[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-25]
TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION
WARFARE: THE COMPETITION
FOR INFLUENCE AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE
TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 30, 2021
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
44-945 WASHINGTON : 2021
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman
RICK LARSEN, Washington JIM BANKS, Indiana
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania, STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
Vice Chair C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JASON CROW, Colorado BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAT FALLON, Texas
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York
Troy Nienberg, Counsel
Chris Vieson, Professional Staff Member
Caroline Kehrli, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and
Information Systems............................................ 1
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and
Information Systems............................................ 4
WITNESSES
Gerstell, Glenn S., Senior Adviser, International Security
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies........ 5
Jankowicz, Nina, Disinformation Fellow, Wilson Center............ 7
Kirschbaum, Joseph W., Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management Team, Government Accountability Office.............. 11
Lin, Herbert, Senior Research Scholar, Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.................. 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Gerstell, Glenn S............................................ 34
Jankowicz, Nina.............................................. 47
Kirschbaum, Joseph W......................................... 80
Langevin, Hon. James R....................................... 31
Lin, Herbert................................................. 60
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 107
TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION WARFARE:
THE COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and
Information Systems,
Washington, DC, Friday, April 30, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:04 p.m., via
Webex, Hon. James R. Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE
TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Mr. Langevin. Good afternoon, everyone. The subcommittee
will come to order. First of all, just some housekeeping
business that I need to take care of, since this is a remote
hearing.
I would like to welcome the members who are joining today's
remote hearing, which, I believe, is just about everybody.
Members who are joining must be visible onscreen for the
purposes of identity verification, establishing and maintaining
a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and voting. Those
members must continue to use the software platform's video
function while in attendance unless they experience
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them unable to participate on camera.
If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should
contact the committee staff for assistance.
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Members participating remotely must seek recognition
verbally, and they are asked to mute their microphones when
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Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep
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Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If members
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Members may use the software platform's chat feature to
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical
support issues only.
Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
So with the technical announcements out of the way, I am
just going to now give my opening statement.
First of all, I want to say welcome to our hearing today on
the Technology and Information Warfare: The Competition for
Influence and the Department of Defense. I want to thank
Ranking Member Stefanik for joining me in holding the hearing
today.
I would also like to thank our witnesses for appearing
today. To discuss technology-enabled information warfare as a
national security threat, we welcome Mr. Glenn Gerstell, senior
adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
and Ms. Nina Jankowicz, disinformation fellow at the Wilson
Center. And to provide insight on the Pentagon's information
operation strategy and leadership, we are joined by Dr. Herb
Lin, senior research scholar at Stanford University. And
finally, Dr. Joseph ``Joe'' Kirschbaum, Director, Defense
Capabilities and Management Team at the Government
Accountability Office.
First of all, I want to say, Dr. Kirschbaum, welcome back,
and I want to thank you all for appearing today. It is an honor
to have you here, and truly it is an esteemed panel.
So, the United States is challenged in the information
environment daily. Competitors like China, Russia, and violent
extremist organizations use information warfare to achieve
their objectives, while--below the threshold of armed conflict,
as they seek to avoid traditional U.S. military advantages, and
undermine the free international order and democratic values.
The recently released Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S.
intelligence community makes clear that a variety of state and
non-state actors weaponize information to undermine the United
States by sowing discord among our citizens, influencing
decision makers, and reversing what had once been a strength of
our Nation's historical information advantage.
So, I often focus on what lies ahead in defense, but it is
worth noting that the United States and the military are facing
momentous challenges in the information environment right now,
which can undermine the very fabric of our democracy.
And what makes these threats particularly powerful is that
foreign adversaries can target U.S. and allied citizens almost
instantly without crossing physical boundaries or borders.
These threats will only grow as artificial intelligence,
machine learning, and other technology-enabled information
operations exponentially increase the speed and the scope of
the danger.
So according to the National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence, state adversaries are employing
artificial intelligence-enabled disinformation attacks to sow
division in democracies and disrupt the public's sense of
reality.
But how to confront these national security challenges is a
difficult question. So I believe the Nation must respond
forcefully to deter bad actors in the information domain,
invest in robust U.S. public diplomacy, and educate the public
and our service members about these dangers.
We must also articulate a vision for the information
environment and delineate thresholds of behavior that will
trigger a response.
So I was sort of encouraged when the National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence recommended that the
United States develop a new strategy to counter disinformation
while investing in technology to counter artificial
intelligence-enabled information warfare.
And I am also looking forward to the insight our witnesses
will provide on how to address these threats.
Likewise, we will explore how the Department of Defense is
organized to compete in the information environment, including
cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, military information support
operations, deception, and operational security.
The military is challenged, in the information environment,
by capable adversaries--make no mistake about it--and
Department of Defense priorities must reflect this reality. The
Pentagon has a critical role in protecting the Nation, our
partners, and our allies from threats in the information
environment, and in advancing our national interests in this
sphere.
Recognizing this, Congress and this committee have
continuously pushed the Department to prioritize adapting to
the weaponized information environment, including by creating
the principal information operations adviser.
Yet, I am concerned the Department leadership has been slow
to adapt to the changing nature of warfare in this domain. To
give an example, in 2020, 9 of the then 11 four-star combatant
commanders wrote a memorandum asking for additional support for
their information operations.
They wrote, and I quote, ``We continue to miss
opportunities to clarify truth, counter distortions, puncture
false narratives, and influence events in time to make a
difference,'' close quote.
I couldn't agree more. Too often, it appears, the
Department's information-related capabilities are stovepiped
centers of excellence with varied management and leadership
structures which makes critical coordination more difficult.
Further, the Pentagon has made limited progress
implementing the 2016 Operations in the Information Environment
Strategy, which raises questions about the Department's
information operations leadership structure.
So with that, these are challenging questions without easy
answers, I know that. But I hope my colleagues will take
advantage of the impressive array of witnesses that we have
before us to get a little clarity and a clear path forward
after this hearing.
So with that, I will now turn to Ranking Member Stefanik
for her opening remarks. Elise, you are recognized.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
YORK, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE
TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Langevin, and thank you
to our witnesses for testifying today. Information warfare is
one of the most complex and important missions undertaken by
the Department of Defense, especially in the 21st century
information age.
From large-scale, conventional conflicts of the past to the
modern-day, gray-zone conflicts of today, information
operations have been critical to shaping the operating
environment and weakening our adversaries' strategic position.
Eroding the resilience of our target adversaries, while
also winning the hearts and minds, remains the ultimate
objective of information operations. As a former senior adviser
to the Secretary of Defense, Robert Riley, said, quote,
``Ultimate victory comes when the enemy speaks your language,
and embraces your idea,'' end quote.
Unfortunately, we know our adversaries are not embracing
our ideas. Instead, China, Russia, Iran, and non-state actors
alike, are weaponizing information to undermine the United
States and our interests, employing asymmetric information
capabilities, rather than engaging us in traditional military
means.
Therefore, we must be prepared to not just resist
information operations and defend our interests, but also
project our own capabilities to exploit and shape the
information environment.
Today's information and media ecosystem is significantly
different than the past, with exponential advancements in
technology allowing words and ideas to spread faster and wider
than ever before.
In the last decade, we have seen how a short video, photo,
or social media post, can have a profound impact on the
geopolitical landscape.
Going forward, international competition, diplomacy, and
military operations will be increasingly based on human-centric
networks and patterns. Fortunately, our military and
intelligence community recognize this, and both are adapting to
this landscape and the information in which we live.
Congress has given clear authorities to DOD [Department of
Defense] to conduct information operations, and we expect the
Department to use those authorities effectively. As such, we
can no longer just rely solely on our special operations forces
to conduct these operations. This must be a comprehensive
approach by the DOD, the services, and combatant commands, to
ensure our messages are effective in achieving our objective to
positively shape the operating environment.
Two years ago, Congress required the Department to conduct
a review of its information operation strategy. However, we are
still awaiting this review and briefing.
This subcommittee, in particular, with jurisdiction over
cyber and artificial intelligence, is uniquely suited to
support the Department's information operations. Yet without
the proper review and information from DOD, it is difficult to
appropriately support this priority.
Congress has also created the position of the principal
information operations adviser, so the Department would have a
single person overseeing military information support
operations, or MISO, efforts.
Unfortunately, this position was layered below the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, contrary to congressional
intent. This position was not created as another bureaucratic
layer, but as an agile single role with the mandate to guide
each service's efforts.
We must also act on the recommendations from the AI
[artificial intelligence] commission and invest in technologies
to combat AI-enabled information threats, as well as increase
coordination with the State Department's Global Engagement
Center to counter foreign propaganda targeted towards the
United States.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how DOD can
organize information operations to be more coherent, nimble,
agile, and effective, and how the Department and the IC
[intelligence community] can work together to enhance MISO
efforts.
Likewise, we must continue to discuss the critical
defensive roles DOD can play to protect the information
environment as our adversaries continue to wage a persistent
information war on our interests abroad, and our citizens here
at home.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ranking Member Stefanik.
With that, I will now turn to our witnesses. We will now
hear from Mr. Glenn Gerstell. Mr. Gerstell served as the
National Security Agency general counsel from 2015 to 2020, is
now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
Mr. Gerstell, you are now recognized to summarize your
testimony for 5 minutes, and thank you for appearing today.
