesses as well--in particular, your
    message about myth-busting. Our ongoing presence in the Middle
    East and the increased awareness of and emphasis on the Indo-
    Pacific can't overshadow, you know, making sure that we protect
    our neighborhood in North and South America. So I appreciate
    this conversation today.
        And, with that, with the challenges that do exist in the
    Western Hemisphere, I think it is important to highlight the
    wins that we have had and learn from those, as you just started
    to comment.
        As NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization's] only
    global partner in the region, Colombia continues to be a
    regional model on how to progress beyond the drug-fueled
    internal conflicts. Could you continue to expound on lessons
    learned from that relationship and what we can do to maybe
    apply that to the Northern Triangle?
        Admiral Faller. Thank you, Congressman.
        Plan Colombia was a 10-year, about-a-billion-dollar-a-year
    investment by the United States, and the Colombians matched
    that with their talent and their money two-to-one. We stuck
    with it for 10 years, so it was consistency over time and
    addressing every element of the whole of government, truly
    whole of government, in Colombia.
        We also brought in other nations that contributed. And
    Colombia has a close relation, because of their experience in
    the Korean War, with South Korea. Other nations contributed to
    this in a million different ways and importantly. And that has
    left a legacy of professionalism.
        Not perfect. We are not perfect. But the Colombians do the
    right thing for the right reason, and I am proud to serve
    alongside them--professionalism, particularly. They have
    adopted some of our own human rights programs within their
    military that have paid off when their forces have been
    confronted with really tough situations.
        I think there are things to be learned from that to develop
    a long-view approach to Central America and not the cyclic
    start/stop, 6 months/1 year, that we see and have seen as we
    have studied best practices.
        Mr. Moore. I think it is a great point to make, as our
    Nation, you know, tries to find the right balance for
    immigration policy. And if we can implement that in the
    Northern Triangle, I think there is lots to learn there. So
    thanks for that. And it is a great opportunity for us to show
    where our defense-related world can interact with some of our
    domestic policies.
        I will continue on with Admiral Faller but welcome comments
    from the other witnesses.
        Just, you know, working in that region--the Latin American
    region may recover last from COVID-19, as you have said in your
    testimony--are we doing enough to combat China's presence? And
    is there anything else we can do to make sure to get out ahead
    of that?
        Admiral Faller. COVID was like a perfect storm on the
    hemisphere. The fragility that existed from the transnational
    criminal organizations and their day-in and day-out violence;
    young institutions, young democracies that are plagued with
    corruption has just fueled this. The conditions in Central
    America are--they rival the Great Depression here in the United
    States in terms of how hard it has hit, and more needs to be
    done.
        This has opened a door for China, and Russia to a lesser
    extent. We see it in their vaccine, heavy-handed vaccine
    diplomacy. The New York Times ran an excellent article that
    cited a couple countries where they are using the vaccines to
    leverage a shift to Taiwan, they are using the vaccines for
    better deals--and this is China using it--for better deals for
    5G and Huawei, for example.
        And so we have to come forward with positive, proactive
    results for these countries to help them. Things like our
    Development Finance Corp. are the right idea--through the BUILD
    [Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development]
    Act--at the right time. DOD has a role as we stay engaged
    professionally.
        Mr. Moore. I welcome additional comments. Okay to pass if
    not.
        General VanHerck. I would agree. I think there is an
    opportunity for whole-of-nation education and a solution to
    this.
        I am encouraged. The President stood up a task force to
    look at China. The Department has a task force to look at the
    China problem set. This will require us to go back to a
    competition focus, but this time it is a global competition
    focus, and it will come with the requirement to balance
    resources on a global basis. So that will determine how we do
    prioritization of those resources. It is an opportunity for us
    to look at it.
        Mr. Salesses. The only thing I would say is, there are a
    lot of good things going on down there right now from the
    Defense Department, too, with our security cooperation, our
    foreign military sales, the education things that we do. So
    there may be, certainly, a lot of competition, but we are in
    the competition. I think that is important to recognize, and we
    need to stay in it.
        As Admiral Faller pointed out, too, the vaccine is an
    important part of that. And as the administration has pledged
    all $4 billion to the COVAX [Coronavirus Vaccines Global
    Access] initiative, that is going to be very helpful in helping
    out Central and South America also.
        Mr. Moore. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Panetta is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and appreciate,
    obviously, your service.
        Sunday I just got back from McAllen, Texas. Did a border
    visit. Obviously got a limited view of the many challenges that
    just that one area faces when it comes to the migration that we
    are seeing right now as well as the influx of narcotics that we
    are seeing hit our borders as well.
        Obviously--that was one of five times I have been to the
    border area. I am from California, central California, so going
    to the border is obviously eye-opening to me. But I have come
    away with the same impression each time I have been there, in
    that there needs to be more resources, obviously short term in
    dealing with our border, but also long term, looking beyond the
    border and, yes, looking at the Northern Triangle and Central
    American countries.
        Obviously, providing resources, Admiral Faller, as you
    mentioned--but, unfortunately, in April of 2019, what we saw is
    a freeze of $450 million of resources, similar to ones that you
    just spoke about, in regards to programs that deal with
    violence prevention, poverty, and improving the justice
    systems.
        And so my question to you is, based on your last statement,
    has that set us back? The fact that we froze those programs,
    has that set us back in our efforts to help down there and work
    with the Northern Triangle countries?
        Admiral Faller. I think, Congressman, consistent programs
    with the right policy and oversight hooks provide us more
    leverage over the long term. And in the foreign ops bill last
    year that zeroed out FMF, foreign military financing, for the
    Northern Triangle, I think we lost leverage, rather than gained
    leverage, in terms of how we can help professionalize behavior.
        And some of the programs that are important that we rely on
    are our humanitarian assistance program. That is a win, and we
    have done well with that. We rely on our security cooperation
    program, where we install institutional capacity-building
    advisors--it is a fancy name for advisors in ministries of
    defense--that can look after corruption-free programs. In fact,
    Monterey is the source of that, the Naval Postgraduate School.
        But being consistent with these programs year to year
    builds trust. And it takes time to build a professional,
    trusted institution in a partner.
        Mr. Panetta. Great. And, obviously, when you say partner,
    that is very important in regards to the work that we do with
    these nations in that area. Is there anything else we can be
    doing at this point in continuing to build those partnerships?
        Admiral Faller. Stay consistent with the exercise program.
    We are appreciative that the Department of Defense supported
    our program request for last year. We are very appreciative
    that we got a plus-up on our security cooperation budget. We
    had that 32 percent reduction over the previous 2 years. The
    Department and the support of Congress arrested that slide. And
    those are key investments going forward to build the capacity
    of our partners.
        The reality is that partner-nation militaries are involved
    in the internal problems that they have. That is just the
    reality. And they are professional and they are the most
    trusted of all the security institutions in these countries,
    and we have to stay with them, because they want to emulate and
    model our professionalism. They learn it at our schools, and
    they learn it by example.
        Mr. Panetta. If you could, Admiral, go into, briefly, the
    Joint Interagency Task Force-South and what work we are doing
    to continue--like you said, you can't interdict our way out of
    it. Although we saw what the Border Patrol is doing there when
    they come to the ports of entry and the efforts that they are
    or are not doing, what else can we do beyond our borders when
    it comes to stopping that flow of narcotics?
        Admiral Faller. Joint Interagency Task Force-South in Key
    West is a team of teams. We have every partner nation,
    including Mexico, Canada, and our allies in Europe, represented
    there. Despite COVID, they stepped up. When the U.S. stayed on
    the field, they stepped up and increased their interdictions
    from 50 to 60 percent participation rate. That is key.
        So we have to incentivize them to do that, recognize when
    they do. And Colombia is one of the countries that made a big
    impact. In fact, Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras, Guatemala all
    made impacts last year professionally in that space.
        So continuing to invest in that capability is a good deal
    and a good return on investment for the U.S.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Carl is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Turn your microphone on, sir. Sorry.
        Mr. Carl. That always helps, doesn't it, sir?
        The Chairman. Yep. There we go. You are good.
        Mr. Carl. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman Smith, Ranking
    Member Rogers.
        And I thank the witnesses for being here, and I certainly
    thank you for your service to this country.
        Admiral, over the recent years, we have heard an increasing
    role that China has played throughout Central and South
    America. China has continued to invest in projects to improve
    their relationship with these countries, which--that is what
    you have been highlighting here. And now your written testimony
    describes the increasing actions China has taken through
    diplomacy because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
        Can you explain what China has been doing and how the Navy
    ships, hospital ships, can be used to combat these while
    continuing to advance our relationship in the region?
        Admiral Faller. The National Defense Strategy and the
    Secretary of Defense's priorities rightly call out that China
    is a pacing threat and a competition that we have to win. And
    we have to recognize that they are the number one trading
    partner with the United States and they are our partners'
    number one trading partner.
        So I don't ask them to choose, but I point out to our
    partners, whose gear would you rather work with? The United
    States, built in America, is the best gear out there, the best
    equipment, best ships. Whose values system better matches your
    values system? And that is our competitive advantage. And our
    workers and our country is our competitive advantage.
        And so I go and I represent the best of the U.S., our
    service men and women and their equipment, and so we talk about
    the Navy and the importance of our Navy participating in
    exercises. And our Navy, with the support of SECDEF [Secretary
    of Defense], stepped up last year and supplied ships, ships
    built in Alabama and all over this great Nation, to work with
    our partner nations. And they did really well in the exercises
    and the training programs.
        It works on interoperability, domain awareness, things that
    General VanHerck has cited as important to defending our Nation
    and important to building our strong alliance and partnerships
    globally.
        Mr. Carl. Thank you, sir.
        Second question: Given the upkeep requirements of our Navy
    hospital ships right now--we have two, correct? We have one in
    dry dock right now, and one is on the east coast?
        Admiral Faller. Correct, sir.
        Mr. Carl. Have I got that right? Yeah.
        Admiral Faller. The Mercy and the Comfort.
        Mr. Carl. Yeah. Given the upkeep requirements for both of
    those and these aging ships, how can increasing the number of
    Navy medical ships help in the response to China's activity in
    the AOR?
        Admiral Faller. Our partnerships, one of the strongest
    aspects of them has been our outreach in humanitarian
    assistance and medical assistance.
        And I have seen firsthand the power of two Comfort
    deployments during my tour, where you send an outstretched
    hand, you help a mother with their son or daughter that has
    never been to a doctor. They are 8 years old, 9 years old. And
    you see the value of that to win hearts and minds. And the
    value of that is it shows the best of America.
        So that capacity in winning the day-to-day competition and
    being able to respond in a competitor fight, a global war, is
    important. So, to me, it is how the services, the Navy, working
    with Secretary of Defense, best resources that. But it is
    really important that we never lose that capability to be able
    to supply the combatant commanders in peace so that we never
    have to fight.
        Mr. Carl. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Veasey is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General VanHerck, I wanted to ask you about the weather
    event that we had in Texas. I know that NORTHCOM works very
    closely with FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] and DOD
    when it comes to natural disasters. And I was hoping that you
    would be able to talk a little bit about what the response was
    to the power outage in Texas and how DOD responded to the
    event.
        General VanHerck. Sure. Thank you for the question.
        So defense support of civil authorities is obviously a
    crucial mission at United States NORTHCOM and something that we
    do as a no-fail mission. Our direct support to that was in
    support of a lead Federal agency, in this case FEMA, to provide
    generator support to where there was no electrical power to
    sustain hospitals and those kinds of things.
        And the result of this is to take a look at our overarching
    resiliency as a nation, something that we do routinely to
    ensure that, from a defense of the homeland, that that is
    factored in to any potential not only disaster but attack on
    our homeland. And so working with the interagency, we continue
    to analyze the resiliency overall from that event you are
    referring to.
        Mr. Veasey. Is there anything that you learned from that
    event that can help us better prepare in the future? Obviously,
    there is still a great amount of concern. The State legislature
    right now is looking at, you know, what sort of safeguards they
    can possibly put in place to try to prevent something like that
    from ever happening again.
        With it being, you know, so many people that were affected
    by that storm, is there something that you think needs to
    happen or that you are going to be looking at so we can better
    respond in the future?
        General VanHerck. So I would say that the largest lesson
    out of that should be applied to the fact that, although this
    was a natural disaster, that somebody with nefarious activity
    could take some kind of action that would put us in a
    precarious situation just like that. They will learn, they will
    see the potential vulnerabilities, and they will take action.
        So us as not only the Department of Defense, within the
    interagency, should exercise this. We should work through the
    command and control of the future to ensure that we are in a
    properly positioned place to command and control and look at
    our resiliency.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you very much.
        Admiral Faller, you were asked a question earlier about
    Colombia and some of the successes that they have had there
    post Medellin and Cali cartels, when that country was a
    complete wreck. And I wanted to ask you specifically about what
    sort of--if today you could implement something to try to
    stabilize the countries where we receive most of the migration
    headed north to our southern border, what would be the first
    thing that you would implement?
        And what sort of requirements or--and maybe ``requirement''
    is not the best word, but what should be the expectation from,
    you know, a country like Honduras, where there is just, you
    know, such a long history of corruption, to be quite frank?
    Like, what, you know, should be, you know, asked of them in
    order to make anything that you would implement be a success?
        Admiral Faller. Thank you for recognizing the
    professionalism and the excellence of the Colombian security
    forces. They work hard every day at that and emulate our values
    in that respect.
        I would ask support for a legislative proposal that we have
    submitted to Congress for the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan. It is
    a plan that is an offshoot of Plan Colombia that helps use
    security cooperation to fund a regional approach.
        Colombia is now a net exporter of professional security and
    has trained thousands of Central American/Northern Triangle
    nations' security forces. And the cultural fit is a very good
    one, and they have trained them to do professional work. They
    are willing to contribute with some additional funding here.
        I would also ask support for our institutional capacity-
    building efforts, where we put these advisors that are trained
    at the institute in Monterey in host nation. We could, for
    example, with additional funding and support, embed one in the
    Ministry of Defense for Honduras. We know who the trusted
    partners are, and the Minister of Defense and his team are
    trying to do the right thing in Honduras. We know, working with
    other agencies, that they are trusted. And by putting an
    advisor in, we could provide the right system and overall view
    to add transparency so we can account correctly to Congress,
    your oversight role, that the dollars are being spent in a
    right way and invested that is going to be a return on
    investment for the U.S.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Jackson is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Rogers, and to our witnesses for being here today.
        While we spend much of our time talking about the threats
    posed by China and Russia, people need to understand, I think,
    that those threats are not limited to geographic locations. The
    threat and the influence imposed by China and Russia impacts
    both NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM AORs. The National Defense Strategy
    correctly prioritizes competition with China and Russia, and
    the Department has seen great progress over the last 4 years in
    confronting that challenge.
        With looming budget cuts in the pipeline, any advantage we
    may have could be wiped out by malign espionage efforts
    influenced by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea through
    their proximity to our military installations. While there are
    conflicting views on this committee about many topics, I would
    hope that one view we all share is that our adversaries should
    not be the owners and operators of any facility that is
    anywhere close to a United States military installation.
        With that said, I am worried about the potential espionage
    efforts related to this particular issue.
        Mr. Salesses, could you speak to the threat that would be
    posed by China or any other adversary in their ability to
    purchase real estate near an installation and the intelligence
    that that could pose to our country?
        Mr. Salesses. Congressman, thanks for the question.
        Obviously, that would be a very significant challenge, and
    we would need to--I know that that has come up around the
    country a couple of times. And we work very closely with the
    Justice Department and other organizations that would be
    involved in those kinds of activities in how we could limit
    that kind of activity here in the country.
        Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.
        I have one more question.
        The threat posed by China and our adversaries is of grave
    concern worldwide. However, there are things that threaten our
    military's ability to train here in the United States as well.
    While we as a country begin to look at renewable sources of
    energy, such as wind, one thing that has not always been
    considered is the impact that construction of these projects
    can have on our readiness levels. It is critical that the young
    men and women training in the United States are able to do so
    in order to prepare for the threats that they may face when
    they are deployed.
        General, could you speak about the detrimental effects that
    wind farms can have on our military training routes [MTRs],
    what steps are being taken to mitigate that impact, and the
    overall readiness impact that occurs when we are forced to
    reduce the number of low-level MTRs flown out of pilot training
    bases, such as the one in my district, Sheppard Air Force Base?
        General VanHerck. Congressman, that is probably best
    answered by the service. But I would tell you that there is a
    detrimental effect that could limit our ability to train here
    in the United States, would have potential readiness impacts.
        What is crucial is that we have a partnership, local
    partnerships with local commanders, with the local civic
    leaders, the mayors, et cetera, that, more broadly, also
    includes a broader discussion, a national security discussion,
    so that we can come to a solution for business--folks that want
    to make that money for renewable energy, as you pointed out, to
    make us resilient as well--and the potential impacts on
    national security.
        And that discussion has to happen any time there is a
    potential building of some kind of a facility that could impact
    training.
        Dr. Jackson. Yes, sir, I agree with you. And I think it
    will be our job as legislators to make sure that that happens
    before this stuff is put into place, because that is what I was
    seeing at Sheppard Air Force Base. And it goes back to my first
    question as well. If we don't think about those things up
    front, then that stuff is going to happen before we realize it,
    and then we are going to be in a position where we can't go
    back and undermine that.
        I thank you all for your thoughtful responses. We face
    threats across the globe and, unfortunately, even some here at
    home. I look forward to working with each of you and with all
    of my colleagues here on the committee to provide our military
    with the resources and the authorities that we need to protect
    our country.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Strickland is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking
    Member Rogers and to our witnesses.
        I have the privilege of representing the Western Area
    Defense Sector, WADS, which is one the two sectors responsible
    for peacetime air sovereignty, strategic air defense, and
    airborne counter-drug operations in the continental U.S. under
    NORAD.
        As we continue to implement the National Security Strategy,
    we must continue to ensure that our homeland assets are a
    deterrent to our adversaries. I strongly support ensuring that
    WADS has the resources it needs to continue to defend our
    homeland.
        General VanHerck, I would like to start with you. And I
    have a few questions, one about WADS and then another about
    hypersonic detection, if we can get there.
        One of the innovations that NORAD is working on is
    Pathfinder, which previously took separate data systems and
    combined them so NORAD can see a more complete picture. I know
    that a contract was recently awarded, so can you please tell me
    how the integration is going, if there are any difficulties,
    and why you think Pathfinder is so important to the concept of
    an all-domain awareness?
        Thank you.
        General VanHerck. Thank you for the opportunity, ma'am, to
    talk about Pathfinder.
        Pathfinder is an innovative capability that we have
    designed to do exactly what you talked about. And working in a
    partnership to take data and information--which, by the way, I
    think is a strategic value, is something that we need to
    utilize. Pathfinder ingests data from multiple sources and
    fuses that data and uses machine learning and intelligence
    capabilities to process and share in near-real-time.
        But, previously to Pathfinder, we had 12 manual systems,
    phone calls, those kinds of things, that would take longer,
    minutes, if not longer. Today, when you utilize Pathfinder, it
    gives us a picture in seconds or less and a much more broad
    picture to help our air defense sectors accomplish our mission
    of defending our homeland.
        Pathfinder is going great. The Canadians just gave us some
    additional funding to continue the program, and we look forward
    to moving that forward.
        I will give you an example real quick, and I don't want to
    steal too much of your time, but Pathfinder was utilized, if
    you remember, in 2015, the gyrocopter that flew down from north
    in the National Capital Region here and landed on the Capitol
    lawn. When you take all the sensors in the National Capital
    Region and you look at them separately, none of the sensors
    detected that gyrocopter. When you take all those sensors--we
    took the real data and you take those sensors and you fuse it
    into Pathfinder, into a single system that aggregates that data
    and assesses it, sure enough, we were able to see that
    gyrocopter.
        That is the value of information and data. Previously, the
    data was left on the cutting room floor and not analyzed.
    Pathfinder analyzes it.
        So thanks for the opportunity to talk about that.
        Ms. Strickland. Great. Thank you. And it just really
    underscores how we talk a lot about data but it actually helps
    us make good decisions.
        So I want to switch over to hypersonic detection and stay
    with General VanHerck.
        As the commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD, what do you see as
    the most critical gap that must be filled in regard to sensor
    coverage of the U.S. for advancing Russian and Chinese threats
    of advanced cruise and hypersonic missiles?
        And as the Air Force completes their analysis of
    alternatives of northern approaches, have NORTHCOM and NORAD
    priorities been accounted for in that final product that we
    get?
        General VanHerck. Well, I look forward to seeing the
    product as the Air Force completes it. I do believe that our
    equities will be accounted for in the product, but I haven't
    seen the final product. It is still with the Air Force.
        Specific domain awareness is what we need for NORAD and
    United States Northern Command, and that is in my priorities
    that you will see in my statement and on my priority list that
    I submitted to the Department--domain awareness to get further
    out.
        Today, competitors have increased capabilities. The
    Russians can actually shoot from over the Russian homeland and
    strike the continental United States. And so we need over-the-
    horizon radars and those kinds of capabilities.
        Specifically with regards to hypersonic capabilities, I
    remain concerned. We are focused on offensive hypersonic
    capabilities, and that is crucial to our overarching deterrent.
    But just as important is our ability to detect, have a threat
    assessment, threat warning and attack assessment, for
    hypersonic coming in. And that is part of our deterrence by
    denial.
        And any solution that we come up with for hypersonics
    should not be just a sensor that tells us what is inbound, but
    it ought to be able to deliver weapons-quality information so
    that we could actually negate that threat from a hypersonic
    vehicle that may be inbound.
        And, by the way, hypersonics are here today. The Russians
    have fielded them. It is not something in the future. They are
    absolutely a threat right here and right now.
        Ms. Strickland. Great.
        And, very quickly, do you think Canada is doing its part to
    equitably contribute to hypersonics?
        General VanHerck. Canada is a wonderful ally and does a
    great thing, specific with the North Warning System and our
    legacy systems. They have funded about 60 percent of that over
    time.
        Going forward, what we really need to do, ma'am, is create
    the framework for NORAD modernization. I am encouraged by the
    President and the Prime Minister talking about it. But there is
    much more work to do on what that framework will look like in
    the future.
        Ms. Strickland. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mrs. McClain is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and thank for your
    service.
        As it pertains to national security, I have heard a lot of
    words today--rule of law, human rights, deterrence--and,
    really, consistencies with our programs and our policies.
        With that said, General VanHerck, as we know, the
    disastrous situation at our southern border is not only a
    humanitarian crisis but a national security crisis, where
