[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






 
                        RESTORING INDEPENDENCE:

                     REBUILDING THE FEDERAL OFFICES

                         OF INSPECTORS GENERAL

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

                                 OF THE

                   COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             APRIL 20, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-15

                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform
      
      
      
      
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]       


                       Available at: govinfo.gov,
                         oversight.house.gov or
                             docs.house.gov
                             
                             
                             
                             
                           ______                       


             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 44-382PDF            WASHINGTON : 2021                             
                             
                             
                             
                   COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM

                CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chairwoman

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of   James Comer, Kentucky, Ranking 
    Columbia                             Minority Member
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts      Jim Jordan, Ohio
Jim Cooper, Tennessee                Paul A. Gosar, Arizona
Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia         Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois        Jody B. Hice, Georgia
Jamie Raskin, Maryland               Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin
Ro Khanna, California                Michael Cloud, Texas
Kweisi Mfume, Maryland               Bob Gibbs, Ohio
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York   Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Rashida Tlaib, Michigan              Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Katie Porter, California             Pete Sessions, Texas
Cori Bush, Missouri                  Fred Keller, Pennsylvania
Danny K. Davis, Illinois             Andy Biggs, Arizona
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida    Andrew Clyde, Georgia
Peter Welch, Vermont                 Nancy Mace, South Carolina
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr.,      Scott Franklin, Florida
    Georgia                          Jake LaTurner, Kansas
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland           Pat Fallon, Texas
Jackie Speier, California            Yvette Herrell, New Mexico
Robin L. Kelly, Illinois             Byron Donalds, Florida
Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
Mark DeSaulnier, California
Jimmy Gomez, California
Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
Mike Quigley, Illinois

                      Dave Rapallo, Staff Director
              Wendy Ginsberg, Subcommittee Staff Director
                    Amy Stratton, Deputy Chief Clerk

                      Contact Number: 202-225-5051

                  Mark Marin, Minority Staff Director
                                 ------                                

                 Subcommittee on Government Operations

                 Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia, Chairman
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of   Jody B. Hice, Georgia Ranking 
    Columbia                             Minority Member
Danny K. Davis, Illinois             Fred Keller, Pennsylvania
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland           Andrew Clyde, Georgia
Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan         Andy Biggs, Arizona
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachsetts       Nancy Mace, South Carolina
Jamie Raskin, Maryland               Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Ro Khanna, California                Yvette Herrell, New Mexico
Katie Porter, California


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on April 20, 2021...................................     1

                               Witnesses

Allison C. Lerner, Inspector General, National Science Foundation 
  Chair, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
  Efficiency
Oral Statement...................................................     6
Kathy A. Buller, Inspector General, Peace Corps; Executive Chair, 
  Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 
  Legislation Committee
Oral Statement...................................................     8
Mia M. Forgy, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Election Assistance 
  Commission
Oral Statement...................................................    10
Clark K. Ervin, Former Inspector General, Department of Homeland 
  Security and Department of State
Oral Statement...................................................    11
Liz Hempowicz, Director of Public Policy, Project on Government 
  Oversight
Oral Statement...................................................    12

Written opening statements and statements for the witnesses are 
  available on the U.S. House of Representatives Document 
  Repository at: docs.house.gov.

                           Index of Documents

                              ----------                              

Documents entered into the record during this hearing by 
  Unanimous Consent (UC) and Questions for the Record (QFR's) are 
  listed below.

  * UC - Project on Government Oversight report, ``The Watchdogs 
  After Forty Years: Recommendations for Our Nation's Federal 
  Inspectors General;'' submitted by Rep. Connolly.

  * UC - Letter from former inspectors general regarding reforms 
  to the inspectors general system; submitted by Rep. Connolly.

  * UC - Statement for the record from former Department of 
  Defense Inspector General Gordon Heddell regarding inspector 
  general independence; submitted by Rep. Connolly.

  * UC - Government Accountability Office report regarding 
  inspector general independence and reforms; submitted by Reps. 
  Maloney and Porter.

  * UC - Congressional Research Service report regarding 
  Congress's authority to limit the removal of inspectors 
  general; submitted by Rep. Maloney.

  * UC - Statement by Michael Horowitz, Chair of the Council of 
  the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, regarding 
  the removal of Inspector General Michael Atkinson; submitted by 
  Rep. Connolly.

  * QFR's: to Ms. Kathy A. Buller; submitted by Rep. Connolly.

  * QFR's: to Mr. Clark K. Ervin; submitted by Rep. Connolly.

  * QFR's: to Ms. Allison Lerner; submitted by Rep. Connolly.

Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.



                        RESTORING INDEPENDENCE:

                     REBUILDING THE FEDERAL OFFICES

                         OF INSPECTORS GENERAL

                              ----------                              


                        Tuesday, April 20, 2021

                   House of Representatives
                  Committee on Oversight and Reform
                      Subcommittee on Government Operations
                                                   Washington, D.C.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in 
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, and via Zoom; Hon. 
Gerald E. Connolly (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Representatives Connolly, Maloney, Norton, Davis, 
Sarbanes, Lynch, Porter, Speier, Hice, Keller, Biggs, Herrell, 
and Comer.
    Mr. Connolly. The committee will come order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any time.
    Without objection, Carolyn Maloney, the gentlewoman from 
New York and Jackie Speier, the gentlewoman from California, 
shall be permitted to join the subcommittee and be recognized 
for questioning the witnesses.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    For more than 40 years, Inspectors General have provided 
independent and objective oversight of Federal Government and 
operations. Offices of the Inspector General conduct audits, 
inspections, evaluations, and investigations in order to 
strengthen program integrity, promote operational economy and 
efficiency, and root out fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as 
mismanagement, across the Federal Government. IGs are 
accountable to the President, to their agencies, to this 
Congress, and, as stewards of taxpayer dollars, to the American 
people. IGs provide a lot of bang for the buck.
    In Fiscal Year 2020, alone, the 75 Federal OIGs 
collectively identified $33.3 billion in potential savings from 
audit reports and $19.7 billion in actual and anticipated 
recoveries from investigations. These potential savings from 
audits and investigations total $53 billion, amounting to a 
return on investment of $17 for every one dollar invested in 
the IG.
    And IGs don't just investigate fraud and recoup money. 
Their return on investment also includes improved 
cybersecurity, ethics oversight of work force and contractors, 
and more recently, work that oversees the health and safety of 
our Nation.
    IGs do not make many friends when they speak truth to 
power; in fact, sometimes they make enemies. During the last 
year in office, unfortunately, President Trump executed a rash 
of politically motivated retaliatory personnel moves against 
IGs. He moved to replace one acting IG whose office was engaged 
in a review of misconduct or mismanagement by administration 
officials. The President publicly blocked a third well-
respected acting IG from serving as the head of the newly 
established pandemic oversight body. In a more difficult and 
maybe sinister move, the President fired the intelligence 
community IG, Michael Atkinson, who reported whistleblower 
allegations to Congress that ultimately led to Mr. Trump's own 
impeachment. He also fired State Department IG, Steve Linick, 
who was investigating allegations of misconduct by Secretary 
Pompeo, allegations that have recently been confirmed by that 
very office.
    The political motives behind these personnel changes were 
hardly veiled. Mr. Trump claimed only that he had lost 
confidence, a very low standard for the removal of an IG. This 
flimsy excuse collapsed under minimal scrutiny. The intent was 
clear: intimidation and obfuscation and obstruction.
    The firings signaled the President's demand for loyalty to 
him over service to the American public. In doing so, the 
former President set a dangerous precedent; that an IG can 
simply be removed because they are doing their job.
    We cannot allow that to happen. If a President needs to 
remove an IG, if there is cause, the President should provide 
very specific reasons for that cause to Congress, in writing. 
That is why I support Chairwoman Maloney's re-introduction of 
the IG Independence Act that includes provisions to require 
cause for removal of an IG.
    In some cases, issues of protecting an effective IG from 
removal were overshadowed by the absence of a permanent IG. 
During the former President's tenure, 14 OIGs were without a 
confirmed individual; in fact, four of those agencies never had 
a permanent IG for the entire duration of the administration.
    While previous administrations also had IG vacancies, 
President Trump was calculated in using the vacancies as a way 
to install acting IGs, sometimes with conflicts of interest. At 
both the State Department and the Department of Transportation, 
for example, IGs were installed as acting, who served within 
the departments they were meant to oversee.
    Wearing dual hats, as we will hear from Ms. Lerner and Ms. 
Buller, undermines IG independence. In the absence of an 
appointed IG, we must sustain the office's independence by 
scoping the selection of qualified acting officials to hold 
their place. My vice chair, Ms. Porter, is championing the 
Accountability for Acting Officials Act that seeks to do just 
that.
    I have also said before that IGs must be pure as the driven 
snow. That is because if IGs are to hold agencies accountable 
and encourage whistleblowers to come forward, they must be 
above reproach themselves.
    Just this week, the Integrity Committee released a scathing 
investigation, not yet made public, that found one IG created a 
culture of witness intimidation at his/her agency. According to 
the investigation, the IG abused authority by ridiculing, 
belittling, and bullying her staff. These findings come more 
than four years after the allegations reached the Integrity 
Committee, the branch of the Council of Inspectors General 
charged with overseeing the overseers.
    This example is why I, and former ranking member Mark 
Meadows, introduced the enhanced Whistleblower Engagement Act, 
to ensure that OIG employees receive whistleblower training and 
direct the IG Council to identify best practices to promote 
timely and appropriate handling of alleged reprisals within an 
IG's office.
    Moreover, given the outlandish and inappropriate steps this 
particular IG took to evade Integrity Committee oversight, you 
can trust we will be following up with legislation to make 
crystal clear that IGs must make documents and personnel 
available to the Integrity Committee in a manner commensurate 
to the access they are provided to oversee their respective 
affiliated agencies.
    The Integrity Committee, itself, has sometimes fallen 
short. To ensure the accountability of our IG community, we 
will be reintroducing legislation today to codify and enhance 
administrative reporting reforms and to allow Congress greater 
insight into the Integrity Committee's operations. Those who 
watch the watchdogs must be held to great account.
    Similar legislation passed this committee without 
opposition in the last Congress, and I hope we can move quickly 
on a bipartisan basis once again in this Congress.
    Independent oversight by the IGs is essential to 
maintaining accountability and transparency in government. That 
independence was under constant attack in recent years. This 
hearing will examine some of the ways in which we can restore 
and bolster the framework of independence within the IG 
community, which benefits taxpayers and this Nation every day.
    With that, I recognize the ranking member for his opening 
remarks.
    Mr. Hice. Thank you, Chairman Connolly.
    And I appreciate you calling this hearing today, as we 
examine the roles and the resources available to our Inspectors 
General. Rooting out waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct is 
certainly one of the most important jobs that this committee 
and the Inspectors General serve; themselves, really, on the 
front line, as we, as a committee, try to serve on the front 
line, as far as Congress is concerned.
    But one of the big concerns that I have, in addition, is 
the fact that according to the Council of Inspectors General on 
Integrity and Efficiency records, of the 76 Inspector General 
Offices, 18 have fewer than 10 employees, and as a result, some 
of these simply don't have the resources needed to do the job 
that we expect them to do, as Congress. Some of these agencies 
include the National Endowment for Humanities, the Farm Credit 
Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Election 
Assistance Commission.
    And all of these, in spite of not having proper resources, 
still provide hundreds of millions of dollars in grants to 
individuals, businesses, states, localities, and so forth, and 
yet, with minimal staffing, they find themselves in a situation 
where it is really, they are incapable of conducting the 
oversight and the responsibilities that they have on their 
shoulders.
    Here is just one example that, personally, I was involved 
with, along with a few others. But when the retirement of 
Inspector General Patricia Layfield, after she retired, Ms. Mia 
Forgy, she is now the only staff member of the Election 
Assistance Commission Office of the Inspector General. I mean, 
that is pretty stunning, to think we have an Inspector General 
Office with only one person there.
    In 2020 alone, the Election Assistance Commission provided 
$825 million in grants. That was an increase of $445 million 
from 2019. And more than half of that money, by the way, went 
out in just 45 days. So, you have got an enormous amount of 
money going out and you only have one person involved in the 
whole office. I mean, it is just amazing.
    And due to the lack of staffing resources, the EAC 
Inspector General Office, they contract out the audits of the 
EAC grant programs, but they, themselves, don't even have the 
personnel to review the audits from the third party. So, how do 
you determine whether or not it is even an accurate audit if 
you don't even have the ability to look into and audit the 
audit that a third party is doing?
    Furthermore, when we asked them to investigate 
substantiated allegations of an improper contract awarded to a 
pro-Biden firm by the California Secretary of State's Office to 
contact voters, the former Inspector General, Ms. Layfield, she 
informed us, the Republicans on this committee, that their 
office did not have the ability to conduct the investigations 
and, instead, they would need to hire a third-party contractor.
    So, what is the purpose of the Inspectors General if they 
can't do their job, and why do we even have an office in the 
EAC if they don't have the ability to do their job?
    And to make matters worse, the contract did not even pay 
out at that time, so immediate action by the Inspector General 
could have prevented, really, millions of dollars in taxpayer 
money from being misspent, but they did not have the resources 
or the personnel to deal with the issue at hand. This is deeply 
concerning, and it highlights a serious problem that many of 
the small Inspector General Offices are facing.
    If an Inspector General's office does not have the 
staffing, I will say it again, if they don't have the staffing 
to conduct investigations into substantial allegations of 
wrongdoing, then, quite frankly, they don't have the resources 
to function at all, if they can't even do investigations into 
substantiated allegations.
    Inspector General Offices should not be a pass-through for 
third-party contractors and they, themselves, still have no 
ability to oversee those contractors. It just is nonsense.
    So, I am hopeful that my Democrat colleagues can and will 
stop the repeated attacks on the Trump administration and focus 
on ensuring that our Inspectors General are able to conduct 
robust oversight or look for other solutions to ensure that all 
agencies have a watchdog capable of overseeing agency 
operations and spending. That is what it is all about.
    And I am hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that we can come together 
and work for those kinds of solutions to a broader problem, 
rather than just use this hearing, and I hope it doesn't turn 
into just an opportunity for continued attacks on the Trump 
administration. We have serious issues that need to be 
addressed and resolved, and I hope we will be able to move in 
the spirit of accomplishing that task before us.
    So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and I thank you.
    Mr. Connolly. I thank the gentleman and assure him that 
holding the Trump administration is not a serious of gratuitous 
attacks. It is, in fact, to highlight actions that were taken 
that seriously threatened to undermine the integrity and the 
independence of IGs.
    Mr. Hice. And I would remind the chairman that President 
Obama did similar actions. So, let's just, in fairness, deal 
with the problem, and not use it as an attack would be my 
request. Thank you.
    Mr. Connolly. Well, I would certainly expect the ranking 
member to show equal sensitivity to the Biden administration, 
because I noticed he lobbed grenades at Biden in his remarks, 
while preaching nonpartisanship for the rest of us.
    With that, I see the distinguished chairwoman of the full 
committee, Mrs. Carolyn Maloney is on. I know she has an 
opening statement.
    Madam Chairwoman, you are recognized for your opening 
statement.
    Chairwoman Maloney. Thank you, Chairman Connolly, for your 
insightful comments.
    And thank you, Member Hice, for calling this important 
hearing on Inspectors General.
    Inspectors General play a crucial role in our democracy by 
independently and objectively working to expose waste, fraud, 
and abuse in government. Supporting Inspectors General and the 
need for adequate independence and access has long been a 
bipartisan issue in this committee. The committee regularly 
relies on the work of IGs to identify issues in need of reform, 
recommendations for how that reform can be achieved. It is 
critical to have experienced, competent, and independent 
Inspectors General at every agency.
    Unfortunately, and based on fact, President Trump 
repeatedly attacked the independence of IGs by removing or 
replacing IGs in what appeared to be retaliation for 
investigating misconduct of his own administration. That is why 
last year, I introduced the Inspector General Independence Act 
with House Majority Leader Hoyer, Chairman Connolly, and 
Chairman Lynch.
    The Inspector General Independence Act would protect IGs 
from being fired as a result of political retaliation by only 
allowing an IG to be removed for one of a set list of reasons. 
I want to build on that proposal with an even bolder package of 
reforms.
    Yesterday, I introduced the IG Independence and Empowerment 
Act. This comprehensive package includes a number of proposals, 
many of which have received broad, bipartisan support. Just a 
few examples include the enhanced whistleblower engagement act, 
a bill introduced by Chairman Connolly, to enhance 
whistleblower training for IGs, and a bill introduced by Vice 
Chair Jimmy Gomez, to give IGs the ability to compel testimony 
from contractors and former Federal employees. We have 
important work to do to both preserve and protect the 
independence and authority of Inspectors General going forward.
    I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today and 
appreciate their willingness to help us draw attention to the 
importance of Inspectors General and the work they do.
    Thank you, again, for holding this important hearing, and I 
yield back.
    Mr. Connolly. I thank the distinguished chairwoman and 
thank her for her leadership on this subject. I look forward to 
working with her, hopefully on a bipartisan basis, as we move 
forward on the legislative agenda.
    I would now like to introduce our witnesses. We are 
grateful to have their expertise. Our first witness will be 
Allison Lerner, who is the Inspector General for the National 
Science Foundation and the chair of the Council of Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency, known as CIGIE.
    We will then hear from Kathy Buller, Inspector General of 
the Peace Corps and executive chair of CIGIE.
    Third, we will hear from Mia Forgy, the Deputy Inspector 
General for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
    Fourth, we will hear from Clark Ervin, former Inspector 
General for the Department of Homeland Security and Department 
of State.
    And last, but certainly not least, we will hear from Liz 
Hempowicz, director of public policy at the Project of 
Government Oversight, I think also known as POGO.
    If the witnesses would unmute themselves, and if our two 
in-person witnesses would rise, and if all of you would raise 
your right hand, it is the tradition of our committee and 
subcommittee to swear in witnesses.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Mr. Connolly. Let the record show that all of our witnesses 
have, in fact, replied in the affirmative.
    I want to thank you all. Without objection, your written 
statements will be made part of the record.
    And with that, Ms. Lerner, you are now recognized for a 
five minute summation of your testimony. Welcome.

