[House Hearing, 117 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] PROTECTING OUR DEMOCRACY: REASSERTING CONGRESS' POWER OF THE PURSE ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 29, 2021 __________ Serial No. 117-2 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available on the Internet: www.govinfo.gov ___________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 44-771 WASHINGTON : 2021 COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky, Chairman HAKEEM S. JEFFRIES, New York JASON SMITH, Missouri, BRIAN HIGGINS, New York Ranking Member BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania, TRENT KELLY, Mississippi Vice Chairman TOM McCLINTOCK, California LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois CHRIS JACOBS, New York DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York BUDDY CARTER, Georgia STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada BEN CLINE, Virginia BARBARA LEE, California LAUREN BOEBERT, Colorado JUDY CHU, California BYRON DONALDS, Florida STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands RANDY FEENSTRA, Iowa JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia BOB GOOD, Virginia ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia ASHLEY HINSON, Iowa SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas JAY OBERNOLTE, California JIM COOPER, Tennessee ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey SCOTT H. PETERS, California SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington Professional Staff Ellen Balis, Staff Director Mark Roman, Minority Staff Director CONTENTS Page Hearing held in Washington, D.C., April 29, 2021................. 1 Hon. John A. Yarmuth, Chairman, Committee on the Budget...... 1 Prepared statement of.................................... 4 Letter submitted for the record.......................... 6 Hon. Jason Smith, Ranking Member, Committee on the Budget.... 8 Prepared statement of.................................... 10 Letters submitted for the record......................... 89 Molly E. Reynolds, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, The Brookings Institution...................................... 14 Prepared statement of.................................... 17 Liz Hempowicz, Director of Public Policy, Project On Government Oversight....................................... 22 Prepared statement of.................................... 24 Edda Emmanuelli Perez, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Government Accountability Office........................... 32 Prepared statement of.................................... 70 Mark R. Paoletta, Senior Fellow, Center for Renewing America. 32 Prepared statement of.................................... 35 Letters submitted for the record......................... 43 Hon. Ashley Hinson submitted a letter for the record......... 118 Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Committee on the Budget, statement submitted for the record......................... 131 Questions submitted for the record........................... 138 Answers submitted for the record............................. 142 PROTECTING OUR DEMOCRACY: REASSERTING CONGRESS' POWER OF THE PURSE ---------- THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 2021 House of Representatives Committee on the Budget Washington, D.C. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., via Zoom, Hon. John A. Yarmuth [Chairman of the Committee] presiding. Present: Representatives Yarmuth, Boyle, Price, Schakowsky, Kildee, Chu, Plaskett, Wexton, Scott, Jackson Lee, Sires; Smith, McClintock, Grothman, Smucker, Burgess, Carter, Cline, Feenstra, Good, and Hinson. Chairman Yarmuth. The hearing will come to order. We are holding this proceeding virtually in compliance with the regulations for committee proceedings pursuant to House Resolution 965 carried over to the 117th Congress via House Resolution 8. I would like to remind Members that we have established an email inbox for submitting documents before and during committee proceedings and we have distributed that email address to your staff. Consistent with regulations, the Chair or staff designated by the Chair may mute participants' microphones when they are not under recognition for the purpose of eliminating inadvertent background noise. Members are responsible for unmuting themselves when they seek recognition. We are not permitted to unmute Members unless they explicitly request assistance. If I notice that you have not unmuted yourself, I will ask you if you would like staff to unmute you. If you indicate approval by nodding, staff will unmute your microphone. They will not unmute your microphone under any other conditions. Members must have their cameras on and be visible on screen in order to be recognized. Members may not participate in more than one committee proceeding simultaneously. I do not know if we have any Members in the hearing room. But if we do, in light of the attending physician's new guidance and his announcement on January 4th, any Members present in the hearing room must wear a mask at all times and are required to keep their masks on when seeking recognition and speaking. For those Members not wanting to wear a mask, the House rules provide a way to participate remotely from your office without being physically present in the hearing room. And now I will say what I should have said at the beginning. Good afternoon and welcome to the Budget Committee's hearing on Protecting our Democracy: Reasserting Congress' Power of the Purse. I want to introduce our witnesses for today. This afternoon, we will be hearing from Dr. Molly Reynolds, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, Liz Hempowicz, Director of Public Policy at the Project on Government Oversight, Edda Emmanuelli Perez, Deputy General Counsel at the U.S. Government Accountability Office, and Mark R. Paoletta, Senior Fellow at the Center for Renewing America. I will now yield myself five minutes for an opening statement. Exactly one year ago yesterday, I introduced the congressional Power of the Purse Act. I said it was an important step in restoring Congress' constitutional spending authority and reinforcing the foundations of our democracy, a responsibility that should be embraced by both sides of the aisle. Today we are in a new Congress, with a new Administration that has taken steps to return to previous longstanding norms. We have a reinvigorated OMB led by an Acting Director with firsthand experience fighting to protect Congress' spending authority. And we are using this Committee's first full hearing to again examine the importance of safeguarding Congress' constitutional authority and the need for the congressional Power of the Purse Act. I believe in this good government reform legislation, and I am fully committed to pursuing its reforms regardless of who is in the White House. Our founders knew that money, and who controls it, is fundamental to a democratic government. They also knew that, with elections every two years, Congress would be the branch most accountable to the public. So, they gave us the power of the purse as a critical check on the President. Congress has exercised this power by enacting foundational laws, like the Antideficiency Act and the Impoundment Control Act, and updating them as challenges to its authority arose. To help protect and enforce its spending decisions, Congress established the non-partisan Government Accountability Office, which, as we all know, is charged with investigating and reporting on violations of budget and appropriations laws. However, Congress' ability to exercise its singular constitutional authority has become increasingly challenged by an executive branch that has sought to seize control of the nation's purse for itself. Presidents and agencies of both parties have pushed the boundaries of their delegated spending powers, exploiting secrecy, a lack of reporting requirements, and limitations on enforcement to push their own agenda and sidestep Congress. Decades of this purposeful infringement on Congress' power of the purse proves that Congress cannot rely on interbranch comity and nonbinding norms in the face of an emboldened executive branch. For our government to work, the American people need to know that when their representatives in Congress pass a funding bill and it is signed into law, the executive branch will follow the law to ensure their hard-earned tax dollars go where their representatives intended. For Congress to remain a co- equal branch of government and live up to our constitutional charge, we must reassert Congress' control over spending and ensure we are the ones holding the purse strings. That is why I introduced the congressional Power of the Purse Act. My legislation increases transparency by requiring the executive branch to make apportionments, along with legal justifications and opinions, publicly available. This helps to prevent arbitrary and self-serving decisionmaking, promote legal compliance, and end the use of expansive legal interpretations to exert undue influence on spending decisions. By making apportionments public, Congress and the American people can see exactly how federal resources are being used. The bill also increases accountability by improving and expanding controls under the Antideficiency Act and the Impoundment Control Act. It strengthens and expedites GAO's ability to obtain information from agencies and requires the executive branch to report to Congress on all violations of the ADA and ICA identified by GAO, a requirement that is unbelievably absent from current law. My bill also authorizes administrative discipline for government employees responsible for violating the law, serving not only as an important deterrent, but also as a tool to empower government employees to push back on political pressure to break the law. Transparency, accountability, checks and balances--these tenets are at the core of our constitutional republic and a key component of our responsibility as Members of Congress. A commitment to good government cannot ebb and flow depending on who controls the levers of power. Our Committee has issued reports, held hearings, written to officials in both the Trump and Biden Administrations, and introduced legislation as part of our work to safeguard Congress' spending authority. We continue this important work with our hearing today. Today presents another opportunity to examine our current framework of fiscal laws, its potential shortfalls, and why Congress must take legislative action to safeguard its constitutional authority, including passing the congressional Power of the Purse Act. We have assembled an expert panel of witnesses to help us, and I look forward to this important discussion. And before I recognize the Ranking Member, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a letter the Power of the Purse Coalition sent to me and to the Ranking Member applauding the Committee's leadership on this ``bipartisan, bicameral issue that impacts accountability and integrity within our governmental system'' and enthusiastically supporting reforms in the congressional Power of the Purse Act and its advancement in the 117th Congress. The Power of the Purse Coalition represents organizations across the ideological spectrum, and this letter of support is signed by Demand Progress, FreedomWorks, the National Taxpayers' Union, Project On Government Oversight, Protect Democracy, R Street Institute, and Taxpayers for Common Sense. I thank these organizations for their strong support and without objection, the submission will be in the record. So ordered. [The prepared statement of Chairman Yarmuth and letter submitted for the record follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Yarmuth. With that, I would like to yield to the Ranking Member Mr. Smith for five minutes for his opening statement. Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing. It could not be more relevant given the current State of Congress' performance on budgeting and spending. It also could not be more necessary given the actions of President Biden when it comes to the crisis on our southern border. And specifically, his decision to abandon construction of the border wall after Congress appropriated funding for it. The President's decision to withhold funding on the border wall, along with other actions his Administration has taken, have only fueled a national security and humanitarian crisis at the southern border. As the Chairman is aware, Republicans on this Committee have called for a hearing on what we view as an unlawful withholding of funding, especially given this Committee's stated oversight responsibilities. I appreciate that the Chairman has chosen this Committee's first hearing to focus on issues that are related to President Biden's decision to freeze funding for the border wall. This is an opportunity to exercise much needed oversight. Given the Chairman's previous concerns with the actions of President Trump on spending appropriated funds, I look forward to his comments on President Biden's decision to withhold funding, since I would assume there would be a similar concern no matter who sits in the oval office. I also look forward to hearing from our GAO witness about what that agency is doing as it relates to President Biden's withholding of funding. Members from both the House and Senate have called on GAO to investigate this matter. Frankly, it is very concerning that such a request was needed given GAO's very public interest in this issue area. One has to wonder why GAO was not on the case the day after President Biden abandoned construction of the wall. I respect the fact that the Chairman will want to discuss the broader issue with Congress. Congress' Article I authorities and the power of the purse. I welcome that discussion. Part of it should center around Congress, their own shortcomings in this matter, and its inability to follow or enforce its own rules, roles, and responsibilities. When it comes to budgeting and spending taxpayer dollars, just look at the historic record. Since 1977, there have been 20 government shutdowns and Congress has had to enact 192 continued resolutions, including four this Fiscal Year because deadlines for completing regular appropriation bills have not been met. Congress has failed to follow regular order, that is passage of a budget resolution followed by 12 separate appropriation bills before the beginning of the fiscal year, every year since Fiscal Year 1995. According to the Congressional Budget Office, 1,046 authorizations from 272 laws expired prior to the start of Fiscal Year 2020. And appropriations for the Fiscal Year 2020 included $332 billion attributable to expired authorizations. As of right now, work on funding for the upcoming fiscal year, Fiscal Year 2022, is not currently on track to look much different. Given delays in the budget process on the part of Congress and the President, there is the growing likelihood Congress starts the Fiscal Year with another CR or massive omnibus spending bill. In closing, we are holding this hearing on the 100th day the Biden Presidency. A hundred days in which not only did the President withhold appropriated funds while fueling a crisis at our southern border, he also fired thousands of Americans by the stroke of a pen and has proposed or pursued policies that will destroy jobs, drive down wages, and drive up the cost of living for America's working class. I hope this Committee would, at the very least, continue to seek answers from the Administration on how it plans to budget for all the policies its proposed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the testimony from today's witnesses. Mr. Chairman, you are muted. [The prepared statement of Jason Smith follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you. Thanks to the Ranking Member. I apologize for that. But thank you for your opening statement. In the interest of time, I ask that any other Members who wish to make a statement, submit their written statements for the record to the email inbox we established for receiving documents before and after--before and during the committee proceedings. We distributed that email address to your staff. I will hold the record open until the end of the day to accommodate those Members who may not yet have prepared written statements. I would like to thank our witnesses for being here this afternoon. The Committee has received your written statements and they will be part of the formal hearing record. You will each have five minutes to give your oral remarks. As a reminder, please unmute your microphone before speaking. Dr. Reynolds, please unmute your microphone and begin when you are ready. STATEMENTS OF MOLLY E. REYNOLDS, SENIOR FELLOW, GOVERNANCE STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION; LIZ HEMPOWICZ, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC POLICY, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT; EDDA EMMANUELLI PEREZ, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; MARK R. PAOLETTA, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR RENEWING AMERICA STATEMENT OF MOLLY E. REYNOLDS Dr. Reynolds. Thank you, Chairman Yarmuth, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee. My name is Molly Reynolds, and I am a Senior Fellow in the Governance Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on how Congress can better fulfill its constitutional obligation to provide for and effectively oversee the executive branch. In this context, I want to make four points. First, because the Constitution separates the legislative and executive functions, divergence between Congress' intent and policy outcomes is inevitable. Congress must design and periodically redesign mechanisms to monitor executive branch implementation of policy. It is not possible, nor is it wise for Congress to try to write every policy detail into law. The executive branch has types of expertise that make it better equipped to make certain detailed decisions. As the policy problems facing the nation have become more complex, Congress has increasingly found itself incapable of writing statutes that contain all these specific choices. In addition, Congress often prefers to leave detailed decisions to the executive branch because they are politically challenging. Together, these circumstances mean that Congress must design ways to monitor this inevitable potential for slippage. Divergence can and does occur regardless of whether the branches are controlled by the same political party. Even in an era of high partisan polarization, the need for monitoring and oversight tools is structural and fundamental to the constitutional system. Second, because divergence between Congress' intent and the executive branch's implementation is inevitable, so too is the need for Congress to periodically revise its procedures as it has done in the past. The Antideficiency Act's apportionment requirement was enacted to prevent the executive branch from quickly spending down its allocations and demanding more funds. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act contain several provisions expressly responding to aggressive assertions of power by the executive branch. Several components of the Power of the Purse Act are natural successors to these earlier budgetary provisions. Importantly, the Presidential powers targeted by these provisions are statutory. If Congress wrote the statute originally, it too should update it periodically in response to changing conditions. The President is not the only actor whose changing behavior can require a response from Congress. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, legislative veto provisions were an important tool in Congress' arsenal. Because legislative veto provisions often included procedures that expedited consideration of the review legislation, they demonstrate a powerful choice by some individual Members of Congress: cede some of their individual power in order to give the institution a stronger voice. The Supreme Court's decision in Chadha disrupted that bargain and Congress would be well- served to adapt its procedures in response as Title III of the Power of the Purse Act does for the National Emergencies Act. Third, the evolution of Congress' own approach to processing spending bills has also increased the need for new tools to enhance oversight capacity. Relying on continuing resolutions and large omnibus bills breeds brinkmanship because the cost to Congress and its constituents of letting the government shut down is so high, legislators cannot credibly threaten to withhold funding from a specific priority or activity because the president has chosen to stray from congressional intent. When there is a partial shutdown of federal operations, the executive branch has substantial discretion over exactly which activities cease and which ones can continue. This discretion further undermines Congress' power in shutdown confrontations. A common reaction to this brinkmanship is to call for a return to so-called regular order. But little in Congress' recent experience suggests that is likely. Given this, Congress must turn to new tools like those in the Power of the Purse Act to ensure it gets the information it needs. Finally, changes in the nature of congressional oversight also mean that reforms to support Congress' work are needed. Historically, Congress' efforts to oversee the executive branch generally followed a model of accommodation. This accommodations process has eroded and Congress has had more difficulty enforcing subpoenas against the executive branch. Given this, Congress would be well served to strengthen its hand as it seeks information from the executive branch. Several provisions in the Power of the Purse Act aim to do this. The slow speed at which the federal courts move, however, constrains Congress' ability to use them effectively as the mechanism to ensure executive compliance, even in instances where the courts are likely to side with Congress. The legislative branch must work on its own behalf, just as previous Congresses have done as part of the continual push and pull between the branches. While other periods of heavy congressional delegations to the executive, like the 1930's and 1960's, were followed by enhancements by Congress of its own capacity to oversee those actions in the 1940's and 1970's, the expansion of executive power that began after September 11th has not been met with a similar assertion of congressional authority. The Power of the Purse Act represents an important part of that necessary effort. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Molly E. Reynolds follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you very much, Dr. Reynolds. I now recognize Ms. Hempowicz for five minutes. Unmute and you have the floor. STATEMENT OF LIZ HEMPOWICZ Ms. Hempowicz. Thank you. Chairman Yarmuth, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today about Congress' power of the purse and efforts to reclaim and reassert that power. One reading of the Constitution's focus and prioritization on the legislative branch is that the founders intended it to be the most powerful actor within the three branches of government. However, today we have an executive branch that has encroached on significant authorities that the Constitution explicitly vested in the legislative branch, including the power of the purse. Because of this encroachment, the executive branch now wields a disproportionate amount of power in our three-branch structure. A rebalancing of that power is long overdue, particularly in light of growing public concern about government corruption. I am here today to ask you to improve your ability to oversee how the executive branch spends the public money that Congress appropriates. More specifically, I urge you to require more transparency from the White House's Office of Management and Budget about how it apportions or schedules how executive agencies spend appropriated funds. Now that you know what I am here to ask you to do, I will explain why. Congress has mandated that the executive branch set a schedule to disburse money that has been appropriated to agencies as an attempt to encourage responsible financial management. This is meant to prevent both overspending and programmatic disruptions. This process of scheduling out funding is called apportionment. I want to emphasize that this is not an inherent executive branch power. It is one that Congress created and it is well within congressional authority to dictate limits to how the executive exercises this function. Today, the Office of Management and Budget exercises apportionment authority on behalf of the President. While they may delay the disbursal of funds for legitimate programmatic or technical reasons, the executive is not authorized to delay or withhold funds to achieve policy objectives. This is quite simply because allowing OMB or the President to withhold or delay funds to achieve policy objectives would be tantamount to handing the power of the purse over to the executive branch entirely. Because there are clear constitutional limits to the apportionment process, transparency is critical to ensure that the executive is not abusing it. Which is why the public may be surprised to hear that these apportionment directives are issued entirely in secret. OMB issues apportionment directives both by fiscal quarter and by project or a combination of those two. So, though they are subject to public records requests through the Freedom of Information Act, it is difficult to ensure consistent transparency without proactive release of this information. That means that lawmakers don't have regular access to the text of apportionment directives or the footnotes, which contain more specific directions from the White House related to the funding and can be used as a way to compel or incentivize agencies to take certain actions. Not only does this make it harder for Congress to conduct oversight, but the lack of transparency makes it difficult for the public to have faith that taxpayer resources are being handled with integrity and in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress. The executive branch has a long history of expansively interpreting the authorities granted to it by Congress, well beyond what the statutory text would dictate. Those legal interpretations often issued by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice are also issued in secret and they have serious ramifications on the balance of power when it comes to matters related to the power of the purse. The President's obligation to take care that the laws and spending decisions enacted by Congress are executed as Congress intended demand additional transparency in both areas. Taking it back to our founding, Congress holds the power of the purse because the founders envisioned it would be the branch of government most accountable to the people, and, therefore, best able to wield that power in a way that is responsive to the needs and interests of the public. It also reflects that the founders were very concerned that vesting too much authority, particularly to spend public money, in an executive branch led by a single person. Remember, the Constitution only gives the executive a handful of independent authorities. None of which require secrecy around how the executive branch apportions funds. The potential for the executive branch to manipulate spending in secret exposes our government to corruption and undermines the delicate balance of power between our branches of government. Additional transparency around these budgetary decisions will only improve Congress' capacity to oversee executive branch spending, serving as a check against malfeasance and corruption. For example, Ranking Member Smith, if the congressional Power of the Purse Act was law, you and Congressman Katko would already have many of the answers to the questions you have recently asked the Biden Administration about how appropriated funds are being used at the southern border. That is because you would have--you would likely have timely access to the documents dictating that spending. I urge this Committee to pass the congressional Power of the Purse Act, either on its own or as part of the sweeping anticorruption package introduced last Congress aptly titled the Protecting Our Democracy Act. Thank you, again, for holding this important hearing, and I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Liz Hempowicz follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you very much for your testimony. I now recognize Ms. Emmanuelli Perez for five minutes. Please unmute and we are interested in your testimony. STATEMENT OF EDDA EMMANUELLI PEREZ Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Chairman Yarmuth, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Congress' constitutional power of the purse, the Government Accountability Office's role in serving this power, and several legislative proposals to strengthen this power. Since our creation a century ago, GAO has performed audits and investigations and issued legal decisions to support Congress in its oversight of executive spending. Congress has also vested GAO with additional statutory responsibilities [inaudible]---- Chairman Yarmuth. If you can suspend for a minute, please? Your sound is breaking up. [Audio malfunction] Chairman Yarmuth. Yes. Sam, why don't we see if we can get her sound corrected, and in the meantime, we will hear from Mr. Paoletta. So, Mr. Paoletta, you are recognized for five minutes. Please unmute and give us your testimony. STATEMENT OF MARK R. PAOLETTA Mr. Paoletta. Chairman Yarmuth, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today on legislation to amend the Impoundment Control Act. This bill has been described as an effort to strengthen Congress' power of the purse and to prevent impoundments. It is ironic that as this bill is being considered, President Biden is holding, that is impounding, funds for the construction of a wall along the southern border, including $1.4 billion specifically appropriated for the border wall construction. Based on GAO's opinion on funding for Ukraine, President Biden's hold is clearly illegal and a violation of the Impoundment Control Act. But the Democrats on this Committee have been silent on this direct assault on Congress' power of the purse. President Biden's hold is 100 days and counting. It is an ongoing hold, which is twice as long as the Trump OMB 50-day hold on Ukraine funds. President Biden's decision to impound these border wall funds, combined with his reversal of other Trump Administration policies on immigration and border security, has led to catastrophic consequences and a true crisis of human suffering at the border. These policies have tragically facilitated increased human trafficking and other horrible situations. And this was all avoidable given the good work done by President Trump and his Administration to address these issues at the border. Even after the Trump OMB released the funds for Ukraine after 50 days, Chairman Yarmuth and Chairwoman Lowey stated that OMB's unilaterally delaying the funding was an abuse--this is a quote--``an abuse of authority provided to the President to apportion appropriations,'' and sent sweeping document requests to OMB. Why hasn't the Chairman or any Democrat on this Committee issued any statements or sent document requests to DHS or OMB asking about this ongoing hold? If you truly cared about preventing impoundments or asserting Congress' power of the purse, your actions would not be governed by who is president or whether you agree with the policy. GAO rejected the Trump OMB's argument that the President could hold funds to figure out how best to spend the funds consistent with the appropriations and the President's agenda. In contrast to that Trump hold, President Biden's hold is designed to specifically thwart a lawfully enacted congressional appropriations to build the border wall. President Biden pledged during the campaign not to build another foot of the wall, calling it a waste of money. His Fiscal Year 2022 discretionary request proposes to rescind the very border wall money that he is holding. Thus, the Biden Administration is apparently now intentionally under-executing congressionally appropriated funding in order to later rescind it. That is a flat-out defiance of congressional intent and is a textbook impoundment. GAO's Ukraine opinion stated, the ICA does not permit deferrals for policy reasons. Faithful execution of the laws does not permit the President to substitute his own policy priorities for those that Congress has enacted. This bill will only make a bad law worse. The ICA has undermined responsible stewardship of government spending. Why? Because the ICA disincentivizes any effort to run programs more effectively to achieve savings by mandating onerous procedures to make it all but impossible to save unnecessary funds. It used to be well-established policy to faithfully implement programs with the least amount of money necessary. The ICA now makes those efforts potentially illegal. The ICA overthrew 200 years of how the executive and legislative branches worked together. Congress should use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to focus on passing detailed authorizing laws, reauthorizing the hundreds of laws that have expired, and enacting separate appropriations bills on time and not in a monstrous omnibus passed months late. Well-crafted laws authorizing federal programs are critically important to ensuring that the executive can effectively fulfill congressional intent. The appropriations should be a means to implementing that federal program, not an end in itself. The bill's provisions are all meant to increase the micromanaging of the daily operations of the executive branch. And they will further undermine effective stewardship of government spending. For example, the provision that requires funds to be made available for obligation within 90 days of the end of the period of availability is wrongheaded. By shortening the timeline by when an appropriation must be apportioned, and particularly given Congress' inability to pass things on time, this bill will only further undermine Presidential decisionmaking and exacerbate wasteful spending. A provision regarding publicly listing the positions that have apportioning authority will ultimately result in the doxing of federal civil servants. A provision regarding applying administrative penalties to executive branch officials found to have impounded funds is bad policy because there are so many gray areas as to what constitutes a violation of the ICA. It is worth noting--this is interesting--that Members of Congress and their staff routinely call agency staff to demand that they hold apportioned funds, often without any purpose related to the implementation of that program. During the Trump Administration, I provided GAO with 300 examples from the State Department in a 3-year period where Members of Congress demanded holds on funding. They ranged from somewhere from 10 days to 321 days. Are these impoundments for which an agency employee would be held responsible? The provisions giving GAO additional powers to make demands on the executive branch are unwise and probably unconstitutional. For example, the law empowered the GAO to demand documents from the President of the United States, and if he does not comply in 20 days, GAO is empowered to sue him in federal court to make him comply. That is astonishing. Congress can't even do that, and GAO works for Congress. There are other concerns with this bill, but in the interest of time, I will leave it at that. My full statement with two attachments, have been submitted for the record, and I am happy to answer any questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mark R. Paoletta and letters submitted for the record follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you for your testimony. Since my name was invoked and by inclusion of the Members of the Committee, I do want to respond to the issue of what we have done with regard to the border wall funding. Within days of the announcement of the Administration that they were not going to fund, we were in contact with the OMB. We have been in contact with them and they have been perfectly willing to engage with us on the issue. We are certainly seeking answers from them. But when the Republican senators, and I guess, Democratic--I mean, Republican House Members as well, requested that GAO investigate this situation and they are currently investigating, we will respect that process as we respected it in prior occasions. So, I just wanted to get that on the record. And, hopefully, we can get Ms. Emmanuelli Perez back on and get her sound corrected. Are you there? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes, sir. Can you hear me? Chairman Yarmuth. We can hear you. You are still a little garbled. Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Oh. Chairman Yarmuth. Let us try it again, though. STATEMENT OF EDDA EMMANUELLI PEREZ Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. OK, thank you very much. I apologize for these connection problems here. Chairman Yarmuth. All right. Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. So, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the Committee---- Chairman Yarmuth. You have five minutes. Ms. Emmanuelli Perez.----thank you for the opportunity to discuss Congress' constitutional power of the purse. The Government Accountability Office's role in serving this power, and several legislative proposals to strengthen this power. Since our creation a century ago, GAO has performed audits and investigations and issued legal decisions to support Congress in its oversight of executive spending. GAO also has been vested with additional statutory responsibilities to oversee the use of public money. For example, under the Impoundment Control Act, we must review any special messages the President submits pursuant to the Act, and report to Congress when a special message is either improperly classified or not transmitted at all. We are regularly providing technical assistance to Congress and executive branch agencies. We published the Red Book, a multi-volume appropriations law treatise that is relied upon across the government and we teach a principles of appropriations law course opinion that should be prudently considered. And the Supreme Court has cited GAO's Red Book in support of its appropriations law matters. GAO takes seriously its role in protecting Congress' power of the purse. Today, I would like to discuss several suggestions we have for legislative changes that will strengthen Congress' power of the purse and provide increased transparency. First, we would like to recommend that Congress amend the Impoundment Control Act to expressly preclude the withholding of budget authority through its expiration to ensure the prudent obligation of appropriated budget authority. The Impoundment Control Act provides a president with the legal authority to temporarily withholding funds from obligation with specific notice to Congress and meeting specific conditions. It is critical to maintain the careful balance of the Impoundment Control Act proposals to cancel budget authority. When Congress does not act to rescind funds, it appropriates its funds for obligation. In 2018, we issued a decision requested by Mr. Yarmuth and Mr. Womack where we examined whether the President had the authority under the Impoundment Control Act to withhold budget authority through its date of expiration. We determined that the President does not have this authority. And Congress can clarify the extent of that authority by explicitly prohibiting the withholding of funds through their date of expiration. Second, we recommend that the Department of Justice report to Congress on whether it will prosecute reported Antideficiency Act violations. In addition to appropriate administrative discipline it should contemplate criminal penalties for knowing and willful violations. And that threat is an essential deterrent. To our knowledge, there has never been a criminal prosecution of an Antideficiency Act violation. And a reporting requirement would ensure that consideration of that liability for all by the enforcement of the Act. Third, we recommend that Congress clarify the reach of the Antideficiency Act to correct the underreporting of Antideficiency Act violations. Although the Office of Management and Budget just yesterday amended its Circular No. A-11 reinstating its instruction that the agencies report Antideficiency Act violations found by GAO, we recommend that Congress amend the Antideficiency Act to clearly require agencies to report. When OMB had changed its longstanding guidance, we reported six Antideficiency Act violations to Congress that agencies failed to report. This will ensure that any future changes to OMB instructions do not interfere with the transparency, increased visibility of the agency operations, and congressional oversight. We also recommend that Congress encourage the agency in spending appropriate funds. And Congress could require that agencies report on the expired and canceled balances in their appropriation accounts. This information would increase the visibility to agency operations, strengthen congressional oversight, and help Congress and GAO identify potential violations of law. Finally, we recommend that Congress require agencies to respond to GAO's request for information within a certain period of time. Delays in receiving information impede our ability to issue decisions in a timely manner and impacts Congress' ability to conduct its oversight functions. Each of these legislative proposals will strengthen Congress' power of the purse, which is a key check on the power of the other branches. James Madison called it the power that allows Congress to reduce all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches. Chairman Yarmuth, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Edda Emmanuelli Perez follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you very much for your testimony. We will now begin our question and answer session. As a reminder, Members can submit any questions to be answered later in writing. Those questions and responses will be made part of the formal hearing record. Any Members who wish to submit questions for the record may do so by sending them to the clerk electronically within seven days. As is my custom, I am going to reserve my time, questioning time, to the end of the session. I believe the Ranking Member is going to go in his normal order. But first I will recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Boyle, for five minutes. Mr. Boyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that and you holding this hearing on such an important piece of legislation. It goes back to what happened almost a quarter of a millennium ago, right here from the city that I am speaking to you from, Philadelphia, when our nation's founders gave Congress the power of the purse. Unfortunately, in so many ways and not just in the power of the purse, we have seen, in my view, a migration of power from the legislative branch to the executive branch really over the last 20, 25 years. And, frankly, that has happened in Administrations of both parties. So, I think it is crucial that Congress again reassert its role in holding the power of the purse. Our founders thought we would jealously--we as members of the legislative branch, would jealously guard our powers. Unfortunately, as intense partisanship has taken hold, and we have even heard some of that already this hearing, as that intense partisanship has taken hold, it has allowed the executive branch to creep into our territory. So, I think this legislation is important. I am supportive of it. Let me turn to Mrs. Hempowicz, and I apologize if I am not getting your name pronounced exactly correctly. But let me ask you specifically on the question of transparency. If Congress makes a spending decision that is transparent, I am very concerned about secrecy and apportionments when it is not Congress. As I mentioned, when we use our appropriations power, you do have transparency. What happens right now when we do see an executive apportionment? Is Congress aware of it? Is the public? What rules right now govern the transparency of that non-legislative process? Ms. Hempowicz. Thank you so much for that question, Representative. And I share your frustration with the ceding of power, congressional power, to the executive branch. Right now, when apportionment directives are issued by OMB, there is no transparency requirement. Congress may see them. The public may see them if, you know, an interested party--if Congress asks for them and goes through a lengthy accommodations process and you may receive them. If members of the public submit Freedom of Information Act requests, which also take a great deal of time to reach fruition, we might also receive--we might have transparency there. But it is not guaranteed. And you are right in the way that Congress passes laws, those are public. That is how lawmaking is supposed to be. I think the excess secrecy here by the executive branch not only is making congressional oversight harder, but I think it's part of what is fueling this growing public concern about corruption in government. And I think the way to answer that, you know, I know it is a cliche, but sunlight is the best disinfectant. And so, I think this is certainly an area where more transparency would not only help Congress, but it would help the public. Mr. Boyle. Thank you for that. The natural followup then is what suggestions or ideas would you have on how we can improve transparency in those sort of executive branch apportionment decisions. Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, well, I think, you know, the first thing I would do is I would recommend passing the congressional Power of the Purse Act. But then going even further than that legislation, I think there needs to be additional transparency around opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel at Department of Justice. While the congressional Power of the Purse Act would require transparency of opinions, OLC issues around interpreting the executive's budget authority, that is the only section of those--that is the only--sorry--subset of those opinions that would be required to be transparent under this law. And I think there is certainly a lot of room and particularly when we are talking about congressional authorities. So, enforcing congressional subpoenas, things like that, you know, the OLC has wielded an incredible amount of power and almost always in favor of more secrecy for the executive. Mr. Boyle. Great. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back. There you go. Chairman Yarmuth. All right. I am having trouble unmuting. Thank you, Mr. Boyle. And I now recognize the Ranking Member Mr. Smith of Missouri for 10 minutes. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I just want to raise my frustration with these virtual hearings. It really is a disservice to all the Members of the Budget Committee whenever one of the key witnesses that you all have from GAO, we can't hardly understand or hear much of what she is saying. I am going to start my questions with her. I hope we can answer them. But I do know that we have retrofitted the budget room so that we could actually do a hybrid hearing. And I would strongly suggest that we get back to regular order, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Yarmuth. We want to as soon as possible. But I think we have connected her with a phone line now so she should be clearly audible. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you. Mr. Smith. Ms. Perez, I will start with you. As you are aware, on March 23, 2021, 71 Republican Members of Congress, including myself, joined 40 Republican senators in requesting a GAO legal opinion on suspension of border wall construction contracts and withholding appropriated funds. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to submit this letter into the record. Chairman Yarmuth. Without objection, so ordered. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Perez, can you provide any status update on when GAO will issue this opinion? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes. Yes, sir. We do have right now pending a decision that we are working on. We have asked OMB and DHS to provide factual and legal views to us. And we are expecting their responses right now mid to late next week. We did actually begin looking at this issue when the President announced this in January. And, of course, also accepted the request signed by you and various other Members. But it is something we have been looking at and are asking OMB and DHS to provide us with information. Mr. Smith. OK. So, Ms. Perez, you are telling me that GAO started looking into this without any Member of Congress requesting it? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes, that is correct. As part of what we do under the Impoundment Control Act, if we become aware of a potential impoundment, we do start looking into it. Sometimes we learn through it from Congress. We have learned through it through the media. In this case, of course, the President did issue a proclamation. So, therefore, we did become aware of a possibility of an Impoundment Control Act issue and did start looking at that at that time. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Ms. Perez. I just want to reiterate, given that this is an ongoing hold, and it is currently happening resulting in a clear humanitarian crisis at our border, I believe that it is the responsibility of GAO to make this decision very quickly, as has I pointed out in prior letters when GAO addressed the Ukraine funding in the prior Administration. That was after all of this was done. And when Senator Van Hollen submitted the letter, it was in December. And on January 16th I believe it was, you all had a decision. So, I definitely want to encourage, because of the crisis on the southern border, that this decision gets out there easily because, I mean, I think it's pretty straightforward that this Administration is violating the law. And I just would highly encourage that just for what is going on and as a Member of Congress, that is the power of the purse. So, I would like to go to--you know, it has been 100 days since President Biden has suspended the border wall funding. Can you tell me what day it was that GAO started to look into this? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. When we heard of the President's decision to pause the funding, you know, when we heard of the declaration that he did make, we immediately did start talking within GAO to start looking at what were the issues we needed to find. Who do we need to talk to. What type of information do we need to obtain. And then consequently, we also received the request from Members such as yourself. So, we will be making that decision. Mr. Smith. I look forward to that and I hope that you will notify us as soon as you have that decision. Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. We absolutely will. And we certainly share, you know, the urgency for having these decisions done as quickly as possible. We do look forward to hearing from OMB and DHS very soon. So, we hope that that will give us the information that we need to make that decision. Mr. Smith. Thank you. I will move on to Mr. Paoletta. It has been 100 days since President Biden suspended construction of the U.S. southern border wall and paused funding for border wall construction. These actions appear, in my opinion, to violate the Impoundment Control Act. This Committee was very active in its oversight of the executive branch last Congress, but the Democrats have seemingly been pretty silent on the biggest power of the purse abuse occurring right now in the first three hours of this current Administration. That is why my colleagues and I on this Committee have demanded a hearing on the Administration's constitutional abuses, the violation of U.S. law, and unjust pause on border wall construction. I am glad this hearing will provide an opportunity to discuss those issues and I ask unanimous consent to submit the letter written by Committee Republicans on this issue, dated March 29, 2021, into the record, Mr. Chairman? Chairman Yarmuth. Without objection, so ordered. [Letters submitted for the record follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, under the Impoundment Control Act, what are permissible grounds to hold or pause funds? Mr. Paoletta. Well, you can pause--thanks, Mr. Smith. You can pause funds if you can send up a deferral notice to the Congress. You can pause funding if you are sending up a recission package to the Congress. If you are in the day-to-day management of your funds--and it is interesting, I listened to this discussion as a person who has been part of the executive branch--if you are trying to implement the program and you need to pause the money to figure out how best to spend that money, within the confines of the appropriation, you can pause it. OMB has an apportionment authority too, right? As the testimony and oral testimony discussed. And it is day-to-day operations within OMB to apportion funds. So, if you have 2- year funds, you might apportion it so that half those funds are unavailable for the first year, right? That is an apportionment, right? It is putting those funds off. That is just--we view that--or the executive branch views that as just day-to-day Administration of our implementing programs. Mr. Smith. So, I just want to get this right. So, funds cannot be withheld for a policy reason? Mr. Paoletta. Again, so, in terms of--my view is that so long as you are trying--so, if you are trying to implement the program consistent with the appropriations and they are multiple ways you can do that, right? So, it is consistent with your appropriation and trying to figure out if you can--I will take the perfect example is the WHO funds, right, on that issue. The appropriation was to fund international organizations. There are scores of them, OK? And Congress when they passed the appropriation, said just pass, you