STATEMENT OF GLENN S. GERSTELL, SENIOR ADVISER, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Mr. Gerstell. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today along with such distinguished
experts.
Over the past few months, social media platforms have been
awash in falsehoods on political topics ranging from election
fraud, to the Capitol insurrection, to climate change and
Antifa protestors.
Even the seemingly non-partisan sphere of public health has
been politicized and damaged by cyber falsehoods about the
efficacy of face masks and vaccinations.
As a former national security official and a lawyer
concerned with our civil liberties, I would offer three
observations relevant to the subcommittee's work.
First, perhaps the most pernicious aspect of the digital
revolution, disinformation, intentionally misleading, erroneous
information threatens our very democracy, leading to mistrust
of institutions, cynicism about our leaders, and skepticism
about our ability to solve social problems.
Second, the problem of foreign disinformation is almost
surely going to get worse, and will pose serious national
security threats against which our military prowess will be
largely ineffective.
Third, while it may be difficult, there are indeed steps we
can take to counter these threats.
Returning to my first point, with three out of four
Americans getting some or all of their news from social media
platforms, disinformation could specifically affect our
military in concerning ways.
At the most basic level, the resulting cynicism, or lack of
trust in our military, as was revealed in the recent Reagan
Institute survey, might well erode the national consensus
underpinning congressional appropriations for weapons systems
or veterans affairs, and more directly, recruiting for our all-
volunteer military forces.
Border threats to our military arise from our foreign
adversaries' use of disinformation as a tool of their
statecraft. For example, China's concerted online campaign to
deflect investigations into the cause of the COVID-19 outbreak,
to paint themselves as successful in curtailing the virus when
Western democracies have been floundering, and to deny their
militarization of the South China Sea, all complicate, if not
undermine, our foreign relations and heighten the chance for
conflict.
The second point is that foreign cyber-propelled
disinformation is likely to get much worse, to the extent that
we would have difficulty in fending off weaponized
disinformation coming from a sophisticated foe.
Indeed, the recent final report of the National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence cited a, quote,
``gathering storm of foreign influence and interference,'' and
asserted that our foreign foes will use artificial intelligence
systems to enhance their disinformation campaigns, including by
creating undetectable, deep-fake videos and audio recordings.
The resulting skepticism, treating official and counterfeit
news sources equally, would yield a chaotic and unreliable
reality in which truth and genuine information are elusive.
The seemingly inexorable trajectory of ever-worsening
foreign cyber attacks from Russia, China, Iran, and North
Korea, shows us what online disinformation will look like from
those adversaries.
The same factors that shield them in cyber malevolence, the
uncertainty of provable attribution, and the absence of
directly caused actual injury or physical damage, will also
work even more effectively to insulate them as they inevitably
step up their disinformation campaigns.
What if next time Russia or Iran seizes on a natural
disaster, say, a hurricane or flood, and weaponized the crisis
with false information online about the hurricane's path or
expected river crestings, or even wrong instructions about
escape routes?
We don't need to wait until such a crisis or a disaster.
The very fact that there are many sources contributing to
disinformation means that we have multiple ways to stem it.
I would be happy to respond to your questions about
specific solutions, but I will concede that responding to the
challenges of disinformation will not be easy, since it will
require making difficult and controversial decisions about the
responsibility of the private sector for our national well-
being, and about restrictions on speech.
But it isn't impossible, and Congress, in concert with the
private sector, should lead the way. Our national well-being
depends on nothing less. Thank you for the opportunity to
present my views to the subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstell can be found in the
Appendix on page 34.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much, Mr. Gerstell. Thank you
for your testimony, and we appreciate having you here.
We will now receive testimony from Ms. Nina Jankowicz. Ms.
Jankowicz is a disinformation fellow at the Center--excuse me
for a second--yeah, it is--Ms. Jankowicz is a disinformation
fellow at the Wilson Center, and is the author of ``How to Lose
the Information War: Russia, Fake News, and the Future of
Conflict.''
Ms. Jankowicz, thank you for being here. You are now
recognized to summarize your testimony for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF NINA JANKOWICZ, DISINFORMATION FELLOW, WILSON
CENTER
Ms. Jankowicz. Thank you Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member
Stefanik, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an
honor to testify before you today.
I am the daughter of a veteran. My father, an aerial
reconnaissance officer in Vietnam, died in 2010 from
complications from multiple myeloma which he contracted as a
result of his exposure to Agent Orange during his service. I
know he would be thrilled to see me testifying before you today
in the service of truth.
I spent my career on the front lines of the information
war. We all now seem to recognize that the threat exists, but
as I told your colleagues on the Appropriations Committee in
2019, the United States has been a tardy, timid, or tertiary
player, stymied by domestic politicization.
Unfortunately, nearly 2 years later, we are in the same
place. So it bears repeating. Disinformation is not a partisan
issue. As we witnessed throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, and on
January 6th, it affects public health, safety, and our
democratic process. It is crucial that Congress understand
this. Otherwise, we remain vulnerable.
How did we get here? In part, we haven't understood the
scope of the problem. The U.S. thinks of disinformation as a
string of one-off occurrences that warrant attention only in
the moment. We haven't created a comprehensive, long-term
defense plan, and there is too little recognition of the need
to shore up domestic vulnerabilities.
Russia, China, and other authoritarian states know how to
exploit this. They take advantage of American inaction,
engaging in perpetual information competition, which has three
characteristics.
First, adversaries understand information competition is
the new normal, and they are constantly probing for societal
fissures to exploit. We have seen this with conspiracy theories
about the origins of COVID-19 and the efficacies of Western
vaccines. And Russia, of course, has an ongoing campaign to
exacerbate racial tensions in the U.S.
Second, they use all channels available--government and
nongovernment, online and offline. China, for example, uses a
wide range of state bodies, not just traditional national
security bodies, to influence Western opinions about protests
in Hong Kong, and more recently, to paint a positive picture of
life in Xinjiang.
Third and finally, they use perpetual information
competition to target alliances and international
organizations. For instance, Russia waged a campaign to prevent
Ukraine from signing an association agreement with the European
Union in 2016.
In short, hostile state information operations increase
domestic tension, and decrease American resilience. To meet the
challenge of perpetual information competition, the Department
of Defense should organize itself around a posture of enduring
information vigilance, a concept I developed with my colleague
in the U.K. Cabinet Office, Henry Collis.
It is composed of the three Cs. The first is capability. We
should remember the old military adage: Don't operate the
equipment, equip the operator. The DOD workforce should be able
to proactively monitor and identify informational
vulnerabilities.
Section 589E of the 2021 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act], which trains Active Duty personnel, their
families, and civilian DOD employees in detecting information
operations, is an excellent starting point. Such a training
program could also be rolled out to all civil servants across
the Federal Government.
The second C is interagency coordination. DOD and the wider
USG [United States Government] must break out of our siloed
national security thinking. To remedy this, the National
Security Commission on AI recommends the creation of a joint
interagency task force to coordinate intelligence and
information-sharing around IO [information operations].
I agree that the Federal Government requires a central mode
for monitoring disinformation and coordinating policy, ideally
in the White House, but my research across Europe suggests we
also need the involvement of nontraditional security
departments.
In the long term, the key to combating disinformation lies
with departments focusing on education, arts, and health, at
Federal and local levels, as well as building a thriving,
pluralistic media environment and teaching civics.
The third C is international cooperation. This includes
better sharing of information to identify threats and
formulation of effective responses with allies.
Toward this goal, the NSCAI [National Security Commission
on Artificial Intelligence] suggests an international task
force, led by the Global Engagement Center [GEC] at the State
Department. However, the GEC's agreement is too large, its
budget too small, and its reputation within the interagency and
international communities too uncertain to add such a task to
its portfolio.
It currently produces open-source intelligence analysis, in
addition to its coordination, policymaking, and analytic roles.
And I recommend that intelligence-gathering rest with
analytics, not policy bodies.
The GEC's limited resources are better allocated in
coordinating with embassies and other agencies in establishing
and implementing policy and program priorities.
Finally, while the idea of a task force for international
coordination is a noble one, the U.S. must recognize that we
are arriving late to this party. We should augment efforts that
are already underway by close allies such as the U.K.'s
international partnership for countering state-sponsored
disinformation, and the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism.
Enduring information vigilance cannot be built overnight.
It requires a long-term commitment that will likely outlast the
current political class, but the result will be a more
resilient society.
The United States must act not only as the staunchest
defender and guarantor of democratic values among our allies
abroad, but actively lead by example, underlining that
disinformation knows no political party, and that America is
committed to reversing the normalization of disinformation in
our own political discourse.
Once again, thank you for this opportunity, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jankowicz can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Ms. Jankowicz.
We will now receive testimony from Dr. Herb Lin. Dr. Lin
studies cyber policy, information warfare and influence
operations, and is a senior research scholar at Stanford
University. He is the author of ``Bytes, Bombs, and Spies.''
Dr. Lin, you are now recognized to summarize your testimony
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HERBERT LIN, SENIOR RESEARCH SCHOLAR, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Lin. Thank you, Chairman Langevin, Ranking Minority
Member Stefanik, and distinguished members. Thank you for
inviting me to testify today. I am speaking for myself today,
and not on behalf of any institution.
