[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM:
THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.
CAPITOL AND BEYOND
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-6
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
44-523 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Committee Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan, Chairwoman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas August Pfluger, Texas, Ranking
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Member
Eric Swalwell, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Peter Meijer, Michigan
officio) John Katko, New York (ex officio)
Brittany Carr, Subcommittee Staff Director
Adrienne Spero, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
Joy Zieh, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Elissa Slotkin, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Witnesses
Ms. Dana Nessel, Attorney General, State of Michigan:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, State of Nevada:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. John T. Chisholm, District Attorney, Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
For the Record
The Honorable Elissa Slotkin, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism:
Letter From Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General, Government of the District of Columbia..... 43
Statement of Ellen F. Rosenblum, Oregon Attorney General....... 45
Letter From Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, County of
New York..................................................... 46
Letter From National District Attorneys Association............ 47
STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM: THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.
CAPITOL AND BEYOND
----------
Wednesday, March 24, 2021
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., via
Webex, Hon. Elissa Slotkin [Chairwoman of the committee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives Slotkin, Thompson, Jackson Lee,
Langevin, Gottheimer, Malinowski, Green, Van Drew, Meijer, and
Pfluger.
Chairwoman Slotkin. The Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism will come to order. Without objection, the
Chair is authorized to declare the committee in recess at any
point. Good morning. It is my honor to be opening up the first
public hearing as the Chair of the Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Counterterrorism. Our subcommittee is meeting today to
examine State and local responses to the growing threat of
domestic terrorism and violent extremism.
Before we begin, I would like to just take a moment to
acknowledge the horrific violence we have seen in Atlanta and
in Boulder over the past week. I know we are all grieving for
the 18 Americans going about their daily life at a spa, at the
supermarket, who have been senselessly torn from their
families.
Now, this subcommittee is charged with combatting domestic
terrorism and violent extremism, among other things, and we are
united by the conviction that we simply cannot allow violence
to be normalized as part of our politics. But we have to
acknowledge that we have allowed these monstrous acts, past
acts of mass violence to become normalized as part of our
society.
While the investigations are on-going, we cannot ignore the
anguish of our Asian-American communities that they are feeling
right now. Nor can we deny the intelligence community's
warning, just last week, that lone-wolf actors, driven by hate
for swaths of our fellow citizens, pose a growing threat of
``mass casualty attacks,'' like the ones we have just seen
against innocent Americans here at home. There is nothing
political about protecting Americans from violence in our
communities, and I am determined to work together with each and
every Member of the subcommittee, regardless of party, to do
just that.
Since this is our first hearing, I want to just take a
second to make all the Members of the subcommittee aware of a
few procedural items. First, in accordance with the procedures
laid out by the Chairman and Ranking Member of the full
committee, Members will be recognized on a strict seniority
basis regardless of time of arrival. Second, I am proud of the
tradition of bipartisan cooperation this subcommittee has
enjoyed in the past. I want to remind and encourage Members to
continue operating in a manner that is respectful of other
Members, our witnesses, and in accordance with the House rules.
To be very specific, Sections 368, 369, and 370 of
Jefferson's Manual prohibit Members from imputing the motives
of another Member, a Senator, or the current President. I would
ask that this subcommittee proceed with its work on the issues
before us this Congress and that all Members do so in a
respectful manner. With that, I recognize myself for a brief
opening statement.
For the better part of the last 2 decades, since the
fateful morning of September 11, 2001, our country's framing of
our National security interests have revolved largely around
threats posed by terrorist organizations halfway around the
world in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, North Africa.
But for those of us with a background in National security,
like myself and many others on this panel, we have seen a
troubling trend in recent years.
Here at home, extremist rhetoric on-line, rising political
tensions and the proliferation of disinformation have brought
us to a boiling point. We have seen flashes of it in the last
few years. Moments that have given us a window into the threat
posed by violent domestic groups in Charlottesville in 2017, in
my own district, Lansing in 2020, and tragically, on January 6
in the Nation's Capitol.
The attack on the Capitol on the 6th and the warnings we
received from law enforcement and intelligence leaders in the
months leading up to and weeks since, have made clear that
while external threats remain, the single greatest threat to
our country right now is the threat of domestic terrorism and
the tensions and polarization between us.
For some people, the division that is rife in our country
right now will lead them to climb that ladder of escalation,
use violence or the threat of violence for political goals, and
become domestic terrorists. Taking on this threat is our top
priority. This is why our first hearing as a full committee
less than a month after the attack on January 6 was focused on
domestic terrorism and why today's hearing, the first
subcommittee hearing for the Homeland Security Committee in
this Congress, will continue that critical discussion.
As a former CIA analyst, I want to take a moment to make
sure we are all on the same page in terms of the scope and
scale of these threats and the words we use to describe them.
First, the threat we face. A week ago, today, the Secretary of
Homeland Security Ali Mayorkas testified in front of our full
committee that ``domestic violent extremism'' represents ``the
greatest threat in the homeland right now.'' That threat isn't
going away. A few weeks ago, FBI Director Wray testified that
domestic terrorism investigations have grown from around 1,000
in September, to about 2,000 after the attack on the 6th.
Director Wray testified in front of our committee last Congress
that we now have more open investigations around domestic
extremism than we do of cases of individuals connected to
foreign terrorist organizations.
Last week, the director of national intelligence in
collaboration with Justice and Homeland Security, released an
assessment warning that domestic violent extremists pose an
elevated risk to the homeland this year. This assessment
cautions that extremists will continue to be radicalized and
will mobilize around narratives of election fraud, pandemic
restrictions, conspiracy theories, and the attack on the 6th.
The threat assessment also laid out important terminology that
our intelligence and law enforcement officers use to describe
these threats. It is important that we get on the same page.
The intelligence community's foremost concern is ``racially
or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs)'', as well
as ``militia violent extremists (MVEs).'' Our intelligence
agencies have assessed that these groups pose, at present, the
most lethal domestic threat. Racially motivated extremists are
the most likely to conduct mass-casualty attacks against
civilians. Militias are likely to target law enforcement and
Government personnel and facilities. The agencies' assessment
notes that the threat is compounded by tech platforms that make
radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization easier.
As we sit here today, we are facing a new reality. The
post-9/11 era of security where the threats come from abroad is
over. In the 20 years of the post-9/11 era, they came to an end
on January 6. The new reality that we have to come to terms
with is that our extremists here at home seeking to exploit
internal division that pose the greatest threat. This is why we
are focusing on these challenges today in this hearing.
The issue is not theoretical for me and others who are on
the screen. In my own district last year, Federal and State
authorities managed to disrupt a plot by at least 14 men to
kidnap and kill our Governor, Gretchen Whitmer. The group spied
on the Governor's vacation home, conducted firearms and combat
training, and practiced building explosives. They planned to
detonate a bomb under a highway bridge to distract local
authorities as they kidnapped our Governor to relocate her to
Wisconsin for a ``trial.'' These plotters weren't affiliated
with al-Qaeda or ISIS. They didn't hail from war-torn regions
halfway around the world. They were Americans. They were
radicalized right here at home. These men were affiliated with
a group who called themselves the Wolverine Watchmen, a violent
extremist group threatening to start a civil war here in the
United States.
Even just this week, another 22-year-old man from my
district who was affiliated with this group, was charged with 2
felony counts related to modifying a semiautomatic weapon. This
is exactly what the FBI and DHS have been sounding the alarm
over. In this moment, groups like this are the ones that pose
the greatest threat to our safety and our way of life.
I am very, very grateful for the work of law enforcement at
both the State and Federal level who disrupted this terrible
plot. Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel, who is here with
us today, has led the majority of the charges against these
defendants. She has charged 8 of the extremists with
``providing material support for terrorist acts.'' Two of the 8
were additionally charged by her office with the ``threat of
terrorism.'' AG Nessel's work highlights the very reason we
have called this hearing. It lays out--today we will hear about
the patchwork of State and local and Federal laws that we have
to prosecute violent extremists.
Many of you know, although domestic terrorism is defined in
Federal law, there are no specific Federal domestic terrorism
charges. While some of these investigations may result in--some
investigations do result in serious charges, such as hate
crimes and gun charges. In the case of January 6, we have had
perpetrators charged with conspiracy and sedition. Many of
these domestic terrorism-related investigations will not
progress as terrorism-related charges.
This is a major reason why we are here today, as I said, to
understand the legal authorities we do and do not have to
prosecute domestic terrorists. In particular, to understand
whether Federal legislation is or is not needed to tackle these
threats. In the mean time, States have tried to devise their
own systems for countering domestic terrorism and hate-fueled
violence, but those approaches differ. In States like Michigan
and Texas, for example, those differences can be significant.
So, today's hearing will allow us to hear from law
enforcement leaders in 3 States about how they are working to
combat these threats and the legal tools they have and don't
have at their disposal. We will also in the subcommittee
examine how States coordinate with the Federal Government to
combat the threat and how the Federal Government can better
complement State and local communities' efforts. Our State and
local law enforcement, our attorneys general, are on the front
lines of this fight and it is great that we have them here
today to speak directly to the public on this.
So, I will just say--so, one of the things that I am
personally looking at is some legislation to ensure that DHS
has the tools that they need from an intelligence analysis
perspective to better understand these threats. One of the
things we know is we just don't do is kind-of data collection.
We just don't understand the magnitude of the threat. I hope
this is an area where myself and the other side of the aisle
can work to improve the Department of Homeland Security's
capabilities.
In addition to our witnesses, I just want to take a brief
moment to thank the attorneys general from District of Columbia
and Oregon, and the National District Attorneys Association for
their work on this topic and note that some statements they
have submitted for the record.
I am eager to hear from our witnesses today about where we
can improve and where we can, you know, follow through with
that guarantee of safety to every American. I know that we want
to set a strong tone, a bipartisan tone, and hear it in this
subcommittee.
[The statement of Chairwoman Slotkin follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Elissa Slotkin
March 24, 2021
It's an honor to be opening my first public hearing as Chair of the
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism. Our subcommittee is
meeting today to examine State and local responses to the growing
threat of domestic terrorism and violent extremism.
Before we begin, I'd like to take a moment to acknowledge the
horrific violence we've seen in Atlanta and Boulder over the past week.
I know we're all grieving for the 18 Americans going about their daily
lives, at a spa or the supermarket, who have been senselessly torn from
their families. Now, this subcommittee is charged with combatting
domestic terrorism and violent extremism--united by the conviction that
we simply cannot allow violence to be normalized as a part of our
politics. But we have to acknowledge that we've allowed these monstrous
acts of mass violence to become normalized as a part of our society.
While the investigations of these heinous attacks are on-going, we
cannot ignore the anguish that our Asian-American communities are
feeling right now. Nor can we deny the intelligence community's
warning, just last week, that lone-wolf actors--driven by hate for
swaths of our fellow citizens--pose a growing threat of ``mass casualty
attacks,'' like the ones we've just seen, against innocent Americans
here at home. There is nothing political about protecting Americans
from violence in our communities--and I am determined to work together
with each and every Member of this subcommittee, regardless of party,
to do just that.
For the better part of the last 2 decades, since that fateful
morning on September 11, 2001, our country's framing of our National
security interests have revolved largely around the threats posed by
terrorist organizations halfway around the world--in places like
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Northern Africa. But for those of us with
a background in National security, like myself and others on this
panel, we've seen a troubling trend in recent years.
Here at home, extremist rhetoric on-line, rising political
tensions, and the proliferation of disinformation have brought us to a
boiling point. We've seen flashes of it over the last few years--
moments that have given us a window into the threat posed by violent
domestic groups--in Charlottesville (2017); in Lansing (2020); and
tragically, on January 6, in the Nation's capital.
The attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, and the warnings we
have received from law enforcement and intelligence leaders in the
months leading up to and in the weeks since, have made clear that while
external threats remain, the single greatest threat to our country
right now is domestic terrorism.
Taking on this threat is our top priority: That is why our first
hearing as a full committee (less than a month after the insurrection)
focused on domestic terrorism, and why today's hearing--the first
subcommittee hearing for the Homeland Security Committee this
Congress--will continue that critical discussion.
I want to take a moment to make sure we're all on the same page, in
terms of the scope and scale of these threats, and the words we use to
describe them. First, the threat we face. A week ago today, Secretary
of Homeland Security Ali Mayorkas testified to me and our full
committee that ``domestic violent extremism'' represents the ``greatest
threat in the homeland right now.'' This threat is not going away: A
few weeks ago, FBI Director Wray testified that domestic terrorism
investigations have grown from around 1,000 in September, to about
1,400 at the end of 2020, to around 2,000 after the attack on the U.S.
Capitol this past January.
Last week, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) in collaboration with the Departments of Justice and Homeland
Security released an assessment warning that domestic violent
extremists (DVEs) pose an elevated risk to the homeland this year. The
assessment cautions that extremists will continue to be radicalized and
will mobilize around narratives of election fraud, pandemic
restrictions, conspiracy theories, and the January 6 attack on the
Capitol. That assessment also lays out the terminology that our
intelligence and law enforcement communities use to describe these
threats.
The intelligence community's foremost concern is racially- or
ethnically-motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) and militia violent
extremists (MVEs), as our intelligence agencies have assessed that
these groups present the most lethal domestic threat. Racially-
motivated extremists are the most likely to conduct mass-casualty
attacks against civilians. And militias are likely to target law
enforcement and Government personnel and facilities. The agencies'
assessment notes that the threat is compounded by tech platforms that
make the radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of extremists
easier.
As we sit here today, we are facing a new reality: The post-9/11
era of security has come to an end. The new reality we have to come to
terms with is that it's extremists here at home seeking to exploit
internal divisions within our own country that pose the greatest
threat. While the insurrection and attack against our Nation's Capitol
on January 6 has brought the threat of domestic terrorism and domestic
violent extremism to the forefront, these threats are ones we have been
dealing with for a long time in our States and local communities--which
is why we are focusing today on the challenges they face. This issue
isn't theoretical for me--it's deeply personal.
In my own district last year, Federal and State authorities managed
to disrupt a plot by at least 14 men to kidnap our Governor, Gretchen
Whitmer. The group spied on Gov. Whitmer's vacation home, conducted
firearms and combat training, and practiced building explosives. They
planned to detonate a bomb under a highway bridge to distract local
authorities as they kidnapped the Governor, and relocate her to
Wisconsin to conduct a ``trial.'' These plotters weren't affiliated
with al-Qaeda or ISIS; they didn't hail from a war-torn region halfway
around the world--they were Americans. They were White. And they were
radicalized right here at home. These men were affiliated with a group
who call themselves the Wolverine Watchmen, a violent extremist group
threatening the start of a civil war.
Even just on Monday of this week, a 22-year-old man from my
district affiliated with this group was charged with 2 felony counts
related to modifying a semiautomatic weapon. This is exactly what the
FBI and DHS have been sounding the alarm over. In this moment, groups
like this are what pose the greatest threat to our safety and way of
life. I am grateful for the work of law enforcement at both the State
and Federal level that disrupted this horrifying plot. Three of 6 of
those indicted on Federal charges were my constituents, and one of the
key raids occurred just 10 minutes from my home.
Michigan Attorney General Nessel, a dedicated public servant who is
here before us today, has led the majority of the charges against these
defendants. AG Nessel has charged 8 of the extremists with ``providing
material support for terrorist acts,'' and 2 of the 8 were additionally
charged by her office with the ``threat of terrorism.'' Now, AG
Nessel's work lays out some of the distinctions between the authorities
that State/local and Federal law enforcement can bring to bear. The
specific terrorism charges she was able to bring were only possible
because Michigan has a State-level domestic terrorism statute, and the
Michigan Constitution forbids private military units from operating
outside State authority.
As we all know here, although domestic terrorism is defined in
Federal law, there is no specific Federal domestic terrorism charge.
And while some of these investigations may result in serious charges,
such as hate crimes and gun charges--and in the case of January 6,
we've seen perpetrators be charged with conspiracy and now possibly
sedition--many of these domestic terrorism-related investigations will
not progress as terrorism-related charges.
The Federal Government has vast resources but they are not
unlimited. States have tried to devise their own systems for countering
domestic terrorism and hate-fueled violence. But those approaches
differ, and in States like Michigan and Texas, for example, those
differences can be significant. Today's hearing will allow us to hear
from law enforcement leaders in 3 States about how they are working to
counter the threat and prevent future attacks from occurring, and the
legal tools they have at their disposal to prosecute individuals
engaged in acts of domestic terrorism.
Today, the subcommittee will also examine how States coordinate
with the Federal Government to combat the threat and how the Federal
Government can better complement State and local communities' efforts.
Our State and local law enforcement--our attorneys general--are on the
front lines of the fight against domestic terrorism and violent
extremism as it threatens our communities.
As Federal lawmakers, we have a responsibility to make sure they
have the resources and support they need to tackle this threat--whether
in the form of intelligence sharing or through material support.
