    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                          A WAY FORWARD FOR VENEZUELA:
              THE HUMANITARIAN, DIPLOMATIC, AND NATIONAL SECURITY
                   CHALLENGES FACING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                     WESTERN HEMISPHERE, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
                  MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 March 3, 2021

                                   __________

                                Serial No. 117-5

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                  __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    43-577PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                       GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman

     BRAD SHERMAN, California              MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
     ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey                  Member
     GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	      CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
     THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	      STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
     KAREN BASS, California		      SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
     WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	      DARRELL ISSA, California
     DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	      ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
     AMI BERA, California		      LEE ZELDIN, New York
     JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas	              ANN WAGNER, Missouri
     DINA TITUS, Nevada		      BRIAN MAST, Florida
     TED LIEU, California		      BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
     SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	      KEN BUCK, Colorado
     DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota	      TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
     ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		      MARK GREEN, Tennessee
     COLIN ALLRED, Texas		      ANDY BARR, Kentucky
     ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		      GREG STEUBE, Florida
     ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	      DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
     CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	      AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
     TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	      PETER MEIJER, Michigan
     ANDY KIM, New Jersey	              NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
     SARA JACOBS, California		      RONNY JACKSON, Texas
     KATHY MANNING, North Carolina	      YOUNG KIM, California
     JIM COSTA, California		      MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
     JUAN VARGAS, California		      JOE WILSON, South Carolina
     VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas		      RON WRIGHT, Texas
    BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois

                        Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
                   Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director

                                    ------

     Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and
                         International Economic Policy

                       ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey, Chairman

    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                MARK GREEN, Tennessee, Ranking
    ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                     Member
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas		     AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
    JUAN VARGAS, California		     MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Reyna, Mr. Feliciano Founder and Executive President, Accion
      Solidaria......................................................     8
    Arnson, Dr. Cynthia J., Director, the Wilson Center Latin America
      Program........................................................    18
    Fonseca, Mr. Brian, Director, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public
      Policy, Florida International University.......................    26
    Berg, Dr. Ryan C., Research Fellow, Latin America Studies,
      American Enterprise Institute..................................    35

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    66
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    67
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    68

                     OPENING STATEMENT FROM CHAIRMAN SIRES

    Opening statement from Chairman Sires............................    69

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    72

    A WAY FORWARD FOR VENEZUELA: THE HUMANITARIAN, DIPLOMATIC, AND NATIONAL
              SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

                            Wednesday, March 3, 2021

                              House of Representatives,
                Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
       Civilian Security, Migration, and International
                                       Economic Policy,
                          Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Albio Sires
    (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Sires. Good morning, everyone. Thank you to our
    witnesses for being here today.
        This hearing entitled, ``A Way Forward For Venezuela: The
    Humanitarian, Diplomatic, and National Security Challenges
    Facing the Biden Administration,'' will come to order.
        Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
    recess of the committee at any point and all members will have
    5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions
    for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.
    To insert something into the record, please have your staff
    email the previously mentioned address.
        As a reminder to members, staff, and all others physically
    present in this room, per recent guidance from the Office of
    the Attending Physician, masks must be worn at all times during
    today's hearing. Please also sanitize your sitting area.
        The chair used these measures as a safety issue and,
    therefore, an important matter of order and decorum for this
    proceeding.
        As a reminder to members joining remotely, please keep your
    video function on at all times, even when you are not
    recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and
    unmuting themselves. And please remember to mute yourself after
    you finish speaking.
        Consistent with H. Res. 8 and other accompanying
    regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses as
    appropriate, when they are not under recognition, to eliminate
    background noises.
        I see that we have a quorum, and will now recognize myself.
        This is our first subcommittee hearing of the 117th
    Congress, so I want to welcome all of our new and returning
    members. I look forward to working with each of you, Democrats
    and Republicans, to advance United States interests and deepen
    our engagement with the Western Hemisphere.
        I want to recognize my friend, Juan Vargas, who will be our
    new vice chair. And I would like to welcome our new ranking
    member, Mark Green. Congressman Green and I met for the first
    time last week, and I am optimistic that we will be able to
    work effectively together on a bipartisan basis.
        I called today's hearing because I want to begin this
    Congress where we began last year, by shining a spotlight on
    the crisis in Venezuela. Two years ago, I chaired a hearing
    entitled, ``Made by Maduro,'' where we discussed the
    humanitarian crisis caused by Venezuela's dictator, Nicolas
    Maduro.
        Unfortunately, while international attention seems to be
    shifting away from Venezuela, the crisis in the country has
    only deepened over the last 3 years. A report issued by the
    United Nations last September confirmed that Maduro's regime
    has committed crimes against humanity. Over 90 percent of
    Venezuelans are living in poverty, suffering under conditions
    made worse by the pandemic. Over five and a half million
    Venezuelans have been forced to flee their homes.
        In April 2019, I led a congressional delegation to the
    Colombia border with Venezuela. I met mothers who had walked
    hours in the hot sun just to get a meal for their children. I
    heard stories about family members with chronic diseases who
    could not obtain the medication they needed in Venezuela and
    were struggling to survive. I saw firsthand the suffering this
    regime has caused.
        For me, the Venezuela crisis has never been about politics.
    The question I have always asked is, what can we, the U.S.
    Congress, do to help end the humanitarian tragedy?
        We have a moral obligation not to turn away from what is
    happening in Venezuela. I am proud that the U.S. Agency for
    International Development has led the way in providing
    humanitarian assistance to the region.
        I salute all those courageous Venezuelans and international
    aid workers who are working in the country to deliver food and
    medicine.
        I want to recognize the efforts of the interim President,
    Juan Guaido, and his government. They are prioritizing the
    needs of the Venezuelan people by pursuing an agreement for
    vaccine deployment and by calling for the World Food Programme
    to be allowed to operate in the country.
        I also want to applaud the Colombian Government, in
    particular President Ivan Duque, for his recent decision to
    grant temporary protective status to Venezuelans. In the face
    of one of the largest refugee crises in modern history,
    Colombia has shown tremendous generosity in providing safe
    haven for Venezuelans.
        I urge other countries to follow Colombia's example and put
    an end to harmful policies like deporting Venezuelans back into
    harm's way.
        I also urge Congress to urgently pass legislation to grant
    temporary protective status to Venezuelans fleeing the crisis.
    House Democrats did this in 2019, and I sincerely hope that all
    of my colleagues would join that effort this year to finally
    provide the relief that Venezuelans deserve.
        Ultimately, know that an end to the humanitarian crisis
    requires a political solution. Ranking Member Green and I will
    introduce a resolution in the coming days expressing our
    bipartisan commitment to supporting democratic aspirations of
    the Venezuelan people. We must pursue a solution to the crisis
    with the urgency it deserves.
        I believe the U.S. must work more closely with our allies
    in Latin America and in Europe to advance a coordinated
    diplomatic strategy. We should also be much more assertive in
    calling out the regimes that are helping to keep Maduro in
    power, including Turkey, China, and Iran, and especially Cuba
    and Russia.
        I am confident that President Biden, who has demonstrated a
    lifelong commitment to Latin America, will bring the
    international community together behind the goal of pursuing a
    peaceful transition that swiftly leads to free and fair
    elections.
        I look forward to hearing from the experts with us today
    about what the U.S. Congress and the new administration can do,
    in close coordination with our allies, to help the Venezuelan
    people in reclaiming their democracy.
        Thank you.
        And I now turn to the ranking member for his opening
    statement.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman Sires, for holding this
    hearing on the ongoing crisis in Venezuela. It is an honor to
    serve as the new ranking member of this subcommittee, and I
    look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman, on the
    various issues.
        And I do believe that when we met the other day, we
    realized you and I have a lot more overlap in the way we think
    than the traditional right/left side of the aisle. So I think
    we are going to have a great time standing up for the people in
    this hemisphere.
        Today, we are discussing the political and humanitarian
    crisis caused by the illegitimate Maduro regime that has left a
    once prosperous country in political and economic shambles. The
    regime's socialist policies and endemic corruption have
    resulted in years of economic free fall, hyperinflation, and
    shortages in basic goods. Venezuela has a poverty rate of 96
    percent that has driven almost 6 million of its citizens to
    seek a better life in other regions.
        This migration crisis has strained the resources of
    neighboring countries in the region, including Colombia, our
    closest regional partner impacted by the Venezuelan crisis.
        In addition to the economic crisis, the Maduro regime is
    among the world's worst violators of human rights, including
    recent accusations of crimes against humanity by the U.N.'s
    fact-finding mission.
        According to local human rights group Foro Penal, there are
    currently close to 330 political prisoners in Venezuela, not
    including the illegal detention of six American Citgo
    executives held on false charges and without due process.
        But the regime cannot carry out these atrocities alone. It
    has been bolstered by some of the world's most brutal regimes.
    The Communist regime in Cuba has successfully exported its
    oppressive system to Venezuela and directly supports the Maduro
    regime's oppressive tactics and human rights abuses.
        Further, the Chinese Communist Party has provided billions
    in loans to the regime and was recently found to be sharing
    technology used to surveil political opposition figures.
        The Maduro regime has also strengthened ties with Russia,
    which has provided military equipment, and Iran, which has
    joined Russia in helping the Maduro regime avoid U.S. oil
    sanctions.
        The regime has also built ties with the region's non-state
    criminal actors, including FARC and ELN, U.S.-designated
    criminal groups who are allowed free rein in Venezuela to carry
    out narcotrafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit
    activities.
        I applaud the Trump administration for leading
    international recognition of the interim President, Juan
    Guaido, and for holding the Maduro regime accountable by
    imposing tough and necessary sanctions on Venezuela's State oil
    company and individuals accused of corruption and human rights
    abuses.
        Some claim that U.S. sanctions are to blame for the
    country's economic crisis. But I want to be very clear today:
    The Maduro regime alone is responsible for the crisis and for
    blocking humanitarian assistance from entering Venezuela. I
    applaud the European Union for recent sanctioning 19 Maduro
    regime officials, and I strongly condemn the Maduro regime's
    expulsion of their Ambassador in retaliation.
        The United States has also led humanitarian efforts by
    donating more than $1.2 billion in assistance to Venezuela and
    its neighbors in the region to address this humanitarian
    crisis. And while the United States is proud to lead, I urge
    the rest of the international community to join us in this
    effort.
        I also applaud the brave efforts of the interim government
    and the democratic opposition, which has withstood violent
    oppression and has been illegally removed from the rightful
    post in the National Assembly through the Maduro regime's
    illegitimate elections. These brave men and women deserve our
    support as they seek freedom for the Venezuelan people.
        Additionally, I was pleased to hear that the Biden
    Administration will continue to recognize President Guaido as
    the legitimate leader of Venezuela. And while I believe there
    is a role for multilateralism in addressing the crisis, the
    United States must continue to lead these efforts.
        The Maduro regime's continued subversion of democratic
    institutions, human rights abuses, and criminal activities
    demonstrate their unwillingness to reform. I believe that
    dialog with this criminal regime cannot be possible without a
    clear demonstration that they are willing to negotiate in good
    faith.
        The U.S. Congress and this committee will play a critical
    role in overseeing U.S. policy in Venezuela and ensuring that
    we have a comprehensive strategy that will lead to a peaceful
    democratic transition for the Venezuelan people.
        The crisis in Venezuela does not only impact our neighbors
    in South America, it threatens United States national security,
    and we cannot afford to allow it to worsen.
        I look forward to the testimoneys of our witnesses today,
    and, Mr. Chairman, working with you.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you very much Ranking Member Green.
        I will now introduce Mr. Feliciano Reyna. He is the founder
    and executive president of Accion Solidaria, an organization
    that has worked since 1995 to combat the HIV-AIDS epidemic.
    Between 2005 and 2012, he also was president of Sinergia, the
    Venezuelan Association of Civil Society Organizations.
        Mr. Reyna has coordinated relief efforts in Venezuela
    through Accion Solidaria since 2016 to address the country's
    humanitarian crisis. He is also a board member of the
    International Center for Not-for-Profit Law.
        Mr. Reyna holds a bachelor's of architecture from Cornell
    University.
        Mr. Reyna, welcome. We welcome you to the hearing.
        We will then hear from Dr. Cynthia J. Arnson. She is the
    director of the Wilson Center'sLatin American Program. A
    leading expert on Latin America and the Caribbean, she has
    testified numerous times before the House and the Senate and
    has written many publications on the region, particularly on
    U.S. policy toward Latin America.
        She also served as a former foreign policy aide in
    Congress. Dr. Arnson holds a Ph.D. From Johns Hopkins
    University.
        Dr. Arnson, thank you for joining us today.
        Our third witness is Mr. Brian Fonseca. He is the director
    of the Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy at Florida
    International University and an adjunct professor of politics
    and international relations.
        Mr. Fonseca is an expert on U.S. national security and has
    written publications focused on Russian and Chinese engagement
    in Latin America and Russian-Venezuelan relations.
        He holds a degree in international business and
    international relations from Florida International University
    and attended Sichuan University in Chengdu, China, and the
    National Defense University in Washington.
        Mr. Fonseca, we welcome you to the hearing.
        Finally, we will hear from Dr. Ryan Berg. He is a research
    fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. His research
    focuses on Latin America and specifically U.S. foreign policy,
    national security and development issues, and the region's
    transnational organized crime and narcotrafficking.
        Previously, he served as a research consultant at the World
    Bank, a Fulbright scholar in Brazil, and a visiting doctoral
    fellow at the Graduate Institute of International and
    Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.
        Dr. Berg obtained a Ph.D. In political science from the
    University of Oxford.
        Dr. Berg, thank you for joining us today.
        I ask the witnesses to please limit your testimony to 5
    minutes, and, without objection, your prepared statements will
    be made part of the record.
        Mr. Reyna, you are recognized for your testimony.