    former President Trump had the border secured.
        My question is simple. Has President Biden's actions to
    open the southern border and encourage migrants to illegally
    cross our border made the United States safer or less safe? And
    do President Biden's border policies threaten the security and
    stability in Mexico and the Northern Triangle?
        General VanHerck. Thanks for the opportunity to talk about
    national security.
        I am not going to comment about the specifics on policies.
    I would ask the President and defer to him about those. But I
    would tell you that we have a national security imperative
    right now on our southern border that we need to deal with.
        Admiral Faller made it very clear in his comments about the
    confluence of things that have come together. Transnational
    criminal organizations create an environment not conducive to
    successful rearing of families, employment, economics, et
    cetera. Combine that with COVID and two major natural
    disasters, and you have a confluence of things ongoing.
        I would say there is a perception that folks can come here
    and bring your family with you. What we need to do is approach
    this from a national security imperative and come up with a
    whole-of-government approach that will secure our borders.
        I am concerned from a homeland defense perspective. I
    believe the symptoms that we are seeing today are exactly that;
    they are symptoms: migration, counter-narcotics, human
    trafficking. The problem and the challenge is creating an
    environment where these folks can succeed so they don't feel
    like they have to migrate. And that takes a whole-of-nation
    approach to get after transnational criminal organizations.
        We figured this out with al-Qaida and ISIS [Islamic State
    of Iraq and Syria]. You can cut off their funding, you can do
    additional things as a whole of government, working with allies
    and partners to get after this problem. And so I look forward--
    I believe the administration is on a good track there. I look
    forward to seeing where it goes.
        Mrs. McClain. Thank you. As we know, perception is 90
    percent of reality.
        I am going to switch gears for a moment. My next question
    is for all the witnesses.
        As we know, China has become an ever-increasing threat not
    only to the Pacific region but globally. In addition to the
    buildup in their armed forces, they have been developing 5G
    technology, as we have discussed earlier, and the United
    States, it appears, is falling further behind in this regard.
        My question is this to each of you: Would a 5G secured
    network accessible anywhere in the world to our forward
    operating bases or other command centers for transmission of
    data be a priority for USNORTH and SOUTHCOMs?
        Mr. Salesses. Congresswoman, any secure network would be
    very helpful. The question is, you know, what are the other
    things that we are balancing against that? So I agree that any
    secure network would be helpful, but we will have to look at
    what other challenges we have associated with that.
        Admiral Faller. When I sit down with our partners, their
    cybersecurity is in the top three of all their security
    challenges. And that is at every level in that partner. And it
    is in our top three as well. So it is important that we get
    this right.
        And we know there is no civil-military divide by law in the
    People's Republic of China. And so any investment in Huawei and
    ZTE and their 5G is a direct pipeline to the PLA [People's
    Liberation Army] and their intelligence services.
        And I point this out to our partners at each and every
    visit and every time. At a professional level, they get it, and
    they don't want to invest in that technology. They want to
    invest in secure technology, clean technology, U.S. or other
    trusted partner technology. And it is important that
    initiatives come forward that allow them an option to do that.
        General VanHerck. To directly answer your question, it
    would be incredibly valuable to have 5G secure technology.
        And we have moved out on that at United States Northern
    Command. Our J6 [Director, Cyberspace Operations] is very
    innovative. J6 does our, you know, command and control and
    those kinds of things. That gives us resiliency as a nation,
    candidly.
        Today, I am able to take a single device to do unclassified
    and classified information from any location and have
    resiliency, not reaching back to a single building or a single
    server, if you will, but can access multiple servers. That is
    incredibly valuable going forward in a crisis, whether that be
    crisis from a natural disaster or a potential attack on the
    homeland.
        Mrs. McClain. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        The gentlelady yields back.
        Ms. Jacobs is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair.
        And thank you so much to our witnesses for being here.
        First, I would just like to say to my colleagues who are
    expressing concern about the southern border, as a
    Representative of San Diego, we feel very safe, and I think we
    know that the root causes are really the key to making sure
    that this situation abates.
        And on the question of root causes, Admiral Faller, I would
    like to ask you: As you referenced in your testimony, Latin
    America militaries and militia groups have a history of
    violating human rights, and these violations have sometimes
    been ignored or even encouraged by the United States.
    Throughout the civil wars of the 1990s, we saw special forces
    trained by the U.S. were used to commit these abuses.
        So, given that reality, I was wondering if you could talk a
    bit about our current train-and-equip missions that SOUTHCOM is
    conducting and how you are working to prevent these types of
    violations from occurring.
        Admiral Faller. Thank you. It is an important question.
        We have learned from that history. SOUTHCOM has a human
    rights program, the only combatant command to have one. It is
    now in its 20th-plus year. We have invested our own money in
    increasing the capacity of that program. We use that program
    with our partners. We have helped our partners--Honduras,
    Guatemala, El Salvador--install human rights observers and
    advisors in their ministries and with their chiefs of defense.
    We hold seminars.
        And I routinely, through that program, meet with the human
    rights NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] in the United
    States and in partner nations, for example in Guatemala, to
    listen to their concerns. These important NGO partners, they
    know their stuff and they have on-the-ground insights. And we
    take it very, very seriously.
        And then we apply that into our Leahy vetting process,
    which is another extremely important program that we should
    look to enhance, frankly, and really embed in a systematic way
    within the Department and make it very consistent.
        These programs have helped change behavior over time. And,
    while not perfect, we have made progress. And particularly in
    the last year, when there was every reason for partner nations,
    their militaries--that is what I can speak to--to turn inward,
    they didn't, and they acted professionally. There were some
    reports here and there, but, by and large, they acted
    professionally.
        You can't assume that that will be future performance, but
    the building blocks are in place to have a better professional
    performance going forward. And I assure you, we are committed
    to that at our headquarters and in our training and education
    programs.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
        And still to you, Admiral Faller, I think, you know, as we
    have talked about the region and we often emphasize our willing
    partners, especially, for instance, the Colombian Government, I
    was wondering how you believe this partnership will serve the
    U.S. goals in the region as it relates to any peace deal with
    FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] or any potential
    peace deal with the ELN [National Liberation Army].
        Admiral Faller. Well, certainly we support our partners in
    information sharing. That is really key to understanding what
    promises are made, what promises are being broken.
        It is unfortunate the Venezuelan crisis has just made all
    that worse. Venezuela is essentially a paradise for
    narcotraffickers, and Maduro and his illegitimate government
    and the military are profiting from that. And by creating that
    safe haven and encouraging them, ``them'' being the FARC
    dissidents and the ELN, it has compounded the situation.
        The 5 million migrants that have been pushed out by the
    human rights abuses of the Maduro regime have also compounded
    it. Colombia has really, overall, just behaved and performed
    with humanity in accepting these migrants.
        And so we are with them. We talk to them every day and
    share information. And it is largely in their ministry and
    government levels, so I just provide--I share information with
    my counterpart, General Navarro, who is just a wonderful,
    professional interlocutor.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And thank you for your long service
    to our country.
        And, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
        And thank you for the witnesses being here and for your
    service.
        To each of you, in a hearing memo, it listed, in the last 2
    years, a quarter of a billion dollars has been spent--DOD
    dollars have been spent for DHS border support.
        Will you be reimbursed for those dollars? And, if not, what
    programs are going to be impacted by the quarter of a billion
    dollars that you have lost in funding?
        Mr. Salesses. So, Congresswoman, I will take that question.
    We have not been reimbursed. It was done on a nonreimbursable
    basis.
        And that funding came out of the defense budget and other
    places. It probably impacted, depending on where the money was
    taken, depending what it impacted. It was probably training,
    some personnel costs, and those types of things, where the
    services had available money to use in that case.
        Mrs. Bice. So, when we are talking about funding, you are
    asking for additional funding to make sure that you have the
    resources needed, but, in fact, you are actually having dollars
    pulled away from you in other ways, including to support DHS
    border support, that do impact the readiness and availability
    of the forces, it seems. Is that correct?
        Mr. Salesses. That is correct.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you.
        My second question is: In the last 6 years, the United
    States has spent over $3.5 billion in strategy and engagement
    for Central America. Do you believe that we are getting a
    return on our investment, given that we have seen a tremendous
    amount of influx of migrants from the Northern Triangle area,
    which is where the bulk of these dollars have been going?
        And I would open that for any of the witnesses.
        Admiral Faller. Consistency in our programs is as important
    as the dollar amount.
        And we have been in extremely good discussions. The
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and SECDEF have been excellent at
    asking for our advice on what might work and will work as part
    of the administration's $4 billion multiyear plan.
        And we are encouraged by the long look of this program. It
    takes time for partners' security forces--I can speak to
    military--to implement programs that they can responsibly and
    professionally enact that will make a difference in tamping
    down the violence.
        And I know State Department--we work hand in hand with
    State Department on this--is committed through their INL
    [Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs]
    to the same professionalization of the police forces.
        The issue has been that we have not applied this
    consistently. It has been started and stopped. And so, while
    there may have been a high dollar value, it is hard to make the
    argument that it was consistently applied over the time period
    that would be required to make a difference.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you for that.
        Last question. Mr. Salesses, have you been requested to
    provide additional border support or security for fiscal year
    2022? And, if so, what are the conversations surrounding that?
        Mr. Salesses. We have not been requested. But, obviously,
    we are talking to DHS, because, as you are aware,
    Congresswoman, we have military members on the border right now
    and have consistently provided military members over the last
    several years in support of DHS's mission.
        Currently, there is no request for 2022, but that doesn't
    mean that we may not get a request for 2022.
        Mrs. Bice. And the request that you have received over the
    last, let's say, several months, is that impacting Reserves or
    National Guard readiness as they are being pulled away to help
    support what is happening on the southern border?
        Mr. Salesses. I don't believe so, Congresswoman. The force
    that is down there now, even though it is National Guard
    members, was brought on as title 10, because it was part of
    their time to come on duty, full-time duty. And so we were able
    to make use of that by having them come on duty during that
    period.
        Mrs. Bice. Great.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Morelle is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Morelle. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
    this very, very important hearing.
        And I want to thank the witnesses for being here today to
    share your expertise and also your dedication to our Nation's
    safety and security.
        I am a new member of this committee, and so some of my
    questions will seem pretty basic. I am just trying to get a
    level set. But I would like to hear, General, a little more
    about NORTHCOM's mission associated with the Arctic. And
    appreciate the questions that my colleagues have asked up to
    this point about it.
        But, General, if I were to go back home and talk to
    constituents and talk about the importance of the Arctic to the
    United States and the challenges associated, what would I say?
    How would I describe to them the importance of Arctic as a
    region and then also the challenges specifically associated
    with the Arctic?
        General VanHerck. Thanks, Congressman.
        The Arctic is very important, and the environmental changes
    that have been ongoing have allowed increased access to the
    Arctic. The Arctic has tremendous resources, natural resources.
        And it is also a line of communication now, with the
    environmental changes, that have a flow from Asia to the
    European AOR and back and forth. And having that flow, the
    economic flow, is crucial to maintain for prosperity of not
    only our Nation but other nations around the globe.
        Russia gets 25 percent of their GDP [gross domestic
    product] from resources in the Arctic, so they absolutely have
    a vested interest in the Arctic, and they also want to ensure
    that it is secure for their efforts, if you will.
        What I would tell you is, both Russia and China would like
    to change the international rules-based norms and the
    consistency that we have had that has served the globe well
    since the end of World War II. So it is incumbent upon us to be
    persistent by working with allies and partners and like-minded
    nations to ensure that we maintain the consistency of the
    international rules-based norms and laws that have served us
    well over time.
        Mr. Morelle. So, just so I might say it in--just so that I
    understand it, it is essentially that the changes in climate,
    then--I think that is what you are referring to in terms of
    environmental--make it more navigable, make it more accessible,
    and, at the same time, our two adversaries want to change the
    rules that govern the region and how we have historically
    approached the region.
        Is that right? Did I get that?
        General VanHerck. Yes. So environmental change has created
    more access and opportunity. And both Russia and China are
    interested in ensuring that the activities conducted in the
    Arctic are favorable to them individually, not necessarily the
    international community.
        Mr. Morelle. So talk to me a little bit about that. So what
    type of investments and capabilities are they--what types of
    investments are they making in capabilities that increase that
    concern? Could you give me a little specificity around that,
    those investments?
        General VanHerck. Sure.
        Russia has taken a dozen or so military installations that
    after the Cold War sat dormant, and they have revitalized
    those. They have worked hard on their nuclear capabilities and
    revitalized those as well, to include their bombers and
    infrastructure. Not only are they placing defensive
    capabilities that they state are obviously for defensive
    purposes, they are putting offensive capabilities into the
    Arctic, capabilities which are capable of not only striking
    Canada and North America but, obviously, our homeland.
        China calls themselves a near-Arctic nation and wants to be
    influential in the Arctic as well. I would remind the committee
    that next month, in May, Russia takes over the Arctic Council.
    It is very important for us to ensure that like-minded nations,
    allies, and partners are well-aligned as we go into this,
    because Russia and China will try to exploit any gaps or seams.
        Mr. Morelle. Thank you.
        If I could just stay on that subject just for a moment
    more, as I use the balance of my time here. As we assess our
    capabilities in the Arctic, talk a little bit about the
    challenge you find with the extreme cold, ice, high altitude on
    our military equipment. And is there anything we should be
    doing in terms of working with industry on innovations to help
    address those needs? And have you began pursuing those
    partnerships? Are we engaged with partnerships already in that
    regard?
        General VanHerck. Thanks, Congressman. I think that is a
    great question.
        And so I do think there is more we can be doing. And units
    that are organized, trained, and equipped and ready to operate
    in the Arctic is crucial. I believe that we need to do a better
    job of identifying those units, enabling them through day-to-
    day competition to practice their operations.
        And working closely with industry, as you point out, to
    ensure that the capabilities that we do develop are conducive
    for successful operations in the Arctic. That goes from the
    human asset all the way to specific platforms and capabilities
    overall.
        Mr. Morelle. Thank you, gentlemen.
        And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Faller, I am struck and I would encourage my
    colleagues to look at your chart here of Chinese activity in
    South/Central America. Just some of the key things hopping out
    at me: 25 out of the 33 countries hosting Chinese
    infrastructure projects; 60 ports; 70 percent increase in
    Chinese Navy port calls; nearly a billion in weapons sales;
    and, most importantly, or at least most disturbingly I think,
    both sides of the Panama Canal now owned in some way, shape, or
    fashion by the Chinese in controlling that strategic choke
    point.
        It leads me to wonder, is the Monroe Doctrine dead or at
    least on life support?
        And if you could elaborate a bit more on what you are doing
    with the interagency. Because we are talking military tools
    here, which are critical, and I certainly support security
    assistance and increasing your security assistance efforts, but
    these are nonmilitary tools. And what tools do you need and
    what tools does the interagency need to combat this and to
    compete?
        Admiral Faller. Certainly, the statistics you cite fuel a
    sense of urgency with respect to strengthening our
    partnerships. Partnerships are key. We like to think of it as a
    good-neighbor doctrine. It resonates. Good neighbors have like
    values. And values are our strength in this hemisphere.
        We recently visited Argentina. They want to do more with
    us. They want to partner with us at a mil-to-mil level. We have
    to do everything we can----
        Mr. Waltz. Which, by the way, now, Argentina has a Chinese
    space tracking station which lines up with our polar launches
    out of----
        Admiral Faller. We discussed----
        Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Vandenberg Air Force Base.
        Admiral Faller. We discussed those important issues.
        We have to look to the Antarctic as well as the Arctic.
    China has a growing interest there. We have visited Ushuaia,
    which is the furthest port in this hemisphere, the continental
    hemisphere, and its important access.
        You mentioned the Panama Canal. Panama, under the current
    leadership there, their President Cortizo, has opened with
    renewed commitment to a relationship with the United States. We
    are working on that with our Department of State. That is
    important. Panama is a very strategic partner with very
    professional security forces.
        And those are the investments we need to make. A small
    investment in security cooperation, a little goes a long way. A
    businessperson, you would invest in it. It is a high P/E [price
    to earnings] stock.
        Mr. Waltz. No, thank you, Admiral.
        And I would also note, you know, we are on the verge of
    having Barbados, Haiti, Honduras potentially switch their
    recognition of Taiwan; port projects in Honduras, Cuba, and,
    General, also, under your purview, the Bahamas as well; in
    addition to potential fishing rights going to the Chinese next
    to our underwater testing facilities.
        Is that correct?
        General VanHerck. China is very aggressive in the Bahamas
    right now, with a new ambassador that is very aggressive. They
    have the largest embassy in the Bahamas right now, and they
    continue to buy up the tourism industry to have access and
    influence.
        And you are exactly right; they do have access right now to
    an overwatch, if you will, of our Navy test and training
    facilities, which is very concerning.
        We are partnering closely with the Royal Bahamian Defense
    Force. They are fantastic partners for domain awareness,
    putting capabilities in the south right now for domain
    awareness, such as radar. This year, we will put one into
    Nassau, as well, to give us additional capabilities.
        But a little will go a long ways for investment with
    regards to Bahamas and Mexico.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
        Just switching to the other--from the Bahamas to the Arctic
    and adding to some of my colleagues. My understanding, the
    Coast Guard has one operational icebreaker that is about 60
    years old, one under construction. The Russians have dozens.
        The Northwest Passage is now open for shipping, along with
    shipping from across the north side of Russia from Asia to
    Europe.
        Do we need more icebreakers?
        General VanHerck. Congressman, for persistence, I support
    the current plan for additional icebreakers for the Coast
    Guard. Your numbers are correct. They have two assigned. They
    had a fire on one. They are about to resurrect that, which will
    end up with two. But for persistence, we do need extra
    icebreakers.
        Mr. Waltz. Great.
        And just with my remaining time--thank you for that,
    General--Admiral Faller, if you could send to my office for the
    record your legislative proposal on adding to Plan Colombia.
        And I would just mention to my colleagues, we have had
    Special Forces in Colombia with an all-of-government effort now
    for 30 years. So a lot of discussion in Washington these days
    of endless wars, but that persistent engagement can be
    incredibly effective.
        Please send that over. Thank you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 138.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mrs. Luria is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you, gentlemen, for appearing
    today.
        And, Admiral Faller, I wanted to start with you. I recently
    read a press release from SOUTHCOM that announced the
    completion of the LCS-1 [littoral combat ship] USS Freedom
    deployment in support of JIATF-South [Joint Interagency Task
    Force-South]. It applauded the work of the ship's crew in
    counter-drug operations, working with partner nations to build
    interoperability, and hosting a U.S. Coast Guard LEDET [Law
    Enforcement Detachment] to counter illicit trafficking.
        All in all, my takeaway from this press release was that
    this was a successful deployment. Would you concur in this
    assessment?
        Admiral Faller. There have been some real bright spots with
    littoral combat ship deployments. You cite Freedom. It was a
    very successful deployment. They had a high operational
    availability.
        I would also cite the USS Gabby Giffords' recent
    deployment, where the CO [commanding officer], on his own
    initiative, made a video for his crew and for his families that
    went public about their high operational success.
        So that capability has proven, and the CNO [Chief of Naval
    Operations], Admiral Gilday's commitment to getting the
    maintenance right is making a difference.
        Mrs. Luria. So it sounds to me that you would welcome
    additional LCS deployments in your AOR. But I also noted,
    however, the headline of this article was ``USS Freedom Returns
    for Final Deployment.''
        Even though the LCS can provide significant contributions
    in your AOR and the Navy wants to grow its fleet, they intend
    to decommission the first LCS in class. Do you agree with this
    plan?
        Admiral Faller. The Navy shipbuilding plan has stated a
    capability and a size that the Navy needs, and I think it is
    recognized that we need a larger fleet. How the Navy sources
    that capability through the joint process, to me, is--I am
    indifferent on what type of ship, but we need a ship. Zero is
    equal to zero or unsolvable in any equation.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you. And I appreciate you noting,
    as we talked about last year, the limited number of ships
    deployed in your AOR.
        And, General VanHerck, I would like to switch and better
    understand the geographic responsibilities of the three
    combatant commanders whose AORs intersect at the Arctic.
        On the west coast--and I am going to focus on naval
    assets--you have a single combatant commander at USINDOPACOM
    with 100-plus naval forces assigned, ``forces for'' [Forces for
    Unified Commands]. On the east coast, you have two combatant
    commanders responsible for deterring Russian aggression from
    the east coast to the Barents Sea, but USNORTHCOM has no
    permanently assigned naval forces in the ``forces for''
    document, and EUCOM [European Command] has very few, which are
    mostly focused in the Mediterranean.
        As USNORTHCOM, U.S. Fleet Forces Command is your maritime
    component commander. Is that correct?
        General VanHerck. That is correct.
        Mrs. Luria. But do you have operational control of those
    forces, as INDOPACOM does on the west coast?
        General VanHerck. Ma'am, I do not have operational control
    of the majority of the forces. Sometimes I get allocated those
    forces to execute for short durations of time, but to answer
    your question directly, no, I do not.
        Mrs. Luria. Okay.
        And then, in 2018, Admiral Richardson, then CNO, stood up
    the new version of the 2nd Fleet, and he said that ``the Second
    Fleet will approach the North Atlantic as one continuous
    operational space and conduct expeditionary fleet operations
    when and where needed.''
        And so, according to Admiral Richardson, the 2nd Fleet's
    area of responsibility crosses the NORTHCOM and the EUCOM AOR,
    yet they are not forces forward to either combatant commander.
    Is this correct?
        General VanHerck. That is correct.
        Mrs. Luria. And I recall that the Harry S. Truman recently
    conducted operations above the Arctic Circle. What combatant
    commander was assigned operational control of the Harry S.
    Truman Strike Group when they were operating in the Norwegian
    Sea?
        General VanHerck. General Wolters at the European Command
    had operation control.
        Mrs. Luria. Okay.
        So, if I understand correctly, with the reestablishment of
    2nd Fleet, we introduced a new Navy and NATO joint command that
    appears to have broad geographic responsibility but is not
    assigned to either combatant commander.
        And, along with commander of USEUCOM, you are given the
    responsibility to deter Russian aggression and activity in the
    North Atlantic, but you essentially have no assigned naval
    forces. Is that correct?
        General VanHerck. That is correct now. From a ship
    perspective, you are correct.
        Mrs. Luria. And so I just wanted to comment--I saw that
    Captain Mohler, the Chief of Staff at 2nd Fleet, recently said
    in regards to this process of standing up the 2nd Fleet that
    ``we were given no blueprints, we were given no resources, we
    were just told to do it.''
        So this command of 2nd Fleet, do you feel that the area of
    responsibility crossing two combatant commands has been
    effective, as the NORTHCOM commander, in the overall mission
    that you need to accomplish in the Arctic?
        General VanHerck. Specific to the 2nd Fleet, I would defer
    to Vice Admiral Lewis there on that question. I will tell you
    that I am closely----
        Mrs. Luria. But, sir, can I just stop you, in the time I
    have remaining? U.S. Fleet Forces Command is your maritime
    component commander, and Admiral Lewis works for them, so he
    works for you.
        The Chairman. I am sorry but the gentlewoman's time has
    expired. You will have to continue this for the record or
    later. Sorry.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 138.]