On January 6, we saw first-hand the consequences of failing to meet
this challenge. As many of you know, I served 3 tours in Iraq alongside
our military during my time as a CIA analyst. Never in my life did I
think that the training I went through in war zones would be necessary
here at home, let alone in the U.S. Capitol where I come to work every
day. But at the beginning of this year, I felt like I had been
transported back to that place. No American should feel threatened in
that way on U.S. soil ever again, and I know all of us here are
committed to making sure the events that took place on that day never
repeat themselves.
I look forward to introducing legislation soon to ensure that DHS
has the tools it needs from an intelligence analysis perspective to
better understand the threats. And I hope that this is an area where my
Republican colleagues can work with me to improve the Department's
capabilities. I also want to thank the attorneys general from the
District of Columbia and Oregon, the Manhattan district attorney, and
the National District Attorneys Association for their work on this
topic and the statements they submitted for the record.
I am eager to hear from our witnesses today about where
improvements can be made to guarantee the safety of every American, and
I'm eager to work with all of you on this subcommittee, on a bipartisan
basis, to achieve that important goal.
Chairwoman Slotkin. With that, I thank the witnesses for
being here, and I recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman
from Texas, Mr. Pfluger, for an opening statement.
Mr. Pfluger. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for holding this
hearing. Thank you for your commitment to work in a bipartisan
way on a topic that is very important to all Americans. I
appreciate that commitment to work across the aisle and to make
sure that we assess this space in a threat-based, fact-based
way.
As we saw in our first official briefing as a subcommittee
a couple of weeks ago, sometimes getting the straight answers
from agencies can be tough. It is incumbent upon all of us to
ask those hard questions and to get to the root of any sort of
violence that is affecting our country. Violent extremism in
any form is unacceptable.
In addition to the recent attacks on the Capitol, we have
seen over the summer, attacks on Federal buildings throughout
the country. Whether it is far left groups or far right groups,
including a plot to kidnap the Governor of Michigan, it is
completely unacceptable in this country to live or have a
threat of fear, which is what terrorism, foreign or domestic,
would have us do. Many of these violent threats are being
driven by rampant disinformation and misinformation on-line.
They have left Federal, State, and local authorities with new
unprecedented challenges on dealing with this.
All of this has led to worthwhile discussions and debates
around the merits of whether new criminal statutes are needed
to combat domestic terrorism. But at the end of the day, it is
so important that we protect our First Amendment while keeping
our citizens safe.
In the wake of the attacks on 9/11, Washington did pass
many laws that impacted our National security and still do, to
this day. I think that our country has benefited from those
greatly. But I also want to make sure that if some of those
were done in a knee-jerk way, that we also take a very
thoughtful and measured approach at this point in time, and
that we consider the effects that may not be immediate but
could be far-reaching in the future. I know that we have had
many of those conversations to assess that.
Today, I hope to hear from our panel witnesses their views
on their own State domestic terror laws, as well as the
efficacy of existing Federal criminal offenses that are used in
domestic terror cases. I hope that we will be able to
understand the Department of Homeland Security's Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program to see how
effective and whether the program is working. If not, how we
can make that better to combat our terror threats within the
country.
It is incumbent upon those on this subcommittee to ensure
that the Department of Homeland Security is doing everything in
their power to protect American citizens across the range of
threats in this country that we are facing right now. I know
and agree with everything that you said that our officers, CBP
officers, and otherwise throughout the Department of Homeland
Security, are on the front lines and are doing everything that
they possibly can. I salute those officers and personnel who
are willing to risk their lives for American citizens every
single day.
We look forward to working with the State and local
authorities. I would like to thank all of the witnesses that
are here, those that we have also talked to in the past week,
to get a better understanding of what we need to do to make
sure that we do protect American life.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and appreciate
the willingness of them to join. With that, Madam Chair, thank
you for your leadership and your commitment to working in a
bipartisan way to keep Americans safe. I yield back at this
time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Pfluger follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member August Pfluger
March 24, 2021
Thank you, Madam Chair, and I am pleased that the subcommittee is
holding this hearing today on a topic that is very top-of-mind for many
Americans these days. I appreciate your commitment to work in a
bipartisan way to address all terror threats facing this country.
As we saw in our first official briefing as a subcommittee, getting
straight answers from the agencies we oversee can be a difficult task;
however, I am committed to working closely with you on these issues.
Violent extremism by any group of any political persuasion is
unacceptable.
Many of these violent threats are being driven by rampant
disinformation and misinformation on-line, and has left Federal, State,
and local authorities with new, unprecedented challenges. All of this
has led to worthwhile discussions and debates around the merits of
whether new criminal statutes are needed to combat domestic terrorism.
At the end of the day: We must protect our first amendment.
In the wake of the attacks on 9/11, Washington passed many laws
which impact the National security space to this day. Some of these
laws were well thought-out and have benefited the American people
greatly. Others were made as a knee-jerk reaction. We need to make sure
we are taking a thoughtful and measured approach to the legislation we
consider in Congress.
Today, I hope to hear from our panel of witnesses their views on
their own State domestic terror laws, as well as the efficacy of
existing Federal criminal offenses used in domestic terror cases. I
also hope to hear from them how State and local authorities utilize
Federal grant programs, including the Department of Homeland Security's
Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) grant program. We
must determine not only how, but if, this programming is working to
combat the terror threat in our local communities.
It is incumbent upon those of us on this subcommittee to ensure
that the Department of Homeland Security is doing everything it can to
protect Americans from domestic violent extremists. DHS should be at
the forefront of information sharing, intelligence analysis, and threat
mitigation.
We look forward to working with State and local authorities and
having a bipartisan discussion to learn more about how we can assist
these important partners in their efforts to combat the terror threat.
I thank our witnesses for their willingness to appear before the
subcommittee, today, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. I now
welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness is Michigan
Attorney General Dana Nessel, a former criminal prosecutor and
civil rights attorney. Attorney General Nessel was sworn in as
Michigan's 54th attorney general in January 2019. As Michigan's
chief law enforcement officer, Attorney General Nessel oversees
one of the most robust State terrorism statutes in the Nation.
Our second witness is Nevada Attorney General Aaron Ford.
Before serving as the AG for Nevada, AG Ford served as the
majority leader of the Nevada State Senate. In 2019, Mr. Ford
sponsored new legislation aimed at countering sovereign
citizens, an anti-Government extremist movement, particularly
in Nevada, by prohibiting the creation of fake judicial
documents, which is a common tactic for adherence of this
movement.
Our third and final witness is Milwaukee County District
Attorney John Chisholm. District Attorney Chisholm's office
handles criminal cases for the State of Wisconsin in the
Milwaukee County Circuit Court. DA Chisholm led Milwaukee
County's response to the 2012 white supremacist terrorist
attack on a Sikh temple in Oak Tree, Wisconsin.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize
his or her statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Attorney
General Nessel. Please go ahead.
STATEMENT OF DANA NESSEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF MICHIGAN
Ms. Nessel. All right. Thank you so much, Chairwoman
Slotkin, Ranking Member Pfluger, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism. Good
morning and thank you for the invitation to appear before you
today. Again, my name is Dana Nessel and I am the attorney
general and chief law enforcement officer of the great State of
Michigan. I am honored to be with you this morning and I share
in your commitment to explore ways that we can better confront
and combat issues related to domestic terrorism. It is my firm
belief that this growing threat is one of the most serious
National security issues we face and that it must be addressed
in a bipartisan manner with local, State, and Federal agencies
partnering together to ensure that this country and our
democracy is defended against all enemies, both foreign and
domestic.
Now, Michigan is no stranger to the threat of domestic
terrorism. In many ways, my State has served as ground zero for
anti-Government militia extremism since the 1990's when it was
discovered that the Michigan Militia had ties to Oklahoma City
bombers Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. Though it has been
more than 25 years since the Oklahoma City bombing, acts of
domestic terrorism still tear at the very fabric of this
country. Just last year, my office, as you noted, charged 8
leaders and associates of the anti-Government extremist
militia, Wolverine Watchmen, with supporting a terrorist plot
to kidnap and kill the Governor of our State, to hold members
of our State legislature hostage in our State Capitol for days
before ultimately destroying it, and planning to harm law
enforcement officers who protect and serve our State residents.
The U.S. Attorney's Office charged another 6 individuals
stemming from the same investigation.
In addition, Michigan has recently seen a deluge of threats
to legislators, judges, and other Government officials on both
sides of the political aisle.
In just the past 6 months, we have issued charges against
individuals in 5 separate cases for threatening public
officials. That is honestly just the tip of the iceberg. We
have been asked to review so many cases that my department had
to establish a special procedure for complaint intake and add
additional prosecutorial resources to handle complaint review.
Though the factual nature of the claims may be different,
my experience in Michigan has demonstrated that acts of
domestic terrorism are not focused on one political party or
even one branch of government, and the threat that they present
is ever-rising. Moreover, anti-Government militia extremism and
racially-motivated violent extremism is not unique to Michigan.
FBI Director Christopher Wray has acknowledged in testimony
before the Senate earlier this month that far-right-wing
extremists are the most significant terrorist threat facing the
United States. In his testimony, he stated that at any given
time, the FBI has approximately 2,000 domestic terrorism
investigations, and he has repeatedly warned of the mounting
domestic terror threat in recent years. He has acknowledged
that racially-motivated violent extremists are also one of the
most significant domestic terrorism threats. Of these, the most
lethal attacks over the last few years have involved white
supremacists.
So, in light of this serious and growing threat, I have
expanded my department's Hate Crimes Unit to now include
domestic terrorism because of the overlap of extremist
ideologies. I have also directed my department to work with the
FBI and Michigan State Police and to prioritize these cases for
prosecutorial review. Now luckily, Michigan is uniquely
situated to address domestic terrorism because of the Michigan
Anti-Terrorism Act. This act went into effect with bipartisan
support in April 2002 following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Our legislature recognized that laws should be enacted to
adequately address the threats of terrorism against targets in
our State. These statutes criminalize domestic terrorism by
providing State prosecutors with the tools necessary to
prosecute as 20-year felonies the following: Acts of domestic
terrorism, providing material support or resources for
terrorism, hindering prosecution of terrorism, communicating
true or false threats of terrorism, disrupting
telecommunications of public safety, education, or Government
operations, and obtaining blueprints or security diagrams for
terrorism to vulnerable targets like school buildings, houses
of religious worship, stadiums, and infrastructure.
In addition to the Michigan Anti-Terrorism Act, my office
has utilized or could utilize Michigan gang statutes to charge
individuals acting on behalf of a group and statutes that
criminalize the impersonation of a police officer and the
training with firearms and explosives in furtherance of civil
disorder.
Now, while Michigan has a robust array of laws to address
domestic terrorism, many States and Federal prosecutors do not.
For example, while Federal prosecutors have laws that address
providing material support for designated foreign terrorist
organizations, there are no laws to address domestic terrorists
or home-grown violent extremists. That is a gap that my
department has used our State laws to fill, but to fully combat
domestic terrorism across the country, changes to Federal
criminal laws must be made. Moreover, because we are on the
front line of this battle, Federal funding is needed for State
law enforcement offices, like mine, so that we can dedicate
staff and resources to this cause. If States are doing the
heavy lifting, they must be adequately resourced.
Last, and importantly, I want to emphasize that terrorism
is a messaging crime. Domestic terrorists seek to send a
message of fear to intimidate and coerce the conduct of
government, all government. Government must send its own
message back by labeling extremist violence as domestic
terrorism. Labels matter. Prosecuting hate-motivated attackers
as terrorists sends the clear message that the threat of
extremism is just as significant when it is based on domestic,
political, religious, or social ideologies as it is when it is
based on violent jihadism.
We need bipartisan and aggressive solutions to the problem
of domestic terrorism because acts of domestic terrorism don't
just harm the target of the crime, they threaten the very
foundations of our democracy. The January 6 Capitol riots
sparked an important National conversation about the potential
dangers of domestic terrorism, but confronting this threat
requires more than just talk. It requires swift action.
For these reasons, I applaud this committee for taking this
important step and starting this conversation. I appreciate the
opportunity to share with you the actions that we are taking
here in Michigan to address this growing crisis.
I stand ready to work with you in all ways possible to help
fight terrorism within our borders, to keep our citizens safe,
and to keep the wheels of our democracy turning. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nessel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dana Nessel
Chairwoman Slotkin, Ranking Member Pfluger, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, good
morning and thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. My
name is Dana Nessel and I am the attorney general--and chief law
enforcement officer--of the great State of Michigan. I'm honored to be
with you this morning and I share in your commitment to explore ways
that we can better confront, and combat issues related to domestic
terrorism. It is my firm belief that this growing threat is one of the
most serious National security issues that we face and that it must be
addressed in a bipartisan manner with local, State, and Federal
agencies partnering together to ensure that this country--and our
democracy--is defended against all enemies, both foreign and domestic.
Michigan is no stranger to the threat of domestic terrorism. In
many ways, my State has served as ground zero for anti-Government
militia extremism since the 1990's when it was discovered that the
Michigan Militia had ties to Oklahoma City bombers Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols. Though it has been more than 25 years since the Oklahoma
City bombing, acts of domestic terrorism still tear at the very fabric
of this country. Just last year, my office charged 8 leaders and
associates of the anti-Government extremist militia, Wolverine
Watchmen, with supporting a terroristic plot to kidnap and kill the
Governor of our State; to hold members of our State legislature hostage
in our State capitol for days before ultimately destroying it; and,
planning to harm law enforcement officers who protect and serve our
State residents. The U.S. Attorney's Office charged another 6
individuals stemming from the same investigation. In addition, Michigan
has recently seen a deluge of threats to legislators, judges, and other
Government officials on both sides of the political aisle. In just the
past 6 months, we have issued charges against individuals in 5 separate
cases for threatening public officials. That's just the tip of the
iceberg--we've been asked to review so many cases that my department
had to establish a special procedure for complaint intake and add
additional prosecutorial resources to handle complaint review.
Though the factual nature of the claims may be different, my
experience in Michigan has demonstrated that acts of domestic terrorism
are not focused on one political party or even one branch of government
and the threat that they present is ever-rising. Moreover, anti-
Government militia extremism and racially-motivated violent extremism
are not unique to Michigan.
FBI Director Christopher Wray has acknowledged in testimony before
the Senate earlier this month that far-right-wing extremists are the
most significant domestic terrorism threat facing the United States. In
his testimony, he stated that at any given time, the FBI has
approximately 2,000 domestic terrorism investigations, and has
repeatedly warned of the mounting domestic terror threat in recent
years. He has acknowledged that racially-motivated violent extremists
are also one of the most significant domestic terrorism threats. Of
these, the most lethal attacks over the last few years have involved
white supremacists.
In light of this serious and growing threat, I have expanded my
Department's Hate Crimes Unit to now include Domestic Terrorism because
of the overlap of extremist ideologies. I have also directed my
department to work with FBI and Michigan State Police and to prioritize
these cases for prosecutorial review. Luckily, Michigan is uniquely
situated to address domestic terrorism because of the Michigan Anti-
Terrorism Act. This act went into effect with bipartisan support in
April 2002 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Our legislature recognized
that laws should be enacted to adequately address the threats of
terrorism against targets in our State. These statutes criminalize
domestic terrorism by providing State prosecutors with the tools to
prosecute as 20-year felonies:
acts of domestic terrorism
providing material support or resources for terrorism
hindering prosecution of terrorism
communicating true or false threats of terrorism
disrupting telecommunications of public safety, education,
or Government operations; and,
obtaining blueprints or security diagrams for terrorism to
vulnerable targets like school buildings, houses of religious
worship, stadiums, and infrastructure.
In addition to the Michigan Anti-Terrorism Act, my office has
utilized or could utilize Michigan gang statutes to charge individuals
acting on behalf of a group and statutes that criminalize the
impersonation of a police officer and the training with firearms and
explosives in furtherance of a civil disorder.
While Michigan has a robust array of laws to address domestic
terrorism, many States and Federal prosecutors do not. For example,
while Federal prosecutors have laws that address providing material
support for designated ``foreign terrorist organizations,'' there are
no laws to address domestic terrorists, or ``home-grown'' violent
extremists. This is a gap that my Department has used our State laws to
fill, but to fully combat domestic terrorism across the country,
changes to Federal criminal laws must be made. Moreover, because we are
on the front line of this battle, Federal funding is needed for State
law enforcement offices--like mine--so that we can dedicate staff and
resources to this cause. If States are doing the heavy lifting, they
must be adequately resourced.
Last, and importantly, I want to emphasis that terrorism is a
messaging crime. Domestic terrorists seek to send a message of fear to
intimidate and coerce the conduct of Government. Government must send
its own message back by labeling extremist violence as domestic
terrorism. Labels matter. Prosecuting hate-motivated attackers as
terrorists sends the clear message that the threat of extremism is just
as significant when it is based on domestic political, religious, or
social ideologies as it is when based on violent jihadism.