  STATEMENT OF ALLISON C. LERNER, INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL 
SCIENCE FOUNDATION, CHAIR, COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON 
                    INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY

    Ms. Lerner. Thank you, Chairman Connolly.
    Chairman Connolly, Ranking Member Hice, and distinguished 
members of the subcommittee, I appreciate you inviting me to 
appear before you today in my role as chair of the Council of 
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
    Since January 1 of this year, I have had the honor of 
serving as CIGIE's chair, and for six years prior to that, I 
served as its vice chair. My testimony today will focus on 
actions to strength IGs' independence and ensure they have the 
tools necessary to do their work, to protect whistleblowers, 
and to hold IGs and their senior leaders accountable.
    CIGIE has several legislative priorities, focused on 
strengthening IG independence. I'd also like to highlight the 
work of CIGIE's IG candidate recommendations panel, which is 
grappling with one of the greatest challenges currently facing 
the IG community: the fact that 15 out of the 75 IG positions 
are vacant, including 13 Presidentially appointed positions.
    The panel has worked with Presidential administrations and 
agency heads since 2009 to identify strong, independent 
candidates for IG positions. It has interviewed candidates and 
provided dozens of recommendations to both the Trump and Biden 
administrations for vacant Presidentially appointed IG 
positions, and it has supported agency heads working to fill IG 
positions through competitive hiring actions. CIGIE supports 
codifying some of the actions taken by the panel to ensure they 
continue across future administrations.
    A strong message from agency leadership supporting 
cooperation with the Office of Inspector General can be an 
invaluable tool for OIGs. To help OIGs, whose agencies have not 
made such statements, CIGIE is preparing a white paper on these 
communications and then a template that IGs can use to work 
with their agency heads to promulgate such statements. We look 
forward to briefing the committee on the results of this 
project and to sharing the white paper and template with OMB, 
as it works to craft and message to agency heads in support of 
the value of IG oversight.
    Inspector General Buller's testimony details legislative 
opportunities to provide IGs with essential oversight tools, 
including testimonial subpoena authority. I'd also like to 
highlight legislation that cures a longstanding problem with 
the Department of Justice OIG's jurisdiction. Unlike all other 
OIGs, the DOJ OIG does not have jurisdiction to review 
misconduct allegations against all Department employees. 
Misconduct by DOJ lawyers is investigated by DOJ's Office of 
Professional Responsibility, which is not independent, like the 
OIG.
    Last Congress, the House passed the bipartisan, Inspector 
General Access Act, without objection. Senators Richard Durbin, 
Mike Lee, and a bipartisan group of co-sponsors, have 
introduced identical legislation in the Senate, and we 
encourage Congress to quickly pass this important legislation.
    Our work as IGs would have far less impact without 
whistleblowers, whose actions have saved U.S. taxpayers 
billions of dollars and made government programs more efficient 
and effective. CIGIE has taken many actions to ensure 
whistleblowers are aware of their right to disclose evidence of 
waste, fraud, and abuse, and are also protected for doing so. 
As CIGIE chair, I'll encourage all OIGs to prioritize internal 
whistleblower education for OIG employees.
    I also support the Securing Inspector General Independence 
Act of 2021, which, among other things, would require 
whistleblower protection coordinators to inform OIG employees 
of their whistleblower rights and protections, including the 
process for filing a complaint with CIGIE's Integrity 
Committee.
    Finally, just as Inspectors General oversee our agencies, 
we're committed to upholding accountability within our own 
community. Since the IG Empowerment Act transferred full 
responsibility for CIGIE's Integrity Committee, the entity that 
oversees IGs and their senior officials, from the FBI to CIGIE, 
the IC's work has become more transparent and rigorous. Its 
workload has also increased steadily, along with the amount of 
staff, time, and other resources required to fulfill the IC's 
essential mission.
    We are exploring ways to provide additional support, such 
as adding a senior investigative attorney to the team. The IC 
is also working to enhance the transparency of its operations, 
while still protecting the whistleblowers who contact it, who 
are often extremely concerned about being retaliated against as 
a result of their decision to come forward.
    Thank you, again, for your strong bipartisan support for 
our community. I look forward to working closely with this 
subcommittee to ensure that Inspectors General continue to be 
empowered to provide the independent, objective oversight for 
which they're known, and which the taxpayers deserve.
    This concludes my prepared remarks, and I'd be pleased to 
answer any questions you might have.
    Mr. Connolly. You are a pro. Sixteen seconds left. Thank 
you.
    Ms. Buller, you are recognized for your five minute 
summation of your testimony.

