[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


. 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-12]

                         DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                        ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM

                       OPERATIONS: CHALLENGES AND

                          OPPORTUNITIES IN THE

                         INVISIBLE BATTLESPACE

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE 
               TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 19, 2021

                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
44-411                     WASHINGTON : 2021                     
          
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

               JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman

RICK LARSEN, Washington              ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          MO BROOKS, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California                MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania,      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Vice Chair                       C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JASON CROW, Colorado                 BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             PAT FALLON, Texas
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York

                Troy Nienberg, Professional Staff Member
                Chris Vieson, Professional Staff Member
                         Caroline Kehrli, Clerk
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, 
  Chairman, Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and 
  Information Systems............................................     1
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and 
  Information Systems............................................     3

                               WITNESSES

Clark, Bryan, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute....................     5
Conley, William ``Bill,'' Former Director for Electronic Warfare, 
  Office of the Secretary of Defense.............................     7
Kirschbaum, Joseph, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 
  Team, Government Accountability Office.........................     9

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Clark, Bryan.................................................    34
    Conley, William ``Bill''.....................................    54
    Kirschbaum, Joseph...........................................    64
    Langevin, Hon. James R.......................................    31

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Moulton..................................................    87
    
    
                 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ELECTROMAGNETIC

                  SPECTRUM OPERATIONS: CHALLENGES AND

               OPPORTUNITIES IN THE INVISIBLE BATTLESPACE

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
       Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and 
                                       Information Systems,
                            Washington, DC, Friday, March 19, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m., via 
Webex, Hon. James R. Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE 
FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE 
             TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

    Mr. Langevin. Good afternoon, everyone. The Subcommittee on 
Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and Information Systems will 
come to order.
    I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today. I am 
looking forward to their testimony.
    I am going to give an opening statement in just a minute 
and then yield to the ranking member for her opening statement, 
but before we do, I just have to read some technical 
information for members, including myself, who are joining 
remotely by video.
    So, with that, I would like to welcome the members who are 
joining today's remote hearing. Members who are joining must be 
visible on screen for the purposes of identity verification, 
establishing and maintaining a quorum, participating in the 
proceeding, and voting.
    Those members must continue to use the software platform's 
video function while in attendance unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences 
technical difficulties, they should contact the committee staff 
for assistance.
    Video of members' participation will be broadcast via the 
television internet feeds.
    Members participating remotely must seek recognition 
verbally, and they are asked to mute their microphones when 
they are not speaking.
    Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep 
the software platform's video function on the entire time they 
attend the proceeding.
    Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If members 
depart for a short while for reasons other than joining a 
different proceeding, they should leave the video function on. 
If members will be absent for a significant period or depart to 
join a different proceeding, they should exit the software 
platform entirely and then rejoin if they return.
    Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
    So, with that, I am going to begin my opening statement, as 
I said, then yield to the ranking member.
    But I want to welcome everyone to our hearing today on the 
Department of Defense's electromagnetic spectrum operations. I 
want to thank Ranking Member Stefanik for joining me in holding 
this hearing today.
    And I would like to recognize also my good friend and 
colleague on the CITI [Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and 
Information Systems] Subcommittee, Representative Larsen, for 
his leadership on this issue as co-chair of the Electromagnetic 
Warfare Working Group, along with his fellow co-chairs, 
Representative Austin Scott and Don Bacon. And I am proud to be 
a co-chair with them as well.
    I also want to thank our witnesses, of course, for 
appearing today. Today we welcome Mr. Bryan Clark, senior 
fellow and director of the Center for Defense Concepts and 
Technology at the Hudson Institute; also, Dr. William ``Bill'' 
Conley, former Director for Electronic Warfare in the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense; and Dr. Joseph ``Joe'' Kirschbaum, 
Director of the Government Accountability Office Defense 
Capabilities and Management Team.
    Thank you all for appearing today.
    The electromagnetic spectrum underpins nearly every aspect 
of the modern U.S. military, and, as co-chair of the 
Electromagnetic Warfare Working Group, I have long recognized 
its importance.
    The Department uses the electromagnetic spectrum for 
situational awareness, communicating with friendly forces, 
identifying enemy capabilities, directing strikes, navigation, 
and countless other tasks. In fact, nearly every U.S. military 
capability, from airplanes to night vision goggles, satellites, 
ships, and radios, depend on the spectrum to function. And they 
depend on it today. This isn't just something in the future. 
This is something they depend on today.
    While previous CITI hearings covered what lies ahead in 
defense, again, the military is facing unseen challenges in the 
electromagnetic spectrum right now. Many of the United States 
most important weapons systems, like the F-35 or Ford-class 
aircraft carrier, are at a disadvantage today without 
uncompromised access to the electromagnetic spectrum.
    So this challenge and the importance of electromagnetic 
spectrum operations will only grow as emerging technologies 
like autonomous weapons, connected battle networks, artificial 
intelligence, and directed energy continue to fundamentally 
change warfare. Future combat will be less about the capability 
of individual weapons systems and more about how a networked 
system of systems communicate and work together through the use 
of the electromagnetic spectrum.
    Seeing this trend, competitor nations like China and Russia 
are developing their own capabilities to dominate this domain 
and connect their forces. These governments believe the 
electromagnetic spectrum represents a potential critical 
vulnerability for the U.S. military which they can exploit to 
reduce our advantage and the efficacy of our high-end weapon 
systems.
    Recent cases in the field speak to this. Russia has 
conducted electronic attacks against U.S. coalition forces in 
Syria. And, in 2018, then-U.S. Special Operations Command head 
General Raymond Thomas called it, and I quote, ``the most 
aggressive electronic warfare environment on the planet from 
our adversaries,'' end quote.
    So we saw similar activity in Ukraine when the Russians 
launched surprise artillery strikes using signals emanating 
from Ukrainian troops' cell phones. There are also alarming 
reports of directed-energy incidents targeting U.S. Government 
personnel, producing extremely concerning bio-effects, a 
phenomenon known as Havana syndrome.
    So Congress and the Department have, therefore, undertaken 
significant efforts recently to position and equip the U.S. 
military for success. I want to recognize the progress the 
Department and the military services have made furthering these 
efforts. However, we have more work to do to ensure that the 
United States maintains its advantage and closes the gap where 
we have lost our edge.
    As the Department modernizes its systems and capabilities, 
it must ensure that both new and existing platforms are 
networked together in a joint environment. To do so, we need to 
develop the right management structures, strategy, and 
resources at the Department of Defense. And I know our 
witnesses will have much insight into how to accomplish these 
objectives.
    So, with that, I look forward to hearing from our expert 
panel, but first I will turn to the ranking member, Ranking 
Member Stefanik, for her remarks.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the 
Appendix on page 31.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW 
    YORK, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INNOVATIVE 
             TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

    Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Langevin. And thank you 
to our witnesses today.
    The electromagnetic spectrum is, quote, ``the invisible 
battlefield,'' end quote, and a domain in which the U.S. 
military's success depends. However, our dominance in this 
domain is no longer secure. The Department of Defense's 
Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy lays out a path 
to reassert our overmatch within the electromagnetic operating 
environment while also recognizing the important evolution of 
private-sector spectrum use.
    As the Department's strategy points out, this new dynamic 
in the spectrum environment will present opportunities as well 
as challenges. However, the strategy is clear in its goal: 
``freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum at the 
time, place, and parameters of our choosing.'' This is a 
requirement for the continuation of our operations in any 
domain.
    It is difficult to understate the importance and range of 
spectrum operations undertaken by the Department. From critical 
command, control, and communications to electronic warfare and 
weapons guidance, the ability to operate in spectrum is an 
existential capability for our Armed Forces.
    Yet spectrum is a finite resource that has become a 
congested, constrained, and contested environment. Actions by 
other countries and their militaries, the private sector and 
their operations, and various regulations all restrict our 
military's ability to operate within spectrum.
    It is within this framework that Congress and the 
Department must take concentrated steps to stay ahead of our 
adversaries and innovate new technologies to achieve the goals 
of the strategy.
    One of the most concerning threats is our adversaries' 
decades of studying our reliance on spectrum to conduct every 
aspect of military operations. China and Russia, specifically, 
are testing and developing offensive and defensive capabilities 
to be used against our systems. All the while, we have failed 
to transform our own capabilities to stay ahead of these near-
peer competitors.
    Russia's employment of spectrum operations in 2014 to 
disrupt their adversary's capabilities in Ukraine and rapidly 
capture Ukrainian territory should serve as a stark warning of 
our adversaries' evolving spectrum capabilities.
    However, I am encouraged by the Department recognizing this 
problem, and Congress must be willing to support efforts to 
boost our competitive advantage as quickly as possible.
    We must also find solutions to balance DOD's [Department of 
Defense's] need to access certain bands of spectrum with the 
private sector and rural communities' critical need to develop 
spectrum for modern communications and 5G capabilities.
    Our Nation's private sector and civilian access to spectrum 
correlates directly with our economic competitiveness and, by 
extension, our national security as well. Our adversaries, 
especially China, recognize the inextricable link between 
spectrum development and national power.
    Going forward, we will have to determine how to most 
efficiently and effectively allocate spectrum to ensure both 
economic prosperity and military superiority. The benefits of 
correctly balancing these priorities are profound, while the 
consequences of getting this balance wrong could be disastrous.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our 
witnesses, and I yield back.
    Chairman, I think you are muted.
    Mr. Langevin. I am. Thank you very much, Elise.
    And I want to thank the ranking member for her remarks, and 
we will now receive testimony from Mr. Bryan Clark.
    Mr. Clark is a senior fellow and director for the Center 
for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute. He 
was also the primary author of a review mandated by the 2019 
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] entitled ``Winning 
the Invisible War,'' which I am sure we will hear about today.
    Mr. Clark, you are now recognized to summarize your 
testimony for 5 minutes, and we welcome you before the 
subcommittee today.

