[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                 PRINCIPLES FOR OUTBREAK INVESTIGATION:
                COVID-19 AND FUTURE INFECTIOUS DISEASES

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
                             AND OVERSIGHT

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
                             AND TECHNOLOGY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             JULY 14, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-24

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
 
 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


       Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
       
                              __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
44-965 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
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              COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

             HON. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas, Chairwoman
ZOE LOFGREN, California              FRANK LUCAS, Oklahoma, 
SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon                 Ranking Member
AMI BERA, California                 MO BROOKS, Alabama
HALEY STEVENS, Michigan,             BILL POSEY, Florida
    Vice Chair                       RANDY WEBER, Texas
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           BRIAN BABIN, Texas
JAMAAL BOWMAN, New York              ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
MELANIE A. STANSBURY, New Mexico     MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California             JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado              DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
JERRY McNERNEY, California           MIKE GARCIA, California
PAUL TONKO, New York                 STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
BILL FOSTER, Illinois                YOUNG KIM, California
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          RANDY FEENSTRA, Iowa
DON BEYER, Virginia                  JAKE LaTURNER, Kansas
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida               CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois                JAY OBERNOLTE, California
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania             PETER MEIJER, Michigan
DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina         VACANCY
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin                VACANCY
DAN KILDEE, Michigan
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
                                 ------                                

              Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight

                  HON. BILL FOSTER, Illinois, Chairman
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado              JAY OBERNOLTE, California,
AMI BERA, California                   Ranking Member
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin                VACANCY
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois                VACANCY
                        
                        
                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                             July 14, 2021

                                                                   Page

Hearing Charter..................................................     2

                           Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Bill Foster, Chairman, Subcommittee 
  on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, 
  and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..................    11
    Written Statement............................................    13

Statement by Representative Jay Obernolte, Ranking Member, 
  Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on 
  Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..    14
    Written Statement............................................    15

Statement by Representative Frank Lucas, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 
  Representatives................................................    16
    Written Statement............................................    18

Written statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, 
  Chairwoman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 
  House of Representatives.......................................    19

                               Witnesses:

Dr. David Relman, Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor, 
  Stanford University School of Medicine, and Senior Fellow, 
  Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford 
  University
    Oral Statement...............................................    20
    Written Statement............................................    23

Dr. Stanley Perlman, Professor of Microbiology and Immunology, 
  University of Iowa
    Oral Statement...............................................    33
    Written Statement............................................    35

Dr. Connie Price, Chief Medical Officer, Denver Health, and 
  Professor of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases, 
  University of Colorado School of Medicine
    Oral Statement...............................................    41
    Written Statement............................................    43

Dr. Suzan Murray, Program Director, Smithsonian Global Health 
  Program, Smithsonian National Zoo & Conservation Biology 
  Institute
    Oral Statement...............................................    52
    Written Statement............................................    54

Discussion.......................................................    58

             Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. David Relman, Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor, 
  Stanford University School of Medicine, and Senior Fellow, 
  Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford 
  University.....................................................    80

Dr. Stanley Perlman, Professor of Microbiology and Immunology, 
  University of Iowa.............................................    82

Dr. Connie Price, Chief Medical Officer, Denver Health, and 
  Professor of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases, 
  University of Colorado School of Medicine......................    84

Dr. Suzan Murray, Program Director, Smithsonian Global Health 
  Program, Smithsonian National Zoo & Conservation Biology 
  Institute......................................................    88

            Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record

Documents Submitted by Representative Bill Foster
    American Society for Microbiology............................    90
    ``Preventing the Next Global Biological Catastrophe,'' 
      Nuclear Threat Initiative..................................    92

Documents Submitted by Representative Bill Posey
    Letters by Representative Bill Posey and Sustainable 
      Development Solutions Network..............................    96
    ``Call for a Full and Unrestricted International Forensic 
      Investigation into the Origins of Covid-19,'' Colin D. 
      Butler, et al..............................................   112
    ``Call for a Full Investigation into the Origins of Covid 
      19'' Colin D. Butler, et al................................   117
    ``Open Letter to the World Health Organization and the 
      Members of its Executive Board,'' Colin D. Butler, et al...   126
    ``Call for a Comprehensive Investigation of the Origin of 
      SARS-CoV-2, if Possible with Chinese Government 
      Participation,'' Parise Adadi, et al.......................   136
    ``Did the SARS-CoV-2 virus arise from a bat coronavirus 
      research program in a Chinese laboratory? Very Possibly,'' 
      Milton Leitenberg..........................................   144
    ``The origin of COVID: Did people or nature open Pandora's 
      box at Wuhan?,'' Nicholas Wade.............................   168
    ``Discovery of a rich gene pool of bat SARS-related 
      coronavirus provides new insights into the origin of SARS 
      coronavirus,'' Ben Hu, et al., PLOS Pathogens..............   200
    ``A SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronaviruses shows 
      potential for human emergence,'' Vineet D. Menachery, et 
      al., Nature Medicine.......................................   227
    ``Bat Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Like Coronavirus WIV1 
      Encodes an Extra Accessory Protein, ORFX, Involved in 
      Modulation of the Host Immune Response,'' Lei-Ping Zeng, et 
      al., Journal of Virology...................................   235

Statement submitted by the Association of Public Health 
  Laboratories...................................................   245

Letter submitted by Dr. Steven Quay, et al.
    ``Science Not Speculation Should Inform the Investigation of 
      the Origin of COVID-19''...................................   247

 
                        PRINCIPLES FOR OUTBREAK
                      INVESTIGATION: COVID-19 AND
                       FUTURE INFECTIOUS DISEASES

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 2021

                  House of Representatives,
      Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
               Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
                                                   Washington, D.C.

     The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:05 p.m., 
via Zoom, Hon. Bill Foster [Chairman of the Subcommittee] 
presiding.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     Chairman Foster. OK. Well, this hearing will now come to 
order. And, without objection, the Chair is authorized to 
declare recess at any time, and before I deliver my opening 
remarks, I wanted to note that today the Committee is meeting 
virtually, and I want to announce a couple of reminders to the 
Members about the conduct of this hearing. First, Members 
should keep their video feed on as long as they are present at 
the hearing. Members are responsible for their own microphones. 
Please also keep your microphones muted, unless you are 
speaking. Finally, if Members have documents that they wish to 
submit for the record, please e-mail them to the Committee 
Clerk, whose e-mail address was circulated prior to the 
hearing.
     Well, good morning again, and welcome, and thanks to our 
Members and panelists. I guess I don't have to remind people 
about the importance of the topic that we are discussing today, 
the origins of COVID-19. For the past year and a half the 
Science Committee and Congress have been appropriately focused 
on optimizing our response to the pandemic, and making sure 
that the full power of our country's scientific apparatus is 
engaged in that battle. But now that the vaccines are 
succeeding in easing--in crushing the national caseload of 
COVID-19, it is time to turn some of our attention to how that 
international catastrophe started, and what can be done to 
lessen the toll of future outbreaks. We are convening this 
first hearing to look at the scientific underpinnings of that 
investigation.
     There is one profoundly correct reason to pursue this 
rigorous investigation: to help protect public health and our 
national security in the future. If we don't learn everything 
that we can about how infectious diseases like COVID-19 get 
started, we will be less safe moving forward. Now, as many of 
you know, I spent most of my career in science before spending 
the last decade in Congress, and I'd like to thank our 
witnesses for their very thoughtful written testimony that 
allowed me to spend a couple hours last night reading it over, 
and remembering what it was like to think like a scientist.
     In science, if you see an interesting data set, you look 
at the logically possible hypotheses that could explain that 
data. You then look at the statistical likelihood of each 
hypothesis with a given set of prior assumptions, and then you 
ask what additional data or measurements are needed to confirm 
or refute each hypothesis. Then, armed with that new 
information, including the uncertainties, you enter the 
engineering phase of the problem, using the--that information 
to make our systems work better. And that is one reason why I 
feel so fortunate to have an engineer, Ranking Member 
Obernolte, as my partner on this Subcommittee, because in 
politics it's often very different. If you see something 
interesting, the first question is not--is often not what is 
true, but what can you convince people is true? Sort of like a 
lawyer convincing a jury. Instead of looking at the full set of 
facts, we look to cherry pick facts to support your political 
position. And when this happens, it often leads to bad policy 
that, in the case of COVID-19, has killed hundreds of thousands 
of people around the world. And that's why I'm proud of the way 
that the House Science Committee conducts its business, by 
letting facts, logic, and science lead the way.
     Unfortunately, we do not at present have the full set of 
facts. Right now American citizens and senior government 
officials have suspicions about China's role, and there is no 
disputing that the Chinese government has withheld information 
and obfuscated efforts to understand the origins. The Chinese 
scientists were very quick to make sure that the genome 
sequence of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome)-CoV-2 was 
available to the public back in January of 2020, which is to 
their eternal credit. This is the master key that NIH (National 
Institutes of Health) and drug makers needed to start work on a 
vaccine, and those Chinese scientists are heroes for publishing 
it. But they took this bold step in spite of the Chinese 
government, and not with its blessing.
     Let the record show that Members of Congress understand 
that the lack of transparency from the Chinese government about 
health emergencies of international consequence is a very 
serious geopolitical and science concern. It is a threat to our 
Nation, and it predates the COVID-19 crisis, and it is not 
entirely restricted to China. At the same time, China's lack of 
transparency is distinct from the body of epidemiological data 
around the origins of COVID-19. The absence of data is not 
itself evidence of a lab leak, or something more sinister. Our 
witnesses today will help us set expectations, and understand 
what real evidence is, and what other ingredients comprise a 
credible inquiry on disease origins. Patience may be one of 
those ingredients. We all remember the SARS virus of 2003. 
Well, it took most of 15 years to identify the original source 
of that virus. It was ultimately found in a bat cave 1,000 
kilometers from the site of the original outbreak.
     President Biden has asked the U.S. Intelligence Community 
to report back in late August on any new information that could 
bring us closer to a conclusion about the origins of COVID-19. 
This is a constructive step, but I would caution that there is 
a very good chance that we still won't have all the answers 
after that report comes back. Like so many important topics in 
science, the deliberate endeavor of establishing origins of 
COVID is likely nowhere near as simple as we'd like it to be. 
If epidemiology were easy, we'd have the answer by now. If the 
Intelligence Community were in possession of a smoking gun 
about COVID origins, I believe that we had heard of--we had--we 
would have heard about it.
     At today's hearing I intend today to establish some 
expectations of Federal and global leaders in their efforts to 
investigate the origins of COVID-19 and future diseases. We 
will not tolerate equivocation and innuendo from public 
officials. Where the facts aren't clear enough to support a 
conclusion, please do not offer one just to humor the news 
media. I ask all Members to take care to remember the 
distinction between the theories of a journalist or blogger and 
the observations of an experienced science professional with 
firsthand knowledge of the virus and similar outbreaks.
     The Science Committee has a long history of playing the 
long game, of seeing the 10,000 foot view on topics that push 
the boundaries of human understanding, and of transcending 
political noise. Our witnesses are going to help steer the 
origins conversation to the high road, where scientific 
expertise, transparency, objectivity, and data are paramount. 
We have the four corners of outbreak investigative--represented 
at today's panel, microbiology, virology, epidemiology, and 
zoonotics. To the four of you--too many of your peers have 
experienced rancor, and even threats, for speaking out publicly 
about this politically hot topic, and that is really, really 
appalling, and your participation today is a service to the 
republic, so thank you again.
     [The prepared statement of Chairman Foster follows:]