 STATEMENT OF KATHY A. BULLER, INSPECTOR GENERAL, PEACE CORPS, 
LEGISLATION COMMITTEE CHAIR, COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 
       ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY LEGISLATION COMMITTEE

    Ms. Buller. Chairman Connolly, Ranking Member Hice, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
inviting me to appear before you today. I am the Inspector 
General of the Peace Corps and the chair of the Legislation 
Committee for the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity 
and Efficiency, or CIGIE.
    Each IG has its own relationship with Congress; however, on 
issues impacting multiple IGs, we are more effective in 
providing technical assistance to Congress through a collective 
effort. I am testifying in my capacity as a Legislation 
Committee chair.
    Today, Inspectors General are operating amid a worldwide 
pandemic, overseeing some of the most extensive government 
spending bills in history. Despite the 15 vacant Inspector 
General positions at some of the largest and most consequential 
agencies within government, Inspectors General and their staff 
are working diligently to provide accountability and ensure 
integrity of Government processes.
    While administration and agency leadership change, the IG 
community has a proven track record with integrity and 
functioning fairly and objectively.
    Last year, with the support from the leadership of this 
committee, legislation was introduced to bolster and protect 
the independence and integrity of the IG community. While not 
all of it passed, CIGIE was pleased to see additional 
whistleblower protections enacted. The protections initially 
introduced in the House by Chairman Connolly, were bolstered by 
bipartisan support. These new whistleblower protections will 
make it easier for whistleblowers to come forward without fear 
of reprisal.
    While these reforms and other key legislation, such as the 
Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, improved the ability 
and capacity of IGs to perform independent oversight, serious 
challenges remain. Each Congress, the CIGIE Legislation 
Committee presents the committee's top reform proposals to 
strengthen government oversight or to resolve challenges that 
IGs face under current law.
    While I have outlined all of our legislative priorities in 
my written remarks, there are three I would like to highlight.
    First, it's imperative that Congress take steps to protect 
the independence of the Inspectors General. CIGIE surges 
Congress to amend Federal Vacancies Reform Act to change who is 
eligible to serve as acting IG, include the first assistant to 
the Inspector General, and allow for senior OIG officials from 
different agencies to serve in that capacity.
    Last year, two Presidential appointees were directed to 
serve as acting IGs for the agencies they served, one of whom, 
in an agency, continued in an agency management position while 
serving as acting IG.
    The fact is that administrations from both parties have 
selected acting Inspectors General from senior management and 
political positions within the agencies to be overseen, 
creating actual and perceived conflicts of interest, and 
undermining independence.
    This legislation, with an additional provision, requiring 
notification to Congress when an IG is placed on non-duty 
status, including the reasons why the action was taken, will 
greatly improve IG independence.
    Second, to address lingering access issues, prohibit the 
use of appropriated funds to deny IG access to information. 
Existing appropriations prohibitions apply only to agencies 
funded under particular subcommittee appropriations acts. CIGIE 
recommends a governmentwide prohibition to further emphasize 
IGs' authority to access agency information.
    Third, provide the IG community with testimonial subpoena 
authority. This tool can be used to get critical information 
from government contractors, subcontractors, volunteers, 
grantees, subgrantees, and former employees.
    We are committed to providing technical assistance, as 
appropriate, to help ensure the effectiveness of testimonial 
subpoenas as an oversight tool. CIGIE recommends that 
testimonial subpoena authority for IGs mirror CIGIE's 
documentary subpoena authority, similar to the authority 
recently granted to the Pandemic Response Accountability 
Committee of CIGIE.
    While there are differences between CIGIE's proposal and 
the legislation, we wanted to express our appreciation to the 
chairman, Committee Chairwoman Maloney, and Congressman Gomez 
for introducing H.R. 2089. As Chairman Connolly stated, when 
introducing the legislation, testimonial subpoena authority for 
IGs is a necessary tool to hold former officials accountable 
for their actions and consequences of their policy decisions.
    In closing, I would like to thank all members and staff of 
this subcommittee and the full committee, for your efforts on 
initiatives affecting CIGIE and our legislative priorities. The 
Legislation Committee looks forward to continuing to be an 
important resource for you as you pursue additional oversight 
and legislative work.
    That ends my prepared remarks and I'm here to take any 
questions.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, Ms. Buller.
    Ms. Forgy, and Ms. Forgy, am I pronouncing your name 
correctly?
    Ms. Forgy. It's Forgy.
    Mr. Connolly. Of course it is.
    Ms. Forgy, forgive me, please. I took a stab and I got it 
wrong.
    Ms. Forgy. No problem.
    Mr. Connolly. Welcome, Ms. Forgy.
    Ms. Forgy. Thank you.

   STATEMENT OF MIA M. FORGY, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. 
                 ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

    Ms. Forgy. Good morning, Chairman Connolly, Ranking Member 
Hice, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you 
for the invitation to discuss with you the operations and 
activities of the Election Assistance Commission, Office of 
Inspector General.
    The EAC is a bipartisan commission, created and authorized 
by the Help America Vote Act, known as HAVA. The OIG is an 
independent division of EAC that's required by HAVA and the 
Inspector General Act of 1978. The OIG is comprised of an 
Inspector General and a Deputy Inspector General. Due to the 
planned retirement of the former Inspector General on March 31, 
2021, the OIG is currently operating with one full-time 
employee.
    For additional resources, the OIG procures audit support 
services from independent public accounting firms and legal and 
investigative services from other Federal agencies. HAVA gives 
EAC the authority to conduct regular audits of grants and 
payments distributed by the EAC and the OIG conducts those 
audits on behalf of the EAC.
    To fulfill that mission, the OIG has established a risk-
assessment process for selecting and auditing the 
administration of the $1.2 billion in payments distributed by 
EAC to its grant recipients, collectively, in 2018 and 2020, 
and the unexpended payments distributed prior to 2011 that the 
EAC has reissued as new grant awards in Fiscal Year 2020.
    The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 included an 
appropriation of $380 million in HAVA election security grants. 
The OIG procured audit support services in September 2019 to 
conduct audits of the 2018 election security grants for six 
states: New Mexico, Arkansas, West Virginia, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, and Florida.
    Due to the impacts of COVID-19 and the states' limited 
availability during the 2020 primary and Presidential 
elections, the six audits were performed between December 2020 
and March 2021. The six audits reviewed a total of $32.4 
million in expended Federal funds and identified $4.4 million 
of questioned costs and $82,466 in funds that could be put to 
better use.
    In general, the six audits of the 2018 election security 
grants found that the states are spending HAVA funds on 
allowable program activities. In December 2019, the EAC 
received an additional $425 million in HAVA election security 
grants, and in March 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security Act, known as CARES Act, provided 
supplemental appropriations of $4 million as support for the 
states in conducting the 2020 Federal elections.
    OIG is currently in the procurement process to obtain audit 
services for Fiscal Year 2021 to continue auditing states' 
expenditures of the 2018 election security grants and to 
include audits of the 2020 election security grants, 2020 CARES 
Act payments, and EAC grant awards being issued to the states 
in Fiscal Year 2020.
    In addition to grant audits, the OIG is responsible for 
conducting internal audits, inspections and evaluations, and 
other reviews of EAC's programs, policies, procedures, and 
reporting on those results.
    There have been considerable changes recently in the OIG's 
audit environment, including a substantial increase in the 
EAC's grant funding, as well as operational changes in EAC's 
grant management. The OIG, however, is working to ensure 
effective oversight of the $1.2 billion of grants issued to the 
states while continuing to conduct OIG statutory audits, audits 
and assessments of EAC's internal business processes, and to 
comply with all OIG mandates issued by governmentwide policy, 
and government-auditing standards.
    The OIG is currently operating with one full-time employee 
and a Fiscal Year 2021 budget of $1 million for contracted 
audits and legal and investigative services. As a result of the 
EAC's recent budget increase, the OIG will have the ability to 
hire an additional FTE anticipated for Fiscal Year 2021. 
Additionally, the EAC is actively recruiting to fill the vacant 
Inspector General position.
    In closing, election systems have been designated by the 
Department of Homeland Security as part of the Nation's 
critical infrastructure and the EAC plays a critical role in 
funding and assisting states to improve election processes. It 
is the OIG's role to offer guidance and information through its 
audits, that will help the EAC build and run programs that 
promote other competence by preventing and detecting fraud, 
waste, and abuse.
    To adequately perform this role, the OIG is required to 
regularly conduct grant audits, as described within HAVA, 
perform our OIG statutory requirements, and showing that 
assessments, reviews, and audits of EAC's high-risk areas are 
performed, and readily respond to congressional requests.
    The OIG will continue to work with the EAC and Congress to 
help promote efficient and effective government.
    I appreciate the opportunity to provide this testimony 
regarding the activities of the OIG. If you have any questions, 
I will be happy to address them. Thank you.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Ms. Forgy, and you got 17 seconds 
to go. Great job.
    Mr. Ervin, you have your five-minute summation of your 
testimony. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF CLARK ERVIN, FORMER INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT 
          OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Mr. Ervin. Good morning, Chairman Connolly, Ranking Member 
Hice, and other members of the subcommittee, and thank you very 
much for the opportunity to testify before you today on this 
very important topic.
    The assault on the IG community in the last few years 
highlights the urgent need to further amend the statute to 
further empower Inspectors General to do the job that Congress 
intended for them to do and to further protect Inspectors 
General from reprisals for doing so.
    Let me touch briefly on a few such reforms. First, I 
support a for-cause removal provision, with cause being defined 
as permanent incapacity or serious misconduct, as specified in 
H.R. 6984. And the stated cause should be documented so that 
its accuracy can be scrutinized by Congress and further tested 
in the court of public opinion.
    Additionally, I support setting a fixed, but renewable term 
for IGs, say seven years. A fixed term would underscore that 
IGs are not typical political appointees who serve only at the 
pleasure of the President, and, therefore, serve the 
President's political purposes and advance his policy agenda.
    In my judgment, the combination of these measures would 
further empower Inspectors General to exercise their oversight 
responsibilities vigorously. They would have the assurance of 
knowing that doing their jobs will not cost them their jobs.
    Second, given the number and length of IG vacancies, we 
must do something to encourage presidents to fill them as soon 
as possible. One thought would be to require presidents, after 
a reasonable period of time, to nominate someone, or at least 
to give Congress a notional date by when a nomination can be 
expected.
    In the meantime, vacancies should be filled only by the 
Deputy Inspector General, the general counsel to the Inspector 
General, or someone else senior in the Office of Inspector 
General.
    The occupant of the IG position, whether on a permanent or 
a temporary basis, should be someone who has the qualifications 
specified in the statute and someone outside the agency chain 
of command, so that his or her independence is not compromised, 
either as a matter of fact or appearance. And IGs should not be 
double-headed, because done right, being an IG is a full-time 
job and then some.
    Third, IGs should be given testimonial subpoena power with 
respect to former employees and agency contractors and 
grantees. Any good investigator will tell you that a thorough 
investigation requires reviewing documents and witness 
testimony, and then cross-checking them against each other.
    I mentioned a couple other items in my written testimony, 
and I can think of, still others, as I sit here today, but in 
the interests of time, I'll leave it at that for now, and, 
again, thank you very much for inviting me, and I look forward 
to answering your questions.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, Mr. Ervin. Very 
thoughtful.
    Ms. Hempowicz, you are recognized for your five-minute 
summation of your testimony. Welcome.
    Ms. Hempowicz. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF LIZ HEMPOWICZ, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC POLICY, PROJECT 
                    ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT

    Ms. Hempowicz. Chairman Connolly, Ranking Member Hice, and 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to 
testify today about Inspectors General.
    Congress enacted the Inspector General Act in 1978 to 
create a system of overseers who work within, but independent 
of, Federal agencies. When agencies, themselves, were charged 
with this work, Congress found that agency personnel clearly 
failed to make sufficient and effective efforts to prevent and 
detect fraud, abuse, waste, and mismanagement in Federal 
programs and expenditures, in large part because of a lack of 
independence and the natural tendency to not call attention to 
your own shortcomings.
    The IG system we have today was Congress' answer to that 
problem, and in large part, that system has been a success. The 
work of the IGs has continually resulted in substantial 
financial savings for the Federal Government, as we have heard.
    That is not to say that the system has reached its full 
potential, however, especially coming off of the sixth year in 
a row in which polling shows that the public is gravely 
concerned about Government corruption. It is critical that 
these watchdogs have the resources, independence, and 
accountability they need to root out all forms of corruption in 
our Government.
    That is why I strongly urge Congress to pass legislation to 
address IG resources and authorities by granting all IGs 
subpoena power to compel testimony when the subjects of their 
investigations have left government service or were contractors 
and reduce the statutorily required reporting elements of 
Inspector General semiannual reports, to preserve their 
independence by protecting Inspectors General against 
unwarranted removal and limiting who can serve as a temporary 
acting Inspector General in the event of a vacancy, and to hold 
IGs accountable by ensuring the Integrity Committee of the 
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, 
has the resources and policies in place to adequately and 
consistently oversee the overseers.
    While my written testimony goes into detail about all of 
these recommendations, I'd like to focus today on the issue of 
independence. Doing the job of an Inspector General well, will 
eventually put most IGs at odds with political leadership; 
indeed, this tension is exactly why Congress established 
independent structures for Federal IGs in the first place.
    While that independence built into the IG Act is a good 
start, there are two critical gaps that leave internal 
watchdogs vulnerable to politically driven interference. First, 
a president has unfettered ability to remove an Inspector 
General even for improper reasons. Second, after such a 
removal, a president can replace them immediately with an 
individual who doesn't meet the standards laid out in the IG 
Act or one whose conflicts of interest could negatively affect 
the Office's work. Both gaps pose serious risks to the 
effectiveness of Inspectors General, and both must be addressed 
by Congress.
    Though the Congress didn't place any limits on the 
President's authority to remove Inspectors General in 1978, 
they did require Presidents to notify Congress about the 
reasons for such a removal. They expected this requirement 
would act as a sufficient deterrent to keep presidents from 
removing aggressive watchdogs, because they were doing their 
job well; however, it has become abundantly clear that this 
notification to Congress is not serving as such a deterrent.
    The public and Congress depend on IGs to ensure our Federal 
agencies are functioning effectively, and to do this job, IGs 
must be confident that the law will protect them from 
retaliation. Right now, IGs do not have that confidence.
    Last year, after President Trump removed four Inspectors 
General in quick succession, POGO immediately began hearing 
from those in the IG community. What we heard was that they 
were afraid that doing their jobs and going after the facts, 
wherever they may lead, without regard for how it would reflect 
on the President or others in political leadership, would cost, 
would be the end of their careers.
    This is not an environment conducive to rigorous and 
effective oversight. That is why I strongly urge Congress to 
enact legislation that would require the President to have just 
cause to fire an Inspector General and to communicate the 
specific causes underlying that impending removal to Congress.
    Granting Inspectors General for-cause removal protections 
will make it less dangerous to exercise the independence 
required of them to fulfill their missions.
    I understand that the executive branch has asserted that 
such protections would be unconstitutional, but I would caution 
Congress against accepting that position outright. The Supreme 
Court recently had a chance to expansively strike down for-
cause removal protections for executive branch officials, and 
it declined to do so; in fact, they went out of their way to 
highlight that in some cases, these protections are 
appropriate.
    Our analysis is that IGs are one such office where these 
protections would be appropriate and constitutional, and the 
nonpartisan congressional Research Service agrees.
    I also urge Congress to limit who the President can choose 
as an acting IG in the event of a vacancy to preempt issues of 
conflicting priorities by preventing agency employees from 
overseeing the agency they work for, and to encourage the 
President to make a formal nomination where she could exercise 
her full appointment power.
    Thank you, again, for holding this important hearing and 
for your demonstrated commitment to the Inspector General 
System and community. I look forward to answering your 
questions.
    Mr. Connolly. Wow. Within three seconds. That is a pro. 
Thank you.
    I would just observe, I was saying this to the 
distinguished ranking member before the hearing began, if we 
are going to bolster the powers and independence of IGs, 
including subpoena power, which I would support, personally, I 
do think, however, we have to reassure ourselves that, as I 
said in my opening statement, that the IGs, themselves, are 
purer than driven snow.
    And that means CIGIE has to be more transparent, rigorous, 
and accountable for investigating any IG who may be, in fact, 
guilty of something that is untoward and that taints his or her 
office. And I just plant that idea, because while we may not 
agree on the record of the previous administration, I do 
believe that we can find common ground, though, in making sure 
that we strengthen the infrastructure of accountability for 
IGs, themselves. Otherwise, confidence gets eroded.
    So, I just want to plant that idea in everyone's mind, 
because I think there is some common ground to be had here, but 
it is going to require a more robust infrastructure at CIGIE, 
frankly, and better communication and accountability to 
Congress in terms of their oversight and investigations.
    Sorry for that advertisement for a bill I would like to 
reintroduce.
    The chair now recognizes for her five minutes of questions, 
our distinguished chairwoman, Chairwoman Maloney.
    Chairwoman Maloney, I think you need to unmute.
    Chairwoman Maloney. Thank you, all of the panelists, for a 
very insightful testimony.
    And, Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, for having this very 
important hearing.
    Ms. Lerner, in the last year in office, President Trump 
removed or replaced five Inspectors General in what appeared to 
be retaliation for investigating misconduct of his own 
administration. In June 2020, the Government Accountability 
Office issued a report addressing the impact of political 
retaliation on IGs, and that report said, and I quote, ensuring 
the independence of IGs is critical to the Office of IG's 
credibility and effectiveness, end quote.
    If there is the appearance of political interference with 
an IG's Office, how might that impact the mission and 
effectiveness of that office, Ms. Lerner?
    Ms. Lerner. Thank you for the question, Madam Chairwoman.
    And to answer it, any action that would make the work of an 
Inspector General appear to be politically motivated, goes to 
the heart of what an OIG is there for. IGs are meant to be 
appointed, without regard to political affiliation, and to 
conduct their work independently and in a nonpartisan fashion. 
And it is entirely in opposition to everything that we hold 
dear, to inject politics into the leadership decisions of the 
office.
    Ms. Hempowicz, yesterday, I introduced, along with Mr. 
Connolly and Mr. Lynch, the IG Independence and Empowerment 
Act, and this legislative package includes a provision that 
would only allow Inspectors General to be removed for one of a 
few specific set of causes.
    How would requiring cause for an IG to be removed, promote 
the independence of Inspectors General?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Thank you so much for your question, 
Chairwoman, and also for that legislation, which POGO has 
endorsed.
    How would requiring cause help to insulate Inspectors 
General? I think, you know, there are two parts to this. One, 
there needs to be cause, and then, two, that cause needs to be 
communicated to the Congress. And so, I think, you know, both 
parts are important.
    First, to require cause, it requires the President to show 
why they're removing that Inspector General, which would remove 
some of those questions about whether or not this is 
politically motivated. But so does that communication to 
Congress, by giving Congress those documented reasons for 
removing the Inspector General. It helps remove politics out of 
the equation and allows the President, really, to exercise 
their authority in a way that is completely above board and not 
subject to abuse of power.
    Chairwoman Maloney. Thank you.
    Also, the Government Accountability Office noted in a June 
2020 report that in order to safeguard the independence of 
Inspectors General, that Congress could consider a for-cause 
removal requirement. And last week, the congressional Research 
Service released an analysis of congressional authority to 
limit the removal of Inspectors General and concluded that for-
cause removal restrictions, quote, appear to be a 
constitutionally permissible means of encouraging independence 
for most IGs.
    Do you believe that legislation to only allow IGs to be 
removed for cause is consistent with Supreme Court precedent?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, Congresswoman, I believe it is 
completely consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
    Chairwoman Maloney. I just want to end by saying that it is 
vital that Inspectors General are empowered to perform their 
jobs and investigate waste, fraud, and abuse, without fear of 
political, interference, or retaliation. Our legislation 
establishing for-cause removal, and other protections, will 
prevent these abuses and strengthen the independence of 
Inspectors General so that they are better able to do their 
jobs.
    Again, I thank everyone in attendance and I yield back.
    Mr. Connolly. I thank the Chairwoman.
    And, without objection, the report she's referring to, the 
June 8, 2020, report to Congress from the GAO, it is a 10-page 
report, and without objection, I will enter it into the record.
    Mr. Connolly. With that----
    Chairwoman Maloney. And also, Mr. Chairman, could you also, 
I request, in addition, to have in the record, the 
congressional Research Services report----
    Mr. Connolly. Yes.
    Chairwoman Maloney.--From April 16, 2021, and----
    Mr. Connolly. Without objection----
    Chairwoman Maloney.--And also, the GAO's report from June 
2020 on IGs.
    Mr. Connolly. Yep. I have a whole list I was going to do at 
the end, but absolutely----
    Chairwoman Maloney. OK. All right.
    Mr. Connolly [continuing]. Without objection.
    Mr. Connolly. I thank the chairwoman.
    Chairwoman Maloney. OK. Great. Thank you.
    Thank you for a great hearing.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much and thank you for your 
leadership.
    The distinguished ranking member, Mr. Hice, is recognized 
for his five minutes.
    Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I would just say that there are very good explanations 
and reasons for each of the Inspectors General that were 
removed, and we can't get into that.
    But I would like to go to Ms. Forgy, if I can, to begin 
with you. A major political firm for President Biden's 
Presidential campaign was SKDKnickerbocker, and you are 
familiar with them.
    What steps has your, the EAC IG Office taken to look into 
this thirty-five-million-dollar contract that was awarded to 
the Secretary of State of California?
    Ms. Forgy. I stated in my opening statement, we are in the 
process of procuring audit support services to start the audit 
to include a review of that particular contract that was 
brought to our attention by the ranking members.
    Mr. Hice. It has taken an awfully long time to look into 
that, in spite of the fact that last year, in a conversation 
that many of us, the committee Republicans, well, first we 
wrote to you back in October, I believe, it was of last year, 
then had a conversation where IG Layfield literally said that 
the allegations were credible.
    Why has it taken so long?
    Ms. Forgy. So, we received the letter in October from the 
ranking members. EAC management had already reached out and had 
correspondence with California and California responding that 
they had not spent Federal funds inappropriately.
    In order for our office to respond to that, we would be 
conducting an audit, however, unfortunately, when we received 
the letter in October, the office was under continuing 
resolution, and we were under continuing resolution from 
October to December. So, not having the appropriations for the 
early part of Fiscal Year 2021 delayed the process of the 
procurement of support services.
    Mr. Hice. So, how many investigations, investigative 
reports and audits does your office conduct each year versus 
the number that you contract out?
    Ms. Forgy. So, for our audits, OIG statutory audits, as 
well as the grant audits, they are all procured by independent 
public accounting firms. We have the statutory audits that we 
do every year, the financial statement audit, and FISMA audit. 
This year includes the data [inaudible] audit.
    The Fiscal Year 2020 audits that we did, we did six grant 
audits which were all, as well, procured with independent 
public accounting firms.
    Mr. Hice. So all of them go out of office, and yet, in your 
own report dated April 7 of this year, your office stated that 
the office's audit of the third-party audit was not sufficient 
to support an opinion on the audit results; in other words, you 
could not come to a conclusion, correct?
    Ms. Forgy. The statement means that we did not audit in 
order to support or to have a test to the opinion.
    What we do is make sure that the independent public 
accountants are following government auditing standards and 
they are complying with those standards when they are doing the 
