[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                      A WAY FORWARD FOR VENEZUELA:
          THE HUMANITARIAN, DIPLOMATIC, AND NATIONAL SECURITY
               CHALLENGES FACING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                 WESTERN HEMISPHERE, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
              MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             March 3, 2021

                               __________

                            Serial No. 117-5

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 
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                              __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                         
                      
                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 
                   GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman
                   
 BRAD SHERMAN, California              MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
 ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey                  Member
 GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	      CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	      STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
 KAREN BASS, California		      SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
 WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	      DARRELL ISSA, California
 DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	      ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
 AMI BERA, California		      LEE ZELDIN, New York
 JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas	              ANN WAGNER, Missouri
 DINA TITUS, Nevada		      BRIAN MAST, Florida
 TED LIEU, California		      BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
 SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	      KEN BUCK, Colorado
 DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota	      TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
 ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		      MARK GREEN, Tennessee
 COLIN ALLRED, Texas		      ANDY BARR, Kentucky
 ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		      GREG STEUBE, Florida
 ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	      DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
 CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	      AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
 TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	      PETER MEIJER, Michigan
 ANDY KIM, New Jersey	              NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
 SARA JACOBS, California		      RONNY JACKSON, Texas
 KATHY MANNING, North Carolina	      YOUNG KIM, California
 JIM COSTA, California		      MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
 JUAN VARGAS, California		      JOE WILSON, South Carolina
 VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas		      RON WRIGHT, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois              

                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
               Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                
                                ------                                

 Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and 
                     International Economic Policy

                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey, Chairman

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                MARK GREEN, Tennessee, Ranking 
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                     Member
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas		     AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
JUAN VARGAS, California		     MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
                         
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Reyna, Mr. Feliciano Founder and Executive President, Accion 
  Solidaria......................................................     8
Arnson, Dr. Cynthia J., Director, the Wilson Center Latin America 
  Program........................................................    18
Fonseca, Mr. Brian, Director, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public 
  Policy, Florida International University.......................    26
Berg, Dr. Ryan C., Research Fellow, Latin America Studies, 
  American Enterprise Institute..................................    35

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    66
Hearing Minutes..................................................    67
Hearing Attendance...............................................    68

                 OPENING STATEMENT FROM CHAIRMAN SIRES

Opening statement from Chairman Sires............................    69

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    72

 
A WAY FORWARD FOR VENEZUELA: THE HUMANITARIAN, DIPLOMATIC, AND NATIONAL 
          SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

                        Wednesday, March 3, 2021

                          House of Representatives,
            Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
   Civilian Security, Migration, and International 
                                   Economic Policy,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in 
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Albio Sires 
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Sires. Good morning, everyone. Thank you to our 
witnesses for being here today.
    This hearing entitled, ``A Way Forward For Venezuela: The 
Humanitarian, Diplomatic, and National Security Challenges 
Facing the Biden Administration,'' will come to order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any point and all members will have 
5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions 
for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 
To insert something into the record, please have your staff 
email the previously mentioned address.
    As a reminder to members, staff, and all others physically 
present in this room, per recent guidance from the Office of 
the Attending Physician, masks must be worn at all times during 
today's hearing. Please also sanitize your sitting area.
    The chair used these measures as a safety issue and, 
therefore, an important matter of order and decorum for this 
proceeding.
    As a reminder to members joining remotely, please keep your 
video function on at all times, even when you are not 
recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and 
unmuting themselves. And please remember to mute yourself after 
you finish speaking.
    Consistent with H. Res. 8 and other accompanying 
regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses as 
appropriate, when they are not under recognition, to eliminate 
background noises.
    I see that we have a quorum, and will now recognize myself.
    This is our first subcommittee hearing of the 117th 
Congress, so I want to welcome all of our new and returning 
members. I look forward to working with each of you, Democrats 
and Republicans, to advance United States interests and deepen 
our engagement with the Western Hemisphere.
    I want to recognize my friend, Juan Vargas, who will be our 
new vice chair. And I would like to welcome our new ranking 
member, Mark Green. Congressman Green and I met for the first 
time last week, and I am optimistic that we will be able to 
work effectively together on a bipartisan basis.
    I called today's hearing because I want to begin this 
Congress where we began last year, by shining a spotlight on 
the crisis in Venezuela. Two years ago, I chaired a hearing 
entitled, ``Made by Maduro,'' where we discussed the 
humanitarian crisis caused by Venezuela's dictator, Nicolas 
Maduro.
    Unfortunately, while international attention seems to be 
shifting away from Venezuela, the crisis in the country has 
only deepened over the last 3 years. A report issued by the 
United Nations last September confirmed that Maduro's regime 
has committed crimes against humanity. Over 90 percent of 
Venezuelans are living in poverty, suffering under conditions 
made worse by the pandemic. Over five and a half million 
Venezuelans have been forced to flee their homes.
    In April 2019, I led a congressional delegation to the 
Colombia border with Venezuela. I met mothers who had walked 
hours in the hot sun just to get a meal for their children. I 
heard stories about family members with chronic diseases who 
could not obtain the medication they needed in Venezuela and 
were struggling to survive. I saw firsthand the suffering this 
regime has caused.
    For me, the Venezuela crisis has never been about politics. 
The question I have always asked is, what can we, the U.S. 
Congress, do to help end the humanitarian tragedy?
    We have a moral obligation not to turn away from what is 
happening in Venezuela. I am proud that the U.S. Agency for 
International Development has led the way in providing 
humanitarian assistance to the region.
    I salute all those courageous Venezuelans and international 
aid workers who are working in the country to deliver food and 
medicine.
    I want to recognize the efforts of the interim President, 
Juan Guaido, and his government. They are prioritizing the 
needs of the Venezuelan people by pursuing an agreement for 
vaccine deployment and by calling for the World Food Programme 
to be allowed to operate in the country.
    I also want to applaud the Colombian Government, in 
particular President Ivan Duque, for his recent decision to 
grant temporary protective status to Venezuelans. In the face 
of one of the largest refugee crises in modern history, 
Colombia has shown tremendous generosity in providing safe 
haven for Venezuelans.
    I urge other countries to follow Colombia's example and put 
an end to harmful policies like deporting Venezuelans back into 
harm's way.
    I also urge Congress to urgently pass legislation to grant 
temporary protective status to Venezuelans fleeing the crisis. 
House Democrats did this in 2019, and I sincerely hope that all 
of my colleagues would join that effort this year to finally 
provide the relief that Venezuelans deserve.
    Ultimately, know that an end to the humanitarian crisis 
requires a political solution. Ranking Member Green and I will 
introduce a resolution in the coming days expressing our 
bipartisan commitment to supporting democratic aspirations of 
the Venezuelan people. We must pursue a solution to the crisis 
with the urgency it deserves.
    I believe the U.S. must work more closely with our allies 
in Latin America and in Europe to advance a coordinated 
diplomatic strategy. We should also be much more assertive in 
calling out the regimes that are helping to keep Maduro in 
power, including Turkey, China, and Iran, and especially Cuba 
and Russia.
    I am confident that President Biden, who has demonstrated a 
lifelong commitment to Latin America, will bring the 
international community together behind the goal of pursuing a 
peaceful transition that swiftly leads to free and fair 
elections.
    I look forward to hearing from the experts with us today 
about what the U.S. Congress and the new administration can do, 
in close coordination with our allies, to help the Venezuelan 
people in reclaiming their democracy.
    Thank you.
    And I now turn to the ranking member for his opening 
statement.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman Sires, for holding this 
hearing on the ongoing crisis in Venezuela. It is an honor to 
serve as the new ranking member of this subcommittee, and I 
look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman, on the 
various issues.
    And I do believe that when we met the other day, we 
realized you and I have a lot more overlap in the way we think 
than the traditional right/left side of the aisle. So I think 
we are going to have a great time standing up for the people in 
this hemisphere.
    Today, we are discussing the political and humanitarian 
crisis caused by the illegitimate Maduro regime that has left a 
once prosperous country in political and economic shambles. The 
regime's socialist policies and endemic corruption have 
resulted in years of economic free fall, hyperinflation, and 
shortages in basic goods. Venezuela has a poverty rate of 96 
percent that has driven almost 6 million of its citizens to 
seek a better life in other regions.
    This migration crisis has strained the resources of 
neighboring countries in the region, including Colombia, our 
closest regional partner impacted by the Venezuelan crisis.
    In addition to the economic crisis, the Maduro regime is 
among the world's worst violators of human rights, including 
recent accusations of crimes against humanity by the U.N.'s 
fact-finding mission.
    According to local human rights group Foro Penal, there are 
currently close to 330 political prisoners in Venezuela, not 
including the illegal detention of six American Citgo 
executives held on false charges and without due process.
    But the regime cannot carry out these atrocities alone. It 
has been bolstered by some of the world's most brutal regimes. 
The Communist regime in Cuba has successfully exported its 
oppressive system to Venezuela and directly supports the Maduro 
regime's oppressive tactics and human rights abuses.
    Further, the Chinese Communist Party has provided billions 
in loans to the regime and was recently found to be sharing 
technology used to surveil political opposition figures.
    The Maduro regime has also strengthened ties with Russia, 
which has provided military equipment, and Iran, which has 
joined Russia in helping the Maduro regime avoid U.S. oil 
sanctions.
    The regime has also built ties with the region's non-state 
criminal actors, including FARC and ELN, U.S.-designated 
criminal groups who are allowed free rein in Venezuela to carry 
out narcotrafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit 
activities.
    I applaud the Trump administration for leading 
international recognition of the interim President, Juan 
Guaido, and for holding the Maduro regime accountable by 
imposing tough and necessary sanctions on Venezuela's State oil 
company and individuals accused of corruption and human rights 
abuses.
    Some claim that U.S. sanctions are to blame for the 
country's economic crisis. But I want to be very clear today: 
The Maduro regime alone is responsible for the crisis and for 
blocking humanitarian assistance from entering Venezuela. I 
applaud the European Union for recent sanctioning 19 Maduro 
regime officials, and I strongly condemn the Maduro regime's 
expulsion of their Ambassador in retaliation.
    The United States has also led humanitarian efforts by 
donating more than $1.2 billion in assistance to Venezuela and 
its neighbors in the region to address this humanitarian 
crisis. And while the United States is proud to lead, I urge 
the rest of the international community to join us in this 
effort.
    I also applaud the brave efforts of the interim government 
and the democratic opposition, which has withstood violent 
oppression and has been illegally removed from the rightful 
post in the National Assembly through the Maduro regime's 
illegitimate elections. These brave men and women deserve our 
support as they seek freedom for the Venezuelan people.
    Additionally, I was pleased to hear that the Biden 
Administration will continue to recognize President Guaido as 
the legitimate leader of Venezuela. And while I believe there 
is a role for multilateralism in addressing the crisis, the 
United States must continue to lead these efforts.
    The Maduro regime's continued subversion of democratic 
institutions, human rights abuses, and criminal activities 
demonstrate their unwillingness to reform. I believe that 
dialog with this criminal regime cannot be possible without a 
clear demonstration that they are willing to negotiate in good 
faith.
    The U.S. Congress and this committee will play a critical 
role in overseeing U.S. policy in Venezuela and ensuring that 
we have a comprehensive strategy that will lead to a peaceful 
democratic transition for the Venezuelan people.
    The crisis in Venezuela does not only impact our neighbors 
in South America, it threatens United States national security, 
and we cannot afford to allow it to worsen.
    I look forward to the testimoneys of our witnesses today, 
and, Mr. Chairman, working with you.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you very much Ranking Member Green.
    I will now introduce Mr. Feliciano Reyna. He is the founder 
and executive president of Accion Solidaria, an organization 
that has worked since 1995 to combat the HIV-AIDS epidemic. 
Between 2005 and 2012, he also was president of Sinergia, the 
Venezuelan Association of Civil Society Organizations.
    Mr. Reyna has coordinated relief efforts in Venezuela 
through Accion Solidaria since 2016 to address the country's 
humanitarian crisis. He is also a board member of the 
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law.
    Mr. Reyna holds a bachelor's of architecture from Cornell 
University.
    Mr. Reyna, welcome. We welcome you to the hearing.
    We will then hear from Dr. Cynthia J. Arnson. She is the 
director of the Wilson Center'sLatin American Program. A 
leading expert on Latin America and the Caribbean, she has 
testified numerous times before the House and the Senate and 
has written many publications on the region, particularly on 
U.S. policy toward Latin America.
    She also served as a former foreign policy aide in 
Congress. Dr. Arnson holds a Ph.D. From Johns Hopkins 
University.
    Dr. Arnson, thank you for joining us today.
    Our third witness is Mr. Brian Fonseca. He is the director 
of the Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy at Florida 
International University and an adjunct professor of politics 
and international relations.
    Mr. Fonseca is an expert on U.S. national security and has 
written publications focused on Russian and Chinese engagement 
in Latin America and Russian-Venezuelan relations.
    He holds a degree in international business and 
international relations from Florida International University 
and attended Sichuan University in Chengdu, China, and the 
National Defense University in Washington.
    Mr. Fonseca, we welcome you to the hearing.
    Finally, we will hear from Dr. Ryan Berg. He is a research 
fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. His research 
focuses on Latin America and specifically U.S. foreign policy, 
national security and development issues, and the region's 
transnational organized crime and narcotrafficking.
    Previously, he served as a research consultant at the World 
Bank, a Fulbright scholar in Brazil, and a visiting doctoral 
fellow at the Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.
    Dr. Berg obtained a Ph.D. In political science from the 
University of Oxford.
    Dr. Berg, thank you for joining us today.
    I ask the witnesses to please limit your testimony to 5 
minutes, and, without objection, your prepared statements will 
be made part of the record.
    Mr. Reyna, you are recognized for your testimony.