   STATEMENT OF BRYAN CLARK, SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE

    Mr. Clark. Thank you very much, Chairman.
    Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this 
opportunity to talk about the challenges and opportunities 
facing U.S. military operations in the electromagnetic 
spectrum.
    As you have noted, the spectrum is arguably the most 
important environment to modern warfare. It connects nearly 
every one of our forces together across multiple domains. It is 
also the mechanism by which almost all of our sensing, 
navigation, and communication technologies work.
    It is also, in a lot of ways, the most unheralded 
warfighting space, at least within the U.S. defense community. 
Although we experience the spectrum every day through our 
smartphones and our mobile computers and the vehicle collision 
avoidance systems in our cars, in a lot of ways it is a 
forgotten domain, because we can't feel it like the land or 
really experience it every time we get on the computer like 
cyberspace.
    So, despite its invisibility, though, access to the 
electromagnetic spectrum is critical for U.S. forces, who 
without it wouldn't be able to do the combined arms warfare 
that they have perfected in a lot of ways over the last century 
of integrating forces from multiple domains.
    America's adversaries, particularly Russia and China, 
recognize this importance of the spectrum, and, as you noted, 
they have been aggressively pursuing mechanisms to deny the 
spectrum to U.S. forces so they can take apart the ability of 
the battle networks the U.S. military uses to conduct 
operations, successful operations like we have done in Iraq and 
Afghanistan or even in Kosovo.
    Unfortunately, during the two decades that followed the 
Cold War, the U.S. largely sat on its hands and let its rivals 
get a leg up on them in the electromagnetic spectrum. We didn't 
do a lot of advancements in technologies or operational 
concepts, and we let them get ahead of us in many ways. So 
multiple assessments have now argued that the U.S. military in 
a lot ways is behind its rivals in the electromagnetic spectrum 
and electromagnetic spectrum technologies, particularly China.
    And, at this point, given the timeframe we are looking at--
Admiral Davidson just recently talked about there being less 
than a decade for us to deter China--and our fiscal 
constraints, we are not going to be able to go and, system 
versus system, try to match the Russian and Chinese and rest of 
world's electromagnetic spectrum capabilities. We are going to 
have to, instead, mount some different kind of efforts to use 
different operational concepts and different technologies to 
get a spectrum advantage.
    Keeping us back from that, unfortunately, is that, today, 
about 40 percent of the Pentagon's electromagnetic-warfare-
related procurement and research development funding goes to 
about 10 platform-centric programs that largely perpetuate the 
Cold War operational approaches that we relied on from 30 years 
ago, such as using manned jamming aircraft to confuse sensors 
that enemies use for air defenses so that we can get a manned 
bomber in to go attack a target. We still use those tactics 
even though 30 years ago that was the state of the art; now it 
may not be.
    So we are going to need to have leap-ahead concepts and 
technologies that can move away from these old concepts and try 
to mount new approaches that allow us to get an advantage in 
the spectrum.
    So Congress can help in this effort. According to GAO 
[Government Accountability Office], a series of recent 
governance changes that were directed by Congress haven't 
really yielded the benefits in electromagnetic spectrum 
superiority that we desired. And so, instead of maybe further 
governance and process changes, Congress should focus now on 
making sure that DOD pursues the operational concept and 
technology changes that are going to help it gain an advantage 
in the spectrum competition with adversaries like Russia and 
China.
    The new Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy is a 
very good part of that. It highlights technology such as 
adaptable systems, agile network, electromagnetic warfare, and 
then virtualized training and testing, as well as open 
architecture systems. All of those are going to be very 
important to the new operational concepts and technologies that 
we need to gain an advantage. Section 152 of last year's NDAA 
also highlighted some of these technologies.
    Making those technologies come into fruition, though, is 
going to require detailed work on the part of Department of 
Defense, such as is reflected in the implementation plan for 
the new Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy. That 
implementation plan, though, is going through the Pentagon 
staffing process and may eventually come out of it and be acted 
upon, but it needs to be managed by an organization that is 
able to really make direction and decisions regarding 
resourcing and operational concept development, such as the 
JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council], as opposed to 
being staffed out and turned into another Pentagon staffing 
exercise that doesn't result in real change.
    And before I close, I just want to highlight a couple of 
technology areas that we are going need to focus on. 
Adaptability is going to be very important, and we can talk 
about that during the hearing. And then, also, technologies 
that allow us to be able to maneuver in the spectrum in real 
time and using AI [artificial intelligence] and cognitive 
systems to manage that maneuver are going to be very important, 
which involves electromagnetic battle management and involves 
the use of new decision support systems for operators.
    So we are going have to make a shift in how we manage our 
operations within the spectrum and move away from traditional 
methods of controlling the spectrum towards new approaches. If 
we don't do that, we are going to have our capabilities erode, 
and we are going to face a situation where our adversaries are 
going to be able to control the destiny of their warfighting 
operations and we won't be able to protect our allies or our 
own interests.
    Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Clark can be found in the 
Appendix on page 34.]
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Clark. I appreciate 
your testimony and for being here today.
    We will now hear from Dr. Bill Conley. Dr. Conley is 
appearing in his personal capacity today, though he was 
previously the Director of Electronic Warfare in the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense. He is now a senior vice president and 
chief technology officer of Mercury Systems.
    Dr. Conley, thank you for being here. I appreciate your 
work in this area for many years, and, again, thank you for 
being here. You are now recognized for 5 minutes to summarize 
your testimony.