audit to come across, to come to their conclusions and 
findings.
    Mr. Hice. OK. I understand that, but from our perspective, 
what we are interested in is, is it an accurate audit?
    And you are not able to come, your office could not come to 
a conclusion with that, and that is very concerning. What is 
the point of having a third party do the audit if you cannot 
conclude whether or not the audit, itself, is accurate?
    That is what we are concerned about. We want to know, is it 
accurate?
    Ms. Forgy. Our office does a review of the independent 
public accountings, in accordance with government auditing 
standards. So, we make sure that they have sufficient evidence 
for the findings that they provide within their audit report. I 
would review those details to make sure that all those 
standards, in accordance with the IG Act, that those standards 
are followed throughout the process of the entire audit.
    Mr. Hice. All right. Well, if I can, I have only got 45 
seconds.
    But the point is, if your office, by your own words, you 
said you couldn't come to sufficiently verify that it was a 
good audit, so if you cannot verify the audit results on 
contractors, then why even use contractors?
    Ms. Forgy. So, that statement doesn't mean that we couldn't 
come to a conclusion. It means that we relied on the 
independent public accounting firms' responses, and the 
findings for their audits, as they follow government auditing 
standards.
    Mr. Hice. Well, from our conversation, it was clear that 
you are ill-funded and, quite frankly, disorganized in multiple 
ways to get things done.
    I see my time is expired, so I will call it quits from 
there, but huge, huge question marks arise from sending out 
audits to third-party contractors and then not having the 
ability to determine whether or not it is a good audit is very 
alarming.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Connolly. I thank the ranking member.
    I think he raises a valid point, and I will certainly 
commit to working with him to explore that aspect of the 
smaller IG offices that don't have the resources to do the job.
    Mr. Hice. Thank you.
    Mr. Connolly. I think it is a very valid point.
    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 
Davis for his five minutes of questioning.
    OK. Mr. Davis is not there.
    The chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. 
Sarbanes, for his five minutes.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Can you hear me OK?
    Mr. Connolly. We can hear you loud and clear, John.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Excellent. Well, thanks for the hearing. I 
appreciate it very much.
    And, you know, this committee has historically shared 
bipartisan concern about Inspector General vacancies. I wanted 
to speak to that a little bit.
    There are currently 13, as I understand it, 13 vacant 
Inspector General positions that are Presidentially appointed 
and Senate confirmed, which is more than a third of the total 
number of all Presidentially appointed Inspectors General.
    And I am going to want to hear from each of you briefly, 
what effect does it have on the Office of Inspector General 
when there is no confirmed Inspector General. Maybe you can 
give me a brief sense of that very quickly, just what does that 
impact look like.
    Why don't we start with Ms. Lerner.
    Ms. Lerner. I'll be happy to start.
    I think GAO did a study a few years back and surveyed the 
IG community and what they found was that most IGs believed 
that acting IGs are capable, do act independently, but many 
believe that there could be a perception by external 
stakeholders that the acting IGs don't have the same 
independence that the confirmed IGs do. And that perception is 
not helpful to the organization and its ability to accomplish 
its mission through its work.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Ms. Lerner, I am going to keep moving around.
    Ms. Lerner. What I have been able to see, I've worked with 
some very--sure.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Yes, let me move to Ms. Buller, quickly.
    Ms. Buller. I agree with everything that Ms. Lerner said. 
In addition, I think that it negatively impacts the ability of 
the office for planning purposes; for example, if you have a 
number of vacant senior executive service positions, that would 
really be something that an IG, a confirmed IG would want to 
fill, an acting IG is more reluctant to go ahead and fill 
positions, I think, that need to be filled in those types of 
situations.
    Mr. Sarbanes. All right. Let me move to another issue.
    The list of Inspector General vacancies includes four 
positions that have been vacant for more than five years, five 
years, including the Department of Defense Inspector General, 
as I understand it. In January, the House passed the Inspector 
General Protection Act, which you know is a bipartisan bill 
sponsored by Ranking Member Hice and Congressman Lieu, which 
would require the President to report to Congress if an 
Inspector General has not been nominated for 210 days after a 
position becomes vacant.
    Ms. Hempowicz, how would requiring the President to report 
to Congress help to incentivize filling the vacant Inspector 
General positions?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
    Quite simply, a five-year vacancy at the Department of 
Defense Inspector General is unconscionable, and so, asking a 
President to explain to Congress why they haven't been able to 
find an individual to lead such a critical office, I think 
would, itself, serve as incentive for the President to go out 
there and find somebody who can fill this job and do this job 
well.
    But I think it also could tell Congress if there are 
problems with the pipeline for Inspectors General. I understand 
that CIGIE keeps a list of qualified individuals, but, you 
know, and so I think there is a talent pool to pull from, but 
if that is not sufficient, you know, the President can tell 
Congress that and we can all work together to figure out what 
is the best way to ensure that there are individuals who are 
qualified and independent in these important offices.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you very much.
    These positions have to be filled, obviously, by qualified 
individuals. The law, as you know, requires Inspectors General 
be appointed, quote, without regard to political affiliation 
and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability 
in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law and management 
analysis, public administration, or investigations.
    Ms. Lerner, can you just touch on, quickly, why are these 
qualifications so important for Inspectors General?
    Ms. Lerner. Well, looking at [inaudible] and starting with 
the nonpartisan nature of the role, as I mentioned earlier in 
response to your first question, you know, that's the heart and 
soul of what we do. It has to be done in a nonpartisan fashion, 
and that makes us, especially our politically appointed IGs, 
different.
    Integrity is another watch word that is critical for our 
community and ensuring that we have people who embody that word 
in their lives and in their work enables us to retain the trust 
of the public in the work that we do.
    And the disciplinary expertise helps, because within an 
OIG, there are many different [inaudible] types of work that we 
do, and having knowledge or expertise in one of those sets the 
Inspector General up for success, as well.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Thanks very much. I yield back.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Sarbanes.
    The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Keller, is recognized 
for his five minutes.
    Mr. Keller. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you to all our 
panelists here today. Based on reports from the Council of 
Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency, 18 of the 76 
offices of Inspectors General have fewer than 10 employees, and 
31 have fewer than 40 employees.
    Further, IG vacancies have proved to be a reoccurring 
problem under both, Democrat and Republican administrations. 
According to a report issued by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office last year, between 2007 and 2016, 53 of 
the 64 IGs covered by the IG Act experienced at least one 
period of vacancy. Alarmingly, the longest IG vacancy spans six 
years.
    The agencies overseen by the IGs are responsible for doling 
out hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars and grants 
annually. With minimal staffing resources and many vacancies to 
point toward, it is no wonder these offices too frequently tell 
Congress they do not have the resources necessary to conduct 
investigations into waste, fraud, and abuse.
    Deputy Secretary Forgy, thank you for your testimony. As 
the only person working in the Election Assistance 
Commission's, or the EAC's, Office of Inspector General, do you 
believe that you have the adequate resources to investigate 
allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse?
    Ms. Forgy. So, our office, with the size of our office, we 
utilize the services of other Federal agencies or investigative 
services. So, at any event where we have an audit that comes up 
or we're looking into something where there is a need for an 
investigation, we have the resources to reach out to another 
Federal agency to obtain those investigative services.
    Mr. Keller. So you do the investigative services through 
other agencies?
    Ms. Forgy. From another Federal agency, yes.
    Mr. Keller. Other agencies. So, it is not, necessarily, the 
Inspector General's Office that is doing it, it is actually an 
agency that is doing it?
    Ms. Forgy. So, we would contract or have an interagency 
agreement with another Federal agency OIG's Office.
    Mr. Keller. OK. Why isn't there currently an acting 
Inspector General, and have you experienced any delay to 
existing investigations and annual audit responsibilities in 
the Election Assistance Commission as a result of the vacancy?
    Ms. Forgy. The former Inspector General had a planned 
retirement date of March 31, 2021, so she retired that day. The 
EAC, I will say, is actively recruiting to fill that IG 
position.
    Since the IG position has been vacant, I have not currently 
had any issues with resources and, soliciting or obtaining 
services or carrying out our work; again, we use independent 
public accounting firms to do our audits, our grant audits, 
specifically, and that goes through a procurement process. And 
once we, we are in the process of doing that now, and getting 
that started is heavily based on having the appropriations 
given to the EAC or the OIG in order for us to have the budget 
to actually do the procurement process.
    Mr. Keller. So the audits that you are conducting, you are 
saying are going to take place by private firms and you have 
somebody in your office that oversees those contracts with the 
private firms?
    Ms. Forgy. Correct.
    Mr. Keller. OK. Thank you for that.
    The Office of the Inspectors General play an important role 
in overseeing Federal agencies and holding bad actors 
accountable. As the body tasked in truth with their oversight, 
Congress should ensure IGs have the resources necessary to 
carry out their work in holding government agencies accountable 
to the American taxpayers.
    I look forward to continuing this committee's efforts to 
improve the IGs' ability to do their important work. I thank 
you and yield back.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Keller.
    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 
Davis, for his five minutes.
    Mr. Davis, you need to unmute. Mr. Davis? I can see you.
    Well, while we are waiting for----
    Mr. Davis. How about now?
    Mr. Connolly. There you are. OK. Great.
    You are recognized. You are recognized----
    Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mister----
    Mr. Connolly [continuing]. Loud and clear.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I also want to thank all of the witnesses for their clear 
testimony.
    The area I want to pursue is that of whistleblower 
protection. We all know that whistleblowers often provide key 
information about waste, fraud, abuse in agencies or in 
government contractors. This seems particularly critical for 
the work that Inspectors General are doing to identify fraud in 
the billions of Federal dollars that have been spent in 
response to the coronavirus pandemic.
    Ms. Lerner, let me ask you, what role are whistleblowers 
playing or could they play in identifying wasteful or 
fraudulent spending under the CARES Act or other pandemic-
response laws?
    Ms. Lerner. As they do in all programs, in which, you know, 
people work, whistleblowers are folks who have insights into 
actions that are being taken that may be inefficient, that may 
constitute waste, fraud, or abuse, and they are uniquely 
positioned to share that information with folks, with oversight 
professionals, like my office.
    In the context of CARES Act funding, you know, for example, 
you could have individuals within the Department of Labor who 
are aware that people who are supposed to be conducting 
identity checks to ensure that people are receiving 
unemployment insurance payments are qualified for them are not 
conducting those checks. That would be the sort of information 
that they could provide to OIGs that would be, you know, very 
useful to us in conducting oversight and holding people 
accountable and protecting the funds involved in those 
programs.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you. We also know that whistleblowers who 
provide information to Inspectors General or to Congress do so 
at great personal risk of retaliation. One method of 
retaliation, sometimes used by an agency or agency management 
is to open an investigation into the whistleblower or to 
request that the Inspector General investigate that individual.
    How can Inspectors General protect against being used as 
conduits for retaliatory investigations, while maintaining the 
ability to investigate legitimate allegations of wrongdoing?
    Ms. Lerner. That's a very good question, sir.
    And Inspectors General are required to have processes in 
place to assess all allegations that come to them for merit to 
determine if there's a potential violation of law, rule, or 
regulation that would require an investigation, and ensuring 
that those processes play out for every allegation that comes 
in, will go a long way toward ensuring that an IG does not open 
an inappropriate investigation.
    I think the bigger concern here would be the actions of 
program peoples who may have been aware of a wrongdoing by an 
employee and failed to act on that until the moment when that 
person blew the whistle, then they make a referral to Inspector 
General. And as an IG, I would want to be aware of a situation 
like that, when it appears that there has been a retaliatory 
referral to my office, and that would be a matter that we would 