The general thrust of my remarks is that Department of
Defense is poorly structured and equipped to cope with the
information warfare threat facing the U.S. as a whole. However,
the DOD can make a meaningful contribution in addressing part
of the problem.
We usually believe in a clear distinction between peace and
war. Today, we are not in a shooting war with Russia or China,
but we are not at peace either. Our adversaries prosecute the
state of ``not peace'' in many ways, including cyber-enabled
information warfare.
Such warfare presents several new challenges. First, the
Constitution is the foundation of U.S. Government. Deeply
embedded into the Constitution is the concept of a marketplace
of ideas. Here ideas publicly compete with each other, and
truth emerges from public debate of ideas.
But this concept emerged at a time when information was
hard to obtain. Today the internet and social media have
brought a deluge of information so great that no one can
possibly access or process all of the information needed to
evaluate any given idea.
The second challenge is that the information marketplace
presumes that people process information rationally,
thoughtfully, and deliberately. However, psychological science
has demonstrated that people often do not do so. Instead, they
often make fast, intuitive judgements based on how they feel
from their gut, even though everyone is, in fact, capable of
thoughtful deliberation.
Such judgements--fast intuitive judgements from the gut--
are usually adequate for the kinds of personal decisions found
in everyday life, but they are inadequate when the consequences
for error are high.
Moreover, many of our tech companies have learned that
supplying content that plays to our worst habits of nonrational
thought is the way to increase user engagement which, in turn,
increases their profitability.
Third, the boundaries between foreign and domestic sources
of information chaos are blurring. Russians and Americans may
not be working side by side to sow disorder, mistrust, and
polarization in the United States, but the scope, nature, and
effect of their activities, even if separately conducted, are
largely indistinguishable.
That means, any effective effort against Russian activities
will inevitably have collateral effects against American
activities that are similarly oriented.
In sum, the information warfare threat to the United States
is different than from past threats, and has the potential to
destroy reason and reality as the basis for societal discourse,
replacing them with rage and fantasy.
Perpetual civil war, political extremism waged through the
information sphere and egged on by our adversaries is every bit
as much of an existential threat for American civilization and
democracy as any military threat imaginable.
Why can't DOD defend effectively against the information
warfare threat? Fundamentally, it is because the information
warfare threat requires a whole-of-society response, and DOD
cannot, and is not in a position to, orchestrate such a
response.
More specifically, DOD policy directives prohibit
information operations directed at U.S. audiences, regardless
of the intent underlying them, and that includes activities
intended to protect U.S. audiences against foreign information
warfare operations.
But there are also cultural constraints. DOD culture is
oriented towards defense against physical threats--planes,
missiles, and the like. But DOD was never designed to defend
against nonphysical threats. Joint doctrine does not even
acknowledge the possibility that the U.S. Armed Forces could be
the target of adversary psychological operations.
Nevertheless, despite existing policy and culture, DOD is
well-positioned to assess the information warfare threat for at
least one segment of the U.S. Government, namely the Armed
Forces and their families.
Every member of the U.S. military swears an oath to support
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic, but the vast majority receive no
education, no instruction, on what these words mean.
The fiscal year 2021 Defense Authorization Act called
attention to the need to protect U.S. military personnel and
their families from foreign malign influence and disinformation
campaigns, that was the previously mentioned section 589E, and
both Secretary Austin and the Congress have expressed concerns
about extremism in the U.S. military, which is facilitated by
exposure to foreign disinformation campaigns.
These points suggest the need for DOD to provide
substantial in-house training for military personnel on the
meaning of their oaths and on civics education as a
prerequisite foundation for such training.
That concludes the oral portion of my testimony. Thank you
for the opportunity. I am happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lin can be found in the
Appendix on page 60.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much, Dr. Lin. Appreciate you
being here as well.
We will now receive testimony from Dr. Joe Kirschbaum.
Dr. Kirschbaum, welcome back, and thank you and your team
for all the recent support. Dr. Kirschbaum is the Director of
the Government Accountability Office Defense Capabilities and
Management Team. Dr. Kirschbaum, you are now recognized to
summarize your testimony for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. KIRSCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Dr. Kirschbaum. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik,
and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today
to discuss the vital role of the Department of Defense's
operations in the information environment.
Throughout history, militaries and states have sought
advantage through actions intended to affect the perception and
behavior of adversaries. As we have noted today, our
adversaries, particularly China and Russia, are taking
advantage of emerging information technology to offset the
United States conventional warfighting advantages.
Although we focused on the Department of Defense, to
reiterate, as an element of U.S. national power, information
operations, as a whole, are necessarily part of a whole-of-
government and whole-of-society effort.
My testimony today describes the Department of Defense's
information operations concepts, and DOD's actions to implement
the 2016 strategy and address information operations
challenges. This statement is based on reports we issued in
late 2019 and our assessment of defense information-related
documents.
The terms for information operations--doctrinal terms--are
many and varied. DOD has defined some, but inconsistency and
potential confusion remains. Among the things the Department is
actually working on right now is a more consistent set of
information operations-related terms.
To achieve greater effects in the information environment,
combatant commanders can plan and execute operations that
combine multiple information-related capabilities.
Such capabilities include military information support
operations, what was traditionally known as psychological
warfare; military deception; cyberspace operations;
electromagnetic warfare; operation security; and special
technical operations.
There are, however, many other related capabilities, such
as public affairs, civil-military operations, and intelligence
capabilities.
A good example of an information operation is the effort by
the Allies in 1944 to convince the Germans that the attack on
occupied Western Europe would come at a place other than the
actual target of Normandy.
Operation Fortitude involved a number of what we would now
call information-related capabilities. These included creation
of fictitious military units, with all the requisite paperwork,
associated radio transmissions and traffic, and assigning a
real U.S. Army General--in this case, George S. Patton--to
command those units.
It also involved the creation of mock aircraft and landing
craft located in southeast England, and many other intelligence
and military deception techniques.
While this is on a grand scale, defense planners today can
do the same kinds of things to integrate more than one
information-related capability to achieve desired end states.
DOD's 2016 Strategy for Operations in the Information
Environment was intended to significantly enhance their ability
to conduct information operations today. However, the
Department did not fully implement that strategy, leaving
approximately 80 percent of the enumerated tasks incomplete.
Among the largest omissions was the absence of an
implementation plan, or an investment framework. The Department
instead shifted focus to develop a joint concept of operations
and a capabilities-based assessment. Both worthy efforts. It
then started to develop a new strategy, which remains in
development.
We also found gaps in DOD's leadership, oversight, and
management. The Department assigned most responsibilities to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. However, delegating
many of those responsibilities down to a lower level and
failing to formalize authorities exacerbated the dispersal of
leadership and focus.
As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, congressional direction
has prompted movement in the Department. In fact, most
movement. Examples include the new information operations
cross-functional team, which may mitigate some of the problems
we identify, and designation of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy as the principal information operations adviser,
reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.
Ultimately, however, the leadership the principal adviser
exercises, and the support the Department gives them in
implementing Department-wide strategy and vision, will be
critical.
DOD has integrated information-related capabilities in some
military operations but has not addressed key planning,
coordination, and operational challenges. This is important for
ensuring that DOD integrates the information dimension into
routine operational planning.
DOD resisted our recommendation to conduct a comprehensive
posture review in order to assess challenges. However, once
again, Congress subsequently required the Secretary of Defense
to conduct such a posture review.
DOD told us they have taken initial steps to conduct this
review, but did not provide an estimated completion date.
In summary, there are opportunities for improved DOD
leadership, recognition of information as a joint function, and
better preparing the military to conduct information operations
and counter our adversaries.
I look forward to continuing to work with this committee,
and the Department, to help it address these challenges and
make the most of these opportunities.
Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik, and members of
the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement, and I
am happy to respond to any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kirschbaum can be found in
the Appendix on page 80.]
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Dr. Kirschbaum, and I
want to thank all of our witnesses for your testimony today.
You do a great service to the subcommittee and to the committee
at whole, writ large, by appearing today and giving us your
perspective.
Dr. Kirschbaum, let me start with you. So Congress has
consistently encouraged the Pentagon to focus on these issues,
including requiring the DOD to create a principal information
operations adviser. Has the Pentagon sufficiently elevated
dedicated information operations leadership?
Dr. Kirschbaum. Mr. Chairman, I would say yes and no. So,
in brief, what has happened with the diffusion of leadership,
for example, most of the responsibilities for information
operations was delegated down to the level of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Combating
Terrorism.
As that title indicates, that is a lot to work on, and so,
incorporating information operations into that very small staff
has generated issues. While very capable, they are not at the
right level, in a lot of cases, to achieve some of the results
because of that lack of leadership.
Now, the Department has gone back and identified the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy as the principal information
operations adviser in the hopes that keeping it at that level
will elevate importance.
And the comparison, of course, is made to the situation
with the principal cyber adviser. There are some differences
that we are a little concerned about, seeing how the Department
carries through with that.