    Good morning, and welcome and thanks to our members and 
panelists.
    I guess I do not have to remind people of the importance of 
the topic we are discussing today: the Origins of COVID-19.
    For the past year and a half, the Science Committee and 
Congress have been appropriately focused on optimizing our 
response to the pandemic and making sure that the full power of 
our country's scientific apparatus is engaged in that battle. 
But now that vaccines are succeeding at easing the crushing 
national caseload of COVID-19, it is time to turn some of our 
attention to how that international catastrophe started, and 
what can be done to lessen the toll of future outbreaks. We are 
convening this first hearing to look at the scientific 
underpinnings of that investigation.
    There is one profoundly correct reason to pursue this 
rigorous investigation: to help protect public health and our 
national security in the future. If we don't learn everything 
that we can about how infectious diseases like COVID-19 get 
started, we will be less safe moving forward.
    As many of you know, I spent most of my career in science, 
before spending the last decade in Congress. I'd like to thank 
our witnesses for their very thoughtful written testimony, that 
allowed me to spend some time reading it over last night and 
remembering what it was like to think like a scientist.
    In Science, if you see an interesting dataset, you ask what 
logically possible hypotheses could explain that data, you then 
look at the statistical likelihood of each hypothesis with a 
given set of prior assumptions, then you ask what additional 
data or measurements needed to confirm or refute each 
hypothesis. Then, armed with that new information, including 
the uncertainties, you enter the engineering phase of the 
problem, using that information to make our systems work 
better. That is why I feel so fortunate to have an engineer, 
Ranking Member Obernolte, as my partner on this subcommittee.
    Because in politics it is often very different. If you see 
something interesting, the first question is often not what is 
true, but what can you convince people is true, like a lawyer 
convincing a jury. Instead of looking at the full set of facts, 
we look to cherry-pick facts to support your political 
position. When this happens, it leads to bad policy that, in 
the case of COVID-19, has killed millions of people around the 
world. That is why I am proud of the way the House Science 
Committee conducts its business, by letting facts, logic and 
science lead the way.
    Unfortunately, we do not at present have the full set of 
facts. Right now, American citizens and senior government 
officials have suspicions about China's role. And there is no 
disputing that the Chinese government has withheld information 
and obfuscated efforts to understand the origins. Chinese 
scientists were very quick to make the genome sequence of SARS-
CoV-2 available to the public back in January of 2020. This is 
the master key that NIH and drugmakers needed to start work on 
a vaccine, and those Chinese scientists are heroes for 
publishing it. But they took this bold step it in spite of the 
Chinese government, without its blessing.
    Let the record show that Members of Congress understand 
that the lack of transparency from the Chinese government about 
health emergencies of international consequence is a very 
serious geopolitical and science diplomacy challenge. It is a 
threat to our nation, and it pre-dates the COVID-19 crisis.
    At the same time, China's lack of transparency is distinct 
from the body of epidemiological data around the origins of 
COVID-19. The absence of data is not itself evidence of a lab 
leak or something more sinister. Our witnesses today will help 
us set expectations and understand what real evidence is and 
what other ingredients comprise a credible inquiry on disease 
origins.
    Patience may be one of those ingredients. We all remember 
the SARS virus of 2003. It took 15 years to identify the 
original source of that virus. It was ultimately found in a bat 
cave, 1,000 kilometers from the site of the original outbreak.
    President Biden has asked the U.S. intelligence community 
to report back by late August on any new information that could 
bring us closer to a conclusion about the origins of COVID-19. 
This is a constructive step, but I would caution that there is 
a very good chance that we still won't have all the answers 
after that report comes back. Like so many important topics in 
science, the deliberate endeavor of establishing origins of 
COVID is likely nowhere near as simple as we'd like it to be. 
If epidemiology were easy, we'd have the answer by now. If the 
intelligence community were in possession of a smoking gun 
about COVID origins, I believe we'd know about it.
    At today's hearing, I intend today to establish some 
expectations of federal and global leaders in their efforts to 
investigate the origins of COVID-19 and future diseases. We 
will not tolerate equivocation and innuendo from public 
officials. Where the facts aren't clear enough to support a 
conclusion, do not offer one just to humor the news media. Take 
care to remember the distinction between the theories of a 
journalist or a blogger with the observations of an experienced 
science professional with first-hand knowledge of the virus.
    The Science Committee has a long history of playing the 
long game, of seeing the 10,000 foot view on topics that push 
the boundaries of human understanding, and of transcending the 
political noise. Our witnesses are going to help steer the 
origins conversation to the high road, where scientific 
expertise, transparency, objectivity and data are paramount. We 
have the four corners of outbreak investigation represented 
today's panel: microbiology, virology, epidemiology and 
zoonotics. To the four of you: Too many of your peers have 
experienced rancor and even threats for speaking publicly about 
this politically hot topic, and that really is appalling. Your 
participation today is a service to the public.
    I yield to Ranking Member Obernolte.

     Chairman Foster. And I now yield to Ranking Member 
Obernolte.
     Mr. Obernolte. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 
and thank you for holding today's hearings on the principles 
for investigating the origins of COVID-19. Before I begin, I'd 
actually like to thank--take a moment to commend Chairman 
Foster for his bipartisanship, and his willingness to hold this 
first official House Committee related to the origins of the 
epidemic. I'm very hopeful that this hearing can serve as an 
example of how Congress can work together to move forward on 
investigating the origins of what happened last year. This is 
not a partisan issue, and I think it's something that we 
definitely all should work together on.
     It's also an opportunity for us to begin looking into the 
principles and standards by which an effective investigation 
into the origins of COVID-19 should be conducted, and, perhaps 
more importantly, to reflect on some of the lessons that we've 
learned over the past 18 months about scientific communication, 
the importance of fair and open public discourt about--
discourse about scientific hypotheses, and the impact that 
media censorship, the politicization of science, and a possible 
lack of scientific integrity has had on efforts thus far to 
investigate the origins of this terrible pandemic.
     Since the early days of COVID-19 discussion regarding its 
origins have, unfortunately, been hampered by the 
politicization of this entire topic. Renowned, reputable 
scientists have, at critical times during the pandemic, 
presented their opinions unfortunately as if they were 
scientific fact, and sometimes avoidable conflict of interests 
have called into question the independence and impartiality of 
efforts that have been undertaken to examine the origins of 
COVID-19, including, unfortunately, some of those at the World 
Health Organization (WHO). These shortcomings have made it much 
more difficult to have fair and open discourse about this 
issue.
     Also equally troubling to me have been the actions of 
media, Big Tech, and their respective fact-checkers, which have 
compounded this difficulty. During the onset of the pandemic 
some media outlets latched onto a preordained narrative about 
the origins of COVID-19, dismissing competing theories as 
false, and even xenophobic conspiracy theories. Social media 
companies then censored information about COVID's origins, 
labeling posts as misinformation despite there being no 
conclusive evidence for one theory over another. The 
unfortunate effect of these actions was to shut down legitimate 
scientific discourse and inquiry, which I think is important to 
everyone on this Committee. Those actions made it more 
difficult for scientists and the public at large to challenge 
what had been held out by only a few as scientific consensus, 
even where the science and facts supported alternative theories 
and hypotheses.
     Fear of retaliation, of being labeled as xenophobic 
conspiracy theorists, and of being ostracized by the scientific 
community led some scientists to self-censor and remain silent 
instead of searching publicly and transparently for the truth, 
which I think is our goal as scientists. To me, censorship in 
any form is very troubling, but even the more so when it 
prevents scientific inquiry, so we're seeking to understand the 
origins of COVID-19. And that matter is not so that we can 
point fingers, or assign blame to a specific country or 
specific leaders, but more importantly that we can better 
prevent future outbreaks. That's certainly my intention today, 
as we consider these principles that should inform how we 
investigate disease outbreaks in the future, and that includes 
acknowledging the shortcomings that have complicated those 
inquiries into the origins issue last year.
     Certainly we've made a lot of progress. Many scientists, 
scholars, and journalists are now publicly calling for renewed 
investigation, and it is my fervent hope that we can move 
forward with a more open discourse and a productive dialog. And 
although I agree with the Chairman, we may never definitively 
know the origin of COVID-19, thanks in no small part to a lack 
of cooperation by the Chinese government, that certainly does 
not mean that investigation into its origins will not bear 
fruit. And, to the contrary, I think the facts and evidence 
that are uncovered during that--such an investigation will help 
us prepare for future pandemics, irrespective of its 
conclusions, so I'm looking very much forward today to learning 
more about what that investigation should look for, as well as 
reflecting on the principles and standards that should form the 
framework of investigations in the future.
     Again, I want to thank Chairman Foster for holding the 
hearing today, and thank our witnesses for appearing before us 
to discuss this very important issue. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I 
yield back the balance of my time.
     [The prepared statement of Mr. Obernolte follows:]

    Thank you, Chairman Foster, for holding today's hearing on 
principles for investigating the origins of COVID-19. And thank 
you to our witnesses for appearing before us today.
    Before I begin, I'd like to take a moment to commend 
Chairman Foster for his bipartisanship and his willingness to 
hold the first official House Committee hearing related to the 
origins of COVID-19. I'm hopeful that this hearing will serve 
as an example of how Congress can work together to move forward 
on investigating the origins of this terrible pandemic.
    Today's hearing is an opportunity for this Committee to 
begin looking into the origins of COVID-19 and to discuss 
principles and standards by which an effective investigation 
into its origins can and should be conducted. It is also an 
opportunity to reflect on some of the lessons learned over the 
past 18 months about science communication, the importance of 
fair and open public discourse about scientific hypotheses, and 
the impact that media censorship, the politicization of 
science, and a lack of scientific integrity has had on efforts 
thus far to investigate the origins of this pandemic.
    Since the early days of the pandemic, discourse and 
discussion regarding the origins of COVID-19 have unfortunately 
been hampered by the politicization of science.
    Renowned, reputable scientists have-at critical times 
during the pandemic-presented their opinions as if they were 
scientific fact. And avoidable conflicts of interest have 
called into question the independence and impartiality of 
efforts that have been undertaken to examine the origins of 
COVID-19, including those at the World Health Organization. 
These shortcomings have made it more difficult to have fair and 
open discourse about the origins issue.
    Also, the actions of media, big tech, and their respective 
fact checkers have compounded this difficulty. During the onset 
of the pandemic, some media outlets latched on to a preordained 
narrative about the origins of COVID-19 and dismissed competing 
theories as false and even xenophobic conspiracy theories.
    Social media companies even censored information about 
COVID's origins, labeling posts as misinformation, despite 
there being no conclusive evidence for one theory over another.
    The effect of these actions was to shut down legitimate 
scientific discourse and inquiry. They made it more difficult 
for scientists and the public at large to challenge what had 
been held out by only a few as scientific consensus, even where 
the science and facts supported alternative theories and 
hypotheses.
    Fear of retaliation, of being labeled as a xenophobic 
conspiracy theorist, and of being ostracized by the scientific 
community led some scientists to self-censor and remain silent 
instead of searching publicly and transparently for the truth.
    Censorship in any form is troubling, but all the more so 
when it prevents scientific inquiry. Understanding the origins 
of COVID matters-not so that we can assign blame to a specific 
country or politician, but so we can better prevent future 
outbreaks.
    That's my intention here today as we consider the 
principles that should inform how we investigate disease 
outbreaks. We must acknowledge the shortcomings that have 
complicated inquiries into the origins issue. I'd also like to 
acknowledge the progress that has been made, as many 
scientists, scholars, and journalists alike are now publicly 
calling for a renewed investigation into the origins of COVID-
19.
    It is my hope that we can move forward with a more open 
discourse and a productive dialogue about the principles and 
standards by which an effective origins investigation should be 
undertaken. Although we may never definitively know the origin 
of COVID-19--thanks in no small part to the Chinese Communist 
Party's lack of transparency and cooperation-that does not mean 
that an investigation into its origins will not bear fruit. To 
the contrary, the facts and evidence that are uncovered during 
such an investigation will almost certainly help us prepare for 
future pandemics, irrespective of its conclusion.
    I am looking forward to learning more today about what a 
proper investigation should look like, as well as the 
principles and standards that should form the framework of such 
an investigation. I also hope we learn how to effectively 
screen for conflicts of interest and reinforce the scientific 
principles of impartiality, transparency, and openness in this 
endeavor.
    I again want to thank Chairman Foster for holding today's 
hearing, and to thank our witnesses for appearing before us 
today to discuss this important issue.
    I yield back the balance of my time.

     Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we are pleased to have the 
Full Committee Ranking Member, Mr. Lucas, with us today. The 
Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member for an opening 
statement.
     Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Chairman Foster, for holding today's 
hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for your participation. 
While this Committee has held a handful of hearings over the 
last 18 months examining the role of the scientific community 
in combatting COVID-19, I would be remiss if I did not mention 
that today's hearing is the first official effort in the U.S. 
House of Representatives to explore the origins of this 
pandemic. I hope we can use today's hearing as an important 
first step toward a full congressional inquiry into the origins 
of COVID-19.
     In the last 18 months the United States has been battling 
this pandemic, and over 600,000 American lives have been 
claimed by the virus. COVID-19 is unlike anything we've seen in 
the United States since the deadly 1918 Spanish Flu, but here 
we are, 18 months later, and only just now discussing the 
principles of investigating the origins of the virus. This 
conversation is long overdue, and over the past several months 
Members of House Democratic leadership had made comments that 
this Committee is investigating the origins of COVID-19. This 
Subcommittee hearing is a good start to determining how this 
outbreak started, but this is not an investigation. In order to 
get answers on COVID-19 origins Congress needs to step up and 
get involved. Relevant Committees of jurisdiction, including 
this Committee, need to come together in a bipartisan manner 
and take this inquiry seriously.
     Understanding the origins of COVID-19 isn't about scoring 
political points, or detracting from ongoing efforts to fight 
the virus. It's about preventing and mitigating future 
pandemics, and ensuring that we can responsibly fund public 
health research. We shouldn't have a preferred outbreak origin 
theory because we prefer one narrative over another, and we 
shouldn't bury our heads in the sand and refuse to investigate 
COVID's origins because we're concerned about what might happen 
if we get answers we don't like. The job of science isn't to 
prop up one argument or another. The job of science is to 
determine the facts. And, as policymakers, our job is to take 
those facts, weigh them alongside other information, and then 
make decisions. We can't do that without a better understanding 
of this outbreak. I urge congressional leadership to allow a 
transparent and thorough investigation of COVID's origins.
     The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has not been forthcoming 
or trustworthy in sharing information about the origins of the 
virus, so U.S. Federal agencies must work closely with the 
intelligence community to find answers. I hope we can work 
together on this Committee to continue to support American 
scientists and researchers at Federal agencies, National Labs, 
and academia who have been working tirelessly since COVID-19 
reached our shores to continue to learn more about where this 
virus came from, and to eradicate it for good.
     We also need to work together to improve trust in science. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the way science has been 
communicated to the general public has not been handled well. 
Information has been presented in ways that are confusing, 
misleading, and occasionally polarizing. That's created 
tremendous problems. The CDC (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention) reports that roughly 40 percent of adults over the 
age of 18 still remain unvaccinated against COVID-19. The only 
way COVID-19 will stop spreading in the United States and 
around the world is if vaccination rates increase, and herd 
immunity is achieved. This message needs to be communicated 
urgently to the public, and we need to ensure the public has 
reason to trust that information.
     For more than a year people were told there was only one 
possible explanation for the pandemic, and that any other 
theories were not only wrong, but dangerous. But now there's an 
acknowledgement that we don't have conclusive evidence for or 
against any specific origin theory. That creates mistrust. 
Communicating science during a global pandemic can be a matter 
of life or death. We need to do so thoughtfully and accurately. 
We cannot treat the assumptions and the opinions of scientists 
and officials as established fact if their claims are not 
supported by evidence. In order to have a credible 
investigation moving forward, all available information and 
theories must be considered fairly, and the process must be 
transparent, free of conflicts of interest, and protected from 
political interference. While we may never know the true 
origins of COVID-19 virus, we owe it to the American people, 
and the rest of the world, to give it our best shot at 
investigating where it came from to better prepare for 
pandemics to come.
     I'd like to thank the witnesses again for their 
participation today, and I look forward to this discussion. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
     [The prepared statement of Mr. Lucas follows:]

