[Senate Hearing 116-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2020
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TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 3:00 p.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Lindsey Graham (Chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Graham, Blunt, Moran, Lankford, Daines,
Leahy, Durbin, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, and Van Hollen.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
opening statement of senator lindsey graham
Senator Graham. The subcommittee will come to order.
Thank you, Secretary Pompeo, for coming.
Our hearing today is on the President's fiscal year 2020
funding request and budget justification for Department of
State. I'd like to welcome two new members of the subcommittee
staff, Katherine Jackson and Sarita Vanka.
So your written testimony, Mr. Secretary, will be accepted
for the record. I will make a short opening statement, and the
floor will be yours, after Senator Leahy.
Your budget proposal is 21 percent below the fiscal year
2019 enacted level. It ain't happening.
So this is the budget. The biggest reduction is in State--
is in our account. I think you've done a great job, Mike, as
Secretary of State. I've been to Iraq and Afghanistan 54 times.
You've been there a lot. The one thing I've learned, you're
never going to win this war against radical Islam by dropping
bombs alone.
Count me in with what Secretary Mattis said years ago, if
you cut the State Department's budget, you need to buy more
ammo. The best thing to do to defeat this radical ideology is
invest in the lives of others. A small schoolhouse in a poor
region of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, you name the location--
Africa--can do more damage to radical Islam than any bomb.
Giving a woman a say about the future of her children is
absolutely imperative to win this conflict. Developmental aid
has proven to be a wise national security investment. The
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) alone has
saved millions of young Africans from certain death from AIDS,
and the story goes on and on and on and on.
I'm a pretty hawkish guy, but I believe in the
International Affairs Budget Function 150 account, and I really
do thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think you've done a wonderful
job dealing with complicated issues all over the world, giving
the President sound advice. It's up to him to take it. I
appreciate the President listening. Sometimes we disagree, but
I've never had anyone, as President of the United States, reach
out and talk to more people than President Trump. Sometimes
that's good, sometimes it's not, but he's subject to changing
his mind, and he has, in my view, done a very good job of being
a better friend to our allies and put our enemies on notice.
And, Secretary Pompeo, thank you for the job you do, the time
you spend away from your family, and I think you represent our
country exceedingly well.
Senator Leahy.
statement of senator patrick j. leahy
Senator Leahy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I'll
say my former neighbor at the times of the week that I'm in
Virginia.
I was actually tempted to submit my opening statement from
last year's hearing because very little has changed, as we see,
in the President's budget request. Like last year, we are still
presented with damaging funding cuts. I don't see any
explanation for them. We've therefore heard the same vocal
opposition to this request from the private sector, from
national security experts, and from a lot of Democrats and
Republicans in the Congress.
Mr. Secretary, on a positive note, I appreciate that you've
lifted the hiring freeze at the State Department. You've begun
to address the vacancies that were created before you took the
job, which actually you couldn't have lifted the hiring freeze
if we had accepted the President's fiscal year 2019 proposal.
But there's not much else that's changed. We've been asked to
consider the proposed funding levels not compared to ongoing
operations in progress, but to the previous year's request as
though nothing has happened in the world since then. Those
comparisons are irrelevant, and that proposal was rejected by
Republicans and Democrats alike in the Congress last year.
Many of the initiatives, though, that the administration
has touted, which I think are good initiatives, women's
economic empowerment, the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the President
has touted those, but they were made possible only because we
rejected the cuts in the previous budget. We need to face
reality that not only does the request cut most of the programs
highlighted by the administration and its own priorities, but
with cuts totaling $11.5 billion, virtually every program
funded by this subcommittee is negatively affected.
And I would note that in my years on this subcommittee,
both as Chairman and as Vice Chairman, the bill usually comes
out with unanimous votes or nearly unanimous vote, but that's
because you have programs like Fulbright scholarships, food
security, law enforcement, countering Russian influence,
reducing poverty and human trafficking, assisting refugees,
empowering women. These are important programs, but the
President will use slogans like ``America First,'' but the
budget says the opposite.
Now, the administration has highlighted some important
programs, like PEPFAR, as we all do, but you can't explain how
if you cut PEPFAR and other programs that cut--combat HIV/AIDS
by $1.7 billion, it's one thing to say you support these
programs, but then you cut it. I don't know how that advances
U.S. interests when the administration talks about having to
make choices, is it a choice of benefits, is actually a choice
that is what this country wants to make knowing that it will
mean countless lives lost that could have been saved? I'd like
to think that we are in favor of saving lives, not losing them.
The administration talks about preserving U.S. global
leadership, so please explain in more than a talking point
about burden sharing, how refusing to pay our assessments at
the U.N., costs that we're obligated to pay, how does that
enhance U.S. leadership?
When the administration talks about curbing migration,
explain why cutting the funds that we appropriate to address
the causes of migration makes sense.
And when the administration talks about standing up for
American values, and rightly calls--I agree with the
administration when they call Nicolas Maduro a tyrant, but then
how do you explain why a dictator, like Egypt's President El-
Sisi, a dictator, is favored at the White House, Russia's
President Putin, North Korea's Kim Jong-un, and Turkey's
President Erdogan are praised as strong leaders, and the Saudi
Crown Prince, who everyone knows was involved with the murder
of an American citizen, is treated as an indispensable friend
and ally?
So every year we have an opportunity to reassure the world
that the United States, as I believe it should be, is defender
of the universal rights of free expression, of free and fair
elections, of apply the rule of law to the rich and powerful,
but words are not enough. I've traveled to a number of these
places with Senator Graham. He's a good friend. And we've seen
that you can't condemn some tyrants while praising others. And
if you cut programs that reinforce American values, American
values, it sends the opposite message.
So I hope that once again, Mr. Chairman, that the Congress
can try to be the conscience of the Nation, provide the funding
for international diplomacy, develop that we know are so
important, and remember, as you said, plus Secretary Mattis
said, if you're going to cut this, buy more bullets.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator Leahy.
The floor is yours, Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. MIKE POMPEO, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you very much, Chairman Graham,
Ranking Member Leahy, distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. I won't read my entire statement, but I do have a
few minutes, so I want to just walk through now. Two years of
the administration, I am now 9 days short of 1 year of my time
as Secretary of State.
Senator Graham. The longest serving member of the Cabinet,
right?
[Laughter.]
Secretary Pompeo. I'm reclaiming my time.
When the Trump administration first took office, the United
States of America faced a series of threats. We faced a China
that wanted to spread its model of economic corruption,
increase its military power, and perfect its Orwellian control
of populations. We face in Iran a revolutionary regime that
wanted to dominate the Middle East and had a guaranteed pathway
to nuclear weapons following a truly bad nuclear deal. We faced
a Russia that had invaded Ukraine and had captured Crimea. We
faced a North Korea nuclear missile proliferation threat, and
we faced a terror threat that spanned continents. We faced
petty dictators in the world, like Maduro in Venezuela and
Assad in Syria.
The Trump administration has recognized the seriousness of
the challenges and we responded. I'd like to take a few minutes
to talk about how we've approached this. We think this has
truly benefited the American people and their security.
First, the Trump administration sees the world as it is,
not as we wish it to be. We've leveled with the American people
and our friends and partners about the threats that we face.
This honesty has produced growing bipartisan consensus on
Capitol Hill about the need to confront Chinese aggression. It
produced a unanimous consensus inside of NATO that arms control
agreements like the INF Treaty are worthless if only one party
adheres to its terms. It produced broad international support
for the brave people of Venezuela. Basing policy on reality, we
recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and we recognize
Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights. That's why the
State Department designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps a terror organization on Monday. We must recognize
reality.
Second, we've used creative diplomacy to build coalitions
to confront our enemies because we neither can nor should do
everything ourselves. We convinced our NATO allies to spend
significantly more on their own defense. We rallied the Defeat
ISIS Coalition, a coalition of over 80 countries, to dismantle
the caliphate in Iraq and in Syria.
In Warsaw, we convened more than 60 countries to discuss
the common threats and shared opportunities in the Middle East
that included Arab and Israeli leaders talking to one another.
We're getting the Middle East Strategic Alliance off the
ground. We built the Indo-Pacific Strategy to do a real pivot
to Asia. We supported our hemispheric partners in the
Organization of American States (OAS) and Lima Group as they
work to support the Venezuelan people. And we forged a global
coalition at the United Nations to impose the toughest ever
sanctions on North Korea.
Third, we're focused on outcomes. This administration
promised to dismantle the ISIS caliphate, and we've done it. We
promised to confront China for its trade practices and call
them out on human rights violations, and we've done it. We
promised to exit the Iran nuclear deal to exert pressure on
Tehran to change its murderous ways. We've done that, too.
We're working every day to protect our citizens at home and
abroad and advance American prosperity and values and to
support our allies and partners overseas.
Finally, when I first became Secretary, I promised to put
diplomacy at the forefront of defending U.S. national security
and advancing our interests. I think I've done that, too.
Here's what's happened in my 11-plus months. We lifted the
hiring freeze for family members as well. This was a no-
brainer. We brought 2,000 family members who are eligible for
employment back onto our team. Our promotion rates in the
foreign services, which were cut in 2017 across the board by 40
or 50 percent, are now growing again. New foreign service
officer and foreign service specialist classes are beginning.
Fifty-five senior leaders have been confirmed by the Senate
since my first day. Thank you for that. More to follow I hope.
I'm holding a small group of events all across the world,
including here in Washington. I call it ``Meet With Mike.'' My
team can hear from me. We listen to many, many voices directly.
And back in the States, I've traveled some to tell the
State Department story here in America to convince Americans
why diplomacy matters. I've also been recruiting.
And my recommendation to the President and Senate,
recognize four individuals to become career ambassadors: David
Hale, Phil Goldberg, Michele Sison, and Dan Smith. The rest of
our team knows that these are people that we can all look up
to.
There is much more to say, but I'll end here. But for
discussion in the administration, foreign policy and the $40
billion budget request for State Department and USAID for 2020.
And with that, I look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mike Pompeo
Chairman Graham, Vice Chairman Leahy, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the administration's fiscal
year 2020 budget request for the State Department and the U.S. Agency
for International Development.
To support our National Security Strategy and achieve our foreign
policy goals, the President has submitted an fiscal year 2020 budget
request of $40 billion for the State Department and USAID.
The proposed request will allow us to protect our citizens at home
and abroad, advance American prosperity and values, and support our
allies and partners overseas.
It will promote partner countries' economic and security self-
reliance as they begin to transition away from U.S. assistance
programs, which the American people have generously underwritten for
decades.
We make this request mindful of the burden on American taxpayers,
and our obligation to deliver exceptional results on their behalf.
In an era of great power competition, the State Department and
USAID's work is key to our security, the protection of our freedoms,
and the promotion of American values.
China is proactively applying its power and exerting its influence
in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Under President Trump's
leadership, the United States is responding decisively to China's
aggressive actions. The United States' future security, prosperity, and
leadership depends on maintaining a free, open, and secure Indo-
Pacific. To advance the Indo-Pacific strategy, the budget request
nearly doubles U.S. foreign assistance resources targeting this crucial
area compared to the fiscal year 2019 request.
Russia poses threats that have evolved beyond external or military
aggression, and now include influence operations targeting America and
the Western world. This budget prioritizes countering Russian malign
influence in Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia, and further strengthens
the Department's own systems against malign actors.
Our diplomatic efforts toward the final, fully-verified
denuclearization of North Korea are the most successful that have ever
been undertaken. We remain committed to that goal. This budget provides
for our diplomatic outreach to continue, and to continue implementation
and enforcement of sanctions until we achieve our objective.
We know that the Islamic Republic of Iran's authoritarian regime
will continue to use their nation's resources to proliferate conflict
in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and beyond. It will continue to bankroll
terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.
The United States will therefore work together with our allies and
partners to counter Tehran's aggressive actions to undermine peace and
security in the Middle East and beyond.
As the people of Venezuela continue to fight for their freedom, the
budget request includes funding to support democracy and prosperity in
Venezuela. The budget also requests new authority to support a
democratic transition in Venezuela, including transferring up to $500
million to foreign assistance accounts.
The budget also delivers on the President's commitment to optimize
the effectiveness of our outdated and fragmented overseas humanitarian
assistance. It ensures the United States will remain the world's
largest single donor of humanitarian assistance. The proposal maximizes
the impact of taxpayer dollars, helps more beneficiaries, and delivers
the greatest outcomes by consolidating our humanitarian programming in
a new bureau at USAID. This budget request also preserves the State
Department's lead role on protection issues, as well as the U.S.
refugee admissions program. Further, through available funding in 2019
and 2020, the United States will have on average approximately $9
billion available per year to support overseas humanitarian programs,
maintaining the highest level of U.S. overseas humanitarian funding
ever.
President Trump has made the protection of religious freedom a key
priority at home and abroad. The fiscal year 2020 budget supports our
efforts to continue U.S. leadership in the promotion of global
religious freedom and the protection of persecuted religious and ethnic
minorities all around the world. This July, the State Department will
host the second annual Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom.
American assistance is helping to reverse the devastation and
suffering caused by ISIS and associated terrorist groups. But much work
remains to be done. Working by, with, and through local partners and
community leaders, our assistance programs clear explosive remnants of
war to help keep families safe, restore access to critical health and
education services, improve economic opportunities, and more.
As we work to promote economic growth, the fiscal year 2020 budget
includes a request for $100 million for a new Fund at USAID for the
White House-led Women's Global Development and Prosperity Initiative.
Through the Fund, we will work to find and scale proposals that advance
women's economic empowerment across the developing world, in support of
the Initiative's goal of reaching 50 million women by 2025.
There are few efforts as important to this administration and to
the safety and security of the American people as border security. The
State Department and USAID budget request will strengthen visa vetting,
and improve our targeting of illicit pathways that transnational
criminal organizations use to traffic people, drugs, money, and weapons
into our Nation.
President Trump has made it clear that U.S. foreign assistance
should serve America's interests, and should support countries that
help us to advance our foreign policy goals. This budget therefore
maintains critical support for key U.S. allies, including Israel,
Jordan, Egypt, and Colombia, among others.
The fiscal year 2020 request also includes $175 million for a
Diplomatic Progress Fund. These funds will be used to respond to new
opportunities arising from potential progress in diplomatic and peace
efforts around the world.
Finally, the diplomatic challenges we face today are compounded by
rapid advancements in technology and an ever-changing media
environment. We need our colleagues to be safe, prepared, and ready to
take on any challenge at a moment's notice. The fiscal year 2020 budget
will fully fund State and USAID's current workforce levels, enabling us
to take on emerging policy challenges. We are also modernizing our
human resources, IT infrastructure, and organizational structures to
stay on the cutting edge of 21st century innovation.
We must continue to put American interests first and remain a
beacon of freedom to the world. With the support of Congress, and
through the strategic, efficient use of resources, this budget will do
just that.
Thank you.
Senator Graham. Well, thank you very much. We'll do 6-
minute rounds for questions. We've got a hard stop at 4:30. Do
the math. We'll try to plow through and have some time for a
second round if possible. But thank you for coming.
If the subcommittee restores the funding, if we reject the
budget and go back to the last year's budget, could you spend
the money wisely?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Graham. Thank you. Outcomes. One, I think you're
doing a great job. Morale is better. You're spending a lot of
time explaining the State Department to people here at home. I
think you should travel more in the United States. That's hard
to ask of a guy who spends his life on an airplane, but it's
really important to tell the State Department's story, and I
think you do it very well.
AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan. The outcome is peace with dignity for women in
Afghanistan. Is that correct?
Secretary Pompeo. That's correct. Also making sure that
America's counterterrorism interests are protected as well.
Senator Graham. So we have two goals: make sure that people
like ISIS and Al Qaeda types, who will never come to the peace
table, they do not recapture, take over, Afghanistan. Correct?
Secretary Pompeo. That's correct, sir.
Senator Graham. And if we reintegrate the Taliban back into
the Afghan community writ large, that we do so on our terms,
not theirs.
Secretary Pompeo. That's correct.
SYRIA
Senator Graham. Thank you. Syria. The stabilizing force
that we're talking about will have more Europeans, and our
numbers will go down in terms of boots on the ground. Is that
correct? Is that the proposal?
Secretary Pompeo. That's the discussion that's underway;
yes, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that having a
stabilizing force is the best insurance policy against the
return of ISIS?
Secretary Pompeo. The President has directed we do
everything necessary to ensure that there is not an ISIS 3.0
or, frankly, the disasters in Idlib don't befall us.
Senator Graham. Right. Do you agree with me that having a
stabilizing force in northeastern Syria will prevent Iran from
coming down and taking over their oil?
Secretary Pompeo. It is an important part of our overall
Middle East strategy, including our counter-Iran strategy.
Senator Graham. So containing Iran would include having a
policy in Syria that would keep them from benefiting from our
withdrawal.
Secretary Pompeo. That's right. That's one piece of it;
yes, Senator.
Senator Graham. Okay. So there is a small contingent of
forces down at Al-Tanf that interdicts the flow of weapons from
Beirut to Tehran. Is that correct?
Secretary Pompeo. It also performs important
counterterrorism mission as well.
Senator Graham. Okay. So I think keeping that contingent
there is a good outcome for America because we want to protect
Israel against an increasingly armed Syria.
TURKEY
Turkey is a NATO ally with plenty of problems. Have you
told Turkey that if they deploy the S-400, they can't be part
of the F-35 program?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
FRAGILE STATES AND THE SAHEL
Senator Graham. Okay. When it comes to Africa, are you
familiar with the Final Report of the Task Force on Extremism
in Fragile States entitled ``Preventing Extremism in Fragile
States: A New Approach'', February 2019, conducted by the
United States Institute of Peace?
Secretary Pompeo. I am.
Senator Graham. In terms of outcome, do you believe that
when it comes to Sahel and other regions, you pay now or you
pay later?
Secretary Pompeo. It is a difficult place, and I have seen
legislation that's proposed for Fragile State, and legislation
that has been proposed, and the objective there is something
the State Department agrees with.
NORTH KOREA
Senator Graham. Thank you. When it comes to North Korea,
what is the objective--the outcome we seek?
Secretary Pompeo. The outcome is a fully verifiably
denuclearized peninsula and greater peace, less risk, and
conventional means, and hopefully a brighter future for the
North Korean people as well.
VENEZUELA
Senator Graham. In Venezuela, what's the outcome?
Secretary Pompeo. We will continue to support democracy for
the Venezuelan people along with our partners in the region.
Senator Graham. What's the prospect of that happening
anytime soon?
Secretary Pompeo. I try to stay out of the prediction
business.
Senator Graham. Fair enough.
Secretary Pompeo. The things I can control, the efforts
that we're making, I think are working in the right direction.
I think we have supported the properly designated leader, Juan
Guaido, in a way that has been good at helping build out what
the Venezuelan people have demanded, and our partners in the
region have been spectacular as well.
IRAN
Senator Graham. When it comes to Iran, the designation of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization: do you think that's justified? Obviously, you do
or you wouldn't have done it.
Secretary Pompeo. I do.
Senator Graham. Give us 15 seconds why.
Secretary Pompeo. It continues to raise the cost for
Iranian terror around the world. It recognizes a basic reality:
it's a terror group. We should not forget I had a group of a
handful of folks who were held in 1979. It was originally 52
folks, 444 days. They reminded me that many of the Iranian
leaders today are the very individuals that beat them,
blindfolded them, handcuffed them, in the American Embassy in
Tehran. This is a long-time challenge pushing back against
Iran, and the designation we made yesterday will further
restrict their access to wealth to spread terror around the
world.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that of all the nation
states on the planet, Iran is near the top of the list, if not
top, in terms of being destabilizing and destructive?
Secretary Pompeo. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. So the outcome that we seek against Iran is
what?
Secretary Pompeo. We laid out 12 things we asked the
Iranian leadership to do, and we are supporting the Iranian
people and helping to change the desires and the actions of the
Iranian government.
ISRAEL
Senator Graham. When it comes to Israel, the outcome we
seek is what?
Secretary Pompeo. Tell me what you're thinking there,
Senator?
Senator Graham. When it comes to Israel, what is the
outcome----
Secretary Pompeo. They're a great partner, a great ally.
They're the premier democracy in the Middle East. They're a
great partner and important for American national security and
a great partner more broadly as well.
Senator Graham. Well, thank you for the terrific job you
and your folks are doing in very difficult circumstances and in
dangerous places. And to me, the State Department people who
are in USAID and other places are risking their lives for a
noble cause.
Thank you.
Senator Leahy.
FOREIGN LEADERS
Senator Leahy. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, you were quoted in
the press referring to Nicolas Maduro as a tyrant after he
ordered his army to block the entry of humanitarian aid. I
think you'll find every single Senator here, Republican and
Democrat, would agree with you. But I think we also have to be
consistent if we're going to be taken seriously. Would you
agree that your description of Maduro also applies to North
Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un?
Secretary Pompeo. Sure. I'm sure I've said that.
Senator Leahy. What about Egypt's President Sisi?
Secretary Pompeo. You know, I would not use that
characterization.
Senator Leahy. Okay. Even though he locked up political
opponents who claimed victory after a sham election?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, there's no doubt that it's a
mean nasty world out there, but not every one of these leaders
is the same. Some of them are trying to wipe entire nations off
the face of the earth, and others are actually partnering with
us to help keep Americans safe. There's a difference among
leaders. You might call them ``tyrant,'' you might call them
``authoritarian,'' but there's a fundamental difference, and,
therefore, a fundamental difference in the way the United
States should respond.
Senator Leahy. I just want to make sure I've got it
straight. Maduro is a tyrant. Kim Jong-un is a tyrant. Sisi has
changed the constitution, locking up thousands of political
opponents and dissidents to try to stay in power, holding
journalists and others, but he is not a tyrant.
Secretary Pompeo. We have not been remotely bashful. You
simply need to read the State Department's Human Rights Report
about calling out human rights violations. Everywhere and
always we are entirely consistent with respect to that, and we
use tools in America's arsenal to push back against that
wherever they can, different tools, different places, different
challenges.
Senator Leahy. Of course, the President calls him a great
friend as a tool to push back on him?
Secretary Pompeo. The President gets to choose his own
words how he speaks about these people. There is no doubt the
Egyptians have been an important security partner helping us
take down terror threats in the Sinai that have reduced risk to
the United States of America. There is no doubt about that, and
for that, I am deeply appreciative of President Sisi. He has
also been remarkably good with respect to religious freedom. I
had a chance to travel there, see it. He has been a remarkable
beacon in the Middle East for religious freedom.
Senator Leahy. Does he do the same for press freedom?
Secretary Pompeo. We've called out the places where
President Sisi has not treated the press in the way that are
consistent with America's values. We are not bashful about
that. He is here today. I met with him yesterday. We talked
about these very issues yesterday, asking him to do better,
asking him to, certainly with respect to Americans, do better
as well.
Senator Leahy. Do you think he will?
Secretary Pompeo. I hope so. We certainly placed it
squarely on something that we're demanding from----
Senator Leahy. I think the thousands of political opponents
and dissidents he's locked up hope he will do better.
Secretary Pompeo. I'm sure they do, Senator.
CUBA
Senator Leahy. The career officials at the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) determined that the major league
baseball could enter into an agreement with the Cuban Baseball
Federation so that they can have the safe entry of Cuban
players into major league baseball, so to stop the human
trafficking of players up here. I think the final agreement was
entered into under the Trump administration. And now the Trump
administration has torn that up and said that they--they won't
change.
Secretary Pompeo. We gained additional information which
made very clear that the beneficiary of these deals were people
that weren't advancing democracy, weren't advancing the very
human rights that I know, Senator, you are so concerned about,
and we wanted to stop that. We wanted money not to go to those
individuals. That's why we changed.
Senator Leahy. So are you going----
Secretary Pompeo. New data, new facts, new policy.
Senator Leahy. Are you going to do the same with Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, or has that----
Secretary Pompeo. We'll use every appropriate tool to try
and change behavior every place we find it inconsistent with
American values.
GLOBAL MAGNITSKY ACT
Senator Leahy. Well, let me go to one of those. Chairman
Graham and I and our counterparts in the Foreign Relations
Committee and I think 18 other Senators requested the
President--this was last October--to make a determination on
the imposition of sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act with
respect to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. He's not done so even
though the Magnitsky Act explicitly requires him to. Are we in
violation of that law?
Secretary Pompeo. No.
Senator Leahy. Why?
Secretary Pompeo. We are continuing to pursue facts just as
with the other individuals that we sanctioned under Global
Magnitsky. We, the United States Government, sanction under
Global Magnitsky when we find the facts. We will apply the law
appropriately. We've done so consistently during my entire time
as Secretary of State.
Senator Leahy. Well, the facts, I remember without going
into classified things here, I remember coming out of one of
the meetings of it. It wasn't, as you said, it wasn't a smoking
gun, it was a smoking saw.
Senator Graham. Yes, that was pretty good, a smoking saw.
Senator Leahy. Okay. You applied losses explicitly, that
the Secretary of State has credible information, not proof, but
credible information that a foreign official has committed a
gross violation of human rights, they're ineligible to enter
the United States. You denied entry to 16 Saudis for their
involvement. If the Crown Prince ought to travel to the U.S.,
and you've read the same intelligence that Senator Graham and I
have, would you then deny him entry?
Secretary Pompeo. My commitment and President Trump's
commitment from the first time we learned of the murder of
Jamal Khashoggi is that we would apply the facts as we learned
them to the law as it exists to everyplace, and that we would
continue to pursue the facts as well so we got to the right
answer.
Senator Leahy. Okay, but you didn't answer my question.
Secretary Pompeo. That's what we'll do. If he seeks to come
here, that's what we'll do.
Senator Graham. Absolutely.
Senator Leahy. So then my other question is for the record,
and I hope this time when I submit questions for the record,
they will actually get answered.