   STATEMENT OF WILLIAM ``BILL'' CONLEY, FORMER DIRECTOR FOR 
     ELECTRONIC WARFARE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Conley. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik, 
distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for the 
opportunity to appear today in a personal capacity. This is my 
first appearance as an individual expert, having departed the 
Pentagon in 2019. I request that my written statement be 
included in the record.
    Two years ago, I performed an analysis between the Chinese 
state and the United States, particularly comparing the gross 
domestic products of the economy, of defense spending, and of 
research and development using a purchase-power ratio 
comparison. What I found in that is that the Chinese state 
economy, their gross domestic product, is already 10 percent 
larger than ours. Fortunately, their R&D [research and 
development] spending is only 80 percent that of the United 
States and their military spending is only 60 percent.
    Unfortunately, as the size of their economy continues to 
grow, we should expect their R&D as well as their defense 
budgets will continue to increase. This is a very different 
strategic situation than we faced during the Cold War against 
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's economy never approached 
parity with that that we had in the United States.
    I believe the strategic question we are faced with today is 
this: How do we want to compete?
    The United States has largely leveraged our manufacturing 
capacity as a proxy for military strength. Globally, however, 
we have transitioned into the information age, in which global 
leadership is defined by innovation, technology development, 
and technology adoption as well as integration. Our strategy 
must reflect this transformation.
    Back in 2015, China formed their Strategic Support Force, 
an equal mix of electronic warfare, cyberspace operations, and 
space operations. The Chinese Strategic Support Force reports 
directly to their central military commission as a peer of 
their Army, Navy, Air Force, as well as their Strategic Rocket 
Force headquarters. In comparison, the United States has 
maintained electromagnetic warfare as well as spectrum 
management as capabilities to achieve a tactical outcome.
    Strategy: I would like to spend a couple minutes talking 
about strategy.
    Electromagnetic battle management--the dynamic 
reconfiguration of our sensors, of our networks, as well as our 
electromagnetic attacks in real time--may become the preferred 
way to achieve power projection when compared to the defensive 
utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum.
    As a nation, the United States strategy should be based in 
innovation and our technology development and our adoption of 
these innovations for national defense and in the full 
integration of these innovations into military tactics and 
operations. Just inventing it is not adequate today. This is a 
dramatic departure from our platform- and program-centric 
legacy investment strategy that we have pursued. Instead of 
viewing capability gaps and shortfalls, EMSO [electromagnetic 
spectrum operations] can actually create opportunities for us.
    Innovation: Where does it come from, what does it mean, and 
how do we access it?
    The National Science Foundation reports that across the 
United States Government, in totality, accounts for 
approximately a quarter of our economic investment into 
research and development. The other three-quarters comes from 
the private sector. The government should seek to maximum the 
value of this investment from the commercial sector.
    For discussion today, I offer six major recommendations, 
the first of which is to incentivize R&D investment by 
commercial companies, particularly for defense applications.
    Second, to develop a strategic framework for innovation by 
both traditional defense contractors as well as nontraditional 
commercial companies; one size does not fit all in this regard.
    Third, to develop policies to share data broadly across our 
national innovation base, government-furnished information 
really needs to be available to the entirety of the supply 
chain to generate the maximum return.
    Fourth, any insight, report, or deliverable generated on a 
government contract or by a government thought leader should be 
broadly available to those with the need to know to improve our 
national competitiveness.
    Fifth, ensuring a realistic EMSO environment and threat 
capability--that is, in budgeting, in testing, as well as in 
training.
    Sixth, to establish a strategic offensive EMSO service core 
function to create an enduring advantage in this space.
    In closing, while organization and authority are important, 
the greatest risk I see today is continuing to apply a legacy 
strategy to the strategic realities of today.
    I again thank you for the opportunity to testify and look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Conley can be found in the 
Appendix on page 54.]
    Mr. Langevin. Very good, Dr. Conley. Thank you very much.
    We will now receive testimony from Dr. Joe Kirschbaum. Dr. 
Kirschbaum is the Director of the Government Accountability 
Office Defense Capabilities and Management Team. He was the 
primary author of a review mandated by the 2020 NDAA entitled 
``Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations: DOD Needs to Address 
Governance and Oversight Issues to Help Ensure Superiority.''
    Mr. Kirschbaum, thank you for being here. You are now 
recognized to summarize your testimony for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES 
     AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Dr. Kirschbaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik, and members of 
the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the 
vital role the electromagnetic, or EM, spectrum plays in the 
Department of Defense's military operations.
    My testimony today is based on that report that we issued 
in December 2020 on DOD electromagnetic spectrum operations. It 
provides information on the EM spectrum's importance to 
military operations, adversaries' advantages and advances in 
spectrum capabilities, and the extent to which the DOD is 
positioned to ensure spectrum superiority.
    Now, as my colleagues have pointed out, the EM spectrum is 
the range of all electromagnetic radiation frequencies. And 
many technologies, in fact most, that are used on the 
battlefield use these frequency bands to operate. DOD is 
dependent on the EM spectrum across all warfighting domains: 
air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.
    Where warfare from ancient times through much of the 
industrial age involved strictly line-of-sight operations and 
weapons, warfare in the information age involves the use and 
the denial of use of the EM spectrum at all levels of 
operation. This includes communications, signals intelligence, 
information systems, command and control, identifying friendly 
and adversarial forces, targeting support, and implementing 
self-protection countermeasures.
    It is not an exaggeration to say that the ability of our 
forces to successfully operate anywhere depends on success in 
the EM spectrum.
    It is also important to appreciate that the EM spectrum 
operations take place in the broader context of the information 
environment. In this context, cyberspace EMS operations, 
information operations, and similar activities are all 
interconnected. This is true in actual war, and it is also true 
in activities that fall short of the threshold of armed 
conflict, which is where our primary adversaries seek to 
operate today.
    While the United States focused on counterterrorism 
operations over the last 20-plus years, China and Russia were 
working to advance their peer-to-peer military capabilities, 
and that includes the EM spectrum operations.
    Among the advances we have seen in either Russian or 
Chinese capabilities are the deployment of old and new 
systems--jammers, small UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], et 
cetera--at the company level; incorporation of other 
information-related capabilities, such as cyber, psychological 
warfare; and demonstration that EMS operations have been 
integrated into a combined arms doctrine and practice.
    As part of our work, in addition to interviewing a wide 
range of defense officials and reviewing original source 
documents, we reviewed some 43 studies about defense 
electromagnetic spectrum issues.
    There was remarkable agreement among those studies on the 
challenges to DOD's EM spectrum capabilities. These challenges 
included outdated capabilities themselves, lengthy and 
disjointed acquisition process, increased spectrum competition 
and congestion, and gaps in experienced staff and training, 
realistic training. Many of these studies also agreed with DOD 
officials that among the chief causes for lack of progress in 
many of these areas was governance.
    DOD issued department-wide electromagnetic spectrum 
strategies in 2013 and 2017 and published a third strategy in 
October 2020. We found that DOD had not fully implemented 
either the 2013 or 2017 strategies. This was not because they 
were bad strategies--quite the opposite--but, rather, because 
of bureaucratic and organizational hindrances.
    Specifically, DOD did not take action to develop detailed 
implementation plans, focus leadership on offices and 
individuals with authority to execute, or create processes to 
review progress and assess results to ensure that they achieved 
intended outcomes. Rather than do these things, DOD re-sought 
and remade each successive strategy. We think this pattern 
threatens potential success for the 2020 strategy.
    In our December report, we made recommendations in each of 
these areas. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations and 
told us the Department planned to address many of them in the 
implementation plan for the 2020 strategy.
    In just under 2 weeks, DOD will reach its own 180-day 
deadline for issuing that implementation plan. We have not yet 
seen it, but we do look forward to seeing the extent to which 
DOD takes the kind of actions we identified in December 2020.
    In conclusion, DOD's response to our December report shows 
that officials are well aware of the challenges and 
opportunities affecting military use of the EM spectrum. 
Ultimately, by addressing the gaps and challenges noted in our 
report, DOD would improve its ability to innovate and expand in 
the way that Mr. Clark and Dr. Conley have mentioned and 
operate in the spectrum. This is important to achieve the 
Department's vision of spectrum superiority.
    I look forward to continuing to work with you and the 
Department to help address spectrum challenges and to make the 
most of its opportunities.
    Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik, members of the 
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement, and I am 
happy to address any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Kirschbaum can be found in 
the Appendix on page 64.]
    Mr. Langevin. Very good, Dr. Kirschbaum. Thank you very 
much for your testimony.
    And to the panel, greatly appreciate your being here today. 
I am anxious to get to questions. I am going to defer and go 
last in the questions. We will get members in who are going to 