    Thank you, Chairman Foster for holding today's hearing. And 
thank you to our witnesses for your participation.
    While this Committee has held a handful of hearings over 
the last 18 months examining the role of the scientific 
community in combatting COVID-19, I would be remiss if I did 
not mention that today's hearing is the first official effort 
in the U.S. House of Representatives to explore the origins of 
this pandemic. I hope we can use today's hearing as an 
important first step towards a full Congressional inquiry into 
the origins of COVID-19.
    For the last 18 months, the United States have been 
battling this pandemic, and over 600,000 American lives have 
been claimed by the virus. COVID-19 is unlike anything we've 
seen in the United States since the deadly 1918 Spanish Flu, 
but here we are 18 months later and only just now discussing 
the principles for investigating the origins of the virus. This 
conversation is long overdue.
    Over the past several months, members of the House 
Democratic Leadership have made comments that this Committee is 
investigating the origins of COVID-19. This subcommittee 
hearing is a good start to determining how this outbreak 
started, but this is not an investigation. In order to get 
answers on COVID-19 origins, Congress needs to step up and get 
involved. Relevant committees of jurisdiction, including this 
Committee, need to come together in a bipartisan manner and 
take this inquiry seriously.
    Understanding the origins of COVID-19 isn't about scoring 
political points or detracting from ongoing efforts to fight 
the virus. It's about preventing and mitigating future 
pandemics, and ensuring that we are responsibly funding public 
health research. We shouldn't have a preferred outbreak origin 
theory because we prefer one narrative over another. And we 
shouldn't bury our heads in the sand and refuse to investigate 
COVID's origins because we're concerned about what might happen 
if we get answers we don't like.
    The job of science isn't to prop up one argument or 
another. The job of science is to determine the facts. As 
policymakers, our job is to take those facts, weigh them 
alongside other information, and then make decisions. We can't 
do that without a better understanding of this outbreak. So I 
urge Congressional leadership to allow a transparent and 
thorough investigation of COVID's origins.
    The Chinese Communist Party has not been forthcoming or 
trustworthy in sharing information about the origins of the 
virus, so U.S. federal agencies must work closely with the 
intelligence community to find answers. I hope we can work 
together on this committee to continue to support American 
scientists and researchers at federal agencies, national labs, 
and academia who have been working tirelessly since COVID- 19 
reached our shores to continue to learn more about where this 
virus came from and eradicate it for good.
    We also need to work together to improve trust in science. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the way science has been 
communicated to the general public has not been handled well. 
Information has been presented in ways that are confusing, 
misleading, and occasionally polarizing. That has created 
tremendous problems.
    The CDC reports that roughly 40 percent of adults over the 
age of 18 still remain unvaccinated against COVID-19. The only 
way COVID-19 will stop spreading in the United States and 
around the world is if vaccination rates increase and herd 
immunity is achieved. This message needs to be communicated 
urgently to the public. And we need to ensure the public has 
reason to trust that information.
    For more than a year, people were told there was only one 
possible explanation for this pandemic and that any other 
theories were not only wrong but dangerous. But now there is an 
acknowledgement that we don't have conclusive evidence for or 
against any specific origin theory. That creates mistrust. 
Communicating science during a global pandemic can be a matter 
of life or death. We need to do so thoughtfully and accurately 
and we cannot treat the assumptions and opinions of scientists 
and officials as established fact if their claims are not 
supported by evidence.
    In order to have a credible investigation moving forward, 
all available evidence and theories must be considered fairly, 
and the process must be transparent, free of conflicts of 
interest, and protected from political interference. While we 
may never know the true origins of the COVID-19 virus, we owe 
it to the American people, and the rest of the world to give it 
our best shot at investigating where it came from to better 
prepare for pandemics to come.
    I would like to thank the witnesses again for their 
participation here today and I look forward to this discussion.
    I yield back.

     Chairman Foster. And thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. I 
should say that if you ever got tired of politics, you may have 
a good career waiting for you as a scientist. And if there are 
any Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, 
your statements will be added to the record at this point.
     [The prepared statement of Chairwoman Johnson follows:]

    Good afternoon to our witnesses and thank you for joining 
us here today.
    As we all know, the global pandemic has ravaged our 
communities and demanded the attention of this country for the 
past 18 months. We have all dedicated our efforts to weathering 
this storm. Thanks to the tireless work of the medical 
community, and the vaccines they have developed, we can finally 
see the light at the end of the tunnel, although it is too soon 
to relax our vigilance given the emergence of variants.
    We now have the opportunity to examine the lessons to be 
learned from this terrible experience. In particular, by 
developing principles for how best to investigate the origins 
of COVID-19, we can prepare for and possibly prevent the next 
pandemic.
    Debate over COVID-19's origins has spread far beyond the 
sphere of science into the realms of national politics and 
international geopolitics. People without scientific expertise 
or firsthand knowledge have dominated the discussion. 
Scientists on all sides of the debate have hesitated to speak 
out in fear of threats or other negative public reactions. Let 
me say right now how harmful and destructive this kind of 
behavior is to the scientific process specifically. If 
anything, it is making it harder for scientists to get to the 
truth.
    Science communicators have also struggled. The nuances of 
this scientific debate have not been communicated to the public 
in a particularly clear way. New scientific evidence that 
emerged was quickly cited as an argument in favor of one theory 
or the other, without being put into proper context. Public 
understanding of the origins of COVID-19 is cloudier today than 
it was a year ago.
    The question of the origins of COVID-19 will not be settled 
here today, and that is not the purpose of today's hearing. The 
famous Texan epidemiologist Patricia Buffler once said: ``The 
work of epidemiology is related to unanswered questions, but 
also to unquestioned answers.'' By asking questions about how 
an investigation of the origins of COVID-19 should be 
conducted, we will improve our approach to outbreak 
investigation in the future. We will affirm stronger principles 
for international health data sharing and transparency. And we 
can take a fresh approach to addressing safety concerns in 
laboratories that conduct genomic engineering and gain-of-
function research of concern.
    The possibility of an animal origin for COVID-19 tells us 
that we must cast a wider net with our animal disease 
surveillance. Similarly, the possibility of a laboratory leak 
means that there is work to be done to improve laboratory 
biosafety.
    With this hearing, the Science Committee intends to 
recenter the discussion around data-driven investigations and 
the expertise of scientists. We will rely on our expert panel 
of witness to ground the discussion within the realm of reason. 
And, most importantly, we will seek to learn about how best to 
investigate the origins of the disease so we can prepare for 
the inevitable disease outbreaks of the future.
    Thank you and I yield back.

     Chairman Foster.  So at this time I'd like to introduce 
our witnesses. Our first witness is Dr. David Relman. Dr. 
Relman is the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in 
Medicine, and a Professor of Microbiology and Immunology at 
Stanford University, and Chief of Infectious Diseases at the 
Veterans' Affairs Palo Alto Healthcare System. He was an early 
pioneer in the modern study of the human indigenous microbiome. 
He currently serves on the Standing Committee on Emerging 
Infectious Diseases and 21st Century Health Threats at the U.S. 
National Academies.
     After Dr. Relman is Dr. Stanley Perlman. Dr. Perlman is a 
Professor of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of 
Iowa. His current research efforts are focused on coronavirus 
pathogenesis, including Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or 
SARS, the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, MERS, and COVID-19. 
His laboratory has developed several novel animal models useful 
for studying pathogenesis, and evaluating vaccines and 
antiviral therapies. He and his colleagues provided the first 
rodent model for--useful for studying MERS, and similar 
approaches have been used to develop several mouse models for 
COVID-19.
     Our third witness is Dr. Connie Price. Dr. Price is the 
Chief Medical Officer at Denver Health, and has--a Professor of 
Medicine in the Division of Infectious Diseases at the 
University of Colorado School of Medicine. Dr. Price's research 
focuses on healthcare, epidemiology, and methods to prevent and 
rapidly detect emerging and anti-microbial resistant 
infections. She has expertise in outbreak management, and has 
served as a consultant for public health authorities around the 
world on controlling of emergency--emerging infections, 
especially MERS and SARS, as well as Ebola preparedness.
     Our final witness is Dr. Suzan Murray. Dr. Murray is 
Board--a Board certified zoo veterinarian at the Smithsonian 
Conservation Biology Institute (SCBI), and serves as both the 
Program Director of the Global Health Program, and as the 
SCBI's Chief Wildlife Veterinary Medical Officer. She leads an 
interdisciplinary team engaged in worldwide efforts to address 
health issues in endangered wildlife and combat emerging 
infection--infectious diseases of global significance, 
including zoonotic diseases. Dr. Murray's work focuses on 
pathogen detection, advanced diagnostics, capacity building, 
and collaboration in infectious disease research at the human/
wildlife domestic animal interface.
     Now, as our witnesses should know, you will each have five 
minutes to--for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony 
will be included in its entirety in the record for the hearing. 
And when you have completed your spoken testimony, we will 
begin with questions. Each Member will have five minutes to 
question the panel. And we will start now with Dr. Relman. 
You're now recognized for five minutes.

                 TESTIMONY OF DR. DAVID RELMAN,

            THOMAS C. AND JOAN M. MERIGAN PROFESSOR,

                   STANFORD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL

                OF MEDICINE, AND SENIOR FELLOW,

               CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

              AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

     Dr. Relman. Chairman Foster, Ranking Members Lucas and 
Obernolte, and Members of the Committee, I'm grateful for the 
opportunity to join you at today's hearing. My name is David 
Relman. I'm a Professor of Medicine, and of Microbiology and 
Immunology, at Stanford University. Over the past several 
decades the rate, distribution, and diversity of recognized 
emerging infections has accelerated and expanded, especially 
those involving animal-associated viruses. Among the many 
reasons, the intrusion by humans into the natural habitats of 
animals and their viruses, as well as urbanization. In response 
to these events, scientists have doubled down on efforts to 
understand these viruses, creating both benefits and risks.
     Soon after disease first appeared in Wuhan, China, the 
causative agent was identified, a coronavirus called SARS-CoV-
2, whose closest known relatives are found in bats in Southern 
China. The key question became how, when, and where did SARS-
CoV-2 first encounter and infect a human? There are two major 
hypotheses: First, a natural spillover, in which the virus 
jumped directly from a bat, or indirectly from another animal, 
to a human, and second, a laboratory-associated mechanism. Both 
hypotheses involve human activities, but suggest different 
opportunities for risk reduction going forward.
     What is the evidence in support of these hypotheses? 
First, despite much analysis and discussion, the sequence of 
SARS-CoV-2 tells us only so much. The problem is that the 
immediate ancestors of this virus are missing. The most closely 
related known virus is not that closely related. Meanwhile, 
SARS-CoV-2 has not been found in nature, and it had not been 
reported from a laboratory prior to 2020. So, where does this 
leave us? We have only circumstantial evidence. In support of a 
natural spillover: First, the fact that nearly all previous 
outbreaks involving animal viruses are believed to have had a 
natural origin. Second, the immense diversity of coronaviruses 
in nature, and the possibility that SARS-CoV-2 is out there, 
but we simply haven't found it yet. Third, the extensive 
wildlife trade, and the risk that it creates. And fourth, the 
fact that natural spillovers happen much more often than we had 
thought.
     In support of a laboratory associated origin, first, 
geography. The closest known virus relatives of SARS-CoV-2 had 
been found more than 1,000 miles from Wuhan, while the 
laboratory with one of the largest collections of bat samples 
and bat-associated coronaviruses in the world is located in 
Wuhan, where disease first emerged. Second, the risky work at 
laboratories in Wuhan. Third, the fact that laboratory 
accidents happen much more often than we had thought. And 
fourth, the lack of transparency and incomplete information 
about samples and sequences at laboratories.
     Again, all of this is just circumstantial. Neither 
hypothesis can be ruled in, nor ruled out. Both are plausible. 
The goals of an outbreak investigation are to provide greater 
clarity about the circumstances and factors that contributed to 
the event. A definitive answer is often not achieved, nor is it 
necessary for an investigation to yield important benefits. 
Some of the key elements of a credible investigation concern 
process, such as objectivity, transparency, representativeness, 
breadth in expertise, independence, and responsible management 
of conflicts of interest. Other key elements concern data, such 
as archived animal samples and derivative data, archived 
clinical samples and derivative data, and multiple kinds of 
laboratory information. Importantly, the veracity and 
providence of samples and data must be assured.
     I will close with some observations and suggested next 
steps. It is unfortunate that the origin issue has become 
grossly politicized, and opinion valued more than rigorous 
analysis. Many scientists are hesitant about addressing this 
issue because of fear that their comments will be 
misinterpreted. All of this undermines the credibility of 
scientists, and of the scientific enterprise. However, there 
are signs of progress, including proposals for roles to be 
played by National Academies of Science under the oversight, 
and with authorities, granted by national and international 
political leadership. Meanwhile, effective international 
governance is still a work in progress. I applaud your efforts, 
and urge you to articulate a plan now for an effective 
investigation of this pandemic, and of pandemics that will 
inevitably follow. Thank you.
     [The prepared statement of Dr. Relman follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
     Chairman Foster. Thank you. And next is Dr. Perlman, who 
will be recognized for five minutes.
     Mr. Perlmutter. You're still muted.