Secretary Pompeo. I'll do my best, Senator.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator----
Senator Leahy. You didn't last time, but thank you.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator Leahy.
Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. Chairman, thank you.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Secretary, welcome. Thank you for your service and your
presence with us today. Travel with me, if you would, around
the globe. Let me start with the Democratic Republic of the
Congo for a home State issue. Michael Sharp was assassinated.
He's a U.N.--was a U.N. worker in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. He comes from Kansas. That occurred in March of 2017.
There is evidence to believe that the assassination was
conducted by the security forces of the previous President,
Joseph Kabila. We have had, as recently as last month,
conversations with the U.N. Secretary. I and others are
dissatisfied with the U.N. investigation. What, if any, role
has the State Department or will the State Department play in
the attempt to provide justice for Mr. Sharp's family?
Secretary Pompeo. So if I may speak without talking about
the particular case, but I'll tell you what we do in instances
just like this one. I'm happy to give you a briefing on exactly
what we've done in this particular instance, but the State
Department is always involved when there's an incident like the
one you described. We work with the local law enforcement as to
other elements of the United States Government to try and get
the facts. Where there is a U.N. investigation, as you
described here, we work to push the U.N. to get it right, to
make sure, too, that they have the resources they need in the
theater in that space to get it right, too. We work to help
them develop relationships and carry out conversations so that
we can get answers for the American people, in this case, a
Kansan.
Senator Moran. Mr. Secretary, if you would, or someone at
your--your bequest, on your behalf, visit with me about this
specific case, I would welcome the conversation.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
SAUDI ARABIA
Mr. Secretary, let's go to Saudi Arabia. We know they have
detained American citizens in the past, have done so as
recently as last week. This is behavior that I would put to
other countries that we would find very objectionable. Would
you agree that these actions are unacceptable and warrant
consequences? What's--what's the plan?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. Anytime someone wrongfully detains
an American citizen, there has to be an American response.
Senator Moran. And we have had that response, or that
response is occurring?
Secretary Pompeo. I have spoken to the senior leadership in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from the King on down about every
instance where we have found human rights abuses, wrongful
detentions, or even the fact that we believe one of those
events may have occurred, and in every conversation, we
continue to do that.
Senator Moran. Mr. Secretary, have you seen any evidence of
changing behavior or hope for change in behavior?
Secretary Pompeo. I'll give an example. The work that we're
doing in Yemen to try and get a decrease in the violence in
Stockholm, the Saudis were instrumental in getting that
agreement completed. It was good. It created opportunity for
there to be foodstuffs and medicine could move through the port
of Hudaida. We have not yet successfully been able to implement
that, but the Saudis have invested and committed resources, and
the Crown Prince himself has worked to try and implement that
agreement as an example of something that the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia has been doing to reduce violence, protect Americans,
and keep us all safe.
MIDDLE EAST
Senator Moran. Mr. Secretary, let's go to the Middle East.
There needs to be a focus, in my view, on promoting good
governance and economic opportunity in the liberated areas from
ISIS so as to deny ongoing support to the groups that would
comprise ISIS. What's the current status of rebuilding those
areas that were liberated from ISIS?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, not much progress has been made
to date, but not only the United States, but European countries
and others have lined up resources to begin to do that. There
is still not a whole lot of real estate in Syria where it's
possible to begin to do even stabilization, let alone
reconstruction. It's still pretty difficult. But our team, the
State Department team, is on the ground there working to create
the conditions where we can begin to do the things we need to
do, first the stabilization operation, so that we can prevent
the resurgence of these terror activities, both in eastern
Syria and in western Iraq.
Senator Moran. How about Egypt? The administration is--
what--what is the administration doing to stop Egypt from
purchasing Russian SU-35 jets? What sanctions, as required by
law, will State implement against the Egyptians if they carry
through with that purchase?
Secretary Pompeo. We've made clear that if those systems
were to be purchased, that statute CAATSA would require
sanctions on the regime. We have received assurances from them
that they understand that, and I'm very hopeful that they will
decide not to move forward with that acquisition.
Senator Moran. That's good to hear.
VENEZUELA
Mr. Secretary, Venezuela, in our own hemisphere, I assume
will need billions of dollars in reconstruction assistance to
repair its infrastructure. There's a request for authority to
transfer $500 million, but I assume more money will be
required. What are--what are your expectations, and what are we
doing with our friends and allies in regard to Venezuela's
future?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. Once we're successful in supporting
Venezuelan democracy, there will be billions of dollars of
investment required. The Maduro regime over coming on now years
and years has destroyed the infrastructure there, including the
oil infrastructure that is the capacity of great wealth for
their people. I've seen numbers that range from $10 to $50
billion worth of investment. It will come from the United
States, but largely from other countries around the world, too.
The Europeans are anxious to participate in that. I'm convinced
that each of the some 50 countries that are with Juan Guaido
will participate in that. And then I'm also very hopeful that
the private sector, that we'll be able to create conditions,
rule of law conditions, sufficient that countries will be
comfortable that they won't have their equipment and people
nationalized yet one more time in Venezuela, and they can
return to make the real investments that it will take to
ultimately stand up to Venezuelan economy.
Senator Moran. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony.
Senator Graham. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought my more
senior Senator on my left was to be next, but I appreciate----
Senator Graham. I've got the list. I'll check----
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate walking in first. Thank you.
Senator Graham. It was a photo finish, but we looked at the
tape.
[Laughter.]
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. I
am puzzled, however, because you talked in your opening remarks
about the threat from China, and you also talked about the
importance of diplomacy, which I very much appreciate. I think,
as you point out, you have refocused on the importance of our
State Department employees and the great work that our American
diplomats do around the world. And yet the State Department's
proposed budget, as the chairman has pointed out, requests the
largest drop for any Cabinet Department by total dollars, and
by percentage, it's 24 percent.
And yet at the same time, we have seen over a period of the
last few years an increase in the Chinese diplomatic budget. So
from 2011 to 2017, China nearly doubled its budget. I know you
know these numbers. Their spending increased by 12.3 percent in
2018. Just last month before the Chinese Parliament, Beijing
presented a budget for 2019 that would increase foreign affairs
spending by another 7.4 percent. American diplomats are already
outnumbered 5 to 1 by Chinese diplomats doing economic and
commercial work in Africa and elsewhere. And we hear from
ambassadors of many of these countries who say to Members of
Congress they'd rather do business with the U.S., but they
can't find us.
So I just wonder if you can talk about how this soft power
dynamic is influencing our ability to win our competition with
China.
Secretary Pompeo. So it is the case that the Chinese use
multiple tools of soft power. Their diplomats are a small part
of that. But they don't as neatly separate their private sector
from their diplomatic sector; frankly, for that matter, from
their military as well. And if you looked at the resources they
are providing to the military, you would see numbers that were
similarly aggressive or demonstrated aggressiveness around the
world, and then you'd see investment in places like Africa,
Asia, South Asia, places that you might not have expected them.
The administration has taken this threat seriously. I'll be
honest, we're late, America is late. I think Europe was late to
recognize this threat, too. But are now very focused on this,
and I don't want to take up a lot of time, but we have a number
of programs, including the BUILD Act that was passed last year
that I am convinced we'll begin to turn the corner, but it's
going to take determination.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I don't want to
interrupt, but I appreciate that. I'm on the subcommittee, so I
know that we passed the BUILD Act. But I guess what I'm trying
to reconcile here is the commitment that you say exists, and
yet it's not reflected in the budget request for the State
Department. So I just--I think this subcommittee feels
differently about the need to support diplomacy and the State
Department budget, and I hope, as you said to the Chairman,
that you will make good use of whatever dollars that we fund.
FAMILY PLANNING
I want to switch topics, if I can, to the expansion of the
Mexico City policy. I know that you and I disagree about
women's reproductive rights, but I thought we agreed about the
importance of ensuring that people could get access to health
care. And yet what we've seen from the expansion of this Mexico
City policy where we have reports about the impact is a real
negative impact on maternal health, on families.
We have, according to Marie Stopes International, they
currently have a funding gap of $50 million as a direct result
of this policy, and that translates to 1.4 million fewer women
with access to contraception services, 600,000 more unsafe
abortions, 4,600 avoidable maternal deaths, the Mozambican
Association for Family Development will lose 60 percent of its
budget next year, 10 of its 20 health clinics will close, and
30 percent of its staff will be laid off. In Swaziland, the
group has lost a quarter of its funding, and as a result, is
now only able to serve 4 towns out of 14. In Botswana, 60
percent of funding is under threat. And while one clinic has
already closed, seven others have scaled back to a bare
minimum.
So, in fact, despite some of the previous testimony that
I've seen, the data is unmistakable. This is having a huge
impact on the health of women and families around the world.
And so how can--I mean, I think we can all agree that we want
to ensure that the United States' policies support health care
for people in this country, and yet this policy is undermining
that for women. Can you justify why you think this is in fact
helping and not hurting?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, the policies that I announced
now a couple weeks back don't reduce funding for health care by
a single dollar, not one dollar. There was not a budgetary
announcement in there. Every single dollar that was program
spend appropriated will continued to be program spend
appropriated. What I was seeking to do was close loopholes in
the policy that were permitting end runs around the Mexico City
policy that prevents taxpayer dollars from going to abortions
and abortion-related services. That's the mission, and while
doing so in a way that preserves all of the resources that are
there for health care.
Senator Shaheen. But, in fact, that hasn't been the
outcome, and as you point out, you are, as the Secretary of
State, focused on outcomes, and the outcomes of this expanded
policy is very clear, it's shown up in every independent study
that has looked at what the impact of the policy is.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
VENEZUELA IMPACT ON COLOMBIA
Thank you, Secretary, for being here. Let's go back to
Venezuela a little bit and talk about impact on Colombia.
Probably in Colombia, the two biggest problems right now would
be the refugees and economic impact of the refugees and the
increased production of coca and drugs. So let's talk about
that a little bit, and if you want to work that into what we're
hoping to do with Peace Colombia, I'd like to hear what those
dollar figures might look like on Peace Colombia as well.
Secretary Pompeo. So, Senator, the challenges in Venezuela
are absolutely moving their way in and through Colombia. It
originally began as a border set of issues, and now have moved
even further. You identified the cost of the folks who have
fled Venezuela, now some 3 million, so 10 percent, of the
population in Venezuela. Our best analysis says there will be
another 2 to 2\1/2\ million people flee during calendar year
2019, a big burden on Colombia.
It also makes issues of keeping security at the border more
difficult, so groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN),
the remnants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
(FARC), now having more people who are subject to their
influence. And then, lastly, it's very difficult for
counternarcotics. As these folks come across, it makes the
Colombia burden even that much greater. So our efforts in
Colombia to support President Duque--I'll actually be there on
Sunday of this week to go visit our things we are going to have
to revisit as this problem continues to grow. We think we have
enough money in the budget to help the Colombians with the
things they can actually achieve throughput on during this
fiscal year, but it could be as this--if there continues to be
an increase in the number of people leaving Venezuela for
Colombia, that problem increases, and we might need more
resources, it's possible.
Senator Blunt. Well, I think we need to watch that closely.
And there's a point here to where if you're going to reverse
what's happened in the last couple years and the increased drug
trade and papa--and poppy growth, the opioid poppy growth, it's
a moment where we need to be committed financially as well as
with our other--other resources. Colombia in many ways is
important to us in South America as maybe Jordan is in the
Middle East. I think there's a lot of similarity between they
can do things that we would do better than we do them in both
cases because they're--they're doing what we'd like to do
instead of us being in there giving the directions.
SYRIAN REFUGEES
And so the other refugee, what are we doing with State
Department programs to help with the Syrian refugee problem,
particularly as it relates to Jordan?
Secretary Pompeo. So you have significant refugees
remaining still in Turkey and in Lebanon as well as in Jordan,
where we work with the Jordanians to try to create situations
on the ground in Syria in certain pockets where there can be a
safe and voluntary return. We're only a fraction of the way on
the way in being able to actually demonstrate that at a volume
that matters to the Jordanians. In the interim, we're providing
resources and participating in forums where the Arab states are
also contributing significantly to ensuring that Jordan has the
resources to take care of those refugees in what is now a
multiyear problem. You've got kids who were born in some of
those camps who are now, by America's standards, kindergarten
age. It's a real challenge.
Senator Blunt. What about Lebanon and Turkey? The same
issue?
Secretary Pompeo. The same set of issues. Each of them has
treated the refugees slightly differently, has chosen different
approaches. There aren't big camps in Lebanon in the same way
there are inside of Jordan. They've dispersed throughout Turkey
as well, but each of those three countries has borne an
enormous burden from the conflict in Syria.
Senator Blunt. What are you doing in this budget for
Embassy security?
Secretary Pompeo. We think the number that we have proposed
is more than adequate for Embassy security.
Senator Blunt. How does it compare to the number we
appropriated last year?
Secretary Pompeo. I don't recall. I would have to go get
that number for you. I don't know the number.
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Senator Blunt. Maybe somebody back there has that number
while we go to one other issue while they're looking for that,
and I'd like to know this number, this year's proposal versus
last year's number. And on the religious freedom issues,
Ambassador Brownback has taken an aggressive role there----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Blunt [continuing]. And a broad view of the world
in his travels and his efforts.
Secretary Pompeo. He has. We've been working on this all
across the world. We've been speaking out recently about the
challenges in China to religious freedom, not just the Uyghurs,
but even more broadly than that. The absence of religious
freedom there is of historic proportions.
Senator Blunt. And I think Ambassador Brownback really has
taken a position on religious freedom versus just the more
narrow freedom to worship, and these countries where allow
freedom to worship, but don't allow people to express their
religion beyond that. And I think that's an important thing for
him to do.
I don't know if you've got a number there behind you or
not, but I think----
Secretary Pompeo. It doesn't look like I do just yet.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL
Senator Blunt. Mm-hmm. Increasingly looking at our
embassies, we've been doing that for over 20 years now trying
to make them more secure. I think also more concern about
security of people--where people live that work in the
embassies that are U.S. citizens and part of the State
Department family. Anything you want to say about that?
Secretary Pompeo. I'm sorry. Would you repeat your
question?
Senator Blunt. Just also, you know, the concerns of people
who are living in countries that we're concerned about and that
part of the State Department family.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. So we've done a handful of things
during my 11 months to put in place programs that will improve
lives, some on some disability issues for officers who have
disabilities. It's proven a challenge in some of the places
around the world. I think we're in a better place today. You
all have been very generous in providing the resources for us
to be able to do that. And each time I go to the Embassy, I
have a chance to get down and talk one-on-one with Embassy
officers, and I always ask them, ``How are the schools? How are
the medical facilities here? Do you have the ability to get
your place of worship?'' and in--for the most part, we're in
very, very good shape. Some of them are just very difficult
places to serve, and we have shorter time on station as a
result of that. I do have the number for you, Senator. The--
this is for the--what we list as ``Worldwide Security
Protection fiscal year 20 Requests Versus 2018 Enacted.'' The
change is up .6 percent. And from fiscal year 2020 requests to
the fiscal year 2019 respect, up 2.2 percent.
Senator Blunt. I want to talk more about that later. And,
Chairman, I think I'm out of time right now.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
VENEZUELA
Senator Durbin. Last year at this time, I was in Caracas,
my only visit to Venezuela, meeting with Maduro and Juan
Guaido, coincidently, during the course of that trip. Little
did I realize at the time what 12 months would mean in terms of
Venezuela. I saw firsthand, and you undoubtedly heard
incredible reports, how miserable life is for the Venezuelans.
They face basic deprivations of food and medicine and things
that we take for granted. And the political situation has
become much more volatile there. It's my understanding that
Cubans have been sending in security forces to support the
Maduro regime. I'm also told the Russians have sent in some
type of new group, such as we saw in eastern Ukraine, to play
some role in support of Maduro. It is not a healthy situation.
Juan Guaido's wife came to see me last week, and I believe she
also met with the President, talked about the danger to her
husband and those who supported him. That was very clear.
So that's why I joined with Marco Rubio about 2 weeks ago
in sending a letter to you and the President saying this is the
time to protect Venezuelans who are here in the United States.
They should not be forced to return to the dangerous conditions
in Venezuela. They should be given temporary protected status.
I have yet to hear. Can you announce today the good news that
these Venezuelans can stay here in the United States?
Secretary Pompeo. I cannot.
Senator Durbin. Why?
Secretary Pompeo. We are still evaluating how to handle
that situation. There is no decision been made by the
administration yet.
Senator Durbin. I don't get this. It is so dangerous, the
United States has intervened on a foreign policy basis. We have
made it clear we have no use for Maduro, and we believe the
Venezuelan people suffer under his leadership. It's--I just
sense, Mr. Secretary, that this President's aversion to
refugees and immigrants is stopping him from doing the obvious,
come to the rescue of Venezuelans in the United States on a
temporary basis. Don't force them back into a dangerous, deadly
situation. Is there any other explanation you can think of?
Secretary Pompeo. I think this administration has done more
for the Venezuelan people than the previous administrations
combined.
Senator Durbin. Well, how about the ones who are here----
Secretary Pompeo. I'm very--I'm very proud of--I'm very
proud of what we've done, so I think to suggest we've
shortchanged the Venezuelan people is inconsistent with our
activities.
Senator Durbin. Well, you should come to my office and meet
with the Venezuelans who are here with their visas expiring.
Perhaps you could see there is more we could do, that it's not
a great problem. And for the record, we're not full, America is
not full. We have room for these Venezuelans and others who
desperately need the United States at this moment in their
history.
Let me ask you the question. Incidentally, I just was
handed a note that the Organization of American States (OAS)
voted 18 to 9 to recognize Guaido's representative as
Venezuela's ambassador to the OAS. So the OAS, though they're
not always in your good favor, I hope you think positively of
them at this moment.
TWO-STATE SOLUTION TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
Do you believe that we should have a two-state solution in
the Middle East?
Secretary Pompeo. The administration will roll out the plan
that Mr. Kushner and Mr. Greenblatt have been working on before
too long, and you will see President Trump's vision for how to
resolve a problem that's been going on for decades and decades
that previous administrations couldn't solve. We are hopeful
that we have some ideas that are different, unique, which will
allow the Israelis and the Palestinian people to come to a
resolution of the conflict.
Senator Durbin. Draw--draw a historic parallel for me
between the decision to say to Israel that they could claim
sovereignty over the Golan Heights, a territory that was seized
during the 1967 war from Syria, and the Russian claims that
they can claim Crimea because they happened to invade it as
well.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, the two situations could not be
more starkly different.
Senator Durbin. I'd like to hear.
Secretary Pompeo. The Golan Heights was--the Israelis ended
up with the Golan Heights as a result of having been attacked.
They were on the defense. They were at risk of their very
nation being overrun during the Battle of the Valley of Tears,
and they defended themselves.
Senator Durbin. I understand that.
Secretary Pompeo. And they retained that terrain to
continue to defend themselves from the murderous regimes in
Syria.
Russia, on the other hand, wasn't on the defensive. Russia
chose at their own moment in time to go seize land from a
people that posed no threat to them whatsoever.
Senator Durbin. So our diplomatic position is that land
seized in the course of a war is then the spoils for those who
happen to occupy it.
Secretary Pompeo. I'll say two things about that. So
there's international law doctrine on this very point. I--we
don't have time to begin to go through it today, but I'm happy
to have a team come over and walk you through that element of
international law.
But the second thing is just a practical policy matter. If
it's the case that there is absolutely no cause for aggression,
that is, if you attack and you have some of your land taken as
a result of an attack that you undertook, and you get it back
just because you didn't succeed, that's a bad incentive system
to set up.
Senator Durbin. So we could claim Iraq, I guess, under that
theory.
Secretary Pompeo. Just I--we could probably go through
dozens and dozens of examples. You asked me to compare and
contrast the situation in the Golan Heights and Crimea.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Secretary, I just don't--I strongly
support a relationship with Israel. I believe the Palestinians
need a homeland as well. Two sovereign states, not a threat to
one another. And this departure that we've made under this
administration I'm afraid puts the future of Israel, as a
Jewish democracy, in doubt. I don't think the administration is
thinking clearly about how this ends well. Perhaps the people
of Israel in this election today will see a different way in
the future.
Thank you.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you.
Senator Graham. Senator Daines.
Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, Mr.
Chairman.
And, Secretary Pompeo, it's good to see you.
Secretary Pompeo. Good to see you.
Senator Daines. And I want to thank you for being here
today. I want to thank you and the administration for your
unwavering support of Israel. It is much appreciated.
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND TECHNOLOGY
Secretary Pompeo, I want to shift gears and talk about
China for a moment. I--as you know, I spent over 5 years living
there as an expat for Procter & Gamble, had two kids born in
Hong Kong, in fact, back in the 1990s, and led multiple CODELs.
I had to visit China as neighbors and continued to see China's
growing regional and global influence. It's very apparent.
I believe it's critically important that we, as a nation,
are clear-eyed about the challenges as well as the
opportunities that the U.S.-China relationship brings. We
cannot just view these ongoing negotiations solely through an
economic lens as a standard trade dispute. It is imperative we
keep in mind China's strategic approach in the long-term goal
of becoming the world's superpower.
Secretary Pompeo, as you know, China has developed an
advanced innovation ecosystem. It's remarkable truly. I led a
group of five Senators last year. We saw companies in Shenzhen
and Hangzhou, you know, the Alibabas, the Tencent, JEDI.com,
and so forth. They're becoming globally competitive in critical
technologies like AI, biotechnology, quantum computing, 5G, and
others. This comes with risks both to our national security as
well as our economic well-being.
With the latest findings of the U.K.'s National
Cybersecurity Center about the significant issues Huawei can
cause for the telcom industry, we're starting to acknowledge
the risks this administration has been stating for months.
Despite these clear risks, some of our allies, including
France, Germany, and potentially even the U.K., continue
testing and moving towards installing Huawei equipment.
My question, Mr. Secretary, how does the U.S. plan to
mitigate the risk of working with countries that continue to
deploy Huawei technology in their 5G infrastructure?
Secretary Pompeo. So while it's fairly technical, I'll
summarize. Our security leaders don't believe there is a
technical mitigation technique that's available today. That is,
we may solve the riddle, but the risks of having equipment and
network systems collocated with Huawei systems and other
Chinese systems is a very, very difficult technical problem. So
our solution to mitigating that risk will be not to collocate
or not to share American information with countries that choose
to put this technology in their systems knowing that the risk
that it will wander to China's government is too great. And so
America will have to choose another method. We won't be able to
share information or participate along with some of our
important national security partners if they choose to go down
this path of installing this technology.
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Senator Daines. Secretary, I want to shift gears and talk
about religious freedom for a moment. Religious freedom is a
fundamental human right, and whether it's China's pervasive
surveillance, the destruction of thousands of churches and
mosques, or the detention of hundreds of thousands in
reeducation camps with the Uyghurs out in Xinjiang Province in
indefinite detentions. It's critically important that we, as a
nation founded on freedom and the rule of law, bring our
influence to bear to advance human rights in China and around
the world.
You've stated that China, and I quote, is a league of its
own when it comes to human rights violations. What work is your
administration actively doing to help protect the human rights
of the Uyghur people, ensuring this is a priority in any
ongoing discussions with the Chinese government?
Secretary Pompeo. So it is in a league of its own. The work
that began in Tibet and now being perfected in Xinjiang is
Orwellian in nature, and our efforts are diplomatic. That is,
we identify this as something that the Chinese can't continue
to do. I had a group of Uyghurs in my office, and this has
probably been 2 weeks ago now. Indeed, just after they came, an
uncle of one of the young men that visited me was approached by
the Chinese government, I'm sure now to worse conditions than
they were in before. He had had a meeting with the United
States Secretary of State. Our whole team all across the world
is very focused on this issue in China.
Senator Daines. Speaking of going around the world, as you
know, Turkey has become one of the few Muslim-majority
countries to condemn China's treatment of the Uyghurs. What
work has been done to build a coalition to raise and address
these human rights violations in Xinjiang Province,
particularly with Muslim-majority nations, around the world?
Secretary Pompeo. Not enough yet. There is a great deal
more work to do. I am very hopeful that we will get an
increased number of Muslim nations who share our view that this
is a gross violation of the human rights of Muslims in China,
and they will begin to work in the same way we are working to
convince the Chinese not to continue these practices. There's a
lot more work to do there, Senator.
Senator Daines. In my view, there is probably only so much
we can do unilaterally as it relates to confronting the
challenges that we see in China, and I think it's critical we
work with our allies and China's neighbors in the region to
mitigate China's maligned actions, whether it be in the South
China Sea, human rights, or ongoing unfair trade practices.
As you think about some of your strategic goals and
engaging with allies in the Indo-Pacific region to proactively
counter Chinese efforts to expand its influence, tell me how
you think about that right now with our allies there in that
part of the world.
Secretary Pompeo. So I actually think this is a place we
have made progress. I think the first challenge has always been
to identify the threat to make clear to them. Sometimes we had
information that was important to share with them about risk.
Sometimes they had information to share with us about risk as
well. So I think pooling understandings of the threat has been
important. I think that has now been socialized in significant
ways.
And you now see partners. You see partners in Australia.
You see partners in Vietnam. You see work that's done
throughout other parts of Southeast Asia, countries that
understand this threat, and I think that threat is also
beginning to be identified in other places, too, African
nations where China is active, Middle Eastern countries where
China is moving out full force. Our Indo-Pacific strategy I am
convinced will raise the costs for this Chinese maligned
activity.
Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want to thank
you, too, when you listed all the outcomes you've accomplished
with this administration and your leadership. I am grateful for
that. Thank you.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Graham. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Pompeo. Hello, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. And I want to associate myself with the
remarks the Chairman made with respect to the foreign affairs
budget at the beginning of the hearing.
EGYPT
I have to beg to differ with you on the President's meeting
with El-Sisi. The President walked out of that meeting and
said, quote, I can tell you he's doing a great job. You
indicated that part of your responsibilities as Secretary of
State was to, quote, work to protect American citizens abroad.