We need bipartisan and aggressive solutions to the problem of
domestic terrorism because acts of domestic terrorism don't just harm
the target of the crime, they threaten the very foundations of our
democracy. The January 6 capitol riots sparked an important National
conversation about the potential dangers of domestic terrorism. But
confronting this threat requires more than talk--it requires swift
action. For these reasons, I applaud this committee for taking this
important step and starting this conversation and I appreciate the
opportunity to share with you the actions we are taking in Michigan to
address this growing crisis.
I am ready to work with you in all ways possible to help fight
terrorism within our borders; to keep our citizens safe; and to keep
the wheels of our democracy turning.
Thank you.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Thank you, Attorney General Nessel, for
your testimony. I now recognize Attorney General Ford to
summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF AARON D. FORD, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF NEVADA
Mr. Ford. Thank you so much, Chairwoman Slotkin, Ranking
Member Pfluger, who incidentally, I am born and raised in
Texas. I have been a Nevadan for 20 years and have a lot of
affinity for Texas with my family still being there. So, I
bring you greetings. Distinguished Members of the subcommittee,
including Sheila Jackson Lee, who I have worked with in the
past on several issues.
My name is Aaron D. Ford, attorney general for the State of
Nevada. I would like to thank Congresswoman Slotkin for the
opportunity to speak here. I would like to also congratulate
and to welcome my good colleague and friend Attorney General
Dana Nessel, who has unfortunately been on the front line of
combat in domestic terrorism, as well as Milwaukee County
District Attorney John Chisholm, who has seen his unfair share
of domestic terrorism taking place in his city as well. Thank
you, again, for inviting me to this important conversation
about ways we can prevent and respond to domestic terrorism.
Nevada is no stranger to violent acts. On October 1, 2017,
Las Vegas became the site of the deadliest mass shooting in our
country's history. Sixty innocent people were killed and nearly
1,000 injured, all who were simply trying to enjoy a music
festival. This tragedy shook our community and terrified the
Nation. We all know too well the pain that our fellow Americans
in Atlanta, Georgia and Boulder, Colorado are feeling right
now. Our hearts go out to those communities.
As much as I would like to say that was an isolated
incident, we all know that that is not true. It is one of a
handful of tragic events over the last decade. Nevada continues
to grapple with domestic violent extremism, whether it be anti-
Government extremists who threaten or commit violence against
the Government, racially or ethnically motivated violent
extremists who target certain people, or extremists that
utilize undefined ideologies to justify their violence.
An incident in 2014, in Bunkerville, Nevada, involved an
armed militia comprised of anti-Government activists who
confronted the Bureau of Land Management over a land dispute.
They aimed loaded weapons at law enforcement in what came to be
known as the Battle of Bunkerville. Not long after this
incident, two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department officers
and a good Samaritan were murdered in Las Vegas by anti-
Government extremists. Just last year, a Nevada highway patrol
trooper was killed in the line of duty by an individual who
demonstrated anti-Government extremist tendencies. Currently,
the Clark County District Attorney's Office and the United
States Attorney for the District of Nevada are jointly
prosecuting an attempted bombing planned by perpetrators
associated with the Boogaloo Bois, which is a loosely organized
far-right anti-Government extremist movement.
Terms such as domestic violent extremism and domestic
terrorism do not always mean the same thing to everyone. In
fact, the October 1, 2017 shooting was not considered an act of
terrorism under Federal law, presumably due to the lack of
known political motivation and lack of international nexus. The
perpetrator of this heinous crime was referred to as a ``lone
wolf.'' The phrase lone wolf has been used to reference many
culprits of mass violence who are usually White. Calling
someone a lone wolf implies that they are not terrorists
because they are not connected to a State sponsor of terrorism
or other group organized around a political ideology. However,
had the perpetrator of the 2017 mass shooting survived, he
likely would have been charged as a terrorist under Nevada law.
Nevada Revised Statutes defines acts of terrorism and
creates criminal penalties for acts of terrorism or attempted
acts of terrorism. This law was passed in the aftermath of 9/11
and it has proven to be a powerful tool for Nevada in charging
terrorists. The Nevada terrorism statute does not require us to
prove hate, political ideology, or other motivation. Nevada law
defines terrorism as sabotage, coercion, or violence which is
intended to ``cause great bodily harm or death to the general
population'' or substantial destruction, contamination, or
impairment to a building, infrastructure, utilities, or natural
resources.
You may be familiar with and you have recently heard the
term, sovereign citizens. These individuals do not recognize
the authority of any government or our laws. The movement also
has racist and anti-Semitic ties, believing that certain racial
and ethnic groups have taken over our Government and financial
institutions.
The sovereign citizens movement is considered by the FBI as
domestic terrorism, extremism. Experts with the Southern Nevada
Counter Terrorism Center estimate that as many as 500 sovereign
citizens reside here in Nevada representing the largest
domestic terrorism threat in our State. Sovereign citizens are
responsible for the murders of Las Vegas metropolitan police
officers that I referenced earlier in my testimony.
A common tactic of sovereign citizens is to serve false
legal documents such as summons, fines, or even arrest warrants
on representatives of the Government from their own made-up
courts. Sovereign citizens often target law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, and judges as we are viewed as enforcing
laws that they do not recognize. Even our broad definition of
terrorism was not sufficient to address some of the common
tactics of domestic terrorists.
In 2019, I personally sponsored a bill in the Nevada State
legislator that criminalized simulated or fake legal documents
purporting to be from false courts with the intent to harass or
defraud someone. When testifying on the bill I sponsored, a
detective with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
assigned to the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center said
that he and other officers received fake indictments and arrest
warrants for treason. The penalty for treason is death. The
goal of this legislation was to crack down on this tactic used
by sovereign citizens whether the tactic is being used as part
of a scam or used to target and threaten violence.
One of the questions that the subcommittee posed to us is
whether in light of January 6, 2021, that attack on the
Capitol, additional Federal legislation is needed to combat
domestic terrorism. So, in my opinion, does Federal law need a
refresh? To use a lawyer's term of art, it depends. There are
no easy fixes in the fight against domestic terrorism. With the
rise of domestic violent extremism, there is no question that
something needs to be change so that can ensure public safety.
I would recommend that we take a measured approach to
enacting new laws regarding counterterrorism to include the
protection of privacy, free speech, and the right to bear arms.
It is important for us to assess and balance the rights of
individuals with matters of security and safety.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Excuse me.
Mr. Ford. There are----
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Aaron D. Ford
March 24, 2121
Chairwoman Slotkin, Ranking Member Pfluger, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, my name is Aaron D. Ford, attorney general
for the State of Nevada. Thank you for inviting Nevada, along with
other members of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG)
to this important conversation about ways in which we can collaborate
and respond to domestic terrorism.
a. nevada is no stranger to violent acts and domestic terrorism
Nevada is no stranger to violent acts. Las Vegas became the site of
the largest mass casualty incident in the United States on October 1,
2017, which tragically took the lives of 60 innocent people and injured
nearly 1,000, all who were simply trying to enjoy a music festival.
This tragic incident shook our community and terrified the Nation.
As much I would like to say that this was an isolated incident of
violence in our State, it is only one of a handful of tragic events
that have occurred within the Silver State over the last decade. Nevada
continues to grapple with domestic violent extremism, whether it be
anti-Government extremists who have threatened to, or have committed,
violence against the Government; racially- or ethnically-motivated
violent extremists that target certain population groups; or extremists
that utilize undefined ideologies to justify their violence. An
incident in 2014, in Bunkerville, Nevada, involved an armed militia
comprised of anti-Government activists who confronted the Bureau of
Land Management over a land dispute. They aimed loaded weapons at law
enforcement in what came to be known as the ``Battle of Bunkerville.''
Many in law enforcement consider the activists to be extremists or
domestic terrorists. While there was no loss of life because of this
event, the stand-off was the largest armed uprising against the Federal
Government in decades, inspiring militias across the United States.
People involved in the ``Battle of Bunkerville'' later moved to Oregon
and led a 41-day occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge.
Not long after, in 2014, 2 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD) officers and a Good Samaritan were ambushed in Las Vegas by
anti-Government extremists, losing their lives. Had the extremists
survived, there is a possibility they may have been charged as
terrorists under Nevada law. Just last year, a Nevada Highway Patrol
trooper was killed in the line of duty by an individual who
demonstrated anti-Government extremist tendencies.
Terms such as ``domestic violent extremism'' and ``domestic
terrorism'' do not always mean the same thing to everyone. In fact, the
2017 shooting was not considered an act of terrorism under Federal law,
presumably due to the lack of known political motivation and lack of
international nexus. The perpetrator of this heinous crime was commonly
referred to as a ``lone wolf.'' The phrase ``lone wolf'' has been used
to reference many culprits of mass violence who are usually White.
Calling someone a ``lone wolf'' implies that they are not terrorists
because they are not connected to a State sponsor of terrorism or other
group centrally organized around a political ideology. However, had the
perpetrator of the 2017 mass shooting survived, he could have, and
likely would have been, charged as a terrorist under Nevada law because
Nevada law does not require a political motive or link to international
terror groups.
b. nevada's definition of terrorism allows for prosecution based on the
extent and type of harm rather than on the motivation underlying it
Nevada Revised Statues defines ``Acts of Terrorism'' and creates
criminal penalties for Acts of Terrorism or Attempted Acts of
Terrorism. This law was passed in the aftermath of 9/11 and has proved
to be a powerful tool for Nevada in charging terrorists. The Nevada
terrorism statute does not require us to prove hate, political
ideology, or other motivation. Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.4415 defines
terrorism as an attempted use of sabotage, coercion, or violence which
is intended to ``Cause great bodily harm or death to the general
population'' or substantial destruction, contamination, or impairment
to a building, infrastructure, utilities, or natural resources/
environment. The laws used to prosecute terrorism and other related
crimes as I just defined include:
Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.445: Acts of terrorism or attempted
acts of terrorism.
Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.4408: Threats or conveying false
information concerning acts of terrorism.
Nev. Rev. Stat. 203.117: Criminal Syndicalism (rarely
used.)
Nev. Rev. Stat. 412.604: Laws Relating to ``Militias''
where it is unlawful to drill or parade with arms by voluntary
company or voluntary organization without license or consent of
Governor (rarely used.)
Nev. Rev. Stat. 203.080: Makes it a misdemeanor for ``any
body of individuals other than municipal police, university or
public school cadets or companies, militia of the State or
troops of the United States, to associate themselves together
as a military company with arms without the consent of the
Governor.''
Under Nevada law, terrorism can also be charged as an enhancement
(Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.1685.) Enhancements allow for an additional
penalty of 1-20 years in prison that must run consecutive to an
underlying conviction. Hate-motivated crimes can only be charged as an
enhancement under current Nevada law (Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.1675.) In
Nevada there are also prohibitions against certain persons possessing
firearms (Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360) or the sale or possession of tear
gas, bombs, or weapons which are not permitted under Nevada law (Nev.
Rev. Stat. 202.360.)
c. nevada is addressing the growing threat of ``paper terrorists''
You may be familiar with the term ``sovereign citizens.'' These
individuals do not recognize the authority of local, State, or Federal
Governments or our laws. For years, the FBI has recognized the
sovereign citizen movement as domestic terrorism extremism. Experts
with the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center estimate that as many
as 500 sovereign citizens reside in Nevada, representing the largest
domestic terrorism threat in our State. The movement also has racist
and anti-Semitic ties, believing that certain racial and ethnic groups
have taken over the Government and financial institutions.
A common tactic of sovereign citizens is to serve false legal
documents such as summons, fines, or even arrest warrants on
representatives of the Government from their own made-up courts.
Sovereign citizens often target law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
and judges as we are viewed as enforcing laws they do not recognize.
Some sovereign citizens file false liens against properties to prevent
their sale, fake tax returns, or other documents as the basis of
financial fraud. For example, sovereign citizens have served fake court
documents to Nevadans, especially seniors, ordering that person to pay
a fine or another amount as part of a scam.
What can begin as a nuisance can quickly escalate to violence. In
2014, the 2 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police officers referenced earlier
were murdered by sovereign citizens. After shooting the officers, the
murderers draped the Gadsden flag \1\ over their bodies with a note to
``Tell the Police that the revolution has begun.'' In another incident,
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police infiltrated a plot to kidnap and execute
police. When testifying on the bill I sponsored, a detective with the
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police assigned to the Southern Nevada Counter
Terrorism Center Stated that he and other officers received fake
indictments and arrest warrants for treason and ``the penalty for
treason is death.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sottile, Leah (August 19, 2020). ``Inside the Boogaloo:
America's Extremely Online Extremists.'' The New York Times. Retrieved
November 7, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2019, I sponsored a bill in the Nevada State legislature that
criminalized simulated or fake legal documents purporting to be from
false courts with the intent to harass or defraud someone. The goal of
this legislation was to crack down on this tactic used by sovereign
citizens, whether the tactic is being used as part of a scam or used to
target and threaten violence.
d. we are working to address gaps in prevention, investigations, and
partnerships across local, state, and federal agencies
Federal funding is a much-needed resource in a State's fight
against domestic terrorism. Federal assistance after a domestic
terrorism event is critical to a State's ability to respond to, and
recover from, a mass violence or domestic terrorism event, and should
be considered in the analysis of a Federal law change. The way an
incident is defined in law has an impact on how response and recovery
can be funded.
After the 2017 mass shooting, Nevada received Federal funding, but
it did not fall under the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act. Other mass casualty incidents that preceded 1 October,
such as the Pulse nightclub shooting, were not granted assistance under
the Stafford Act. The definition of ``major disaster'' in the Stafford
Act that dictates eligibility is very restrictive as it relates to
terrorist attacks if the event does not include a fire or explosion. We
can all agree that mass shootings can be no less deadly or horrific
than an explosion, but it is uncertain if the current definition in the
Stafford Act would include these events. In the case of the 2017 mass
shooting, the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services received a
grant from U.S. Department of Justice's Anti-terrorism Emergency
Assistance Program, which was utilized for the overtime needed to
respond to the event, as well as mental health treatment.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program (AEAP),
available at https://ovc.ojp.gov/program/antiterrorism-and-emergency-
assistance-program-aeap/overview.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the investigatory side of terrorism, more tools are needed for
prevention and further legislation could help satisfy that need.
Existing law enforcement tools used by first responders working to
mitigate domestic terrorism include Fusion Centers, emergency
management systems, and information sharing through Suspicious Activity
Reports (SARS.) Still, we can do better by increasing partnerships,
improving the accuracy of shared information, and more expedient SARS
follow-up. One suggestion I have heard from law enforcement would be to
implement a State-wide notification process like the Amber Alert
System.
We need more data to determine trends and provide information about
who are domestic terrorists. It would be helpful to have more
flexibility for Federal law enforcement agencies to share information
with local law enforcement, especially when serving on joint task
forces. The Domestic National Terrorism Data Act, Sect 5602 of fiscal
year 20220 [sic] National Defense Authorization Act, may help in some
of these areas.
State, local, and Federal agencies work both independently and in
collaboration with each other to combat domestic terrorism. Imagine a
Venn diagram where the work we do intersects. When these partnerships
fail, domestic terrorism thrives. It matters who is investigating
domestic terrorism and the diversity of thought and background within
the ranks of law enforcement. Diversity is an advantage in law
enforcement because it helps guard against groupthink and blind spots.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
(1) Local Prosecutors are on the Front Line
The Clark County District Attorney's Office, Major Violator's Unit,
has been most active in prosecuting crimes under Nevada's Terrorism
statutes. Since 2016, the CCDA has been working hand-in-hand with
Federal agents through the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center.
This enables them to work with Federal prosecutors wherein subjects can
be charged both under Federal and State law. The number of domestic
terrorism cases the CCDA prosecutes varies each year and can range
between 7-15 prosecutions per year. Currently, the CCDA and the United
States Attorney for the District of Nevada are jointly prosecuting a
case against the Boogaloo Boys or Boogaloo Bois, which is a loosely-
organized, far-right anti-Government extremist political movement in
the United States. My office has primary jurisdiction over crimes
committed in the Nevada Department of Corrections and we have
coordinated with the CCDA to investigate or prosecute crimes of
violence and domestic terrorism coordinated between persons
incarcerated and those on the streets. This kind of coordination mostly
pertains to members of various gangs.
(2) Fusion Centers and Regional Intelligence Centers are Instrumental
(located in both Northern and Southern Nevada)
Our office coordinates with local law enforcement agencies and
Federal agencies through the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center.
The 3 main intelligence-sharing entities include the Northern Nevada
Regional Intelligence Center (NNRIC), the Southern Nevada Counter
Terrorism Center (SNCTC) and the Nevada Threat Analysis Center (NTAC).