        STATEMENT OF MR. FELICIANO REYNA, FOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE
                      PRESIDENT, ACCION SOLIDARIA

        Mr. Reyna. Good morning, Chairman Sires. Thank you and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee. As a Venezuelan
    implementing a humanitarian action program in Venezuela, I
    really appreciate your invitation to address this subcommittee
    today.
        Since late 2015, Venezuela's complex humanitarian emergency
    has caused deprivations of the people's rights to health, food,
    education, livelihoods, and access to basic services, such as
    water and electricity. Human insecurity has forced millions to
    flee, unable to cope with such daily struggles here at home.
        Understanding the nature and broad dimension of the
    humanitarian emergency and its effects in widespread loss of
    life and human suffering continues to be necessary to properly
    address it, finding the means to work through the barriers
    imposed by the political conflict which have been an obstacle
    to scaling up much needed humanitarian support.
        In this challenging environment, over 120 national and
    international NGO's have partnered with the U.N. system and
    many others are coordinating independently to implement
    humanitarian programs all over the country. Venezuelan NGO's
    not only were the very first responders in early 2016, but have
    continued building capacities to provide a progressively
    increasing humanitarian response.
        Despite fear of politicization of aid delivery among donor
    countries, the United States continues to be the largest funder
    of the humanitarian response, with over 40 percent for 2020.
    However, even though Venezuela has the world's fourth-largest
    food insecure population, it had the least-financed 2020
    humanitarian response plan among 34 countries in need.
        Despite having the world's second-largest migrant
    population, Venezuela's appeal for the regional migration
    response in 2020 was $1.4 billion while Syria's was $6 billion.
        Regardless of challenges, there are opportunities for the
    United States to scale up humanitarian support.
        One, promoting multilateral engagement among donor
    countries to address both the humanitarian emergency in
    Venezuela and the migrant response in the region.
        Two, increasing funding for local Venezuelan humanitarian
    and community-based organizations, allowing for longer-term
    funding, at least 2 years at a time, strengthening local
    capacities for future sustained development.
        Three, continuing to support initiatives, such as the
    agreement reached between the Humanitarian Aid Commission of
    the 2015 National Assembly and the Venezuelan Health
    Department, as well as the COVAX initiative and the
    Humanitarian Response Plan 2021.
        Four, engaging multilaterally and creatively with key
    actors within the Maduro government to open the humanitarian
    space, expand humanitarian action, and protect humanitarian
    workers and organizations serving people in need.
        Five, revising general and secondary sanctions which have
    an impact on the Venezuelan population already severely
    affected by the humanitarian emergency. Licenses for oil for
    diesel swaps, for example, should be extended again.
        Six, adopting the TPS for Venezuelans, joining the recent
    approval by the Colombian Government.
        These humane and rights-based initiatives could also become
    a framework for a coordinated regional response.
        Distinguished members of the subcommittee, humanitarian
    responses save lives and alleviate suffering, adhering to the
    ``do no harm'' principle. Finding a long-lasting, nonviolent,
    democratic solution to Venezuela's political conflict will take
    time. Without such a solution, the humanitarian emergency will
    continue to take its toll on the Venezuelan people, forcing
    many more to flee.
        However, we all have a moral obligation, as Chairman Sires
    said, to save lives today, to alleviate suffering today. We
    cannot wait to do so once the political conflict is solved, for
    it will not be solved for a while, not for the millions in need
    inside Venezuela, not for those forced to migrate who also
    suffer along the way, not for the region, which will also
    continue to be impacted.
        To save lives and alleviate suffering today and to continue
    contributing to a long-lasting, nonviolent, democratic solution
    to Venezuela's political conflict demands multilateral thinking
    and action by the international political, diplomatic, human
    rights, and humanitarian community, as well as engagement with
    those who control power today in Venezuela.
        Together with Venezuelan political party actors,
    multilateral thinking and action must include Venezuelan civil
    society organizations on the ground which have proven to have
    the capacities, commitment, courage to generate solutions to
    the humanitarian emergency, create opportunities for sustained
    development, and continue advocating for human rights despite
    threats and risks.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Reyna follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Reyna.
        Now we will hear from Dr. Arnson.
        I now turn to you for your testimony.

    STATEMENT OF DR. CYNTHIA J. ARNSON, DIRECTOR, THE WILSON CENTER
                         LATIN AMERICA PROGRAM

        Dr. Arnson. [inaudible] And notably--oops. I am--am I
    muted? Uh-oh. Am I muted? No, I am not muted. Sorry. Okay.
        The prospects of a democratic transition in Venezuela have
    worsened. The Armed Forces, an essential pillar of regime
    survival, have remained united despite multiple efforts inside
    and outside the country to foster divisions. Maduro's
    repressive apparatus remains fully intact, with murders carried
    out with impunity in poor neighborhoods, political prisoners
    tortured, raids and attacks on nongovernmental organizations.
        As others have pointed out, this growing authoritarianism
    has gone hand in hand with Venezuela's economic collapse.
    Because of that collapse, others have made reference to the
    refugee flows. The United Nations estimates that another 3
    million Venezuelan migrants and refugees will leave the country
    in 2021.
        Countries in South America and the Caribbean are simply
    incapable of absorbing such large additional refugee
    populations and the threats to social cohesion and political
    stability should not be taken lightly.
        In approaching the Venezuelan crisis, the U.S. Government
    should establish both long-term and short-term goals.
        The long-term goal is the one that we all know and has been
    longstanding in U.S. policy, which is the democratization of
    Venezuela's political life via free, fair, and verifiable
    elections.
        So the question is, what are the short-term measures that
    can be adopted that could help lead to that outcome?
        First, now that the scenarios aimed at the collapse of the
    regime have been tried and have failed, it is important to
    achieve broad political agreements that offer some guarantees
    to the regime and its supporters in exchange for concessions.
    This constitutes a more fruitful strategy for stabilizing and
    democratizing Venezuela.
        As Feliciano Reyna was pointing out, humanitarian
    agreements can serve as stepping stones toward a more
    comprehensive settlement. Partial agreements build trust among
    the parties, and if they are successful they build faith among
    the population at large in the possibility of negotiated
    outcomes.
        And as we have just heard, the discussions in Venezuela
    over ways for access to the COVID-19 vaccines through COVAX to
    carry out a national vaccination campaign are a hopeful step.
        The U.S. Government should not lead these efforts at
    partial agreements, but the Biden Administration should
    recognize that the sectoral, the secondary, the individual
    sanctions, the criminal indictments, give the United States
    tremendous leverage in Venezuela.
        Prudently targeted sanctions relief in exchange for
    verifiable concessions, such as the release of political
    prisoners, an easing of the restrictions on humanitarian aid,
    the reform of the National Electoral Council, should be
    carefully considered as part of a broad strategy coordinated
    with Venezuelan civil society and other actors in the
    international community.
        In any negotiation, creating incentives, not just wielding
    sticks, is essential to bringing the parties together.
        Although U.S. sanctions policy allows for humanitarian
    exemptions, as the recent GAO report pointed out, these may not
    be functioning well enough to provide enough maneuvering space
    for humanitarian actors on the ground. Those humanitarian
    exemptions should be revised in coordination with Venezuelan
    civil society actors.
        The Biden Administration should also consult with a broad
    range not only of Venezuelan actors, but international relief
    organizations to clear up remaining obstacles.
        As others have mentioned, the Biden Administration's oft-
    cited preference for multilateralism in foreign policy is an
    asset in approaching Venezuela. Multiple international partners
    of the United States have worked to maintain channels of
    communication with all sides. These include the European Union,
    the International Contact Group, the Lima Group, the
    Governments of Norway and Sweden.
        All of these countries and organizations have, as a common
    denominator, their search for a peaceful, democratic solution
    to the Venezuelan crisis.
        And as my colleague Brian Fonseca will shortly indicate, we
    should not harbor illusions that the only important
    international actors in Venezuela are Western democracies
    seeking a democratic outcome. Russia, China, Cuba, India,
    Turkey, and Iran have played a variety of roles in sustaining
    the Maduro regime. But we should keep in mind that their
    interests are diverse, as is their relative importance to
    regime survival.
        Finally, and to reiterate the point about refugees, the
    United States has done a huge amount to assist South American
    and Caribbean countries hosting Venezuelan refugees, but much
    more needs to be done. In 2020, the United Nations Refugee and
    Migrant Response Plan received less than half of the
    international funding that it requested and identified to meet
    the needs of Venezuelan migrants and refugees across the
    region.
        And special attention, as Chairman Sires pointed out,
    should be given to Colombia, which hosts more Venezuelan
    refugees than any country in the world and which just extended
    temporary protective status for 10 years to the almost 2
    million refugees within its borders.
        The United States can and must play an ongoing leading role
    in mobilizing resources that are sufficient for Colombia, as
    well as other frontline nations that are directly impacted by
    Venezuela's ongoing meltdown.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Arnson follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
        I now turn to your testimony, Mr. Fonseca.

       STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN FONSECA, DIRECTOR, JACK D. GORDON
     INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

        Mr. Fonseca. Thank you, Chairman Sires, Ranking Member
    Green, distinguished members of the subcommittee, of course
    including my own hometown Representative, Congresswoman
    Salazar. It is my privilege to address you today on the state
    of Venezuelan foreign relations and its short-term and long-
    term effects on U.S. policy.
        As already stated, Venezuela isin the midst of one of the
    worst economic contractions ever recorded, and because of that,
    the Maduro dictatorship continues to lean on a small group of
    States to remain in power. Russia, China, Cuba, Turkey, and
    Iran have all played important supporting roles for the regime.
        These countries help Maduro bypass U.S. sanctions to keep
    the Venezuelan economy muddling through and provide technical
    assistance to help stave off internal and external threats.
        The question before the House today is not whether the
    Venezuelan Government is a repressive and corrupt authoritarian
    regime. I believe that is clear. Rather, what can we do to
    alleviate the ongoing humanitarian crisis, regain influence on
    the ground, displace our geopolitical rivals, aid in the
    restoration of democratic governance, and help pave the way for
    a prosperous country for the Venezuelan people?
        My testimony will focus on Russian-Venezuelan relations,
    but I must point out that Russia is just one of a handful of
    countries vital to Venezuelan domestic and foreign policy
    interests.
        The considerations binding Russia, Venezuela, and the
    others are far less ideological. Instead, these countries are
    tied together by common authoritarian political structures and
    economic and political opportunism.
        Furthermore, these countries all share antagonistic
    relationships with the United States. That is, regime survival,
    combined with our policy position, for better or worse,
    encourage these authoritarian regimes to travel together.
        These countries also overwhelmingly prioritize their own
    survival well above the relationships. That leads me to
    conclude that these relationships--Russia-Venezuela included--
    are largely transactional and vulnerable to fracturing.
        The Russo-Venezuelan relationship has evolved a great deal
    since former President Hugo Chavez and Vladimir Putin first met
    in Moscow in 2001. Putin saw tremendous economic and political
    opportunities in Venezuela, while Chavez sought to diversify
    its foreign relations away from the United States.
        In subsequent years, Russian companies invested billions
    into Venezuela, largely focusing on arms and energy deals.
    Chavez also offered Russia political and military access on the
    ground in Venezuela.
        Interestingly, much of the surge in Russian-Venezuelan
    engagement occurred during Maduro's tenure as Chavez's Minister
    of Foreign Affairs from 2006 to 2013.
        After ascending to office in 2013, Maduro sought to
    leverage his relations with Russia and others to stave off
    challenges from internal political opposition, offset the
    massive amount of money siphoned through widespread corruption
    and criminality, and mitigate the economic death spiral that
    accelerated shortly after he took office.
        Today, most experts would agree that Russia's direct
    business activities in Venezuela have not yielded the desired
    return on investment. Still, it maintains important economic
    interests; namely, energy infrastructure and enduring arms
    contracts.
        However, the lack of direct ROI has forced the Russians to
    focus more on the indirect economic benefits and extracting
    political and geopolitical value out of Venezuela, primarily,
    maintaining a geostrategic footprint near the U.S., portraying
    Russia as a global power, unsettling American policymakers,
    undermining Western democratic values, and scoring political
    points at home for Putin.
        In the economic context, Russia is just one of several
    countries vying for access to Venezuela's large proven oil
    reserves. There are clear indications that Rosneft and other
    Russian companies were taking huge losses well before U.S.
    sanctions.
        Despite their losses, Russia owned significant energy
    assets in Venezuela, including nearly 81 billion barrels of
    proven reserves via its joint ventures with PDVSA--that, by the
    way, it chooses to leave in the ground.
        One theory is that Russiais content with locking up
    Venezuelan oil in the ground and reducing global supply so that
    it can fetch a higher price for its own heavy crude on the
    global market.
        Russia exports roughly 9 to 10 million barrels of heavy
    crude per day. So a $5 increase in price of a barrel would
    generate roughly an additional $50 million a day for Russian
    exporters. Thus, Russia may be deriving indirect economic
    benefits from a deteriorated Venezuelan oil industry made worse
    by U.S. sectoral sanctions.
        In 2020, Russia oil exports to the U.S. hit a 16-year high,
    solidifying its place as the second-largest exporter of U.S.
    crude to the United States. Industry experts argue that the
    spike in Russian imports to the United States is driven, in
    large part, by U.S. sanctions against PDVSA.
        Oil and gas are not the only drivers of Russian economic
    interests in Venezuela. Military sales are also an important
    part of Russia's broader economic interests. Building on
    military sales, Russia has established important military-to-
    military relationships with Venezuela. Russia provides
    technical assistance and offers professional military
    educational opportunities in Russia for Venezuelan military
    personnel.
        Russia also maintains a formidable intelligence footprint
    in Venezuela. Although it is difficult to estimate how deep
    this aspect of the relationship goes or whether these
    relationships will be enduring, Russian military and
    intelligence presence in Venezuela is not in our national
    security interest.
        Still, I assess the strategic intent for Russia is not to
    directly challenge the U.S. military. Instead, I think it finds
    value in creating a low-cost opportunity to irritate the United
    States, but not necessarily provoke an escalatory response.
        Let me cover just a few recommendations, if I can, and then
    conclude.
        I mean, to be clear, there is no easy path to transition in
    Venezuela and there are severe limitations to what the U.S. can
    do now. Still, I think there are meaningful actions that we
    should be thinking about as the situation continues to evolve.
        First, we should reevaluate our sanctions and consider
    doubling down on targeted sanctions against individuals and
    reversing broader sanctions that may be hurting our national
    interests and the interests of the Venezuelan people.
        There is good reason to believe that some of our sanctions
    are undermining our long-term domestic and foreign policy
    objectives. Our sanctions should not exacerbate the ongoing
    crisis, erode America's reputation, or work in the interests of
    our global rivals.
        Second, we must find ways to close the important pressure
    release valves or else the sanctions will do little to effect
    change. If the dictatorship can leverage its allies and use
    illicit trafficking proceeds to subsidize its struggling
    Venezuelan economy, meaningful change will remain elusive.
        Third, we should consider reestablishing some diplomatic
    and economic access. I am not suggesting we reestablish an
    embassy without evaluating important concessions, but we should
    look to regain some diplomatic footprint.
        We should also create space for the American private sector
    to outcompete Russia, China, and others taking advantage of the
    U.S. absence. There is certainly a clear preference for
    American businesses over Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey.
        Finally, we should consider bolstering the governance
    capacity and reassure our partners in the region, especially
    Venezuela's neighbors Guyana, Colombia, and Peru, and consider
    working more closely with our international allies, especially
    the U.K., France, and Canada, which all maintain diplomatic
    relations.
        The fact that this is among the first hearings of the 117th
    Congress and the first for this committee is a testament to the
    importance of Venezuela to the United States and our commitment
    to the Venezuelan people.
        As I said before this committee in 2019, nature abhors a
    vacuum. If we do not have a presence, then China, Russia, Iran,
    and others antithetical to our interests and the interests of
    the Venezuelan people will be more than happy to fill that
    void.
        Again, thank you for this amazing opportunity, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Fonseca follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Sires. Thank you.
        Dr. Berg, you are recognized for your testimony.

     STATEMENT OF DR. RYAN C. BERG, RESEARCH FELLOW, LATIN AMERICA
                 STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