I just want to say I don't think anybody that's detaining and
putting in prison 20 American citizens is doing a great job.
TURKEY
Let me ask you about Turkey and the F-35s. The Supreme
Allied Commander, General Scaparrotti, said recently, quote, if
the Russians get the S-400, quote, it's his best military
advice that we don't then follow through with the F-35s. As I
understood your response to the Chairman, the clear and
resolute position of the administration is if Turkey gets
delivery of the S-400s, it will not get delivery of the F-35s.
Is that correct?
Secretary Pompeo. I have communicated that to them both
privately and I will do so again publicly right here.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Would you agree also that if
they go through with that $2.5 billion transaction, which is
what the S-400 purchase amounts to, that that would trigger the
significant transaction requirements in the CAATSA legislation
and require the imposition of sanctions on Turkey?
Secretary Pompeo. If I can avoid making a legal conclusion,
that is a very significant transaction.
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
Senator Van Hollen. I thank you. So I want to follow up on
Senator Durbin's question. And you would agree that you can be
pro-American if you don't agree with all the policies of the
Trump administration, right?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. And you can be pro-Israel--and there's
a bipartisan pro-Israel sentiment in this Congress--if you
don't agree with all the policies of the Netanyahu government.
Secretary Pompeo. Critiquing a policy that Israel
undertakes is part of our democratic process.
Senator Van Hollen. And we have a democratic process, too,
when we disagree with the President, and that still makes us
good Americans.
So let me ask you this, Is it still the policy of the
United States to oppose Israel's unilateral annexation of any
or all of the West Bank?
Secretary Pompeo. Here's what I can say. I'll give the same
answer I gave to Senator Durbin. We are in the process of
laying down our vision for how to resolve a problem that is----
Senator Van Hollen. So, Mr. Secretary, if I could--if I
could ask you, I asked about unilateral--right?--annexation. So
that--that, by itself, indicates no agreement with the
Palestinians.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. So my question is it sounds like you've
already abandoned what has been a bipartisan foreign policy of
opposing the annexation of any or part of the West Bank by
Israel. Is that what you're telling us today?
Secretary Pompeo. I think we've seen--I think it was
Senator Durbin that critiqued our decision on the Golan, where
he would characterize that----
Senator Van Hollen. I'm not asking you about the Golan
right now.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. Right.
Senator Van Hollen. I'm asking you about the West Bank.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, and I'm telling you will--you will
see our proposal----
Senator Van Hollen. The polls--the polls are closing right
now, right now, in Israel, and things could move very quickly.
And as you know, the Prime Minister, as a candidate, said he
would annex all or part of the West Bank. He said settlements,
and then he said including outposts. And today you cannot tell
us what U.S. policy is on this issue.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. I think, again, I think I've
answered the question as I am going to answer the question.
Senator Van Hollen. All right. Do you agree that
Palestinians should be extended basic human rights?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, of course. Our proposal will
absolutely have one of its core undertakings making life better
for the people that live in the Gaza and in the West Bank.
Senator Van Hollen. And so if you had a one-state solution,
since you haven't affirmed support for a two-state solution,
would you agree that in a one-state solution Palestinians
should have full and equal political and legal rights with
other citizens of that state?
Secretary Pompeo. I'm not going to engage in this--
ultimately the Israelis and the Palestinians will decide how to
resolve this. We'll propose our administration----
Senator Van Hollen. You just talked about we were expecting
the deal of the century, and you said the Israelis and
Palestinians would have to agree. That----
Secretary Pompeo. That's right.
Senator Van Hollen. Okay. So I asked you about unilateral
annexation. That means--that means there is no agreement. And
you can't tell me today whether that's something you support
even though that is, as you know, compromising the ability----
Secretary Pompeo. Senator----
Senator Van Hollen [continuing]. To have a two-state
solution, which, as you know--let me ask you this, Do you think
you can preserve a state that is Jewish and democratic and
observes the rights of all its citizens without a two-state
solution?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, you're trying to get us to lay
down what our proposal is going to be before we're prepared.
Senator Van Hollen. I'm trying to ask you about our--what
our policy is today, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Pompeo. Which involves--which will be America's
policy on these very issues. You have seen our policy to date.
We made the decision that I think--I don't know how many--but
who voted for to move the Embassy to Jerusalem. Finally,
President Trump did it.
Senator Van Hollen. Yes.
Secretary Pompeo. Which was good.
Senator Van Hollen. Which would, of course, as you know,
Mr. Secretary, would have been part of any final agreement, and
you didn't get anything in exchange with respect to the goals
of U.S. policy. President Bush, President Clinton, Presidents--
both Bushes, Obama. So let me ask you this, Do you think it
advances the peace process to cut off all humanitarian systems
to Palestinians?
Secretary Pompeo. You should note that----
Senator Van Hollen. That's a--do you think it advances the
peace process to cut off----
Secretary Pompeo. May I answer your question, sir?
Senator Van Hollen. Sure. Yes.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, you should note that each of the
Presidents you identified didn't solve this problem.
Senator Van Hollen. Yes. They----
Secretary Pompeo. Whatever policies they chose failed.
Senator Van Hollen. I understand. And a unilateral solution
is not going to do it. I would just leave you, Mr. Secretary,
with the example of Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus where
Turkey would be--would argue that they came in to help the
Turkish Cypriots at the time. And Mr. Erdogan is going to love
what you're saying about the ability to take lands that were
occupied through force. It is a dangerous and slippery slope,
and when it comes to the West Bank, it will undermine any
effort of a peaceful two-state solution.
Senator Graham. Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford. Secretary, great to see you. Thanks for
all the work. You've been across a lot of miles for a while and
had a lot of meetings and conversations. So thanks for
continuing the work.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
CENTRAL AMERICA
Senator Lankford. Can we shift to Central America for a
moment, which is exceptionally important to us, not only in
this hemisphere and economically with our trade there, but
we're finding out rapidly with immigration.
You go back to 4 years ago, Joe Biden started leading an
effort called the Alliance for Prosperity----
Secretary Pompeo. Mm-hmm.
Senator Lankford [continuing]. To greatly accelerate
investment into Central America. It was my impression after the
first year, 4 years ago, that once the State Department pushed
out funds, they seemed to just push out funds to as many
Federal entities as we had in Central America to get the money
out the door, but it didn't seem to be very strategic. There
seemed to be some learning from that after that. And then the
third year of it, it still seemed to be forcing money out the
door rather than being as strategic as it could be.
The administration now has said we're going to try to end
foreign assistance, and then it became we're going to review
foreign assistance. But I just want to be able to ask for
clarification of purposeful of this. It seems to me the
Alliance for Prosperity was very focused in on, How do we help
develop security, economics improve an area where there is
stability and safety, and ending government corruption in that
zone to be able to help with whatever we could with mayors and
police chiefs and military leaders to be able to help in that
corruption?
Give me a quick update of where we're headed on the
Alliance for Prosperity in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador
in specific.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, the President concluded--and
this is something that I saw when I was in my previous role as
well, as Director of the CIA--the President concluded I think
in the same way you just described, that these resources
weren't very effective, that they may well have been thought
out, but they just weren't getting the outcomes.
Senator Lankford. Right.
Secretary Pompeo. And then they make----
Senator Lankford. Tough--it was tough for us to even get
metrics involved.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, and I think that's remained the
case, even for the last year as well, so the first year of this
administration, too. The President saying that, and then
combined with the challenge of we have not yet been able to
convince El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to take seriously
this need to control heir own borders and to keep their people
from moving into Mexico and ultimately across our southern
border, that we should stop, take a time out. We've done that,
so we have ceased allocating new funds inside of those three
countries.
And we will present to each of those three countries a set
of requirements. These are the things that are expectations
that the United States needs for America's interest. We think
also in every case it will be in their own best interest as
well. And when we get to that point, we will return to
considering whether and how much and under what means and what
tools will we use to restart providing them assistance to each
of those three countries in the Northern Triangle.
Senator Lankford. Okay. They've been tremendous partners
with us in interdicting drugs----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Lankford [continuing]. In the past, and obviously
they have a real willingness to do that because that builds
corruption in their own government and their own system as
those drugs pass through from South America through Central
America and come north. Are we continuing to be able to help
them and help them protect us from some of the incoming drugs?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, it's been hit-and-miss. In
places, it has worked. I don't mean to suggest there was
nothing that came from this, that it was entirely wasted, but
it certainly wasn't the case that there were good metrics, and
I'm convinced we can be more effective.
Senator Lankford. Okay. We look forward to being--working
together on that and to be able to help fix that because we
need both them as partners and we need to be able to help them
actually step up and engage in the areas that are essential. We
want them to be solid economic traders in the days ahead on it.
SYRIA
You've made some recent comments on Assad in Syria. As I
visited with some of the refugees in Lebanon a few weeks ago,
it was pretty clear from the refugees that I talked to there,
they are not going to return until Assad is gone because they
are concerned that their children will be conscripted into his
army and they will never see them again. And so they are more
concerned about Assad than they are of ISIS. How do we help
this in the days ahead with what's happening as more and more
Arab countries are starting to backchannel in diplomatic
relationships with Assad and to try to reestablish diplomatic
connections there to be able to help manage what's going on
there and still have Assad not as a leader because millions of
people won't return if he is?
Secretary Pompeo. So it's a challenge. Let me just step
back half a step. So Assad is there. It is the case he still
controls just a fraction of his own country, and there is no
clear means by which he will achieve anything other than prior
state status, certainly from the United States or Europe. So
our effort has been to engage in a political process where
there can be a path forward for a return to something akin to
democracy in Syria under the U.N. resolution. So that's what
Ambassador Jeffrey is engaged in each and every day.
As for the refugees, I can't remember if I was there just
before you or just after you in Lebanon. I saw the same thing.
The Lebanese government is struggling mightily to continue to
school, educate, these refugees and to take care of them, to
house and clothe them. But I heard the same thing, if we're
looking for safe, voluntary return, we're not yet in a position
where we can deliver that for several million refugees, not
only the million and a half there in Lebanon, but those in
Jordan and Turkey as well. I can't tell you we have a clear
path forward other than the political process that the Iranians
and the Russians continue to foil.
NORD STREAM 2
Senator Lankford. Right. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline between
Russia and Germany, do you have any progress report on that? Is
Germany still continuing to lean forward into buying their gas
from Russia?
Secretary Pompeo. They are.
BURMA
Senator Lankford. One last comment is on Burma. Burma has
been an ongoing issue for a while. We've listed them as a
Country of Particular Concern. Thank you for your work on
religious liberty and continuing to be able to focus in on
that. That is a growing genocide that has happened there for
quite a while. How is State engaging in trying to be able to
bring some kind of stability to Burma or to be able to help?
Secretary Pompeo. So our team on the ground is applying
pressure everyplace that we can. I met with my Bangladeshi
counterpart, a huge challenge for the country of Bangladesh.
There is no quick-term fix for that. I don't know if you've
ever traveled to Cox's Bazar. This is going to be a year's long
challenge. We are also not only using the potential carrots in
Burma, but also making clear to them that the things that
America is doing for them could stop, and they continue to need
our support. And I'm hopeful we can move them in a better
direction, not only with respect to religious liberty, but
restoring basic freedoms to their people.
Senator Lankford. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Graham. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Graham and Ranking
Member Leahy, for this hearing.
And thank you, Secretary Pompeo, for your testimony, your
service, and congratulations on being a day away from a year,
if I heard your opening correct.
Secretary Pompeo. A few more than that, the 26th.
Senator Coons. I agree with many of my colleagues, the
Chairman, as well as others, that I think the proposed cuts in
the President's budget would handicap America's ability to
secure interests at a time of unprecedented challenges. I
broadly agree with your identification of the threats and
challenges we face. In some cases, we have differences in
strategy; in others, we don't. But I am fairly certain that a
24-percent cut to the 150 count overall would not help us meet
these challenges.
I don't believe in spending for spending's sake, but I
think investing in development, diplomacy, and humanitarian aid
can actually save us money in the future.
FRAGILE STATES AND THE GLOBAL FRAGILITY ACT
This February, the United States Institute of Peace Task
Force commissioned by this panel with Senator Graham's
leadership published a final report of strategies to prevent
fragile states from becoming failed states. They consulted
closely with the Department of State, Department of Defense,
USAID, and its recommendations, including new coordinated
governmentwide strategy and innovative funding, a system with
metrics, with required performance metrics. And I think it
underscores the need for targeted development and diplomacy
assistance in addition to security to address the root causes
of fragility in places like the Northern Triangle, that we've
talked about, like the Sahel.
Senators Graham, Merkley, Young, Rubio, and I have
introduced the Global Fragility Act. I was pleased to hear you
say that we could count on your support to pass that. I'd be
interested in hearing from you if you think this is the right
strategy to allow us to act and think more strategically about
preventing fragile states from becoming failed states, and if a
coordinated investment strategy across development, diplomacy,
defense is the right way to go in trying to learn from the last
18 years and the $6 trillion we've invested in combating
extremism.
Secretary Pompeo. I do think that strategy is right. I
can't say I read the whole report. I read the executive
summary.
Senator Coons. It makes for pretty compelling reading.
Secretary Pompeo. It's compelling reading both in that it's
the right plan, and it is the most cost effective way to tackle
this problem as well, which I think you referred to as----
Senator Coons. I look forward to working with you on that.
UNITED STATES DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION
In the last Congress, the BUILD Act created a new 21st
century development finance agency. China is going to be
holding its annual ``Belt and Road'' conference in Beijing next
month where it will highlight more press announcements of
massive investment. I think the reality of Chinese investment
in infrastructure to secure both strategic advantage and
economic opportunity is not as rosy as they portray it. I think
a number of our allies and of their potential partners are
learning that there are hidden costs and hidden challenges to
Chinese investment.
As the Secretary of State, you're the chairperson of the
new Development Finance Corporation, and I was pleased to see
the budget request say you would rely on this new agency to
help add to ``Prosper Africa,'' the ``Indo-Pacific Strategy,''
countering Russia maligned influence, the ``Women's Global
Development and Prosperity Initiative.''
Could you just share for a few minutes how you plan to use
this new agency as a tool of U.S. foreign policy, and how the
BUILD Act and our partnering with our key allies in Development
Finance projects could provide an American-facing or an
American values-based alternative to China's ``Belt and Road''
initiative?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I think you actually captured
the most important element of this, is that it's not America
trying to do this with just taxpayer dollars; we have private
sector partners and international allies and partners. They are
very excited about this throughout parts of the world. I think
you mentioned ``Prosper Africa'' as part of this as well,
perhaps you didn't, but there are many places where I think the
Development Finance Corporation will ultimately deliver real
outcomes to counter what China is doing.
We are almost certain to show up with fewer dollars every
time than they'll show up with, and the terms of our deal from
just a pure economic perspective probably won't compete. But
your point about the ``Belt and Road'' initiative not wearing
well over time, and the increased understanding in countries
all around the world of the risks associated with taking this
Chinese financing or these Chinese projects is ever increasing.
And so I think our effort there with the DFC and the BUILD Act
is very timely, and I'm convinced we'll have real successes as
a result of it.
Senator Coons. Yes, I'm excited to work with you on it. I
think it's a new tool that really has great promise, and I
recently spoke to Ambassador Hagerty in Japan. I think it is a
way in particular in the Indo-Pacific for us to partner with
some of our key allies and to strengthen those alliances.
SYRIA AND IRAN
I have just a few quick points if I could. I agree strongly
that we should have a force in Syria to contain Iran. I
recognize the President has focused on ending the caliphate on
the ground, but I was encouraged by your comment about a
direction to prevent ISIS 3.0 from rising, but I, frankly, see
independent value in preventing Iran from gaining, sustaining,
holding, and expanding a role in Syria, and I think that is
well worth our continued engagement at Al-Tanf and elsewhere.
FAMILY PLANNING
I agree with Senator Shaheen. I have a real concern about
the Mexico City policy expansion and its actual negative
impact. And I'd love to work with you on making sure that
impact on maternal and child health is not large and negative.
That's something I've spent a lot of time on, in particular, in
Africa, and I think there's a gap between closing loopholes and
having a real impact on maternal and child health we could work
on.
The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), my
understanding is, directed the closing of the only refugee
resettlement site in Delaware, a faith-based organization that
had done a lot of good work, and I'd love to review that with
you at some point.
AFRICA
Let me close with three quick thoughts about some concerns
in Africa. I'm sorry. I also wanted to mention I agree with
expanding investment in the Indo-Pacific and was encouraged to
see a 90-percent increase over fiscal year 2019, $1.8 billion
in economic and security assistance for the Indo-Pacific
Strategy. I thought that was encouraging and would frankly like
to work on that.
Secretary Pompeo. Mm-hmm.
Senator Coons. There is right now in Sudan an impressive
widespread, ongoing, largely peaceful protest against one of
the longest standing strongmen in Africa, and I hope that in
countries like Algeria and Sudan, just as we are in Venezuela,
that we will find appropriate ways to encourage peaceful
transitions of power.
Last, I am concerned about Cyclone Idai and its impact on
Mozambique and Zimbabwe. They are making real progress in
combating both hunger and cholera with help from USAID and the
State Department, but I just want to urge you to not let that
one slip off the very large radar screen of threats we all have
to take into account. I think the region is looking to whether
or not the United States continues to be the sort of leading
humanitarian relief partner that they have long counted on us
to be.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I think I agree with everything
you said there. I would add that as challenges that are there
today and emerging in Africa, the Ebola outbreak is continuing,
and it is something the USAID and World Health Organization and
other elements of the USG as well are continuing to be very,
very focused on. It's a difficult situation. The security
situation there is a real challenge, but it's something that
the world I don't think has focused on significantly, and the
numbers I see each week don't show that we have our arms around
it yet.
Senator Coons. They are going in the wrong direction. If we
did not have a vaccine, this would already be dramatically out
of control. So we have learned from the last big outbreak,
invested in vaccine, but you're right, I agree with you, that
is one of the most concerning developments on the continent,
and I look forward to hearing more from you and to working in
partnership with the Chairman to try and tackle that.
Forgive me for going over my time. Thank you for your
answers.
Senator Graham. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for spending so much time with us
today. A couple quick comments and then I'll try to squeeze in
a few questions. Let me associate myself with the comments that
have been made already about this budget. Listen, I just--I
think it's bananas. I think there's celebration happening in
Beijing and Moscow every time that we telegraph our withdrawal
from the world. I don't know that this budget is the one you
would write, Mr. Secretary, but cutting democracy by 50 percent
and cutting exchange programs by 50 percent, global health
programs by $2 billion just provides this increasing vacuum for
others to fill.
And then my second point is on this, I think, interesting
exchange you had with Senator Van Hollen about the upcoming
plan that the administration is going to present. I think that
that would be a satisfactory answer if we were in April of
2017, but we aren't, we're in April of 2019. And the idea that
the world doesn't know 2\1/2\ years into this administration
whether America still stands for a two-state solution or we
still stand against the unilateral annexation of the West Bank
is what makes people's heads spin.
And so I get that you're not going to go any further in
your answer, but we aren't 3 months into the administration,
we're 2 years and 3 months into the administration, and that
is, in part, what drives a lot of uncertainty in the region
about where America stands. And so I will just leave it at
that.
THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT AND BREXIT
On a subject that maybe we can find some agreement on, I
just came back from Belfast and Dublin, and we may disagree on
the right prescription for Britain moving forward with respect
to whether or not they stay in the European Union, but we
likely don't disagree on the importance of protecting the Good
Friday Agreement, and there is great uncertainty as to what the
impact of Brexit would be on the ability to keep that agreement
together. It seems like a moment when we should be standing up,
Republicans and Democrats, and telling our friends in London
that whatever they do, they need to recognize the existing
fragility of peace in Northern Ireland and the importance of
protecting that peace process no matter how this agreement with
the European Union turns out, and I wanted to get your thoughts
on that.
Secretary Pompeo. You did find a place we agree. I don't
mean to make light of it. It's an incredibly important
agreement, one that has been proven very effective and one that
needs to be sustained.
YEMEN
Senator Murphy. Second, I want to thank you for the
investment you made in the peace--the beginnings of peace
negotiations in Yemen. You and I have talked about this. And
we've also talked about when the right moment is for the United
States to play a more active regular role. I think there's a
sense in the region that Secretary Mattis was engaged in a
daily basis. I have great respect for the U.N. envoy, but it
seems, as we're having trouble keeping the Stockholm Agreement
together, that it's time for the United States to play a
leadership role in maybe a way that we have thus far outsourced
to the U.N. Your thoughts on whether it's time for a change in
U.S. leadership in this process.
Secretary Pompeo. We might disagree about this. I think
we've played a very constructive role. I suppose we could
disagree about whether that's a leadership role or not. I
certainly think that it has. There are places we're best fit
for purpose to achieve the outcome that I think you and I share
as our desired end state there. There are places that we're
probably not the best face to put in front of that. We've tried
to weigh in where it was and stay out where it isn't.
I am very worried about the Stockholm Agreement. I spoke
with the U.N. envoy, it's been 3 days ago now. There's still
hope. There are a lot of pieces to it. I'm happy to give you
the long sordid details, but there are lots of pieces of it. It
is not hopeless to think that it will still be implemented,
but, frankly, the Houthis have just simply refused to date to
agree to a couple of the basic premises which would free up the
port there in Hudaida.
Senator Murphy. Now, I agree that they are clearly much
more at fault with respect to the implementation of the
agreement. I just think we continue to be the only game in town
with respect to the ability to bring the Saudis to the table
and the ability to convince the Houthis that there will be an
honest broker to make sure that the other side complies with
the agreements that they make.
SAUDI ARABIA
Lastly, staying on Saudi Arabia, just a couple points of
clarification. You are testifying that you believe the
administration is in compliance with the Magnitsky Act because
you are still gathering evidence. But the Magnitsky Act, which
is a piece of legislation passed by Congress, signed by the
President of the United States, doesn't give you the unlimited
ability to gather evidence. In fact, it states very clearly
that not later than 120 days after receiving a request from the
Chairperson and Ranking Member of the appropriate committee,
you need to submit a response. And so how do you square this
very clear requirement that you have to respond in 120 days
with your contention that you have unlimited time to collect
evidence?
Secretary Pompeo. So the State Department did submit a
response. Indeed I know I've submitted two responses.
Senator Murphy. Right. But the response has to determine if
that person has engaged in the activity, not defer to a later
point as to make that determination.
Secretary Pompeo. I think we've fully complied with the
statutory requirement.
Senator Murphy. And, lastly, on the two American citizens
that are in custody, Salah Haidar and Bader El-Ibrahim, these
are new disclosures of dual citizens that have been imprisoned.
These are journalist intellectuals, activists. You mentioned
that we can't--there has to be some response, but the only
response you mentioned was asking about them with the Saudis.
At some point, when they don't answer our requests for release,
would we expect some more consequential response from the
administration? They're holding Americans prisoner for their
political beliefs, and the medical reports out of these prisons
suggest that there are some really awful things going on:
deprivation of sleep, electrocution, malnourishment. What's the
next step here?
Secretary Pompeo. So I'm happy to talk to you privately
about the range of things that are under consideration. We take
every American citizen who is wrongfully detained as a burden,
as a duty, as something that we know we have the responsibility
that weighs on us, and we work to achieve their release.
Senator Murphy. Asking is not the beginning and end of our
policy.
Secretary Pompeo. We have lots of tools, lots of different
ways to try and get those outcomes. We don't always succeed.
Senator Murphy. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Thank you. And we're going to get you out
of here right at 4:30. So, Senator Van Hollen, I'll give you 3
minutes, and then I'll close.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
SAUDI ARABIA
Mr. Secretary, just briefly on the--on Saudi Arabia. With
respect to the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology in Saudi
Arabia, I gather you signed off on the Department of Energy's
decision to provide the Part 810 authorizations. Is that right?
Secretary Pompeo. I did. We were part of that conversation.
Senator Van Hollen. Can you tell us when that was?
Secretary Pompeo. I'll get you the answer.
Senator Van Hollen. For the record. Okay.
[The information follows:]
The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, which
has responsibility within the Department for civil nuclear cooperation
matters, oversaw the Department's review of the seven Saudi Arabia-
related Part 810 applications from November 2017 to March 2019 and
provided concurrence on each of them to the Department of Energy. These
reviews were conducted consistent with U.S. law and standard Department
of State practices.
As you know, Saudi Arabia has talked openly about acquiring
a nuclear weapon in addition to many of the sort of
transgressions we've discussed today. As you know, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) adopted the gold standard. Would you agree
that it should be our position that before we move forward with
any kind of nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, even if we made the
decision that that was a wise move, that at the very least they
should have the gold standard?
Secretary Pompeo. It's certainly been what we've been
pursuing. Right? It's what the administration had been trying
to get. That's our goal.
Senator Van Hollen. I understand, Mr. Secretary, but you,
of course, will be able to make the decision about whether
that's an absolute condition or not, assuming people move
forward on the merits. And I would--I hope it would be American
policy to require that as a condition if the decision is made
to move forward.
Let me briefly just mention two bipartisan bills that have
been introduced and ask if you can take a look at them and get
back to us.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
OTTO WARMBIER BANKING RESTRICTIONS INVOLVING NORTH KOREA (BRINK) ACT
Senator Van Hollen. One is on--it's called the BRINK Act.
Senator Toomey and I introduced it. Is it your position, the
administration's position, that as we continue negotiations
with North Korea, we should maintain maximum economic pressure?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. Okay. Because there was some confusion,
as you know, recently, because the President made a comment and
maybe walked it back. But I'm glad to hear that answer because
that's exactly what the BRINK Act would do. It would apply the
same sanctions regime with respect to North Korea that we did
with Iran that helped bring Iran to the negotiating table,
applying secondary sanctions. There was a report today about
how China had, you know, opened another crossing on the Yalu
River with respect to trade, which obviously undermines the
economic pressure. So I hope that you will join with us in that
effort.