    STATEMENT OF MR. FELICIANO REYNA, FOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE 
                  PRESIDENT, ACCION SOLIDARIA

    Mr. Reyna. Good morning, Chairman Sires. Thank you and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee. As a Venezuelan 
implementing a humanitarian action program in Venezuela, I 
really appreciate your invitation to address this subcommittee 
today.
    Since late 2015, Venezuela's complex humanitarian emergency 
has caused deprivations of the people's rights to health, food, 
education, livelihoods, and access to basic services, such as 
water and electricity. Human insecurity has forced millions to 
flee, unable to cope with such daily struggles here at home.
    Understanding the nature and broad dimension of the 
humanitarian emergency and its effects in widespread loss of 
life and human suffering continues to be necessary to properly 
address it, finding the means to work through the barriers 
imposed by the political conflict which have been an obstacle 
to scaling up much needed humanitarian support.
    In this challenging environment, over 120 national and 
international NGO's have partnered with the U.N. system and 
many others are coordinating independently to implement 
humanitarian programs all over the country. Venezuelan NGO's 
not only were the very first responders in early 2016, but have 
continued building capacities to provide a progressively 
increasing humanitarian response.
    Despite fear of politicization of aid delivery among donor 
countries, the United States continues to be the largest funder 
of the humanitarian response, with over 40 percent for 2020. 
However, even though Venezuela has the world's fourth-largest 
food insecure population, it had the least-financed 2020 
humanitarian response plan among 34 countries in need.
    Despite having the world's second-largest migrant 
population, Venezuela's appeal for the regional migration 
response in 2020 was $1.4 billion while Syria's was $6 billion.
    Regardless of challenges, there are opportunities for the 
United States to scale up humanitarian support.
    One, promoting multilateral engagement among donor 
countries to address both the humanitarian emergency in 
Venezuela and the migrant response in the region.
    Two, increasing funding for local Venezuelan humanitarian 
and community-based organizations, allowing for longer-term 
funding, at least 2 years at a time, strengthening local 
capacities for future sustained development.
    Three, continuing to support initiatives, such as the 
agreement reached between the Humanitarian Aid Commission of 
the 2015 National Assembly and the Venezuelan Health 
Department, as well as the COVAX initiative and the 
Humanitarian Response Plan 2021.
    Four, engaging multilaterally and creatively with key 
actors within the Maduro government to open the humanitarian 
space, expand humanitarian action, and protect humanitarian 
workers and organizations serving people in need.
    Five, revising general and secondary sanctions which have 
an impact on the Venezuelan population already severely 
affected by the humanitarian emergency. Licenses for oil for 
diesel swaps, for example, should be extended again.
    Six, adopting the TPS for Venezuelans, joining the recent 
approval by the Colombian Government.
    These humane and rights-based initiatives could also become 
a framework for a coordinated regional response.
    Distinguished members of the subcommittee, humanitarian 
responses save lives and alleviate suffering, adhering to the 
``do no harm'' principle. Finding a long-lasting, nonviolent, 
democratic solution to Venezuela's political conflict will take 
time. Without such a solution, the humanitarian emergency will 
continue to take its toll on the Venezuelan people, forcing 
many more to flee.
    However, we all have a moral obligation, as Chairman Sires 
said, to save lives today, to alleviate suffering today. We 
cannot wait to do so once the political conflict is solved, for 
it will not be solved for a while, not for the millions in need 
inside Venezuela, not for those forced to migrate who also 
suffer along the way, not for the region, which will also 
continue to be impacted.
    To save lives and alleviate suffering today and to continue 
contributing to a long-lasting, nonviolent, democratic solution 
to Venezuela's political conflict demands multilateral thinking 
and action by the international political, diplomatic, human 
rights, and humanitarian community, as well as engagement with 
those who control power today in Venezuela.
    Together with Venezuelan political party actors, 
multilateral thinking and action must include Venezuelan civil 
society organizations on the ground which have proven to have 
the capacities, commitment, courage to generate solutions to 
the humanitarian emergency, create opportunities for sustained 
development, and continue advocating for human rights despite 
threats and risks.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Reyna follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Reyna.
    Now we will hear from Dr. Arnson.
    I now turn to you for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DR. CYNTHIA J. ARNSON, DIRECTOR, THE WILSON CENTER 
                     LATIN AMERICA PROGRAM

    Dr. Arnson. [inaudible] And notably--oops. I am--am I 
muted? Uh-oh. Am I muted? No, I am not muted. Sorry. Okay.
    The prospects of a democratic transition in Venezuela have 
worsened. The Armed Forces, an essential pillar of regime 
survival, have remained united despite multiple efforts inside 
and outside the country to foster divisions. Maduro's 
repressive apparatus remains fully intact, with murders carried 
out with impunity in poor neighborhoods, political prisoners 
tortured, raids and attacks on nongovernmental organizations.
    As others have pointed out, this growing authoritarianism 
has gone hand in hand with Venezuela's economic collapse. 
Because of that collapse, others have made reference to the 
refugee flows. The United Nations estimates that another 3 
million Venezuelan migrants and refugees will leave the country 
in 2021.
    Countries in South America and the Caribbean are simply 
incapable of absorbing such large additional refugee 
populations and the threats to social cohesion and political 
stability should not be taken lightly.
    In approaching the Venezuelan crisis, the U.S. Government 
should establish both long-term and short-term goals.
    The long-term goal is the one that we all know and has been 
longstanding in U.S. policy, which is the democratization of 
Venezuela's political life via free, fair, and verifiable 
elections.
    So the question is, what are the short-term measures that 
can be adopted that could help lead to that outcome?
    First, now that the scenarios aimed at the collapse of the 
regime have been tried and have failed, it is important to 
achieve broad political agreements that offer some guarantees 
to the regime and its supporters in exchange for concessions. 
This constitutes a more fruitful strategy for stabilizing and 
democratizing Venezuela.
    As Feliciano Reyna was pointing out, humanitarian 
agreements can serve as stepping stones toward a more 
comprehensive settlement. Partial agreements build trust among 
the parties, and if they are successful they build faith among 
the population at large in the possibility of negotiated 
outcomes.
    And as we have just heard, the discussions in Venezuela 
over ways for access to the COVID-19 vaccines through COVAX to 
carry out a national vaccination campaign are a hopeful step.
    The U.S. Government should not lead these efforts at 
partial agreements, but the Biden Administration should 
recognize that the sectoral, the secondary, the individual 
sanctions, the criminal indictments, give the United States 
tremendous leverage in Venezuela.
    Prudently targeted sanctions relief in exchange for 
verifiable concessions, such as the release of political 
prisoners, an easing of the restrictions on humanitarian aid, 
the reform of the National Electoral Council, should be 
carefully considered as part of a broad strategy coordinated 
with Venezuelan civil society and other actors in the 
international community.
    In any negotiation, creating incentives, not just wielding 
sticks, is essential to bringing the parties together.
    Although U.S. sanctions policy allows for humanitarian 
exemptions, as the recent GAO report pointed out, these may not 
be functioning well enough to provide enough maneuvering space 
for humanitarian actors on the ground. Those humanitarian 
exemptions should be revised in coordination with Venezuelan 
civil society actors.
    The Biden Administration should also consult with a broad 
range not only of Venezuelan actors, but international relief 
organizations to clear up remaining obstacles.
    As others have mentioned, the Biden Administration's oft-
cited preference for multilateralism in foreign policy is an 
asset in approaching Venezuela. Multiple international partners 
of the United States have worked to maintain channels of 
communication with all sides. These include the European Union, 
the International Contact Group, the Lima Group, the 
Governments of Norway and Sweden.
    All of these countries and organizations have, as a common 
denominator, their search for a peaceful, democratic solution 
to the Venezuelan crisis.
    And as my colleague Brian Fonseca will shortly indicate, we 
should not harbor illusions that the only important 
international actors in Venezuela are Western democracies 
seeking a democratic outcome. Russia, China, Cuba, India, 
Turkey, and Iran have played a variety of roles in sustaining 
the Maduro regime. But we should keep in mind that their 
interests are diverse, as is their relative importance to 
regime survival.
    Finally, and to reiterate the point about refugees, the 
United States has done a huge amount to assist South American 
and Caribbean countries hosting Venezuelan refugees, but much 
more needs to be done. In 2020, the United Nations Refugee and 
Migrant Response Plan received less than half of the 
international funding that it requested and identified to meet 
the needs of Venezuelan migrants and refugees across the 
region.
    And special attention, as Chairman Sires pointed out, 
should be given to Colombia, which hosts more Venezuelan 
refugees than any country in the world and which just extended 
temporary protective status for 10 years to the almost 2 
million refugees within its borders.
    The United States can and must play an ongoing leading role 
in mobilizing resources that are sufficient for Colombia, as 
well as other frontline nations that are directly impacted by 
Venezuela's ongoing meltdown.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Arnson follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
    I now turn to your testimony, Mr. Fonseca.

   STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN FONSECA, DIRECTOR, JACK D. GORDON 
 INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

    Mr. Fonseca. Thank you, Chairman Sires, Ranking Member 
Green, distinguished members of the subcommittee, of course 
including my own hometown Representative, Congresswoman 
Salazar. It is my privilege to address you today on the state 
of Venezuelan foreign relations and its short-term and long-
term effects on U.S. policy.
    As already stated, Venezuela isin the midst of one of the 
worst economic contractions ever recorded, and because of that, 
the Maduro dictatorship continues to lean on a small group of 
States to remain in power. Russia, China, Cuba, Turkey, and 
Iran have all played important supporting roles for the regime.
    These countries help Maduro bypass U.S. sanctions to keep 
the Venezuelan economy muddling through and provide technical 
assistance to help stave off internal and external threats.
    The question before the House today is not whether the 
Venezuelan Government is a repressive and corrupt authoritarian 
regime. I believe that is clear. Rather, what can we do to 
alleviate the ongoing humanitarian crisis, regain influence on 
the ground, displace our geopolitical rivals, aid in the 
restoration of democratic governance, and help pave the way for 
a prosperous country for the Venezuelan people?
    My testimony will focus on Russian-Venezuelan relations, 
but I must point out that Russia is just one of a handful of 
countries vital to Venezuelan domestic and foreign policy 
interests.
    The considerations binding Russia, Venezuela, and the 
others are far less ideological. Instead, these countries are 
tied together by common authoritarian political structures and 
economic and political opportunism.
    Furthermore, these countries all share antagonistic 
relationships with the United States. That is, regime survival, 
combined with our policy position, for better or worse, 
encourage these authoritarian regimes to travel together.
    These countries also overwhelmingly prioritize their own 
survival well above the relationships. That leads me to 
conclude that these relationships--Russia-Venezuela included--
are largely transactional and vulnerable to fracturing.
    The Russo-Venezuelan relationship has evolved a great deal 
since former President Hugo Chavez and Vladimir Putin first met 
in Moscow in 2001. Putin saw tremendous economic and political 
opportunities in Venezuela, while Chavez sought to diversify 
its foreign relations away from the United States.
    In subsequent years, Russian companies invested billions 
into Venezuela, largely focusing on arms and energy deals. 
Chavez also offered Russia political and military access on the 
ground in Venezuela.
    Interestingly, much of the surge in Russian-Venezuelan 
engagement occurred during Maduro's tenure as Chavez's Minister 
of Foreign Affairs from 2006 to 2013.
    After ascending to office in 2013, Maduro sought to 
leverage his relations with Russia and others to stave off 
challenges from internal political opposition, offset the 
massive amount of money siphoned through widespread corruption 
and criminality, and mitigate the economic death spiral that 
accelerated shortly after he took office.
    Today, most experts would agree that Russia's direct 
business activities in Venezuela have not yielded the desired 
return on investment. Still, it maintains important economic 
interests; namely, energy infrastructure and enduring arms 
contracts.
    However, the lack of direct ROI has forced the Russians to 
focus more on the indirect economic benefits and extracting 
political and geopolitical value out of Venezuela, primarily, 
maintaining a geostrategic footprint near the U.S., portraying 
Russia as a global power, unsettling American policymakers, 
undermining Western democratic values, and scoring political 
points at home for Putin.
    In the economic context, Russia is just one of several 
countries vying for access to Venezuela's large proven oil 
reserves. There are clear indications that Rosneft and other 
Russian companies were taking huge losses well before U.S. 
sanctions.
    Despite their losses, Russia owned significant energy 
assets in Venezuela, including nearly 81 billion barrels of 
proven reserves via its joint ventures with PDVSA--that, by the 
way, it chooses to leave in the ground.
    One theory is that Russiais content with locking up 
Venezuelan oil in the ground and reducing global supply so that 
it can fetch a higher price for its own heavy crude on the 
global market.
    Russia exports roughly 9 to 10 million barrels of heavy 
crude per day. So a $5 increase in price of a barrel would 
generate roughly an additional $50 million a day for Russian 
exporters. Thus, Russia may be deriving indirect economic 
benefits from a deteriorated Venezuelan oil industry made worse 
by U.S. sectoral sanctions.
    In 2020, Russia oil exports to the U.S. hit a 16-year high, 
solidifying its place as the second-largest exporter of U.S. 
crude to the United States. Industry experts argue that the 
spike in Russian imports to the United States is driven, in 
large part, by U.S. sanctions against PDVSA.
    Oil and gas are not the only drivers of Russian economic 
interests in Venezuela. Military sales are also an important 
part of Russia's broader economic interests. Building on 
military sales, Russia has established important military-to-
military relationships with Venezuela. Russia provides 
technical assistance and offers professional military 
educational opportunities in Russia for Venezuelan military 
personnel.
    Russia also maintains a formidable intelligence footprint 
in Venezuela. Although it is difficult to estimate how deep 
this aspect of the relationship goes or whether these 
relationships will be enduring, Russian military and 
intelligence presence in Venezuela is not in our national 
security interest.
    Still, I assess the strategic intent for Russia is not to 
directly challenge the U.S. military. Instead, I think it finds 
value in creating a low-cost opportunity to irritate the United 
States, but not necessarily provoke an escalatory response.
    Let me cover just a few recommendations, if I can, and then 
conclude.
    I mean, to be clear, there is no easy path to transition in 
Venezuela and there are severe limitations to what the U.S. can 
do now. Still, I think there are meaningful actions that we 
should be thinking about as the situation continues to evolve.
    First, we should reevaluate our sanctions and consider 
doubling down on targeted sanctions against individuals and 
reversing broader sanctions that may be hurting our national 
interests and the interests of the Venezuelan people.
    There is good reason to believe that some of our sanctions 
are undermining our long-term domestic and foreign policy 
objectives. Our sanctions should not exacerbate the ongoing 
crisis, erode America's reputation, or work in the interests of 
our global rivals.
    Second, we must find ways to close the important pressure 
release valves or else the sanctions will do little to effect 
change. If the dictatorship can leverage its allies and use 
illicit trafficking proceeds to subsidize its struggling 
Venezuelan economy, meaningful change will remain elusive.
    Third, we should consider reestablishing some diplomatic 
and economic access. I am not suggesting we reestablish an 
embassy without evaluating important concessions, but we should 
look to regain some diplomatic footprint.
    We should also create space for the American private sector 
to outcompete Russia, China, and others taking advantage of the 
U.S. absence. There is certainly a clear preference for 
American businesses over Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey.
    Finally, we should consider bolstering the governance 
capacity and reassure our partners in the region, especially 
Venezuela's neighbors Guyana, Colombia, and Peru, and consider 
working more closely with our international allies, especially 
the U.K., France, and Canada, which all maintain diplomatic 
relations.
    The fact that this is among the first hearings of the 117th 
Congress and the first for this committee is a testament to the 
importance of Venezuela to the United States and our commitment 
to the Venezuelan people.
    As I said before this committee in 2019, nature abhors a 
vacuum. If we do not have a presence, then China, Russia, Iran, 
and others antithetical to our interests and the interests of 
the Venezuelan people will be more than happy to fill that 
void.
    Again, thank you for this amazing opportunity, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Fonseca follows:]

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    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    Dr. Berg, you are recognized for your testimony.

 STATEMENT OF DR. RYAN C. BERG, RESEARCH FELLOW, LATIN AMERICA 
             STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