               TESTIMONY OF DR. STANLEY PERLMAN,

           PROFESSOR OF MICROBIOLOGY AND IMMUNOLOGY,

                       UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

     Dr. Perlman. Chairman Foster, Ranking Member Obernolte, 
Ranking Member Lucas, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank 
you for the invitation to testify you--before you today about 
this incredibly important topic: outbreak investigation for 
COVID-19 and future infectious diseases. My name is Stanley 
Perlman, and I run a lab at the University of Iowa that has 
focused on coronaviruses for almost four decades. I am pleased 
to join this distinguished panel.
     There are actually two issues to consider in addressing 
this question. The first is based on the actual origin of the 
virus, and the second is based on determining how the virus 
entered human populations. At the beginning of the pandemic it 
was postulated by some that that virus was engineered in a 
laboratory. However, this is not a viable possibility, in my 
opinion, because one would not know how to design a virus like 
SARS-CoV-2 from scratch. The next question is whether a 
naturally derived virus could have been manipulated in a 
laboratory. Certain characteristics of the virus have been 
considered as evidence for manipulation in a laboratory. In 
general, one would need to correctly identify or guess which 
coronavirus to manipulate, and then correctly determine or 
guess how to manipulate it.
     Another question is whether naturally derived coronavirus-
2 like virus could have been passaged in cells in a laboratory 
so that it adapted to growth in a new type of cell. This virus 
would have first had to have been present in the library--in 
the laboratory, and been growing in cell culture. Most bat 
SARS-CoV related viruses do not grow well in cell culture, and 
they exist in the laboratory only as non-viable viral RNA. The 
general experience is that only some viruses can be grown in 
new cross-species tissue culture cells and adapt to the new 
environment. Most of these will lose disease potential when 
passaged in cell culture, and this also explains how we obtain 
vaccines, like the poliovirus vaccine. This leaves a naturally 
derived virus not manipulated in the laboratory as the most 
likely source of SARS-CoV-2. Such a virus has not been found in 
nature, but viruses that are very similar to SARS-CoV-2 have 
been found in bats.
     A second question is how the virus actually entered human 
populations. The possibilities that have been discussed in the 
public discourse and elsewhere are that the virus was 
transported to Wuhan by an infected human or infected wildlife, 
or it was released from a laboratory that had the virus in 
hand. The latter possibility has been raised because Wuhan is 
the home to several well-established virology laboratories. In 
support of the first possibility, there's increasing evidence 
that wildlife that is susceptible to infection with SARS-CoV-2, 
raccoon dogs, and minks, were, in fact, traded in the Wuhan 
Seafood Market. The question of whether release from a 
laboratory, a lab leak, is harder to address. For example, if 
the virus was brought into a laboratory by someone working with 
relevant wildlife, and the virus then infected either that 
person or someone else in the laboratory, that person could 
then, in theory, infect others in the community. Therefore, 
since the--this possibility cannot be ruled out, it must be 
appropriately investigated.
     Both data transparency and international collaboration are 
necessary and critical for investigations of the origin of an 
infectious disease. Both the WHO and the U.S. CDC, who have 
experts who have a long history of epidemiological 
investigations, and both institutions are natural candidates 
for working with these studies. It is evident from the COVID-19 
pandemic that it is necessary to obtain as many samples as 
possible at the early stage of the pandemic from a broad group 
of wild, companion, and farmed animals, as well as from humans 
with unexplained respiratory or other disease to have the best 
chance, or perhaps the only chance, of determining how the 
virus crossed species to infect humans. COVID-19 has infected 
so many people around the world that it's impossible, 
virtually, to get samples now from the--from present 
populations.
     In addition to surveillance, which needs to be done by 
these--both locally and internationally, we need to have risk 
assessment associated with the surveillance, otherwise we're 
just cataloguing viruses. All the zoonotic SARS and MERS 
coronavirus spillover events to date have occurred outside of 
the U.S. To reduce the risk of a pandemic like COVID-19 
occurring again, we need to know as much as possible about 
viruses circulating in bats and other wildlife populations 
throughout the world. It should be noted that, while much of 
this sounds theoretically--most sounds seemingly theoretical, 
we know that there are MERS-like coronaviruses throughout Asia 
and Africa. MERS-COV does not spread efficiently between 
people, however, we learned in 2019 that even though SARS-CoV 
did not transmit readily between people, a fairly close 
relative, SARS-CoV-2, does. Similarly, a zoonotic MERS-like 
coronavirus could evolve, and potentially cause a pandemic. 
Like the SARS-CoV-2, such a virus would pose a great threat to 
human populations because, as was the case with SARS-CoV-2, we 
lack immunity to this virus. And with this I will conclude my 
remarks, and look forward to answering any questions that you 
have.
     [The prepared statement of Dr. Perlman follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     Chairman Foster. Thank you. And after Dr. Perlman is Dr. 
Price, who is now recognized for five minutes. And whoops, 
you'll have to unmute, I'm afraid.

                 TESTIMONY OF DR. CONNIE PRICE,

             CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, DENVER HEALTH,

                   AND PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE,

                DIVISION OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES,

           UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

     Dr. Price. Chairman Foster, Ranking Members Lucas and 
Obernolte, and Members of the Investigations and Oversight 
Subcommittee, my name is Connie Savor Price. I am a practicing 
infectious diseases physician and healthcare epidemiologist 
with experience and expertise in outbreak management. I have 
served as a consultant to public health authorities on control 
of emerging infections, including Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome for the Ontario Ministry of Health. I am 
the Executive Director for HHS (Health and Human Services) 
Region 8 Ebola and Special Pathogens Treatment Center and HHS 
Regional Disaster Health Response system. I'm a Professor of 
Medicine in the Division of Infectious Diseases at the 
University of Colorado School of Medicine. I'm honored to be 
here today to speak with you about the principles for 
investigating infectious diseases outbreak.
     When a threat to the public's health occurs, 
epidemiologists and other relevant experts investigate the 
problem so they can identify sources and risk factors, 
implement prevention and control measures, and communicate with 
stakeholders. Whether the event occurs in a hospital setting or 
in a community, there's a well-described--defined process for 
performing a complete investigation into the origins of an 
infectious diseases outbreak. The process requires significant 
collaboration between public health officials, laboratory 
personnel, clinicians, and other stakeholders in areas affected 
by the outbreak.
     The detailed review begins with the initial cases, but 
should also include a time period preceding the current problem 
to determine whether earlier cases existed, and if so, the 
occurrence rates between the period of the current problem and 
the comparator period. A high level of data transparency is 
required, including full and complete access to patient medical 
records and other pertinent clinical information to infected 
patients, and their contacts for interviews, and to laboratory 
specimens and microbiologic isolates for molecular 
epidemiology, and possibly to other environmental sources or 
animals, should the investigation lead that way.
     In the United States there are data collection and 
preservation standards in place at hospitals to ensure they can 
track emerging infectious diseases. The Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services requires that a healthcare facility maintains 
an infection prevention and control program in order to 
prevent, recognize, and control, to the extent possible, the 
onset and spread of infection within a facility, including 
surveillance and investigation to prevent the spread of 
infection. It also requires that hospital complies with the 
reportable diseases requirements of the public health or local 
health authority. To comply with this regulation, accrediting 
agencies, such as the Joint Commission, survey hospital 
infection prevention infrastructure and written plans for 
detecting and controlling infections. Public health authorities 
may also monitor required data received from hospitals to look 
for concerning trends.
     As part of standard work, once a trend of concern is 
identified by the hospital infection control program, case 
ascertainment and maintaining an epidemiologic description of 
the outbreak will inform initial hypotheses for explaining a 
potential cause, source, and mode of spread of the outbreak's 
causative agents. A related step to confirming diagnoses is the 
need to proactively save clinical specimens for longer than 
conventional holding periods, and not discard them, so they are 
available for further analysis. Both the clinical data and the 
laboratory data together are essential for tracing an outbreak. 
These data should inform next steps, such as environmental 
sampling, obtaining specimens from suspect animals such as 
bats, or a suspected intermediary host.
     When it comes to investigating the emergence and spread of 
infectious diseases, hospitals and local or State health 
departments will take the lead, but national and international 
health authorities are available upon invitation. The CDC, for 
instance, provides surveillance data and clinical guidance on 
the management of emerging infectious diseases, but they will 
also routinely provide consultation and laboratory assistance 
to healthcare facilities and health departments that are 
working to solve outbreaks and investigate infection control 
breaches and other adverse events, but only upon request.
     Hospitals will reach out through their local and State 
public health, or vice versa, if a concerning reportable or 
trend is identified, and that health department in turn may 
extend a formal invitation to the CDC for help leading an 
onsite team. Public health will help gather additional 
information from community cases through interviews, case 
reviews, observations, and possibly environmental sampling. In 
the case of a multi-State outbreak, the CDC coordinates that 
investigation. The World Health Organization will investigate 
outbreaks if invited by the government, but currently it is 
more often looked to as an important and exclusive source for 
global surveillance information.
     Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today 
on data and access that investigators need in order to trace an 
outbreak to a discrete origin. Upholding the principles for 
transparency, scientific integrity and objectivity are critical 
to the understanding. Thank you.
     [The prepared statement of Dr. Price follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     Chairman Foster. Thank you. And our final witness, Dr. 
Murray, will now be recognized for five minutes.

        TESTIMONY OF DR. SUZAN MURRAY, PROGRAM DIRECTOR,

               SMITHSONIAN GLOBAL HEALTH PROGRAM,

                    SMITHSONIAN NATIONAL ZOO

                & CONSERVATION BIOLOGY INSTITUTE

     Dr. Murray. Thank you so much, Chairman Foster, Ranking 
Members Lucas and Obernolte, and Members of the Subcommittee, 
as well as the distinguished panelists. Thank you for calling 
the hearing, and inviting me to participate. My name's Dr. 
Suzan Murray, and I'm the Director of Smithsonian's Global 
Health Program based out of the National Zoo and the 
Conservation Biology Institute. Recognizing that 75 percent of 
these diseases come from the wildlife population first, and 
then jump to the human population, our program was built and 
utilizes experts in wildlife medicine, human medicine, public 
health, conservation biology, and epidemiology to study and 
respond to health issues at the human/animal interface. 
Recognizing that human, wildlife, and environmental health are 
all inextricably linked, we utilize this multidisciplinary 
approach to investigate emerging infectious diseases, we build 
in-country capacity, and train the next generation of health 
specialists.
     Determining the origins of a virus is difficult, and 
ongoing investigation and identification of new viruses can 
improve and expedite this process. With a robust sample 
collection, we can precise--we can more precisely determine how 
a virus in question is genetically related to variants. This 
can tell us much about geographic location, host species, and 
time period over which the virus may have evolved. We learn a 
great deal of information from data collection from free-
ranging species, including, but not limited to, bats, primates, 
and rodents, and expanding this data set exponentially is the 
most critically--the most critical opportunity we have to 
better understand the origins of this particular virus.
     Over the past decade, as part of a larger consortium, we 
have worked in more than 30 countries and discovered over 1,000 
new mammalian viruses. Analysis of these viruses has determined 
that they represent less than 1 percent of existing viruses. To 
more fully understand the origins and evolution of these 
viruses, continued sampling at an increasing rate is needed, 
and the best way to accomplish this is by forming and utilize a 
broad and inclusive approach. The wide variety of factors that 
contribute to disease emergence underscores the need to develop 
a multi-disciplinary, transparent, and cooperative community 
that works together to develop and analyze approaches to data 
collection and protocols for sharing this information. Some of 
this work is already underway now between multiple agencies and 
organizations, such as NSTC's (National Science and Technology 
Council's) Health Threats Subcommittee. Additional coordination 
could further improve our ability to react to the next 
pandemic.
     Orchestrating this kind of coordination is not easy. 
Managing across governments, researchers, and impacted 
communities is a huge undertaking, especially when no one 
organization is charged with ensuring that coordination. Even 
when there is a commitment to work together, differences in how 
places operate can add difficulty. Principles for transparency 
and data access range from--and vary from community to 
community based upon several factors, including, but not 
limited to, shared trust on how data will be interpreted, 
utilized, and credited.
     We learned a great deal from the current pandemic and 
other epidemics about what's working well, as well as areas in 
which we must improve. We developed invaluable partnerships 
with many countries, forming a strong and growing One Health 
workforce to build upon the foundational works in the areas of 
bio-surveillance, viral discovery, laboratory protocol 
development and implementation, as well as rapid response units 
and data sharing. Over the past decade our work has shifted 
from primary disease surveillance to investigating and better 
understanding the drivers of disease emergence. In this process 
we have increasingly incorporated such essential practices such 
as modeling, data sharing, and understanding the role of human 
behaviors, cultural norms, as well as outreach.
     Further, we are recognizing the science is strongest and 
most impactful when it draws upon these multidisciplinary 
assets, while being inclusive and contextualized for affected 
communities, cultures, arcs, and broader societies. For 
instance, some of the most critical and inter-related drivers 
of disease emergence include land use change, human behaviors, 
and education that can affect human behaviors. Recently, with 
internal partners from the National Air and Space Museum, the 
National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian's Occupational 
Health Program, and our Office of Communication and External 
Affairs, along with outside partners such as UBS's Global 
Visionaries Program, we are developing a more comprehensive 
approach to pandemic prevention by incorporating previously 
underutilized techniques to assess high risk interfaces more--
while--more quickly and truth-find this data. This will ensure 
that our approach is iterative, always learning, and--while 
incorporating infected communities from the beginning, and then 
throughout the process. This will require that we conduct both 
human and animal surveillance concurrently, utilizing the most 
advanced data collection methodology, such as smartphone 
technology and field-based PCR (polymerase chain reaction) 
machines. Not only will this more quickly inform scientists and 
pharma companies, but it will ensure that the public is engaged 
and informed along the way.
     Knowledge of pandemic prevention, public health, and 
vaccinology are helpful to all of us, from communities living 
at the high-risk interfaces, to scientists who study viruses, 
to economists interpreting the impacts on global economy, to 
people visiting exhibits such as National--the Natural 
History's Outbreak Museum outbreak exhibit, to the general 
public reading and watching the news. Knowledge is power, and 
broadly sharing knowledge is absolutely essential to our global 
health. Thank you again for inviting me to participate in 
today's hearings, and I look forward to answering any questions 
you might have.
     [The prepared statement of Dr. Murray follows:]
    
