[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RACIALLY AND ETHNICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT
EXTREMISM: THE TRANSNATIONAL THREAT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERTERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-10
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
44-824 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Committee Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan, Chairwoman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas August Pfluger, Texas, Ranking
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Member
Eric Swalwell, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Peter Meijer, Michigan
officio) John Katko, New York (ex officio)
Brittany Carr, Subcommittee Staff Director
Adrienne Spero, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
Joy Zieh, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Elissa Slotkin, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Witnesses
Mr. John T. Godfrey, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism and
Acting Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS,
United States Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. John Cohen, Counterterrorism Coordinator and Assistant
Secretary for Counterterrorism and Threat Prevention, United
States Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
For the Record
The Honorable Elissa Slotkin, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism:
Letter From Chairwoman Slotkin to Secretary Antony J. Blinken.. 45
Letter From Naz Durakoglu to Chairwoman Slotkin................ 46
RACIALLY AND ETHNICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE TRANSNATIONAL
THREAT
----------
Thursday, April 29, 2021
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:31 a.m.,
via Webex, Hon. Elissa Slotkin [Chairwoman of the subcommittee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives Slotkin, Jackson Lee, Langevin,
Gottheimer, Malinowski, Pfluger, Guest, Van Drew, and Meijer.
Ms. Slotkin. The Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism will come to order. Without objection, the
Chair is authorized to declare the subcommittee in recess at
any point.
Good morning, everyone. I want to thank our witnesses from
the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State
for being here today to discuss a complex and pressing topic
that deals directly with our safety here at home.
As the President said just last night, we won't ignore what
our intelligence agencies have determined to be the most lethal
terrorist threat to our homeland today, White supremacy. With
that in mind, our subcommittee is meeting today to explore the
threats posed by transnational, racially and ethnically
motivated violent extremists, or RMVEs. That is an acronym,
because the Government just loves our acronyms.
Our focus today is on the connections between individuals
and groups here in the United States who use violence to
further their racially or ethnically driven political goals,
and the growing number of foreign groups who share their aims,
ideologies, and violent designs.
While the information our intelligence community has on
some of these foreign groups is admittedly less than we would
like, the intelligence community has assessed that domestic
racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist groups,
which advocate for the superiority of the White race, have,
``the most persistent and concerning transnational
connections'' of all U.S. domestic violent extremists.
Through these connections, they spread propaganda, train,
and attempt to collaborate in carrying out violent acts. Given
their relative ease of travel and communication, labeling these
groups, their leaders, and their supporters as what they are is
one of--is all the more important to curb the threat at home
and abroad.
That said, it remains true that foreign groups with
transnational ties span a broad range of ideologies, including
everyone from White supremacists to radical Islamic terrorists.
This isn't a new or unfamiliar threat. It is one we have been
confronted with in various forms for decades. But over the past
few years, the United States and countries around the world
have seen a surge in violence and terrorism, perpetrated by
these kinds of organizations. This isn't just an American
threat, it is a global one.
Many of these foreign groups are downright eager to use
deadly violence to advance their goals. They are often heavily-
armed, such as the Nordic Resistance Movement. They are trained
in firearms and communications security tactics. They are often
coordinated, and they are increasingly global.
Another example: The Russian Imperial Movement's leadership
was finally named as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
last year, by Secretary Pompeo, after recruiting and training
followers for urban assaults, like the one its trainees carried
out in Gothenburg, Sweden. Combat 18, which started in the
United Kingdom, has similarly organized around neo-Nazi
principles, and as recently as 2019, was linked to the
assassination of a German politician.
In recent years, we have seen individual Americans reaching
out to foreign groups, and connecting over common ideology,
tactics, and training. A handful of Americans have even sought
to travel overseas to take up arms and fight alongside these
groups. We saw it, for instance, in September 2019 when a U.S.
Army soldier at Fort Riley--who was planning to travel to
Ukraine to fight with the Azov Battalion, a paramilitary
militia--was arrested for distributing bomb-making
instructions.
We have seen this for 20 years as individual Americans get
radicalized on-line, seek out groups, like al-Qaeda in Yemen,
and share tactics, ideology, and, in some cases, carry out
deadly attacks on the United States. Just as we in the
Government have spent significant effort to root out all these
individual Americans, so, too, should we care about American
White supremacists sharing tactics and training across National
lines.
To that end, given the threat of violence from White
supremacist extremists, we need to look to their links to
foreign organizations, especially as the barriers to
communicate, plan, recruit, and train internationally with our
ideological sympathizers has nearly disappeared.
My colleagues here this morning were also with me on
January 6 as we experienced a first-hand manifestation of the
threat we are going to talk about today. We all saw the havoc
domestic terrorists and other rioters caused as they tried to
upend our democratic process, and we mourn the loss of life
that resulted.
As the dust settles from the attack, and hundreds of the
insurrectionists have been charged with an assortment of
crimes, we are beginning to see the connections between some of
the more organized groups connected to that attack, and
sympathetic groups that have taken root in parts of Europe,
Australia, and elsewhere.
For example, the Proud Boys, which has had a number of its
members indicted on conspiracy charges around January 6, has
spawned local chapters, not just in the United States, but in
Britain, Norway, and Australia. Canada is so concerned about
the Proud Boys that they have made the decision to list them as
a foreign terrorist organization, along with The Base and the
Atomwaffen Division. This is something we will need to discuss
here today.
I spent a significant amount of time examining the
connections between terrorists and their networks in the Middle
East in my prior life, before running for Congress, and I have
been surprised by the vast amount of publicly-available
information that demonstrates the international connections of
some of these U.S.-based extremist groups, especially ones
promoting a White supremacist ideology.
We can see for ourselves that these domestic groups are
generating, and, in many cases, exporting a unique brand of
terrorism. They are learning lessons from plots, propaganda,
and attacks that are similarly driven by hate and violence
abroad.
The State Department's move last year to designate the
Russian Imperial Movement as one of these SDGTs, or
specifically designated global terrorists, was an unprecedented
and important first step to begin addressing the threat, but it
didn't go nearly far enough, and the time and the time is now
to take further action.
Earlier this month, I sent a letter to Secretary of State
Tony Blinken, asking him to use publicly available evidence,
along with intelligence our Government has, to determine
whether certain foreign White supremacist groups should be
labeled as foreign terrorist organizations under the Department
of State's formal processing criteria. If they couldn't go as
far as listing them as an FTO, I asked that they consider
labeling them an SDGT, a specially designated global terrorist
group.
If designated as an FTO, the United States can limit a
foreign group's financial property and travel interests. An
SDGT designation allows for the blocking of the group's assets
as well as those associated individuals, or subgroups, but this
designation does not restrict travel to the United States,
though it flags those individuals in numerous watch lists.
In the Department's response to me, which we just received
last week, which I deeply appreciate, the State Department
emphasized that a lack of updated credible information and
intelligence about these foreign groups is one of the
``important limitations'' they face when considering groups for
designation.
This is an issue I will be raising directly with the
intelligence community this week. I had hoped to raise these
issues with leadership from the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence today. Unfortunately, they were unable to
participate in this hearing.
Nonetheless, I am eager to hear from our witnesses about
the level and quality of intelligence we have collected on
these organizations thus far, and how we can ensure that the
State Department has the information and tools it needs to make
these designations if they are deemed to meet the appropriate
criteria.
The challenge of domestic violent extremism is one that we
need to confront and take on here at home within our
communities, and with careful respect for our domestic laws,
civil rights, and civil liberties. But any solution will
require an understanding of these transnational ties and
trends, as well as coordination with our allies.
Additionally, we need to see a much more robust,
coordinated effort between Government and private-sector
companies to take on this challenge, particularly the companies
that operate social media platforms, which we know are abused
to spread racially and ethnically motivated extremist ideology
world-wide.
For our Government, this issue sits as a crossroads of 2
agencies uniquely charged with keeping us safe at home, and
encouraging peace, liberty, and prosperity abroad. Their
different vantage points will shed light on this topic, and
help us understand how Congress can effectively confront
violent extremist threats that are rapidly taking root in
communities large and small across the country.
I look forward to hearing how your agencies are engaged in
this fight, and how we, as Members of Congress, can help.
[The statement of Chairwoman Slotkin follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Elissa Slotkin
April 29, 2021
I want to thank our witnesses from the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of State for being here today to discuss a
complex and pressing topic that deals directly with our safety here at
home. As the President said last night: ``We won't ignore what our
intelligence agencies have determined to be the most lethal terrorist
threat to the homeland today: White supremacy is terrorism.''
With that in mind, our subcommittee is meeting today to explore the
threats posed by transnational racially and ethnically motivated
violent extremists, or RMVEs.
Our focus today is on the connections between individuals and
groups here in the United States, who use violence to further their
racially or ethnically driven political goals; and the growing number
of foreign groups who share their aims, ideologies, and violent
designs. While the information our intelligence community has on some
of these foreign groups is admittedly less than we'd like, the IC has
assessed that domestic racially and ethnically motivated violent
extremist groups which advocate for the superiority of the White race
have ``the most persistent and concerning transnational connections''
of all U.S. domestic violent extremists.
Through these connections, they spread propaganda, train, and
attempt to collaborate in carrying out violent acts. Given their
relative ease of travel and communication, labeling these groups, their
leaders, and their supporters as what they are is all the more
important to curb this threat at home and abroad.
That said, it remains true that foreign groups with transnational
ties span a broad range of ideologies, including everyone from White
supremacists and radical Islamic terrorists. This isn't a new or
unfamiliar threat: It's one we've confronted in various forms, for
decades. But over the past few years, the United States and countries
around the world have seen a surge in violence and terrorism
perpetrated by these kinds of organizations. This isn't just an
American threat, it's a global one.
Many of these foreign groups are downright eager to use deadly
violence to advance their goals. They are often heavily-armed, such as
the Nordic Resistance Movement. They are trained in firearms and
communications security tactics. They are often coordinated. And they
are increasingly global.
Another example: The Russian Imperial Movement's leadership was
finally named as specially designated global terrorists last year, by
Secretary Pompeo, after recruiting and training followers for urban
assaults--like the one its trainees carried out in Gothenburg, Sweden.
Combat 18, which started in the United Kingdom, has similarly organized
around neo-Nazi principles, and as recently as 2019 was linked to the
assassination of a German politician.
In recent years, we've seen individual Americans reaching out to
foreign groups, and connecting over common ideology, tactics, and
training. A handful of Americans have even sought to travel overseas to
take up arms and fight alongside these groups. We saw it, for instance,
in September 2019, when a U.S. Army soldier at Fort Riley--who was
planning to travel to Ukraine to fight with the Azov Battalion, a
paramilitary militia--was arrested for distributing bomb-making
instructions. We have seen this for 20 years, as individual Americans
get radicalized on-line, seek out groups like al-Qaeda in Yemen, and
share tactics, ideology, and--in some cases--carry out deadly attacks
in the United States. Just as we in the Government have spent
significant effort to root out all these individual Americans, so too
should we care about American White supremacists sharing tactics and
training across National lines.
To that end, given the threats of violence from White supremacist
extremists, we need to look at their links to foreign organizations--
especially as the barriers to communicate, plan, recruit, and train
internationally with their ideological sympathizers and partners have
nearly disappeared.
My colleagues here this morning were also with me on January 6, as
we experienced a firsthand manifestation of the threat we are going to
talk about today. We all saw the havoc domestic terrorists and other
rioters caused as they tried to upend our democratic process, and we
mourn the loss of life that resulted. As the dust settles from that
attack--and hundreds of the insurrectionists have been charged with an
assortment of crimes--we are beginning to see connections between some
of the more organized groups connected to that attack, and sympathetic
groups that have taken root in parts of Europe, Australia, and
elsewhere. For example, The Proud Boys, which has had a number of its
members indicted on conspiracy charges around January 6, has spawned
local chapters not just across the United States but also in Britain,
Norway, and Australia. Canada is so concerned that they have made the
decision to list the Proud Boys, as well as The Base and the Atomwaffen
Division, as foreign terrorist organizations. That is something we will
need to discuss here today.
I spent a significant amount of my career examining the connections
between terrorists and their networks in the Middle East, and I've been
surprised by the vast amount of publicly available information that
demonstrates the international connections of some of these U.S.-based
violent extremist groups, especially ones promoting a White supremacist
ideology. We can see for ourselves that these domestic groups are
generating--and, in many cases, are exporting--a unique brand of
terrorism. And, they're learning lessons from plots, propaganda, and
attacks that are similarly driven by hate and violence abroad.
The State Department's move last year to designate the Russian
Imperial Movement as a Specially-Designated Global Terrorist (or SDGT)
group was an unprecedented and important first step in beginning to
address this threat, but it didn't go nearly far enough, and the time
to take further action is now.
Earlier this month, I sent a letter to Secretary of State Blinken
asking him to use publicly-available evidence, along with intelligence
our government has, to determine whether certain foreign White
supremacist groups should be labeled as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, under the Department of State's formal process and
criteria. If they couldn't be labeled an FTO, I asked that they be
labeled an SDGT. If designated as an FTO, the United States can limit a
foreign group's financial, property, and travel interests. An SDGT
designation allows for the blocking of the group's assets, as well as
those of associated individuals or subgroups--but this designation does
not restrict travel to the United States, though it likely flags those
individuals in our numerous watch lists.
In the Department's response to me, which we received last week,
the State Department emphasized that a lack of updated, credible
information and intelligence about these foreign groups is one of the
``important limitations'' they face when considering groups for
designation. This is an issue I'll be raising directly with the
intelligence community this week. I had hoped to raise this issue with
leadership from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
today, but unfortunately they were unable to participate in this
hearing. Nonetheless, I'm eager to hear from our witnesses about the
level and quality of the intelligence we've collected on these
organizations thus far and how we can ensure the State Department has
the information and tools it needs to make these designations, if
they're deemed to meet the appropriate criteria.
The challenge of domestic violent extremism is one that we need to
confront and take on here at home, within our communities, and with
careful respect for our domestic laws, civil rights, and civil
liberties. But any solution will require an understanding of these
transnational ties and trends, as well as coordination with our allies.
Additionally, we need to see a much more robust, coordinated effort
between Government and private-sector companies to take on this
challenge--particularly companies that operate social media platforms,
which we know are abused to spread racially and ethnically motivated
extremist ideology, world-wide.
For our Government, this issue sits at the crossroads of two
agencies, uniquely charged with keeping us safe at home, and
encouraging peace, liberty, and prosperity abroad. Their different
vantage points will shed important light on this topic, and help us
understand how Congress can effectively confront the violent extremist
threats that are rapidly taking root in communities large and small
across the country, and across the world.
I look forward to hearing how your agencies are engaged in this
fight and how we, as Members of Congress, can help.
Ms. Slotkin. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks for holding
this hearing.
I appreciate the opportunity to talk to our incredible
witnesses as well, Mr. Cohen, the coordinator for
counterterrorism, and assistant secretary for counterterrorism
and threat prevention, and Mr. John Godfrey. I appreciated the
opportunity to speak with them before-hand and have some good
conversations, and I think their credibility, their
professional career will add much to this discussion, and
really, you know, bring out the facts on what threat we are
facing and how we as a country can better deal with that.
As I said in our first official hearing on this
subcommittee, it is incumbent upon all of us to ensure that we
are doing everything we can to search those facts, to
understand the threat landscape, to be a threat-based committee
that is not a partisan issue. This is a non-partisan piece of
work for us to protect our homeland, and that is really the
most important thing.
Whether it is domestic violent extremists or foreign
organizations, we need to search that out for intelligence. The
intelligence piece of this committee is extremely important for
us to understand the facts, to come up with a game plan, and to
adequately equip the organizations that sit within our
jurisdiction so that they can do their job to continue to
protect us. So, I am glad to find that we are continuing to
search out key areas of bipartisanship where we can do so.
Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism, along
with anti-Government, or anti-authority violent extremism, and
every category of domestic terrorism, cannot be tolerated, not
by our law enforcement, not by our prosecutors, not by us in
Congress, and not by the American public. Those who commit
crimes in furtherance of extremist agendas, no matter what
their ideology is, must be held accountable to the fullest
extent of the law, and that is why we are here today to talk
about that.
I think it is important for all of us on this subcommittee,
and for Congress as a whole, to also recognize that our foreign
adversaries who are out there every single day, as our National
Security Strategy has stated, whether it is China, Russia,
Iran, North Korea, they are continually attempting, and
succeeding in some points, at dividing the American public
through amplification of extremist messaging, through on-line
platforms, if foreign governments are attempting to influence
the American people through social media.
Whether it is to impact an election or breed hate amongst
our citizens, I believe it is a problem. It is a problem that
is not new, but what is new at this point in time is the
rapidity and the speed in which these organizations can reach
every-day citizens in our country because of those social media
platforms. I hope that we can get into that today to look at
that.
But on the other side of the problem, we do, as the Chair
said--and, Madam Chair, thank you very much for mentioning the
fact that the balance intention here is really to make sure
that the protected rights, the First Amendment rights, remain
protected.
I think it is also incumbent for us to look at the fact
that, you know, we as a country, I think we can look at this as
the sky is falling, or we can also look at it as these are
mostly lone-wolf actions, and these lone-wolf actions are very
difficult to identify and to predict, and then, to do something
about, and that is why we are here today is to talk about those
ways of doing it.
But, as an American society, as a culture, and for somebody
who has spent my career fighting against all sorts of the
threats around the globe, you know, I think we should look at
our system of justice and the law enforcement agents and those
who are studying this on a daily basis and say, you know, there
is a bright side to this, that the organization, and from my
conversations with our witnesses today, it seems to be a lone-
wolf type of a threat instead of a very organized threat that
we see in some of the foreign terrorist organizations, like al-
Qaeda, like ISIS, and others that have organized to the point
where they are affecting society as a whole. So, let's dig into
that, and let's not be afraid to look at those facts.
It is on points like these that I look forward to working
with Chair Slotkin, and other Members of the subcommittee, to
address the variety of challenges that we are facing. The
threat landscape today is vast. It is far and wide, whether we
are dealing with cyber attacks from China, ISIS; whether it is
in Syria or terrorism, domestic terrorism here on American
soil, there is a lot of work to be done.
We need to look forward to working with the Executive
branch agencies, the partners there that are combating the
threat of terrorism, both internationally and domestically, day
in and day out, and we thank them for that. So, I absolutely
look forward to the contents of this hearing.
I think that it is also important to admit and to look
today at what is happening along our border, and it is--as an
Intelligence and Counterterrorism Subcommittee, we really need
to look at the intelligence that we are putting, and the
emphasis that we are putting on the surge at our Southern
Border. Let's not be, you know, distracted by one word or
another.
But if we have folks that are on terror lists that are
getting into this country, then the threat of domestic
terrorism will continue to rise in this country, because once
they get into this country, they are now domestic. So, let's
talk about that.
While the contents of this hearing are going to be focused
on a different subject, I do look forward, Madam Chair, to
putting that forth to our agencies and those under our
jurisdiction to really understand whether it is on the Northern
Border in the racially-motivated extremist groups that do
threaten us, or whether it is on the Southern Border in groups
that we may not know having access to our country. It is a
threat to our homeland.
So, I thank our witnesses. I thank, Madam Chair, your
leadership to get to the bottom of this, to have a fact-based
conversation, and to truly dig in and protect the American
people, according to our oath sworn to the Constitution. So
with that, I yield back. Thank you for your time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Pfluger follows:]
Statement of Honorable August Pfluger
Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate you holding this hearing today
and thank you to our witnesses: John Cohen, coordinator for
counterterrorism and assistant secretary for counterterrorism and
threat prevention, and John Godfrey, acting coordinator for
counterterrorism and acting special envoy for the Global Coalition to
Defeat ISIS.
As I said in our first official hearing as a subcommittee, it is
incumbent upon those of us on this subcommittee to ensure that we are
doing everything we can to protect Americans from domestic violent
extremists and I'm glad that we're continuing to find points of
bipartisanship where we can do so.
Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism, along with
anti-Government or anti-authority violent extremism, and every other
category of domestic terrorism, cannot be tolerated: Not by our law
enforcement and prosecutors; not by us in Congress; and not by the
American public. Those who commit crimes in furtherance of extremist
agendas, no matter their ideology, must be held accountable to the
fullest extent of the law.
I think it's important for all of us on the subcommittee, and for
Congress as a whole, to also recognize that foreign adversaries like
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are continually attempting, and
succeeding, at dividing the American people through amplifying
extremist messaging through on-line platforms. Foreign governments
attempting to influence the American people through social media,
whether it's to impact an election or to breed hate amongst our
citizens, I believe is a problem we all--on both sides of the aisle--
agree must to be dealt with.
It's on points like these that I look forward to working with Chair
Slotkin and the other Members of the subcommittee to address the
variety of challenges which we are currently facing.
The threat landscape today stretches far and wide--whether we are
dealing with a cyber attack from China, ISIS in Syria, or terrorism
here on American soil. There is a lot of work to be done. We look
forward to working with our Executive branch partners to continue to
combat the threat of terrorism both internationally and domestically. I
look forward to hearing more about how we can support and further these
efforts in relation to RMVE from an agency perspective.
I thank our witnesses for their willingness to appear before the
subcommittee, today, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Slotkin. I thank the Ranking Member.
Members are also reminded that the subcommittee will
operate according to the guidelines laid out by the Chairman
and Ranking Member of the full committee in their February 3
colloquy regarding remote procedures. Member statements may be
submitted for the record:
[The statements of Chairman Thompson and Honorable Jackson
Lee follow:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
April 29, 2021
We are here today to talk about racially and ethnically motivated
violent extremists or RMVEs.
Last month, the director of national intelligence published a
report on the heightened threat posed by domestic violent extremists.
The report warned that U.S.-based RMVE actors ``who promote the
superiority of the White race'' possess the most ``persistent and
concerning transnational connections'' because they ``frequently
communicate with and seek to influence each other.'' The Department of
Homeland Security's Homeland Threat Assessment, or HTA, released in the
fall also called attention to this concern.
The HTA acknowledged that White supremacist extremists have
conducted outreach abroad to spread their message, increasing the risk
of mobilization to violence and travel to conflict zones. White
supremacist RMVE actors are often inspired by the acts of like-minded
individuals abroad. They exchange tactics and techniques for their
violent plots, and they have even set up or inspired the creation of
affiliate groups.
It is time for our treatment of foreign RMVE threats to be
consistent with how we treat other foreign terrorist threats. When we
faced this same challenge in the context of al-Qaeda, the Islamic
state, home-grown violent extremists, and other Sunni and Shia
jihadists, the U.S. Government and private-sector partners rose to the
occasion to combat the threat. Indeed, our legal and counterterrorism
tools are different for domestic actors as opposed to international
ones. However, the individuals, groups, and movements we are here to
speak about today possess concrete links overseas.
For instance, several of the individuals associated with the Rise
Above Movement--a California-based White supremacist group--who were
initially charged for violence during the deadly Charlottesville rally,
appear to have traveled to Europe to meet with members of European
White supremacist extremist groups. More recently, the FBI is
reportedly probing whether foreign governments, groups, or individuals
funded some January 6 Capitol rioters using Bitcoin.
The January 6 attack will undoubtedly serve as a watershed moment
for RMVE actors across the globe--and we cannot ignore how the event is
affecting our allies and others abroad. And as COVID-19 protocols begin
to loosen, we must be forward-thinking about how RMVE actors might
again engage in travel and lead to a greater risk of violence. By not
taking action or taking inconsistent action--whether by failing to
prioritize the threat, educate the public on it, or using the tools we
have at our disposal to counter it--we condone the actions of White
supremacists at home and abroad.
We must abandon our traditional passive approach to this issue and
instead be creative in our solutions. And we can do these things while
upholding the Constitution. This subcommittee held a similar joint
hearing on this topic last Congress with non-Governmental subject-
matter experts. This time, it is great to have DHS and the State
Department in front of us to talk about the issue--specifically how
they are prioritizing it and what they are doing to combat it.
Before I conclude, I would be remiss if I did not express my
disappointment that the report required in Section 5602 of the fiscal
year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act--which would provide
policy makers and the public with extensive domestic and international
terrorism data--is now more than 10 months past due. This data is
crucial for Members of Congress to accurately understand the threat and
effectively legislate on it. I would request that our DHS witness
provide us with an update on the status of this report today.
I look forward to having a productive conversation on this topic
and working with both Departments on solutions.
______
Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
April 29, 2021
Thank you, Chairwoman Slotkin and Ranking Member Pfluger for
holding today's hearing on ``Racially and Ethnically Motivated Violent
Extremism: The Transnational Threat.''
It is a well-known fact that before you can begin to address any
problem, you must first recognize the symptoms.
There have been symptoms of racially and ethnically motivated
violent extremism in the United States for too many years and deaths
proving is presence in too many communities in this country.
This hearing will provide Members of this committee with an
opportunity to discuss:
the international and transnational racially or ethnically
motivated violent extremist (RMVE) threat landscape;
the spread of RMVE narratives and counternarratives; and
how the U.S. Departments of State and Homeland Security are
addressing the threats.
I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses:
Mr. John Cohen, assistant secretary for counterterrorism and
threat prevention, Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
Mr. John T. Godfrey, acting coordinator for counterterrorism
and acting special envoy for the global coalition to defeat
ISIS, Department of State.
The escalation in violent domestic attacks over the last decade has
made it clear that domestic terrorism is a problem.
The rise in violence is linked to the presence of racially/
ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs).
Of all domestic terrorist actors, RMVEs who promote the superiority
of the white race present the most persistent and concerning
transnational connections.
RMVEs who advocate for the superiority of the white race are not
new but the proficiency with which these organizations operationally
employ and share techniques, tactics, and procedures--especially over
the last several years--is alarming and must be taken seriously.
Although some elements of the U.S. Government have recently been
more aggressive in tackling the threat from transnational and foreign
RMVE threats, more must be done.
In comparison with our allies, the U.S. Goverment is seemingly
lagging in addressing the transnational threat from RMVE actors,
especially when it comes to designating RMVE organizations and
individuals with international ties as foreign terrorist organizations
or specially designated global terrorists.
The U.S. must work with our allies in a coordinated and cohesive
fashion to counter the transnational threat from RMVE actors.
recent terrorist attacks in the united states
April 15, 2013--The Boston attacks were tragic killing 3 and
injuring more than 260 men, women and children awaiting the arrival of
runners in the Boston Marathon.
On November 28, 2016, 11 individuals were injured in an incident at
Ohio State University when Abdul Razaq Ali Artan drove a car into a
crowd and also wounded individuals with a knife.
On July 17, 2016, an offender shot and killed 6 police officers in
Baton Rouge, LA. Three of the officers died and 3 were hospitalized.
On July 7, 2016, an offender shot and killed 5 police officers and
wounded 11 others (9 police officers and 2 civilians) in Dallas, TX.
The offender was killed by police with a remotely guided robot loaded
with an explosive.
On June 12, 2016, an armed assailant shot and killed 49 people and
non-fatally wounded over 50 others in an Orlando, FL Pulse Nightclub.
After a 3-hour standoff with police, the assailant was killed by
police.
On December 2, 2015, 2 offenders killed 14 people and wounded 21
others in San Bernardino, CA at a social services center. Both
offenders were killed by police while resisting arrest.
On November 27, 2015, at a Planned Parenthood clinic, in Colorado
Springs, CO, a lone offender shot and killed 3 people and wounded
another 9 people with a semiautomatic rifle before surrendering to the
Police after a 5-hour standoff.
On July 16, 2015, in Chattanooga, TN, a lone offender killed 5
people and wounded another person at a military recruitment office and
naval reserve center, before he was killed by police.
On June 17, 2015, in Charleston, SC, a lone offender shot and
killed 9 parishioners and wounded another parishioner with .45 caliber
pistol at the historic Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church.
October 1, 2017--Las Vegas Mass Shooting, killed 60 and wounded
over 1,000 when a gunman opened fire on a crowd attending the Route 91
Harvest music festival on the Las Vegas Strip in Nevada.
March 22, 2018--Austin Serial Bombings occurred between March 2 and
March 22, 2018, when 5 package bombs exploded, killing 2 people and
injuring another 5. The suspect, 23-year-old Mark Anthony Conditt of
Pflugerville, Texas, blew himself up inside his vehicle after he was
pulled over by police on March 21, also injuring a police officer.
August 3, 2019--El Paso Texas, a mass shooting occurred at a
Walmart store in El Paso, Texas, United States. A gunman shot and
killed 23 people and injured 23 others in his attempt to harm persons
he perceived as being Hispanic.
March 16, 2021--In the Atlanta Suburbs 8 people where killed by a
21-year-old leaving a city in and community in shock and mourning that
extends to communities and cities throughout the Nation and around
world.
March 22, 2021--in Colorado a 21-year-old suspect killed 10 people
at a Colorado supermarket--which included Boulder police Officer Eric
Talley, 51, father of 7 children.
According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), in the
immediate aftermath of Election Day, a wave of hate crimes and lesser
hate incidents swept the country--1,094 bias incidents occurred in the
first 34 days following November 8, 2016.
SPLC reports that anti-immigrant incidents (315) remain the most
reported, followed by anti-black (221), anti-Muslim (112), and anti-
LGBT (109). Anti-Trump incidents numbered 26 (6 of which were also
anti-white in nature, with 2 non-Trump related anti-white incidents
reported).
The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from the
witnesses on the important role that local and State response to
domestic terrorism has filled in homeland security.
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Federal Government had a wide
range of law enforcement, National security, and benefits management
agencies that collected information, but jealously guarded this
information from other agencies.
The 9/11 Commission Report allowed an in-depth assessment of the
failures that led to the horrific terrorist attacks against the United
States that cost the lives of nearly 3,000 people.
The House Committee on Homeland Security was created to implement
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report and ensure that
resources were provided to support the mission of homeland security.
The most significant task of the committee was guiding the
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and making sure
that it had all that it would need to carry out its mission.
I, along with other Members who have served on this committee since
its inception, made a commitment that a terrorist attack of the
magnitude that occurred on September 11, 2001 would never happen again.
From 2009 to 2018 there were 427 extremist-related killings in the
U.S. Of those, 73.3 percent were committed by right-wing extremists,
23.4 percent by Islamist extremists, and 3.2 percent by left-wing
extremists.
In short, 3 out of 4 killings committed by right-wing extremists in
the U.S. were committed by white supremacists (313 from 2009 to 2018).
Before the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, State capitols
across the country were the targets of armed demonstrations, and States
have grappled with other domestic terrorism incidents to include mass
killings of minorities in furtherance of white supremacist ideology.
The long and blood history of white supremacy requires an approach
that holds individuals accountable for their actions as a means of
ending the lure of the mob as a tool of violence against targets of
interest.
Reports that cite that over a hundred current or former members of
the military were involved in the riot at the Capitol are shocking to
some.
Unfortunately, this aspect of white supremacist violence was
evident by violence committed by Proud Boys and Boogaloo adherents made
clear their objectives.
My efforts to focus the attention of the military on this link was
evident in an amendment I offered to the NDAA for fiscal year that was
adopted
This Jackson Lee Amendment included in the House version of the
NDAA directed the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress the
extent, if any, of the threat to national security posed by domestic
terrorist groups and organizations motivated by a belief system of
white supremacy, such as the Boogaloo and Proud Boys extremists is
reflected in the Conference bill.
The NDAA conference identified that the FBI is under statutory
obligation, established by Section 5602 of the NDAA fiscal year 2020
(Public Law 116-92), to complete a report that would better
characterize the domestic terrorist threat by requiring the FBI and the
Department of Homeland Security in consultation with the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), to produce a set of comprehensive
reports over 5 years.
