    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    .

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 117-25]

                           TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION

                            WARFARE: THE COMPETITION

                             FOR INFLUENCE AND THE

                             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE
                    TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 APRIL 30, 2021

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    44-945                     WASHINGTON : 2021

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

                   JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman

    RICK LARSEN, Washington              JIM BANKS, Indiana
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    RO KHANNA, California                MO BROOKS, Alabama
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MATT GAETZ, Florida
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania,      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
        Vice Chair                       C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
    JASON CROW, Colorado                 BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
    ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             PAT FALLON, Texas
    VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
    JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York

                             Troy Nienberg, Counsel
                    Chris Vieson, Professional Staff Member
                             Caroline Kehrli, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
      Chairman, Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and
      Information Systems............................................     1
    Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and
      Information Systems............................................     4

                                   WITNESSES

    Gerstell, Glenn S., Senior Adviser, International Security
      Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies........     5
    Jankowicz, Nina, Disinformation Fellow, Wilson Center............     7
    Kirschbaum, Joseph W., Director, Defense Capabilities and
      Management Team, Government Accountability Office..............    11
    Lin, Herbert, Senior Research Scholar, Center for International
      Security and Cooperation, Stanford University..................     9

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Gerstell, Glenn S............................................    34
        Jankowicz, Nina..............................................    47
        Kirschbaum, Joseph W.........................................    80
        Langevin, Hon. James R.......................................    31
        Lin, Herbert.................................................    60

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Moulton..................................................   107

                      TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION WARFARE:

          THE COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
           Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and
                                           Information Systems,
                                Washington, DC, Friday, April 30, 2021.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:04 p.m., via
    Webex, Hon. James R. Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee)
    presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
    FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE
                 TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

        Mr. Langevin. Good afternoon, everyone. The subcommittee
    will come to order. First of all, just some housekeeping
    business that I need to take care of, since this is a remote
    hearing.
        I would like to welcome the members who are joining today's
    remote hearing, which, I believe, is just about everybody.
        Members who are joining must be visible onscreen for the
    purposes of identity verification, establishing and maintaining
    a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and voting. Those
    members must continue to use the software platform's video
    function while in attendance unless they experience
    connectivity issues or other technical problems that render
    them unable to participate on camera.
        If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should
    contact the committee staff for assistance.
        A video of members' participation will be broadcast via the
    television internet feeds.
        Members participating remotely must seek recognition
    verbally, and they are asked to mute their microphones when
    they are not speaking.
        Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep
    the software platform's video function on the entire time they
    attend the proceeding.
        Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If members
    depart for a short while for reasons other than joining a
    different proceeding, they should leave the video function on.
        If members will be absent for a significant period or
    depart to join a different proceeding, they should exit the
    software platform entirely, and then rejoin if they return.
        Members may use the software platform's chat feature to
    communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical
    support issues only.
        Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
    necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
    inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
        So with the technical announcements out of the way, I am
    just going to now give my opening statement.
        First of all, I want to say welcome to our hearing today on
    the Technology and Information Warfare: The Competition for
    Influence and the Department of Defense. I want to thank
    Ranking Member Stefanik for joining me in holding the hearing
    today.
        I would also like to thank our witnesses for appearing
    today. To discuss technology-enabled information warfare as a
    national security threat, we welcome Mr. Glenn Gerstell, senior
    adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
    and Ms. Nina Jankowicz, disinformation fellow at the Wilson
    Center. And to provide insight on the Pentagon's information
    operation strategy and leadership, we are joined by Dr. Herb
    Lin, senior research scholar at Stanford University. And
    finally, Dr. Joseph ``Joe'' Kirschbaum, Director, Defense
    Capabilities and Management Team at the Government
    Accountability Office.
        First of all, I want to say, Dr. Kirschbaum, welcome back,
    and I want to thank you all for appearing today. It is an honor
    to have you here, and truly it is an esteemed panel.
        So, the United States is challenged in the information
    environment daily. Competitors like China, Russia, and violent
    extremist organizations use information warfare to achieve
    their objectives, while--below the threshold of armed conflict,
    as they seek to avoid traditional U.S. military advantages, and
    undermine the free international order and democratic values.
        The recently released Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S.
    intelligence community makes clear that a variety of state and
    non-state actors weaponize information to undermine the United
    States by sowing discord among our citizens, influencing
    decision makers, and reversing what had once been a strength of
    our Nation's historical information advantage.
        So, I often focus on what lies ahead in defense, but it is
    worth noting that the United States and the military are facing
    momentous challenges in the information environment right now,
    which can undermine the very fabric of our democracy.
        And what makes these threats particularly powerful is that
    foreign adversaries can target U.S. and allied citizens almost
    instantly without crossing physical boundaries or borders.
    These threats will only grow as artificial intelligence,
    machine learning, and other technology-enabled information
    operations exponentially increase the speed and the scope of
    the danger.
        So according to the National Security Commission on
    Artificial Intelligence, state adversaries are employing
    artificial intelligence-enabled disinformation attacks to sow
    division in democracies and disrupt the public's sense of
    reality.
        But how to confront these national security challenges is a
    difficult question. So I believe the Nation must respond
    forcefully to deter bad actors in the information domain,
    invest in robust U.S. public diplomacy, and educate the public
    and our service members about these dangers.
        We must also articulate a vision for the information
    environment and delineate thresholds of behavior that will
    trigger a response.
        So I was sort of encouraged when the National Security
    Commission on Artificial Intelligence recommended that the
    United States develop a new strategy to counter disinformation
    while investing in technology to counter artificial
    intelligence-enabled information warfare.
        And I am also looking forward to the insight our witnesses
    will provide on how to address these threats.
        Likewise, we will explore how the Department of Defense is
    organized to compete in the information environment, including
    cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, military information support
    operations, deception, and operational security.
        The military is challenged, in the information environment,
    by capable adversaries--make no mistake about it--and
    Department of Defense priorities must reflect this reality. The
    Pentagon has a critical role in protecting the Nation, our
    partners, and our allies from threats in the information
    environment, and in advancing our national interests in this
    sphere.
        Recognizing this, Congress and this committee have
    continuously pushed the Department to prioritize adapting to
    the weaponized information environment, including by creating
    the principal information operations adviser.
        Yet, I am concerned the Department leadership has been slow
    to adapt to the changing nature of warfare in this domain. To
    give an example, in 2020, 9 of the then 11 four-star combatant
    commanders wrote a memorandum asking for additional support for
    their information operations.
        They wrote, and I quote, ``We continue to miss
    opportunities to clarify truth, counter distortions, puncture
    false narratives, and influence events in time to make a
    difference,'' close quote.
        I couldn't agree more. Too often, it appears, the
    Department's information-related capabilities are stovepiped
    centers of excellence with varied management and leadership
    structures which makes critical coordination more difficult.
        Further, the Pentagon has made limited progress
    implementing the 2016 Operations in the Information Environment
    Strategy, which raises questions about the Department's
    information operations leadership structure.
        So with that, these are challenging questions without easy
    answers, I know that. But I hope my colleagues will take
    advantage of the impressive array of witnesses that we have
    before us to get a little clarity and a clear path forward
    after this hearing.
        So with that, I will now turn to Ranking Member Stefanik
    for her opening remarks. Elise, you are recognized.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
    Appendix on page 31.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
        YORK, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE
                 TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Langevin, and thank you
    to our witnesses for testifying today. Information warfare is
    one of the most complex and important missions undertaken by
    the Department of Defense, especially in the 21st century
    information age.
        From large-scale, conventional conflicts of the past to the
    modern-day, gray-zone conflicts of today, information
    operations have been critical to shaping the operating
    environment and weakening our adversaries' strategic position.
        Eroding the resilience of our target adversaries, while
    also winning the hearts and minds, remains the ultimate
    objective of information operations. As a former senior adviser
    to the Secretary of Defense, Robert Riley, said, quote,
    ``Ultimate victory comes when the enemy speaks your language,
    and embraces your idea,'' end quote.
        Unfortunately, we know our adversaries are not embracing
    our ideas. Instead, China, Russia, Iran, and non-state actors
    alike, are weaponizing information to undermine the United
    States and our interests, employing asymmetric information
    capabilities, rather than engaging us in traditional military
    means.
        Therefore, we must be prepared to not just resist
    information operations and defend our interests, but also
    project our own capabilities to exploit and shape the
    information environment.
        Today's information and media ecosystem is significantly
    different than the past, with exponential advancements in
    technology allowing words and ideas to spread faster and wider
    than ever before.
        In the last decade, we have seen how a short video, photo,
    or social media post, can have a profound impact on the
    geopolitical landscape.
        Going forward, international competition, diplomacy, and
    military operations will be increasingly based on human-centric
    networks and patterns. Fortunately, our military and
    intelligence community recognize this, and both are adapting to
    this landscape and the information in which we live.
        Congress has given clear authorities to DOD [Department of
    Defense] to conduct information operations, and we expect the
    Department to use those authorities effectively. As such, we
    can no longer just rely solely on our special operations forces
    to conduct these operations. This must be a comprehensive
    approach by the DOD, the services, and combatant commands, to
    ensure our messages are effective in achieving our objective to
    positively shape the operating environment.
        Two years ago, Congress required the Department to conduct
    a review of its information operation strategy. However, we are
    still awaiting this review and briefing.
        This subcommittee, in particular, with jurisdiction over
    cyber and artificial intelligence, is uniquely suited to
    support the Department's information operations. Yet without
    the proper review and information from DOD, it is difficult to
    appropriately support this priority.
        Congress has also created the position of the principal
    information operations adviser, so the Department would have a
    single person overseeing military information support
    operations, or MISO, efforts.
        Unfortunately, this position was layered below the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy, contrary to congressional
    intent. This position was not created as another bureaucratic
    layer, but as an agile single role with the mandate to guide
    each service's efforts.
        We must also act on the recommendations from the AI
    [artificial intelligence] commission and invest in technologies
    to combat AI-enabled information threats, as well as increase
    coordination with the State Department's Global Engagement
    Center to counter foreign propaganda targeted towards the
    United States.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how DOD can
    organize information operations to be more coherent, nimble,
    agile, and effective, and how the Department and the IC
    [intelligence community] can work together to enhance MISO
    efforts.
        Likewise, we must continue to discuss the critical
    defensive roles DOD can play to protect the information
    environment as our adversaries continue to wage a persistent
    information war on our interests abroad, and our citizens here
    at home.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ranking Member Stefanik.
        With that, I will now turn to our witnesses. We will now
    hear from Mr. Glenn Gerstell. Mr. Gerstell served as the
    National Security Agency general counsel from 2015 to 2020, is
    now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies.
        Mr. Gerstell, you are now recognized to summarize your
    testimony for 5 minutes, and thank you for appearing today.

