[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RESTORING INDEPENDENCE:
REBUILDING THE FEDERAL OFFICES
OF INSPECTORS GENERAL
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 20, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-15
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available at: govinfo.gov,
oversight.house.gov or
docs.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
44-382PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chairwoman
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of James Comer, Kentucky, Ranking
Columbia Minority Member
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Jim Jordan, Ohio
Jim Cooper, Tennessee Paul A. Gosar, Arizona
Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Jody B. Hice, Georgia
Jamie Raskin, Maryland Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin
Ro Khanna, California Michael Cloud, Texas
Kweisi Mfume, Maryland Bob Gibbs, Ohio
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Rashida Tlaib, Michigan Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Katie Porter, California Pete Sessions, Texas
Cori Bush, Missouri Fred Keller, Pennsylvania
Danny K. Davis, Illinois Andy Biggs, Arizona
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Andrew Clyde, Georgia
Peter Welch, Vermont Nancy Mace, South Carolina
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Scott Franklin, Florida
Georgia Jake LaTurner, Kansas
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland Pat Fallon, Texas
Jackie Speier, California Yvette Herrell, New Mexico
Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Byron Donalds, Florida
Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
Mark DeSaulnier, California
Jimmy Gomez, California
Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
Mike Quigley, Illinois
Dave Rapallo, Staff Director
Wendy Ginsberg, Subcommittee Staff Director
Amy Stratton, Deputy Chief Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
Mark Marin, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Government Operations
Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia, Chairman
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Jody B. Hice, Georgia Ranking
Columbia Minority Member
Danny K. Davis, Illinois Fred Keller, Pennsylvania
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland Andrew Clyde, Georgia
Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Andy Biggs, Arizona
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachsetts Nancy Mace, South Carolina
Jamie Raskin, Maryland Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Ro Khanna, California Yvette Herrell, New Mexico
Katie Porter, California
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 20, 2021................................... 1
Witnesses
Allison C. Lerner, Inspector General, National Science Foundation
Chair, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency
Oral Statement................................................... 6
Kathy A. Buller, Inspector General, Peace Corps; Executive Chair,
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Legislation Committee
Oral Statement................................................... 8
Mia M. Forgy, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Election Assistance
Commission
Oral Statement................................................... 10
Clark K. Ervin, Former Inspector General, Department of Homeland
Security and Department of State
Oral Statement................................................... 11
Liz Hempowicz, Director of Public Policy, Project on Government
Oversight
Oral Statement................................................... 12
Written opening statements and statements for the witnesses are
available on the U.S. House of Representatives Document
Repository at: docs.house.gov.
Index of Documents
----------
Documents entered into the record during this hearing by
Unanimous Consent (UC) and Questions for the Record (QFR's) are
listed below.
* UC - Project on Government Oversight report, ``The Watchdogs
After Forty Years: Recommendations for Our Nation's Federal
Inspectors General;'' submitted by Rep. Connolly.
* UC - Letter from former inspectors general regarding reforms
to the inspectors general system; submitted by Rep. Connolly.
* UC - Statement for the record from former Department of
Defense Inspector General Gordon Heddell regarding inspector
general independence; submitted by Rep. Connolly.
* UC - Government Accountability Office report regarding
inspector general independence and reforms; submitted by Reps.
Maloney and Porter.
* UC - Congressional Research Service report regarding
Congress's authority to limit the removal of inspectors
general; submitted by Rep. Maloney.
* UC - Statement by Michael Horowitz, Chair of the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, regarding
the removal of Inspector General Michael Atkinson; submitted by
Rep. Connolly.
* QFR's: to Ms. Kathy A. Buller; submitted by Rep. Connolly.
* QFR's: to Mr. Clark K. Ervin; submitted by Rep. Connolly.
* QFR's: to Ms. Allison Lerner; submitted by Rep. Connolly.
Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.
RESTORING INDEPENDENCE:
REBUILDING THE FEDERAL OFFICES
OF INSPECTORS GENERAL
----------
Tuesday, April 20, 2021
House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Reform
Subcommittee on Government Operations
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, and via Zoom; Hon.
Gerald E. Connolly (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Connolly, Maloney, Norton, Davis,
Sarbanes, Lynch, Porter, Speier, Hice, Keller, Biggs, Herrell,
and Comer.
Mr. Connolly. The committee will come order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the committee at any time.
Without objection, Carolyn Maloney, the gentlewoman from
New York and Jackie Speier, the gentlewoman from California,
shall be permitted to join the subcommittee and be recognized
for questioning the witnesses.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
For more than 40 years, Inspectors General have provided
independent and objective oversight of Federal Government and
operations. Offices of the Inspector General conduct audits,
inspections, evaluations, and investigations in order to
strengthen program integrity, promote operational economy and
efficiency, and root out fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as
mismanagement, across the Federal Government. IGs are
accountable to the President, to their agencies, to this
Congress, and, as stewards of taxpayer dollars, to the American
people. IGs provide a lot of bang for the buck.
In Fiscal Year 2020, alone, the 75 Federal OIGs
collectively identified $33.3 billion in potential savings from
audit reports and $19.7 billion in actual and anticipated
recoveries from investigations. These potential savings from
audits and investigations total $53 billion, amounting to a
return on investment of $17 for every one dollar invested in
the IG.
And IGs don't just investigate fraud and recoup money.
Their return on investment also includes improved
cybersecurity, ethics oversight of work force and contractors,
and more recently, work that oversees the health and safety of
our Nation.
IGs do not make many friends when they speak truth to
power; in fact, sometimes they make enemies. During the last
year in office, unfortunately, President Trump executed a rash
of politically motivated retaliatory personnel moves against
IGs. He moved to replace one acting IG whose office was engaged
in a review of misconduct or mismanagement by administration
officials. The President publicly blocked a third well-
respected acting IG from serving as the head of the newly
established pandemic oversight body. In a more difficult and
maybe sinister move, the President fired the intelligence
community IG, Michael Atkinson, who reported whistleblower
allegations to Congress that ultimately led to Mr. Trump's own
impeachment. He also fired State Department IG, Steve Linick,
who was investigating allegations of misconduct by Secretary
Pompeo, allegations that have recently been confirmed by that
very office.
The political motives behind these personnel changes were
hardly veiled. Mr. Trump claimed only that he had lost
confidence, a very low standard for the removal of an IG. This
flimsy excuse collapsed under minimal scrutiny. The intent was
clear: intimidation and obfuscation and obstruction.
The firings signaled the President's demand for loyalty to
him over service to the American public. In doing so, the
former President set a dangerous precedent; that an IG can
simply be removed because they are doing their job.
We cannot allow that to happen. If a President needs to
remove an IG, if there is cause, the President should provide
very specific reasons for that cause to Congress, in writing.
That is why I support Chairwoman Maloney's re-introduction of
the IG Independence Act that includes provisions to require
cause for removal of an IG.
In some cases, issues of protecting an effective IG from
removal were overshadowed by the absence of a permanent IG.
During the former President's tenure, 14 OIGs were without a
confirmed individual; in fact, four of those agencies never had
a permanent IG for the entire duration of the administration.
While previous administrations also had IG vacancies,
President Trump was calculated in using the vacancies as a way
to install acting IGs, sometimes with conflicts of interest. At
both the State Department and the Department of Transportation,
for example, IGs were installed as acting, who served within
the departments they were meant to oversee.
Wearing dual hats, as we will hear from Ms. Lerner and Ms.
Buller, undermines IG independence. In the absence of an
appointed IG, we must sustain the office's independence by
scoping the selection of qualified acting officials to hold
their place. My vice chair, Ms. Porter, is championing the
Accountability for Acting Officials Act that seeks to do just
that.
I have also said before that IGs must be pure as the driven
snow. That is because if IGs are to hold agencies accountable
and encourage whistleblowers to come forward, they must be
above reproach themselves.
Just this week, the Integrity Committee released a scathing
investigation, not yet made public, that found one IG created a
culture of witness intimidation at his/her agency. According to
the investigation, the IG abused authority by ridiculing,
belittling, and bullying her staff. These findings come more
than four years after the allegations reached the Integrity
Committee, the branch of the Council of Inspectors General
charged with overseeing the overseers.
This example is why I, and former ranking member Mark
Meadows, introduced the enhanced Whistleblower Engagement Act,
to ensure that OIG employees receive whistleblower training and
direct the IG Council to identify best practices to promote
timely and appropriate handling of alleged reprisals within an
IG's office.
Moreover, given the outlandish and inappropriate steps this
particular IG took to evade Integrity Committee oversight, you
can trust we will be following up with legislation to make
crystal clear that IGs must make documents and personnel
available to the Integrity Committee in a manner commensurate
to the access they are provided to oversee their respective
affiliated agencies.
The Integrity Committee, itself, has sometimes fallen
short. To ensure the accountability of our IG community, we
will be reintroducing legislation today to codify and enhance
administrative reporting reforms and to allow Congress greater
insight into the Integrity Committee's operations. Those who
watch the watchdogs must be held to great account.
Similar legislation passed this committee without
opposition in the last Congress, and I hope we can move quickly
on a bipartisan basis once again in this Congress.
Independent oversight by the IGs is essential to
maintaining accountability and transparency in government. That
independence was under constant attack in recent years. This
hearing will examine some of the ways in which we can restore
and bolster the framework of independence within the IG
community, which benefits taxpayers and this Nation every day.
With that, I recognize the ranking member for his opening
remarks.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Chairman Connolly.
And I appreciate you calling this hearing today, as we
examine the roles and the resources available to our Inspectors
General. Rooting out waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct is
certainly one of the most important jobs that this committee
and the Inspectors General serve; themselves, really, on the
front line, as we, as a committee, try to serve on the front
line, as far as Congress is concerned.
But one of the big concerns that I have, in addition, is
the fact that according to the Council of Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency records, of the 76 Inspector General
Offices, 18 have fewer than 10 employees, and as a result, some
of these simply don't have the resources needed to do the job
that we expect them to do, as Congress. Some of these agencies
include the National Endowment for Humanities, the Farm Credit
Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Election
Assistance Commission.
And all of these, in spite of not having proper resources,
still provide hundreds of millions of dollars in grants to
individuals, businesses, states, localities, and so forth, and
yet, with minimal staffing, they find themselves in a situation
where it is really, they are incapable of conducting the
oversight and the responsibilities that they have on their
shoulders.
Here is just one example that, personally, I was involved
with, along with a few others. But when the retirement of
Inspector General Patricia Layfield, after she retired, Ms. Mia
Forgy, she is now the only staff member of the Election
Assistance Commission Office of the Inspector General. I mean,
that is pretty stunning, to think we have an Inspector General
Office with only one person there.
In 2020 alone, the Election Assistance Commission provided
$825 million in grants. That was an increase of $445 million
from 2019. And more than half of that money, by the way, went
out in just 45 days. So, you have got an enormous amount of
money going out and you only have one person involved in the
whole office. I mean, it is just amazing.
And due to the lack of staffing resources, the EAC
Inspector General Office, they contract out the audits of the
EAC grant programs, but they, themselves, don't even have the
personnel to review the audits from the third party. So, how do
you determine whether or not it is even an accurate audit if
you don't even have the ability to look into and audit the
audit that a third party is doing?