    Dr. Berg. Chairman Sires, Ranking Member Green, members of 
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on 
this timely topic today.
    The political and economic devastation wrought by the 
Maduro regime in Venezuela, Latin America's erstwhile 
wealthiest country, is truly unprecedented. The country has 
lost 20 percent of its pre-crisis population, 5 to 6 million 
refugees, a number that could rise to as many as 10 million by 
2023, according to the International Monetary Fund.
    De facto President Nicolas Maduro has presided over the 
largest economic decline outside of war in world history and 
his regime is now considered a criminalized or a mafia State. 
Venezuela's institutions are so thoroughly penetrated by 
corruption and criminal interests that senior leaders, 
including Maduro himself, are actively participating in 
transnational criminal enterprises.
    The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, the 
National Liberation Army, or ELN, and Lebanese Hezbollah all 
have received shelter and even material support from the Maduro 
regime.
    Maduro's Venezuela represents a combustible mix of national 
security threats that have metastasized throughout the 
hemisphere, leaving the door wide open and beckoning the 
involvement of extra-hemispheric actors and U.S. strategic 
competitors that have seized on the bedlam in Venezuela to 
enter our shared neighborhood, sow chaos, destabilize the 
region, and augment their power-projection capabilities.
    Russia has provided the Maduro regime with a critical 
sanctions-busting lifeline, as well as myriad weapon systems.
    China has provided more than $60 billion in loans since 
2007 and traded repressive digital surveillance technology to 
further Maduro's control.
    And Cuba has remade the repressive organs of Venezuela's 
police state in exchange for oil.
    Perhaps the most concerning aspect of Venezuela's slide 
into chaos, however, are the bonds it has forged and solidified 
with Russia, China, and Cuba, in many cases turning 
transactional relationships into blossoming strategic 
partnerships and even, in some cases, outright dependencies.
    Venezuela has become a prime example of the phenomenon 
known as authoritarian export or authoritarian learning, 
whereby authoritarian leaders share best practices in 
repression and adopt survival strategies based upon their prior 
successes in other countries.
    Like a family recipe, authoritarians have bequeathed to 
Caracas their best advice in regime survival. If not for Cuba, 
the Venezuelan regime would arguably not exist in its current 
form. And if not for Russia and China, the Maduro regime would 
probably have collapsed.
    As Venezuela's economy slips further into the abyss, 
however, the Maduro regime has doubled down on the narrative of 
a nation under siege and abdicated any responsibility for the 
country's collapse.
    I think it is critical to avoid misconstruing the realities 
of who is to blame here because it means misidentifying the 
most appropriate strategies for addressing the unique security 
challenges the regime poses to the region.
    Mr. Chairman, I would like to use the remaining time 
available to highlight very briefly several policy 
recommendations for the United States.
    First, pursue a policy of management, not solutionism. The 
Biden Administration should recognize that it has inherited a 
significant position of leverage, but it should resist the 
temptation to go big and rush into negotiations with the Maduro 
regime. A Hail Mary pass at this inauspicious moment could 
actually entrench the regime further.
    Second, attend to the unfolding humanitarian disaster. As 
we have all heard today already, this is the most underfunded 
humanitarian crisis in modern history. For comparison, Syrian 
refugees have received the equivalent of $3,150 per refugee, 
while Venezuelans have received a paltry $265 per refugee.
    Aid should be targeted to encourage and defray the costs of 
further integration of Venezuelan refugees in host countries 
such as Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and others.
    Third, monitor the effect of sanctions on humanitarian 
efforts. The Treasury Department should monitor potentially 
negative humanitarian consequences of our U.S. sanctions. The 
U.S. should seek to ensure the reliability of the humanitarian 
exemptions that are built into our sanctions architecture, and 
fine-tuning sanctions should be the first impulse, rather than 
simply lifting them.
    Fourth, avoid the siren song of negotiations until minimum 
conditions in the country are met. By some accounts, there have 
been nearly a dozen attempts to negotiate with the Maduro 
regime and limited progress has been made, with significant 
opportunity costs to the Venezuelan people.
    I will note that there is currently no consensus of what 
the minimum conditions would be for a negotiation, and major 
questions persist regarding objectives, timing, process, and 
trust-building measures with the Maduro regime.
    Fifth, encourage the European Union to bring more pressure. 
While awaiting a more fortuitous diplomatic moment, the Biden 
Administration should encourage the European Union to adjust 
its policy in a nod to reality.
    Quite simply, the EU's current approach is riddled with 
inconsistencies and the pressure setting is insufficient to 
meaningfully contribute to a negotiated solution and to protect 
human rights on the ground.
    Sixth, broaden the diplomatic tool kit to complement 
sanctions. The U.S. should employ nonsanctions instruments 
concurrently with U.S. sanctions to achieve the effective 
pressure level. These instruments include legal referrals to 
international tribunals, such as the current case pending 
against Venezuela before the International Criminal Court, and 
anti-money-laundering mechanisms and resource certification 
regimes to deter the Maduro regime's participation in the 
illicit economy.
    And seventh and last, bolster intelligence capabilities. 
The failed April 2019 uprising announced from La Carlota Air 
Base in Caracas and Operation Gideon, the failed 2020 
amphibious invasion planned in neighboring Colombia by a 
sanctioned Venezuelan general, should prompt the incoming 
Director of the CIA and the intelligence community to conduct a 
thorough investigation of intelligence failures in the country 
related to the Maduro regime's authoritarian resilience and 
bolster U.S. intelligence assets and capabilities in Venezuela.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering 
the committee's questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Berg follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Sires. Thank you to our witnesses today.
    Now I would like to ask unanimous consent that 
Representatives Omar, Steube, Malliotakis, and Wasserman 
Schultz participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee 
members have had the opportunity to participate and question 
any of the witnesses. Thank you.
    And now we will get into questions. I will start by asking 
questions to our members.
    First, I would like to say that for years I have been 
saying that Russia and China participate in this Western 
Hemisphere in order to create anarchy, in order to destabilize 
governments, in order to play with our closest allies.
    Cuba has a security apparatus in Venezuela. Russia has been 
selling arms. And one interesting conversation that I had with 
someone from the Colombian Embassy the other day told me that 
in 2019, 6,000 Russians visited Colombia. Last year, due to the 
pandemic, it dropped down to 3,000. The Colombian Government 
expelled three Russians recently.
    I can only think that having Russians visiting Colombia, 
6,000, Colombiais not exactly a beach destination for the 
Russians, plays into this idea that Russia and China would love 
nothing better than to create chaos in the Western Hemisphere.
    So I was wondering from our members, can you comment on 
that?
    Anyone? Do not all answer at once. Just one.
    Mr. Fonseca.
    Mr. Fonseca. Chairman, I apologize. I thought when you 
meant members, that you were querying somebody else.
    No, I could not agree with you more. I absolutely think one 
of the primary objectives, certainly of Russia, is to continue 
to sort of poke a finger in the eye of the United States.
    Keep in mind that, as I mentioned, I think they find it 
incredibly valuable to have a geostrategic footprint near the 
U.S., and I think that is one of it. And oftentimes that sort 
of--this idea of reciprocity gets thrown into the discussion 
among experts that look specifically at Russian engagement in 
Venezuela, because oftentimes that reciprocity sort of pathways 
back to the pronounced U.S. footprint in Eastern Europe.
    And so oftentimes in the past you have even heard rumors 
about the potential tradeoffs of maybe the U.S. kind of 
withdrawing its support in places like Ukraine in exchange for 
Russia withdrawing its support in Venezuela. And, again, for 
now, that is all been sort of hearsay, kind of listening to 
people on the ground.
    But there is no doubt that, in the consciousness of Russia, 
having that geostrategic footprint is really vital, No. 1.
    No. 2, I also think that--and this is inclusive of--by the 
way, that geostrategic footprint is also inclusive of China. Of 
course, the United States has a tremendous footprint in Asia, 
notwithstanding our support to Taiwan, our military access in 
South Korea, Japan, in broader sort of Southeast Asia, you 
know, U.S. influence.
    But that is No. 1. So geostrategic value to having close 
proximity to the United States.
    No. 2, they both have a tremendous interest in undermining 
sort of Western liberal order, undermining democratic 
institutions around the world, and trying to strategically 
create space to sort of embrace their authoritarian political 
models.
    I think that sort of lends itself to destabilizing the 
democracies around the region. And we have seen at times in the 
past Russia leveraging information operations in other 
sophisticated technology means to be disruptive and impact sort 
of the political stability of partners across the hemisphere.
    So, Chairman, I could not agree with you more. I think 
China and Russia absolutely are intent on disrupting and 
undermining U.S. policy.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    I also think that we just do not pay enough attention to 
the Western Hemisphere. So if we do not pay attention, the 
Russians and the Chinese and all the other countries that are 
helping Venezuela fill that void that we have in the Western 
Hemisphere.
    Dr. Arnson. Mr. Chairman, if I might add to that.
    Mr. Sires. Sure.
    Dr. Arnson. I certainly associate myself with what Brian 
Fonseca just said, and I agree that the influence of China and 
Russia in Venezuela is counter to U.S. interests. But I think 
that one needs to separate the kind of involvement that the two 
countries have had. As Brian was saying, it is geostrategic, it 
is an opportunity for the Russians to mess around in what they 
call or what they consider the U.S. ``near abroad'' in the 
reciprocal kind of way that Brian was mentioning.
    China's interests have been somewhat different. China is 
the largest oil consumer in the world. Venezuela has the 
world's largest known oil reserves.
    And so the relationship has been heavily focused on oil 
extraction, and the $62 billion in loans approximately are 
being repaid in oil and there has not been any new money for 
some time. And the loans that were given in recent years were 
simply to allow Venezuela to continue paying back the loans 
that had been initially given.
    There is also, I think, the case that China has reached out 
to the opposition at various points trying to guarantee its 
long-term access to Venezuela's oil resources independent of 
the political leadership of the country.
    So I see it as less committed to the survival of Nicolas 
Maduro and the regime overall and much more committed to the 
long-term survival of its interest in the oil fields.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
    Now I will recognize Ranking Member Green.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman. Again, appreciate your 
opening remarks and appreciate the witnesses' testimony. I 
thank all of them for being present and their participation 
today.
    I think one of America's greatest challenges is China, and 
I am greatly concerned with their penetration into not only 
Venezuela, but all of Latin America. And my comments are really 
to the whole slate of witnesses, whoever wants to jump in.
    In 2019, China specifically stated that the blackouts in 
Venezuela were because of cyber attacks from the United States, 
obviously a blatant lie.
    One of my questions is, how do we confront this 
disinformation campaign from China in Venezuela and throughout 
Latin America?
    Dr. Berg. Let me jump in on this here, Ranking Member 
Green.
    As you well stated, the cyber attack claim, of course, is 
spurious. Largely, the blackouts were a cause of the fact that 
there was not only corruption, but a failure to maintain the 
power grid in Venezuela. And also something, quite simply, 
somebody did not bother to cut the vegetation around one of the 
main power plants outside of Caracas, and so that vegetation 
overgrew some of the power lines and ended up knocking off 
power periodically throughout 2019, as we saw.
    This is an incredibly important question in terms of the 
disinformation environment. It is not just China. It is also 
Russia. It is also Cuba participating as well.
    And I think in this sense, the United States can do its 
best to try to get reliable information to Venezuelans on the 
ground, to members of the opposition, in especially critical 
periods of time. We have seen the internet knocked off grid in 
really important periods of time around protests, around street 
pressure, around moments in time when the regime felt like it 
was quite vulnerable.
    And so this is one of those areas that kind of flies below 
the radar, but is quite important in terms of our ability to 
help the opposition on the ground. Given the lack of political 
space in the country to organize, the reliable presence of the 
internet is absolutely critical.
    Mr. Green. One other, sort of taking that a step further. 
It appears that ZTE, China's big telecommunications giant, has 
created ID cards for the Venezuelan people, which essentially 
do the same thing that their social score system does--tracks 
their behavior, monitors their actions, can dig into their 
checking accounts, all of this.
    How do we stop that?
    Mr. Fonseca. So, Ranking Member Green, I think it is an 
excellent question. I think it underscores the point of China 
as the real strategic competitor in the region. And Chinese 
tech proliferation has been growing rapidly certainly for the 
