[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SOLARWINDS AND BEYOND:
IMPROVING THE CYBERSECURITY
OF SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAINS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
AND OVERSIGHT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 25, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-17
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
44-636PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas, Chairwoman
ZOE LOFGREN, California FRANK LUCAS, Oklahoma,
SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon Ranking Member
AMI BERA, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
HALEY STEVENS, Michigan, BILL POSEY, Florida
Vice Chair RANDY WEBER, Texas
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey BRIAN BABIN, Texas
JAMAAL BOWMAN, New York ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana
JERRY McNERNEY, California PETE SESSIONS, Texas
PAUL TONKO, New York DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
BILL FOSTER, Illinois MIKE GARCIA, California
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
DON BEYER, Virginia YOUNG KIM, California
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida RANDY FEENSTRA, Iowa
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois JAKE LaTURNER, Kansas
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida
DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina JAY OBERNOLTE, California
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin PETER MEIJER, Michigan
DAN KILDEE, Michigan VACANCY
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
HON. BILL FOSTER, Illinois, Chairman
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado JAY OBERNOLTE, California,
AMI BERA, California Ranking Member
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin PETE SESSIONS, Texas
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Research and Technology
HON. HALEY STEVENS, Michigan, Chairwoman
PAUL TONKO, New York MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida,
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin Ranking Member
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
BILL FOSTER, Illinois JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana
DON BEYER, Virginia PETE SESSIONS, Texas
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania JAKE LaTURNER, Kansas
DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina PETER MEIJER, Michigan
C O N T E N T S
May 25, 2021
Page
Hearing Charter.................................................. 2
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Bill Foster, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Jay Obernolte, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 11
Written Statement............................................ 12
Statement by Representative Haley Stevens, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 13
Written Statement............................................ 14
Statement by Representative Michael Waltz, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 15
Written Statement............................................ 16
Written statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Chairwoman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives....................................... 17
Witnesses:
Mr. Matthew Scholl, Chief, Computer Security Division of the
Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
Oral Statement............................................... 19
Written Statement............................................ 21
Dr. Trey Herr, Director, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Atlantic
Council
Oral Statement............................................... 30
Written Statement............................................ 32
Ms. Katie Moussouris, Founder and CEO, Luta Security
Oral Statement............................................... 40
Written Statement............................................ 42
Mr. Vijay D'Souza, Director, Information Technology and
Cybersecurity, Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Oral Statement............................................... 54
Written Statement............................................ 56
Discussion....................................................... 75
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Dr. Trey Herr, Director, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Atlantic
Council........................................................ 94
SOLARWINDS AND BEYOND:
IMPROVING THE CYBERSECURITY
OF SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAINS
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 25, 2021
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
joint with the Subcommittee on Research
and Technology
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m.,
via Zoom, Hon. Bill Foster [Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight] presiding.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Foster. All right, this hearing will now come to
order. And, without objection, the Chair is authorized to
declare recess at any time. But before I deliver my opening
remarks, I wanted to note the circumstances under which we're
meeting today. Pursuant to House Resolution 8, the Subcommittee
is meeting virtually. I have a couple of reminders for Members
about the conduct of this remote hearing. First, Members should
keep their video feed on as long as they are present at the
hearing. Members are responsible for their own microphones. And
please also keep your microphones muted unless you are
speaking. And finally, if Members have documents that they wish
to submit for the record, please e-mail them to the Committee
Clerk, whose e-mail addresses was circulated prior to the
hearing.
Well, good afternoon, and welcome to our Members and
panelists. Thank you for joining us for this important hearing
on supply chain cybersecurity. We're focusing on the software
supply chain today, and cybersecurity attacks throughout the
software supply chain are especially insidious. A company can
deploy a digitally signed software update from a trusted
partner, but unless they are willing to do a complete
cybersecurity analysis of that update, they are wide open to
any significant breach of cyber hygiene in their trusted
provider. So supply chain attacks are harder to detect, to
prevent, and to remediate than traditional malware. And, once
an adversary is in the system, they can deploy multiple types
of attacks to maintain access and steal data. They run--might
run amok on your system for a long time once they're in because
the access came through a trusted partner, and can be
reinstalled.
In the case of SolarWinds, the Russian intelligence
service embedded a back door in the company's Orion software in
the fall of 2019, and customers were downloading that infected
software by the spring. 18,000 organizations did this over the
course of 2020, and not one of them realized that they had a
company on their network--had company on their networks until
FireEye detected the breach of their own systems and sounded
the alarm in December. I want to thank FireEye for moving
quickly to alert public officials to what it had discovered.
This is a well-regarded cybersecurity company that was itself
breached by a malicious actor. They might have worried about
how news of the hack could affect the company's reputation, but
they did the right thing anyway. And we are all aware of the
fact that FireEye could have just as easily kept quiet to
protect their reputation, because there is no requirement for
private companies to disclose a cybersecurity breach to the
Federal Government. If a reputable company--cybersecurity
company like FiberEye--FireEye can be breached by an attack
like this, any organization can. As we will hear from our
Atlantic Council witness, Dr. Herr, the supply chain
cyberattacks are ticking up. In fact, we've seen several
alarming incidents reported even since the SolarWinds breach
was disclosed in December.
As a semi-separate item I have concerns about whether the
Federal agencies are doing enough to enforce best practices to
reduce their exposure to cyber risks, and whether they have
systems in place to respond quickly enough to a significant
breach. Last summer Microsoft discovered a serious
vulnerability called Zerologon that made it possible for the
hackers to impersonate any computer on the network, including
the system designed to identify and authenticate trusted people
on the network. And I have to say that when I read the
technical description of that flaw, I found that its existence
in such a crucial piece of software, and the simplicity of the
attack, sort of breathtaking. This was very different than,
say, the technical details of the Meltdown and Spectre flaws of
a couple of years back, when I was, frankly, blown away by
their sophistication and complexity. It's clear to me that we
need some mechanism to put more eyes on such commonly used and
critical software. But the Federal issue here is that Microsoft
issued the first of two patches on August 11 of last year, and
by late September some Federal agencies still had failed to
update their systems. The DHS (Department of Homeland Security)
Cybersecurity Office, CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency), had to issue an emergency order to force
agencies to patch or disable affected Windows servers.
Meanwhile, it was discovered that the breach was already being
exploited in the wild by at least Iranian and Russian hackers.
Malicious actors with a creative flair for exploiting
technology are working every day to put Americans at risk, but
engineers at NIST (National Institute of Standards and
Technology) and other Federal agencies are innovating too.
President Biden has recently released an Executive order (EO)
on improving Federal cybersecurity that calls on agencies to
take bold actions to address the challenge of software supply
chain security and other items. I look forward to hearing today
about the likely effectiveness of this Executive order, and how
Federal science--the Federal science apparatus can do more to
help understand the threat, and help private and public sectors
mitigate that risk.
And, finally, as the only Ph.D. physicist, though not the
only Ph.D. scientist on this Committee and in Congress, and
also an integrated circuit designer, I have to say how glad I
am to be able to partner with Ranking Member Obernolte on this
important matter. I believe he's the first and only Member of
Congress with an advanced degree in artificial intelligence,
and I'll ask him to put his Caltech electrical engineering and
information technology executive pants back on today to help us
get near the heart of this matter. I thank him and his staff
for their partnership, and I yield to him for an opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Foster follows:]
Good morning, and welcome to our members and panelists.
Thank you for joining us for this important hearing on supply
chain cybersecurity. We're focusing on the software supply
chain today. And cybersecurity attacks through the software
supply chain are a special kind of insidious. Supply chain
attacks are harder to detect, to prevent, and to remediate than
traditional malware.
And once an adversary is in the system, they can deploy
multiple types of attacks to maintain access and steal data.
They might run amok on your system for a long time once they're
in, because their access came through a trusted partner. In the
case of SolarWinds, the Russian intelligence service embedded a
backdoor in the company's Orion software in the fall of 2019.
Customers were downloading the infected software by the spring.
18,000 organizations did this over the course of 2020. And not
one of them realized that they had company on their networks
until FireEye detected the breach on their own systems and
sounded the alarm in December.
I want to thank FireEye for moving quickly to alert public
officials to what it had discovered. This is an esteemed
cybersecurity company that was itself breached by a malicious
actor. They might have worried about how news of the hack could
affect the company's reputation, but did the right thing
anyway. And we have since woken up to the fact that FireEye
could have just as easily kept quiet, because there is no
requirement for private companies to disclose a cybersecurity
breach to the Federal government.
If a reputable cybersecurity company like FireEye can be
breached by an attack like this, any organization can. And as
we will hear from our Atlantic Council witness, Dr. Herr,
supply chain cyber attacks are ticking up. In fact, we've seen
several alarming incidents reported even since the SolarWinds
breach was discovered in December.
And I have concerns about whether Federal agencies are
doing enough to reduce their exposure to cyber risks, and
whether they have systems in place to respond quickly to a
breach. Last summer, Microsoft discovered a serious
vulnerability called Zerologon that made it possible for the
hackers to impersonate any computer on a network, including the
system designed to identify and authenticate trusted people on
the network. Microsoft issued the first of two patches on
August 11. But by late September, some Federal agencies had
still failed to update their systems. The DHS Cybersecurity
office, CISA, had to issue an emergency order to force agencies
to patch or disable affected Windows servers. Meanwhile, it was
discovered that the breach was already being exploited in the
wild by Iranian and Russian hackers.
Malicious actors with a creative flair for exploiting
technology are working every day to put Americans at risk. But
the engineers at NIST and other Federal agencies are
innovating, too. President Biden has released an Executive
Order on improving Federal cybersecurity that calls on agencies
to take bold actions to address the challenge of software
supply chain security. I look forward to hearing today about
how the Federal science apparatus can do more to understand the
threat and help the private and public sectors mitigate their
risk.
I'm also glad to partner with Ranking Member Obernolte on
this important matter. I believe he is the first and only
Member of Congress with an advanced degree in artificial
intelligence. I'll ask him to put his technology executive hat
back on today to help us get to the heart of the matter. I
thank him and his staff for their partnership, and I yield for
his opening statement.
Mr. Obernolte. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Foster,
and thank you for holding this hearing on an extremely
important topic. I found the GAO (Government Accountability
Office) report on supply chain risk management (SCRM) from
December to be truly alarming. And the thing that stood out to
me about that report was the finding that, of the organizations
the GAO looked at, they identified core supply chain risk
management best practices, and then went through 23 different
agencies looking at how many of those best practices were being
implemented, and this is what stood out to me. For over half of
the organizations, none of the best practices were being
implemented. So, to me, that points to a failure of governance,
and I think that we are at an important position here, to build
on the Executive order, and to call attention to this problem,
and this hearing is a critical part of doing that. So, for
myself, what I'm hoping to get out of this hearing is the
answer to three different questions, one of which is why isn't
the guidance being followed, the second of which is how can the
guidance be easier to implement, and the third of which is how
does the guidance need to change to meet these emerging
threats? And I think recent events have shown just how
vulnerable our supply chain can be.
I think as we conduct this hearing we're going to find
that our organizations fall into three different categories. We
have organizations that are Federal agencies, we have
organizations that Federal agencies contract with, and then we
have organizations that are private industry organizations, but
still have a significant impact on our supply chain, and I
think that those organizations also need to be included in this
discussion. That Colonial Pipeline incident over the last
couple of weeks I think really graphically illustrates just how
big those risks are.