     STATEMENT OF GLENN S. GERSTELL, SENIOR ADVISER, INTERNATIONAL
       SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
                                STUDIES

        Mr. Gerstell. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik,
    and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
    to appear before you today along with such distinguished
    experts.
        Over the past few months, social media platforms have been
    awash in falsehoods on political topics ranging from election
    fraud, to the Capitol insurrection, to climate change and
    Antifa protestors.
        Even the seemingly non-partisan sphere of public health has
    been politicized and damaged by cyber falsehoods about the
    efficacy of face masks and vaccinations.
        As a former national security official and a lawyer
    concerned with our civil liberties, I would offer three
    observations relevant to the subcommittee's work.
        First, perhaps the most pernicious aspect of the digital
    revolution, disinformation, intentionally misleading, erroneous
    information threatens our very democracy, leading to mistrust
    of institutions, cynicism about our leaders, and skepticism
    about our ability to solve social problems.
        Second, the problem of foreign disinformation is almost
    surely going to get worse, and will pose serious national
    security threats against which our military prowess will be
    largely ineffective.
        Third, while it may be difficult, there are indeed steps we
    can take to counter these threats.
        Returning to my first point, with three out of four
    Americans getting some or all of their news from social media
    platforms, disinformation could specifically affect our
    military in concerning ways.
        At the most basic level, the resulting cynicism, or lack of
    trust in our military, as was revealed in the recent Reagan
    Institute survey, might well erode the national consensus
    underpinning congressional appropriations for weapons systems
    or veterans affairs, and more directly, recruiting for our all-
    volunteer military forces.
        Border threats to our military arise from our foreign
    adversaries' use of disinformation as a tool of their
    statecraft. For example, China's concerted online campaign to
    deflect investigations into the cause of the COVID-19 outbreak,
    to paint themselves as successful in curtailing the virus when
    Western democracies have been floundering, and to deny their
    militarization of the South China Sea, all complicate, if not
    undermine, our foreign relations and heighten the chance for
    conflict.
        The second point is that foreign cyber-propelled
    disinformation is likely to get much worse, to the extent that
    we would have difficulty in fending off weaponized
    disinformation coming from a sophisticated foe.
        Indeed, the recent final report of the National Security
    Commission on Artificial Intelligence cited a, quote,
    ``gathering storm of foreign influence and interference,'' and
    asserted that our foreign foes will use artificial intelligence
    systems to enhance their disinformation campaigns, including by
    creating undetectable, deep-fake videos and audio recordings.
        The resulting skepticism, treating official and counterfeit
    news sources equally, would yield a chaotic and unreliable
    reality in which truth and genuine information are elusive.
        The seemingly inexorable trajectory of ever-worsening
    foreign cyber attacks from Russia, China, Iran, and North
    Korea, shows us what online disinformation will look like from
    those adversaries.
        The same factors that shield them in cyber malevolence, the
    uncertainty of provable attribution, and the absence of
    directly caused actual injury or physical damage, will also
    work even more effectively to insulate them as they inevitably
    step up their disinformation campaigns.
        What if next time Russia or Iran seizes on a natural
    disaster, say, a hurricane or flood, and weaponized the crisis
    with false information online about the hurricane's path or
    expected river crestings, or even wrong instructions about
    escape routes?
        We don't need to wait until such a crisis or a disaster.
    The very fact that there are many sources contributing to
    disinformation means that we have multiple ways to stem it.
        I would be happy to respond to your questions about
    specific solutions, but I will concede that responding to the
    challenges of disinformation will not be easy, since it will
    require making difficult and controversial decisions about the
    responsibility of the private sector for our national well-
    being, and about restrictions on speech.
        But it isn't impossible, and Congress, in concert with the
    private sector, should lead the way. Our national well-being
    depends on nothing less. Thank you for the opportunity to
    present my views to the subcommittee.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstell can be found in the
    Appendix on page 34.]
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much, Mr. Gerstell. Thank you
    for your testimony, and we appreciate having you here.
        We will now receive testimony from Ms. Nina Jankowicz. Ms.
    Jankowicz is a disinformation fellow at the Center--excuse me
    for a second--yeah, it is--Ms. Jankowicz is a disinformation
    fellow at the Wilson Center, and is the author of ``How to Lose
    the Information War: Russia, Fake News, and the Future of
    Conflict.''
        Ms. Jankowicz, thank you for being here. You are now
    recognized to summarize your testimony for 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF NINA JANKOWICZ, DISINFORMATION FELLOW, WILSON
                                 CENTER