The report is to include: A strategic intelligence threat internal
to the United States; metrics on the number and type of incidents,
coupled with resulting investigations, arrests, prosecutions, and
analytic products, copies of the execution of domestic terrorism
investigations; detailed explanations of how the FBI, DHS, and NCTC
prioritize the domestic terrorism threats and incident; and
descriptions regarding the type and regularity of training provided by
the FBI, DHS, or NCTC to other Federal, State, and local law
enforcement.
The conferees noted that the report has not been delivered to the
appropriate committees and they urged the FBI Director to deliver the
report without delay.
The Jackson Lee Amendment to the NDAA fiscal year 2021 sought the
same information that is required under the NDAA fiscal year 2020
because of the threat posed by accelerationists and militia extremists
who comprise a range of violent anti-government actors, movements, and
organizations, some of which branch out of decades-old ideologies and
others of which are relatively new has led to violent engagement of law
enforcement.
My concern is that in the aftermath of a historic national
election, the activity of violence influencers like Boogaloo Boys or
Proud Boys will increase and lead to attacks becoming more frequent.
In 2018, we saw too many instances of violent extremists searching
for opportunities to sow violence and disrupt democratic processes.
Boogaloo and Proud Boys are targeting constitutionally protected
activity for cooption or to provide cover for attacks.
I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and the
question and answer opportunity that will follow.
Thank you. I yield back the remainder of my time.
The efforts of this committee must shine a light where needed to
inform ourselves on the things that we must do to better secure the
Nation and our people from threats posed by domestic terrorist attacks.
There is no Federal law, that provides a domestic terrorism charge,
and in light of the attack on the U.S. Capitol there have been renewed
calls for the creation of such a statute.
The designation of new laws is not the purview of this committee,
but that of the Judiciary Committee on which I serve as chair of the
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security.
Currently, at the Federal level, domestic terrorism suspects are
almost always charged with a wide array of Federal crimes including but
not limited to hate crimes, guns, explosives, and tax-related charges.
The list of domestic incidents continues to grow and this committee
must learn all that we can from today's witnesses who can provide
insight into the experiences they have in responding to and recoverying
from terrorist attacks.
State and local governments are the first to respond to, mediate,
and recover from domestic terrorism attacks and we thank them and their
leadership for your service to the Nation.
I thank the Chairwoman, and I look forward to the testimony of
today's witnesses.
Thank you.
Ms. Slotkin. I don't see Chairman Thompson here, so we will
proceed, and I don't see Ranking Member Katko. So I will now
welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness is Mr. John
Godfrey, the acting coordinator for counterterrorism and acting
special envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS of the
Department of State.
As the acting coordinator, Mr. Godfrey leads the State
Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism in developing
coordinated strategies and approaches to defeat terrorism
abroad and securing the counterterrorism cooperating of
international partners. Prior to this role, Acting Coordinator
Godfrey served as the acting deputy chief of mission for
Embassy Riyadh.
Our second witness is Mr. John Cohen, the assistant
secretary for counterterrorism and threat prevention for the
Department of Homeland Security. Assistant Secretary Cohen has
over 3 decades of experience in law enforcement,
counterintelligence, and homeland security. Assistant Secretary
Cohen has returned to DHS after having previously served as the
counterterrorism coordinator and acting under secretary for
intelligence and analysis. In this capacity, Mr. Cohen led
DHS's efforts to counter violent extremism and improve
information sharing.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize
his statement for 5 minutes. There is a little clock on your
screen so you can check yourself, and I will start with Acting
Coordinator Godfrey.
STATEMENT OF JOHN T. GODFREY, ACTING COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM AND ACTING SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE GLOBAL
COALITION TO DEFEAT ISIS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Godfrey. Chairwoman Slotkin, Ranking Member Pfluger,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for
this opportunity to appear before you today. I am here today to
discuss the international dimensions of what we call racially
or ethnically motivated violent extremism, or RMVE--and we do,
indeed, love acronyms--and the State Department's on-going
efforts to address this transnational threat. I would ask that
my full written statement be entered into the record.
Just last month, we commemorated the second anniversary of
the terrible attacks on 2 mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand,
a horror that was live-streamed and amplified by supporters on
the internet for all the world to see. This massacre was
shocking, but unfortunately, it was not unique. Indeed, from
Christchurch and Pittsburgh to Quebec City and Hanau, we have
seen an escalation in violence perpetrated by RMVE actors
globally.
That is why the Biden-Harris administration has made
countering RMVE, including White-identity terrorism, a top
priority. The National Security Council staff is leading a
comprehensive review of the domestic terrorist landscape,
including RMVE, with the goal of formulating a strategic
framework to address this threat. Today, I wish to focus on the
transnational dimensions of this threat.
A brief note on terminology. The State Department uses the
term ``RMVE'' for attacks perpetrated by individuals and groups
aiming to advance a political agenda to defend against what
they perceive as threats to their racial or ethnic identity.
RMVE individuals and groups often violently target members of
religious, racial, or ethnic minority groups, immigrants,
LGBTQI+ persons, and governments.
Today's digital platforms connect RMVE individuals and
groups to a broad range of conspiracy theories, misinformation
and disinformation, and violent extremist ideologies, fueling a
perverse fear of a so-called White genocide and other
exclusionary narratives and stoking calls to action.
RMVE actors often communicate through mainstream social
media platforms, anonymous on-line messaging boards and gaming
platforms, smaller websites with targeted audiences, and end-
to-end encrypted chat applications, often using coded language
and symbols.
Through these avenues, RMVE groups across the ideological
spectrum, fundraise, communicate, recruit, radicalize, and
inspire others to violence. They also share practical
information about how to establish and run training facilities,
procure fraudulent travel documents, and clandestinely move
people and materiel. As a result, many RMVE attacks are carried
out by lone actors who are not affiliated with a single group,
but who are, instead, inspired by transnational connections,
often but not only in digital space with RMVE actors abroad.
Before I outline the State Department's efforts, let me
first say a brief word about the whole-of-Government approach
this administration is bringing to this fight. Domestically,
the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security have the lead
on protecting the homeland from this threat, and investigating
cases, including those involving RMVE.
The State Department's role begins at our borders and
extends internationally. We work closely with a range of other
interagency partners in this effort as well. The Secretary
formally designated the counterterrorism coordinator on
February 24, 2021, to coordinate the Department's global
efforts to counter White-identity terrorism, fulfilling a
requirement in the fiscal year 2021 National Defense
Authorization Act. To that end, the Department is proactively
coordinating with diplomatic posts, interagency stakeholders,
academic entities, and other relevant parties to address these
threats.
The State Department also has a number of tools to counter
RMVE: First, terrorist designations. In April 2020, as the
Chairwoman mentioned, we designated the Russian Imperial
Movement and 3 of its leaders as specially-designated global
terrorists, the first time we have designated RMVE actors using
State Department authorities.
Second, preventing terrorist travel by RMVE actors. The
State Department is actively encouraging partner governments to
nominate RMVE actors as appropriate into their own National
watch lists, as well as international law enforcement platforms
such as INTERPOL.
Third, diplomatic engagement. The State Department
proactively engages with foreign partners to bolster
information sharing on RMVE, and those efforts have recently
intensified.
Fourth, using public diplomacy tools, we are leveraging
international platforms to build the capacity of local
governments to address the RMVE threat.
Fifth, engagement with the tech sector, and this involves
first informing providers of what the threat is, and, second,
urging them to voluntarily establish, and then rigorously
enforce, terms of service to allow them to remove on-line
content that doesn't meet those terms of service.
Finally, we use our foreign assistance to build partner
capacity around the world. We are committed to protecting the
United States and our interests from the increasingly dangerous
RMVE actors that we face, and we are leading the global
community in acknowledging, understanding, and effectively
addressing the transnational dimension of this RMVE threat. We
very much welcome the interest of the Congress in this issue,
and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Godfrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of John T. Godfrey
April 29, 2021
Chairwoman Slotkin, Ranking Member Pfluger, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear
before you today. I am here today to discuss the international
dimensions of what we call ``racially or ethnically motivated violent
extremism,'' or ``REMVE,'' and the State Department's on-going efforts
to address this persistent and growing transnational threat.
Just last month, we commemorated the second anniversary of the
terrible attacks on 2 mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, where on
March 15, 2019, a 28-year-old Australian national gunned down 51
people--a horror that was pre-planned to be live-streamed and amplified
by supporters on the internet for the world to see. Just before the
attack, the perpetrator posted on-line a lurid and deranged 74-page
manifesto. His writing revealed a violent racist and White supremacist
world-view, expressing rage that immigration flows and demographic
changes were purportedly causing what he referred to as the
``replacement of the White race'' around the world.
This massacre in Christchurch was shocking, but, unfortunately, it
wasn't unique. The attacker made clear in his screed that he was
inspired by others who shared similar twisted views and had conducted
similar attacks, including the individual who massacred nearly 80
people in Oslo, Norway, in 2011. Indeed, from Christchurch and
Pittsburgh to Quebec City and Hanau, we have seen an escalation in
violence perpetrated by REMVE actors around the world. And we have seen
ample evidence that those individuals are increasingly interconnected,
often--but not only--on-line.
This is why the Biden-Harris administration has made it a top
priority to counter racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism,
particularly violent White supremacist ideology. To kick off this
effort, the National Security Council (NSC) staff is leading a
comprehensive review of the Domestic Violent Extremism landscape,
including REMVE, with the goal of building a strategic framework to
address this threat. Assistant Secretary Cohen will discuss the
domestic dimensions of REMVE; in the time I have before you today, I
wish to focus on the international and transnational dimensions of this
threat.
understanding the ``remve'' threat
I'd like to begin with a brief overview of the threat landscape.
The State Department is using the term REMVE for attacks perpetrated by
individuals and groups aiming to advance a broader political agenda to
defend against what they perceive as a threat to their racial or ethnic
identity. REMVE often encompasses individuals and groups driven by an
intolerant and ethno-supremacist ideology, with ``White identity
terrorism'' the largest component of the REMVE landscape. REMVE actors
engage in violence or the plotting of violence targeting: Immigrants;
people of other races; Jewish, Muslim, or other ethnic or religious
groups; LGBTQI+ persons, governments; and other perceived enemies.
While the U.S. Government uses the term ``REMVE,'' partner governments,
NGO's, and others use a variety of terms to describe facets of this
threat, including ``far right terrorism,'' ``extreme right-wing
terrorism,'' ``White identity terrorism,'' and/or ``White supremacist
terrorism.''
Between 2015 and 2020, the U.N. Security Council's Counterterrorism
Committee tracked a 320 percent increase in ``extreme right-wing
terrorism'' globally. In recent years, deadly REMVE attacks have
occurred in Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, among other countries. In Singapore, authorities
recently arrested a 16-year-old male who was inspired by the
Christchurch attacker and planned to attack 2 mosques on the
anniversary of that horrendous event. This was a rare and isolated
incident for the country, demonstrating the reach of these pernicious
ideologies. Violent White supremacist and neo-Nazi groups have also
become increasingly prominent and vocal in a number of Western
countries, with a corresponding rise in attacks.
To effectively tackle the threat posed by REMVE actors, we need to
understand the motivations and ideologies that fuel the horrific crimes
they commit. The on-going misuse of today's digital platforms can
connect REMVE individuals and groups to a broad range of conspiracy
theories, mis- and disinformation, and violent extremist ideologies,
many of which may be protected speech under the First Amendment. While
these informal on-line communities make it difficult to encapsulate one
overarching REMVE narrative, REMVE ideologies often encompass anti-
Semitism, drawing extensively from Nazi-era propaganda. REMVE actors
are frequently influenced by works of hate and paranoia that provide an
ideological framework for their violent actions. These narratives fuel
a call to action by fomenting a perverse fear of ``White genocide,''
and feed into other exclusionary narratives globally.
It's also important to understand how REMVE individuals and groups
organize and operate. In some aspects, REMVE actors function similarly
to Islamist terrorists, such as members of al-Qaeda, ISIS, and
Hizballah. Like Islamist terrorists, REMVE actors are part of a global
and interconnected on-line community. They exploit the internet to
propagandize, radicalize, recruit, and inspire individuals, incite
violence, raise funds, organize training, plot attacks, and broadcast
their attacks world-wide. But in other important respects, REMVE actors
tend to operate differently. Unlike ISIS or al-Qaeda, REMVE actors
often have a more diffuse organizational structure. Most do not have
clear leadership or command-and-control structures to coordinate
attacks--or clear membership or affiliation. They also often lack a
physical safe haven or territory they control where they can operate
with complete impunity.
While many attacks by individuals and groups are self-funded, REMVE
actors do raise money from a variety of licit and illicit sources,
including merchandise and music sales, donations from individuals,
criminal activity such as narcotics and weapons trafficking and selling
counterfeit goods, and providing military-style training to other
extremists. In contrast with Islamist terrorists, who often rely on
informal financial institutions and networks, REMVE groups often use
formal financial institutions, such as banks and monetary transmitters,
to move funds domestically and internationally. Several REMVE groups
are also known to use crowd-funding platforms and virtual currency to
solicit donations and effect money transfers.
The U.S. Government is deeply concerned about the extent of the
transnational links between REMVE actors world-wide. REMVE actors often
communicate through mainstream social media platforms, anonymous on-
line message boards, on-line gaming platforms, smaller websites with
targeted audiences, and end-to-end encrypted chat applications, often
using coded language and symbols. Through these avenues, REMVE groups
across the ideological spectrum fundraise, communicate, recruit,
radicalize, and inspire others to violence. They also share practical
information about how to establish and run training facilities, procure
fraudulent travel documents, fabricate explosives and obtain weapons,
and clandestinely move people and materiel. As a result, many REMVE
attacks are carried out by lone actors with no affiliation to a single
group, who are inspired by a transnational REMVE movement or movements
with adherents around the globe who connect virtually on-line. Part of
this phenomenon includes violent White supremacists traveling overseas
to train and fight with like-minded individuals in foreign conflict
zones. U.S.-based REMVE actors have also been known to communicate with
and travel abroad to engage in person with foreign REMVE actors,
primarily in Europe and in countries such as Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and South Africa.
countering the ``remve'' threat
The United States is taking concrete and specific actions to
counter the complex and evolving REMVE threat world-wide. Before I
outline the State Department's efforts, let me first say a word about
the whole-of-Government approach the administration is bringing to this
fight. Domestically, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security
have the lead in protecting the homeland from this threat and
investigating cases of DVE, including those involving REMVE. In turn,
the State Department's role begins at our borders and extends
internationally. We work closely with interagency partners, including
the FBI, DHS, the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury,
U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. intelligence
community, and use tools similar to those we have effectively used
against terrorist threats, such as those posed by ISIS and al-Qaeda.
To bring all our counterterrorism tools to the fight against REMVE,
the Secretary formally designated the CT Coordinator on February 24,
2021 to coordinate the Department's global efforts to counter ``White
identity terrorism,'' fulfilling a requirement in the fiscal year 2021
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). To that end, the State
Department is proactively coordinating with our diplomatic posts,
interagency partners, academic entities, and other relevant
stakeholders to better understand and address ``White identity
terrorism'' and the broader REMVE threat. We are also collaborating
with interagency partners to develop a Department strategy to counter
REMVE abroad, and we have contracted a Federally-Funded Research and
Development Center (FFRDC) to conduct an independent study to map
global connections between REMVE actors, in line with the NDAA.
Countering Terrorist Financing and Travel
The State Department has a broad range of tools to counter REMVE.
First, the State Department utilizes our counterterrorism-related
designation authorities to counter the REMVE threat. In April 2020, we
designated the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), a group that provides
paramilitary-style training to neo-Nazis and White supremacists, and 3
of its leaders as specially-designated global terrorists (SDGTs). In
August 2016, 2 Swedish men traveled to St. Petersburg and underwent 11
days of paramilitary-style training provided by RIM. A few months
later, these men and another individual conducted a series of terrorist
attacks in Gothenburg, Sweden. Designating RIM was an unprecedented
step--it was the first time the United States has designated a foreign
White supremacist organization as an SDGT. This action was enabled by
the September 2019 amendments to Executive Order 13224, expanding
State's ability to designate leaders of terrorist groups or those that
participate in terrorist training.