My staff and I have solicited input from directors of Fusion Centers
and incorporated some of their thoughts and information herein. During
the 2021 election season and local events relating to the certification
of the Presidential election, the fusion centers were vital in our
ability to obtain public concerns and complaints regarding potential or
threatened acts of violence to both local and Federal partners in real
time. The way the fusion centers are structured is what makes this a
particularly powerful tool in combatting domestic terrorism. For
example, the SNCTC represents a collaboration of Government and private
entities monitoring and collecting data on the Las Vegas Strip via
multiple live stream camera feeds to protect critical infrastructure
and monitor criminal activity that may result in the loss of life or
that critical infrastructure.
(3) Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) are Located Throughout the
United States
Partnerships strengthen our ability to investigate and disrupt
domestic terrorism. One of those partnerships is the Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTF.) The JTTF comprises locally-based investigators,
analysts, linguists, and other specialists from law enforcement. As you
know, these JTTFs exist in many, if not all States. According to the
FBI, there are about 200 task forces around the country, including at
least one in each of the FBI's 56 field offices, with hundreds of
participating State, local, and Federal agencies.
My office has participated in Nevada's JTTF. However, there are
serious challenges for such a task force, given the existing Federal
legislation. Because so much of what we combat on the local level is
not associated with foreign state sponsors or organized foreign
terrorist groups, the task force has limited jurisdiction and goals.
Our work with the JTTF has revolved around cases involving fraudulent
documents. This is what led to us sponsoring Nevada's Assembly Bill 15
during the 2019 legislative session. Prior to the passage of this law,
we used a mishmash of statutes to address the illegal filings of
``sovereign citizens.''
e. we need to balance fundamental rights with security concerns
One of the questions staff posed to us in advance of this hearing
is whether, in light of the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol,
additional Federal legislation is needed to combat domestic terrorism.
So, in my opinion, does Federal law need a refresh? Probably--or to use
a lawyer's term of art--it depends. Federal law defines the term
``domestic terrorism,'' but does not provide a law under which it can
be specifically and directly prosecuted.
There are no easy fixes in the fight against domestic terrorism.
Unfortunately, the ability to prosecute domestic terrorism after the
fact does not address the lack of investigatory tools needed to prevent
domestic violent extremism events from happening in the first place.
With the rise of domestic violent extremism in Nevada and across the
Nation there is no question that something needs to change so we can
ensure public safety. As leaders, we must devise ways to combat these
threats while still honoring the Constitutional protections that exist
for our citizens. Any law that seeks to criminalize domestic terrorism
will have to be narrowly tailored to ensure that our civil rights are
not unreasonably impacted by the changes in law.
I recommend we take a measured approach to enacting new laws
regarding counterterrorism to include the protection of privacy, free
speech, and the right to bear arms. It is important for us to assess
and balance the rights of individuals with matters of security and
safety. We cannot ban all vulgar, derisive, or controversial rhetoric
as terrorism. The United States Supreme Court has opined that to
prosecute specific conduct or language as being evidence of
intimidation or other malevolence, there must be a real threat.\3\
Other considerations to weigh when crafting new Federal legislation
include States' rights, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of
association. We must also consider implicit and explicit biases
throughout the criminal justice system that may penalize violent
extremists from one race or ethnicity less harshly and less frequently
than those belonging to immigrant or minority groups. Equally important
is the need to safeguard or insulate prosecutorial discretion from the
political process or from those in power who would seek to punish
political rivals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 155 L. Ed. 2d
535 (2003). This case sets guidance on what is a true threat. Ku Klux
Klan member appealed his conviction under a Virginia State Statute
classifying cross burning in itself as prima facie evidence of an
intent to intimidate. Supreme Court found statute unconstitutional
because cross burning is protected as long as the intent is to exercise
political speech and not intimidate.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430
(1969). Ku Klux Klan member appealed conviction of violating Ohio
Criminal Syndicalism Act during Klan meeting. Supreme Court overturned
because the act ``failed to distinguish mere advocacy from incitement
to imminent lawless action, violates First and Fourteenth Amendments.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another element worthy of discussion at the Federal level is how
people are radicalized and the proliferation of terrorism planning
using the internet and social media. A person can now be radicalized in
a relatively short period of time from on-line interactions and
viewings. On-line algorithms are designed to serve up news and
information exclusive to a person's appetite, leading to an
increasingly isolated point of view. In several recent terrorist
attacks, the perpetrators used the internet to post manifestos or hate
speech leading up to an attack. The perpetrator of the 2015 shooting at
the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South
Carolina had his own website where he posted his white-supremacist
screed. The perpetrator of the 2016 shooting at Pulse nightclub in
Orlando, Florida watched violent jihadist videos on-line. The
perpetrator of the 2018 shooting at the Tree of Life synagogue in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania frequently posted antisemitic and anti-
immigrant hate speech on a social media platform called Gab, even
announcing on-line ``I'm going in'' just 5 minutes before he started
shooting. The perpetrator of the 2019 Escondido, California mosque fire
and the shooting at the Chabad of Poway synagogue posted a racist and
antisemitic manifesto on 8kun, previously called 8chan. Likewise, the
perpetrator of the El Paso, Texas Wal-Mart shooting posted an anti-
Hispanic racist manifesto on 8kun. Both of those perpetrators cited the
Christchurch, New Zealand mosque shooting that was livestreamed on
social media as their inspiration.
We need to examine why our country appears to be growing
increasingly vulnerable to domestic terrorism and how isolation can
lead to radicalization and even violence. Of course, the internet is
the 21st Century's town square and we do not lose our First Amendment
rights to free speech when we go on-line. Not every person who uses
hate speech on-line goes on to commit a violent attack. But nearly
every person who has committed domestic terrorism in recent years has
used the internet to plan their attack or participate in a hate-fueled
social media discourse preceding the attack. Often, these terrorists
are hiding in plain sight.
f. we have much to learn from each other
One of the values I promote throughout the office is community
engagement. Through community engagement we can work with educational
institutions, community groups, and local and Federal law enforcement
agencies. We help build resiliency in our communities through training
and education to increase cultural understanding and to recognize blind
spots relative to racial and ethnic needs. Deep and trusting
relationships between community members and between law enforcement and
the communities they serve increases public safety and helps prevent
violence. When people in a community know each other well enough to
recognize when someone is at risk of radicalization or violent
behavior, and when those community members trust law enforcement enough
to report that information, we have an opportunity to intervene and
prevent violence. We can ensure that person receives mental health
services and other resources. My office frequently holds virtual town
halls so the community can view us as a resource and an ally.
Building community relationships and trust helps prevent
``othering,'' or viewing another group of people as intrinsically
different than you. It is much more difficult to harm someone you view
as your neighbor or believe a conspiracy theory about someone you know
and trust. All of our institutions have a responsibility to foster this
community building, from civic education in our children's classroom,
to the media that provides us information about the world, to law
enforcement and every level of our Government. When we invest the time
and resources into community building, the results serve us all.
As part of NAAG, I work with and learn from other Attorneys General
to tackle tough problems. D.C. Attorney General Karl Racine and current
president of NAAG has made fighting hate his Presidential Initiative.
Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel shares lessons learned from the
failed attempt to kidnap and execute Governor Whitmer. Illinois
Attorney General Kwame Raoul is working with the United States Secret
Service and Homeland Security to educate communities on how to combat
hate and terrorism. This program is designed toward prevention and
education by bringing together community leaders, after-school program
administrators, volunteer program administrators, hospital staff and
administrators, community safety and security personnel, mental health
professionals, and law enforcement. To paraphrase a quote from the
Bible, ``We don't fight against flesh and blood.'' That is, we do not
fight against our fellow Americans. We fight against misinformation,
radicalization, and ignorance. We fight against hate. In doing so, we
must learn from each other, share information with each other and make
our communities safer to defeat domestic terrorism.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Attorney General Ford, I will just say
I am sure we will get to it in questions. I want to make sure
we have time to get to our next witness. Sorry, to cut you off.
I apologize, but I know people will be asking you questions
about your last couple of comments there. With that, I am going
to turn and recognize Mr. Chisholm to summarize his statement
in 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF JOHN T. CHISHOLM, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, MILWAUKEE
COUNTY, WISCONSIN
Mr. Chisholm. Good morning Chairwoman Slotkin, Ranking
Member Pfluger, distinguished Members of the subcommittee. My
name is John Chisholm. I am the district attorney of Milwaukee
County, Wisconsin, serving since 2007. For the 12 years
preceding my election, I was an assistant district attorney in
the same jurisdiction specializing primarily in criminal
prosecutions related to illegal firearm use and violence. As
district attorney, I have participated in our jurisdiction's
response to acts of domestic violent extremism, and in our
preparations to forestall future attacks. I appear before you
this morning in the hope that my experience as a local public
safety policy maker may prove of use in your deliberations
concerning one of the critical issues of our time, and that is
the resurgence, in the form of domestic extremism of political
violence within American public life.
What I believe is very simple. In order for our democracy
to survive, we must maintain a steadfast commitment to
maximizing individual liberty while restraining acts that harm
the social compact. This means an absolute intolerance of
unlawful violence, without qualification, whether interpersonal
or political. As a prosecutor, I have devoted my career to
preventing and responding to acts of interpersonal violence and
holding those perpetrators to account. The same vigor with
which we investigate and prosecute interpersonal violence must
be applied to our efforts to curb violent extremism in our
country, regardless of the political spectrum it arises from.
My experience in responding to acts of extremism dates to
August 5, 2012, when a White Supremacist attacked the Sikh
Temple of Wisconsin here in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, killing 6
members of our Sikh community and severely wounding several
others, including an Oak Creek police lieutenant. As recently
as last year, a Sikh priest wounded in this attack died of the
injuries he sustained that day.
I responded in person to the scene that day with my
investigative staff and with my victim services staff. I knew
some of the people in that place of worship because prior to
that day, the president of the Sikh Temple, Satwant Singh
Kaleka, had invited me and other elected officials to share the
Sikh faith's commitment to fully participating in civic life in
our county and to address his concerns about the safety of the
Sikh community.
While the memory of the tragic suffering of our Sikh
brothers and sisters that day will always remain fresh with me,
what stands out the most in my mind is the bond that was forged
in the shared sacrifice between the officers who responded that
day and the incredible lesson in compassion, dignity,
forgiveness displayed by the Sikh community and embraced by the
larger Milwaukee community after the shooting. The role of the
Department of Justice in facilitating that healing was
significant. I intentionally refrain from naming the person who
walked into a temple of worship and gunned down innocent people
of peace. I think instead of the bravery of the people inside,
how Lieutenant Murphy, as the first officer on scene,
confronted in close combat the offender, was wounded 15 times,
but stopped him long enough for a fellow officer to arrive and
bring the rampage to an end.
When violence struck our jurisdiction, we responded using a
toolbox that is often more readily accessible than it may
appear, our existing criminal intelligence infrastructure,
historically used to combat illegal drug commerce and the
violence associated with it such as our Milwaukee High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. We also developed our
Intelligence Fusion Center, a collaborative effort anchored at
the Milwaukee Police Department comprising personnel and
resources from suburban jurisdictions, Milwaukee County
agencies, and our Federal and State partners. Over the years,
this criminal intelligence infrastructure has supplemented
resources dedicated exclusively to counterterrorism.
This structure and its corresponding communication
platforms allowed us to work on the ground to communicate real
time to a dynamic threat.
An additional consideration at the local level is that in
the event of violence occasioned by political extremism,
members of the public, in jurisdictions of all sizes, must have
the reassurance that their local law enforcement agencies can
serve as a reliable first line of defense. Always, we have to
make sure that our public safety preparations both in spirit
and in practice align with the expressed direction of the
people we serve.
One potential solution, taking all these factors into
account, is to increase Federal financial support for mutual
aid compacts at the local and regional levels. These compacts
can equip mobile response teams to respond to violent incidents
in smaller neighboring communities, with the signed consent of
those communities' elected civilian leadership. Southeastern
Wisconsin has experienced success with such a model, in the
form of a regional partnership called SMART, the Suburban
Mutual Aid Response Team.
In addition, there should be a robust discussion about the
appropriate and the restrained use of hate crime laws both at
the State and Federal level. Most local jurisdictions operate
under States laws designed to address substantive underlying
offences. We rarely address the motive behind a harmful act. We
instead focus on issues of intent, recklessness, and
negligence. Our laws are often designed as here in Wisconsin,
as enhancers to the underlying crime. Working closely with our
partners in the United States Attorney's Office allows us to
address the broader issues of unlawful motive. However, I
believe that the time has come that our respective States
should create a framework for addressing hate crimes and acts
of domestic terror in a more comprehensive way, perhaps by
authorizing our State attorney generals, as we have heard in
Michigan, to commence prosecutions related to violations of
civil liberties based on the respective rights in each State
constitution.
I will finish by indicating that in 1973, the Berger
Commission was addressing similar issues related of National
importance and Professors Remington and Goldstein from the
University of Wisconsin had this to say: ``Those in the system
must work together through liaison, cooperation, and
constructive joint effort. It is effective to the operation of
the police and the entire criminal justice system to achieve
optimum police effectiveness, they should be--the police should
be recognized as having complex and multiple tasks to perform
in addition to apprehending people committing serious offenses.
Such other tasks include the protection of certain rights such
as to speak and to assemble, participation directly in social
agencies in the prevention of criminal and delinquent behavior,
the maintenance of order and assistance to citizens in need
such as those who are mentally ill, the chronic alcoholic, and
the drug addict.''
This was written at a time of social unrest not wholly
dissimilar to our own. Each generation faces its own unique
challenges, but we must endeavor to respond in a way that
learns both from past failure and past success and allows
future generations the right to expand and enrich upon this
unique experiment in democracy by promoting respectful
discourse and rejecting violence as a path to change.
Thank you for inviting me to speak and I will provide any
assistance requested as you work to address this issue of
National importance. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chisholm follows:]
Prepared Statement of John T. Chisholm
March 22, 2021
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the subcommittee. My
name is John Chisholm, and I am the district attorney of Milwaukee
County, Wisconsin, serving since 2007. For the 12 years preceding my
election, I was an assistant district attorney in the same
jurisdiction, specializing primarily in criminal prosecutions related
to illegal firearms and violence.
As district attorney, I have participated in our jurisdiction's
response to acts of domestic violent extremism, and in our preparations
to forestall future attacks. I appear before the subcommittee this
morning in the hope that my experience as a local public safety policy
maker may prove of use to your deliberations concerning one of the
critical issues of our time: The resurgence, in the form of domestic
violent extremism, of political violence within American public life.
I will refrain from conducting an unsolicited examination of the
causes of domestic violent extremism. What I will state is very simple:
In order for our democracy to survive, we must maintain a steadfast
commitment to maximizing individual civil liberty while restraining
acts that harm the social compact. This means an absolute intolerance
of unlawful violence, without qualification, whether interpersonal or
political. As a prosecutor, I have devoted my career to preventing and
responding to acts of interpersonal violence and holding those
perpetrators to account. The same vigor with which we investigate and
prosecute interpersonal violence must be applied to our efforts to curb
violent extremism in our country, regardless of the political spectrum
it arises from.
My experience in responding to acts of domestic violent extremism
dates to August 5, 2012, when a white supremacist terrorist attacked
the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, killing 6 members
of our Sikh community and severely wounding several others, including
an Oak Creek police lieutenant. As recently as last year, a Sikh priest
wounded in this attack died of the injuries he sustained that day. I
responded in person to the scene that day with my investigative staff
and my victim services staff. I knew some of the people in that place
of worship because prior to that day the president of the Sikh Temple,
Satwant Singh Kaleka, had invited me and other elected officials to
share the Sikh faith's commitment to fully participating in the civic
life in our county and to address his concerns about the safety of the
Sikh community in Milwaukee.
While the memory of the tragic suffering of our Sikh brothers and
sisters that day will always remain fresh with me, and I am willing to
give more details as needed, what stands out most is the bond forged in
the shared sacrifice between the officers who responded that day and
the incredible lesson in compassion, dignity, and forgiveness displayed
by the Sikh community and embraced by the larger Milwaukee community
after the shooting. The role of the Department of Justice in
facilitating healing was significant. I intentionally refrain from
naming the person who walked into a temple of worship and gunned down 7
innocent unarmed people of peace. I think instead of the bravery of the
people inside and how Lieutenant Murphy, as the first officer on scene,
immediately confronted the terrorist in close-combat, was wounded 15
times, but stopped him long enough for a fellow officer to arrive and
help bring the rampage to an end.
When domestic violent extremism struck within our jurisdiction, we
responded using a toolbox that is often more readily accessible than it
may appear: Our existing criminal intelligence infrastructure,
historically utilized to combat illegal drug commerce and the violence
associated with it such as the Milwaukee High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area. In Milwaukee County, we also developed our
Intelligence Fusion Center, a collaborative effort anchored at the
Milwaukee Police Department but comprising personnel and resources from
suburban jurisdictions, Milwaukee County agencies, and our Federal and
State partners. Over the years, this criminal intelligence
infrastructure has supplemented resources dedicated exclusively to
counterterrorism, including the Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis
Center and the Joint Terrorism Task Force led by our local FBI field
office.