And, in closing, I want to point out that if the outcome
of this whole process is just another PDF or another
spreadsheet, I think we will have failed, because that's not
going to make the change that we need to make. I really think
we're going to have to take a more active approach in
highlighting what the vulnerabilities are, you know, and at
helping organizations evaluate for themselves which of those
best practices and guidance are being followed, and which are
not. And I'm hopeful that we can do that in a way that really
doesn't resemble overregulation, but is really government being
helpful. So, again, thank you very much, Chairman Foster, and
I'm looking forward to hearing from our witnesses. I yield
back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Obernolte follows:]
Thank you, Chairman Foster and Chairwoman Stevens, for
holding today's hearing on improving the cybersecurity of
software supply chains. And thank you to the panel of expert
witnesses for taking time to help educate us on this very
timely and important topic.
Recent cyber incidents like SolarWinds, Microsoft Exchange,
and Colonial Pipeline have thrust the issue of cybersecurity
into the limelight. The most notorious and perhaps the most
pernicious of these incidents is SolarWinds - a software supply
chain attack that impacted roughly 100 organizations and at
least 9 Federal agencies.
Although analysis and investigation into this incident is
ongoing, the details that have emerged thus far paint a
troubling picture for the state of Federal cybersecurity.
Advanced cyber actors infiltrated SolarWinds' build
environment, surreptitiously implanted malicious code into a an
otherwise valid software update, and then waited for that
update to be downloaded. Ultimately, the actors responsible for
this software supply chain attack abused the trusted
relationship that SolarWinds had with its customers--including
federal entities-by compromising the software update with a
``backdoor'' that could be leveraged against the actors'
intended targets, like the 9 federal agencies impacted by this
incident. The update was then made available for download by
SolarWinds' customers, with no indication to them that the
update had been tainted by cyber adversaries.
The amount of time that this actor was able to lie dormant,
undetected in federal networks is particularly concerning - it
took almost two years before Federal agencies discovered the
intrusion. And only then with the help of the cybersecurity
firm FireEye. The SolarWinds incident makes clear that the
Federal government must do more to secure its software supply
chains.
In December 2020, GAO published a report based on its
investigation into federal agency implementation of Information
and Communications Technology (ICT) Supply Chain Risk
Management (SCRM) foundational practices. The findings are
disturbing.
GAO found that none of the federal agencies it reviewed had
fully implemented foundational practices for ICT SCRM, and that
roughly 60% of the agencies reviewed had not implemented any of
the foundational ICT SCRM practices. This is unacceptable.
In May, the Biden Administration signed Executive Order
14028 on improving the nation's cybersecurity. The EO, among
other things, tasks NIST with identifying existing or
developing new guidance to help improve the security of
software supply chains.
While this is a step in the right direction, proper
implementation is critical to its success. For example, NIST
has several products to inform Federal agency ICT SCRM
practices. In fact, the GAO report I referenced earlier derived
its seven foundational ICT SCRM practices from NIST guidance.
Nevertheless, the reason most frequently cited by agencies for
their failure to implement identified practices was a lack of
clear Federal guidance. Without proper implementation by
Federal agencies, more guidance, best practices, and other
resources will be useless.
To that end, we need to find a better way to conduct
oversight of agencies' implementation of this guidance, and
agencies must be more accountable for their responsibilities
under FISMA to secure the information and systems for which
they are responsible.
I look forward to learning more from our witnesses today
about how we can get agencies the implementable guidance that
they need to shore up the security of their software supply
chains, and the resources needed to see implementation is
carried out across the board.
Thank you to our panelists for being here today. And thank
you again to Chairman Foster and Chairwoman Stevens for holding
this important hearing. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Foster. Thank you. And the Chair will now
recognize Ms. Stevens for an opening statement.
Ms. Stevens. Yeah. Thank you so much, Congressman and Dr.
Foster. Thank you to you and Congressman Obernolte for holding
today's hearing, and I'm pleased to give opening remarks on
behalf of the Research and Technology Subcommittee that has
direct oversight of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, which we're certainly going to be talking about
today, as it relates to our supply chain vulnerability,
something that we know very well here in Michigan. It's very
real. Right across from me is a poster from the Michigan
Manufacturing Technology Center, our NIST MEP (Manufacturing
Extension Partnership) Center, located just a few short miles
from where I sit right now, on our Cybersecurity and Industry
4.0 Imperative. So it's--is clear that this hearing is coming
at a critical and an auspicious time.
President Biden's recent Executive order improving the
Nation's cybersecurity represents what I hope to be a sea
change in how the Federal Government approaches cybersecurity,
from modernizing Federal IT systems, to strengthening how the
government responds to cyber threats from our adversaries. The
Executive order also focuses heavily on software supply chain
issues, which is the topic of this hearing. It--the Executive
order seeks to help software developers identify
vulnerabilities before they release their software, and helps
consumers better understand the security, and certainly the
best practices, that are going to be a huge part of setting the
standards and level setting industries of scale here.
It should not be a surprise that, you know, we're ready to
lean in on the NIST component and have NIST represented here on
this panel to talk about their leadership in cybersecurity. I
was bragging about NIST cybersecurity initiatives earlier
today. NIST has played a huge role in the implementation of the
Executive order I just referenced. The agency is going to
develop a broad set of standards for the security of the supply
chain within 90 days. Within 60 days the agency is also going
to identify and define what constitutes as critical software,
and create special standards to protect it. Also within 60
days, NIST will develop standards so that software developers
can test their source code.
This is something Dr. Baird and I explored and sat down
together on in the--in a meeting. It wasn't a hearing, it was a
meeting, last legislative session of Congress. These are
certainly aggressive timelines, and I only mentioned some of
the things that NIST is going to be doing, but it's, again,
just a reminder of the important and critical role they play
that is highly respected in incorporating input from private
and public sector partners to develop effective cybersecurity
standards. This work is certainly going to take time and
resources, no doubt about that. NIST's entire cybersecurity and
privacy portfolio was funded at only $78 million in the last
year's budget, and, you know, we think about the economic
ramifications of cybersecurity attacks, those bills tally up to
that number, you know, it--within seconds should there be a
cybersecurity attack, so I do worry that we are increasingly
asking NIST experts to do exponentially more work more quickly,
without necessarily the adequate resources.
We've referenced and talked about the GAO. They have found
that Federal agencies are not adopting the guidelines already
on the books to deal with software supply chain threats. We're
certainly seeing this across industries. I've had these
conversations here in Michigan, particularly in our
manufacturing sectors, automotive, defense, aerospace.
Additional guidance is maybe going to be necessary, but we also
must ensure agencies prioritize the implementation of the
guidance that already exists, and provides adequate resources
for them to do so. Congress, and the Biden Administration, must
and will think creatively about modernizing the Federal
Government's approach to cybersecurity. I welcome the
recommendations of this expert panel on how we can ensure that
cybersecurity guidance is developed as part of the Executive
order that is operational, effective, and relatively easy to
adopt. I want to thank our witnesses again, as well as our
other Subcommittee Chair, for helping us tackle these issues,
and with that, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Stevens follows:]
Good morning and welcome to this joint hearing of the
Subcommittee on Research and Technology and the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight. I would like to thank my esteemed
colleagues, Chairman Foster and Ranking Member Obernolte, for
leading this joint hearing. As the SolarWinds incident
revealed, software supply chain issues are a threat to our
Federal agencies and businesses across the country, including
my district in Michigan.
This hearing comes at an auspicious time. President Biden's
recent Executive Order ``Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity''
represents what I hope to be a sea change in how the Federal
government approaches cybersecurity, from modernizing Federal
IT systems to strengthening how the government responds to
cyber threats from our adversaries.
The Executive Order focuses heavily on software supply
chain issues, the topic of this hearing. It seeks to help
software developers identity vulnerabilities before they
release their software and help consumers better understand the
security of the products they buy.
It should not be a surprise that I am excited to have NIST
represented on this panel to talk about their leadership in
cybersecurity standards and best practices.
NIST has a big role to play in the implementation of the
Executive Order. The agency must develop broad standards for
the security of the software supply chain within 90 days.
Within 60 days, the agency must also identify and define what
constitutes ``critical software'' and create special standards
to protect it. Also within 60 days, NIST must develop standards
so that software developers can test their source code. These
timelines are aggressive, and I only mentioned some of the
things that NIST is being asked to do.
NIST is highly respected for its role in incorporating
input from its private and public sector partners to develop
effective cybersecurity standards. But this work takes time and
resources. NIST's entire cybersecurity and privacy portfolio
was funded at only $78 million in last year's budget. I worry
that we are increasingly asking NIST's experts to do
exponentially more work, more quickly, with inadequate
resources.
Moreover, GAO has found that Federal agencies are not
adopting the guidance already on the books to deal with
software supply chain threats. Additional guidance may be
necessary, but we must also ensure agencies prioritize
implementation of the guidance that already exists, and provide
adequate resources for them to do so.
Congress and the Biden Administration must think creatively
about modernizing the Federal government's approach to
cybersecurity. I welcome the recommendations of this expert
panel on how we can ensure that cybersecurity guidance
developed as part of the Executive Order is operational,
effective, and relatively easy to adopt.
I want to again thank the witnesses for being here today to
help us tackle these challenging issues. I yield back.
Chairman Foster. Thank you. And the chair will now
recognize Mr. Waltz for an opening statement.
Mr. Waltz. Hey, thank you. Thank you, Chairman Foster, and
Chairwoman Stevens, for holding this joint hearing. I also want
to thank our panel of witnesses for their participation, and I
am looking forward to hearing their testimony today. And I hope
we will all be able to use this opportunity to learn more about
software supply chain attacks, impacts on Federal agencies, and
I share everyone's sentiments on how to improve our Nation's
software supply chain security.
So--the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology has
held several hearings over the years. Some of them have been
mentioned, on bolstering the Federal Government's cybersecurity
posture. I'm pleased to see that this Committee is playing such
an active role in that posture. Obviously the recent
SolarWinds, Microsoft Exchange, Colonial Pipeline incidents
make it clear that the United States is being continuously
targeted with malicious cyberattacks. When I was in business,
there was the saying, those that have been attacked, and those
that don't know they've been attacked, by various criminal
actors and nation-states.
So, unfortunately, these attacks were not the first. They
won't be the last. I share the Chairwoman's focus on NIST as
the primary Federal agency responsible for setting standards
and guidelines for Federal agencies, and providing voluntary
best practices for private industry. It's worth noting that in
2014 NIST published a voluntary risk-based cybersecurity
framework with a set of industry standards and best practices
to help organizations manage these risks. NIST also established
guidance specifically related to supply chain security,
including the Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management, the CSRM
Framework, and the Secure Software Development Framework, to
help identify, assess, and mitigate these risks.
On May of this year, as Chairwoman Stevens mentioned, the
president issued his EO on improving the Nation's
cybersecurity, entrust multiple Federal agencies, including
NIST, with strengthening the security of software supply chain.
I think it's worth noting Section Four of the EO directs the
Secretary of Commerce, through NIST, to consult with Federal
agencies, private sector, academia, all of the stakeholders, to
identify or develop standards, tools, best practices, and other
guidelines to enhance our supply chain security. And, based on
my experience, 25 years now in the National Guard, I would
encourage NIST, and would love to see them consult with the
cyber talent within the Guard and the Reserve in executing
Section Four of the EO. The Guard and the Reserve really does
retain elite cyber talent from Silicon Valley, the private
sector, as well as the Pentagon, and truly can serve as a
bridge between the private sector and Federal Government with
their various authorities. I think the EO is a good starting
point for addressing these vulnerabilities in our Nation's
software supply chain, but obviously we have a long way to go,
a lot more work to do.