        Dr. Berg. Chairman Sires, Ranking Member Green, members of
    the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
    this timely topic today.
        The political and economic devastation wrought by the
    Maduro regime in Venezuela, Latin America's erstwhile
    wealthiest country, is truly unprecedented. The country has
    lost 20 percent of its pre-crisis population, 5 to 6 million
    refugees, a number that could rise to as many as 10 million by
    2023, according to the International Monetary Fund.
        De facto President Nicolas Maduro has presided over the
    largest economic decline outside of war in world history and
    his regime is now considered a criminalized or a mafia State.
    Venezuela's institutions are so thoroughly penetrated by
    corruption and criminal interests that senior leaders,
    including Maduro himself, are actively participating in
    transnational criminal enterprises.
        The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, the
    National Liberation Army, or ELN, and Lebanese Hezbollah all
    have received shelter and even material support from the Maduro
    regime.
        Maduro's Venezuela represents a combustible mix of national
    security threats that have metastasized throughout the
    hemisphere, leaving the door wide open and beckoning the
    involvement of extra-hemispheric actors and U.S. strategic
    competitors that have seized on the bedlam in Venezuela to
    enter our shared neighborhood, sow chaos, destabilize the
    region, and augment their power-projection capabilities.
        Russia has provided the Maduro regime with a critical
    sanctions-busting lifeline, as well as myriad weapon systems.
        China has provided more than $60 billion in loans since
    2007 and traded repressive digital surveillance technology to
    further Maduro's control.
        And Cuba has remade the repressive organs of Venezuela's
    police state in exchange for oil.
        Perhaps the most concerning aspect of Venezuela's slide
    into chaos, however, are the bonds it has forged and solidified
    with Russia, China, and Cuba, in many cases turning
    transactional relationships into blossoming strategic
    partnerships and even, in some cases, outright dependencies.
        Venezuela has become a prime example of the phenomenon
    known as authoritarian export or authoritarian learning,
    whereby authoritarian leaders share best practices in
    repression and adopt survival strategies based upon their prior
    successes in other countries.
        Like a family recipe, authoritarians have bequeathed to
    Caracas their best advice in regime survival. If not for Cuba,
    the Venezuelan regime would arguably not exist in its current
    form. And if not for Russia and China, the Maduro regime would
    probably have collapsed.
        As Venezuela's economy slips further into the abyss,
    however, the Maduro regime has doubled down on the narrative of
    a nation under siege and abdicated any responsibility for the
    country's collapse.
        I think it is critical to avoid misconstruing the realities
    of who is to blame here because it means misidentifying the
    most appropriate strategies for addressing the unique security
    challenges the regime poses to the region.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to use the remaining time
    available to highlight very briefly several policy
    recommendations for the United States.
        First, pursue a policy of management, not solutionism. The
    Biden Administration should recognize that it has inherited a
    significant position of leverage, but it should resist the
    temptation to go big and rush into negotiations with the Maduro
    regime. A Hail Mary pass at this inauspicious moment could
    actually entrench the regime further.
        Second, attend to the unfolding humanitarian disaster. As
    we have all heard today already, this is the most underfunded
    humanitarian crisis in modern history. For comparison, Syrian
    refugees have received the equivalent of $3,150 per refugee,
    while Venezuelans have received a paltry $265 per refugee.
        Aid should be targeted to encourage and defray the costs of
    further integration of Venezuelan refugees in host countries
    such as Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and others.
        Third, monitor the effect of sanctions on humanitarian
    efforts. The Treasury Department should monitor potentially
    negative humanitarian consequences of our U.S. sanctions. The
    U.S. should seek to ensure the reliability of the humanitarian
    exemptions that are built into our sanctions architecture, and
    fine-tuning sanctions should be the first impulse, rather than
    simply lifting them.
        Fourth, avoid the siren song of negotiations until minimum
    conditions in the country are met. By some accounts, there have
    been nearly a dozen attempts to negotiate with the Maduro
    regime and limited progress has been made, with significant
    opportunity costs to the Venezuelan people.
        I will note that there is currently no consensus of what
    the minimum conditions would be for a negotiation, and major
    questions persist regarding objectives, timing, process, and
    trust-building measures with the Maduro regime.
        Fifth, encourage the European Union to bring more pressure.
    While awaiting a more fortuitous diplomatic moment, the Biden
    Administration should encourage the European Union to adjust
    its policy in a nod to reality.
        Quite simply, the EU's current approach is riddled with
    inconsistencies and the pressure setting is insufficient to
    meaningfully contribute to a negotiated solution and to protect
    human rights on the ground.
        Sixth, broaden the diplomatic tool kit to complement
    sanctions. The U.S. should employ nonsanctions instruments
    concurrently with U.S. sanctions to achieve the effective
    pressure level. These instruments include legal referrals to
    international tribunals, such as the current case pending
    against Venezuela before the International Criminal Court, and
    anti-money-laundering mechanisms and resource certification
    regimes to deter the Maduro regime's participation in the
    illicit economy.
        And seventh and last, bolster intelligence capabilities.
    The failed April 2019 uprising announced from La Carlota Air
    Base in Caracas and Operation Gideon, the failed 2020
    amphibious invasion planned in neighboring Colombia by a
    sanctioned Venezuelan general, should prompt the incoming
    Director of the CIA and the intelligence community to conduct a
    thorough investigation of intelligence failures in the country
    related to the Maduro regime's authoritarian resilience and
    bolster U.S. intelligence assets and capabilities in Venezuela.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering
    the committee's questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Berg follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Sires. Thank you to our witnesses today.
        Now I would like to ask unanimous consent that
    Representatives Omar, Steube, Malliotakis, and Wasserman
    Schultz participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee
    members have had the opportunity to participate and question
    any of the witnesses. Thank you.
        And now we will get into questions. I will start by asking
    questions to our members.
        First, I would like to say that for years I have been
    saying that Russia and China participate in this Western
    Hemisphere in order to create anarchy, in order to destabilize
    governments, in order to play with our closest allies.
        Cuba has a security apparatus in Venezuela. Russia has been
    selling arms. And one interesting conversation that I had with
    someone from the Colombian Embassy the other day told me that
    in 2019, 6,000 Russians visited Colombia. Last year, due to the
    pandemic, it dropped down to 3,000. The Colombian Government
    expelled three Russians recently.
        I can only think that having Russians visiting Colombia,
    6,000, Colombiais not exactly a beach destination for the
    Russians, plays into this idea that Russia and China would love
    nothing better than to create chaos in the Western Hemisphere.
        So I was wondering from our members, can you comment on
    that?
        Anyone? Do not all answer at once. Just one.
        Mr. Fonseca.
        Mr. Fonseca. Chairman, I apologize. I thought when you
    meant members, that you were querying somebody else.
        No, I could not agree with you more. I absolutely think one
    of the primary objectives, certainly of Russia, is to continue
    to sort of poke a finger in the eye of the United States.
        Keep in mind that, as I mentioned, I think they find it
    incredibly valuable to have a geostrategic footprint near the
    U.S., and I think that is one of it. And oftentimes that sort
    of--this idea of reciprocity gets thrown into the discussion
    among experts that look specifically at Russian engagement in
    Venezuela, because oftentimes that reciprocity sort of pathways
    back to the pronounced U.S. footprint in Eastern Europe.
        And so oftentimes in the past you have even heard rumors
    about the potential tradeoffs of maybe the U.S. kind of
    withdrawing its support in places like Ukraine in exchange for
    Russia withdrawing its support in Venezuela. And, again, for
    now, that is all been sort of hearsay, kind of listening to
    people on the ground.
        But there is no doubt that, in the consciousness of Russia,
    having that geostrategic footprint is really vital, No. 1.
        No. 2, I also think that--and this is inclusive of--by the
    way, that geostrategic footprint is also inclusive of China. Of
    course, the United States has a tremendous footprint in Asia,
    notwithstanding our support to Taiwan, our military access in
    South Korea, Japan, in broader sort of Southeast Asia, you
    know, U.S. influence.
        But that is No. 1. So geostrategic value to having close
    proximity to the United States.
        No. 2, they both have a tremendous interest in undermining
    sort of Western liberal order, undermining democratic
    institutions around the world, and trying to strategically
    create space to sort of embrace their authoritarian political
    models.
        I think that sort of lends itself to destabilizing the
    democracies around the region. And we have seen at times in the
    past Russia leveraging information operations in other
    sophisticated technology means to be disruptive and impact sort
    of the political stability of partners across the hemisphere.
        So, Chairman, I could not agree with you more. I think
    China and Russia absolutely are intent on disrupting and
    undermining U.S. policy.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you.
        I also think that we just do not pay enough attention to
    the Western Hemisphere. So if we do not pay attention, the
    Russians and the Chinese and all the other countries that are
    helping Venezuela fill that void that we have in the Western
    Hemisphere.
        Dr. Arnson. Mr. Chairman, if I might add to that.
        Mr. Sires. Sure.
        Dr. Arnson. I certainly associate myself with what Brian
    Fonseca just said, and I agree that the influence of China and
    Russia in Venezuela is counter to U.S. interests. But I think
    that one needs to separate the kind of involvement that the two
    countries have had. As Brian was saying, it is geostrategic, it
    is an opportunity for the Russians to mess around in what they
    call or what they consider the U.S. ``near abroad'' in the
    reciprocal kind of way that Brian was mentioning.
        China's interests have been somewhat different. China is
    the largest oil consumer in the world. Venezuela has the
    world's largest known oil reserves.
        And so the relationship has been heavily focused on oil
    extraction, and the $62 billion in loans approximately are
    being repaid in oil and there has not been any new money for
    some time. And the loans that were given in recent years were
    simply to allow Venezuela to continue paying back the loans
    that had been initially given.
        There is also, I think, the case that China has reached out
    to the opposition at various points trying to guarantee its
    long-term access to Venezuela's oil resources independent of
    the political leadership of the country.
        So I see it as less committed to the survival of Nicolas
    Maduro and the regime overall and much more committed to the
    long-term survival of its interest in the oil fields.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
        Now I will recognize Ranking Member Green.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman. Again, appreciate your
    opening remarks and appreciate the witnesses' testimony. I
    thank all of them for being present and their participation
    today.
        I think one of America's greatest challenges is China, and
    I am greatly concerned with their penetration into not only
    Venezuela, but all of Latin America. And my comments are really
    to the whole slate of witnesses, whoever wants to jump in.
        In 2019, China specifically stated that the blackouts in
    Venezuela were because of cyber attacks from the United States,
    obviously a blatant lie.
        One of my questions is, how do we confront this
    disinformation campaign from China in Venezuela and throughout
    Latin America?
        Dr. Berg. Let me jump in on this here, Ranking Member
    Green.
        As you well stated, the cyber attack claim, of course, is
    spurious. Largely, the blackouts were a cause of the fact that
    there was not only corruption, but a failure to maintain the
    power grid in Venezuela. And also something, quite simply,
    somebody did not bother to cut the vegetation around one of the
    main power plants outside of Caracas, and so that vegetation
    overgrew some of the power lines and ended up knocking off
    power periodically throughout 2019, as we saw.
        This is an incredibly important question in terms of the
    disinformation environment. It is not just China. It is also
    Russia. It is also Cuba participating as well.
        And I think in this sense, the United States can do its
    best to try to get reliable information to Venezuelans on the
    ground, to members of the opposition, in especially critical
    periods of time. We have seen the internet knocked off grid in
    really important periods of time around protests, around street
    pressure, around moments in time when the regime felt like it
    was quite vulnerable.
        And so this is one of those areas that kind of flies below
    the radar, but is quite important in terms of our ability to
    help the opposition on the ground. Given the lack of political
    space in the country to organize, the reliable presence of the
    internet is absolutely critical.
        Mr. Green. One other, sort of taking that a step further.
    It appears that ZTE, China's big telecommunications giant, has
    created ID cards for the Venezuelan people, which essentially
    do the same thing that their social score system does--tracks
    their behavior, monitors their actions, can dig into their
    checking accounts, all of this.
        How do we stop that?
        Mr. Fonseca. So, Ranking Member Green, I think it is an
    excellent question. I think it underscores the point of China
    as the real strategic competitor in the region. And Chinese
    tech proliferation has been growing rapidly certainly for the