last decade or so.
    The idea of the fatherland card, as you reference, is 
something that certainly we have been battling around in terms 
of how to--sort of how to combat that. In Venezuela perhaps it 
is very difficult to sort of overturn that.
    But I think education, continuing to sort of dominate the 
educational space, not just in broader Latin America, but 
wherever we can sort of reach in and help educate consumers on 
the threats and challenges associated with China tech 
penetration.
    It is important for us to disaggregate good from bad. Not 
all Chinese activities in the region I think should be seen 
through sort of a threat landscape. But I do think we have to 
provide education as tech penetration becomes more proliferated 
across the broader hemisphere.
    And I think this is also consistent with what Dr. Berg was 
saying just a few minutes ago about information operations. The 
Russians are incredibly sophisticated in terms of their ability 
to effect impact on information operations. They also have an 
incredibly sophisticated and forward-leaning cyber capability.
    In fact, lots of open reporting about that threat. In fact, 
the Atlantic Council's digital analytics lab has done some 
really good work on assessing information operations and 
putting out recommendations that can help undermine sort of the 
effect of those information operations.
    And part of that is about sort of credibility of the 
source. The United States needs to remain credible as a source 
across the broader hemisphere. We have to ensure that our 
actions do not undermine our credibility, broadly speaking.
    And I think we need to continue to point out and attack the 
credibility of Russia, and when China does it call them out as 
well, for proliferating just false information that affects the 
social, political, and economic landscapes across the region.
    Mr. Green. My timeis up. Mr. Chairman, I will go in second 
round.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    Congressman Castro, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
    This question is for Mr. Reyna.
    First, thank you for speaking to our committee about the 
important work that civil society organizations like yours are 
doing in Venezuela.
    I chair the subcommittee that handles international 
development policy, and so I want to ask you a question along 
those lines.
    As you know, on February 11, Venezuela's opposition and 
Nicolas Maduro agreed to cooperate to purchase and distribute 
COVID-19 vaccines for 6 million Venezuelans. I think this is a 
positive step toward fighting the coronavirus pandemic in the 
country. And it has been reported that about 1.4 million doses 
of the vaccine will come from the World Health Organization-
linked COVAX initiative, while the source of the rest of the 
vaccines is yet unclear.
    So my question is, how can the United States help mobilize 
resources to ensure countries in need, like Venezuela, receive 
the appropriate amount of vaccines? And how can we ensure that 
there is a proper oversight and equitable distribution of those 
vaccines in Venezuela?
    Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much for your question. I think 
this is really important.
    One way in which it is possible to continue providing 
support in regards to health, and with vaccination 
particularly, is to support these efforts that the Humanitarian 
Aid Commission of the 2015 National Assembly has been carrying 
on and also being able to work with the Pan American Health 
Organization, as well as with the Health Department of 
Venezuela.
    I think this is one example of possibilities that still 
exist to provide support. And the signing of this COVAX 
agreement is also a show of those possibilities. So we did have 
a previous agreement, now this COVAX one.
    And the oversight and the mobilization to expand, on the 
one hand, and the oversight, one perhaps can be achieved 
through supporting the entrance into Venezuela of the World 
Food Programme with its logistical capacities.
    We are seeing huge challenge there with issues, for 
example, of cold chain. And since our transportation 
infrastructure has been also somewhat collapsed, as many other 
areas, then the World Food Programme can play an important 
role.
    And in regards to oversight, we are proposing to follow the 
model that has already been in place since 2018 by the Global 
Fund for HIV, TB and Malaria, Pan American Health Organization, 
UNH, and Venezuelan civil society, again, with the Health 
Ministry, to followup on the provision and distribution of 
antiretrovirals.
    It has worked well, with challenges, with difficulties. But 
that oversight has been in place. And there is a working group, 
monthly information, and followup of the results. Whenever 
there is a gap or difficulties, then these can be called by the 
activists on the ground doing that oversight.
    So these are the kinds of perhaps mechanisms that would 
deserve looking into and supporting.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman Castro.
    Congressman Pfluger, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Chairman thank you for an excellent 
hearing on a very important topic. And to all of our panelists 
thank you for your time.
    I have got a couple of questions. I will start with Dr. 
Arnson. Knowing that Maduro is--it will not sign any sort of 
deal with the World Food Program, unless he can control the 
distribution of that food, how do we as the United States in 
working with our, with our allies and partners in the region 
ensure that delivery of food gets to the people that need it 
the most and can prevent Maduro from controlling that 
distribution.
    Dr. Arnson. Thank you very much for the question, 
Congressman Pfluger. It is an essential principle of 
humanitarian assistance that it must be given with neutrality 
and without any regard for the political affiliation of the 
recipient. Up until now, the Maduro regime has maintained tight 
control over food distribution through this program known as 
CLAP, through food boxes which are woefully insufficient. And 
it is a form of social control. And it is obviously reluctant 
to relinquish that form of control.
    But I think what Feliciano was indicating is that on 
humanitarian issues involving health, there have been--there 
has been the possibility of reaching agreement between the 
opposition, the government working closely with civil society 
organizations.
    I do not know what the magic formula will be to allow or to 
convince the regime to allow the World Food Program to operate. 
I suggested in my testimony that there might be some 
consideration given to relaxing U.S. secondary sanctions that 
would permit the import of fuel, gasoline, and diesel which are 
in short supply. I know that that is a controversial 
recommendation that we should not have to offer anything to 
Nicolas Maduro to get him to allow the international community 
to feed starving people.
    I mean, we are talking about at a minimum 9 million 
Venezuelans who are either severely food insecure, or 
moderately food insecure, and that is the assessment of the 
World Food Program itself in 2020.
    So I think that these humanitarian agreements that have 
been reached over COVAX, the kind of things with 
antiretrovirals that Feliciano was mentioning, provide a kernel 
of hope that these kinds of agreements around food and food 
insecurity can also be reached.
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you very much.
    And now for Dr. Berg. My question is what are the 
consequences to the U.S., and the region, if this crisis 
continues and if these criminal groups are allowed to thrive? 
And, specifically, to our southern border, what is the threat 
with this crisis, continuing the number of refugees?
    Dr. Berg, to you.
    Dr. Berg. Thank you very much, Congressman, for the 
question. I think the crisis has region-wide impacts. As Dr. 
Arnson mentioned in her opening statement, the region is not 
poised to be able to absorb this level of refugees we have seen 
so far, about 5-and-a-half million. Remember that figure that I 
mentioned in my opening statement from the IMF that this could 
rise by 10 million by 2023.
    And so the numbers of people and the pace which they are 
exiting the country is still unabated. And this really has dire 
consequences, not only for the stability and security of the 
region, but the future economic growth of the region. Many 
countries have difficulty not only absorbing this number of 
refugees, but also--look at a country like Colombia, it has 
taken the very commendable step of including about 1.7 million 
refugees into its, into its legal ranks. About 1 million of 
them will be affected by the temporary protective status that 
they granted to them.
    But that is going to be a Herculean undertaking, which the 
United States can help with because many of us do not believe 
that countries in the region have the capability to absorb 
these types of numbers on a bureaucratic level, on an economic 
level, on a political level. There are political ramifications 
as well. We have seen in some places, despite the fact that the 
region has had a pretty welcoming stance, a rise in xenophobia.
    I mentioned Colombia before. I looked at a poll the other 
day that said that a clear majority of Colombians were actually 
against the move by Ivan Duque to allow temporary protective 
status for Venezuelans in the country. So the regional cohesion 
here is at stake as well.
    And the last thing that you mentioned is a migratory crisis 
that could push north to our borders. Again, we have seen a lot 
of refugees in South America. As I think the next waves start 
to come out, we might see more and more actually traversing 
through Colombia, going up into Panama and into Central 
America, certainly more so than they are now.
    And, lastly, Congressman, if I can just go back to the 
question that Dr. Arnson answered previously about the 
neutrality principle and humanitarianism. Obviously, it is 
absolutely critical. I think that there is one cautionary tale 
here, and that is the agreement that was signed last summer to 
bring in personal protective equipment and COVID PCR tests, 
which were very quickly, sort of, confiscated by the Maduro 
regime. They were not actually spread around the country in the 
way that the agreement stipulated. And the opposition since has 
been crying foul about it. And with the regime in control of 
those resources, there is not much we can do at this point.
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you very much.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    Congressman Andy Levin, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 
this important hearing. To our panelists, thank you. I am going 
to try to ask a number of questions, so I ask you to try to be 
brief in your answers.
    A February GAO report, which I requested along with the 
full committee back in 2019, found that U.S. sanctions, 
particularly those on the oil industry, have likely contributed 
to the steep decline of the Venezuelan economy and suggested 
steps that the Treasury Department and other agencies could 
take to mitigate the humanitarian impacts of sanctions, which 
some of you have addressed very movingly.
    Mr. Reyna, what recommendations do you have for the U.S. 
Government regarding how it could provide clear guidance for 
financial institutions or take other steps to minimize any 
second-order impacts of sanctions on the operations of 
humanitarian organizations that are doing their best in this 
situation?
    Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much, Congressman Levin. We 
really welcome that report. We think it offers information that 
is quite important, because one may think, you know, of the 
impact of sanctions on issues that were already deteriorating. 
But to us, what is of serious concern today is impact on the 
Venezuelan population. And, certainly, there is some that can 
be--work differently.
    But what we have had sometimes is conversations with 
Treasury, for example, to give precise examples of how 
sanctions can put obstacles and restrict the work of 
organizations. I think that is--you know, having those 
conversations, even before imposing certain types of sanctions 
made--would have made sense and still makes sense to talk 
through them.
    One issue that we have faced, for example, is that--and we 
understand Treasury cannot impose, for example, they say issues 
on operations of the banking system, lets say. But they can 
offer certainly a more decisive kind of advice in order for, 
you know, the system not to prevent us from carrying on our 
humanitarian work, our accompanying, for example, victims of 
situations of lack of access to food or health.
    So I think that this requires perhaps sitting down, looking 
at particular issues and seeing how to solve them. Licenses, 
for example, when we were looking at them, they might take from 
18 months to 24 months to get. So, again, it is not even having 
license to get them for organizations such as ours here on the 
ground. So, you know, thank you for your concerns then.
    Mr. Levin. Yes, I tell you what, we will be a partner with 
you in trying to work with the administration to help you do 
your work, basically. It is so important.
    Mr. Reyna. Thank you.
    Mr. Levin. Yes, the Trump administration strategy toward 
Venezuela relied on maximum pressure betting that sanctions 
would lead to a quick transition to democracy. But here in 
March 2021, Maduro's grip on power appears stronger than at any 
point since 2019. It seems that in order to work toward a 
democratic transition, the U.S. will need a longer-term 
strategy.
    Dr. Arnson, it is good to see an old friend. Given reports 
that the Biden Administration is reviewing its sanctions policy 
in many parts of the world, can you talk, specifically, about 
sanctions you think should be reassessed or advised, or how 
should we look at this in more detail than you may have gone 
into earlier?
    Dr. Arnson. Sure. Well, I would say that it is certainly 
not in the cards for the United States to be unilaterally 
lifting certain sanctions. But as I said in my statement, they 
do convey enormous amounts of leverage. The question is how 
they can be used in a back and forth to require verifiable 
steps by the Maduro government in exchange for certain forms of 
sanctions relief.
    Now, that implies that the government is actually 
interested in that kind of sanctions relief. There may be--it 
may be the case that they are more interested in the lifting of 
criminal indictments or, you know, the lifting of these 
individual sanctions that have frozen bank accounts and 
prohibited them from traveling to the United States in the case 
of the EU to the European Union.
    But I think it is very positive that there is a recognition 
at this point that the campaign of maximum pressure actually 