know, you have so much money to fund international organizations. One of them was the WHO. We paused those funds--or the President. It was an apportionment. Paused them to figure out where else could we spend that money within the appropriation, OK? That is a policy, right? It is a policy discussion about how best we acquire those funds within the scope of that appropriation. What is happening with President Biden's hold is that he is specifically thwarting the appropriation. He wants to defy the law in implementing that program. Mr. Smith. So, I am about to run out of time. And I want to try to get some stuff in the record as quickly as possible. So, if you could try to give me your opinion quickly, I would definitely appreciate it. But do you believe that the executive branch violated GAO standard of the Impoundment Control Act when it began withholding funds for the border wall? Mr. Paoletta. One hundred percent. Mr. Smith. Do you believe withholding funding for the border wall is an attempt by the Administration to circumvent congressional intent? Mr. Paoletta. I don't need to think that. President Biden has said that. Mr. Smith. OK. How is pausing funds for the border wall different than the temporary hold that occurred on funds for Ukraine, which as you know, GAO investigated? Mr. Paoletta. Sure. We paused those funds to allow policy process to go on and figure out how best to spend those funds. If you looked at that first hold, it was 10 days. It was to get a policy discussion because the President had expressed concerns about the spending of that money in the way it may have been spent. So, we paused it for 10 days, you know, and will shorter holds to allow a policy discussion to happen. It was to be done consistent with that appropriation and, in fact, it was obligated consistent with that appropriation. Mr. Smith. Perfect. OK, when it comes to Congress' power of the purse, it appears Congress itself is failing to do its job. As I mentioned in my opening statement, Congress has failed to follow regular order when it comes to budgeting and reauthorizing programs. Would you agree that a focus when discussing Article I authorities should include how Congress has, on its own, ceded its power of the purse by failing to authorize and appropriate in a regular, detailed, and timely manner? Mr. Paoletta. Yes, 100 percent. Mr. Smith. You know, Congress has consistently failed to meet its budget and appropriations responsibilities for Fiscal Year 2021, alone. Four continuing resolutions were enacted before enacting a huge omnibus appropriations act. And Congress has already missed its deadline to pass a Fiscal Year 2022 budget resolution. And, therefore, it appears Fiscal Year 2022 funding will likely be delayed and result in yet another omnibus appropriations act. Can you comment on how Congress' power of---- Chairman Yarmuth. The gentleman's time has expired. I have actually been already generous with the Ranking Member. Mr. Smith. Well, I appreciate that. And I think that Mr. Chairman, we probably could be more efficient in asking questions if we could actually be in the room. So, I would reiterate on behalf of the House Republicans, that we are all ready. We are all ready to stand in a committee room with a mask or without a mask in an in-person hearing. And if you need all of us to sign to do that, we will do it. Chairman Yarmuth. All right. You made your position very clear. I appreciate that. I now yield five minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Price. Mr. Price. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to quickly review four episodes from 2019 as the premise for my question. First of all, President Trump withheld duly appropriated funds from Ukraine. The GAO later determined that that was, in fact, an impoundment in his attempt to extort President Zelensky. Second, the President totally withheld funds, appropriated funds, from the West Bank in Gaza, foreign aid funds. He did the same with funds to the Northern Triangle countries of Central America. And we struggled to get those funds reinstated. Third, in early 2019, Leader McConnell acquiesced in Trump's demand that the border situation be declared a national emergency. Now, that let us reopen the government, but it also freed the President to spend unappropriated funds on his border wall. And fourth, in 2019, President Trump bypassed congressional review under the Arms Export Control Act for arms sales to Saudi Arabia by declaring an emergency. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to ensure that we can hold the record open for any Republican Members who would like to document the kind of objections they made at that time to any of these actions. Chairman Yarmuth. We can hold the record open for a week. We will do that for a week. Mr. Price. I think that would be useful to see what kind of objections were made to any of these by our Republican colleagues. And my questions are these, and maybe we start with Ms. Reynolds or Ms. Hempowicz. First of all, how do we do something about this unrestrained, uncontrolled declaration of emergencies? What kind of boundaries should be placed around a president's power to declare emergencies and then to spend money as he pleases? Whether he just spends the money or whether he diverts the money from appropriated sources. And then, second, how can appropriations be protected? You know, we struggled in the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee to figure out how in writing the next year's bill, how do we prevent another withholding of West Bank and Gaza funds? How do we prevent just a total shutoff of any funds to address the sources of migration in Central America? Are there additional--did we miss something? We had a very had time doing this. So, those two questions. The enhancement of some kind of controls over emergency declarations, willy nilly emergency declarations. And also, how do you protect appropriations? Dr. Reynolds. I am happy to offer a few comments first and then let Mrs. Hempowicz come in. So, Representative Price, on the national emergencies piece, I think one of the most powerful pieces of the Power of the Purse Act is the proposal that would shift the current mechanism for congressional review of national emergencies declarations from a joint resolution of disapproval to a joint resolution of approval. And as I mentioned in my statement, this situation arises in part because of a Supreme Court decision in 1983. But there are other examples where Congress has said that it believes that it should have the power to review, in an approval manner, decisions made by the executive branch. The recissions provisions of the Congressional Budget Act are one example. So, I would point to that in response to your first question. And in response to your second question, I think that some of the aspects of the Power of the Purse Act, especially around the transmission of information from the executive branch to the legislative branch, are the kinds of things that you are looking for to guarantee that in your case, the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee is getting as much good information in a timely fashion that it can to make informed decisions in the next year's appropriations process. Ms. Hempowicz. And I agree with everything Dr. Reynolds said. And I just want to say--make one additional point on the national emergencies question. After President Trump declared the emergency at the southern border, there actually was incredibly bipartisan pushback in both the House and Senate. The President had to do, you know, had to use the first veto of his presidency to over--to veto the Congress telling him in a bipartisan way, we object to this emergency authority being used this way immediately after we, you know, had a long, drawn-out government shutdown over this very issue. And I just want to highlight that Members of Congress from both sides of the aisle objected there. Not because they objected to always to the policy that was being enacted by the President to build the border wall, but because they objected to how the President was making an end-run around Congress and really usurping the Congress' power of the purse in that instance. And so, I just wanted to highlight that under the National Emergencies Act, again, these are authorities that the Congress has delegated to the executive. And so, it doesn't make sense to me that it is so easy for the executive to work against Congress' expressed intent when it comes to executing those powers. And so, I think the voting--a vote by Congress as envisioned by part of this--by part of the congressional Power of the Purse Act where Congress has to approve an emergency for it to go longer than 30 days is exactly the way to address that problem. Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you for your response. The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. McClintock, for five minutes. Mr. McClintock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to offer the thought that we have got no standing to complain about executive actions whoever the president is until we have thoroughly cleaned up our own house. Our refusal, under both Republican and Democratic majorities, to follow our own rules and meet our own responsibilities, I think is at the heart of the fiscal mess that we are facing today. Let me mention three issues. Our failure to follow our own rules on unauthorized appropriations. Our failure to follow our statutory responsibilities under the 1974 Budget Act. And, finally, this return to earmarks that I am ashamed to say Republicans in the House are now joining. Thank God the Senate Republicans are not. First, let us talk about unauthorized appropriations. Ever since 1835, the rules of the House have required that appropriations may only be for purposes authorized by law. Under that rule--it is still on the books--any member can raise a point of order to block any unauthorized appropriation. This provision established a process that is absolutely essential if the House is to meet its constitutional responsibilities to superintend the nation's finances. First, a program has to be authorized by Congress in a process that begins in an authorizing committee. Only then does a separate action appropriate funding for it. This process imposes on Congress the responsibility periodically to review these programs. As a program's authorization expires, Congress has to revisit it to ask the obvious questions. Is it effective? Is it meeting its goals? Is it still needed? Is it worth the money we are paying for it? And depending upon the answer to these questions, Congress then renews the program, reforms it, or lets it die. The failure of this House and the Senate to agree on recent appropriations has often degenerated into these continuing resolutions and merely tweak last year's spending and then extend it in the future. And when we do pass appropriations bills, about one-third of the discretionary spending are for purposes not authorized by law. The law presumes authorizations that last years and sometimes decades ago. This is happening because the 1835 rule forbidding unauthorized appropriations is consistently waived, stripping Members of their right to object. The second issue is our failure to follow the budget law. You know this, the 1974 Budget Act gives the House a very powerful set of tools to control spending and balance the budget. For years on the House Budget Committee, I have heard it said that, well, the budget's merely an aspirational document, offering a vision for the direction the government should take. That is simply not true. The budget is an operational document, the single most important tool we have to control spending. The problem is we just don't use it. I have also heard incessantly that, well, it is a mandatory spending and that is beyond our control. Well, the budget resolution sets limits on the discretionary side. It is appropriated annually. That is about one-third of our budget. It also limits the mandatory spending that is set by statute. That is about two-thirds of the budget. But it also gives us powerful tools to enforce both limits. The problem is we just don't use it. On the discretionary side, as the deadline approaches and the threat of government shutdown looms, the appropriations bills are cast aside in favor of stopgap measures that continue the spending trajectory without reform. And on the mandatory side, enforceable limits are supposed to be placed in the reconciliation instructions that are sent to the House authorizing committees. Those committees are then required to make conforming statutory changes. If the committees fail to act, the Budget Committee can do so directly. But this powerful process is never used. Why? Because decisions on reforming mandatory spending, mainly entitlement programs, are those difficult decisions in our fiscal policy. It is easier not to make them and just blame the process. And finally, I want to address this return to earmarks, aided and abetted by my own party. It is an ominous development. There has been a set of principles since the Magna Carta that the authority that appropriates money should not be the same authority that spends that money. That is why we have a separation of powers. Congress makes law but cannot enforce it. The President enforces law but cannot make it. Congress declares war but cannot wage it. The President wages war but cannot declare it. And Congress appropriates money but cannot spend it. The President spends money but cannot appropriate it. There is a reason why earmarks breed corruption. They breakdown that same separation of powers that is at the center of our constitutional architecture. So, I would simply say in response to the subject matter, Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, the fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars and it is not in our presidents, but it is in ourselves that we are underlings. I yield back. Chairman Yarmuth. The gentleman's time has expired. I now yield five minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. Schakowsky. Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I have to be honest, other than the Members of Congress and legal and constitutional scholars, I really don't believe that most everyday Americans are thinking about the Congress' power of the purse and what the framers intended. And while I certainly believe that it is critical that the Congress control how the peoples' tax dollars are spent, the people are thinking more about things like whether or not they have access to quality healthcare, that their children are safe at school, and that they are able to pay their bills, their rent, and their mortgage. So, what I would like to do is go witness by witness and ask if you can give me an example of why these questions about the control of federal spending matter in the real world. I will start with Ms. Reynolds, just real short because I don't have that much time. Dr. Reynolds. Sure, thank you. I think what is important to remember is that Congress and the executive branch both have roles to play here. The executive branch makes certain decisions. But someone has to make sure those are good decisions, and that is Congress' responsibility. And so, if you have a constituent who calls the Social Security and waits a long time on hold, how else are you supposed to help them than sort of investigate and oversee what is happening? Ms. Schakowsky. That is an example. That is good. That is an example. OK, and Ms. Hempowicz--Hempa---- Ms. Hempowicz. You got it. Ms. Schakowsky. Did I get it? OK, Hempowicz. Ms. Hempowicz. Yes. I agree with you. I don't think--even I am not sitting around my kitchen table talking about apportionment decisions. But I think one thing, not a specific example, but I think the growing tension between Congress and the executive branch and the fights that publicly play out over access to information and access to documents, that Congress needs to conduct rigorous oversight. I think that is certainly permeating to the kitchen table. And I think as we see I think--and that points to the necessity for bills like the congressional Power of the Purse Act to show your constituents, we are doing what we can to empower ourselves---- Ms. Schakowsky. I hear you. Ms. Hempowicz.----to address your concerns. Ms. Schakowsky. I hear you. And, Ms. Emmanuelli Perez, if you could--Emmanuelli Perez--if you could answer that as well? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes, certainly, ma'am. Ms. Schakowsky. An example would be good. Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes. It is important because even though everyday citizens may not be looking specifically at these types of decisions all of the time, they do see where the government gives them service. They do see where the branches are either, you know, negotiating or disputing. And so, it is important to them, as well, to make sure that everyone has the information needed in order to carry out our function. Ms. Schakowsky. OK, and Mr. Paoletta. I have a feeling I know what your example is going to be but go ahead. Can you give---- Chairman Yarmuth. You need to unmute. Ms. Schakowsky. Go ahead. Mr. Paoletta. I apologize. It is important for Congress to write clear laws, you know. So, they set out the program requirements and then the executive branch is going to implement that law. And I think that is the problem in terms of why people are sort of when they watch Congress and the executive branch fighting, that it is a lack of clarity from Congress as to what they expect from the executive branch. And what I see and what I saw are Congress, you know, Congress encroaching on the executive branch in their implementation of the law. Congress passes the law. That is what they do. They can't day-to-day implement the law. That is why the President does it. That is his constitutional responsibility. So, I think writing clear laws so that there is better focus on how that law gets implemented. Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you. I barely have time for my question, actually, which is about the role of the GAO. And I think I will jump to if Ms. Emmanuelli Perez, if you could talk about and elaborate on what the role of the GAO decisions play in congressional oversight of the executive spending. I know you talked a bit about that, but if you could elaborate on that. Are you still here? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes, ma'am. So, the role of GAO is really to help Congress in its constitutional power of the purse. It is important that Congress has the information that it needs and GAO through its audits and in its decisions, is the one that is providing that information and really helping Congress in terms of carrying out those laws, carrying out the power of the purse, and ensuring that Congress can then make changes as it sees fit and ensures that the executive is carrying that out appropriately. Ms. Schakowsky. Well, I have always felt that the GAO has played a very important and constructive role. So, I thank you for that, and I yield back. Chairman Yarmuth. The gentlewoman's time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, for five minutes. You need to unmute, Mr. Grothman. He has left the building. I don't see him there visually. So, we will come back to him. I now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Kildee, for five minutes. Mr. Kildee? All right, he probably didn't expect to be called on so soon. Is Mr. Smucker available? Mr. Smucker. Yes. Can you hear me, Mr. Chairman? Chairman Yarmuth. Yes, Mr. Smucker. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized for five minutes. Mr. Smucker. All right. Sorry about that, caught me by surprise a little bit there. Chairman Yarmuth. Yes, I know. All right. Mr. Smucker. Thank you so much for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I was pleased that we are holding a hearing on this important topic. And actually, a little surprised given that it is based on the actions taken by President Biden on his very first day in office relative to the---- Ms. Schakowsky. Is there any reason for me to stay on? Mr. Smucker.----relative to the border wall. I think if we were to be consistent with the comments made last Congress by Democrats and by the Chairman, we should be calling this executive order illegal. I don't know that I have specifically heard that word today, but, you know, this is I think an important discussion to have. And, certainly, you know, to the point that was made earlier about what people care about, people care, certainly in my district, about what is happening on the southern border. We are seeing a real crisis here on the border. I can tell you I saw firsthand along with, you know, many of my colleagues who have visited the border and seen the impact on the border. Certainly, the impact on the border patrol agents who are just completely overwhelmed. And so, this is a real crisis that we are dealing with as a result of what I think is an illegal action by the President: freezing the congressionally appropriated funding for the construction on the southern border wall. So, Mr. Paoletta, you know, I would just like to ask you whether you would make that statement? Based on your work at OMB and the standard that was set last Congress as we talked about President Trump's actions, do you believe that the President's action in this case were illegal? Mr. Paoletta. Yes, I do, Congressman. I think they are 100 percent illegal, and it is very clear from his actions and his statements. During the campaign, he said he wouldn't build another foot of wall. On his first day, he issued an executive order pausing all funds. Every report is that all funds have been paused and construction has been completely stopped, which is a terrible policy decision, but for purposes of legality, it is illegal. His press secretary also said they weren't going to spend any more money on the wall. And then he put it in his Fiscal Year 2022 discretionary request that he wants to have Congress rescind all unobligated balances. So, that is completely different than what we were doing in the Trump Administration, which was within the appropriation, trying to figure out how we would spend those funds. So, it was consistent with the appropriation. It wasn't defying the appropriation. That is why this is illegal. And it is interesting to hear GAO say that she started looking at it and talking internally. It would be interesting to know exactly when they reached out to the Administration to ask their views. It seems like it was well after the 2-months when the senators in the House sent a letter asking them to look at it. Mr. Smucker. Yes, well, they will have an opportunity to answer that question a little later. But, you know, I would like to, I guess, hear from you, why do you think we are not talking about this in those terms, particularly in what we have seen my colleagues from the other side of the aisle really talk about the Administration last cycle. Why aren't we doing that this cycle relative to this action? Mr. Paoletta. You know, I was on the--we were on the receiving end of the Trump OMB of the letter from the Chairman on, I think it was September 27, 2019, asking us for a ton of documents. He says he has reached out to OMB to ask for information. That is a little different in terms of how he handled the Trump hold. And the media has been completely silent on this. And any story--in fact, there was a political story that ran complete cover, in my opinion, for the Biden hold. And so, it is really to me disappointing that, you know, if you are going to be--and, you know, enforcing or wanting to strengthen the power of the purse, you would be using it right now on this President for what he is doing. And it may be---- Mr. Smucker. Thank you. I am going to stop you at that if you don't mind. I am running out of time, you know. And I do appreciate the Chairman holding this hearing. I said that. I meant that. And he has certainly introduced legislation that would, you know, give more Budget Committee responsibilities to the GAO. I think a better solution would be to empower this very Committee to fulfill its responsibility in the government funding process. And I am talking about marking up a budget resolution for a given fiscal year, which we have not done. It is now nearly May, and we have yet to even consider a Fiscal Year 2022 budget resolution. And meanwhile, the appropriators are already drafting their bills. You know, it is additionally under threat of a second multitrillion dollar bill being passed through reconciliation. You know, it's a tool that is supposed to be used to reduce the deficit and not increase it by trillions. So, you know, I think to restore fiscal accountability, restore transparency, responsibility, we got to return to regular order within this Budget Committee to for us to play and continue to be a key player in this process. I think it is very important that we do that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. I will remind you, Mr. Smucker and others, that we are now awaiting a GAO opinion, which according to our witnesses notably could soon to be issued. So, we will be able to know what the GAO's opinion is in relatively short order. With that, I don't see Mr. Grothman has returned. Has Mr. Kildee returned? I will now recognize the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Chu, for five minutes. Ms. Chu. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Dr. Reynolds, I represent a district in California, and in California, there are several so-called sanctuary cities. These are cities that were very disturbed with the Trump Administration's approach to immigration enforcement. And especially with his wanting federal law enforcement to enter state and local jails to question and prosecute people for their immigration or citizenship status, and, therefore, frightened members of their cities who might not cooperate with the police. Well, one of President Trump's first executive orders in January 2017, directed federal agencies to withhold funds from these so-called sanctuary cities. The order was repeatedly blocked in court, but the Administration continued to pursue it for the entirety of President Trump's term. And then, there was another attempt to target California in December 2020, as California was about to hit the peak of coronavirus cases. That is when the Trump Administration announced it would be withholding $200 million in Medicaid funding quarterly because of California's requirement that all private health plans in our state cover abortion services. Not only did this put the lives of Californians struggling to fight off a pandemic in danger, it showed blatant executive overreach because the funding the Trump Administration threatened to withhold, had nothing to do with the alleged violations or restrictions on abortion funding. These repeated attempts to place unauthorized restrictions and conditions on congressionally appropriated funds was, of course, another attempted encroachment on Congress' power of the purse. But it is also democratic unelected Administration officials seeking to disburse the funds--were doing so unilaterally without responding to voters and gaining approval in Congress. So, could you talk about the accountability measures that the executive branch even needs when it circumvents Congress in this way? How do Americans have less transparency into this process when it happens this way? Dr. Reynolds. Thank you, Representative Chu. It is a great question. And I think it really comes back to the heart of what is on the table here when we talk about this legislation, which is that Congress needs as much information as it can get from the executive branch to make responsible spending decisions. And that includes information around the kinds of things that you are describing. I will also reiterate something that I mentioned in my testimony, which is the increasing reliance or the increasing need to rely on the federal courts by Congress to try and enforce its spending and other policy decisions. And one major challenge there and one of the reasons why Congress needs to bolster its own authority is because that process is incredibly slow. So, you mentioned in the case of California, sanctuary cities. And you talked a little bit about the length of time that court fight went on. We have many other examples of lengthy court fights. And so, one of the reasons that Congress needs to give itself more tools is so that it does not have to turn to the federal courts who move quite slowly in this area, to try and have that as a backstop in these disputes with the executive branch. Ms. Chu. Thank you so much. Now, I would like to ask Ms. Perez a question about the ability for GAO to operate. And that is I am the--I was last October, the Chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight for the Small Business Committee, and the GAO's Director William Shear testified that the Trump Administration refused to give GAO access to documents and information concerning the implementation of the Paycheck Protection Program. And also resisted implementation for an oversight plan for PPP until December. Using this example of PPP, can you describe why GAO needs timely access to agency documents and information and how that may have hampered implementation and congressional oversight of the program? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes, ma'am. So, and this is an example of when GAO needs access to information as quickly as possible to be able to carry out its oversight for Congress. So, in the programs that you are describing, obviously, we are looking at the CARES Act and various funds and authorities provided there. And so, in order to give Congress the most timely advice and the most timely review, we need to have that information promptly. With those types of delays, unfortunately, it then delays our reporting to Congress. It delays our ability to be able to give you the advice that you need and the information that you need. So, that definitely does have an impact on Congress' oversight. Ms. Chu. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Yarmuth. Somebody muted me. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Dr. Burgess, for five minutes. I know Dr. Burgess is here. Unmute your mic, please, unless he left. I can see Dr. Burgess on the screen. Dr. Burgess, you have five minutes for your questions. Mr. Burgess. Well, can you hear my question? Chairman Yarmuth. No, we didn't. Now we hear you though. Mr. Burgess. All right, very good. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses for joining us today. Mark Paoletta, it is good to see you again. Mr. Paoletta spent a good deal of time as Chief Counsel on our Oversight Investigations Subcommittee on Energy and Commerce. A subcommittee that I have always held in very high regard. One of the most important subcommittees in the U.S. House of Representatives. But I am just going to ask you again, Mr. Paoletta, and I think the Ranking Member Smith and perhaps Representative Smucker had also made this point, but it seems like we have got a set of parallel circumstances. January 16, 2020, the Government Accountability Office determined the President did not withhold funds under the Impoundment Control Act for policy reasons. And then on his first day in office, President Biden signed a proclamation pausing all obligated funding for the border wall construction and directing the Secretary of Defense and Homeland Security to create a plan to redirect these funds. So, is there a substantial difference between the actions of then President Trump and now President Biden in regards to those two activities? Mr. Paoletta. Yes. They are completely different. When the funds were paused on Ukraine, the very first hold was 10 days. It was literally to try and pause the funding so that--because there had been concerns about the funding expressed by the President. So, there had been a process right below, that doesn't end the process, right? In the executive branch, the president is the person who makes the decision at the end of the day. And so, we wanted to pause the funds to allow a policy discussion to happen. I wasn't part of that policy process, but we were able to pause those funds. And at the end of the day, those funds were spent consistent with the appropriation, right? What is happening here is that it is completely designed to thwart that appropriation because President Biden has already said he doesn't want to build another foot of the wall. His executive order said it is a waste of money. Mr. Burgess. Let just ask you though if I could, the GAO though made a determination when President Trump paused the funding that seems like it would have to be consistent, it would have to make the same decision about the pausing of the border wall funding. In other words, the inconsistency of coming to a different conclusion giving those two fact sets, well, that just wouldn't be possible, would it? Mr. Paoletta. It would be impossible. Mr. Burgess. Well, I mean, that is what is so frustrating for so many of us. I live in Texas, not on the southern border. I live on the northern border. But made many trips down there over there over the years and to see the border wall construction literally halted and with big gaps and that is where the cartels and coyotes are directing their human smuggling and human trafficking. And it is heartbreaking. It is, in fact, President Biden's own commander of the public health service at the Dallas Convention Center where 2,400 of these young men remained under an emergency hold, he said that we are responding to a--it is a crisis management situation. Well, you wouldn't have a crisis management situation if you didn't have a crisis. Look, I just left another hearing and we are talking a lot about budget process here today. And I know that is something that can bore people, but you are very familiar with, unfortunately, the oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Energy and Commerce Committee, for several years going back to an IG report in 2015, when they suggested that the Title 42 exceptions for salaries in the EPA were never authorized by the U.S. Congress. And, in fact, I had an opportunity to question the new administrator. He seemed unaware of that. He did make a promise that he would come back with forthright and transparent data for the subcommittee about their hires. They are set to hire a bunch of new people. They thought the Trump Administration made too many personnel cuts. So, they are on a hiring spree. And it concerns me that having never authorized the Title 42 exceptions to the senior executive service salaries, that the possibility of overspending on those positions is a very real one. So, would you agree that the authorization needs to occur before the expenditure can happen? Mr. Paoletta. That is the best way to do it. To authorize programs and, again, pursuant to I think your House rules, you would need to--it would be best to authorize before you appropriate. Mr. Burgess. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Yarmuth, I just have to also echo what Ranking Member Smith said about getting back to normal hearings. Look, the Doctors Caucus sent a letter to our House leadership. Many of us have been vaccinated. Others have had the illness. We need to be able to meet in a more normal fashion because there is just so much you get out of an in-person hearing that you cannot get. And we have seen the technical problems that we have encountered. I encountered them on the E&E hearing as well. We have to get passed that point. We can't do the peoples' business if we can't meet as the people intended. And thank you and I will yield back. Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you, Dr. Burgess. And I was going to save this until the end, but I will commit to the Ranking Member and to you and all the Members of the Committee that the next Committee we have, I will be in the hearing room. And we will at least have a hybrid at that point. So, I want to accommodate my friends on the other side and some of ours too. I am sure we would all prefer to be back in that situation. But I will be in the hearing room for the next hearing. I now yield five minutes to the gentlewoman from Virgin Islands, Ms. Plaskett. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you, Chairman Yarmuth and Ranking Member Smith for holding this hearing to explore how Congress can reassert its power of the purse. I appreciate the opportunity to examine this important issue. Several of my colleagues have noted despite the Constitution's clear delegation of tax and spending power to Congress, various Presidential Administrations have steadily infringed on this authority in recent decades. This infringement is concerning because it represents a shift in power away from our constituents who have elected us and, therefore, a weakening of their voices in important decisions regarding funding allocations. Dr. Reynolds, this issue is particularly personal for me and for my constituents, the American people of the Virgin Islands. As some of you may remember, two Category 5 hurricanes, Irma and Maria, struck the Virgin Islands in 2017, and caused devastating amounts of damage that my constituents are still grappling with every day. When I say still grappling with, we have not to this date, had put up the mobile hospital unit. FEMA and others have not agreed until just recently on the mobile unit for us to have a hospital. Never mind the rebuild of the hospital. And while Congress appropriated billions of dollars to provide emergency relief for areas impacted by the hurricanes, such as the example I gave you, the previous Administration significantly delayed the disbursal of these funding to both the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. These delays have negatively impacted our ability to recover from the disaster, to rebuild, and to prepare for future hurricanes. We have seen this in inspector generals reports just recently about Puerto Rico. Can you, Doctor, speak to how recent encroachments by the executive branch on Congress' power of the purse can lead to prioritization of a president's political priorities over the needs of our specific constituents? Dr. Reynolds. Thank you, Congresswoman Plaskett. I appreciate the question. And I think that your experience and that of your constituents does illustrate one of the challenges that is sort of inherent in Congress and the executive branch having to work together to deliver services and meet the needs of the American people. And I think that, again, one of the purposes of this legislation of the issues that we are talking about today, is to try to make sure that you, as Members of Congress, are getting more information, better information, in a timely fashion to be able to say to the executive branch you are not doing what we, Congress, intended with our constitutional tax and spend powers when we told you that you have this money to spend on, in your case, replacing--building a mobile that will be replacing a hospital in your district. And so, I do think, again, that that is to Representative Schakowsky's earlier request for examples of why this matters. I think that is another good one. And I appreciate you raising it. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. That leads me to you, Mrs. Hempowicz. You recently discussed the lack of transparency regarding Office of Management and Budget's apportionment decisions, which show how money is being allocated within an agency. And you have recommended that Congress require OMB to publicly post all apportionment schedules, including special notes in apportionment documents. Can you speak to how these apportionment decisions can sometimes be used to advance a president's policy goals rather than simply serving the intended administrative purpose? Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, thank you so much for that question. You are right. You know, I think these footnotes, apportionment footnotes are a very technical thing. And so, you know, I guess an example of that is saying that, you know, money that has been appropriated can't be spent until a report has been issued about how those funds would be spent, or how the funds under that project would be managed. But it also, you know, there is no requirement for specificity in these footnotes. And so, you can also get something that is as vague as, you know, we are going to do an interagency process to determine the best use of the funds. That doesn't tell Congress a lot. That doesn't tell the American people a lot. You know, what is that inter--what is that interagency process? What policy are you trying to accomplish? And that I should say was the reason given for the--in the footnote on the hold for the Ukraine assistance. And so, I think that just goes to show that like, you know, these--the vague explanations are part of the problem. If there was more--if there was more transparency to Congress you could see that vague explanation, reach out to OMB, reach out to the White House, reach out to the State Department and say, what is this interagency process? Ask some of those questions. Because it is not always something nefarious going on. But if you don't have the information you need to conduct effective oversight, nefarious things can be going on in the background that the public will never know and the Congress will never know about and can't correct for. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity. This is very insightful, and I yield back. Chairman Yarmuth. The gentlewoman's time has expired. If he is in the room, I don't see him, but Mr. Carter would be up next. Mr. Carter of Georgia are you here? OK, if not, I don't see Ms. Wexton of Virginia as well. But I know I see Mr. Scott of Virginia, and so, we will come back and get any others who might have been thrown off by the change in schedule. I now yield five minutes to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Mr. Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask Ms. Emmanuelli Perez what is the legal effect of a GAO conclusion that impoundment is inappropriate? Does it have any enforcement effect? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Well, sir, GAO doesn't enforce the decisions that we issue. They are really intended for both the Congress and the executive branch to have the benefit of those legal decisions. So, in the case of an Impoundment Control Act decision, when we say that the Impoundment Control Act has been violated, the effect really is for the executive branch to immediately have to release the funding. That is release the withholding and ensure that those funds get obligated on time. Mr. Scott. But if there is a disagreement, the disagreement just lands. What is the recourse if there is a--if the executive branch just disagrees with your decision, what is the recourse under present law? And what would be the recourse under Chairman Yarmuth's legislation? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes, so, the resource under present law is that, of course, since we at GAO can't enforce the decision, it really is up to Congress to enforce it. So, you know, in the case of the Impoundment Control Act or any other appropriations law issue, Congress can certainly enforce that. With respect to under the Chairman's Power of the Purse Act, it would provide some additional authorities for the executive branch to not take these additional legal, you know, practices and look and try to use them in a way that are not, you know, in accordance with either the Impoundment Control Act or the Antideficiency Act or other laws. So, it really would be emphasizing, you know, certain reporting, emphasizing certain actions that the executive branch would have to take and ensuring that those follow the decisions as shown by GAO. Mr. Scott. You mentioned Congress, what can Congress do if there is a violation? How does it enforce the impoundment violation? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Well, Congress certainly, you know, as part of its own legislative process with the oversight, as well as with appropriations, you know, Congress has taken actions before in either cutting the budgets of agencies or identifying areas where they feel that an agency has to take action. So, certainly, Congress through that oversight and legislative process can do that. Mr. Scott. If you have something that has been properly authorized and appropriated, but depends on promulgation of rules, and the executive branch just refuses to promulgate the rules, what happens in that case? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Well, it certainly would depend on the particular facts, whatever law is authorizing it, what the rules that are being required of the executive branch. So, certainly, you know, we would be taking a look at whether there are certain actions the agency has to take by law and identifying if they have not done so. And, again, that could be up to, you know, Congress to enforce that. Mr. Scott. And can you say a word about violations that happen during a government shutdown? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes. With the government shutdowns, one of the issues that we have seen and we have issued a number of decisions on this in the past year and a half, is that agencies may have often tried to really expand on the authority that they would have to continue operation. So, under the Antideficiency Act, it is very specific that only--the only exceptions really are for constitutional duties, as well as for emergency type situations. Not for regular operations or ongoing operations of agencies. So, we do have a couple of examples where agencies did go beyond the Antideficiency Act. The other thing that we would recommend would be really that Congress have more oversight, you know, the ability to see how agencies are obligating funds during shutdowns. So, in addition to understanding their plans for shutdowns, that they would see what exactly they obligated, what activities they carried out. And we think that would be really helpful in terms of the oversight that GAO can assist the Congress with. Mr. Scott. And what can be done if--in these cases you have an executive branch and a legislative branch, probably a contentious split in the legislative branch, what can actually be done if the executive agency just goes ahead and spends the money? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Well, if an agency, for example, violates the Antideficiency Act, and if GAO, for example, finds that the agency had violated the Antideficiency Act, then what we have said is that the agency should report that violation to Congress. And in reporting that violation to Congress, they are going to provide information about the rationale for using the funds, what actions they are taking with respect to ensuring it doesn't recur, and any discipline or other action. So, we think that having Congress ensure that those types of violations are reported are really going to assist again in that transparency and oversight. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. Chairman Yarmuth. The gentleman's time has expired, and I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Feenstra. Mr. Feenstra. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Chairman Yarmuth and Ranking Member Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for having this hearing today. I want to thank each of the witnesses for their testimony. I am new to Congress, but not new to the government finance, especially when it comes to city and state governments. I was a City Administrator and a State Senator. And I am very cognizant of budgets. And in my home state, we have specific rules that we do not spend more than we take in. We have a 99 percent spending level. I have found very little concern of this at the federal level. Mr. Chairman, you said on the House floor that the national debt will probably rise to about 50 trillion in the next couple of decades. You mentioned several historical points where our debt grew but did not mention that or in terms of debt to GDP, and at that time our debt to GDP is about 50 percent. Well, today, our debt to GDP is well over 100 percent and we are in uncharted waters, which we just can't shrug off as we move forward. I am new here, but you don't have to be a Member of Congress to see that we are piling up debt on this credit card and it has consequences. Mark Paoletta, this question is for you. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has existed over 50 years without ever being codified into law. A 2016 CBO report highlighted that many federal agencies like the State Department, HUD, and the National Weather Service haven't been reauthorized in decades. Just last year, the CBO released a report that found $332 billion of funding was provided to 407 expired authorizations. It seems to me that there is a lot more ways than the Impoundment Control Act for Congress to reclaim the power of the purse. We could actually try to do our jobs and pass timely legislation through regular order, rather than spending weeks on messaging bills shouting our political talking pounds. I have been digging into these reports and we aren't suffering from a lack of things to do. So, Mr. Paoletta, my question is you have worked both on committee and at the OMB, do you believe that autopilot funding and authorizing as needed in omnibus bills impacts how the executive branch functions? And who benefits from this, the executive or Congress? Mr. Paoletta. Well, the people who don't benefit are the American people. Congress needs to do their job and authorize programs in clear and understandable terms as to how programs are supposed to work. The fact that there are hundreds of unauthorized programs, some as you said, the Department of State is unauthorized, is outrageous. And passing omnibus appropriations that throw massive amounts of money in a very vague way, you know, that has the legislative branch encroaching into the executive branch on how to implement it. What Congress needs to do is to pass a budget, pass appropriations bills on time, and that is the best way to make our government work. That is as simple as it can be. Mr. Feenstra. I agree. So, how did the train go off the rails? I mean, how did this all begin and how do we get the train back on the track? Mr. Paoletta. My views in Congress is, you know, I am not going to--it is in Congress' control as to pass their budgets, to authorize their programs, and to pass appropriations bills on time. I am not sure what the answer is. It is just I know that the way it is run right now, and particularly having worked in both branches and most recently in OMB, it is very difficult as Congress does--and you see these--what is interesting, Congressman, is the idea that there is going to be this broad appropriation and then Congress is going to come in on individual levels and tell the executive how to spend the money. That is not their role, right? The law, what they pass is what is important, and is the guiding light as to how you are going to implement a program. And just one more point, if I may. Just in terms of transparency, it would be useful if FOIA was applied to Congress, right? We all talk about the transparency of the executive branch and, you know, looking, you know, sunlight being the best disinfectant. It is outrageous, in my view, that Congress is not subject to FOIA. GAO is not subject to FOIA. So, what goes into lawmaking? One of the witnesses said, you know, we pass a law, that is sunlight. No, what went into that law as to why it was passed and what a member thinks it should be, you know, doing when it is enacted. So, I think FOIA applying to Congress would be a great way to actually help the system work better. Mr. Feenstra. I would agree. I would agree 100 percent. Thank you, Mr. Paoletta, for your comments. Mr. Chair, I yield back. Chairman Yarmuth. I thank the gentleman. His time has expired. I now recognize the gentlewoman from Iowa, Mrs. Hinson, for five minutes. I think she was the first one to sign on today, so, you have been very patient. Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can everyone hear me OK? OK, thank you. Thank you for holding this hearing today. I believe this is an incredibly important topic and I would like to thank my colleague from Iowa for his comments on unauthorized programs. It is very difficult for appropriators and us here on the Budget Committee to do our job when Congress is failing at doing its basic oversight, its basic job of authorizing, and its basic job of appropriating. So, I have only been in Congress a few short months and already I am concerned about the lack of transparency and fiscal responsibility that I have seen here in Washington. I think it is incredibly important that Congress does reassert its control over the power of the purse. I am a member of the Appropriations Committee and the Budget Committee. And there is a reason that the committee is required to include the perspectives of appropriators because we do see those spending decisions and authorizations from this Budget Committee all the way out the door. I personally believe this is incredibly important in advocating for the taxpayers of Iowa and this country and fighting for transparency throughout this process. So, my first question today is for Ms. Hempowicz. Simple here that you have done a lot of work on transparency, accountability, freedom of information. So, how does the impact of administrative deferrals or recissions like what we have seen with President Biden's redirecting of these border security funds recently raise concerns about transparency in this process? Ms. Hempowicz. I think, you know, the fact that apportionments are issued in secret, you know, raises a lot--it makes it much difficult for--much more difficult for Congress to fulfill its role as overseeing the spending process. You know, Mr. Paoletta said how Congress passes the law and it is the executive's job to implement it. But that is not the only job of the executive. It is to implement that law with the intent of Congress in mind. And when there is no transparency here and when we have seen, as we have, that there is a lot of room for flexibility for the executive to interpret things as they would see fit, and in ways that maybe run counter to what congressional intent was, there is a lot of room for manipulation in this process. And I think transparency is one of the things and certainly not the only thing but is one thing that will dramatically rebalance power between the executive and Congress. Mrs. Hinson. And what do you think about the transparency or the impact on transparency when an Administration fails to notify Congress of what it is doing? Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, I mean, again, it just goes to Congress' decreased ability to conduct rigorous oversight over the executive branch. Something that the Project On Government Oversight believes is incredibly important no matter who is in the White House. And the less transparency to Congress means that it takes longer for you to do that oversight, for you to get that information. Because eventually you will likely get it, but in that time, you know, what have you missed? It is also, I think, important to mention how, you know, fighting with the executive branch to release information to Congress takes up so much time of your staff. Your staff has so many responsibilities to do and to execute in a given day. You know, if there was transparency required in the law, proactive transparency that will give you a lot of that information, you can redirect your staff to more important things because you have got access to those documents and now you are able to fulfill your oversight function. Mrs. Hinson. Right. Well, thank you for your feedback on that issue. And then my next question is for Deputy Counsel Perez. I know you are familiar with our Constitution so, as we read the section that gives the executive branch authority to spend funds, do they have the authority to spend funds for purposes other than what Congress has appropriated? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. No, ma'am. The whole purpose there is that with the purpose statute with the actual appropriations themselves, the executive branch does have to follow what the Congress has appropriated. Now, certainly, Congress sometimes is much more specific in some cases in what the funds should be spent for. There are times, of course, when Congress also has provided the executive with some discretion. But the whole intent is that the executive branch needs to follow the laws that Congress has passed and that the President---- Mrs. Hinson. And I agree, legislative intent is crucial and paramount here. So, you also talk about the Impoundment Control Act in your testimony that it was enacted to stop executive overreach. What do you consider to be executive overreach? What is that threshold for you? And what actions are being taken to prevent overreach for this current Administration in regards to the border wall funding freeze? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Well, with respect to the border wall funding freeze, obviously, we have that decision that is pending. We have not issued it yet. And we are, of course, waiting for information. Part of what we did was immediately start to contact the agencies when we learned of the President's proclamation and, you know, to start to ask for information. And then, of course, followed up with development letters. The whole purpose there of the Impoundment Control Act is we need to look at that there is a process there in the Impoundment Control Act, and the President has to follow that process. That is to notify Congress with specific conditions provided by the law and to not, for example, you know, propose deferrals for policy reason and in the case of any policy situation, the only process really is to propose a recission. And so, what we look at there is what has the executive branch carried out? We look at the rate of obligations. We look at what, for example, in these cases, what has OMB instructed? Those are all critical parts of that analysis. Mrs. Hinson. OK, thank you, Ms. Perez. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit our letter for the record that House Appropriations Committee Republicans, including myself, wrote today to Vice President Harris requesting an update on the results of the funding pause. So, I would seek unanimous consent to add that to the record today. Chairman Yarmuth. Without objection, so ordered. Mrs. Hinson. Thank you. I yield back. [Letter submitted for the record follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Yarmuth. The gentlewoman's time has expired. I now recognize Mr. Cline of Virginia for five minutes. Mr. Cline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this important hearing. The power to direct and control federal spending is arguably Congress' most important legislative tool. So, I am pleased that we are holding this hearing regarding ways that we in Congress, and especially on the Budget Committee, can restore and strengthen Congress' power of the purse against executive branch overreach. This is particularly timely since soon after taking office, President Biden announced the withholding of funds for construction of the southern border wall. There are other issues at play on this topic, including how Congress can create better legislation, rather than relying on end of the year omnibus bills and continuing resolutions to govern. So, I will ask Mr. Paoletta, Chairman Yarmuth's bill from the last Congress, the congressional Power of the Purse Act, modified GAO's role in matters regarding budget and appropriations law. Do you have any thoughts about the section of the congressional Power of the Purse Act that would make administrative and possibly criminal consequences on federal branch--federal employees in the executive branch who are found to have violated the Impoundment Control Act? Mr. Paoletta. Thanks for the question, Congressman. You know, the problem with the Impoundment Control Act is that it is a very confusing law. And so, I think that it puts federal employees in a difficult position, right? You have the Antideficiency Act that you can't spend more money than you have. And if it is, you know, intentional, that would be criminal, and--or, you know, possibly criminal. And on the flipside, if you are not spending all your funds, you could be--you could be in trouble with these administrative sanctions. I think GAO proposed criminal penalties for impounding funds. The problem with--the problem with--so, I think it is a bad policy idea to impose sanctions on individuals with respect to the Impoundment Control Act. Mr. Cline. Thank you. I will ask Ms. Perez. Congress' reliance on continuing resolutions and omnibus appropriations is not an ideal way to effectively and efficiently budget and govern. What are some of the GAO's findings with regard to this negative effect of this type of governing? And further, what impact do CRs have on agency budgets and their ability to adequately plan? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes, so, we have done work on looking at the impact of continuing resolutions, you know, multiple continuing resolutions during a year or actually having them, you know, for a full--for a full year. And, certainly, what we have found in our work and we are very happy to provide that information for the record, is that there are impacts with respect to having, you know, having to rework. So, for example, multiple attempts to be able to, you know, implement grants or to be able to award contracts because you have shorter periods for the funding to be available. We have seen delays in hiring, delays in other programs and programs being implemented because with a continuing resolution, one of the things, the prerogatives that Congress has is really to kind of really put everything on hold that is status quo. And so, agencies then have an impact on being able to implement any new authorities. We have seen a number of those issues in our work. With respect to, you know, to looking at how, you know, how that can be approved, we certainly have also seen issues with the budget process when there is a continuing resolution. There is an impact on the agencies as well in being able to plan out their budgets and plan how they are going to implement. So, we definitely have seen some negative impacts there. Mr. Cline. Can you talk about the ways the GAO can measure the amount of waste that is generated from government shutdowns? Have you ever tried to quantify it and have you ever produced a report related to government shutdowns and the amount of waste that is--that are--that is produced? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. We have done work on government shutdowns and looked at the impact of, you know, on shutdowns, on agency programs. We have not actually, though, really come up with any, you know, any estimate of the, you know, the amounts that are used there and any possible waste. We do understand that there may be other entities that have done that, however. And we would be happy to look for that information. Mr. Cline. Thank you. Dr. Reynolds, you coauthored an article in October 2020 that stated, strengthening congressional committees could also help the legislative branch pushback against the President's use of his budgetary power. What are ways congressional committees could serve as an effective check on the executive branch? Dr. Reynolds. I thank you, Representative Cline. I think there are all of the tools that are available to congressional committees can be deployed in service of asserting Congress' role in the separation of power. So, hearings like this one, letters that can be sent looking for additional information. Part of, again, what we are talking about today is the ability to make that process work better for Congress, make it easier for you all to get your information back. And the last thing I will say is boosting the staffs on your committee. Making sure that you have the ability to hire subject matter experts, to compensate them well, to keep them in those roles in order to make sure that your committees really have the expertise you need to understand the federal programs that you are trying to oversee in the executive branch. Mr. Cline. Thank you. I appreciate the answers. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Yarmuth. The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize another gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Good, for five minutes. Mr. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of our guest witnesses. I appreciate your testimony that you provided to us. And, you know, I share the concerns that have already been mentioned by many colleagues about how the--our legislative branch, our legislative body has surrendered so much of our power and authority to the executive branch. You know, constitutionally there is a reason why Article I comes first and deals with the legislative branch. And it is the largest portion of our Constitution deals with the legislative branch as the founders intended that branch that is closest to the people to be the most powerful, dominant branch. And I quickly appreciate the remarks previously here today by Congressman McClintock from California, what he shared, and I would echo his remarks without being redundant and repeating those. I do have a question for Mr. Paoletta. In your testimony, you noted that reforming the ICA--and I am quoting here--``to return to a more equitable division of power between Congress and the President with respect to the expenditure and appropriated funds would allow prudent financial management to flourish.'' Can you just speak a little further on what recommendations you would have for reforming the ICA? Mr. Paoletta. Well, I think it is not so much focused on the ICA. I have written on the ICA in my opening statement, but I think it is really just a return to regular order. It is actually, you know, having well-written authorizations and stand-alone appropriations that really lay out what Congress wants so there isn't, you know, this broad, you know, appropriation or an unauthorized program that continues on. So, that is at the heart of it is what I think Congress needs to do is authorize programs very clearly as to what they want the executive to carry out and then pass appropriations to fund those. Mr. Good. Well, you did an effective job in your testimony also of talking about how dysfunctional we are in the way that we are handling our funding now and how we are--it is not sustainable what we are doing. I do want to yield the balance of my time out of respect to the Ranking Member because he ran out of time and I know he had some more questions he wanted to ask. So, I do yield the balance of my time to Ranking Member Smith, thank you. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Representative, for yielding. My question, Ms. Hempowicz, you previously wrote an article about pandemic spending which stated Congress must make sure that the money is really going to protect jobs and keep workers safe. That large corporations don't get loans that they don't truly need. That crony capitalism doesn't influence who receives assistance, and that fraudsters don't rip off taxpayers, correct? Ms. Hempowicz. Yes. Yes, Ranking Member. Mr. Smith. To that end, I understand you and your organization even published newsletters called, Corrupted, that described instances of corruption, fraud, waste, and abuse related to spending and other things during the pandemic? Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, sir. Mr. Smith. So, if you remember, when did you all begin publishing those articles? Ms. Hempowicz. I don't remember that. Mr. Smith. I think it is like August 13th is--does that sound about right? Ms. Hempowicz. Sure. Mr. Smith. OK. And do you know how often you all distributed these articles? Ms. Hempowicz. The Corrupted newsletter? Mr. Smith. Yes. Ms. Hempowicz. I believe it was weekly. Mr. Smith. OK. And do you all still distribute these weekly newsletters about your oversight efforts? Ms. Hempowicz. Not that one in particular for our--the content that had been in the Corrupted newsletter is now spread between a couple different products. But we are certainly still doing investigations and publishing reports on any waste, fraud, and abuse that we are able to identify in COVID spending. Mr. Smith. So, when did you stop doing that weekly newsletter? Ms. Hempowicz. It was a couple months ago, I believe. Mr. Smith. January 14th is what I saw. Does that sound about right? Ms. Hempowicz. Sure. Mr. Smith. You know, given your previous statement that Congress must make sure that money is really going to protect jobs and keep workers safe and your organization's stated commitment to oversee COVID-related spending, coupled with the fact that President Biden and congressional Democrats recently enacted 1.9 trillion in federal spending, why did you stop publishing these weekly reports? Ms. Hempowicz. Again, it was a strategic decision behind the scenes to kind of make sure that we are using our resources well. We are a small organization. We are still absolutely publishing that content. You know, I think maybe you are suggesting that we have stopped investigating COVID fraud, and that is just absolutely not the case, sir. Mr. Smith. So, would you say that this is not because there is a different occupant in the White House? Ms. Hempowicz. Absolutely not. And I would say even earlier this week, our organization published a piece critical on the Biden Administration in particular. Particularly on some revolving door issues that may be affecting some of the policymaking coming out of the White House. Mr. Smith. You know, I think some waste that you all could look into is some waste that I have been reading about and discovered just in the last week that billionaires in Florida received the $1,400 stimulus check. I think that's pretty wasteful, wouldn't you think so? Ms. Hempowicz. I would agree. And I would say, you know, a lot of the oversight over COVID spending has been actually very difficult. And the inspectors general have mentioned that too. Partially because last year, the Office of Management and Budget undercut some of the reporting requirements that were included in the CARES Act that would have given the public and the inspectors general and the internal watchdogs more detailed information. You mentioned earlier jobs, particularly would have given more detailed information about how those various programs were reflecting in or not reflecting in increased jobs. And so, I would say, you know, part of it is, again, we are a small organization. We don't have unlimited resources. We are trying to make sure that we are using those resources as best as we can. But we also did create a tracker. It is called--and now I am forgetting the name, but I am sure it is on our website--that tracks all the COVID spending. And I believe that tracker is the most comprehensive tracker that we have that is out there. You know more so than what the government has put together. Because it is really important to us as an organization that the public is able to track this spending. And particularly, on the unemployment insurance that you were mentioning, we don't have a lot of data about that. So, it is more difficult to do those kinds of investigations. But I certainly take your point and it is really important to us as an organization. And so, I would encourage you to keep your eye on our website because that is where that content is now, not in that newsletter. Mr. Smith. I didn't mention anything about unemployment insurance. I was talking about stimulus checks---- Ms. Hempowicz. I'm sorry. Mr. Smith.----that billionaires don't need. Ms. Hempowicz. I'm sorry. I missed that. Mr. Smith. So, that may have been someone else. But I appreciate that you all---- Chairman Yarmuth. The gentleman's---- Mr. Smith.----continue to look at the waste in spending. Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, of course. Chairman Yarmuth. The gentleman from Virginia's time has expired. I now recognize the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for five minutes. Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this hearing. And thank you for the earlier work. I remember when you introduced the protecting of the purse and all of the Democratic Members signed on to it and it is very commendable that you are holding this hearing again in a different Administration. But we do know that the king of moving money around and ignoring the needs that Congress dictated for their appropriations to be used for certainly was the past Administration. And I guess, as we all know, the greatest abuse was the $391 million from Ukraine that was utilized as a carrot, as a stick, as a brick against the President of Ukraine in order to find out dirt on the family and/or present holder of the Presidency of the United States. I think it is important and as Members of Congress, we look at this in a non-partisan manner to constitutionally protect what our duties happen to be. But let me add some additional affronts. And that is the diminishing and the not using and not helping to support different agencies that dealt with civil rights. Particularly, the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ. The last Administration was particularly prone to not want to have that kind of appropriation going on. This was not precisely an appropriation, but it was language in attempting to get violence, gun violence as a national health issue. Thank goodness we have a new day. So, it can also be policy that may generate into the Congress' decision on funding. So, I want to ask the question, how diligent we should be under the Constitution to ensure that some of the underbelly of the agencies, the subagencies like the Office of Civil Rights, that we can also delve into and find out whether or not there is a cutting, there is a non- expenditure, there is sort of a smothering of these agencies unbeknownst to Congress who has expended funding for them. Why don't I start with the representative from the GAO to answer that question, Mr. Perez. Is that Ms.? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes, this is Ms. Perez, no problem. Yes, absolutely. So, part of what we see, which is in the power of the purse bill that had been, you know, presented in the last session that we would continue to recommend is really having agencies not only have OMB publish the apportionments so that we have information specifically on those accounts in that real time basis, but also having agencies report on their obligations with respect to shutdowns, report on their expiring and canceled appropriations, because that would really give Congress and GAO as well as other watchdogs, the ability to look at what is occurring really with sort of that lifespan of the appropriations as Congress has set out. So, these are the types of information that we think would be helpful to Congress in being able to conduct its oversight. Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I am going to ask this last question to both Ms. Hempowicz and Ms. Reynolds. How important is it and, Ms. Perez, indicated that we need to do the subset, the subagencies, if you will, because I think that is where havoc can really be activated. How important is it for Congress' due diligence, but more importantly, for the vision and/or the right running of Congress that all of these agencies that are not well-known that are doing lifesaving actions, are dealing with civil rights, are dealing with civil liberties, protecting the LGBTQ community, how important is it for Congress to dig into how moneys are obstructed or not used for those purposes? Ms. Hempowicz? Ms. Hempowicz. It is incredibly important. I mean, you know, I can't really expound on that. It is just so critical. It is so critical that when Congress appropriates money, the executive branch spends it as Congress intended. And so, to do that to make sure that is happening, you need transparency to make sure that--to facilitate your oversight. Ms. Jackson Lee. And I would add the religious community as well and protecting them. Ms. Reynolds? Dr. Reynolds. The only thing I will add is that part of why it is so important is because there can be divergence between what Congress asks for and what the executive branch does for reasons from nefarious to routine. And you need good information to be able to figure out all of those things because, again, the potential here for gaps is inevitable. And that is part of why it is so important that you get the information you need to make good decisions. Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman. I think my time has expended and thank you for this hearing. I yield back. Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. Your time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, for five minutes. Mr. Grothman. Just a general question. Could anybody give me a suggestion as to how we can better improve identifying areas that we feel are wasteful or lead us to, really, I think the biggest problem we have here, reduce overall spending? Ms. Hempowicz. I can jump in with a suggestion. I would-- and this might be surprising--but I would consider, you know, raising staff pay. I think one area where--one of the reasons why Congress is suffering here is because congressional staff, you know, there is just I think it is called brain drain. There is such high turnover that you don't have oftentimes the expertise your staff needs to be to be doing these programs effectively. And so, that would be my suggestion. Mr. Grothman. Go ahead, I'm sorry. Go ahead. Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Oh, I'm sorry, sir. And if I could, from GAO's perspective, we certainly have the work that we do annually on the duplication overlap and fragmentation, as well as really just generally all of our work looking at, you know, fraud, waste, and abuse. In addition, we have got the high-risk series and just a number of other areas. So, we certainly would urge you to, you know, work with GAO to help you identify any of those subjects. Mr. Grothman. Nobody could argue that right now Congress is not overspending substantially. Obviously, things have gotten worse since we got rid of the sequester. Could you give a crack at whether that was a big mistake or not? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Well, we certainly did some work as well looking at sequestration and the effect. And one of the things that we did find is because sequestration is an across the board cut, it is difficult then for agencies to be able to, you know, adjust to it and to be able to react to it because they are not able to identify or prioritize what Congress may want them to do, as well as agencies' programs are. So, in that sense, while it may be effective for some cutting spending, it does have an across the board impact which does make it difficult to prioritize. Mr. Grothman. Anyone else want to take a crack at that. I am not sure I buy it, but. Mr. Paoletta. I could take a crack at how to spend less money. You know, the Impoundment Control Act, from my perspective, Congressman, as I said, it disincentivizes. It actually makes it illegal to try and save money, in my opinion, right? If you get $100 billion, and you can do the program for $70 million, you get that $30 million. And if you put a pause on it, you deferred those funds to make it a better-run program, and you have those $30 million left over, you have to spend those funds by the end of the period of availability, unless you send it up for recission, and those never get passed. So, there is no incentive to do a program to make it better, to do it cheaper because that money has to be spent, per the ICA, by the end of the year. In the old days, if you did it and got it done, and you had money left over, so long as you accomplished the purposes of that program, it could lapse. Whenever you try and save money, the ICA makes it illegal. So, there is no incentive to save money running federal programs. Mr. Grothman. Why won't we reinstate it? Mr. Paoletta. Well, that is what the ICA does right now, sir. And so, my view is one of the tools could be if you can run a program for less money, those funds should lapse. And if Congress wants to reappropriate it after it lapses with some fast track, they can do that. But I think the ICA as written right now is a terrible law. Mr. Grothman. OK. Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. So, we would disagree with that because in the sense, the ICA does permit you to propose those for recissions. And we do have statistics that show how Congress enacts recissions, as well as, you know, historically how Congress would also enact recissions that were proposed by the Administration. So, we do feel that that act does have the opportunity for the executive branch to identify that type of situation. Mr. Grothman. OK, thank you. I give it back to the Chairman. Chairman Yarmuth. I thank the gentleman. His time has expired. And I now yield myself 10 minutes for questioning. And I am going to begin by yielding to the gentleman from North Carolina for questions, Mr. Price. Mr. Price. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since we are not going to have another round, I want to just suggest a question that our witnesses could usefully explore for the record. And that has to--but I think we must raise it. And that is the--I don't know if Mr. McClintock is still on the call, is he? But he raised questions suggesting that congressional projects or earmarks were somehow constitutionally infirm, constitutionally questionable. And I just think we have to get a response on that from our witnesses for the record. My view has always--I was stunned by that. My view has always been that the constitutional argument ran in the other direction, that there was something very questionable about this kind of arbitrary denial of the power of the purse. I don't imagine that earmarking is constitutionally required, but I certainly can't imagine that it is constitutionally denied. Mr. McClintock said that Congress appropriates and the executive branch spends. Well, an earmark or a congressionally directed appropriation is an appropriation. It is just a more precise and more specific kind of appropriation. And the executive agency, of course, still executes that project. So, I just think we need to clear that up because we are embarking on this and I view it as a reclaiming of the power of the purse and, therefore, a very positive affirmative act. And I am glad that both parties in the House, the majorities of both parties in the House, have agreed with that. But if we could ask our witnesses to submit some kind of commentary on that for the record, I think it would be very useful. Chairman Yarmuth. We would be happy to do that. I thank the gentleman. So, reclaiming my time, I want to mention I have been informed by counsel just in relation to the last exchange with Mr. Paoletta, that the Impoundment Control Act specifically allows for deferrals to achieve savings through greater efficiency of operations. So, there is an opportunity to do that under current law and ICA law. So, I want to respond to a couple of things because one of them just doesn't pass the BS test in my opinion. And that is the claim that the Ranking Member made and I think Mr. Paoletta made also, that the impoundment of refusal to spend $1.4 billion on the border wall had somehow exacerbated or caused the current situation at the border. And the notion that in 100 days that that 1.4 billion could have been spent and to in any way affect the flow of people who are trying to enter the country is just absurd. I am sorry, that is just crazy. I am not defending what the Administration does and GAO will have a response to us again in a short period of time as to the legality of what he did. But the idea that that is somehow connected to the situation at the border is really ridiculous. And I do want to respond also to Mr. Feenstra. I don't think he is with us any longer, but, you know, when you compare what a state government's fiscal constraints are or a local government or a business or a household, as many people always do, it is not a valid comparison to the federal government. The federal government is the issuer of currency. All of those other either corporations or government entities, are users of currency. They cannot create dollars. The U.S. Government can and does, and we do it every day. And the idea that somehow, you know, the constant refrain is that we are piling debt on the future generations, I have said this many times before, we have been accumulating debt in this country for 230 years. Not one person has ever been asked to pay up. Not one person. And when the national debt reached $1 billion under Abraham Lincoln, I am sure a lot of people were saying that same thing. When it reached $1 trillion under Ronald Reagan, I know there were people saying the same thing because I was around then. But the fact is that what many people refer to as debt is an accounting device. It represents all of the money that the federal government has injected into this country over its history minus the taxes. And when we talk about debt as a percentage of GDP, I think many, many economists now are saying that is the wrong measure. It doesn't mean anything. And I think you will get agreement from that from the Federal Reserve Chairman and many others. Japan's GDP ratio, debt to GDP ratio, is 240. Japan has very low interest rates. They have 0 percent interest rates and so they pay on their securities they issue. Zero interest rate. They have very little inflation. And their currency is stable. So, again, we throw around all of these things that kind of we have been living with for the last 50 or 60 years these notions that really don't reflect the way the federal money supply works, and how the federal debt in emphasis what they mean. So, I throw that out. We can have a hearing on that at some time. I actually intend to do that. I do have a question for Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. In your testimony you recommended that Congress require that OMB publicly post all apportionments of executive branch appropriations. You also noted that many of GAO's inquiries into potential violations of the Impoundment Control Act include requesting the relevant apportionment documents. Can you explain why a greater apportionment transparency would be beneficial for GAO, Congress, and the public? Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Absolutely, sir. So, in order to have the information to provide you and the Congress, with timely decisions, we need to have timely access to information. So, having those apportionments available publicly means that as they are being published, as they are being carried out, we can have access to that information. We can be looking at programs as things are coming to our attention or with respect to any other work we are doing. So, it definitely gives us the opportunity to give you more timely advice, to give you timely decisions in other work that we do. Chairman Yarmuth. And so, you would have a much easier time of flagging potential problems with potential violations in the law. We would have a much easier---- Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes. Chairman Yarmuth.----time doing oversight of the money that we appropriate. Ms. Emmanuelli Perez. Yes, absolutely because if we look at an apportionment and we see something that seems to be anomalous, then we can question it right away. We can say this seems different. We can compare it to prior years. That is one of the key things you can do in looking at the Impoundment Control Act issues is look at the prior rate of obligations. See how the program was working in prior years. So, that again, having that information up front is going to help us identify potential problems. Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you. Now, Mr. Paoletta said something which I think is very true and that is that Congress doesn't do a very good job of specifying what we want when we allocate money a lot of the times. For instance, and I don't know if this the case, but I don't have any idea how the language of the law is read. I don't know whether it said new law, whether it said replacement. I don't know. You may know, Mr. Paoletta. And I am not trying to say that is justification for anything because it is clearly true that, you know, we don't always write the laws in the best way. We do try to have report language that clarifies some of those more detailed intentions when we know them. So, I think that your advice to Congress to be very--as clear as we can be as to how the executive branch is supposed to implement those policies is well taken and considered. So, I appreciate that. Mr. Paoletta. Thanks, Chairman. Chairman Yarmuth. I am going to--no, go ahead and talk to it. Mr. Paoletta. No, thank you, sir, for that. Thank you. Chairman Yarmuth. You are welcome. You are welcome to respond, yes. But I have no other questions and I have vented already enough. So, I am going to thank the witnesses for their testimony, their responses. I thank the Members for their questions. And once again, I will reiterate to the Ranking Member and every other member that the next hearing of the Budget Committee on the Budget Committee, I will be--for that hearing, I will be in the budget room. Mr. Smith, I will join you there and anyone else who wants to join us. You are absolutely right. We have equipped the hearing room so that we can hold hybrid hearings in a much better way than we could have in the beginning of the pandemic. So, we will do that. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Yarmuth. And with that, if there is no further business before the Committee, this hearing is adjourned. Oh, Mr. Carter showed up. Wait a minute. Mr. Carter. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. That is OK. Chairman Yarmuth. OK, sorry. We will give you a little extra time next time. Mr. Carter. Well, I am just glad I have got something I can hold over your head, and don't worry, I will do it. Chairman Yarmuth. Thank you all. And once again, thanks to all the witnesses. The meeting is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]