We will not hesitate to continue using our counterterrorism-related
designation authorities against all terrorist and violent extremist
groups, regardless of ideology, as appropriate. The State Department
actively assesses REMVE groups and/or individuals abroad, including for
potential designation under our authorities. An important limitation is
the availability of sufficient credible information that meets
standards for those designations. Nonetheless, we will continue to
actively review all credible sources of information to assess whether
foreign REMVE groups and/or individuals meet the criteria for
designation under States' authorities.
Second, we play a leading role in preventing terrorist travel,
including by REMVE actors. The State Department is actively encouraging
partner governments to nominate REMVE actors, as appropriate, into
their own National watch lists as well as international law enforcement
platforms, including that of INTERPOL. We also continue to negotiate
and implement bilateral terrorism screening arrangements with select
foreign partners, which allows us to exchange watch list identities
with those partners. These efforts augment both U.S. and foreign
partners' border screening systems. Continuing an effort that dates to
9/11, the State Department is also taking steps to bolster the
biometric and traveler targeting border security capabilities of key
international partners, including in Europe. These initiatives provide
capacity that enables partner nations to better identify and disrupt
terrorist travel, including that of REMVE actors.
Diplomatic Engagement and Public Diplomacy
Third, through diplomatic engagement via our embassies abroad, the
State Department has emphasized to our foreign partners that this issue
is a priority for the Biden-Harris administration, and encouraged
increased information sharing on this critical subject. To underscore
this message, in March, we sent a global demarche to all of our posts
highlighting this administration's focus on these issues, and seeking
information from all of our partners on REMVE. We have been hearing
back from our partners that REMVE is a serious concern and a top
priority for many of them as well, and they are eager to bolster
cooperation and collaboration in this area. We are also engaging our
foreign partners, as well as technology sector and civil society
partners, through multilateral venues, such as the Council of Europe
(CoE), the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the industry-led
Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Hedayah (the CVE Center
based in Abu Dhabi), and the United Nations (UN), on REMVE. In October
2020, for example, we partnered with Germany and the United Kingdom to
convene a virtual event at the United Nations General Assembly to
improve information sharing between partner nations and explore REMVE
actors' transnational linkages. On April 21 and earlier today, the
United States participated in high-level virtual dialogs on REMVE under
the banner of the GCTF--a gathering of 30 like-minded partners from
across the globe. We are also co-leading with Germany a new Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) initiative to counter REMVE financing.
Fourth, public diplomacy is an effective tool in preventing and
countering REMVE. We are leveraging existing international platforms,
such as the Strong Cities Network (SCN) and the City Pair Program, to
build the capacity of local governments from Australia to Canada to
address the REMVE threat. In October 2021, the SCN will bring local and
National government officials from the Czech and Slovak Republics
together to discuss strategies for preventing and countering REMVE. And
in December 2021, representatives of the German cities of Halle and
Rostock will visit Atlanta and Savanna for a REMVE-focused City Pair
Program, which is a two-way exchange program we created in 2014 to help
cities address the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and
Iraq. We do this in close partnership with DHS's Office of Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP). Through the State
Department's International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), we have
also introduced international government and law enforcement officials
to strategies used by the U.S. Government and private sector to prevent
attacks on public gathering places and other soft targets, such as
houses of worship, which can be targeted by REMVE actors. The State
Department also funds programs related to democracy, pluralism, human
rights, and tolerance to prevent and counter recruitment and
radicalization to violence related to REMVE. For instance, we support
the participation of French universities in the ``Peer to Peer:
Countering Hate and Intolerance'' program, which empowers university
students to develop on-line and off-line messaging campaigns to counter
REMVE and anti-Semitic narratives in their communities.
We have also increased awareness among foreign audiences by
amplifying the testimony of ``formers'' through speaker programs. These
are individuals who were previously involved in REMVE, have realized
the error of their ways, and are now uniquely qualified to dissuade
others from becoming radicalized to violence. In December 2019, just
ahead of COVID-19, we sent a former neo-Nazi to Austria and Belgium to
share insights about his radicalization and deradicalization journeys,
and to discuss his community-based rehabilitation and reintegration
programs for REMVE actors. Through the first-hand accounts of
``formers,'' our allies are better understanding the nature of REMVE
and developing more tailored strategies to confront this threat.
Engagement with the Tech Sector
Fifth, the State Department engages with the international
community and tech companies in the vitally important effort to counter
the use of the internet by REMVE actors for terrorist purposes. The
reliance of REMVE actors on on-line platforms to radicalize, recruit,
communicate, and organize to violence makes this line of effort
particularly consequential. We have shaped and mobilized international
support on 2 high-level calls for action: The G20 Osaka Leaders'
Statement on Preventing Exploitation of the Internet for Terrorism and
Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism (VECT) and the G7 Biarritz
Strategy for an Open, Free, and Secure Digital Transformation. These
documents reflect and protect important American values, such as
freedom of speech. We have long held and continue to believe that the
most effective remedy for objectionable speech isn't censorship; it's
more engagement. As a result, these documents uphold freedom of
expression by promoting credible alternative rhetoric rather than
endorsing approaches that rely on coercing ideologues into silence. In
addition, Osaka and Biarritz stress the importance of voluntary,
collaborative efforts with the tech sector over regulation that
threatens the innovation that has made the internet an engine of
prosperity, creativity, and connectivity.
The State Department, in partnership and coordinating with other
departments and agencies such as the National Counterterrorism Center,
also has engaged tech companies to voluntarily share information on
terrorist trends and tactics and encouraged tech companies to consider
voluntarily removing REMVE-related content when appropriate by
enforcing their respective terms of service that forbid the use of
their platforms for terrorist purposes while maintaining full respect
for the right to freedom of expression. For example, following the
designation of RIM as an SDGT, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and
Google/YouTube decided to remove RIM accounts and content from their
platforms. This was an important step, though government designations
are not required for companies to be able to take action against bad
actors on their platforms.
Foreign Partners' Capacity Building
Finally, the State Department is beginning to use our foreign
assistance funding to build foreign partners' capacity to address the
REMVE threat. In October 2020, we supported the International Institute
for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) in launching a new initiative
focused on how criminal justice practitioners can address REMVE. This
initiative, which we co-led with the United Kingdom, gathered more than
40 policy makers and practitioners from 19 countries to develop a good
practices guide with concrete steps to confront this threat. Influenced
by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) principles, the guide
includes good practices on the types of counterterrorism tools and
legislation countries should consider to effectively tackle the REMVE
threat, and how criminal justice actors should work with non-
Governmental actors, including social media companies and community
leaders. That guide will be launched later this year and help equip
criminal justice practitioners tackling REMVE threats around the world.
conclusion
Protecting the United States and our interests against all forms of
terrorism, including REMVE, remains a top priority for the U.S.
Government and the State Department. The scale and complexity of REMVE
threats around the world reflect how the terrorist landscape has
evolved to become more diverse, challenging, and global, as terrorists
spread their twisted ideas with unprecedented speed and scope via
modern technology. As I said before, the State Department's authorities
are focused on the international dimension of this threat, yet this is
a problem that involves connections between REMVE actors here at home
and abroad. We are committed to leading the global community in
recognizing and effectively addressing the transnational dimension of
the REMVE threat. We welcome the interest of the Congress in this issue
and I wish to thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you
today. I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Slotkin. Great. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Assistant Secretary Cohen to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN COHEN, COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR AND
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AND THREAT PREVENTION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cohen. Chairwoman Slotkin, Ranking Member Pfluger,
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be
here with you today to discuss this important issue. I too have
submitted a written statement for the record, and I ask that it
be submitted as part of the record.
In preparing for this hearing, it allowed me some time for
some self-reflection. As you pointed out, Madam Chairwoman,
this is my second tour with DHS. This is the third Presidential
administration that I have served with since the September 11
attack, and this is part of a 35-plus year career in law
enforcement and homeland security.
I echo your and the Ranking Member's comments about the
importance of this hearing and the topic we are discussing,
because in those 35-plus years, I have to say, I believe that
it is the most dynamic, complex, and volatile threat
environment that this Nation has confronted since September 11.
While after September 11, the United States built a
tremendous capability to detect and prevent attacks from
persons coming to the United States from abroad, persons who
had been recruited and trained and deployed by foreign
terrorist organizations, many of those capacities--many of
those capabilities simply do not address important elements of
the threat we are facing today.
So while the U.S. Government remains concerned and very
focused on preventing attacks by foreign terrorist
organizations, today, the most significant terrorism threat
facing the United States involves acts of targeted violence by
lone offenders and small groups, in particular, those inspired
by domestic extremist beliefs.
While the use of violence is not limited to a single
ideological belief system, among DVEs, racially and ethnically
motivated violent extremists, White-identity extremists, or
White supremacist extremists remain the most persistent and
lethal threat facing the homeland.
But if we are going to be effective in countering the
current threat, we really have to, as Representative Pfluger
pointed out, come to this from a fact-based and common
understanding of the threat.
So what do I mean by that? The threat we face today
primarily comes from within the United States, from individuals
and small groups who self-connect with an ideological belief
system, and they use those ideological beliefs to justify the
use of violence as a way to express their dissatisfaction with
our Nation, or with their personal situation.
For many of those who have conducted attacks, or have been
disrupted and prevented from conducting attacks, their
connection with these ideological beliefs comes through the
consumption of racist, violent extremist, terrorism-related
materials and conspiracy theories that they find on-line
through social media and other on-line platforms.
Further complicating the threat environment is that our
adversaries, whether they be foreign nation-states,
international extremist thought leaders, or even foreign
terrorist groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic State, they
understand this, and they have devoted themselves toward
understanding and leveraging the fractures in our society, so
that they can also disseminate extremist rhetoric, and other
false narratives in an effort to incite violence and sow
discord.
So over the past several years, the United States has
experienced a number of targeted attacks by angry, disaffected
individuals motivated by a combination of extremist ideologies
and/or personal grievances. These attacks have targeted a
cross-section of our society. People in facilities have been
targeted because of their faith, their political beliefs, their
race, their gender, or their ethnicity.
This is a threat that is increasingly becoming
international. As my colleague, Coordinator Godfrey pointed
out, we are increasingly concerned about the sharing of
resources and extremist rhetoric on-line between those in the
United States and, those like-minded people abroad. We are also
concerned about the use of encrypted communication
technologies, the dark web, cryptocurrencies by individuals who
have adopted these extremist ideologies so they can further
that coordination, and do so in a way that avoids detection of
law enforcement.
Further complicating and challenging law enforcement and
counterterrorism officials as we seek to confront this threat
is that we have to understand the close proximity between
Constitutionally-protected speech and other Constitutionally-
protected activities, and the threat of violence posed by
individuals who use that speech, or leverage that speech as a
way to incite violence.
As we address the serious and dangerous nature of the
threat posed by domestic violent extremists, we must be mindful
and protective of the Constitutional rights afforded all
Americans. Our job is not to police thought and speech. Our job
is to prevent acts of violence. This has been a major priority
for the Department since January 20. We have engaged in a
number of activities intended to address this threat, and I am
happy to discuss those further during the questioning portion
of this.
So thank you again, Madam Chairwoman. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Cohen
April 29, 2021
Chairwoman Slotkin, Ranking Member Pfluger, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here with you today.
I appreciate you holding this important and timely hearing.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS or the Department)
confronts grave challenges, both seen and unseen, on behalf of the
American people. The challenges endanger our communities and our way of
life, and include terrorism perpetrated by both foreign and domestic
actors. Terrorist and targeted violence threats to the United States
have evolved and become more varied since the attacks on September 11,
2001. Combatting terrorism and targeted violence is and will remain a
top priority for DHS.
Foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) still have the intent to
attack the United States within and from beyond our borders. In the
years since September 11, 2001, we have enhanced our ability to
identify and prevent individuals affiliated with these organizations
from traveling or entering the United States. We have also enhanced
security at our airports, ports of entry, and collaboration with our
foreign partners to ensure that terrorists never reach our borders.
However, the most significant terrorist threat currently facing our
Nation comes from lone offenders and small groups of individuals who
commit acts of violence and are motivated by a broad range of violent
racial or ethnic biases, political, religious, anti-Government,
societal, and personal ideological beliefs and grievances--or a
combination of these factors. In particular, Domestic Violent Extremism
(DVE) represents the most persistent and lethal terrorism-related
threat facing the United States today.
When we discuss DVE, we are talking about individuals or movements
based and operating primarily within the United States who seek to
further political or social goals through unlawful acts of force or
violence, without direction from a foreign terrorist group or other
foreign power. The mere advocacy of political or social positions,
political activism, use of strong or offensive rhetoric, or generalized
embrace of violent tactics does not necessarily constitute violent
extremism and may be Constitutionally protected. DVEs can fit within 1
or multiple categories of ideological motivation or grievances and can
span a broad range of movements.
DVE is typically fueled by violent extremist rhetoric and other
grievances, including false narratives and conspiracy theories, often
spread through social media and other on-line platforms by a broad
range of domestic actors, and occasionally amplified by foreign threat
actors, such as foreign nation-states or FTOs. DVEs exploit a variety
of popular social media platforms, smaller websites with targeted
audiences, and encrypted chat applications to recruit new adherents,
plan and rally support for in-person actions, and disseminate materials
that contribute to radicalization and mobilization to violence.
DVE lone offenders will continue to pose significant detection and
disruption challenges because of their ability to mobilize discreetly
and independently, and access to weapons. The lethality of this threat
is evidenced by recent attacks across the United States, including
against Government buildings and personnel and minority groups.
Combatting this violence requires a whole-of-Government approach. As
stated in last month's joint report from DHS, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence titled, Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat
in 2021, the intelligence community (IC) assesses that DVEs who are
motivated by a range of ideologies and galvanized by recent political
and societal events in the United States pose an elevated threat to the
United States in 2021. In particular, racially or ethnically motivated
violent extremists (RMVEs) and militia violent extremists (MVEs)
present the most lethal DVE threats, with RMVEs most likely to conduct
mass-casualty attacks against civilians and MVEs typically targeting
law enforcement and Government personnel and facilities.
The IC also assesses that the MVE threat increased last year, in
part due to anger over COVID-19-related restrictions. The IC assessment
is that this threat will almost certainly continue to be elevated
throughout 2021 because of contentious sociopolitical factors that
motivate MVEs to commit violence.
Additionally, RMVEs who promote the superiority of the White race
are the DVE actors with the most persistent and concerning
transnational connections because individuals with similar ideological
beliefs exist outside of the United States. These RMVEs frequently
communicate with and seek to influence each other, most often on-line.
Such connectivity with overseas violent extremists might lead to a
greater risk of U.S. RMVEs mobilizing to violence, including traveling
to conflict zones. In many cases, these DVE actors have spent
inordinate amounts of time on-line, viewing extremist, violent
materials, engaging with like-minded individuals, and ultimately, in
many cases, communicating their intent to commit some type of violent
attack.
In many cases, these RMVEs are inspired by violent extremist
narratives or conspiracy theories that are spread on-line by U.S.-based
ideologues, movements, and other individuals, and occasionally by a
variety of foreign adversaries. Identifying those involved in
destructive, violent, and threat-related behavior is a complex
challenge. For example, DVEs may filter or disguise on-line
communications with vague innuendo or coded language to protect
operational security, avoid violating social media platforms' terms of
service, and appeal to a broader pool of potential recruits. Under the
guise of First Amendment-protected activity, DVEs can recruit
supporters, and incite and engage in violence. Further complicating the
challenge, these groups often migrate to private or closed social media
platforms and encrypted channels to obfuscate their activity.
Attacks perpetrated by these actors have targeted a cross-section
of our society, including groups targeted for their faith, ethnicity,
sociocultural group or profession, as well as Government facilities and
officials, law enforcement, and even Members of Congress.