For example, the principal cyber adviser had a deputy who
could leverage a deputy assistant secretary who was focused
solely on cyber operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, as you appreciate, is doing just a few things. So,
focusing on information operations will be important to see
what level of resources, what level of attention it gets,
assuming it is at that right level, assuming they are able to
assign a deputy with the right focus, and, then, follow through
with the right structural, procedural impetus in order to make
sure momentum continues.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you for that answer. Mr.
Gerstell, can you further explore why foreign-enabled malign
influence and disinformation are a national security threat?
And how will emerging technologies, like artificial
intelligence, increase this threat?
Mr. Gerstell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, I think we have
rich evidence of the fact that foreign-inspired disinformation
is a real national security threat. The 2016 elections were
certainly a good example of that with, as you know, the Senate
Intelligence Committee issued a five-volume bipartisan report
finding that Russia actively intervened in our elections in an
effort to influence them in 2016.
It is hard to say for sure exactly what the result would
be, but anybody would think that tampering with our democratic
process must--must--by definition, be a national security
issue.
We have certainly seen how foreign disinformation from
China and Russia, which just this week, once again, was touting
the virtues of their Sputnik vaccine, and degrading the virtues
and qualities of the American Pfizer and other COVID vaccines,
clearly disinformation that is going to hurt our public health,
the ability of Americans to get vaccinated. Again, another
effect on national security.
If we want a very specific example, just quickly, back in
last September, when there were terrible wildfires in Oregon in
the Northwest, Russia jumped on a couple of misleading and
false statements that were set forth in some QAnon accounts and
really weaponized them. They, in a concerted, coherent way,
amplified them and turned them into a detailed, rich story of
falsehoods about who started the wildfires, claiming that
Antifa protesters were doing it.
It reached a point, because of what Russia was doing, that
civilians actually set up roadblocks in Oregon, in effort to
stop these perceived but erroneous protesters who, of course,
weren't there. It actually hurt people who were trying to flee
the fire, so much so, that the Douglas County Sheriff and the
FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] pleaded with the public
to stop circulating these falsehoods.
So we have seen how foreigners can take an existing
division and create national security problems here on our
soil. It stands to reason, following your other question, Mr.
Chairman, that using technology--artificial intelligence--to
micro-target viewers and listeners will only exacerbate the
problem. So that is why I said, I believe the problem has the
potential for getting worse before it gets better.
Mr. Langevin. And from your vantage point, what can the
United States do to protect itself from both a technological
and policy standpoint?
Mr. Gerstell. I think there are a wide range of tools. As I
said in my earlier comment, and I know the other panelists
agree with me here, disinformation has many causes. So the fact
that it has many causes means that we also have many ways of
treating it, to use a--sort of a medical analogy. This is a
chronic condition, a complex chronic condition. So it is not a
disease that will be cured by one miracle drug.
So, I think we have a rich opportunity to use a range of
legal tools at our disposal, perhaps by tightening up section
230 of the Communications Decency Act, perhaps by either
causing the industry to self-regulate, or to regulate the
ability of social media platforms to limit the virality of
falsehoods to check them before they get spread too widely.
We can take steps in our society to increase, as others
have said, digital literacy, civic education, so that people
will have a better understanding and will be better able to
assess falsehoods.
I think the most important thing--and I am echoing what Ms.
Jankowicz just said, and you, Mr. Chairman, also--is, we need
an integrated approach to this. Russia and China use an
integrated approach, a whole-of-government and their private
sector, to create these disinformation campaigns.
There is an asymmetry. We don't. We need to do that, and
that will be the key to success in this area.
Mr. Langevin. Very insightful, well said, and I couldn't
agree more. Thank you.
My time is expired. I am going to now turn to Ranking
Member Stefanik for her questions.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
My question is for Dr. Lin. In the past, the special
operations community and service members in the field of PSYOPs
[psychological operations] and civil affairs had the most
experience with information operations. It is going to be very
important that the Department scale these skills to a wider
force. How do we do that, and specifically how do we equip our
cyber forces with the skills to conduct effective information
operations?
Mr. Moore. Mr. Lin, you are on mute still.
Dr. Lin. All right. Thank you. Ranking Minority Member
Stefanik, thank you for asking the question. I hate technology.
How do we get the cyber forces to be better able to address
the influence operations side of the house? That is a
question--I addressed that in the paper that I submitted for
the record, on dysfunction in the DOD about doctrine and so on.
The short answer is that I believe that there needs to be a
joint--something that is joint and standing, some effort, some
entity, that pulls together the cyber people together and the
PSYOPs people together, as equals.
Cyber Command has the expertise in the information delivery
side of the house. The PSYOPs people, the MISO people, have the
responsibility of understanding content, and those two have to
be put together.
For me, trying to grow psychological expertise out of what
are fundamentally a bunch of technical hackers, as good as they
are, that is not their skill set. Their skill set is flipping
bits, and so on.
I speak as a former bit-flipper myself, and getting the
psychological insights from others who are much more expert in
that, I think, is the way to go.
So there has to be a standing team, and the standing part
is really important, because it recognizes the fact that this
is an ongoing problem, not one of a specific campaign here or
there.
Ms. Stefanik. Yield back.
Dr. Lin. I hope that answers your question.
Ms. Stefanik. It did. Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Stefanik.
Mr. Keating is now recognized for 5 minutes. Is Mr. Keating
still with us? If so, you might be on mute.
Okay. If Mr. Keating is not there, in the tradition of
going Democrat, Republican, I will just go down the list to Mr.
Morelle.
Mr. Morelle. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is
really a fascinating subject. And I am new to the committee and
the subcommittee, so I am not entirely familiar with DOD's
actions. But having listened now, and I hear that there is
calls for more coordination, more information-sharing, greater
intentionality of our focus, but I am still struggling, just as
a layperson, to suggest what you have offered as
recommendations that would actually stop the disinformation
from seeping in. Given that we have an open and democratic
society, given that we have social media, how do we actually
stop this, other than--well, I am just sort of curious.
What are the tactics and the strategies we use to prevent
this from really undermining society here in the United States
and really creating more divisiveness?
Ms. Jankowicz. I am happy to jump in there. Thank you,
Congressman, for that question. You are absolutely right. There
is not very much that we can do to instantaneously correct this
problem. Right now, and for the past 4 or 5 years, we have been
playing what I call ``whack a troll,'' where we want to just
focus on offensive content, harmful content, but really we need
a much more systematic and, in fact, endemic solution.
And our adversaries--Russia, China, Iran--have been playing
the long game, they are playing a generational game. They are
not necessarily interested in getting it right every time, but
they know that if they can chip away at the surface, eventually
they are going to get to the core of the polarization that they
are seeking for, and keep us distracted so that they can do
whatever it is that they are looking to do in their near
abroads, domestically, with regards to human rights, et cetera,
as well as achieve political goals.
So that is why, in addition to focusing a little bit on
content moderation, which is the topic du jour, right, in
addition to making sure that our government bodies are putting
out authoritative information, that it is trusted by the
public, that is why we really need to start investing in what I
call citizens-based responses.
So all of the countries that I have studied in Central and
Eastern Europe that have been dealing with Russian
disinformation for much longer than we even recognized it
existed, have all, of course, looked at the kinetic side of
things. They have good cyber defenses, but they also invest in
their people.
And I know that is out of remit of this subcommittee, but
it just speaks to what Mr. Gerstell, Mr. Lin, and Dr.
Kirschbaum have all touched on, that we need a whole-of-society
response, and we really need to get out of this siloed national
security thinking, invest in libraries, invest in public media,
so that people have trustworthy sources of information to go
to, and invest in awareness and civics, so that folks
understand their role in the democratic process, because
ultimately, that is what disinformation is trying to
undermine--people's participation.
Mr. Morelle. Look, yeah, I appreciate that, and I certainly
don't want to be argumentative. I read recently Anne
Applebaum's, the Twilight of Democracy, which is a frightening
volume, similar kinds of lines of communications. But what
troubles me is, I can certainly envision foreign adversaries
starting to spread, through social media and otherwise,
arguments that a Presidential election, for instance, was
stolen from the American public, and despite a lot of
investigation, no evidence ever emerges that such a thing
happened.
And yet, you can imagine potentially a third of the
American public believing that no matter, and that really gets
at the foundations of American democracy. I think I would like
to believe that that wasn't possible, but frankly, I feel like
I just lived through this nightmare.
And, so, I appreciate what you are saying, and I don't
disagree with you, I am just really, really concerned that
there may not be an answer. And I don't know that it is the
Department of Defense's job. I don't even know how they would
begin to do this, but having listened to all three of you, I
just struggle with, like, okay, so what, if anything, can we do
here?
And I apologize, I am using up a lot of time, but if the
other two witnesses want to respond, I would love to hear your
thoughts as well.
Dr. Lin. I would say, starting with education of the Armed
Forces is a big step forward. Getting the people whose job it
is to protect us and defend the Constitution, teaching them
what it means to do that, getting them some real education,
that is a meaningful step forward----
Mr. Morelle. I am not sure--I mean, I don't mean to
disagree with you. I think that is a great suggestion. We
couldn't even get Members of the House of Representatives to
defend the Constitution this past November against a suggestion
that an election was stolen with no evidence that that is the
case. I am not sure--if we can't get the Congress to do it, I
don't know how we would get members of the United States
military to do it. But again, I don't mean to be argumentative.