    last decade or so.
        The idea of the fatherland card, as you reference, is
    something that certainly we have been battling around in terms
    of how to--sort of how to combat that. In Venezuela perhaps it
    is very difficult to sort of overturn that.
        But I think education, continuing to sort of dominate the
    educational space, not just in broader Latin America, but
    wherever we can sort of reach in and help educate consumers on
    the threats and challenges associated with China tech
    penetration.
        It is important for us to disaggregate good from bad. Not
    all Chinese activities in the region I think should be seen
    through sort of a threat landscape. But I do think we have to
    provide education as tech penetration becomes more proliferated
    across the broader hemisphere.
        And I think this is also consistent with what Dr. Berg was
    saying just a few minutes ago about information operations. The
    Russians are incredibly sophisticated in terms of their ability
    to effect impact on information operations. They also have an
    incredibly sophisticated and forward-leaning cyber capability.
        In fact, lots of open reporting about that threat. In fact,
    the Atlantic Council's digital analytics lab has done some
    really good work on assessing information operations and
    putting out recommendations that can help undermine sort of the
    effect of those information operations.
        And part of that is about sort of credibility of the
    source. The United States needs to remain credible as a source
    across the broader hemisphere. We have to ensure that our
    actions do not undermine our credibility, broadly speaking.
        And I think we need to continue to point out and attack the
    credibility of Russia, and when China does it call them out as
    well, for proliferating just false information that affects the
    social, political, and economic landscapes across the region.
        Mr. Green. My timeis up. Mr. Chairman, I will go in second
    round.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you.
        Congressman Castro, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
        This question is for Mr. Reyna.
        First, thank you for speaking to our committee about the
    important work that civil society organizations like yours are
    doing in Venezuela.
        I chair the subcommittee that handles international
    development policy, and so I want to ask you a question along
    those lines.
        As you know, on February 11, Venezuela's opposition and
    Nicolas Maduro agreed to cooperate to purchase and distribute
    COVID-19 vaccines for 6 million Venezuelans. I think this is a
    positive step toward fighting the coronavirus pandemic in the
    country. And it has been reported that about 1.4 million doses
    of the vaccine will come from the World Health Organization-
    linked COVAX initiative, while the source of the rest of the
    vaccines is yet unclear.
        So my question is, how can the United States help mobilize
    resources to ensure countries in need, like Venezuela, receive
    the appropriate amount of vaccines? And how can we ensure that
    there is a proper oversight and equitable distribution of those
    vaccines in Venezuela?
        Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much for your question. I think
    this is really important.
        One way in which it is possible to continue providing
    support in regards to health, and with vaccination
    particularly, is to support these efforts that the Humanitarian
    Aid Commission of the 2015 National Assembly has been carrying
    on and also being able to work with the Pan American Health
    Organization, as well as with the Health Department of
    Venezuela.
        I think this is one example of possibilities that still
    exist to provide support. And the signing of this COVAX
    agreement is also a show of those possibilities. So we did have
    a previous agreement, now this COVAX one.
        And the oversight and the mobilization to expand, on the
    one hand, and the oversight, one perhaps can be achieved
    through supporting the entrance into Venezuela of the World
    Food Programme with its logistical capacities.
        We are seeing huge challenge there with issues, for
    example, of cold chain. And since our transportation
    infrastructure has been also somewhat collapsed, as many other
    areas, then the World Food Programme can play an important
    role.
        And in regards to oversight, we are proposing to follow the
    model that has already been in place since 2018 by the Global
    Fund for HIV, TB and Malaria, Pan American Health Organization,
    UNH, and Venezuelan civil society, again, with the Health
    Ministry, to followup on the provision and distribution of
    antiretrovirals.
        It has worked well, with challenges, with difficulties. But
    that oversight has been in place. And there is a working group,
    monthly information, and followup of the results. Whenever
    there is a gap or difficulties, then these can be called by the
    activists on the ground doing that oversight.
        So these are the kinds of perhaps mechanisms that would
    deserve looking into and supporting.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman Castro.
        Congressman Pfluger, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Chairman thank you for an excellent
    hearing on a very important topic. And to all of our panelists
    thank you for your time.
        I have got a couple of questions. I will start with Dr.
    Arnson. Knowing that Maduro is--it will not sign any sort of
    deal with the World Food Program, unless he can control the
    distribution of that food, how do we as the United States in
    working with our, with our allies and partners in the region
    ensure that delivery of food gets to the people that need it
    the most and can prevent Maduro from controlling that
    distribution.
        Dr. Arnson. Thank you very much for the question,
    Congressman Pfluger. It is an essential principle of
    humanitarian assistance that it must be given with neutrality
    and without any regard for the political affiliation of the
    recipient. Up until now, the Maduro regime has maintained tight
    control over food distribution through this program known as
    CLAP, through food boxes which are woefully insufficient. And
    it is a form of social control. And it is obviously reluctant
    to relinquish that form of control.
        But I think what Feliciano was indicating is that on
    humanitarian issues involving health, there have been--there
    has been the possibility of reaching agreement between the
    opposition, the government working closely with civil society
    organizations.
        I do not know what the magic formula will be to allow or to
    convince the regime to allow the World Food Program to operate.
    I suggested in my testimony that there might be some
    consideration given to relaxing U.S. secondary sanctions that
    would permit the import of fuel, gasoline, and diesel which are
    in short supply. I know that that is a controversial
    recommendation that we should not have to offer anything to
    Nicolas Maduro to get him to allow the international community
    to feed starving people.
        I mean, we are talking about at a minimum 9 million
    Venezuelans who are either severely food insecure, or
    moderately food insecure, and that is the assessment of the
    World Food Program itself in 2020.
        So I think that these humanitarian agreements that have
    been reached over COVAX, the kind of things with
    antiretrovirals that Feliciano was mentioning, provide a kernel
    of hope that these kinds of agreements around food and food
    insecurity can also be reached.
        Mr. Pfluger. Thank you very much.
        And now for Dr. Berg. My question is what are the
    consequences to the U.S., and the region, if this crisis
    continues and if these criminal groups are allowed to thrive?
    And, specifically, to our southern border, what is the threat
    with this crisis, continuing the number of refugees?
        Dr. Berg, to you.
        Dr. Berg. Thank you very much, Congressman, for the
    question. I think the crisis has region-wide impacts. As Dr.
    Arnson mentioned in her opening statement, the region is not
    poised to be able to absorb this level of refugees we have seen
    so far, about 5-and-a-half million. Remember that figure that I
    mentioned in my opening statement from the IMF that this could
    rise by 10 million by 2023.
        And so the numbers of people and the pace which they are
    exiting the country is still unabated. And this really has dire
    consequences, not only for the stability and security of the
    region, but the future economic growth of the region. Many
    countries have difficulty not only absorbing this number of
    refugees, but also--look at a country like Colombia, it has
    taken the very commendable step of including about 1.7 million
    refugees into its, into its legal ranks. About 1 million of
    them will be affected by the temporary protective status that
    they granted to them.
        But that is going to be a Herculean undertaking, which the
    United States can help with because many of us do not believe
    that countries in the region have the capability to absorb
    these types of numbers on a bureaucratic level, on an economic
    level, on a political level. There are political ramifications
    as well. We have seen in some places, despite the fact that the
    region has had a pretty welcoming stance, a rise in xenophobia.
        I mentioned Colombia before. I looked at a poll the other
    day that said that a clear majority of Colombians were actually
    against the move by Ivan Duque to allow temporary protective
    status for Venezuelans in the country. So the regional cohesion
    here is at stake as well.
        And the last thing that you mentioned is a migratory crisis
    that could push north to our borders. Again, we have seen a lot
    of refugees in South America. As I think the next waves start
    to come out, we might see more and more actually traversing
    through Colombia, going up into Panama and into Central
    America, certainly more so than they are now.
        And, lastly, Congressman, if I can just go back to the
    question that Dr. Arnson answered previously about the
    neutrality principle and humanitarianism. Obviously, it is
    absolutely critical. I think that there is one cautionary tale
    here, and that is the agreement that was signed last summer to
    bring in personal protective equipment and COVID PCR tests,
    which were very quickly, sort of, confiscated by the Maduro
    regime. They were not actually spread around the country in the
    way that the agreement stipulated. And the opposition since has
    been crying foul about it. And with the regime in control of
    those resources, there is not much we can do at this point.
        Mr. Pfluger. Thank you very much.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you.
        Congressman Andy Levin, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for holding
    this important hearing. To our panelists, thank you. I am going
    to try to ask a number of questions, so I ask you to try to be
    brief in your answers.
        A February GAO report, which I requested along with the
    full committee back in 2019, found that U.S. sanctions,
    particularly those on the oil industry, have likely contributed
    to the steep decline of the Venezuelan economy and suggested
    steps that the Treasury Department and other agencies could
    take to mitigate the humanitarian impacts of sanctions, which
    some of you have addressed very movingly.
        Mr. Reyna, what recommendations do you have for the U.S.
    Government regarding how it could provide clear guidance for
    financial institutions or take other steps to minimize any
    second-order impacts of sanctions on the operations of
    humanitarian organizations that are doing their best in this
    situation?
        Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much, Congressman Levin. We
    really welcome that report. We think it offers information that
    is quite important, because one may think, you know, of the
    impact of sanctions on issues that were already deteriorating.
    But to us, what is of serious concern today is impact on the
    Venezuelan population. And, certainly, there is some that can
    be--work differently.
        But what we have had sometimes is conversations with
    Treasury, for example, to give precise examples of how
    sanctions can put obstacles and restrict the work of
    organizations. I think that is--you know, having those
    conversations, even before imposing certain types of sanctions
    made--would have made sense and still makes sense to talk
    through them.
        One issue that we have faced, for example, is that--and we
    understand Treasury cannot impose, for example, they say issues
    on operations of the banking system, lets say. But they can
    offer certainly a more decisive kind of advice in order for,
    you know, the system not to prevent us from carrying on our
    humanitarian work, our accompanying, for example, victims of
    situations of lack of access to food or health.
        So I think that this requires perhaps sitting down, looking
    at particular issues and seeing how to solve them. Licenses,
    for example, when we were looking at them, they might take from
    18 months to 24 months to get. So, again, it is not even having
    license to get them for organizations such as ours here on the
    ground. So, you know, thank you for your concerns then.
        Mr. Levin. Yes, I tell you what, we will be a partner with
    you in trying to work with the administration to help you do
    your work, basically. It is so important.
        Mr. Reyna. Thank you.
        Mr. Levin. Yes, the Trump administration strategy toward
    Venezuela relied on maximum pressure betting that sanctions
    would lead to a quick transition to democracy. But here in
    March 2021, Maduro's grip on power appears stronger than at any
    point since 2019. It seems that in order to work toward a
    democratic transition, the U.S. will need a longer-term
    strategy.
        Dr. Arnson, it is good to see an old friend. Given reports
    that the Biden Administration is reviewing its sanctions policy
    in many parts of the world, can you talk, specifically, about
    sanctions you think should be reassessed or advised, or how
    should we look at this in more detail than you may have gone
    into earlier?
        Dr. Arnson. Sure. Well, I would say that it is certainly
    not in the cards for the United States to be unilaterally
    lifting certain sanctions. But as I said in my statement, they
    do convey enormous amounts of leverage. The question is how
    they can be used in a back and forth to require verifiable
    steps by the Maduro government in exchange for certain forms of
    sanctions relief.
        Now, that implies that the government is actually
    interested in that kind of sanctions relief. There may be--it
    may be the case that they are more interested in the lifting of
    criminal indictments or, you know, the lifting of these
    individual sanctions that have frozen bank accounts and
    prohibited them from traveling to the United States in the case
    of the EU to the European Union.
        But I think it is very positive that there is a recognition
    at this point that the campaign of maximum pressure actually
    did not achieve the--either the democratic opening or the