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     Chairman Foster. Thank you. And at this point we will 
begin our first round of questions, and the Chair will now 
recognize himself for five minutes. Before I get started, I 
have a statement here from the American Society for 
Microbiology to be entered into the hearing record, and, 
without objection, it will be so ordered. Thank you.
     Now, Dr. Price, it strikes me that two of the most 
significant words in your testimony seem to be ``upon 
invitation.'' And, you know, it seems like the very extensive 
set of data that you'd like to have before, and during, and 
even after the outbreak of a pandemic are things where you're 
going to need exceptional local cooperation. One of the lessons 
that I take away from this, and probably from other pandemics, 
is that there's a big incentive for institutions to cover up 
the extent. You know, this, happens, you know, at the family 
level, at the business level, at the local government, State, 
nation, you know, even at the level of systems of government.
     And so how do we--is there an alternative here to doing 
our best to try to get treaty level commitments in advance that 
spell out exactly what is necessary here? Because, you know, my 
fear is that all--the best-intended voluntary data sharing 
agreements will not survive the first contact with the enemy. 
And what--could you say a little bit about what the thinking of 
the scientific community worldwide is on that?
     Dr. Price. To establish ground rules before this happens 
is important, so treaty level, whatever it may be, but at the 
end of the day the host country needs to be collaborative, 
needs to cooperate, so forcing it upon them, we have to do 
something where it is an agreed upon standard, and make sure 
that we are addressing concerns that they may have about 
negative impact, and minimizing that for the sake of getting 
the data, and for the sake of understanding the science.
     Chairman Foster. Um-hum. Are there international efforts 
to get data repositories, for example, that will be immediately 
accessible ahead of time so you don't have to negotiate that, 
at least? It's one way around part of this.
     Dr. Price. Well, I think there are some collaborations 
internationally, but more ad hoc. One well-established venue we 
have for sharing information is a very low-tech e-mail platform 
called ProMED. ProMED's been around since 1994, and has--was 
established by the International Society for Infectious 
Diseases, and basically it is a bunch of frontline doctors, 
epidemiologists, sometimes veterinarians, just e-mail about 
things they're seeing that seem odd. Sometimes it turns into 
nothing, but sometimes it ends up being something. So, for 
instance, the first notification the world had of Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome was through ProMED. On December 31, four 
days before the World Health Organization announced to the 
world the SARS-CoV-2, or what later became known as SARS-CoV-2, 
that had been already released through ProMED.
     So there are platforms like that that allow early 
communication and direct scientist to scientist communication. 
The problem is is I think sometimes governments, you know, do 
get involved in maybe stifling communication through those 
venues.
     Chairman Foster. Yeah. And, Dr. Murray, you held out some 
optimism that sort of flooding the zone with technology, cheap 
handheld PCR machines, potentially, that automatically report 
what it is that they've measured in the field, so that, when, 
you know, someone is in the--in Barro Colorado Island and finds 
a capybara with a weird viral infection----
     Dr. Murray. Uh-huh.
     Chairman Foster [continuing]. You can immediately--you 
know, just to pick a Smithsonian relevant example.
     Dr. Murray. I caught that. Thank you.
     Chairman Foster. Yeah.
     Dr. Murray. Yeah.
     Chairman Foster. And so--you know, so that this 
automatically gets reported to the relevant international 
database. And is there--is that something where potentially the 
U.S. Congress could put some money into to get that deployed 
nationally and internationally?
     Dr. Murray. Yes. Thank you very much. I wanted to also 
just echo what Dr. Price said, because I think that, in 
addition to what you're saying, if we--with a lot of the 
partners that we work with, again, in 30 different countries, 
we have to establish the ground rules ahead of time, and also 
incentivize our partners that if you participate and follow 
these rules, you get something from it, and if you don't, you 
don't. So I think that's part of it, and I also think that 
there are some other projects funded by USAID (United States 
Agency for International Development), as well as the Global 
Viral Project, to build platforms upon which a lot of the data 
of all these viruses, the sequences, will sit and be available 
to everyone. So I think there are some movements afoot.
     In combination with that, yes, I think that's one of 
Smithsonian's strengths, using our field sites to--as--
especially those that are within the hot spots, the areas in 
which the next disease is most likely to occur, and using the--
and using the field technologies to identify in the field, and 
then having the relationships where that can be uploaded and 
shared very quickly. We have a lot of that existing in Kenya 
already, some really great relationships with the Kenyan 
government, the Mpala Research Center, Kenya Wildlife Services, 
and National Museums of Kenya, whereby that data sharing can 
happen very rapidly. So I think another thing we might want to 
look at is if something is going well, how do we replicate 
that? How do we replicate it broadly and quickly?
     Chairman Foster. Thank you, and I am now over my time 
allotment, so I will recognize Ranking Member Obernolte for 
five minutes.
     Mr. Obernolte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very 
much to our witnesses. This has been a fascinating hearing. I 
have a question for Dr. Relman. In the early days of the 
pandemic there was a letter written by a group of scientists 
that was published in the Lancet and Nature Medicine, two 
scientific medical journals, in which the theory that anything 
other than a natural origin theory for the coronavirus was--
should be considered implausible, and I'll read an excerpt of 
it, because I find it a little disturbing. The letter said, 
``The rapid, open, and transparent sharing of data on this 
outbreak is now being threatened by rumors and misinformation 
around its origins. We stand together to strongly condemn 
conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a 
natural origin. Conspiracy theories do nothing but create fear, 
rumors, and prejudice that jeopardize or global collaboration 
in the fight against this virus.''
     So after the publication of those--of that letter, and 
that, you know, was just about a month after the appearance of 
the first case in the United States, so very early in the 
pandemic, after the appearance of that letter, media and social 
media companies would refer back to that letter in having their 
fact checkers label as untrue anyone that tried to express the 
theory about anything other than a natural origin, so it became 
this self-reinforcing cycle. So my question for you, at the 
time that letter was published, would you consider that a 
statement of scientific fact, would you consider it a statement 
of scientific consensus, or would you consider it a statement 
of opinion?
     Dr. Relman. Well, I think I share with you your concern 
about statements that don't properly reflect what we know and 
don't know. Many people have opinions, and I think it's 
important that people make clear that when they express a point 
of view it either is an opinion or based upon something more 
concrete. And I agree that that letter did have a chilling 
effect on certain elements of public discussion. I understand 
where many of those letter writers were coming from. They 
were--I think to a large degree, operating from a perspective 
of a priori understanding. Past outbreaks have largely occurred 
through natural spillover mechanisms, and I think it was a 
reasonable assumption to say this one may well be as well.
     But every time we, as scientists, make these statements, I 
think to your point, we have to be very clear about the basis 
on which we make them, and where there is certain--there is 
certainly--remaining uncertainty, and then what it is we need 
to do to either disprove the counterargument, or prove our own. 
And I worry, and found it disheartening early last year, that 
there was much too little of that.
     Mr. Obernolte. So, a related question, then, how do we 
prevent this from occurring in the future? Because obviously we 
are in a period of intense polarization in our society. You 
know, science has been politicized in a lot of different areas. 
How do we prevent this from happening next time? Because, 
obviously, I think everyone agrees it was not helpful.
     Dr. Relman. Yeah. It's a complicated question. It's 
outside my pay grade, but I'll simply point out that there was 
a larger sort of cultural problem, societal problem, with the 
tenor of discussion at that time. And as you well recall, there 
were others outside the scientific community who were making 
very forceful, and almost defiant statements that made it 
difficult for any of us with more measured arguments to insert 
our positions into this public discourse. So I think the 
answers come from multiple directions. We need to remember what 
the scientific process is about, who--and how it's undertaken, 
and simply better inform our public as well about how to judge 
statements that are being made, and the questions they should 
be asking of all of us.
     Mr. Obernolte. Right. Well, thank you. And then, final 
question for you, you didn't touch on it a lot in your 
testimony today, but in your written testimony I was interested 
in--when you were talking about the Wuhan Institute of 
Virology, and the possibility of a lab leak from that 
institution. You discussed some of the practices for studying 
viruses there that you consider risky. Can you talk a little 
bit more about that?
     Dr. Relman. Sure. Well, I want to start by saying that I 
think the rest of us, the rest of the panelists here, and I 
share a lot of similar sort of thinking about this. If there is 
an origin, or an argument to be made about the possibility of a 
laboratory origin here, I think we have to consider first the 
possibility that there was unrecognized presence of this virus 
either in the laboratory, through samples that were collected, 
or an encounter by a laboratorian out in the field, and that 
the infection perhaps was asymptomatic, or simply not 
recognized.
     But I am concerned about the--sort of the--sort of 
unregulated--lack of proper discussion about how we go about 
examining diversity in nature. And I fully support the 
statements that have been made by Doctors Murray, and Price, 
and Perlman, but when we collect lots of sequences we have to 
ask what's their relevance? And the way in which some of this 
relevance is determined is by scientific experimental means, 
either by trying to grow the entity that we think resides 
within a sample, or by trying to recreate it, or study a piece 
of it. And what I think concerns me is that we haven't yet had 
a proper discussion about where there may be risk in some of 
these experiments, not the majority, but some of it, that 
hasn't been properly addressed, and that we need to sort of 
confront and discuss more openly.
     And I'll just call out a certain set of experiments that 
have been published by the Wuhan Institute that I view as 
particularly risky. In this work, they started with a natural 
isolate of bat coronavirus called WIV-1, which a good friend 
and colleague of mine, Ralph Baric, had already studied and 
declared to be a virus ``poised for human emergence.'' This is 
WIV-1, came out of a bat in the Wuhan Institute of Virology. 
And their approach for studying novel sequences that they found 
in other samples was to take a piece of those genomes, a piece 
of that sequence, and swap it into this WIV-1 virus. They then 
resurrected a few of those viruses and grew them in the 
laboratory, so now we're talking about a chimeric virus with 
properties that we don't know yet, we don't--we can't predict 
well. That was the purpose of the experiment. Those are 
experiments that concern me. And I'm not saying that they led 
to this outbreak or pandemic by any means, but it's simply the 
kind of work that we, as a scientific society, need to think 
much more clearly and more deliberately about before we 
undertake it, again, in the search of important--answers to 
important questions about the diversity in nature.
     Mr. Obernolte. Thank you. Well, thank you, Dr. Relman.
     Chairman Foster. Thank you.
     Mr. Obernolte. I see my time's expired. Thank you to all 
of our panelists for this fascinating discussion. I yield back.
     Chairman Foster. Yeah. And I gave you a little extra time 
because of the extraordinary interest in that question. It's 
one of the threads that this Subcommittee's going to have to be 
looking at, just trying to understand what the definition and 
limits of dangerous research are, and how we deal with that 
internationally. I now recognize Representative Perlmutter for 
five minutes.
     Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to the 
panelists, thank you very much for your testimony today. I feel 
compelled to defend something my--one of my best friends in 
life, the Chairman, had to say early in his introduction, and 
that is concerning the scientific method, and the ability of--
whether it's a lawyer or a politician, our responsibility is to 
make decisions based on the best information we have available 
to us at the time, and it may not be perfect in the scientific 
method. And, Dr. Relman, you go through the six factors that 
you consider as part of the scientific method, but, you know, 
it takes time, obviously, to understand the origin of things, 
to understand this virus, and decisions had to be made.
     And, just for the record, I'll read something President 
Trump said at the time in January--late January of 2020. 
``China has been working very hard to contain the coronavirus. 
The United States greatly appreciates their efforts and 
transparency. It will all work out well. In particular, on 
behalf of the American people, I want to thank President Xi.'' 
And he goes on for the next two months thanking China for their 
tremendous efforts with respect to the coronavirus. And when I 
looked, Dr. Relman, at the points that you make as to the 
scientific method, you say verifiable and reproduceable, 
transparent, representative, expert, independent, and without 
conflicts of interest. And so there are a number of things 
within that list of components as to how to prove a point where 
you introduce people. And when you introduce people, then you 
start losing some of the facts that my Chairman and my 
physicist friend, Dr. Foster, find so concrete. And so, just to 
defend lawyers and people who have to make decisions, I want to 
say it's not all that cut and dry.
     Now I want to turn my attention to a Coloradan, and a 
Buff, and I want to thank her for being part of our panel 
today. I want to ask Dr. Price, in Colorado we've now seen the 
Delta variant overtake all the other types of viruses, and 
variations in viruses, and it makes up three-quarters of the 
cases that we now see in our State. From your point of view, 
Dr. Price, what steps can the international public health 
authorities take to prevent new strains like the Delta variant 
from emerging?
     Dr. Price. Well, I think we're starting that now with 
vaccination, and I think the trick is to get vaccinated before 
these new strains emerge, and allow to take hold, and circulate 
enough where they can start infecting others, and potentially 
even vaccinated people. So that's the first step. And then the 
second step, and my virology colleagues are already doing this, 
is keeping track of the evolution of this virus, and when we 
need to tweak the vaccine or create a booster that will cover 
different variants, that we are on top of it, and we're 
constantly surveilling very proactively to be able to design a 
booster or a new vaccine to overcome it.
     Mr. Perlmutter. So in your testimony you talked about sort 
of--there has to be a little level of trust among the 
scientific community, among the epidemiologists, among the 
vaccinologists, the virologists. So how do you--how does one 
build that trust so that you can work with Dr. Perlman, or Dr. 
Murray, and know that you're getting straight information?
     Dr. Price. Yeah. Well, you have to respect that when a 