DEFENDING ELECTIONS FROM THREATS BY ESTABLISHING REDLINES (DETER) ACT
The other measure is the DETER Act. I've introduced that
with Senator Rubio. It's designed to make sure that we deter
future Russian interference in our elections. And unlike other
measures here, which are just adding new sanctions now, it's a
prospective sanction. I think sanctions should be designed to
try to influence behavior. And the idea is pretty simple: if we
catch the Russians again interfering in our elections, they
will face swift and severe sanctions. So if you're Putin trying
to make that calculation going forward, you will know you have
a very heavy price to pay. We introduced it last year, but
we're going to be reintroducing it. I think you were very
supportive of the concept.
Secretary Pompeo. Mm-hmm.
Senator Van Hollen. Would you support going forward with
something like that?
Secretary Pompeo. I would. I know the outlines of the DETER
Act, and conceptually I think it makes sense.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. I appreciate that. Thank
you.
Senator Graham. We've got like 30 seconds. You've been
great, by the way.
TURKEY
Turkey, important ally, a lot of problems. Do you support
increased economic integration between the American economy and
Turkey?
Secretary Pompeo. I do.
AFGHANISTAN
Senator Graham. When it comes to Afghanistan, can you
assure this subcommittee and the world that the Afghan
government will be a meaningful participant in any peace deal?
Secretary Pompeo. More than that. They will be at the
center readily of Afghan led.
LIBYA
Senator Graham. I am going to Italy and Tunisia next week:
what should the message be about Libya?
Secretary Pompeo. So we have made clear our expectation
that the process, the political process, there will be allowed
to come to its fruition and that there shouldn't be bloodshed
and violence to resolve this, that there should be a political
resolution there at Libya.
Senator Graham. Well, thank you. You've done an excellent
job as Secretary of State. I personally appreciate all the
effort that you put into your job, the counsel you've given the
President, and appearing before the subcommittee today.
We have statements from the Department of State's Office of
Inspector General, and the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction that will be made part of the
record. Also, a letter from the Comptroller General of the
United States regarding ``Priority Open Recommendations:
Department of State'' will be made part of the record.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of Steve A. Linick, Inspector General for the U.S.
Department of State and the U.S. Agency for Global Media
HEARING TO REVIEW THE FISCAL YEAR 2020 FUNDING REQUEST AND BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for requesting my testimony regarding the work
of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the Department of State
(Department) and the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM, formerly
Broadcasting Board of Governors). We appreciate your interest in and
support of OIG's work.
In this testimony, I will highlight some of our recent work,
including our oversight of top management challenges facing the
Department and USAGM. I will also discuss priority recommendations and
issues, OIG initiatives, and some of the effects of our work.
i. mission and oversight efforts
It is my honor to have led OIG since the beginning of fiscal year
2014, and I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss our work.
OIG's mandate is extensive, requiring us to oversee both Department and
USAGM programs and operations, which include more than 75,000 employees
and over 270 overseas missions and domestic entities. We are
responsible for the oversight of more than $70 billion in Department
and USAGM programs and operations, including more than $14 billion in
combined annual appropriations and more than $18 billion in Department-
managed foreign assistance.
Additionally, our mandate is unique in that we are statutorily
required to inspect and audit every domestic and overseas operating
unit of the Department and USAGM at least once every 5 years. Although
this requirement has routinely been waived by Congress due to our
limited resources, OIG employs a risk-based approach to planning
inspections that allows us to leverage those resources and target them
more efficiently. Under this approach, we are focusing on higher risk
missions and tailoring inspections to the needs at specific posts.
Our work has resulted in significant monetary and non-monetary
benefits for the Department, USAGM, and the American public. I discuss
these results in more detail below.
Management and Performance Challenges
In this testimony, I will focus on the Department's top management
and performance challenges as identified in the statutorily mandated
annual report on this matter. In fiscal year 2018, we noted seven key
challenges: the protection of people and facilities; oversight of
contracts, grants, and foreign assistance; information security and
management; financial and property management; operating in contingency
and critical environments; workforce management; and promoting
accountability through internal coordination and clear lines of
authority.
Protecting People and Facilities
One of OIG's top priorities is overseeing the protection of the
Department's greatest asset, its people. The threat of terrorism or
physical violence against U.S. diplomats and U.S. diplomatic facilities
touches every region of the world. Additionally, natural disasters,
environmental hazards, and ordinary crime continually pose risks to the
health and safety of Department personnel and their families serving
abroad.
Although the Department has made improvements in overseas safety
and security since the 2012 attacks on various diplomatic facilities in
Benghazi, Libya, our inspection and audit work continues to identify
vulnerabilities that put our people at risk. Given the sensitive nature
of OIG's work in this area, many of the reports related to safety and
security are classified. As these reports pertain to some of our most
important work--including, for example, setback and perimeter issues at
overseas posts; employees working in unprotected spaces, such as
warehouses; and the status of emergency medical supplies at some
posts--I encourage you to review those materials in an appropriate
setting. This testimony includes only information that is publicly
available, much of which relates to the day-to-day work Department
employees perform--the safety and appropriateness of the facilities in
which they work, the vehicles that they drive, and the places where
they live.
Constructing and maintaining safe and secure diplomatic facilities
has been an ongoing challenge for the Department and is compounded in
regions affected by conflict and humanitarian crises. In terms of
existing facilities, our inspection work frequently finds overseas
posts that lack comprehensive and routine preventative maintenance
programs. In terms of new construction, one significant challenge our
work increasingly highlights is the management and oversight of
construction contracts. Aside from their substantial cost, they have
significant security implications. For example, our work has examined
the construction of two buildings at Embassy Kabul. In one audit
report, OIG concluded that poor quality assurance and oversight of the
construction process resulted in a failure to adhere to electrical and
fire safety standards. A follow-up report in fiscal year 2018 also
revealed risks to personnel and property due to the improper
installation of the Embassy's fire alarm system as part of a major
office and residential expansion.
As a general matter, we have found that systemic issues in the
Department contribute to our concerns about physical security measures.
We have identified places where coordination between the Bureau of
Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) and the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS), both of which have responsibilities in this area, could
be improved. One longstanding and significant issue on which we have
recommended the two bureaus coordinate is the tracking and prioritizing
of physical security needs at overseas posts. Although the Department
has made substantial progress in this area, as I will discuss later in
this testimony, work remains, and that recommendation has not yet been
fully implemented.
Another area of OIG focus related to the safety of Department
personnel has been the operation of official vehicles overseas. Our
fiscal year 2018 inspection work continued to find long-standing
deficiencies that pose health and safety risks. These include failure
to follow policies related to excessive work hours, lapses in medical
clearances for operators of official vehicles, and outdated or absent
safety training for drivers. Finally, we have identified issues related
to the Department's residential housing program and overseas posts'
emergency preparedness that pose risks to the health and safety of
Department personnel. In several fiscal year 2018 inspection reports,
we identified posts that had not properly inspected or could not
demonstrate they had properly inspected residential properties for
health and safety risks before assigning employees to occupy them.
Oversight of Contracts, Grants, and Foreign Assistance
OIG focuses on oversight of contracts and grants, an area where the
Department expends substantial resources. The Department's obligations
in fiscal year 2018 included approximately $15 billion for contracted
services and the same amount in grants and fixed charges. The
Department faces continuing challenges managing its contracts, grants,
and cooperative agreements, particularly those that are long-term and
complicated. The Department must ensure that contractors and grantees
are appropriately selected, work is properly conducted and monitored,
objectives of the grant or contract are achieved, and costs are
effectively managed. As with ensuring the safety of personnel,
management of grants and contracts is especially challenging in
conflict areas, which present unique obstacles to effective oversight.
Overall, we have found that the Department can significantly
improve its oversight of contracts and grants. As a result, a large
percentage of our audit, inspection, and management assistance reports
address, at least in part, deficiencies in this area. Additionally,
nearly 40 percent of the investigations OIG's Office of Investigations
closed in fiscal year 2018 related to contract and grant fraud. At the
root of many of these deficiencies are inexperienced and untrained
oversight personnel, staff rotations that lead to inefficiency, and
complex programs and contracts that simply require more robust
oversight. Although the Department has addressed some problems,
particularly related to invoice review processes in certain bureaus, we
continue to identify widespread weaknesses.
In recent reports, inspectors and auditors have noted that routine
contract management tasks, such as validating performance metrics to
assess contractor performance and maintaining complete and accurate
contract files, were not being performed in compliance with Department
guidance and Federal regulations. For example, an audit of food safety
controls at Embassy Baghdad found that the Department failed to develop
a quality assurance surveillance plan that included measurable and
structured performance standards and was unable to provide
documentation for over one quarter of required food service
inspections.
OIG's audit and inspection reports also highlight circumstances
where Contracting Officer's Representatives (CORs) served without
proper training or without proper designation, which could affect their
ability to ensure adequate oversight of contractors. For instance, in
the example above, the CORs assigned to the food services task order we
audited--which had an obligated value of nearly $300 million as of
December 2017--had no experience in food safety and received no food
safety training before assuming oversight responsibilities. Taking a
more systemic view, one management assistance report identified
structural issues that contribute to the agency's widespread contract
oversight challenges. It reported that the broad dispersal of CORs
throughout the Department limits the ability of Contracting Officers
and the Office of the Procurement Executive (which provides overall
leadership on procurement and Federal award functions) to oversee the
performance of CORs who often work in other bureaus and offices,
frequently far from Washington, D.C.
Inadequate or unskilled contract oversight can be costly for the
Department. During our audit of the Department's aviation program, we
found that the Bureau of Medical Services had awarded a sole-source
contract based on one contractor's unique capability to conduct
aeromedical biocontainment evacuations but subsequently never used the
specialized capability. Furthermore, the Contracting Officer later
modified the contract so that the Department could use the aeromedical
aircraft to shuttle Department employees between Kenya and Somalia as
part of routine transportation needs. We concluded that this change in
the purpose of the contract constituted such a significant change in
its scope that it required full and open competition. As a result of
the modification, the Department has used the sole-source contract for
other services at higher costs than would have been incurred using
competed sources or the Department's own aircraft. In another example,
OIG found that contracting personnel for the same food services task
order at Embassy Baghdad referenced above did not effectively implement
contractually established cost controls to protect the Department's
financial interest. We identified approximately $45 million in
questioned costs in this review.
A growing body of OIG's work addresses a particular subset of
Department contracts: those for the construction of new diplomatic
facilities. These contracts are usually long-term, complex, and high
value. Thus, inadequate management and oversight pose significant
financial risks for the Department. One approach intended to reduce
costs for high-value contracts is the value engineering program--a
systematic process of reviewing and analyzing systems, projects,
equipment, facilities, services, and supplies for the purpose of
achieving the essential functions at the lowest life-cycle cost
consistent with required levels of performance, reliability, quality,
or safety. Although Office of Management and Budget policy requires
agencies to have a value engineering program, we found the Department
had not implemented one outside of OBO. Moreover, in an audit of the
OBO value engineering program, we could not complete some planned
analysis because of missing documentation that prevented auditors from
evaluating the overall effectiveness of the program. Therefore, we
concluded that the Department is missing opportunities to consider cost
reductions for major procurements, including construction projects.
With regard to grants and foreign assistance programs, we have
noted problems with performance monitoring and risk assessment. For
example, in an inspection of the Bureau of African Affairs foreign
assistance program, we reported a lack of documented processes related
to foreign assistance project planning, monitoring and evaluation, and
risk management. We concluded that the program did not consistently
deploy monitoring and evaluation resources effectively across the
bureau and did not coordinate site visits.
Additionally, several fiscal year 2018 reports identified concerns
regarding the Department's ability to plan and design foreign
assistance programs that meet policy goals. For example, in one Bureau
of International Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) foreign assistance
program in Central America, our inspection work found that inadequate
planning resulted in the acquisition and provision of unusable
equipment. Specifically, five helicopters furnished to the host
government could not be used for drug interdiction missions--a core
focus of the program--because they had been grounded since 2016 as a
result of poor maintenance and questionable procurement practices. On a
broader scale, an audit of the Department's aviation program found that
the Department had not succeeded in permanently increasing host
nations' institutional capability to operate programs without U.S.
Government assistance. Efforts to do so have faltered primarily because
transition plans, including benchmarks, had not been developed and
executed with the host countries.
Information Security and Management
The Department depends on information systems and electronic data
to carry out essential functions that are critical to its mission. The
Department is entrusted with sensitive information, both classified and
unclassified, which it processes and stores on those systems. The
security of these systems is vital to protecting national and economic
security, public safety, and the flow of commerce. IT security and
management is a longstanding and significant management challenge for
the Department.
As in prior years, OIG's annual assessment of the Department's
information security program identified numerous control weaknesses
that significantly affected program effectiveness and increased the
Department's vulnerability to cyberattacks and threats. Throughout
fiscal year 2018, OIG identified various areas where the Department
could strengthen its cybersecurity performance. For example, our
inspection work noted numerous instances of lapses in the performance
of Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) duties at overseas
posts. This is a significant risk because ISSOs are responsible for
implementing the Department's information systems security program and
for working closely with system managers to ensure compliance with
information systems security standards. Several inspections of overseas
posts also noted deficiencies in IT contingency planning, which risks
ineffective responses to or loss of critical communication during an
emergency crisis. Finally, we have repeatedly identified concerns
regarding the Department's ability to maintain an accurate inventory of
its IT assets.
Two of the issues that contribute to OIG's concerns regarding IT
security and management at the Department are the lack of an effective
risk management strategy and dispersed authority for IT matters. In
particular, the Chief Information Officer (CIO), who is the head of the
Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM), is not well placed in
the organization to be fully accountable for information security
program issues. For example, DS, which also has information security
responsibilities, does not report to the CIO. We continue to recommend
that the Department address this decentralized reporting structure so
the CIO can effectively manage information security and information
security risk management processes for the Department. Although the
Department took some steps to improve the CIO's authority, we continue
to view the organizational placement of the CIO as a deficiency.
This management challenge is particularly significant because of
the uniquely broad effect that information security program weaknesses
have on the Department's overall programs and operations. Such
weaknesses can affect the integrity of financial applications, which,
in turn, increases a variety of risks.
Financial and Property Management
Financial management has historically been a challenge for the
Department, and we continue to identify wide-ranging concerns related
to this issue and to property management.
Weaknesses in the Department's collection, use, and analysis of
financial information are a particularly significant manifestation of
this challenge. In one notable report from fiscal year 2017, OIG
highlighted significant flaws in the Department's processes that set
certain cost-of-living allowances for Department employees who are
stationed in foreign areas. Our report described a laborious,
subjective, and error-prone process for gathering data that has not
changed in decades. We estimated that using independent economic data
instead of collecting the underlying information on its own would have
saved the Department more than $18 million from fiscal year 2013 to
fiscal year 2015 at six of the seven posts audited. Nonetheless, our
recommendation to develop and implement a plan to use independent
economic data to determine post allowance rates remains unimplemented.
Another fiscal year 2017 report identified significant flaws in the
processes the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) used to set fees for
selected consular services. Specifically, the report noted that the
fee-setting methodology did not rely on adequate data and did not fully
consider the effects of large carry-forward balances. Furthermore, CA
did not have an adequate process to analyze its financial results over
time to determine whether adjustments to its fee-setting methodology
were required, and it did not have adequate historical data or sound
quality processes to assess the data that it did use. The Department is
working to address our recommendations that the Department determine a
threshold for required carry-forward balances and return excess
unobligated balances from consular fees to the Department of the
Treasury, which OIG reported as $284 million, to be put to better use
across the Federal Government and to benefit taxpayers.
More recently, we published an audit that found that the Department
lacked adequate policies and procedures for evaluating and remitting to
the Department of the Treasury excess earnings in its Working Capital
Fund accounts. The Working Capital Fund provides a variety of goods and
services to Department and other Federal customers through its cost
centers, which are funded by reimbursements or advanced payments at
rates that will approximate the cost of goods and services provided--
that is, they are intended to ``break even.'' Our audit was unable to
determine whether excess earnings should have been transferred to the
Department of the Treasury and concluded that the Department is unable
to advance the primary purpose of the Working Capital Fund, which is to
provide an effective means for controlling costs of goods and services
and to encourage cost consciousness and efficiency for users and
suppliers of services.
We regularly identify internal control weaknesses at the
Department, which is another subset of its financial and property
management challenge. Internal control deficiencies span a wide range
of Department operations and may be related to unliquidated
obligations, acquisition planning, warehouse operations, or oversight
of bulk fuel inventory, to name a few examples. In one fiscal year 2018
audit, we found that the Department is not optimally managing aviation
resources and that it accordingly spent $72 million on unnecessary
services over a 4-year period. Our audit report noted that a lack of
procedures and guidance contributed to insufficient accountability over
aircraft equipment and improper disposal of aircraft, placing aviation
assets at increased risk for fraud, waste, and abuse.
Lastly, we assess the difficulty the Department faces in tracking
and reporting on foreign assistance funds under this challenge. The
lack of information on this crucial aspect of the Department's work
hinders its ability to manage foreign assistance resources
strategically, identify whether programs are achieving objectives, and
determine how well bureaus and offices implement foreign assistance
programs. I will discuss this further when I highlight our priority
issues below.
Operating in Contingency and Critical Environments
We recognize the particular difficulties the Department faces in
managing posts and programs in environments characterized by
contingency operations or other types of conflict or instability.
Because of the security concerns, constant change, and sometimes
dramatic swings in personnel and funding that can occur in these
environments, every other challenge the Department faces is magnified
in these locations.
Managing contracts and foreign assistance can be particularly
challenging in contingency and critical environments. In an audit of
new construction projects at Embassy Kabul, we found the Department
declared new construction substantially complete even though 14 major
buildings systems were not fully tested and confirmed to meet the
design intent and specified performance requirements. We learned that
an unstable security environment and the pressure to move staff into
hardened structures contributed to this action, which ultimately
resulted in personnel occupying buildings that had a range of ongoing
deficiencies, including issues affecting plumbing systems and heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning systems. Some of the identified
deficiencies created electrical and fire safety issues. Similarly, at
Embassy Baghdad, Department officials told us they did not implement a
point-of-sale cafeteria system because of a security-related crisis in
Iraq and later because of morale concerns. Further, officials told us
that they did not restrict access to the dining facility for locally-
engaged staff due to contractual limitations. As a result of these
weaknesses in oversight, we estimated that the Department
inappropriately paid for at least 450,000 meals valued at more than $4
million.
Financial and property management challenges are also exacerbated
in difficult operating environments. For example, in an inspection of
the Yemen Affairs Unit--the diplomatic mission established in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, following the suspension of operations and evacuation of
Embassy Sana'a, Yemen, in February 2015--we found that lost records
made addressing unliquidated obligations difficult and labor-intensive.
Similarly, the inability to return to Yemen created ongoing problems in
managing a leased property.
Workforce Management
A challenge we first identified in fiscal year 2017 and again in
fiscal year 2018 is workforce management. Across functional areas and
geographic regions, OIG found that inexperienced staff, insufficient
training, staffing gaps, and frequent turnover contribute to the
Department's other management and performance challenges. These
problems afflict programs and operations domestically and overseas and
are identified in a range of reports that cover a variety of topics.
Deficiencies associated with oversight of contracts and grants are
sometimes connected to these issues. For example, an audit of the
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs' selection and management of contract
oversight personnel illustrated how the Department's contract oversight
and workforce management challenges intersect. We found that the bureau
did not consistently nominate CORs with the required certification
level and technical expertise to oversee contracts in Iraq and did not
always effectively evaluate the performance of contract oversight
staff. As a result, we also found deficiencies in COR files and
contractor performance monitoring. In another example, we found that in
one office in IRM, only one COR was responsible for overseeing 14
complex contracts worth over $100 million per year in fiscal year 2016
and fiscal year 2017. As a result, we found oversight weaknesses,
including approval of invoice payments without appropriately verifying
that goods had been received.
More generally, we see that many Foreign Service personnel are
assigned management of contracts and grants as a collateral duty but do
not receive necessary training. In addition, most Foreign Service
employees rotate in and out of posts frequently, and some assignments
are as short as 1 year. As a result, many large grants and contracts
have multiple employees overseeing them, which leads to a lack of both
continuity and accountability.
Another area of concern is significant staffing shortfalls at
particular bureaus. For example, our inspection of the Bureau of
African Affairs noted the bureau's profound difficulties in attracting
Foreign Service Officers to its overseas posts. The Bureau of South and
Central Asian Affairs experiences similar challenges.
Promoting Accountability Through Internal Coordination and Clear Lines
of Authority
Another challenge that we first identified in fiscal year 2017
relates to internal coordination and clear lines of authority. We found
that poor coordination and vague or dispersed authority are often at
the root of some of the Department's other challenges. This is a
concern that affects a wide range of Department functions. It is often
implicated in problems particular to certain Department programs or
projects, and it is likewise relevant to some of the Department's more
longstanding and systemic difficulties, including ensuring physical and
information security, both of which I mentioned previously.
In one fiscal year 2018 report, OIG found that the Department had
not effectively implemented its non-financial management control
program. Although Department policy gave overall responsibility for
designing this program to the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global
Financial Services (CGFS), the Department's Comptroller stated that the
policy did not accurately reflect the entities responsible for
particular tasks and that such obligations were actually split between
CGFS and the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation.
We concluded that, nonetheless, the two entities had not coordinated or
maintained close communication and did not have the same understanding
of their respective obligations. This report illustrates how unclear
lines of responsibility make it more difficult for the Department to
manage its overall risks.
Additionally, in a review of passport seizures at Embassy Sana'a,
Yemen, we found that diffused and overlapping legal responsibilities at
the Department--along with the lack of a single decision maker with
clear authority for resolving differing viewpoints--contributed to the
prolonged and difficult search for a resolution.
ii. priority recommendations and issues
Many of our recommendations are specific to particular posts or
programs, but others address more systemic issues that have the
potential to improve overall operations of the Department and USAGM.\1\
With respect to the Department, we believe that the following
recommendations, all of which have been previously issued by OIG and
suggest changes in the Department's processes, would go far in
addressing the most important management challenges.
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\1\ During my tenure, we have issued numerous reports on USAGM
programs and operations. Many challenges we have identified are similar
to those affecting the Department, including information security and
management, financial and property management, and grants management.
For example, we recently reported that USAGM has not fully developed
and implemented an effective organization-wide information security
program to identify, protect, detect, respond to, and recover from
information security weaknesses using risk-based decisions.
Additionally, we noted USAGM's noncompliance with some of its reporting
responsibilities in the Improper Payments Act and the Digital
Accountability and Transparency Act.
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As to physical security, OBO and DS have overlapping
responsibilities for crucial physical security issues. As described
above, OIG recommended that the bureaus develop and implement formal,
standardized processes to prioritize physical security needs. Follow-up
work found that the Department has made significant progress on this
recommendation by developing and populating a physical security
deficiencies database to collect all deficiencies at overseas posts.
Nonetheless, it has not yet implemented a process to prioritize, fund,
and plan for security upgrades in a systematic, deliberate way.
On the topic of IT, we have reported on deficiencies with the
Department's risk management strategy for the past 5 years, and we
continue to urge the Department to implement a strategy to identify,
assess, respond to, and monitor risk. Although a Cyber Risk Office was
established in the Bureau of Information Resource Management, we found
little had been accomplished on a strategy as of the issuance of our
annual information security program audit report in October 2018. An
effective organization-wide approach would enable the Department to
understand its current risk profile, identify opportunities to improve
risk management, and communicate risk. As described previously, other
key outstanding IT recommendations also relate to the organizational
placement of the CIO. We will monitor whether these steps are
sufficient to ensure that the Department properly manages its
information security risk.
Another longstanding issue relates to the tracking of foreign
assistance. In a 2017 compliance follow-up review, we found that the
Department had not complied with 2015 recommendations to implement a
comprehensive plan for tracking and reporting foreign assistance
funding. Without such a system, the Department cannot make data-driven
decisions. We accordingly recommended that the Deputy Secretary issue
clear requirements for the data needs of senior Department policymakers
and prioritize the Department's efforts related to foreign assistance
tracking and reporting. The Department took sufficient action to close
this recommendation in April 2018. In fiscal year 2020, however, we
plan to follow up on how the Department has developed and implemented
plans to address foreign assistance management, including legal and
regulatory oversight needs and external reporting requirements.
To reiterate, I treat these issues as a priority in large part
because they relate to the systemic concerns that we have identified as
key management challenges. Attention to these issues--particularly the
need for coordination and clear lines of authority--will go far in
addressing specific deficiencies identified in individual reports.
iii. oig initiatives
My tenure as Inspector General began at the outset of fiscal year
2014, and since that time, we have undertaken a number of initiatives
meant to make the most of our limited resources to further our
oversight mission. Soon after my arrival, we began to issue management
assistance reports and management alerts that are intended to alert
senior Department leadership to significant issues that require
immediate corrective action. These reports allow us to bring issues
that we identify in the course of fieldwork to the Department's
attention quickly, without waiting for the conclusion of our overall
work. We also established the Office of Evaluations and Special
Projects (ESP) shortly after my arrival. ESP complements the work of
OIG's other offices by improving our capacity to focus on broad,
systemic issues.
In August 2016, OIG established its own IT network. Before we made
this change, our IT infrastructure was part of the Department's own
unclassified network, which meant that vulnerabilities in that network
directly affected us. Moreover, the contents of our unclassified
network could be easily accessed by the Department and potentially
compromised, a situation that placed our independence at unnecessary
risk and did not reflect best practices within the IG community.
More recently, to further enhance our commitment to transparency,
we have begun posting to our website monthly reports regarding our
unclassified recommendations, which include the total number of open
recommendations as well as the number of recommendations closed in the
previous month. Additionally, we provide relevant congressional
committees monthly information on unclassified, classified, and
sensitive but unclassified recommendations.