work with the Office of Special Counsel on, to determine the 
best course of action to respond to that inappropriate 
behavior.
    Mr. Davis. Are there any further protections that an 
individual, I mean, we often hear from individuals that, you 
know, if I come forth with what I know, something is going to 
happen to me. I am going to bear the brunt of something, 
myself.
    How do we assure employees that they can be protected and 
that they are protected when they decide to reveal information?
    Ms. Lerner. I think we do that by making sure that 
employees understand that the Inspector General Act requires us 
to protect the identity of people who come to us with 
information like this, to the maximum extent practicable, and 
every IG I know takes that responsibility extremely seriously. 
Because we recognize that if people are afraid to come to us, 
then we will lose out on important leads that could help us do 
our work and [inaudible] in the strongest possible fashion.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
    The chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Biggs, 
for his five minutes.
    Mr. Biggs. I thank the chairman and the ranking member.
    Ms. Forgy, like many of my fellow members on this 
subcommittee, I am profoundly disturbed that Presidential 
candidate Joe Biden's main election advisory firm, 
SKDKnickerbocker, received $35 million in HAVA funds from then-
California Secretary of State, Alex Padilla, in apparent 
violation of Federal law. This committee has been trying to 
examine that contract since at least September of last year, 
which is before my time serving on this body.
    Your predecessor, former Election Assistance Commission 
Inspector General Patricia Layfield, frequently indicated her 
need to rely on third-party contractors to investigate the 
SKDKnickerbocker transaction.
    Ms. Layfield left the EAC earlier this month and we still 
don't know the story behind the thirty-five-million-dollar 
transaction, now, seven months after this committee's initial 
inquiry; meanwhile, Joe Biden is in the White House and Mr. 
Padilla is in the U.S. Senate.
    My colleagues, Mr. Comer, Mr. Hice from this committee, as 
well as Mr. Davis from the House Administration Committee, 
pointed out in a March 18, 2021, letter to your boss, EAC 
Commissioner Donald Palmer, the troubling fact that the EAC OIG 
cannot oversee a single contract worth $35 million, but it is 
still disbursing nearly $1 billion in taxpayer funds.
    Ms. Forgy, I know you are now the sole person working in 
the EAC IG Office, and very simply, what do you need to ensure 
the SKDKnickerbocker contract is more expeditiously 
investigated?
    Ms. Forgy. So, I previously stated we are in the process of 
doing the procurement process to obtain the services that we 
need from independent public accountants to review that 
contract. That contract process is underway, and once we have a 
legal contract in place, we will start the process of looking 
into that contract in order to address the concerns that were 
expressed by the ranking members to our office.
    Mr. Biggs. So, Ms. Forgy, if I understand you correctly, 
you basically let out bids for a contract, is that correct, and 
you haven't received those bids back and you are going to be 
reviewing those?
    Ms. Forgy. The process is still--the contracting officer is 
doing their internal review at this moment. Once that's 
completed, we will do a solicitation through a blanket purchase 
agreement that we have. Those contractors that are on that 
blanket purchase agreement are experienced with doing grant 
audits and with the EAC.
    And so, once we have those proposals back, we will review 
those. Once we have that process completed, we will have a 
complete contract and we will be able to start the process of 
looking into the SKD contract and addressing the concerns that 
were expressed by the ranking members.
    Mr. Biggs. Ms. Forgy, can you give us kind of a rough 
timeline on when that will be completed, that process?
    Ms. Forgy. Based on prior experience, the procurement 
process and internal review takes about 21/2 to 3 weeks. So, we 
are hoping to have a solid contract, official contract in place 
by early to mid-June.
    Mr. Biggs. OK. Thank you.
    Now, under the HAVA and the CARES Act, the EAC received a 
huge infusion of cash for staff and gave out about $1 billion 
in grants across the country.
    What plans did the EAC put in place to oversee the increase 
in grant money that the EAC was awarded this year?
    Ms. Forgy. I am not able to speak on the matter, as that's 
a programmatic matter under the Grants Management Office, for 
their oversight, but I would be happy to write that question 
down and take that back to the Grants Management Office and 
provide you with further information after the hearing.
    Mr. Biggs. I would appreciate that. Thank you, Ms. Forgy.
    And, are also, is the IG Office, then, reviewing 
allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse of any of these funds?
    Ms. Forgy. Yes. That will be included as the oversight of 
our review of grant audits when we go out with the IPAs. That 
is a part of that review of all the states that we review for 
grant audits.
    Mr. Biggs. So, when Inspector General Patricia Layfield 
retired on April 9, leaving you as the only employee in the EAC 
OIG's Office, the EAC has not yet designated you as an acting 
OIG, and this raises questions about whether your agency is 
hamstringing your ability to conduct robust oversight of its 
actions and make investigative decisions.
    Can you elaborate on the impacts of not having an acting 
EAC IG while your office should be reviewing, you know, the 
billion dollars in grants from 2020.
    Ms. Forgy. So, currently, as my role as Deputy IG and 
carrying out, specifically, that role of overseeing the grants, 
the grant audits, I'm able to do the procurement process under 
my role and get that process started for the contract that we 
anticipate for June. So, that process had not currently been 
hindered.
    The EAC, again, as I mentioned in my earlier statement, 
they are actively in the process of hiring the--filling the 
Inspector General position.
    Mr. Biggs. Thank you. My time has expired.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Connolly. I thank the gentlemen.
    The gentlemen from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, is recognized 
for his five minutes.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Can you hear me?
    Mr. Connolly. We can hear you loud and clear.
    Mr. Lynch. Very good.
    First of all, I want to say thank you to you. You have been 
nothing short of relentless on this issue, trying to get the 
process and the protections for our Inspectors General. I know 
you have been working on this for several years and putting a 
lot of energy and effort into this, and I just want to, you 
have been like a dog on a bone, and I mean that as a 
compliment. You have been really relentless on this, and it is 
so important, right.
    We rely so heavily, especially on the Oversight Committee, 
it is a real partnership that we have with our Inspectors 
General, and I appreciate Inspector General Horowitz's efforts 
and, you know, several of the people on this call and the work 
they have done.
    In our Subcommittee on National Security, as you know, Mr. 
Chairman, we rely so heavily on, first of all, Stuart Bowen, 
during, you know, he was the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
reconstruction, and then Inspector General Sopko, who has been 
doing Afghanistan.
    We would have been totally in the blind, really, without 
the reports that they offered to us to assist. And this was 
across Republican and Democratic administrations, right; they 
identified waste and fraud in the contracting process in both, 
you know, in both Democratic and Republican administrations and 
gave Congress the information that we needed to take 
appropriate action. So, I am grateful for that process.
    I do want to point out a difference of approach, though, 
however, between what President Trump did versus what President 
Biden is doing. In the case with President Trump, I mean, let's 
be honest, every time an Inspector General came up with an 
opinion or information that was contrary to the wishes of the 
President, he got rid of them. They were gone. And then, he 
would put them on administrative leave, before they could 
contest their removal, so they were completely out of the 
picture. So, you know, to my colleagues on the other side of 
the aisle, you have got to be kidding me, you know, just a 
clear abuse of power in removing Inspectors General for doing 
their jobs.
    And I will give you an example for President Biden, here is 
his response. So, we recently had Inspector General Sopko 
before my subcommittee and he testified in a way that was not 
helpful at all to President Biden's eventual decision to remove 
U.S. troops from Afghanistan in September.
    Mr. Sopko testified that it would be, you know, a disaster 
or, you know, that there might be a collapse. But President 
Biden did not attack that Inspector General. He did not attack 
that Inspector General. He accepted the information but weighed 
other information that he thought was even more compelling 
about the 20 years that we have spent in Afghanistan.
    And he made a decision that was contrary to the evidence 
provided by Inspector General Sopko. But he showed due respect 
for the work that Inspector General Sopko undertook. He just 
came up with a difference of opinion than the recommendations 
of the IG, and he made a decision that was contrary to the 
recommendations of the Inspector General.
    That is a lot different than what President Trump did. If 
it were President Trump, he would have removed that Inspector 
General. He would have fired him for coming up with information 
that was not harmonious with the President's wishes.
    So, look, I am a co-sponsor of a lot of your legislation 
that is going to protect Inspectors General. We have had some 
very helpful commentary and advice from all the witnesses here.
    I do want to ask, you know, with respect to the information 
we got on Afghanistan and Iraq, Ms. Hempowicz, from POGO, how 
helpful and how important is that information, because I know 
you are doing God's work, as well, in terms of trying to keep 
us on the right side of things, but how helpful was that 
information to POGO?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Those Inspectors General reports have been 
invaluable to our work, conducting oversight over the 
Department of Defense.
    Mr. Lynch. OK. I got it.
    Ms. Hempowicz. Just completely invaluable. Yes, it's hard 
to state it in another way, it's just, you know, it's 
irreplaceable.
    Mr. Lynch. Yes. I am with you. OK.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    Mr. Connolly. And thank you for your gracious comments, Mr. 
Lynch. I very much appreciate it.
    The gentlewoman from New Mexico, Ms. Herrell, is recognized 
for her five minutes.
    Ms. Herrell?
    Ms. Herrell. Yes. Sorry, I had to unmute.
    Mr. Connolly. No problem.
    Ms. Herrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    I just want to make a statement and then I have a question 
for Allison Lerner. It seems she's asked Congress to enable all 
Inspectors General to issue testimonial subpoenas for former 
employees, contractors, and grant recipients. And we have heard 
from some IGs that they would use that subpoena power to call 
former executive branch officials to discuss the policy and 
political considerations behind a policy decision.
    Is it appropriate for an IG to investigate the political 
considerations behind a policy decision?
    And let me just keep going. I am concerned about the 
likelihood that the subpoena power could be used for entirely 
political purposes, including calling former administration 
officials to testify on subjects unrelated to waste, fraud, and 
abuse.
    What protections are there in CIGIE's proposals or existing 
legislation to ensure that this tool is not abused for 
political purposes?
    Ms. Lerner. I believe that the legislation that was dropped 
yesterday by this committee, focuses the testimonial subpoena 
authority on, you know, the areas within the jurisdiction of 
the IG, which is preventing and detecting waste, fraud, and 
abuse in the programs and operations of the agencies they 
oversee. So, IGs could use this testimonial subpoena authority 
to conduct reviews into matters appropriately within their 
jurisdiction.
    And being able to do this would ensure that, you know, 
unfortunately, sometimes today we have people who retire in 
order to avoid participating in a compelled interview, which 
they would have to do if they remained a Federal employee, and 
that undermines the ability of an Inspector General to 
completely review into an issue that they have independently 
determined warrants review.
    So, enabling IGs to have access to those people, whether or 
not they remain employed with the agency, is crucial to our 
ability to complete the work that we think is necessary for the 
American taxpayer.
    Mr. Connolly. Would my colleague yield, without prejudice? 
We will freeze her time.
    Ms. Herrell, would you yield?
    Ms. Herrell. Yes, sir. What did----
    Mr. Connolly. I just want to underscore a point you are 
making. You are right, subpoena power could be abused, as can 
any power of an IG, and that is why CIGIE has to be thorough, 
robust, and expeditious, as well as transparent in insisting on 
accountability, so those kinds of abuses are caught and dealt 
with. And so, I thank you for bringing that up.
    Thank you for yielding, and your time is now resumed.
    Ms. Herrell. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Just one followup to that. So, would we be guaranteed that 
this tool would not be used as a preliminary tool by the IGs, 
in your opinion, Ms. Lerner?
    Ms. Lerner. I'm not quite sure what you mean by 
preliminary, but what I can say is that the IGs have a long 
history of utilizing documentary subpoenas and utilizing them 
well. They have review processes in place to ensure that what 
they're seeking isn't overbroad and that it's not burdensome. 
And we would ensure that appropriate procedures are in place, 
too, for testimonial subpoenas to ensure that, you know, the 
same considerations are addressed and that those are not 
abused, as well.
    Ms. Herrell. Great.
    Ms. Hempowicz. Congresswoman, can I add something?
    I just want to add----
    Ms. Herrell. Sure. Of course.
    Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, I just want to add that the Department 
of Defense Inspector General does have testimonial subpoena 
power currently, and so does the Pandemic Response 
Accountability Committee, and I would say in those, in neither 
instance have we seen that authority be abused. I completely 
take your question, I think there is the threat and so, it is 
critical that there is accountability for Inspectors General. 
But just from what we've seen so far, that authority has not 
been abused.