        Ms. Jankowicz. Thank you Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member
    Stefanik, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an
    honor to testify before you today.
        I am the daughter of a veteran. My father, an aerial
    reconnaissance officer in Vietnam, died in 2010 from
    complications from multiple myeloma which he contracted as a
    result of his exposure to Agent Orange during his service. I
    know he would be thrilled to see me testifying before you today
    in the service of truth.
        I spent my career on the front lines of the information
    war. We all now seem to recognize that the threat exists, but
    as I told your colleagues on the Appropriations Committee in
    2019, the United States has been a tardy, timid, or tertiary
    player, stymied by domestic politicization.
        Unfortunately, nearly 2 years later, we are in the same
    place. So it bears repeating. Disinformation is not a partisan
    issue. As we witnessed throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, and on
    January 6th, it affects public health, safety, and our
    democratic process. It is crucial that Congress understand
    this. Otherwise, we remain vulnerable.
        How did we get here? In part, we haven't understood the
    scope of the problem. The U.S. thinks of disinformation as a
    string of one-off occurrences that warrant attention only in
    the moment. We haven't created a comprehensive, long-term
    defense plan, and there is too little recognition of the need
    to shore up domestic vulnerabilities.
        Russia, China, and other authoritarian states know how to
    exploit this. They take advantage of American inaction,
    engaging in perpetual information competition, which has three
    characteristics.
        First, adversaries understand information competition is
    the new normal, and they are constantly probing for societal
    fissures to exploit. We have seen this with conspiracy theories
    about the origins of COVID-19 and the efficacies of Western
    vaccines. And Russia, of course, has an ongoing campaign to
    exacerbate racial tensions in the U.S.
        Second, they use all channels available--government and
    nongovernment, online and offline. China, for example, uses a
    wide range of state bodies, not just traditional national
    security bodies, to influence Western opinions about protests
    in Hong Kong, and more recently, to paint a positive picture of
    life in Xinjiang.
        Third and finally, they use perpetual information
    competition to target alliances and international
    organizations. For instance, Russia waged a campaign to prevent
    Ukraine from signing an association agreement with the European
    Union in 2016.
        In short, hostile state information operations increase
    domestic tension, and decrease American resilience. To meet the
    challenge of perpetual information competition, the Department
    of Defense should organize itself around a posture of enduring
    information vigilance, a concept I developed with my colleague
    in the U.K. Cabinet Office, Henry Collis.
        It is composed of the three Cs. The first is capability. We
    should remember the old military adage: Don't operate the
    equipment, equip the operator. The DOD workforce should be able
    to proactively monitor and identify informational
    vulnerabilities.
        Section 589E of the 2021 NDAA [National Defense
    Authorization Act], which trains Active Duty personnel, their
    families, and civilian DOD employees in detecting information
    operations, is an excellent starting point. Such a training
    program could also be rolled out to all civil servants across
    the Federal Government.
        The second C is interagency coordination. DOD and the wider
    USG [United States Government] must break out of our siloed
    national security thinking. To remedy this, the National
    Security Commission on AI recommends the creation of a joint
    interagency task force to coordinate intelligence and
    information-sharing around IO [information operations].
        I agree that the Federal Government requires a central mode
    for monitoring disinformation and coordinating policy, ideally
    in the White House, but my research across Europe suggests we
    also need the involvement of nontraditional security
    departments.
        In the long term, the key to combating disinformation lies
    with departments focusing on education, arts, and health, at
    Federal and local levels, as well as building a thriving,
    pluralistic media environment and teaching civics.
        The third C is international cooperation. This includes
    better sharing of information to identify threats and
    formulation of effective responses with allies.
        Toward this goal, the NSCAI [National Security Commission
    on Artificial Intelligence] suggests an international task
    force, led by the Global Engagement Center [GEC] at the State
    Department. However, the GEC's agreement is too large, its
    budget too small, and its reputation within the interagency and
    international communities too uncertain to add such a task to
    its portfolio.
        It currently produces open-source intelligence analysis, in
    addition to its coordination, policymaking, and analytic roles.
    And I recommend that intelligence-gathering rest with
    analytics, not policy bodies.
        The GEC's limited resources are better allocated in
    coordinating with embassies and other agencies in establishing
    and implementing policy and program priorities.
        Finally, while the idea of a task force for international
    coordination is a noble one, the U.S. must recognize that we
    are arriving late to this party. We should augment efforts that
    are already underway by close allies such as the U.K.'s
    international partnership for countering state-sponsored
    disinformation, and the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism.
        Enduring information vigilance cannot be built overnight.
    It requires a long-term commitment that will likely outlast the
    current political class, but the result will be a more
    resilient society.
        The United States must act not only as the staunchest
    defender and guarantor of democratic values among our allies
    abroad, but actively lead by example, underlining that
    disinformation knows no political party, and that America is
    committed to reversing the normalization of disinformation in
    our own political discourse.
        Once again, thank you for this opportunity, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Jankowicz can be found in
    the Appendix on page 47.]
        Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Ms. Jankowicz.
        We will now receive testimony from Dr. Herb Lin. Dr. Lin
    studies cyber policy, information warfare and influence
    operations, and is a senior research scholar at Stanford
    University. He is the author of ``Bytes, Bombs, and Spies.''
        Dr. Lin, you are now recognized to summarize your testimony
    for 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF HERBERT LIN, SENIOR RESEARCH SCHOLAR, CENTER FOR
      INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Lin. Thank you, Chairman Langevin, Ranking Minority
    Member Stefanik, and distinguished members. Thank you for
    inviting me to testify today. I am speaking for myself today,
    and not on behalf of any institution.
        The general thrust of my remarks is that Department of
    Defense is poorly structured and equipped to cope with the
    information warfare threat facing the U.S. as a whole. However,
    the DOD can make a meaningful contribution in addressing part
    of the problem.
        We usually believe in a clear distinction between peace and
    war. Today, we are not in a shooting war with Russia or China,
    but we are not at peace either. Our adversaries prosecute the
    state of ``not peace'' in many ways, including cyber-enabled
    information warfare.
        Such warfare presents several new challenges. First, the
    Constitution is the foundation of U.S. Government. Deeply
    embedded into the Constitution is the concept of a marketplace
    of ideas. Here ideas publicly compete with each other, and
    truth emerges from public debate of ideas.
        But this concept emerged at a time when information was
    hard to obtain. Today the internet and social media have
    brought a deluge of information so great that no one can
    possibly access or process all of the information needed to
    evaluate any given idea.
        The second challenge is that the information marketplace
    presumes that people process information rationally,
    thoughtfully, and deliberately. However, psychological science
    has demonstrated that people often do not do so. Instead, they
    often make fast, intuitive judgements based on how they feel
    from their gut, even though everyone is, in fact, capable of
    thoughtful deliberation.
        Such judgements--fast intuitive judgements from the gut--
    are usually adequate for the kinds of personal decisions found
    in everyday life, but they are inadequate when the consequences
    for error are high.
        Moreover, many of our tech companies have learned that
    supplying content that plays to our worst habits of nonrational
    thought is the way to increase user engagement which, in turn,
    increases their profitability.
        Third, the boundaries between foreign and domestic sources
    of information chaos are blurring. Russians and Americans may
    not be working side by side to sow disorder, mistrust, and
    polarization in the United States, but the scope, nature, and
    effect of their activities, even if separately conducted, are
    largely indistinguishable.
        That means, any effective effort against Russian activities
    will inevitably have collateral effects against American
    activities that are similarly oriented.
        In sum, the information warfare threat to the United States
    is different than from past threats, and has the potential to
    destroy reason and reality as the basis for societal discourse,
    replacing them with rage and fantasy.
        Perpetual civil war, political extremism waged through the
    information sphere and egged on by our adversaries is every bit
    as much of an existential threat for American civilization and
    democracy as any military threat imaginable.
        Why can't DOD defend effectively against the information
    warfare threat? Fundamentally, it is because the information
    warfare threat requires a whole-of-society response, and DOD
    cannot, and is not in a position to, orchestrate such a
    response.
        More specifically, DOD policy directives prohibit
    information operations directed at U.S. audiences, regardless
    of the intent underlying them, and that includes activities
    intended to protect U.S. audiences against foreign information
    warfare operations.
        But there are also cultural constraints. DOD culture is
    oriented towards defense against physical threats--planes,
    missiles, and the like. But DOD was never designed to defend
    against nonphysical threats. Joint doctrine does not even
    acknowledge the possibility that the U.S. Armed Forces could be
    the target of adversary psychological operations.
        Nevertheless, despite existing policy and culture, DOD is
    well-positioned to assess the information warfare threat for at
    least one segment of the U.S. Government, namely the Armed
    Forces and their families.
        Every member of the U.S. military swears an oath to support
    and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
    enemies, foreign and domestic, but the vast majority receive no
    education, no instruction, on what these words mean.
        The fiscal year 2021 Defense Authorization Act called
    attention to the need to protect U.S. military personnel and
    their families from foreign malign influence and disinformation
    campaigns, that was the previously mentioned section 589E, and
    both Secretary Austin and the Congress have expressed concerns
    about extremism in the U.S. military, which is facilitated by
    exposure to foreign disinformation campaigns.
        These points suggest the need for DOD to provide
    substantial in-house training for military personnel on the
    meaning of their oaths and on civics education as a
    prerequisite foundation for such training.
        That concludes the oral portion of my testimony. Thank you
    for the opportunity. I am happy to answer any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Lin can be found in the
    Appendix on page 60.]
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much, Dr. Lin. Appreciate you
    being here as well.
        We will now receive testimony from Dr. Joe Kirschbaum.
        Dr. Kirschbaum, welcome back, and thank you and your team
    for all the recent support. Dr. Kirschbaum is the Director of
    the Government Accountability Office Defense Capabilities and
    Management Team. Dr. Kirschbaum, you are now recognized to
    summarize your testimony for 5 minutes.

         STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. KIRSCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
      CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
                                 OFFICE