Furthermore, when we asked them to investigate
substantiated allegations of an improper contract awarded to a
pro-Biden firm by the California Secretary of State's Office to
contact voters, the former Inspector General, Ms. Layfield, she
informed us, the Republicans on this committee, that their
office did not have the ability to conduct the investigations
and, instead, they would need to hire a third-party contractor.
So, what is the purpose of the Inspectors General if they
can't do their job, and why do we even have an office in the
EAC if they don't have the ability to do their job?
And to make matters worse, the contract did not even pay
out at that time, so immediate action by the Inspector General
could have prevented, really, millions of dollars in taxpayer
money from being misspent, but they did not have the resources
or the personnel to deal with the issue at hand. This is deeply
concerning, and it highlights a serious problem that many of
the small Inspector General Offices are facing.
If an Inspector General's office does not have the
staffing, I will say it again, if they don't have the staffing
to conduct investigations into substantial allegations of
wrongdoing, then, quite frankly, they don't have the resources
to function at all, if they can't even do investigations into
substantiated allegations.
Inspector General Offices should not be a pass-through for
third-party contractors and they, themselves, still have no
ability to oversee those contractors. It just is nonsense.
So, I am hopeful that my Democrat colleagues can and will
stop the repeated attacks on the Trump administration and focus
on ensuring that our Inspectors General are able to conduct
robust oversight or look for other solutions to ensure that all
agencies have a watchdog capable of overseeing agency
operations and spending. That is what it is all about.
And I am hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that we can come together
and work for those kinds of solutions to a broader problem,
rather than just use this hearing, and I hope it doesn't turn
into just an opportunity for continued attacks on the Trump
administration. We have serious issues that need to be
addressed and resolved, and I hope we will be able to move in
the spirit of accomplishing that task before us.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and I thank you.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the gentleman and assure him that
holding the Trump administration is not a serious of gratuitous
attacks. It is, in fact, to highlight actions that were taken
that seriously threatened to undermine the integrity and the
independence of IGs.
Mr. Hice. And I would remind the chairman that President
Obama did similar actions. So, let's just, in fairness, deal
with the problem, and not use it as an attack would be my
request. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly. Well, I would certainly expect the ranking
member to show equal sensitivity to the Biden administration,
because I noticed he lobbed grenades at Biden in his remarks,
while preaching nonpartisanship for the rest of us.
With that, I see the distinguished chairwoman of the full
committee, Mrs. Carolyn Maloney is on. I know she has an
opening statement.
Madam Chairwoman, you are recognized for your opening
statement.
Chairwoman Maloney. Thank you, Chairman Connolly, for your
insightful comments.
And thank you, Member Hice, for calling this important
hearing on Inspectors General.
Inspectors General play a crucial role in our democracy by
independently and objectively working to expose waste, fraud,
and abuse in government. Supporting Inspectors General and the
need for adequate independence and access has long been a
bipartisan issue in this committee. The committee regularly
relies on the work of IGs to identify issues in need of reform,
recommendations for how that reform can be achieved. It is
critical to have experienced, competent, and independent
Inspectors General at every agency.
Unfortunately, and based on fact, President Trump
repeatedly attacked the independence of IGs by removing or
replacing IGs in what appeared to be retaliation for
investigating misconduct of his own administration. That is why
last year, I introduced the Inspector General Independence Act
with House Majority Leader Hoyer, Chairman Connolly, and
Chairman Lynch.
The Inspector General Independence Act would protect IGs
from being fired as a result of political retaliation by only
allowing an IG to be removed for one of a set list of reasons.
I want to build on that proposal with an even bolder package of
reforms.
Yesterday, I introduced the IG Independence and Empowerment
Act. This comprehensive package includes a number of proposals,
many of which have received broad, bipartisan support. Just a
few examples include the enhanced whistleblower engagement act,
a bill introduced by Chairman Connolly, to enhance
whistleblower training for IGs, and a bill introduced by Vice
Chair Jimmy Gomez, to give IGs the ability to compel testimony
from contractors and former Federal employees. We have
important work to do to both preserve and protect the
independence and authority of Inspectors General going forward.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today and
appreciate their willingness to help us draw attention to the
importance of Inspectors General and the work they do.
Thank you, again, for holding this important hearing, and I
yield back.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the distinguished chairwoman and
thank her for her leadership on this subject. I look forward to
working with her, hopefully on a bipartisan basis, as we move
forward on the legislative agenda.
I would now like to introduce our witnesses. We are
grateful to have their expertise. Our first witness will be
Allison Lerner, who is the Inspector General for the National
Science Foundation and the chair of the Council of Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency, known as CIGIE.
We will then hear from Kathy Buller, Inspector General of
the Peace Corps and executive chair of CIGIE.
Third, we will hear from Mia Forgy, the Deputy Inspector
General for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
Fourth, we will hear from Clark Ervin, former Inspector
General for the Department of Homeland Security and Department
of State.
And last, but certainly not least, we will hear from Liz
Hempowicz, director of public policy at the Project of
Government Oversight, I think also known as POGO.
If the witnesses would unmute themselves, and if our two
in-person witnesses would rise, and if all of you would raise
your right hand, it is the tradition of our committee and
subcommittee to swear in witnesses.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Connolly. Let the record show that all of our witnesses
have, in fact, replied in the affirmative.
I want to thank you all. Without objection, your written
statements will be made part of the record.
And with that, Ms. Lerner, you are now recognized for a
five minute summation of your testimony. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF ALLISON C. LERNER, INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL
SCIENCE FOUNDATION, CHAIR, COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON
INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY
Ms. Lerner. Thank you, Chairman Connolly.
Chairman Connolly, Ranking Member Hice, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, I appreciate you inviting me to
appear before you today in my role as chair of the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
Since January 1 of this year, I have had the honor of
serving as CIGIE's chair, and for six years prior to that, I
served as its vice chair. My testimony today will focus on
actions to strength IGs' independence and ensure they have the
tools necessary to do their work, to protect whistleblowers,
and to hold IGs and their senior leaders accountable.
CIGIE has several legislative priorities, focused on
strengthening IG independence. I'd also like to highlight the
work of CIGIE's IG candidate recommendations panel, which is
grappling with one of the greatest challenges currently facing
the IG community: the fact that 15 out of the 75 IG positions
are vacant, including 13 Presidentially appointed positions.
The panel has worked with Presidential administrations and
agency heads since 2009 to identify strong, independent
candidates for IG positions. It has interviewed candidates and
provided dozens of recommendations to both the Trump and Biden
administrations for vacant Presidentially appointed IG
positions, and it has supported agency heads working to fill IG
positions through competitive hiring actions. CIGIE supports
codifying some of the actions taken by the panel to ensure they
continue across future administrations.
A strong message from agency leadership supporting
cooperation with the Office of Inspector General can be an
invaluable tool for OIGs. To help OIGs, whose agencies have not
made such statements, CIGIE is preparing a white paper on these
communications and then a template that IGs can use to work
with their agency heads to promulgate such statements. We look
forward to briefing the committee on the results of this
project and to sharing the white paper and template with OMB,
as it works to craft and message to agency heads in support of
the value of IG oversight.
Inspector General Buller's testimony details legislative
opportunities to provide IGs with essential oversight tools,
including testimonial subpoena authority. I'd also like to
highlight legislation that cures a longstanding problem with
the Department of Justice OIG's jurisdiction. Unlike all other
OIGs, the DOJ OIG does not have jurisdiction to review
misconduct allegations against all Department employees.
Misconduct by DOJ lawyers is investigated by DOJ's Office of
Professional Responsibility, which is not independent, like the
OIG.
Last Congress, the House passed the bipartisan, Inspector
General Access Act, without objection. Senators Richard Durbin,
Mike Lee, and a bipartisan group of co-sponsors, have
introduced identical legislation in the Senate, and we
encourage Congress to quickly pass this important legislation.
Our work as IGs would have far less impact without
whistleblowers, whose actions have saved U.S. taxpayers
billions of dollars and made government programs more efficient
and effective. CIGIE has taken many actions to ensure
whistleblowers are aware of their right to disclose evidence of
waste, fraud, and abuse, and are also protected for doing so.
As CIGIE chair, I'll encourage all OIGs to prioritize internal
whistleblower education for OIG employees.
I also support the Securing Inspector General Independence
Act of 2021, which, among other things, would require
whistleblower protection coordinators to inform OIG employees
of their whistleblower rights and protections, including the
process for filing a complaint with CIGIE's Integrity
Committee.
Finally, just as Inspectors General oversee our agencies,
we're committed to upholding accountability within our own
community. Since the IG Empowerment Act transferred full
responsibility for CIGIE's Integrity Committee, the entity that
oversees IGs and their senior officials, from the FBI to CIGIE,
the IC's work has become more transparent and rigorous. Its
workload has also increased steadily, along with the amount of
staff, time, and other resources required to fulfill the IC's
essential mission.
We are exploring ways to provide additional support, such
as adding a senior investigative attorney to the team. The IC
is also working to enhance the transparency of its operations,
while still protecting the whistleblowers who contact it, who
are often extremely concerned about being retaliated against as
a result of their decision to come forward.
Thank you, again, for your strong bipartisan support for
our community. I look forward to working closely with this
subcommittee to ensure that Inspectors General continue to be
empowered to provide the independent, objective oversight for
which they're known, and which the taxpayers deserve.
This concludes my prepared remarks, and I'd be pleased to
answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Connolly. You are a pro. Sixteen seconds left. Thank
you.
Ms. Buller, you are recognized for your five minute
summation of your testimony.
STATEMENT OF KATHY A. BULLER, INSPECTOR GENERAL, PEACE CORPS,
LEGISLATION COMMITTEE CHAIR, COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL
ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY LEGISLATION COMMITTEE
Ms. Buller. Chairman Connolly, Ranking Member Hice, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to appear before you today. I am the Inspector
General of the Peace Corps and the chair of the Legislation
Committee for the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency, or CIGIE.
Each IG has its own relationship with Congress; however, on
issues impacting multiple IGs, we are more effective in
providing technical assistance to Congress through a collective
effort. I am testifying in my capacity as a Legislation
Committee chair.
Today, Inspectors General are operating amid a worldwide
pandemic, overseeing some of the most extensive government
spending bills in history. Despite the 15 vacant Inspector
General positions at some of the largest and most consequential
agencies within government, Inspectors General and their staff
are working diligently to provide accountability and ensure
integrity of Government processes.
While administration and agency leadership change, the IG
community has a proven track record with integrity and
functioning fairly and objectively.
Last year, with the support from the leadership of this
committee, legislation was introduced to bolster and protect
the independence and integrity of the IG community. While not
all of it passed, CIGIE was pleased to see additional
whistleblower protections enacted. The protections initially
introduced in the House by Chairman Connolly, were bolstered by
bipartisan support. These new whistleblower protections will
make it easier for whistleblowers to come forward without fear
of reprisal.