As has been mentioned, the recent GAO report, it really is
alarming, and assessing that Federal information and
communication supply chain risk management practices, and the
findings that none of the Federal agencies reviewed had
implemented the recommended practices. 60 percent of these
agencies had not implemented any of the practices. I'm sorry,
none have fully implemented those practices. And, as a result,
GAO identifies 145 recommendations for agencies to fully
implement foundational practices in their approach to ICT
(information and communications technology) SCRM.
Moving forward, I do think we need to provide agencies
with the resources, and push them, frankly, to move more
quickly to close the gap between these recommendations and
implementations of foundational practices. Cyber frameworks are
otherwise useless, frankly, unless proper fundings were
available to fully implement them. Additionally, the National
Science Foundation's Cyber Corps, Scholarship for Service
Program, should receive consideration by the Committee for
enhancing the Federal Government's cybersecurity workforce.
Time truly is of the essence here. It's imperative that we
modernize these defenses and get ahead of our adversaries. We
cannot afford to continue to allow foreign adversaries, and
criminals, often working together, witting and unwitting, to
take advantages of our weaknesses in software supply chains. I
think we've seen in recent days that the consequences truly can
be catastrophic and detrimental to the economic and national
security of the United States. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Waltz follows:]
Thank you, Chairman Foster and Chairwoman Stevens for
holding today's joint subcommittee hearing.
I also want to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses
for their participation today. I am looking forward to hearing
your expert testimony. I hope we will use this opportunity to
learn more about software supply chain attacks and their
impacts on federal agencies and examine how to improve our
nation's software supply chain security. The Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology has held several hearings over
the years on bolstering the federal government's cybersecurity,
and I am pleased to see that the Committee is still playing an
active role in enhancing our nation's cybersecurity posture.
The recent SolarWinds, Microsoft Exchange, and Colonial
Pipeline incidents make it clear that the United States is
continuously being targeted with malicious cyber-attacks by
nation-states and criminal actors. China, Russia, Iran, and
other malign actors are focusing on cyber capabilities.
Unfortunately, these attacks are not the first, and certainly
will not be the last of their kind.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
is the primary federal agency responsible for setting standards
and guidelines for federal agencies and provides voluntary best
practices for private industry. In 2014, NIST published a
voluntary risk-based Cybersecurity Framework with a set of
industry standards and best practices to help organizations
manage cybersecurity risks. Additionally, NIST has established
guidance specifically related to supply chain security,
including the Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM)
framework and the Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF)
to help identify, assess, and mitigate supply chain risks.
On May 12, 2021, the President issued an Executive Order
(EO) on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity, which entrusts
multiple federal agencies, including NIST, with strengthening
the security of the software supply chain. Section 4 of the EO
directs the Secretary of Commerce, through NIST, to consult
with federal agencies, the private sector, academia, and other
stakeholders and to identify or develop standards, tools, best
practices, and other guidelines to enhance software supply
chain security.
Based on my experience in the National Guard, I would like
to see NIST consult with the cyber talent within the Guard when
executing Section 4 of the EO. The National Guard and Reserve
retains elite cyber talent from both Silicon Valley and the
Pentagon and can effectively serve as a bridge between the
private sector and federal government.
This EO is a good starting point for addressing
vulnerabilities in our nation's software supply chain, but
there is more work to be done.
A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
assessed federal information and communications (ICT) supply
chain risk management (SCRM) practices and the findings are
alarming. None of the federal agencies reviewed had fully
implemented the SCRM practices, and approximately 60 percent of
these agencies had not implemented any of the practices. As a
result, GAO identifies 145 recommendations for agencies to
fully implement foundational practices in their approach to ICT
SCRM.
Moving forward, we must work diligently to provide agencies
with the resources to move swiftly to close the gap between
recommendations and implementation of foundational practices.
Cybersecurity frameworks are otherwise useless unless proper
funding and support are available to fully implement them.
Additionally, NSF's CyberCorps: Scholarship for Service
program should receive consideration by the committee for
enhancing the federal government's cybersecurity workforce.
Time is of the essence, and it is imperative that
modernized cyber defenses are implemented to get ahead of the
next cyber-attack from China, Russia, Iran and other
adversaries. We cannot afford to let foreign adversaries and
cyber criminals take advantage of weaknesses in software supply
chains as the consequences can be detrimental to the national
and economic security of the United States.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Foster. Thank you. And if there are any other
Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, your
statements will be added to the record at this point.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Johnson follows:]
Good afternoon to our witnesses and thank you for joining
us here today.
Securing Federal government systems from cyberattack is an
evolving challenge. We have repeatedly seen the importance of
getting it right, and the painful consequences of getting it
wrong. As SolarWinds and other recent attacks have shown, the
software supply chain is especially challenging to protect. We
must ensure that the Federal Government is coordinating
effectively to secure our IT systems.
Jurisdiction over cybersecurity is widely shared across
Congressional committees and Federal agencies. I want to affirm
the Science Committee's role on cybersecurity matters. The
scope of jurisdiction for authorizing committees in the
technology space was last changed significantly in 2002. That's
when Congress created the House Homeland Security Committee and
the Department of Homeland Security in response to 9/11.
That same year, Congress passed the Federal Information
Security Management Act, or FISMA. FISMA was updated in 2014
and became the Federal Information Security Modernization Act.
FISMA called on Federal agencies to develop information
security programs to protect themselves. The Science Committee
focus is on developing tools for prevention. Specifically, we
are responsible for directing and overseeing the National
Institute of Standards and Technology's role in cybersecurity.
Under FISMA, NIST creates cybersecurity standards and guidance
for the government. The Science Committee is one of the three
House Committees that receives cyber incident reports under
FISMA.
It's hard to comprehend how much the cybersecurity
landscape has changed since 2002. The threats that Federal
agencies and the private sector face today are sophisticated
and relentless. Recent attacks have shown that existing
oversight mechanisms are not enough. After the SolarWinds
attack was revealed, information was slow to emerge. Briefings
and reports to Congress were unpredictable in their timing and
their content. Federal agencies reported that they were not
able to share information with other agencies. Determinations
of whether the incident was reportable to Congress or not were
based on a one-size-fits-all form. I worry we are not capturing
the full extent of the potential harm from attacks on our
Federal systems.
We must do better, both in mitigating attacks after they
happen and in preventing them in the first place.
This has been and will continue to be a bipartisan concern
on this Committee. I look forward to continuing to work with
Ranking Member Lucas and our colleagues on the Committee to
reinforce NIST's role in cybersecurity.
There is simply so much work to be done on cybersecurity--
both for policymakers and for practitioners in the field. I am
glad that the witnesses here today offer a wide range of
expertise to help us chart our next steps.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Foster. And at this time I'd like to introduce
our witnesses. Our first witness is Mr. Matthew Scholl. Mr.
Scholl is the Chief of the Computer Security Division of the
Information Technology Laboratory at NIST. He--his research
program cultivates trust in information technology through
standards and measurements, and by testing the
interoperability, security, and reliability of cybersecurity
systems. The guidance produced by his program is widely used by
Federal agencies and U.S. industry. He also co-leads NIST's
participation with cybersecurity national and international
standards development organizations.
After Mr. Scholl is Dr. Trey Herr. Dr. Herr is the
Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic
Council. His team works on a range of cybersecurity issues,
including cloud computing, the security of the internet, supply
chain policy, and growing a more capable cybersecurity policy
workforce. Previously he was a Senior Security Strategist at
Microsoft, working on cloud computing and the supply chain--and
supply chain security policy. Dr. Herr also served as a fellow
at the Belfer Cyber Security Project at Harvard's Kennedy
School, and a non-resident fellow with the Hoover Institution
at Stanford University.
Our third witness is Ms. Katie Moussouris. Ms. Moussouris
is Founder and CEO (chief executive officer) of the
cybersecurity company Luta Security. She led the launch of the
first bug bounty programs at both Microsoft and the Department
of Defense, and has also helped start Microsoft's Supply Chain
Vulnerability Program. She is a co-author of documentation on
vulnerability disclosure and vulnerability handling processes
for the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).
Ms. Moussouris is a visiting scholar with the MIT
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Sloan School, a Harvard
Belfer affiliate, and advisor to the Center for Democracy and
Technology.
Our final witness is Mr. Vijay D'Souza. Mr. D'Souza is the
Director of the--Information Technology and Cybersecurity at
the GAO, where he leads a diverse set of evaluations and--on
government cybersecurity and IT issues. His current work
focuses on the SolarWinds breach, use of the NIST cybersecurity
framework, and IT modernization efforts at USDA (United States
Department of Agriculture). Mr. D'Souza also leads GAO's Center
for Enhanced Cybersecurity, which provides advanced technical
support for GAO's Cybersecurity Office.
And, as our witnesses should know, each of you have five
minutes for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony will
be included in the record for the hearing, and when you've all
completed your spoken testimony, we will begin with questions.
Each Member will have five minutes to question the panel. And I
will also mention that at the end of our hearing here, after I
gavel it closed, any of our witnesses and Members who wish are
welcome to sort of hang around and talk informally, which is
often a very valuable part of hearings that we do informally at
the end when we're meeting in the non-virtual world. And we
will start now with Mr. Scholl. You are now recognized for five
minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MR. MATTHEW SCHOLL,
CHIEF, COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION
OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS
AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST)
Mr. Scholl. Thank you. Chairwoman Stevens, Ranking Member
Waltz, Chairman Foster, Ranking Member Obernolte, and Members
of the Subcommittee, I am Matt Scholl, the Chief of the
Computer Security Division at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, known as NIST. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on improving the cybersecurity of
software supply chains. NIST has nearly a 50-year history
working in cybersecurity. Most recently, threat activity has
highlighted the IT supply chain as a major cybersecurity
vulnerability. Cybersecurity risks associated with extended
supply chains and supply ecosystems are significant, and the
scope of these risks must be understood by companies and
organizations as they continue to expand their use of digital
technologies.
To address the ever-challenging issues related to this
cybersecurity risk, on May 12 President Biden signed Executive
Order 14028 to improve the Nation's cybersecurity and to
protect Federal Government networks. Recent cybersecurity
incidents, such as the SolarWinds type of incident we are
discussing here, are a sobering reminder that U.S. public and
private sector entities face increasingly sophisticated
malicious cyber activity from both nation-state actors, as well
as cyber criminals. NIST's role in this Executive order will be
to develop standards, tools, best practices, references, and
other key guidance for use by any organization to enhance their
software supply chain security.
Specifically, NIST will address identifying and securing
critical software. We will identify secure software development
life cycles and practices for securing development
environments. We will also identify security measures for the
Federal Government in using critical software, and requirements
for testing software. In addition, NIST will initiate two pilot
labeling programs to assist consumers in understanding the
security properties in products that we all use. NIST will
respond to these responsibilities in ways that are effective in
reducing risks to our supply chain, while also continuing to
facilitate the innovation and economic growth that a secure
software ecosystem can provide.
NIST's arsenal in the defense against cyberattacks is
large and growing. NIST is responsible for developing reliable
and practical standards, guidelines tests, and metrics to help
organizations with their cyber supply chain risk management.
The public and private sector can use these NIST resources to
create and conduct their cyber supply chain risk management
programs. NIST also continues to work directly with Federal
agencies through practice guides, tools, models, best
practices, quora, as well as membership on the Federal
Acquisition Security Council (FASC).