host country, or when another lab, invites you in to 
investigate and help them solve a problem that it is their data 
that you are working with, and the way to get access to it is 
to be invited, and agree on the objective. And you need to have 
that collaboration, I mean, both philosophically and 
practically. So philosophically it's important for the host 
country, in my experience, to be viewed as the lead for solving 
the problem, that they want to solve a problem that they might 
be viewed as creating, so you are there in the capacity of a 
consultant, not to parachute in, and take data, and then 
publish on behalf of yourself and the United States. So you 
have to remember just basic, you know, human consideration.
     And then practically it's very important because you're 
going in and reviewing charts in another country. They may be 
in a different language, they may have different medical norms, 
they may--you know, you need their people there alongside you 
to work together and do this collaboratively. So stay focused 
on the scientific question you seek to answer, do not make 
conclusions with incomplete data, resist the urge to start 
making conclusions, and communicate often with their government 
authorities. And make sure you're not exploiting the host, 
whether it's an underdeveloped country that often this happens 
in, or in a developed country, that you're not going in to try 
to get something on behalf of, you know, your own country, or 
your own institution or academic career.
     Mr. Perlmutter. My time has expired. I thank you, and I'll 
yield back to the Chair, and I just felt compelled to defend 
lawyers and politicians. Thank you.
     Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we'll now recognize the 
Ranking Member, who is, I believe, neither a lawyer nor a 
scientist, and yet a tremendous contributor to this Committee.
     Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Being a farmer by 
trade, and my university training is in agricultural economics, 
so how to allocate those finite resources, and on the unlimited 
demands to achieve the greatest possible rate of return. And if 
I wanted to put you to sleep, we would discuss the inelasticity 
of the demand for food, but that's a whole different entire 
subject.
     Turning to Dr. Relman, since the early days of the COVID-
19 pandemic, China's not been transparent with the rest of the 
world about how the virus began to spread in Wuhan, China, or 
shared reliable data that could inform on the possible origins. 
So thinking about the last exchange between my colleague and 
one of your wonderful fellow witnesses, recognizing this, how 
do we move forward in investigating the origins of COVID-19 
without cooperation from China, and how must Congress, Federal 
agencies, and scientific community more broadly work together 
to do this? I give you the big question, Doc.
     Dr. Relman. Thank you for that, Congressman. Well, I have 
to turn back to my co-panelist, Dr. Price, and suggest that we 
are in dramatic agreement on a number of the points that she 
made. But I will call--I will make a distinction between the 
importance of relationships amongst scientists and the kinds of 
relationships that exist between governments. And here I will 
again reflect much of the sentiment by Dr. Price. There have 
been, in fact, very good working relationships between 
scientists in the United States and those in China at these 
very institutes. I've been on trips to those places, and have 
met many of those scientists, and greatly respect them. And I 
think, in fact, they have much to share if we could create the 
right circumstances under which they feel allowed, and 
empowered to do so.
     That's a very complicated task, and I don't mean to 
suggest that any of this is easy, Congressman Perlmutter. It is 
not. But it doesn't mean that we shouldn't try. And I'll point 
out that our National Academies of Sciences and the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences held a series of meetings last summer, of 
which I participated, where we had some very fruitful 
discussions. They did not involve the governments of our two 
countries, and I think there was some useful progress made. So 
I'm maybe an idealist or an optimist, but I think that if we 
can build these kinds of relationships amongst scientists, we 
can start there, and then find ways in which to take into 
account the interests of our governments, and other larger 
institutions. I'll----
     Mr. Lucas. Continuing with you, Doctor, in your written 
testimony you disagree with the argument that further clarity 
about the origins of COVID-19 is not needed. So could you 
explain to us--and remember we are a conduit to the great 
American people, the folks who ultimately pay and suffer or 
benefit from our actions. Could you explain to us, and them, 
why it is so important that we investigate the origins of 
COVID-19, and what an investigation into the current pandemic 
would--how it would enable future pandemic preparedness and 
response?
     Dr. Relman. Be happy to. I would say there are at least 
four benefits to an effort to understand the origins. The first 
is a point that's been made already, that anything we learn 
will help us devote resources and design strategies to both 
anticipate and prevent the next pandemic. That's first and 
foremost. Second, we will learn how better to investigate 
outbreaks. That's a point that's already been made by my fellow 
panelists. Third, we may deflect further recriminations, and 
perhaps some finger pointing, by the gaining of greater 
clarity. And then fourth, if there is further evidence that 
perhaps accidents occurred in the conduct of science, then I 
think we will be forced to have conversations and further 
discussions beyond that which we have already had in this 
country that look more carefully about where there is risk that 
perhaps deserves special attention.
     Mr. Lucas. In your written testimony, again, you discuss 
the two predominant COVID-19 origin theories. What I would now 
ask you is, moving forward, how do we better communicate 
scientific and factual evidence so we can continue to 
investigate the origins of COVID-19? How do we regain that 
trust? How do we convince the American public of the merits of 
what we need to do?
     Dr. Relman. Yeah. I know we're almost out of time, but let 
me just suggest that the first place would be something that 
Dr. Price has already mentioned, the great importance of 
transparency in all of the information upon which we base our 
statements. And that come--that has to come from all corners of 
the globe. Not just China, not just the United States, but 
every other place where there's useful information about the 
virus, the early clinical events, and everything else that we 
have to understand about this ecosystem. So data transparency 
is where we start, and that should be made available to the 
world's public as well.
     Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Doctor. And, with that, Mr. 
Chairman, I would yield back, noting that the general public 
doesn't necessarily always understand what goes on behind those 
lab doors where you worked all those years, and we need to make 
sure they understand it is to their benefit, and the future of 
everyone, that those things happen. Yield back.
     Chairman Foster. I agree. And we'll now recognize one of 
our most valued Members of the Investigation Subcommittee, Dr. 
Ami Bera, M.D., for five minutes.
     Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And while my good 
friend from Colorado's a lawyer and a politician, I happen to 
be a doctor and a politician, and in a prior life was Chief 
Medical Officer for Sacramento County, so--did a lot of public 
health work.
     Again, thank you for holding this hearing. I think, just 
from a pure medical, and scientific, and epidemiologic 
perspective, it is really important for us to take a look 
backwards, and get a sense of what's happened. And, you know, 
as the Member of Congress who held the first hearing on that 
kind of novel coronavirus, didn't have a name, and had--chaired 
multiple hearings on this, one of the first recommendations we 
made in early January 2019 or 2020 was that we had to use every 
effort and resource to get the best scientists into the hot 
zone, into Wuhan, to not just understand what was going on, 
understand how this virus was transmitted, but also to help the 
Chinese, in terms of containment. Obviously that didn't happen. 
I think, you know, China's response was different, which really 
was setting up barriers, and I think we'll look back and 
certainly see a missed opportunity that slowed down our 
response.
     That said, the scientists in China, you know, there was a 
hero in China who, again, probably not at the request of the 
government, released the gene sequence fairly early, and 
probably did save untold--tens of thousands of life. You know, 
certainly allowed us to develop the ability to do testing 
fairly early on, and, you know, it ultimately allowed, you 
know, Moderna, Pfizer to start working on vaccines as well. So, 
you know, I'm not disparaging any of the Chinese scientists, 
per se, because I actually think the scientific community 
would've wanted to work in a cooperative, collaborative way. 
It's when the politicians get involved, in this case, you know, 
the Chinese government, that I think things went awry.
     I appreciate all the questions of my colleagues. I do 
think, just from a purely scientific perspective, it is 
important for us to understand the origins so we can better 
prepare ourselves both to address and minimize the next 
pandemic, and be prepared for that. You know, as one of the 
witnesses talked about, I think we do have to go through and, 
you know, get a better understanding of the zoonotic risks that 
are out there so we can be better prepared for that. But one 
area that, you know, I think is incredibly important for us to 
think about as Congress, and--is our own biosecurity. Because 
there are bad actors in the world, and, you know, for folks 
watching a virus bring the world to its knees, they've just 
seen what's possible, and we spend a lot of time--you know, I 
chair the Subcommittee on Nonproliferation, and we think about 
nuclear threats, but what we've just seen is a biological 
threat bring us to our knees. And as we prepare for the next 
naturally occurring pathogen, I think we also have to build in 
systems to address and think about, you know, potential man-
made pathogens, whether, intentionally or unintentionally, that 
could impact us.
     I know we were able to get $1.7 billion in the American 
Rescue Plan to build out our infrastructure for gene sequencing 
of these viruses. It's helping us right now as we deal with the 
pandemic, but, you know, maybe--I'll ask Dr. Relman, as we 
build out these bio-surveillance tools at the global level, as 
we try to put in these institutional norms for lab standards, 
as, you know, Chairman Foster and I have talked about, you 
know, what is appropriate gene--genetic research, and, you know 
this CRISPR technology, you know, is readily available to the 
world. We're teaching our high school students how to do gene 
editing. There's real risks here. So [inaudible] Dr. Relman 
some things we should be thinking about, as Congress, to better 
prepare for the next naturally occurring pathogen, but also to 
prevent a man-made pathogen from bad actors?
     Dr. Relman. Those are all really, really important, good 
questions, and there obviously are no simple answers. I think 
one response would be say that there are multiple approaches 
that will be needed, no one of which would be sufficient. Part 
of this, I think, is going to be a question about whether we 
think there are discrete, probably very small, defined parts of 
this science that deserve special attention. In other words, 
might there be a red line? Might there be a place past which we 
simply ought not to deliberately go? I personally think that 
there are. I also think that those are vanishingly few, and 
that we have to be very careful in perhaps drawing a line, if 
we do so, so that we don't impair or impede the rest of the 
critical science upon which we depend.
     So these are really tough problems. I would like to see, 
for example, our government sponsoring further international 
discussion about whether there are norms of this sort, how we 
go about defining them, who needs to be at the table, and 
perhaps not just scientists, and not certainly just life 
scientists, but social scientists, I think, to some of your 
points previously made. But that's a start, and, you know, this 
is as much about people as it is about rules. And we're going 
to have to have a better understanding of where we all stand on 
this, and a mechanism for ongoing discussion as unforeseen 
problems arise.
     Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you. And maybe that's a topic for a 
future hearing, Chairman Foster.
     Chairman Foster. I agree, and the analogy between nuclear 
nonproliferation and the dangers of, you know, of bioweapons, 
and everything from homebrew bioweapons to nation-states. And, 
without objection, I'd actually like to enter into the record a 
report and--from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) that they 
issued last fall, entitled ``Preventing The Next Global 
Biological Catastrophe''. And--recommended, among other things, 
stronger mechanisms at the United Nations for determining the 
source of a biological threat regardless of origin. And so, 
without objection, I'd like to enter that into the record. And 
next is Representative Gonzalez for five minutes.
     Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you, Chairman Foster, and Ranking 
Member Obernolte, for holding this timely hearing today, and to 
our distinguished witnesses for joining us. Dr. Relman, in your 
testimony you labeled the work being performed at the Wuhan lab 
as ``unusually risky''. I want to focus on that specifically 
because in 2016 the lab reportedly experimented on a live bat 
coronavirus that could infect human cells in a BSL-2 lab, a 
biosafety level compared to a U.S. dentist's office. 
Furthermore, in 2018, the lab's director, Dr. Xi [phonetic] 
gave a presentation with slides that exposed some of her 
unmasked colleagues working with bats in their bare hands. And 
then finally, in 2019, Dr. Peter Daszak, one of the lab's top 
contractors, who has coincidentally been charged with leading 
The Lancet and WHO investigations, made comments that 
researchers in the Wuhan lab have found over 100 coronaviruses, 
including some that can get into human cells in the lab, and 
are ``untreatable''. I recognize you'll not offer a personal 
opinion on this hypothesis, but would you agree that this is a 
troubling fact pattern that warrants further investigation?
     Dr. Relman. I think my response would be to say we, as an 
international community of scientists, have some important 
issues to address, some of which you've just alluded to. I do 
think that some of the work that they have described, like work 
that has been done by others elsewhere in the world, deserves 
special attention. I mentioned already some of the experiments 
that I think were unusually risky. And it's not just my 
opinion, it's the opinion of other well-known coronavirus 
experts, in fact. But this is work that they had permission to 
do, at least by their own government, so I think there are many 
people here that need to be--you know, that need to be in these 
discussions to decide how do we go about viewing and assessing 
risk, and how are we going to manage it going forward? It's a--
--
     Mr. Gonzalez. Yeah, I agree.
     Dr. Relman [continuing]. Not a problem of one place.
     Mr. Gonzalez. Yeah, absolutely. I think this screams for 
more global coordination and pressure, frankly. Given Dr. 
Daszak's professional and financial ties to the Wuhan lab, do 
you have any--does it give you pause that an investigation 
completed by the WHO and Lancet can be considered credible? 
Because I struggle with that mightily, if I'm being honest.
     Dr. Relman. No, I too--and I've stated this in various 
places, I was troubled by the--first of all, the terms of 
reference with which they began their investigation, their 
exclusion of certain hypotheses just because, and then second 
the skewed treatment of just one, and not another. Yes, I think 
that was a problem.
     Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you. Dr. Perlman, in a 2020 op-ed you 
applauded Chinese efforts to share relevant COVID-19 
information rapidly and responsibly. We now know that the--that 
following the WHO's 2020 mission to China, the CCP implemented 
a gag order to stop the sharing of any information related to 
the pandemic so as to coordinate the release of the information 