    regime collapse that was hoped for. And, therefore, a different
    approach is needed. And I think that those consultations are
    under way and should be encouraged.
        And sanctions are, you know, an instrument in the, in the
    toolkit. And the United States has, because of the economic
    sanctions against the oil sector, the financial sector, and
    secondary sanctions on those who also trade with PDVSA and
    other Venezuelan entities give us tremendous leverage. And we
    should explore, you know, what combination of concession and
    sanctions relief should be desirable.
        Mr. Levin. All right. Thanks.
        Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. Great hearing, and I
    yield back.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman. We now recognize
    Congresswoman Salazar from Florida for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Salazar. Thank you, Chairman. Wonderful to be here. And
    it is such an important topic for the Americas, and I thank the
    witnesses for their time and their expertise, specifically, Dr.
    Fonseca who is one of the most prominent scholars in my
    district. So wonderful to have you here.
        I just want--I have a different type of questioning, and I
    would like to start with Dr. Fonseca just to take this to a
    more basic or granular topic where reality is more crude, and
    it is more understood. So, I am going to have--I am going to do
    ten questions, and I would like you to just answer yes or no if
    it is possible. Is it true that Venezuela went from being one
    of the richest countries in the hemisphere to one of the
    poorest?
        Mr. Fonseca. That is correct.
        Ms. Salazar. Is it true that inflation right now is over
    4,000 percent?
        Mr. Fonseca. That is correct.
        Ms. Salazar. Is it true that the Venezuelans can only go to
    the supermarket a few days a week because there are no goods on
    the shelves?
        Mr. Fonseca. In most places, that is absolutely correct.
        Ms. Salazar. And is it true that the average Venezuelan has
    lost more than 50 pounds in the last 20 years because of lack
    of food?
        Mr. Fonseca. That is also correct.
        Ms. Salazar. Is it also true that Venezuela is empowering
    Hezbollah, the terrorist group, and that the United States has
    indicted members of the Venezuelan Congress just like if one of
    us were participating or working with the terrorist group
    Hezbollah? We know who that person is or who that group is. Is
    that true?
        Dr. Fonseca, did you hear me.
        Mr. Fonseca. I am sorry. I was muted. Yes, that is correct.
        Ms. Salazar. The has dog gone away.
        Is it true that the Venezuelan is empowering--the
    Venezuelan Government is empowering the terrorist group
    Hezbollah, and that the United States indicted a member of the
    Venezuelan Congress for working with Hezbollah.
        Mr. Fonseca. That is true.
        Ms. Salazar. And is it true that Venezuela is becoming a
    major hub for drug trafficking? And that criminal organization
    is their only--their only purpose is to harm the United States?
        Mr. Fonseca. They are absolutely a major hub for drug
    trafficking.
        Ms. Salazar. And is it true that Maduro's representative or
    the repressive apparatus is controlled and directed by more
    than 30,000 high-ranking Cuban agents like Ramiro Valdes, and
    they control even the Venezuelan customs office and the
    passport issuing office?
        Mr. Fonseca. There is absolutely a heavy presence. And I
    know you wanted a ``yes'' or ``no,'' but I am not sure that the
    numbers are what I am seeing as high. I think to your point,
    they still play a really vital, vital role in fire-walling the
    regime and absolutely have an important presence around Maduro,
    ensuring the survival of the regime.
        Ms. Salazar. And the Maduro is blocking at this hour the
    aid for food and medicine that, we, the United States are
    offering to give to them so they can help their people? They
    are blocking it and denying it?
        Mr. Fonseca. That is right, yes.
        Ms. Salazar. And, finally, is it true that 20 years ago,
    Hugo Chavez promised in an interview to yours truly that he was
    going to establish democratic socialism of the 21st century for
    the Venezuelan people?
        Mr. Fonseca. Yes, I recall that interview well, and yes, he
    did.
        Ms. Salazar. Thank you. Now, my question to you and to the
    rest of the panel is to what can we do as a country to help the
    Venezuelan people?
        Mr. Fonseca. I think, you know, one, we have to continue to
    apply pressure and, again, look for ways to allow access for
    vital humanitarian assistance. I think we also need to continue
    to reassure and support Venezuelan neighbors and those in the
    region that are having to absorb millions of Venezuelans
    fleeing the country. I think it should be noted that the--that
    the millions of Venezuelans fleeing the country are another
    really important release valve that allow the regime to muddle
    through by having to, you know, sort of having fewer mouths to
    feed in the country with an economy that continues to sort of
    move in a death spiral. And so I think that----
        Ms. Salazar. If there is one single thing that we could do
    as a country to help the Venezuelan people, what would that be?
        Mr. Fonseca. Continue to apply pressure. I do not--
    unfortunately, I do not see a short-term----
        Ms. Salazar. What type of pressure? What type of pressure?
        Mr. Fonseca. I think we need to continue to apply
    diplomatic and economic pressure. We need to continue to press
    for the admission of humanitarian assistance in to support
    those--and, again, I think we need to--I know you asked for
    one, but I also think we need to shore up our allies and
    partners in the region----
        Ms. Salazar. I only have 50 seconds. Why do not you let
    me--Dr. Arnson answer. If there is one single thing we can do
    as a country to help the Venezuelan people, what would that be?
        Dr. Arnson. It would be to work closely with our
    international allies, with the Venezuelan opposition, and with
    a broad range of actors in civil society that can come together
    around a common agenda, first, for humanitarian issues, and
    then eventually to tackle some of the more difficult political
    and security challenges.
        Ms. Salazar. Dr. Berg, one thing in 13 seconds. What could
    we do as a country to help the Venezuelan people at this hour?
        Dr. Berg. Thank you, Congresswoman. I would say to
    reiterate what Mr. Fonseca said, the pressure is, obviously,
    key. It has to be multi-dimensional. As I mentioned in my
    opening remarks, it is not just sanctions, but sanctions and--
    and Congresswoman Levin asked a great question, previously,
    about sanctions and targeting. I think we can look at targeting
    and look at----
        Ms. Salazar. What does targeting mean? I only have 14
    seconds. One thing. What does targeting mean?
        Dr. Berg. To look at the actual targets of our sanctions.
    The people on whom we are putting sanctions. The theory behind
    the maximum pressure campaign was that sanctions would be
    enough to dislodge Maduro. But unfortunately the targeting of
    those sanctions has not been on actual military figures whom we
    all believe to control the security apparatus on the domestic
    level.
        So looking at targeting when it comes to our pressure will
    be key, Congresswoman.
        Ms. Salazar. Thank you.
        I yield back. My time is up.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        Congressman Vincente Gonzalez, you are recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Congressman Gonzalez, are you on?
        Congressman Vargas, are you on?
        Mr. Vargas. Yes, I am.
        Mr. Sires. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear
    me? This is Juan Vargas.
        Mr. Sires. Okay, Juan. You are on.
        Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, first of all, Mr.
    Chairman, for having this hearing, and I also want to thank the
    ranking member and all of the witnesses.
        Two things jump out at me in this hearing, one, our failure
    with humanitarian aid. That seems to jump out when I hear
    statistics that Syrian refugees have received, literally,
    almost ten times as much aid as have Venezuelan refugees, that
    is one.
        And, second, our intelligence failures. It seems like that
    we believed that one thing was going to happen with sanctions
    and maximum pressure, and then it did not come about.
        So I can start first with humanitarian aid. I am very
    concerned about not only internally displaced people, but, of
    course, refugees, also. How can we work better with the allies
    that we have all been talking about, both in the region,
    European allies as we have said earlier, how can we work better
    with everybody to have a better result? Because the result
    right now is disastrous.
        I would ask that of Dr. Arnson.
        Dr. Arnson. Thank you very much, Congressman, for the
    question. I think that the United States certainly can
    contribute more of its own resources, but there are other ways
    to continue to mobilize the international community. There have
    been donors' conferences convened by the European Union. We
    should press for more.
        They, of course, are dealing with their own influx of
    refugees from Syria, from Afghanistan, from other parts of the
    Middle East and Northern Africa, and it is a complicated
    situation there as well. But we could also look to mobilize
    more contributions by the U.S. private sector and work in
    partnership with other organizations like the DFC to provide
    employment opportunities on the ground for Venezuelan refugees
    and host communities in the region.
        Mr. Vargas. I guess I am also very concerned about the food
    insecurity, in particular. I mean, I have great respect for the
    United Nations Food Program. As you know, they just won the
    Nobel Peace Prize for all the work that they are doing. But at
    the same time, they alerted us to all the millions of people in
    this world who may starve this year because of COVID and other
    issues.
        How can we work with the U.N. better knowing that what the
    Maduro regime has been doing to manipulate the food
    distribution because they want to do it? What can we do? I am
    very concerned about that.
        Dr. Arnson.
        Dr. Arnson. Yes, well you know, you have hit the nail on
    the head. I mean the greatest source of--the greatest obstacle
    to greater food assistance by the international community is
    precisely Nicolas Maduro and the rest of the Venezuelan
    Government.
        The United Nations has dramatically expanded its footprint
    in Venezuela over the last 2 years. There are a variety of U.N.
    agencies that are on the ground, the Office of Coordination of
    Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA, the--UNICEF and others. This does
    not include at this time the World Food Program.
        And I would note that, you know, there have been numerous
    efforts to take the issue of Venezuela to the U.N. Security
    Council. Most of those have served to just reproduce the
    polarization between the United States on the one hand and
    Russia and China on the other. But in bringing the humanitarian
    issue to the Security Council that did provide an opening--and
    there was agreement on providing this greater opening for U.N.
    agencies to have a presence.
        So the bottom line is, you know, how do you force people to
    do something that they do not want to do? It is very difficult.
    And so the question is can you offer them something which is
    not violating of your, you know, basic principles? Can you
    offer them anything in exchange?
        Mr. Vargas. If I can just interrupt the last few seconds
    that I have. What about the intelligence failure? Why have we
    gotten it so wrong?
        Dr. Arnson. Is that a question for me?
        Mr. Vargas. Yes.
        Dr. Arnson. Theories of political change are multiple. And
    there was the sense that by tightening the screws enough, you
    can create fractures in the regime, you can cause the military
    to divide. There were all kinds of ways in which, you know--
    there was the assumption that the Maduro regime would implode
    or cry uncle and agree to the kinds of things that the United
    States and others wanted, including, you know, the Venezuelan
    opposition and the majority of the Venezuelan people. And that
    theory of change has proved false.
        And so I think it is to the credit of the Biden
    Administration that they are now looking at alternatives and
    looking to see what, if any, kind of, you know, negotiations
    that involve the opposition, that involve this big tent, civil
    society, you know, organizations, academia, unions, et cetera,
    can collectively pressure for some real change.
        Mr. Vargas. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman.
        Congressman Gonzalez, are you on the line.
        Mr. Gonzalez. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        Mr. Sires. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Gonzalez. Sorry, I had some technical difficulties
    there for a second. But my question is, there is--you know,
    American companies have seen their investment severely affected
    by the crisis in Venezuela. And while Venezuela's oil
    capabilities have severely decreased, some energy companies
    have played a crucial role in preventing the total collapse.
        How can Congress work with the private sector to protect
    American investment in Venezuela? And how can the private
    sector assist us? I chair the Oil and Gas Caucus for the
    Democratic Party. And I have a pretty good relationship with
    some of the energy companies that are down there. And they seem
    to have--talk about intelligence failures, they seem to have a
    lot of intelligence, and they seem to know a lot about what is
    going on. How could we better work together, or are we--and it
    just has not been working out--to both protect our energy
    investments in Venezuela? And how can they assist us in
    structuring policy?
        Dr. Berg. Congressman, if I can jump in on this one. It is
    a great question. So we have seen a lot of American companies
    and American investment in Venezuela affected by the Maduro
    regime, and its operations. I think--you and I are both
    observing energy companies, for example, trying to operate
    under extremely difficult conditions, under conditions where
    they do not have proper partnership from PDVSA with which they
    have to partner as a condition of being able to operate in the
    country.
        But there have been unique approaches by some American oil
    and gas companies to operate, basically, with the attempt of
    putting proceeds from those operations in say an escrow account
    or some way of sort of syphoning it off or kind of bracketing
    it off to the side and ensuring that a lot of the proceeds from
    that activity does not actually flow to the Maduro regime and
    the funding of that repressive security apparatus.
        And so there are creative ways in which we can think about
    keeping American investment there and keeping a footprint on
    the ground, as Mr. Fonseca said in his opening statement, while
    also ensuring that that money is not actually fuelling and