did not achieve the--either the democratic opening or the 
regime collapse that was hoped for. And, therefore, a different 
approach is needed. And I think that those consultations are 
under way and should be encouraged.
    And sanctions are, you know, an instrument in the, in the 
toolkit. And the United States has, because of the economic 
sanctions against the oil sector, the financial sector, and 
secondary sanctions on those who also trade with PDVSA and 
other Venezuelan entities give us tremendous leverage. And we 
should explore, you know, what combination of concession and 
sanctions relief should be desirable.
    Mr. Levin. All right. Thanks.
    Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. Great hearing, and I 
yield back.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman. We now recognize 
Congresswoman Salazar from Florida for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Salazar. Thank you, Chairman. Wonderful to be here. And 
it is such an important topic for the Americas, and I thank the 
witnesses for their time and their expertise, specifically, Dr. 
Fonseca who is one of the most prominent scholars in my 
district. So wonderful to have you here.
    I just want--I have a different type of questioning, and I 
would like to start with Dr. Fonseca just to take this to a 
more basic or granular topic where reality is more crude, and 
it is more understood. So, I am going to have--I am going to do 
ten questions, and I would like you to just answer yes or no if 
it is possible. Is it true that Venezuela went from being one 
of the richest countries in the hemisphere to one of the 
poorest?
    Mr. Fonseca. That is correct.
    Ms. Salazar. Is it true that inflation right now is over 
4,000 percent?
    Mr. Fonseca. That is correct.
    Ms. Salazar. Is it true that the Venezuelans can only go to 
the supermarket a few days a week because there are no goods on 
the shelves?
    Mr. Fonseca. In most places, that is absolutely correct.
    Ms. Salazar. And is it true that the average Venezuelan has 
lost more than 50 pounds in the last 20 years because of lack 
of food?
    Mr. Fonseca. That is also correct.
    Ms. Salazar. Is it also true that Venezuela is empowering 
Hezbollah, the terrorist group, and that the United States has 
indicted members of the Venezuelan Congress just like if one of 
us were participating or working with the terrorist group 
Hezbollah? We know who that person is or who that group is. Is 
that true?
    Dr. Fonseca, did you hear me.
    Mr. Fonseca. I am sorry. I was muted. Yes, that is correct.
    Ms. Salazar. The has dog gone away.
    Is it true that the Venezuelan is empowering--the 
Venezuelan Government is empowering the terrorist group 
Hezbollah, and that the United States indicted a member of the 
Venezuelan Congress for working with Hezbollah.
    Mr. Fonseca. That is true.
    Ms. Salazar. And is it true that Venezuela is becoming a 
major hub for drug trafficking? And that criminal organization 
is their only--their only purpose is to harm the United States?
    Mr. Fonseca. They are absolutely a major hub for drug 
trafficking.
    Ms. Salazar. And is it true that Maduro's representative or 
the repressive apparatus is controlled and directed by more 
than 30,000 high-ranking Cuban agents like Ramiro Valdes, and 
they control even the Venezuelan customs office and the 
passport issuing office?
    Mr. Fonseca. There is absolutely a heavy presence. And I 
know you wanted a ``yes'' or ``no,'' but I am not sure that the 
numbers are what I am seeing as high. I think to your point, 
they still play a really vital, vital role in fire-walling the 
regime and absolutely have an important presence around Maduro, 
ensuring the survival of the regime.
    Ms. Salazar. And the Maduro is blocking at this hour the 
aid for food and medicine that, we, the United States are 
offering to give to them so they can help their people? They 
are blocking it and denying it?
    Mr. Fonseca. That is right, yes.
    Ms. Salazar. And, finally, is it true that 20 years ago, 
Hugo Chavez promised in an interview to yours truly that he was 
going to establish democratic socialism of the 21st century for 
the Venezuelan people?
    Mr. Fonseca. Yes, I recall that interview well, and yes, he 
did.
    Ms. Salazar. Thank you. Now, my question to you and to the 
rest of the panel is to what can we do as a country to help the 
Venezuelan people?
    Mr. Fonseca. I think, you know, one, we have to continue to 
apply pressure and, again, look for ways to allow access for 
vital humanitarian assistance. I think we also need to continue 
to reassure and support Venezuelan neighbors and those in the 
region that are having to absorb millions of Venezuelans 
fleeing the country. I think it should be noted that the--that 
the millions of Venezuelans fleeing the country are another 
really important release valve that allow the regime to muddle 
through by having to, you know, sort of having fewer mouths to 
feed in the country with an economy that continues to sort of 
move in a death spiral. And so I think that----
    Ms. Salazar. If there is one single thing that we could do 
as a country to help the Venezuelan people, what would that be?
    Mr. Fonseca. Continue to apply pressure. I do not--
unfortunately, I do not see a short-term----
    Ms. Salazar. What type of pressure? What type of pressure?
    Mr. Fonseca. I think we need to continue to apply 
diplomatic and economic pressure. We need to continue to press 
for the admission of humanitarian assistance in to support 
those--and, again, I think we need to--I know you asked for 
one, but I also think we need to shore up our allies and 
partners in the region----
    Ms. Salazar. I only have 50 seconds. Why do not you let 
me--Dr. Arnson answer. If there is one single thing we can do 
as a country to help the Venezuelan people, what would that be?
    Dr. Arnson. It would be to work closely with our 
international allies, with the Venezuelan opposition, and with 
a broad range of actors in civil society that can come together 
around a common agenda, first, for humanitarian issues, and 
then eventually to tackle some of the more difficult political 
and security challenges.
    Ms. Salazar. Dr. Berg, one thing in 13 seconds. What could 
we do as a country to help the Venezuelan people at this hour?
    Dr. Berg. Thank you, Congresswoman. I would say to 
reiterate what Mr. Fonseca said, the pressure is, obviously, 
key. It has to be multi-dimensional. As I mentioned in my 
opening remarks, it is not just sanctions, but sanctions and--
and Congresswoman Levin asked a great question, previously, 
about sanctions and targeting. I think we can look at targeting 
and look at----
    Ms. Salazar. What does targeting mean? I only have 14 
seconds. One thing. What does targeting mean?
    Dr. Berg. To look at the actual targets of our sanctions. 
The people on whom we are putting sanctions. The theory behind 
the maximum pressure campaign was that sanctions would be 
enough to dislodge Maduro. But unfortunately the targeting of 
those sanctions has not been on actual military figures whom we 
all believe to control the security apparatus on the domestic 
level.
    So looking at targeting when it comes to our pressure will 
be key, Congresswoman.
    Ms. Salazar. Thank you.
    I yield back. My time is up.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    Congressman Vincente Gonzalez, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Congressman Gonzalez, are you on?
    Congressman Vargas, are you on?
    Mr. Vargas. Yes, I am.
    Mr. Sires. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear 
me? This is Juan Vargas.
    Mr. Sires. Okay, Juan. You are on.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, first of all, Mr. 
Chairman, for having this hearing, and I also want to thank the 
ranking member and all of the witnesses.
    Two things jump out at me in this hearing, one, our failure 
with humanitarian aid. That seems to jump out when I hear 
statistics that Syrian refugees have received, literally, 
almost ten times as much aid as have Venezuelan refugees, that 
is one.
    And, second, our intelligence failures. It seems like that 
we believed that one thing was going to happen with sanctions 
and maximum pressure, and then it did not come about.
    So I can start first with humanitarian aid. I am very 
concerned about not only internally displaced people, but, of 
course, refugees, also. How can we work better with the allies 
that we have all been talking about, both in the region, 
European allies as we have said earlier, how can we work better 
with everybody to have a better result? Because the result 
right now is disastrous.
    I would ask that of Dr. Arnson.
    Dr. Arnson. Thank you very much, Congressman, for the 
question. I think that the United States certainly can 
contribute more of its own resources, but there are other ways 
to continue to mobilize the international community. There have 
been donors' conferences convened by the European Union. We 
should press for more.
    They, of course, are dealing with their own influx of 
refugees from Syria, from Afghanistan, from other parts of the 
Middle East and Northern Africa, and it is a complicated 
situation there as well. But we could also look to mobilize 
more contributions by the U.S. private sector and work in 
partnership with other organizations like the DFC to provide 
employment opportunities on the ground for Venezuelan refugees 
and host communities in the region.
    Mr. Vargas. I guess I am also very concerned about the food 
insecurity, in particular. I mean, I have great respect for the 
United Nations Food Program. As you know, they just won the 
Nobel Peace Prize for all the work that they are doing. But at 
the same time, they alerted us to all the millions of people in 
this world who may starve this year because of COVID and other 
issues.
    How can we work with the U.N. better knowing that what the 
Maduro regime has been doing to manipulate the food 
distribution because they want to do it? What can we do? I am 
very concerned about that.
    Dr. Arnson.
    Dr. Arnson. Yes, well you know, you have hit the nail on 
the head. I mean the greatest source of--the greatest obstacle 
to greater food assistance by the international community is 
precisely Nicolas Maduro and the rest of the Venezuelan 
Government.
    The United Nations has dramatically expanded its footprint 
in Venezuela over the last 2 years. There are a variety of U.N. 
agencies that are on the ground, the Office of Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA, the--UNICEF and others. This does 
not include at this time the World Food Program.
    And I would note that, you know, there have been numerous 
efforts to take the issue of Venezuela to the U.N. Security 
Council. Most of those have served to just reproduce the 
polarization between the United States on the one hand and 
Russia and China on the other. But in bringing the humanitarian 
issue to the Security Council that did provide an opening--and 
there was agreement on providing this greater opening for U.N. 
agencies to have a presence.
    So the bottom line is, you know, how do you force people to 
do something that they do not want to do? It is very difficult. 
And so the question is can you offer them something which is 
not violating of your, you know, basic principles? Can you 
offer them anything in exchange?
    Mr. Vargas. If I can just interrupt the last few seconds 
that I have. What about the intelligence failure? Why have we 
gotten it so wrong?
    Dr. Arnson. Is that a question for me?
    Mr. Vargas. Yes.
    Dr. Arnson. Theories of political change are multiple. And 
there was the sense that by tightening the screws enough, you 
can create fractures in the regime, you can cause the military 
to divide. There were all kinds of ways in which, you know--
there was the assumption that the Maduro regime would implode 
or cry uncle and agree to the kinds of things that the United 
States and others wanted, including, you know, the Venezuelan 
opposition and the majority of the Venezuelan people. And that 
theory of change has proved false.
    And so I think it is to the credit of the Biden 
Administration that they are now looking at alternatives and 
looking to see what, if any, kind of, you know, negotiations 
that involve the opposition, that involve this big tent, civil 
society, you know, organizations, academia, unions, et cetera, 
can collectively pressure for some real change.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman.
    Congressman Gonzalez, are you on the line.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Yes, sir. Thank you.
    Mr. Sires. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Sorry, I had some technical difficulties 
there for a second. But my question is, there is--you know, 
American companies have seen their investment severely affected 
by the crisis in Venezuela. And while Venezuela's oil 
capabilities have severely decreased, some energy companies 
have played a crucial role in preventing the total collapse.
    How can Congress work with the private sector to protect 
American investment in Venezuela? And how can the private 
sector assist us? I chair the Oil and Gas Caucus for the 
Democratic Party. And I have a pretty good relationship with 
some of the energy companies that are down there. And they seem 
to have--talk about intelligence failures, they seem to have a 
lot of intelligence, and they seem to know a lot about what is 
going on. How could we better work together, or are we--and it 
just has not been working out--to both protect our energy 
investments in Venezuela? And how can they assist us in 
structuring policy?
    Dr. Berg. Congressman, if I can jump in on this one. It is 
a great question. So we have seen a lot of American companies 
and American investment in Venezuela affected by the Maduro 
regime, and its operations. I think--you and I are both 
observing energy companies, for example, trying to operate 
under extremely difficult conditions, under conditions where 
they do not have proper partnership from PDVSA with which they 
have to partner as a condition of being able to operate in the 
country.
    But there have been unique approaches by some American oil 
and gas companies to operate, basically, with the attempt of 
putting proceeds from those operations in say an escrow account 
or some way of sort of syphoning it off or kind of bracketing 
it off to the side and ensuring that a lot of the proceeds from 
that activity does not actually flow to the Maduro regime and 
the funding of that repressive security apparatus.
    And so there are creative ways in which we can think about 
keeping American investment there and keeping a footprint on 
the ground, as Mr. Fonseca said in his opening statement, while 
also ensuring that that money is not actually fuelling and 