While these reforms and other key legislation, such as the
Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, improved the ability
and capacity of IGs to perform independent oversight, serious
challenges remain. Each Congress, the CIGIE Legislation
Committee presents the committee's top reform proposals to
strengthen government oversight or to resolve challenges that
IGs face under current law.
While I have outlined all of our legislative priorities in
my written remarks, there are three I would like to highlight.
First, it's imperative that Congress take steps to protect
the independence of the Inspectors General. CIGIE surges
Congress to amend Federal Vacancies Reform Act to change who is
eligible to serve as acting IG, include the first assistant to
the Inspector General, and allow for senior OIG officials from
different agencies to serve in that capacity.
Last year, two Presidential appointees were directed to
serve as acting IGs for the agencies they served, one of whom,
in an agency, continued in an agency management position while
serving as acting IG.
The fact is that administrations from both parties have
selected acting Inspectors General from senior management and
political positions within the agencies to be overseen,
creating actual and perceived conflicts of interest, and
undermining independence.
This legislation, with an additional provision, requiring
notification to Congress when an IG is placed on non-duty
status, including the reasons why the action was taken, will
greatly improve IG independence.
Second, to address lingering access issues, prohibit the
use of appropriated funds to deny IG access to information.
Existing appropriations prohibitions apply only to agencies
funded under particular subcommittee appropriations acts. CIGIE
recommends a governmentwide prohibition to further emphasize
IGs' authority to access agency information.
Third, provide the IG community with testimonial subpoena
authority. This tool can be used to get critical information
from government contractors, subcontractors, volunteers,
grantees, subgrantees, and former employees.
We are committed to providing technical assistance, as
appropriate, to help ensure the effectiveness of testimonial
subpoenas as an oversight tool. CIGIE recommends that
testimonial subpoena authority for IGs mirror CIGIE's
documentary subpoena authority, similar to the authority
recently granted to the Pandemic Response Accountability
Committee of CIGIE.
While there are differences between CIGIE's proposal and
the legislation, we wanted to express our appreciation to the
chairman, Committee Chairwoman Maloney, and Congressman Gomez
for introducing H.R. 2089. As Chairman Connolly stated, when
introducing the legislation, testimonial subpoena authority for
IGs is a necessary tool to hold former officials accountable
for their actions and consequences of their policy decisions.
In closing, I would like to thank all members and staff of
this subcommittee and the full committee, for your efforts on
initiatives affecting CIGIE and our legislative priorities. The
Legislation Committee looks forward to continuing to be an
important resource for you as you pursue additional oversight
and legislative work.
That ends my prepared remarks and I'm here to take any
questions.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, Ms. Buller.
Ms. Forgy, and Ms. Forgy, am I pronouncing your name
correctly?
Ms. Forgy. It's Forgy.
Mr. Connolly. Of course it is.
Ms. Forgy, forgive me, please. I took a stab and I got it
wrong.
Ms. Forgy. No problem.
Mr. Connolly. Welcome, Ms. Forgy.
Ms. Forgy. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MIA M. FORGY, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
Ms. Forgy. Good morning, Chairman Connolly, Ranking Member
Hice, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you
for the invitation to discuss with you the operations and
activities of the Election Assistance Commission, Office of
Inspector General.
The EAC is a bipartisan commission, created and authorized
by the Help America Vote Act, known as HAVA. The OIG is an
independent division of EAC that's required by HAVA and the
Inspector General Act of 1978. The OIG is comprised of an
Inspector General and a Deputy Inspector General. Due to the
planned retirement of the former Inspector General on March 31,
2021, the OIG is currently operating with one full-time
employee.
For additional resources, the OIG procures audit support
services from independent public accounting firms and legal and
investigative services from other Federal agencies. HAVA gives
EAC the authority to conduct regular audits of grants and
payments distributed by the EAC and the OIG conducts those
audits on behalf of the EAC.
To fulfill that mission, the OIG has established a risk-
assessment process for selecting and auditing the
administration of the $1.2 billion in payments distributed by
EAC to its grant recipients, collectively, in 2018 and 2020,
and the unexpended payments distributed prior to 2011 that the
EAC has reissued as new grant awards in Fiscal Year 2020.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 included an
appropriation of $380 million in HAVA election security grants.
The OIG procured audit support services in September 2019 to
conduct audits of the 2018 election security grants for six
states: New Mexico, Arkansas, West Virginia, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, and Florida.
Due to the impacts of COVID-19 and the states' limited
availability during the 2020 primary and Presidential
elections, the six audits were performed between December 2020
and March 2021. The six audits reviewed a total of $32.4
million in expended Federal funds and identified $4.4 million
of questioned costs and $82,466 in funds that could be put to
better use.
In general, the six audits of the 2018 election security
grants found that the states are spending HAVA funds on
allowable program activities. In December 2019, the EAC
received an additional $425 million in HAVA election security
grants, and in March 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act, known as CARES Act, provided
supplemental appropriations of $4 million as support for the
states in conducting the 2020 Federal elections.
OIG is currently in the procurement process to obtain audit
services for Fiscal Year 2021 to continue auditing states'
expenditures of the 2018 election security grants and to
include audits of the 2020 election security grants, 2020 CARES
Act payments, and EAC grant awards being issued to the states
in Fiscal Year 2020.
In addition to grant audits, the OIG is responsible for
conducting internal audits, inspections and evaluations, and
other reviews of EAC's programs, policies, procedures, and
reporting on those results.
There have been considerable changes recently in the OIG's
audit environment, including a substantial increase in the
EAC's grant funding, as well as operational changes in EAC's
grant management. The OIG, however, is working to ensure
effective oversight of the $1.2 billion of grants issued to the
states while continuing to conduct OIG statutory audits, audits
and assessments of EAC's internal business processes, and to
comply with all OIG mandates issued by governmentwide policy,
and government-auditing standards.
The OIG is currently operating with one full-time employee
and a Fiscal Year 2021 budget of $1 million for contracted
audits and legal and investigative services. As a result of the
EAC's recent budget increase, the OIG will have the ability to
hire an additional FTE anticipated for Fiscal Year 2021.
Additionally, the EAC is actively recruiting to fill the vacant
Inspector General position.
In closing, election systems have been designated by the
Department of Homeland Security as part of the Nation's
critical infrastructure and the EAC plays a critical role in
funding and assisting states to improve election processes. It
is the OIG's role to offer guidance and information through its
audits, that will help the EAC build and run programs that
promote other competence by preventing and detecting fraud,
waste, and abuse.
To adequately perform this role, the OIG is required to
regularly conduct grant audits, as described within HAVA,
perform our OIG statutory requirements, and showing that
assessments, reviews, and audits of EAC's high-risk areas are
performed, and readily respond to congressional requests.
The OIG will continue to work with the EAC and Congress to
help promote efficient and effective government.
I appreciate the opportunity to provide this testimony
regarding the activities of the OIG. If you have any questions,
I will be happy to address them. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Ms. Forgy, and you got 17 seconds
to go. Great job.
Mr. Ervin, you have your five-minute summation of your
testimony. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF CLARK ERVIN, FORMER INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Ervin. Good morning, Chairman Connolly, Ranking Member
Hice, and other members of the subcommittee, and thank you very
much for the opportunity to testify before you today on this
very important topic.
The assault on the IG community in the last few years
highlights the urgent need to further amend the statute to
further empower Inspectors General to do the job that Congress
intended for them to do and to further protect Inspectors
General from reprisals for doing so.
Let me touch briefly on a few such reforms. First, I
support a for-cause removal provision, with cause being defined
as permanent incapacity or serious misconduct, as specified in
H.R. 6984. And the stated cause should be documented so that
its accuracy can be scrutinized by Congress and further tested
in the court of public opinion.
Additionally, I support setting a fixed, but renewable term
for IGs, say seven years. A fixed term would underscore that
IGs are not typical political appointees who serve only at the
pleasure of the President, and, therefore, serve the
President's political purposes and advance his policy agenda.
In my judgment, the combination of these measures would
further empower Inspectors General to exercise their oversight
responsibilities vigorously. They would have the assurance of
knowing that doing their jobs will not cost them their jobs.
Second, given the number and length of IG vacancies, we
must do something to encourage presidents to fill them as soon
as possible. One thought would be to require presidents, after
a reasonable period of time, to nominate someone, or at least
to give Congress a notional date by when a nomination can be
expected.
In the meantime, vacancies should be filled only by the
Deputy Inspector General, the general counsel to the Inspector
General, or someone else senior in the Office of Inspector
General.
The occupant of the IG position, whether on a permanent or
a temporary basis, should be someone who has the qualifications
specified in the statute and someone outside the agency chain
of command, so that his or her independence is not compromised,
either as a matter of fact or appearance. And IGs should not be
double-headed, because done right, being an IG is a full-time
job and then some.
Third, IGs should be given testimonial subpoena power with
respect to former employees and agency contractors and
grantees. Any good investigator will tell you that a thorough
investigation requires reviewing documents and witness
testimony, and then cross-checking them against each other.
I mentioned a couple other items in my written testimony,
and I can think of, still others, as I sit here today, but in
the interests of time, I'll leave it at that for now, and,
again, thank you very much for inviting me, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, Mr. Ervin. Very
thoughtful.
Ms. Hempowicz, you are recognized for your five-minute
summation of your testimony. Welcome.
Ms. Hempowicz. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF LIZ HEMPOWICZ, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC POLICY, PROJECT
ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT
Ms. Hempowicz. Chairman Connolly, Ranking Member Hice, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
testify today about Inspectors General.
Congress enacted the Inspector General Act in 1978 to
create a system of overseers who work within, but independent
of, Federal agencies. When agencies, themselves, were charged
with this work, Congress found that agency personnel clearly
failed to make sufficient and effective efforts to prevent and
detect fraud, abuse, waste, and mismanagement in Federal
programs and expenditures, in large part because of a lack of
independence and the natural tendency to not call attention to
your own shortcomings.
The IG system we have today was Congress' answer to that
problem, and in large part, that system has been a success. The
work of the IGs has continually resulted in substantial
financial savings for the Federal Government, as we have heard.
That is not to say that the system has reached its full
potential, however, especially coming off of the sixth year in
a row in which polling shows that the public is gravely
concerned about Government corruption. It is critical that
these watchdogs have the resources, independence, and
accountability they need to root out all forms of corruption in
our Government.
That is why I strongly urge Congress to pass legislation to
address IG resources and authorities by granting all IGs
subpoena power to compel testimony when the subjects of their
investigations have left government service or were contractors
and reduce the statutorily required reporting elements of
Inspector General semiannual reports, to preserve their
independence by protecting Inspectors General against
unwarranted removal and limiting who can serve as a temporary
acting Inspector General in the event of a vacancy, and to hold
IGs accountable by ensuring the Integrity Committee of the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
has the resources and policies in place to adequately and
consistently oversee the overseers.
While my written testimony goes into detail about all of
these recommendations, I'd like to focus today on the issue of
independence. Doing the job of an Inspector General well, will
eventually put most IGs at odds with political leadership;
indeed, this tension is exactly why Congress established
independent structures for Federal IGs in the first place.