with the Chinese government. They've also silenced their own 
scientists, deleted data bases, and, of course, blamed the 
United States military for the outbreak, which is ridiculous. 
Given how the last year and a half has unfolded, do you still 
stand by those comments?
     Dr. Perlman. Yeah, so I think that--I think the points you 
make are very well taken. I think a lot of those comments were 
made at a time when the world was a little different. We talked 
about the 2020 Lancet paper, and that did have a big impact, 
but it was at a time when the world was really divided into 
those who thought this was all man-made versus a natural 
origin, and now everything's become more nuanced, and I think 
it's very appropriate to be more nuanced. I certainly would--if 
I had to do everything over again, and I was really smart, I 
would've thought about those nuances back then. But at the 
time, that's what we were thinking.
     And also the other thing I was thinking about was the SARS 
epidemic, it took--the Chinese government was even more opaque 
then initially, and it took several months for that to be 
admitted to. So this felt like it--in those early days felt 
like it was more rapidly done, information was being spread, 
but there was no question, even in the very beginning, there 
was some coverup, because I have friends in China who were 
telling me that they thought things should've been released 
more quickly, and this was in the first days of January. So 
this--and the problems only got worse, because the things 
you're describing are what--going to make it so difficult to 
figure out where this virus came from. Destroying farmed 
animals, not having specimens available, not having information 
available. This is the only way I think we're going to figure 
out this particular pandemic.
     Mr. Gonzalez. Yeah. I mean, just following up, I mean, if 
the Chinese won't permit researchers to conduct field work, and 
only offer limited access to granular lab records and data, how 
can we carry out an investigation that is credible and immune 
to CCP influence when we've already seen such horrible 
behavior, whether it was SARS or COVID-19?
     Dr. Perlman. Yeah, I think it's something that has to 
change, because--if we're going to figure this out.
     Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you. And----
     Dr. Murray. And if it's possible to add to that, could I 
make a comment?
     Mr. Gonzalez. Sure.
     Dr. Murray. Yeah, that--one of the things I would just 
like to underline as we're talking about this is that, if we're 
trying to create the entire puzzle, if we're trying to 
understand the entire picture, and if we think about what we 
can control, what we do have the access to, if we have a jigsaw 
puzzle with 100 pieces, and we only have one or two of those 
pieces currently available, it's hard to understand everything. 
But I think the more that we can really develop that robust 
data set that's independent, perhaps, of--that's--you know, 
from the wildlife surveillance that's perhaps independent of 
government, it might give us the chance to have a better 
understanding, and that might be something we can--that we can 
more easily control.
     Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
giving me a few extra seconds there. I yield back.
     Chairman Foster. No, I'm happy to--also, if our witnesses 
and Members are interested, I think we will continue this sort 
of informal procedure we have of, after we've gaveled the 
hearing closed, we'll turn off the live feed, and just have the 
sort of private discussions that we have typically after in-
person hearings as well, which are often very, very productive 
and useful. And so now I will recognize Representative Beyer 
for five minutes.
     Mr. Beyer. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and--to you 
and Mr. Obernolte for hiring the--holding this really 
fascinating--I will begin that I am concerned about the low 
vaccination rates in Republican-led States, continuing to place 
our economic and societal recovery at risk, and Tennessee's 
willful abandonment of any attempt at pandemic response is only 
the latest example of failed leadership. So while we're focused 
today broadly on the origins, which will be very helpful in 
trying to understand how to prevent both a future lab leak or 
any other future natural origin for a virus, we have to 
remember there have been more COVID deaths in 2021 than in all 
of 19--in all of 2020.
     So we need to also be focused on the variants, and if we 
don't get serious about addressing COVID, the next variants of 
concerns are likely to be homegrown. They're not in China, not 
in the market, not in a lab, and they're preventable in light 
of our access to vaccines. So one of the concerns I have is 
that--for much of the pandemic is we're not going to know much 
about these variants if we don't have good surveillance. For 
Dr. Murray, can you offer your perspective on the current 
status of U.S. COVID surveillance? What's working well, what 
should we be thinking about for the future?
     Dr. Murray. There's--we--to be honest, I think that our 
COVID surveillance was much more robust just a few years ago. 
We knew that--even 3 or 4 years ago that an epidemic--not 
necessarily a pandemic, but we knew that an epidemic was likely 
on its way, and we knew that it was likely to be an influenza 
virus, or a coronavirus, that it was likely to come from bats 
or primates, and Asia or Africa. So we knew a lot, and I think 
that we were pretty actively involved in a number of different 
countries doing that surveillance, and creating the data base 
from which all of our scientists and pharma companies need to 
access information. For a variety of reasons, I think in part 
due to changes in funding structures that--and changing in 
priorities, that surveillance isn't as robust right now as it 
was, and, from my perspective, I think it's time that we lean 
in, because that continuous sampling I think was what's most 
critical as we look at trying to understand viral evolution.
     One other thing I'll just note is that if we're trying to 
understand how the--what--how the viruses might mutate in the 
future, it's very helpful to look at past collections as well, 
to even, like, historical collections from the museums, the 
Museum of Natural History, to look at the coronaviruses 100 
years ago, 50 years ago, where they are now. It gives us some 
indication of where to go. So we are still, obviously, doing--
there's a number of different groups doing surveillance, but 
it's a strange time to be slowing down.
     Mr. Beyer. Thank you. Dr. Relman, I was fascinated by your 
discussion about how, in the Wuhan lab, they had taken 
previously characterized bat-associated coronavirus poised for 
human emergence, and then inserting the all-important spike 
protein from the novel viruses. This sounds awfully dangerous. 
What was the possible gain from introducing the spike protein 
into these viruses?
     Dr. Relman. Well, the purpose was to understand the very 
diversity that you've been hearing about, and trying to 
understand what parts of this diversity may prove to be a true 
threat to humans. One of the approaches, and I would argue an 
approach that we ought to, you know, step back and perhaps 
discuss more, is to take the part of the virus that we think is 
most likely responsible for interaction with human cells, the 
spike protein, and study it in some way, shape, or fashion. The 
way they chose to do it was to place it--swap it into another 
virus whose properties they had just characterized--and a virus 
that they were able to resurrect and propagate.
     So these were the chimeric viruses that they created, and 
they literally did not know what was going to happen when they 
did that. Their purpose was to see if this starting virus, WIV-
1, had now become even more well adapted to human cells, and 
more able to grow. They didn't know what the answer would be, 
and I would say that that was a pretty risky throw of the dice 
that they were undertaking there.
     Mr. Beyer. Yeah. Doctor, one last quick question. You've 
talked about the COVID Commission Planning Group, Nuclear 
Threat Initiative, World Economic Forum. Do you think we can 
actually build this new global entity to track these things 
ahead of time?
     Dr. Relman. I do, I do, and I've admitted my conflicts as 
an advisor to a number of those organizations, but the NTI, for 
example, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, has a very interesting 
proposal for a novel international entity that would routinely 
investigate small outbreaks which are happening all the time as 
a way of practicing how to do this right for the time that 
comes when something large happens, and--so I do like some of 
these proposals.
     Mr. Beyer. Great. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I 
yield back.
     Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we'll now recognize 
Representative Waltz for five minutes.
     Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, just as an 
opening statement, I certainly want to state my opinion, and I 
think the vast majority of the American people would agree, 
that it's a little insane--I mean, it's kind of nuts that 18 
months after this outbreak, trillions of dollars spent, 
millions of lives lost, millions more disrupted, businesses 
ruined, kids falling further behind in school than they already 
were, that this is the first hearing that the majority has 
hosted on the origins of the coronavirus. I mean, I just think 
the total lack of urgency to get to the bottom of this, again, 
a year and a half after the outbreak is, just to be candid, a 
bit outrageous, and I do hope this is the first of many. This 
is a very complicated issue, and I do hope this is the first of 
many to get to the bottom of it. But I certainly applaud that--
you know, let's get started in having the hearing today.
     You know, Dr. Relman, you walk through in your testimony 
what an investigation should look like. I think we all agree it 
hasn't looked like that, with all of those elements. Key 
factors are objectivity and conflicts of interest. And you also 
stated, I just want to make sure I understand you correctly, 
neither hypothesis should be ruled out, natural origin or a lab 
leak conducting very dangerous research that you just 
described, is that correct? They're both viable?
     Dr. Relman. That's correct.
     Mr. Waltz. Thank you. And I would certainly agree. I 
just--trying to wrap my mind around what I think may be the 
world's biggest coincidence that the epicenter of this virus 
happened in a city--the only city in all of China that is 
conducting research--dangerous research on this virus, 1,000 
miles away from natural origin, a city larger than Manhattan, 
and in a lab that the State Department, in 2018, shared real 
concerns for its safety in a cable. So that brings me over to 
Dr. Perlman. And, you know, it was already mentioned, but I 
think it's worth mentioning again, that in March 2020 you 
signed a letter that ``strongly condemned conspiracy theories 
that suggested COVID-19 does not have a natural origin.''
     And I have to say, the entire world was looking to the 
scientific community at that time, just months after the 
outbreak, and that really did set the tone, and it's no 
surprise, then, we had the media and Big Tech banning any 
discussion of anything but natural origin. Dr. Perlman, do you 
still stand by that, that any discussion is a conspiracy 
theory, that Dr. Relman, who says it's a viable hypothesis that 
it's not natural origin, is a conspiracy theorist? Do you stand 
by that statement?
     Dr. Perlman. So, remember the statement that I said just a 
few minutes ago, the statement was based on the notion that 
this was constructed from scratch, so that was really what the 
letter was about. I don't think it was defined well enough in 
that letter. But that's what the discussion was. It wasn't 
about----
     Mr. Waltz. So----
     Dr. Perlman [continuing]. All these other possibilities.
     Mr. Waltz. --[inaudible] that it is constructed from 
scratch, you would call it conspiracy theory?
     Dr. Perlman. Well, it's--I would--I don't know--you know, 
conspiracy theory obviously has a lot of pejorative terms with 
it, so it's not a term that one would want to use lightly. I 
think the idea at the time was, though, that this was all being 
convoluted so that a whole bunch of possibilities were put into 
the idea that this virus was made from the beginning.
     Mr. Waltz. Dr. Perlman, what that letter had the effect of 
doing was shutting off very viable lines of investigation into 
whether this came from that lab. We--which we are funding with 
U.S. taxpayer dollars, indirectly or directly. And we can't 
stop the next pandemic, the last three of which have come from 
China, without understanding where it came from. And now here 
we are a year and a half later just trying to start figuring 
this out, and then you sign the Lancet Commission letter, which 
Peter Daszak has since resigned and recused himself from 
because he's receiving funding, and his livelihood is dependent 
on the very type of research that we're asking him to 
investigate.
     So I think, yes, the Chinese coverup has been abhorrent, 
but I think, Mr. Chairman, just as inexcusable is a scientific 
community who has not been objective, who has effectively shut 
off lines of research, whose livelihoods depend on funding 
pertaining to that research, and could be compromised. And I 
think we, as a Committee, need to take a hard look at those 
backgrounds, and if there are conflicts of interest, as Dr. 
Relman pointed out, before we move forward in an objective way. 
I thank you for holding this, and I yield back.
     Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we will now recognize 
Representative Stansbury. If she is willing to activate her 
video? Yes.
     Ms. Stansbury. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's nice to be 
here this morning. I really appreciate the opportunity ask a 
couple of questions during this hearing. Mr. Chairman, my 
questions are for Dr. Relman. The first question I have is 
about laboratory biosafety. As you pointed out in your 
testimony, the lab that--lab accidents involving dangerous 
pathogens occur more frequently when--than we would like to 
admit, even here in the United States. But, you know, one of 
the things I'd like to kind of just put on the record is a 
little bit about the biosafety standards in American 
laboratories, and your thoughts about how we can ensure that 
the highest standards are upheld not only in the United States, 
but proliferated internationally.
     Dr. Relman. Thank you for the question. I think, from my 
perspective, safety and security are about both guidelines, 
rules, or regulations, as well as people, and the people part 
is as important as any of the other. The finest rules and 
regulators, if not properly followed or believed in, simply 
don't serve us to the degree that we need. So I agree that this 
is a collective responsibility. We here in the United States, I 
think, have further soul searching to do, but building upon 
good efforts that have started already. And so I would like to 
see more attention to this, and more attention to the idea of 
how we can provide incentives, positive incentives, for people 
to believe that this is important, and worthy of some 
attention.
     Ms. Stansbury. Thank you.
     Dr. Price [continuing]. I can add to that, Representative 
Stansbury, is that OK?
     Ms. Stansbury. Yes. Thank you.
     Dr. Price. So in the U.S., you know, the BSL-4 is the 
level of laboratory that would require work with this type of 
virus, and would have oversight in clinical samples by the 
Joint Commission, as--the Clinical Laboratory Standards 
Institute. And I suppose if research only, Doctors Relman and 
Perlman can correct me, but the CDC would probably oversee 
that. And the Joint Commission accredits 22,000 healthcare 
institutions in the United States, but there's also an 
international arm that accredits hospitals around the globe, 
and currently there are 54 such hospitals in China that are 
accredited by the JCI (Joint Commission International).
     The Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services also 
regulates some laboratory testing via CLIA (Clinical Laboratory 
Improvement Amendments), and there is an ability for 
international laboratories seeking CLIA certification to do so. 
So I do wonder, in addition to what Dr. Relman said, is if 
there is a will to have some regulatory oversight more so at a 
global level using some existing structures that we have.
     Ms. Stansbury. Thank you both, and thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. My second question is about the kinds of research 