Addressing this threat is a top priority for DHS and requires a
multi-dimensional approach. The Department has taken a number of steps
to expand our focus on this threat, working across the Federal
Government, with our State and local partners, and with the private-
sector and non-Government entities, and to ensure all available
resources are devoted to combatting DVE. This undertaking requires
nothing less than a Department-wide effort, which Secretary Mayorkas
has initiated.
Within the first 30 days of the Secretary's tenure, he
designated me as the senior official, to organize, plan, and
oversee the Department's operational coordination and response
to all terrorism-related threats, including those from DVEs.
On January 27, 2021, DHS issued a National Terrorism
Advisory System (NTAS) Bulletin, highlighting our assessment
that domestic violent extremists may be emboldened to act in
the wake of the U.S. Capitol breach, and that this threat
environment will persist through the near future. The NTAS,
which is a public and broadly disseminated product, is a
critical tool that DHS will continue to leverage to communicate
with the American public and our partners.
For the first time, DHS designated DVE as a National
Priority Area within the Department's Homeland Security Grant
Program. This means that in fiscal year 2021, State, local,
Tribal, and territorial governments will spend at least $77
million to prevent, prepare for, protect against, and respond
to domestic violent extremism.
Further, at the direction of Secretary Mayorkas, DHS is redoubling
its efforts to augment intelligence analysis and information-sharing
capabilities and determine how we can better access and use publicly-
available information to inform our analysis of violent extremist use
of social media and other on-line platforms. The Department is also
conducting a review of our posture to counter terrorist threats and
targeted violence, and our priority moving forward will include
expanding our attention and capabilities in the following areas:
Intelligence and information-sharing capabilities,
particularly with State, local, Tribal, and territorial
partners.
Dissemination of intelligence to the broadest audience, at
the lowest classification level possible, while protecting
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all.
Increased analytic focus to more comprehensively assess how
violent extremist actors and other perpetrators of targeted
violence exploit and leverage social media and other on-line
platforms, and how those on-line activities are linked to real-
world violence.
Enhanced capabilities to conduct threat assessments and
apply threat management techniques.
Enhanced capacity for our stakeholders to implement risk
mitigation measures that address the tactics, techniques, and
procedures utilized by domestic violent extremists and other
perpetrators of targeted violence, such as active shooter,
improvised explosive devices, and vehicle ramming attacks.
The Department's Office of Intelligence and Analysis has already
initiated some of these efforts through its focus on analyzing and
producing products on the trends within the full spectrum of the
domestic violent extremism threat landscape. Additionally, the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency continues to provide
resources that support community security and resilience, as well as
protective measures that organizations can implement to protect
facilities and venues.
We have also increased collaboration with the FBI, the IC, and the
State Department to more comprehensively understand and assess the
growing operational collaboration between violent extremists in the
United States and those operating in Europe and other parts of the
world. This increased collaboration enhances the watch-listing process,
screening and vetting protocols, and travel pattern analysis to detect
and assess travel by known violent extremists.
Finally, we are engaging with the tech industry, academia, and non-
Governmental organizations to better understand on-line narratives
associated with terrorism and targeted violence and how they are spread
across the globe. We are looking to more effectively work with these
partners; evaluate the emerging narratives, whether they come from an
individual DVE, a domestic violent extremist movement, a foreign
intelligence service, or an international terrorist organization;
assess which of those narratives are most likely to incite or result in
an act of terrorism or targeted violence; and work with local
communities to most effectively mitigate any risks. This is where our
Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention plays an
important role through its provision of technical, financial, and
educational assistance to establish and expand local prevention
frameworks across the Nation.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before your
subcommittee today, and I look forward to continuing to work with you
and other Members of Congress as we address this threat. I look forward
to your questions.
Ms. Slotkin. Great. I thank all the witnesses for their
testimony. I will remind the subcommittee that we will each
have 5 minutes to question the panel. When you hit close to
your 5 minutes you will hear off-stage here [inaudible]
reminding you to the end of the tunnel.
I will now recognize myself for some questions. So, Mr.
Godfrey, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I sent that
letter to Secretary Blinken. I am sure you had a hand in
drafting the response, and I appreciate that. I have never, in
my life, seen a letter sent to a department or agency come back
before the deadline that we asked for it, so thank you for
that.
You know, but the sort-of [inaudible], you know, an
important limitation on your ability to designate these violent
RMVEs is the ability of sufficient credible information that
meets standards for designation. Speak to us a little bit about
that, because, you know, my experience working in the post-9/11
era is right after 9/11, you know, while there was a handful of
people who had been watching a group like al-Qaeda, there was
really a full-throated effort for years to build up the
architecture to prevent future terrorist attacks from al-Qaeda.
We have been incredibly successful, but it was an extreme
level of effort to get to the visibility on leaders, tactics,
money, organization, communication that we now enjoy for some
of these groups. Can you speak more to the information and
intelligence gaps that the Department has encountered on these
foreign RMVEs?
Mr. Godfrey. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I am glad we got
our homework in on time. That is always good to know.
Ms. Slotkin. It is impressive.
Mr. Godfrey. Thank you. I am happy to address your
question. It is a really important one, and I think there is a
lot of misunderstanding about how the designations work, and
so, I am happy to take this opportunity to shed a little light
on that. They are definitely a critical tool in our effort to
address RMVE as they have been in our efforts against other
terrorist threats down through the years.
Our counterterrorism authorities at the State Department
can only be applied to foreign persons or organizations or
those that are primarily--or rather can't be used to designate
individuals or organizations that are predominantly based in
the United States or exclusively U.S.-based. There are a couple
of challenges that we frequently encounter in the RMVE arena,
that includes a lack of sufficient information about these
groups or actors.
Let me just unpack that a little bit. Unlike ISIS or al-
Qaeda, for example, RMVE actors have a much more diffuse
organizational structure. Most of these so-called organizations
don't necessarily have a clear leadership or command-and-
control structure, and that includes one that directs and
coordinates attacks, which can be a critical element in
assessing whether the activities of an individual or a group
can be attributed to an organization for designation purposes.
In order to designate a group, we have to be able to
demonstrate that it is engaged in terrorist activity, and that
is defined as having a capacity and an intent to carry out
terrorist activity. Unlike some of our foreign partners who
have recently designated RMVE organizations, we are unable to
designate groups based solely on hateful speech without
providing an additional link to actual terrorist activity.
So, the other thing I would flag, and this is something
that has already been touched on by a number of individuals
already, is that many of these groups have become quite
sophisticated in their use of end-to-end encrypted
communications which poses challenges with respect to gathering
information about their organizational structures and
activities.
I think that in your discussions coming up with the
intelligence community, I don't, in any way, want to speak for
them, but I would anticipate that you will hear quite a lot
about that----
Ms. Slotkin. Yes.
Mr. Godfrey [continuing]. That the increased prevalence of
commercially-available encrypted technology does constitute a
real challenge in this space. Thank you.
Ms. Slotkin. Yes, thanks for that. I will be following up
sending some letters to the intelligence community asking them
to put a higher priority on some of these foreign RMVEs, so
that we can close some of those gaps.
You raised a good point that I want to turn to Mr. Cohen.
As a Michigander, someone who enjoys, in normal, non-COVID
times, constantly going back and forth over the Canadian
border, or over the U.S.-Canadian border, what does it mean
that Canada has taken this step to designate the Proud Boys and
The Base as foreign terrorist organizations?
What specifically can our poor border agents in Windsor and
Detroit expect is the new requirement, or any changes to what
we do on the American side given that our closest English-
speaking cousin has designated these groups?
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for the question.
As you are aware, our Customs and Border Protection personnel
work very closely with Canada as well as other close allies,
such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia. We have
extensive information-sharing relationships with them.
As it relates specifically to your question, if someone is
driving from Detroit over the bridge to Windsor, it is not the
Customs and Border Patrol officer that would have the first
encounter with them. Their first encounter would be with
Canadian authorities.
If the Canadian authorities had some reason to believe that
that individual seeking entry to the country was a member of a
group that had been designated as a terrorist organization
under their laws, then, they could be denied entry, they could
be subject to more extensive scrutiny. If that were to occur,
that information would be relayed back to U.S. authorities,
and, potentially, there could be further action.
Ms. Slotkin. I have already abused the clock. I apologize
for setting a bad example, but I will come back to you on what
we are now, or not, putting into our databases to flag for the
Canadians, if there has been any changes as it relates to
someone being a Proud Boy or a member of The Base.
I recognize Mr. Pfluger for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Madam Chair, and 5 minutes goes
very quickly in this discussion.
I appreciate both witnesses' statements. I have got a
couple of questions that I will get to. But let me just ask
very quickly, this is the fringes of our society. I mean, if
you want to put a percentage point by .00001 percent of our
society who is in the business of thinking about racially
motivated violence, which is inexcusable, and has no place in
this society, is that true? I mean, these are the fringes,
these lone actors, both Mr. Godfrey and Mr. Cohen, before I get
to the real meat of my question. I think you may be on mute.
Mr. Cohen. While the numbers may not be large in
comparison, we have seen, over a multi-year period, a
significant number of mass casualty attacks conducted by
individuals who were inspired to commit that act of violence
through narratives and extremist narratives that they viewed
on-line. So while, you know--so I would have to say that the
level of activity by those--that fit that description is
significant enough that it is considered one of the primary
National security threats facing the country.
Mr. Pfluger. So my question revolves around, you know, the
use, the wedge, the people that are the state actors. How big
of a threat is it that folks like China, Iran, Russia, North
Korea, other state actors are using these people, these
individuals who are disenfranchised and amplifying their
message, driving home a message in order to, you know, to try
to increase their passions to carry out violent attacks? How
big of a threat is this?
Mr. Cohen. It is highly significant, because what you
described is one element of a broader effort by foreign hostile
powers to undermine credibility of the U.S. Government by
sowing discord amongst our populous for the purposes of
destabilizing our country, undermining our relationships with
our key allies through the use of disinformation and other
narratives that are intended to exacerbate the problems within
the United States, so it is part of a broader effort.
You know, I will tell you, after the recent trial and
conviction of Derek Chauvin, I was surprised to see reporting
that there were narratives being spread by groups loosely
affiliated with al-Qaeda, by foreign, hostile powers, and by
domestic extremist thought leaders in the United States that
were mirroring each other. So, there is a level of interplay,
not necessarily coordination, but these hostile threat actors
understand what will drive our society apart, and they are
developing narratives for the purposes of doing that.
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Cohen, thank you.
Mr. Godfrey, can you tell us--talk to us about the
partnerships that we have around the world, and what we can do
better in order to get at the heart of these either state or
non-state actors who would drive that wedge and sow discord in
our own country.
Mr. Godfrey. Thank you very much, Congressman. Happy to
address that question. I think that it is a combination of
bilateral and multilateral engagement that really is the
primary avenue through which we would seek to address the sort
of dynamic that Mr. Cohen just identified.
Bilaterally, we work with a number of partners on things
like information sharing to ensure that we are sharing a common
picture of the threat. That is particularly important with
partners and allies who frankly may be questioning the
credibility of the United States as a partner and ally in light
of the disconcerting and persistent and aggressive kinds of
disinformation campaigns that Assistant Secretary Cohen
referred to.
But it is also a very practical avenue through which we
pass information that can help inform efforts to counter these
sorts of narratives, but also, the actions of individuals who
are seeking to carry out attacks and other sorts of things of
that nature.
Multilaterally, I think this is a really important line of
effort for us as well. It is helping create a common quorum of
concern around this issue set that is really the--one of the
big goals of that sort of engagement. There has been quite a
lot of development recently on this front, as you can imagine.
A number of our European partners and others, including Canada,
New Zealand, Australia, are very focused on this threat, in
part, because of some of them have experienced RMVE attacks
themselves in recent years.
So just in the last week, we had the launch of 2 new
initiatives, 1 under the auspices of the Global
Counterterrorism Forum, that is a constellation of 30 like-
minded countries that focus on elaborating best practices for
addressing terrorist threats.
We are moving out quite rapidly on a set of guidelines that
would provide some best practices for national governments to
look at when they are elaborating their own protocols for
addressing this. We have also got a line of effort under the
OSCE that is on-going, or just launching rather, that I think
reflects the level of concern, particularly in Europe.
Then, finally, I would just note a somewhat more obscure
but frankly really important multilateral platform that we are
working with, and that is the International Institute for
Justice, which is in Valletta, Malta. It is focused on
developing programs and protocols to train partners from around
the world. These are investigators, prosecutors, and judges who
focus in the judicial realm on terrorism-related cases.
We have recently launched a RMVE-specific line of effort to
help equip those practitioners with an understanding of, and
tools that they will need in looking at RMVE terrorist actors
when they enter courtrooms.
Ms. Slotkin. And----
Mr. Pfluger. Madam Chair, may I have 30 seconds to respond?
Ms. Slotkin. Very quickly, because I gave you the 30 that I
took. Go ahead.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you all for the efforts multilaterally
to make sure that we protect our way of life. It is not just
ours as a beacon of freedom. These are other countries who have
followed the United States' lead on this. I would like to
follow up, whether it is a Classified briefing or not, to look
at the actual numbers of how many people in our society are
being affected by this, and are being amplified by this, so
that we can have a fact-based discussion and make a decision on
whether or not it is the fringes of society.
With that, I yield back. Thanks for the extra time.
Ms. Slotkin. Thanks. I think it will be interesting in that
further study to demonstrate that while lone-wolf attacks are,
by far, the example of RMVE attacks in the United States, so,
too, are things like al-Qaeda attacks and ISIS-affiliated
attacks.
I would want to confirm this, but I believe between the
attacks on synagogues and other places we have had in the
couple years, dozens more Americans have been killed by RMVE
attacks than al-Qaeda-associated attacks. But, Mr. Cohen, you
will correct me at another time if I am wrong on that.
I now yield to Representative Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today.
Mr. Godfrey, the mission of the State Department's Global
Engagement Center is to counter foreign state and non-state
propaganda in disinformation efforts. Given their efforts to
understand how narratives and counter-narratives work in
societies, and to work with the tech sector to develop tools
and methods to fight false narratives, what is the role of the
GEC, the Global Engagement Center, in State Department efforts
against racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist
groups?
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Congressman. You are right that the
Global Engagement Center has, exactly as you said, the mandates
to both track and also counter state and non-state
disinformation efforts. That is something that initially came
out of, as you know, the focus on Islamist terrorists, al-
Qaeda, ISIS, and the like. But certainly, it encompasses, as
all of our counterterrorism tools here at the Department of
State do, all brands, or types of terrorism, so those tools are
ideologically neutral and they get applied in that way.
I think one of the things that is vitally important that
both the GEC and the Bureau of Counterterrorism do, often in
tandem, is to engage the tech sector directly on the nature of
these threats, and we do that for a couple of purposes. One is
to ensure, particularly for smaller platform providers that may
lack the resources of some of the larger tech companies that
have big Government services offices, to ensure awareness of
what the threat is, what it looks like, and the specific ways
in which some of these actors are exploiting platforms for
malign purposes.
The second part, as I alluded to earlier in my statement,
is to encourage those companies to elaborate, and then
rigorously enforce terms of service. So to make them
responsible, frankly, or to assume voluntarily the
responsibility for ensuring that their platforms aren't
exploited by these actors.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Mr. Cohen, you have mentioned that
the Department of Homeland Security has increased collaboration
with partner organizations to more comprehensively understand
the collaboration between violent extremists in the United
States and their counterparts abroad. So, what are the
operational implications of determining that a domestic violent
extremist group or individual has interacted with a foreign
RMVE group? Does this change depending on whether or not the
foreign group has a terrorist designation?
Mr. Cohen. Absolutely, Congressman. Thank you for that
question. One area where it could impact Departmental operation
is the more knowledge that we acquire from the intelligence
community through our communications with foreign law
enforcement and border control authorities, more information
that we learn about the travel patterns of extremists abroad
operating abroad, the more we can learn about where their
training facilities are located. We can apply that information
to the travel pattern analysis and screening and vetting
protocols that we have used for years to protect against
foreign terrorists from entering the United States. So that is
one area.