While that independence built into the IG Act is a good
start, there are two critical gaps that leave internal
watchdogs vulnerable to politically driven interference. First,
a president has unfettered ability to remove an Inspector
General even for improper reasons. Second, after such a
removal, a president can replace them immediately with an
individual who doesn't meet the standards laid out in the IG
Act or one whose conflicts of interest could negatively affect
the Office's work. Both gaps pose serious risks to the
effectiveness of Inspectors General, and both must be addressed
by Congress.
Though the Congress didn't place any limits on the
President's authority to remove Inspectors General in 1978,
they did require Presidents to notify Congress about the
reasons for such a removal. They expected this requirement
would act as a sufficient deterrent to keep presidents from
removing aggressive watchdogs, because they were doing their
job well; however, it has become abundantly clear that this
notification to Congress is not serving as such a deterrent.
The public and Congress depend on IGs to ensure our Federal
agencies are functioning effectively, and to do this job, IGs
must be confident that the law will protect them from
retaliation. Right now, IGs do not have that confidence.
Last year, after President Trump removed four Inspectors
General in quick succession, POGO immediately began hearing
from those in the IG community. What we heard was that they
were afraid that doing their jobs and going after the facts,
wherever they may lead, without regard for how it would reflect
on the President or others in political leadership, would cost,
would be the end of their careers.
This is not an environment conducive to rigorous and
effective oversight. That is why I strongly urge Congress to
enact legislation that would require the President to have just
cause to fire an Inspector General and to communicate the
specific causes underlying that impending removal to Congress.
Granting Inspectors General for-cause removal protections
will make it less dangerous to exercise the independence
required of them to fulfill their missions.
I understand that the executive branch has asserted that
such protections would be unconstitutional, but I would caution
Congress against accepting that position outright. The Supreme
Court recently had a chance to expansively strike down for-
cause removal protections for executive branch officials, and
it declined to do so; in fact, they went out of their way to
highlight that in some cases, these protections are
appropriate.
Our analysis is that IGs are one such office where these
protections would be appropriate and constitutional, and the
nonpartisan congressional Research Service agrees.
I also urge Congress to limit who the President can choose
as an acting IG in the event of a vacancy to preempt issues of
conflicting priorities by preventing agency employees from
overseeing the agency they work for, and to encourage the
President to make a formal nomination where she could exercise
her full appointment power.
Thank you, again, for holding this important hearing and
for your demonstrated commitment to the Inspector General
System and community. I look forward to answering your
questions.
Mr. Connolly. Wow. Within three seconds. That is a pro.
Thank you.
I would just observe, I was saying this to the
distinguished ranking member before the hearing began, if we
are going to bolster the powers and independence of IGs,
including subpoena power, which I would support, personally, I
do think, however, we have to reassure ourselves that, as I
said in my opening statement, that the IGs, themselves, are
purer than driven snow.
And that means CIGIE has to be more transparent, rigorous,
and accountable for investigating any IG who may be, in fact,
guilty of something that is untoward and that taints his or her
office. And I just plant that idea, because while we may not
agree on the record of the previous administration, I do
believe that we can find common ground, though, in making sure
that we strengthen the infrastructure of accountability for
IGs, themselves. Otherwise, confidence gets eroded.
So, I just want to plant that idea in everyone's mind,
because I think there is some common ground to be had here, but
it is going to require a more robust infrastructure at CIGIE,
frankly, and better communication and accountability to
Congress in terms of their oversight and investigations.
Sorry for that advertisement for a bill I would like to
reintroduce.
The chair now recognizes for her five minutes of questions,
our distinguished chairwoman, Chairwoman Maloney.
Chairwoman Maloney, I think you need to unmute.
Chairwoman Maloney. Thank you, all of the panelists, for a
very insightful testimony.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, for having this very
important hearing.
Ms. Lerner, in the last year in office, President Trump
removed or replaced five Inspectors General in what appeared to
be retaliation for investigating misconduct of his own
administration. In June 2020, the Government Accountability
Office issued a report addressing the impact of political
retaliation on IGs, and that report said, and I quote, ensuring
the independence of IGs is critical to the Office of IG's
credibility and effectiveness, end quote.
If there is the appearance of political interference with
an IG's Office, how might that impact the mission and
effectiveness of that office, Ms. Lerner?
Ms. Lerner. Thank you for the question, Madam Chairwoman.
And to answer it, any action that would make the work of an
Inspector General appear to be politically motivated, goes to
the heart of what an OIG is there for. IGs are meant to be
appointed, without regard to political affiliation, and to
conduct their work independently and in a nonpartisan fashion.
And it is entirely in opposition to everything that we hold
dear, to inject politics into the leadership decisions of the
office.
Ms. Hempowicz, yesterday, I introduced, along with Mr.
Connolly and Mr. Lynch, the IG Independence and Empowerment
Act, and this legislative package includes a provision that
would only allow Inspectors General to be removed for one of a
few specific set of causes.
How would requiring cause for an IG to be removed, promote
the independence of Inspectors General?
Ms. Hempowicz. Thank you so much for your question,
Chairwoman, and also for that legislation, which POGO has
endorsed.
How would requiring cause help to insulate Inspectors
General? I think, you know, there are two parts to this. One,
there needs to be cause, and then, two, that cause needs to be
communicated to the Congress. And so, I think, you know, both
parts are important.
First, to require cause, it requires the President to show
why they're removing that Inspector General, which would remove
some of those questions about whether or not this is
politically motivated. But so does that communication to
Congress, by giving Congress those documented reasons for
removing the Inspector General. It helps remove politics out of
the equation and allows the President, really, to exercise
their authority in a way that is completely above board and not
subject to abuse of power.
Chairwoman Maloney. Thank you.
Also, the Government Accountability Office noted in a June
2020 report that in order to safeguard the independence of
Inspectors General, that Congress could consider a for-cause
removal requirement. And last week, the congressional Research
Service released an analysis of congressional authority to
limit the removal of Inspectors General and concluded that for-
cause removal restrictions, quote, appear to be a
constitutionally permissible means of encouraging independence
for most IGs.
Do you believe that legislation to only allow IGs to be
removed for cause is consistent with Supreme Court precedent?
Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, Congresswoman, I believe it is
completely consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
Chairwoman Maloney. I just want to end by saying that it is
vital that Inspectors General are empowered to perform their
jobs and investigate waste, fraud, and abuse, without fear of
political, interference, or retaliation. Our legislation
establishing for-cause removal, and other protections, will
prevent these abuses and strengthen the independence of
Inspectors General so that they are better able to do their
jobs.
Again, I thank everyone in attendance and I yield back.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the Chairwoman.
And, without objection, the report she's referring to, the
June 8, 2020, report to Congress from the GAO, it is a 10-page
report, and without objection, I will enter it into the record.
Mr. Connolly. With that----
Chairwoman Maloney. And also, Mr. Chairman, could you also,
I request, in addition, to have in the record, the
congressional Research Services report----
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
Chairwoman Maloney.--From April 16, 2021, and----
Mr. Connolly. Without objection----
Chairwoman Maloney.--And also, the GAO's report from June
2020 on IGs.
Mr. Connolly. Yep. I have a whole list I was going to do at
the end, but absolutely----
Chairwoman Maloney. OK. All right.
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. Without objection.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chairwoman.
Chairwoman Maloney. OK. Great. Thank you.
Thank you for a great hearing.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much and thank you for your
leadership.
The distinguished ranking member, Mr. Hice, is recognized
for his five minutes.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would just say that there are very good explanations
and reasons for each of the Inspectors General that were
removed, and we can't get into that.
But I would like to go to Ms. Forgy, if I can, to begin
with you. A major political firm for President Biden's
Presidential campaign was SKDKnickerbocker, and you are
familiar with them.
What steps has your, the EAC IG Office taken to look into
this thirty-five-million-dollar contract that was awarded to
the Secretary of State of California?
Ms. Forgy. I stated in my opening statement, we are in the
process of procuring audit support services to start the audit
to include a review of that particular contract that was
brought to our attention by the ranking members.
Mr. Hice. It has taken an awfully long time to look into
that, in spite of the fact that last year, in a conversation
that many of us, the committee Republicans, well, first we
wrote to you back in October, I believe, it was of last year,
then had a conversation where IG Layfield literally said that
the allegations were credible.
Why has it taken so long?
Ms. Forgy. So, we received the letter in October from the
ranking members. EAC management had already reached out and had
correspondence with California and California responding that
they had not spent Federal funds inappropriately.
In order for our office to respond to that, we would be
conducting an audit, however, unfortunately, when we received
the letter in October, the office was under continuing
resolution, and we were under continuing resolution from
October to December. So, not having the appropriations for the
early part of Fiscal Year 2021 delayed the process of the
procurement of support services.
Mr. Hice. So, how many investigations, investigative
reports and audits does your office conduct each year versus
the number that you contract out?
Ms. Forgy. So, for our audits, OIG statutory audits, as
well as the grant audits, they are all procured by independent
public accounting firms. We have the statutory audits that we
do every year, the financial statement audit, and FISMA audit.
This year includes the data [inaudible] audit.
The Fiscal Year 2020 audits that we did, we did six grant
audits which were all, as well, procured with independent
public accounting firms.
Mr. Hice. So all of them go out of office, and yet, in your
own report dated April 7 of this year, your office stated that
the office's audit of the third-party audit was not sufficient
to support an opinion on the audit results; in other words, you
could not come to a conclusion, correct?
Ms. Forgy. The statement means that we did not audit in
order to support or to have a test to the opinion.
What we do is make sure that the independent public
accountants are following government auditing standards and
they are complying with those standards when they are doing the
audit to come across, to come to their conclusions and
findings.
Mr. Hice. OK. I understand that, but from our perspective,
what we are interested in is, is it an accurate audit?
And you are not able to come, your office could not come to
a conclusion with that, and that is very concerning. What is
the point of having a third party do the audit if you cannot
conclude whether or not the audit, itself, is accurate?
That is what we are concerned about. We want to know, is it
accurate?
Ms. Forgy. Our office does a review of the independent
public accountings, in accordance with government auditing
standards. So, we make sure that they have sufficient evidence
for the findings that they provide within their audit report. I
would review those details to make sure that all those
standards, in accordance with the IG Act, that those standards
are followed throughout the process of the entire audit.
Mr. Hice. All right. Well, if I can, I have only got 45
seconds.
But the point is, if your office, by your own words, you
said you couldn't come to sufficiently verify that it was a
good audit, so if you cannot verify the audit results on
contractors, then why even use contractors?
Ms. Forgy. So, that statement doesn't mean that we couldn't
come to a conclusion. It means that we relied on the
independent public accounting firms' responses, and the
findings for their audits, as they follow government auditing
standards.
Mr. Hice. Well, from our conversation, it was clear that
you are ill-funded and, quite frankly, disorganized in multiple
ways to get things done.
I see my time is expired, so I will call it quits from
there, but huge, huge question marks arise from sending out
audits to third-party contractors and then not having the
ability to determine whether or not it is a good audit is very
alarming.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the ranking member.
I think he raises a valid point, and I will certainly
commit to working with him to explore that aspect of the
smaller IG offices that don't have the resources to do the job.