    Ms. Herrell. Great.
    Ms. Lerner. And I would just note.
    Ms. Herrell. Thank you--go ahead.
    Ms. Lerner. I would just note, as well, that frequently 
having the authority means that you don't have to use it. In 
situations, you know, voluntary cooperation follows, instead of 
the need to compel cooperation. So, I think we would see that, 
in addition, and I imagine that the instances in which people 
would actually use testimonial subpoena authority would be 
limited, as it has been in the IGs that have it currently.
    Ms. Herrell. Great. Thank you both.
    And thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, Ms. Herrell.
    The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Speier, is recognized 
for her five minutes. Welcome.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me first say how grateful I am to you that you are 
having this hearing. I had a similar hearing last week on the 
Department of Defense Inspector General and the Service 
Inspectors General, and what are called component Inspectors 
General, and I am deeply concerned that we have a serious 
problem on our hands.
    First of all, we now have an Inspector General for the 
Department of Defense who is also the Inspector General for the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Defense has 
a budget, as we know, of $740 billion, and yet we don't have an 
Inspector General that is designated specifically for that 
Department. So, hopefully, we are going to see that that is 
going to change.
    But I actually think that the system is broken, and I am 
curious whether or not we should go back to the drawing board. 
And I appreciate the chairman's commitment to this issue, and 
as Congressman Lynch said, you are a dog with a bone.
    So, here is my concern. First of all, it could be used for 
political purposes by either administration, depending on their 
concern for being criticized. So, would we not be better served 
to have a term, and I think one of our witnesses, Mr. Ervin, 
has suggested that, have a term of office for, let's say, eight 
years, that we give the President the opportunity to make an 
appointment? If it is not done within, you know, 90 days of a 
vacancy that another entity, maybe it is CIGIE, would make the 
appointment. That we require specific qualifications to become 
an Inspector General.
    So, I guess I would like to start off by asking Ms. 
Hempowicz what she thinks of that idea.
    Ms. Hempowicz. Yes. So, to your first question, thank you, 
Congresswoman, in that hearing, I watched every minute of it. 
It was incredible last week. Thank you so much for holding that 
hearing.
    You know, I think, one, the Project on Government Oversight 
has made a recommendation, ourselves, that if there is a 
longstanding vacancy in an IG Office, that Congress designate 
an entity within CIGIE to make a temporary appointment. I think 
that would surely incentivize a President to exercise their 
full appointment authority and choose the individual who would 
sit in that seat.
    And to your question about term limits, I think there is 
some wisdom there. I think my, one, I think that would need to 
be accompanied by improvements to the Integrity Committee to 
ensure that those individuals aren't, you know, kind of lawless 
during that eight years, not to suggest that they would be, but 
I also--and one concern would be by the end of their term, they 
might be looking kind of for their next job, and so I think 
that would be my one hesitancy there.
    I think, really, how to increase independence of these 
offices is to give them for-cause removal protections and to 
address who can serve as a temporary Inspector General when 
there is a vacancy. But we certainly don't object to term 
limits.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
    Ms. Lerner, what are your thoughts on that?
    Ms. Lerner. Having served in this community for almost 30 
years, you know, I've seen that there's kind of natural 
turnover that comes. Some IGs come and stay for a couple of 
three years. Some last, like I have, I'm 12 years in my role, 
and some are even longer.
    I'm concerned that if we have term limits, first, it would 
make, it would increase our difficulty in recruiting people. 
Some folks might not want to have a limit on the time that they 
can serve, and anything that makes it harder to find people to 
take, qualified people to take these jobs, would be of concern 
to me.
    But I am also concerned that we would still have leaving, 
people leaving even before the end of their term. So, it 
wouldn't get us out of the constant need to fill IG vacancies.
    Certainly, if we did have terms, I think that putting them 
more along the lines of the controller general, which I believe 
is 10 years, would make sense. Because for an IG to--you know, 
we're agents of positive change and making change takes time, 
and you want to ensure that people have sufficient time to 
really have an impact on an organization.
    But I agree with Ms. Hempowicz that some of the other 
matters that are the focus of this conversation, the ensuring 
that we have protections for people who will act when vacancies 
are long term, are areas that I would focus on more than 
putting term limits in place.
    Ms. Speier. So, tell me about the training that an 
Inspector General goes through. In the Department of Defense, 
these component IGs have three weeks of training and they have 
the position for two years, and they are servicemembers, so, I 
mean, I am very curious as to how they can do their jobs, but 
could you tell me a little bit about that.
    Mr. Chairman, I can't see what my time limit is, so you 
will have to cut me off when it is appropriate.
    Mr. Connolly. The witness may answer the question, 
although, the gentlelady's time has expired.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
    Ms. Lerner. There aren't, isn't specific training required 
of Inspectors General, but what CIGIE does is for all 
Inspectors General who come on, they're offered what we call IG 
101, which is courses that CIGIE provides to new Inspectors 
General to ensure that they understand their responsibilities, 
their broad responsibilities, how to, you know, their budgetary 
responsibilities, that they understand what the Integrity 
Committee is.
    We also work to introduce new Inspectors General to their 
peers so that they can find mentors and folks that they can 
call when they have questions, which inevitably, you get 
moments that you think no one else has ever encountered, but 
other people have. We try to forge those relationships.
    And we invite new Inspectors General to come to a meeting 
of CIGIE's executive council so they can see the depth and 
breadth of the committees that CIGIE has and get involved in 
the work that the organization does.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, and thank you for your 
kind comments, Ms. Speier.
    The Congresswoman from the District of Columbia is 
recognized, Ms. Norton, for her five minutes. Welcome.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. I just came from a Rules 
Committee meeting, Mr. Chairman, but I wanted very much to be 
here to ask a question in this important hearing, because these 
IGs are so important to us when we are investigating waste, 
fraud, or abuse, you know, the usual problems.
    But over the last four years, I looked at the record and I 
was amazed to see the attacks on Federal IGs from the Trump 
administration. He fired multiple Inspectors General because 
apparently a fear of what they might uncover.
    And if I could indicate what I mean, he fired Michael 
Atkinson, the IG of the Intelligence Committee, who first 
alerted Congress to the whistleblower report over the notorious 
Ukraine phone call, because the IG followed the law, so he 
fired him.
    He nominated an IG to replace Christy Grimm, acting IG for 
the Department of Health and Human Services, after she released 
a report that there were, quote, severe shortages at hospitals 
combatting the coronavirus.
    Then he fired Steve Linick from his role as IG of the State 
Department, at the request of then-Secretary Mike Pompeo, 
because Mr. Linick was investigating Pompeo for misuse of 
government resources. And we have just seen that he has been 
found to have, they learned just this morning that it was true 
that he and his wife misused government resources.
    Mr. Trump didn't fire IGs who were investigating the things 
his administration was doing wrong. He left gaping holes in the 
IG community for years to come. While vacancies have plagued 
previous administrations, they were particularly widespread on 
this one. He left 13 agency IG positions vacant, 5 of which 
were vacant for his entire presidency, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Hempowicz, what problem do vacancies in IG roles 
present to the American taxpayer?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Thank you so much for the question, 
Congresswoman.
    I think it presents three distinct problems. The first, I 
think is, the first is that it sends a signal that oversight is 
not important to the administration, which is not a great 
signal to send to taxpayers. Second, is that there is a reduced 
independence when you have vacancies in these offices, whether 
they're longstanding or short vacancies.
    In many, in a couple of instances that POGO has seen over 
the years, there are acting Inspectors General that are 
auditioning for the permanent role, and as part of that 
auditioning process, they would like the buy-in and they would 
like the positive recommendation of the agency head.
    We know from Congress' legislative history in creating the 
IG Act and the IG system, that when the agency has buy-in into 
the Inspector General's work, that that office is less likely 
to call out problems that may be, that may reflect poorly on 
the agency.
    And the third problem is that vacancies in these offices 
really reduce their ability to do long-term planning. And I 
think, you know, you see offices focusing a little bit more on, 
you know, numbers of audits and small things that they can use 
to kind of show Congress this is what we're doing, but not 
necessarily focusing on those big-picture issues of 
constitutional concern, those issues that are of concern to 
people across the country.
    And so, I think, really, you know, it's those three issues 
are the main ones that present themselves.
    Ms. Norton. Ms. Hempowicz, that is very enlightening.
    I am wondering if you could tell us about the people that 
President Trump did nominate to fill vacancies----
    Ms. Hempowicz. Yes.
    Ms. Norton [continuing]. were they experienced 
investigators and accomplished members of the IG community?
    Ms. Hempowicz. When we're talking about those who were 
nominated to fill the position permanently, I think it was a 
mixed bag. Some of the nominations, you know, were, made total 
sense; individuals who understand the IG community, who come 
from investigative backgrounds, who have strong leadership, who 
demonstrated strong leadership throughout their careers.
    But then there were also a couple of nominees who appeared 
to not really have any experience with the Inspector General 
realm; in particular, one nominated to lead the Department of 
Defense Inspector General had very little management experience 
at all. And considering the size of that office and also the 
breadth of their mission, not only overseeing the Department of 
Defense, but also overseeing all the component IGs underneath 
them that don't have that same structural independence, I think 
it raises serious questions about the quality of those 
nominees.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, my colleague from the 
District of Columbia.
    The vice chairwoman of our subcommittee, the gentlelady 
from California, where I know it is still early there, Ms. 
Porter, is recognized for her five minutes.
    Ms. Porter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
    Ms. Hempowicz, Inspectors General, as you have testified, 
are individuals appointed to serve in an oversight role for 
Federal agencies. Can we break that role down a little bit? 
What is the Inspectors General mission?
    Ms. Hempowicz. So, the Inspectors General mission is to 
oversee their office, and their offices' mission is to 
investigate waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement within the 
agency they serve.
    Ms. Porter. This would include things like audits, looking 
at things for efficiency, effectiveness, trying to make sure 
tax dollars are spent wisely, that Congress' purpose is being 
carried out?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, ma'am, absolutely.
    Ms. Porter. So, because of this need for independence, 
Inspectors General are typically never selected from within the 
agency that they are assigned to oversee; is that right?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Porter. But last year, that happened. A political 
appointee from within an agency was appointed to be the acting 
Inspector General, overseeing that agency. And, in fact, my 
understanding is that this happened not once, but twice.
    I guess, would that and did that put the very purpose of 
the Inspector General role at risk? Does this potentially 
create serious conflicts of interest?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Absolutely. And I would argue that it puts 
all whistleblowers that come to that, that came to that 
Inspector General Office, at risk of being exposed to the 
agency leadership that they may have been blowing the whistle 
on.
    Ms. Porter. So, this issue, let's call it wearing dual 
hats, working within the agency and being the acting Inspector 
General for the agency at the same time. This could effectively 
put the Inspector General's role at risk. It could open the 
door for waste, fraud, or abuse, it wouldn't protect 
whistleblowers, necessarily.
    A GAO report issued last summer noted that when the same 
person is an agency official and an acting Inspector General, 
that situation raises concerns. So, I want to submit that GAO 
report for the record, which is very consistent with your 
testimony.
    Ms. Lerner, I want to turn to you. You are the chair of the 
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, or 
CIGIE. Did you or any member of CIGIE express to any Trump 
administration officials opposition to this dual-hat conflict 
of interest that we have just been discussing?
    Ms. Lerner. Yes.
    Ms. Porter. Who did you speak to?
    Ms. Lerner. I can't go into the specifics, with whom I had 
the conversations, but, you know, I have, through, in the prior 
administration and in the current administration, engaged with 
the White House to ensure what, you know, the qualities of a 
strong acting Inspector General would be and the importance 
that those people be independent in mind and appearance.
    Ms. Porter. With that dual-hat person coming from within 
the agency to be Inspector General, did you raise, would you 
characterize the concerns you raised as strong?
    Ms. Lerner. Well, they are strong concerns. I mean, being 