funding the repressive apparatus there.
    Mr. Fonseca. Congressman, can I make one brief addition. 
Again, I could not agree more with Dr. Berg. And I do think we 
need to create space for the American private sector to out-
compete Russia, China, and others and gain some access back on 
the ground. I cannot underscore how important, I think, to 
unleash the American private sector, and how that can provide 
consequential long-term influence in aid in ushering democratic 
transition at some point.
    The U.S. could consider the issuance of specific licenses 
to American companies engaged in sort of an oil for food 
medicine, rather than, you know, their removal of sectoral 
sanctions in the near term. I think this would give the 
American private sector some access on the ground, as well as 
possibly help alleviate some of the humanitarian pressures.
    One of the things I am most concerned about is the 
September 2020 Anti-Blockade Law that was passed. I think 
Venezuela in the near-term is going to be going, Maduro is 
going to be going through the process of privatizing major 
Venezuelan assets. And I think our adversaries are going to 
move in and try to consume those assets. And it might be very 
difficult to get them back at some point in the future, even if 
the hand or the pendulum swings back to the opposition.
    Mr. Gonzalez. That is just a huge concern.
    Dr. Arnson. Could I just add to that? I mean, I think what 
Brian Fonseca said nature earlier, of course, that nature 
abhors a vacuum is really true. And if U.S. companies, 
particularly, in the oil sector, and mostly in the oil sector 
are prohibited from producing, even if those assets go into an 
escrow fund or some other mechanism that is verifiable that 
does not benefit the regime, they are going to be taken over.
    And, you know, I think one of Maduro's survival strategies 
is going to be, over this next year, precisely to privatize 
PDVSA assets and other government assets and look for 
international companies to step in and run them. And we know 
exactly who those--who will be eager to acquire a greater share 
of the economic price of the country.
    Dr. Berg. Congressman, if I can just jump in here really 
quickly and piggyback on what Dr. Arnson said.
    One thing that I think the regime is looking at here is 
that during this--the political and economic crisis in the 
country, there are sort of three types of crudes within 
Venezuela: Light, medium, and heavy. The heavy crude is largely 
produced in conjunction with the private sector and with 
international companies. And that has been, if you look at the 
oil output in the country, some of the least affected as 
compared to medium and light crudes, which have been some of 
the most affected. And that is entirely basically produced by 
PDVSA the State owned oil company.
    So I think the regime is looking at this very clearly and 
saying, as Dr. Arnson mentioned and Mr. Fonseca, privatization 
might be the way to go here in terms of being able to increase 
productivity, because PDVSA is essentially beyond repair in 
terms of its ability to actually maintain the rigs and 
contribute to an uptick in oil production in the country.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you so much. I yield back.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    We now recognize Congressman Steube from Florida for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And first I want to thank 
you for allowing members who are not on the subcommittee to ask 
questions. I appreciate that greatly, as these issues affect 
state of Florida that I represent in my district.
    My questions are directed to Mr. Berg. President Trump 
signed an order on his last full day in office which defers 
deportation of some 145,000 Venezuelans for 18 months. 
Venezuelans who are eligible for deferral can continue to live 
and work in the United States. Some of those included under the 
TPS program. President Trump blamed the Venezuelan socialist 
government and President Maduro for quote, ``The worst 
humanitarian crisis in the Western hemisphere in recent 
memory,'' Secretary of State Blinken even called Maduro a 
brutal dictator.
    The shortage and basic goods in medicine has forced these 
Venezuelans to flee the country. As a member of the Florida 
delegation, I know there is a significant number of Venezuelans 
in my State. What do you think the Biden Administration's plan 
should be regarding President Trump's order that he signed on 
those last days in office?
    Dr. Berg. Thank you for the question, Congressman, as I 
understand it, the deferred enforced departure was signed on 
the last day, but the details were left to the Biden 
Administration. And so from that standpoint, I would certainly 
encourage the Biden Administration to--not only to implement 
but to work out the exact details of the stay, the duration, 
the documentation, as well as the work permits. Because it is 
not in the United States' interest to send back Venezuelans to, 
as we have heard today at this hearing, to humanitarian 
disaster and a brutal dictatorship.
    I would also note that there is a real economic opportunity 
here with the number of Venezuelan migrants we have in the 
country. Numerous reports of late have shown just how educated, 
how entrepreneurial, and how dynamic this diaspora is. And so I 
think from an economic standpoint, particularly, from your 
state's standpoint where there are quite a few Venezuelan 
refugees, it could be a huge economic boom if done the right 
way.
    Mr. Steube. Well, Maduro has strengthened ties with--and it 
has been discussed already in this committee hearing--with 
Russia, China, Cuba, and Iran for political, economic, and 
military purposes. These malign, external actors prop up the 
regime and perpetuate the ongoing humanitarian crisis despite 
U.S. sanctions. What steps can the international community take 
that complement or support U.S. efforts to counter-support from 
these external actors to the regime?
    Mr. Fonseca. Congressman, I can take a shot at that, if 
that is okay. I think that is absolutely right. I think one of 
the things the United States, you know, needs to continue to 
place pressure and leverage our allies, multilateral 
organizations to continue to pressure, specifically, China, 
Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Cuba for the activities they are 
doing on the ground to, you know, keep the regime sort of 
muddling through, as well as, you know, not sort of 
contributing positively to alleviating the humanitarian crisis. 
I think we definitely need to do that.
    And to sort of build off of a comment, you know, that we 
made earlier, collectively, not having a presence on the ground 
allows our, you know, our adversaries, our rivals, you know, to 
certainly, you know, run, you know, run fairly rampant 
throughout the country. And so I think we need some presence 
back on the ground, not just sort of intel collection, but also 
to occupy influence space.
    Mr. Steube. What steps can the U.S. take to counter efforts 
from State actors, like Iran and Russia, to support the regime 
in evading U.S. sanctions, Mr. Berg?
    Dr. Berg. Great question, Congressman. I think one of the 
things that we have seen here is the regime's head-long plunge 
into the illicit economy, specifically, as the sources of legal 
activity in the country have dried up.
    And so I have outlined a number of recommendations, both in 
my oral testimony, my written, as well as in other places about 
certification regimes, for example, that we could--we could 
seek when it comes to parts of the illicit economy such as gold 
mining, which are very easily sort of brought into the legal 
economy through a number of maneuvers in countries like 
Colombia and in Brazil.
    And so those certification processes will be key. And a lot 
of it is just about pressure, as has been mentioned many times 
here, is that we have quite a bit of leverage, and we would be 
wise to use it for the right purposes here rather than 
squandering it.
    Mr. Steube. The Chinese Communist Party has helped the 
Madura regime evade U.S. sanctions and is one of regime's main 
financial backers and has more recently delayed Maduro's debt 
repayment in exchange for some shipments of oil.
    What does the Chinese Communist Party gain from involvement 
in Venezuela, and how does it reflect the nature of the Chinese 
Communist Party's influence in other parts of the region?
    Dr. Berg. Congressman, I think that China's role in, in 
Venezuela, as Dr. Arnson mentioned earlier, it started as a 
transactional economic relationship. It has now evolved into 
more of a geopolitical and possibly even strategic partnership. 
And so I know that there has been mention of the fact that 
there are no new loans that have been given to the country 
since 2017. But the fact is of the more than $60 billion in 
loans that were given since 2007, there is still a reasonable 
amount of that money that is outstanding.
    And so as long as China is bearing the burden--as long as 
Venezuelan debt remains in arrears, China in some sense is 
carrying the burden of this country's collapse. But 
nevertheless, I think for China, Venezuela at a standstill and 
therefore as a major liability and potential strategic threat 
for the region is actually to China's advantage in this broader 
geopolitical rivalry than a Venezuela working toward a 
democratic transition, possibly giving the United States an 
increased position or boost in their region.
    Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    We now recognize Congresswoman Omar from Minnesota for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for allowing me to 
come and be part of your committee. My colleague, Ms. Salazar 
from Florida asked her questions to everyone except the 
panelist who lives in Venezuela.
    So, Mr. Reyna, I would like to give you a chance to address 
her question.
    Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Omar. Perhaps 
not in just one issue, I have to say that aid has been coming 
in, not of course in the numbers that is needed. But just in 
our case as a small organization on the ground, in 3 years, we 
have brought in over 180 tons of aid and have distributed, just 
last year, 86 tons of aid in terms of medicines, medical 
supplies, and so on.
    My position here and my recommendation has been to engage 
in spite of all the reservations with some key actors within 
the Maduro government, as well as to continue working, for 
example, with the National Assembly of 2015 commission on 
humanitarian aid to increase the number of aid, I mean, the 
amount of aid coming into the country.
    I think that if one looks at the humanitarian situation and 
humanitarian impact on the lives of everyday Venezuelans, this 
is a must. And so I thank you for this, but I do believe that 
it is possible. We have been able to do this in spite of 
challenges, risks, and threats, and even having some of our 
personnel and colleagues going through, you know, difficult, 
risky situations, but we are still here, and we believe that 
this is possible. And once again, that engagement to me 
requires flexibility and creativity, but it is a must if we 
want to help the Venezuelan people.
    Ms. Omar. I am really grateful for the opportunity to hear 
directly from you. It has not been lost on me sitting here, 
hearing my colleagues engage on Venezuela and not having a 
single question addressed to you. So thank you so much.
    I am hoping that you can expand on a couple of points from 
your testimony. As you outlined the situation in Venezuela is 
dire, people are going without food and medicine. And, 
obviously, to many of us, you know, we believe that we cannot 
allow people to continue to suffer because of our own domestic 
policies.
    Can you tell us how your work has been impacted by the 
canceling of licenses for oil-for-diesel swaps, and what other 
sanctions are proving to be significant barriers to the 
humanitarian response?
    Mr. Reyna. Thank you. That is--there is one issue in 
particular that I think that is--that can be solved, I think, 
quickly, also, as a show of good faith between both the U.S. 
administration, the Biden Administration, and hopefully having 
bipartisan support, and the Maduro government. And this is 
lifting the sanctions on secondary--in the secondary sanctions 
on the swaps of oil for diesel. And this has quite an impact 
again on the population.
    The committee, the human rights committee in one of the 
States of Venezuela working with the anticorruption network 
stated very recently, this was just last month in February, 
Venezuela began 2021 with a severe shortage of diesel, the fuel 
used to transport heavy cargo, food stalls for public 
transportation, and turbo electric plants. Essential groups 
report diesel distribution failures since the end of 2020. For 
the agricultural sector, this has brought paralysis on the 
field. And they go on with other issues regarding that--this in 
particular.
    I think it would be quite an important step to lift the 
sanctions on the oil for diesel swaps and open a conversation, 
also in having the World Food Program coming into Venezuela 
with their capacity.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Omar. All right. And, then, just my last question to 
you--again grateful for the opportunity to ask these questions. 
How is the political stalemate between Maduro and Guaido 
impacting your ability to do your work and just the lives of 
Venezuelans since you are the only Venezuelan on this panel?
    Mr. Reyna. Thank you. I think that given the principles of 
humanitarian action, you know, we have worked in our own space, 
let's say, even though we have had, of course, conversations, 
for example, again with the Commission of Humanitarian Aid of 
the 2015 National Assembly, which is really important. I mean, 
if the aim is to help, it is to support the Venezuelan people 
suffering the consequences of the humanitarian emergency, that 
should be the consideration.
    So we have not been involved in the political conflict. It 
has to be solved. It needs to be addressed, definitely. But, 
certainly, we can find ways to have sort of a two-track kind of 
work. And the one that goes toward supporting the Venezuelan 
people suffering severely the consequences of the emergency can 
be worked out again, and we have shown that, a civil society 
organization is on the ground.
    Ms. Omar. Thank you. And, Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    Now, we will recognize Congresswoman Malliotakis. You are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 
you for allowing me to participate in today's subcommittee 
meeting. And I have really have found the exchange to be 
enlightening and a good discussion.
    You know, for me, it is heartbreaking to see how the 
wealthiest country in South America has been destroyed by 