We also continue to fulfill our responsibilities related to
whistleblower protection. In addition to conducting outreach to educate
Department and USAGM employees on the rights and protections available
to whistleblowers, our whistleblower protection coordinator oversees
investigations of allegations of retaliation filed by employees of
contractors, subcontractors, grantees, subgrantees, and personal
services contractors.
iv. effects of oig's work
Through our audits, evaluations, inspections, and investigations,
OIG returns substantial value to U.S. taxpayers. In my first 5 years as
Inspector General (fiscal year 2014-fiscal year 2018), we issued more
than 600 reports and identified more than $1.7 billion in potential
monetary benefits, which amounts to a fourfold potential return to
taxpayers for every dollar appropriated to OIG.
Additionally, OIG embraces its mission to protect people and
information, although these efforts rarely result in a monetary return
on investment. By helping the Department improve its security, OIG's
work safeguards the lives of people who work in or visit our posts
abroad. Our security work is a source of immense pride.
Since 2014, our investigative work has seen consistent and positive
growth in administrative actions and criminal convictions associated
with our cases. For example, one of our investigations resulted in the
conviction and sentencing of a former Department employee to 26 years
in prison for conspiring to produce more than a thousand sexually
explicit images and videos of minor children in Canada during a 2-year
period. Another investigation led to a Department contract company
agreeing to pay a nearly $1 million administrative settlement to
resolve allegations that it knowingly provided false information to the
Department. Our special agents determined that the company did not
comply with contractual obligations to ensure that U.S. Embassy local
guard force personnel were adequately trained to contract
specifications. Finally, a joint investigation with the Department's
Bureau of Diplomatic Security resulted in the sentencing by a foreign
court of three Department locally employed staff, along with three
local foreign national citizens, to probation. The court also ordered
restitution of $460,000 to the Department as well as various fines. The
individuals participated in a large-scale theft of approximately $2.3
million in diesel fuel from Embassy Tbilisi, Georgia. In addition, 11
individuals were debarred, and post management terminated six
employees. At least two pensions were withheld, resulting in
approximately $46,500 in funds put to better use.
In recent years, we have also observed notable improvements on
specific aspects of Department programs and operations. Regarding the
physical security deficiencies database I mentioned previously, the
Department has completed the majority of past-due physical security
surveys and populated the deficiencies database, and the work done thus
far has already made the database a useful tool. As I emphasized with
respect to our priority recommendations, though, the Department must
still implement a method for prioritizing those deficiencies, and this
vital aspect of our recommendation should be addressed as soon as
possible. The Department has also developed an e-filing document
management system for Contracting Officer's Representatives to store
contract files that had previously been kept in hard copy. Although the
development of the e-filing system has been an important step toward
providing effective contract file inventory control, the Department has
not required its use. We advised the Department to issue guidance
mandating use of the system. In response to our audit and inspection of
the armored vehicle program, which illustrated program management
deficiencies and health and safety issues, the Department has made a
number of improvements to the program. For example the Department
established mandatory training for all overseas professional drivers,
developed and implemented an armored vehicle program plan and hired a
program manager, developed a system to ensure that posts are
reassessing the need for armored vehicles at posts, and established an
oversight mechanism to ensure posts are performing the reassessment.
v. conclusion
In conclusion, I want to again thank Chairman Graham, Ranking
Member Leahy, and the Members of the subcommittee for inviting my
testimony. I also want to emphasize that OIG's accomplishments are a
credit to the talented and committed staff that I have had the
privilege to lead, and I also want to thank them for their hard work. I
take my statutory requirement to keep the Congress fully and currently
informed seriously, and I appreciate your interest in our work.
______
Prepared Statement of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction
U.S. RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN: KEY HIGH-RISK AREAS TO
PERSIST INTO FUTURE
Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, and Members of the
subcommittee,
This statement explains the fiscal year 2020 budget request for the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). The
statement describes SIGAR's successes, challenges to accomplishing its
mission, and steps taken to overcome or mitigate these challenges. In
keeping with the agency's oversight mission, this statement also
touches on key management and program challenges facing State, the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the
Department of Defense (DoD) by noting areas of high risk that SIGAR has
identified.
Since fiscal year 2002, Congress has appropriated approximately
$132.3 billion to rebuild Afghanistan.\1\ For fiscal year 2020, the
President has requested $533 million in Afghanistan-related funding via
the State Department budget.\2\ The President has also requested more
than $4.8 billion in the Department of Defense (DoD) budget to train,
equip, and sustain the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces
(ANDSF).\3\ Another $10.8 billion from previous years' reconstruction
appropriations remains available for disbursement.\4\
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\1\ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the Congress of the United States,
1/30/2019, p. 43.
\2\ The White House, Fiscal Year Budget 2020 Budget of the U.S.
Government, 3/11/2019, p. 72.
\3\ Department of Defense, Justification for Fiscal Year 2020
Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, March
2019, p. 6.
\4\ Data as of 12/31/2018. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United
States Congress, 1/30/2019, p. 49.
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SIGAR's mission is to ensure that all these funds are spent as
effectively and efficiently as possible, and that they are protected
from waste, fraud, and abuse. Our enabling legislation also directs
SIGAR to keep Congress and the Secretaries of State and Defense
informed on reconstruction issues and to offer recommendations for
improvement.\5\
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\5\ Public Law No. 110-181, Sec. 1229.
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Embedded in State's overall request is SIGAR's fiscal year 2020
budget request of $52.9 million. The amount sought is $2 million less
than provided in each of the last two fiscal years. We believe the
requested funding level is adequate to continue meeting SIGAR's
congressional mandate. However, the $2 million reduction does limit
SIGAR's ability to adapt to the rapidly changing environment in
Afghanistan. Should the U.S. increase its use of ``on-budget''
assistance (assistance channeled directly to the Afghan government or
through multilateral trust funds), it will be vitally important that
the ministries have strong accountability measures and internal
controls in place. Oversight over those measures and controls will be
equally important. SIGAR's experience reviewing bilateral and
multilateral on-budget assistance and exposing waste, fraud, and abuse
makes it uniquely qualified to review ministries and their ability to
handle on-budget assistance. For example, at the request of President
Ghani, SIGAR currently is conducting a financial audit of Afghanistan's
electric utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS). SIGAR also has
a strategy in place for looking at the internal controls of other
ministries if asked.
While the United States continues to support a peaceful resolution
to the Afghanistan War, Taliban insurgents are still waging war, and
foreign terrorist groups are making their presence felt. Personal
safety and obstacles to travel remain key concerns. In other words, the
risk of waste, fraud, and abuse of reconstruction funds in Afghanistan
has grown, even as the ability to exercise effective oversight is
increasingly constrained.
Nevertheless, SIGAR continues to provide aggressive oversight of
reconstruction projects and the use of U.S. funds, and has adapted to
the more constrained environment by using innovative remote monitoring
techniques, including using third-party inspectors to go where SIGAR
employees cannot, employing Afghan nationals, and using geospatial
monitoring.
Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request Highlights SIGAR's Unique and Critical
Role in Overseeing Afghanistan Reconstruction Funds
SIGAR is the only inspector general with interagency authority to
audit, inspect, and investigate the activities of all U.S. Government
agencies and international organizations that receive U.S. funding for
Afghanistan reconstruction. As a result, SIGAR can conduct crosscutting
reviews of State, USAID, DoD, and other agencies that are involved in
reconstruction programs. In addition, SIGAR is the only oversight
agency devoted solely to Afghanistan reconstruction, enabling it to
examine reconstruction programs and issues in more depth while still
producing timely and high-quality work. Further, SIGAR is truly
independent. We conduct our oversight autonomously and report directly
to Congress and to the Secretaries of State and Defense.
SIGAR currently has the largest oversight presence in Afghanistan,
with more auditors, analysts, and investigators in country than any
other agency. SIGAR has an authorized staff of 30 employees at U.S.
Embassy Kabul and Bagram Airfield.\6\ These employees comprise
auditors, inspectors, and investigators, plus management and support
staff. In addition, five Afghan citizens support SIGAR's work in Kabul.
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\6\ The actual number of SIGAR staff residing in Afghanistan is
usually fewer than 30, due to reassignments and normal turnover.
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Most of SIGAR's deployed staff serve at least 2 years in country.
This practice reduces annual turnover compared to other U.S. agencies
and mitigates the risk of institutional memory loss. The deployed and
local staff are augmented by SIGAR personnel from our Arlington,
Virginia offices who frequently travel to Afghanistan on 2- to 8-week
temporary assignments.
When SIGAR was established in 2008, the agency created four
directorates: (1) Audits and Inspections, (2) Investigations, (3)
Research and Analysis, and (4) Management and Support. The Research and
Analysis Directorate, originally known as Information Management,
produces SIGAR's quarterly report to Congress and other publications.
Management and Support provides human resources, budget, information
technology, and other support to SIGAR's other directorates and to
staff.
Since then, two additional units have been established. In 2012,
SIGAR created its Office of Special Projects to examine emerging issues
and deliver prompt, actionable reports to implementing agencies and
Congress. The team conducts a variety of assessments and produces
inquiry and alert letters, reviews, fact sheets, and other products.
In late 2014, SIGAR established its Lessons Learned Program. While
audits and inspections typically focus on the planning, execution, and
outcome of particular programs and projects, the Lessons Learned more
broadly documents U.S. reconstruction objectives, assesses results, and
distills this knowledge into recommendations to improve reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan and in future contingency operations. Other
Federal agencies and the U.S. military also operate lessons learned
units, but SIGAR's Lessons Learned Program is the only one established
and positioned to extract and frame lessons from a whole-of-government
perspective.
SIGAR's Work Continues to Improve the Effectiveness and Efficiency of
Reconstruction Programs, and to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse of Funds
SIGAR's investigations, audits, and other work continues to have
positive impacts on ongoing and planned reconstruction programs and
agency operations. As of March 2019, SIGAR's audits and investigations
work has identified some $2.6 billion in savings and recoveries for
U.S. taxpayers. These impacts take several forms. SIGAR does more than
simply identify waste, fraud, and abuse. It can bring malefactors to
justice, and recover money. SIGAR investigators are full-fledged
Federal law-enforcement officers with powers of search and arrest.
Whether acting on their own or in coordination with other law-
enforcement agencies, they have conducted investigations into cases of
bribery, theft, smuggling, money laundering, and other offenses; have
made arrests in Afghanistan and stateside; and have referred many
Afghans to that country's prosecutors.
As of March 27, 2019, SIGAR had 168 ongoing investigations. At that
time, the cumulative results of the SIGAR Investigations Directorate
comprised 129 arrests, 174 criminal charges, 135 convictions, and 126
individuals sentenced. The cumulative total from investigations-related
criminal fines, restitutions, forfeitures, civil-settlement recoveries,
and savings to the government exceeds $1.5 billion--the equivalent of
27 years' funding for SIGAR at current levels. Investigative work has
also led to 928 referrals of companies and individuals for suspension
or debarment to prevent them from receiving more U.S. contract awards;
about 74 percent of these referrals led to suspension or debarment, not
counting a small number of special-entity designations or
administrative-compliance agreements.
From 2009 through March 2019, SIGAR had made 952 recommendations in
its 333 published audits, alert letters, evaluations, and inspection
reports. SIGAR has closed more than 86 percent of its recommendations.
These recommendations have, among other things, strengthened contract
oversight, management, and compliance; assisted in building and
sustaining Afghan government capacity; and improved accountability for
on-budget support. SIGAR audits and inspections have resulted in
agencies recovering an estimated $43 million and identified some $1.1
billion that could be put to better use.
SIGAR's Lessons Learned Program has issued seven reports, including
five reports covering corruption, Afghan security forces, private
sector development, stabilization, and illicit narcotics. These reports
identified 98 findings and lessons and made 78 recommendations to
Congress and executive branch agencies. Some of these lessons and
recommendations have become public law, while others have garnered
high-level interest from executive branch agencies. SIGAR will be
publishing several more lessons learned reports in the coming months.
SIGAR also maintains professional and productive working
relationships with DoD and its subcomponents and commands, and with
State and USAID. In addition, SIGAR coordinates regularly with other
inspectors general and the Government Accountability Office to ensure
coverage of all aspects of the reconstruction effort and to avoid
duplication of effort.
SIGAR Has Taken Steps to Overcome Challenges to Conducting Its
Oversight Mission
In 2015, the Afghan government took on full responsibility for its
own security, U.S. and Coalition forces switched from combat to a
train, advise, and assist mission, and the Afghanistan's
``Transformation Decade'' aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in fiscal
and security matters began. In this changed setting of heightened
security precautions and reduced access to program and project sites,
SIGAR has faced challenges.
To overcome these challenges, SIGAR has hired several Afghan
engineers and analysts to assist with audit and inspection work. SIGAR
has also signed a cooperative agreement with a well-respected Afghan
civil-society organization to conduct site visits, including
inspections and engineering assessments of U.S.-funded projects. This
Afghan organization's work is subject to generally accepted government
auditing standards (GAGAS), and to SIGAR's internal quality-control
requirements.
In addition, SIGAR is continuing its financial audit program.\7\
Established in 2012, the program contracts with independent public
auditing firms to perform financial audits of completed reconstruction
contracts. SIGAR staff oversees the firms' conduct of these financial
audits, from notification to final report. To date, SIGAR's financial
audits have identified about $425.3 million in questioned costs,
interest, and other amounts payable to the U.S. Government. Funding
agencies had disallowed about $26.6 million in questioned amounts,
which are subject to collection. In some cases, when questioned costs
are identified, SIGAR investigators review those costs and initiate
criminal investigations if appropriate. At the request of President
Ghani, SIGAR currently is conducting a review of Afghanistan's power
utility, DABS.
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\7\ SIGAR produces two types of audits: (1) financial and (2)
performance. Financial audits evaluate completed reconstruction
contracts and identify questioned costs, if any, resulting from
significant deficiencies in the audited entity's internal controls
related to the contracts, and any instances of noncompliance with
contract requirements and applicable laws and regulations. Performance
audits provide objective analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency
of reconstruction programs, and make recommendations to improve
performance and operations, reduce costs, and facilitate decisionmaking
by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action
for public accountability.
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SIGAR Has Updated the Areas of High Risk to the Success of the U.S.
Reconstruction Effort in Afghanistan
In 2014 and 2017 SIGAR issued its High-Risk List to call attention
to program areas and elements of the U.S.-funded reconstruction effort
in Afghanistan that are especially vulnerable to significant waste,
fraud, and abuse. In March SIGAR released the 2019 edition of the High-
Risk List, which calls attention to areas of the U.S. reconstruction
effort in Afghanistan that are at serious risk of waste, fraud, abuse,
mismanagement, and even program failure. With negotiations underway
that could lead to the end of America's longest war, this report
differs from our prior two reports by identifying risks to the
reconstruction effort that might persist or arise in the event of a
hoped-for peace agreement.
The new High-Risk List focuses on program areas and elements of the
reconstruction effort that are (1) essential to success; (2) at risk of
significant and large-scale failure due to waste, fraud, or abuse; and
(3) subject to the control or influence of the U.S. Government.
Applying these criteria, SIGAR identified eight high-risk areas: \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ HRL 2019, p. 9.
--Widespread Insecurity
--Underdeveloped Civil Policing Capability
--Endemic Corruption
--Sluggish Economic Growth
--Illicit Narcotics Trade
--Threats to Women's Rights
--Reintegration of Ex-Combatants
--Restricted Oversight
Three of these areas--economic growth, women's rights, and
reintegration--are new to the High-Risk List. Additionally, the
critical issue of sustainability appears as a facet of each high-risk
area. Sustainability is a long-standing concern in reconstruction;
shortcomings in finance, staffing, institutional capacity, technology
and technical skills, political will, and other issues individually or
in combination can undermine the Afghan government's ability to
maintain programs once foreign support has decreased or withdrawn.
widespread insecurity
Since 2001, the main goal of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan
has been to prevent the country from reverting to a safe haven for al-
Qaeda and other extremist groups that threaten the United States and
other countries.\9\
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\9\ DoD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 12/2018,
pp. 8-9.
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With or without a sustainable peace settlement or a local or
nationwide ceasefire between the Taliban and the ANDSF, Afghanistan
will continue to need a security force to protect the Afghan population
from internal and external threats, provide a policing function to
respond to criminal activity, and control its borders. Any political
settlement entails the risk that not all subordinate groups will abide
by an agreement made by their organization's leadership.
The ANDSF will also continue to be constrained by capability and
sustainability challenges. In a post-settlement environment, depending
on the terms of an agreement, there may also be the challenge of
integrating former Taliban fighters into the national security forces
and society (see the reintegration section of this testimony). These
issues could become more acute should international financial and
military support decline sharply before, during, or after peace talks
between the Afghan government and the Taliban.
According to DoD, Resolute Support (RS), and U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan (USFOR-A), the ANDSF currently face critical capability
gaps in key areas that hinder the force's effectiveness and readiness
and may continue to do so in the future, including force manning;
personnel accountability and pay systems; logistics and maintenance;
institutional training; persistent threat from Islamic State; and
stalemated control of districts, population, and territory.
Questions for Policymakers
--What would the American contribution to any ongoing train, advise,
and assist effort for the ANDSF be in a post-peace deal
environment when the active insurgent threat to the ANDSF might
be reduced or significantly diminished?
--If the United States were to drastically decrease its train,
advise, and assist mission, how might DoD continue to ensure
the ANDSF is capable of defending Afghanistan and ensure U.S.
national security interests in the region are protected?
--In a possible post-peace deal environment, if the United States had
a reduced role in training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF
and/or providing less financial and military support to it,
what would be the risks to the gains made in key areas, such as
the expansion and improvement of the Afghan Air Force and the
Afghan Special Security Forces?
--Are the various ANDSF components properly trained and equipped to
function in peacekeeping and other roles required in a post-
reconciliation environment? What type of future investment,
financial and otherwise, would the United States need to make
to ensure the ANDSF components function in these various
capacities?
--In a possible post-settlement environment, how would former Taliban
fighters be integrated into the ANDSF?
--Are U.S.-funded materiel (such as vehicles and aircraft) and
computer-based technology programs (such as Afghan Personnel
Pay System and CoreIMS) independently sustainable by the ANDSF?
If not, what is the plan to address this, and what are the
projected dates for when the ANDSF will be capable of
sustaining them?
underdeveloped civil policing capability
With the possibility of a peace settlement coming into view, and
based upon SIGAR's work to date, there is no comprehensive strategy for
how the United States and Coalition partners will align its nationwide
police advising mission to support Afghan rule of law and civil
policing.\10\ Following a political settlement, Afghan police, rather
than the army, are likely to be the element responsible for everyday
security and will serve as a direct link to the Afghan government in
local communities. The underdeveloped civil policing capabilities of
the Afghan National Police (ANP) thus present a risk to long-term
stability of the Afghan government.\11\
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\10\ SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces: Lessons From the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR 16-62-
LL, 9/2017, viii-ix, pp. 122-123.
\11\ SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces: Lessons From the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR 16-62-
LL, 9/2017, viii-xix; SIGAR conclusion based on analysis of available
data sources, 3/2019.
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Unlike the Afghan National Army (ANA), a significant share of ANP
personnel costs are paid through the U.N.-administered Law and Order
Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), to which the United States has
historically been the largest contributor, although not in fiscal year
2018. The LOTFA mechanism relieves some financial pressure on the
United States by spreading the ANP funding burden to the Coalition.\12\
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\12\ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/2019,
p. 68.
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SIGAR's 2017 lessons learned report, Reconstructing the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience
in Afghanistan, found that police development was treated as a
secondary mission for the U.S. Government, despite the critical role
that ANP was intended to play in implementing rule of law and providing
static, local-level security nationwide. SIGAR also found that the
United States lacks an institutionalized capability to develop foreign
police forces in a high-threat environment.
SIGAR's quarterly reports track ANP reconstruction metrics, some of
which seem to show that the ANP has sustained itself or even improved
in important areas such as organizational structure, the number of
security incidents involving the ANP, personnel strength, and personnel
accountability since SIGAR's last High-Risk List was published in
January 2017. Challenges, of course, remain in all of these areas.
SIGAR is scheduled to initiate a new lessons learned report in 2019
focused on the development of the ANP and a civil policing function in
Afghanistan.
Questions for Policymakers
--Given the lack of U.S. emphasis on civil policing in Afghanistan
since 2001, what is the U.S. strategy for coordinating with
allies and the Afghan government to implement professional
civil policing?
--The Afghan government generated approximately $2.5 billion in
domestic revenues in fiscal year 2018. Currently, ANP
sustainment costs for fiscal year 2019 are about $1.1 billion,
of which the Afghan government is scheduled to contribute $207
million from its domestic revenues (the rest of ANP sustainment
costs are covered by the U.S. and Coalition nations). In a
post-reconciliation environment, how can the ANP be sustained
at a cost of $1.1 billion a year?
--U.S., Afghan, and Coalition officials and researchers have accused
the ANP of multiple types of corruption, including corruption
related to narcotics trafficking and reconstruction
contracting.\13\ In a post-reconciliation environment in which
the drawdown in U.S. and Coalition advisers makes oversight
even more challenging, how will the U.S. Government and
Coalition partners ensure that continued security assistance is
not directed to corrupt ANP officials?
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\13\ The Atlantic, ``Our Man in Kandahar,'' 11/2011; United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan's Drug Industry: Structure,
Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy,
11/2006, p. 102.
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--In a post-reconciliation Afghanistan, what is the U.S. strategy for
facilitating the rule-of-law--including ANP warrants and
arrests--in remaining high-threat districts?
--As part of a peace agreement and efforts to reintegrate the
Taliban, what role in civil policing might former Taliban play?
endemic corruption
Corruption remains an enduring risk to the U.S. mission in
Afghanistan. SIGAR's September 2016 Lessons Learned Program report on
corruption found that corruption substantially undermined the U.S.
mission in Afghanistan from the very start. SIGAR concluded that
failure to effectively address the problem means U.S. reconstruction
programs, at best, will continue to be subverted by systemic corruption
and, at worst, will fail.\14\ Despite many anticorruption efforts, the
problem persists. According to DoD, ``corruption remains the top
strategic threat to the legitimacy and success of the Afghan
government.'' \15\
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\14\ SIGAR, Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S.
Experience in Afghanistan, 9/2016.
\15\ DoD, Enhancing Security and Sustainability in Afghanistan, 6/
2018, p. 38.
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As of January 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ) reported some
progress by Afghanistan's Attorney General in pursuing major crimes as
a result of the U.S. Embassy demanding accountability. However, in a
January 2019 report covering July--September 2018, DOJ said the Afghan
government is still slow to prosecute corruption cases and has a poor
record of prosecuting powerful and influential actors.\16\
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\16\ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/
2019, pp. 130-131.
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In January 2019, State said the U.S. Embassy's new corruption-
related Compact benchmark priority for the Afghan government is to
increase transparency at Afghan special courts, the Anti-Corruption
Justice Center, the Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC), and the
Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP). The U.S. Embassy continues to
emphasize such anticorruption measures as executing warrants,
prosecuting high-profile corruption cases, and collecting on Kabul Bank
cases.\17\
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\17\ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/
2019, p. 132.
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In the security sector, the Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) said corruption remains pervasive throughout the
Afghan security forces. This corruption, they added, harms the
battlefield effectiveness of the Afghan security forces by diverting
resources meant for fighting units and by creating negative perceptions
of the Afghan government, undermining the Afghan government's
legitimacy and reconciliation efforts.\18\
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\18\ CSTC-A is tasked with training, advising, and assisting the
Afghan security institutions. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United
States Congress, 1/30/2019, p. 134.
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Questions for Policymakers
--What are reasonable expectations for Afghan government
anticorruption-related results given competing challenges of
regime stability and reform?
--In the event of a peace settlement, how could the U.S. Government
restructure its reconstruction assistance and programs to
promote compelling anticorruption programs in Afghanistan? Does
that calculus change for an Afghan government that includes the
Taliban?
--What will be the impact of fewer international troops and reduced
assistance on the ability of the Afghan government to fight
corruption?
--Are reform benchmarks so vague and/or bland that they have no
meaningful impact against rampant institutional corruption?
--Should the United States consider imposing financial penalties or
other consequences should Afghan reform benchmarks not be met?
sluggish economic growth
The U.S. Government's current Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for
Afghanistan states that no U.S. efforts in Afghanistan--including the
fundamental objective of preventing further attacks by terrorists on
the U.S. homeland--can be sustained without a growing licit Afghan
economy.\19\ While a sustainable peace agreement could boost business
confidence and investment, and therefore improve growth prospects
substantially, peace also carries its own set of challenges.\20\
Despite its centrality to U.S. objectives--and its continued importance
even if a peace agreement is reached--licit economic growth remains
relatively low and Afghanistan remains heavily reliant on donor
support. This raises questions about whether Afghanistan will be able
to achieve the long-term stability and economic self-reliance that are
key reconstruction goals.\21\
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\19\ State, Integrated Country Strategy: Afghanistan, 9/27/2018,
pp. 2-3.
\20\ International Monetary Fund, Fourth Review under the Extended
Credit Facility Arrangement, Request for Modification of Performance
Criteria, and Request for Extension and Rephasing of the Arrangement,
11/20/2018, p. 8.
\21\ IMF, Fourth Review under the Extended Credit Facility
Arrangement, Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, and
Request for Extension and Rephasing of the Arrangement,
11/20/2018, p. 24; USAID, ``Economic Growth--Afghanistan,'' 9/2018,
https://www.usaid.gov/
afghanistan/economic-growth, accessed 9/14/2018; Government of
Afghanistan, Realizing Self-Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and
Renewed Partnership, 12/2014, p. 4.