get flights.
    And, with that, I am going to yield time first to Mr. 
Larsen for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate that 
very much. I have to get out to Dulles Airport, so I appreciate 
that.
    Dr. Kirschbaum, in 2006, 15 years ago, the Electronic 
Warfare Working Group, at the time it was named, issued a 
report on EW in the Pentagon that concluded that what needed to 
happen for focus was that we needed to have leadership, we 
needed to have a pipeline of training on EW, and we needed to 
have the research and development budgets that resulted in 
capabilities.
    Can you explain to me how, if I came back, if I was here 15 
years from now, that your report, which largely mirrors a 
report that we wrote 15 years ago, won't say the same thing?
    Dr. Kirschbaum. That is a great question. I am hopeful that 
it won't, for a number of reasons, the first of which is the 
amount of attention that is paid to this critical issue by you, 
Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik, and people like us, 
whereas it was much more specialized in those days.
    Now, what we see when we interview the people in the 
Pentagon that are responsible for putting the strategies 
together, they get it. They understand the critical issues. 
They understand the impact and the way the operational doctrine 
needs to change, the way that needs to flow into training, the 
way that needs to drive innovation.
    What happens is, as I alluded to, once those strategies are 
put out and everyone signs off on them, they go into the normal 
process. And that normal process is governed by the services, 
who are responsible for training and equipping forces.
    Mr. Larsen. Right.
    Dr. Kirschbaum. They have their priorities. And even though 
you have broad agreement about that things like EM spectrum cut 
across all those efforts, when push comes to shove and the 
dollars get spent, they are not going to achieve----
    Mr. Larsen. Can I stop you there? Because this is a great 
segue for a question for Mr. Conley, who pointed out the PLA's 
[People's Liberation Army's] Strategic--or the--yeah, the 
Strategic Support Force, the SSF. It is actually organized so 
that cyber and space are on par with the other services, and 
points out that we don't have that when it comes to EMSO.
    So, Mr. Conley, can you address how we can get there and if 
we can get there? Or do your recommendations even help us get 
there?
    Dr. Conley. Right. So what I would offer is, in my opinion, 
the part that China, with their Strategic Support Force, did in 
a way that I think is really insightful and could be valuable 
for us is, first off, the blending of electronic warfare, 
cyberspace, and space operations as peers and, secondarily, 
that elevation to say, this is strategically important and we 
are going to use it to achieve a strategic outcome.
    It is the combination of both of those things that I think 
are really important for operationally what they have been able 
to do. There is a governance conversation, there is a structure 
conversation, there is a resourcing conversation. But what they 
have achieved operationally, I think, is really pretty darn 
impressive.
    Mr. Larsen. Well, we should find out more about that.
    And I want to ask Mr. Clark in my remaining time: I have 
NAS [Naval Air Station] Whidbey Island in my district. We have 
the Growlers; we have the jamming pods on those. These are the 
expensive platforms that you were talking about that maybe have 
a--well, they certainly do have a critical function in certain 
areas but not in other areas.
    How should we think about balancing resources that we give 
to EMSO largely, you know, whether it is a platform like a 
plane or a platform like a motherboard?
    Mr. Clark. Right. So I think there are a lot of 
opportunities. There is a lot of great work that has been going 
on in terms of research and development over the last decade to 
develop small-form-factor electronic warfare/electromagnetic 
warfare systems that can go onto UAVs and also the networking 
to allow networked electronic warfare.
    And so what I would see in the future is that the Growler, 
Prowler now--or Prowler, now Growler----
    Mr. Larsen. Right.
    Mr. Clark [continuing]. Is going to be the quarterback, 
right? It will be the quarterback for electromagnetic warfare 
operations.
    So it may not be doing a mod [modified] escort jamming 
operation, where it is going to get in relatively close and jam 
an air defense radar so that a bomber can go hit a target. It 
may stand back and be coordinating the actions by both itself 
and then some expendable UAVs that will go in closer. And some 
of those are being developed by DOD right now.
    But what that means is some of that investment is going to 
have to shift away from the platform to these other systems.
    Mr. Larsen. All right. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for yielding me your time 
at the beginning so I can get to the airport. I very much 
appreciate that. And I don't yield back, because I have no time 
to yield back, so I won't be pretentious and say I am going to 
yield back anything. Thanks a lot.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. And I appreciate your leadership 
in this area. I know that you take great pride in the work that 
you have done in working to try to solve this problem. So thank 
you for your leadership and your expertise that you bring to 
the table too.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin. So thank you. Thank you very much.
    I would now recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Stefanik. Sir, I will yield to Mr. Moore, who looks 
like he is in an airport right now.
    Blake, do you want to take my 5 minutes for questions?
    Mr. Moore. You know, I am good for another 40 minutes. I am 
not in any immediate rush. So I am actually okay, if you want 
to give your opening statements. Thank you, though. I 
appreciate that. But, yes, I am at the airport, but I am okay 
for the next 45 minutes.
    Ms. Stefanik. Okay. So I will take back that time if you 
will yield it back to me.
    Mr. Moore. Yield back.
    Ms. Stefanik. My question is: Mr. Clark, in your report, 
``The Invisible Battlefield,'' you and your colleagues provide 
extensive analysis of China's strategy, operational concepts, 
and their four stages to achieve electromagnetic spectrum 
superiority: number one, meticulous planning; number two, 
multilevel integration; number three, precise release of 
energy; and, number four, demonstrating effects.
    In which of those stages do you believe that China is most 
effective and which of those stages is the U.S. most 
vulnerable? And then what are your overall thoughts on China's 
ability to effectively execute these steps to superiority?
    Mr. Clark. Well, thank you for the question.
    So they are very well-positioned to be able to execute 
these steps. I would say that the ones where they have the most 
efficacy are the meticulous planning--they have analyzed our 
battle networks to an exquisite degree of detail, both through 
clandestine means and because they just look and see what we 
have available on the open web, to figure out how we are going 
to put our pieces together to be able to create a set of forces 
that are going to conduct an operation.
    And then they have also done very well at building the 
specific systems necessary to release the precise energy that 
is going to disconnect the parts of our battle network away 
from each other, so to jam our communications, to deceive our 
sensors. So they have identified what those key nodes are in 
the force packages that we are going to send downrange so that 
they can prevent them from being effective.
    So they have done very well with those two steps, I would 
say, in particular, the planning and the release of energy.
    The demonstrating of effects I see less from them. I mean, 
the goal there is to try to deter us by showing that they not 
only have planned this out but they have figured out how to 
release the energy in specific ways that can defeat our battle 
networks.
    So they are working on that, and, obviously, we have seen 
indications of that in the intel world. But they have not done 
as much of that as I thought they might, given the gray-zone 
operations they have been pursuing.
    Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
    I will yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good.
    Next, Ms. Escobar, if you are still there, I will recognize 
you for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. I am. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, not 
just for this hearing but also for the accommodation that you 
are making on a Friday fly-home day, especially for those of us 
who live further away.
    And to our panel, thank you so much for your work, your 
expertise, and your testimonies, which are really informative 
and helpful.
    My questions are for Dr. Conley. And, actually, I really 
appreciate Dr. Clark's focus on the need to be adaptable and, 
Dr. Conley, your emphasis on innovation.
    One of the many goals of the 2020 electromagnetic spectrum 
operations strategy under the Defense Department has been to 
develop new EMS capabilities.
    In my home district of El Paso, Texas, the University of 
Texas at El Paso, or UTEP, has been a leading force in the 
worldwide revolution of 3D printing. In 2000, the Keck Center 
and UTEP's College of Engineering made strategic investments in 
additive manufacturing technologies in order to assist 
manufacturers in prototyping parts before investing in costly 
manufacturing tools needed for production.
    Most recently, in 2018, UTEP became the North American base 
of operations for one of the world's emerging technology 
leaders in the production of 3D printing equipment.
    As you strategically evaluate opportunities to strengthen 
our EMS capabilities, to what extent would you say there are 
components and applications of EMS that can be potentially 
involved with additive manufacturing?
    Dr. Conley. So I really appreciate that question. As an 
engineer myself, this is a fascinating and great time to be a 
practicing engineer in any way, shape, or form. And the reason 
for saying that is really based around what is happening with 
the digital transformation and the ability to do a digital 
design to rapidly prototype--additive manufacturing being 
exactly one of those capabilities--and the ability to actually 
not have to prototype and go and exhaustively test it, to then 
redesign, to then build the actual thing that you want, but to 
actually take that 3D piece and go and immediately start using 
it.
    And so what I think is really exciting about additive 
manufacturing are all of the different places it allows us to 
more rapidly integrate a capability onto a platform and do 
really well there.
    There is one part, though, that I think is really core to 
our electronic warfare, our electromagnetic warfare, and our 
EMSO capabilities, which is the microelectronics which underpin 
them. And for where we are today, additive manufacturing won't 
solve that part of the problem, but it will solve substantial 
parts of the problem that we have and, I think, will allow us 
to go faster more affordably and generate more value.
    Ms. Escobar. And, Dr. Conley, just in the time that I have 