        Dr. Kirschbaum. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik,
    and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today
    to discuss the vital role of the Department of Defense's
    operations in the information environment.
        Throughout history, militaries and states have sought
    advantage through actions intended to affect the perception and
    behavior of adversaries. As we have noted today, our
    adversaries, particularly China and Russia, are taking
    advantage of emerging information technology to offset the
    United States conventional warfighting advantages.
        Although we focused on the Department of Defense, to
    reiterate, as an element of U.S. national power, information
    operations, as a whole, are necessarily part of a whole-of-
    government and whole-of-society effort.
        My testimony today describes the Department of Defense's
    information operations concepts, and DOD's actions to implement
    the 2016 strategy and address information operations
    challenges. This statement is based on reports we issued in
    late 2019 and our assessment of defense information-related
    documents.
        The terms for information operations--doctrinal terms--are
    many and varied. DOD has defined some, but inconsistency and
    potential confusion remains. Among the things the Department is
    actually working on right now is a more consistent set of
    information operations-related terms.
        To achieve greater effects in the information environment,
    combatant commanders can plan and execute operations that
    combine multiple information-related capabilities.
        Such capabilities include military information support
    operations, what was traditionally known as psychological
    warfare; military deception; cyberspace operations;
    electromagnetic warfare; operation security; and special
    technical operations.
        There are, however, many other related capabilities, such
    as public affairs, civil-military operations, and intelligence
    capabilities.
        A good example of an information operation is the effort by
    the Allies in 1944 to convince the Germans that the attack on
    occupied Western Europe would come at a place other than the
    actual target of Normandy.
        Operation Fortitude involved a number of what we would now
    call information-related capabilities. These included creation
    of fictitious military units, with all the requisite paperwork,
    associated radio transmissions and traffic, and assigning a
    real U.S. Army General--in this case, George S. Patton--to
    command those units.
        It also involved the creation of mock aircraft and landing
    craft located in southeast England, and many other intelligence
    and military deception techniques.
        While this is on a grand scale, defense planners today can
    do the same kinds of things to integrate more than one
    information-related capability to achieve desired end states.
        DOD's 2016 Strategy for Operations in the Information
    Environment was intended to significantly enhance their ability
    to conduct information operations today. However, the
    Department did not fully implement that strategy, leaving
    approximately 80 percent of the enumerated tasks incomplete.
        Among the largest omissions was the absence of an
    implementation plan, or an investment framework. The Department
    instead shifted focus to develop a joint concept of operations
    and a capabilities-based assessment. Both worthy efforts. It
    then started to develop a new strategy, which remains in
    development.
        We also found gaps in DOD's leadership, oversight, and
    management. The Department assigned most responsibilities to
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. However, delegating
    many of those responsibilities down to a lower level and
    failing to formalize authorities exacerbated the dispersal of
    leadership and focus.
        As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, congressional direction
    has prompted movement in the Department. In fact, most
    movement. Examples include the new information operations
    cross-functional team, which may mitigate some of the problems
    we identify, and designation of the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy as the principal information operations adviser,
    reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.
        Ultimately, however, the leadership the principal adviser
    exercises, and the support the Department gives them in
    implementing Department-wide strategy and vision, will be
    critical.
        DOD has integrated information-related capabilities in some
    military operations but has not addressed key planning,
    coordination, and operational challenges. This is important for
    ensuring that DOD integrates the information dimension into
    routine operational planning.
        DOD resisted our recommendation to conduct a comprehensive
    posture review in order to assess challenges. However, once
    again, Congress subsequently required the Secretary of Defense
    to conduct such a posture review.
        DOD told us they have taken initial steps to conduct this
    review, but did not provide an estimated completion date.
        In summary, there are opportunities for improved DOD
    leadership, recognition of information as a joint function, and
    better preparing the military to conduct information operations
    and counter our adversaries.
        I look forward to continuing to work with this committee,
    and the Department, to help it address these challenges and
    make the most of these opportunities.
        Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik, and members of
    the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement, and I
    am happy to respond to any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Kirschbaum can be found in
    the Appendix on page 80.]
        Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Dr. Kirschbaum, and I
    want to thank all of our witnesses for your testimony today.
    You do a great service to the subcommittee and to the committee
    at whole, writ large, by appearing today and giving us your
    perspective.
        Dr. Kirschbaum, let me start with you. So Congress has
    consistently encouraged the Pentagon to focus on these issues,
    including requiring the DOD to create a principal information
    operations adviser. Has the Pentagon sufficiently elevated
    dedicated information operations leadership?
        Dr. Kirschbaum. Mr. Chairman, I would say yes and no. So,
    in brief, what has happened with the diffusion of leadership,
    for example, most of the responsibilities for information
    operations was delegated down to the level of the Deputy
    Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Combating
    Terrorism.
        As that title indicates, that is a lot to work on, and so,
    incorporating information operations into that very small staff
    has generated issues. While very capable, they are not at the
    right level, in a lot of cases, to achieve some of the results
    because of that lack of leadership.
        Now, the Department has gone back and identified the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy as the principal information
    operations adviser in the hopes that keeping it at that level
    will elevate importance.
        And the comparison, of course, is made to the situation
    with the principal cyber adviser. There are some differences
    that we are a little concerned about, seeing how the Department
    carries through with that.
        For example, the principal cyber adviser had a deputy who
    could leverage a deputy assistant secretary who was focused
    solely on cyber operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy, as you appreciate, is doing just a few things. So,
    focusing on information operations will be important to see
    what level of resources, what level of attention it gets,
    assuming it is at that right level, assuming they are able to
    assign a deputy with the right focus, and, then, follow through
    with the right structural, procedural impetus in order to make
    sure momentum continues.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you for that answer. Mr.
    Gerstell, can you further explore why foreign-enabled malign
    influence and disinformation are a national security threat?
    And how will emerging technologies, like artificial
    intelligence, increase this threat?
        Mr. Gerstell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, I think we have
    rich evidence of the fact that foreign-inspired disinformation
    is a real national security threat. The 2016 elections were
    certainly a good example of that with, as you know, the Senate
    Intelligence Committee issued a five-volume bipartisan report
    finding that Russia actively intervened in our elections in an
    effort to influence them in 2016.
        It is hard to say for sure exactly what the result would
    be, but anybody would think that tampering with our democratic
    process must--must--by definition, be a national security
    issue.
        We have certainly seen how foreign disinformation from
    China and Russia, which just this week, once again, was touting
    the virtues of their Sputnik vaccine, and degrading the virtues
    and qualities of the American Pfizer and other COVID vaccines,
    clearly disinformation that is going to hurt our public health,
    the ability of Americans to get vaccinated. Again, another
    effect on national security.
        If we want a very specific example, just quickly, back in
    last September, when there were terrible wildfires in Oregon in
    the Northwest, Russia jumped on a couple of misleading and
    false statements that were set forth in some QAnon accounts and
    really weaponized them. They, in a concerted, coherent way,
    amplified them and turned them into a detailed, rich story of
    falsehoods about who started the wildfires, claiming that
    Antifa protesters were doing it.
        It reached a point, because of what Russia was doing, that
    civilians actually set up roadblocks in Oregon, in effort to
    stop these perceived but erroneous protesters who, of course,
    weren't there. It actually hurt people who were trying to flee
    the fire, so much so, that the Douglas County Sheriff and the
    FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] pleaded with the public
    to stop circulating these falsehoods.
        So we have seen how foreigners can take an existing
    division and create national security problems here on our
    soil. It stands to reason, following your other question, Mr.
    Chairman, that using technology--artificial intelligence--to
    micro-target viewers and listeners will only exacerbate the
    problem. So that is why I said, I believe the problem has the
    potential for getting worse before it gets better.
        Mr. Langevin. And from your vantage point, what can the
    United States do to protect itself from both a technological
    and policy standpoint?
        Mr. Gerstell. I think there are a wide range of tools. As I
    said in my earlier comment, and I know the other panelists
    agree with me here, disinformation has many causes. So the fact
    that it has many causes means that we also have many ways of
    treating it, to use a--sort of a medical analogy. This is a
    chronic condition, a complex chronic condition. So it is not a
    disease that will be cured by one miracle drug.
        So, I think we have a rich opportunity to use a range of
    legal tools at our disposal, perhaps by tightening up section
    230 of the Communications Decency Act, perhaps by either
    causing the industry to self-regulate, or to regulate the
    ability of social media platforms to limit the virality of
    falsehoods to check them before they get spread too widely.
        We can take steps in our society to increase, as others
    have said, digital literacy, civic education, so that people
    will have a better understanding and will be better able to
    assess falsehoods.
        I think the most important thing--and I am echoing what Ms.
    Jankowicz just said, and you, Mr. Chairman, also--is, we need
    an integrated approach to this. Russia and China use an
    integrated approach, a whole-of-government and their private
    sector, to create these disinformation campaigns.
        There is an asymmetry. We don't. We need to do that, and
    that will be the key to success in this area.
        Mr. Langevin. Very insightful, well said, and I couldn't
    agree more. Thank you.
        My time is expired. I am going to now turn to Ranking