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In its 2018 Lessons Learned Program report on private sector
development and economic growth, SIGAR found that despite significant
U.S. effort, estimated poverty, unemployment, and underemployment had
not been reduced substantially; further, corruption had undermined the
legitimacy of the Afghan state.\22\ Moreover, despite near double-digit
growth over the first decade of reconstruction, the Afghan government
faced a substantial budget shortfall in 2014 when international
military expenditures in country declined rapidly as U.S. and Coalition
forces drew down.\23\ Ultimately, SIGAR determined, economic gains in
the first decade of reconstruction were heavily subsidized by donor
support and therefore unsustainable.\24\
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\22\ SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth--Lessons
from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, 4/2018, viii-ix; SIGAR,
Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in
Afghanistan, 7/2016, p. 75.
\23\ U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), What Can Be Done to Revive
Afghanistan's Economy?,
2/2016, pp. 3, 8; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress, 1/30/2019, pp. 149, 153.
\24\ SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth--Lessons
from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, 4/2018, viii.
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While a lasting peace agreement could fundamentally improve
Afghanistan's prospects, its greatest economic challenge today remains
identifying sustainable sources of growth, according to the World
Bank.\25\ Additionally, a peace agreement is unlikely to immediately
overcome the many enduring barriers to economic growth. These include
limited skilled labor, the lingering effects of near-continuous
conflict over multiple decades, deficits in physical and institutional
infrastructure, heavy reliance on foreign donor support, and widespread
corruption.\26\
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\25\ USIP, What Can Be Done to Revive Afghanistan's Economy?, 2/
2016, p. 3; World Bank, ``The World Bank in Afghanistan,'' no date,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan, accessed 9/14/2018.
\26\ Asian Development Bank, Chair's Summary of Meeting of the
Board of Directors, ``Country Partnership Strategy Afghanistan, 2017-
2021--Achieving Inclusive Growth in a Fragile and Conflict-Affected
Situation,'' 10/31/2017; SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic
Growth: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, 4/2018, ix;
World Bank, Afghanistan Poverty Status Update Progress at Risk, 5/2017,
p. 7; USIP, Afghan Economic Policy, Institutions, and Society Since
2001, 10/2015, p. 6.
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Questions for Policymakers
--How will U.S. economic development programming adjust to a
potential peace settlement?
--If a sustainable peace settlement is reached, how will economic
development programming simultaneously support the
reintegration of former fighters, the possible return of Afghan
refugees from Pakistan, and the large number of returnees from
Iran?
--To what extent will current Afghan laws, rules, regulations, and
policies concerning economic growth continue to apply if a
peace agreement materializes?
--Are current interventions to increase Afghanistan's economic growth
positioned to have a sustained impact after they end?
--What would the economic effects be of a drawdown of U.S. military
and civilian personnel from Afghanistan?
the illicit narcotics trade
Since 2002, the United States Government has provided $8.9 billion
to thwart narcotics production and trafficking in Afghanistan. Yet
Afghanistan remains the global leader in opium cultivation--a
distinction it has held since the late 1990s, according to opium-
cultivation data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC).\27\ The illicit opium trade hinders the Afghan government's
efforts across numerous sectors, including security, governance, and
economic and social development.\28\
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\27\ Funding as of December 31, 2018. UNODC, 2006 World Drug
Report, Volume I: Analysis, p. 57.
\28\ GIROA, Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387-1391
(2008-2013), p. 42.
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A SIGAR lessons learned report published in June 2018 found that
U.S. counternarcotics programs have not resulted in long-term
reductions in opium poppy cultivation or production. The findings in
SIGAR's lessons learned report prompted the Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control to request that SIGAR conduct a
thorough review of the U.S. Government's current counternarcotics
efforts in Afghanistan. That review is ongoing.
Addressing Afghanistan's illicit drug trade appears to have fallen
off the international agenda since 2017. In September 2018, the State
Department informed SIGAR it was no longer developing a stand-alone
U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan that had previously been
under review. According to State, counternarcotics efforts are now
interwoven into the administration's South Asia strategy.\29\ USAID
said it will no longer design or implement programs to address opium
poppy cultivation.\30\ DoD does not have a counternarcotics mission in
Afghanistan, but until recently has pursued a counter-threat-finance
mission.\31\ In February 2019, DoD reported that the counter-threat-
finance campaign ceased at the end of 2018.
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\29\ State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2018.
\30\ USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2018.
\31\ DoD, USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/13/2018; DoD,
response to SIGAR vetting, 7/16/2016.
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Questions for Policymakers
--Given the poor performance of many U.S. counternarcotics programs
over the past 17 years, can the U.S. Government support
effective counternarcotics programs after a peace accord?
--Can capacity-building programs strengthen Afghan government
institutions to prevent the country's collapse into a narco-
state?
--How would a potential peace accord with the Taliban impact opium
cultivation and production in Afghanistan?
--Will counternarcotics operations targeting insurgent groups be
carried out during a ceasefire or after a peace settlement?
--Which tools are the most effective in curbing opium cultivation and
battling the narcotics trade? How can existing tools be
improved or new ones devised?
--Which type of economic programs will provide the most employment
opportunities for farmers and discourage opium cultivation?
--How can U.S. agencies better coordinate counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan in order to achieve U.S. goals and objectives?
threats to women's rights
Improving the quality of life and the status of Afghan women has
been a key goal of the United States and the international donor
community since 2002. The United States has committed at least $1
billion for gender-related programs in Afghanistan and spent another $1
billion on programs for which the advancement of women was a
component.\32\ Since the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001,
millions of Afghan women have voted, and some women now occupy
prominent positions in Afghan society. Sixty-three women are members of
parliament (out of 320 seats); 68,000 women are instructors in schools
and universities; 6,000 women serve as judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, police, and soldiers; about 10,000 women are doctors,
nurses, or other healthcare professionals; and 1,150 women
entrepreneurs have invested $77 million in their businesses.\33\
Nonetheless, in 2018, the United Nations ranked Afghanistan 153rd out
of 160 countries for gender equality--despite a constitution that
nominally protects women's rights.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/
2016, p. 3.
\33\ USIP, Afghanistan Talks: No Women, No Peace, 3/1/2019.
\34\ United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Indices and Indicators 2018 Statistical Update, p. 40; UNDP, ``Gender
Inequality Index (GII),'' no date, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/
gender-inequality-index-gii, accessed 3/4/2019; The National Interest,
``Afghan Women are In Charge of Their Own Fate,'' 2/27/2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The prospect of a peace agreement with the Taliban raises new
concerns about the sustainability of the gains Afghan women have made
over the past 17 years. Some experts believe that a precipitous
withdrawal of U.S. forces could lead to the deterioration of political
and economic freedoms, however limited, currently enjoyed by women in
Afghanistan.\35\ Official Taliban statements involved in the peace
negotiations confirm such risks. For example, despite some signals the
Taliban may be open to more liberal policies regarding women, the
Taliban's chief negotiator called the current Afghan constitution
(providing the same rights to men and women) an obstacle to peace and
demanded a new Afghan constitution based on ``Islamic principles,
national interests, historic pride, and social justice.'' \36\
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\35\ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
Finishing Strong: Seeking a Proper Exit from Afghanistan, 2/2019, pp.
1, 5.
\36\ Alemarah, ``Complete Transcript of Speech Delivered by
Delegation of Islamic Emirate in Moscow Conference,'' 2/5/2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions for Policymakers
--What can the United States do to ensure that women's rights, as
currently enshrined in Afghan law, are protected in a post-
peace agreement environment in which the Taliban may become
part of the Afghan political system?
--In talks with the Taliban, how is the United States promoting ``the
meaningful participation of women in mediation and negotiation
processes seeking to prevent, mitigate, or resolve violent
conflict'' and the ``physical safety, economic security, and
dignity of women and girls'' as called for in the Women, Peace,
and Security Act of 2017 (Public Law No. 115-68)?
--How can DoD, State, and USAID better track the outcomes of gender
advancement programming in Afghanistan, determine any causal
connection between U.S. gender programming and those outcomes,
and become better stewards of U.S. taxpayer dollars spent on
these programs?
the challenge of reintegration
The U.S. and Afghan governments agree that the best way to ensure
lasting peace and security in Afghanistan is to achieve reconciliation
and a sustainable political settlement with the Taliban.\37\ While
current estimates for the number of active Taliban fighters vary, the
nominee for commander of U.S. Central Command, Lieutenant General
Kenneth McKenzie Jr., put the figure at 60,000 fighters.\38\ If a
comprehensive peace agreement is reached, these ex-combatants will need
to transition to a sustainable livelihood and peacefully reintegrate
into Afghan society. There may also be efforts to demobilize and
reintegrate members of other illegal armed groups.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/
2018, p. 112.
\38\ DoD, ``Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Kenneth
F. McKenzie Jr., USMC, Nominee for Commander, United States Central
Command,'' 12/4/2018, p. 9.
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Successfully reintegrating these tens of thousands of former
fighters into society--a complex and long-term process with social,
economic, political, security, and humanitarian dimensions--will be
critical for Afghanistan to achieve lasting peace and stability.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ UNDP, Practice Note: Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration of Ex-combatants, 2011, p. 11.
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The mixed record of reintegration efforts undertaken in dozens of
countries since the late 1980s suggests that similar efforts in
Afghanistan will likely face significant challenges.\40\ SIGAR assesses
that the nature and extent of those challenges will depend largely on
the peace process itself, its level of inclusivity, trust among the
parties, the degree to which reintegration issues are decided in an
agreement or deferred, and numerous other factors. For example, a weak
economy with few job opportunities would complicate reintegration.
Ongoing insecurity, political uncertainty, poor social cohesion within
a population traumatized by decades of war, and weak governance and
rule of law will probably pose serious challenges to reintegration
efforts.\41\ Further, donor fatigue regarding Afghanistan could be a
concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, ``Reintegration and
Reconciliation in Conflict: Experience and Lessons,'' July 2016, p. 2.
\41\ U.N., Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), 2014, pp. 33-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SIGAR is currently making a thorough investigation of reintegration
issues for a forthcoming Lessons Learned Program report to be published
later this year.
Questions for Policymakers
--What lessons can be gleaned from prior reintegration initiatives in
Afghanistan?
--What transferable lessons can be gleaned from reintegration
initiatives in other countries, such as Colombia, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, and El Salvador?
--Should the international community encourage Afghan negotiators,
during a potential peace process, to include the reintegration
of ex-combatants as a focused area of discussion?
--If a reintegration program were established, what entities would be
responsible for designing, implementing, and funding it, and
what role would the United States play in reintegration
efforts?
--Do donors have the appetite to commit to a series of long-term,
post-conflict reintegration activities, and the ability to
effectively implement such activities?
--Will a future peace agreement include details regarding the
integration of former insurgents into state security forces?
--How should U.S. agencies adjust current assistance and programming
to ensure that these are conducive to potential reintegration
efforts?
--Can sufficient employment be created in the licit rural economy in
order to encourage re-integrees to return to rural areas,
rather than migrate to already overstressed urban centers?
restricted oversight
Oversight of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, already
difficult, may become even more challenging if substantial numbers of
U.S. military and civilian personnel withdraw following an Afghan peace
settlement.\42\ Accessing reconstruction project sites and programs in
Afghanistan is already difficult due to deteriorated security. Site
access would continue to be challenging should a potential peace
agreement not actually lead to a cessation of hostilities--a possible
outcome about which several experts have written in recent months.\43\
Moreover, a reduced footprint for U.S. agencies operating in
Afghanistan could exacerbate ongoing problems with contract oversight,
such as spotty compliance, documentation and accountability, as well as
institutional memory loss.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/
2019, pp. 9-10, 69, 80, 148, 169, 179.
\43\ CSIS, ``Afghanistan as Vietnam Redux: Bomb, Declare Peace, and
Leave?'' 1/17/2019, p. 7; Brookings, ``The U.S.-Taliban negotiations
breakthrough: What it means and what lies ahead,'' 1/29/2019.
\44\ SIGAR, ``Challenges to Effective Oversight of Afghanistan
Reconstruction Grow as High-Risk Areas Persist,'' Statement of John F.
Sopko for the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the
Departments of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs,
2/24/2016, p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 2002, the United States has provided nearly $14.6 billion in
on-budget assistance to the Afghan government. This includes about $9.2
billion to Afghan government ministries and institutions, and about
$5.4 billion to three multinational trust funds--the World Bank's
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the United Nations
Development Programme's Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), and the Asian
Development Bank's Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/
2019, p. 47.
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SIGAR's experience shows that as the United States provides more
reconstruction funds on-budget, whether through bilateral transfers or
disbursement via multilateral trust funds, it will be vital that Afghan
ministries have strong accountability measures and internal controls in
place because external visibility into the use of funds is likely to
shrink. Oversight of those measures and controls will be equally
important.
In Afghanistan's conflict setting, where rules are not rigorously
observed and documentation is often incomplete and unverifiable, having
personnel physically present and able to move about the country is
essential for effective oversight. Otherwise, it is difficult to
determine whether training is effective, equipment is operable, clinics
are stocked with medicines, schools are open, or buildings are safe and
functional.
Questions for Policymakers
--What levels of U.S. military and civilian personnel would best
protect U.S. on- and off-budget funds to the Afghan government
should a peace settlement be reached?
--If more (or most) U.S. assistance to the Afghan government moves
on-budget as a result of a negotiated peace settlement, whether
through bilateral transfers or disbursement through
multilateral trust funds, what are the best oversight
mechanisms to make the waste, fraud, and abuse of U.S.
reconstruction funds more difficult, and more likely to be
spotted?
--Have agencies taken appropriate steps to use third-party monitors,
remote sensing, increased access to Afghan documentation and
officials, or other tools to maintain acceptable levels of
oversight, and have they reported the limitations of these
methods to Congress? How will a possible reduction of U.S.
military and civilian personnel after a potential peace
agreement affect agency oversight plans?
--How can Congress and U.S. implementing agencies focus their
oversight on reconstruction program outcomes rather than on
easy measures of activity or outputs? How will a possible
reduction of U.S. military and civilian personnel after a
potential peace agreement affect this?
--When reviewing U.S. military and reconstruction footprints in
conflict areas, how can the U.S. Government ensure sufficient
number of qualified, experienced, and certified contract
officers and technical representatives are deployed, especially
in high-risk missions like Afghanistan?
conclusion
No one disputes that after 40 years of war, peace would be a
blessing for the long-suffering people of Afghanistan. And no one knows
at this point what the specific terms of an acceptable peace deal would
look like. But as the topical sections of SIGAR's 2019 High-Risk List
indicate, even a broadly popular agreement might present risks to
Afghanistan's reconstruction and to its long-term viability as a
nation-state.
If large-scale withdrawals of U.S. operational and oversight
personnel occur, the stewardship of U.S. taxpayer funds and achievement
of reconstruction goals could suffer. If widespread corruption is not
adequately addressed, the effectiveness of programs, the perceived
legitimacy of the Afghan state, and the willingness of donors to
continue their assistance could all suffer. If economic development
stalls, accommodating new entrants to the labor force, including
returning refugees and former government and insurgent fighters, could
prove a daunting task. If women's rights and progress are not
respected, and if the rule of law is not upheld, equitable and
effective governance could fail. And if new security arrangements do
not provide for fair and effective policing while standing ready to
quash any resurgence of terrorism, then all other aspects of
reconstruction could ultimately fail.
As discussions progress, Members of the U.S. Congress and of
executive agencies should consider the ``day after'' a peace agreement
and be on the alert for unexamined assumptions, overlooked details,
unintended consequences, concealed agendas, and other issues that could
turn a wished-for peace deal into another sort of conflict.
An opportunity for peace exists. How it is embraced, shaped, and
nurtured will determine if Afghanistan is to avoid further decades of
conflict that might result in it once again becoming a danger to the
international community. As Congress considers ways to reduce or avert
these dangers, we at SIGAR stand ready to assist in any way we can.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit a written statement for the
hearing record. SIGAR shares your commitment to protecting U.S. funds
from waste, fraud, and abuse and is committed to assisting Congress,
U.S. agencies, and other stakeholders by continuing to provide
aggressive and independent oversight of the reconstruction effort, and
by offering recommendations and lessons based on that work.
Prepared Statement of the Comptroller General of the United States
``Priority Open Recommendations: Department of State''
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Graham. Any questions for the record should be
submitted no later than Friday, April 12. Our next hearing will
be on April 30 with USAID Administrator Mark Green.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Hon. Michael Pompeo
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Question. Your budget request States that educational and cultural
exchanges ``advance U.S. foreign policy and national security goals,''
``provide enormous benefits to the American people and economy,'' and
``are central to the Department's diplomatic engagement efforts.'' Why
then would you propose to cut these exchange programs by 56 percent
below the fiscal year 2019 enacted level?
Answer. The administration's budget request makes efficient and
effective use of available resources. The State Department's overall
mission to engage foreign publics on behalf of the United States
remains unchanged. I will continue to prioritize engagement with
emerging world leaders through U.S. Government-sponsored exchanges. The
fiscal year 2020 budget request continues support for core global
programs such as Fulbright and the International Visitor Leadership
Program, while focusing resources on programs that support
administration initiatives. Academic, professional, youth, and cultural
exchange programs will remain effective foreign policy tools.
Question. Your budget request states that educational and cultural
exchanges ``advance U.S. foreign policy and national security goals,''
``provide enormous benefits to the American people and economy,'' and
``are central to the Department's diplomatic engagement efforts.'' What
is the specific justification for cutting the Fulbright Program by 48
percent and youth leadership initiatives by 61 percent?
Answer. Contingent on enacted funding, I will base any future
adjustments in educational and cultural exchanges on the most efficient
and effective use of those resources. U.S. Government-sponsored
exchange programs will continue to empower and influence important
audiences at home and abroad through academic coursework, leadership
training, professional development, mentoring, networking, and follow-
on support. Both the Fulbright program and our three regional youth
initiatives--the Young African Leaders Initiative, the Young Southeast
Asian Leaders Initiative, and the Young Leaders of the Americas
Initiative--will continue to play an important role in cultivating the
next generation of world leaders.
Question. I am sure you have visited refugee camps, as I and many
of us have. You've seen the misery, and the numbers of refugees and
other displaced persons due to violence and natural disasters is at an
all time high. In the past year the crisis in Venezuela has exploded,
with thousands of people fleeing each day. What is the specific
justification for cutting refugee and disaster assistance by 35 percent
below the fiscal year 2019 level?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2020 budget request
consolidates our overseas humanitarian programming, implementation, and
oversight into one account. The request of $6.3 billion for
humanitarian assistance (including resettlement) enables the United
States to remain the largest single donor. The request calls on other
countries to increase contributions and restructures our overseas
humanitarian programming to allow the United States to respond
seamlessly to evolving humanitarian needs. The request will allow the
U.S. to remain the world's largest single donor of humanitarian
assistance and to robustly address needs for Syria, Yemen, and other
major crises around the world. When combined with all available
resources, average annual funding available for fiscal year 2019 and
fiscal year 2020 of around $9 billion roughly matches the highest-ever
annual level of U.S. overseas humanitarian programming. I am also
working on implementing a strategy intended to get other donors to step
up and increase their share of global humanitarian funding and reduce
the burden on American taxpayers.
Question. On October 10, I, Chairman Graham, our counterparts on
the Foreign Relations Committee, and 18 other Senators requested the
President to make a determination on the imposition of sanctions under
the Global Magnitsky Act, with respect to the murder of Jamal
Khashoggi. He has not done so, even though the Magnitsky Act explicitly
requires him to. When pressed on the fact that the law has an explicit
deadline, you then stated that two documents were submitted to meet the
requirement, neither of which was the required determination. That also
contradicts the administration's initial position, which was that ``the
President maintains his discretion to decline to act on congressional
committee requests when appropriate.'' On what basis is the President
in compliance with the law? If the law were changed to require the
Secretary of State to make the determination, would you comply?
Answer. The administration has taken significant actions to promote
accountability in this case, including by imposing sanctions on 17
Saudi government officials under the Global Magnitsky sanctions
program. Section 1263(d) of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act addresses certain Congressional committee requests
for determinations and reports by the President on whether a foreign
person has engaged in an activity described in Section 1263(a) of the
Act. The authorities under Section 1263(d) have not been delegated by
the President to the Secretary of State and thus the Department is not
in a position to make such a determination or report. I am not in a
position to speculate on any potential future amendments to the Act.
Question. The annual appropriations bill includes section 7031(c),
which says explicitly that if the Secretary of State has ``credible
information''--not proof--credible information, that a foreign official
has committed a gross violation of human rights, that person is
ineligible to enter the United States. You have applied that law to
deny entry to 16 Saudis for their involvement in the crime. If the
Crown Prince sought to travel to the U.S., would you let him in?
Answer. While the Department of State cannot comment on a
hypothetical visa application, we will ensure that all visa applicants
who may be subject to section 7031(c) undergo appropriate review prior
to the issuance or denial of a visa.
Question. The annual appropriations bill includes section 7031(c),
which says explicitly that if the Secretary of State has ``credible
information''--not proof--credible information, that a foreign official
has committed a gross violation of human rights, that person is
ineligible to enter the United States. The November 2018 Treasury
sanctions announcement includes information that 17 Saudi officials
were involved in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, meaning the Secretary
of State had credible information about each of these individuals last
November. Why did it take 5 months to apply 7031(c) to these
individuals, when the law does not allow for such discretion in timing?
Answer. Section 7031(c) is separately administered from the Global
Magnitsky sanctions program under Executive Order 13818, which
implements and expands upon the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (the Act) and provides the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General, with the authority to make designations. Designation under one
authority does not automatically trigger the applicability of the other
authority. Due to the need to treat each case individually, it can take
time for the Department to prepare the information and analysis needed
for the Secretary to make determinations under section 7031(c). We
intend to devote further training and resources to the exercise of this
authority.
Question. The annual appropriations bill includes section 7031(c),
which says explicitly that if the Secretary of State has ``credible
information''--not proof--credible information, that a foreign official
has committed a gross violation of human rights, that person is
ineligible to enter the United States. Why hasn't the Saudi Consul
General who was sanctioned in November been listed as ineligible to
enter the United States pursuant to section 7031(c) in addition to the
other 16 of 17 Saudi officials referenced above?
Answer. Multiple authorities exist that may make an individual
ineligible to enter the United States on human rights grounds,
including authorities in the Immigration & Nationality Act Section
212(a)(3)(E), Presidential Proclamation 8697, and Section 7031(c) of
the State Appropriations Act. We note that the standard for designation
under Executive Order 13818, which implements and expands the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, is different than the
standard for designation under Section 7031(c). The Department cannot
comment on any specific case until a decision has been made to publicly
identify an individual under 7031(c)(1)(B).
Question. Eleven individuals were indicted in connection with the
murder, five of whom will reportedly face the death penalty if
convicted. Do you know the identities of those eleven individuals? Do
you know the identity of the ``local collaborator''?
Answer. The Department is aware of the identities of the 11
individuals indicted by the Saudi Arabian Public Prosecutor's Office.
The U.S. Embassy in Riyadh is closely monitoring the ongoing trial of
these individuals and continues to urge Saudi authorities to conduct
transparent, credible judicial procedures surrounding the heinous
murder of Jamal Khashoggi. The State Department's Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs would be pleased to brief you and your staff in an
appropriate setting.
Question. Last week, nine more writers and activists were arrested,
including two Saudi-American citizens. One is the son of a prominent
women's rights activist who was recently released after spending a year
in prison. Have you called for the release of these latest victims of
the Crown Prince's crackdown?
Answer. The Department remains deeply concerned by the detention of
activists and dissidents in Saudi Arabia and takes all allegations of
abuse seriously. I, along with U.S. Embassy officials in Riyadh and
senior Department leadership in Washington, consistently urge the
Government of Saudi Arabia to ensure freedom from unlawful or arbitrary
detention, and transparency and fair trial guarantees in the legal
process. U.S. Embassy Riyadh is actively seeking consular access to the
two detained U.S. citizens to ensure their well-being.
Question. The Treasury Department's November 2018 sanctions
announcement includes the following paragraph: ``This operation was
coordinated and executed by his subordinate Maher Mutreb, and involved
participation of at least 14 other Saudi government officials: Salah
Tubaigy; Meshal Albostani; Naif Alarifi; Mohammed Alzahrani; Mansour
Abahussain; Khalid Alotaibi; Abdulaziz Alhawsawi; Waleed Alsehri; Thaar
Alharbi; Fahad Albalawi; Badr Alotaibi; Mustafa Almadani; Saif
Alqahtani; and Turki Alsehri.'' Did any of these individuals, or
associated individuals, receive training from a Memphis, Tennessee
company called Tier One Group, with funds provided by the USG?
Answer. No U.S. foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia was used to fund
training for these Saudi government officials by the Tier 1 Group.
Question. Do you agree that it is in the interest of U.S. national
security, and global security, for the United States to be a leader in
the United Nations, and that our influence derives, in part, from
paying what we owe to the U.N.?
Answer. Yes, I agree that being a leader at the United Nations is
in the national interest. The United States will continue to be the
largest financial contributor to the United Nations and other
international organizations. We will make every effort to project U.S.
leadership and the advancement of U.S. ideals.
Question. I understand you want other countries to pay more of the
costs of the U.N. We do too. But each country has an assessed share and
this administration agreed to the current U.N. budget. Why is the
administration proposing a cut of 33 percent, nearly $479 million,
below what we owe for the U.N. regular budget? Nations, and that our
influence derives, in part, from paying what we owe to the U.N.?
Answer. The administration is proposing reductions in funding in an
effort to spur long-needed reforms and promote more equitable burden-
sharing. By demanding fiscal discipline, the United States is
encouraging the U.N. to rethink the way it operates. The President's
budget request reinforces the expectation that the U.N., and other
international organizations in which the United States participates,
must become more efficient and effective.