        Mr. Bergman is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, gentlemen, thank you all for your thoughtful,
    proactive leadership and continuing engagement.
        General, the Joint Pub. 3-27 on Homeland Defense published
    in April of 2018 states that the purpose of homeland defense is
    to protect against incursions or attacks on sovereign U.S.
    territory, the domestic population, and critical infrastructure
    and key resources.
        The publication also states that virtually all strategic
    threats to the homeland are based in the areas of
    responsibility of other geographic commanders and that major
    operations against an enemy in the U.S. remain, quote, ``highly
    unlikely.''
        You can take any part or all of this question for the
    record or, you know, offer comments however you would like. But
    are these assumptions in Joint Pub. 3-27 still valid?
        General VanHerck. Congressman, I think the last point you
    made with regards to a likely attack on the homeland from a
    peer competitor is accurate, that we don't see indications of
    that right now. But we do see indications of peer competitors
    developing capabilities to hold the homeland at risk, which
    would have influence on our ability to project power on our
    timeline.
        Specific to your first comment with regards to a majority
    of the threats existing in other AORs, I think we need to
    reconsider that. I think the persistent, proximate threat is
    here and it is here to stay in the future.
        Mr. Bergman. Is NORTHCOM prepared to conduct operations in
    the homeland?
        General VanHerck. Day to day, based on current indications
    and warning, my assessment is yes. If indication and warning
    dramatically change, then I am going to have to ask for forces.
    And those forces would have to be allocated to me through the
    Secretary of Defense, at which point the Secretary would have
    to balance the globe based on the threat and risk that he would
    accept.
        Mr. Bergman. Well, in that case, has all coordination with
    the many State and local jurisdictions been precoordinated,
    rehearsed, trained, exercised, et cetera, to allow NORTHCOM to
    quickly and effectively carry out its mission in the homeland
    when an immediate response is required?
        General VanHerck. My assessment, if I understand your
    question, is, do we need to practice and execute----
        Mr. Bergman. Well, any time, whether you are Active,
    Reserve, Guard, whatever it is, you have a mission, you put
    together a plan, you get the people, get the gear, and then go
    train it, exercise it, see where you need to improve it or
    change it or whatever it is.
        So that is, I guess, what I am asking, is, are those cross
    boundaries, everything from, you know, who is in charge when
    you start mixing title 10, title 32, et cetera, et cetera.
        General VanHerck. We do that on a daily basis, specifically
    with defense support of civil authorities. We do that with our
    seaborne response as well. We train that.
        I am pushing hard for an exercise that is focused on a
    state-actor attack on the homeland that takes a look at exactly
    what you are talking about. Historically, when we work with an
    interagency, we work from a perspective of us providing support
    to the interagency. I think we also need to look at the
    opposite, where there is a potential state-actor attack on the
    homeland, where I am the supporting commander in that
    situation, and we work closely about command and control across
    the interagency with the other combatant commanders as well.
        Mr. Bergman. Okay.
        And, lastly, is Joint Pub. 3-27 in need of an update or a
    revision?
        General VanHerck. My assessment, based on the comments you
    made, was we need to go look at it and update it to reflect the
    threat to the homeland that exists today.
        Mr. Bergman. Good. Thank you.
        Admiral, my colleague asked a question about the littoral
    combat ships. I am going to ask a slight derivative of it, and
    the answer can be a simple ``yes'' or ``no.'' Do we need to
    consider other platforms, other than LCS, for use in SOUTHCOM
    AOR at this point?
        Admiral Faller. Staying engaged with our people is our
    number one and making sure we are properly resourced there, so
    absolutely.
        And we are appreciative for Congress's involvement in
    ensuring that we didn't get cuts last year in our defense
    attaches. That is our front line, our senior defense officials.
        So I think it is the capabilities, and there is none better
    than the U.S. service women and men.
        Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Escobar is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for this very
    critical hearing.
        And, gentlemen, thank you so much for your testimony today.
        I represent El Paso, Texas, which is on the southern
    border. And I am delighted that we are finally focusing a bit
    more on the Western Hemisphere, because, frankly, the crisis is
    not at our border; the crisis is outside of our borders, all
    the way south to the Northern Triangle.
        And so it is really critical, I think, that in this moment
    where we can come forward with solutions to what is happening
    outside of our Nation's front door that we really examine where
    we have been effective, where we have been ineffective, and
    recognize this as a decades-long situation where we have failed
    to meet the moment over and over and over again, is my thought.
        I think the thing that we need to recognize is we need a
    multifaceted approach to addressing mass migration coming from
    south of us. As we have, as a country, limited legal pathways
    for folks, we should not be surprised that illegal pathways
    become an only option for people who are fleeing exactly what
    you have described, Admiral Faller, with what is happening in
    their home countries.
        And so, as a Congress, we need to reexamine what pathways
    we need to reopen, what legal pathways, for refugees, for
    asylum seekers, possibly TPS [Temporary Protected Status].
        I think we also, as a Congress, need to acknowledge that
    many of those transnational criminal organizations that are
    trafficking drugs are in place, in part, because of America's
    insatiable appetite for those drugs. And so we need to look in
    the mirror, recognize our role as well.
        But I would like to focus a little bit on those
    transnational criminal organizations and what we can do. I do
    think that, again, going back to a multifaceted approach, in
    addition to opening up legal pathways, in addition to
    investment and collaboration with our neighbors--you talked
    about good neighbors, Admiral. I am a big believer in that, as
    well, and coming up with solutions together, where there is not
    just investment but accountability.
        We also--although I am not a huge fan of relying on the DOD
    for efforts like this, I do think that the DOD has a role to
    play. And I am curious about what your thoughts are in terms of
    the opportunities that exist.
        I think we have to recognize we need a sustained approach.
    It can't be in fits and starts. And so we have to really work
    with those neighbors closely and make a long-term commitment.
    We have to respect human rights within those countries. We have
    to hold those countries accountable.
        Because those organizations have become more powerful and
    more sophisticated over the last several years, and the
    policies of the last 4 years, like ``Remain in Mexico,'' which
    is being unwound now by this administration, title 42, which
    has been kept in place by this administration, those policies
    basically don't stop migration. They just create a sea of
    humanity right outside our front door that is victim to these
    organizations. I have heard accounts right across from my
    community in Ciudad Juarez about horrific rapes, kidnapping,
    persecution. It is horrific, what is happening. And these
    policies basically provide that human fuel to these
    organizations.
        What is our first step? And how do we ensure that we uplift
    the human rights of folks who have been vulnerable for decades?
        And I have 1 minute. I am so sorry.
        Admiral Faller. The transnational criminal organizations,
    the first step is recognizing them in our strategic documents,
    that they are a national security threat and a national
    security imperative.
        And, as you cite, while I am a big fan of DOD as well, we
    play a supporting and minor role in this, but a key role,
    because we pull people together.
        An example of that success: During the last year, we helped
    the interagency develop a targeting process to identify and
    then identify the right interagency or partner lever to go
    after these threat networks on a more holistic threat basis.
        An example of the magnitude of the problem that you cite:
    Forty million migrants over the last 5 years, 40 million, is
    the number, total, across the hemisphere. That is just an
    example of the scope and scale of the violence and the
    insecurity that is driving mothers and families to separate
    from their kids to seek a better life.
        Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Admiral.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I appreciate all three of you being here today and your
    leadership roles in defending our country.
        And I want to say, it is great to see a fourth star on
    General VanHerck. So congratulations.
        I have two questions for General VanHerck and one for
    Admiral Faller if time allows.
        My first question is dealing with hypersonic weapons. You
    know, ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] take about 35
    minutes from Russia to reach here; China, maybe a little
    longer. But hypersonics cuts that time in half.
        How can we support you better out of Congress in being able
    to respond to those shorter times? Do you need better sensors?
    Better interceptors? How do we do a better job ensuring
    continuity of government with the--I mean, there is a whole
    myriad of issues that we have to look at with a 15-minute
    response time.
        Thank you.
        General VanHerck. Thanks, Congressman.
        First, I would say, go back to that domain awareness
    discussion I had up front, and create the domain awareness to
    have situational awareness on an inbound hypersonic live
    vehicle or a missile and the ability to take that awareness and
    transition it into a defense capability.
        But, more broadly, as I talked about previously, it is
    getting further left. And we need to utilize data and
    information, that domain awareness, that gives us a picture
    ahead of any activity.
        And so we can take today's GEOINT [geospatial intelligence]
    capability from satellite imagery or signals intelligence
    capability or even open-source from cell phone tracking to
    phones, et cetera, and give us a broader picture and a better
    picture much earlier, before we actually have to be defending,
    to create options to deter or de-escalate.
        And that is where we are focused at United States Northern
    Command and NORAD.
        Mr. Bacon. One of the things that concerns me is the
    continuity of government, having nuclear C3 [command, control,
    and communications] confidence in deterrence. I know it is
    broader than just your combatant command, but with a 15-minute
    warning time and some of our stuff right off the coasts, I just
    think we need to rethink when it comes to deterrence and having
    an assured ability to respond.
        A second question. Do you feel like we are on the right
    track with the Next Generation Interceptor program? And do you
    think it will adequately address the future threats?
        General VanHerck. In my discussions with Vice Admiral Hill
    at MDA [Missile Defense Agency], I do believe we are on the
    right track. I can't afford, from my mission, to have any
    further delays. I am encouraged by the decision the Deputy
    Secretary made to move forward with that, and I look forward to
    continuing to partner with MDA to deliver on that capability on
    time.
        Going forward, I remain concerned about capacity, from the
    10 October parade that we saw in North Korea, to ensure that I
    maintain enough capacity for the total number of ballistic
    missiles that North Korea could launch at the United States or
    North America.
        I am also concerned about their capability--capability to
    develop advanced techniques to potentially deceive, decoy,
    those kinds of things.
        In that way, Next Generation Interceptor will address
    those, both the capacity and the capability.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        Admiral Faller, with China's GDP reaching ours, Russia
    totally modernizing its nuclear force, you know, regional
    threats, it seems to me America cannot do it alone, but yet we
    are indispensable. We are going to have to do more and more to
    bring in countries with like values to help shoulder this
    burden.
        So what are the opportunities in your AOR? And,
    particularly, how about Brazil? It is growing in wealth,
    growing in capability. Hopefully they will see a role for
    themselves in this area.
        Thank you.
        Admiral Faller. The National Defense Strategy calls out
    strengthening our alliances and partnerships as a top priority.
    The new Secretary's guidance is right in line with that, as is
    National Security Strategy, interim security strategy.
        Brazil recently signed on a partnership with New York Guard
    and, in the last couple years, has really worked to align
    themselves with our training and exercises in a way that
    recognizes their strengths and our needs. And so, you know,
    partnerships being two ways, the legacy that we have with
    Brazil that goes back to World War II and the capable fighting
    force that they have is an area that we are clearly looking at,
    as we move forward, as a way to enhance capacity.
        We are not going to outspend--we can't outspend our way out
    of this challenge of competition. We have to prioritize, focus
    on the right instruments with ruthless prioritization that give
    us the highest rate of return. And some of these competition
    elements--security cooperation exercises, Guard partnerships--
    we need to have an increased appreciation for the value they
    bring for $1 or 1 hour of investment in time for the overall
    defense of our great Nation.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Admiral.
        And, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Crow is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I wanted to start with Admiral Faller.
        You had mentioned before that, you know, China is the
    pacing threat and a significant threat in your area of
    operations. And one thing you didn't mention in the beginning
    was just the threat of the climate crisis and climate change.
        Obviously, you are a career Navy man, and you know well how
    that is impacting our ports, our operations around the world. I
    would just like a brief comment from you on the impact in the
    near- and mid-term on the climate and your operations.
        Admiral Faller. In the fall of 2019, I flew all over
    Guatemala with the then-NORTHCOM commander, General
    O'Shaughnessy, and we saw--we were doing a partner visit to
    both Mexico and Guatemala, and we saw firsthand dried white
    corn fields, endless fields, dried and parched.
        In the fall of 2020, back-to-back Category 4 hurricanes
    within a 2-week period, on the same track, unprecedented, that
    flooded and wiped out what little crops were left across
    Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. It is a credit to
    Honduran security forces and Guatemala that they responded so
    professionally with such devastation.
        So it is a fact that climate is changing. Science--I
    believe in science. And it is a fact that that requires rapid
    response. And that is a military capability that we have,
    something that our partners need enhancement with, something
    that our security cooperation programs can and should focus on.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you.
        And, General VanHerck, a similar question to you. I am
    wondering about particularly the impact of a warming climate
    and climate change on installations in Alaska. I know we are
    having some issues regarding our radar facilities as the tundra
    actually thaws out, challenges with the infrastructure.
        So a brief comment on that, if you will?
        General VanHerck. Sure, Congressman. I will be real brief.
        You are absolutely correct. The permafrost, as it thaws,
    creates access problems to infrastructure, infrastructure we
    have for legacy warning systems, those kinds of things, which
    challenge us to get to those.
        It also creates challenges for us in building any future
    capabilities within the Arctic. We must plan for that. It has
    to be part of any strategy and plan going forward.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you.
        And just to carry on my colleague Mike Waltz's comments
    about the icebreakers, I wanted to dig into that a little bit
    more, because I know Russia, you know, has over 20, I believe,
    and I don't even need this full hand to count ours.
        I know you had mentioned your support for the Coast Guard
    plan. Is that enough? Are we on a right track to actually be
    competitive and to have the navigability and the access and the
    persistence that you talked about in the Arctic with our
    current plan?
        General VanHerck. My assessment is that, right now, their
    plan for six additional icebreakers would give me the
    persistence and the capability. That is a resource decision,
    though. If they are allocated elsewhere in the globe, then it
    may challenge me for my persistence.
        My assessment is Russia has 54 icebreakers, not only
    military but overall, civilian as well.
        Mr. Crow. Okay. Which is even worse than I thought. Thank
    you for that comment.
        And then back to you, Admiral Faller. I, like many of my
    colleagues, recently went to the border to conduct oversight of
    the unaccompanied-minor issue. Obviously, we need to go to the
    root cause, because, you know, we set up these, quote/unquote,
    ``emergency'' facilities, but this is an emergency that
    actually happens every year at the same time every year. It is
    fairly predictable.
        So we have to go to the root cause and stabilize Central
    America. You already talked about the transnational criminal
    organizations that are important, but--and the predictability
    of our investment funding.
        With regard to the Northern Triangle countries, are there
    opportunities--do the conditions exist for us to expand our
    training and our professional exchange programs, given some of
    the challenges with the government officials in the current
    governments in those areas?
        Admiral Faller. There are opportunities, working with the
    professional elements of their security forces and working by,
    with, and through our embassies--we take the lead from the
    embassies and our ambassadors and charges on everything--to
    look at smart investments.
        The exercise program focuses on their needs; it focuses on
    partner needs, rapid response. Along with that we use
    humanitarian assistance authorities and money very successfully
    to do minor construction projects--for example, helping fix a
    leaky roof on a school, which is a skill set for partner
    militaries, it is a skill set for our Guard and Reserve forces,
    which are our principal force providers, and it provides hope--
    hope to the people.
        And so there are opportunities. And we are currently
    looking at our existing exercise program for the next few
    months and next year, at how we can enhance that, in close
    cooperation with Secretary Salesses and others to get this
    right. And so, yes.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time----
        Mr. Crow. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman [continuing]. Has expired.
        Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I would like to start by saying I am glad that
    President Biden is continuing the good work of President Trump
    to end the war in Afghanistan. There was a bipartisan
    consensus, a bipartisan majority, on this committee regarding
    legislation that would have limited President Trump's effort to
    draw down troops in Afghanistan, and I am grateful that
    President Biden appears to be going in a direction more aligned
    with President Trump than the majority of this committee.
        And while that may not seem particularly relevant to this
    discussion about the Western Hemisphere, it is. My community is
    home to the 7th Special Forces Group. They have as their
    principal area of responsibility Latin America, and yet they
    have seen frequent, persistent, bloody deployments to CENTCOM
    [Central Command].
        And so I am hopeful that under this announcement from
    President Biden that they will be able to get back to their
    good work in the area of responsibility that I think
    increasingly calls for our attention.
        Admiral Faller, you mentioned the importance of our partner
    nations. And I want to talk about the methodology of that
    engagement. One theory of the case is we can always be sending
    our service members down to our partner nations for train-and-
    equip missions. The other theory of the case is that we could
    do more by bringing some of those partners forces here so that
    we can collaborate and train and build those capabilities.
        What is your assessment about the cost savings that could
    be realized if we did more of the train-and-equip work here in
    our country as opposed to down in the jungle?
        Admiral Faller. The engagement with our partners is so
    critical. And 7th Special Forces Group is a professional team
    that is culturally aligned and engaged day-to-day in training--
    training and advising, not accompanying. It is appropriate for
    the progress we have made. And they are doing it
    professionally, along with General Clarke's focus on
    professionalism and doing the right thing.
        And so I think it is a mix. I think we have to go to
    partner-nation countries. Sometimes that can be very cost-
    effective, and it really gains cultural skills that our teams
    need. And then bringing our partners here gives them an
    appreciation. And I have been to the 7th Special Forces Group
    headquarters, been there, and they appreciate that two-way
    exchange. We learn as much from our partners as they learn from
    us.
        And that persistent and episodic engagement with the
    Special Forces team, small teams--three, four, sometimes
    seven--is key to helping our partners build that capacity and
    securing our hemisphere, our home, and our neighborhood.
        Mr. Gaetz. You mentioned that we cannot interdict our way
    out of these challenges in Latin America. I would suggest we
    also can't decapitate our way out of them. As we take out
    leaders in some of these organizations, they seem to have quite
    capable human resources to be able to replenish that talent.
    And so it would seem that those partner capabilities are
    increasingly important.
        And it would also seem that we save a lot of money doing
    more and more of that here. And it has the added benefit of our
    service members being able to have their heads and beds at
    home, which I know increases their own morale and capability as
    well.
        I also wanted to ask about the Chinese Communist Party's
    investments in infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere, and
    Mr. Waltz went through those. And you busted the myth that this
    is purely economic.
        Could you talk about the infrastructure enhancements from
    the Chinese Communist Party that are most concerning to you?
        Admiral Faller. Most concerning infrastructure enhancement
    and advancements are in space and intelligence assets. We would
    welcome a classified hearing at a future date on that.
        They are in IT and in the lack of civ-mil divide in how IT
    is viewed based on Chinese Communist Party law.
        Enhancements in port infrastructure, which could be easily
    scaled up. And we have seen how that has insidiously scaled up
    globally.
        And I think the world welcomes a fair competition and a
    fair access to the economic progress that we all need, but not
    an unfair one. And----
        Mr. Gaetz. Thank you.
        Admiral Faller [continuing]. In cyber and IT.
        Mr. Gaetz. Yeah, no, that is very helpful.
        One final question. ELN seems to be playing the Duque
    government and the Maduro government off of each other in some
    of the work that they are doing in the border region between
    Colombia and Venezuela. Any comment you would have about how we
    ought to contextualize what ELN is currently doing?
        Admiral Faller. I think the illegitimate Maduro government
    has synergy with the ELN and the FARC dissidents. They share a
    lot in common: no values, a lack of respect for human rights,
    and a brutality that is driving migration.
        I applaud the way President Duque and his Minister of
    Defense and team has responded to the challenge, given the
    circumstances.
        Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Brown is for recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I have a question--two questions each for Admiral Faller
    and General VanHerck. And I will ask that perhaps you can take
    no more than a minute each in answering each of the questions.
    And I will ask one at a time.
        The first one is regarding the directive from Secretary
    Austin in late January, early February, for each command across
    the Department to conduct a stand-down for the purpose of
    discussing the problem of extremism in the ranks.
        So my question for each of you is: What activities have you
    undertaken or directed within your command to execute and
    implement the Secretary's directive? And what lessons, if any,
    have you learned and are you able to share with us today?
        Admiral Faller. This is an important topic. It gets at
    readiness. It gets at cohesion. It gets at harmony. It gets at
    the necessity for all that to be combat-ready. And these
    unacceptable behaviors--extremism, racism, sexual assault and
    harassment--just erode at that good order and discipline, and
    we can never do enough to get after that.
        And I think what I have learned is the importance of
    listening and the importance of perceptions and bias that comes
    into that. And whether we believe it or not, I think we all
    have them and we carry them with us. And we have done a lot to
    try to break down those barriers and look for ways to move
    forward.
        Mr. Brown. General VanHerck.
        General VanHerck. Yeah. Thank you for the opportunity.
        So, specific, we executed and I personally led a session
    with the leadership in the headquarters that addressed the
    Secretary's guidance. Very informative. This is a leadership
    problem, and we have to apply leadership molecules to it. The
    rest of the command executed, as well, on the timeline that the
    Secretary asked.
        I agree with Admiral Faller that the lessons are quite
    significant that we ought to take away--perception, realism. We
    led a diverse organization, a diverse group, and hearing from a
    diverse crowd on the challenges that are faced by those
    individuals is quite eye-opening.
        Thanks.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you.
        And, look, I agree with Secretary Austin; the vast majority
    of men and women serving in uniform, as well as civilian
    employees at DOD, embrace the values that we fight for and
    protect and value as a nation and a military. But even if you
    have a small element within the ranks that adhere to extremist
    views, we have to do everything we can to discover it and
    address it.
        My second question: Can you briefly describe the
    initiatives or programs or activities within your command that
    you use to develop a culture that values diversity, equity, and
    inclusion?
        And, also, can you share with us the diversity of your
    leadership team in your headquarters?
        Thank you.
        Admiral Faller. It goes back to listening, Congressman, and
    the importance of including that in training. So our training
    and education program has embraced that. The human rights
    training, I think, is key to that as well. They are all really
    interconnected as fundamental human rights, the ability to
    approach things and have an equal opportunity in whatever
    aspect.
        And so, as we saw the tragedy of George Floyd unfold last
    year, we stood up a diversity and inclusion team. And I picked
    a brigadier general, Regina Sabric, ``Torch'' Sabric, and one
    of our civilians, Mr. Darrell McCarthy, to lead that. We hold
    listening groups that are part of our training, and we feed
    that back in to how to do better things in the command.
        Our leadership team: My deputy commander, civilian deputy
    commander, is an ambassador, Ambassador Jean Manes, a female.
    The Chief of Staff is the first female Hispanic admiral in the
    United States Navy, Rear Admiral Yvette Davids. And we have a
    deputy director, a one-star admiral, and I have a female. And
    then I have an African-American one-star deputy J3.
        So we have tried to use what I would call the Rooney law in
    our hiring within our own headquarters.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you, Admiral.
        General.
        General VanHerck. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity.
        First of all, I think it starts with action, and your
    actions speak much louder than words. And so that is where we
    are focused. We continue to have sensing sessions in groups to
    expose and have a candid discussion about the challenges of
    extremism and diversity.
        With regards to what we have done, I did a climate
    assessment that concluded in January ahead of the Secretary in
    the office, and it gave us a good focus on where we stand