NIST provides a series of documentary guidance, data
reference, tools, and testing as part of its program to
specifically work on improving the efficiency, reliability, and
security of software. Two specific examples of resources that
NIST provides are the National Vulnerability Database and the
National Software Reference Library. The National Vulnerability
Database is a repository of all known and publicly reported IT
vulnerabilities, and is the authoritative source for
standardized information on security, vulnerabilities which
NIST updates daily. The National Software Reference Library
creates unique digital signatures of software so that any
organization can efficiently search for that software, and
determine if and where it might be deployed within its
ecosystems. Another critical resource at NIST is the National
Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. This collaborative hub is a
place where industry organizations, government agencies, and
academic institutions work together to address business's most
pressing cybersecurity issues. We produce practical
cybersecurity solutions that benefit large and small businesses
and third-party service providers alike.
In conclusion, NIST is proud of its role in establishing
and improving cybersecurity solutions, as well as our
longstanding and robust collaborations with our Federal
Government partners, private sector collaborators, and
international colleagues. NIST has continued to be committed to
apply its expertise and help to solve the critical
cybersecurity issues that face our Nation now, as well as in
the future. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today,
and I will be pleased to answer any questions that you might
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scholl follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Perlmutter. Bill, you need to unmute.
Chairman Foster. Did--who did that to me? OK. Next is Dr.
Herr.
TESTIMONY OF DR. TREY HERR, DIRECTOR,
CYBER STATECRAFT INITIATIVE, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Dr. Herr. Chairman Foster, Ranking Member Obernolte,
Chairwoman Stevens, and Ranking Member Waltz, and the Members
and staff of the Subcommittees, thank you for the invitation to
speak today. My name is Trey Herr, and I run the Cyber
Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, a non-partisan
think tank based here in D.C. For the past 2 years my team and
I have been looking at the security of software supply chains
and cataloguing a range of attacks against them. We're here in
no small part because of the revelations about the Sunburst and
SolarWinds campaign. The scale of this event, and its impact on
the cybersecurity policies of a new administration, have
received widespread appreciation, and this attention is duly
warranted. But even in the crises of the past few months, there
were remarkable echoes of the past decade. Software supply
chain attacks are not new, and they're becoming more visible
and more consequential by the day.
Over the past 10 years there have been more than 140
attacks or disclosures of vulnerabilities fit to be used in
such an attack against software supply chains. Of these, at
least 30 had been positively attributed to governments around
the world. Within just a few months of the public discovery of
the Sunburst SolarWinds campaign, cybersecurity vendors
reported three different state-backed software supply chain
attacks targeting governments and high-profile companies in
South Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam. Where the most recent
crisis impacted hundreds of organizations, and perhaps tens of
thousands of users, software supply chain attacks have been
used to target millions of users at once.
Software has spread to every corner of the human
experience. Our watches have internet connections. Combat
aircraft come with more code than many operating systems, and
embedded software controls the operation of everything from
medical hardware to our brake pedals. With this software comes
security flaws, and a long chain of updates from vendors and
developers. This ongoing relationship between those that build
code and those who use it creates a need for trust, trust that
the update you're about apply is genuine and benign. Software
supply chain attacks take advantage of and break this trust.
The responsibility for the insecurity of these software supply
chains lies at home more than with foreign adversaries. I'm
encouraged by the proposals contained in the President's recent
Executive order. We can demand more of our vendors, and of
ourselves, while learning from the lessons of Sunburst, and a
decade of software supply chain attacks.
In the final analysis it would be a mistake to equate
software supply chain attacks to a new weapons system in an
opponent's arsenal. These attacks are a manifestation of
opportunity, pursuing targets, compromising weaknesses and the
tools and code we depend on, and which we even take for
granted. Trust in software supply chain security is not built,
nor is it broken, in isolation. There are opportunities for
meaningful progress, and this can play an important role to
better protect the code we have embedded in our daily lives
with appropriate investment, and greater focus on cloud
security, automatable guidance, and secure software deployment,
not just development.
I commend the Committee for the time and effort taken to
prepare today's hearing. Recent events show us it is an
unambiguously important topic. With that, I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Herr follows:]
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Chairman Foster. Thank you, and next is Ms. Moussouris.
TESTIMONY OF MS. KATIE MOUSSOURIS,
FOUNDER AND CEO, LUTA SECURITY
Ms. Moussouris. Thank you. Chairman Foster, Ranking Member
Obernolte, Chairwoman Stevens, Ranking Member Waltz, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittees, thank you for
inviting me to testify today about how to improve software
supply chain security. My name is Katie Moussouris. I'm the
Founder and CEO of Luta Security, a company that works with
governments and complex organizations to create mature, robust,
and sustainable vulnerability disclosure and bug bounty
programs. We base these programs on the international standard
ISO 29147, Vulnerability Disclosure, ISO 30111, Vulnerability
Handling Processes, and our Vulnerability Coordination Maturity
Model. I'm the co-author and co-editor of these international
standards. With more than 20 years of professional technical
and strategic experience in technology and information security
as a penetration tester at @stake, followed by creating
Microsoft Vulnerability research, which handled supply chain
vulnerability coordination, establishing Microsoft's first bug
bounties and advising the U.S. Department of Defense, resulting
in the launch of Hack-the-Pentagon. Additionally, I served as
co-chair of the NTIA (National Telecommunications and
Information Administration) multi-stakeholder vulnerability
disclosure working group subcommittee of multi-party
vulnerability coordination. It is an honor to appear before
these Subcommittees to testify about the challenge that
securing the software supply chain presents to our economy and
to our national security.
While supply chain attacks have become more prevalent in
the headlines during the past few years, these types of attacks
have been occurring regularly since the dawn of major operating
systems, which are then used to compromise many downstream
targets. This problem is not new, and believing that it is can
impede meaningful conversations regarding potential solutions.
One of the main reasons why these problems haven't yet been
solved is that the cybersecurity industry itself is still in
its infancy, while the United States and the world have grown
exponentially faster in our dependence and complexity of
increasingly interconnected technology. Even large
organizations with many highly skilled technical workers
struggle with getting the right resources in place to
simultaneously respond to incidents and investigate and fix
single vendor vulnerabilities, let alone supply chain
vulnerabilities in both open and closed source software.
In the global cybersecurity workforce shortage, estimated
at over 3.1 million unfilled positions worldwide, over half a
million of those unfilled cyber roles are in the United States.
The United States participates in the software supply chain in
many complex roles, as do our international partners and our
adversaries. There are multiple ways that supply chain attacks
can occur, and not all efforts to combat these various attacks
result in the same return on investment (ROI). In our ongoing
national effort to build up our cyber resilience, we must
evaluate the efforts put forth with desired outcomes in mind to
yield measurable increased security of the supply chain now.
To address the complexity in software supply chain
security, my testimony today outlines the problem space, and
offers proposed solutions and actions to measurably increase
the cyber-resilience of the United States and our international
partners. I believe that following the recommendations,
building upon some of the most important work and best
practices in the public and private sector, will increase our
national security. No. 1, providing CISA with the authorities
and resources to oversee cyber readiness for the civilian
Federal Government, and as a resource to support privately
owned critical infrastructure. No. 2, amending FISMA to require
an annual, comprehensive Federal maturity assessment and gap
analysis that will identify critical gaps in people, process,
and technology. No. 3, conducting a CISA-led dynamic assessment
of ROI for each proposed new requirement in the cybersecurity
Executive order to determine the priority of each based on the
investments required to make a dent in the problem. And four,
raising Federal pay scales, especially in cybersecurity, to
better compete with the private sector, and investing in
cybersecurity recruitment and training for existing and
aspiring workers.
In the early stages of building our cyber resilience,
organizations focus first on incident response, which has been
echoed in the cybersecurity Executive order's breach
notification requirements, as well as CISA's request for more
endpoint detection budget. Investing in better breach response
is important, but the ROI for investment breach prevention is
higher, yet lacks the urgency to drive near term action. While
new requirements like SBOMs (software bill of materials) may
make supply chain vulnerabilities faster to respond to in
theory, producing or consuming an SBOM would've had no effect
in stopping or detecting either the SolarWinds nor the CodeCov
supply chain attacks. There are no tools that can produce this
enriched vulnerability data that includes vetting actual
exploitability at scale, forcing continued reliance on skilled
cybersecurity workers to make that final determination of
imminent risk and act upon it.
In conclusion, I appreciate this Committee's and CISA's
leadership on cybersecurity and supply chain issues. The
Federal Government must direct what resources we have, while
also growing our capacity at scale. As part of expanding CISA's
role and resources, CISA should apply a system dynamics
approach that models the effects of changing variables in a
complex system, focused on a targeted approach to enhance
security outcomes. Thank you for this opportunity to testify
before the Committee today on this critical issue. I look
forward to answering any questions you may have for me.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Moussouris follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Foster. Thank you. And next is Mr. D'Souza.
TESTIMONY OF MR. VIJAY D'SOUZA, DIRECTOR,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CYBERSECURITY,
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)
Mr. D'Souza. Hello, Chairs Foster and Stevens, Ranking
Members Obernolte and Waltz, and Members of the Subcommittees.
Thank you for inviting me to testify at today's hearing on
SolarWinds and IT supply chain issues. My testimony is based on
GAO's ongoing look at the SolarWinds cybersecurity incident,
and GAO's December 2020 report on IT supply chain risk
management at Federal agencies.
The SolarWinds cybersecurity incident was arguably one of
the most severe and sophisticated cyberattacks on the Federal
Government, but much remains unknown publicly about the full
impact. The attackers, now known to be affiliated with the
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, were able to take
advantage of weaknesses in the SolarWinds company security
practices to insert malicious content in updates that
SolarWinds supplied to its customers, including Federal
agencies. Thus, the attackers were able to take advantage of
what we generally consider good cybersecurity practice,
patching and updating your software regularly.
The government has taken a number of steps in response to
SolarWinds. Beginning in December 2020, DHS and CISA issued an
emergency directive, and later several additional tools and
pieces of guidance on how Federal agencies and other
organizations should respond to the attack. The most recent
guidance was actually just issued a few days ago, and more
remains to be done. A unified coordination group including
CISA, the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), NSA (National
Security Agency), and ODNI (Office of the Director of National
Intelligence) was also created to coordinate the government's
intelligence gathering and response activities. This group was
recently disbanded, and has shifted its focus to identifying
lessons learned from the incident. GAO currently has work
underway compiling what is known about the impact of SolarWinds
on the Federal Government, and what lessons have been learned.
We recently issued a blog post on this issue, and plan to issue
a public report later this year.
Although SolarWinds was both an unpleasant and
unprecedented discovery, unfortunately, we can't be surprised
that something like this occurred. In December 2020, just as
the attack was announced by CISA, GAO released a public version
of our report looking at how well Federal agencies were keeping
an eye on their IT supply chains. The bottom line, most
agencies were not following even foundational practices in this
area. We identified seven practices that should be followed
agency wide. These include establishing executive oversight,
developing a strategy, and developing a way to document and
identify risks. For the 23 agencies we examined, none had
implemented all the practices, and 14 hadn't implemented any of
the practices. Given what we now know about the threats we
face, this is concerning.
Agencies told us they hadn't implemented many of these
practices because they were awaiting additional guidance, most
specifically from the Federal Acquisition Security Council, or
FASC. And it's true today that FASC hasn't issued detailed
guidance that agencies may need to fully implement a supply
chain risk management program, but it's important to not let
the perfect be the enemy of the good in this case. NIST has had
guidance in this area since 2015, and OMB has directed agencies
to begin thinking about this issue since at least 2016. The
foundational practices we focused on include basic issues, such
as identifying who is in charge in establishing an overall
strategy and process. While, as with all issues technology
related, how you do this will change over time, SolarWinds
demonstrates that it's important to get started on supply chain
security right away.