left, just a couple minutes, how do we best utilize that 
talent, that skill set, that brain power in academia, in these 
young minds, and connect them to the work that we need to do to 
innovate and to lead and to demonstrate superiority?
    Dr. Conley. So one of the things that I mentioned in my 
opening statement was that ability to broadly and 
democratically share information and insights that we have. And 
so I think, in many cases, we have challenges and problems that 
we actually can expose to the academic community, to students, 
prior to them joining the workforce, prior to worrying about 
things like security clearances, and we can actually get them 
working on problems that really matter.
    When you look underneath the hood of our EMSO capabilities 
today, the vast majority of them are really defined by 
software-defined radio technology. And these are things that 
you actually can go ahead and, you know, play with on a college 
campus and work with the entirety of your time while you are in 
school and immediately bring that knowledge into being a 
technology developer in support of our EMSO capabilities and 
ultimately our national defense with strategic implications.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Dr. Conley. This is, I 
think, an exciting area of opportunity for us, one that we 
definitely need to exploit.
    Mr. Chairman, again, thank you so much for accommodating me 
before I run to the airport. I yield back.
    Mr. Langevin. You are very welcome. Glad you got your 
questions in, and have a safe flight home.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin. I don't have the list in front of me. I think 
we are going to go with Mr. Moore next. I am not sure. I don't 
have the seniority list. They have not sent me that list quite 
just yet, so I apologize to my colleagues if I am going out of 
order.
    But, Mr. Moore, I will recognize you for 5 minutes.
    No? He may be offline.
    Ms. Stefanik. Bice.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to the witnesses for being here. As a 
freshman, I am still learning a lot about this particular 
issue, and so I appreciate you all kind of bringing some 
historical context to what you have done in the past.
    My question is really a twofold question. Mr. Clark and Dr. 
Conley, you really talked about making a shift in how we manage 
the spectrum and then also research and development and 
investment in the future.
    Can you talk a little bit or flesh a little bit more out, 
how do we incentivize young people to want to look at this 
particular issue? Because it is, in some ways, sort of 
abstract, right? You can't see it, feel it, touch it. How do 
you, sort of, explain and understand--or explain and incite 
someone that may be looking at this to get involved?
    And then what do you see on the research front? What do we 
need? What is the long-term vision for us, trying to figure out 
what is next on the horizon past electromagnetic spectrum?
    Mr. Clark. Well, I can start, because I think Dr. Conley is 
going to have a lot more to say on this subject than I do.
    But I will say, I think one of the most important things is 
to make an area, a technology area, exciting for people to want 
to go into. Today, electrical engineering in a lot of cases 
means computer engineering, and back when I was in college, it 
meant actually dealing with, you know, circuits and wires and 
stuff.
    So I think that part of it is shifting people's focus to 
think of this as an exciting area of research. And one of the 
ways to do that is this focus on adaptable, cognitive systems 
that are AI-enabled--basically, taking advantage of the 
virtualization that is happening in machines to begin to use 
our electromagnetic spectrum systems more like virtualized 
computer-type systems, where they are able to adapt in real 
time to an adversary's emission, create new techniques and new 
waveforms in real time to be able to defeat those jamming 
effects or to create a new communications link with another 
platform.
    So that kind of merging of the software and the hardware 
worlds, if you will, I think, could be very exciting for people 
to go into.
    And it deals with the problem that I just talked with 
Member Stefanik about, which is the advent of the Chinese 
approach to warfare, where they plan meticulously, develop a 
way to defeat our forces. But then, if we present them 
something that is much less predictable, because we are using 
these cognitive and AI-enabled electromagnetic systems, it 
might defeat that attempt on their part to take apart our 
battle networks.
    So I will turn it over to Dr. Conley.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you.
    Dr. Conley. Thank you, Mr. Clark.
    What I would add is, in my--my own story. I studied 
nanotechnology when I did my Ph.D. And so nanotechnology 
intrinsically is, well, nano, something small and therefore 
something invisible. And so, personally, it was a very easy 
journey for me into this EMSO community, because I was already 
used to studying and working on things that, candidly, I 
couldn't see without using specialized tools. The 
electromagnetic spectrum, in many ways, is no different.
    And building on, you know, Mr. Clark's comments there on 
the AI side, that ability to expose someone to the most 
pressing national security challenges for them to understand 
the impact of what that meant--in my case, it was a radio-
controlled improvised explosive device on a roadside in Iraq or 
Afghanistan and the ability to say, ``If we figure out how to 
defeat this thing, we can save lives,'' that is motivation to 
get up and get to go to work in a way that nearly nothing else 
is.
    And so I think there is a lot there that we actually can 
get, you know, young kids really excited about as soon as they 
finish college. And so I think there is a great opportunity 
there.
    The second thing that I will offer and one of the really 
unique things about EMSO is that the rate of technology 
adoption and the critical nature of it is profound for the 
implications it has. Bryan and I previously have chatted about 
this exact topic.
    The rate of the innovation of new radar and radar warning 
receivers during World War II for the identification of German 
U-boats in the Bay of Biscay, it was a standard period of time 
of 4 months. And that was seven decades ago now. And it was 4 
months from measure to countermeasure. Today, we should expect 
it to be even faster. You can't do that with a large aircraft, 
but you can with a software-defined radio capability and 
implementing EMSO holistically.
    Mrs. Bice. And what about the research and development 
piece? What do you see as far as needs for DOD to invest in 
this? I think the need is there, but how do you sort of push 
that to the forefront? And what are we looking at?
    Dr. Conley. Yep. What I would offer is, it is a mix of what 
is happening with microelectronics with the ability to use them 
in a defense application. It is very different when you put a 
chip in an air-conditioned, climate-controlled environment 
versus on a military aircraft that shakes when it flies. And so 
we have to get that part right. There is a lot about the 
thermal there that is really critical.
    And then the other side is, it is really easy to get 
excited about the digital, but, in reality, there are a lot of 
really hard analog problems on the radio frequency side--
filters, mixers, components that have to go in--to really be 
able to get that performance at a level that we want. And every 
time you start talking about advanced technologies, price 
almost immediately shows up. And so how do we generate that at 
a value that we can do in low quantity for defense applications 
while we get that necessary value out of it?
    And so, if I was to offer a couple suggestions for really 
important problems to work on, I think those would be my top 
couple.
    Mrs. Bice. Great.
    Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mrs. Bice.
    I think that I am next, unless there is another member on 
the Democratic side who is on who hasn't been recognized.
    But let me start with this. And I know we have touched on 
this a bit already, but let me just jump into it again and 
expand on it.
    To Mr. Clark or Dr. Conley, I wanted to know, you know, 
again, further discuss, you know: Is DOD adequately leveraging 
spectrum to enable future concepts like Multi-Domain 
Operations, Distributed Maritime Operations, and Joint All-
Domain Command and Control? And how will those concepts 
contribute to future U.S. military operations?
    In addition, how do we ensure that both legacy and future 
capabilities and systems are networked and interoperable among 
military services?
    We can start with Mr. Clark and then go to Dr. Conley.
    Mr. Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    So, on Joint All-Domain Command and Control, one of the 
things we are finding in the work that we are doing there is 
that, in the future, our communication networks are going to 
not be able to necessarily provide us the command and control 
relationships we always want. We want to have this very 
hierarchical command and control team, with somebody in a 
distant headquarters controlling forces way out in the field. 
Our networks aren't going to be able to do that against a 
capable adversary like China.
    So, instead, we are going to have to think about adjusting 
our command and control relationships to accommodate our 
communications availability, which means we are going to have 
to be ready to shift the command node to different places at 
different times depending on what communications are available.
    So that is going to reinforce this idea of, we need 
interoperable forces that are able to quickly mix and match 
their forces to be able to create force packages that can 
deliver the right effects at the time. So interoperability will 
be really important.
    And, also, the network flexibility will be very important. 
So, to get that network flexibility, we need systems that are 
agile and can move across the spectrum to avoid enemy jamming 
and then can be able to communicate with one another where they 
are so they can reconnect their networks in a mesh sort of 
framework.
    So that requires systems that are able to work across a 
wide range of frequencies and adjust their bandwidth and power 
levels to minimize their chances of being detected. So agility 
both in power and in beam width and beam direction and in 
frequency are going to be necessary.
    And then we are going to need to be able to cause those 
forces to interoperate. So, inside of trying to use gateways to 
connect a force that uses a Link 16 to a guy who is using a 
MADL [multifunction advanced datalink] to a guy who using a 
SADL [situation awareness datalink]--three different 
communication protocols--we are going to have to use software-
defined toolkits, like STITCHES [System-of-Systems Technology 
Integration Tool Chain for Heterogeneous Electronic Systems], 
which is a program that DARPA [Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency] developed which builds an interoperable 
connection between those two networks on the fly. So, instead 
of having to build a hardware gateway between the two, it will 
write software in real time to accommodate that connection.
    So those are----
    Mr. Langevin. Can I----
    Mr. Clark [continuing]. Some of the things they----