Question. For U.N. peacekeeping, this administration is proposing
to pay at a rate of only 16 percent when we owe 27.9 percent, even
though the U.S. has already racked up more than $700 million in arrears
to the U.N.--money we owe but have not paid. These are missions the
U.S. has voted for and that don't require deployment of Americans. Do
you plan to pay these arrears, and do you believe the Congress should
lift the statutory cap on U.S. peacekeeping contributions to enable you
to pay our full dues? If not, why not?
Answer. I believe that other countries should take on more of the
burden for financing U.N. peacekeeping operations. As the President
said in his remarks to the U.N. General Assembly last September, the
administration does not intend to pay more than 25 percent of UN
peacekeeping costs.
Question. According to one advocate for funding to combat HIV/AIDS,
``the President's budget stands in stark contrast to his February State
of the Union pledge to `defeat AIDS in America and beyond.' Proposed
cuts . . . would risk resurgence of the world's deadliest infectious
diseases--AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. This proposed budget is more
than just a funding cut. If enacted, it would signal a rapid retreat in
U.S. global health leadership . . . '' How do you respond to that?
Answer. The United States continues to be the single largest donor
to global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria relief efforts. The
fiscal year 2020 budget includes $6.3 billion--more than 23 percent of
the overall fiscal year 2020 foreign assistance request for the State
Department and USAID--to support key global health efforts such as the
U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR); the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria; the President's Malaria Initiative;
and other global health programs. These resources allow PEPFAR to help
control the HIV/AIDS epidemic globally by achieving goals articulated
in the administration's PEPFAR Strategy for Accelerating HIV/AIDS
Epidemic Control (2017-2020).
Question. For reasons that have not been explained, the
administration is proposing to reduce the U.S. share of contributions
to the Global Fund from 33 percent to 25 percent. How does the
administration reconcile this cut with its prior support for 33
percent? Won't this reduce pressure on other donors to increase their
commitments?
Answer. The U.S. Government is planning to pledge up to $3.3
billion over 3 years (fiscal year 2020-fiscal year 2022) to the Global
Fund's next replenishment cycle, subject to the availability of
appropriated funds, with a commitment to match other donors at a rate
of $1 from the United States for every $3 pledged from other donors.
This new approach to the U.S. pledge's matching ratio demonstrates
continued U.S. global leadership, specifically in the fight against
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, but also pushes other donors to
contribute a greater share of resources to address these public health
challenges.
Question. Do you support amending the Anti-Terrorism Clarification
Act in a way that preserves the ability of U.S. citizens who lost loved
ones in terror attacks to pursue civil claims in U.S. courts?
Answer. The administration is deeply concerned about U.S. victims
of terrorism and strongly supports their rights to seek just
compensation for their injuries. This concern has featured prominently
in our discussions with Congress about the implications of the Anti-
Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA).
Question. Will your staff meet with the victims and their lawyers
to see if there is an amendment that protects the claims of U.S. terror
victims, and does not restrict humanitarian and development aid for the
Palestinians?
Answer. The Department has spoken and met with a wide range of
stakeholders in the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA). We
particularly value the input we have received on the views of U.S.
victims of terrorism. We look forward to continued discussion with
Congress and other stakeholders on the implications of ATCA.
Question. Do you agree that any peace agreement with the Taliban
must include enforceable protections of the rights and safety of Afghan
women, who were systematically persecuted and brutalized by the Taliban
when they were in power?
Answer. As the Department's annual report on human rights
demonstrates, there is still a long way to go to ensure these rights
are protected in the rural regions of Afghanistan, particularly where
the Taliban exerts influence. That is why it is essential that all
parties to the talks engage directly with Afghan women and Afghan women
activists to ensure their concerns and priorities are addressed.
Special Representative Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Ambassador John
Bass have been strong advocates for the inclusion of women and their
perspectives in any dialogue among Afghans about Afghanistan's future.
In addition, consistent with the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017,
Ambassador Khalilzad in his discussions with the Taliban is vigorously
pressing the group's leadership to respect the rights and promote the
safety of Afghan women and include them in future peace talks.
Question. How will the U.S. ensure that, given recent press reports
that Afghan women have so far been excluded from negotiations with the
Taliban? Will you obtain a commitment from the Afghan government to
include them?
Answer. It has long been the U.S. position that the full
empowerment of women and girls is essential to Afghanistan's future
security and prosperity. Formal negotiations between the Afghan
government, other Afghan leaders, and the Taliban have not yet begun.
In discussions with Afghan government, opposition, and civil society
leaders, Special Representative Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and
Ambassador John Bass have strongly and successfully advocated for the
participation of Afghan women as these leaders prepare for negotiations
with the Taliban.
Question. What is the administration's Central America policy?
Answer. The Department wants to see a safe and prosperous Central
America and is urging governments to address security, governance, and
economic drivers of illegal immigration and illicit trafficking. We
expect the governments to take more steps to improve border security;
combat human smuggling and human trafficking, especially related to
children; receive and reintegrate their returned citizens; and dissuade
their people from immigrating illegally. In Belize, Costa Rica, and
Panama, we promote economic prosperity, regional security, and
governance. In Nicaragua, we support democratic actors and early, free,
and fair elections.
Question. Do you agree that any person has a right under
international law to seek asylum in another country?
Answer. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is a non-
binding instrument, sets forth that, except in cases of prosecution for
non-political crimes or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations, everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum in
other countries. Neither the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees nor its 1967 Protocol refers to a ``right to seek asylum,''
but, subject to limited exceptions, they oblige States parties to
protect individuals who meet the definition of a ``refugee'' from
refoulement. The United States encourages other governments to
incorporate refugee protection standards into national laws and
policies, and supports the mandate of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees.
Question. What specific actions have you told the Central American
governments they must take in order to reduce the exodus of migrants
and be eligible for U.S. assistance?
Answer. The Northern Triangle governments need to be more effective
in preventing illegal immigration to the United States. We are actively
engaging the governments on additional steps they can take to improve
border security; combat human smuggling and human trafficking,
especially related to children; receive and reintegrate their returned
citizens; and implement public messaging campaigns to dissuade illegal
immigration to the United States. Likewise, we continue urging these
governments to make needed reforms to improve citizen security,
increase economic growth, improve democratic governance, and combat
corruption and impunity.
Question. Are you asking these governments to arrest their citizens
to prevent them from fleeing to another country to seek asylum?
Answer. No. However, the Northern Triangle governments are not
doing enough to prevent illegal immigration to the United States. We
are actively engaging the governments on additional steps, in
accordance with their domestic laws and international obligations, they
can take to improve border security; combat human smuggling and
trafficking, especially related to children; receive and reintegrate
their returned citizens; and implement public messaging campaigns to
dissuade illegal immigration to the United States. We also continue to
urge the governments to make needed reforms to improve citizen
security, increase economic growth, improve democratic governance, and
address corruption and impunity.
Question. How does your policy distinguish between aid to
governments and aid through other entities to meet the needs of
vulnerable people?
Answer. The Northern Triangle governments need to be more effective
in preventing illegal immigration to the United States. We are actively
engaging with the governments on additional steps they can take to
improve border security; combat human smuggling and human trafficking,
especially related to children; receive and reintegrate their returned
citizens; and implement public messaging campaigns to dissuade illegal
immigration to the United States. Likewise, we continue urging these
governments to make needed reforms to improve citizen security,
increase economic growth, improve democratic governance, and address
corruption and impunity.
Question. (Jessikka Aro award). Why should we accept the State
Department's claim that this was just an innocent mistake, when emails
and other evidence points to the contrary? Who made the decision to
rescind the award, and why?
Answer. A number of errors were made in the nomination and approval
process of Ms. Jessikka Aro. Ms. Aro should not have been notified that
she was an awardee in the absence of a comprehensive review, which is a
prerequisite for the nomination process. We commit to improving the
process moving forward.
Question. Sharing biological samples and their derived digital
information, such as pathogen genetic sequences, is crucial for
effective response to infectious diseases. In the past, this type of
sharing of pathogens has been mostly routine under World Health
Organization rules. But governments are increasingly refusing to share
disease samples. For example for over a year, the Chinese government
withheld samples of a rapidly evolving influenza virus from U.S.
researchers. That meant they were not able to conduct research on the
virus in the event we needed vaccines or treatments. This obviously has
potentially far reaching consequences for the health of people
everywhere. Are you aware of this, and if so what steps is the
Department taking to address it?
Answer. The State Department coordinates with Federal agencies,
including the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to engage
stakeholders and promote rapid, consistent, and systematic access to
pathogens, as prioritized in the National Biodefense Strategy. We
expect to discuss emerging challenges with timely pathogen sharing at
the May 2019 World Health Assembly. China committed in 2017 to maintain
a clear process for sharing novel influenza viruses with pandemic
potential (IVPP). In 2018, China shared with the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention six H7N9 samples and one H7N9 candidate
vaccine virus. The Department continues to work closely with HHS to
press China to share IVPP in accordance with its commitments.
Question. One of the points of agreement from the Singapore Summit
between President Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un related to
recovering American POW/MIA remains from the Korean War. I am told
there are at least 20 Vermont veterans of that war who are still
unaccounted for. This POW/MIA agreement is reportedly being handled on
a track separate from the nuclear issue. Are these discussions
progressing? Have you been satisfied with the level of North Korean
cooperation?
Answer. Since the Singapore Summit, the United States and North
Korea have cooperated on the return of 55 sets of human remains
believed to be those of Americans who fell on the battlefields of North
Korea more than 60 years ago. Building on this success, we are
continuing to engage North Korea on the resumption of joint recovery
operations. We also continue to call for the immediate repatriation of
those already identified, to achieve closure for every American family.
Question. Last May, June, September, and December I wrote to you
about the application of the Leahy Law in Israel. I have written
similar letters concerning the application of the Leahy Law in other
countries. The reason I have written four times in the past 11 months
is that none of your responses even attempted to answer my questions. I
received your one page reply to my September letter at the end of
March--over half a year later--and it failed to answer any of my
questions. When can I expect to receive specific answers to my
questions?
Answer. Several issues raised in our correspondence regarding
application of the Leahy Law in Israel remain under active
investigation by Israeli authorities and continue to be the subject of
active internal consultations in the Department. My team is ready to
brief your staff at their convenience.
Question. The Leahy Law requires you as the Secretary of State to
establish and update procedures to ``ensure that for each country the
Department of State has a current list of all security force units
receiving United States training, equipment, or other types of
assistance.'' Does the Department maintain such lists, including for
units that receive U.S. equipment? If the Department does not know
which units receive U.S. assistance, how can the Department claim to
fully comply with the Leahy Law?
Answer. The Department maintains records of units that receive U.S.
training assistance through Leahy vetting requests submitted in the
International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) system. In
addition, the Department annually requests that embassies submit to the
Department a list of any security force units in their country that
received assistance but were not vetted through INVEST.
Question. Does the Department of State have a ``current list of all
security force units receiving United States training, equipment, or
other types of assistance'' for the following countries: Bahrain,
Colombia, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Kenya,
Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, UAE?
Please provide the lists.
Answer. The Department maintains records of units that receive U.S.
assistance through Leahy vetting requests submitted in the
International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) system. In
addition, the Department annually requests that posts submit to the
Department a list of any security force units in their country that
received assistance but were not vetted through INVEST. The Department
is committed to the implementation of the Leahy Law and would be
pleased to offer a brief on the sensitive issue of units receiving U.S.
assistance in an appropriate setting.
Question. Prior Secretaries of State have refused to provide U.S.
assistance to foreign governments until such government agreed to
provide the names of the security force units that would receive U.S.
assistance. Will you likewise deny U.S. assistance--whether training,
equipment, or other types of assistance--to governments that refuses to
provide the specific names of each unit that will receive assistance so
they can be vetted?
Answer. Current Leahy vetting procedures require the identification
of the units receiving training assistance. The Department routinely
denies the provision of training assistance when unit identification
information is not provided. The Department is currently developing
guidance for vetting cases of non-training assistance.
Question. Sometimes the United States provides assistance to
foreign security forces in a manner that a specific individual or unit
cannot be vetted, such as a transfer of a large amount of ammunition or
weapons to a foreign military for distribution. In those cases, the
only way to ensure compliance with the Leahy Law is to maintain a
current list of units that are ineligible to receive that assistance,
share the list with the partner government, and make sure they do not
transfer the assistance to those ineligible units. Do you agree? If
not, why not?
Answer. The Department continues internal consultations on issues
related to vetting under the Leahy law of U.S. equipment provided to a
country's security force units and intends to complete those
consultations as soon as possible. Maintaining lists of ineligible
units is one way to address the requirements of the Leahy Laws. There
are, however, circumstances where sharing such information with the
partner governments may not be feasible. The Department is prepared to
brief your staff once our internal consultations are completed.
Question. The Leahy Law requires that in every case in which the
Secretary determines that the Department has credible information that
a security force unit has committed a gross human rights violation the
Secretary shall, ``to the maximum extent practicable, assist the
foreign government in taking effective measures to bring the
responsible members of the security forces to justice.'' Since January
20, 2017 how many times has the Department offered assistance pursuant
to this provision, and what was the foreign government's response?
Answer. Since January 2017, it has been practice for the Department
to offer assistance each time an Embassy informs a foreign government
that assistance has been withheld from a security forces unit
consistent with the State Leahy Law. This offer of assistance to
foreign governments is not to replace Leahy-applicable assistance, but
to help the government take effective measures to bring the responsible
members of the security forces to justice. In 2017, the Department
informed foreign governments around the world that assistance was
withheld 58 times, and in each instance, the relevant Embassy made an
offer of assistance. The host governments had varied responses, ranging
from refusal of assistance to a request to discuss options of working
with prosecutors or other parts of the government's judiciary.
Question. Do you agree that ``credible information'' includes
information provided by media sources, multilateral agencies, and NGOs
with a record of ``past accuracy and reliability'' as stated on the
Department of State website?
Answer. As a general matter, yes. However, the Department considers
each report on its own merits. In evaluating any information, we also
consider a number of other factors, including: how the original source
of any report obtained the information (e.g., personal knowledge,
witness interviews, government records, etc.); known political agenda,
if any, of a source; corroborative information that confirms part or
all of the allegation; information that contradicts part or all of the
allegation; history of an individual or security unit and known
patterns of abuse/professional behavior; and the level of detail of the
gross violation of human rights (GVHR) allegation, including detail in
identification of the GVHR, perpetrator (or link to an operational
unit), and victim.
Question. Do you agree that the use of reporting by a media source,
multilateral agency, or NGO in the Department's Annual Reports on
Country Human Rights Practices indicates that the Department considers
that source to have a record of ``accuracy and reliability''?
Answer. Yes. However, the Department considers each report on its
own merits. In evaluating any information, we also consider a number of
other factors, including: how the original source of any report
obtained the information (e.g., personal knowledge, witness interviews,
government records, etc.); known political agenda, if any, of a source;
corroborative information that confirms part or all of the allegation;
information that contradicts part or all of the allegation; the history
of an individual or security unit and known patterns of abuse/
professional behavior; and the level of detail of the gross violation
of human rights (GVHR) allegation, including detail in identification
of the GVHR, perpetrator (or link to an operational unit), and victim.
Question. Do you agree that it is not necessary for the Department
to independently verify or obtain directly the information cited in
reports of media sources, multilateral agencies, or NGOs with a record
of ``past accuracy and reliability'' for the information to be treated
as presumptively ``credible'' under the Leahy Law, absent specific
factors in a given case to suggest that in that particular case the
information may not be correct (e.g., specific information in the
possession of the Department that contradicts the report from the media
source, multilateral agency, or NGO)?
Answer. Yes, the Department agrees that independent verification or
direct knowledge of information from a reliable source is not always
necessary to conclude that information is credible for the purposes of
the Leahy laws. However, such verification or direct knowledge, where
available, is helpful in determining whether a given report constitutes
``credible information'' for Leahy purposes.
Question. Recently the Department's Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) conducted a review of the operations of the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor (DRL) including the Department's Leahy vetting
process. What specific steps have you taken or will you take to address
the OIG's concern that the Department lacks a system to ensure that
U.S. Embassies are complying with their Leahy Law obligations?
Answer. The Department is committed to the Leahy vetting process
and has been working to enhance the INVEST system. In response to the
OIG's recommendations, the Department is developing a policy to provide
for regular quality assurance checks of vetting decisions; has
instituted a procedure to ensure that embassies have complied with the
duty to inform host governments of units denied assistance under the
State Leahy law; and has promulgated a policy requiring training
implementers to verify the identities and unit affiliations of training
attendees.
Question. Please list all instances in which the U.S. Government
has determined that a foreign security force unit which was previously
denied assistance under the Department of State Leahy Law, or the
Department of Defense Leahy Law, and has subsequently found to have
been ``remediated'' and eligible for assistance. For each such unit
please describe why it was denied assistance and what remediation steps
were taken.
Answer. There have been 12 instances in which the Secretary has
determined that foreign governments have taken effective steps to bring
responsible members of security forces to justice under the Department
of State Leahy Law. I defer you to the Department of Defense to report
on those units it has determined to have been remediated under its
Leahy Law. The State Department has provided the appropriate
Congressional committees with individual reports that provide details
regarding why each unit was denied assistance and how the government of
such country took effective steps to bring the responsible members of
the security forces unit to justice.
Question. What does the State Department Office of the Legal
Adviser believe constitutes ``assistance'' under the Leahy Law? Does
the State Department Office of the Legal Adviser interpret ``gross
human rights violations'' to include violations of International
Humanitarian Law?
Answer. Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA)
prohibits the U.S. Government from furnishing assistance authorized
under the FAA or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of a security
force of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible
information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human
rights (GVHR). Such assistance can include training or equipment
authorized under those authorities. In considering whether to provide
assistance to a foreign security forces unit, the Department assesses
whether there is credible information that a unit has committed a GHVR.
In some circumstances, the same conduct could be both a violation of
international humanitarian law and a GVHR.
Question. In your certification to Congress regarding civilian
casualties in Yemen, you stated that Saudi Arabia has only violated
agreements with the United States concerning the use of U.S.-origin
defense articles and services ``with rare exception.'' Did those end
use violations involve use of U.S. weapons against other than
legitimate military targets or re-transfers or both?
Answer. The ``rare exception'' reference did not pertain to any
alleged violations of use against other than legitimate military
targets. The Department did not authorize transfers of U.S.-origin
weapons from Saudi Arabia or the UAE to Yemen or other forces in Yemen.
We continue to investigate these allegations. Saudi Arabia and the UAE
have been cooperative with our investigation. If the articles were
intentionally transferred without the Department's written consent, we
will determine the appropriate next steps for any repercussions or
procedures to mitigate future transgressions.
Question. In your certification to Congress regarding civilian
casualties in Yemen, you stated that Saudi Arabia has only violated
agreements with the United States concerning the use of U.S.-origin
defense articles and services ``with rare exception.'' Section 3 of the
Arms Export Control Act requires the suspension in transfers or
deliveries of defense articles and services to governments that have
violated end use agreements unless the President certifies that there
is a national security need to continue the assistance. Have you
provided the required certification for Saudi Arabia?
Answer. In all cases, we notify Congress of any violations
reportable under Section 3(c) or 3(e) of the Arms Export Control Act
and, as has been our practice, provide information on how it was
addressed with the foreign government, including any remedial steps
that have been taken. With respect to Saudi Arabia, there has not been
a violation that resulted in a determination of ineligibility.
Question. In recent years, Congress has directed the State
Department to dedicate $9-$10 million annually to implement section
620M of the FAA. What has this funding supported since January 20,
2017? How many full time Leahy Law vetting staff are working in DRL?
How does this number compare to the number of full time equivalents
working at this in 2016? What is the caseload per staff? Does this
funding support vetting staff in other bureaus or in embassies?
Answer. Since January 2017, funding to implement section 620M of
the FAA has principally been expended for salaries and support costs of
Leahy vetting, and costs associated with development of INVESTc, the
cloud-based successor to INVEST. DRL salaries/support costs include one
full time equivalent position in DRL who is a full-time vetter and six
others who spend the majority of their time on Leahy vetting and policy
issues; eight full-time contract vetters; two contractors who assist as
advisors on Leahy law implementation; and eight IT contractors. The
funding also supports eight contractors in the Department's regional
bureaus and 12 overseas positions in the WHA bureau who are a mix of
contractors, eligible family members, and locally employed staff. In
2016, DRL had four full-time equivalents and seven contractors
performing vetting. The caseload per vetting employee in DC is roughly
25,000 to 30,000 cases per year.
Question. An equipment vetting policy was put in place at Embassy
Cairo following a GAO report in 2016-2017. That policy has since been
discontinued. Why?
Answer. All security assistance, including to Egypt, is subject to
the Leahy laws. Units that commit gross violations of human rights are
ineligible for assistance. Leahy Vetting standard operating procedure
requires that all recipients of equipment assistance be screened. The
Department continues to develop and implement procedures to enhance
vetting of equipment and other non-training assistance in line with GAO
recommendations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard J. Durbin
Question. What is the administration's strategy to secure the
release of unjustly detained Turkish-American NASA scientist Serkan
Golge and U.S. Consulate General Istanbul local employees Metin Topuz
and Mete Canturk?
Answer. I will continue Mission Turkey's ongoing engagement to
ensure fair, timely treatment of all detainees and press for the
immediate release of all those held arbitrarily, including Serkan
Golge, Metin Topuz, and Mete Canturk. I am committed to taking whatever
steps necessary to ensure the fair resolution of these cases. I will
continue to raise the cases of wrongfully detained U.S. citizens and
local employees of the U.S. Mission in Turkey at the highest levels.
Question. Given Turkey's reliance on Western commercial and
international financial institutions, why has the administration not
deployed the United States' considerable economic leverage over Turkey
to obtain the release of our citizen and local employees?
Answer. I will take whatever steps we deem necessary and effective
to ensure the fair resolution of the case of U.S. citizen and NASA
scientist Dr. Serkan Golge and our detained locally employed staff,
including applying pressure or leverage, economic or otherwise, as
appropriate. I will also continue to raise the cases of wrongfully
detained U.S. citizens and local employees of the U.S. Mission in
Turkey at the highest levels. Securing the freedom of our wrongfully
detained U.S. citizens and local staff in Turkey has been and continues
to be a priority for me since I became Secretary, and I will not rest
until they are released.
Question. By all public accounts it appears that Finnish
investigative journalist Jessikka Aro was going to be one of this
year's winners of the Department of State's International Women of
Courage Awards. However, her award was apparently rescinded late in the
process under questionable circumstances. Can you please clarify what
happened, specifically if any such actions was taken because of her
defense of freedom of the press?
Answer. A number of errors were made in the nomination and approval
process of Ms. Jessikka Aro. Ms. Aro should not have been notified that
she was an awardee in the absence of a comprehensive review, which is a
prerequisite for the nomination process. We commit to improving the
process moving forward.
Question. What are the Department's projections for the next 10,
20, and 50 years for increased refugee and migration flows due to
climate change, and what steps are being taken to address climate
refugees?
Answer. The Department has not generated any out-year projections
regarding how climate or weather may affect the movements of different
populations. Additionally, ``climate'' is not a basis for refugee
status under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or
its 1967 Protocol.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Merkley
Question. The Columbia River Treaty is currently in negotiations
with Canada to ensure flood protection in the Columbia River Basin. The
Columbia Basin tribes worked closely with stakeholders, including the
State Department, when the Regional Recommendation was developed in
2013. Tribal priorities were included in that recommendation, and
included ecosystem management, such as implementation of the Endangered
Species Act and maintaining salmon populations, as well as respecting
tribal rights. Secretary Pompeo, will you commit to maintaining the
terms of the regional recommendation in treaty negotiations?
Answer. We continue to use the 2013 U.S. Entity Regional
Recommendation as a guide in our ongoing negotiations with Canada.
Consistent with the Regional Recommendation, we seek opportunities to
improve ecosystem cooperation for the benefit of fish and wildlife in
both countries in a manner that appropriately balances this desired
outcome with other objectives.
Question. Columbia Basin tribal nations were not included as part
of the negotiating team, even though they have been included on
negotiating teams for past treaties, such as the Pacific Salmon Treaty.
I would also like to point out that Canada's First Nations have been
made formal members of the Canadian negotiating advisory team, which
allows them to provide input each negotiation session. Will you commit
to using tribal policy and expertise for informed decisionmaking during
negotiations?
Answer. The Department has benefited from the advice and
perspectives of tribal leaders and experts since the Regional
Recommendation was submitted on the modernization of the treaty regime.
Once negotiations began in May 2018, we scheduled discussions with
tribal leaders and staff before and after each round of negotiations
and quarterly meetings in the Basin. We have conducted these
consultations within a framework developed in concert with Columbia
Basin tribes, who provide expertise and perspectives that inform our
negotiation positions.
Question. You have committed to restore State Department hiring
levels to where they were at the end of 2017: 10,503 for the Civil
Service and 13,676 for the Foreign Service. As of the end of 2018,
those numbers stood at 10,140 for the Civil Service and 13,764 for the
Foreign Service. For the Civil Service, that amounts to a 3.5 percent
decrease off 2017 levels and a full 10 percent when compared to 2016.
If additional funds were to be appropriated for the American Salaries
Account for fiscal year 2020, would you commit to dedicating a
percentage of that increase to recruiting the next generation of
national security professionals into the Department--such as through
the landmark Presidential Management Program (PMF), returning Peace
Corps Volunteers, Rangel and Pickering Fellows, Veterans Recruitment
Authorities, and other more flexible hiring authorities?
Answer. The Department expects to continue hiring exceptional
people under the auspices of these successful programs and would be
pleased to enhance our candidate pools as funding permits. For example,
Pickering and Rangel Fellowships are critical recruitment programs that
continue to provide outstanding candidates for Foreign Service Officer
positions. The PMF program has provided the Department with a wealth of
diverse Civil Service talent. We also plan to fill certain staffing
needs with employees with noncompetitive eligibility including
veterans, military spouses, persons with disabilities, family members,
and former Peace Corps employees.