This structure, and its corresponding communication platforms,
allowed members of law enforcement agencies ``on the ground'' to
communicate in real time to respond to a dynamic threat. Efforts that
foster flexibility within criminal investigative and intelligence
functions, so that they can easily be reallocated to the fight against
domestic violent extremism, will be critical in empowering mid-sized
and smaller jurisdictions to assume leadership roles on the front lines
of this National effort.
An additional consideration at the local level is that, in the
event of violence occasioned by political extremism, members of the
public--in jurisdictions of all sizes--must have the reassurance that
their local law enforcement agencies can serve as a reliable first line
of defense. As we have seen over the past year, domestic violent
extremists are willing to use significant firepower and a wide variety
of asymmetric tactics, requiring preparedness and flexibility on the
part of even small and mid-sized agencies. But we must also be careful
so as not to force unprepared or untrained line personnel within our
local law enforcement agencies--particularly agencies without much
experience in these matters--into dynamic tactical or crowd management
situations. An error in law enforcement judgment can result,
respectively, in death or injury to personnel in a tactical situation
or in the unlawful deprivation of civil liberties in a disturbance
mitigation setting. We must also be mindful that all our public safety
preparations, both in spirit and in practice, must align with the
expressed direction of the residents we serve.
One potential solution, taking all of these factors into account,
is to increase Federal financial support for mutual aid compacts at the
local and regional levels. These compacts can equip mobile response
teams to respond to violent incidents in smaller neighboring
communities, with the signed consent of those communities' elected
civilian leaders. Southeastern Wisconsin has experienced success with
such a model, in the form of a regional partnership called ``SMART''--
the Suburban Mutual Aid Response Team.
There have been recent incidents where it is alleged that
individuals in Wisconsin planned domestic terror attacks in another
State. This highlights a capacity divide between the local intelligence
assets in major urban areas with that needed in smaller rural
jurisdictions. As shown in Oak Creek or recently in Washington DC,
domestic terror does not spare the responding law enforcement officers
from harm and any ability to detect and defuse such incidents before
they occur must be supported.
In addition, there should be a robust discussion about the
appropriate and restrained use of hate crime laws at both the State and
Federal level. Most State and local jurisdictions operate under State
laws designed to address the substantive underlying offense. We rarely
address the motive behind a harmful act, we instead focus on issues of
intent, recklessness, and negligence. Our hate crime laws are often, as
here in Wisconsin, ``enhancers'' to the underlying crime. Why someone
does something can be relevant, but proving that they did it is our
primary responsibility. Working closely with our partners in the United
States Attorney's Office allows us to address the broader issues of
unlawful motive. The time may have come that the respective States
should create a framework for addressing hate crimes in a more
comprehensive way, perhaps by authorizing State Attorney Generals to
commence prosecutions related to violations of civil liberties based on
the respective rights in each State constitution.
In 1973 the late University of Wisconsin Law School Professors
Frank Remington and Herman Goldstein, as part of the Berger Special
Committee on Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice,
articulated the general principles that should guide urban policing
stating:
``Those in the system must work together through liaison, cooperation,
and constructive joint effort. This effort is vital to the effective
operation of the police and the entire criminal justice system. To
achieve optimum police effectiveness, the police should be recognized
as having complex and multiple tasks to perform in addition to
identifying and apprehending persons committing serious criminal
offenses. Such other police tasks include protection of certain rights
such as to speak and to assemble, participation either directly or in
conjunction with other public and social agencies in the prevention of
criminal and delinquent behavior, maintenance of order and control of
pedestrian and vehicular traffic, resolution of conflict, and
assistance to citizens in need such as the person who is mentally ill,
the chronic alcoholic or the drug addict.'' (Emphasis added).
This was written at a time of social unrest not wholly dissimilar
to our own. Each generation faces its own unique challenges, but must
endeavor to respond in a way that learns from both past failure and
past success and allows future generations the right to expand upon and
enrich this unique experiment in democracy by promoting respectful
discourse and rejecting violence as a path for change. Thank you for
inviting me to speak and I will provide any assistance requested as you
work to address this issue of National importance.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Great, thank you. I thank all the
witnesses for your testimony. I know we are going to have lots
of meaty questions for you. I will remind the subcommittee that
we will each have 5 minutes to question the panel. For both our
Members and our witnesses, there is a little screen that you
should see that shows the clock and I will keep our Members to
time so that we can efficiently make it through the questions.
I will recognize myself to start for a 5-minute period.
You know, I think it is important to understand for all 3
of you, for the average American to understand what goes on
when there is an incident that might qualify as something like
domestic terrorism in your State. What is the process that you
go through in determining who will charge that individual,
whether it would be you or the Federal official? Kind-of walk
us through maybe, AG Nessel, if you could start, the nuts and
bolts, you know, if you want to speak to the specific plot
against our Governor, how can the average American understand
how we figure out how or prosecute these folks?
Ms. Nessel. Well, first of all, I think that the best way
to go about it and the way that we went about it in regards to
the plot involving the Governor was to work in a task force
that involved multiple layers and multiple levels. You know,
and when we identified that there was this issue, to work
together in consort with, you know, the FBI, the Michigan State
Police, our office, and also the global authorities. So, you
know, I think that working together works best for a variety of
different reasons. But also, you know, the analysis data for us
involved what laws were applicable to what kind of conduct.
That is why you saw and as we talked about, we had more
cases that were charged by us at the Department of Attorney
General at the State level than we had Federally. A big part of
that, of course, was because quite honestly, we did not have
the Federal laws available in order to, I think, properly
charge these individuals with the conduct of which they were
accused.
The thing that, I think, was most astonishing was the fact
that had these individuals--and let me--I should interject
that, of course, these individuals are presumed innocent until
or unless found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of
law--but that being the case, just from a sort-of a theoretical
level as we are discussing this, had the plot been just to
execute the Governor, the Federal authorities might not have
had any charges at all. Had it not involved kidnapping, they
would have been unable to charge her, and the State would have
had to have taken each and every one of the applicable charges
and defendants.
But that being the case, in terms of having an
understanding of the best way to handle it, I really do think
it is important that you have all of these different entities
working together. I think that not only does that resolve the
issue of who has the best laws and the most applicable laws,
but I think it keeps everybody else in check.
As you likely know, you know, obviously, I am a State-wide
elected official who is a Democrat. But I was working with 2
U.S. attorneys that were Republican. Of course, then we had the
FBI, of course, the director was a Trump appointee, and we had
the Michigan State Police is overseen by our Democratic
Governor. I say all this because I think it is just so
important that we had those checks and balances in place to
make certain that we didn't have any instances where anyone
felt as though we overstepping our bounds or that these
prosecutions in any way, shape, or form, were politicized.
But I think that the most important thing is to ensure that
you have a task force that is multi-leveled. Then honestly that
it is properly resourced in addition to, as I stated earlier,
of having the right laws in place so that we can appropriately
investigate and prosecute any set of circumstances that
involves harm to the public or harm to public officials or
anyone in Government.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Great. Go ahead, did someone want to
speak? No? I now recognize Ranking Member Pfluger, the
gentleman from Texas, for his 5 minutes of questions. Go ahead,
Representative.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate all
the witnesses' testimony. Attorney General Ford, a question for
you. What tools do you have at the State and local level to
charge offenders when they do commit acts of domestic terrorism
such as the 2017 Las Vegas incident or the 2012 incident at the
Sikh temple?
Mr. Ford. Thank you so much for the question,
Representative Pfluger. Again, thank you so much Congresswoman
Slotkin for having me here. Representative Pfluger, we have
comparable to what Dana Nessel just talked about, the
opportunity to coordinate among our State and local and Federal
officials in instances like that. We have different
jurisdictions, if you will, that the public doesn't recognize
or even know about. So, the opportunity to discuss who has
priority, who has the primary jurisdiction or issues like that
is always an important conversation to have.
So, we have State statues, for example, that we could have
utilized if he survived to charge him with terrorism, for
example. But the district attorney at the local level would
have had potentially primary jurisdiction for other types of
crimes that would have been committed or that could have been
charged. Likewise, to the extent there were Federal laws that
were implicated, the Federal agencies could have coordinated
and figured out a way to charge him under Federal laws.
What we have in southern Nevada is a fusion center. That is
what we call it, a fusion center where all of us are able to
talk among one another and to ascertain who is the best entity,
which is the best entity to address which particular instances
of concern that we have. That is in southern Nevada, but it is
also in northern Nevada.
So, in the incidents that you talk about in October 1, we
were all activated. I wasn't attorney general at the time. I
was actually in the State senate at the time, but I was also on
the Homeland Security Committee in our State. I understood that
there was a lot of coordination taking place to figure out what
was going on because, again, we talk about lone wolves. We
didn't know he was a lone wolf necessarily at the time. So,
trying to figure out which resources were going to be
marshalled in going to address this issue was a on-going
conversation at that time.
Mr. Pfluger. Well, thank you very much for that. My
question on the joint terrorism task force and the fusion, I
think both the Chairwoman and I share the, you know, the same
thought that we want to understand the intelligence that is
being passed down. Do you feel like your ability to get
intelligence to work with the joint terrorism task force and
the fusion center is effective? If not, what would you
recommend as changes?
Mr. Ford. I would say that we could always improve in our
communications in that arena. The truth be told, communication
and coordination could always be improved. We do have great
relationships with our State, local, and Federal partners and
the fusion center is a great opportunity to have those
conversations. But I wouldn't be telling the truth if I were to
say that we couldn't improve in that arena. Those
communications lines are vitally important when it comes to
being able to respond on the ground.
Just yesterday, just yesterday, at the Government building
in southern Nevada in Las Vegas, we had what we thought was a
bomb threat. Just yesterday, where everybody in our building
down in southern Nevada had to be evacuated. So, being able to
coordinate and cooperate in that fusion center with information
flowing back and forth was vitally important. We were able to,
obviously, secure the scene and return everybody to the office.
But, again, it was a test of cooperation, a test of
coordination, a test of communication, and we look forward to
always trying to improve those.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you very much. Again, to all the
witnesses, thank you for your testimony today. I think it goes
without saying we are committed to making sure that the
resources are there to identify these threats before they
become an issue. Madam Chairwoman, I do have some questions
that I will submit for the record. But with that, I would like
to thank all the witnesses again for being here and their
commitment to keeping the country safe, and I yield back.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Great, thank you, Representative
Pfluger. Just to manage expectations, we will turn in a second
to Representative Jackson Lee, then Representative Van Drew,
Gottheimer, Meijer, and Malinowski, just to manage
expectations. With that, I recognize Representative Jackson
Lee, unless she has stepped away.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Good afternoon. Good morning, rather.
Thank you to the Chairman and Ranking Member for this important
hearing. It complements the work that we are doing in Judiciary
on the Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Committee. I am
delighted to be part of this committee and this focus this
morning. Thank you to all the witnesses for your presentation.
Let me--and your service because these are very trying and
difficult times. Let me quickly start with Attorney General
Nessel and refer to Michigan's Anti-terrorism Act that I
believe was passed in the early 2000's, 2002. I would be eager
to know the value of that particular statue as you attempted or
worked to prosecute the perpetrators who attempted to harm a
State official, a Government official, an official, in essence,
of the United States serving the State of Michigan. How did
that statute--how did you utilize that statue?
Ms. Nessel. Well, the statute has been invaluable, quite
honestly. I think it really speaks to the importance of it
having been passed. When you say how did we utilize it. We have
utilized this in a number of different circumstances. In fact,
to follow up on something that AG Ford said, we have a case
that is pending right now in terms of an individual that
threatened to blow up our State capitol building, and we were
able to utilize this particular act in order to charge him.
Quite honestly, you know, there are aspects of this law that
allow us to prosecute in a litany of different circumstances
that but for this specific act, we either wouldn't be able to
charge at all, or we would have to charge very, very minor
offenses that I honestly don't think would be fitting for the
specific conduct.
Unfortunately, over the course of maybe just the last year,
we had to charge this in a number of different circumstances,
as we have had incidences of domestic terror rise
exponentially. But, you know, as I indicated earlier, it fits
so many different categories of criminal conduct, but it is not
overly burdensome. It is not overly specific in a way that it
hinders us. So----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Nessel [continuing]. You know, it is----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Nessel [continuing]. Particularly helpful and I
recommend it at the Federal level.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, in the course of recommending it,
have you found in your tenure, the mis-prosecution of
individuals who are simply civil rights protestors or Black
Lives Matter? The disparate treatment between what would be
militia with the intention to kidnap a Governor versus those
who are simply protesting? Has that happened?
Ms. Nessel. No. I haven't seen any incidences of that at
all. If you look again at the law, it is pretty specific as to
what it involves. But I have not seen it abused. I am not
saying that there are no sets of circumstances under which that
could potentially occur. But again, I think that goes back to
why I think it is important to have these multi-layered task
forces so that we don't see one particular office working alone
where you might have intentions that are not----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Nessel [continuing]. Not always pure, so.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Nessel. But I feel it has been used well in our State.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so very much. My time is short.
General Ford, very quickly. Thank you all for your service. But
let me pose to you as Las Vegas and Nevada has faced so many
challenges. Thank you for your leadership. How do we balance
having a terrorism initiative on the Federal level and making
sure that the protection of those who are lawfully protesting,
such as the contrast between the treatment of the
insurrectionists on January 6 versus the over-arresting of the
those in Washington, DC that were Black Lives Matter during the
summer of 2020? General Ford?
Mr. Ford. Yes, thank you so much, Congresswoman Sheila
Jackson Lee. Great to see you again. Thank you so much for that
question. It is an important one. The truth of the matter is we
must always balance the rights of individuals with matters of
security and safety. We cannot ban or bowl over the rights of a
controversial rhetoric as terrorism and the United States has
been quite able to prosecute specific conduct or language has
been evident--as being evidence of intimidation or other
malevolence. That has to be a real threat. I do have concerns
about a bill that would not be narrowly tailored to separate
and distinguish between what you have indicated as peaceful
protestors, as opposed to those who are potentially engaging in
terroristic acts. So, to the extent there is going to be
consideration for a bill in that regard, we have to be
conscious of that fact.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Ford. While General Nessel has indicated that we don't
necessarily see that happening relative to her State, we could
see it happening. At the end of the day, we want to be cautious
about that and ensure that that doesn't occur. So, thank you so
much.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Thank you, Attorney General Ford.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Chairwoman Slotkin. I now yield to the gentleman from New
Jersey, Mr. Van Drew. I don't think we are hearing you, Mr. Van
Drew, unless that is just me. No.
Mr. Van Drew. There you go. Now you can hear me.
Chairwoman Slotkin. There we go. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Van Drew. Good deal, OK. Someday I will learn this. I
thought I pressed the right button. Thank you, Chairwoman, for
having this meeting and thank you, Ranking Member, as well. I
am going to make this a little personal. I am curious what all
3 individuals who are testifying think of this. So, on February
28, at my home, I received a voice mail, actually, my wife did.
The voice mail said--this individual said--and this happens
unfortunately to people in Congress. But I will do everything
in my power to ensure that you are deposed, if not dead.
Anything I can do to get you basically out of office. You are a
traitor, Jeff Van Drew, and you deserve the fate of all
traitors. He goes on to say in written that we have before me,
he goes on to say, should we--and he speaks about my wife--
should we test the acceptability and get the direct response of
a prominent GOP female by greeting Van Drew's wife with a
Republican high-five, putting our hands between her legs,
lifting her over the hood of her car, and objectively recording
her physical reaction to the tickle when she lands. He then
writes, as a traitor, Van Drew has forfeited his right to
protection under law. Know this Jeff Van Drew, it doesn't stop
here. God save you.
He then goes on to say, this is treason. The penalty for
treason is execution. This applies to the great and to the
small. He goes on after that to say, should conscientious
critics take a cue from the armed rioters? Storm his house,
smash everything, violate his family, and walk away laughing.
Would that be silly? Then, finally, and he says a lot of other
things, but I won't go into them. We are forced to ponder
Thomas Jefferson's grim directive that for the good of our
Nation, the tree of liberty must be refreshed with the blood of
tolerance and traitors.
He is very angry. As many people know, I am a Republican
and I used to be a Democrat, which is things that happen in
life. What is unusual about this--and I just think everybody
would be interested in it, he is a freelance reporter. He
writes for a newspaper called the Ocean City Sentinel. That,
everything I read to you, except the original death threat, was
actually in the paper as a op-ed, an opinion editorial. Not
just a letter to the editor, but opinion editorial.