corruption and socialism. People--and let's make it clear that 
the people of Venezuela suffer because of their own government, 
not for any other reason. And as a Cuban, the daughter of a 
Cuban refugee, it is all too familiar to me, because it is very 
similar to what happened in my family. But we have an 
obligation as the leader of the free world to help the 
Venezuelan people.
    And I look forward to working with the people on this 
committee to achieve that.
    I was pleased when the Biden Administration recognized Juan 
Guaido as the leader of the Nation. And--but I am--I am I guess 
a little upset about his announcement to reenter the United 
Nations Human Rights Council without having any type of 
concessions. And, as you know, last week at the first day of 
the session of the U.N. Human Rights Council, it was Nicolas 
Maduro who was given a platform to speak.
    One of the--one of the biggest violators of human rights 
was given a platform to speak at the United Nations Human 
Rights Council. And I think we have an obligation to speak out 
against that.
    And I would like to know from the panel their thoughts on 
how we can utilize the leverage of President Biden wanting to 
return to the council, and how we should be using that as 
leverage to try to get some accountability and to protect the 
human rights of not only the people of Venezuela, but of the 
nations that have propped up Venezuela, like Cuba, like Iran, 
like China, like Russia? That is my first question.
    And the second question is, in terms of it is good to have 
verbal support for Guaido, but what actions, specifically, do 
you think we should be taking as a nation to support him? Thank 
you.
    Dr. Berg. If I can jump in on the U.N. Human Rights Council 
question, that would be great. Congresswoman, that is a great 
question. And this exactly--this shows exactly the linkages 
that I mentioned in my opening statement. It was precisely the 
support of other authoritarian regimes, also, on the human 
rights council, like China, like Russia to be able to help 
Venezuela win from the South America region when there were 
really no other sort of competitors for those, for those seats 
on the human rights council.
    It was a total disgrace that Nicolas Maduro and his envoy 
in Geneva are giving the world lessons on human rights 
protections. So I absolutely share, your--your concern. And as 
a matter of fact AEI has done a report on reforming the U.N. 
Human Rights Council, which includes a number of things, 
actionable things that should happen before the U.S. sits in 
that body again. So periodic reviews of members that are on the 
council. So a kind of policing of one another to make sure that 
the body does not become a rogues' gallery of suspect States.
    More competitive elections. In many cases, we have 
elections where there are real only a few countries on the 
slate for--to represent their region. And so you have countries 
like Venezuela able to slip through because it has the support 
of greater powers, but also it just does not face that much 
competition. We have to increase the level of interest here, I 
think, in terms of the desire to sit on this body, and part of 
that is going to be shoring up its reputation.
    And, last, I would mention that there should be some sort 
of review, I think, before you are even eligible to put 
yourself forward for membership in this body that you sort of--
you comply with basic human rights standards. Because as we 
have seen, quite a few candidates in U.N. Human Rights Council 
elections have been extremely suspect. And so those are three 
sort of tangible things that I would throw out there right 
away.
    But I absolutely share your concern that Maduro and his 
envoys were given time in Geneva to present last week.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Please send me a copy of your report. I 
would like to read that. Thank you.
    Mr. Sires. I recognize now Debbie Wasserman Schultz. A 
tireless defender of Venezuela, and of human rights of 
Venezuela, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you for your indulgence in allowing me to moonlight as member 
of your subcommittee on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
    Some of you may know that I represent the largest 
concentration of Venezuelans in the United States. My home town 
has so many Venezuelans that its nickname is West Venezuela, 
and proudly so. In my own neighborhood we are surrounded and 
are mixed with friends and neighbors who have family in 
Venezuela who have themselves fled from Venezuela. I have heard 
harrowing experiences shared with me repeatedly, a fight from 
political persecution, businesses confiscated, denial of basic 
food, or lifesaving medicines. And so making sure that we shine 
a spotlight on this plight is really critical.
    I want to ask Ms. Arnson and Mr. Reyna if they can talk 
briefly about the relief that declaring temporary protective 
status for Venezuela would provide the Venezuelans and the 
United States who fear deportation. And, specifically, if you 
could address why TPS, which is a legal protection that is 
based in statute offers better protection than DED, which was 
haphazardly declared in the last 16 hours of the previous 
President's term.
    And making sure, you know, from my perspective, I have been 
pleased to see as I--that President Biden has clearly indicated 
his plans to declare TPS for Venezuelans. And if you could 
share with us your perspective on the difference and why TPS 
would be preferable.
    Dr. Arnson. And I do not know if Feliciano wants to go 
first. Congresswoman Wasserman Schultz, I am not an expert on 
U.S. immigration law, but I think that, you know, what you have 
indicated in your question is true. That temporary protected 
status gives much greater certainty to Venezuelans that they 
will not be deported, but they will have not just a temporary 
stay of deportation, but also a number of rights to work in the 
United States and to have a life until such time as they may 
choose to return to Venezuela when the country is in a 
dramatically different circumstance.
    The deferred deportation is exactly that. It says we will 
not deport you. But there are many other things that go with 
being able to survive and live a productive life in the United 
States. And I think that Congress has on numerous occasions, in 
a bipartisan way, endorsed TPS for Venezuelans. And I would 
certainly support that and hope that the Biden Administration 
will follow through on its commitment which it made repeatedly 
during the campaign.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you. Mr. Reyna.
    Mr. Reyna. Yes, thank you very, Congresswoman. I agree with 
Cindy that any status that would grant more rights to people in 
the United States who have migrated forcefully from Venezuela 
and who if coming back would really face, you know, 
difficulties, it is--it is the right way to go.
    So again, without having the total knowledge of the 
migration situation in the U.S., I understand from what I have 
read, from what I heard from colleagues that TPS would be the 
proper way to go. Thank you.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you.
    And Mr. Reyna, I know earlier you spoke about the need for 
the donor community to step up globally. I am a member of the 
Appropriations Committee, and you know, as I said just 
moonlighting on the Foreign Affairs Committee today, but I 
curious about what more the United States should be doing. 
Particularly, where should we be focusing our efforts, our 
funding efforts within Venezuela, as well as neighboring 
countries like Colombia who has taken in, you know, significant 
refugees and migrant populations and also maybe throw in what 
about the rest of the international donor community?
    Mr. Reyna. Thank you. I believe that, again, in seeing the 
numbers and the extent of the situation here that there is room 
for much more. There are reservations because of the political 
situation and manipulation, for example, of humanitarian aid. 
But this is a risk I think that has to be taken, unfortunately, 
because such is the situation in Venezuela, and that does not 
mean that one cannot overcome, for example, a narrative or 
propaganda, or something like that. It can be done.
    And at the end, the end result is really supporting a 
popular
    [inaudible]. I think that there are others who should be 
coming in. Again, perhaps in a multilateral kind of reflection 
on the obstacles in Venezuela, why, and how to overcome. It 
would be possible to increase the amount of resources that are 
coming in. Working through the U.N. system is one way, is an 
important way both inside and outside of Venezuela, but also 
directly to civil society as has been happening so far, but 
perhaps this can be increased.
    And so are different ways in which I am quite sure that 
international cooperation can be increased in the case of 
Venezuela. Again, looking at the numbers with other countries 
in need, it really does not make any sense to see why is it 
that Venezuela is not receiving all the funding that it should 
receive for humanitarian aid.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman. We have votes at 
12:15, so we are going to go for another 10 minutes. The 
ranking member and I will have one more question.
    My question is to you, Mr. Reyna. Mr. Reyna, the reason you 
are a guest of our committee is because we recognize the work 
that you do inside of Venezuela. We recognize the risk that you 
take all the time.
    So as a recognition of your work and your effort, we want 
to make sure that we receive your thoughts here today at this 
committee. I happen to have visited Cucuta, Mr. Reyna, a couple 
of years ago. I have never seen anything like it. People from 
Venezuela work hours and hours just to get a meal. There had to 
be a line of about 5,000 people. There was a line for the 
bathroom for about 500,000 people alone. And there is a priest 
that through volunteers provides the meal for these people. I 
think that priest should be canonized because of the way he has 
organized and helped those people in that area.
    I was just wondering if your organization is involved at 
all in trying to help this particular part of Colombia or 
Venezuela at all? Are you involved, your organization, or any 
of your members involved?
    Mr. Reyna. Thank you, Chairman Sires. At Accion Solidaria, 
we are not working on the border, but we are part of the 
community of humanitarian organizations on the ground.
    What you are describing really is for us--this is sort of a 
daily happening, and it is something that, that takes you know, 
our time fully in terms of--I mean, even today, we are having 
about 80 people at our doors receiving medicines donated, and 
this goes to about 1,400 to 1,500 per month. But we do have a 
large network.
    Some of the organizations on the border towns are working 
with the UNHCR and others in order to provide support for the 
displaced, internally displaced, and then also working with 
others outside of Venezuela to provide support for refugees and 
migrants on the other side of the border. So----
    And, again, I think, I really appreciate that you took the 
time to go to Cucuta to speak to the people and to see what 
they are going through. And, hopefully, also perhaps this 
would--you know, as I was saying, will lead to an increase in 
support, not only for what the response is here in Venezuela, 
but also in the region. We do need that.
    And the organizations that are working outside in this 
platform called response for Venezuelans would really 
appreciate such support.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Reyna.
    I now recognize the ranking member.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have heard throughout 
our discussion today something that made me think of a quote 
that I used to use when I run my healthcare company. I used to 
tell my physician leaders that, ``No one cares how much you 
know, until they know how much you care.''
    And I want to make sure that both the people of Venezuela 
who can hear my voice today, the international community and 
all of our witnesses, and we want to help. We want to help. We 
want to help the people of Venezuela who are suffering one the 
greatest humanitarian crises ever and, certainly, the greatest 
economic collapse ever.
    But my concern is that if that assistance is funneled to 
and through the regime, it only empowers the regime's 
leadership. One example is Maduro's henchmen destroyed, 
literally destroyed resupply convoys of humanitarian aid coming 
in from Colombia.
    So my last and final question is how effective would 
relaxing sanctions be if Maduro is just going to seize, 
destroy, or misuse that aid?
    Ms. Arnson. If I could address that, Congressman Green.
    I mean, again, just to repeat, the Maduro regime is the 
principle obstacle to greater delivery.
    But as Feliciano Reyna was pointing out, there is, I think, 
a lot of experience in Venezuelan civil society, in the 
international community, in delivering aid in an apolitical 
fashion. And that has to be a fundamental principle.
    And to go to what a number of questions have touched on, I 
think that the scale, the resources for the humanitarian 
response, both inside Venezuela and outside Venezuela, for the 
refugees and migrants, has to be dramatically increased.
    And there are multiple international relief organizations, 
U.S. relief organizations, church organizations, USAID, State 
Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migrants, that 
are involved in this every single day, and they just do not 
have enough. There is just not enough funding to go around.
    So I would encourage people, as they look to what are the 
next steps to help Venezuela, to dramatically increase the 
amount of resources available.
    Mr. Green. Yes. And I was, in my preparations for today's 
committee hearing, surprised to see the delta between the aid 
to Syrian refugees and the aid to the Venezuelan refugees. And 
I agree with you, that disparity, I mean, we have got to 
recruit international partners to it, to this cause.
    But, again, my great concern is, whether it is an NGO or 
governmental assistance, it is got to get past Maduro to get to 
the people who need it.
    And I appreciate your thoughts and your comments.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    And thank you again to our witnesses and the members for 
their participation in this important hearing today.
    The crisis in Venezuela deserves our urgent attention. I 
will continue to work closely with my colleagues and the Biden 
Administration on a bipartisan basis to pursue the peaceful 
return to democracy in Venezuela.
    With that, the committee is adjourned. Thank you to our 
witnesses. Thank you very much.
    [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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