    today. We are going to conduct the Secretary's additional
    climate assessment.
        In my office, when you walk in, I have an African-American
    master sergeant, a Hispanic female, I have a female aide-de-
    camp, I have an African-American junior----
        The Chairman. I do apologize. The gentleman's time has
    expired here. A couple quick closing thoughts there?
        Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
        Mr. DesJarlais is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
        General VanHerck, as the commander of NORTHCOM, you are
    tasked with defending the homeland. Can you describe the
    importance of maintaining strong, secure borders in defending
    the homeland?
        General VanHerck. Thanks, Congressman.
        Border security is national security, and we must have
    awareness of who is coming across that border and what their
    actual intent is. I think it is a security imperative overall.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah. As far as controlling the spread of
    the coronavirus, what does a vulnerable, porous border do to
    your efforts to stop the spread of this virus and get the
    pandemic under control?
        General VanHerck. It certainly increases the potential
    risk, because those folks coming across the border, we are
    unaware of their exposure, whether they have been vaccinated,
    et cetera. So I assess that, overall, it is a slight increase
    in risk to the U.S. population.
        Dr. DesJarlais. The numbers were pretty stark, saying up to
    10 percent. I think the holding facilities, I have heard, that
    have a capacity of maybe for 33 are at 1,000 times capacity.
    So, certainly, that is not any kind of protocol that we have
    followed in the United States and certainly shouldn't be
    following at the border.
        For the sake of time, just a ``yes'' or ``no'': Do you
    believe strong enforcement of existing immigration laws serve
    as a deterrent to legal immigrants?
        General VanHerck. Well, as I said, I believe our border
    security is national security and that the laws that we have on
    the books would be part of contributing to overarching national
    security when enforced.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So, on the other side of that, do you
    believe the weak enforcement of immigration laws can serve as a
    pull factor in drawing more migrants to our southern border?
        General VanHerck. As we previously stated, I believe it is
    a confluence of multiple things that are drawing folks to our
    border, from transnational criminal organizations, to COVID, to
    multiple natural disasters, to include the perception of weak
    border enforcement.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So, I mean, you believe that
    maintaining a secure border should be a top priority in our
    shared goal of protecting the homeland?
        General VanHerck. Border security is national security, and
    we must know who is coming across the border and what their
    intent is, especially for potential nefarious actors. My
    assessment would be, nefarious actors that might want to do
    harm to the United States of America and our citizens, if there
    is a porous opportunity, they will find a way to exploit that.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah. Well, the CBP [Customs and Border
    Patrol] refuses to release the numbers of individuals on the
    terror watchlist that have been apprehended on the border. We
    can assume that the two men from Yemen are not alone in making
    the trip.
        What are the implications of this free flow of unvetted,
    sometimes highly dangerous individuals crossing our southern
    border when it comes to protecting the homeland?
        General VanHerck. I remain concerned about knowing who is
    coming across that border. And we work closely with Homeland
    Security and Customs and Border Protection and FBI, other law
    enforcement agencies who enforce the laws on our border, so
    that I maintain awareness of what is actually going on with
    regards to the border.
        I am aware of the reports that you are alluding to. I won't
    talk about those in an unclassified environment. But I will
    tell you, the numbers are very small right now. But we do need
    to maintain an awareness on who is coming across that border.
        Dr. DesJarlais. All right.
        And, in 2018, when President Trump and Secretary Mattis
    deployed U.S. troops to support CBP and DHS efforts to counter
    transnational criminal organizations, human trafficking, and
    drug trafficking activities at the border, they were met with
    harsh criticism by many on the political left in Congress as
    well as the media.
        Can you discuss the need to continue fighting these
    transnational criminal organizations at the southern border
    from a national security and homeland defense perspective?
        General VanHerck. Well, Homeland Security, I would defer to
    them for the law enforcement aspect of enforcing what
    transnational criminal organizations do with counternarcotics
    and those kinds of things. We are in direct support of Homeland
    Security and Customs and Border Protection.
        Let me tell you what I am doing. I have a fantastic
    partnership and a relationship with Mexico, SEDENA [Secretariat
    of National Defense] and SEMAR [Naval Secretariat], General
    Sandoval and Admiral Ojeda. They are a fantastic partner. I am
    encouraged by what I heard the President announce with regards
    to an additional 10,000 folks from the Mexican military to help
    us get after this problem, Congressman.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay.
        Well, I mean, clearly, from the reports that we are all
    seeing on the news, there has been an escalation at the border
    that wasn't there a few months ago. Do you agree with that?
        General VanHerck. Congressman, there has been a significant
    uptick of migrants coming across the border. In the last
    quarter, it has been over 350,000.
        Dr. DesJarlais. And a lot of this is created by the cartels
    and criminal organizations. And so, certainly, this provides
    opportunities to our adversaries, whether it be China, Russia,
    or nonstate actors, to exploit these vulnerabilities. Do you
    agree?
        General VanHerck. I agree it creates opportunity.
    Instability does create----
        Mr. Larsen [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, General.
        Mr. Larsen. And I recognize Representative Carbajal for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you all for being here. And I look forward to my
    colleague Mr. DesJarlais supporting President Biden's
    immigration proposal to address those very important issues.
        With that, Mr. Salesses, I want to take a moment to discuss
    DOD's coordination with FEMA and HHS to temporarily house
    unaccompanied children at military installations.
        Earlier this month, DOD announced that it received a
    request for assistance, RFA, to use land at Army National Guard
    Base Camp Roberts, which is located in my district. I
    understand that DOD confirmed it will support this RFA.
        In what ways does DOD support HHS throughout this process,
    from installation selection to when the first unaccompanied
    children arrive on base? And after the children arrive, in what
    capacity does DOD personnel stationed on the base interact with
    HHS facilities and personnel?
        Mr. Salesses. Congressman, thank you for the question.
        Currently, right now, we are at Fort Lewis. We are
    supporting HHS, the Administration for Children and Families,
    who oversees the sheltering of the unaccompanied children. We
    are also planning to use Camp Roberts.
        We work very closely with HHS, but the Defense Department,
    in particular, has no role in supporting the children directly.
    We provide facilities or we provide land. If we provide the
    land, like we will at Camp Roberts, HHS will contract and
    develop soft-sided facilities there. They will provide all the
    services, the wraparound services, and they will provide the
    care for the children.
        So there is very little interaction from the Defense
    Department and our military members in dealing with the
    children at all.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you for that clarification.
        General VanHerck, as the combatant commander responsible
    for the defense of the United States against rogue nations'
    ballistic missile threats, besides the Next Generation
    Interceptor, what would be your top three priorities in the
    upcoming budget that must be prioritized to keep pace with the
    growing threat around the world?
        General VanHerck. As I have alluded to, domain awareness is
    at the top, and that would include over-the-horizon radar
    capability to see beyond where our legacy systems do today.
        Undersea surveillance would be number two on my integrated
    priority list to take a look and ensure we know what is going
    on to our approaches from an undersea capability.
        And then, obviously, that domain awareness and information
    that I talked about earlier to get further left to give us
    options before endgame kinetic defeat and give us options to
    create deterrence during competition would be the primary
    focuses.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        Admiral Faller, I want to ask you about Brazil. In the past
    few weeks, the leaders of all three branches of Brazil's armed
    forces jointly resigned the day after President Bolsonaro fired
    the Defense Minister. All of this is very alarming.
        How have these departures affected SOUTHCOM's engagement
    with Brazil's armed forces?
        Admiral Faller. I have remained engaged with the Chief of
    Defense, General Botelho. He is a professional. And we look at
    the future, and there is a professional force with values that
    we have shared and trained and worked together, particularly
    through programs like our IMET program, our International
    Military Education and Training.
        So, with continued investments in those types of programs,
    I am confident that, institution to institution, which is what
    we focus on, that we will be together in the long haul. And the
    rest is a political decision and choices that people make.
        Mr. Carbajal. Do you feel there is enough continuity there
    to give us assurances that our partnership can weather?
        Admiral Faller. Ultimately, sovereign nations make
    decisions based on their own policy. What we can do is provide
    the best professional and consistent partnership from our
    standpoint.
        That is why it is so important we remain on the field. If
    you are not on the playing field, if you are not engaged, you
    are not going to be heard or seen, and you can't make an impact
    and you can't make a difference.
        So consistency year to year, and then looking at where we
    can make modest increases to stay together. The education
    program is one where we could use an increase. IMET is a State-
    run program; there is more capacity there.
        But, given what we have invested in it to date, I am
    confident we will stay together as professional institutions,
    Brazil and across the hemisphere.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        And, lastly, Mr. Salesses and General VanHerck, the
    Department and NORTHCOM have been critical partners this past
    year in the fight against COVID. What lessons have you both
    learned from this past year? And what changes are you looking
    to implement within your jurisdictions going forward to be
    better prepared for a health crisis?
        Mr. Larsen. The gentlemen will have to respond for the
    record. The gentleman's time has expired.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 137.]
        Mr. Larsen. And the chair recognizes Representative Scott
    of Georgia for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Scott. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, I know that multiple members have talked with you
    about Communist China's increasing influence in the Western
    Hemisphere. I have a specific question with regard to that, and
    it has to do with money laundering for the transnational
    criminal organizations.
        And so could you speak to Communist China's increase in
    influence? And what is happening with regard to the money
    laundering for the transnational criminal organizations?
        I also know that you lost funding of the ISR transfer fund.
    That is something that I am interested in and the impact that
    it has on you and your mission in SOUTHCOM.
        And then Representative Panetta hit on this a little bit,
    but the differing authorities that you have for humanitarian
    assistance and disaster relief compared to authorities that you
    have for security cooperation.
        So there are three questions that I have for you, and look
    forward to your response.
        Admiral Faller. Our interagency partners here in the United
    States have pointed out to us, the FBI, and others that Chinese
    money laundering is the number one underwriting source for
    transnational criminal organizations.
        If you look at SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility, we have 8
    percent of the world's population, 60 percent of the
    cryptocurrency. So there are active efforts to evade tough
    enforcement that the U.S. does and can provide when legitimate
    banking systems and methods are utilized.
        It is a concern. It goes back to the need for a holistic
    approach to getting after these organizations and metrics to do
    so and big data and artificial intelligence, machine learning.
    DOD and SOUTHCOM play a supporting role in those overall
    efforts.
        With respect to the ISR transfer fund, it is a fund that
    was set up by the appropriators in Congress to augment all the
    combatant commands. ISR is underappreciated by many but not by
    us in terms of its ability for us to see and hear and
    understand the battlefield.
        That fund was not authorized and appropriated last year,
    and that resulted for SOUTHCOM in a precisely 38 percent
    reduction to our overall funding for ISR. That is significant.
    We only have about 1 percent of the ISR.
        Intel drives everything. And without that intel--and that
    is in-year, this year's funding--we are going to understand
    less of the battlespace.
        The humanitarian assistance program has been key. It is a
    flexible program. It allows us to meet our partners' needs. In
    the past year, we have had, just in COVID response, close to
    500 projects, $74 million worth, and we have been able to work
    with 28 different countries. That has strengthened our
    partnerships, it wins hearts and minds, and it is responsive to
    need. It is about long-term capacity.
        Because of the way the rules are written in the
    authorizations, I can't apply that authority to work with a
    partner military force. I think that is a gap. I think we
    should look at how we could work that authorization so we can
    meet the point of need with our partners and work on capacity.
    A strong partnership, whatever the country, is good for the
    United States. It is a good return on investment.
        I would also like to see if we could look into our security
    cooperation programs, the 333 program and others, and how would
    we craft a small-dollar-amount, flexible military assistance
    program, along the lines of the humanitarian assistance
    program, to allow combatant commanders to have a 21st-century,
    flexible, and responsible tool that will allow us to outcompete
    and win by meeting our partners' needs and focusing on our
    collective needs and our collective readiness.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Admiral.
        And, you know, I would point out to my colleagues that you
    said millions. In many cases, we are talking about billions. We
    are talking about the whole Western Hemisphere. We could get a
    whole lot more return on our dollar if we focused on some of
    the areas closer to home, I believe, with regard to security
    for the United States.
        General, the questions I have for you have--many of them
    have been answered. But one of the questions I have a concern
    about is the ability to use small, unmanned aerial systems to
    attack U.S. military installations.
        And do you have the authorities that you need to protect
    our military installations from these small or unmanned aerial
    systems?
        General VanHerck. Congressman, we have the authorities over
    Federal installations to protect Federal people and equipment.
        My concern is, that is a little bit of a reactive and a--we
    are approaching this from a law enforcement perspective.
    Looking at defense, I want to get more proactive, to be able to
    engage when they are detected through that domain awareness and
    further out when they are a threat. So we are working closely
    with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] and the
    interagency to get there with those authorities.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, General.
        Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
        I recognize Representative Speier for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        And thank you, gentlemen, for your presentations and for
    your service.
        I was impressed by what you said, Admiral Faller, about a
    little goes a long way in SOUTHCOM. What would you define as a
    little?
        Quickly, because I have lots of questions to ask you.
        Admiral Faller. A congressional visit. A partnership
    exchange. This past week, I visited Uruguay. I was the first
    combatant commander to go there in a number of years. That
    visit went a long way to strengthen our relationship.
        So time is our most underappreciated resource and one that
    I welcome an increased investment of in this hemisphere.
        Ms. Speier. Okay.
        I have a very different view of the littoral combat ship
    than my colleague, and I would like to drill down on this a
    little bit.
        The Freedom class is, in my view and in the view of many,
    terribly unreliable, with the Little Rock, Detroit, and Sioux
    City all recently experiencing major propulsion failures. The
    Freedom-class LCS may also have a classwide defect, a flawed
    combining gear that breaks early in life of the ship. That will
    require a massive and expensive taxpayer-funded reconstruction.
    In the meantime, the last administration increased the OPTEMPO
    [operational tempo] to new highs.
        So I would like to know the following. And if you could
    just be prepared to answer them either here in person or
    subsequently.
        How much are taxpayers spending for each LCS deployment in
    SOUTHCOM? How much have LCS deployments increased over the past
    3 years?
        A recent article in Defense News says that each LCS costs
    about $70 million a year to operate. And there are some 35 of
    them. So it is $70 million per year to operate, almost as much
    as the cost of operating a much larger Arleigh Burke-class
    destroyer. Is that accurate?
        But let me go on with my other questions, and you can
    answer them all at the same time.
        What is the impact of the LCS maintenance problem on
    SOUTHCOM's ability to complete drug interdiction and
    humanitarian missions?
        Admiral Faller. Congresswoman, it is an important question,
    and the Navy is committed.
        I look at it this way: Those ships that came into the fight
    have saved lives across the United States. So, whatever the
    steaming-hour cost, we have saved hundreds of lives. Without
    those Navy ships, about 40 percent more drugs would have made
    it into the United States. The CNO----
        Ms. Speier. I understand that, but let's talk, separately
    from saving 100 lives in terms of drugs, to the actual
    functionality of these ships that cost over $500 million apiece
    and then $70 million a year to operate and maintain. And when
    you said a little money goes a long way in SOUTHCOM, you know,
    I would much rather see us spending some of that money there
    than on ships that don't float.
        And I would also say, the Belt and Road Initiative, as you
    pointed out, is an example of how China has used $50 billion to
    $100 billion a year across the world in a way to benefit
    themselves exclusively, frankly. We tend to give money out in
    ways that are soft money that help the country. So maybe what
    we need to do is be a little smarter about how we invest in
    some of these countries.
        But I think that somehow relying on the fact that you are
    interdicting some drugs to keep these ships operating makes no
    sense. And, at some point, we have to recognize--and the
    Department is very reluctant to say, ``You know, we made a
    mistake''--and cut our losses. And I guess I am asking you to
    think about that and do that.
        And I have only 59 more seconds, so let me just move on to
    Mr. Salesses.
        When I was at Fort Hood recently, I went and visited some
    of the barracks. I have to tell you, it was like looking at
    tenements.
        Now, beyond the barracks, we have 135 childcare development
    centers in the military that are defined as failing or poor.
    Now, I don't want to send my kid to a failing childcare
    development center. So, even though 135 have been identified,
    only 8 have been fixed in the last 10 years.
        So my question to you is, how is DOD planning to spend the
    $2.2 billion remaining of the military construction funds that
    were diverted to the border wall but were not spent? Will you
    spend that money on doing something on behalf of our service
    members----
        Mr. Larsen. The Representative's time has expired. I would
    like to offer that for the record.
        Ms. Speier. Please respond.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The panel will take that for the
    record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 137.]
        Mr. Larsen. The chair recognizes Representative Wilson of
    South Carolina for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
        And I want to thank the panel for being here today. Your
    service is just so appreciated.
        I also, Admiral Faller, want to share a concern with
    Congressman Mike Waltz about the influence of the Chinese
    Communist Party on both sides of the Panama Canal. This is a
    threat to the people of Panama, and we need to be ever
    vigilant.
        Additionally, Admiral Faller, I am a grateful Naval Academy
    graduate dad myself, so I particularly appreciate your service.
        And I appreciate your update on Plan Colombia. This has
    been a real success story the American people need to know,
    working to stop narcoterrorists. And then my wife and I have
    been the South Carolina co-chairmen of the Partners of the
    Americas program, working with the country of Colombia. We have
    hosted students to live with us, high school students from
    Colombia. It has been very uplifting. In fact, my Naval Academy
    graduate actually was an exchange student to Colegio Bennett in
    Cali, Colombia. So we have such a relationship with that
    country.
        And then I am very grateful, with the leadership of
    Adjutant General Van McCarty, former Adjutant General Bob
    Livingston, South Carolina National Guard is the State partner
    with Colombia. And so what a great opportunity we have working
    together, particularly with the tyrannical regime that now
    rules in Venezuela.
        With that, Admiral, I have a question. What is your
    assessment of the whole-of-government approach to countering
    Russian, Iranian, and Chinese support to the corrupt regime in
    Venezuela? What can SOUTHCOM do to assist the multinational
    efforts to assist the people and benefit the people of
    Venezuela?
        Admiral Faller. Thank you for recognizing the Naval
    Academy, my alma mater. And I had the opportunity to speak to
    the class of 2021 in the fall, and I would tell you,
    Congressman, that we should all be proud of the young men and
    women that are going to be today and tomorrow's leaders. They
    are just as strong as any other generation, and they make you
    proud. Under the leadership of Admiral Buck at the Academy and
    others, we are in good shape for the future, I am convinced of
    that.
        Thanks also for recognizing the importance of our State
    Partnership Programs. South Carolina Guard is so actively
    involved with Colombia. There are ongoing exchanges. No one
    ever stepped down when the pandemic heated up. And we are
    working particularly to use the Guard's capability of the F-
    16s. As Colombia has stated, that is an important capability
    that they need, and they are willing to commit their resources
    to that capability going forward.
        That is the kind of investment that will make a difference
    against Venezuela, as they continue to isolate themselves. And
    you correctly point out the insidious and corrosive influence
    of Russia, Cuba, Iran, and China inside their--you look at that
    as an example. And over the last year, we see thousands of
    Cubans, hundreds of Russians, an increase in Iranian presence.
    And they are working in the cyberspace, as well, to control
    that information domain.
        We have to work together for solutions that strengthen the
    neighbors, strengthen our partnerships with the neighbors, and
    isolate the Venezuelan regime, as Maduro has increasingly done
    himself through his human rights atrocities.
        Mr. Wilson. Okay. Thank you for that response. And, indeed,
    it is remarkable to see the success of Colombia and then to see
    what was possibly the most wealthy country of South America,
    being Venezuela, being reduced to destitution. And so, what a
    great contrast. So thank you for your efforts.
        Additionally, General VanHerck, the Russian threat spans
    two COCOMs [combatant commands]. What coordination do you take
    with the U.S. European Command to properly address Russia's
    military strategy?
        General VanHerck. Congressman, we work closely in
    partnership with the U.S. European Command through my various
    components, as well, to deal with threats to the homeland
    presented by not only Russia but others that may come through
    our approaches that may include the European Command area of
    responsibility. It may include working closely with my partner
    right next to me, Admiral Faller, the approaches that come from
    the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, as well as INDOPACOM and
    working closely with our Canadians.
        So we work closely in partnership. I believe relationships
    and partnerships are crucial and that homeland defense does not
    start in the homeland; it actually starts with the
    relationships and partnerships, not only with my fellow
    combatant commanders but also allies and partners for each of
    those combatant commanders as well.
        Mr. Wilson. And, again, thank all of you for your service,
    and we look forward to working with you in a bipartisan manner.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
        Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to both witnesses here today.
        Admiral Faller, I just want to say, your description of
    the--and you are in a unique position, given your portfolio in
    SOUTHCOM. But your description of, sort of, the, you know,
    forces, the external forces, that are driving, you know,
    massive numbers of people from their homes in the Northern
    Triangle, whether it is, you know, the COVID depression that
    has hit the economy in that region, the natural disasters that,
    you know, were, I think, very underreported in the U.S., and,
    of course, the political violence that, again, is forcing
    people to make a, you know, incredibly difficult and high-risk
    decision to send their kids northward.
        So thank you for that testimony today. Because I frankly
    think, coming from you, you know, it is a really important
    message that people should really think about as we try to deal
    with the problems at the border.
        General VanHerck, your colleague from INDOPACOM testified,
    Admiral Davidson, a couple weeks ago, again, who is also
    dealing with, sort of, maritime challenges, freedom of
    navigation, which, again, are somewhat similar to what is going
    on up in the Arctic. Admiral Davidson actually was very, you
    know, frank about the fact that he believes that the U.S.
    should join the international Law of the Sea treaty, as did his
    predecessors and your--you know, in the EUCOM theater, same
    thing. We have heard that over the years. You know, there is a
    bipartisan group of us--Don Young from Alaska, who also is
    supporting a resolution with me calling on the Senate to ratify
    the UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea].
        And I just wondered, you know, based on what you are seeing
    up there, in terms of the increased maritime activity and the
    competition for seabed minerals, whether you have any
    perspective or comment, as your combatant commanders have made,
    regarding UNCLOS.
        General VanHerck. Congressman, I would share the sentiment
    of Admiral Davidson. I support the accession to UNCLOS. I think
    it puts us in a more strategic position when we address these
    issues internationally, globally with competitors or our allies
    and partners as well.
        Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you for that testimony. As I
    said, you know, on this committee, we have certainly elicited
    the same response from other combatant commands. I think,
    frankly, that is the first time we have heard that from the
    Northern Command.
        And we are going to have a joint hearing with Foreign
    Affairs at the end of April to, sort of, dig deeper into this.
    It is really time that the U.S. get in the game in terms of
    being able to stake claims for seabed minerals as well as to
    protect freedom of navigation.
        You know, we have had some discussions regarding the Coast
    Guard's involvement up in the Arctic. And I just would note
    that this committee was the one that authorized construction of
    the first large icebreaker a number of years ago.
        Again, the Coast Guard's program office in terms of
    shipbuilding just really needed some help, and we provided an