So, of course, we were involved with the police and others
and are looking into this. But I would be curious, I mean, that
was very chilling for my wife. I accept that and all of us who
are in Congress accept the fact that we are going to go through
things like this. It is not acceptable. The bar has been
lowered recently. But what I ask is this. Is that acceptable or
is that a form of terrorism to, you know, say literally threat
your family, your children, your grandchildren, your wife, and
to say that you are going to sexually assault her? Is that--and
then you are, of course, going to kill me. All the political
speak about tolerance. Is that acceptable? Is that something?
Because evidently it is not from what I understand from
attorneys. I wanted your thoughts on it. Whoever wants to
start.
Ms. Nessel. Representative, I would be happy to start
because I have actually prosecuted a number of cases in our
State that are similar to what you just suggested. Now, any
constituent, anyone at all is free to disagree with your
policies or your vote. They, you know, they can let you know
that they don't approve of the way that you conduct yourself in
office. But what they cannot do is threaten you or your family
with physical harm or death. Whether you do that to your
neighbor that lives next door or whether you do it to an
elected official, it is illegal.
So, in our State, what I have been doing is we have a
particular statute that involves using an electronic device to,
you know, in order to threaten an individual. So, whether that
is by telephone or, you know, text message, if you post it on
social media, or it is an email, that is a crime. I charge it
over and over again involving a number of public officials. All
the way from, you know, President Biden to Representative
Slotkin to a judge that is on our court of claims to a
Republican member of our State house.
So, we have been very aggressive in terms of making sure
that people understand the difference between what is
acceptable First Amendment-protected activity and what is a
crime. The sorts of threats that you and your family received
in my opinion, that is criminal conduct. It is illegal and if
you were in my State, I would prosecute it.
Mr. Ford. Mr. Van Drew, if I could.
Chairwoman Slotkin. I am so sorry, we are going to have to
leave it at that. We have a strict rule of 5 minutes here. I
apologize.
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you for your information.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the
other gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Gottheimer, if he is
available. Oh, I am sorry. Now, that I see that Mr. Langevin is
jumping on. Mr. Langevin, we yield to you for your 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank our
witnesses for their testimony today. Let me start if I could
with Mr. Ford. Mr. Ford, and I apologize if this has already
been covered, but the Homeland Security Threat Assessment
specifically notes that White Supremacist extremists are
engaged in outreach networking opportunities abroad. What is
the process for notifying and working with Federal law
enforcement if someone you know or suspect to be a White
Supremacist extremist seeks out connections abroad?
Mr. Ford. Thank you so much for your question, sir. Aaron
Ford, for the record. You know, what I indicated in a couple of
responses ago was that the public doesn't really recognize or
know about our different jurisdictions, for example. So, we
operate under what we call 5Cs in my office. One of those Cs is
community outreach and community engagement. So, and client
services. When we receive a complaint, if it is not within our
jurisdiction, we can relay that to the appropriate entities. We
utilize the fusion center for communications of that sort. So,
the bottom line is if there is ever a concern, if you ``see
something, you should say something'' you could always reach
out to my office and we will find out where that type of
information needs to be directed to.
Mr. Langevin. How do you think international coordination
changed the threat posed by these groups?
Mr. Ford. I missed the first part of the question. How do
I----
Mr. Langevin. How does international coordination, how do
you think it changes the threat posed by these groups?
Mr. Ford. Well, I do think that it presents a unique
problem. You know, at the Federal level, terrorism is defined a
lot less broadly, if you will. So, internationally, we are able
to utilize a definition of terrorism that is different than
what we use from a domestic terrorism perspective. So, the
Joint Terrorism Task Force is limited in that regard and can
oftentimes present problems and issues and road blocks for us
being able to address those issues. But again, through a
communication through, for example, the fusion center and other
joint task forces, we are able to have those communications and
ascertain which entities are the right ones to address
particular issues.
Mr. Langevin. OK, and let me just say this. You know, I
applaud your efforts as law enforcement officers, you know, the
second-best way to prevent crime is from maintaining law and
order and, obviously, to catch and prosecute criminals. But the
best way is to prevent crime from ever happening in the first
place. So, I would like to focus on the root causes and
solutions that domestic extremism that leads to criminal acts
and outright terrorism.
So, Mr. Ford, in your written statement, you rightly
emphasize community engagement to build the social and cultural
bond that unite us and resolve divisions that stem from
unwarranted fears and apprehensions about fellow Americans. So,
I have 2 questions for you. First of all, what works? How do
you rigorously measure whether community efforts are working?
What are the barriers to doing more of what works best?
Mr. Ford. Yes, I mean, I think at the end of the day, as
you have indicated, that coordination and cooperation is very
important and, you know, there are probably several responses
to that, some of which are best practices, others of which are
hit-and-miss. I think the actual effort of engaging in the
communities and having conversations with folks and trying to
improve relationships between law enforcement and the
communities that they serve oftentimes can lead to us being
able to address domestic terrorism to the extent that we are
able to learn about it, right? Through those conversations and
through those communications.
We have seen, for example, instances where individuals have
been seen walking through neighborhoods with AR-15s and then
subsequently months later ultimately prosecuted because they
were, in fact, a domestic terrorist attempting to do something
bad on our strip. That has happened. So, that comes through
community coordination, cooperation, and communication. I think
that that is part and parcel with--that is part and parcel to
addressing this problem.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. With the little bit of time I have
left, Mr. Chisholm, what are the enablers and barriers to
defusing extremists and violent tendencies in your State or
county? What authorities, resources, constraints, and
requirements are most helpful or harmful? What do you need more
of or less of?
Chairwoman Slotkin. Very briefly, please.
Mr. Chisholm. Thank you very much for the question, Mr.
Representative. We actually have benefited tremendously from a
close relationship with the U.S. Attorney's Office and the
Federal Government providing us resources to enact programs
like community-based prosecution where we actually take
experienced people from our office, place them in
neighborhoods, and develop a different type of relationship.
Also, focusing on victims of crime and addressing the trauma
issues is in my view, absolutely critical. In other words, when
we respond to massive events like this, it is really my office
that has the personnel and experience to deal with the
immediate effects of the trauma that those individuals and
their families that have now been exposed to violence and we do
need more resources to be able to address those issues. With
the view of preventing----
Chairwoman Slotkin. We are going to have to leave it there.
I apologize, sir. We are going to have to leave it there. The
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Meijer.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you Ranking
Member and thank you all of the other witnesses who have joined
us here today here. You know, at our first full committee
hearing as Representative Slotkin mentioned, we met with not
only the threat of domestic terrorism following the events of
January 6 and the questions I asked for mainly how we can shift
away from the reactive approach that I think we have all too
often seen especially when grappling with magnitude of the
issue and then how we can be a bit more targeted on the front
end so that we are addressing some of those underlying levers.
You know, and instead of just constantly creating new
agencies, offices, programs, you know, how can we better use
existing capabilities in order ensure that we are instituting
reforms that target threats appropriately while measuring the
effectiveness of those relative approaches? So, that was one of
the reasons why this week I joined a colleague on this panel,
Mr. Malinowski, in calling for additional funding for DHS's
Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention or TVTP,
and its corresponding grant program. So, that office provides
technical, financial, and educational assistance to
stakeholders to establish and expand local prevention networks,
help the Department combat all forms of violence regardless of
ideological motivation, but specifically, to award funds on a
competitive basis to States, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments, nonprofits, and institutions of higher education
to establish sustainable prevention capabilities.
The word that I think I never want us to forget because it
is the way that we avoid that is just becoming a defensive
partisan exercise is the violence. Now, the word extremism gets
thrown around a lot but, you know, where our focus and where
our issue is when that violent nexus, when that violent act is
in the process or is planning to occur, and as Representative
Slotkin has mentioned, that is something we saw in our home
State of Michigan. It is something that we experienced during
the assault on the Capitol itself. It is where the First
Amendment protections, you know, fall away because that has
entered into a criminal act, a criminal behavior, and how can
we ensure that we are appropriately mitigating while have the
corresponding respect for civil rights and civil liberties.
So, on that note, Attorney General Nessel--and I want to
ask about your experiences with these challenges in our home
State of Michigan. Obviously, you mentioned the Wolverine
Watchmen. We have talked about some of those specific threats
and a legacy that goes back, you know, over 30 years. But do
you feel the role of DHS in the Federal Government in
combatting these kinds of violence, how have you found that
cooperation to be to date? I know you touched upon fusion
cells--or excuse me--fusion centers in a prior question, but
just wanted to get your broad approach on how you feel that
Federal cooperation has been so far?
Ms. Nessel. You know, certainly I think we had great
cooperation as it pertained to that particular set of
circumstances and that we worked very well together at that
juncture. Like AG Ford, I will tell you that is not always the
case. Being someone who before I came to State government, I
worked for a county prosecutor's office. The Wayne County
prosecutor's officer. We often had a lot of complaints about
the coordination between the county level and the State level
and then the State level and the Federal level. So, we can
always do better when it comes to that.
Now, in terms of the DHS Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention grants, let me say this. You know, that money as you
know is for prevention, not for prosecution. So, from my
perspective, you know, what is needed to support the Michigan
State police and my office and for MSP, intelligence sharing
really between local police and MSP is really the greatest
reset I think. Now, of course, MSP has fusion centers, but
outreach and education to local law enforcement is badly needed
to make an identified intelligence that really should be shared
and, you know, sometimes the locals fail to properly assess and
identify risk factors like individual behavior of local
extremists at the early stages so that it can be passed up so
that we can evaluate whether this is a person who is truly
inherently dangerous. Now, for----
Mr. Meijer. I am just going claim back a minute of my time
and I am running short but I just wanted to clarify. I get the
sense from speaking with local law enforcement and interstate
partners that they feel it is a one-way information flow, that
they are feeding information up but not necessarily having that
be reciprocated by the Federal Government?
Ms. Nessel. You know, I do sometimes get that from them.
But I will say this, that lack of information flow goes both
ways. I have had several circumstances where we have cases that
we will get it when it gets to a certain level and we will find
out later on that there were indicators that an individual was
dangerous and had aberrant behavior that one would think would
lead to something more dangerous later, but we just never found
out about it because nobody passed it up to us. Had we known
about it to begin with, we could have prosecuted something
perhaps, you know, even a lower-level misdemeanor, but it would
have put this person, you know, under the guidance of the court
so that whether it is a mental health-related issue or some
other issue, that could be addressed before it turned into
something much more dangerous. So, at all levels I think we are
failing to some extent.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Thank you. I appreciate it. The Chair
recognizes the Member from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much, Madam Chair, and thanks
to the witnesses. I have unfortunately I have been in and out
so I may have missed a couple of the questions and answers. But
I did want to make sure that I understood as best I can the
witnesses' advice and recommendations on the DHS Targeted
Violence Prevention Grants. So, I wanted to ask whether you
have all had specific experience with the program over the last
3 years. It was, you know, it was in operation and then
virtually shut down in 2017. We started last year. We are
looking potentially at a significant increase in funding. So, I
am wondering if the 3 of you can share experiences with what
has worked and what hasn't in the past in that program. I am
sorry if that is repetitive of something I missed.
Mr. Ford. Well, this is Aaron Ford, for the record. I am
not certain that I could speak specifically to that program,
but what I can say, sir, is that Federal funding is critical to
the State's ability to respond to and to recover from mass
violence or domestic terrorism events. The way an incident is
defined in law has an impact on how our response and recovery
can be funded. In fact, after October 1, 2017, the Nevada
Department of Health and Human Services received a grant from
the U.S. Department of Justice Anti-Terrorism Emergency
Assistance Program, which is utilized for law enforcement
overtime needed to respond to that event, as well as mental
health treatment for October 1 survivors.
You know, it is unclear whether Nevada will qualify for
funding under the Stafford Disaster Relief and the Emergency
Assistance Act because that definition of major disaster is
restrictive and so, you know, looking at these forms of
definitions and programs, I think, is an important component to
discussing actual responses to domestic terroristic and
domestic violence events or domestic extremism events.
Ms. Nessel. May I----
Mr. Malinowski. OK, does anybody else want to chime in?
Yes.
Ms. Nessel. I think it is an important question and for the
purposes of my department, I will say first of all we just
haven't had a lot of contact at all in regard to these grants.
But what we need at our department, quite honestly, is we need
resources that go directly to the Michigan Department of
Attorney General. We need money for analysts. We need money for
investigators and we need money for additional prosecutors.
I will be honest with you, we were getting so many threats
we ended up partnering with a college. At Ferris State
University they have a cybersecurity program. We are actually
having to work with undergraduate students right now to help us
track threats. We have an MLU with them that just put together
partially because we don't have the funding available to do
this on our own. We have so few investigators in our office
that are not on specific funding tracks that would not even
allow them to do this kind of work even if we could reassign
them. We are not permitted to by law. So, we need help. We need
finances. For us to be able to do our job, we just need more in
the way of funding because the problem is greater than ever and
it is going to involve more resources than ever.
Mr. Malinowski. Understood. Just shifting the subject in my
remaining time, one of the issues that I have been really
focused is the role that social media platforms and their
algorithms play in connecting vulnerable, susceptible
individuals to extremist groups and making that initial
connection. There was a really fascinating case, actually, in
Michigan that I read about recently in the local press in
Michigan about an FBI--a guy who turned out to be an FBI
informant having joined the Wolverine militia. He said in an
interview that he joined the group because it was recommended
to him by Facebook. He had been scrolling through pro-gun
pages, basically, Second Amendment pages, and they recommended
he join it.
I guess here is the way I would pose it to you, Attorney
General, imagine you heard that somebody in your State was
doing that, just looking at gun rights pages. The next day a
Facebook executive called him on the phone to say, hey, you
know, couldn't help but notice that you were interested in the
Second Amendment, and we have got this really, really,
wonderful, neat organization we think you might be interested
in. So, we want to send you their phone number and email
address and contact info so that you can have a meaningful
experience with the Wolverine militia. Would you feel that
Facebook was at least morally responsible for the consequences
of that kind of action?
Chairwoman Slotkin. Very, very briefly, 15 seconds.
Ms. Nessel. Yes.
Mr. Malinowski. Good enough. Thank you so much. I yield
back.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Thank you, Attorney General Nessel, for
being so concise. The Chair now recognizes Representative
Green. Representative Green over to you. You are recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I greatly
appreciate this extension of this opportunity. I am an
interloper and an interloper who did not register himself
properly. So, I do humbly apologize to you and appreciate your
graciousness. My question will be a very simple one for anyone
who would like to help me. I plan to visit the border in El
Paso this weekend. My concerns are many, but I would like to
know from the point of view of people who are on the ground
there, what should I look for? What is important for me to see
and to understand so that I may better negotiate legislation in
the Congress? Whichever person would like to be first to
answer, I will be more than honored to hear your response.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Why don't we start with
Representative--or Mr. Chisholm, then Mr. Ford, then Ms.
Nessel.
Mr. Chisholm. Thank you, Representative Green. Having spent
some time on the border, I would just strongly encourage you to
work both with the individuals who are operating those
facilities, but I would also encourage speaking to the informal
and support networks that have to provide an enormous amount of
support to the individuals at the respective centers. I think
that it is, again, an issue of critical importance on how we
address this problem and do so in an urgent fashion, but also,
make sure that we do it in a way that reflects the highest
values of our country.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
Mr. Ford. Thank you. Aaron Ford, for the record. Not much
more that I can add, frankly, to that response. I would simply
say, however, that you describe what you see, and ensure that
the country understands the difference and the distinction that
are available to us. Not everything happening at the border--or
some things happening at the border should not be classified as
prospects for domestic terrorism. At the end of the day, being
able to acknowledge that to say it out loud, to call out lies
when there are occurring is critically important in this
conversation as well. So, I would offer that for consideration
and tender the mike.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
Ms. Nessel. I agree with my colleagues. I don't have
anything additional to add except for that I have never been to
El Paso, but I hear wonderful things about it.
Mr. Green. Thank you. Madam Chair, if there are no
additional comments, I will yield back the time. Again, express
my gratitude to you for your graciousness. Thank you.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Of course. Of course. OK, the Chair
recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey. We are a little New
Jersey-heavy here in this committee. We are working on it, I
assure you. We are doing everything we can to mitigate. With
that, I recognize Representative Gottheimer.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you so much, Chairwoman Slotkin. You
can never be Jersey-heavy enough. So, we will recruit more
Jersey to the committee. I appreciate you recognizing me and
for organizing this very important hearing and thanks to each
of the witnesses for being here and for the work you do to help
counter this serious threat.
I also want to take a moment to acknowledge one of the
tragic, senseless attacks on our fellow citizens in recent
days, including last week's mass shooting in Atlanta, in which
8 people were killed, including 6 Asian women against a
backdrop of rising hate targeting the Asian-American and
Pacific Islander community in recent months and years. We also
grieve for the victims of another attack just this Monday, as
you know, in Colorado that tragically took 10 lives, including
an officer with the Boulder Police Department. We must do
everything we can to better protect all Americans from such
horrific violence.