    Mr. Langevin. Is that something that is exquisite 
technology that will be DOD, or are there commercial off-the-
shelf options that we can adopt and get into the field more 
quickly?
    Mr. Clark. So the STITCHES and similar programs are DOD 
systems today. There are some commercial versions of those. We 
talked about software-defined radios. There is a new version--
the new radio that is part of the 5G infrastructure is a 
software-defined radio that can reprogram its waveforms in real 
time, if programmed correctly to do that. So there are 
commercial systems that allow you to reprogram a radio to use a 
different waveform in real time that could allow a radio to 
talk to another radio that maybe it wasn't originally designed 
to work with.
    So there are commercial versions of----
    Mr. Langevin. Okay.
    Mr. Clark [continuing]. This, because, of course, 
interoperability is a thing in the commercial world as well.
    Mr. Langevin. Great. Thank you.
    Dr. Conley.
    Dr. Conley. Yeah. The one thing that I would add on top of 
what Mr. Clark said is, with electromagnetic battle management, 
the integration of that with the multidomain operation, Joint 
All-Domain Command and Control, the ability to maneuver in and 
through the electromagnetic spectrum is something that every 
time that you turn the dial on your radio you actually are 
doing. You are maneuvering in the electromagnetic spectrum when 
you do that in the same way that you can move to a different 
lane on the highway. Your cell phone does that automatically 
today with all of the different adjustments that are happening 
underneath the hood.
    But for a military commander, the ability to go ahead and 
not only physically maneuver an aircraft, a ship, a ground 
unit, but also maneuver in the electromagnetic spectrum in a 
coordinated scheme is actually what I alluded to in my opening 
statement: It may be one of the best strategic offensive 
advantages that we can actually have that will be enduring in a 
way that I think is really powerful for us. And so that is an 
area that I personally am really excited about.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
    And, Dr. Conley, again, elaborating on this, because I 
think you touched on this earlier, but, you know, the 
perspective you can provide on the speed at which DOD adapts 
and moves to address challenges versus what you have seen in 
the private sector thus far. How do you think DOD can better 
incorporate private-sector innovation and talent at scale and 
speed up its ability to innovate to confront emerging threats 
and take advantage of opportunities?
    Dr. Conley. So there are two dramatically different 
directions I could take the answer. And so, one of which that 
has been suggested many times is, how do we shorten the 
planning cycle and how do we allow a new program to start at a 
faster rate? I am not going to touch on that because I think 
that that has been discussed substantially by others, but it 
definitely is one viable option.
    The other option is, how can you attract commercial capital 
into our Nation's defense problems, and how can you go ahead 
and generate a rate of return that will attract that capital to 
come into the ecosystem? And I think that we actually can plan 
that in a way that is much more familiar to those of us that 
are used to the Federal budgeting process, but we can actually 
go ahead and set up an ecosystem that allows that to occur.
    And so that is what I touched on earlier with that making 
sure, for both traditional defense contractors as well as 
nontraditional commercial companies that want to service the 
defense ecosystem, how do we get the appropriate expectation 
for the income statement, for the balance sheet, for the cash-
flow side to actually make our national security problems an 
area that they want to work in with a business model that 
closes.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. I will hold there. Hopefully we 
will have time for a second round, but I will hold there for 
now. Thank you for those answers.
    Mr. Moore is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moore. Thank you, Chairman.
    I would like to continue a little bit with what we were 
discussing a few questions ago. I was intrigued by the concept 
of how we encourage students and new professionals to get into 
this.
    Workforce development has been something that I continually 
harp on, and am very frustrated that in my role in Congress I 
don't know how to fix it, but it is something that I definitely 
want to be involved with.
    Could you speak to anything that can be specifically done 
to encourage, whether it be on the commercial side, whether it 
be potential, you know, jobs within the Federal Government, 
within the DOD, to--what changes will we need to make to our 
educational institutions to get them so they would be equipped 
in addressing some of this need and being able to, you know, 
prepare and produce enough talent that we can, you know, answer 
the call for the future on this particular issue?
    I speak with the--my district is Hill Air Force Base in the 
First District of Utah, and, you know, they talk to me all the 
time about how they could hire as many electrical engineers or 
any type of engineers as would graduate in Utah and still have 
a need.
    What specifics would you foresee--and this question, I will 
throw it to all of you; thank you for being here. What shift 
does education need to do to produce this? And is there 
anything we can do, even as a committee, to encourage or 
incentivize potential employers for providing the necessary 
credentialing or certifications that would be needed?
    I will pause there.
    Dr. Conley. So the first part that I would offer--and there 
are a lot of facets of this. Unfortunately, it is a complex 
problem, as you pointed out.
    The first part that I would go ahead and emphasize is 
making sure that we are attracting graduate students and 
undergraduate students to our universities who ultimately stand 
a decent chance of going on to work in defense.
    When we look at, kind of, where is the biggest segmentation 
of the pipeline of the total available talent versus those that 
are interested, I think that is an area that we definitely 
should consider what would be required to help there. And so I 
offer that as a data point to you.
    The secondary part of it that I would offer is making sure 
that we are bringing in people with the right skills, the right 
education, the right background for what type of problem it is 
that we need. As someone with a Doctor of Philosophy degree, 
not every problem in the electronic warfare community that I 
have been able to work on over the years requires a Ph.D., 
right?
    And so, with that in mind, it is, how do we make sure that 
people are broadly aware of these problems but we get the right 
problem to the right person's desk for them to work on? And so 
I think there is a lot that we can do there. As we say, what is 
the role of industry? What is the role of government? And what 
type of skill sets do we want, in which different places, to 
make sure that we do the right thing?
    The third part that I would offer--I had a peer in the 
Pentagon. He and his wife had three children, all of whom went 
on to work in, basically, the high-tech side of industry on 
advanced AI, advanced robotics. Despite the fact that he is a 
Naval Academy grad, none of his three kids are working on 
defense programs. He and his wife met in the Navy.
    And so that is a little bit of a unique opportunity, I 
think, to say, what is there that culturally we want to do to 
make sure that we make these types of problems accessible, but 
what do we also want to do on the business side to attract that 
kind of talent?
    A young graduate that is excited and passionate is looking 
for a company where they get equity today. If you look at 
Federal acquisition regulations and you say, ``Hey, I would 
like to go ahead and give a 22-year-old engineer a share of 
this company,'' that is not a cost that you actually can go 
ahead and pass on.
    And so I think the question is, how do we get the right 
business model to drive things to create a culture both in the 
private and the public sector that really attracts what we want 
to achieve?
    Mr. Clark. I----
    Mr. Moore. Let me--please, go ahead.
    Mr. Clark. I would add, one of the things we have looked at 
in the work we have been doing inside the Pentagon has been 
professionalizing the electromagnetic spectrum operations 
community, which is not just the military side--so, you know, 
trying to get the professional development for the military 
side such that folks in that world feel like they are 
developing as technicians or as supervisors and leaders--but 
also on the civilian side.
    And we have done not a great job in the DOD of 
professionalizing the folks that work in the electromagnetic 
spectrum operations community on the engineering and the 
program management side. They feel like they are just kind of a 
cog in the overall organization, they could be easily 
interchanged out with somebody else, when, in fact, that is not 
really true.
    So by professionalizing the track, you know, for people 
coming in to work at the labs, people who come to work at the 
warfare centers, and they feel like they are entering a 
professional community that is going to have their back and is 
going to develop them over time--that is something that DOD has 
been trying to do and has failed to really pull together. But 
on the civilian side, if we could do that, it would make the 
DOD a much more attractive employer to young engineers coming 
out and looking, potentially, for a long-term--or at least a 
career for a while.
    Mr. Moore. Let me quickly add in there, this technology is 
going to change rapidly, in my opinion, almost exponentially. 
Are we equipped at the DOD level to be able to reskill and 
upskill our current workforce so they can continually meet the 
challenge? Or does this have to then--once they have been in 
the industry 5 years, do they have to go back, do they have to 
go dig deep into the education world and bring out the new 
pieces? Are we going to be able to adjust on the fly is my 
question.
    Dr. Conley. Absolutely----
    Mr. Clark. I think we could rapidly reskill people. And I 
will let Bill answer.
    Dr. Conley. I would offer, I think that we can definitely 
upskill. And there is a lot of the analog side of the problem, 
in particular, which is a little bit like art, and it is art 
meets a lot of science. But you need that artisan that 
understands the history of why we do things today. And so I 
think there is a lot that we can do with upskilling the current 
workforce.
    Mr. Moore. I appreciate it.
    Thank you, Chairman. I apologize. I yield back.
    Mr. Langevin. No worries. Thank you, Mr. Moore.
    Elise, I only had one or two more questions. Are you okay 
if we go for a second round?
    Ms. Stefanik. Uh-huh. Yes.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Great.
    Dr. Kirschbaum, I know we have kind of talked about this as 
well, but DOD is now in its third electromagnetic spectrum 
strategy in 7 years. Based on what the GAO is seeing, is this 
strategy different from the prior two, and should we expect a 
different result? What steps can Congress take to ensure 
positive momentum and implementation?