    assist in terms of Navy's collaboration, which is continuing to
    this day with the joint program office. But, again, your
    testimony about the fact that we need to kind of boost that
    capability, I think, is also extremely helpful.
        Admiral Faller, you in your testimony described the work
    that you are doing with your sea service, you know, colleagues
    in the Coast Guard. And I was wondering if you could talk
    about, you know, the offshore patrol cutters and how they
    collaborate with the Navy in SOCOM.
        Admiral Faller. The Coast Guard is such a tremendous,
    important element of our engagement in countering threats.
    Recently, the recent patrol of the United States Coast Guard
    cutter Stone, a national security cutter, to get after illegal,
    unregulated, unreported fishing, with China being the principal
    state sponsor of this IUU [illegal, unreported and unregulated]
    threat, is one example. Tremendous, reliable vessels. Their
    fast-response cutters, the whole cutter fleet is topnotch, and
    I am a big supporter. Tremendous readiness, and they have done
    a great job for us.
        Additionally, another, sort of, example I would cite,
    Congressman, is some of our Navy patrols. And I call them
    patrols because they are short-duration. It is exactly the kind
    of focused, small investment that goes a long way. The USS
    Vermont's deployment to patrol to Brazil, where we worked joint
    exercises and capability demonstrations, was exactly in line
    with what we need to do to prepare for the future and increase
    our own crew's readiness.
        Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Admiral.
        Again, Mr. Chairman, just for the record, the USS Vermont
    is our newest Virginia-class submarine, which was commissioned
    in the middle of COVID, up in Groton.
        So I thank you for the mention, and I will certainly pass
    along your compliments to the shipyard.
        And, with that, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        For your situational awareness, gentlemen--appreciate you
    being here--is that we have two more at the moment. That does
    not mean that someone might not come back in the next 10
    minutes, but, for now, we have Mr. Fallon.
        Mr. Fallon, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Appreciate it.
        SOUTHCOM is responsible for the region that covers 31
    countries in Central and South America. And the thing that
    concerns me is the drug trafficking, because they seem to be,
    every year, increasing in wealth, in power, in influence, and
    it is clearly a major national security threat, and I think
    everybody here would agree that it presents a clear and present
    danger to our country.
        And, under the prior administration, you know, it had been
    a flood and it reduced to a trickle, in large measure. And now,
    unfortunately, it is back to a flood.
        I was at the Donna holding facility a couple weeks ago,
    where it was supposed to be 250 people in the facility, and
    there were 4,377. And there were 3,700 unaccompanied minors.
    There were pods where they had these unaccompanied minors, and
    they were sectioned off, and they had segregated them by gender
    and then roughly by age. And, in each pod, there were supposed
    to be 32 children, and unfortunately there were 500. And the
    Border Patrol was babysitting these kids. And that was their
    term for it.
        And Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have 34.5 million
    people. That is an inexhaustible amount of human folks that--
    and it is a long way to travel. I believe it is about roughly
    1,200 miles from Central America to the United States. And, you
    know, it begs the question, how did they get here? Do they owe
    and who do they owe for the transit? Are the traffickers
    facilitating this?
        And the reason why we mention this is, the Border Patrol
    agents were telling us the cartels love this crisis because it
    makes it very much easier for the cartels to do their business
    of smuggling illicit drugs because almost half of the Border
    Patrol are in these facilities changing diapers and what have
    you.
        And so I wanted to ask the SOUTHCOM commander if he does
    agree that this is a clear and present danger, the drug
    trafficking and the cartels' power and influence?
        And, sir, in your opinion, what is the best way to combat
    the Mexican drug cartels and the other drug traffickers and
    organized crime in Central America in reducing their power?
        Admiral Faller. Transnational criminal organizations are
    exactly as you state, Congressman, a national security threat,
    killing people in your home State and in my hometown in
    Pennsylvania as well.
        And they are fueled by a tremendous amount of resources,
    money, a multibillion-dollar-a-year industry. And drugs are
    actually not their top source of revenue. It is illegal mining,
    it is illegal businesses, it is extortion, it is human
    trafficking, it is arms trafficking, it is PPE, illicit PPE and
    COVID supplies, and everything to carry forward their influence
    and access. They are fueled by corruption.
        The best way of stopping this is a whole-of-government
    approach, whole-of-nation approach, and empowering our partners
    with the right tools. And one of them is good judicial systems
    that do the right thing and operate in accordance with the rule
    of law.
        And I have talked to these partners. The narcoterrorists,
    they fear the U.S. judicial system. They need to fear their
    home countries' judicial system too, because they need to have
    instilled in them the deterrent model that they are going to be
    held accountable for their murderous behavior and the violence
    that is driving people to leave their homes and make that
    treacherous trip.
        Mr. Fallon. You know, Admiral, exactly to your point, too,
    according to the Department of Justice, in 2018, the most
    dangerous country on the planet, if you define that by murders
    per 100,000, weren't--if you asked a regular American--and,
    quite frankly, I had the impression that it was going to be
    maybe a country like Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia, or Iraq. But
    it is in this hemisphere, and it was El Salvador, at 50 murders
    per 100,000. Honduras was closely behind at 40, and Guatemala
    was 22.5. And to give that context, Mexico is at 26, the United
    States is at 5, and a very safe country like Denmark is only at
    1.
        So it seems that the more power that the drug cartels have,
    the less GDP growth we have and the more violence. And it is
    something that we just have to address. I think it is the
    number one, right now, topic that we must--and it is the
    greatest national security threat. And it is an economic drain,
    as well, on our country.
        And I hope that we can work in a bipartisan fashion to
    solve it, because we have the resources to do so; it is just a
    question of if we have the political will.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Larsen [presiding]. Thank you, and I appreciate that.
        I now will recognize myself for 5 minutes. I would note
    that Representative Smith did say there were two more, but we
    have had additional people show up, so it will be more than two
    more. So I want to just add that.
        First off, I will come back to you, Admiral Faller, but it
    is good to see you again. It is always good to see you.
        General VanHerck, thanks for the conversation yesterday. I
    am really pleased to hear my colleagues talk about the Arctic,
    something that I have been talking about for the last 20 years.
    So welcome aboard, everybody, on the concerns we have about the
    Arctic.
        What I didn't hear today, though, is--I have had a briefing
    from the Air Force on the Arctic. I have had a briefing from
    the Coast Guard. I have had a briefing from the Navy. What I
    haven't had is the DOD briefing--that is, the umbrella strategy
    about what we are doing in the Arctic.
        And I wanted to hear from you, General, about Northern
    Command's view of that. Is there a broader strategy? Or, as you
    said on page 12 of your testimony, with regards to data,
    getting all the data, breaking down stovepipes is achievable.
    Do we have a stovepiped approach on our strategy in the Arctic
    with regards to the DOD? And what do we do to break those down?
        General VanHerck. So the Department did put out a strategy
    in 2019 for the Arctic, followed by each of the services. I
    also put out a strategy this winter as well. My strategy is not
    focused specifically on the Arctic, but the Arctic figures in
    heavily to my strategy at USNORTHCOM and NORAD as well.
        I do think there is more we can do as a group focused on
    the Arctic to collaborate. It is not just a NORTHCOM problem,
    it is a EUCOM problem, it is an INDOPACOM problem, it is an
    ally and partner problem with multiple nations. And I think
    that is how we should approach it, from a global problem, to
    ensure that we approach and compete in the Arctic to keep the
    international rules-based order that we have had in the past.
        Mr. Larsen. I think what we will learn, too, as folks look
    into it more, is that there is not one Arctic. It is easy to do
    operations--a little easier to do operations in the Barents Sea
    or north in Norway because the water is a lot more free of ice
    year-round than it is in our part of the Arctic. And so we
    really need to be thinking about what is appropriate, what is
    the appropriate presence, what is the appropriate persistence
    that we need up there.
        And, on that point, can you expand a little bit more on
    gaining knowledge to the left of action or the all-domain
    dominance and the decision superiority? What does that mean for
    us when we look at the budget?
        General VanHerck. That means having the sensor capabilities
    that will allow us to see further than we have in the past,
    that will allow us to take data--much of it exists today--and
    share that data, although it is in stovepipes where there may
    be laws or policies that don't allow us to share that data and
    information.
        I believe data and information is a strategic asset that
    will enable us to--no kidding--win in the future in conflict if
    we have to, but, more importantly, take us further left in the
    competition to deter and de-escalate in crisis.
        And so what I hope we see when the 2022 budget comes out is
    a domain awareness capability, such as over-the-horizon radars,
    undersea capabilities, and a focus on the ability to take that
    information and share it. What you would hear the Department
    talk about is joint all-domain command and control, if you put
    a bow around what I have been talking about.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
        I would also note, this begs the question, though, about:
    You get all that data; then what? I mean, you are the dog who
    caught the car, so what do you do with it now?
        So I think, you know, looking at maybe one of the
    subcommittees that we have, the CITI [Cyber, Innovative
    Technologies, and Information Systems], looking at the role of
    AI [artificial intelligence] and machine learning. And the
    applications, the algorithms need to be written to gather that
    information and pick through it for you to give you decisions--
    is a critical part, which may not be your budget, but it is
    still an important part of DOD's efforts.
        General VanHerck. Congressman, I concur. We have to move
    forward with machine learning and artificial intelligence from
    a policy perspective and get our arms around this. What we
    can't do is field capabilities and then wait till the end and
    we don't have our arms around the policy or the laws that go
    with it that enable us to support it.
        What you do with this information, in my mind, is you give
    it to decision-makers--decision-makers all the way from the
    tactical level that may be pulling a trigger, but, more
    importantly, what I see is the operational level and the
    strategic level that you can take action on. Me, as an
    operational commander, could posture forces to create
    deterrence, or the President or the Secretary of Defense can
    use messaging to create deterrence as well.
        Mr. Larsen. Right. Right.
        Admiral Faller, I will be really quick here. IUU fishing is
    important for us in the Northwest because of the Gulf of Alaska
    and the problems we have with not just Russians but Chinese and
    others.
        Why is IUU fishing an important issue--be very specific why
    it is important--in Central and South America?
        Admiral Faller. Food security is national security for any
    nation. And when nations are losing their food stocks, their
    fishing, it is impacting their life. It is driving insecurity.
    It is all connected. And we play a role. Domain awareness is
    key there, helping people see on and across the sea.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
        I yield back. Thank you.
        The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
        Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is great to have you all here.
        General VanHerck, congratulations on your promotion into
    this position. I look forward to seeing you in Colorado Springs
    one of these days when the COVID protocols make it easier.
        But I would like to ask you a little bit more about missile
    defense. And I believe you are of the opinion, as are all the
    experts who look at North Korea's threat, that, while we can
    address that currently, starting around 2025, if current
    projected rates of their progress come true, that we start
    encountering greater risk.
        And so I know that you are in support of an NGI, Next
    Generation Interceptor, to hopefully have by the end of this
    decade. In the meantime, do you support an underlayer or
    layered homeland defense with things like the Standard Missile-
    3 IIA, SM-3 IIA, and other assets that would give us an interim
    additional layer of protection?
        General VanHerck. Congressman, thanks for that question.
        I think there is tremendous value in looking at the
    possibility of an underlayer. I know you are aware of the
    recent SM-3 test that proved incredibly successful. As you
    said, I am comfortable where we are today, but, as we go
    forward, there will be additional capabilities developed to
    hold our homeland at risk, and an underlayer would give us
    additional capacity and capability to do that.
        If we do create an underlayer or additional sensors and
    capabilities to support that, it should not be focused on a
    single threat, such as a ballistic missile. That underlayer--a
    layered defense of the homeland should focus on everything from
    small UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] all the way to ballistic
    missiles, cruise missiles, and everything in between.
        We can't afford any longer to build stovepiped systems
    which have capabilities for only one threat. We need to look
    more broadly at these systems to achieve affordable solutions
    to defend the homeland.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you for that answer.
        And you mentioned cruise missiles. Let's talk about that.
    What do we need to do to better protect ourselves from that
    particular very dangerous threat?
        General VanHerck. Congressman, the first thing I am working
    on is getting a policy on what must we defend kinetically in
    our homeland. I would tell you that it looks something along
    the lines of continuity of government, our nuclear
    capabilities, command and control, ability to project power
    forward, and our defense industrial base. That would defend
    against a cruise missile kinetic kind of capability.
        But I will go back to where I am focused in domain
    awareness. And I don't want to be shooting cruise missiles down
    in our homeland. And that is why it is so important to have
    these domain-awareness capabilities using information, machine
    learning, and artificial intelligence to get further left of
    that launch so we then create options for deterrence and de-
    escalation much sooner in competition.
        We also need to balance our focus between planning,
    strategy, force management, force development from a conflict
    focus and more balanced on a competition focus as well, and
    competition globally across all domains.
        But endgame defeat is not where I want to be. We need to
    figure out what that looks like. But I want to get further left
    and give our decision-makers options.
        Mr. Lamborn. And I know we are in an open setting here, but
    can you be more specific about going to the left and having
    these additional options?
        General VanHerck. Yeah, so going left means getting
    information sooner to make decisions. So, for example, our
    satellite capability, our GEOINT, our signals intelligence
    capability comes from National Security Agency or even open-
    source information--from social media, for example. Oftentimes,
    that information is not analyzed in a timely manner to have
    decision-makers make a decision.
        So getting further left means taking that information,
    making it readily available by having policy and laws that
    allow us to do that, and then sharing it, and taking machine-
    learning capabilities and artificial intelligence to rapidly
    analyze and process in near-real-time, and then sharing it with
    decision-makers. That will give us the opportunity to be
    further left.
        I can give you a specific example. So if you take a look at
    a parking lot over and over that supports a submarine base, for
    example, the machine will figure out how many cars are in that
    parking lot. And when you start to see changes and you couple
    that with cell phone data or information through social media,
    you can build a picture. Now it gives us the ability to take
    action much sooner.
        Mr. Lamborn. And also, General, lastly, you have talked
    about making sure we have the authorities in place that we
    need. And I think the implication is that we don't have all
    those authorities.
        What are some specific authorities that maybe when we are
    looking at the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] this
    year we should consider that make your job easier?
        General VanHerck. I believe we need to take a look at
    intelligence sharing. Intelligence should be part of our
    overall deterrence factor. And what we share and reveal and
    conceal, for example, if you don't know about it, it is not
    creating any deterrence effects. But sometimes our policies or
    laws may hinder us from sharing that information.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Okay. We are going to stop at 2:00. We have Mr. Langevin.
    We have Mr. Khanna. All right, I lie. We are going to stop at,
    like, 2:02. But Mr. Langevin and Mr. Khanna are going to be
    last, and so we are done at that point.
        Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. We
    have covered a lot of ground today in looking at national
    security challenges and U.S. military activities in North and
    South America.
        I guess what I would like to start with, if we could, with
    General VanHerck: As we look to increase nonkinetic options
    available for homeland defense, how do you plan to incorporate
    things like emerging technologies such as directed energy,
    hypersonics, and artificial intelligence?
        General VanHerck. Well, absolutely, we must take machine
    learning, artificial intelligence, and innovative technologies
    and factor them into every homeland defense strategy, plan,
    policy.
        I believe that everything that we do from now on, based on
    the threat to the homeland, from the strategy plan, force
    management, force design, acquisition, and budgets, ought to
    start with a discussion about what is the potential impact to
    homeland, what is the potential impact to a risk of strategic
    deterrence failure. We must incorporate the technologies as we
    go forward.
        Mr. Langevin. So further discussion, too, on, say,
    information sharing. Let me also talk about communications.
    When you talk about left-of-launch deterrence, how important
    are secure and robust command-and-control systems in the
    strategy? And how do other Federal agencies contribute to the
    strategy?
        General VanHerck. Secure capabilities are an imperative,
    Congressman. We have to go down that path with encrypted
    capabilities going forward to ensure that we have access to
    that data and information. That is an imperative that General
    Nakasone talks about routinely from his CYBERCOM [Cyber
    Command] and NSA [National Security Agency] hat as well.
        Mr. Langevin. And for Mr. Salesses: So the COVID response
    demonstrated that homeland chemical and biological scenarios
    demand a whole-of-government response. What are the major
    investments DOD made in interagency coordination? And how do
    you plan to sustain those gains beyond the current pandemic?
        Mr. Salesses. Thanks, Congressman.
        I think the first thing is our ability to detect and
    surveil the kinds of biological threats that we face in the
    future, to include pandemics, our ability to do that more
    effectively.
        And beyond that, it is certainly working with the
    laboratories, as we have, to develop the kind of
    countermeasures that we need to protect our population against
    those threats.
        Mr. Langevin. It is important to incorporate those lessons
    learned and make sure that they are institutionalized. This
    isn't going to be the last challenge that we face--
    biologically, manmade, or otherwise--that we see.
        For all three, I think we have touched on this a bit, but I
    am going to ask it directly: Do you believe that climate change
    is undermining your command's core mission or at least
    complicating it? And if yes, then how?
        Admiral Faller. I believe in the science of climate change,
    and it has made rapid response imperative in our exercise, our
    training programs. And to the extent that it has caused us to
    respond to support partners' humanitarian assistance and
    disaster relief, it is a fact.
        The point you make about secure communications, that has a
    role here too. So our ability to talk to our partners as part
    of this joint all-domain command and control concept that my
    shipmate General VanHerck talked about is so key. So we have to
    get that right.
        And the vision that the Air Force and Lieutenant General
    Crall, the Joint Staff J6, have to encompass partners at the
    right scalable level in the future is key. If we can't talk to
    our partners secure, we can't respond rapidly to that
    catastrophic event. And, you know, we were challenged to talk
    to them, in some respects, last fall when those two major
    hurricanes hit.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
        General VanHerck. Congressman, I will go next.
        To specifically answer your question, I am not sure it
    undermines our ability to accomplish our mission. What I think
    it does is, environmental change creates opportunities and it
    creates vulnerabilities. The question is, are we postured to
    take advantage of the opportunities and to plug any
    vulnerabilities that that may create for us?
        Mr. Langevin. And Mr. Salesses?
        Mr. Salesses. Obviously, climate change is having a big
    impact. We have talked about the Arctic a lot today. We talk
    about sea rise. We talk about all those things.
        For the Defense Department, it is the vulnerabilities that
    are created from these efforts. And our work here in the
    homeland, in particular, as we have seen the severity of storms
    and wildfires and those types of things, it drives additional
    requirements on the Defense Department in support of our
    Federal partners.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
        Well, I can't underscore enough how we need to think
    holistically about how climate change is affecting U.S.
    national security.
        I think it was, Admiral, you who talked about how climate
    change is affecting food supplies, food stocks, creates
    instability. That creates problems for international security,
    where the U.S. has to get involved.
        So, with that, my time has expired and I will yield back.
    Thank you all.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Khanna is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
    this important hearing.
        Admiral Faller, one of the causes of our border crisis is
    the rampant human rights abuses in El Salvador and Guatemala
    and in Honduras. As you know, the State-Foreign Ops bill
    specifically forbids any foreign military financing aid to
    these countries that have had oppressive practices.
        Does SOUTHCOM intend to make sure that we aren't having
    section 333 programs in the Northern Triangle, in light of the
    State-Foreign Ops bill?
        Admiral Faller. Congressman, every program we apply, we
    apply the principles of the Leahy law and the processes. And
    our human rights training and programs are embedded in every
    single one of those. And we are making a difference with those
    security institutions over time as part of U.S. Government
    whole-of-government efforts, working with our embassies. And so
    we are committed to that, working forward.
        In addition to the human rights programs, we have ramped up
    our Women, Peace, and Security Program, which is another part
    of the fundamental rights enshrined in the various
    constitutions of all these countries. So it is extremely
    important.
        Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Admiral. But specifically on section
    333 programs, are we still doing them with those countries, or
    are we are not? And can you just address that as it relates to
    the State-Foreign Ops bill?
        Admiral Faller. I think, to be heard and seen, we have to
    stay engaged, and those programs allow us to stay engaged. And
    so we are continuing with the 333 programs. We are following
    all the guidelines that are set out for the right vetting and
    the right rule sets. I think we are going to have modeled
    responsible behavior better if we stay engaged with those
    programs, Congressman.
        Mr. Khanna. And maybe we can explore it after the hearing
    just to make sure that the equipment that is being given to
    these countries isn't in violation of the State-Foreign Ops.
        But I think, more broadly, there are many people in
    Congress who are concerned that the ongoing drug war is
    actually hurting Americans' safety, that it is one of the
    causes for the mass migration to our border. Because you have
    these military governments in Honduras, in Guatemala, in El
    Salvador basically justifying oppression, in a desire to crack
    down against drug lords or drug cartels, captured by drug
    cartels. We have seen in Uruguay, where you have had a move
    towards legalizing and decriminalizing drugs, a more stable
    democracy, and we don't have many Uruguayan migrants coming to
    our border.
        Mr. Salesses, could you speak to the possibility of
    rethinking this drug war if we really are serious about
    lessening migrants coming to our border?
        Mr. Salesses. Congressman, I think we have heard this today
    several times, the importance of a whole-of-nation approach to
    this. The Defense Department can certainly play a role in
    helping, but it also takes the diplomatic, the economic, the
    information, the law enforcement, all of that and our partners
    in the south, working together, too, to rethink this. And I
    think that approach can be very successful.
        I do think that the work the Defense Department is doing
    down in Central and South America is key, though. As Admiral
    Faller has repeated several times today, it is the values
    system, it is our professionalism, it is what the U.S. military
    brings to the region and provides to the militaries down there
    with security cooperation, foreign military sales, education,
    institutional reform. Those kinds of initiatives make a huge
    difference in that region and need to continue.
        Mr. Khanna. And one final question, Mr. Chairman.
        I am one of 80 cosponsors on the Berta Caceres Human Rights
    Act, and that would suspend our law enforcement aid to some of
    these military regimes, consistent with Leahy and what Senator
    Merkley are proposing in the Senate, just making sure that
    American tax dollars aren't going to repressive human rights
    practices that are then causing migrants to come to our border.
        Do you have a view on the Berta Caceres Human Rights Act
    and any thoughts on it?
        Admiral Faller. I think the human rights is a focus we need
    to continue. And I worry that if we abandon our partners, that
    Chinese malign influence will take over. And that is a view of
    human rights I don't think any of us want in our neighborhood.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        And I think that is the----
        Mr. Khanna. Thank you.
        The Chairman [continuing]. Balance that is very difficult
    to strike. We want to maintain those relationships, but we
    don't want to give support to human rights violations. On the
    other hand, no nation, including our own, is perfect. So how do
    we strike that balance? Because if we just cut them off, like
    you said, they are going to turn to others, and then we don't
    have any influence. So how do we balance that? I think we--
    well, I know we always try to strike that balance in this
    committee.
        With that, I really want to thank our witnesses above and
    beyond, staying with us for 3 hours, without a break, I might
    add.
        And, as you can see, members have a great deal of interest
    in your areas of responsibility. There are incredibly important
    policy decisions we have to make, and I found this enormously
    helpful to all of us, to get your expertise and background on
    how we should approach those challenges. Look forward to
    continuing to work with you.
        And, with that, we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 2:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