To be fair, it's important to note that there are a lot of
Federal activities underway looking at IT supply chain
security. NIST is currently revising its existing guidance, and
hopes to reissue it in 2022 to incorporate best practices from
Federal and private organizations, and to integrate with other
NIST guidance. In addition, CISA has a task force underway that
is trying to address some of the underlying issues in this
area. For example, how do we encourage private companies to
share information, and how do we certify and vet Federal
suppliers? We issued a more detailed sensitive report in
October of last year that our December report was based on. In
the October report we made 145 recommendations to specific
agencies to implement the foundational practices that I
discussed. We have received updates from six agencies on their
progress, but to date none of the agencies have fully
implemented our recommendations.
It's not going to be easy to address IT supply chain
issues, and what we do is going to change as we continue to
learn more about the threats in this area, but if we want to be
prepared for the next SolarWinds type incident, it's important
for Federal agencies to immediately begin addressing this
issue, and for Congress to continue its oversight through
activities such as today's hearing. This concludes my
statement. I'm happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Souza follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Foster. Thank you. And, at this point, we will
now begin our first round of questions. The Chair will
recognize himself for five minutes.
Mr. D'Souza, if we could step back for a moment and
consider the Federal response to SolarWinds? Could you please
briefly go over the timeline of how the Federal agencies
responded? You know, when was the Federal Government first made
aware of the breach, how did the directions to address the
breach roll out, and in general did the system work as
designed, and did the--all the Federal agencies act quickly to
remediate the breach?
Mr. D'Souza. Thank you. As I mentioned, the first public
announcement from DHS was in December, although it is our
understanding they may have, you know, had some earlier
information about the incident. The agencies were directed to
respond to that, and certainly by April our understanding is it
had been largely addressed. However, the details are--we're
still looking into the details. Part of what we're doing in our
ongoing work is trying to look at the detailed information that
was provided to Congress and to CISA, and try to compile it to
see kind of how it lines up.
Chairman Foster. Yeah. Did--so what is the procedure when
the first alert comes in through classified channels, and then
people realize this will have a big--as--a big effect on the
commercial world? Is there a well-defined protocol for deciding
when the commercial world should be apprised of the threat?
Mr. D'Souza. So your question is when the government
should let the private sector entities know about issues?
Chairman Foster. Right. Yeah. Is that--is there a well-
defined procedure for that that operates regularly?
Mr. D'Souza. I think--so I think there are procedures, but
I don't--I think well--you know, I think there's area for
improvement. I think part of what this has established is the
need for better information sharing. Part of what you touched
on is, you know, the Executive order that the administration
recently released, directs DHS to do more to kind of specify
the triggers in this area. There definitely are tools and
processes in place. For example, there was some legislation
passed a few years ago directly related to cyber information
sharing. But, you know, our experience has been, when we talked
to the private sector, you know, they definitely identified
positive steps that the Federal Government has taken with
regard to information sharing, but also a lot of room for
improvement.
Chairman Foster. Um-hum. Is there--would the rest of the
panelists like to chime in on that issue? Any observations on,
you know, whether the system was badly designed, or worked as
it should, or what the--or are we going to have to undergo a
fundamental redesign to get a better result?
Mr. D'Souza. If I could add one point, is--I think the
processes are in place, but I think it's the trust building. I
think, you know, there's a lot of--there tends to be a lot of
nervousness from the private sector about sharing information
with the government. I'm not sure so much about the other way,
although one of the issues the government has is sharing
classified information, figuring out how to sort of declassify
the information, share it publicly. So these issues have been
identified, but we're definitely not where we need to be in
this area.
Chairman Foster. Um-hum. And one of the decisions that the
government, and probably every player in industry has to do, is
the make versus buy decision. And, you know, if we're--you
know, we do a lot in Congress to encourage the government to
contract with a large number of small businesses, all right?
That is sort of the exact opposite of what you'd want to do for
cybersecurity reasons. And how should we think about and handle
that, you know, that tension? Any observation, or--some of you
have experience with some of the large players in industry,
where it's my understanding they just do a lot of stuff in
house in part to avoid cybersecurity threats that they cannot
control.
Dr. Herr. It's a good question, asking about firm size and
vendors, but I think it speaks to two issues. One is capability
and maturity, but the other is innovation, and to some degree
the downside of a large vendor is the risk of a monoculture,
and the risk of some homogeneity in the way that that vendor
approaches security in the way it manages the assumptions, or
the threat model, that it has for its products. So I don't
think it's necessarily a clean cut to say bigger is better. It
can offer some efficiencies and some scale, and you will find,
in some cases, at a number of these vendors' security teams
that no other company could afford to maintain, and talent that
you're not going to find in very many places on the planet, but
that said, a mix--a composition of small and large I think is
important.
Mr. Scholl. I also--I'm sorry.
Ms. Moussouris. Go ahead, Matthew.
Mr. Scholl. When you look at the build versus buy
decision, it's not necessarily just the point issue of
acquiring, especially in software, a piece of software, but
it's a full range of life cycle costs that come with keeping
and maintaining a piece of software over time. And often in
those cases you will find industry has the persistence, to some
extent, to be able to maintain and update, especially software
now that is so dynamic in its nature in a way that sometimes
the government is not able.
Ms. Moussouris. And I'd like to add to that answer, in
terms of build versus buy, in some cases we have to participate
according to technical specifications, so even if we were to
build technology ourselves, there still may be vulnerabilities
inherent in the technical specification. That is one of the
reasons why the United States, its partners, and also the
adversaries that we have in cyberspace, participate in
international standard setting and specification setting. But
there are going to be implementation issues if an underlying
technical specification contains vulnerabilities. That is one
of the common scenarios that requires multi-party vulnerability
coordination across the supply chain.
Chairman Foster. Thank you, and I'll now recognize the
Ranking Member, Mr. Obernolte, for five minutes of questions.
Mr. Obernolte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our panelists. It's been a fascinating hearing. My first
question is for Mr. Scholl at NIST.
So one of the things that stood out to me, from reading
the GAO report was that these organizations that had not
implemented the best practices, when questioned about why they
had not implemented them, the No. 1 answer was a lack of
Federal guidance, which I think is probably going to be a
source of frustration for you. Hopefully the Executive order
will help with that, because it directs NIST to either identify
existing standards and best practices, or develop new standards
and best practices to combat this problem. Do you have a
preliminary feel for which of those two options NIST is going
to take? Are there existing standards that you'll be able to
identify, or are you going to have to write your own?
Mr. Scholl. Thank you for the question, and it's an
excellent question. We too are encouraged by the Executive
order and its ability to shine a focus on this issue not just
for the Federal agencies, but for NIST in our work as well. Our
preliminary look at fulfilling the requirements within the
Executive order will be to identify existing guidance, or even
specifics within existing guidance, that we can call out and
consolidate for use by the agencies. So, first and foremost, we
want to identify and cite work that exists rather than create
new work. After we have done that, we will work with both our
industry and our agency partners to see if there are any
critical gap areas in that existing work, and then that will
form the nucleus for any new created items that we'll have to
make. The timelines are short in getting out our initial
deliverables, and so that is going to be our approach.
Mr. Obernolte. Well, thank you, that makes sense. And
follow-on question, since you brought it up, obviously the
timelines in the Executive order are very ambitious. Do you
think that they are realistic, and does NIST have the resources
that you need to meet them?
Mr. Scholl. NIST is certainly committed to meeting all of
the objectives that NIST is assigned within the Executive
order, and we are on track and working toward achieving all of
those objectives. So currently NIST believes wholeheartedly
that we will accomplish the objectives assigned to us, and even
though the timelines for initial deliverables may be short,
NIST is also committed to applying a sense of persistence to
this activity over a much longer term. So the initial
deliverable may be short, but we also plan on staying
persistent on these issues over a much longer period of time as
well.
Mr. Obernolte. Well, great. Thank you. Well, we're
certainly looking forward to reviewing what you've come up
with. Then a question for Dr. Herr. So we've been talking about
guidance here, but obviously guidance is meaningless without
implementation. So what can be done to make the guidance that's
being developed more implementable by Federal agencies?
Dr. Herr. It's a great question, sir. I think part of the
challenge that we've seen is that much of the standards process
for software development for security, for deployment, is still
rooted in PDFs and spreadsheets, I think as you mentioned in
your opening statement, and that is a--it presents an
implementation challenge for any developer to then take that,
interpret it, and try to write it into their own tools, and
build their own organic processes and policies.
So I think the biggest thing, and we've seen calls for
this from a number of folks in the community, is automation,
right? Implementable guidance that can be pulled into common
developer tools, into integrated development environments, and
made an automated rule. And there's two sort of big drivers for
this, or reasons for this. One is that ease of implementation,
but the second is to keep pace with software development. So
not just developers of varying levels of maturity and scale.
Not everybody is a large software vendor. Many of these
security concerns are coming from open source projects, small,
not well resourced academic outfits, places where we want to
see good security practice, but we're not necessarily going to
expect a million dollar, full time security team. But the
second is to keep pace with software development, where we may
see five, 10, 15 versions of a single product in one day, and
so there is no process, no PDF-based audit framework, that is
going to allow someone to come along behind and check every box
for every one of those versions. So I think automation really
has to be the watch word. And, to the extent possible, where
NIST is appropriately resourced to provide guidance to
developers, and to those that own these development tools, on
exactly how to implement that in those programs.
Mr. Obernolte. I completely agree with you. And then
lastly here, not a question as much as a comment on, Dr. Herr,
your response to Chairman Foster's previous question, you said
that you thought that a mix of large and small companies is
vital to the supply chain, and I completely agree, but I'd also
like to highlight some other advantages of having more
companies in the supply chain is maintaining diversity in the
supply chain so that we don't have a single point of failure
that affects the rest of the chain. And so I think it's vital
that we have lots of companies in the supply chain, and--both
small and large companies, particularly small companies,
because in addition to diversity, that also creates
competition, and drives down our governmental costs. I think
we're stuck with this idea that we're going to have a lot of
companies out there, and that some of them are going to be
small, and therefore are going to be less sophisticated about
implementing these best practices. But I want to thank you very
much, and I'll yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we will now recognize
Representative Stevens for five minutes.
Ms. Stevens. Thank you so much. Mr. Scholl, how long have
you been working at NIST?
Mr. Scholl. I've been at NIST for 15 years, ma'am.
Ms. Stevens. OK, great. And I know you're--you also served
your country previously as well as a veteran, and we want to
thank you for that. And how big is your shop in your area with
the chief information, or chief--you know, cybersecurity
efforts? How many people are working with you?
Mr. Scholl. My Federal staff is at 94 headcount, and I am
augmented with post-doctoral fellows, guest researchers,
foreign guest researchers, and summer undergraduate research
fellows as well. But Federal----
Ms. Stevens. Great.
Mr. Scholl [continuing]. Staff is 94.
Ms. Stevens. Great, great. And do you mind just reminding
us your total budget? Is it 32?