I am just frustrated, and I think probably all of you are with
where we find ourselves.
Mr. Gerstell. Congressman Morelle, if I may add to that----
Mr. Morelle. Sure.
Mr. Gerstell [continuing]. I certainly share your
frustration. I suspect probably everyone on both sides of,
metaphorically, of the witness table, so to speak, feels that.
But the Supreme Court has been very clear that Americans have a
First Amendment right to receive foreign disinformation, no
matter how outrageous it is.
Some philosophers talk about the paradox of tolerance,
which is that a society that is very tolerant and open to lots
of views, also potentially has the seeds of its own
destruction, of course, because someone could criticize the
very society. So you are right.
I think the best analogy, just very quickly, is the
cybersecurity one, which is, I think cybersecurity experts will
tell you that at the end of the day, we are probably never
going to be able to completely eliminate cybersecurity attacks
from a sophisticated foreign adversary.
Instead--and we should certainly work on that, but instead,
what we need to do is limit their effectiveness and their
scope. And I think it is the same thing with disinformation. We
are not going to stop it where it starts, overseas, but we can
limit its effectiveness on our soil.
Mr. Morelle. I have well exceeded my time. Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your indulgence, as I am glad you gave the
gentleman an opportunity to answer, and I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Morelle.
Now I would like to recognize Mr. Moore for 5 minutes.
Mr. Moore. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member. It is
clear, and I think I want to just--a sentiment that was given a
few minutes ago, we can't even just keep this with respect to
the Department of Defense. Cyberspace, this threat, is in every
aspect of our lives, from banking, entertainment--I mean,
across the board. So just to emphasize the importance of this,
and when we do think about our defense-related work, our legacy
platforms, our legacy weapons platforms, they still serve a
valuable deterrent.
But electronic warfare and cyber operations are central to
the future fight. I will keep my questions geared towards that,
and making sure we can be thinking about the future. And, so, I
will start with a question to Mr. Gerstell.
We have heard in this committee that the artificial
intelligence capabilities of our adversaries are rapidly
progressing to the point where it can only be combative with
our own AI technologies. Can you just give us some perspective?
Is the United States winning this AI arms race? If not, what
steps need to be taken to increase our competitiveness?
Mr. Gerstell. Sure. Thank you very much, Congressman. I
think the best answer I could give would be to point to
something that has already been alluded to, which is the final
report of the National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence, which has a rich series of recommendations for
our Nation to invest in, ranging from everything from educating
our workforce, to stepping up government investment, working
with the private sector to increase AI, and perhaps--and also,
including a series of laws, ultimately, and recommendations on
limiting the use of AI for beneficial purposes and limiting its
misuse.
So we are in an arms race, so to speak, principally with
China, on the area of artificial intelligence. They are busy
amassing data, including data on Americans, that could be very
significant when coupled with artificial intelligence and
machine learning, and used against us in nefarious ways.
So, we have our work cut out for us. I think there is a
large series of recommendations that I would endorse of the
Commission, and that would be a very, very important step for
us to go down that road.
Mr. Moore. Excellent. Thank you.
On that same topic, Dr. Lin, Chinese and Russian militaries
are structured to integrate information-related capabilities,
and are absent of any genuine oversight, I will say. How can
the DOD refine their current management structure to improve
synchronization of information capabilities, while maintaining
the merits of civilian control of the military, where we, as a
Nation, will always, you know, have proper oversight to the
extent possible, and knowing that we don't always get to fight
against nations that don't value that as much as we do. But is
there improvements that we can make to level the playing field?
Dr. Lin. Well, one of the things that I--certainly one of
the things that I have thought about is, for example, the
distinction that this committee is very well aware of, the
distinction between title 10 and title 50 authorities.
A large part of this game is done in the intelligence
world, sort of in the covert-action world. Systems operations
are often covert, and it is an interesting question as to how--
whether--how and to what extent coordination between title 10
and title 50 authorities, I have heard people say that you
should--we need a title 60, you know, as a combination of the
two, to better coordinate.
It is very hard, as long as we are very concerned about
authorities, to achieve the kind of coordination that you are
talking about. Neither the Chinese, nor the Russians, are
really worrying very much about who has the authority to do
[inaudible]. It is hard to imagine [inaudible] whether
something happens because one branch does it or another branch
does it, but we care a lot about that.
Mr. Moore. Okay. Excellent. Thank you. For a final
question, Ms. Jankowicz, first off, I was touched by your
comments on your dad, and I am sorry to hear that, but I am
sure he is proud of you.
Anything you wanted to highlight in this platform, just on
some of the things that we are doing right, and as meetings
that I have had recently with some of the cyber companies in my
neck of the woods out in Utah, like small business and smaller
operations are being more nimble, is there an opportunity to
leverage those types of more--I guess I will just reuse the
term nimble--organizations to help fight this battle going
forward?
Ms. Jankowicz. Yeah, absolutely. Thank you, Congressman,
and thanks for your comments about my dad.
I mean, I think, finally, the fact that we are recognizing
this problem, that these hearings are happening more frequently
is a good thing. And the fact that this is a bipartisan showing
here in this committee warms my heart frankly, and the
leadership that you all show is really important in setting an
example for your constituents, for the media, for everyone. So
kudos on that.
I do really think we need a central node in the Federal
Government, not only to work on the intelligence issues, which
we heard from ODNI [Office of the Director of National
Intelligence] is going to be happening soon within ODNI, but we
need somebody to be setting policy, and I think that is where
DOD and the GEC, and other bodies in DHS [Department of
Homeland Security], like CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency], for instance, are kind of operating all in
their own spheres. So I would like to see a lot more
coordination.
And on a local level, I think you are absolutely right. We
need to really create and invest in more robust public-private
partnership in this area, not just with the Big Tech firms, but
with local businesses and with civil society organizations.
You know, the most successful programs to counter
disinformation that I have seen around the world have been ones
that invest in those local connections, with local media, local
civil society groups, local libraries, even local influencers
and performers who can go there and deliver an authoritative
message to folks that they are neighbors with, without, you
know, the baggage of it coming from the Federal Government.
So I think we need to think a lot more creatively, a lot
more out of the box, and business, local business, is a great
place to start with that.
Mr. Moore. Thanks for the thoughtful comments, and I yield
back. Thanks for that.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah, thanks, Mr. Chair. I appreciate it.
Greetings from the Pacific Northwest, where you will not be
surprised to know it is raining today. So thanks for the chance
to say hello.
My first question is for Dr. Kirschbaum. I usually embrace
everything the GAO [Government Accountability Office] says. I
want to preface my comments. I do want you to explain a little
bit more on the recommendation. We are moving to criticism
about the delegation that the U.S.--or under the theory defense
policy makes on MISO operations, in particular, to special
operations forces. I think your characterization that special
operations forces focused quote, ``only on special operations
and counterterrorism'' might have been accurate 10 years ago,
is inaccurate today. In fact, there is a bit of a debate going
on about the role special operations needs to play in great
power competition, which, in part, includes information
operations, but specific to special operations.
So can you talk a little bit about how you approach that
particular question, and then relate that to a broader comment
about how the Pentagon is organized? And could you grade that
for us, for information operations?
Dr. Kirschbaum. Mr. Larsen, thank you so much for your
question. So, first, I want to make sure that my comments are
not misunderstood. You are correct that the idea of Military
Information Support Operations, PSYOP. That is exactly where
that user belongs. That is where that specialty is. It is in
special operations, and then the combination for intelligence.
That is true.
The comment that I made really has to do with the decision
by the Department to move information operations writ large
into that space where you have very few people. And I have had
the great opportunity to work with most of those people, and
they get it, they understand what needs to be done. They have
written a lot of the things in the direction that kind of point
the way to where the Department is going. However, I think they
are a little stymied in being able to get traction in the rest
of the Department to look for.
So, for example, when we talk about what you have to do to
kind of inculcate info operations and understanding throughout
the Department. It kind of goes to what Dr. Lin was talking
about, you need a broader, joint understanding. And, so, you
take advantage of those individual specialties, like MISO, you
take advantage of cyber, you take advantage of all these other
things, but you do it in a way that everyone understands how to
integrate that, which is why I said it needs to be integrated,
operationally, into the planning cells for the J-2s, the J-3s,
and the J-5s at all the COCOMs [combatant commands].
In terms of Department leadership, it really doesn't matter
who has got the ball, as long as there is Department-wide
emphasis and momentum. And that is what we have seen lacking.
And depending on a very small number of people to carry the
ball to implement the strategy, to carry out the capabilities
base assessments, to do all the things we have asked them to do
over and over again, it hasn't worked. They haven't got the
traction throughout the Department. They have not gotten the
support they need. That is where the potential for identifying
the principal information operations adviser, keeping it at the
level it is, and then rely on those existing staff, and giving
them the support is hopefully the way to make that stick.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah, maybe when either this subcommittee or
the full committee has an opportunity to talk to Under
Secretary of Defense [for] Policy Kahl about his view on this
now that he has been approved by the Senate, or by the Senate,
we can have a chance to talk to him.
I noted that the clock didn't start exactly on time, but it
was adjusted, so I will assume I do have a minute 40 left, and
go to Ms. Jankowicz.