    =======================================================================

                                A P P E N D I X

                                 April 14, 2021

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 April 14, 2021

    =======================================================================

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 April 14, 2021

    =======================================================================

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

        Mr. Salesses. Of the total $3.6 billion made available for border
    barrier projects under 10 U.S.C. 2808, $2.1 billion is currently
    unobligated. An additional $0.1 billion for a Navy project in
    Washington State that was deferred to make funds available for Section
    2808 construction also is unobligated, but pursuant to a court order
    that is on appeal, the funds were released to the Navy.
        As announced April 30, 2021, consistent with Presidential
    Proclamation 10142 (issued on January 20, 2021), the Department of
    Defense has cancelled all border barrier construction projects paid for
    with funds originally appropriated for other military missions and
    functions. With this cancellation, unobligated military construction
    funds that had been allocated for border barrier military construction
    projects will be released and made available to fund previously
    deferred military construction projects.   [See page 49.]
                                     ______

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
        Mr. Salesses. The COVID-19 pandemic is the greatest public health
    challenge our nation has faced in more than 100 years, since the 1918
    influenza pandemic. Domestically, most disasters or emergencies either
    affect a single State or region within the United States. In contrast,
    the COVID-19 pandemic not only affected the entire United States, but
    the entire world. This created an unprecedented demand signal for DOD
    support.
        When the risk of the pandemic has passed, or sufficiently
    diminished, a data-driven and comprehensive after-action review is
    needed to prepare for the next health crisis. However, DOD has
    conducted an in-stride strategic review, which has identified some
    potential opportunities for improvements, such as:
          The need to evaluate approaches to accelerate and expand
    capability to develop and mass-produce tests and medical capabilities
    rapidly for future man-made or naturally occurring biological threats
    of interest;
          The need to digitize DOD's manual contact tracing
    program;
          Investments in medical intelligence and bio-surveillance
    may be warranted to enable early warning of a potential outbreak.
          The need to incorporate lessons learned from the COVID-19
    pandemic into planning for domestic incidents while concurrently
    conducting national defense missions.
          The need to identify and realign personnel to those
    medical capabilities most needed in wartime and other crises.
          The need for further analysis to incorporate lessons
    learned from the COVID-19 pandemic into future medical command and
    control structures and to inform the optimal joint force mix between
    Active and Reserve Component medical forces.   [See page 46.]
        General VanHerck. I have placed strong emphasis on capturing and
    incorporating all lessons learned during the COVID crisis, and
    highlight the following two specific topics:
        1) Relationships and rehearsals are crucial. The activation of the
    National Response Framework (NRF) and National Response Coordination
    Center provided an established coordinating structure that immediately
    reinforced effective leadership and interagency coordination.
    USNORTHCOM has developed long-standing, close relationships over many
    years with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other
    interagency partners, as well as state and local governments, by
    exercising the NRF and supporting lead federal agencies in times of
    crisis. These formal and informal relationships set the conditions for
    a successful military response.
        2) Resiliency matters, especially in command and control. To
    prevent cross-infection during the pandemic, USNORTHCOM and NORAD
    dispersed the force, moved watch-standing functions to multiple
    locations, and sequestered teams from the larger population. This
    ensured continuity of operations as USNORTHCOM and NORAD maintained
    100% mission assurance of critical homeland defense missions throughout
    the pandemic response.   [See page 46.]
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
        Admiral Faller. We look forward to continuing our work with
    Congress on this important issue once the President has transmitted his
    Legislative Proposals for FY22.   [See page 31.]
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA
        General VanHerck. For clarification, Naval Forces North (NAVNORTH),
    commanded by ADM Chris Grady, is the U.S. Navy's component command that
    works for USNORTHCOM; Second Fleet is not organizationally aligned
    under NAVNORTH or USNORTHCOM. While Second Fleet does work for ADM
    Grady in his Navy responsibility as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces
    Command (FFC), Second Fleet does not work for USNORTHCOM in this
    designated Navy chain of command.
        Regarding your specific question, yes, purely from an
    organizational perspective, USNORTHCOM and USEUCOM routinely employ a
    variety of command and control mechanisms to ensure the appropriate
    combatant commander receives required USN support when and where
    required. Consistent with how adjacent combatant commanders in other
    areas of responsibility execute command and control, USNORTHCOM and
    USEUCOM regularly assess and iterate command and control mechanisms to
    seamlessly operate between our two commands.
        I would add however that USNORTHCOM has numerous documented
    capability gaps related to establishing a persistent, sustainable
    presence in the Arctic, to include maritime fueling capability north of
    Dutch Harbor, which is necessary to expand the Navy's and Coast Guard's
    operations; improved facilities for air assets (e.g., fighters,
    tankers, and ISR platforms); and reliable, resilient communications
    systems.   [See page 33.]