able to be not just act independently but be viewed 
independently is essential to the credibility of an Inspector 
General and the work of his or her office.
    Ms. Porter. And I know you feel like you can't say who you 
spoke to, and I respect that. Could you share the office in 
which the individual spoke, that you spoke to?
    Ms. Lerner. I would have to leave it broad, but I can 
assure you that, you know, the concerns were raised.
    And Mr. Horowitz and I also met with the acting Inspectors 
General who were, and to ensure that they understood their 
responsibilities to act independently and the impact that it 
could have on their ability to meet with, and especially, 
government, generally accepted government auditing standards 
and the actions that they'd need to----
    Ms. Porter. Well, Ms. Lerner, first, I want to hope that 
you had more luck with accountability than I just did with my 
teenager, who desperately, apparently needs to fill his water 
bottle in the middle of this questioning.
    [Laughter.]
    Ms. Porter. I want to state that I think it is so 
important, what you just said, that we prevent this from 
happening again, because you did raise strong concerns, others 
raised concerns, and this happened again, not just once, but 
twice.
    And that is why I introduced the Accountability for Acting 
Officials Act, which would preventive these dual-hat conflicts 
of interest. The bill would require an acting Inspector General 
to be the next-in-line official from the same office, generally 
the deputy or principal deputy or a senior official from the 
broader Inspector General community, if the deputy position is 
vacant.
    Ms. Buller, does CIGIE support these, do you support these 
provisions to prevent this type of dual-hat conflict of 
interest?
    Ms. Buller. Absolutely.
    Mr. Connolly. The gentlelady's time has expired, but the 
witness may respond.
    Ms. Buller. Absolutely. And as a matter of fact, it is one 
of CIGIE's priorities that we submitted to Congress.
    And I would like to thank the Congresswoman for her support 
in this priority.
    Ms. Porter. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, and don't be too hard on 
your son. In a pandemic we are seeing all kinds of things, 
right.
    The last questioner is the chair, and I want to thank 
everyone for participating in this hearing.
    So, Mr. Ervin, you are a former IG; is that correct?
    If you would turn on your mic.
    Mr. Ervin. That's right, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Connolly. And would you favor adding a former IG, given 
all the experience that person might have to CIGIE?
    Mr. Ervin. I would, sir. And I see at least a couple of 
advantages to that. One is, arguably, and in my judgment, this 
would be the case, adding a former Inspector General would add 
additional heft to CIGIE in its oversight role with regard to 
the Inspector General community.
    Mr. Connolly. Right.
    Mr. Ervin. Two, and if that person were a former IG who had 
served for a considerable period of time, and there are many, 
that person, over time, would have developed some perspective, 
would have seen it all, as it were, and, therefore, could give 
some advice to his counterparts about what is a credible 
allegation, what is not a credible allegation, what actions 
should be taken with regard to allegations, et cetera. So, I 
think I would----
    Mr. Connolly. And, presumably, several steps removed, there 
is a certain disinterest. You are not judging peers.
    Mr. Ervin. Exactly.
    Mr. Connolly. Yes. Ms. Lerner, would you be open to that 
idea?
    Ms. Lerner. I would, sir.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much.
    So, Ms. Hempowicz, we have got a lot of vacancies that are 
probably close to a historic high; is that fair?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, I would say so.
    Mr. Connolly. We have people with dual roles, where even if 
the intent is not conflictual, the possibility of conflict is 
there, the dispassionate, disinterested, you know, 
investigative motivation or impulse could be compromised and, 
certainly, perception-wise is a problem, fair enough?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
    Mr. Connolly. Having people as acting, when you have, say, 
39 of these positions required by law, law passed by Congress, 
requiring confirmation, which is clearly the intent of 
Congress, that there be accountability and advice and consent, 
and that these positions are elevated in a certain way, that I 
think is a pretty strong statement, even if the intent isn't 
circumvention of the law, de facto, it is circumventing the 
law.
    Would that be fair?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Absolutely. I would say, absolutely, it is 
circumventing the law.
    Mr. Connolly. So, we have got some work to do--oh, here is 
another one.
    What is your view about a standard of removal for an IG 
that, I am just not comfortable with that person?
    Ms. Hempowicz. That I've lost confidence in this 
individual?
    Mr. Connolly. Or I've lost confidence.
    Ms. Hempowicz. Yes. That is what we see from the White 
House, White Houses of both political parties. I don't think 
that's a reason for removal.
    Why did you lose confidence in the individual is what----
    Mr. Connolly. Right. So, at the very least, if you are 
going to make that assertion, Democrat or Republican, you are 
going to have to back it up----
    Ms. Hempowicz. Yes, and you should have to----
    Mr. Connolly [continuing]. With actual evidence for why 
your confidence has gone away.
    Ms. Hempowicz. Absolutely. You should have to do so in 
that, so, before that 30-day window that Congress has put into 
the law, before that individual is removed from this office.
    Mr. Connolly. Do you believe that having a fixed term that 
maybe could be renewable, might add to the independence and the 
ability of an IG to function?
    Mr. Ervin, I see you shaking your head yes.
    Mr. Ervin. I do, sir, for a couple reasons. One, I think it 
would further underscore that Inspectors General are not 
typical appointees, that they are supposed to be apolitical, 
and if the term were sufficiently long, seven years, renewable, 
14 years, et cetera, that would mean that over time, an 
Inspector General would serve in both, Republican 
administrations and Democratic administrations.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
    And I saw you also shaking your head, Ms. Hempowicz. You 
agree?
    Ms. Hempowicz. Yes. I think it certainly would. But I 
would, again, say, you know, I think the No. 1 way to increase 
and ensure independence is to give these Inspectors General 
protections from removal.
    Mr. Connolly. Now, the final thing I want to ask about, 
because we have covered a lot of territory here today, and I 
don't wish to abuse time, but I have been focused for a number 
of years on strengthening the role of CIGIE, because my view 
is, if on both sides of the aisle, we are going to accept an 
IG's report as prima facie evidence of X, unquestioned the 
integrity behind it, then the integrity behind it has to be 
unquestionable.
    And if there is any reason to believe that integrity is 
subject to question, we have to have faith, the American public 
has to have faith, that there is an accountable body that will 
swiftly, robustly, thoroughly, and expeditiously, investigate 
whatever the issue may be and either clear somebody or hold 
them to account.
    Do you believe that the current structure of CIGIE provides 
that, Ms. Hempowicz?
    Ms. Hempowicz. No, sir, I don't. I think, you know, if you 
just look at the annual report from this last year, the vast 
majority of allegations of wrongdoing against Inspectors 
General that came to CIGIE were allegations of abuse of power.
    But what we've seen, at least in the annual report, is then 
what gets reported back to Congress, is that, you know, the 
majority of those investigations were closed, either because 
they didn't meet the investigative threshold standard, which is 
one thing, or because the allegations, themselves, didn't 
provide enough information.
    The fact that those are reported together does not give us 
enough information to know, and I would just highlight, again, 
I would also highlight that the investigative threshold 
standard that CIGIE has, the Integrity Committee has put out, 
which is great, we certainly appreciate that transparency, is 
not an objective standard. There is a lot of room for, there's 
a lot of wiggle room there.
    And so, I think that is one area where the Integrity 
Committee can have a clearer standard and then the reporting to 
Congress that would be required under your legislation, I think 
also answers another piece of that puzzle, where it would be 
required to report to Congress why they didn't continue 
investigations.
    Mr. Connolly. And I am going to invite you, Mr. Ervin, to 
comment on it, as well, but I just have to tell you I have had 
my own direct experience, where several members of this 
committee a number of years ago filed a complaint against an 
IG, a complaint that I continue to believe is profoundly valid. 
And CIGIE, to members of this committee, basically said, we 
looked at it. There is nothing to look at. Thank you very much.
    Now, we detailed something like an 8-or a 10-page 
complaint, and they didn't even have the courtesy to at least 
go down the charges we made or the concerns we expressed and 
show it the respect of a response. We looked at it, and here is 
what we found.
    And I can tell you that it really shook us in terms of our 
confidence in CIGIE's functioning. And it can't be pro forma. 
It actually has to be pretty robust.
    And, by the way, I don't mean in any way to reflect on the 
current leadership of CIGIE. This was a number of years ago, 
and it raised institutional, structural questions, not the 
willingness of individuals to look at it.
    Mr. Ervin, would you like to comment on that?
    Mr. Ervin. Yes, I'd just say two things about that, Mr. 
Chairman.
    One, I could not agree with you more on your larger point, 
and that is, we have to hold Inspectors General to account for 
their own behavior. We have to watch the watchdogs. It reflects 
directly on the credibility of Inspectors General work if they, 
themselves, are not thoroughly investigated when credible 
allegations are made. That's the first thing I would say.
    And the particular instance that you cite, I'm not aware 
of, but if there was bipartisan consensus that a given 
Inspector General needed to be investigated, and if that is the 
response that you got back, that is very troubling and suggests 
that reform should be made to process.
    Mr. Connolly. Yes, I can't confess that it was bipartisan 
consensus, because part of the complaint was that this 
particular IG, flat-out, had engaged in partisan activity, with 
respect to circumscribing an investigation that had, you know, 
real impact, and it was hugely prejudicial.
    Now, that was our view.
    Mr. Ervin. Right.
    Mr. Connolly. We wanted CIGIE to look at it to confirm or 
exonerate that person. We would have certainly respected a 
thorough investigation, but we didn't get one.
    But aside from that personal experience, as a member of 
this committee, it raised questions about CIGIE. And I have 
talked to other IGs about that and the need to strengthen it.
    Ms. Lerner, you chair CIGIE. I am going to give you the 
final word, but would you like to comment on how, maybe, you 
think we could help you in your job to strengthen the role of 
CIGIE and the transparency of your proceedings.
    Ms. Lerner. Thank you for the opportunity.
    Certainly, I think we've made a lot of progress in CIGIE's 
taking over running the Integrity Committee from the FBI with 
the passage of the Inspector General Empowerment Act, where 
our, we have more investigations. They are looking into more 
complex matters.
    But that gets us to the issue of resources, and I think the 
most important thing that we could do for the Integrity 
Committee to help it do its job better is to get additional 
resources for it. Right now, we have a very small staff and the 
chair of the committee, who is an Inspector General himself, 
has to be involved in overseeing, I think we have nine ongoing 
investigations right now, on top of his full-time day job. It 
is an untenable situation.
    Mr. Connolly. Yes.
    Ms. Lerner. And if we had, if CIGIE had an appropriation, 
if we had dedicated resources for the committee, that would 
enable us to hire a senior investigative attorney to oversee 
the work and have a cadre of investigators available to do 
these investigations, instead of having to beg, borrow, and 
steal from our colleagues across the Inspector General 
community. I think we would be in a much better position to do 
these cases, handle them well, and handle them in a more timely 
fashion.
    Mr. Connolly. Well, I think those are very fair points, Ms. 
Lerner, and I am sympathetic, because I want to do everything, 
we can to make sure that CIGIE is, you know, so above reproach 
and so respected for its ability to quickly look at the 
situations and look at them thoroughly, and, by the way, clear 
names.
    Anyone can file a complaint. That doesn't mean you have 
done anything wrong, and we don't want to besmirch reputations, 
but on the other hand, we have got to make sure that there is 
accountability.
    Mr. Hice, I promised you equal time if there is anything 
that you wish to add.
    Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend from Georgia, and I hope we 
can cooperate on, at least the CIGIE legislation, which I see 
as just an improvement and a good government measure.
    With that, I want to insert in the record: a report from 
the Project on Government Oversight, titled, ``The Watchdogs 
After Forty Years: Recommendations for Our Nation's Federal 
Inspectors General''; a letter, also from the Project on 
Government Oversight, titled, ``Former Inspectors General Call 
on Congress to Pass Overdue Reforms to the IG System''; a 
statement from former IG for the Department of Defense, Gordon 
Heddell; and a report from the congressional Research Service, 
previously referred to by the chairwoman, titled, ``Congress' 
authority to limit the removal of Inspectors General.''
    And I would ask, without objection, all that material be 
entered into the record, as well as the GAO letter I referenced 
earlier.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Connolly. And also without objection, all members will 
have five legislative days, within which to submit additional 
written questions for the witnesses through the chair, which 
will be forwarded to the witnesses for their expeditious 
response, we hope.
    I would ask the witnesses to please respond as promptly as 
you are able.
    I want to thank all of our colleagues. We had great 
participation today. We have a legislative program to follow 
through on this hearing, and I thank our witnesses for their 
very thoughtful contribution to this discussion.
    With that, this hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]