    Member Stefanik for her questions.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        My question is for Dr. Lin. In the past, the special
    operations community and service members in the field of PSYOPs
    [psychological operations] and civil affairs had the most
    experience with information operations. It is going to be very
    important that the Department scale these skills to a wider
    force. How do we do that, and specifically how do we equip our
    cyber forces with the skills to conduct effective information
    operations?
        Mr. Moore. Mr. Lin, you are on mute still.
        Dr. Lin. All right. Thank you. Ranking Minority Member
    Stefanik, thank you for asking the question. I hate technology.
        How do we get the cyber forces to be better able to address
    the influence operations side of the house? That is a
    question--I addressed that in the paper that I submitted for
    the record, on dysfunction in the DOD about doctrine and so on.
        The short answer is that I believe that there needs to be a
    joint--something that is joint and standing, some effort, some
    entity, that pulls together the cyber people together and the
    PSYOPs people together, as equals.
        Cyber Command has the expertise in the information delivery
    side of the house. The PSYOPs people, the MISO people, have the
    responsibility of understanding content, and those two have to
    be put together.
        For me, trying to grow psychological expertise out of what
    are fundamentally a bunch of technical hackers, as good as they
    are, that is not their skill set. Their skill set is flipping
    bits, and so on.
        I speak as a former bit-flipper myself, and getting the
    psychological insights from others who are much more expert in
    that, I think, is the way to go.
        So there has to be a standing team, and the standing part
    is really important, because it recognizes the fact that this
    is an ongoing problem, not one of a specific campaign here or
    there.
        Ms. Stefanik. Yield back.
        Dr. Lin. I hope that answers your question.
        Ms. Stefanik. It did. Thank you. Yield back.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Stefanik.
        Mr. Keating is now recognized for 5 minutes. Is Mr. Keating
    still with us? If so, you might be on mute.
        Okay. If Mr. Keating is not there, in the tradition of
    going Democrat, Republican, I will just go down the list to Mr.
    Morelle.
        Mr. Morelle. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is
    really a fascinating subject. And I am new to the committee and
    the subcommittee, so I am not entirely familiar with DOD's
    actions. But having listened now, and I hear that there is
    calls for more coordination, more information-sharing, greater
    intentionality of our focus, but I am still struggling, just as
    a layperson, to suggest what you have offered as
    recommendations that would actually stop the disinformation
    from seeping in. Given that we have an open and democratic
    society, given that we have social media, how do we actually
    stop this, other than--well, I am just sort of curious.
        What are the tactics and the strategies we use to prevent
    this from really undermining society here in the United States
    and really creating more divisiveness?
        Ms. Jankowicz. I am happy to jump in there. Thank you,
    Congressman, for that question. You are absolutely right. There
    is not very much that we can do to instantaneously correct this
    problem. Right now, and for the past 4 or 5 years, we have been
    playing what I call ``whack a troll,'' where we want to just
    focus on offensive content, harmful content, but really we need
    a much more systematic and, in fact, endemic solution.
        And our adversaries--Russia, China, Iran--have been playing
    the long game, they are playing a generational game. They are
    not necessarily interested in getting it right every time, but
    they know that if they can chip away at the surface, eventually
    they are going to get to the core of the polarization that they
    are seeking for, and keep us distracted so that they can do
    whatever it is that they are looking to do in their near
    abroads, domestically, with regards to human rights, et cetera,
    as well as achieve political goals.
        So that is why, in addition to focusing a little bit on
    content moderation, which is the topic du jour, right, in
    addition to making sure that our government bodies are putting
    out authoritative information, that it is trusted by the
    public, that is why we really need to start investing in what I
    call citizens-based responses.
        So all of the countries that I have studied in Central and
    Eastern Europe that have been dealing with Russian
    disinformation for much longer than we even recognized it
    existed, have all, of course, looked at the kinetic side of
    things. They have good cyber defenses, but they also invest in
    their people.
        And I know that is out of remit of this subcommittee, but
    it just speaks to what Mr. Gerstell, Mr. Lin, and Dr.
    Kirschbaum have all touched on, that we need a whole-of-society
    response, and we really need to get out of this siloed national
    security thinking, invest in libraries, invest in public media,
    so that people have trustworthy sources of information to go
    to, and invest in awareness and civics, so that folks
    understand their role in the democratic process, because
    ultimately, that is what disinformation is trying to
    undermine--people's participation.
        Mr. Morelle. Look, yeah, I appreciate that, and I certainly
    don't want to be argumentative. I read recently Anne
    Applebaum's, the Twilight of Democracy, which is a frightening
    volume, similar kinds of lines of communications. But what
    troubles me is, I can certainly envision foreign adversaries
    starting to spread, through social media and otherwise,
    arguments that a Presidential election, for instance, was
    stolen from the American public, and despite a lot of
    investigation, no evidence ever emerges that such a thing
    happened.
        And yet, you can imagine potentially a third of the
    American public believing that no matter, and that really gets
    at the foundations of American democracy. I think I would like
    to believe that that wasn't possible, but frankly, I feel like
    I just lived through this nightmare.
        And, so, I appreciate what you are saying, and I don't
    disagree with you, I am just really, really concerned that
    there may not be an answer. And I don't know that it is the
    Department of Defense's job. I don't even know how they would
    begin to do this, but having listened to all three of you, I
    just struggle with, like, okay, so what, if anything, can we do
    here?
        And I apologize, I am using up a lot of time, but if the
    other two witnesses want to respond, I would love to hear your
    thoughts as well.
        Dr. Lin. I would say, starting with education of the Armed
    Forces is a big step forward. Getting the people whose job it
    is to protect us and defend the Constitution, teaching them
    what it means to do that, getting them some real education,
    that is a meaningful step forward----
        Mr. Morelle. I am not sure--I mean, I don't mean to
    disagree with you. I think that is a great suggestion. We
    couldn't even get Members of the House of Representatives to
    defend the Constitution this past November against a suggestion
    that an election was stolen with no evidence that that is the
    case. I am not sure--if we can't get the Congress to do it, I
    don't know how we would get members of the United States
    military to do it. But again, I don't mean to be argumentative.
    I am just frustrated, and I think probably all of you are with
    where we find ourselves.
        Mr. Gerstell. Congressman Morelle, if I may add to that----
        Mr. Morelle. Sure.
        Mr. Gerstell [continuing]. I certainly share your
    frustration. I suspect probably everyone on both sides of,
    metaphorically, of the witness table, so to speak, feels that.
    But the Supreme Court has been very clear that Americans have a
    First Amendment right to receive foreign disinformation, no
    matter how outrageous it is.
        Some philosophers talk about the paradox of tolerance,
    which is that a society that is very tolerant and open to lots
    of views, also potentially has the seeds of its own
    destruction, of course, because someone could criticize the
    very society. So you are right.
        I think the best analogy, just very quickly, is the
    cybersecurity one, which is, I think cybersecurity experts will
    tell you that at the end of the day, we are probably never
    going to be able to completely eliminate cybersecurity attacks
    from a sophisticated foreign adversary.
        Instead--and we should certainly work on that, but instead,
    what we need to do is limit their effectiveness and their
    scope. And I think it is the same thing with disinformation. We
    are not going to stop it where it starts, overseas, but we can
    limit its effectiveness on our soil.
        Mr. Morelle. I have well exceeded my time. Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for your indulgence, as I am glad you gave the
    gentleman an opportunity to answer, and I yield back.
        Mr. Langevin. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Morelle.
        Now I would like to recognize Mr. Moore for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Moore. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member. It is
    clear, and I think I want to just--a sentiment that was given a
    few minutes ago, we can't even just keep this with respect to
    the Department of Defense. Cyberspace, this threat, is in every
    aspect of our lives, from banking, entertainment--I mean,
    across the board. So just to emphasize the importance of this,
    and when we do think about our defense-related work, our legacy
    platforms, our legacy weapons platforms, they still serve a
    valuable deterrent.
        But electronic warfare and cyber operations are central to
    the future fight. I will keep my questions geared towards that,
    and making sure we can be thinking about the future. And, so, I
    will start with a question to Mr. Gerstell.
        We have heard in this committee that the artificial
    intelligence capabilities of our adversaries are rapidly
    progressing to the point where it can only be combative with
    our own AI technologies. Can you just give us some perspective?
    Is the United States winning this AI arms race? If not, what
    steps need to be taken to increase our competitiveness?
        Mr. Gerstell. Sure. Thank you very much, Congressman. I
    think the best answer I could give would be to point to
    something that has already been alluded to, which is the final
    report of the National Security Commission on Artificial
    Intelligence, which has a rich series of recommendations for
    our Nation to invest in, ranging from everything from educating
    our workforce, to stepping up government investment, working
    with the private sector to increase AI, and perhaps--and also,
    including a series of laws, ultimately, and recommendations on
    limiting the use of AI for beneficial purposes and limiting its
    misuse.
        So we are in an arms race, so to speak, principally with
    China, on the area of artificial intelligence. They are busy
    amassing data, including data on Americans, that could be very
    significant when coupled with artificial intelligence and
    machine learning, and used against us in nefarious ways.
        So, we have our work cut out for us. I think there is a
    large series of recommendations that I would endorse of the
    Commission, and that would be a very, very important step for
    us to go down that road.
        Mr. Moore. Excellent. Thank you.
        On that same topic, Dr. Lin, Chinese and Russian militaries
    are structured to integrate information-related capabilities,
    and are absent of any genuine oversight, I will say. How can
    the DOD refine their current management structure to improve
    synchronization of information capabilities, while maintaining
    the merits of civilian control of the military, where we, as a
    Nation, will always, you know, have proper oversight to the
    extent possible, and knowing that we don't always get to fight
    against nations that don't value that as much as we do. But is
    there improvements that we can make to level the playing field?