    I know we kind of talked on this at the end of Mr. Larsen's 
line of questions, but if you want to elaborate.
    Dr. Kirschbaum. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think, you know, you hit on it rather well--and, first of 
all, as I said in my opening statement, we are concerned about 
the direction for the implementation of 2020, because, so far, 
we have seen a pattern before. So we are concerned about it.
    The strategies themselves have definitely recognized a lot 
of the concepts that my colleagues and I have hit on: the idea 
that you need to innovate and not just catch up with 
technology, you need to think of bigger concepts. These 
strategies themselves have taken aboard some of those ideas. 
The idea of how we appreciate and understand electromagnetic 
spectrum and operations today is different than it was just a 
few years ago, and these strategies incorporate those ideas.
    There is also a lot of consideration right now for ideas 
that are going to make some of the connections, hopefully, in 
the operational side--how you tie these things together into 
battle management, how you achieve some of those broader 
effects. Those kinds of things are going to be critical to glom 
on to for future. Whether it is the education and motivating 
people for education we just talked about or whether it is 
system development, those are all critical to do that.
    In order to get there, we have to put the right Department 
emphasis on achieving those things and making sure that what we 
are doing, what we are testing, what we are breaking apart, 
what we are learning lessons from, what we are then going back 
into experiment with, that is the rhythm and that is the 
accepted rhythm and that is what we are doing. That is what 
really needs to be done, and that is what we are looking 
forward to.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good.
    If I could, too, given the organizational challenges that 
you have highlighted today and how these issues impact so many 
issues across the information environment, including 
electromagnetic spectrum issues, cybersecurity, cyberspace 
operations, and information operations, what organizational 
change or changes would you recommend the subcommittee and/or 
DOD consider to address these broader issues?
    Dr. Kirschbaum. So I would say that, if you look at the 
balance of our recommendations that we made at the end of 2020 
on this, we are very specific that it needs to be 
organizational responsibility to execute the strategy. So that 
needs to be offices and/or people who have the authority and 
responsibility to do so.
    It is the next best thing to say, we don't care who that is 
except those conditions need to be achieved. It needs to be 
someone who has the authority to execute, backed up by a 
process to assess what actions are taken and assess whether or 
not those actions met the intent of the vision.
    Those things are going to help the Department get over the 
hump, as it were, that we have seen in other areas. So, for 
example, you are well aware, sir, that we have worked with you 
and Ranking Member Stefanik on things like the DOD Cyber 
Strategy implementation, and we have seen the difference. In 
those cases where you have someone with authority and a process 
to back it up, you have seen some progress. And your committee, 
in particular, has been vital in ensuring that success.
    We have seen it in other areas, like with the nuclear 
enterprise, nuclear deterrence reform efforts, where it has got 
the attention and that helps push things along in terms of 
where we need to go on innovation.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much, Dr. Kirschbaum.
    Ranking Member Stefanik, you are recognized.
    Ms. Stefanik. I have no further comments or questions, Jim, 
so I will yield back for the next Republican.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you.
    Mrs. Bice.
    Mrs. Bice. I don't have any additional questions either, 
Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you very much.
    Then Mr. Moore.
    Mr. Moore. No additional. Well, if you could summarize--in 
fact, let me just be very, very brief.
    If you could summarize, like, as we just kind of wrap this 
up, what would you say, compared to some of our key 
adversaries, where are we? Where is our biggest deficient area 
that we need to focus on?
    And then, if we want to say Russia and China, that is 
great, or if you feel like there are other adversaries that 
could be targeting. But what areas are we most vulnerable? I 
would love to just get your candid thoughts. That is not 
scripted or anything like that. And I will pause there.
    Mr. Clark. So I would say our biggest vulnerability is our 
reliance on active sensors and wide-area high-power networks.
    When we have to operate inside the near abroad of China or 
Russia, you know, we are on their turf. You know, they are the 
home team. They have their sensor networks out there; they are 
able to listen for any of our emissions. So the fact that our 
ships and our airplanes have to rely, to a great degree, on 
active radars to be able to do missile defense or active radars 
to find targets and then on these wide-area networks, like Link 
16, to communicate makes us, you know, very detectable, and it 
makes it easy for them to figure out what we are doing and 
attack us.
    That is our biggest vulnerability, I think, is this home-
team advantage that the Chinese and Russians have and the fact 
that we need to develop new technologies and tactics to be able 
to still operate in those contested areas using passive sensors 
and multistatic sensors and LPI--Low Probability of Intercept/
Low Probability of Detection sensors.
    So it is a different approach that we need to mount, which 
is uncomfortable, in a lot of ways, for the military forces of 
today.
    Dr. Conley. From my perspective, I would offer, we have to 
ensure that we train as we intend to fight. In many cases, I 
think we actually have an adequate understanding of adversary 
capabilities, but when you look at the operational level and we 
bring operational units together to train before a deployment, 
we want to make sure that we exercise our command and control 
network in a way that demonstrates that we have command and 
control over those forces and we are able to execute everything 
we want. That is exactly what either China or Russia would 
attempt to fight us in. And it is an area, when we prepare, we 
have to make sure we get right. At the operational level, I 
would offer that.
    At the strategic level, the other thing I would offer is: I 
believe, from the three different testimonies that this 
subcommittee has received so far this year, for this session of 
Congress, this is the first one that does not have a former 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, either acting or confirmed in the 
role, who is appearing. And so making sure that, at the 
strategic level, the investment that we are making is aligned 
with where we want the strategy to go and making sure there is 
that senior-leader buy-in from the budgeting side.
    Dr. Kirschbaum. I would say it is kind of a melding of 
those two--two things.
    The first is, from that strategic level, the appreciation 
of where and how vital EM spectrum operations are to that 
entire information environment, as I mentioned--its importance 
to everything from strategic messaging, information operations, 
cyber. That incorporation and appreciation from the strategic, 
operational, and tactical level is crucial, and we are not 
quite there.
    The other one is much more of, kind of, a pace, that 
technology, doctrine, learning pace.
    One of the dangers of inviting a historian to testify is 
you are going to get examples from a long time ago. So, in 
1914, armies marched off to war with the appreciation that the 
machine gun was an awesome weapon. They had the machine gun set 
up in separate units that--you kind of used them where you 
needed them. Well, it didn't take long to figure out that that 
was the wrong way to use them. And the Army that figured out 
first that machine guns needed to be deployed in numbers 
throughout specific units to support actual operations, they 
had an advantage right away. And that was--the German Army did 
that.
    Right now, we are kind of marching off in the 1914. We 
think of these kind of spectrum operations as enablers for 
existing operation, and in a lot of ways we still treat them 
that way. They are not as integrated as they need to be 
throughout the force. A lot of the work we saw characterized 
that. So that is the hump we need to get over.
    Mr. Moore. Thank you.
    And I yield back. Appreciate the perspective there. Thank 
you, Chairman.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Moore.
    I guess I have one last one. I guess maybe this might be 
for Mr. Kirschbaum, but also Dr. Conley might want to weigh in.
    Who or what entity within DOD is responsible for ensuring 
new and existing systems can connect to one another? You know, 
who is responsible for that plan and process? Especially 
systems owned by different services.
    Dr. Kirschbaum. So I would love Dr. Conley to help with 
this, because I know he is going to have some very good 
opinions on it.
    Right now, the answer is: Everyone. Obviously, the CIO 
[Department of Defense Chief Information Officer] is 
responsible for that communications side and interoperability, 
but for systems development, the responsibility also lies in 
other places.
    And that is actually one of the issues we have seen over 
time with this and other areas, where the responsibility to 
ensure that these systems are developed in an integrated 
fashion falls second, third, and fourth order of priority, 
versus individual service area development, so you don't get 
the connectivity.
    Mr. Langevin. Yeah. That is a bit troubling, obviously, to 
say the least.
    So, Dr. Conley.
    Dr. Conley. Yeah. So completely agree with CIO owning the 
strategy and the policy around that.
    The other thing that I would add is, obviously, the 
services at the program officer level, the PEO [program 
executive office] level, obviously have a lot of 
responsibility, obviously, on the acquisition piece.
    I think the only part that we didn't touch on yet is the 
JROC and the requirements process and ensuring, whenever we 
can, we articulate which links we want to make sure have to be 
able to talk with each other or how we set that expectation 
into a requirement that ultimately is testable so we can make 
sure that we are meeting that strategic objective that you 
mentioned.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
    I have no further questions. I would just ask the ranking 
member if you had anything?
    Okay. Very good.
    Well, this has been an excellent hearing. I want to thank 
you all for your time today, your incredibly valuable insights. 
You have given us a lot to think about and to work on. We look 
forward to staying in touch.
    Members may have additional questions that they may want to 
submit for the record. If you could help in responding to 
those, we would appreciate that.
    So, with that, again, excellent hearing. Thank you all for 
being here today and what you have had to say. It has been 
very, very helpful.
    With that, this hearing stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
     