Secondarily, if there are groups that are designated as
terrorist organizations abroad, and we can identify individuals
in this country who are engaged in activities to support those
groups or collaborate with those groups, that broadens the
types of investigative and watch listing authority--steps that
we can take.
Mr. Langevin. What kind of information-sharing activities
occur, though, between U.S. agencies and their international
partners in these situations?
Mr. Cohen. Well, there is an increasing conversation, and
to Chairwoman Slotkin's earlier question about Canadian
authorities, we share some limited watch listing information
regarding foreign terrorists, or people under investigation for
terrorism-related charges with Canadian authorities. We receive
information from Canadian authorities about individuals who may
be associated with extremist organizations abroad who enter
Canada, and may be entering Canada for the purposes of trying
to enter the United States much.
There have been examples where individuals who entered
Canada who were in--where there was information that they were
associated with violent extremist organizations, they sought to
enter the United States and they were restricted from entering
the United States because of that information sharing.
Mr. Langevin. OK. Very good. My time is expired. Thank you
for your answers, and I yield back.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
I recognize Mr. Meijer.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member, and
to our distinguished guests who are here today. I know I have
had a chance to speak with Mr. Cohen and just appreciate these
continuing and kind-of following discussions.
I want to try to bridge a little bit of a gap between, you
know, some of the incidents we have seen in the United States,
which definitely have--there was the Tree of Life Synagogue
attack--which have had a, you know, RMVE motivation, but aren't
connected to kind of broader groups, and then the discussion of
the broader, you know, potentially FTO designations or
specially designated--or special designations we are looking at
through State Department channels.
Is the broader concern that the pool of dissatisfaction,
the discontents, the socially alienated within the United
States, that that is sort-of a swamp, a fertile breeding ground
for the international entities to try to take advantage of in
order to establish more of a beachhead, or is the concern more
that those international groups could be resources for
individuals who are motivated within the United States but
aren't yet part of a group? I guess, can you kind-of break out,
how are you viewing that linkage and that ultimate threat?
Mr. Cohen. So it is a little bit of both. You know, over
the past several years, we have seen a number of attacks in the
United States that were conducted by individuals, and we can
draw direct correlation between their attack and extremist
narratives that were promoted by individuals abroad.
Coordinator Godfrey referenced the Christchurch attack. We
know that that attack, or in addition to live-streaming his
attack also posted a document relating to his belief systems
on-line. We know that that document was viewed by individuals
in the United States who subsequently used the narrative in
that to justify their conducting attacks within the United
States.
So that is one area we are very concerned about, the
sharing of ideas, the dissemination of extremist rhetoric and
materials, the posting of live-streaming videos of acts of
violence. That all is--we have found acts of violence in this
country that were informed by the attacker consuming that
material on-line.
But as you also pointed out, there are increasing concerns
within the Department of Homeland Security that we are seeing
groups of individuals who hold extremist beliefs, not only just
communicating with like-minded people abroad, but traveling to
meet with people abroad, perhaps working together to acquire
resources through crowdsourcing or fundraising may engage in
the sharing of strategies.
We were tracking some on-line narratives during a recent
period where we were seeing postings by individuals abroad who
are seeking to travel to the United States to join planned
gatherings and protests by extremist organizations.
So, it is a little bit of both. We are concerned about how
that can feed the threat environment domestically, the rhetoric
that is being posted on-line intentionally; and then,
secondarily, we are concerned about individuals in this
country, or groups in this country, collaborating operationally
with individuals abroad.
Mr. Meijer. Yes. Obviously, the strategy for mitigating,
you know, the individual versus the strategy for combating the
group is going to be very different. I know when we spoke it
was--and this is a conversation I have had with our local law
enforcement as well. In Michigan, you know, we were--our law
enforcement was clued in to the attempted kidnapping plot
against the Governor through one of the participants who grew
uneasy at the prospect of some of the targeting of law
enforcement that was occurring, and so then became a
confidential informant and helped bring--expose that plot and
ensure that it was prevented from occurring.
So how--I guess, we are kind-of drilling from that that
international, almost terrorist mastermind, you know, organized
notion to all the way down to that individual preemption and
how do we identify somebody who may be susceptible? As we have
seen, and then I think we have talked about this within some of
our Islamic communities as well, that idea of trying to have
some intervention before somebody tilts to the point where they
may be susceptible to the rhetoric, but how do we get someone
off that edge before they go full bore down a violent path. Can
you also speak to that more local level engagement,
interaction?
Mr. Cohen. Yes.
Ms. Slotkin. Very briefly. Very briefly, please.
Mr. Cohen. Absolutely, Congressman. A big part of our
strategy focuses on how we complement the work of a JTTF, for
example, to build community-based violence prevention programs.
There are times when someone may come to the attention of law
enforcement. They don't meet the threshold required for a
counterterrorism investigation, but the concern is that person
poses a high risk of violence.
We are working with local communities around the country to
develop programs and approaches that focus on reducing the risk
posed by those individuals who are exhibiting those warning
signs.
Mr. Meijer. Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you. I would just note to Representative
Meijer, you know, certainly part of my interest in looking at
these RMVE groups abroad is that should they be designated as
foreign terrorist organizations, it opens up a potential charge
of material support to terrorism here in the United States for
those individuals who are supporting those groups. We have that
charge for groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda and many, many others,
and I just, you know, think we should put the same RMVE groups
through that same process to see what happens, to see if they
make threshold on those.
I recognize Ms. Jackson Lee for 5 minutes. I think you are
still on mute, ma'am. There we go.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am unmuted now. Thank you so very much.
Let me--first, good morning. Thank you for this hearing, to
the Chairwoman and the Ranking Member, and to the witnesses
that are here this morning. Racially and ethnically motivated
violent extremism, the RMVE groups, I think that the United
States has lagged behind, and I am grateful for the 2
witnesses.
Madam Chair, I am grateful for a response of a letter
before the deadline. I think we are moving in the right
direction. But the Government, over the years, has seemingly
lagged in addressing the transnational threat from RMVE actors,
especially when it comes to designating RMVE organizations and
individuals with international ties as foreign terrorist
organizations, or specially-designated global terrorists.
I would venture to say, 3 years ago, most Americans were
not aware of the Oath Takers, the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo
Bois. Those of us on Homeland Security obviously were engaging
with those names, but when you would speak in public, most
people would have a very glazed look, but they have been here
and they are circulating.
Last evening, the President, rightly so, got a group of
bipartisan Members inside the Chamber to get a standing ovation
to law enforcement, to the police officers, to individuals who
put their life on the line for us. On January 6, we saw the
extended organizations--I think there are other layers of
such--literally take the American flag and beat the symbol of
law enforcement at the citadel of democracy near to their
death. We obviously lost officers in the midst of this battle.
So, I want to raise these questions about thought and about
the idea that as the investigation proceeds, there is the
question of the elements of law enforcement that might have
been engaged, the elements of the military that might be
engaged. I would be interested in your assessment of the size
of that, how we should respond to that, whether there is an
international connection to that.
I would also indicate that--the second part of my question
is, we are beginning to heal the Nation, heal the Nation with
legislation. I know you have heard the name George Floyd
Justice in Policing Act, which many of our Members have
supported, and legislation to repair the history of slavery in
this country, H.R. 40.
I wonder if the work of Congress, because we are opinion-
setters, we are looked to as leaders, contribute to the
formulation or the extensiveness of the growth. When I say
Congress, what I am saying is, the body politic. Are these
groups responding directly to their sense of the political
arena, and they are not in the arena, they are on the outside
of the arena, and how that continues to grow them? So, I would
like to start with Mr. Cohen and then Mr. Godfrey. Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. So, Congresswoman, it is nice to see you again,
and thank you for the question.
On your first question about your concerns about military
and law enforcement personnel, as you know, Congresswoman, I
was a police officer for a number of years in California. I
worked closely under Mayor Lee Brown in Houston to work on
issues pertaining to policing. It is a career that I am very
proud--a profession I am very proud to have been a part of.
I share your concern. Police officers, members of the
military are susceptible to being influenced by on-line
conspiracy theories and narratives like anybody else. It is
important--and I know I have spoken with a number of police
chiefs, and one of the issues that we are focused on within the
Department and the Federal Government broadly is to ensure that
we have an understanding of whether those narratives are
influencing not only the beliefs, but the behavior of the men
and women who either serve in the military or in law
enforcement.
In conversations I have had with our civil liberties and
civil rights officer at the Department, you know, we are not
just there to enforce the law. We are there to enforce the
Constitution as well, protect the Constitution. As law
enforcement and security officials, we have a responsibility to
ensure that we can do that credibly.
To your other question, I have to say, it was very
poignant. As you know, I was one of the individuals in the
Obama administration that helped design the Countering Violent
Extremism program. I have to tell you, as I look back it, we
had--there were some flaws in our assumptions. I think we
underestimated the amount of distrust that existed between some
communities of color, immigrant communities, and in particular,
the Arab-American and Muslim communities in the United States,
and we underestimated how that distrust was going to impact our
ability to address this problem.
So a big part of our effort today is working to regain that
trust, and we are doing that at a time where, quite frankly, it
is challenging. The debate on criminal justice reform that is
going on across the country, which is a needed debate, and a
needed discussion, you know, comes at a time where we are
dealing with an angry and polarized public, and it comes at a
time where we are dealing with significant instances of mass
casualty attacks by people who are being influenced by
narratives, and we are dealing with it at a time when our
foreign adversaries, in particular, are using the protests and
the debate over racial justice to trash our society.
Ms. Slotkin. We will have to leave it there. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Congressman Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Gentlemen, I want to thank each of you-all for spending
some time with us today to talk about this very important
issue.
Mr. Godfrey, I want to talk to you very briefly. You talk
in your report--and I think that this may have been clear, has
been made clear throughout this hearing--that this is not just
an issue that the United States is dealing with, that this is
actually an international issue. You talk about attacks that
have occurred in Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand. You
referenced in your report a recent arrest in Singapore. You
talk about the fact that these actors are part of a globally,
interconnected on-line community and that they use that as a
way in which to fundraise, to organize, to plot attacks.
If you will, you talk a little bit about the organizational
structure. I would just ask if you might expand on that. Talk
about the organizational structures for the RMVEs and how they
contrast with other terrorist organizations such as ISIS and
al-Qaeda?
Mr. Godfrey. I am so sorry. Are you hearing distortion on
that end?
Mr. Guest. No, sir. I hear you clearly.
Mr. Godfrey. OK. Super. I am so sorry. I just got some
feedback here, but I will drive on.
So there are some, I think, ways in which RMVE actors or
groups compare organizationally to other terrorist threats that
we have been dealing with, including groups like ISIS and al-
Qaeda. You, Congressman, very artfully mentioned a number of
those that is principally using on-line fora to radicalize,
recruit, fundraise, and to, some extent, organize.
I think one of the principle differences is that the RMVE
groups tend to be much less hierarchical, both in terms of
having an identified leader, but also, individuals who then are
responsible for organizing and conducting operations.
There is a lot of focus in RMVE groups on rhetoric and here
I would circle back to one of the previous questions and say
that a lot of what we see in terms of the interplay between
these groups is inspirational versus organizational. I don't
want to underestimate the degree to which some of these actors
are looking to collaborate on things like how to organize
training camps or even move people and material illicitly, but
a lot of what we see is really focused on the rhetoric and this
mutually, self-reinforcing echo chamber is one way to look at
it.
To that end, they, I think--or to that point, and to the
question from Congresswoman Jackson Lee, I think that that has
tended to amplify and reinforce some of that sense of
alienation and grievance that these groups are able to adroitly
capitalize on.
Mr. Guest. Let me--let me just kind-of build on that. You
also talk, and I think actually in the same part of your
report, about the funding of these groups, and you say some are
self-funded. Some raise funds from various--both legal and
illegal sources. Can you talk a little and expand on that just
a little bit about what you are seeing as the different funding
sources for the groups that we are talking about today?
Mr. Godfrey. Absolutely, Congressman.
I think RMVE actors do raise money from a variety of
sources; including merchandise and music sales; donations from
individuals; criminal activity, such as narcotic and weapons
trafficking; selling counterfeit goods turns out to be
something they do quite a lot of as well.
Then, finally, providing military-style training to other
extremists. All of those constitute revenue streams for some of
these groups. As with any sort of range of actors, they are not
homogenous. There is some variation as to who kind-of focuses
more on what within that realm.
I think one other important thing that I would emphasize is
that by contrast with groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS, which
often rely on informal financial institutions and networks,
RMVE groups often use financial institutions, formal ones, such
as banks and monetary transmitters to move funds both
domestically and internationally. Several of these groups,
these RMVE groups, are also known to use crowdfunding platforms
and virtual currency to both solicit donations, but also to
effect transfers of funds.
Mr. Guest. Thank you.
Madam Chairman, I believe my time is up.
At this time I will yield back.
Ms. Slotkin. OK. We could have given you a few extra
seconds there, but got it and we will probably move to a second
round here in a second.
But in the mean time, I recognize Mr. Malinowski from New
Jersey.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks to the
witnesses. I think this is an incredibly interesting discussion
and an important issue.
I very strongly agree with you. It is vital to call things
by their name. I think it is really interesting, by the way, to
highlight that these people, these fringe extremists in our
country who see themselves as nationalists, are actually
internationalists, who see themselves as kind-of extreme,
America-first patriots, are actually, in many cases, receiving
funding and support from abroad, and that is important to
expose.
I think the word ``terrorism'' is an appropriate one to use
in this context. It is a very powerful word in our effort to
discredit these people and what they do and the threat that
they pose. But where I--where things get much more complicated,
of course, is whether the legal designation of terrorists or
terrorist group is appropriate. It would certainly be useful.
It is an incredibly powerful thing to designate an organization
as an FTO. It enables, it gives us extraordinary powers to deal
not just with acts of terrorism after they have been committed,
but, as Chairwoman Slotkin mentioned, to criminalize material
support, really, to criminalize membership or association with
a group.
But, of course, with great power comes great
responsibility, and we know that governments have sometimes
abused the extraordinary powers that these kinds of
designations give them.
So as we examine that--and we do need to examine the
question of whether some of these internationally-active groups
should be designated--I wanted to ask the witnesses about other
potential tools in the tool kit.
So, for example, we have wide-ranging financial sanctions
authorities that enable--that we use in the counterterrorism
context, the human rights context, in all kinds of National
security-related situations.
Take a group like, say, the Asov brigades in Ukraine, or
the Nordic Resistance Movement, just to name 2 groups that are
of great concern to us. It may be difficult, even if we wanted
to do it, to officially label them as foreign terrorist
organizations, because you have to show that they have
committed acts of terrorism.
Should we consider, and if so, do we have the authority
under current law to use financial sanctions authorities, SDN
listings, against a group that, say, advocates violence openly,
that advocates race war, that conducts military-style training
of people who come to them to learn, you know, explosives and
small arms tactics, none of which may be enough to get them an
FTO designations, but which are dangerous things? Is that
something that could be considered? Again, do we have the legal
authorities?
For either of you.
Mr. Godfrey. Congressman, thank you for the thoughtful
question. I am happy to take an initial stab at this, and I
expect that Assistant Secretary Cohen may have thoughts as
well.
I think you have hit on a really important distinction, and
that is that between foreign terrorist organization
designations and those of specially designated global
terrorists. Those are different authorities. We have really had
a really important development with respect to the latter, the
so-called SDGT authorities. In late 2019, when those
authorities were broadened under E.O. 13224 to allow us to
designate individuals who were either determined to be leaders
of organizations or who directed and conducted training for
individuals that were parts of those organization, and that, in
fact, those 2 prongs were the way that we were able to do the
designation of the Russian Imperil Movement in April 2020.
We are very proactively looking at using those authorities
against other RMVE actors. We are close in a couple of cases. I
don't want to go into too much in this forum about the details,
but those challenges I highlighted generically at the top with
respect to using the designations' authorities are relevant
here, and that is that we often have part of the picture of a
group and its structure and the activities of some of its
individuals, but making sure that we have the picture that
meets the legal sufficiency standards can be quite difficult,
given the need to have, in some cases, very specific
information.