        Dr. Lin. Well, one of the things that I--certainly one of
    the things that I have thought about is, for example, the
    distinction that this committee is very well aware of, the
    distinction between title 10 and title 50 authorities.
        A large part of this game is done in the intelligence
    world, sort of in the covert-action world. Systems operations
    are often covert, and it is an interesting question as to how--
    whether--how and to what extent coordination between title 10
    and title 50 authorities, I have heard people say that you
    should--we need a title 60, you know, as a combination of the
    two, to better coordinate.
        It is very hard, as long as we are very concerned about
    authorities, to achieve the kind of coordination that you are
    talking about. Neither the Chinese, nor the Russians, are
    really worrying very much about who has the authority to do
    [inaudible]. It is hard to imagine [inaudible] whether
    something happens because one branch does it or another branch
    does it, but we care a lot about that.
        Mr. Moore. Okay. Excellent. Thank you. For a final
    question, Ms. Jankowicz, first off, I was touched by your
    comments on your dad, and I am sorry to hear that, but I am
    sure he is proud of you.
        Anything you wanted to highlight in this platform, just on
    some of the things that we are doing right, and as meetings
    that I have had recently with some of the cyber companies in my
    neck of the woods out in Utah, like small business and smaller
    operations are being more nimble, is there an opportunity to
    leverage those types of more--I guess I will just reuse the
    term nimble--organizations to help fight this battle going
    forward?
        Ms. Jankowicz. Yeah, absolutely. Thank you, Congressman,
    and thanks for your comments about my dad.
        I mean, I think, finally, the fact that we are recognizing
    this problem, that these hearings are happening more frequently
    is a good thing. And the fact that this is a bipartisan showing
    here in this committee warms my heart frankly, and the
    leadership that you all show is really important in setting an
    example for your constituents, for the media, for everyone. So
    kudos on that.
        I do really think we need a central node in the Federal
    Government, not only to work on the intelligence issues, which
    we heard from ODNI [Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence] is going to be happening soon within ODNI, but we
    need somebody to be setting policy, and I think that is where
    DOD and the GEC, and other bodies in DHS [Department of
    Homeland Security], like CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
    Security Agency], for instance, are kind of operating all in
    their own spheres. So I would like to see a lot more
    coordination.
        And on a local level, I think you are absolutely right. We
    need to really create and invest in more robust public-private
    partnership in this area, not just with the Big Tech firms, but
    with local businesses and with civil society organizations.
        You know, the most successful programs to counter
    disinformation that I have seen around the world have been ones
    that invest in those local connections, with local media, local
    civil society groups, local libraries, even local influencers
    and performers who can go there and deliver an authoritative
    message to folks that they are neighbors with, without, you
    know, the baggage of it coming from the Federal Government.
        So I think we need to think a lot more creatively, a lot
    more out of the box, and business, local business, is a great
    place to start with that.
        Mr. Moore. Thanks for the thoughtful comments, and I yield
    back. Thanks for that.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
        Mr. Larsen is now recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah, thanks, Mr. Chair. I appreciate it.
    Greetings from the Pacific Northwest, where you will not be
    surprised to know it is raining today. So thanks for the chance
    to say hello.
        My first question is for Dr. Kirschbaum. I usually embrace
    everything the GAO [Government Accountability Office] says. I
    want to preface my comments. I do want you to explain a little
    bit more on the recommendation. We are moving to criticism
    about the delegation that the U.S.--or under the theory defense
    policy makes on MISO operations, in particular, to special
    operations forces. I think your characterization that special
    operations forces focused quote, ``only on special operations
    and counterterrorism'' might have been accurate 10 years ago,
    is inaccurate today. In fact, there is a bit of a debate going
    on about the role special operations needs to play in great
    power competition, which, in part, includes information
    operations, but specific to special operations.
        So can you talk a little bit about how you approach that
    particular question, and then relate that to a broader comment
    about how the Pentagon is organized? And could you grade that
    for us, for information operations?
        Dr. Kirschbaum. Mr. Larsen, thank you so much for your
    question. So, first, I want to make sure that my comments are
    not misunderstood. You are correct that the idea of Military
    Information Support Operations, PSYOP. That is exactly where
    that user belongs. That is where that specialty is. It is in
    special operations, and then the combination for intelligence.
    That is true.
        The comment that I made really has to do with the decision
    by the Department to move information operations writ large
    into that space where you have very few people. And I have had
    the great opportunity to work with most of those people, and
    they get it, they understand what needs to be done. They have
    written a lot of the things in the direction that kind of point
    the way to where the Department is going. However, I think they
    are a little stymied in being able to get traction in the rest
    of the Department to look for.
        So, for example, when we talk about what you have to do to
    kind of inculcate info operations and understanding throughout
    the Department. It kind of goes to what Dr. Lin was talking
    about, you need a broader, joint understanding. And, so, you
    take advantage of those individual specialties, like MISO, you
    take advantage of cyber, you take advantage of all these other
    things, but you do it in a way that everyone understands how to
    integrate that, which is why I said it needs to be integrated,
    operationally, into the planning cells for the J-2s, the J-3s,
    and the J-5s at all the COCOMs [combatant commands].
        In terms of Department leadership, it really doesn't matter
    who has got the ball, as long as there is Department-wide
    emphasis and momentum. And that is what we have seen lacking.
    And depending on a very small number of people to carry the
    ball to implement the strategy, to carry out the capabilities
    base assessments, to do all the things we have asked them to do
    over and over again, it hasn't worked. They haven't got the
    traction throughout the Department. They have not gotten the
    support they need. That is where the potential for identifying
    the principal information operations adviser, keeping it at the
    level it is, and then rely on those existing staff, and giving
    them the support is hopefully the way to make that stick.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah, maybe when either this subcommittee or
    the full committee has an opportunity to talk to Under
    Secretary of Defense [for] Policy Kahl about his view on this
    now that he has been approved by the Senate, or by the Senate,
    we can have a chance to talk to him.
        I noted that the clock didn't start exactly on time, but it
    was adjusted, so I will assume I do have a minute 40 left, and
    go to Ms. Jankowicz.
        Because the Pentagon is the Pentagon, and because it has to
    operate outside, not inside, the country, how should we look at
    fitting the Pentagon IO function in this largely--in a larger
    coordinated fashion with other government operations?
        Ms. Jankowicz. Thank you, Congressman. I think the
    important thing here, again, is the central node. So taking
    under account the defense intelligence gathering that is going
    on, sharing that in the interagency, making sure that
    priorities out in the field in our areas of conflict are lined
    up with what the Department of State is doing in their
    programming. And then again, I think the Department of Defense
    has an opportunity to really be the laboratory for educating
    the Federal workforce about information operations. They are
    certainly a targeting bio. Their families are. And there have
    been multiple studies about catfishing and other things against
    the Armed Forces.
        So, educate them and then roll that out more broadly to the
    rest of the Federal workforce. And I think it is the biggest
    opportunity that the Department of Defense has with this
    challenge.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah, good, thanks. Thank you very much. And
    thank you, Chair Langevin. I appreciate it very much. I will
    yield back.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
        Let's see, Mr. Fallon, is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Fallon.
        Mr. Fallon. Can you hear me? Sorry.
        Mr. Langevin. Yeah go, ahead.
        Mr. Fallon. Oh, wonderful. Thank you. I wonder if the panel
    can answer some questions. One of which is, amongst rule of law
    Jeffersonian democracies in the world, what countries are the
    gold standard? [Inaudible] emulating vis-a-vis cyber
    disinformation?
        Ms. Jankowicz. Well, I can jump in there, Congressman. In
    my research I look at a number of countries in Central and
    Eastern Europe, again, that have been dealing with this for
    decades now. Estonia is one I always like to bring up. Of
    course, it is quite a small country, only 1.3 million people.
    But in 2007, they were hit with a cyber attack as well as what
    I call beta disinformation, pre-social media, at the hands of
    the Russians that caused a riot, that caused one person to die.
    And the cyber attack, of course, took down their banking as is
    well known, and many of their other E-governance operations in
    Estonia.
        And that was a real wake-up call, along with kind of a
    reinvigoration during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. And as
    a result, the Estonian Government is really invested in cyber
    operations, they have invested in Russian language media, to
    reach out to that disenfranchised population. And they have
    invested in really building trust between the Estonian
    Government and the ethnic Russian population there.
        And I think that is a great model for a whole-of-society, a
    whole-of-government solution. And if fluffy little Estonia can
    do it, I think that the United States of America should be able
    to do something similar as well.
        Dr. Lin. I was just going to say that Finland also is
    another example of whole-[inaudible]-country, whole-
    [inaudible]-society approach to disinformation. They have been
    dealing with it for a lot longer than most of the other
    countries in the world. And they emphasize this throughout
    society, and it is very much a part of their educational
    regime.
        Mr. Fallon. Is it fair to say that Russia is the most
    adroit at this, or is China catching up, or are they on par?
        Dr. Lin. Different people have different judgements about
    that. I think the Russians are most pernicious because they--it
    is easier to tear down stuff than it is to build something up.
    And the Russians are extraordinarily good at tearing stuff
    down. And the Chinese are getting there, but for my money, it
    is the Russian threat that I am most concerned about right now.
        Mr. Fallon. I think the Russians had 600 years of practice
    in that regard. What are we doing as far as offensively to
    combat this? Because we don't need to--we just need to get out
    information in a lot of ways when we are talking about
    totalitarian regimes and giving it to their people. Are we
    taking specific--because you know, the old adage is the best
    offense--or the best defense is a good offense. Are you all
    aware of efforts that we have that we are making, and do we
    need to focus more on that as well?
        Dr. Lin. I just had a little bit in my written testimony. I