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 19, 2021

      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 19, 2021

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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 19, 2021

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON

    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Clark, in addition to defending our spectrum use 
against adversaries, we must also share spectrum overseas with allies. 
In your view, how can we best ensure that we successfully work with our 
allies in this ``domain''? Should we focus on improving international 
standards of spectrum use? Should we focus on building interoperable 
systems that leverage complementary parts of the spectrum? Are there 
other courses of action we can pursue?
    Mr. Clark. Interoperability is one of the most significant 
challenges facing U.S. and allied forces in countering the threats 
posed by adversaries such as China and Russia. Although other opponents 
like Iran and transnational insurgents will contest allies' use of the 
spectrum, China and Russia can comprehensively attack multiple allied 
sensor and communication systems while also presenting challenges in 
other domains that increase the allies' reliance on a contested 
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).
    To counter Chinese and Russian EMS threats, the U.S. military is 
pursuing more sophisticated electromagnetic warfare (EW), radar, and 
communication systems that incorporate artificial intelligence-enabled 
controls, adaptive algorithms, and wideband apertures. In addition to 
circumventing enemy countermeasures or detection, these systems would 
enable U.S. forces to dynamically share spectrum with other users such 
as 5G mobile communications. However, more agile U.S. EMS capabilities 
could be less interoperable with legacy systems employed by allies.
    One approach to sustain EMS interoperability among U.S. allies 
would be for DOD to share its EMS technologies and tactics, which may 
present security risks outside of the Five Eyes countries or fail to 
succeed if allies are unable to implement equivalent capabilities in 
their own forces. A more feasible approach would be to share new 
spectrum control and management technologies that improve systems 
already shared among allies, such as new algorithms for protecting 
Link-16 from jamming and interception.
    For systems that are not already shared, such as ALQ-249 Next 
Generation Jammer or F-15 Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability 
System (EPAWSS), U.S. and allied forces could focus on deconflicting 
operations with allies procedurally. Allied forces could geographically 
or spectrally separate their EMS activities by assigning zones where 
different allied force would conduct sensing or jamming operations. 
This approach may work in geographically dispersed regions like the 
Western Pacific, where U.S. forces may be operating forward with allied 
forces protecting mid and rear areas. In Eastern Europe, procedural 
deconfliction may be infeasible due to the constrained geography and 
fast operational tempo. Another approach would be near real-time 
deconfliction. Allied forces could use electromagnetic battle 
management (EMBM) systems such as the Army electronic warfare planning 
and management tool (EWPMT) or Navy Real-Time Spectrum Operations 
(RTSO) systems to plan EMS operations and communicate those plans to 
other allied forces shortly before they are executed. Allied units 
could coordinate their plans electronically using EMBM tools or use 
them to prevent interfering with one another's operations. This 
approach may the most promising because EMBM tools are already being 
employed in the U.S. military and could be adopted by U.S. allies with 
minimal disruption to their current EMS systems.
    Whether done by sharing technology and tactics, procedure, or using 
communications, the DOD and its allied counterparts need to begin 
developing processes and systems that promote EMS interoperability. 
Otherwise, the U.S. military risks leaving behind allies that are not 
yet able to field the highly-adaptive and cognitive EMS capabilities 
being pursued by U.S. forces.
    Mr. Moulton. Dr. Kirschbaum, China has consistently and 
aggressively engaged with international bodies like the ITU to shape 
global spectrum operations in a way that benefits Chinese companies and 
government. What can we do to counter these efforts and ensure that our 
interests and values are better represented in global spectrum 
standards?
    Dr. Kirschbaum. In short, in order to be more effective in 
international bodies, we need to do a better job of collaborating 
between the federal government and the private sector and between 
military and civilian interests on all spectrum-related matters. We've 
talked during this hearing about the level of civil-military fusion the 
Chinese enjoy in comparison to our own approach. This allows the 
Chinese to think about and operationalize broader strategic approaches 
to EM spectrum operations--both in the normal military operational 
construct and in the ``gray zone'' below the level of armed conflict. 
It also allows them to combine efforts in international bodies. Whereas 
Western public and private concerns tend to approach matters according 
to their own interests and vote separately, Chinese members tend to 
vote as a bloc. We have long recommended that the federal government 
better coordinate its own efforts in spectrum management. This involves 
much more than sharing separate points of view. It involves serious 
policy discussion to avoid conflicts and ensure progress. It also 
involves collaboration on technical and technological matters and 
opportunities for innovation that may help us better arrive at and 
communicate spectrum sharing practices and influence international 
standards. The recent National Strategy to Secure 5G provides a good 
example of vision and direction to collaborate and coordinate within 
the federal government, between public and private sectors, and for 
coordinated effort in international standard setting bodies. DOD's own 
recent strategies recognize the need to be more involved with its 
government and civil partners along these lines.
    Mr. Moulton. Dr. Kirschbaum, can you speak a little more about the 
future of secure spectrum use? We know that the Department of Defense 
is already investing in capabilities like millimeter wave spectrum use 
to mitigate communications interception. In your view, is that the 
appropriate use of Department resources to fight spectrum interference 
or interception? What, if any, alternative methods exist to help our 
warfighters operate on the EM spectrum without interference or 
interception?
    Dr. Kirschbaum. With respect to use of the EM spectrum, obviously, 
the military has different interests from other civil government bodies 
and from the private sector. In many cases, these interests have been 
in direct opposition. The military would prefer to secure unfettered 
access to portions of the spectrum that the civil sector deem vital for 
new technologies. That constriction of the spectrum is a common theme 
in the many studies we reviewed for our work and in discussions with 
defense officials. 5G is a good recent example. The military views the 
millimeter wavelength bands as crucial for operations. But these are 
among the very frequencies required for commercial success of 5G. So 
some sort of collaboration and accommodation will need to be achieved. 
One of the encouraging things we found in our work that is reflected 
more and more in DOD's strategies and thinking is the appreciation of 
the need for DOD to be a much fuller partner with federal government 
and commercial stakeholders on all spectrum related issues. This 
includes the traditional policy and governance considerations of 
spectrum use. It also includes a deeper commitment to exploring and 
collaborating on innovation and ways to use and adapt new technologies 
to the problem. For example, DOD's emerging Joint Operating Environment 
anticipates the central role artificial intelligence and quantum 
computing will play in managing spectrum use in general and in the 
future success of offensive and defensive EM spectrum capabilities. The 
concept of Dynamic Spectrum Sharing is one such idea DOD is committed 
to in order to ease sharing of the spectrum rather than attempting to 
wall off portions solely for military use when that might not be 
practical, especially in an overseas operational environment.

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