    funding the repressive apparatus there.
        Mr. Fonseca. Congressman, can I make one brief addition.
    Again, I could not agree more with Dr. Berg. And I do think we
    need to create space for the American private sector to out-
    compete Russia, China, and others and gain some access back on
    the ground. I cannot underscore how important, I think, to
    unleash the American private sector, and how that can provide
    consequential long-term influence in aid in ushering democratic
    transition at some point.
        The U.S. could consider the issuance of specific licenses
    to American companies engaged in sort of an oil for food
    medicine, rather than, you know, their removal of sectoral
    sanctions in the near term. I think this would give the
    American private sector some access on the ground, as well as
    possibly help alleviate some of the humanitarian pressures.
        One of the things I am most concerned about is the
    September 2020 Anti-Blockade Law that was passed. I think
    Venezuela in the near-term is going to be going, Maduro is
    going to be going through the process of privatizing major
    Venezuelan assets. And I think our adversaries are going to
    move in and try to consume those assets. And it might be very
    difficult to get them back at some point in the future, even if
    the hand or the pendulum swings back to the opposition.
        Mr. Gonzalez. That is just a huge concern.
        Dr. Arnson. Could I just add to that? I mean, I think what
    Brian Fonseca said nature earlier, of course, that nature
    abhors a vacuum is really true. And if U.S. companies,
    particularly, in the oil sector, and mostly in the oil sector
    are prohibited from producing, even if those assets go into an
    escrow fund or some other mechanism that is verifiable that
    does not benefit the regime, they are going to be taken over.
        And, you know, I think one of Maduro's survival strategies
    is going to be, over this next year, precisely to privatize
    PDVSA assets and other government assets and look for
    international companies to step in and run them. And we know
    exactly who those--who will be eager to acquire a greater share
    of the economic price of the country.
        Dr. Berg. Congressman, if I can just jump in here really
    quickly and piggyback on what Dr. Arnson said.
        One thing that I think the regime is looking at here is
    that during this--the political and economic crisis in the
    country, there are sort of three types of crudes within
    Venezuela: Light, medium, and heavy. The heavy crude is largely
    produced in conjunction with the private sector and with
    international companies. And that has been, if you look at the
    oil output in the country, some of the least affected as
    compared to medium and light crudes, which have been some of
    the most affected. And that is entirely basically produced by
    PDVSA the State owned oil company.
        So I think the regime is looking at this very clearly and
    saying, as Dr. Arnson mentioned and Mr. Fonseca, privatization
    might be the way to go here in terms of being able to increase
    productivity, because PDVSA is essentially beyond repair in
    terms of its ability to actually maintain the rigs and
    contribute to an uptick in oil production in the country.
        Mr. Vargas. Thank you so much. I yield back.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you.
        We now recognize Congressman Steube from Florida for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And first I want to thank
    you for allowing members who are not on the subcommittee to ask
    questions. I appreciate that greatly, as these issues affect
    state of Florida that I represent in my district.
        My questions are directed to Mr. Berg. President Trump
    signed an order on his last full day in office which defers
    deportation of some 145,000 Venezuelans for 18 months.
    Venezuelans who are eligible for deferral can continue to live
    and work in the United States. Some of those included under the
    TPS program. President Trump blamed the Venezuelan socialist
    government and President Maduro for quote, ``The worst
    humanitarian crisis in the Western hemisphere in recent
    memory,'' Secretary of State Blinken even called Maduro a
    brutal dictator.
        The shortage and basic goods in medicine has forced these
    Venezuelans to flee the country. As a member of the Florida
    delegation, I know there is a significant number of Venezuelans
    in my State. What do you think the Biden Administration's plan
    should be regarding President Trump's order that he signed on
    those last days in office?
        Dr. Berg. Thank you for the question, Congressman, as I
    understand it, the deferred enforced departure was signed on
    the last day, but the details were left to the Biden
    Administration. And so from that standpoint, I would certainly
    encourage the Biden Administration to--not only to implement
    but to work out the exact details of the stay, the duration,
    the documentation, as well as the work permits. Because it is
    not in the United States' interest to send back Venezuelans to,
    as we have heard today at this hearing, to humanitarian
    disaster and a brutal dictatorship.
        I would also note that there is a real economic opportunity
    here with the number of Venezuelan migrants we have in the
    country. Numerous reports of late have shown just how educated,
    how entrepreneurial, and how dynamic this diaspora is. And so I
    think from an economic standpoint, particularly, from your
    state's standpoint where there are quite a few Venezuelan
    refugees, it could be a huge economic boom if done the right
    way.
        Mr. Steube. Well, Maduro has strengthened ties with--and it
    has been discussed already in this committee hearing--with
    Russia, China, Cuba, and Iran for political, economic, and
    military purposes. These malign, external actors prop up the
    regime and perpetuate the ongoing humanitarian crisis despite
    U.S. sanctions. What steps can the international community take
    that complement or support U.S. efforts to counter-support from
    these external actors to the regime?
        Mr. Fonseca. Congressman, I can take a shot at that, if
    that is okay. I think that is absolutely right. I think one of
    the things the United States, you know, needs to continue to
    place pressure and leverage our allies, multilateral
    organizations to continue to pressure, specifically, China,
    Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Cuba for the activities they are
    doing on the ground to, you know, keep the regime sort of
    muddling through, as well as, you know, not sort of
    contributing positively to alleviating the humanitarian crisis.
    I think we definitely need to do that.
        And to sort of build off of a comment, you know, that we
    made earlier, collectively, not having a presence on the ground
    allows our, you know, our adversaries, our rivals, you know, to
    certainly, you know, run, you know, run fairly rampant
    throughout the country. And so I think we need some presence
    back on the ground, not just sort of intel collection, but also
    to occupy influence space.
        Mr. Steube. What steps can the U.S. take to counter efforts
    from State actors, like Iran and Russia, to support the regime
    in evading U.S. sanctions, Mr. Berg?
        Dr. Berg. Great question, Congressman. I think one of the
    things that we have seen here is the regime's head-long plunge
    into the illicit economy, specifically, as the sources of legal
    activity in the country have dried up.
        And so I have outlined a number of recommendations, both in
    my oral testimony, my written, as well as in other places about
    certification regimes, for example, that we could--we could
    seek when it comes to parts of the illicit economy such as gold
    mining, which are very easily sort of brought into the legal
    economy through a number of maneuvers in countries like
    Colombia and in Brazil.
        And so those certification processes will be key. And a lot
    of it is just about pressure, as has been mentioned many times
    here, is that we have quite a bit of leverage, and we would be
    wise to use it for the right purposes here rather than
    squandering it.
        Mr. Steube. The Chinese Communist Party has helped the
    Madura regime evade U.S. sanctions and is one of regime's main
    financial backers and has more recently delayed Maduro's debt
    repayment in exchange for some shipments of oil.
        What does the Chinese Communist Party gain from involvement
    in Venezuela, and how does it reflect the nature of the Chinese
    Communist Party's influence in other parts of the region?
        Dr. Berg. Congressman, I think that China's role in, in
    Venezuela, as Dr. Arnson mentioned earlier, it started as a
    transactional economic relationship. It has now evolved into
    more of a geopolitical and possibly even strategic partnership.
    And so I know that there has been mention of the fact that
    there are no new loans that have been given to the country
    since 2017. But the fact is of the more than $60 billion in
    loans that were given since 2007, there is still a reasonable
    amount of that money that is outstanding.
        And so as long as China is bearing the burden--as long as
    Venezuelan debt remains in arrears, China in some sense is
    carrying the burden of this country's collapse. But
    nevertheless, I think for China, Venezuela at a standstill and
    therefore as a major liability and potential strategic threat
    for the region is actually to China's advantage in this broader
    geopolitical rivalry than a Venezuela working toward a
    democratic transition, possibly giving the United States an
    increased position or boost in their region.
        Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you.
        We now recognize Congresswoman Omar from Minnesota for 5
    minutes.
        Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for allowing me to
    come and be part of your committee. My colleague, Ms. Salazar
    from Florida asked her questions to everyone except the
    panelist who lives in Venezuela.
        So, Mr. Reyna, I would like to give you a chance to address
    her question.
        Mr. Reyna. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Omar. Perhaps
    not in just one issue, I have to say that aid has been coming
    in, not of course in the numbers that is needed. But just in
    our case as a small organization on the ground, in 3 years, we
    have brought in over 180 tons of aid and have distributed, just
    last year, 86 tons of aid in terms of medicines, medical
    supplies, and so on.
        My position here and my recommendation has been to engage
    in spite of all the reservations with some key actors within
    the Maduro government, as well as to continue working, for
    example, with the National Assembly of 2015 commission on
    humanitarian aid to increase the number of aid, I mean, the
    amount of aid coming into the country.
        I think that if one looks at the humanitarian situation and
    humanitarian impact on the lives of everyday Venezuelans, this
    is a must. And so I thank you for this, but I do believe that
    it is possible. We have been able to do this in spite of
    challenges, risks, and threats, and even having some of our
    personnel and colleagues going through, you know, difficult,
    risky situations, but we are still here, and we believe that
    this is possible. And once again, that engagement to me
    requires flexibility and creativity, but it is a must if we
    want to help the Venezuelan people.
        Ms. Omar. I am really grateful for the opportunity to hear
    directly from you. It has not been lost on me sitting here,
    hearing my colleagues engage on Venezuela and not having a
    single question addressed to you. So thank you so much.
        I am hoping that you can expand on a couple of points from
    your testimony. As you outlined the situation in Venezuela is
    dire, people are going without food and medicine. And,
    obviously, to many of us, you know, we believe that we cannot
    allow people to continue to suffer because of our own domestic
    policies.
        Can you tell us how your work has been impacted by the
    canceling of licenses for oil-for-diesel swaps, and what other
    sanctions are proving to be significant barriers to the
    humanitarian response?
        Mr. Reyna. Thank you. That is--there is one issue in
    particular that I think that is--that can be solved, I think,
    quickly, also, as a show of good faith between both the U.S.
    administration, the Biden Administration, and hopefully having
    bipartisan support, and the Maduro government. And this is
    lifting the sanctions on secondary--in the secondary sanctions
    on the swaps of oil for diesel. And this has quite an impact
    again on the population.
        The committee, the human rights committee in one of the
    States of Venezuela working with the anticorruption network
    stated very recently, this was just last month in February,
    Venezuela began 2021 with a severe shortage of diesel, the fuel
    used to transport heavy cargo, food stalls for public
    transportation, and turbo electric plants. Essential groups
    report diesel distribution failures since the end of 2020. For
    the agricultural sector, this has brought paralysis on the
    field. And they go on with other issues regarding that--this in
    particular.
        I think it would be quite an important step to lift the
    sanctions on the oil for diesel swaps and open a conversation,
    also in having the World Food Program coming into Venezuela
    with their capacity.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Omar. All right. And, then, just my last question to
    you--again grateful for the opportunity to ask these questions.
    How is the political stalemate between Maduro and Guaido
    impacting your ability to do your work and just the lives of
    Venezuelans since you are the only Venezuelan on this panel?
        Mr. Reyna. Thank you. I think that given the principles of
    humanitarian action, you know, we have worked in our own space,
    let's say, even though we have had, of course, conversations,
    for example, again with the Commission of Humanitarian Aid of
    the 2015 National Assembly, which is really important. I mean,
    if the aim is to help, it is to support the Venezuelan people
    suffering the consequences of the humanitarian emergency, that
    should be the consideration.
        So we have not been involved in the political conflict. It
    has to be solved. It needs to be addressed, definitely. But,
    certainly, we can find ways to have sort of a two-track kind of
    work. And the one that goes toward supporting the Venezuelan
    people suffering severely the consequences of the emergency can
    be worked out again, and we have shown that, a civil society
    organization is on the ground.
        Ms. Omar. Thank you. And, Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        Now, we will recognize Congresswoman Malliotakis. You are
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    you for allowing me to participate in today's subcommittee
    meeting. And I have really have found the exchange to be
    enlightening and a good discussion.
        You know, for me, it is heartbreaking to see how the
    wealthiest country in South America has been destroyed by
    corruption and socialism. People--and let's make it clear that