Mr. Scholl. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Stevens. OK. $32 million? And I know my colleague on
the other side of the aisle asked you a nice question about
your ability to meet the Executive order, and it--very much
appreciated your response. And I'm not a fan, by the way, of--
you know, I think NIST is a great example of an agency that
does a lot with a little. I'm not a fan of bloating, and, you
know, just unnecessarily, you know, pumping up dollars in
agencies that, like yours, can do a lot with a little, but I do
think identifying, you know, that pinpoint of where we could
use additional resources could be helpful. I'm just also
wondering, could you--do you have any--you say you have 94
people, and you're working with different researchers and the
post-docs--we love hearing from them when they come to
testify--throughout NIST, but how's retention back?
Mr. Scholl. Retention is outstanding at NIST.
Ms. Stevens. Great.
Mr. Scholl. A fair amount of my workforce actually could
retire any day, and they have no intention to do so. There's a
strong commitment to mission. People feel very energetic and
energized by the purpose, and it's an outstanding set of staff
that I'm actually privileged to lead.
Ms. Stevens. Well, that's what we like to say, Mr. Scholl,
NIST is the best kept secret in government, and so I'm glad to
hear that your workforce has a high retention and a high charge
to the mission, and we want to continue to support you in all
those ways.
Katie, your company and background is just absolutely
amazing, and I'm drooling hearing your testimony, and reading
about your contribution to ISO standards, and the
implementation of those. Have you worked with NIST in any
specific ways?
Ms. Moussouris. I have been invited to work with NIST,
presented at various meetings, and I'm in the process of
potentially joining one of the advisory boards for NIST, so
Matthew and I have met a few times before.
Ms. Stevens. Wonderful. Yeah, you and Matthew have to
spend some time together, because--yeah, we're--I think what
we're getting at in this hearing is pinpointing the nexus
between where we can identify our software supply chain
opportunities with our Federal Government. You know, Dr. Foster
touched on this as well with the standards, and, you know, in
many respects I guess we'll have to come back to you, because
I'd be interested in any feedback that you have to pay about,
you know, why people aren't leveraging certain programs, you
know, is there enough outreach? And it's not programs, but, you
know, when we were brief on NIST's cybersecurity capabilities
it's like, does everyone really know about this? How are we
connecting--and, you know, we've got our NIST MEP centers as
well that are located around the country. Can you just remind
me where you're located too, Katie, if you don't mind sharing
for the record?
Ms. Moussouris. I am in the sunny Seattle area in the
Pacific Northwest.
Ms. Stevens. Right. So--yeah, and so, you know, you're
also bolstered by a strong ecosystem out there, but you could
imagine that--and I don't know if you've encountered any
partners, or people who are different geographies who haven't
been able to connect into some of the resources out there in
our Federal Government who maybe aren't as co-located by--like
entities such as yours.
Ms. Moussouris. Well, I can say that, by comparison of the
scale of what Microsoft, one major software vendor, invested in
overall cybersecurity, its budget at the time that I was last
there close to half a billion dollars in cybersecurity, with
more than 400 dedicated technical resources and others in
support of the cybersecurity mission of just one company. So I
think that, you know, when we look at--that's an outlier,
obviously, in its investment and its capabilities, but we do
have to look at this in terms of a long tailed spectrum of even
very large organizations similar in, you know, overall size of
company to Microsoft not having those types of investments in
place over many years because they weren't forced to do so,
like the operating systems were starting, you know, over 20
years ago.
Ms. Stevens. Well, great. Well, with that, thank you so
much to all of our witnesses, and I'll yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Foster. Thank you, and we will now recognize the
Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Lucas, for five
minutes.
Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a very
fascinating hearing so far. I'd like to turn to Mr. Scholl.
This Committee's one of three congressional Federal agencies
who are required to be notified within 7 days of a major cyber
incident under the Federal Information Security Modernization
Act of 2014, or FISMA, as I prefer to call it. After the
SolarWinds incident, only a handful of Federal agencies that
were breached complied with FISMA notification requirement, and
they did not consider the breach to be a major incident. These
reports are a major source of transparency and oversight for
Congress and the American people. Can you explain the process
for how Federal agencies determine what constitutes a major
incident under FISMA?
Mr. Scholl. I certainly will do my best, sir, and if need
be, I can follow up. It is my understanding that specific
guidance on definitions of major incidents come through policy
from the Office of Management and Budget to the agencies. This
is further clarified and specified by CISA, whereupon an agency
then identifies an issue first, then categorize it as
reportable or not reportable under that OMB policy guidance,
and then initially conducts the first reports back to CISA and
OMB. This is my understanding.
Often first analysis and initial forensics of an issue may
be incomplete or inaccurate, so I believe agencies are
encouraged to err to the side of reporting just to be safe, but
that lack of sometimes initial information does make the
clarity of reportable versus non-reportable incident difficult,
at least upon initial report.
Mr. Lucas. You see why that causes us great concern. Would
anybody else on the panel like to touch on this subject about
the recommendations about how to improve reporting and
transparency under FISMA?
Mr. D'Souza. Sure, if I could. A major incident is
basically an incident that's likely to result in demonstrable
harm to the U.S. interest, so, I mean, I think just from--sort
of from instinct SolarWinds would meet that criteria, but we do
know that several agencies working at the same criteria came up
with, you know, different determinations. So I think part of
what we're doing in our work, for example, is to compare the
decisionmaking by the different agencies. I do think a more
consistent interpretation of the guidance is probably something
that's going to be important.
Ms. Moussouris. I would also like to add that some of the
resources internally to investigate some of these issues are
the same resources that have to, you know, implement security
best practices, as well as performing these investigations, as
well as investigating potential vulnerability reports that
ideally have not been exploited yet. We have an overstretch of
internal cybersecurity resources across the private sector as
well with those unfilled job roles. The problem is exacerbated
across the Federal Government.
Mr. Lucas. Anyone else? Mr. D'Souza, is there presently an
oversight mechanism by which Federal agencies that fail to
implement requisite standards and best practices under ICT
SCRAM can be held accountable? And if so, can you briefly
describe that process?
Mr. D'Souza. We think that there's a weakness in this
area. There are a number of processes that Federal agencies
have to follow for oversight generally in IT security. There's
the annual FISMA reporting. DHS has authority in this area as
well through its binding operational directives. However, the
specific issue of supply chain risk management is really the
FASC, the Federal--the organization I mentioned earlier. That
is going to have sort of the enforcement ability here. And they
have not done a lot in this area. They had issued a strategic
plan, and they issued an interim rule, but more needs to be
done there. The agency inspector generals (IGs), which do the
annual FISMA evaluations, they did add one metric related to
supply chain security to their latest evaluation guidance, but
that was just added after SolarWinds, so, you know, clearly we
need to probably add more to that area going forward, and then
both the IGs and OMB are going to need to incorporate that into
their annual reporting. This is going to take, you know,
several years to really change the culture, and really make
sure agencies are dedicating the resources they need to do, but
they could do it through the existing oversight mechanisms.
Mr. Lucas. Clearly, Mr. Chairman, this is an area we need
to keep track of, and with that I yield back. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we'll now recognize the
gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter, for five minutes. Mr.
Perlmutter? You're being recognized for five minutes of
questions. And you must unmute.
Mr. Perlmutter. Sorry.
Chairman Foster. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perlmutter. I'm multitasking here. I've got a----
Chairman Foster. I know it was a last minute----
Mr. Perlmutter [continuing]. Couple things going.
Chairman Foster [continuing]. Change of order.
Mr. Perlmutter. I----
Chairman Foster. Right.
Mr. Perlmutter. Let's see. Can you hear me?
Chairman Foster. Yes.
Mr. Perlmutter. All right, good. Sorry. So I just have a
few questions. And, first, Dr. Scholl, where is your office?
Mr. Scholl. I am located in Gaithersburg, Maryland.
Mr. Perlmutter. OK. And is that where most of your staff
is?
Mr. Scholl. Correct.
Mr. Perlmutter. OK. We've been working with NIST for
several years, and I've got several of my Financial Services
Committee colleagues on here, a bill called the Data Breach
Insurance, where we've tried to use the NIST protocols for, you
know, to get small businesses, not so much because of Federal
hacking, but because of hacking that a small business might
have that then affects their lender, or their bank, which then
spreads every place. And we've been trying to use both
insurance and tax incentives, to couple those with the NIST
protocols. How do you find your protocols that you guys
established back in 2014/2015 being accepted by small business
generally? Is it--do you see it happening or not?
Mr. Scholl. We see it happening across a wide range of
both small businesses, as well as levels of use and adoption.
We have a couple of different mechanisms to do that. We have a
dedicated small business corner, where we look to tailoring and
adapting our work to small businesses. Chairwoman Stevens had
mentioned the MEP Centers as well, the Manufacturing Extension
Partnership Centers that NIST has around the country, which we
also use to tailor and amplify NIST cybersecurity products out
to small businesses through the MEP Centers as well. So we have
a couple of different mechanisms that we use to try to both
tailor our guidance so it's appropriate for a small business,
as well as reach them.
Mr. Perlmutter. OK. Thanks. I mean, I guess from the
Financial Services standpoint, we're just trying to--you know,
the banks say, well, the vendor caused this hack, and vice
versa, and who's going to pay for it? So we're going to
continue to press forward in providing incentives and promoting
that protocol. But my next question is for Ms. Moussouris and
Dr. Herr, because you both said something that was a little bit
troubling to me, and they involve sort of--I guess I'll start
with you Dr. Herr. There was an effort a number of years ago at
the Federal level to have a single portal for all the
departments, all the agencies, everything goes through there,
and it used some kind of--and, Mr. D'Souza you may recall this
too--something called EINSTEIN, or--I can't remember what the
heck it was, to try to, you know, be a first guard against
hacking. But there has always been a desire to try to have sort
of separate silos so that everything didn't get hacked at once.
I mean, what's your opinion on something like that? Do you
understand what I'm asking?
Dr. Herr. Yes, sir, and I think the question you're asking
is one that's been discussed at length over the last five to 10
years in cybersecurity. It's the debate between a walled, you
know, garden, effectively, right, a single perimeter that you
defend with your life, and acknowledging that that perimeter is
not going to save you from the enemy, and figuring out how to
adapt to that.
So EINSTEIN, as I understand it, is a multi-generational
set of systems intending to detect and mitigate attacks on
Federal networks as rapidly as possible in time potentially to
also eject them automatically. The challenge is, I think, to
the question that you're asking, is that trying to take a
network and isolate it from the outside world to keep it
pristine is what we've seen in many cases fail against both
rudimentary and sophisticated attacks, and that, in SolarWinds
and Sunburst, I think what we're seeing really good evidence of
is the need to embrace the concept that's known as assumed
breach, to look at your network, to assume that it's been
compromised, and to try to minimize the harm that any one
device or any one user can do to you as they're moving through
those networks. So I think EINSTEIN, you know, is a pathway
toward that, hopefully.
There's been some discussion about the notion of zero
trust, as you saw in the Executive order to a great extent.
Zero trust is a useful concept. It's a design philosophy.
There's a lot of maturation still required there to take that
and actually implement it into policy, but I--hopefully I think
that gets to the question you're asking.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you. And, Ms. Moussouris, do you
have a thought about that?
Ms. Moussouris. Yes. EINSTEIN, you know, has limitations,
much like many other, you know, cybersecurity tools, in that it
is limited to look for what is already known and identified. In
the SolarWinds incident, for example, that wouldn't have been
detectable using EINSTEIN, or truly any other off the shelf
tools, and that's evidenced in the fact that one of the top
companies for investigating internal compromises, FireEye, even
itself failed to detect that compromise for a few months while
the attackers were working using the SolarWind software that
they had compromised.