Mr. Hice. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly. I think it is a very valid point.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Davis for his five minutes of questioning.
OK. Mr. Davis is not there.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, Mr.
Sarbanes, for his five minutes.
Mr. Sarbanes. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Can you hear me OK?
Mr. Connolly. We can hear you loud and clear, John.
Mr. Sarbanes. Excellent. Well, thanks for the hearing. I
appreciate it very much.
And, you know, this committee has historically shared
bipartisan concern about Inspector General vacancies. I wanted
to speak to that a little bit.
There are currently 13, as I understand it, 13 vacant
Inspector General positions that are Presidentially appointed
and Senate confirmed, which is more than a third of the total
number of all Presidentially appointed Inspectors General.
And I am going to want to hear from each of you briefly,
what effect does it have on the Office of Inspector General
when there is no confirmed Inspector General. Maybe you can
give me a brief sense of that very quickly, just what does that
impact look like.
Why don't we start with Ms. Lerner.
Ms. Lerner. I'll be happy to start.
I think GAO did a study a few years back and surveyed the
IG community and what they found was that most IGs believed
that acting IGs are capable, do act independently, but many
believe that there could be a perception by external
stakeholders that the acting IGs don't have the same
independence that the confirmed IGs do. And that perception is
not helpful to the organization and its ability to accomplish
its mission through its work.
Mr. Sarbanes. Ms. Lerner, I am going to keep moving around.
Ms. Lerner. What I have been able to see, I've worked with
some very--sure.
Mr. Sarbanes. Yes, let me move to Ms. Buller, quickly.
Ms. Buller. I agree with everything that Ms. Lerner said.
In addition, I think that it negatively impacts the ability of
the office for planning purposes; for example, if you have a
number of vacant senior executive service positions, that would
really be something that an IG, a confirmed IG would want to
fill, an acting IG is more reluctant to go ahead and fill
positions, I think, that need to be filled in those types of
situations.
Mr. Sarbanes. All right. Let me move to another issue.
The list of Inspector General vacancies includes four
positions that have been vacant for more than five years, five
years, including the Department of Defense Inspector General,
as I understand it. In January, the House passed the Inspector
General Protection Act, which you know is a bipartisan bill
sponsored by Ranking Member Hice and Congressman Lieu, which
would require the President to report to Congress if an
Inspector General has not been nominated for 210 days after a
position becomes vacant.
Ms. Hempowicz, how would requiring the President to report
to Congress help to incentivize filling the vacant Inspector
General positions?
Ms. Hempowicz. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
Quite simply, a five-year vacancy at the Department of
Defense Inspector General is unconscionable, and so, asking a
President to explain to Congress why they haven't been able to
find an individual to lead such a critical office, I think
would, itself, serve as incentive for the President to go out
there and find somebody who can fill this job and do this job
well.
But I think it also could tell Congress if there are
problems with the pipeline for Inspectors General. I understand
that CIGIE keeps a list of qualified individuals, but, you
know, and so I think there is a talent pool to pull from, but
if that is not sufficient, you know, the President can tell
Congress that and we can all work together to figure out what
is the best way to ensure that there are individuals who are
qualified and independent in these important offices.
Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you very much.
These positions have to be filled, obviously, by qualified
individuals. The law, as you know, requires Inspectors General
be appointed, quote, without regard to political affiliation
and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability
in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law and management
analysis, public administration, or investigations.
Ms. Lerner, can you just touch on, quickly, why are these
qualifications so important for Inspectors General?
Ms. Lerner. Well, looking at [inaudible] and starting with
the nonpartisan nature of the role, as I mentioned earlier in
response to your first question, you know, that's the heart and
soul of what we do. It has to be done in a nonpartisan fashion,
and that makes us, especially our politically appointed IGs,
different.
Integrity is another watch word that is critical for our
community and ensuring that we have people who embody that word
in their lives and in their work enables us to retain the trust
of the public in the work that we do.
And the disciplinary expertise helps, because within an
OIG, there are many different [inaudible] types of work that we
do, and having knowledge or expertise in one of those sets the
Inspector General up for success, as well.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Sarbanes. Thanks very much. I yield back.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Sarbanes.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Keller, is recognized
for his five minutes.
Mr. Keller. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you to all our
panelists here today. Based on reports from the Council of
Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency, 18 of the 76
offices of Inspectors General have fewer than 10 employees, and
31 have fewer than 40 employees.
Further, IG vacancies have proved to be a reoccurring
problem under both, Democrat and Republican administrations.
According to a report issued by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office last year, between 2007 and 2016, 53 of
the 64 IGs covered by the IG Act experienced at least one
period of vacancy. Alarmingly, the longest IG vacancy spans six
years.
The agencies overseen by the IGs are responsible for doling
out hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars and grants
annually. With minimal staffing resources and many vacancies to
point toward, it is no wonder these offices too frequently tell
Congress they do not have the resources necessary to conduct
investigations into waste, fraud, and abuse.
Deputy Secretary Forgy, thank you for your testimony. As
the only person working in the Election Assistance
Commission's, or the EAC's, Office of Inspector General, do you
believe that you have the adequate resources to investigate
allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse?
Ms. Forgy. So, our office, with the size of our office, we
utilize the services of other Federal agencies or investigative
services. So, at any event where we have an audit that comes up
or we're looking into something where there is a need for an
investigation, we have the resources to reach out to another
Federal agency to obtain those investigative services.
Mr. Keller. So you do the investigative services through
other agencies?
Ms. Forgy. From another Federal agency, yes.
Mr. Keller. Other agencies. So, it is not, necessarily, the
Inspector General's Office that is doing it, it is actually an
agency that is doing it?
Ms. Forgy. So, we would contract or have an interagency
agreement with another Federal agency OIG's Office.
Mr. Keller. OK. Why isn't there currently an acting
Inspector General, and have you experienced any delay to
existing investigations and annual audit responsibilities in
the Election Assistance Commission as a result of the vacancy?
Ms. Forgy. The former Inspector General had a planned
retirement date of March 31, 2021, so she retired that day. The
EAC, I will say, is actively recruiting to fill that IG
position.
Since the IG position has been vacant, I have not currently
had any issues with resources and, soliciting or obtaining
services or carrying out our work; again, we use independent
public accounting firms to do our audits, our grant audits,
specifically, and that goes through a procurement process. And
once we, we are in the process of doing that now, and getting
that started is heavily based on having the appropriations
given to the EAC or the OIG in order for us to have the budget
to actually do the procurement process.
Mr. Keller. So the audits that you are conducting, you are
saying are going to take place by private firms and you have
somebody in your office that oversees those contracts with the
private firms?
Ms. Forgy. Correct.
Mr. Keller. OK. Thank you for that.
The Office of the Inspectors General play an important role
in overseeing Federal agencies and holding bad actors
accountable. As the body tasked in truth with their oversight,
Congress should ensure IGs have the resources necessary to
carry out their work in holding government agencies accountable
to the American taxpayers.
I look forward to continuing this committee's efforts to
improve the IGs' ability to do their important work. I thank
you and yield back.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Keller.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Davis, for his five minutes.
Mr. Davis, you need to unmute. Mr. Davis? I can see you.
Well, while we are waiting for----
Mr. Davis. How about now?
Mr. Connolly. There you are. OK. Great.
You are recognized. You are recognized----
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mister----
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. Loud and clear.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also want to thank all of the witnesses for their clear
testimony.
The area I want to pursue is that of whistleblower
protection. We all know that whistleblowers often provide key
information about waste, fraud, abuse in agencies or in
government contractors. This seems particularly critical for
the work that Inspectors General are doing to identify fraud in
the billions of Federal dollars that have been spent in
response to the coronavirus pandemic.
Ms. Lerner, let me ask you, what role are whistleblowers
playing or could they play in identifying wasteful or
fraudulent spending under the CARES Act or other pandemic-
response laws?
Ms. Lerner. As they do in all programs, in which, you know,
people work, whistleblowers are folks who have insights into
actions that are being taken that may be inefficient, that may
constitute waste, fraud, or abuse, and they are uniquely
positioned to share that information with folks, with oversight
professionals, like my office.
In the context of CARES Act funding, you know, for example,
you could have individuals within the Department of Labor who
are aware that people who are supposed to be conducting
identity checks to ensure that people are receiving
unemployment insurance payments are qualified for them are not
conducting those checks. That would be the sort of information
that they could provide to OIGs that would be, you know, very
useful to us in conducting oversight and holding people
accountable and protecting the funds involved in those
programs.
Mr. Davis. Thank you. We also know that whistleblowers who
provide information to Inspectors General or to Congress do so
at great personal risk of retaliation. One method of
retaliation, sometimes used by an agency or agency management
is to open an investigation into the whistleblower or to
request that the Inspector General investigate that individual.
How can Inspectors General protect against being used as
conduits for retaliatory investigations, while maintaining the
ability to investigate legitimate allegations of wrongdoing?
Ms. Lerner. That's a very good question, sir.
And Inspectors General are required to have processes in
place to assess all allegations that come to them for merit to
determine if there's a potential violation of law, rule, or
regulation that would require an investigation, and ensuring
that those processes play out for every allegation that comes
in, will go a long way toward ensuring that an IG does not open
an inappropriate investigation.
I think the bigger concern here would be the actions of
program peoples who may have been aware of a wrongdoing by an
employee and failed to act on that until the moment when that
person blew the whistle, then they make a referral to Inspector
General. And as an IG, I would want to be aware of a situation
like that, when it appears that there has been a retaliatory
referral to my office, and that would be a matter that we would
work with the Office of Special Counsel on, to determine the
best course of action to respond to that inappropriate
behavior.
Mr. Davis. Are there any further protections that an
individual, I mean, we often hear from individuals that, you
know, if I come forth with what I know, something is going to
happen to me. I am going to bear the brunt of something,
myself.
How do we assure employees that they can be protected and
that they are protected when they decide to reveal information?
Ms. Lerner. I think we do that by making sure that
employees understand that the Inspector General Act requires us
to protect the identity of people who come to us with
information like this, to the maximum extent practicable, and
every IG I know takes that responsibility extremely seriously.
Because we recognize that if people are afraid to come to us,
then we will lose out on important leads that could help us do
our work and [inaudible] in the strongest possible fashion.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Biggs,
for his five minutes.
Mr. Biggs. I thank the chairman and the ranking member.
Ms. Forgy, like many of my fellow members on this
subcommittee, I am profoundly disturbed that Presidential
candidate Joe Biden's main election advisory firm,
SKDKnickerbocker, received $35 million in HAVA funds from then-
California Secretary of State, Alex Padilla, in apparent
violation of Federal law. This committee has been trying to
examine that contract since at least September of last year,
which is before my time serving on this body.
Your predecessor, former Election Assistance Commission
Inspector General Patricia Layfield, frequently indicated her
need to rely on third-party contractors to investigate the
SKDKnickerbocker transaction.
Ms. Layfield left the EAC earlier this month and we still
don't know the story behind the thirty-five-million-dollar
transaction, now, seven months after this committee's initial
inquiry; meanwhile, Joe Biden is in the White House and Mr.