    think that the biggest policy question that we have to--that we
    have to address as a country, is how and to what extent, if at
    all, we should be adopting the techniques of the Russians in
    prosecuting information for their offense. I am going to point
    out that our offensive information worker efforts don't help
    defend the United States, and defense information warfare can
    only influence other populations.
        Do we want to adopt the tactics of the Russians in this? I
    am very uncomfortable about that as an American citizen. On the
    other hand, it is pretty clear that speaking the truth, just
    the truth, doesn't work very well. And Americans believe that
    speaking truth, that the truth will eventually win. Maybe
    eventually, but it sure doesn't--there is good evidence that it
    doesn't always win in the short term. And how far are we
    willing to go down that path? That is a very tough policy
    question that is way above my pay grade to answer.
        Mr. Fallon. Do you believe, the panel believe, that forming
    an information command would be something that we should
    explore?
        Dr. Kirschbaum. Mr. Fallon, this is Joe Kirschbaum. So I am
    not sure a command is necessary. The reason that your question
    piqued my interest is I remember more than 10 years ago, before
    Cyber Command was stood up, I remember having a conversation
    with someone in the Department of Defense, and someone asked me
    and said, What would be your biggest surprise after we are--
    eventually stand up this U.S. Cyber Command? You know, however
    many years from now, and I forget what they asked me. And my
    answer to them was, my number one surprise would be if it is
    still called U.S. Cyber Command, because of the nature, you
    know, what we are talking now, the information environment
    involves so much more, and cyber is a part of it.
        So people have argued for, in fact, that maybe Cyber
    Command should be expanded. We are agnostic on that. We,
    obviously, don't have an opinion on that. But those are the
    kind of things to think about. It's, on the one hand, too broad
    to be just one organization, but you definitely got to make
    sure that everyone understands what that breadth means, and who
    is involved, and get them working the correct way. That is more
    important than establishing an organization.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much. The gentleman's time has
    expired.
        Mr. Khanna is recognized now for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all
    of the panelists for your testimony. Many of you have spoken
    about the importance of the United States maintaining our
    strategic advantage in AI and in industries of the future. I
    wonder if any of the panelists have followed the bipartisan
    effort that Senator Schumer, Senator Young, Representative
    Gallagher, and I [have undertaken] with the Endless Frontiers
    Act, which would put $100 billion over 5 years in the National
    Science Foundation, and create a technology directorate to make
    sure America is collaborating with the private sector to lead
    in the industries of the future, a bipartisan bill that has six
    Republican Senators, a number of Republicans and Democrats on
    in the House. And I wonder if any of the panelists have
    comments about the importance of that legislation?
        Mr. Gerstell. Congressman, I would simply say that that is
    exactly the part of the effort that we talk about when we say
    we need a whole-of-society effort. And the National Commission
    on Artificial Intelligence, to which we have made many
    allusions, certainly, underscore the need for a highly trained
    and skilled workforce. And the legislation that you just
    described would be a significant step in that direction.
        The Office of the Director of National Intelligence in its
    Global Trends 2040 Report, talking about what future scenarios
    would look like, made great reference to the fact that it would
    be critically important for our country to have a really
    skilled workforce to be able to deal with the challenges of the
    digital revolution. So anything we can do in that regard is
    clearly going to have very significant dividends. That by
    itself isn't going to stop disinformation, no one suggests that
    it would, but it is part of the overall solution.
        Mr. Khanna. Let me ask you this: I was reading--I am going
    to ask two different questions. I read the report that Eric
    Schmidt and others did on the National Security Commission on
    Artificial Intelligence. So, I think one of the critical points
    in there is that right now, the AI traditionally has--it
    requires voluminous data. But when you are a child and you are
    learning, let's say, the word ``dog,'' it is not like we put
    give a child thousands of data points or pictures of dogs. They
    see a few dogs, and they learn the word ``dog,'' which suggests
    that the human mind is far more complex and sophisticated than
    current AI. And there is work being done at MIT [Massachusetts
    Institute of Technology] and other places to try to understand
    how the human mind actually comprehends with probabilistic
    modeling that would allow AI to operate without voluminous
    data.
        Could you speak to how much of a comparative advantage that
    would be over China, given that China has a data advantage if
    we are able to have AI that doesn't require as much data?
        Mr. Gerstell. I am not sure I have the expertise on that
    particular topic. I don't know if the other panelists do.
        Dr. Lin. I know enough about that to be dangerous. So
    please don't take my word as gospel. It is definitely worth an
    inquiry. I will just point out that the Chinese are aware of
    this, too, and they also understand the importance of
    understanding the neurophysiology of the human brain.
        And, so, I think that to assume that we could go down that
    path and the Chinese wouldn't, I think doesn't work. It is true
    that the Chinese have many data advantages, in some ways, and
    other places we have better data advantages. But to assume that
    the Chinese aren't aware of the importance of neurophysiology
    and so on in the human brain, I think is probably not correct.
        Mr. Khanna. We always have good insight. And I wasn't
    suggesting that China was unaware of--well, I do think leading
    research is being done in the U.S., but more that the data
    advantage that China has is enormous if we don't have
    alternative innovations.
        The final question I have is, I don't know if any of the
    panelists have studied what Finland has done. I was reading
    somewhere that they have this extraordinary intervention at the
    age of 6, because the Russian disinformation campaign was a big
    problem there. And that this digital literacy campaign has,
    presumably, or at least from what I have read, worked in having
    a more informed citizenry that doesn't fall for disinformation.
    A, is that true? Are any of you familiar with the program in
    Finland? And, B, do you have any ideas of what digital literacy
    would look like in the United States?
        Ms. Jankowicz. I am happy to take that one, Congressman.
    Yes, absolutely, that is true. It was not only on Comedy
    Central with Samantha B, but there are many academic studies of
    this as well. And the program starts as early as 5, actually,
    with students getting exposure to what is an ad versus what is
    your Saturday morning cartoon? So, really, not just media
    literacy, but general informational awareness.
        And I would say the United States needs to go one step
    farther when we are talking information literacy. We often
    think about this as something that we can fairly easily, even
    given our federal education system, do in schools. But I would
    say we need to reach voting age adults as well. And how can we
    do that? I mentioned libraries before. Libraries maintain a
    very high level of trust across partisan divides in the United
    States. We have a lot of them. They are looking for their
    raison de'etre in the 21st century. And I think this is a great
    vehicle to deliver this sort of training.
        In the Czech Republic, they have a similar program. I like
    to call this the peas-in-the-mashed-potatoes approach. It is
    targeted at elderly people, teaching them how to use their cell
    phones or iPads to Facetime their grandchildren, just basic
    computer skills. But they also sneak in some information
    literacy in there. And that, again, gets to the need to be
    creative with these sorts of approaches and think outside of--
    outside of our normal education national security boxes.
        But the most important thing, not only having a nonpartisan
    messenger, but the curriculum itself needs to be nonpartisan,
    and make sure that we are giving the people tools that they
    need to support the information that they are trying to gather,
    to make decisions at the ballot box, to, you know, make
    economic decisions, et cetera. It shouldn't be motivated by any
    partisan agenda.
        Mr. Khanna. Well, thank you. I would look forward to
    working with you and maybe in a bipartisan way. I think that
    would be a very worthy project for the Congress, in a
    bipartisan way, if we can design a form of digital literacy for
    students and adults. And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back my
    time.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Khanna.
        Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is really for any
    of the panelists. You know, it is crucial for our Nation to
    have our own robust, offensive information operations
    capabilities in place to influence adversary actions, deceive
    enemies, and to try to stay ahead of the adversarial decision
    making in times of war. What role do you feel is proper for the
    military in this area?
        Dr. Kirschbaum. So, Mrs. Bice, the Department of Defense
    really--it is, at its heart, is an operational military role.
    So at the operational level of war, you know, it is below the
    strategic level. That is primarily what we have been looking
    at, what we are talking about. How to make sure that everyone
    at the combatant command level, the commander understands, as
    he or she is working with partners at the ambassador level, or
    regional allies and partners, understands what we are trying to
    achieve, and to get that done. So those are campaigns that we
    talked about that are taking place below the threshold around
    conflict all the time. The military has--that is the primary
    thing that we are talking here in terms of what the military's
    role is.
        Now, that whole-of-government approach that bring it up a
    level, strategy, where does the United States fit in with its
    allies and partners? That is a much broader--that whole-of-
    government, whole-of-society. In this case, the Department
    should plug in to whatever efforts are being done and led out
    of places like the State Department or whatever organizations
    get created in the future. You know, during the Cold War, we
    had the United States Information Agency that organized a lot
    of those things; that orchestrated large campaigns to support
    information for our allies, our partners, and beyond into the
    Iron Curtain, for example. That is a huge undertaking that no
    longer exists. That is gone. That has been swept away. And we
    can't necessarily just recreate it, nor should we, but we think
    about how we do that. And the military would plug in to those
    efforts in addition to maintaining its own battlefield
    capabilities.
        Mrs. Bice. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Langevin. Very good. Is there any member on that hasn't
    been recognized yet that wants to be recognized?
        I think we have gotten to everybody.
        Okay. With that, I just want to thank our witnesses for
    your testimony today. It has been very insightful and very
    helpful to our work. I know that I had additional questions,
    and other members may have additional questions that we would
    like to submit for the record. If you could respond to those,
    it would be very helpful as well.
        So with that, again, thank you to our witnesses. I deeply
    value your expertise and your contributions to this important
    conversation in helping us to understand and get our arms
    around these challenges. With that, the hearing stands
    adjourned. Have a great weekend, everyone.
        [Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 April 30, 2021