To your point about network segmentation internally, we do
want organizations to move away from the model of hard, crunchy
outside, soft, chewy center, so that is an apt, you know, an
apt observation of what needs to go into place. I think the
Executive order further stipulates that multi-factor
authentication needs to be applied and rolled out across
Federal Government systems, especially at access points to
critical assets. That endeavor in the Executive order, while
bold and necessary, is going to be a huge, heavy lift, so that
is something to be aware of, that parts of the solution,
including that example of rolling out multi-factor
authentication to tightly access control, or monitor the access
control, of various assets in the Federal Government, that is
going to require a very, very heavy lift.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you. My time is way over, and I
thank the Chair and Ranking Members for allowing me, and I
yield back.
Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we'll now recognize Mr.
Gonzalez for five minutes.
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses and panel for their testimony today to discuss
the importance of our cybersecurity infrastructure. SolarWinds
exposed multiple government and private sector vulnerabilities.
The witness testimonies today have illuminated some
improvements that I think we can make. I want to talk briefly
about public/private partnerships, and data and information
sharing with respect to how we solve this going forward.
I was speaking with one of my friends yesterday who works
in the industry, the cybersecurity industry, and his comment to
me was, we share information across portfolio companies, this
gentleman happens to work in private equity, with respect to
cybersecurity and cyber threats, but there's not a great
coordinating mechanism, either at the Federal level or in
private industry and we can do it with our companies, but
broadly there's less information sharing. So I guess, Ms.
Moussouris, from the industry perspective, I want to get your
insight on this notion of cyber threat sharing across agencies
and industry. Do you think there needs to be further
collaboration, and do you think one of the existing public/
private partnerships on cybersecurity is the best way to foster
this collaboration? Just help me understand, from your
perspective, what we might gain from this sort of thing.
Ms. Moussouris. Well, I think information sharing with the
private industry is very much gated upon the perceived or
actual liability for those private organizations, so that is
something that has been brought up numerous times, not just in
this hearing, as something that would need to be addressed to
provide sufficient legal cover for organizations that are
seeking to share, private organizations.
I do think that, you know, some of our issues here are
information sharing when there has been a breach versus before
the breach, which is the vulnerability coordination type of
information sharing. So when you are coordinating a
vulnerability that affects a supply chain, ideally you're doing
so ahead of a breach, so that is a different kind of
information sharing that poses its own risks, in terms of, you
know, investigations in progress up and down the supply chain,
remediation plans in progress and being coordinated up and down
the supply chain. The risks to that information sharing being
accessed by an attacker is something that is of concern,
especially with some of the Executive order breach notification
requirements that are in place, because some of the deadlines
would be occurring sort of mid-investigation of a potential
vulnerability that could lead to a supply chain attack or a
breach.
Mr. Gonzalez. And how----
Ms. Moussouris. Does that sort of answer your question?
Mr. Gonzalez. Yeah, it does. How would you recommend we
mitigate that risk, if at all? I mean, what ideas do you have
on that?
Ms. Moussouris. Well, you know, some of this has to be
built out, in terms of capability. It is why I'm recommending
maturity assessments for capabilities not just in regular
cybersecurity practices, but also in the specialized internal
practices that are required for multi-party vulnerability
coordination. Microsoft itself, with its significant investment
in cybersecurity, has only been tackling this problem head-on
of supply chain vulnerability coordination with other entities
since about 2008. When I created Microsoft Vulnerability
Research to help coordinate Dan Kaminsky's DNS (Domain Name
System) vulnerability was one of the first issues that we
coordinated industry-wide, and including our government
partners.
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you. And in your testimony you
mentioned some improvements that could be made to the software
bill of materials. Can you elaborate on some of the concerns
with creating machine-readable inventory that is uniform?
Ms. Moussouris. I have no issues with creating machine-
readable inventory that is uniform. The concerns that I have
around implementing SBOM is that, one, you know, it may yield
dividends to us, in terms of speeding up vulnerability
coordination across the supply chain in time. However, that
working group has been at it for about 3 years, has not come up
with a standard definition of what a minimum SBOM would entail,
and that is part of NIST's big heavy lift to do as part of this
Executive order, is defining what a minimum SBOM would be. An
ingredient list alone does not give you actionable information,
nor does a mapping to which CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures), which vulnerabilities, apply to those ingredients.
You actually need additional technical information, including
the exploitability of a particular sub-vulnerability that may
be included in the product package. So those are a summary of
my concerns in that area.
Mr. Gonzalez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield
back.
Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we'll now recognize Mr.
Beyer for five minutes.
Mr. Beyer. Dr. Foster, thank you very, very much. This is
really fascinating, I'm very grateful. Mr. D'Souza, how do you
live with the frustration? Let me just point out that five
months ago GAO recommended 23 agencies adopt these seven
procedures. That's--seven times 23, that's 161 opportunities to
succeed. 16 of them did it, so you've got a 10 percent
completion ratio. As I read it, 14 did nothing. They complained
about lack of guidance, and yet there was SCRM guidance from
NIST in 2015, from OMB in 2016. You put out 145 recommendations
in October 2020. As somebody who was never late with a paper,
or unprepared for a test, even if I didn't do well on the test,
how do you--well, is there any consequence for our public
leaders who just don't do their job?
Mr. D'Souza. I think--as I was commenting earlier, I think
enhanced reporting and oversight here is really going to be key
to making changes. Agencies always face, you know, more than
they--more things to do than they have time for, so they have
to make a decision about what are they going to devote the most
time to. If the status of their supply chain security programs
is routinely reported on, and measured by Congress, and
measured by OMB, and there's more transparency around these
issues, I think that they will make progress in these areas. I
think that's basically the thing that has to happen.
Mr. Beyer. Well, this slides right into a question for Ms.
Moussouris. Luta Security, you had four very good suggestions,
but the last was that Federal pay scales across the board,
especially in cybersecurity, have to be able to compete with
the private sector. I represent Northern Virginia, where every
contractor I've talked to, every business I've talked to, says
they can't find the sophisticated people that they need. How
are we--do you see any plausible political way of paying
Federal employees enough money to compete with the private
sector? Like even a third of what they could make in the
private sector?
Ms. Moussouris. Well, I think that, especially those of us
with offensive security skills that can hack into everything,
money is not our deciding driver of what we choose to do with
our talents. Mission is also very important. But even with such
an important mission, and an honor to contribute to national
security, I think there does need to be, you know, a--an effort
to uplift the cybersecurity salaries in the Federal Government.
But another part of that suggestion No. 4 in my testimony
was actually hiring and training either existing employees in
the Federal Government who desire to move into cybersecurity,
but also providing a better national pipeline for hiring
talent. Most of the cybersecurity job openings that you see are
for senior and very experienced people. We do not have a great
pipeline for entry level cybersecurity positions, which may
help with some of the talent shortage, and some of the
budgetary concerns.
Mr. Beyer. And it sounds like the talent shortage and the
budgetary concerns feed back into what Mr. D'Souza has to work
with, when, if you have people that don't have enough time,
they're overwhelmed by the challenges that they have and may
not have the training either.
As long as we're talking consequence, maybe, Ms.
Moussouris, one more thought. When any of these supply chains
things happen, or when they shut down Colonial Pipeline, and we
see the consequence ripple through the economy, and, you know,
with not much imagination, ripple through the fatality rates,
you know, it hit the hospitals, it hits pharmacies, it--what
should the consequences be? And I'm reminded of--in the Old
West, when you stole a horse, you got hung, because it was life
or death in that situation. It's life or death for so many
people right now, and yet you never hear about anybody going to
jail for violating cybersecurity. What you typically hear is
they get hired.
Ms. Moussouris. Was there a question in there for me?
Mr. Beyer. I guess I'm asking you to lay out the criminal
penalties for hacking, so----
Ms. Moussouris. You know, the Colonial Pipeline issue, as
you are aware, sir, was orchestrated by non-Americans. They
were a Russian cybercrime group, so I do think that, you know,
some additional pressure from this administration on not
harboring cybercrime groups, or turning a blind eye toward
their activities internationally, will go a long way. But in
terms of domestic cybercrime--or domestic origin cybercrime, I
do think that there's a lot of opportunity for reform in
existing cybersecurity anti-hacking laws. There's been a lot of
ambiguity and a chilling effect on good cybersecurity
researchers who happen to be able to perform very bad
activities against critical infrastructure, and only recently
have vulnerability disclosure programs been in place in the
Federal Government level, but certainly hasn't trickled down to
all of critical infrastructure in terms of allowing the public
to notify if they see something, say something in
cybersecurity.
So I do think that we need to take a look at ways to
redirect young talent in cybersecurity domestically, especially
if they got into a little bit of trouble when they were young.
I think that is a potential huge source of cybersecurity talent
eventually.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you.
Chairman Foster. Thank you. And we will now recognize Mr.
Casten for five minutes.
Mr. Casten. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
panelists. The--I want to start with my own experience, that
I'm hoping is not too stale. Before I came to Congress I ran a
company that we built and operated utility operations inside
industrials, which is to say that we managed huge campuses that
had a ton of dumb equipment, valves, traps, meters, lots of
PLC- (programmable logic controller-) based systems. And we
were sort of keenly aware that they didn't dispatch in the most
efficient possible way, but when we tried to bring in an
overarching system control to manage it, we never got
comfortable that we could maintain, I think as you described,
Ms. Moussouris, a--that hard, crunchy exterior. But we knew we
had the creamy interior, if we let them in.
And, you know, to take it maybe in less metaphorical
language, we couldn't find the software to solve the problem,
and so we're then backing up to saying, well, can we implement
the processes that would allow this? And as a mid-sized
company, we just couldn't get comfortable that we could have
the human resources, the process RAM (random-access memory) to
manage it. So my first question for you, Ms. Moussouris, is
there's a whole set of these solutions that are technical in
nature, software patches, standards, what have you. There's a
whole other set of solutions that are process in nature. When
you are advising companies in the private sector, is there a
single answer to that or--for a given problem, or does it
depend on the size of the organization?
Ms. Moussouris. It depends on a number of factors. That's
why we conduct maturity assessments, because an organization
can be at a different maturity level for different areas of
cybersecurity at a given time. Usually cybersecurity efforts
are somewhere between the basement of compliance and the
ceiling of whatever, you know, best practice trends were
successfully marketed to the CISO (chief information security
officer) of that organization. Whether or not those practices
in between are effective at securing an organization, you know,
it depends. And I've seen very large organizations struggle
with maturity in vulnerability disclosure and coordination, for
example, even when they are doing well in other areas of
cybersecurity, so there are specializations and maturity
changes over time. A recent study said that there were no magic
bullets, no definitive correlations between certain best
practices in cybersecurity and security outcomes.
Mr. Casten. OK. So the--my district is a lot of small
suburban towns, and I get--I've recently been getting the
question from a lot of the, you know, small municipal water
utilities, who are saying that they're grappling with this
issue. They've got, you know, diverse assets, and are starting
to get concerned that they're not going to be able to get the
cyber insurance they need to protect their assets because
there's no credible way that they can provide that scope of
maturity that you describe. Are there good models out there for
organizations banding together to provide some kind of an
umbrella security, right? Or does that create a security
vulnerability of its own? So, you know, should I be
recommending to all these municipals to say, you know,
everybody pitch in your 20 percent to hire a, you know, a
cybersecurity unit, or does that create more problems that we
have to be mitigating----
Ms. Moussouris. Well, there may be some problems, you
know, with having enough resources if you are relying on a
single or very few shared resources, in terms of a shared
cybersecurity team across some different organizations. But you
also run into a--you know, a--sort of a single point of failure
if that centralized security team is compromised in and of
itself. And certainly all major organizations have been
compromised at one point or another, and the adversaries do
tend to go for, you know, highly valuable information systems,
accounts, and leverage additional attacks from there. So
aggregation may have some efficiencies gained, but it also may
present an attack surface and a further overtasking of those
resources.