As you know, the Proud Boys, the despicable group which I
have called on our Government to consider designating as
terrorists, are being charged with conspiracy for their role in
the January 6 attack on the United States Capitol. The Justice
Department is also set to be considering sedition charges
against members of the Oath Keepers, another dangerous militia
group, which was heavily involved in the attack on the Capitol.
While I welcome these charges, I am concerned that it has been
very difficult to win convictions for these charges in the
past, and a message that might be sent to would-be extremists
in all of our States.
Attorney General Nessel and Attorney General Ford, if I can
start with you with Attorney General Nessel first, in general,
do you believe the legal tools currently available to Federal,
State, and local enforcement agencies are strong enough to
deter potential extremists from engaging in domestic terror?
Attorney General Nessel.
Ms. Nessel. Sorry, can you hear me now?
Mr. Gottheimer. Yes, thank you.
Ms. Nessel. Great. So, we are fortunate in Michigan as I
have indicated, that we do have some very strong laws in place
that allow us to tackle organizations like the Proud Boys. So,
for instance, you know, we have gang-related statutes that have
been in place for many, many years. In Michigan, for instance,
you know, criteria to be considered a gang so that we can in
the event that we are charging that a gang provides the motive,
means, or opportunity to commit whatever the underlying felony
is, our criteria is 5 or more people, not a non-profit
organization, a common name, sign, or symbol, leadership
structure, and defined membership criteria. So, those are the
types of things that we have been able to do to go after a
group such as the Proud Boys. We did that, in fact, in another
case involving the white supremacy group called the Base, in a
case that we charged here in the last few months.
So, we do have these types of statues in place. They have
worked for years and, you know, traditionally, they have been
used against street gangs and these have been the kinds of laws
that have been upheld on First Amendment-related challenges.
Do you need to have something similar to this at the
Federal level? I would indicate I believe so. I would submit
that I think that it is important and that it is a useful tool.
It is a tool that you don't currently have. So, I think that
along with--and I would suggest to you a proposed piece of
legislation from 2019 by your colleague Adam Schiff,
Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act, would
probably be a good place to start.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you. Attorney General Ford, what sort
of message do you think it would send if individuals involved
in attacks like on January 6 were to get off the hook?
Mr. Ford. Thank you so much, Representative Gottheimer.
Aaron Ford, for the record. I think the message would be clear
that it is condoned. It has no repercussion. There is no
consequence. At the end of the day, what we want to do is
ensure that, in fact, these actions do have consequences and
that we will not kowtow to the extremism that we have seen
taking place over the course of these last few months
especially in what we saw on January 6.
I think it is important as General Nessel has indicated, to
ensure that we have strong laws and we have done comparably
here in Nevada. We have been nimble in our approach to
sovereign citizens and ensuring that we have the actual tools
in our State legislation to address those types of unique
approaches that they have taken to domestic terrorism. I think
at the end of the day, what we need to be doing at the Federal
level through your actions and otherwise is the ensure that
those who engage in these actions know that there are
absolutely consequences and those consequences will be dire.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you very much. In my home State of
New Jersey, our Regional Operations and Intelligence Center is
tasked to being an intelligence and information sharing conduit
between the Federal Government and the State and local
enforcement and public safety. I guess I will ask Attorney
General Chisholm, based on your experience with your State
fusion centers, how can DHS and its intelligence arm better
support investigative work that you, your prosecutors, and law
enforcement partners do?
Mr. Chisholm. Thank you very much, Representative. I would
say that we do a very good job of acting upon tactical
information, things that are actually unfolding. I am sorry--
yes. We do a good job of acting on tactical information. I
think that sort of the strategic information level is where
there tends to be a little bit of a breakdown. Then that is
where it does tend to become a one-way street. Information
flows up and rarely flows back down. I would--I believe that by
expanding the capacity both at the sort-of the major urban
centers and also expanding it into the rural areas, it would
facilitate that communication better.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Thank you, Congressman Gottheimer.
Mr. Gottheimer. I yield back, thank you.
Chairwoman Slotkin. We are going to start a very brief
second round for those who are still on for our witnesses. I
promise to have you out of here by no later than 11:30 Eastern
Standard Time for the 2-hour mark. I will recognize myself just
for a brief moment.
You know, I guess I would like to go back to the question
that I think Representative Jackson Lee was getting at in her
questioning. Whenever we bring up the topic in this committee
of additional Federal domestic terrorism law, there are a raft
of letters and concerns that come in from civil rights and
civil liberties organizations, and, frankly, on both ends of
the political spectrum. I have heard folks from the
conservative world say it is going to infringe on their First
Amendment rights. I hear people from civil rights organizations
saying it is just a hop, skip, and a jump until a Federal
domestic terrorism law is going to be targeted at Black and
Brown people, at activists.
So, help me understand. Maybe we can start with AG Ford,
help me understand how taking some of the legislation that you
have on the books in your State and bringing it to the Federal
level help alleviate those concerns if this is something that
you are saying we should prudently and carefully look at. How
do we mitigate those concerns if, indeed, this is something
that you think would be useful as a law enforcement officer?
Mr. Ford. Well, thank you so much for that question. It is
a very real concern and it is appropriate that you have these
conversations. As a Black man, frankly, I look for the
opportunities to bring this to the forefront. Listen, we have
to consider implicit and explicit biases throughout the
criminal justice system. That they penalize violent extremists
from one race or ethnicity less harshly and less frequently
than those belonging to an immigrant or minority group. Equally
important is the need to safeguard or insulate prosecutorial
discretion from the political processes or from those in power
who seek to punish political rivals.
So, I mean, for example, you know, it seems strange that
the Oklahoma City bomber wasn't charged with terrorism. But I
think most folks would look at that instance and say that if
you were to switch out ethnicity, we would have a different
conversation going on. That is a very real conversation. It is
a very real concern. It is a very real issue that arises in
communities of color in the minority communities around the
country. It is one that I am glad to hear Congress is at least
talking about. So, kudos to you for bringing that up as the
Chairwoman and kudos to assemblywoman Sheila Jackson--pardon
me--Representative Sheila Jackson Lee for bringing it out to
the forefront as well.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Yes, and let me shift gears in my
remaining time. Attorney General Nessel, you know, I am
interested in this idea that Canada has designated the Proud
Boys as a terrorist organization. Obviously, anyone from
Michigan knows we spend a lot of time separate from COVID going
to concerts and going to meals and, you know, visiting family
and property over in Canada. What, if any, conversations have
you had with your Canadian colleagues? What does it mean if a
member of the Proud Boys in Michigan decides that they want to
go to Windsor for a concert? Is there any discussion, legal
discussion, going on on the implications of that designation by
the Canadian government?
Ms. Nessel. So, honestly, I haven't had these conversations
with the Canadian government. Obviously, as we know, there are
a litany of things that are legal in the State of Michigan and
as soon as you start to cross over, they won't allow you in.
Even for a drunk driving conviction, you cannot be admitted
into the State--sorry--admitted to Canada if you have a drunk
driving conviction. So, you know, I imagine that there are
repercussions in the event that we have individuals that
identify with these groups that cross the border. But I don't
know exactly what those are. Have I seen examples of that?
If I can just very quickly go back to something you said.
If States are truly responsible for, you know, prevention and
you can model the Federal law with the Federal Government after
State law, I would just indicate I understand all these
concerns that people are indicating in terms of civil
liberties-related issues. I just, again, want to point to the
fact that we have all these laws on the books in terms of gang
affiliation, in terms of domestic terrorism in Michigan. We
have a very diverse State. That is why I am always arguing that
we should have our primary start with Michigan instead of Iowa
or New Hampshire because we are such a diverse State that is
more reflective of the United States of American than many
other States are. We simply haven't seen that in the State of
Michigan. We have not seen, you know, egregious violations of
people's civil liberties being Constitutional right. So, I am
not saying that it is not an important concern. I am just
saying in our State, we already have all these laws. They have
been on the books for decades. We haven't had that situation.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Thank you, Attorney General. I will
turn to my fellow colleague from Michigan. We have a little of
a Michigan mafia here. Mr. Meijer, please go ahead.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Madam Chair. I strongly support
Michigan being first in the Nation as well on that primary
system. You know, I just I guess I want to circle back to a
couple of comments that were made earlier. One, by Attorney
General Nessel on, you know, talking about how if there had
been more information sharing, there could have been that
ability to route somebody who may have been heading toward a
violent outcome. Then have them be able to seek the mental--or
get them directed to the mental health treatment they might
need. Then also Attorney General Ford, you know, I can't help
but think of the Las Vegas shooter and how the unknown motives
in that case are almost more disquieting than if it oh, well,
here we have a nexus to one extremist group of men or kind of
violent ideology or another.
It would be, I think, we have seen in the past week with
the shootings, the mass shootings in both Atlanta and Boulder,
obviously, we are still learning more about the tragic events
in Boulder and what motivations may have been there. But this
need on behalf of the public writ large in order to ascertain
what that motive is in order to kind-of fit into a preexisting
understanding.
I can't help but find a relation between that and how so
many of our domestic terrorism and international terrorism
focus is on a group rather than, you know, realizing that group
is comprised of a number of individuals. I have seen this
personally, you know, through my, you know, political
experience to date those--that moment in which a, you know,
legitimately held in First Amendment-protected political belief
starts to devolve into essentially a pathology, a creation of
an alternate reality, and then one that inherently justifies
violence.
I received a text the evening of the January 6 from
somebody who said--called me a traitor for not voting to
decertify or object to the electoral college process. In the
process said, you know, the real patriots were those who
stormed the building. Now, how somebody gets to that
understanding and, again, that understanding is not in and of
itself, you know, a violent act, but, you know, lays the
groundwork, you know, creates the fertile conditions in order
to have the justification for that violence that would
otherwise, you know, be reprehensible. Or that a reasonable
individual would rightly view as reprehensible.
So, I guess, Attorney General Nessel, could you expound a
little bit more, you know, on that notion of the dichotomy
between if we can have a group affiliation, it is a lot easier
then to preempt violence, the Wolverine Watchmen being an
example, you know, versus the challenge when that same impetus,
you know, is living at the individual level and you cannot have
a confidential source in that network. You are minimized in the
ways in which that type of violence can be preempted.
Ms. Nessel. Well, Representative Meijer, let me say this.
First, we sort-of view that already at the individual level. As
I know that you are aware, in Michigan we have something called
the Ethic Intimidation Act. What it does is it allows us to
take what is ordinarily a low-severity assaultive crime or a
malicious destruction of property crime, and if it is a biased-
oriented crime, we can enhance it from a misdemeanor to a
felony. Why do we do that? Because we know that when you make a
threat against someone based on their heritage, based on their
national origin, based on their race, that it is not just a
threat to them personally, it is often a threat to an entire
community. We also know that the mass shootings that you might
see at a synagogue or at an Asian spa or what have you,
normally they start off as something much smaller, a threat or
a minor assault or a minor type of property damage. But if you
can elevate it immediately because of that racial component, or
because of the bias-oriented component, you can often stave off
a much more serious crime later on. So, we do that with
individuals already in Michigan.
But in terms of designating a group of people as a hate
group, I think is really impactful because you know that if you
have a mission statement from a group and that is an anti-
Government or extremist mission that say seeks to overthrow the
Government, I think it is helpful that in terms of just
alerting people's attention and law enforcement's attention as
to who those individuals are and to be, you know, concerned
about their activities, maybe and be watchful of them, by, you
know, I think it is impactful in terms of later prosecutions as
well and holding people accountable when those activities turn
toward the planning or the execution of violent crimes.
Chairwoman Slotkin. We are going to have to----
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Meijer. We
will have to leave it at that. For our final question of our
hearing today, I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas,
Representative Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chair, thank you so very much. Let
me join my colleague from New Jersey in acknowledging that 8
people are dead in Atlanta and 10 are dead in the great city of
Boulder, and that we offer our deepest sympathy for the pain.
As many of you have faced that in Wisconsin and Michigan and,
of course, Nevada, I think the meeting--the hearing today must
be focused on the reality that whenever the Federal Government
speaks, it is the heavy hand. It is the statement of this
Nation.
I was on the campus when 9/11 occurred. I saw the building
smoke from the Pentagon and heard the cries and claims that
they were coming toward the Capitol, the White House, and the
State Department. That kind of terrorism is something that
broke America's naivete even though we had already experienced
Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma.
So, terrorism is something that is dark, it is devastating,
and for us to be able to find a way to put a stop sign and to
give you the tools to do so is important. But at the same time,
we know what happened to the Black Panthers, the new Black
Panthers, Black Lives Matter. I think it is very important to
make that point here today.
So, let me start and I will give the question for all 3 to
answer starting with the district attorney. I did not get a
chance, Mr. Chisholm, to ask you a question. Thank you so very
much for that. But would you give me what the dominant
description of those attacking the Government today are in
terms of intelligence, in terms of what you see in your
community, and the one tool, the most important tool, that you
would need. District Attorney Chisholm, then General Ford, and
then General Nessel if you would answer those questions. Thank
you so very much. District Attorney Chisholm.
Mr. Chisholm. Thank you very much Representative. The
predominant profile of a person is somebody that is deeply
disaffected and has lost faith in the Government and believes
that they are entitled to take action on their own. That is
what poses the greatest risk. Again, I would--I believe that
what has been most effective is when we work together very
closely and we have the proper restraints in place by having,
for example, prosecutors both at the local, State, and Federal
level screening information and make sure it is not used
inappropriately against people who are simply exercising their
Constitutional rights. My experience is that it has been done
appropriately.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so much. General Ford, in terms
of whether you have been seeing White racism as a dominant
force. General Ford.
Mr. Ford. Yes, ma'am. I mean, the short answer is
absolutely. I mean, and we have to acknowledge that. So, thank
you for asking the question so that we can acknowledge that. To
address these issues, I think, I would say 3 things. First of
all, funding is very important. We have talked about that.
Funding from the Federal Government could be very helpful.
Second, increasing joint agency cooperation can assist our
investigatory and prosecutorial efforts between agencies. I
think that is important. Then third, just figuring out an
examination of Federal law and how people are actually being
radicalized and the proliferation of terrorism is playing into
all of this, especially on the internet. You know, I won't go
so far as my colleague and say that all the blame lies on the
internet, but I will say that a lot of the radicalization is
taking place on the internet. So, we should look at ways in
which we can address that issue and use Federal partnerships to
help effectuate some change in that arena as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. General Nessel, and the type of
terrorists that you have seen, White militia, White racism,
other kinds? Please, thank you. You are muted.
Ms. Nessel. What we learned in our investigation in
Michigan is that, you know, subjects who intend to commit
politically-motivated violence don't always fit into neat
little boxes. But we know that the motivation behind a
radicalized person can be complicated and their world view
doesn't always make sense. So, most of the extremists today
that we see they often adhere to, you know, conspiracy-based
theories that are both, you know, White supremacy in nature,
right-wing extremist ideology agendas. While we have seen left-
wing, I guess, anarchists that sometimes join militias being
Constitutionalists or libertarian values. More often than not
what we see is that it is, again, it is race-based, White
supremacy based, and right-wing based. That has just been our
experience here in Michigan.
Just very quickly, to follow on something I said earlier.
Listen, I desperately want to make sure that we are protecting
peaceful protestors that are members of Black Lives Matter. I
need the tools to be able to protect Black lives. That is what
is critical to me here in the State of Michigan.
Chairwoman Slotkin. Thank you. OK, with that, I thank the
witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for
their questions. I ask unanimous consent that the statements I
mentioned earlier be submitted to the record.
The first is from attorney general of the District of
Columbia, Karl Racine, the second from attorney general of
Oregon, Ellen Rosenblum, and the third, the Manhattan district
attorney, Cyrus Vance, Jr. Last, the statement from the
president of the National District Attorneys Association, Nancy
G. Parr.
These statements will help shed light on the diverse threat
landscape and inform us of existing tools used throughout the
country to address domestic terrorism.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General, Government of the District of Columbia
March 23, 2021.
Dear Chairwoman Slotkin, Ranking Member Pfluger, and Members of the
Subcommittee: The District of Columbia is not only the Nation's
capital, but it is a vibrant and diverse city, it is the epicenter of
political thought, a major center for art and a burgeoning foodie
scene, it is the where Go-Go music was started and it is where Martin
Luther King, Jr. shared his dreams. For me, it is the city I have
called home since the age of 3 from Haiti. From young Capitol Hill
staffers to newly-arrived immigrants, it is a city of promise. For
many, it is a city where generations of family members have lived,
worked, and played. They have walked these streets and lived the
history that most of our country has only read about in textbooks.
Currently over 700,000 residents call this city home and I am proud to
serve as their attorney general.