Ms. Slotkin. OK. I know that Mr. Malinowski's time is up,
and we will enter a second round of questions here and I will
keep people to time so that we can get through the second round
and maybe we can follow up.
I will recognize myself.
Mr. Cohen, just to finish up the question I had at the
beginning about Canada, so I understand that, you know,
Canada--if an individual, right, as someone who represents many
people who subscribe and consider themselves Proud Boys, for
instance, that is a popular thing, a popular group in Michigan.
If they were to travel across the bridge or tunnel to go to
Windsor, Canada, I hear you that it would be the Canadian
Customs officials who would look their name up, see if they are
any watch lists that we share with them, and then make a
distinction.
I guess my question is: In terms of the inputting of data
into those watch lists, has anything changed since Canada
designated the Proud Boys, and The Base terrorist organizations
from the American inputting of that data?
Mr. Cohen. So as it currently stands, inputting data into
a--into the terrorist watch list would be done by the FBI. It
would have to have reached a threshold of reasonable suspicion.
It would be based on investigations, and under some
circumstances, not on a regular basis, but on some
circumstances, that information could be made available to
Canadian authorities proactively.
So, for example, if I am conducting an investigation into
an individual, and I become aware that that individual, who is
being investigated for violent activity, is traveling to
Canada, Canada then may be provided prior notification so
investigative activities could take place.
But from a Government--as a Government perspective, we are
not trolling through the internet, trying to find people who
say they are associated with Proud Boys or posting pictures of
themselves, wearing Proud Boys garb, and providing that
information to the Canadians. We don't do that anyway.
Currently, I am told that it would be under--that that
information that is purely related to a domestic--domestic
terrorism situation with no nexus to a foreign government is
not regularly shared.
Ms. Slotkin. OK. Thank you for that clarification.
Mr. Godfrey, you know, in this attempt to get more
intelligence and information and data on these RMVEs abroad,
can you tell me what the State Department has already done to
try and increase what we know about these groups? I mean, we
know embassies across the world were not thinking about al-
Qaeda before 9/11. They were not thinking about ISIS before
they took over Iraq and Syria, and only with guidance did they
start to really collect and ask about those things. Can you
tell me what the State Department has or has not done on this
issue?
Mr. Godfrey. Absolutely. Thank you very much, Madam Chair,
for the question.
On March 19, we sent a cable to all our diplomatic and
consular posts, asking them to engage with their host
governments regarding individuals or groups affiliated with
RMVE, and particularly those with White identity terrorism
ties, and to share that information back in formal reporting
about RMVE networks and activities in their countries.
To date, we have received responses from 64 posts globally,
and are expecting additional responses in the weeks ahead. Some
of those have been a little bit slow by the combination of
COVID and Ramadan, respectively, but we are making some pretty
good progress. I don't want to get into specifics about what
individual posts said, because we do need to protect the
correspondence with our partner governments, but I do want to
talk about a couple of trends that were highlighted.
I can say that in Europe, there was particular, or there
was the greatest concern that was expressed about the RMVE
threat, including particularly transnational linkages, and a
number of European governments noted they were seeing RMVE as a
growing counterterrorism priority. They assessed that RMVE lone
actors posed a greater threat than RMVE organizations that were
publicly known to them. They also noted that in a number of
countries in Europe, RMVE actors have been specifically
encouraged to join the military or law enforcement to gain
tactical experience that could subsequently be used in
targeting their perceived enemies.
In terms of funding, there was a common thread of donations
and solicitations on-line, as well as the sales of apparel,
music, and literature. Then, I would also note that some of the
governments that we have talked with are encountering many of
the same challenges that we have talked about here today, in
terms of countering the threat and that lack of hierarchical
structure and a central command, and the use of secure
communication techniques and platforms has really complicated
efforts to get after the threat.
Then, finally, a number of posts noted that their host
government interlocutors had emphasized that RMVE actors have
increasingly been moving to smaller, newer, lesser-known, and
more fully encrypted platforms for communication in an effort
to escape Government scrutiny.
Ms. Slotkin. Great. Thank you for that. Very helpful.
The Chair recognizes Representative Pfluger.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have several
questions for both witnesses, or either witness.
Which country non-state actor, state actor, presents the
biggest threat right now to sowing discord to using these
actors in the United States to amplify this threat?
Mr. Cohen. We----
Mr. Godfrey. Go ahead, John.
Mr. Cohen. I was going say from the Department of Homeland
Security perspective, we have been concerned and have monitored
intelligence community reporting on efforts by Russia and Iran
in particular.
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Godfrey.
Oh, you are on mute.
Mr. Godfrey. Apologies.
We would share that assessment, Congressman.
Mr. Pfluger. OK. Very good. That is very helpful, and I
think we want to continue to dig into that.
My second question is, you know, when it comes to the
designations, I think this is a fascinating discussion. I
appreciate Mr. Malinowski's comments on it. You know, what are
the unintended consequences that you believe when it comes to
our First Amendment rights, protected rights, that if we do
move toward designating and explore this, could happen? I mean,
where are the dangers in this?
Mr. Godfrey. Congressman, could I ask, are we--when you
mention designations, are we talking about foreign entities or
domestic entities, or both, perhaps?
Mr. Pfluger. Well, for anyone in the United States who is--
who is working with transnational groups, let's say that Iran
and Russia are able to get to them and then they have the
organizations through other, you know, European countries, for
instance, you know, if we move toward designating, what First
Amendment rights are we, you know, likely to either breach, or
have as an unintended consequence that makes it, you know, very
difficult and blurring of the lines?
Mr. Godfrey. So just speaking for the State Department--and
I will defer to Assistant Secretary Cohen, perhaps, on the
domestic piece--I think we would only have--envision a
situation in which we could use our authorities to designate
actors abroad. There would have to be a change in the scope of
our authorities to enable us to contemplate designating
individuals here at home, and I don't know if Assistant
Secretary Cohen might have something further he wants to add.
Mr. Cohen. No. I would just add simply that, Congressman,
you are hitting on one of the central challenges in dealing
with this threat which is being able to distinguish between
protected speech, Constitutionally-protected speech, and
actions that relate to a specific threat or the threat of
violence in particular.
So for us, for the Department, or for law enforcement to
take action against an individual, we have to have information
that says, that reflects behavior beyond simply posting racist
or extremist narratives on-line. We would have to see activity
that relates that belief system to the potential threat of
violence.
Mr. Pfluger. When it comes to--thank you both for that. I
mean, it is a very difficult and complex issue here. When it
comes to the work, the coordination, the information sharing,
intelligence sharing, and how our JTTF is working, what
authorities do we not have right now that would help us
identify, detect, and, you know, maybe even intervene at times?
Mr. Cohen. So that is a very interesting question,
Congressman, and it goes to the question that Congressman
Meijer brought up. A number of the circumstances that we have
experienced over the year have been effective--over the past
several years, have been effectively disrupted by the
investigations of a JTTF. But we have also seen situations in
which an individual has come to the attention of law
enforcement authorities. They didn't meet the definitional
thresholds that would warrant a terrorism or counterterrorism
investigation, but they were still deemed to be a significant
risk, and, in some cases, have even gone out and committed an
act of violence.
So in conjunction to the activities of the JTTF which,
again, have been highly effective and are an important part of
dealing with this threat, we have to look at other activities
that can take place within the community, whether it is the
conduct of a threat assessment investigation that assesses the
risk posed by an individual and the employment of different
types of threat management strategies, whether it be mental
health support, whether it be working with the family of an
individual who is exhibiting these behaviors, whether it is
some other type of law enforcement action or the imposition of
a flag law that restricts their access to a firearm, there is a
number of things that we can--that can be done at the local
level by local authorities and community members that can
reduce the risk posed by an individual who is exhibiting the
warning sign.
So that is a big area of emphasis for us at the Department,
is that we have adjusted our grant program language and, you
know, just so that we can support those types of activity at
the local level.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Godfrey.
I yield back.
Mr. Cohen. I heard the clicker, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you. I am trying. It is the virtual
world.
The Chair recognizes Representative Gottheimer.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you, Chairwoman Slotkin, for holding
this very important and timely hearing.
As FBI Director Wray recently testified before Congress,
the top threat we face from domestic violent extremists
continues to be those we identify as racially or ethnically
motivated violent extremists, specifically those who advocate
for the superiority of the White race and who are the primary
source of ideologically-motivated lethal incidents of violence
in 2018 and 2019.
Assistant Secretary Cohen, can you please discuss how U.S.-
based White supremacists and other domestic extremists have
increasingly adopted the tactics of foreign terrorist
organizations, and how DHS is working to address the threat?
Mr. Cohen. Thank you for that question, Congressman.
So the Department--Secretary Mayorkas instructed my office
to conduct an operational review of the Department, which is
on-going, and it seeks to answer a very specific question,
which is: Based on the current state of the threat, are we
doing all that we can to address the threat posed by domestic
violent extremists? Areas that we are focusing on, what more
can we do to address the use of on-line platforms by foreign
and domestic threat actors who seek to incite violence? What
more can we do to increase literacy amongst our young people,
and individuals who may be potentially influenced by those on-
line narratives?
What more can we do from the perspective of training?
Should we be increasing our presence on Joint Terrorism Task
Forces? How do we better leverage the watch-listing authorities
and travel pattern analysis capabilities of CBT and TSA in
order to identify violent extremists who may be preparing to
travel domestically and internationally?
Those are some of the issues we are working on, but I look
forward to briefing the committee more fully at the completion
of the review.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you.
I don't know, Mr. Cohen, if I can--if you are able to
answer this, given the on-going review, but I have been very
focused on the social media aspect of foreign and domestic
extremists for radicalization and recruitment. Are there ways
that you can talk about of how we can more effectively identify
and prevent the on-line spread of despicable ideologies that we
know encourage people to engage in lethal violence?
Mr. Cohen. That is a great question. I share your concerns.
I think this is one of the driving forces behind the current
threat. One of the things that we are looking at intently at
the Department is what more can we do to identify emerging
narratives as early as possible, and assess the--whether those
narratives are likely to influence acts of violence, and how
fast they are spreading across multiple platforms. Once we are
able to do that, we will be able to anticipate potential target
areas. We can work with our partners at the Federal level and
at the State and local level to reduce the risk to those
targets.
A good example of that is what we experienced in
Washington, DC between January 6 and January 20 where, after
the January 6 incident, we continued to see reflections on-line
that people were intending to come back on the 20th to engage
in violence. So we were able to take steps to mitigate the
risks through more visible security and other measures.
So, that is the type of work that we are looking at. We are
working closely with the tech industry and non-Government
entities to learn from them, to see how they are identifying
toxicity in residents of narratives on-line.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you so much.
As you know, the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation
was first used in 1997. Today, nearly 25 years later, the
terrorism landscape looks very different. Increasingly, you see
White supremacist extremists spreading their ideologies and
distributing guidance and encouragement for independent actors
outside of established groups or channels.
Acting Coordinator Godfrey, is our current designation and
sanctions reviewing sufficient, in your opinion, for combating
diffuse, leaderless, or amorphous racially and actively
motivated violent extremists, threats? How do we better target
these types of actors?
Mr. Godfrey. Thank you, Congressman.
I think that, as I have mentioned a couple of times, the
authorities that we currently have, which are very much focused
on international actors, have demonstrated themselves down
through the years to be quite effective. I am not sure it is so
much a question of the authorities themselves as the
information that underpins getting to a legal sufficiency
standard that is required to take those designation actions
that is the real challenge for us with respect to these groups
which, as you said, are different from some of the kinds of
terrorist groups that we have dealt with down through the
years.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you so much.
I yield back.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Meijer from Michigan.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Madam Chair.
You know, I appreciated the discussion and, Madam Chair, we
have also kind-of discussed on other channels, kind-of, how we
strike that right balance between protecting civil liberties,
and making sure that we are adequately preparing our law
enforcement for the task and, indeed, I think that is the
overall intent of this subcommittee hearing today as we are
looking at what those higher-level distinctions would be.
I guess one request--and then I will go into some more
remarks--is I know there was a reference to, in one of the
documents, to a Classified annex, or kind-of more fulsome
report on this issue.
Would love to speak, or have an opportunity for the
committee as a whole to dive a little bit more deeply, because
I know especially, as we are on the Homeland Security Committee
but we are tying into international entities as well. So would
love to get the fuller picture.
Then, I am well aware, Madam Chair, as well, that you had
reached out to the DNI's office to try to get some more
information and have them participate. But, you know, as we are
looking down and assessing between some of the neo-Nazi
elements, like Atomwaffen, versus those who don't fall into as
need a description, understanding that overall threat profile
on a specific level would be appreciated.
Now, I guess, getting back to some of our panelists here
today, we have that distinction or that--I guess, I would love
to dig a little bit more deeper into the balance of what we
have seen from propaganda, or misinformation, that has been
amplified by foreign governments, especially malign foreign
governments, with an intent toward the recruitment, or the
populating of that misinformation ecosphere for domestic
consumption, versus where have foreign governments--I guess
here is the question: Have we seen foreign governments that
have been actively using organizations that could potentially
be designated FTOs? Have we seen foreign governments actively
using them in order to recruit or bolster membership
domestically?
I guess more likely for Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, thank you for the question.
That is probably an issue we would have to discuss in a
closed session, to address it completely.
Mr. Meijer. I guess just stepping a little bit back, have
we seen foreign governmental influence been more on supporting
organizations that may seek to recruit, or on amplifying
information that gets consumed in a non-organizational setting
on an individual basis?
Mr. Cohen. So without touching the first part of your
question, what we have seen are examples where a foreign
hostile power will, you know, will watch what is going on in
this country, and then they will use events. Some topics that
they have focused on in the past have been--have been issues
relating to immigration, race--immigrant--I am sorry--issues
relating to discussions on race and issues discussed--
regarding, you know, terrorism, enforcement of terrorism, you
know, addressing terrorism threats. They have used issues like
that to try to sow discord amongst our populace. They know
these are issues that are passionately being debated, and they
will use narratives on both sides of the issue for the purposes
of inflaming the discussion.
As I mentioned earlier, I was--it was really intriguing to
me to see common--after the conviction was announced of Derek
Chauvin in Minneapolis, it was really interesting to see that
we saw common language being used, for example, focusing on
whether the jury had been unfairly influenced to make the--to
come up with the verdict they came up with. We saw that on
forums known--associated with Russia, forums associated with
Iran, as well as domestic extremists.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. I am just running a
little low on time. I wanted to get one last question in real
quick.
I know we have talked about how an FTO designation may
bolster law enforcement. Would an FTO designation also bolster
our ability to combat that international, or that foreign state
nexus, or that foreign state support for a RMVE
internationally?
Mr. Godfrey. That would depend on the individual group and
the nature of the proxy relationship between a foreign state
actor and that group, as to the extent to which an FTO
designation could have an impact. Without going into too much
in this forum, I would say that there are some instances in
which that could, in fact, have an impact.
Mr. Meijer. OK. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I yield back.
Ms. Slotkin. No problem. I think absolutely we can
certainly have a discussion about a Classified session, going
into some of these details. I would also suggest that any
Member who is interested ask the Homeland staff to pull the
Classified kind of production that has gone on the past couple
of months on these groups, or on whatever issue you are
interested in. They will pull that. You can sit in a room and
read it. I do it pretty frequently. While the collection is not
great, right, I don't want anyone to think that there is
incredibly detailed information, it is certainly an interesting
read file to pull.
So, the Chair recognizes Representative Jackson Lee from
Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I cannot see the clock, and, so, I really lost out in terms
of trying to get my questions in. I appreciate Mr. Cohen gave a
very thorough answer, but forgive me. I just cannot see the
clock, and it makes it very difficult to get your questions in.
So I will do my very best. This is a very important topic.
I have, in my opening statement, about 4 pages of
terroristic acts, beginning with April 15, 2013, the Boston
attacks during the Boston Marathon, individuals here in the
United States. One could argue that there was an international
issue, but domestic terrorism. Two, the 2 individuals in Dallas
in 2016, ex-military who shot and killed 5 police officers, and
an offender in Louisiana that killed 6 police officers in Baton
Rouge.