Padilla is in the U.S. Senate.
My colleagues, Mr. Comer, Mr. Hice from this committee, as
well as Mr. Davis from the House Administration Committee,
pointed out in a March 18, 2021, letter to your boss, EAC
Commissioner Donald Palmer, the troubling fact that the EAC OIG
cannot oversee a single contract worth $35 million, but it is
still disbursing nearly $1 billion in taxpayer funds.
Ms. Forgy, I know you are now the sole person working in
the EAC IG Office, and very simply, what do you need to ensure
the SKDKnickerbocker contract is more expeditiously
investigated?
Ms. Forgy. So, I previously stated we are in the process of
doing the procurement process to obtain the services that we
need from independent public accountants to review that
contract. That contract process is underway, and once we have a
legal contract in place, we will start the process of looking
into that contract in order to address the concerns that were
expressed by the ranking members to our office.
Mr. Biggs. So, Ms. Forgy, if I understand you correctly,
you basically let out bids for a contract, is that correct, and
you haven't received those bids back and you are going to be
reviewing those?
Ms. Forgy. The process is still--the contracting officer is
doing their internal review at this moment. Once that's
completed, we will do a solicitation through a blanket purchase
agreement that we have. Those contractors that are on that
blanket purchase agreement are experienced with doing grant
audits and with the EAC.
And so, once we have those proposals back, we will review
those. Once we have that process completed, we will have a
complete contract and we will be able to start the process of
looking into the SKD contract and addressing the concerns that
were expressed by the ranking members.
Mr. Biggs. Ms. Forgy, can you give us kind of a rough
timeline on when that will be completed, that process?
Ms. Forgy. Based on prior experience, the procurement
process and internal review takes about 21/2 to 3 weeks. So, we
are hoping to have a solid contract, official contract in place
by early to mid-June.
Mr. Biggs. OK. Thank you.
Now, under the HAVA and the CARES Act, the EAC received a
huge infusion of cash for staff and gave out about $1 billion
in grants across the country.
What plans did the EAC put in place to oversee the increase
in grant money that the EAC was awarded this year?
Ms. Forgy. I am not able to speak on the matter, as that's
a programmatic matter under the Grants Management Office, for
their oversight, but I would be happy to write that question
down and take that back to the Grants Management Office and
provide you with further information after the hearing.
Mr. Biggs. I would appreciate that. Thank you, Ms. Forgy.
And, are also, is the IG Office, then, reviewing
allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse of any of these funds?
Ms. Forgy. Yes. That will be included as the oversight of
our review of grant audits when we go out with the IPAs. That
is a part of that review of all the states that we review for
grant audits.
Mr. Biggs. So, when Inspector General Patricia Layfield
retired on April 9, leaving you as the only employee in the EAC
OIG's Office, the EAC has not yet designated you as an acting
OIG, and this raises questions about whether your agency is
hamstringing your ability to conduct robust oversight of its
actions and make investigative decisions.
Can you elaborate on the impacts of not having an acting
EAC IG while your office should be reviewing, you know, the
billion dollars in grants from 2020.
Ms. Forgy. So, currently, as my role as Deputy IG and
carrying out, specifically, that role of overseeing the grants,
the grant audits, I'm able to do the procurement process under
my role and get that process started for the contract that we
anticipate for June. So, that process had not currently been
hindered.
The EAC, again, as I mentioned in my earlier statement,
they are actively in the process of hiring the--filling the
Inspector General position.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you. My time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the gentlemen.
The gentlemen from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, is recognized
for his five minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Can you hear me?
Mr. Connolly. We can hear you loud and clear.
Mr. Lynch. Very good.
First of all, I want to say thank you to you. You have been
nothing short of relentless on this issue, trying to get the
process and the protections for our Inspectors General. I know
you have been working on this for several years and putting a
lot of energy and effort into this, and I just want to, you
have been like a dog on a bone, and I mean that as a
compliment. You have been really relentless on this, and it is
so important, right.
We rely so heavily, especially on the Oversight Committee,
it is a real partnership that we have with our Inspectors
General, and I appreciate Inspector General Horowitz's efforts
and, you know, several of the people on this call and the work
they have done.
In our Subcommittee on National Security, as you know, Mr.
Chairman, we rely so heavily on, first of all, Stuart Bowen,
during, you know, he was the Special Inspector General for Iraq
reconstruction, and then Inspector General Sopko, who has been
doing Afghanistan.
We would have been totally in the blind, really, without
the reports that they offered to us to assist. And this was
across Republican and Democratic administrations, right; they
identified waste and fraud in the contracting process in both,
you know, in both Democratic and Republican administrations and
gave Congress the information that we needed to take
appropriate action. So, I am grateful for that process.
I do want to point out a difference of approach, though,
however, between what President Trump did versus what President
Biden is doing. In the case with President Trump, I mean, let's
be honest, every time an Inspector General came up with an
opinion or information that was contrary to the wishes of the
President, he got rid of them. They were gone. And then, he
would put them on administrative leave, before they could
contest their removal, so they were completely out of the
picture. So, you know, to my colleagues on the other side of
the aisle, you have got to be kidding me, you know, just a
clear abuse of power in removing Inspectors General for doing
their jobs.
And I will give you an example for President Biden, here is
his response. So, we recently had Inspector General Sopko
before my subcommittee and he testified in a way that was not
helpful at all to President Biden's eventual decision to remove
U.S. troops from Afghanistan in September.
Mr. Sopko testified that it would be, you know, a disaster
or, you know, that there might be a collapse. But President
Biden did not attack that Inspector General. He did not attack
that Inspector General. He accepted the information but weighed
other information that he thought was even more compelling
about the 20 years that we have spent in Afghanistan.
And he made a decision that was contrary to the evidence
provided by Inspector General Sopko. But he showed due respect
for the work that Inspector General Sopko undertook. He just
came up with a difference of opinion than the recommendations
of the IG, and he made a decision that was contrary to the
recommendations of the Inspector General.
That is a lot different than what President Trump did. If
it were President Trump, he would have removed that Inspector
General. He would have fired him for coming up with information
that was not harmonious with the President's wishes.
So, look, I am a co-sponsor of a lot of your legislation
that is going to protect Inspectors General. We have had some
very helpful commentary and advice from all the witnesses here.
I do want to ask, you know, with respect to the information
we got on Afghanistan and Iraq, Ms. Hempowicz, from POGO, how
helpful and how important is that information, because I know
you are doing God's work, as well, in terms of trying to keep
us on the right side of things, but how helpful was that
information to POGO?
Ms. Hempowicz. Those Inspectors General reports have been
invaluable to our work, conducting oversight over the
Department of Defense.
Mr. Lynch. OK. I got it.
Ms. Hempowicz. Just completely invaluable. Yes, it's hard
to state it in another way, it's just, you know, it's
irreplaceable.
Mr. Lynch. Yes. I am with you. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Connolly. And thank you for your gracious comments, Mr.
Lynch. I very much appreciate it.
The gentlewoman from New Mexico, Ms. Herrell, is recognized
for her five minutes.
Ms. Herrell?
Ms. Herrell. Yes. Sorry, I had to unmute.
Mr. Connolly. No problem.
Ms. Herrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
I just want to make a statement and then I have a question
for Allison Lerner. It seems she's asked Congress to enable all
Inspectors General to issue testimonial subpoenas for former
employees, contractors, and grant recipients. And we have heard
from some IGs that they would use that subpoena power to call
former executive branch officials to discuss the policy and
political considerations behind a policy decision.
Is it appropriate for an IG to investigate the political
considerations behind a policy decision?
And let me just keep going. I am concerned about the
likelihood that the subpoena power could be used for entirely
political purposes, including calling former administration
officials to testify on subjects unrelated to waste, fraud, and
abuse.
What protections are there in CIGIE's proposals or existing
legislation to ensure that this tool is not abused for
political purposes?
Ms. Lerner. I believe that the legislation that was dropped
yesterday by this committee, focuses the testimonial subpoena
authority on, you know, the areas within the jurisdiction of
the IG, which is preventing and detecting waste, fraud, and
abuse in the programs and operations of the agencies they
oversee. So, IGs could use this testimonial subpoena authority
to conduct reviews into matters appropriately within their
jurisdiction.
And being able to do this would ensure that, you know,
unfortunately, sometimes today we have people who retire in
order to avoid participating in a compelled interview, which
they would have to do if they remained a Federal employee, and
that undermines the ability of an Inspector General to
completely review into an issue that they have independently
determined warrants review.
So, enabling IGs to have access to those people, whether or
not they remain employed with the agency, is crucial to our
ability to complete the work that we think is necessary for the
American taxpayer.
Mr. Connolly. Would my colleague yield, without prejudice?
We will freeze her time.
Ms. Herrell, would you yield?
Ms. Herrell. Yes, sir. What did----
Mr. Connolly. I just want to underscore a point you are
making. You are right, subpoena power could be abused, as can
any power of an IG, and that is why CIGIE has to be thorough,
robust, and expeditious, as well as transparent in insisting on
accountability, so those kinds of abuses are caught and dealt
with. And so, I thank you for bringing that up.
Thank you for yielding, and your time is now resumed.
Ms. Herrell. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Just one followup to that. So, would we be guaranteed that
this tool would not be used as a preliminary tool by the IGs,
in your opinion, Ms. Lerner?
Ms. Lerner. I'm not quite sure what you mean by
preliminary, but what I can say is that the IGs have a long
history of utilizing documentary subpoenas and utilizing them
well. They have review processes in place to ensure that what
they're seeking isn't overbroad and that it's not burdensome.
And we would ensure that appropriate procedures are in place,
too, for testimonial subpoenas to ensure that, you know, the
same considerations are addressed and that those are not
abused, as well.
Ms. Herrell. Great.
Ms. Hempowicz. Congresswoman, can I add something?
I just want to add----
Ms. Herrell. Sure. Of course.
Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, I just want to add that the Department
of Defense Inspector General does have testimonial subpoena
power currently, and so does the Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee, and I would say in those, in neither
instance have we seen that authority be abused. I completely
take your question, I think there is the threat and so, it is
critical that there is accountability for Inspectors General.
But just from what we've seen so far, that authority has not
been abused.
Ms. Herrell. Great.
Ms. Lerner. And I would just note.
Ms. Herrell. Thank you--go ahead.
Ms. Lerner. I would just note, as well, that frequently
having the authority means that you don't have to use it. In
situations, you know, voluntary cooperation follows, instead of
the need to compel cooperation. So, I think we would see that,
in addition, and I imagine that the instances in which people
would actually use testimonial subpoena authority would be
limited, as it has been in the IGs that have it currently.
Ms. Herrell. Great. Thank you both.
And thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, Ms. Herrell.
The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Speier, is recognized
for her five minutes. Welcome.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first say how grateful I am to you that you are
having this hearing. I had a similar hearing last week on the
Department of Defense Inspector General and the Service
Inspectors General, and what are called component Inspectors
General, and I am deeply concerned that we have a serious
problem on our hands.