More recently, District residents have been confronted with hate in
our streets. Like many other cities in the Nation, the District saw a
sharp rise in hate crimes after 2015 that we are only now beginning to
see level off. Perhaps more disturbing, is that the District has been
impacted by ugly displays of hate and violent extremism brought here by
outsiders who seek to force political change through violence.
The horrific January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol is the most
obvious example. On that day, hate actors and hate groups engaged in
acts of domestic terrorism. They interfered with the processes of our
Government, attacked a building that serves as the symbol of our
democracy, and the office where Nationally-elected leaders and District
residents work. They also threatened the District. Many may not realize
the heroic efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to end that
attack, and the direct impact that attack had on District resources.
Just before that attack, in mid-December, outsiders also came to the
District, and in an act of violent white supremacy, attacked 2 historic
Black churches in downtown Washington.
These incidents of hate impact District residents' feelings of
safety, community, access to services, businesses, and their ability to
live their daily lives. Indeed, we saw significant parts of our city
shut down between the insurrection and inauguration as well as curfews
to protect our safety, and we continue to see some of the fencing that
makes it harder for District residents to get around their
neighborhoods. These violent incidents have ripple effects throughout
the city that extend far beyond the profound harms they inflict on the
victims they target.
We are a politically divided and polarized Nation; but at the end
of the day we all desire many of the same things for ourselves, our
families, and our communities. District residents are no different and
are entitled to live their lives free from the terror of hate actors
choosing violence as their main form of expression against the Federal
Government. To move forward, we need to acknowledge the wrongs
committed against the District and work to repair them. A critical
first step in this process is holding perpetrators from these 2 violent
incidents accountable. Only then can we begin to heal as a Nation and
only then can District residents begin to heal from the trauma
inflicted on them during those days.
The ability of my office to represent the voices of over 700,000
District residents, to protect them from hate, and to hold violent
White Supremacists who commit illegal acts against District residents
accountable, is hamstrung by our lack of Statehood. The absence of
Statehood is itself a vestige of White Supremacy. It harkens back to
1874 when the Congress, fearing Black political power, installed a
Board of Commissioners to run the D.C. municipal government and
stripped D.C. residents of their political power. This was made
permanent with the Organic Act of 1878 when District residents lost the
vote for nearly 100 years. In 1971 and 1973 progress was made with a
non-voting House delegate and home rule, respectively; however,
opposition to Statehood has represented a historical fear of the Black
vote and Black political power. For decades, Members of Congress have
chosen the institutionalized racism that non-Statehood represents over
the democratic will of Washingtonians.
In addition to issues of civil rights, the District's lack of
Statehood results in tangible limitations to our ability to combat
domestic terrorism and White Supremacy--including holding those who
perpetrated the violent acts of January 6 accountable. Because D.C. is
not a State, we do not have a local prosecutor who has the authority to
prosecute local felonies. The District is the only jurisdiction in the
country where the Federal Government prosecutes all adult felonies.
This means that the Office of the Attorney General is limited to
juvenile offenses and some adult misdemeanors. To be sure, we always
work closely with Federal prosecutors on criminal justice matters in
the District, but we have only the power of persuasion, not the power
of prosecution.
The incidents of January 6 exemplify this. My office is in on-going
communication with the United States Attorneys' Office on these
investigations and prosecutions. To that end, I have told the new
Interim United States Attorney that my office is willing to provide
whatever staffing and other resources they may need to thoroughly
investigate and prosecute these offenses. Nevertheless, this means that
we need to wait to bring any misdemeanor charges until after the United
States Attorney's Office has had a chance to investigate and prosecute
felonies so that we are ensuring that the most serious charges are
brought without double jeopardy issues. To be clear, there are several
misdemeanor charges that may be available here. This includes inciting
violence--part of our disorderly conduct statute--and we will work to
hold those who broke the law on January 6 accountable to the maximum
extent consistent with the facts and the law. And we may also have
civil claims against the groups that perpetrated the insurrection, but
all of this falls short of local authority to charge those who engaged
in serious wrongdoing with felonies.
It is worth noting that the District has long been concerned about
the intersection of extremism, hate, and lack of local control. In
2019, after a spike in hate crimes, the Council for the District of
Columbia and my office both noted the failure of the previous
administration's U.S. Attorney to prosecute those who perpetrated these
offenses. The Council held a hearing on October 23, 2019, where the
then-U.S. Attorney did not even appear, demonstrating the previous
Department of Justice's disregard for the voices of District residents.
In light of the silence of the U.S. Attorney, we worked to draft
legislation that would give our office authority to bring civil cases
against those who perpetrate bias-motivated violent acts, which the
Council subsequently passed but which became law only after the
December 2020 attacks on our historically Black churches.
I also wear another hat, that is president of the National
Association of Attorneys General. As president, I have an opportunity
to shine a spotlight on and convene my fellow Attorneys General around
an issue of National importance, and I have chosen countering hate. My
initiative, the People v. Hate: Standing Up for Humanity is focused on
raising awareness of violent extremists and hate actors, like the ones
who came to the District, but also on the legacy of hate, which is
exemplified by the District's lack of Statehood. We will also seek
opportunities to increase prevention and support to those communities
who have been impacted by horrific acts of hate and its existence in
the fabric of our institutions and policies.
The entrenched systems of white supremacy disenfranchise the
District's primarily Black and Brown residents while protecting those
who commit acts of violent extremism. Congress must pass H.R. 51 as a
significant step toward acknowledging past wrongs, repairing the damage
of White Supremacy, and disentangling the institutionalization of White
Supremacy from the lives of District residents. Only then, can the
District fully protect and defend all of its residents and ensure that
domestic terrorism has no home here.
Sincerely yours,
Karl A. Racine,
Attorney General for the District of Columbia.
______
Statement of Ellen F. Rosenblum, Oregon Attorney General
March 24, 2021
Chair Slotkin, Ranking Member Pfluger, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to submit written testimony
on this matter of fundamental importance to our democracy. As you
undoubtedly know, Oregon has been the site of significant unrest
involving members of the Proud Boys, Patriot Prayer, III percenters,
Boogaloo Bois, and similar groups. These encounters have become more
violent. Since last May, approximately 110 riots have been declared by
the police in Oregon.
Last July, in Springfield, racial justice protesters were met with
armed counter-protesters. The same thing happened in August, in Eugene,
where some counter-protesters made Nazi salutes and a protester was
assaulted in an incident captured on live-stream video.
A Portland-area caravan demonstration in August included members of
several of these groups. Participants used pepper spray, shot paintball
guns and intentionally drove trucks into crowds. The following week,
the same groups, armed with rifles, batons, and tear gas, rallied
around the State capitol in Salem. Once again, violence ensued.
Then, on December 21, the Oregon State Capitol was breached.
Violent radicals damaged property, fought with police, and deployed
pepper spray. Fortunately their incursion was relatively contained and
no deaths resulted.
But we all know what happened just a couple of weeks later. An
insurrectionist mob subsequently invaded the U.S. Capitol, causing
death and destruction. This was a brazen effort to subvert the
transition of democratic power to the winner of the 2020 Presidential
election. And many of the groups that have been active in Oregon appear
to have played a key role in organizing and carrying out this attack.
It is imperative that we respond effectively to these assaults.
These groups are actively trying to stifle the first amendment rights
of others, and to deprive us of our collective right to govern
ourselves democratically. And what they cannot accomplish at the polls,
they intend to accomplish through violence and intimidation.
We cannot allow this. But for too long, law enforcement at all
levels has either failed to see the extent of this problem, or else
found reasons not to respond commensurately to the threat posed by
groups like these. Indeed, the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol was
successful even though the desire to interfere with the certification
of the electoral vote was being loudly trumpeted, and even though
Federal law enforcement agencies had acknowledged right-wing extremism
as our country's most pressing domestic security threat.
I am hopeful that the on-going FBI investigation into the events of
January 6 means that Federal law enforcement has, albeit belatedly,
realized that it must respond to this serious threat. I am confident
that many States are similarly seeing the need to act.
Fortunately, I believe that States have several under-utilized
enforcement tools to dust off and evaluate. Legal scholars have noted
that every State has laws on the books against unlawful paramilitary
activity. Yet those laws have essentially lain dormant. In Oregon, for
example, it appears the crime has never been charged. But surely these
groups are engaging in at least some coordinated training efforts, an
element of this crime.
In addition, there are criminal laws that prohibit the use of force
or intimidation to disrupt the administration of Government. But again,
it is not clear that such crimes are being charged, even when groups
are acting with express intent to impede institutions that they don't
agree with. Prosecutorial decisions can be difficult, and familiar
crimes like assault and trespass certainly should be prosecuted. But
whenever possible, prosecutors should send a clear message that
personal political views do not convey any license to violently impede
our Government.
The final example I will offer today is that organized criminal
enterprises are prohibited at both Federal and State levels. Indeed,
anti-racketeering statutes frequently provide civil remedies, as well
as the potential for criminal prosecution. Although the direct
motivation behind the violence committed by these organizations
purports to be political, rather than economic, laws against organized
crime may still prove to be useful tools.
Although I am optimistic that States will be able to use existing
laws against these organizations with some success, Congressional
attention to this problem is vital. For one thing, the fact that State
tools exist does not necessarily mean they will prove adequate to
actually eliminate the problem of organized, politically-motivated
extremist violence. Indeed, these groups clearly plan and organize
across State lines, complicating State enforcement efforts and making
them appropriate subjects of Federal enforcement. In addition, the
events of January 6 make it obvious that our Federal Government is an
important target--perhaps the most important target--for these groups.
If Washington, DC lacks the will to hold them accountable, it will
weaken efforts to hold them accountable in Oregon and other States.
Federal leadership, Federal resources, and strong State-Federal
partnerships will all be necessary as we move to protect our republic
from extremist organizations.
I believe the hearings in this committee today represent an
important step toward preserving our Government against those who want
to use violence and intimidation to subjugate democratic government to
their own preferences. I thank you for beginning that work, and I thank
you again for inviting me to testify. I look forward to continuing this
conversation with the committee and its Members.
______
Letter From Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, County of New York
March 23, 2021.
The Honorable Elissa Slotkin,
Committee on Homeland Security, H2-176 Ford House Office Building,
Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable August Pfluger,
Committee on Homeland Security, H2-176 Ford House Office Building,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairperson Slotkin & Ranking Member Pfluger: I submit this
letter in support of your important efforts to combat domestic
terrorism. I appreciate your understanding of the vital role State and
local law enforcement play in combatting this ever-expanding threat to
our Nation.
As the District Attorney of New York County, I have witnessed
first-hand the threat of domestic terrorism. Through our Counter
Terrorism (CT) program which I formed in 2015, my office investigates,
disrupts, and prosecutes domestic and international terror threats. The
cases that my office has investigated and prosecuted illustrate the
importance of State and local involvement in investigating and
preventing domestic terror threats. For example, in 2019, my office
prosecuted a White Supremacist named James Harris Jackson. Mr. Jackson
sought to start a race war. He traveled to Manhattan to execute his
plan. Mr. Jackson brutally murdered Timothy Caughman, a 66-year-old
African American man, who was just walking on the street in the heart
of New York City. The terrorist was sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole--the maximum sentence permitted under New
York criminal law. More recently, we have worked with both our NYPD and
JTTF partners on investigations and prosecutions related to ghost guns
and ghost gun parts. Ghost guns are often found in the possession of
individuals active in the domestic terror chat rooms on-line. Just a
week ago our Office charged Samuel Fisher, an individual also charged
in the assault on the U.S. Capitol, for local charges related to the
possession of a loaded AR-15 assault rifle, a loaded pistol, a loaded
shotgun, a bullet-proof vest, and over 1,000 rounds of ammunition.
Our office recognizes that domestic terrorism also includes cyber-
based attacks. These cyber threats, especially those to our critical
infrastructure, are incredibly concerning. Over the last several years,
the number of cyber attacks impacting State and local communities has
escalated. These cyber attacks are a threat to public safety and have
caused significant disruption to sectors as diverse as health care,
education, emergency services, and transportation, to name a few.
The proliferation of significant cyber events has underscored the
need for better coordination and response capabilities at the State and
local level, both to thwart attacks and to limit their impact. The
bottom line is there must be dramatically enhanced coordination across
sectors that protect our communities' critical infrastructure and
provide essential services. The Federal Government can assist State and
local communities by financially supporting these communities' efforts
at accomplishing 3 primary tasks: (1) Sharing of real-time threat
information across sectors; (2) training across sectors; and (3)
developing volunteer response teams to assist sector(s) in need.
As to the sharing of real-time threat information, New York City
and the State of Michigan provide 2 models of ensuring that indicators
of compromise (IoCs) and other relevant cyber attack information are
moved, without delay, across sectors. The New York City Cyber Critical
Services and Infrastructure (NYC CCSI), for example, includes cyber
professionals from 14 sectors who share such relevant data from their
individual sector to their counterparts in other sectors. Those
receiving this data can act upon it with dispatch to protect their
individual entity.
As to training across sectors, approximately twice a year NYC cyber
professionals gather to develop and enhance the partnership's
coordination skills--to conduct cyber emergency fire drills. The threat
scenarios are not generic; rather, they are developed to closely
emulate the most current cyber threat landscape facing New York City.
As a result of the training, both the individual NYC CCSI participant
and the city are better prepared for future attacks. Finally, as to
developing cyber response capacity, trained NYC CCSI volunteers are
prepared to respond to a given sector in crisis, usually following a
crippling cyber attack. For example, in November 2020, NYC CCSI
volunteers were called upon and dispatched to a hospital whose servers
had been locked in a ransomware attack. The NYC CCSI volunteers
assisted the hospital personnel with getting patient information back
on-line and accessible to doctors, nurses, and other medical
professionals.
We respectfully request that Congress assist prosecutors and our
law enforcement partners in this effort by dedicating funding and
resources to strengthening technical assistance and training as we
fight to end the spread of domestic terrorism. We are confident that
directing additional resources and funding to combat domestic terrorism
will strengthen relationships between Federal law enforcement and their
State and local partners as we work together to stamp out domestic
terror threats made to our country.
We stand ready to assist you in any way as you move forward with
consideration of Federal legislation to combat domestic terrorism.
Sincerely,
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr.
______
Letter From National District Attorneys Association
March 24, 2021.
The Honorable Elissa Slotkin,
Committee on Homeland Security, H2-176 Ford House Office Building,
Washington, DC, 20515.
The Honorable August Pfluger,
Committee on Homeland Security, H2-176 Ford House Office Building,
Washington, DC, 20515.
Dear Chairwoman Slotkin & Ranking Member Pfluger: I am reaching out
on behalf of the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA), the
oldest and largest National organization representing State and local
prosecutors in the country. With more than 5,000 members Nation-wide,
NDAA is recognized as the leading source of National expertise on the
prosecution function and is a valuable resource for the media,
academia, Government, and community leaders. Today, I write in
anticipation and support of your hearing on the State and Local
Responses to Domestic Terrorism.
As the Nation continues to confront the challenges of home-grown
terrorism, State and local prosecutors continue to work with our
Federal partners to hold bad actors accountable. In light of these
recent tragedies, NDAA and its members have focused our efforts on
improving training and resources to prepare the field to proactively
root out domestic terrorism in our communities and combat the spread of
misinformation. Congress can assist prosecutors and our law enforcement
partners in this effort by dedicating funding and resources to
strengthening technical assistant and training as we fight to end the
spread of domestic terrorism.
Often, State and local incidents that involve domestic terrorism
are complex and involve multiple agencies responding to the scene.
Additionally, States largely lack specific domestic terrorism statutes
and must look to other criminal laws where elements are present in
order to seek justice for victims. Given the complex nature of these
investigations and subsequent prosecutions, additional resources are
needed for State and local prosecutors to provide training and
technical assistance on how to handle these cases when they occur,
develop threat assessment models for their jurisdictions, and
collaborate with Federal partners to hold perpetrators accountable.
Based on these challenges, NDAA is encouraged to hear that Congress
is considering addressing the issue of domestic terrorism through
Federal legislation. Our Members agree that now is the time to act in
response to this growing threat to our homeland and call on the
committee to ensure any such proposal includes training, technical
assistance, and increased resources to assist crime intelligence units.
These units play a vital role in identifying threats at the State and
local level and assisting collaboration between Federal, State, local,
and Tribal partners to counteract potential threats to communities. We
are confident that directing additional resources and funding to combat
domestic terrorism will strengthen relationships between Federal law
enforcement and their State and local partners as we work together to
stamp out the domestic terror threat to our country.
We thank you for your tireless efforts to address this on-going
issue and look forward to working alongside you and your staff to
combat the danger posed by domestic terrorism.
Sincerely,
Nancy G. Parr,
NDAA President.
Chairwoman Slotkin. The Members of the subcommittee may
have additional questions for the witnesses and we ask that you
respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. Without
objection, the committee record shall be kept open for 10 days.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
Thank you to our witnesses.
Have a great day everyone.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]