Because the Pentagon is the Pentagon, and because it has to
operate outside, not inside, the country, how should we look at
fitting the Pentagon IO function in this largely--in a larger
coordinated fashion with other government operations?
Ms. Jankowicz. Thank you, Congressman. I think the
important thing here, again, is the central node. So taking
under account the defense intelligence gathering that is going
on, sharing that in the interagency, making sure that
priorities out in the field in our areas of conflict are lined
up with what the Department of State is doing in their
programming. And then again, I think the Department of Defense
has an opportunity to really be the laboratory for educating
the Federal workforce about information operations. They are
certainly a targeting bio. Their families are. And there have
been multiple studies about catfishing and other things against
the Armed Forces.
So, educate them and then roll that out more broadly to the
rest of the Federal workforce. And I think it is the biggest
opportunity that the Department of Defense has with this
challenge.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah, good, thanks. Thank you very much. And
thank you, Chair Langevin. I appreciate it very much. I will
yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
Let's see, Mr. Fallon, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Fallon.
Mr. Fallon. Can you hear me? Sorry.
Mr. Langevin. Yeah go, ahead.
Mr. Fallon. Oh, wonderful. Thank you. I wonder if the panel
can answer some questions. One of which is, amongst rule of law
Jeffersonian democracies in the world, what countries are the
gold standard? [Inaudible] emulating vis-a-vis cyber
disinformation?
Ms. Jankowicz. Well, I can jump in there, Congressman. In
my research I look at a number of countries in Central and
Eastern Europe, again, that have been dealing with this for
decades now. Estonia is one I always like to bring up. Of
course, it is quite a small country, only 1.3 million people.
But in 2007, they were hit with a cyber attack as well as what
I call beta disinformation, pre-social media, at the hands of
the Russians that caused a riot, that caused one person to die.
And the cyber attack, of course, took down their banking as is
well known, and many of their other E-governance operations in
Estonia.
And that was a real wake-up call, along with kind of a
reinvigoration during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. And as
a result, the Estonian Government is really invested in cyber
operations, they have invested in Russian language media, to
reach out to that disenfranchised population. And they have
invested in really building trust between the Estonian
Government and the ethnic Russian population there.
And I think that is a great model for a whole-of-society, a
whole-of-government solution. And if fluffy little Estonia can
do it, I think that the United States of America should be able
to do something similar as well.
Dr. Lin. I was just going to say that Finland also is
another example of whole-[inaudible]-country, whole-
[inaudible]-society approach to disinformation. They have been
dealing with it for a lot longer than most of the other
countries in the world. And they emphasize this throughout
society, and it is very much a part of their educational
regime.
Mr. Fallon. Is it fair to say that Russia is the most
adroit at this, or is China catching up, or are they on par?
Dr. Lin. Different people have different judgements about
that. I think the Russians are most pernicious because they--it
is easier to tear down stuff than it is to build something up.
And the Russians are extraordinarily good at tearing stuff
down. And the Chinese are getting there, but for my money, it
is the Russian threat that I am most concerned about right now.
Mr. Fallon. I think the Russians had 600 years of practice
in that regard. What are we doing as far as offensively to
combat this? Because we don't need to--we just need to get out
information in a lot of ways when we are talking about
totalitarian regimes and giving it to their people. Are we
taking specific--because you know, the old adage is the best
offense--or the best defense is a good offense. Are you all
aware of efforts that we have that we are making, and do we
need to focus more on that as well?
Dr. Lin. I just had a little bit in my written testimony. I
think that the biggest policy question that we have to--that we
have to address as a country, is how and to what extent, if at
all, we should be adopting the techniques of the Russians in
prosecuting information for their offense. I am going to point
out that our offensive information worker efforts don't help
defend the United States, and defense information warfare can
only influence other populations.
Do we want to adopt the tactics of the Russians in this? I
am very uncomfortable about that as an American citizen. On the
other hand, it is pretty clear that speaking the truth, just
the truth, doesn't work very well. And Americans believe that
speaking truth, that the truth will eventually win. Maybe
eventually, but it sure doesn't--there is good evidence that it
doesn't always win in the short term. And how far are we
willing to go down that path? That is a very tough policy
question that is way above my pay grade to answer.
Mr. Fallon. Do you believe, the panel believe, that forming
an information command would be something that we should
explore?
Dr. Kirschbaum. Mr. Fallon, this is Joe Kirschbaum. So I am
not sure a command is necessary. The reason that your question
piqued my interest is I remember more than 10 years ago, before
Cyber Command was stood up, I remember having a conversation
with someone in the Department of Defense, and someone asked me
and said, What would be your biggest surprise after we are--
eventually stand up this U.S. Cyber Command? You know, however
many years from now, and I forget what they asked me. And my
answer to them was, my number one surprise would be if it is
still called U.S. Cyber Command, because of the nature, you
know, what we are talking now, the information environment
involves so much more, and cyber is a part of it.
So people have argued for, in fact, that maybe Cyber
Command should be expanded. We are agnostic on that. We,
obviously, don't have an opinion on that. But those are the
kind of things to think about. It's, on the one hand, too broad
to be just one organization, but you definitely got to make
sure that everyone understands what that breadth means, and who
is involved, and get them working the correct way. That is more
important than establishing an organization.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much. The gentleman's time has
expired.
Mr. Khanna is recognized now for 5 minutes.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all
of the panelists for your testimony. Many of you have spoken
about the importance of the United States maintaining our
strategic advantage in AI and in industries of the future. I
wonder if any of the panelists have followed the bipartisan
effort that Senator Schumer, Senator Young, Representative
Gallagher, and I [have undertaken] with the Endless Frontiers
Act, which would put $100 billion over 5 years in the National
Science Foundation, and create a technology directorate to make
sure America is collaborating with the private sector to lead
in the industries of the future, a bipartisan bill that has six
Republican Senators, a number of Republicans and Democrats on
in the House. And I wonder if any of the panelists have
comments about the importance of that legislation?
Mr. Gerstell. Congressman, I would simply say that that is
exactly the part of the effort that we talk about when we say
we need a whole-of-society effort. And the National Commission
on Artificial Intelligence, to which we have made many
allusions, certainly, underscore the need for a highly trained
and skilled workforce. And the legislation that you just
described would be a significant step in that direction.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence in its
Global Trends 2040 Report, talking about what future scenarios
would look like, made great reference to the fact that it would
be critically important for our country to have a really
skilled workforce to be able to deal with the challenges of the
digital revolution. So anything we can do in that regard is
clearly going to have very significant dividends. That by
itself isn't going to stop disinformation, no one suggests that
it would, but it is part of the overall solution.
Mr. Khanna. Let me ask you this: I was reading--I am going
to ask two different questions. I read the report that Eric
Schmidt and others did on the National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence. So, I think one of the critical points
in there is that right now, the AI traditionally has--it
requires voluminous data. But when you are a child and you are
learning, let's say, the word ``dog,'' it is not like we put
give a child thousands of data points or pictures of dogs. They
see a few dogs, and they learn the word ``dog,'' which suggests
that the human mind is far more complex and sophisticated than
current AI. And there is work being done at MIT [Massachusetts
Institute of Technology] and other places to try to understand
how the human mind actually comprehends with probabilistic
modeling that would allow AI to operate without voluminous
data.
Could you speak to how much of a comparative advantage that
would be over China, given that China has a data advantage if
we are able to have AI that doesn't require as much data?
Mr. Gerstell. I am not sure I have the expertise on that
particular topic. I don't know if the other panelists do.
Dr. Lin. I know enough about that to be dangerous. So
please don't take my word as gospel. It is definitely worth an
inquiry. I will just point out that the Chinese are aware of
this, too, and they also understand the importance of
understanding the neurophysiology of the human brain.
And, so, I think that to assume that we could go down that
path and the Chinese wouldn't, I think doesn't work. It is true
that the Chinese have many data advantages, in some ways, and
other places we have better data advantages. But to assume that
the Chinese aren't aware of the importance of neurophysiology
and so on in the human brain, I think is probably not correct.
Mr. Khanna. We always have good insight. And I wasn't
suggesting that China was unaware of--well, I do think leading
research is being done in the U.S., but more that the data
advantage that China has is enormous if we don't have
alternative innovations.
The final question I have is, I don't know if any of the
panelists have studied what Finland has done. I was reading
somewhere that they have this extraordinary intervention at the
age of 6, because the Russian disinformation campaign was a big
problem there. And that this digital literacy campaign has,
presumably, or at least from what I have read, worked in having
a more informed citizenry that doesn't fall for disinformation.
A, is that true? Are any of you familiar with the program in
Finland? And, B, do you have any ideas of what digital literacy
would look like in the United States?
Ms. Jankowicz. I am happy to take that one, Congressman.
Yes, absolutely, that is true. It was not only on Comedy
Central with Samantha B, but there are many academic studies of
this as well. And the program starts as early as 5, actually,
with students getting exposure to what is an ad versus what is
your Saturday morning cartoon? So, really, not just media
literacy, but general informational awareness.
And I would say the United States needs to go one step
farther when we are talking information literacy. We often
think about this as something that we can fairly easily, even
given our federal education system, do in schools. But I would
say we need to reach voting age adults as well. And how can we
do that? I mentioned libraries before. Libraries maintain a
very high level of trust across partisan divides in the United
States. We have a lot of them. They are looking for their
raison de'etre in the 21st century. And I think this is a great
vehicle to deliver this sort of training.