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 April 14, 2021

    =======================================================================

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

        Ms. Speier. How much are taxpayers spending for each LCS deployment
    in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, and what is the typical
    duration of such a deployment?
        Admiral Faller. A typical LCS deployment to the SOUTHCOM AOR is
    planned for approximately 120 days. The daily operating cost for an LCS
    (according to United States Fleet Forces) is $45,574 per day, or $5.4M
    per 120-day deployment.
        Ms. Speier. How much have LCS deployments increased over the past 3
    years in the SOUTHCOM areas of responsibility? What is the breakdown
    among drug interdiction, humanitarian and disaster response, and other
    missions?
        Admiral Faller. There have been nine LCS deployments over the last
    three years to the SOUTHCOM AOR. The first LCS deployment began in Nov
    2019. Five deployments were executed in 2020 as part of SOUTUHCOM's
    enhanced operations to counter-transnational criminal organizations
    (TCOs). In 2021, three LCS have deployed.
        LCS deployments in the SOUTHCOM AOR are predominately focused on
    countering TCOs, accounting for 95% of all mission days. Less than one
    percent of LCS mission days were spent on Humanitarian Assistance/
    Disaster Response (three mission days) and the remaining 4% on
    traditional U.S. Navy (USN) missions and Theater Security Cooperation
    exercises.
        Ms. Speier. For the Freedom-class ships assigned to SOUTHCOM, what
    was the average number of days that the ships were in dry dock in 2019
    and 2020? What is the average number of days that they were planned to
    be at sea in 2019 and 2020? What is the average number of days that
    they were unable to complete planned/assigned missions in 2019 and 2020
    due to maintenance requirements?
        Admiral Faller. When a USN ship deployed in the SOUTHCOM AOR has a
    serious maintenance problem, it goes into dry-dock facilities stateside
    where Fleet Forces Command takes operational control. When this occurs,
    the USN works to fill our operational requirement with another ship to
    minimize impact to operations. For specific information on the number
    of days a particular ship was in dry dock, I would have to refer you to
    the U.S. Navy.
        Ms. Speier. What capability does the LCS provide to SOUTHCOM that
    is not present in other available vessels in the fleet?
        Admiral Faller. LCS, with its employment of the SH-60S helicopter
    and 11-meter Rigid-hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB), is the only USN
    combatant that can execute both airborne use of force (day and night)
    and surface use of force--a critical capability during the interdiction
    and apprehension stage. Structural modifications and asset re-
    allocations would be required to embark 11-meter RHIBs and SH-60S on
    other vessels.
        Ms. Speier. A recent article in Defense News says that each LCS
    costs about $70 million per year to operate--almost as much as the cost
    of operating a much-larger Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. Is that
    accurate? If not, what is the actual annual operating cost of a
    Freedom-class LCS?
        Admiral Faller. I would have to defer to the U.S. Navy for specific
    operational costs of different types of ships.
        Ms. Speier. What is the impact of the LCS maintenance problems on
    SOUTHCOM's ability to complete drug interdiction, humanitarian, and
    other missions?
        Admiral Faller. From April 1, 2020 until May 10, 2021, we have lost
    118 operational days because of LCS maintenance issues, and that number
    continues to grow. To the Navy's credit, they have worked to mitigate
    the operational days lost, and the above number is lower than it could
    be due to their efforts. However, the LCS platform is still plagued by
    systemic maintenance issues, which reduce its effectiveness.
        Ms. Speier. What is the impact of the combination of high OPTEMPO
    and the unreliability of the Freedom-class LCS on the sailors who crew
    these ships? What, if anything, are you doing to mitigate these
    impacts?
        Admiral Faller. Due to shorter deployment cycles in the SOUTHCOM
    Area of Responsibility, the impact to crews has been minimal and
    significantly less than impacts from COVID associated with restriction
    of movement (ROM) requirements and country access. Navy's employment
    model for LCS mitigates high OPTEMPO. Each LCS, with few exceptions,
    have two crews--blue and gold. This two-crew model mirrors that of
    other maritime platforms. Crews conduct a crew swap every 4-7 months,
    which is designed to limit OPTEMPO.
        Ms. Speier. What are your plans going forward for OPTEMPO and LCS
    deployments in SOUTHCOM? Are you reconsidering the increased OPTEMPO?
        Admiral Faller. We anticipate future LCS presence to continue in
    this AOR. SOUTHCOM has an ideal mission set and compatible geography
    for this platform, but it will remain up to the U.S. Navy to provide
    assets based on SOUTHCOM's stated requirements. Although LCS presence
    has increased in the SOUTHCOM AOR, Navy's LCS employment model
    mitigates OPTEMPO concerns.
        Ms. Speier. Both in media reporting and in my personal experiences
    speaking with service members and their families, it is clear that high
    OPTEMPO has been incredibly destructive to our military. How do you
    balance your mission needs, especially the unpredictability of disaster
    response, with stable force planning to reduce the burden of on short-
    notice deployments on the force?
        Admiral Faller. As a Combatant Command with no assigned forces, we
    rely exclusively on the Services to meet our mission requirements, both
    planned and emergent. We work closely with the Joint Staff through the
    Global Force Management Process to plan for normal, predictable mission
    requirements. While we cannot anticipate all emergency deployments, we
    take some proactive steps to minimize unplanned, short-notice
    deployments. For example, we do try to time deployments to coincide
    with hurricane season so that we can simply shift the mission of an
    already ongoing deployment to respond rapidly, rather than having to
    request a new deployment to react to a disaster.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
        Mr. Scott. How would the designation of cartels as foreign
    terrorist organizations affect U.S. Southern Command?
        Admiral Faller. While designating cartels as Foreign Terrorist
    Organizations (FTOs) could change operational authorities from ``law
    enforcement support and training'' to the broader ``counterterrorism''
    authorities, practically speaking, DOD activities would likely not
    change significantly. Alternatively, recognizing Transnational Criminal
    Organizations (TCOs) formally as threats to national security in key
    national strategic documents, which are directly tied to funding
    decisions, could result in direct positive impacts in the region.
        Mr. Scott. The U.S. Coast Guard plays a significant role in
    SOUTHCOM. Do you have sufficient Coast Guard assets in SOUTHCOM or
    could you use more?
        Admiral Faller. The Coast Guard plays a key role in maintaining
    forward operating presence in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility and
    is a top force provider in the region. The unique capabilities and
    authorities the Coast Guard bring are invaluable, and more USCG
    aircraft, cutters, and personnel would certainly contribute to meeting
    our mission requirements. However, Coast Guard assets are in demand
    worldwide, and they are only one force provider to our joint command.
    We work with the Joint Staff to source mission requirements through the
    Global Force Management Process, which includes assets from all
    Services.
        Mr. Scott. CDR Daniel Upp, U.S. Navy, wrote in the April 2021
    edition of Proceedings, ``. . . the Paraguayan Navy is a worthy and
    critical partner for the United States in the struggle against the TCOs
    that threaten regional security in Latin America.'' What additional
    support does the Paraguayan Navy need from both the U.S. Coast Guard
    and the U.S. Navy so that it can defeat the transnational criminal
    organizations on some of South America's critical rivers?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM is addressing the lack of riverine
    security capability in Paraguay to conduct successful Counter
    Transnational Criminal Organizations (C-TCO) operations through an
    approved FY22 Significant Security Capability Initiative (SSCI) which
    was recently funded at $773K to equip and train the Paraguayan Maritime
    Forces. We are currently looking to provide a new maritime riverine
    platform along with additional domain awareness capacity. In
    coordination with the Security Cooperation Office in Asuncion, DSCA,
    U.S. Navy South and the U.S. Coast Guard, we will assess the
    requirements and build an FY22 Section 333 support package to include a
    Minister of Defense-level Institutional Capacity line of effort
    executed by the U.S. Institute for Security Governance (ISG).
    Additionally, Paraguay and Colombia have agreed to conduct bi-lateral
    training under the U.S. Colombia Action Plan (USCAP), which will
    include both Military (DOD supported), and Public Security Forces
    (State supported) lines of effort.
        Mr. Scott. Commander Jennifer Runion, U.S. Coast Guard, wrote in
    the February 2021 edition of Proceedings an article entitled ``Protect
    Western Hemisphere Fish.'' Is a regional fisheries commission needed to
    coordinate information sharing and enforcement efforts to protect Latin
    American fish stocks? Would the establishment of a shiprider program by
    the U.S. Coast Guard be effective in protecting the region's fisheries?
        Admiral Faller. The practice of Illegal, Unreported, and
    Unregulated (IUU) fishing is an economic and ecological threat, but
    also undermines port and maritime security, widens existing gaps in
    maritime governance, and is utilized by criminal elements to traffic
    drugs, arms, people, and other contraband. The Coast Guard is
    implementing a global strategy to combat IUU fishing that incorporates
    not only at-sea enforcement, but also intelligence sharing, legal
    support, and policy development. Partnerships with coastal nations
    aimed towards countering predatory behavior, and strengthening of
    multilateral and multinational coalitions, is a key part of this global
    framework. The Coast Guard coordinates partner nation cooperation and
    capacity building based on each nation's capabilities and needs through
    the Department of State as well as the Department of Defense.
        Mr. Scott. Commander Jonathan Ahlstrom, U.S. Navy, wrote in the
    January 2021 edition of Proceedings an article entitled ``People-to-
    People Exchanges for the Win.'' Has the U.S. Southern Command
    identified unfunded opportunities to ``facilitate the cultural,
    educational, and people-to-people exchanges that create the networks of
    current and future political, civil society, and educational leaders
    who will extend a free and prosperous world.'' If so, what are they and
    how much would they cost to implement?
        Admiral Faller. The benefits of collaborating with the U.S.
    military are far greater than just increased technical capability for
    the partner and we look for every opportunity to further our network of
    relationships within the region. Every engagement builds trust with our
    partners and reassures them that the United States wants to contribute
    in meaningful ways, and at the speed of relevance. The tools available
    through Security Cooperation, for example, allow for maximum engagement
    with our partner nation military and security forces. These tools
    include key leader engagements, subject matter expert exchanges,
    conferences, workshops, mobile training teams, and institutional
    capacity building at the Ministry level, to name a few. Our
    professional military education efforts in the region including
    International Military Education and Training (IMET), exchanges, and
    exercises shape future leaders and foster long-term relationships with
    partner nation military personnel. The programs are generally small
    investments with high, long-term return. A little bit goes a long way
    in this theater. When the U.S. military is present, we bring with us
    our values and we model professional behavior--we show our partners
    what ``right'' looks like. We have programs in place, like our Women
    Peace and Security initiative and the only Human Rights Office among
    the Combatant Commands, that help build the institutional capacity of
    our partner nation forces and make the resilient to all external
    influences and threats; programs to help partner nations develop
    diverse and inclusive militaries that respect the rule of law and human
    rights. We also agree with CDR Ahlstrom's assessment that the inverse
    is also critical to developing our relationships--sending our U.S.
    military personnel to schools and exchange programs in partner nations
    and building cultural awareness and literacy within our own ranks shows
    partners that we are interested in understanding where they come from
    while informing our own decisions on how best to work with our partners
    in ways that are relevant to them. We will be submitting a list of
    unfunded requirements to Congress shortly after the President transmits
    the FY22 budget to Congress that will include partner engagement
    activities.
        Mr. Scott. How is SOUTHCOM addressing the emerging threat of drones
    and drone swarming tactics?
        Admiral Faller. The Department of Defense has announced an intent
    to continue important research, development and procurement of unmanned
    aircraft systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (C-UAS) technology. As DOD
    continues to develop, procure, and deploy these systems, we will work
    closely with our partner nations in the region to determine a
    collaborative way forward in the area of UAS.
        Mr. Scott. What SOUTHCOM's capabilities against a drone swarm
    attack? Do we currently have the ability to defeat a drone swarm attack
    and ensure we do not take out our drones?
        Admiral Faller. Unmanned aircraft systems are increasingly small,
    cheap, scalable, and disposable and can be used both offensively and
    defensively. We are paying attention to this technology and would be
    happy to discuss further in a classified setting.
        Mr. Scott. What is SOUTTHCOM working on to defeat adversary drones,
    singles and swarms, today and in the future?
        Admiral Faller. We would be happy to provide a classified briefing
    on this topic.
        Mr. Scott. What are the factors limiting your ability to deploy
    counter-UAS systems in SOUTHCOM?
        Admiral Faller. We continue to work together with partner nations
    in the region to evaluate and develop strategies in this area based on
    current capabilities and requirements.
        Mr. Scott. Admiral Faller, you testified last year that ISR was
    critical to drug interdiction efforts, an issue with direct impact on
    the security of our nation and our communities. Despite that, you've
    said in the past that SOUTHCOM is forced to cover down on an area the
    size of the United States with just a handful of assets and that you're
    reaching just 20 percent of your overall ISR goal. What steps have you
    taken to remedy this shortfall? How do you assess your current ISR gaps
    or needs? Does your command plan to partner with U.S. companies to fill
    the gap with contractor-owned, contractor-operated ISR assets? How can
    Congress help?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM receives only one percent of DOD ISR. This
    creates a significant gap in our intelligence. For years, Congress has
    supported our intelligence program through the ISR Transfer Fund and
    other additional funding that has enabled us to mitigate some of those
    shortfalls. We have used these additional resources to contract, as
    well as purchase, ISR capabilities such as maritime patrol aircraft,
    tactical UAS, and more recently, non-traditional ISR capabilities that
    allow us to better harness large amounts of data to inform C-TCO and
    other operations in our AOR. Congressional recognition of the
    importance of this hemisphere, our own neighborhood, is key to sourcing
    this mission and countering the threats that directly impact our
    homeland. Modest increases in ISR, security cooperation, and presence
    in this region really go a long way in building our partners'
    resilience to all threats--TCOs, influence from malign state actors
    like China, and even humanitarian crises spurred by climate change.
        Mr. Scott. In 2020, Congress responded to the combatant commanders'
    call for more ISR resources by appropriating $250M for the ISR transfer
    fund, which funded additional ISR activities in the SOUTHCOM AOR. How
    did you leverage these additional resources in 2020? For 2021, the
    Pentagon did not request any funds for the ISR transfer fund and
    Congress did not appropriate any additional funds. How will the lack of
    ISR transfer funds in 2021 impact your mission?
        Admiral Faller. Intelligence drives everything. The loss of the ISR
    Transfer Fund this year resulted in a 38 percent reduction to our ISR
    in the current year. Over the last five years, the ISR Transfer Fund
    has provided 47 percent of our ISR. That's significant, especially
    since we only have about 1 percent of DOD ISR. Without that
    intelligence, we are going to understand less of the battle space.
    Small investments in ISR help inform us and, just as important, our
    partner nations, on the activities of the People's Republic of China
    (PRC) and TCOs in this region. With capabilities like COGINT
    (Commercial + Open Geointelligence) and Open Source Intelligence, we
    are able to understand the impact malign influences are having in the
    SOUTHCOM AOR and do so rapidly by leveraging automated machine
    learning. For instance, we have a better understanding of which Chinese
    companies and vessels are conducting illegal, unreported, and
    unregulated (IUU) fishing, and are constantly monitoring patterns of
    activity. This information is key to help strengthening relationships
    with our impacted partners and for maritime sovereignty and security
    throughout the region.
        Mr. Scott. What is the current rate of interdiction and
    apprehension of narcotics traffickers, and is this rate increasing or
    decreasing?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM works very closely with the interagency on
    the counternarcotic mission, as this is a true team effort. DHS, and
    specifically the U.S. Coast Guard, working with Joint Interagency Task
    Force-South (JIATF-S), is our primary law enforcement partner for drug
    interdictions at sea. Disruption rates have stayed within a tight range
    over the past five years. In terms of metric tons interdicted, JIATF-S
    saw an 11.6 percent rate of interdiction in 2020 which was
    approximately the same as the year before. It is worth noting that
    partner nation participation in these disruptions has increased to 60
    percent, up from 50 the previous year. While we must continue to
    prevent as many drugs from entering our homeland as possible, we must
    also look toward a whole-of-society approach to address this scourge.
    For our part, SOUTHCOM can directly impact the supply side by
    continuing to work with our partners to stop the TCOs who will traffic
    in any commodity to turn a profit. It's not just about stopping the
    flow of drugs, we must go after their logistics chains and ultimately,
    their profits.
        Mr. Scott. As SOUTHCOM's demand for ISR continues to grow
    exponentially, year after year, how is SOUTHCOM positioning itself to
    properly process, exploit, and disseminate the growing volume of
    information?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM continues to learn how best to leverage
    capabilities in order to stay innovative. Part of this effort is
    leveraging emerging artificial intelligence and machine learning
    capabilities that would allow us to collect and exploit information
    orders of magnitude faster than we once could and with fewer manpower
    requirements. We will look to continue expanding and investing in non-
    traditional ISR utilizing 21st Century tradecraft as a means of
    illuminating and limiting disinformation/misinformation in a whole of
    government approach that includes engaging with industry to best
    compete in a competitive information environment.
        Mr. Scott. How is SOUTHCOM leveraging the opportunities that
    advanced cloud computing and artificial intelligence/machine learning
    can offer to more effectively manage this increasing volume of
    information?
        Admiral Faller. As I've said before, ISR drives everything. One
    thing we have started looking at more closely as an institution is non-
    traditional ISR. For example, our Special Operations Command South
    looks at big data--commercially available information--and they are
    able to quickly analyze this large quantity of data and make it
    actionable through artificial intelligence and machine learning. The
    next step is removing barriers to sharing information in order to
    leverage that data to understand what the threat is doing and to better
    inform our partners.
        Mr. Scott. Do you think ABMS and Joint All-Domain Command and
    Control will have enough operational capability to fill the ISR gaps
    that JSTARS will not be able to fulfill once it is parked?
        Admiral Faller. The E-8C (JSTARS) has been a very valuable asset in
    our region. This platform enables valuable layered intelligence and the
    unique ability to characterize wide-areas of maritime trafficking
    environments with its moving target indicator (MTI), vital to
    identifying unknown suspicious surface activity along traditional high-
    volume trafficking routes. Additionally, employing the E-8C gives
    SOUTHCOM the opportunity to leverage external intelligence expertise
    for second and third phase analysis. The E-8C, when packaged with other
    airborne and surface Detection & Monitoring (D&M) assets, enables
    JIATF-S helicopter-equipped surface assets to increase their
    probability of detection of maritime targets from 7% to up to 50%. I
    would refer you to the Air Force for information on the Advance Battle
    Management System (ABMS) and Joint All Domain Command and Control
    (JADC2) systems and what their capabilities will be in the near to mid-
    term.
        Mr. Scott. I am a strong supporter of the National Guard's State
    Partnership Program. My home State of Georgia is partnered with
    Argentina. While the current political environment makes it a
    challenge, can you talk about the value added by the Georgia National
    Guard to this partnership with Argentina?
        Admiral Faller. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is an integral
    part of our engagement capability with our partners and a force
    multiplier in the SOUTHCOM region. The State Partnership Program
    enables the exchange of tremendous expertise resident in our citizen
    Soldiers and Airmen fostering long-term relationships with partner
    nation military and security forces. SOUTHCOM fully leverages this
    value with 24 State Partnerships--the most of any region. The Georgia
    National Guard engagements with Argentina are nested under our security
    cooperation priorities. As part of the State Partnership Program,
    Georgia and Argentina continue to strengthen their relationship through
    multiple annual engagements since 2016. In 2020, even with COVID
    restrictions, the Georgia National Guard conducted 10 events with
    Argentina and have successfully executed nine of 27 events planned for
    2021. One of the most recent engagement was a virtual subject matter
    expert exchange on COVID-19 best practices working group which enable
    leaders from each organization to share effective pandemic influenza/
    infectious disease (PI/ID) countermeasures, response to the novel
    outbreak and lessons learned. A team of medical professionals from
    Georgia National Guard, Georgia Department of Public Health, National
    Guard Bureau and Air Force South led the virtual engagement, sharing
    best practices with the Argentina partners on how the state of Georgia
    was managing its COVID-19 distribution logistics. They have exchanged
    knowledge in other SPP focus areas such as Cyber, Maintenance and
    professional development.
        Mr. Scott. Could increased maintenance of current ground-based
    radar and communications intercept ISR assets expand capability? Has
    SOUTHCOM looked at leasing options with respect to ground-based ISR
    assets to include radars and communications intercept systems?
        Admiral Faller. We are always looking for ways to expand our
    ability to illuminate threats, not only to the U.S. but also our
    partners in the region. Maintenance of our assets is a critical but
    complex task to orchestrate at forward operating locations. We prefer
    basing our assets at U.S. controlled facilities or at locations where
    have existing agreements with a partner nation. We do consider leasing
    if it is the only option that allows us to collect the information we
    need, and funding is available.
        Mr. Scott. What is the demand signal for Navy hospital ships in
    SOUTHCOM?
        Admiral Faller. Navy hospital ships are capable platforms that
    provide a vital service to our partner nations in their hour of need.
    They help build goodwill and highlight the best of America to our
    neighbors and the world. We have had multiple hospital ship deployments
    in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility: from 2007-2019 those deployments
    treated 634,463 patients and performed 7,781 surgeries. There is a
    stable, consistent demand for medical care in many areas of the region,
    which is compounded by natural disasters and other crises. As a result
    of the seasonal threat of hurricanes, we have looked to schedule
    deployments in the summer in order to have hospital ship presence in
    order to quickly respond to an event.
        Mr. Scott. What would the benefits be for NORTHCOM if the U.S. Navy
    established an Arctic Fleet?
        General VanHerck. As the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, I have
    consistently stated that our strategic competitors are exhibiting
    behaviors and taking actions that demonstrate their intent to compete
    with the United States globally and in all domains, including in the
    Arctic.
        In order to counter their actions, the Department must establish a
    persistent, sustainable presence in the Arctic and close capability
    gaps. That includes establishing a maritime fueling capability north of
    Dutch Harbor, Alaska, which is necessary to expand the Navy's and Coast
    Guard's operational reach; improving facilities for air assets in
    coordination with our Canadian and Danish allies (e.g., fighters,
    tankers, and ISR platforms); and building reliable, resilient
    communications systems in the high north. We must also increase the
    capability of the Joint Force to operate in the Arctic, which
    necessitates examining existing equipment allowances as well as
    expanding opportunities to train in the Arctic.
        I fully support the Navy's implementation of its ``A Blue Arctic''
    strategy, with the objectives of establishing a more persistent
    maritime presence in the high north, strengthening relationships with
    Arctic allies and partners, and developing the capabilities and
    proficiency necessary to operate in the challenging Arctic environment.
    Achieving these objectives in all domains--not just at sea--would
    enable USNORTHCOM and NORAD to more effectively deter and counter
    strategic competitors' malign activities in the Arctic during day-to-
    day competition, provide national leaders with expanded options to de-
    escalate crises, and significantly improve the ability of USNORTHCOM
    and NORAD to defeat attacks against the homeland originating from or
    transiting through the Arctic approaches. I defer to the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations as to the
    advisability or feasibility of establishing an Arctic Fleet.
        Mr. Scott. What are the advantages to Arctic security of joint U.S.
    and Canadian Coast Guard patrols through the Northwest passage?
        General VanHerck. The extensive experience of the U.S. Coast Guard
    and Canadian Coast Guard in the Arctic and their long-shared history of
    combined operations in the Arctic Ocean provide significant benefits
    for Arctic security. Combined U.S. and Canadian Coast Guard operations
    demonstrate the strong security relationship and extensive maritime
    expertise between our nations and contribute to a safe, cooperative and
    prosperous Arctic region that protects the international rules-based
    order.
        Mr. Scott. How much would it cost to modernize the missile early
    warning system with the capability to give the United States a clear
    advantage over Russia?
        General VanHerck. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency, the United
    States Space Force, and the United States Air Force regarding the cost
    to modernize the missile early warning system. USNORTHCOM and NORAD
    identify capability requirements in support of our assigned missions
    and work closely with the DOD Services and Agencies to provide fiscally
    viable solutions. I believe the emergence of peer competitors and their
    fielding of large numbers of long-range conventional cruise missiles
    and delivery platforms necessitates a more aggressive approach to
    missile defense for the homeland. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are aggressively
    working within the Department, along with Canada and other partners, to
    assess and identify capabilities such as over-the-horizon-radars that
    may complement terrestrial, airborne, and space-based technologies to
    improve early warning capabilities against current and future threats.
    A more aggressive approach must account for defense against the full
    spectrum of air and missile threats that we currently face in the
    homeland; we must avoid single threat solutions. The Department needs a
    more holistic approach in order to field an effective and affordable
    homeland defense capability.
        Mr. Scott. How is NORTHCOM addressing the emerging threat of drones
    and drone swarming tactics?
        General VanHerck. NORAD is responsible for and has the authority to
    defend against attacks by large unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).
    However, the responsibility and authority for defense against small UAS
    (sUAS) is distributed across multiple DOD and non-DOD agencies under
    law enforcement authorities. NORAD, together with USNORTHCOM, is
    aggressively collaborating with multiple DOD organizations and
    interagency partners to address the emerging threat of sUAS attack
    (e.g., small radar signature, easily purchased, commercially
    available). As an example, my commands are developing an integrated
    prototype sUAS detection and warning system, to include threats from
    swarms, that we intend to use in the continental United States.
        The National Strategy for Aviation Security (NSAS) recognizes the
    wide variety of sizes in UAS, and that law enforcement has the
    authorities to counter sUAS. There is no lead federal agency designated
    to address sUAS threats within the National Airspace System.
        I note that national-level statutes and policies currently
    constrain development of an effective interagency solution to this
    emerging sUAS threat. As such, I fully support efforts to establish
    national-level authorities and responsibilities that will enable a more
    fully integrated, interagency, whole-of-government solution that will
    mitigate potential sUAS and swarm sUAS attacks on the homeland.
        Mr. Scott. What are NORTHCOM's capabilities against a drone swarm
    attack? Do we currently have the ability to defeat a drone swarm attack
    and ensure we do not take out our drones?
        General VanHerck. Today, NORAD (vice USNORTHCOM) has limited
    capability to detect small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) swarm
    attacks (e.g., small radar signature, easily purchased, commercially
    available). Further, NORAD has no ability to counter or defeat sUAS
    threats, nor is NORAD assigned the mission to counter-sUAS at this
    time. Instead, the counter-sUAS mission is conducted under law
    enforcement authorities as a reactive, not proactive, approach in
    domestic airspace. The counter-sUAS mission is conducted under military
    Service authorities only when over covered DOD assets and
    infrastructure. From a homeland defense perspective, I remain concerned
    with the reactive vice proactive approach to countering sUAS.
        Mr. Scott. What is NORTHCOM working on to defeat adversary drones,
    singles and swarms, today and in the future?
        General VanHerck. NORAD (vice USNORTHCOM) is actively working with
    the Joint Counter-UAS Office and the Services to improve the
    Department's collective capability to successfully mitigate both single
    as well as swarm small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) threats.
    Advanced technologies, such as the USNORTHCOM and NORAD Pathfinder
    prototype, are allowing us to take advantage of increased computing
    power, data analytics, and machine learning to detect and identify sUAS
    using existing sensors.
        Through technologies such as Pathfinder, military commanders and
    senior civilian decision makers will gain decision space and the
    ability to employ a greater range of options. Instead of a reactive
    stance to sUAS threats, an expanded and integrated decision space will
    be key to a proactive defense against either single or swarm attacks.
        By law and policy, the mitigation of sUAS is the responsibility of
    the Services and law enforcement agencies. NORAD (as the command tasked
    with aerospace warning and aerospace control) is focused on enhancing
    the ability to detect, track, identify sUAS in order to provide DOD
    installation commanders and interagency partners with the decision
    space necessary to successfully engage single and swarm sUAS threats.
    Gaining this enhanced awareness necessitates a more comprehensive
    approach than the installation-by-installation and point-by-point
    efforts that have been focused on in the past. It requires the netting
    together of DOD and non-DOD sensor data to gain composite air domain
    awareness, allowing for real-time detection of the full spectrum of air
    threats, including sUAS. This holistic approach will enable those
    tasked with the mitigation of sUAS by providing critical threat
    information, and most importantly, increased decision time.
        My team is currently working with both DOD and interagency partners
    to test a prototype system that uses machine learning and artificial
    intelligence to provide real-time identification of those sUAS that are
    operating in such a manner as to warrant attention. This system will
    first be evaluated in the National Capital Region and Puget Sound, WA.
    Enabling early identification and shared early warning will increase
    decision time and allow those tasked with threat mitigation to take
    action when warranted.
        Mr. Scott. What are the factors limiting your ability to deploy
    counter-UAS systems in NORTHCOM and specifically U.S. airspace?
        General VanHerck. As the NORAD (vice USNORTHCOM) Commander, I have
    the authorities needed for defense against large unmanned aircraft
    system (UAS) threats under the NORAD mission set. As the USNORTHCOM
    Commander, however, there are legal and policy limitations for
    employment of counter-small UAS (sUAS) systems in the defense of the
    homeland. For example, domestic security partners are restricted from
    sharing sUAS data with DOD organizations, which has impeded the
    development of a holistic, integrated approach for early detection of
    sUAS and protection of national infrastructure and critical assets from
    sUAS threats. In addition, Federal Aviation Administration controls
    designed to ensure safety of civilian aircraft preclude the use of some
    of the UAS mitigation systems that have proven effective in other
    theaters. Finally, no single agency is assigned within the National
    Strategy for Aviation Security to set overarching technical and
    operational standards necessary to facilitate an effective, whole-of-
    government approach to the sUAS threat.
        Mr. Scott. Will the continued National Guard presence on the
    Southwest border become an enduring mission after the current
    mobilization authority expires?
        General VanHerck. This is a policy decision that I will defer to
    the Secretary of Defense. DOD personnel are currently deployed to the
    southwest border in response to a request from the Secretary of
    Homeland Security that was subsequently approved by Secretary of
    Defense authorizing up to 4,000 total DOD personnel on the border in
    FY21. All are currently National Guard members in Title 10 status
    providing support to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S
    Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) homeland security mission,
    enabling DHS and CBP personnel to focus their efforts on law
    enforcement.
                                     ______