Mr. Casten. Well, you've maybe perfectly teed up my final
question for Dr. Herr, which is, I'm going to confess, wildly
outside the jurisdiction of this Committee. My roommate in
college senior year, his dad was a New York City beat cop for a
long time, and he joked with me at one point that he had no
idea why criminals ever committed anything but white collar
crime, because the risk/reward for white collar crime was so
much better than everything else. And the--and I share that
story because if our enemies wanted to attack and take Rhode
Island from us, there are a whole lot of rules around kinetic
warfare. But if they wanted to steal all the data from J.P.
Morgan, it's probably a lot more valuable, and there's a lot
fewer rules. So, you know, we can put all these standards in
place, but I'm curious, Dr. Herr, do we need something like a
Geneva Convention for cyber warfare that we have for kinetic
warfare?
Dr. Herr. I appreciate the question, sir, and as a native
of Massachusetts, I suspect Rhode Island would be a tough
fight. You know, I think the question that you ask about a
broader geopolitical response is a good one. I think the Geneva
Convention is a very bad model for what we talk about here for
two reasons. One, the consequence scale of the events we're
talking about on a daily basis do not come anywhere near close
to--you know, to match the horrors of chemical warfare and
nuclear conflict. The second, though, is that that sort of
broad, you know, as much of the globe as possible kind of
multi-stakeholder collaboration gets us to a point of very low
accomplishment, right? We have as many people bought into a
very small standard, a very little bit of progress, as
possible, and I think, unfortunately, the cyber norms process
has demonstrated that over the last decade.
Instead, I would suggest that our thought process for this
is, rather than a negotiated settlement or a set of rules, how
do we get more competitive? How do we--as we think about this
not as trying to prevent a catastrophe, but more like improving
our batting average, how do we get up to the plate and start
taking more walks? How do we start hitting just a few more
singles each time? And if that's about protecting some of these
lower hanging fruit--some of these targets, or if that's just
competing against many of these adversaries more effectively, I
think that gets us to a place where we're able to keep J.P.
Morgan and Rhode Island safely at home at night, where they
need to be, and avoid any sort of catastrophe down the line.
Mr. Casten. Thank you so much, and I yield back.
Chairman Foster. Thank you, and we will now recognize
Representative Ross for five minutes.
Ms. Ross. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
also to Chairwoman Stevens, for holding this very crucial and
timely meeting. I'm from North Carolina, so I want to let you
know I represent the Research Triangle area of North Carolina,
and we have a lot of tech companies there, including SASS, Red
Hat, Pendo, and the companies have a talent pipeline that comes
through our colleges and universities. And, to Ms. Moussouris's
issue of building this pipeline, we have a Secure Computing
Institute at NC State University that has become a focal point
for cybersecurity research, and at our community college, at
Wake Tech Community College, we have a--it's been designated a
National Center of Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense
Education. So I think we need a field trip to my district. I
just--I'm pitching that to the whole Committee.
And while I recognize that ransomware isn't the topic of
this hearing, the Colonial Pipeline has come up several times,
and, because it affected my district so acutely, I just wanted
to ask in particular, Dr. Herr and Ms. Moussouris, had the
requirements articulated in the May 12 Executive order been
adopted by private industry, do you think the cyber attack on
the Colonial Pipeline would've unfolded the way that it did?
Dr. Herr. I think there's no way to give a definitive
answer, unfortunately, because much of the order, which is, I
think, aspirational and positive in the direction that it's
heading, is still to be decided, and it sets up processes and
policy to be defined. But in--to your question, the focus on IT
security, and on the security of software, certainly couldn't
have hurt in the context of what Colonial faced.
Ms. Moussouris. I would say that the Colonial Pipeline
attack allegedly occurred because of a phishing--a successful
phishing attempt that was an administrator clicking on a link
that they shouldn't have. Internal network segmentation, asset
management requiring robust multi-factor authentication, may
indeed have helped slow down the ransomware attack, however,
ransomware is opportunistic. It is just a--you know, it's an
opportunistic monetization of vulnerabilities that exist, so
whether they are partly due to human error is one thing, but
certainly network segmentation and multi-factor authentication
tagged to specific assets may have helped mitigate it. It might
not have completely eliminated the possibility of that attack
taking place.
Ms. Ross. OK. Thank you both. And, Mr. Scholl, your
testimony talks about the National Cybersecurity Center of
Excellence, which is a public/private partnership that works to
address business cybersecurity challenges. And I wanted to
know, has the private sector shown any interest in the NIST
standards and best practices, and what can we do to get them
more on board? Because they just keep--can't, you know, wait
for something bad to happen, or say it costs too much. What can
we do to make them more robust participants?
Mr. Scholl. So--yeah, thank you for the question.
Mr. Baird. I'm moving, so I have turned my video off.
Mr. Scholl. The private sector has shown great interest in
NIST's work, in our--in the guidance that we've developed. This
initially was seen in 2015, when we created the cybersecurity
framework under a previous Executive order, which had
outstanding participation from the private sector in its
development. It--the cybersecurity framework, and all of NIST's
work, is voluntary for use outside of the U.S. Government, so
NIST is not a regulatory agency, nor do we wish to be one, but
we find, because of that, participation and use of our work on
a voluntary basis does seem to be rather robust. As far as
furthering that participation through other mechanisms, I'm
actually not sure what would be good leverage in order to have
that from the private sector.
Ms. Ross. OK. Well, maybe we should explore that. If
anybody has any ideas for good leverage--yes, Ms. Moussouris?
Ms. Moussouris. I think that, you know, adding Federal
procurement guidelines, and leveraging the NIST framework, and
requiring that companies that want to do business with the
Federal Government comply with some of these NIST guidelines
and standards is a good step in that direction.
Ms. Ross. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Foster. And now, without objection, we will
attempt to recognize Representative Baird, despite his having
video problems right now. If his--the audio is working, I'm--
Jim, are you available here?
Mr. Baird. I'm here. I'm here. Thank you.
Chairman Foster. OK. You're recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Baird. Thank you, sir, and good afternoon. And I
really appreciate Chairwoman Stevens and Ranking Member Waltz
of the Research and Technology Subcommittee, and Chairman
Foster, I appreciate your efforts, and Ranking Member
Obernolte, of the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee for
holding this important hearing over the SolarWinds incident.
So I guess my first question goes to Dr. Herr. In your
testimony you point out that since 2010 there have been at
least 30 different state-backed software supply chain attacks
on the United States from states including Russia, China, North
Korea, Iran, as well as others. So the United States is
increasingly being targeted with cyber attacks as the nation-
states are focusing on using cyber capabilities for malicious
intent. As the scale of our cybersecurity posture is growing at
a slower pace than emerging threats, how can the United States
shore up our cybersecurity in order to protect our networks
from our foreign adversaries?
Dr. Herr. Yes, sir, and I would point out only that those
30 attacks impacted a variety of countries, although the U.S.
was certainly a leading part of that whole. I think there's a
whole host of answers, and we could hold a number of hearings
on the topic, but I'll give you two. The first is better
combining the activities of our offensively focused
organizations with those focused on defense.
The--part of the challenge that we face is where defense
is rooted entirely on audits and compliance, it lacks the focus
on where adversaries are attempting to push their own tactics,
and their techniques, and their technologies. And so one of the
failings that we recognized, and are reporting on Sunburst, is
an inability for defenders to recognize software systems which
were relatively small and innocuous, but incredibly value to--
incredibly valuable to attackers, based on where they were
placed on the network, or the permissions that they were
granted. And so I think informing defenders with what offensive
agencies--on a more regular basis, and trying to push that
offensive mindset as defenders are choosing where to invest and
prioritize, I think, is important.
But the second, and it's been mentioned a number of times
today, is that, as we seek to improve our defensive posture, we
have to push to automate as many of these activities as
possible. There's a really good piece of work that's been done,
I think it was--the term was coined by Wendy Nather of Cisco in
2011, the notion of the cyber poverty line. The majority of the
organizations operating the technology that we care about, the
potential targets of the next decade, don't have the resources
or the internal maturity to operate at a high level of
sophistication to make many of their own choices and judgments.
They have the ability to plug things in, and hope for the best.
And so what they plug in, and how they monitor it, has to be as
capable as possible out of the box, and supported from as many
directions as possible.
So I would come back and suggest to you that while we do
have reasonable threats in these high consequence attacks, and
have a lot of conversations to be had about what the U.S. is
doing with allies outside of its borders, that at home a key
part of our focus should be trying to resource and support,
with technology that's as usable as possible, those folks that
are most likely to be the target of these events.
Mr. Baird. Thank you. Dr. Foster, do I have any time left?
I've got one more question for----
Chairman Foster. You have 1 minute and 45 seconds, and----
Mr. Baird. There we go, one minute----
Chairman Foster. 20 seconds----
Mr. Baird. 45----
Chairman Foster [continuing]. After that.
Mr. Baird. OK. So I have a joint question for Dr. Herr and
Ms. Moussouris, and that is in the months since the SolarWinds
incident it's become clear just how sophisticated this hack
was, and, with some estimating, the operation involved over
1,000 engineers. States like Russia and China they can deploy
the manpower to carry out an operation like this. So what
actions need to be taken to ensure that the United States is
capable of defending our networks at this scale? Dr. Herr, you
want to start?
Dr. Herr. Sure. I'll say only that that 1,000 engineers
number has come under significant, and I think fairly accurate,
criticism. While there were likely a large number of people,
perhaps more than 1,000, involved in processing all of the
intelligence gathered in this operation, the number involved in
actually building and maintaining the tools that targeted these
U.S. Government agencies and private sector organizations was
likely substantially smaller. What that suggests, though, is
that manpower is not a good measure of impact, and I think
we've seen that repeatedly in----
Mr. Baird. OK. Ms. Moussouris?
Ms. Moussouris. Absolutely agreed. The 1,000 engineers
number, I believe, you know, was produced by Microsoft, and by
their head lawyer, so I do not--I don't think that they're--
that that number is realistic, in terms of what we're up
against in that particular attack. I do think that our, you
know, our numbers of people who can perform some of the most
sophisticated attacks worldwide is actually a fairly small
number. I can provide references after this hearing on the
record for some of the labor market numbers that I and
colleagues at MIT and Harvard had studied the vulnerability
economy and exploit market, and estimated some of those numbers
worldwide.
So we are, you know, in the United States, obviously
needing to create more of those elite cyber warriors to have
the ability to create those types of attacks ourselves, but the
number of them tends to be fairly small worldwide because the
target gets harder and more sophisticated. The latest operating
systems, the latest phone operating systems, get hardened
further and further, and that enhances the technical needs and
the bar to meet to carry out attacks of that sophistication
level.
Mr. Baird. Thank you very much for those responses. I wish
I had time to question the other witnesses, but I'm sure I'm
out of time, so thank you, Dr. Foster, and I yield back.
Chairman Foster. Thank you. And--now, before bringing this
hearing to a close, I want to thank our witnesses for
testifying before the Committee. The record will remain open
for two weeks for additional statements from the Members, and
any additional questions the Committee may ask of the
witnesses, and the hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
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