In the Czech Republic, they have a similar program. I like
to call this the peas-in-the-mashed-potatoes approach. It is
targeted at elderly people, teaching them how to use their cell
phones or iPads to Facetime their grandchildren, just basic
computer skills. But they also sneak in some information
literacy in there. And that, again, gets to the need to be
creative with these sorts of approaches and think outside of--
outside of our normal education national security boxes.
But the most important thing, not only having a nonpartisan
messenger, but the curriculum itself needs to be nonpartisan,
and make sure that we are giving the people tools that they
need to support the information that they are trying to gather,
to make decisions at the ballot box, to, you know, make
economic decisions, et cetera. It shouldn't be motivated by any
partisan agenda.
Mr. Khanna. Well, thank you. I would look forward to
working with you and maybe in a bipartisan way. I think that
would be a very worthy project for the Congress, in a
bipartisan way, if we can design a form of digital literacy for
students and adults. And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back my
time.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Khanna.
Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is really for any
of the panelists. You know, it is crucial for our Nation to
have our own robust, offensive information operations
capabilities in place to influence adversary actions, deceive
enemies, and to try to stay ahead of the adversarial decision
making in times of war. What role do you feel is proper for the
military in this area?
Dr. Kirschbaum. So, Mrs. Bice, the Department of Defense
really--it is, at its heart, is an operational military role.
So at the operational level of war, you know, it is below the
strategic level. That is primarily what we have been looking
at, what we are talking about. How to make sure that everyone
at the combatant command level, the commander understands, as
he or she is working with partners at the ambassador level, or
regional allies and partners, understands what we are trying to
achieve, and to get that done. So those are campaigns that we
talked about that are taking place below the threshold around
conflict all the time. The military has--that is the primary
thing that we are talking here in terms of what the military's
role is.
Now, that whole-of-government approach that bring it up a
level, strategy, where does the United States fit in with its
allies and partners? That is a much broader--that whole-of-
government, whole-of-society. In this case, the Department
should plug in to whatever efforts are being done and led out
of places like the State Department or whatever organizations
get created in the future. You know, during the Cold War, we
had the United States Information Agency that organized a lot
of those things; that orchestrated large campaigns to support
information for our allies, our partners, and beyond into the
Iron Curtain, for example. That is a huge undertaking that no
longer exists. That is gone. That has been swept away. And we
can't necessarily just recreate it, nor should we, but we think
about how we do that. And the military would plug in to those
efforts in addition to maintaining its own battlefield
capabilities.
Mrs. Bice. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Is there any member on that hasn't
been recognized yet that wants to be recognized?
I think we have gotten to everybody.
Okay. With that, I just want to thank our witnesses for
your testimony today. It has been very insightful and very
helpful to our work. I know that I had additional questions,
and other members may have additional questions that we would
like to submit for the record. If you could respond to those,
it would be very helpful as well.
So with that, again, thank you to our witnesses. I deeply
value your expertise and your contributions to this important
conversation in helping us to understand and get our arms
around these challenges. With that, the hearing stands
adjourned. Have a great weekend, everyone.
[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 30, 2021
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 30, 2021
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 30, 2021
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. I am disheartened by the dramatic drop in the public's
trust and confidence in the U.S. military from 70% to 56% that you
point out in your written testimony, Mr. Gerstell. Trust between the
people and the military is vital to a democratic nation and to the
health of an All-Volunteer Force. While this drop in confidence may be
influenced by external disinformation, do you believe service members'
own social media activity, personal or professional, may play a role in
negatively impacting the public's views on the military? Are there
policy recommendations you would make to the services to ensure the
U.S. military retains the public's trust without impeding troops'
freedom of speech?
Mr. Gerstell. Thank you Representative Moulton for the opportunity
to respond to your questions. I am not an expert on military matters so
I will address this from the point of view of a former national
security official who has studied online disinformation generally. As
you know, a number of academicians, cyber researchers and think tanks
have sought to determine the extent to which trust in societal
institutions can be undermined--and thus democracy corroded--by
disinformation and the corresponding expression of extremist views.
Surveys indicate that reinforcing and amplifying factors play a key
role in instilling and confirming hateful or erroneous beliefs in
people exposed to extremist speech and false information. The identity
of the communicators spreading the speech disinformation and
corroboration and enhancement by opinion leaders are all factors in
promoting the ``effectiveness'' of extremist speech and disinformation.
It thus stands to reason that when the general public sees social media
posts by members of the military espousing hateful or extremist
positions that are aligned with what the public might be predisposed to
accept based on prior exposure to disinformation from non-military
sources, it inevitably combines to shape the public's view of the
military. That type of reinforcing and corroborating action has a
potent effect on influencing what people believe. In short, it's hard
to believe that social media posts (positive and negative) by members
of the military don't have any effect on the public's perception of our
armed forces. As you note, it is of course vital that our military
enjoys the strong approval and trust of the American public, for
purposes of recruiting, assistance to veterans and obviously support in
times when our troops are in harm's way. Social media activity by
members of the military that do not reflect well on that institution
can have an insidious and ultimately pernicious effect on this level of
needed approval and trust. Countering problematic speech is difficult
given how strongly our nation prizes freedom of speech, and it is
sometimes hard to draw the line between improper hateful expressions
that should be curtailed for the good of society, and merely
distasteful if not repugnant opinions. But the mere fact that it's
difficult to draw the line doesn't mean we should abandon any effort in
this regard. Indeed, we have legal room to maneuver in this area; the
law allows stricter regulation of the armed services than the general
public, and the First Amendment is not absolute (to be clear, this is
not to suggest any diminution of the latter's scope). Secretary
Austin's stand-down day was an important substantive as well as
symbolic step, and clearly the military can do more with internal
training and education. But many young men and women come to the
military with little knowledge of how our government works or the
underlying values upon which our democracy was founded, because of the
almost total dearth of civic education in high school and lower grades.
Fixing that problem alone would help minimize extremism in the
military.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Gerstell, you have advocated for an integrated
disinformation center within the Federal Government, aligning the many
departments and agencies that have a role in information digital
communications and creating a central node for responsibility over this
issue. The NSCAI has made a similar recommendation. Can you describe in
more detail what you envision this center to look like? What
authorities or capabilities would this center need to be effective?
Mr. Gerstell. Representative Moulton, the establishment of an
integrated ``disinformation'' center, bring together all relevant parts
of the federal government as well as the private sector, is one of the
most crucial steps we can take in tackling the problem of
disinformation.
While purely domestically generated disinformation is indeed a
problem, it is made much worse by amplification and expansion by
foreign adversaries that exploit the natural divisions in our society;
and of course, those foreign parties themselves are often the initial
source of the disinformation. Thus, my comments below will focus on
foreign-propelled disinformation.
To determine how best to counter foreign disinformation, we need to
first understand how our foreign adversaries create and spread
disinformation. Those adversaries, especially Russia and China, engage
in coordinated, integrated disinformation campaigns involving many
elements of their governments. For example, when China decided to push
the falsehood that its system of government was more successful at
fighting the COVID19 pandemic than ``weak, corrupt Western
governments,'' the messaging started at the top, from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and was disseminated in a concerted way through the
Twitter accounts of over 130 Chinese diplomats stationed around the
world; Chinese-controlled news media and websites picked up the line
and spread it too, and then seemingly corroborated it with further
postings on social media and secondary news stories about how the
message was reverberating around the globe. Russia's disinformation
campaigns fomented by the GRU and other organs of the Russian state are
if anything even more coordinated, so as to create the impression of an
overwhelming number of ``independent'' news sources and social media
accounts all espousing the Russian disinformation. In addition to
creating inauthentic Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts owned by
false personas (often with AI-generated fake profile pictures), the
Russians might also enlist private sector proxies, such as the Internet
Research Agency in St. Petersburg, to further promote the Russian
falsehoods. The Russians careful monitor our domestic social media,
seizing tendentious statements, conspiracy theories, and outright
falsehoods, and then amplify and elaborate on them through their
integrated disinformation machine.
This system of whole-of-government campaigns to promote online
malicious disinformation is so different from our American values and
the way our government operates abroad, that we have difficulty in
appreciating the effectiveness of our adversaries' endeavors. And yet,
to be successful in countering it, we must be equally integrated, and
not regard online disinformation as a one-off expression on a
particular social media account, or as something that can be simply
rebutted with a press release from a government agency.
Thus, to fully apprehend, let alone effectively counter, the scope
of foreign disinformation aimed at us, we need the active cooperation
of the major social media platforms, the intelligence community and law
enforcement to share current information about the sources and scale of
disinformation campaigns. Artificial intelligence can clearly play a
major role here in analyzing massive amounts of data on social media,
combining information about foreign cyber activity from government and
private sector sources, and in other ways assisting in the overall
effort to identify and respond to disinformation. We would then be able
to rebut falsehoods at an earlier stage, and that would entail
consistent messaging from the White House, the State Department, the
Departments of Defense, Justice and others. Our federal government has
historically been reluctant to correct errors circulating in news
media, let alone social media (partly out of First Amendment concerns
and the restricted role of government relative to the private sector).