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 April 30, 2021

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 April 30, 2021

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON

        Mr. Moulton. I am disheartened by the dramatic drop in the public's
    trust and confidence in the U.S. military from 70% to 56% that you
    point out in your written testimony, Mr. Gerstell. Trust between the
    people and the military is vital to a democratic nation and to the
    health of an All-Volunteer Force. While this drop in confidence may be
    influenced by external disinformation, do you believe service members'
    own social media activity, personal or professional, may play a role in
    negatively impacting the public's views on the military? Are there
    policy recommendations you would make to the services to ensure the
    U.S. military retains the public's trust without impeding troops'
    freedom of speech?
        Mr. Gerstell. Thank you Representative Moulton for the opportunity
    to respond to your questions. I am not an expert on military matters so
    I will address this from the point of view of a former national
    security official who has studied online disinformation generally. As
    you know, a number of academicians, cyber researchers and think tanks
    have sought to determine the extent to which trust in societal
    institutions can be undermined--and thus democracy corroded--by
    disinformation and the corresponding expression of extremist views.
    Surveys indicate that reinforcing and amplifying factors play a key
    role in instilling and confirming hateful or erroneous beliefs in
    people exposed to extremist speech and false information. The identity
    of the communicators spreading the speech disinformation and
    corroboration and enhancement by opinion leaders are all factors in
    promoting the ``effectiveness'' of extremist speech and disinformation.
    It thus stands to reason that when the general public sees social media
    posts by members of the military espousing hateful or extremist
    positions that are aligned with what the public might be predisposed to
    accept based on prior exposure to disinformation from non-military
    sources, it inevitably combines to shape the public's view of the
    military. That type of reinforcing and corroborating action has a
    potent effect on influencing what people believe. In short, it's hard
    to believe that social media posts (positive and negative) by members
    of the military don't have any effect on the public's perception of our
    armed forces. As you note, it is of course vital that our military
    enjoys the strong approval and trust of the American public, for
    purposes of recruiting, assistance to veterans and obviously support in
    times when our troops are in harm's way. Social media activity by
    members of the military that do not reflect well on that institution
    can have an insidious and ultimately pernicious effect on this level of
    needed approval and trust. Countering problematic speech is difficult
    given how strongly our nation prizes freedom of speech, and it is
    sometimes hard to draw the line between improper hateful expressions
    that should be curtailed for the good of society, and merely
    distasteful if not repugnant opinions. But the mere fact that it's
    difficult to draw the line doesn't mean we should abandon any effort in
    this regard. Indeed, we have legal room to maneuver in this area; the
    law allows stricter regulation of the armed services than the general
    public, and the First Amendment is not absolute (to be clear, this is
    not to suggest any diminution of the latter's scope). Secretary
    Austin's stand-down day was an important substantive as well as
    symbolic step, and clearly the military can do more with internal
    training and education. But many young men and women come to the
    military with little knowledge of how our government works or the
    underlying values upon which our democracy was founded, because of the
    almost total dearth of civic education in high school and lower grades.
    Fixing that problem alone would help minimize extremism in the
    military.
        Mr. Moulton. Mr. Gerstell, you have advocated for an integrated
    disinformation center within the Federal Government, aligning the many
    departments and agencies that have a role in information digital
    communications and creating a central node for responsibility over this
    issue. The NSCAI has made a similar recommendation. Can you describe in
    more detail what you envision this center to look like? What
    authorities or capabilities would this center need to be effective?
        Mr. Gerstell. Representative Moulton, the establishment of an
    integrated ``disinformation'' center, bring together all relevant parts
    of the federal government as well as the private sector, is one of the
    most crucial steps we can take in tackling the problem of
    disinformation.
        While purely domestically generated disinformation is indeed a
    problem, it is made much worse by amplification and expansion by
    foreign adversaries that exploit the natural divisions in our society;
    and of course, those foreign parties themselves are often the initial
    source of the disinformation. Thus, my comments below will focus on
    foreign-propelled disinformation.
        To determine how best to counter foreign disinformation, we need to
    first understand how our foreign adversaries create and spread
    disinformation. Those adversaries, especially Russia and China, engage
    in coordinated, integrated disinformation campaigns involving many
    elements of their governments. For example, when China decided to push
    the falsehood that its system of government was more successful at
    fighting the COVID19 pandemic than ``weak, corrupt Western
    governments,'' the messaging started at the top, from the Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs, and was disseminated in a concerted way through the
    Twitter accounts of over 130 Chinese diplomats stationed around the
    world; Chinese-controlled news media and websites picked up the line
    and spread it too, and then seemingly corroborated it with further
    postings on social media and secondary news stories about how the
    message was reverberating around the globe. Russia's disinformation
    campaigns fomented by the GRU and other organs of the Russian state are
    if anything even more coordinated, so as to create the impression of an
    overwhelming number of ``independent'' news sources and social media
    accounts all espousing the Russian disinformation. In addition to
    creating inauthentic Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts owned by
    false personas (often with AI-generated fake profile pictures), the
    Russians might also enlist private sector proxies, such as the Internet
    Research Agency in St. Petersburg, to further promote the Russian
    falsehoods. The Russians careful monitor our domestic social media,
    seizing tendentious statements, conspiracy theories, and outright
    falsehoods, and then amplify and elaborate on them through their
    integrated disinformation machine.
        This system of whole-of-government campaigns to promote online
    malicious disinformation is so different from our American values and
    the way our government operates abroad, that we have difficulty in
    appreciating the effectiveness of our adversaries' endeavors. And yet,
    to be successful in countering it, we must be equally integrated, and
    not regard online disinformation as a one-off expression on a
    particular social media account, or as something that can be simply
    rebutted with a press release from a government agency.
        Thus, to fully apprehend, let alone effectively counter, the scope
    of foreign disinformation aimed at us, we need the active cooperation
    of the major social media platforms, the intelligence community and law
    enforcement to share current information about the sources and scale of
    disinformation campaigns. Artificial intelligence can clearly play a
    major role here in analyzing massive amounts of data on social media,
    combining information about foreign cyber activity from government and
    private sector sources, and in other ways assisting in the overall
    effort to identify and respond to disinformation. We would then be able
    to rebut falsehoods at an earlier stage, and that would entail
    consistent messaging from the White House, the State Department, the
    Departments of Defense, Justice and others. Our federal government has
    historically been reluctant to correct errors circulating in news
    media, let alone social media (partly out of First Amendment concerns
    and the restricted role of government relative to the private sector).
    But the efforts, for example, of the Department of Homeland Security in
    rebutting false claims--both domestic and foreign-sourced--of election
    fraud in last year's elections show how the federal government can make
    its voice heard in impactful ways. Moreover, if the federal government
    provides more detailed information to the news media, think tanks,
    cyber researchers and the like, they can be part of a national effort
    to stem disinformation.
        While it is possible that some additional legal authorities may be
    needed on the margins (for example, mandatory reporting by private
    sector companies of foreign cyber maliciousness), the reality is that
    we can make much progress now, without new legislation, if the
    executive branch makes this a high priority and directs agencies to
    work together in a coherent way. Among other things, the intelligence
    community should be told that disinformation is a higher priority
    national security threat, additional resources should be dedicated for
    that purpose, and a greater effort can be made to declassify relevant
    information to assist social media companies in identifying and
    stopping foreign online malice.
        These steps by the federal government, working with the private
    sector, are within our grasp and will help reduce the scope and
    influence of online disinformation. Obviously, the problem is complex,
    and other societal elements such as more civic education must be part
    of an overall solution--but the federal government can and should take
    the first critical steps now.
        Mr. Moulton. While I am concerned about military readiness,
    disinformation is clearly not just a military problem. As we face
    increasing efforts to mislead the American public and sow distrust and
    disunity, we see social media companies dodge substantive efforts to
    block disinformation's spread. If disinformation is not or cannot be
    eliminated, how would you advise we instead make ourselves harder
    targets? Ms. Jankowicz, you advise bringing local and Federal
    Government entities in health and education into the discussion. Can
    you describe in more detail how these departments and agencies might
    contribute to increased public digital literacy, which is clearly a
    matter of national security in addition to public health and public
    safety?
        Ms. Jankowicz. Thank you for the question, Mr. Moulton. Building
    societal resilience at home is one of the most important aspects of
    responding to disinformation. Our adversaries use pre-existing fissures
    in our society--such as economic inequality, systemic racism, and hot-
    button issues like gun rights--to drive us further apart. Their efforts
    are amplified by broad-based misunderstandings of how the traditional
    and social media ecosystem operates. It can be difficult for national
    institutions to deliver resonant messages to the most vulnerable
    populations, however. Those that already distrust government are
    unlikely to be convinced by a public service announcement encouraging
    them to ``take care before they share.'' This is where local government
    can play a critical role in building awareness of the tools and tactics
    of disinformation and building information literacy and civics more
    broadly. They can also serve as the connective tissue between funding
    sources and the organizations best positioned to deliver such
    interventions. I emphasize bringing state and local departments of
    health, education, arts, as well as local libraries to the forefront of
    America's counter-disinformation effort, because they know their local
    communities, their vulnerabilities, and the issues important to them
    best. In my research in Central and Eastern Europe, I have come across
    several local initiatives built on such bespoke local expertise. They
    include:
          In Estonia, where ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers
    are vulnerable to Kremlin-backed disinformation, the Integration
    Foundation offers free courses in Estonian language, cultural
    activities, and consultations about citizenship requirements both in
    Tallinn and Narva, a city on the border with Russia, where much of the
    ethnic Russian population is concentrated.
          In the Czech Republic, recognizing that the elderly are
    particularly susceptible to disinformation but hesitant to engage with
    counter disinformation programming, organizations attempting to build
    media literacy in the local population offered basic computer literacy
    training (such as how to use FaceTime to stay in touch with your
    grandchildren) and snuck in basic information literacy tenets to the
    curriculum. I call this the ``peas in the mashed potatoes'' approach.
          In the Republic of Georgia, one organization trains
    artists (singers, actors, musicians, comedians) from outside of the
    capital, Tbilisi, in recognizing and responding to disinformation. The
    artists then travel to their home region and put on a show
    incorporating what they've learned. This is ``infotainment'' at its
    best, delivered by influencers with credibility in an engaging and
    accessible format.
        In the United States, state and local governments might fund
    similar programs. They could develop information literacy curricula to
    be delivered by local librarians (still highly trusted across the
    political spectrum). They might identify local civil society groups to
    partner with influencers with connections to the locality to act as
    trusted third-party messengers. In times of health emergencies, rampant
    democratic vulnerabilities, or developing public safety issues, such
    trusted conduits can be invaluable in getting authoritative information
    out to the public. It is important to recognize this approach is, by
    necessity, long-term. As I often remark, we cannot fact-check our way
    out of the crisis of truth and trust in which we find ourselves. But we
    can slowly build citizens' ability to recognize disinformation and
    introduce friction into the sharing process. Just like most Americans
    now know to ignore spam emails from purported Nigerian princes
    promising to make them millionaires, we can train them to spot and
    resist sharing the dubious information they encounter online. I am
    including several links to other writing I have done on this topic
    below. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on these important
    issues.
        Mr. Moulton. A third of troops have reportedly declined the Covid
    vaccine, undermining our troops' readiness well before we have entered
    into conflict. As I wrote in a recent Time magazine op-ed, this issue
    has demonstrated the ability of targeted disinformation campaigns to
    undermine troops' confidence in the emerging science and technology
    that underpin national security. How do you advise we protect troops
    from ongoing targeted disinformation campaigns and protect military
    readiness?
        Dr. Lin. I agree entirely with your position that disinformation
    can be (and is indeed sometimes) a threat to military readiness.
    However, the DOD is not in a position to protect troops from all
    sources of disinformation, simply because everyone, including troops,
    can obtain information from multiple sources. That said, the DOD does
    have control over a variety of information sources to which the troops
    may be exposed.
        For example, cable television is available on many if not all
    bases. One could reasonably ask the question--which cable TV channels
    (or shows carried on those channels) broadcast large amounts of
    disinformation that are relevant to national security? For example, DOD
    would be fully within its prerogatives to forbid military bases from
    carrying RT (formerly Russia Today) on cable TV--and indeed, I have no
    knowledge that RT is carried on cable TV at any U.S. military base. But
    certain domestic cable channels have also carried programming with
    disinformation that threatens national security, such as disinformation
    related to Covid vaccines--and DOD has no obligation to make those
    channels (or shows) available on military bases either, even though
    off-base, everyone, including troops, has the right to access them as
    they see fit.
        The same goes for Internet access provided on base. To the extent
    that the troops use DOD facilities to access the Internet, there is no
    reason that DOD should not block access sites that are known to provide
    substantial amounts of disinformation that threaten national security,
    even though DOD cannot forbid the troops from accessing such sites
    using their own resources (such as personal smart phones that they pay
    for themselves).
        Both of these measures regarding cable TV and internet access on
    base require DOD to determine the nature of disinformation that is
    threatening to national security and to identify the channels and sites
    that are the most common purveyors of such disinformation. This will be
    an ongoing challenge rather than an assessment that can be done once
    and then left alone.
        Such measures alone will not make a substantial dent in the problem
    that you describe. Over the longer term, I refer back to my testimony
    in which I call for DOD to take a more active role in training the
    troops on what it means to support and defend the Constitution against
    all enemies, foreign and domestic. Such training presupposes an ability
    to engage in critical thought and to have information literacy skills,
    and to the extent that these skills need to be strengthened in the
    troops, DOD has an obligation to address them in its training efforts.
        Mr. Moulton. Dr. Kirschbaum, it is my understanding that each of
    the services defines information warfare in varying ways, and therefore
    staffs and plans for information warfare differently. Does this limit
    our ability to effectively execute information warfare in a joint
    environment?
        Dr. Kirschbaum. There are indeed differences in how the services
    define and use terms related to operations in the information
    environment. The term ``information warfare'' technically is no longer
    part of joint doctrine and hasn't been since 2006. In its former
    definition, it covered activities DOD would need to perform to
    influence the actions of adversaries as well as the protection of our
    own information. It had both offensive and defensive elements. However,
    the context for its place in joint doctrine suggested that information
    warfare was something done in the early phases of a crisis or conflict.
    In other words, the perception might be that information warfare was
    something done only when there was a war. The broader term
    ``information operations,'' on the other hand, had accepted that such
    activities could occur in peace and war. Some services or individuals
    continue to use the term ``information warfare.'' The U.S. Navy, for
    example, has embraced the term in naval doctrine while also recognizing
    how its' sister services (U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard) use
    different terms and definitions (Operations in the Information
    Environment and Information Operations, respectively). The Navy's term
    implies more of a wartime set of activities, while the other terms
    imply broader application. But there is significant overlap. As we have
    discussed in this hearing, one of the fundamental challenges we face
    today is that activities, competition, and conflict are occurring every
    day globally. Our adversaries have prepared for this and view the
    information environment as a useful arena to pursue and secure their
    interests while degrading our own. This is particularly true in the
    area short of armed conflict (often referred to as the ``gray zone'').
    Our adversaries operate freely in this space as we struggle to define
    the lines between peace and war where there may be none. While there is
    a large degree of generality and vagueness to the idea of the
    information environment, it is important to avoid confusion between the
    services and, more importantly, among combatant commanders about the
    importance of the information environment and our ability to operate
    effectively--in offense or defense. These definitions and other lexicon
    issues must be addressed if DOD is going to develop a cohesive,
    holistic, and joint strategy for Information (as a joint function); the
    Information Environment (i.e. current battle space); and activities,
    capabilities, operations, and security functions that will be employed
    in that battlespace. It is our understanding that officials within DOD
    understand this--as they have tried to thread this needle for years
    while struggling to update the 2016 DOD Strategy for Operations in the
    Information Environment. This will be an important part of the
    department's ongoing discussions about the right terms and the right
    context to ensure that the entire joint force can adequately plan for,
    and operate, in the information environment every single day.

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