                       QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NORCROSS
        Mr. Norcross. General VanHerck, in your testimony you state that
    there is significant emphasis being placed on ``left of launch
    framework'' to provide ``flexible response options to deter, deny or if
    required defeat every threat. . . .''
        Can you please describe in a bit more detail how this framework
    matches up against and can be utilized to defend the homeland or U.S.
    forces against adversary hypersonic weapons?
        General VanHerck. A left-of-launch framework to deter in
    competition, de-escalate in crisis, and deny and defeat in conflict
    against any threat--including hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise
    missiles--is all about increasing the ability to anticipate an attack
    before it occurs or has the ability to threaten the homeland. That is
    why my top priority is improving all-domain awareness, particularly
    against existing and emerging air and missile threats.
        An all-domain awareness capability, achieved through layering a
    global array of existing and new sensors, will provide detection,
    identification, and tracking of the full range of threats, from
    hypersonic missiles to small unmanned aircraft systems. Although all-
    domain awareness by itself is not sufficient to deter an attack, it
    will enable information dominance and decision superiority by
    increasing decision space and creating an expanded range of options for
    military commanders and senior civilian decision makers, allowing them
    to assess and act well ahead of our competitors.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
        Mr. Moulton. Admiral Faller, you referred in your testimony to PRC
    efforts to expand access to South American infrastructure and networks,
    including through its Safe City program, which exports the CCP's
    particular brand of technologically enabled authoritarianism. If, as
    you state, values are our strength in the hemisphere, where are you
    most concerned about losing ground to PRC influence, access, and
    particularly tools of oppression in South America? Can you elaborate on
    what additional tools, resources, or interagency support does
    USSOUTHCOM need to properly address this threat?
        Admiral Faller. In our AOR, China is increasing activity across all
    fronts, and it is all concerning: IT, cyber, space, extractive
    industries, ports (sea, air, land), roads, infrastructure, legal and
    illegal fishing, agriculture, and military-especially Spanish and
    Portuguese language professional military education modeled after U.S.
    education systems, along with gifts of military equipment because China
    knows countries in our hemisphere have fragile economies. China thrives
    on the corruption and lack of transparency in business and political
    deals resident in many of the countries in Latin America and the
    Caribbean. Additionally, COVID 19 and the subsequent vaccinations
    brought on a new era of mask, health, and vaccine diplomacy that China
    seeks to leverage to its advantage. Chinese information operations are
    aggressive and full of lies--not bound by the same authorities or
    values as the U.S. As I said in my testimony, our strategic approach to
    China must be global. We can start by leveraging intelligence--find out
    everything we can about China across all dimensions and domains and
    document it. Information sharing in this endeavor is key. We need to
    operate in a manner that allows us to release this information to our
    partners and, in some cases, the public. We'll use the findings to
    inform better DOD and USG actions to include resources. Additionally,
    we must remain present in the AOR--you can't win if you aren't on the
    field. We need to continue to get better and stronger with respect to
    partnerships, both bilaterally and multilaterally, through security
    cooperation activities. We are stronger together and even modest
    investments in this hemisphere go a long way and will help us and our
    partners counter these global threats.
        Mr. Moulton. General VanHerck, in your testimony you discuss the
    need for all-domain awareness enabled by machine learning and
    artificial intelligence. The Future of Defense Task Force, which I co-
    led last year, highlighted the importance of digital education and
    training to maximize use of those technologies. What changes in
    training do your leaders--junior and senior--need to be able to fully
    utilize and trust these capabilities to achieve decision superiority
    over our adversaries?
        General VanHerck. Digital education and training, as well as
    embedding a culture of innovation within USNORTHCOM and NORAD, are
    essential to reaching the strategic goals of attaining domain
    awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority over any
    competitor. To that end, I am pursuing a concentrated and focused
    effort to affect a digital cultural transformation across my commands,
    and within the Department of Defense. The cornerstone of this effort is
    investing in the digital education of our people in a way that makes us
    better today, and better able to counter future threats. Specifically,
    within my commands, initial efforts are to define the necessary skills
    to become digitally literate for every echelon of activity from
    operator to commander. The commands will then expand the model to
    address specialized, job-specific digital education and training to
    develop and deepen the technical expertise across the enterprise.
    Because many best practices often lie outside the Department, I am also
    seeking avenues to bring in experts from academia and industry, and
    leverage their knowledge and experience to educate our personnel and
    sharpen the edge of our digital initiatives. I expect to implement most
    of the commands' digital transformation training and education
    initiatives this calendar year.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
        Mr. Bacon. Over the last year, Iran has flouted sanctions and made
    illicit oil deliveries to Venezuela. According to the Biden
    administration, they are aware of reports of a Venezuelan-Iranian
    petroleum exchange and continue to monitor. There are reports that Iran
    is disguising their vessels to evade these sanctions. What is DOD doing
    to counter these illicit flows and keep these two despotic regimes from
    propping each other up?
        Mr. Salesses. DOD is aware of the alleged Venezuelan-Iranian
    petroleum exchange and is closely monitoring the situation. As DOD's
    role is a supporting role, I defer to the Departments of State,
    Treasury, and Justice regarding U.S. Government efforts to counter the
    alleged illicit activities in violation of U.S. sanctions.
        Mr. Bacon. The 2021 USSOUTHCOM Posture Statement notes that the
    dissemination of intelligence to our partners is critical to ``shine a
    light on the PRC's predatory and corrupt actions.'' China has made
    deliberate attempts to expand it's ``Belt and Road'' Initiative to
    South America by establishing self-serving, exploitative economic and
    military ties to cement a foothold there What is your assessment of our
    partners' response to our intelligence sharing efforts?
        Admiral Faller. U.S. Intelligence is a highly desired commodity by
    our partners, and our ability to share is a critical capability that is
    greatly appreciated. Sharing of this commodity is a persistent topic in
    my staff's interactions with partners. To this end, our Intelligence
    Directorate has a dedicated team focused on intelligence cooperation,
    sharing at the bilateral and multilateral level, and building and
    enhancing our partners' intelligence capacity and capabilities to
    include partner ability to absorb, secure, process and disseminate
    intelligence. In 2020 alone, our intelligence staff and partners
    collectively shared over 1,700 intelligence products and conducted over
    8,000 intelligence collaboration voice/video calls. These interactions
    allow our partners to make better informed decisions and adroitly
    apportion scarce resources to counter shared threats in our AOR.
        Mr. Bacon. In 2020, USSOUTHCOM initiated Enhanced Counter Narcotics
    Operations under the whole-of-government approach to stem the flow of
    illicit drugs into the homeland. One year later, have these operations
    been successful in achieving their objective and what are some benefits
    and drawbacks to using this type of operation? Have you noted any links
    between this activity and the activity at our southern borders?
        Admiral Faller. The enhanced counter narcotics efforts were
    critical in keeping tons of illicit drugs off our streets and saving
    American lives. Our presence and commitment to the region, which
    continued through the COVID-19 pandemic, was reciprocated by partner
    nations, who contributed to an increasing percentage of interdictions.
    Key partners like Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador,
    and others were involved in 60% of drug disruptions during the
    operation. These efforts not only stop the drugs themselves, but
    address the violence, corruption, and erosion of the rule of law caused
    by TCOs and the drugs they smuggle through the region, impacts that are
    a driving force behind the population movements we see on our border.
    However, this is a complex issue that cannot be solved by interdiction
    alone. While the U.S. military plays a critical role in countering
    these TCOs and addressing the root causes of illegal migration, this
    national security imperative will ultimately require a whole of society
    approach.
        Mr. Bacon. SOUTHCOM's contractor-owned contractor-operated service
    has provided wide area persistent ISR of the SOUTHCOM AOR for the past
    year. How important is this service for SOUTHCOM and do you intend to
    extend COCO operations to ensure there are no ISR gaps?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM receives only 1% of DOD ISR assets. To
    mitigate our ISR shortfalls, we have used additional funds provided by
    Congress through the ISR Transfer Fund to contract for ISR
    capabilities. With the loss of the ISR Transfer Fund this year, which
    provided 47% of our ISR requirements over the last five years, our
    ability to close some of these gaps has been limited. As an example, we
    have used these additional congressional funds to contract aerial ISR
    capabilities, to include required sensor packages, that have been
    critical to our missions in this region.
        Mr. Bacon. In March you emphasized that Russia remains the top
    threat to the U.S. homeland due in large part to their whole-of-
    government strategy that leverages information operations, deception,
    and threats of military force. On March 29th, Russian Tu-142 maritime
    patrol aircraft entered the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone, in
    another sign of their resolve to assert themselves in the western
    hemisphere. Russia continues to conduct operations below the threshold
    of war against our institutions with the aim of causing discord and
    dissent. What can Congress do to help you reinforce your strategy to
    protect the Homeland and diminish Russia's operational effectiveness in
    targeting the American people?
        General VanHerck. Immediate actions Congress could take are to
    ensure sufficient research and development funding for emerging
    technologies and data science developments, while continuing to create
    opportunities for partnerships between DOD and outside experts. In
    addition, Congress can help to foster and support a culture where
    failure, when properly managed, is okay and a natural part of
    accelerating capability development--the Department learns the most
    from failures. Those collaborative efforts are critical to achieving
    all-domain awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority.
    As threats continue to advance, it is increasingly important to foster
    public-private partnerships, as well as collaboration with national and
    defense labs, the National Guard, and our Canadian partners to outpace
    our competitors.
        I would also welcome any progress toward more streamlined and
    flexible acquisition processes that allow USNORTHCOM and NORAD to take
    full advantage of the innovative solutions offered by our tech industry
    partners. Russia has fielded advanced long-range and stealthy systems
    that are specifically designed to overcome current defense
    capabilities, and the Department must move quickly and efficiently to
    regain its strategic and technological advantage.
        Mr. Bacon. As the Arctic grows in significance to U.S. and allied
    security, NORTHCOM/NORAD has an urgent need for increased early warning
    and maritime domain awareness in the high north. What advantages and
    challenges do you see with the use of unmanned systems as an affordable
    option to provide early warning (AEW) and maritime domain awareness
    (MDA) in the Arctic? Are there viable options to partner with Canada
    and other Arctic Allies to increase AEW and MDA coverage in the Artic
    and how do you recommend we engage with them?
        General VanHerck. Unmanned systems can provide persistent
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities from the
    sea floor to space, including providing that critical information in
    the high north. However, unlike manned systems, they lack the ability
    to respond to our competitors' actions if or when needed. The harsh
    Arctic environment remains unforgiving and only the most robust manned
    or unmanned systems are capable of sustained Arctic operations. Whether
    undersea, on land, or in the air, unmanned systems still face the
    challenges of remote maintenance, a difficult logistical tail and, for
    now, a limited communications infrastructure. In fact, the North
    Warning System, which is the system of radars across Alaska and the
    Canadian Arctic, is an unmanned land-based system. Operational for over
    three decades, this is the system NORAD still relies on each and every
    day. An opening Arctic invites competitors to operate ships and
    submarines on our northern flank, compounding our maritime challenge.
    Maritime domain awareness, above and below the surface, will be
    increasingly important to our ability to deter competitors in the North
    American Arctic. As the DOD Advocate for the Arctic, I have directed
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD to begin work to establish additional persistent
    early warning capabilities in the Arctic by advocating for land-, sea-,
    air-, and space-based sensors that will provide persistent domain
    awareness. Part of the solution will likely include modern over-the-
    horizon radar (OTHR) technology that has shown promise for delivering
    cost-effective, persistent wide area surveillance of the Arctic. The
    United States and Canada are pursuing the fielding of OTHR at key
    locations and actively researching polar OTHR technology as a means to
    surveil the entire polar region. Timely information sharing between
    allies and partners is also vital to global all-domain awareness, and
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD gain critical insight from the mutually beneficial
    and highly valuable relationships we share with Canada and our other
    Arctic allies. Finally, I am on record that I believe the United States
    must include a space-based sensor network as soon as possible to
    provide a global, persistent, and resilient surveillance capability so
    threats to the homeland can be detected and tracked from wherever they
    may be launched.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
        Mr. Waltz. A whole-of-government approach to combat the trafficking
    of illegal narcotics and other contraband into the United States is
    essential to the protection of the homeland from transnational criminal
    organizations (TCOs). Federal law enforcement agencies partner with the
    Department of Defense (DOD) to work closely together to detect,
    interdict, and prosecute these criminal actors utilizing the source,
    transit, and arrival zones (to include the U.S. maritime waters) as
    primary smuggling routes for their illicit goods. U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO) partners
    closely with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and other federal agencies in
    bringing to bear a whole-of-government capability against these
    transnational criminal actors exploiting the maritime environment. From
    my understanding, AMO is a critical partner to these interdiction
    efforts utilizing aircraft and vessels, hand in hand with DOD and USCG
    partners, to impact TCOs. I also understand that current authorities
    limit AMO's maritime enforcement zone to only twelve nautical miles
    from our coasts. There is a draft legislative proposal to extend AMO
    Customs Authorities from the current limit of twelve nautical miles out
    to twenty-four nautical miles, incorporating the Contiguous Zone to the
    fullest intended extent (as authorized by the 1999 Presidential
    Proclamation number 7219). Would the extension of AMO's authority help
    DOD in its overall counter-narcotics mission?
        Admiral Faller. You are absolutely correct that a whole of
    government approach to combat the trafficking of illegal narcotics and
    other contraband into the United States is essential to the protection
    of the homeland from TCOs. Because our mission really focuses on
    identifying activity as close to the source as possible, the impact of
    the referenced bill would be minimal to DOD. Under 10 USC 124 DOD is
    the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and
    monitoring (D&M) of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into
    the U.S. DOD may operate equipment to intercept a vessel or aircraft
    detected outside the land area of the U.S., but typically these
    interdictions are happening well beyond the U.S. Contiguous Zone and
    are closer to the departure zones in South and Central America. I would
    not speak for the Coast Guard, U.S. Northern Command, or other
    government entities who have missions that bring them much closer to
    U.S. soil.
        Mr. Waltz. A whole-of-government approach to combat the trafficking
    of illegal narcotics and other contraband into the United States is
    essential to the protection of the homeland from transnational criminal
    organizations (TCOs). Federal law enforcement agencies partner with the
    Department of Defense (DOD) to work closely together to detect,
    interdict, and prosecute these criminal actors utilizing the source,
    transit, and arrival zones (to include the U.S. maritime waters) as
    primary smuggling routes for their illicit goods. U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO) partners
    closely with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and other federal agencies in
    bringing to bear a whole-of-government capability against these
    transnational criminal actors exploiting the maritime environment. From
    my understanding, AMO is a critical partner to these interdiction
    efforts utilizing aircraft and vessels, hand in hand with DOD and USCG
    partners, to impact TCOs. I also understand that current authorities
    limit AMO's maritime enforcement zone to only twelve nautical miles
    from our coasts. There is a draft legislative proposal to extend AMO
    Customs Authorities from the current limit of twelve nautical miles out
    to twenty-four nautical miles, incorporating the Contiguous Zone to the
    fullest intended extent (as authorized by the 1999 Presidential
    Proclamation number 7219). Would the extension of AMO's authority help
    DOD in its overall counter-narcotics mission?
        General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM provides support to counterdrug
    operations at the request of federal law enforcement agencies, to
    include CBP. Because CBP operates under authorities that do not extend
    to the Department of Defense, extending AMO's authority would be
    unlikely to impact USNORTHCOM's counterdrug support.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
        Dr. Jackson. There are opportunities to help train young operators
    as they learn to use technology out in the field. One example could be
    training for sensor operators learning to perform surveillance and
    reconnaissance while piloting Remotely Piloted Aircraft.
        These operators could get real world application by conducting
    their training in support of law enforcement by monitoring the southern
    border and providing surveillance coverage.
        General VanHerck or Mr. Salasses, could either of you speak to the
    feasibility of this and perhaps identify other areas in which DOD could
    utilize its training time to support law enforcement in their efforts
    to address the crisis at the southern border?
        Mr. Salesses. I defer to General VanHerck, who is currently
    commanding DOD's military support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    at the southern border of the United States.
        Dr. Jackson. There are opportunities to help train young operators
    as they learn to use technology out in the field. One example could be
    training for sensor operators learning to perform surveillance and
    reconnaissance while piloting Remotely Piloted Aircraft.
        These operators could get real world application by conducting
    their training in support of law enforcement by monitoring the southern
    border and providing surveillance coverage.
        General VanHerck or Mr. Salasses, could either of you speak to the
    feasibility of this and perhaps identify other areas in which DOD could
    utilize its training time to support law enforcement in their efforts
    to address the crisis at the southern border?
        General VanHerck. The DOD regularly leverages required military
    unit training when possible to also provide incidental support to the
    Department of Homeland Security. Specifically on the southern border,
    the 2-13th Aviation Battalion, which operates the U.S. Army Unmanned
    Aerial Systems Training Schoolhouse in Ft Huachuca, AZ, flies sorties
    to train and certify their soldiers while simultaneously providing
    support to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. I see the potential for
    expanded training opportunities that could support multiple USNORTHCOM
    missions, however I will defer to the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense and the Services regarding the feasibility to execute.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
        Mr. Moore. Your testimony detailed the challenges posed to our
    legacy warning and assessment systems. Do you believe our deterrent
    capabilities outpace the modernization efforts of our adversaries?
        Mr. Salesses. Both Russia and China are advancing modernization
    programs aimed at eroding the U.S. military advantage, limiting U.S.
    freedom of movement, and deterring the United States from intervening
    in a regional conflict. As our competitors develop and deploy
    increasingly sophisticated offensive systems capable of striking the
    U.S. homeland, it is imperative that the U.S. modernization of
    assessment and warning systems outpaces competitor capabilities and
    provide sufficient decision space to enable timely action to detect and
    defeat incoming threats. Armed with timely information drawn from
    modern sensor systems and advanced software, and backed by flexible and
    responsive conventional defeat capabilities, DOD would be capable of
    deterring or denying adversary acts of aggression more effectively.
        Mr. Moore. Bad actors necessitate the need for increased missile
    defense of the homeland. Do you think recent efforts are adequate to
    address existing gaps in missile defense?
        General VanHerck. No. While I currently have the ability to defend
    against a limited number of ballistic missile threats from rogue
    nations, I am very concerned about their ability to exceed my defensive
    capacity and capability in the near future and my intelligence team
    keeps me continuously apprised of North Korean and Iranian efforts to
    advance their missile programs. Without improvements to our current
    system--such as fielding of the Next Generation Interceptor, on time or
    sooner, and a Department decision about a layered missile defense
    capability--our defensive capacity will remain constant, while the
    threat continues to grow, eventually exceeding my defensive capacity
    and capability.
        I would also note that the U.S. strategic deterrent provides the
    foundation for our defense against ballistic missile threats. The
    reliable and credible U.S. strategic capability, backed by a policy of
    deterrence by punishment, makes clear to potential adversaries that
    launching a ballistic missile attack against the United States would
    result in an overwhelming and devastating response. That deterrent
    effect, when reinforced by the deterrence by denial afforded by a
    reliable and capable ballistic missile defense system is critical to
    defending the homeland against ballistic missile threats. As such, I
    believe future deterrence reviews such as the Nuclear Posture Review
    and Missile Defense Review should be a single product to ensure that
    U.S. deterrence policy and corresponding capabilities are part of a
    comprehensive approach that considers all elements of overarching
    deterrence.
        In addition, I believe the emergence of peer competitors and their
    fielding of large numbers of long-range conventional cruise missiles
    and delivery platforms necessitates a more aggressive approach to
    missile defense for the homeland. A more aggressive approach must
    account for defense against the full spectrum of air and missile
    threats that we currently face in the homeland; we must avoid single
    threat solutions. The Department needs a more holistic approach in
    order to field an effective and affordable homeland defense capability.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY
        Mrs. Murphy. With regards to the rise in transnational criminal
    organizations (TCOs), are there lessons that can be learned from our
    decades in countering violent extremism, and do you believe we are
    approaching the TCOs in the right way by having law enforcement take
    the lead? Are there other ways in which the Department of Defense could
    play a more robust role?
        Admiral Faller. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) are
    murderous, violent entities that pose a direct threat to our national
    security. The corruption, instability, and human suffering that is
    fostered by TCOs not only drives the flow of narcotics and illegal
    migration, but it also opens the door for competitors like China to
    leverage the dire circumstances in these countries for their gain. TCOs
    are an existential threat, and we need to approach them from every
    angle--not through law enforcement or military action alone but with a
    whole-of-government strategy that includes all U.S. elements of
    national power and leverages our partners and Allies globally. In order
    to do that, we must recognize the significant threat TCOs pose to our
    nation and include them in our national strategic documents that drive
    priorities and funding.

                                      [all]