But the efforts, for example, of the Department of Homeland Security in
rebutting false claims--both domestic and foreign-sourced--of election
fraud in last year's elections show how the federal government can make
its voice heard in impactful ways. Moreover, if the federal government
provides more detailed information to the news media, think tanks,
cyber researchers and the like, they can be part of a national effort
to stem disinformation.
While it is possible that some additional legal authorities may be
needed on the margins (for example, mandatory reporting by private
sector companies of foreign cyber maliciousness), the reality is that
we can make much progress now, without new legislation, if the
executive branch makes this a high priority and directs agencies to
work together in a coherent way. Among other things, the intelligence
community should be told that disinformation is a higher priority
national security threat, additional resources should be dedicated for
that purpose, and a greater effort can be made to declassify relevant
information to assist social media companies in identifying and
stopping foreign online malice.
These steps by the federal government, working with the private
sector, are within our grasp and will help reduce the scope and
influence of online disinformation. Obviously, the problem is complex,
and other societal elements such as more civic education must be part
of an overall solution--but the federal government can and should take
the first critical steps now.
Mr. Moulton. While I am concerned about military readiness,
disinformation is clearly not just a military problem. As we face
increasing efforts to mislead the American public and sow distrust and
disunity, we see social media companies dodge substantive efforts to
block disinformation's spread. If disinformation is not or cannot be
eliminated, how would you advise we instead make ourselves harder
targets? Ms. Jankowicz, you advise bringing local and Federal
Government entities in health and education into the discussion. Can
you describe in more detail how these departments and agencies might
contribute to increased public digital literacy, which is clearly a
matter of national security in addition to public health and public
safety?
Ms. Jankowicz. Thank you for the question, Mr. Moulton. Building
societal resilience at home is one of the most important aspects of
responding to disinformation. Our adversaries use pre-existing fissures
in our society--such as economic inequality, systemic racism, and hot-
button issues like gun rights--to drive us further apart. Their efforts
are amplified by broad-based misunderstandings of how the traditional
and social media ecosystem operates. It can be difficult for national
institutions to deliver resonant messages to the most vulnerable
populations, however. Those that already distrust government are
unlikely to be convinced by a public service announcement encouraging
them to ``take care before they share.'' This is where local government
can play a critical role in building awareness of the tools and tactics
of disinformation and building information literacy and civics more
broadly. They can also serve as the connective tissue between funding
sources and the organizations best positioned to deliver such
interventions. I emphasize bringing state and local departments of
health, education, arts, as well as local libraries to the forefront of
America's counter-disinformation effort, because they know their local
communities, their vulnerabilities, and the issues important to them
best. In my research in Central and Eastern Europe, I have come across
several local initiatives built on such bespoke local expertise. They
include:
In Estonia, where ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers
are vulnerable to Kremlin-backed disinformation, the Integration
Foundation offers free courses in Estonian language, cultural
activities, and consultations about citizenship requirements both in
Tallinn and Narva, a city on the border with Russia, where much of the
ethnic Russian population is concentrated.
In the Czech Republic, recognizing that the elderly are
particularly susceptible to disinformation but hesitant to engage with
counter disinformation programming, organizations attempting to build
media literacy in the local population offered basic computer literacy
training (such as how to use FaceTime to stay in touch with your
grandchildren) and snuck in basic information literacy tenets to the
curriculum. I call this the ``peas in the mashed potatoes'' approach.
In the Republic of Georgia, one organization trains
artists (singers, actors, musicians, comedians) from outside of the
capital, Tbilisi, in recognizing and responding to disinformation. The
artists then travel to their home region and put on a show
incorporating what they've learned. This is ``infotainment'' at its
best, delivered by influencers with credibility in an engaging and
accessible format.
In the United States, state and local governments might fund
similar programs. They could develop information literacy curricula to
be delivered by local librarians (still highly trusted across the
political spectrum). They might identify local civil society groups to
partner with influencers with connections to the locality to act as
trusted third-party messengers. In times of health emergencies, rampant
democratic vulnerabilities, or developing public safety issues, such
trusted conduits can be invaluable in getting authoritative information
out to the public. It is important to recognize this approach is, by
necessity, long-term. As I often remark, we cannot fact-check our way
out of the crisis of truth and trust in which we find ourselves. But we
can slowly build citizens' ability to recognize disinformation and
introduce friction into the sharing process. Just like most Americans
now know to ignore spam emails from purported Nigerian princes
promising to make them millionaires, we can train them to spot and
resist sharing the dubious information they encounter online. I am
including several links to other writing I have done on this topic
below. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on these important
issues.
Mr. Moulton. A third of troops have reportedly declined the Covid
vaccine, undermining our troops' readiness well before we have entered
into conflict. As I wrote in a recent Time magazine op-ed, this issue
has demonstrated the ability of targeted disinformation campaigns to
undermine troops' confidence in the emerging science and technology
that underpin national security. How do you advise we protect troops
from ongoing targeted disinformation campaigns and protect military
readiness?
Dr. Lin. I agree entirely with your position that disinformation
can be (and is indeed sometimes) a threat to military readiness.
However, the DOD is not in a position to protect troops from all
sources of disinformation, simply because everyone, including troops,
can obtain information from multiple sources. That said, the DOD does
have control over a variety of information sources to which the troops
may be exposed.
For example, cable television is available on many if not all
bases. One could reasonably ask the question--which cable TV channels
(or shows carried on those channels) broadcast large amounts of
disinformation that are relevant to national security? For example, DOD
would be fully within its prerogatives to forbid military bases from
carrying RT (formerly Russia Today) on cable TV--and indeed, I have no
knowledge that RT is carried on cable TV at any U.S. military base. But
certain domestic cable channels have also carried programming with
disinformation that threatens national security, such as disinformation
related to Covid vaccines--and DOD has no obligation to make those
channels (or shows) available on military bases either, even though
off-base, everyone, including troops, has the right to access them as
they see fit.
The same goes for Internet access provided on base. To the extent
that the troops use DOD facilities to access the Internet, there is no
reason that DOD should not block access sites that are known to provide
substantial amounts of disinformation that threaten national security,
even though DOD cannot forbid the troops from accessing such sites
using their own resources (such as personal smart phones that they pay
for themselves).
Both of these measures regarding cable TV and internet access on
base require DOD to determine the nature of disinformation that is
threatening to national security and to identify the channels and sites
that are the most common purveyors of such disinformation. This will be
an ongoing challenge rather than an assessment that can be done once
and then left alone.
Such measures alone will not make a substantial dent in the problem
that you describe. Over the longer term, I refer back to my testimony
in which I call for DOD to take a more active role in training the
troops on what it means to support and defend the Constitution against
all enemies, foreign and domestic. Such training presupposes an ability
to engage in critical thought and to have information literacy skills,
and to the extent that these skills need to be strengthened in the
troops, DOD has an obligation to address them in its training efforts.
Mr. Moulton. Dr. Kirschbaum, it is my understanding that each of
the services defines information warfare in varying ways, and therefore
staffs and plans for information warfare differently. Does this limit
our ability to effectively execute information warfare in a joint
environment?
Dr. Kirschbaum. There are indeed differences in how the services
define and use terms related to operations in the information
environment. The term ``information warfare'' technically is no longer
part of joint doctrine and hasn't been since 2006. In its former
definition, it covered activities DOD would need to perform to
influence the actions of adversaries as well as the protection of our
own information. It had both offensive and defensive elements. However,
the context for its place in joint doctrine suggested that information
warfare was something done in the early phases of a crisis or conflict.
In other words, the perception might be that information warfare was
something done only when there was a war. The broader term
``information operations,'' on the other hand, had accepted that such
activities could occur in peace and war. Some services or individuals
continue to use the term ``information warfare.'' The U.S. Navy, for
example, has embraced the term in naval doctrine while also recognizing
how its' sister services (U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard) use
different terms and definitions (Operations in the Information
Environment and Information Operations, respectively). The Navy's term
implies more of a wartime set of activities, while the other terms
imply broader application. But there is significant overlap. As we have
discussed in this hearing, one of the fundamental challenges we face
today is that activities, competition, and conflict are occurring every
day globally. Our adversaries have prepared for this and view the
information environment as a useful arena to pursue and secure their
interests while degrading our own. This is particularly true in the
area short of armed conflict (often referred to as the ``gray zone'').
Our adversaries operate freely in this space as we struggle to define
the lines between peace and war where there may be none. While there is
a large degree of generality and vagueness to the idea of the
information environment, it is important to avoid confusion between the
services and, more importantly, among combatant commanders about the
importance of the information environment and our ability to operate
effectively--in offense or defense. These definitions and other lexicon
issues must be addressed if DOD is going to develop a cohesive,
holistic, and joint strategy for Information (as a joint function); the
Information Environment (i.e. current battle space); and activities,
capabilities, operations, and security functions that will be employed
in that battlespace. It is our understanding that officials within DOD
understand this--as they have tried to thread this needle for years
while struggling to update the 2016 DOD Strategy for Operations in the
Information Environment. This will be an important part of the
department's ongoing discussions about the right terms and the right
context to ensure that the entire joint force can adequately plan for,
and operate, in the information environment every single day.
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