First of all, we now have an Inspector General for the
Department of Defense who is also the Inspector General for the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Defense has
a budget, as we know, of $740 billion, and yet we don't have an
Inspector General that is designated specifically for that
Department. So, hopefully, we are going to see that that is
going to change.
But I actually think that the system is broken, and I am
curious whether or not we should go back to the drawing board.
And I appreciate the chairman's commitment to this issue, and
as Congressman Lynch said, you are a dog with a bone.
So, here is my concern. First of all, it could be used for
political purposes by either administration, depending on their
concern for being criticized. So, would we not be better served
to have a term, and I think one of our witnesses, Mr. Ervin,
has suggested that, have a term of office for, let's say, eight
years, that we give the President the opportunity to make an
appointment? If it is not done within, you know, 90 days of a
vacancy that another entity, maybe it is CIGIE, would make the
appointment. That we require specific qualifications to become
an Inspector General.
So, I guess I would like to start off by asking Ms.
Hempowicz what she thinks of that idea.
Ms. Hempowicz. Yes. So, to your first question, thank you,
Congresswoman, in that hearing, I watched every minute of it.
It was incredible last week. Thank you so much for holding that
hearing.
You know, I think, one, the Project on Government Oversight
has made a recommendation, ourselves, that if there is a
longstanding vacancy in an IG Office, that Congress designate
an entity within CIGIE to make a temporary appointment. I think
that would surely incentivize a President to exercise their
full appointment authority and choose the individual who would
sit in that seat.
And to your question about term limits, I think there is
some wisdom there. I think my, one, I think that would need to
be accompanied by improvements to the Integrity Committee to
ensure that those individuals aren't, you know, kind of lawless
during that eight years, not to suggest that they would be, but
I also--and one concern would be by the end of their term, they
might be looking kind of for their next job, and so I think
that would be my one hesitancy there.
I think, really, how to increase independence of these
offices is to give them for-cause removal protections and to
address who can serve as a temporary Inspector General when
there is a vacancy. But we certainly don't object to term
limits.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
Ms. Lerner, what are your thoughts on that?
Ms. Lerner. Having served in this community for almost 30
years, you know, I've seen that there's kind of natural
turnover that comes. Some IGs come and stay for a couple of
three years. Some last, like I have, I'm 12 years in my role,
and some are even longer.
I'm concerned that if we have term limits, first, it would
make, it would increase our difficulty in recruiting people.
Some folks might not want to have a limit on the time that they
can serve, and anything that makes it harder to find people to
take, qualified people to take these jobs, would be of concern
to me.
But I am also concerned that we would still have leaving,
people leaving even before the end of their term. So, it
wouldn't get us out of the constant need to fill IG vacancies.
Certainly, if we did have terms, I think that putting them
more along the lines of the controller general, which I believe
is 10 years, would make sense. Because for an IG to--you know,
we're agents of positive change and making change takes time,
and you want to ensure that people have sufficient time to
really have an impact on an organization.
But I agree with Ms. Hempowicz that some of the other
matters that are the focus of this conversation, the ensuring
that we have protections for people who will act when vacancies
are long term, are areas that I would focus on more than
putting term limits in place.
Ms. Speier. So, tell me about the training that an
Inspector General goes through. In the Department of Defense,
these component IGs have three weeks of training and they have
the position for two years, and they are servicemembers, so, I
mean, I am very curious as to how they can do their jobs, but
could you tell me a little bit about that.
Mr. Chairman, I can't see what my time limit is, so you
will have to cut me off when it is appropriate.
Mr. Connolly. The witness may answer the question,
although, the gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Ms. Lerner. There aren't, isn't specific training required
of Inspectors General, but what CIGIE does is for all
Inspectors General who come on, they're offered what we call IG
101, which is courses that CIGIE provides to new Inspectors
General to ensure that they understand their responsibilities,
their broad responsibilities, how to, you know, their budgetary
responsibilities, that they understand what the Integrity
Committee is.
We also work to introduce new Inspectors General to their
peers so that they can find mentors and folks that they can
call when they have questions, which inevitably, you get
moments that you think no one else has ever encountered, but
other people have. We try to forge those relationships.
And we invite new Inspectors General to come to a meeting
of CIGIE's executive council so they can see the depth and
breadth of the committees that CIGIE has and get involved in
the work that the organization does.
Ms. Speier. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, and thank you for your
kind comments, Ms. Speier.
The Congresswoman from the District of Columbia is
recognized, Ms. Norton, for her five minutes. Welcome.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. I just came from a Rules
Committee meeting, Mr. Chairman, but I wanted very much to be
here to ask a question in this important hearing, because these
IGs are so important to us when we are investigating waste,
fraud, or abuse, you know, the usual problems.
But over the last four years, I looked at the record and I
was amazed to see the attacks on Federal IGs from the Trump
administration. He fired multiple Inspectors General because
apparently a fear of what they might uncover.
And if I could indicate what I mean, he fired Michael
Atkinson, the IG of the Intelligence Committee, who first
alerted Congress to the whistleblower report over the notorious
Ukraine phone call, because the IG followed the law, so he
fired him.
He nominated an IG to replace Christy Grimm, acting IG for
the Department of Health and Human Services, after she released
a report that there were, quote, severe shortages at hospitals
combatting the coronavirus.
Then he fired Steve Linick from his role as IG of the State
Department, at the request of then-Secretary Mike Pompeo,
because Mr. Linick was investigating Pompeo for misuse of
government resources. And we have just seen that he has been
found to have, they learned just this morning that it was true
that he and his wife misused government resources.
Mr. Trump didn't fire IGs who were investigating the things
his administration was doing wrong. He left gaping holes in the
IG community for years to come. While vacancies have plagued
previous administrations, they were particularly widespread on
this one. He left 13 agency IG positions vacant, 5 of which
were vacant for his entire presidency, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Hempowicz, what problem do vacancies in IG roles
present to the American taxpayer?
Ms. Hempowicz. Thank you so much for the question,
Congresswoman.
I think it presents three distinct problems. The first, I
think is, the first is that it sends a signal that oversight is
not important to the administration, which is not a great
signal to send to taxpayers. Second, is that there is a reduced
independence when you have vacancies in these offices, whether
they're longstanding or short vacancies.
In many, in a couple of instances that POGO has seen over
the years, there are acting Inspectors General that are
auditioning for the permanent role, and as part of that
auditioning process, they would like the buy-in and they would
like the positive recommendation of the agency head.
We know from Congress' legislative history in creating the
IG Act and the IG system, that when the agency has buy-in into
the Inspector General's work, that that office is less likely
to call out problems that may be, that may reflect poorly on
the agency.
And the third problem is that vacancies in these offices
really reduce their ability to do long-term planning. And I
think, you know, you see offices focusing a little bit more on,
you know, numbers of audits and small things that they can use
to kind of show Congress this is what we're doing, but not
necessarily focusing on those big-picture issues of
constitutional concern, those issues that are of concern to
people across the country.
And so, I think, really, you know, it's those three issues
are the main ones that present themselves.
Ms. Norton. Ms. Hempowicz, that is very enlightening.
I am wondering if you could tell us about the people that
President Trump did nominate to fill vacancies----
Ms. Hempowicz. Yes.
Ms. Norton [continuing]. were they experienced
investigators and accomplished members of the IG community?
Ms. Hempowicz. When we're talking about those who were
nominated to fill the position permanently, I think it was a
mixed bag. Some of the nominations, you know, were, made total
sense; individuals who understand the IG community, who come
from investigative backgrounds, who have strong leadership, who
demonstrated strong leadership throughout their careers.
But then there were also a couple of nominees who appeared
to not really have any experience with the Inspector General
realm; in particular, one nominated to lead the Department of
Defense Inspector General had very little management experience
at all. And considering the size of that office and also the
breadth of their mission, not only overseeing the Department of
Defense, but also overseeing all the component IGs underneath
them that don't have that same structural independence, I think
it raises serious questions about the quality of those
nominees.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, my colleague from the
District of Columbia.
The vice chairwoman of our subcommittee, the gentlelady
from California, where I know it is still early there, Ms.
Porter, is recognized for her five minutes.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Hempowicz, Inspectors General, as you have testified,
are individuals appointed to serve in an oversight role for
Federal agencies. Can we break that role down a little bit?
What is the Inspectors General mission?
Ms. Hempowicz. So, the Inspectors General mission is to
oversee their office, and their offices' mission is to
investigate waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement within the
agency they serve.
Ms. Porter. This would include things like audits, looking
at things for efficiency, effectiveness, trying to make sure
tax dollars are spent wisely, that Congress' purpose is being
carried out?
Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, ma'am, absolutely.
Ms. Porter. So, because of this need for independence,
Inspectors General are typically never selected from within the
agency that they are assigned to oversee; is that right?
Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Porter. But last year, that happened. A political
appointee from within an agency was appointed to be the acting
Inspector General, overseeing that agency. And, in fact, my
understanding is that this happened not once, but twice.
I guess, would that and did that put the very purpose of
the Inspector General role at risk? Does this potentially
create serious conflicts of interest?
Ms. Hempowicz. Absolutely. And I would argue that it puts
all whistleblowers that come to that, that came to that
Inspector General Office, at risk of being exposed to the
agency leadership that they may have been blowing the whistle
on.
Ms. Porter. So, this issue, let's call it wearing dual
hats, working within the agency and being the acting Inspector
General for the agency at the same time. This could effectively
put the Inspector General's role at risk. It could open the
door for waste, fraud, or abuse, it wouldn't protect
whistleblowers, necessarily.
A GAO report issued last summer noted that when the same
person is an agency official and an acting Inspector General,
that situation raises concerns. So, I want to submit that GAO
report for the record, which is very consistent with your
testimony.
Ms. Lerner, I want to turn to you. You are the chair of the
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, or
CIGIE. Did you or any member of CIGIE express to any Trump
administration officials opposition to this dual-hat conflict
of interest that we have just been discussing?
Ms. Lerner. Yes.
Ms. Porter. Who did you speak to?
Ms. Lerner. I can't go into the specifics, with whom I had
the conversations, but, you know, I have, through, in the prior
administration and in the current administration, engaged with
the White House to ensure what, you know, the qualities of a
strong acting Inspector General would be and the importance
that those people be independent in mind and appearance.
Ms. Porter. With that dual-hat person coming from within
the agency to be Inspector General, did you raise, would you
characterize the concerns you raised as strong?
Ms. Lerner. Well, they are strong concerns. I mean, being
able to be not just act independently but be viewed
independently is essential to the credibility of an Inspector
General and the work of his or her office.
Ms. Porter. And I know you feel like you can't say who you
spoke to, and I respect that. Could you share the office in
which the individual spoke, that you spoke to?
Ms. Lerner. I would have to leave it broad, but I can
assure you that, you know, the concerns were raised.
And Mr. Horowitz and I also met with the acting Inspectors
General who were, and to ensure that they understood their
responsibilities to act independently and the impact that it
could have on their ability to meet with, and especially,
government, generally accepted government auditing standards
and the actions that they'd need to----
Ms. Porter. Well, Ms. Lerner, first, I want to hope that
you had more luck with accountability than I just did with my
teenager, who desperately, apparently needs to fill his water
bottle in the middle of this questioning.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Porter. I want to state that I think it is so
important, what you just said, that we prevent this from
happening again, because you did raise strong concerns, others
raised concerns, and this happened again, not just once, but
twice.