    the people of Venezuela suffer because of their own government,
    not for any other reason. And as a Cuban, the daughter of a
    Cuban refugee, it is all too familiar to me, because it is very
    similar to what happened in my family. But we have an
    obligation as the leader of the free world to help the
    Venezuelan people.
        And I look forward to working with the people on this
    committee to achieve that.
        I was pleased when the Biden Administration recognized Juan
    Guaido as the leader of the Nation. And--but I am--I am I guess
    a little upset about his announcement to reenter the United
    Nations Human Rights Council without having any type of
    concessions. And, as you know, last week at the first day of
    the session of the U.N. Human Rights Council, it was Nicolas
    Maduro who was given a platform to speak.
        One of the--one of the biggest violators of human rights
    was given a platform to speak at the United Nations Human
    Rights Council. And I think we have an obligation to speak out
    against that.
        And I would like to know from the panel their thoughts on
    how we can utilize the leverage of President Biden wanting to
    return to the council, and how we should be using that as
    leverage to try to get some accountability and to protect the
    human rights of not only the people of Venezuela, but of the
    nations that have propped up Venezuela, like Cuba, like Iran,
    like China, like Russia? That is my first question.
        And the second question is, in terms of it is good to have
    verbal support for Guaido, but what actions, specifically, do
    you think we should be taking as a nation to support him? Thank
    you.
        Dr. Berg. If I can jump in on the U.N. Human Rights Council
    question, that would be great. Congresswoman, that is a great
    question. And this exactly--this shows exactly the linkages
    that I mentioned in my opening statement. It was precisely the
    support of other authoritarian regimes, also, on the human
    rights council, like China, like Russia to be able to help
    Venezuela win from the South America region when there were
    really no other sort of competitors for those, for those seats
    on the human rights council.
        It was a total disgrace that Nicolas Maduro and his envoy
    in Geneva are giving the world lessons on human rights
    protections. So I absolutely share, your--your concern. And as
    a matter of fact AEI has done a report on reforming the U.N.
    Human Rights Council, which includes a number of things,
    actionable things that should happen before the U.S. sits in
    that body again. So periodic reviews of members that are on the
    council. So a kind of policing of one another to make sure that
    the body does not become a rogues' gallery of suspect States.
        More competitive elections. In many cases, we have
    elections where there are real only a few countries on the
    slate for--to represent their region. And so you have countries
    like Venezuela able to slip through because it has the support
    of greater powers, but also it just does not face that much
    competition. We have to increase the level of interest here, I
    think, in terms of the desire to sit on this body, and part of
    that is going to be shoring up its reputation.
        And, last, I would mention that there should be some sort
    of review, I think, before you are even eligible to put
    yourself forward for membership in this body that you sort of--
    you comply with basic human rights standards. Because as we
    have seen, quite a few candidates in U.N. Human Rights Council
    elections have been extremely suspect. And so those are three
    sort of tangible things that I would throw out there right
    away.
        But I absolutely share your concern that Maduro and his
    envoys were given time in Geneva to present last week.
        Ms. Malliotakis. Please send me a copy of your report. I
    would like to read that. Thank you.
        Mr. Sires. I recognize now Debbie Wasserman Schultz. A
    tireless defender of Venezuela, and of human rights of
    Venezuela, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
    you for your indulgence in allowing me to moonlight as member
    of your subcommittee on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
        Some of you may know that I represent the largest
    concentration of Venezuelans in the United States. My home town
    has so many Venezuelans that its nickname is West Venezuela,
    and proudly so. In my own neighborhood we are surrounded and
    are mixed with friends and neighbors who have family in
    Venezuela who have themselves fled from Venezuela. I have heard
    harrowing experiences shared with me repeatedly, a fight from
    political persecution, businesses confiscated, denial of basic
    food, or lifesaving medicines. And so making sure that we shine
    a spotlight on this plight is really critical.
        I want to ask Ms. Arnson and Mr. Reyna if they can talk
    briefly about the relief that declaring temporary protective
    status for Venezuela would provide the Venezuelans and the
    United States who fear deportation. And, specifically, if you
    could address why TPS, which is a legal protection that is
    based in statute offers better protection than DED, which was
    haphazardly declared in the last 16 hours of the previous
    President's term.
        And making sure, you know, from my perspective, I have been
    pleased to see as I--that President Biden has clearly indicated
    his plans to declare TPS for Venezuelans. And if you could
    share with us your perspective on the difference and why TPS
    would be preferable.
        Dr. Arnson. And I do not know if Feliciano wants to go
    first. Congresswoman Wasserman Schultz, I am not an expert on
    U.S. immigration law, but I think that, you know, what you have
    indicated in your question is true. That temporary protected
    status gives much greater certainty to Venezuelans that they
    will not be deported, but they will have not just a temporary
    stay of deportation, but also a number of rights to work in the
    United States and to have a life until such time as they may
    choose to return to Venezuela when the country is in a
    dramatically different circumstance.
        The deferred deportation is exactly that. It says we will
    not deport you. But there are many other things that go with
    being able to survive and live a productive life in the United
    States. And I think that Congress has on numerous occasions, in
    a bipartisan way, endorsed TPS for Venezuelans. And I would
    certainly support that and hope that the Biden Administration
    will follow through on its commitment which it made repeatedly
    during the campaign.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you. Mr. Reyna.
        Mr. Reyna. Yes, thank you very, Congresswoman. I agree with
    Cindy that any status that would grant more rights to people in
    the United States who have migrated forcefully from Venezuela
    and who if coming back would really face, you know,
    difficulties, it is--it is the right way to go.
        So again, without having the total knowledge of the
    migration situation in the U.S., I understand from what I have
    read, from what I heard from colleagues that TPS would be the
    proper way to go. Thank you.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you.
        And Mr. Reyna, I know earlier you spoke about the need for
    the donor community to step up globally. I am a member of the
    Appropriations Committee, and you know, as I said just
    moonlighting on the Foreign Affairs Committee today, but I
    curious about what more the United States should be doing.
    Particularly, where should we be focusing our efforts, our
    funding efforts within Venezuela, as well as neighboring
    countries like Colombia who has taken in, you know, significant
    refugees and migrant populations and also maybe throw in what
    about the rest of the international donor community?
        Mr. Reyna. Thank you. I believe that, again, in seeing the
    numbers and the extent of the situation here that there is room
    for much more. There are reservations because of the political
    situation and manipulation, for example, of humanitarian aid.
    But this is a risk I think that has to be taken, unfortunately,
    because such is the situation in Venezuela, and that does not
    mean that one cannot overcome, for example, a narrative or
    propaganda, or something like that. It can be done.
        And at the end, the end result is really supporting a
    popular
        [inaudible]. I think that there are others who should be
    coming in. Again, perhaps in a multilateral kind of reflection
    on the obstacles in Venezuela, why, and how to overcome. It
    would be possible to increase the amount of resources that are
    coming in. Working through the U.N. system is one way, is an
    important way both inside and outside of Venezuela, but also
    directly to civil society as has been happening so far, but
    perhaps this can be increased.
        And so are different ways in which I am quite sure that
    international cooperation can be increased in the case of
    Venezuela. Again, looking at the numbers with other countries
    in need, it really does not make any sense to see why is it
    that Venezuela is not receiving all the funding that it should
    receive for humanitarian aid.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
    back.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congresswoman. We have votes at
    12:15, so we are going to go for another 10 minutes. The
    ranking member and I will have one more question.
        My question is to you, Mr. Reyna. Mr. Reyna, the reason you
    are a guest of our committee is because we recognize the work
    that you do inside of Venezuela. We recognize the risk that you
    take all the time.
        So as a recognition of your work and your effort, we want
    to make sure that we receive your thoughts here today at this
    committee. I happen to have visited Cucuta, Mr. Reyna, a couple
    of years ago. I have never seen anything like it. People from
    Venezuela work hours and hours just to get a meal. There had to
    be a line of about 5,000 people. There was a line for the
    bathroom for about 500,000 people alone. And there is a priest
    that through volunteers provides the meal for these people. I
    think that priest should be canonized because of the way he has
    organized and helped those people in that area.
        I was just wondering if your organization is involved at
    all in trying to help this particular part of Colombia or
    Venezuela at all? Are you involved, your organization, or any
    of your members involved?
        Mr. Reyna. Thank you, Chairman Sires. At Accion Solidaria,
    we are not working on the border, but we are part of the
    community of humanitarian organizations on the ground.
        What you are describing really is for us--this is sort of a
    daily happening, and it is something that, that takes you know,
    our time fully in terms of--I mean, even today, we are having
    about 80 people at our doors receiving medicines donated, and
    this goes to about 1,400 to 1,500 per month. But we do have a
    large network.
        Some of the organizations on the border towns are working
    with the UNHCR and others in order to provide support for the
    displaced, internally displaced, and then also working with
    others outside of Venezuela to provide support for refugees and
    migrants on the other side of the border. So----
        And, again, I think, I really appreciate that you took the
    time to go to Cucuta to speak to the people and to see what
    they are going through. And, hopefully, also perhaps this
    would--you know, as I was saying, will lead to an increase in
    support, not only for what the response is here in Venezuela,
    but also in the region. We do need that.
        And the organizations that are working outside in this
    platform called response for Venezuelans would really
    appreciate such support.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Reyna.
        I now recognize the ranking member.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have heard throughout
    our discussion today something that made me think of a quote
    that I used to use when I run my healthcare company. I used to
    tell my physician leaders that, ``No one cares how much you
    know, until they know how much you care.''
        And I want to make sure that both the people of Venezuela
    who can hear my voice today, the international community and
    all of our witnesses, and we want to help. We want to help. We
    want to help the people of Venezuela who are suffering one the
    greatest humanitarian crises ever and, certainly, the greatest
    economic collapse ever.
        But my concern is that if that assistance is funneled to
    and through the regime, it only empowers the regime's
    leadership. One example is Maduro's henchmen destroyed,
    literally destroyed resupply convoys of humanitarian aid coming
    in from Colombia.
        So my last and final question is how effective would
    relaxing sanctions be if Maduro is just going to seize,
    destroy, or misuse that aid?
        Ms. Arnson. If I could address that, Congressman Green.
        I mean, again, just to repeat, the Maduro regime is the
    principle obstacle to greater delivery.
        But as Feliciano Reyna was pointing out, there is, I think,
    a lot of experience in Venezuelan civil society, in the
    international community, in delivering aid in an apolitical
    fashion. And that has to be a fundamental principle.
        And to go to what a number of questions have touched on, I
    think that the scale, the resources for the humanitarian
    response, both inside Venezuela and outside Venezuela, for the
    refugees and migrants, has to be dramatically increased.
        And there are multiple international relief organizations,
    U.S. relief organizations, church organizations, USAID, State
    Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migrants, that
    are involved in this every single day, and they just do not
    have enough. There is just not enough funding to go around.
        So I would encourage people, as they look to what are the
    next steps to help Venezuela, to dramatically increase the
    amount of resources available.
        Mr. Green. Yes. And I was, in my preparations for today's
    committee hearing, surprised to see the delta between the aid
    to Syrian refugees and the aid to the Venezuelan refugees. And
    I agree with you, that disparity, I mean, we have got to
    recruit international partners to it, to this cause.
        But, again, my great concern is, whether it is an NGO or
    governmental assistance, it is got to get past Maduro to get to
    the people who need it.
        And I appreciate your thoughts and your comments.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I yield.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Ranking Member.
        And thank you again to our witnesses and the members for
    their participation in this important hearing today.
        The crisis in Venezuela deserves our urgent attention. I
    will continue to work closely with my colleagues and the Biden
    Administration on a bipartisan basis to pursue the peaceful
    return to democracy in Venezuela.
        With that, the committee is adjourned. Thank you to our
    witnesses. Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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