I say that because my last question finished on police
officer involvement. These individuals were allegedly with
sovereign nation. We haven't mentioned them. I would like to
get a comment about that, Mr. Cohen, if I could get it very
briefly. I want to make sure that I didn't end on the note that
all of the military and all police officers are involved with
the Boogaloo Bois and the Proud Boys and the Oath Takers. I
wanted to suggest that there was a minute group that we needed
to assess, and I wanted to kind-of get an understanding of how
Homeland Security was doing that.
I would be interested, if you want to comment on the
sovereign nation, if you can do that very briefly so that I can
raise questions with Mr. Godfrey as well.
Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, Congressman. Sovereign citizens believe
that the current Government of the United States is illegal and
they have no responsibility to obey the laws or defer to
authority figures, such as local police, and there have been a
number of instances where they have engaged in lethal
encounters, killing police officers.
I agree with you that the overwhelming majority of law
enforcement officials around this country go out every day to
protect the Nation. There are a small group that may be
susceptible to being influenced, and we have a responsibility
to make sure that we counteract that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right. So what I want to say--so what I
want to make the point is, you are not excluding or precluding
your work to ensure that in those ranks, you don't have--I know
the military is being assessed by the Secretary of Defense, but
I just want to make sure that you are looking at those groups
as well, so we weed them out from the larger body. Is that
correct?
Mr. Cohen. Yes. We just initiated a major effort across the
Department to do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very good. Thank you.
Let me ask--and I think this question was asked but I just
want to make sure. Mr. Godfrey, in terms of the numbers of
those domestic terrorists going internationally to join wars,
we are familiar with the Ukraine War that some of our
terrorists from here were going to refine their skills. How
extensive is that?
Mr. Godfrey. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. It is nice
to see you again. I think the last time we crossed past was in
Riyadh.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Godfrey. To your question, the number--and this will
echo what Assistant Secretary Cohen mentioned earlier--the
numbers are not terribly large. The concern we have is that the
impact of those individuals traveling and acquiring skills in
war zones is disproportionate, such that when they return, they
have skill--they typically come back more radicalized than when
they left would be one point to make, and the other would be
that they do have hard skills that they are able to, in some
cases, use in attacking targets domestically.
One final note. One of the things we are hearing
increasingly in diplomatic channels that I think would be
interesting for the Members of the committee to know is
increased concern from partners abroad about the U.S. racially
and ethnically motivated violent extremists cohort being an
exporter of--a net exporter of ideology and pernicious thought.
There is often the perception that American actors at home,
RMVE actors, White and terrorist actors, are more influenced by
foreign actors than the other way around. What we are
increasingly seeing evidence of is concern about the flow going
the other way.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If you could just finish quickly, again, I
had asked the question earlier in the first round about the
actions of legislation or comments by Members which I wanted to
finish the point. I think it is important for us to show our
ability to debate issues like policing bills, the Commission to
Study and Develop Reparation Proposals, which may be sounding
differently in some ears, but it really is important for the
Congress to be able to show a democratic debate so that it
doesn't fuel the fires of those who feel that they are on the
outside, or want to attack elected officials.
Can someone just take a quick stab at that? The voices that
come out of Government, does that fuel the fires if we don't do
it in a civil and engaging manner, showing how democracy really
works?
Ms. Slotkin. Very quickly, please.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Cohen. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. That was--yes, yes Congressman. The--the
people--we have seen attacks in which people have derived
inspiration or justification for the use of violence based on
on-line narratives, but also based on the words of public
officials and individuals who work in the media.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, we will try to do better. I think
that is very important.
Thank you, Madam Chair. There is a lot of work that we have
to do. Thank you.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
For our final question, the Chair recognizes Representative
Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Just, first, a brief note on the unintended consequences
question that I think all of us, you know, have in the back of
our minds at least. Material support has been defined very,
very broadly by some agencies of our Government in the past.
One experience in work that I have done, you know, we had,
several years ago, poor Colombians who had been victims of the
FARC, which had been a designated terrorist group, applying for
refugee status to come to the United States, but DHS labeled
them as material supporters of terrorism, because they had been
forced at gunpoint to provide food to the FARC, and that was
deemed as material support.
There have been just cases that defy logic and common
sense, and yet, the law being what it is, we have had to
struggle with how this is actually applied in practice, which
brings me back to kind-of where I left off, the discussion of
the specially designated global terrorist authority, which
allows us to apply the financial sanctions, really important in
cutting off financial flows, and some forms of cooperation by
American nationals and the activities of these groups.
Just want to get more clarity about how that works. The
standard for designating someone a specially designated global
terrorist, basically they have to provide they have committed a
terrorist act, or there is a finding that they are--they pose a
significant risk of committing a terrorist act.
Is that basically correct, Mr. Godfrey, maybe to you?
Mr. Godfrey. Thank you, Congressman.
Right. So the SDGT designation allows the Department to
designate foreign groups or individuals that have committed, or
have attempted to commit or pose a significant risk of
committing, or have participated in training to commit acts of
terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals, or
National security, and that includes foreign policy or the
economy of the United States.
Mr. Malinowski. OK. So making that a little more specific,
I mean, imagine a group based in Europe, or overseas, that
advocates the supremacy of the White race, that advocates the
replacement of democratically-elected governments with, you
know, basically, you know, fascism or Nazism, that advocates
violence in support of that goal, perhaps, even offers small
arms training, or explosives training, to people who want it,
who share their ideology. Would that be enough to be able to,
you know, generically--I am not talking about a specific
group--to trigger that kind of designation?
What I am getting at here is whether that authority is
sufficiently robust. It is more limited in terms of the
unintended consequences, which is why it is attractive. But is
the definition sufficient? You know, is the bar set at the
right point?
Mr. Godfrey. Congressman, the example, the hypothetical you
gave, which we are always reluctant to engage in, but I think
it is an aptly formed one, I think in that instance, the kind
of group you identified with the activities that you
identified--and that is the critical part of this--would likely
meet the standard for designation.
So, again, the critical nexus for designations is good
information that demonstrates both capacity and intent on the
part of a group to engage in terrorist acts. If we meet that
threshold, we are on solid ground.
Mr. Malinowski. OK. Well, let's explore that further
because, again, I am not--some would argue that the examples
that I rattled off do not necessarily constitute intent to
commit terrorist acts.
Slightly different example, there has been reporting
recently that there have been very large transfers of bitcoin
to particular Americans, Nick Fuentes, for example, who is
sort-of a well-known extreme right activist involved in the
January 6 riots, receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars'
worth of bitcoin from foreign supporters.
It is not illegal for a foreigner to provide cash support
to political causes in the United States, not political
electoral, but social causes.
But would that kind of transfer raise any kind of legal
questions that you guys could pursue under current law related
to tax reporting, or something outside of the counterterrorism
realm that would allow us to get at that kind of support for
these groups in the United States?
Ms. Slotkin. Briefly, please.
Mr. Godfrey. Congressman, I think on that sort of an issue,
those authorities would reside with the Treasury as opposed to
the State Department.
If I could just circle back, one point of clarification on
your hypothetical, the element that you mentioned that
specifically allows us to bridge to an SGTD potential
designation was the training going back to the expansion of
authorities in late 2019.
Mr. Malinowski. Got it. All righty. Thanks.
I will yield back. I am out of time.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
With that, I thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony, and for the Members for their questions.
I ask unanimous consent that 2 letters be inserted into the
record. One is the letter I wrote to Secretary Blinken on April
5 requesting the Department of State, with input from
interagency partners, consider designating these groups either
as FTOs or SDGTs. The second is the State Department's response
dated April 23.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Chairwoman Slotkin to Secretary Antony J. Blinken
April 5, 2021.
The Honorable Antony J. Blinken,
Secretary, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C St NW, Washington, DC
20520.
Dear Secretary Blinken: In April of 2020, the State Department
designated the first-ever white supremacist extremist (WSE) group, the
Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), and three of its leaders as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT). This was a welcome step to curb
the global threat from white supremacist extremists, but it's time for
more to be done. As such, I write to ask that you designate additional
overseas violent WSE groups in the attached list that meet the
necessary criteria as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). If these
groups do not meet the more stringent FTO criteria, I ask that you
designate these groups as SDGTs, as your predecessor did with RIM. Such
designations will help apply more stress to curtail these violent
organizations' and their leaders' ability to operate their groups. It
would also give the U.S. Government more tools to engage and flag the
Americans who contact, support, train, and join these WSE groups, under
applicable laws.
As a former CIA officer who has looked at foreign terrorist
organizations in the Middle East most of my career, I was struck by the
threat these white supremacist groups pose, the amount of contact they
have with extremists in the U.S., the minimal intelligence and
diplomatic reporting we have on these groups, and the relative lack of
review taken by the U.S. Government. In the past several years there
have been numerous incidents of WSE-inspired violence across the globe,
in places like Germany,\1\ New Zealand,\2\ Ukraine,\3\ and France,\4\
in furtherance of white supremacist political ideology. The Department
of Homeland Security's most recent Threat Assessment recognizes this
growing problem and its impact on the homeland, noting that ``WSEs have
engaged in outreach and networking opportunities abroad with like-
minded individuals to expand their violent extremist networks. Such
outreach might lead to a greater risk of mobilization to violence,
including traveling to conflict zones.''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ German Halle Gunman Admits Far-Right Synagogue Attack, BBC,
Oct. 11, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50011898.
\2\ Christchurch Mosque Shootings: Gunman Livestreamed 17 Minutes
of Shooting Terror, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Mar. 15, 2019, https://
www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/christchurch-mosque-shootings-gunman-
livestreamed-17-minutes-of-shooting-terror/BLRK6K4XBTOIS7EQCZW24G-
FAPM/.
\3\ Tim Lister, The Nexus Between Far-Right Extremists in the
United States and Ukraine, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT,
April 2020, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-nexus-between-far-right-
extremists-in-the-united-states-and-ukraine/.
\4\ Angelique Chrisafis, Police Arrest 84-Year-Old Man Over Gun and
Arson Attack at French Mosque, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 28, 2019, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/28/two-injured-in-arson-and-gun-
attack-at-french-mosque.
\5\ Homeland Threat Assessment, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Oct. 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
2020_10_06_homeland-threat-assessment.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As you know, the Department of Justice regularly prosecutes
American citizens for providing material support to groups like the
Islamic State or al-Qaeda, who are designated as FTOs. However, if that
same American citizen collaborates with a violent WSE group based
overseas and supports their designs for terror, receives training,
money or resources, or travels to fight alongside them, the Federal
Government does not currently have access to the same legal tools,
since these WSE groups are not designated terrorist organizations or
individuals.
By my read, there seem to be ample examples of foreign white
supremacist groups that meet the criteria for the FTO list. For
example, the 2018 U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy names the Nordic
Resistance Movement and the National Action Group as Terrorist
Adversaries in the same section as ISIS, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and
Hizballah.\6\ The Azov Battalion, a well-known militia organization in
Ukraine, uses the internet to recruit new members and then radicalizes
them to use violence to pursue its white identity political agenda.\7\
A full list of the foreign groups I would ask you to review is
attached.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of
America, THE WHITE HOUSE, Oct 2018, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/
documents/news_documents/NSCT.pdf.
\7\ Simon Shuster and Billy Perrigo, Like, Share, Recruit: How a
White-Supremacist Militia Uses Facebook to Radicalize and Train New
Members, TIME MAGAZINE, Jan. 7, 2021, https://time.com/5926750/azov-
far-right-movement-facebook/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, I would ask your help with a related matter: Canada
has taken the step of designating The Proud Boys and The Base as
terrorist groups whose members may now see their financial assets
seized.\8\ While there is less information on the foreign affiliates of
these two groups, as a representative of a border State, I ask for your
help in clarifying what their designation means for U.S. diplomatic
reporting, intelligence sharing, and law enforcement cooperation
between the U.S. and Canada, given the complicated legal issues at
play--particularly before the border re-opens after COVID.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Ian Austen, Canada Formally Declares Proud Boys a Terrorist
Group, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 3, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/
03/world/canada/canada-proud-boys-terror-group.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you for your attention to these matters. I know you are
concerned about foreign organizations that use violence to further
their political goals, particularly when they pose a threat to U.S.
citizens, interests, and allies abroad. I ask that you take a thorough
look at these WSE groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations as soon as
possible. They continue to show in very public ways who they are and
the lethal steps they will take to achieve their goals in countries
across the globe.
Thanks for your attention. I would appreciate even an interim
response by May 3, 2021.
Sincerely,
Elissa Slotkin,
Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism,
Committee on Homeland Security.
Suggested List of WSE Groups to Consider for Designation
Atomwaffen Division Deutschland
Azov Battalion (foreign affiliates and members)
Blood & Honour
Combat 18
Feuerkrieg Division
Generation Identity
Hammerskins (foreign affiliates and members)
National Action Group, aka System Resistance Network
Nordic Resistance Movement
Northern Order
Order of Nine Angles
Rise Above Movement (foreign affiliates and members)
Sonnenkrieg Division
______
Letter From Naz Durakoglu to Chairwoman Slotkin
April 23, 2021.
The Honorable Elissa Slotkin,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism,
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Madam Chairwoman: Thank you for your letter of April 5 about
the potential designations of violent white supremacist groups under
the Secretary of State's counterterrorism authorities.
The Biden-Harris Administration shares your deep concern about the
threat posed by racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism
(REMVE), including violent white supremacist groups. The National
Security Council is currently leading an expedited policy review of
domestic terrorism, including the nexus to REMVE actors overseas, to
determine how the government can better share information about this
threat, support efforts to prevent radicalization to violence, and more
effectively disrupt REMVE networks at home and abroad.
You mentioned in your letter a number of REMVE groups overseas that
could be considered for designation as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(FTOs) or Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). Thank you for
sharing this information, and please rest assured that the Department
is deeply committed to the appropriate use of its counterterrorism-
related designations authorities to limit the ability of foreign groups
or individuals linked to acts of terrorism to obtain resources and
support, regardless of their ideologies or motivations. Designation of
the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and members of its leadership as
Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) in April 2020--the first
time in history the Department has designated a white supremacist
terrorist group--reflect that commitment. As you know, we actively and
continuously assess REMVE groups abroad that could be designated as
FTOs and/or SDGTS and stand ready to use our authorities to do so. An
important limitation in those efforts is the availability of sufficient
credible information that meets standards for designation.
It is clear that our foreign partners share our concern about the
increased threat posed by REMVE actors and welcome coordination with
the United States to address it. With respect to your question about
Canada's recent designations of The Proud Boys and The Base and U.S.-
Canadian diplomatic reporting, intelligence sharing and law enforcement
cooperation, Canada has been and remains one of our closest
counterterrorism partners, one with whom we regularly share information
about potential threats through diplomatic, law enforcement, and
intelligence channels.
The State Department is bringing all our counterterrorism tools to
the fight against REMVE actors--information sharing, preventing and
countering violent extremism (P/CVE), restricting terrorist travel,
engaging with technology companies to urge enforcement of terms of
service for use of online platforms, and building partner capacity to
protect soft targets like synagogues, mosques, and churches. We will
also continue to review all sources of information to assess whether
foreign REMVE groups and/or individuals meet the legal criteria for
designation under State's authorities.
On February 24, 2021, the Secretary designated the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism as the lead for the Department's efforts to counter
REMVE, including White Identity Terrorism (WIT), as mandated in the
Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In response
to other NDAA provisions, the Department has now funded a WIT social
networking study by a Federally Funded Research and Development Center
and is working to expeditiously address other NDAA WIT requirements.
We hope this information is helpful to you. Please let us know if
we may be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
Naz Durakoglu,
Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Legislative Affairs.
Ms. Slotkin. The Members of the subcommittee may have
additional questions for the witnesses, and we ask that you
respond just as expeditiously in writing to those questions.
Without objection, the committee record shall be kept open
for 10 days. Hearing no further business, the subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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