And that is why I introduced the Accountability for Acting
Officials Act, which would preventive these dual-hat conflicts
of interest. The bill would require an acting Inspector General
to be the next-in-line official from the same office, generally
the deputy or principal deputy or a senior official from the
broader Inspector General community, if the deputy position is
vacant.
Ms. Buller, does CIGIE support these, do you support these
provisions to prevent this type of dual-hat conflict of
interest?
Ms. Buller. Absolutely.
Mr. Connolly. The gentlelady's time has expired, but the
witness may respond.
Ms. Buller. Absolutely. And as a matter of fact, it is one
of CIGIE's priorities that we submitted to Congress.
And I would like to thank the Congresswoman for her support
in this priority.
Ms. Porter. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, and don't be too hard on
your son. In a pandemic we are seeing all kinds of things,
right.
The last questioner is the chair, and I want to thank
everyone for participating in this hearing.
So, Mr. Ervin, you are a former IG; is that correct?
If you would turn on your mic.
Mr. Ervin. That's right, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Connolly. And would you favor adding a former IG, given
all the experience that person might have to CIGIE?
Mr. Ervin. I would, sir. And I see at least a couple of
advantages to that. One is, arguably, and in my judgment, this
would be the case, adding a former Inspector General would add
additional heft to CIGIE in its oversight role with regard to
the Inspector General community.
Mr. Connolly. Right.
Mr. Ervin. Two, and if that person were a former IG who had
served for a considerable period of time, and there are many,
that person, over time, would have developed some perspective,
would have seen it all, as it were, and, therefore, could give
some advice to his counterparts about what is a credible
allegation, what is not a credible allegation, what actions
should be taken with regard to allegations, et cetera. So, I
think I would----
Mr. Connolly. And, presumably, several steps removed, there
is a certain disinterest. You are not judging peers.
Mr. Ervin. Exactly.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. Ms. Lerner, would you be open to that
idea?
Ms. Lerner. I would, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much.
So, Ms. Hempowicz, we have got a lot of vacancies that are
probably close to a historic high; is that fair?
Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, I would say so.
Mr. Connolly. We have people with dual roles, where even if
the intent is not conflictual, the possibility of conflict is
there, the dispassionate, disinterested, you know,
investigative motivation or impulse could be compromised and,
certainly, perception-wise is a problem, fair enough?
Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Mr. Connolly. Having people as acting, when you have, say,
39 of these positions required by law, law passed by Congress,
requiring confirmation, which is clearly the intent of
Congress, that there be accountability and advice and consent,
and that these positions are elevated in a certain way, that I
think is a pretty strong statement, even if the intent isn't
circumvention of the law, de facto, it is circumventing the
law.
Would that be fair?
Ms. Hempowicz. Absolutely. I would say, absolutely, it is
circumventing the law.
Mr. Connolly. So, we have got some work to do--oh, here is
another one.
What is your view about a standard of removal for an IG
that, I am just not comfortable with that person?
Ms. Hempowicz. That I've lost confidence in this
individual?
Mr. Connolly. Or I've lost confidence.
Ms. Hempowicz. Yes. That is what we see from the White
House, White Houses of both political parties. I don't think
that's a reason for removal.
Why did you lose confidence in the individual is what----
Mr. Connolly. Right. So, at the very least, if you are
going to make that assertion, Democrat or Republican, you are
going to have to back it up----
Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, and you should have to----
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. With actual evidence for why
your confidence has gone away.
Ms. Hempowicz. Absolutely. You should have to do so in
that, so, before that 30-day window that Congress has put into
the law, before that individual is removed from this office.
Mr. Connolly. Do you believe that having a fixed term that
maybe could be renewable, might add to the independence and the
ability of an IG to function?
Mr. Ervin, I see you shaking your head yes.
Mr. Ervin. I do, sir, for a couple reasons. One, I think it
would further underscore that Inspectors General are not
typical appointees, that they are supposed to be apolitical,
and if the term were sufficiently long, seven years, renewable,
14 years, et cetera, that would mean that over time, an
Inspector General would serve in both, Republican
administrations and Democratic administrations.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
And I saw you also shaking your head, Ms. Hempowicz. You
agree?
Ms. Hempowicz. Yes. I think it certainly would. But I
would, again, say, you know, I think the No. 1 way to increase
and ensure independence is to give these Inspectors General
protections from removal.
Mr. Connolly. Now, the final thing I want to ask about,
because we have covered a lot of territory here today, and I
don't wish to abuse time, but I have been focused for a number
of years on strengthening the role of CIGIE, because my view
is, if on both sides of the aisle, we are going to accept an
IG's report as prima facie evidence of X, unquestioned the
integrity behind it, then the integrity behind it has to be
unquestionable.
And if there is any reason to believe that integrity is
subject to question, we have to have faith, the American public
has to have faith, that there is an accountable body that will
swiftly, robustly, thoroughly, and expeditiously, investigate
whatever the issue may be and either clear somebody or hold
them to account.
Do you believe that the current structure of CIGIE provides
that, Ms. Hempowicz?
Ms. Hempowicz. No, sir, I don't. I think, you know, if you
just look at the annual report from this last year, the vast
majority of allegations of wrongdoing against Inspectors
General that came to CIGIE were allegations of abuse of power.
But what we've seen, at least in the annual report, is then
what gets reported back to Congress, is that, you know, the
majority of those investigations were closed, either because
they didn't meet the investigative threshold standard, which is
one thing, or because the allegations, themselves, didn't
provide enough information.
The fact that those are reported together does not give us
enough information to know, and I would just highlight, again,
I would also highlight that the investigative threshold
standard that CIGIE has, the Integrity Committee has put out,
which is great, we certainly appreciate that transparency, is
not an objective standard. There is a lot of room for, there's
a lot of wiggle room there.
And so, I think that is one area where the Integrity
Committee can have a clearer standard and then the reporting to
Congress that would be required under your legislation, I think
also answers another piece of that puzzle, where it would be
required to report to Congress why they didn't continue
investigations.
Mr. Connolly. And I am going to invite you, Mr. Ervin, to
comment on it, as well, but I just have to tell you I have had
my own direct experience, where several members of this
committee a number of years ago filed a complaint against an
IG, a complaint that I continue to believe is profoundly valid.
And CIGIE, to members of this committee, basically said, we
looked at it. There is nothing to look at. Thank you very much.
Now, we detailed something like an 8-or a 10-page
complaint, and they didn't even have the courtesy to at least
go down the charges we made or the concerns we expressed and
show it the respect of a response. We looked at it, and here is
what we found.
And I can tell you that it really shook us in terms of our
confidence in CIGIE's functioning. And it can't be pro forma.
It actually has to be pretty robust.
And, by the way, I don't mean in any way to reflect on the
current leadership of CIGIE. This was a number of years ago,
and it raised institutional, structural questions, not the
willingness of individuals to look at it.
Mr. Ervin, would you like to comment on that?
Mr. Ervin. Yes, I'd just say two things about that, Mr.
Chairman.
One, I could not agree with you more on your larger point,
and that is, we have to hold Inspectors General to account for
their own behavior. We have to watch the watchdogs. It reflects
directly on the credibility of Inspectors General work if they,
themselves, are not thoroughly investigated when credible
allegations are made. That's the first thing I would say.
And the particular instance that you cite, I'm not aware
of, but if there was bipartisan consensus that a given
Inspector General needed to be investigated, and if that is the
response that you got back, that is very troubling and suggests
that reform should be made to process.
Mr. Connolly. Yes, I can't confess that it was bipartisan
consensus, because part of the complaint was that this
particular IG, flat-out, had engaged in partisan activity, with
respect to circumscribing an investigation that had, you know,
real impact, and it was hugely prejudicial.
Now, that was our view.
Mr. Ervin. Right.
Mr. Connolly. We wanted CIGIE to look at it to confirm or
exonerate that person. We would have certainly respected a
thorough investigation, but we didn't get one.
But aside from that personal experience, as a member of
this committee, it raised questions about CIGIE. And I have
talked to other IGs about that and the need to strengthen it.
Ms. Lerner, you chair CIGIE. I am going to give you the
final word, but would you like to comment on how, maybe, you
think we could help you in your job to strengthen the role of
CIGIE and the transparency of your proceedings.
Ms. Lerner. Thank you for the opportunity.
Certainly, I think we've made a lot of progress in CIGIE's
taking over running the Integrity Committee from the FBI with
the passage of the Inspector General Empowerment Act, where
our, we have more investigations. They are looking into more
complex matters.
But that gets us to the issue of resources, and I think the
most important thing that we could do for the Integrity
Committee to help it do its job better is to get additional
resources for it. Right now, we have a very small staff and the
chair of the committee, who is an Inspector General himself,
has to be involved in overseeing, I think we have nine ongoing
investigations right now, on top of his full-time day job. It
is an untenable situation.
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
Ms. Lerner. And if we had, if CIGIE had an appropriation,
if we had dedicated resources for the committee, that would
enable us to hire a senior investigative attorney to oversee
the work and have a cadre of investigators available to do
these investigations, instead of having to beg, borrow, and
steal from our colleagues across the Inspector General
community. I think we would be in a much better position to do
these cases, handle them well, and handle them in a more timely
fashion.
Mr. Connolly. Well, I think those are very fair points, Ms.
Lerner, and I am sympathetic, because I want to do everything,
we can to make sure that CIGIE is, you know, so above reproach
and so respected for its ability to quickly look at the
situations and look at them thoroughly, and, by the way, clear
names.
Anyone can file a complaint. That doesn't mean you have
done anything wrong, and we don't want to besmirch reputations,
but on the other hand, we have got to make sure that there is
accountability.
Mr. Hice, I promised you equal time if there is anything
that you wish to add.
Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend from Georgia, and I hope we
can cooperate on, at least the CIGIE legislation, which I see
as just an improvement and a good government measure.
With that, I want to insert in the record: a report from
the Project on Government Oversight, titled, ``The Watchdogs
After Forty Years: Recommendations for Our Nation's Federal
Inspectors General''; a letter, also from the Project on
Government Oversight, titled, ``Former Inspectors General Call
on Congress to Pass Overdue Reforms to the IG System''; a
statement from former IG for the Department of Defense, Gordon
Heddell; and a report from the congressional Research Service,
previously referred to by the chairwoman, titled, ``Congress'
authority to limit the removal of Inspectors General.''
And I would ask, without objection, all that material be
entered into the record, as well as the GAO letter I referenced
earlier.
Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Connolly. And also without objection, all members will
have five legislative days, within which to submit additional
written questions for the witnesses through the chair, which
will be forwarded to the witnesses for their expeditious
response, we hope.
I would ask the witnesses to please respond as promptly as
you are able.
I want to thank all of our colleagues. We had great
participation today. We have a legislative program to follow
through on this hearing, and I thank our witnesses for their
very thoughtful contribution to this discussion.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]