that we're talking about, including gain of function research. 
Dr. Relman, you argued in your testimony that we should 
consider whether or not there are certain kinds of life 
sciences research that is so risky that perhaps it shouldn't be 
undertaken, and I wanted to understand a bit more about gain of 
function research, and how this research is used in 
microbiology, how common it is in vaccine development, and what 
we can understand as to how it might apply to what we're 
discussing here today.
     Dr. Relman. Thank you. I'm not a big fan of this term, 
gain of function, because it's confusing, and used in confusing 
ways. I would prefer to talk about risky research, risk--
research that is unusually risky, and for several reasons. To 
me, the two properties that matter most that we need to be 
concerned about the property of something being able to do 
harm, so that's pathogenicity, and the property of 
transmission. Anything that has both of those properties, 
something that can do harm and can transmit easily, is 
something that we need to pay attention to. And, to make it 
very simple, I would argue that we should not go about 
deliberately, intentionally, creating something that has both 
of those properties that doesn't exist in nature without a 
very, very thorough and well-informed discussion. That's the 
kind of thing that gets out of control very quickly, and, if it 
hasn't yet happened, it will. I'm just very concerned about 
that kind of work.
     Ms. Stansbury. Thank you, Dr. Relman. And, with that, Mr. 
Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
     Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we will now recognize 
Representative Feenstra for five minutes.
     Mr. Feenstra. Thank you, Chairman Foster, and Ranking 
Member Obernolte, for the opportunity participate in this first 
official hearing on COVID-19 origins in the U.S. House. And 
thank you to all the witnesses for your testimony, and sharing 
your extensive research and experience with us on such a 
crucial, crucial topic today.
     Dr. Relman, in your testimony you mentioned that some say 
further clarity about the origin of the COVID pandemic is no 
longer needed. I personally think that's absurd, and I was 
happy to see that you disagree with them also. Following up on 
past questions, can you elaborate on the potential consequences 
of not investigating the origin of the virus?
     Dr. Relman. Sure. And to clarify, I think the viewpoint 
that I was seeking to portray was one where a number of people 
have said this seems so difficult, it seems so unlikely that we 
are going to gain greater clarity, for some of the reasons that 
have been discussed here this morning, that perhaps the effort 
is not worth it, that the effort, which will come with a lot of 
political difficulty and complication perhaps ought not to be 
undertaken. I disagree with that. I do think, for a whole 
number of reasons, there are likelihoods of greater insight 
into the origins of the pandemic, in part because science is 
such an international undertaking, and that there are lots of 
useful kinds of information there that could come from all 
corners of the globe about how this pandemic began.
     But I do think it's critical that we pursue this, and the 
reason is that, in part, if we do nothing further, one of these 
two hypotheses, in my view, continues to be so difficult for 
some of us scientists to discuss, the idea that one of us could 
have caused an accident, that's--that one of us made an error, 
that it will not be pursued with sufficient rigor and 
attention. And that's my concern, should we simply drop this 
now.
     Mr. Feenstra. Yeah. Dr. Relman, I fully agree with you. I 
mean, I think everyone--we owe it to the world to understand, 
and that we never let something like this happen again if we 
can come up with the way it happened, and then to protect 
ourselves that it never happens again.
     Dr. Murray, you worked as part of a governmental funded 
USAID consortium to collect dormant viruses and study 
infection--and the infectiousness, and sometimes implemented 
gain of function research to predict disease outbreaks, risk 
factors, and create predictive models. I've got two questions. 
How does the COVID-19 emergence and spread compare to your 
predictive models, and then what are your predictive models and 
risk factors your team considers for laboratory accidents?
     Dr. Murray. Just to--thank you for the question. Just to 
clarify, we were not involved in any gain of function research. 
We were doing surveillance, both human and wildlife 
surveillance, in several different countries, and--yeah. So--
and then in terms of--we do have modelers on the team who do 
look at how diseases can spread. The places we were most active 
in is looking at some of the gaps, and recognizing that if we 
want to understand how viruses can best spread, there is a 
missing gap of social scientists, and looking at what humans do 
to put them in--at times in harm's way, and what the riskiest 
behaviors are. So we do--we have spent a fair amount of time 
developing some strategies, and making sure we're incorporating 
social scientists and behavioralists to investigate cultural 
norms, and to better understand to build those partnership with 
our--with folks in different countries so we can address--so we 
can all be part of the solution as part of the problem, per se.
     Mr. Feenstra. Well, thank you. And I'm an academic myself. 
I'm actually doing research and funding. I'm just going through 
an IRB (institutional review board) hearing as we speak, and it 
concerns me that, you know, I take into consideration all the 
risk factors when I'm doing research, and, you know, here we 
have a situation that we're not sure exactly how it happened, 
but we have to be very cognizant of the risk factors that 
happen. And it--you know, it--I'm sure it didn't happen on 
purpose, but how did this--could it have been a laboratory 
accident, and how do we make sure that never happens again? I'm 
not saying it necessarily was, but it could have been. And I 
just hope, Dr. Murray, that your studies can look into this 
more, and I would just like to hear a little more of your 
thoughts on that.
     Dr. Murray. I think that one of the best things that we 
can all do is look at what our research so far has identified, 
and then also identify the gaps. And part of the gaps I think 
is looking at a risk analysis, a risk analysis across the 
board. I think my esteemed colleagues on the panel have said 
the same thing, and there's many places along the way, from the 
human behaviors in the field, and what--and how people come in 
contact with wildlife--you know, living, and then also dead 
wildlife, the--whether it's the--the risk is in the--a 
restaurant, whether it's eating wildlife, or whether it's 
preparing wildlife ahead of time, and then what happens when 
you bring it back home. So everything, all the way through, 
looking at risks--risk factors in laboratories as well. And the 
more that we can all feel comfortable, and develop that--
trusting relationships to say, hey, this is an area we should 
really look at more closely, the better.
     Mr. Feenstra. Thank you, and I yield back. I fully agree 
this is very serious, and in all research we take human 
subjects very, very, very seriously, and I just hope that we 
look at that further. Thank you, and I yield back.
     Chairman Foster. Thank you. And now, despite the fact that 
he only has a Master's Degree in Biochemical Engineering, we 
will recognize Representative Casten for five minutes.
     Mr. Casten. Thank you, Doctor. Really appreciate you guys 
all being here. I'm--want to be careful picking my words here, 
because I want to ask something that's going to sound 
controversial, and I hope that my colleagues across the aisle 
will take it in the spirit it's intended. I've had this fear 
from the start of COVID that we're repeating some of the 
mistakes we made in the HIV crisis, in the sense that there are 
political conversations we're uncomfortable having, and because 
of our discomfort having those political conversations we've 
allowed this to spread in ways that it shouldn't. And this is 
going to sound political, because we're all politicians, but it 
makes me so sad that we're seeing, you know, certain political 
populations less likely to get vaccinated, more likely to die. 
And if we can't talk about that epidemiologically, then we're 
leaving something out of the conversation.
     Layered on top of that is the fact that we have created 
some real risks to health and welfare because of that politics. 
You know, I had an Asian-American constituent who was attacked 
with a stick a year ago and told to go back to China, which was 
not where he or his family tree was from, but that was the way 
he looked. And--so I guess my question for you all as 
scientists who, you know, if you do your job well, you are 
looking at all the data, and asking questions without any 
presumed answer, how would you like us as political figures, 
hopefully political leaders, to speak about those issues in a 
way that maximizes your ability to do your job effectively? And 
it--happy for any of you who have answers to that, but I think 
we're all--in our line of work, we could use your guidance and 
wisdom to make sure that we don't unnecessarily inflame things, 
while still making sure that we don't ignore hard questions as 
we did during the early stages of the HIV epidemic. Any 
comments would be welcome.
     Dr. Murray. Personally, I really like the idea of us, it's 
been mentioned a few times along, making big efforts to bring 
the public along. As scientists, we do a lot of work, and we 
collect data, and we share it with other scientists, but we 
don't always make the effort, or sometimes we don't--we're not 
effective in translating that information to the general public 
along the way. I do feel like we have known a lot about the, 
you know, epidemics that were on their way, and had we more 
effectively communicated with the general public, I think we 
would've had been very able to respond more quickly at--that's 
my thought.
     Dr. Price. I would follow up and say I've appreciated this 
Subcommittee's willingness to consider all theories of the 
origins of COVID-19, even though some have somehow generated a 
political view or polarization behind each of those theories. 
And I think it's important to remember that we don't have the 
data. We have to use the science, and back off from anything 
that seems to be going to the left or the right, and just look 
at the data, and make conclusions based on that alone, and be 
open until then.
     Dr. Relman. I would simply add that, from an international 
point of view, in my humble opinion, it's humility that we, as 
a nation, need a little bit more of. I think we've been a 
little quick to point fingers and suggest that we're not 
equally, you know, culpable in some cases for either promoting 
factors that encourage natural outbreaks or for promoting 
certain kinds of science that carry unusual risks. And I think, 
you know, it's that glass house analogy. We have to be careful 
about where we throw stones without first saying, look, we're 
fallible, just like everyone else. Here are some examples of 
problems that we have discovered amongst our own. Now let's 
have a more open conversation about where we each see this 
being the case.
     Mr. Casten. Well, thank you.
     Dr. Perlman. Yeah, could I just add something to that?
     Mr. Casten. Yeah. Yeah, sorry. Please go ahead.
     Dr. Perlman. Yeah. I'm on the FDA (Food and Drug 
Administration) and the ACIP (Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices) Vaccine Committee, so we actually think 
about the first part of your question, about how do we get 
vaccines into the whole population? And I think it's not only 
politicians being all in agreement about whether vaccines are 
necessary or not, but I think we think pretty strongly that 
bringing in community leaders, and making sure that everybody's 
on the same page about the importance of vaccination. Because 
both in the U.S. and the rest of the world, this vaccine 
hesitancy is a big deal in terms of having problems in ending 
the pandemic. So there's a lot of places in the world there's 
not enough vaccine, but even where there is there's still so 
much hesitancy. So I think that it's just the--it's--making it 
very clear that everyone thinks vaccination is the way for--to 
move forward is really an important intervention.
     Mr. Casten. Thank you. I yield back.
     Chairman Foster. Thank you. And now, with some relief, we 
will return to the other Ph.D. on--in the Science Committee, 
Representative Baird.
     Mr. Baird. Thank you, Ranking Member Obernolte, and--so 
now I'm--is that coming through better?
     Chairman Foster. Yes.
     Mr. Baird. I really appreciate, Mr. Chairman, holding this 
kind of discussion, and it seems to me that the purpose of this 
hearing, and I commend you for taking the opportunity to do 
that, is to look into how this COVID virus was released. There 
are two theories at the present time, one about being an animal 
to human situation, or a zoonotic situation, and the other 
being the laboratory leak. So my question comes down to--is how 
we identify, and how we can be helpful, in trying to re-
establish or re-affirm, as some of you have suggested, the 
credibility for our scientific community, because they really 
haven't had a chance to weigh in.
     So I guess I'm going to start one question with Mr.--or 
Dr. Relman. You--in your testimony you had discussion about 
international governance mechanism leading to the investigation 
of the COVID-19 origins. And so, from your perspective, how do 
we re-establish a protocol that is appropriate and effective 
for convincing our society that our scientists can make the 
appropriate conclusions? And so I would appreciate your 
comments on how we can identify the bipartisan, transparent 
program for investigating the origins of this COVID-19.
     Dr. Relman. Yeah, it's a tough question. There are issues 
of governance and of authorities, and then there are a set of 
other issues around which I feel I have a little bit 
familiarity, which is how do we articulate the questions at 
hand carefully, how do we decide upon the kinds of data that 
will best address those questions, then how do we decide upon 
the right expertise to make use of those data in addressing 
those questions? And, finally, the process that will be 
purused. All of those four things, I think, still need some 
attention. This is where your Committee has, I think, important 
standing. You're all about how does a proper investigation 
become well-articulated, and empowered, and defined? And that's 
what we need here. And I think, once we have those four 
elements better articulated, we'll have much greater--a better 
ability to decide who is it that can best do this, and how are 
we going to proceed?
     Mr. Baird. Well, I--if I'm understanding you right, I 
think now is a good time to review how we think that protocol 
ought to be, and maybe this Committee is a good place to start 
with reviewing that. And then that adds credibilities if we 
approve that and move forward. Am I understanding that 
correctly?
     Dr. Relman. Yes, I think so. And there may well be good 
partners for you who have already begun this process. The COVID 
Planning Commission that I referred to in my testimony, the 
U.S. National Academies that's begun to have conversations, and 
other National Academies around the world. So I think 
partnerships, perhaps informal, between countries with various 
kinds of standing and roles to play could be a part of this 
discussion with you as well.
     Mr. Baird. So thank you very much, and I yield back, Mr. 
Chairman.
     Chairman Foster. Well, thank you. I think, at this point, 
we--unless I--there's someone lurking on Zoom, I think we are 
now out of Members with questions. As I mentioned earlier, we 
will--after we gavel this hearing closed, we'll be able to have 
an opportunity for sort of informal conversation, sort of the 
electronic equivalent of hanging around in the anteroom after 
this. And--so I'm--any Members or panelists who are interested 
in that are very welcome to. So, with that, I will thank our 
witnesses again, and gavel this hearing closed.
     [Whereupon, at 2:02 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

                               Appendix I

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                   Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

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                              Appendix II

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                   Additional Material for the Record


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