Question. You have committed to restore State Department hiring
levels to where they were at the end of 2017: 10,503 for the Civil
Service and 13,676 for the Foreign Service. As of the end of 2018,
those numbers stood at 10,140 for the Civil Service and 13,764 for the
Foreign Service. For the Civil Service, that amounts to a 3.5 percent
decrease off 2017 levels and a full 10 percent when compared to 2016.
What is the current level of Civil Service and Foreign Service staff?
Answer. Current employment through March 2019 is 13,770 for the
Foreign Service and 10,023 for the Civil Service. Foreign Service
levels are actually higher than 2016 or 2017 levels. By the end of the
fiscal year, we expect Civil Service employment levels to increase as a
result of more aggressive Department-wide hiring strategies. Foreign
Service employment is expected to increase since there are additional
intake classes planned for the remainder of the year. As we look toward
the new fiscal year, we continue to expect Civil Service employment to
increase commensurate with need and are committed to reaching the
employment numbers supported by the Department's appropriation.
Question. You have committed to restore State Department hiring
levels to where they were at the end of 2017: 10,503 for the Civil
Service and 13,676 for the Foreign Service. As of the end of 2018,
those numbers stood at 10,140 for the Civil Service and 13,764 for the
Foreign Service. For the Civil Service, that amounts to a 3.5 percent
decrease off 2017 levels and a full 10 percent when compared to 2016.
Is the hiring level for the end of 2018 for the Foreign Service--
13,764--inclusive of spouses of Foreign Service personnel? If so, what
is the sub-set number of Foreign Service spouses?
Answer. The full-time permanent employment figures for the Foreign
Service cited above do not include spouses of Foreign Service
personnel. Foreign Service spouses employed by the Department would be
shown as Eligible Family Member (EFM) employees. EFM employment has
increased from its lowest point during the hiring freeze of 1,500 to
over 2,300 as of March 31.
Question. You have committed to restore State Department hiring
levels to where they were at the end of 2017: 10,503 for the Civil
Service and 13,676 for the Foreign Service. As of the end of 2018,
those numbers stood at 10,140 for the Civil Service and 13,764 for the
Foreign Service. For the Civil Service, that amounts to a 3.5 percent
decrease off 2017 levels and a full 10 percent when compared to 2016.
Do you believe that greater flexibility in hiring authorities, such as
delegating to you direct-hiring authority (DHA) for critical needs
positions at the State Department, as well as allowing for a certain
percentage of positions to be filled through the excepted service, will
help advance the goal of returning to fiscal year 2017 hiring levels?
Answer. Direct hiring authority (DHA) will help the Department
attract and retain talented individuals to the Department of State,
particularly in hard to recruit skill categories like IT. In addition
to DHA, the Department is looking at other initiatives such as
recruitment incentives to help attract additional candidates. These
initiatives will help ensure the Department will be able to return to
authorized employment levels.
Question. As the administration undertakes negotiations with Russia
on nuclear arms control, I am concerned about the Department's staffing
and expertise in this highly technical field. Former Bush
administration Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC)
Assistant Secretary Paula DeSutter testified before the House Armed
Services Committee that the arms control bureau is ``losing staff.''
Please provide me the following information. Have you or your senior
officials, such as Under Secretary Thompson conducted any formal or
informal ``exit interviews'' to ascertain why the Bureau is losing
staff? If so, please inform us as to the results.
Answer. In June 2014, the Department's Office of Inspector General
issued report ISP-I-14-14A, ``Inspection of the Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification, and Compliance.'' One aspect reviewed was ``Workforce
Development and Succession Planning.'' OIG reported 48 percent of the
workforce would be eligible to retire by 2019. The Bureau's Assistant
Secretary is implementing the OIG recommendations, including a robust
professional development program and strategic hiring process, to
ensure we hire and retain the next generation of arms control and
verification experts.
Question. As the administration undertakes negotiations with Russia
on nuclear arms control, I am concerned about the Department's staffing
and expertise in this highly technical field. Former Bush
administration Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC)
Assistant Secretary Paula DeSutter testified before the House Armed
Services Committee that the arms control bureau is ``losing staff.''
Please provide me the following information. Do you concur with Ms.
DeSutter, that the Bureau is ``losing staff''? If so, are there any
plans to make up for the loss in staff and their highly technical
expertise?
Answer. In June 2014, the Department's Office of Inspector General
issued report ISP-I-14-14A, ``Inspection of the Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification, and Compliance.'' One aspect reviewed was ``Workforce
Development and Succession Planning.'' OIG reported 48 percent of the
workforce would be eligible to retire by 2019. Hiring of specialized
subject-matter experts in this competitive field has a long lead-time.
The Bureau's Assistant Secretary has sought to implement OIG
recommendations through greater integration of technical experts and
recruiting technical experts to ensure we maximize employment
opportunities and promote professional development.
Question. As the administration undertakes negotiations with Russia
on nuclear arms control, I am concerned about the Department's staffing
and expertise in this highly technical field. Former Bush
administration Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC)
Assistant Secretary Paula DeSutter testified before the House Armed
Services Committee that the arms control bureau is ``losing staff.''
Please provide me the following information. What was the total number
of Washington DC-based full-time equivalents (not including Schedule C
positions) as of January 2017 in the AVC Bureau and what is the current
number?
Answer. In June 2014, the Department's Office of Inspector General
issued report ISP-I-14-14A, ``Inspection of the Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification, and Compliance.'' One aspect reviewed was ``Workforce
Development and Succession Planning.'' OIG reported 48 percent of the
workforce would be eligible to retire by 2019. Hiring of specialized
subject-matter experts in this competitive field has a long lead-time.
The total number of Washington DC-based full-time equivalents in the
AVC Bureau as of January 2017 was 113. The current total number of
Washington DC-based full-time equivalents in the AVC Bureau is 94.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen
Question. Did the Department of Energy seek the Department of
State's concurrence on issuing seven Part 810 authorizations to allow
U.S. companies and persons to transfer certain nuclear energy
technology and information to Saudi Arabia, as required under Part 810
of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, which implements section 57
b.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Did the Department of State concur with each of the seven
Part 810 authorizations? When did the Department of State concur with
each of the seven Part 810 authorizations? Who at the Department of
State reviewed the seven aforementioned Part 810 authorizations? Who at
the Department of State has authority to provide concurrence on Part
810 authorizations?
Answer. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation,
which has responsibility within the Department for civil nuclear
cooperation matters, oversaw the Department's review of the seven Saudi
Arabia-related Part 810 applications from November 2017 to March 2019
and provided concurrence on each of them to the Department of Energy.
These reviews were conducted consistent with U.S. law and standard
Department of State practices.
Question. What were the specific contents of the Part 810
authorizations? What do the authorizations allow the U.S. to engage in?
Answer. Part 810 authorizations authorize the transfer of nuclear-
related technical assistance, subject matter expertise, and data. I
refer you to the Department of Energy for questions regarding the
specific contents of the authorizations.
Question. Which U.S. companies and persons received Part 810
authorizations to transfer certain nuclear energy technology and
information to Saudi Arabia?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Energy for questions
regarding the content of Part 810 authorizations.
Question. Did the Department of State have any concerns regarding
the transfer of nuclear energy technology and information to Saudi
Arabia pursuant to Part 810 authorizations?
Answer. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
oversaw the State Department's review of Part 810 applications for
transfers of civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, consistent with
U.S. law and standard Department of State practices, and concurred on
the authorizations.
Question. To what extent has the Secretary of State led nuclear
cooperation negotiations with Saudi Arabia, as required under section
123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954?
Answer. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation,
under the direct guidance of the Secretary of State, is leading the
negotiations on a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia
with the concurrence and technical assistance of the Department of
Energy and in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Question. What have been the extent of the Department of State
officials' meetings, communications, or other interactions with Saudi
Arabian officials and/or representatives of any Saudi Arabian non-
governmental organizations or commercial entities regarding nuclear
cooperation with the United States? What has been the nature of these
interactions, and what specific forms of nuclear cooperation have been
discussed?
Answer. The Department of State has engaged in consultations with
Saudi Arabian government officials regarding civil nuclear cooperation
since 2012. With Saudi Arabia, the Department of State: leads
negotiations for a civil nuclear cooperation agreement pursuant to
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended; communicates
regarding the benefits of civil nuclear cooperation with the United
States and the importance of engaging in civil nuclear cooperation only
with the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and
nonproliferation; and coordinates to obtain governmental
nonproliferation and peaceful-use assurances for transfers of civil
nuclear technology under 10 CFR Part 810 prior to the Secretary of
Energy authorizing those transfers.
Question. To what extent have Department of Energy officials
jointly planned or involved Department of State officials in
interactions with Saudi Arabia regarding nuclear cooperation?
Answer. In accordance with standard procedures, the Departments of
State and Energy jointly plan their interactions with Saudi Arabia
regarding nuclear cooperation.
Question. What diplomatic efforts has the Department of State
undertaken to induce Saudi Arabia to rescind its Small Quantities
Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and bring
into force an Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA?
Answer. We encourage all countries, particularly those with nuclear
programs, to adopt the current standards for IAEA safeguards, including
by bringing an Additional Protocol into force, and as applicable, by
modifying or rescinding the outdated version of the Small Quantities
Protocol. We have regularly and consistently raised the Additional
Protocol with Saudi interlocutors in bilateral engagements, including
negotiations on a 123 agreement.
Question. What diplomatic efforts has the Department of State
undertaken to induce Saudi Arabia to commit to forgoing uranium
enrichment as a condition of concluding a Section 123 nuclear
cooperation agreement with the United States?
Answer. All 123 agreements include, at a minimum, the requirements
listed in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended. Beyond
these requirements, the United States has a longstanding policy of
limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities around
the world and will continue to seek the highest nonproliferation
standards possible in all future 123 agreements, including restrictions
on enrichment and reprocessing.
Question. In addition to making severe cuts to U.S. assessments for
the U.N. and U.N. peacekeeping operations, your budget request also
proposes eliminating the International Organizations and Program (IO&P)
account, an important source of voluntary funding for U.N. agencies
that provide humanitarian relief, development assistance, and promote
human rights and gender equality around the world. One of these
agencies is the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), which received $137.5
million for its core budget from the account in fiscal year 2019.
UNICEF provides long-term humanitarian and development assistance to
children and mothers. UNICEF is involved in a number of critical
initiatives, working to help increase the number of girls enrolled in
school worldwide and providing clean water, sanitation, educational
support, and nutritional assistance to children in disaster zones and
war-torn regions around the world, including Syria, Iraq, Yemen, the
Central African Republic, and South Sudan. UNICEF is also responsible
for procuring vaccines that reach 45 percent of the world's children,
saving the lives of 2.5 million children each year. The U.S.--under
both Democratic and Republican administrations--has long been the top
funder of these efforts, and the Trump administration itself has
supported them since it came into office. Why then has the
administration chosen to target this important humanitarian agency?
Answer. The International Organizations and Program account is only
one of numerous U.S. Government sources of voluntary funding for
international organizations. State Department and USAID funding may
still be provided to U.N. organizations and programs, such as UNICEF,
if they are selected as implementing partners to execute specific
foreign assistance programs, such as humanitarian or health programs.
Question. The State Department's fiscal year 2020 budget
justification states that you are ``committed to promoting U.S.
leadership in international organizations as a means of countering
actions by countries that do not share U.S. national security interests
and values.'' While not named explicitly, it is safe to say that one of
these countries is almost certainly China, which is actively seeking to
expand its profile and influence at the U.N. As the tenth largest
contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations and the second largest
financial contributor to the U.N.'s peacekeeping and regular budgets,
Beijing is increasingly in a position to do just that. This past
summer, for example, China aggressively pushed for the elimination of a
large number of critical human rights monitoring posts in U.N.
peacekeeping missions. This is a clear indication of China's growing
leverage at the U.N., as well as its willingness to use its financial
clout to push back against some of the bedrock principles of the
liberal international order long championed by the United States. By
diminishing our role in important multilateral institutions and
discussions, and financially undercutting activities that advance our
interests, aren't we in effect providing China with an opening to even
further expand its clout at the U.N.?
Answer. The fiscal year 2020 budget request ensures that the United
States will continue to be the largest financial contributor to
international organizations. We will make every effort to project U.S.
leadership and the advancement of U.S. ideals, including by thwarting
the efforts of other countries, such as China, to advance objectives
that are contrary to U.S. national interests.
Question. The State Department's fiscal year 2020 budget
justification states that you are ``committed to promoting U.S.
leadership in international organizations as a means of countering
actions by countries that do not share U.S. national security interests
and values.'' While not named explicitly, it is safe to say that one of
these countries is almost certainly China, which is actively seeking to
expand its profile and influence at the U.N. As the tenth largest
contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations and the second largest
financial contributor to the U.N.'s peacekeeping and regular budgets,
Beijing is increasingly in a position to do just that. This past
summer, for example, China aggressively pushed for the elimination of a
large number of critical human rights monitoring posts in U.N.
peacekeeping missions. This is a clear indication of China's growing
leverage at the U.N., as well as its willingness to use its financial
clout to push back against some of the bedrock principles of the
liberal international order long championed by the United States. Given
that international leadership and influence are built as much on
sustained engagement and long-term investments in development, how does
a substantial reduction in the international affairs budget counter
countries--like China--that seek reduced U.S. influence at
international forums like the U.N.?
Answer. Through the strategic funding and programming included in
the fiscal year 2020 budget request, the United States will continue to
be the largest financial contributor to international organizations. We
will ensure that our nation is fully engaged in the regions of the
world upon which our national security and future prosperity depend. We
will make every effort to project U.S. leadership and the advancement
of U.S. ideals in our programming and engagement with multilateral
forums, including by thwarting the efforts of other countries, such as
China, to advance objectives that are contrary to U.S. national
interests.
Question. In fiscal year 2018, the State Department withheld $18.9
million from its U.N. regular budget payments to express disapproval of
the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
OHCHR plays a critical role in advancing U.S. human rights priorities:
for example, the Office helps implement and coordinate international
investigations into human rights abuses authorized by the UNHRC in a
number of countries, including North Korea, Iran, Syria, Yemen,
Myanmar, Belarus, DR Congo, and South Sudan, among others. These
activities help raise international awareness of human rights
violations, magnify the voices of human rights defenders and civil
society organizations working on the ground, and serve as a useful tool
for applying pressure to repressive governments. Your policy of
withholding funding is especially confounding given that the State
Department itself has publicly expressed support for the work of OHCHR.
In a statement provided to The Guardian in March, one of your
spokespersons noted that, ``The United States remains engaged in the
work of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights . . . and strongly
supports those special procedures and mandates that have proven
effective in illuminating the most grave human rights environments,
including in Iran and DPRK.'' How do you account for the gap between
your Department's financial decisions on the one hand and statements of
support for OHCHR on the other? If the Office is engaging in activities
that this administration supports and has deemed important to U.S.
interests, what sense does it make to withhold funding?
Answer. Following withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Council in
fiscal year 2018, there was a decision to withhold assessed funding
that was, in part, going to support human right mandates and activities
that do not advance U.S. national interests. At the same time,
Department voluntary contributions have continued for those mandates
and activities that do advance U.S. national interests. This approach
ensures that Department funding aligns with national priorities.
Question. Since January, The Guardian has twice reported that the
administration has stopped cooperating with U.N. special procedures,
upending decades of established practice whereby the State Department
has responded to queries from mandate-holders and facilitated country
visits. Back in January, nine U.S.-based NGOs, led by Freedom House,
sent you a letter expressing concern that this apparent shift in
posture would negatively impact our country's ability to promote human
rights abroad and send a bad signal to authoritarian regimes, whose
policies are frequently targeted for scrutiny by the U.N. As the letter
notes, the credibility of special procedures ``depends on applying the
same international standards to all countries, including democracies
that may have robust national oversight mechanisms of their own . . .
Halting U.S. engagement with U.N. special rapporteurs would set a
dangerous precedent that repressive regimes are likely to copy and
exploit. The eventual result could be a breakdown of the international
human rights architecture that the United States helped to create as a
means of strengthening American security, promoting American values,
and ensuring a freer, more stable, and more prosperous world.'' Could
you clarify State's stance on this issue?
Answer. We continue to cooperate with U.N. special procedures that
are determined to be in the U.S. national interest. Given the broad
range of mandates and requests, we prioritize interactions that
maximize the promotion of U.S. objectives. In February, the Department
met twice with the Special Rapporteur for extrajudicial, summary, or
arbitrary executions to discuss the Global Magnitsky program and the
killing of Jamal Khashoggi. Department officials and our Missions in
New York and Geneva have also met with numerous mandate holders,
including the Independent Expert on the Central African Republic and
the Special Rapporteurs on Myanmar and freedom of religion or belief,
among others.
Question. Recently there have been some interesting developments at
the U.N. with regards to human rights in Saudi Arabia. In January,
Agnes Callamard, the U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions, announced that she would be heading an
independent international investigation into the murder of Saudi
journalist Jamal Khashoggi, with the goal of determining ``the nature
and the extent of states' and individuals' responsibilities for the
killing.'' She is due to report to the UNHRC on her findings in June.
In March, during the UNHRC's 40th regular session, 36 countries--
including all members of the European Union--released a joint statement
condemning Saudi Arabia for its ``continuing arrests and arbitrary
detentions of human rights defenders,'' use of counterterrorism laws to
quash dissent, and for its lack of cooperation with Ms. Callamard's
investigation into the Khashoggi killing. Led by Iceland--the country
that assumed our seat on the Council when we pulled out last June--the
statement was, according to Human Rights Watch, ``the first-ever
collective action'' at the UNHRC criticizing the Saudis over their
human rights record. Notably, the U.S. did not sign on to the joint
statement. What signal does the U.S.'s absence from these initiatives
send regarding this administration's commitment to improving the human
rights situation in Saudi Arabia? Is the promotion of human rights in
Saudi Arabia a priority for this administration? Does the United States
support Agnes Callamard's investigation of the murder of Mr. Khashoggi?
If so, how will the United States support this investigation given its
absence from the UNHRC?
Answer. We remain deeply concerned by the murder of Jamal Khashoggi
and the ongoing detentions of Saudi citizens engaged in peaceful
activism. Department officials have met twice with Ms. Callamard to
discuss U.S. actions related to Mr. Khashoggi's death and we welcome
her findings. While we did not join the joint statement on Saudi Arabia
following our principled withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Council,
we take all allegations of human rights violations and abuses seriously
and have publicly recommended changes to Saudi practices to protect
against arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial detention, and unlawful
killings.
Question. U.N. humanitarian agencies are playing an essential role
in responding to the crisis in Yemen, where nearly 75 percent of the
population is reliant on some form of humanitarian aid. The World Food
Program (WFP), for example, is working to reach 12 million people per
month with food and nutritional assistance, while UNICEF is working to
ensure access to clean water and education for children and the U.N.
Population Fund (UNFPA) has integrated nutrition assistance for
pregnant women into its reproductive health and safe delivery services.
Nevertheless, violence and a lack of access allowed by the parties to
the conflict remain significant obstacles to reaching more people. What
concrete actions is the administration taking to convince the Saudis
and Emiratis to do more to ensure humanitarian access for the U.N. and
international NGOs?
Answer. The administration engages the Saudis and Emiratis at all
levels on this issue--through private bilateral engagements and other
opportunities such as meetings of the U.N. Verification and Inspection
Mechanism stakeholders and the Yemen Quad (U.S., United Kingdom, Saudi
Arabia, and the UAE). Hudaydah and Saleef ports remain open and
operational, and humanitarian actors are continuing to import
assistance for tens of millions of Yemenis utilizing these key entry
points. We will continue to urge all parties to the conflict to fully
implement the Sweden Agreement and increase humanitarian and commercial
access to all of Yemen's ports of entry and throughout Yemen so that
critical food, fuel, and medicine reaches the neediest Yemenis.
Question. Last year, the administration ended all U.S. funding for
the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), an
organization that provides a number of critical services, including
education, healthcare, and food aid to destitute Palestinian refugees
in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. While UNRWA was
ultimately able to pull together enough funds from other donor
countries to avert having to close its schools or health clinics last
year, the loss of its largest donor has left the organization in an
extremely precarious position. Last summer, a bipartisan group of seven
former U.S. Ambassadors to the U.N. sent you a letter calling for the
restoration funding, noting that organization's funding challenges
``has national security ramifications for our closest allies, including
Israel and Jordan.'' This view has been echoed by former Israeli
security officials, one of whom--former IDF Spokesperson Lt. Col.
(ret.) Peter Lerner --wrote that, ``By weakening UNRWA and,
consequentially, the Palestinian population even further, without a
real administrative alternative, I believe that Palestinians will be
even more susceptible to extremism and violence. This will not
contribute to security or stability in the region.'' Are you concerned
about the possibility of greater security disruptions in places like
Gaza? Did the administration take these warnings into consideration
when it made its decision last year?
Answer. We made it clear when we provided our final contribution of
$60 million in January 2018 that the United States would no longer bear
a disproportionate share of UNRWA's costs, and other countries must
step up and do their part to advance regional security and stability.
UNRWA continues to operate with an unsustainable business model, tied
to an expanding community of beneficiaries. Palestinians deserve better
than a service provision model that operates in permanent crisis mode.
We continue to work closely with Israel and key regional partners on
ways to improve economic and humanitarian conditions in Gaza. Hamas is
primarily responsible for those conditions, having put its own
interests above those of Gaza's residents.
Question. The State Department's fiscal year 2020 budget
justification states that, ``The role and size of the U.N. Mission in
South Sudan (UNMISS) will likely increase somewhat, in order to
appropriately respond to the severe security and humanitarian situation
and to support the fledgling commitment from South Sudanese parties to
engage in peace processes.'' Nevertheless, that same document requests
a nearly one-third cut in U.S. funding for the mission. If the
administration does, as your own department suggests, plan to vote for
an expansion of UNMISS on the Security Council, what rational basis is
there for underfunding it?
Answer. U.N. peacekeeping operations, including the U.N. Mission in
South Sudan (UNMISS), are effective mechanisms to address global
challenges to international peace and security. However, the U.N. needs
to complete reforms to achieve more efficient operations, and other
U.N. member countries must assume more of the financial burden. The
United States is focused on supporting Secretary-General Guterres'
peacekeeping reform efforts and is working with U.N. member states to
create a ``culture of performance'' in U.N. peacekeeping. Doing so will
ensure that U.S. taxpayer resources are used in the most cost-effective
manner.
Question. In what the U.N. has termed a ``textbook example of
ethnic cleansing,'' hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, a stateless
Muslim minority group in Myanmar, were driven from their homes into
neighboring Bangladesh by an organized campaign of violence and
persecution beginning in August 2017. While the U.N. and international
NGOs have only been granted limited access to Myanmar's northern
Rakhine state, the epicenter of the violence, they are playing a
crucial role in meeting the needs of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.
WFP has provided food aid--including rations and vouchers--to nearly
900,000 Rohingya, as well as nutritional support to over 200,000
malnourished children and pregnant and nursing women. UNFPA midwives
have screened more than 500,000 women, provided dignity kits to more
than 110,000 women, and delivered over 5,600 babies safely. UNHCR has
also developed new sites in Bangladesh to help house displaced
Rohingya, including building latrines and wells, distributing shelter-
building materials, and constructing major roads and access points to
ease living constraints. Does the administration plan to continue to
support these kinds of humanitarian efforts? Given that it remains far
too dangerous for Rohingya refugees to return home, do you think it is
important for the U.N. to continue providing humanitarian assistance to
these vulnerable populations?
Answer. The United States has led the donor response to the Rakhine
State crisis since it began in August 2017. As of April 9, 2019, the
United States has provided more than $494 million in humanitarian
assistance in Bangladesh and Burma. The President's fiscal year 2020
budget request includes plans for continued U.S. leadership in the
humanitarian response to the Rakhine State crisis, as well as to
support the humanitarian needs of long-displaced Burmese elsewhere in
the region. It is important for the international community to continue
providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations affected by
the Rakhine State crisis while durable solutions are being pursued,
given that conditions in Rakhine State are not yet conducive for
voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable returns.
Question. The U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Central African
Republic (MINUSCA) has helped the country make some important strides.
In 2016, for example, CAR organized, with robust U.N. support, peaceful
and credible presidential and legislative elections, replacing a
previous government that had been in office on an interim basis. While
MINUSCA's work has helped to preserve calm in some areas of the
country, the security situation has deteriorated in northern and
eastern CAR, with a patchwork of armed groups fighting each other for
control of resources and targeting civilians. The capital, Bangui, has
also recently been rocked by an increase in violence, which has
included attacks on churches and mosques. This has led to sharp
increases in displacement and humanitarian needs over the last year.
The State Department's budget request states that, ``The role and size
of MINUSCA will likely remain unchanged until the government gains the
capacity to fully assume its responsibilities to protect civilians,
ensure the viability of the state, and prevent violence.'' What is the
administration doing to strengthen CAR's government and ensure that
MINUSCA has the resources and support it needs to fulfill its mandate?
Answer. During President Touadera's visit this month, I stressed
that we will remain a partner to the government of the Central African
Republic (CAR). We provide training and equipment to the CAR military
and are helping the CAR government rebuild and professionalize its
internal security forces, corrections system, and judiciary, including
the Special Criminal Court. We continue to support implementation of
the peace agreement and to seek justice for those who threaten the
peace, stability, or security of CAR. We remain closely engaged with
the U.N. in Bangui and New York, and continually evaluate MINUSCA's
performance in line with the five U.S. peacekeeping principles in order
to ensure the mission is adequately resourced, fit to task, and
performing effectively.
Question. Does assistance to United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) advance U.S. policy goals in Iraq? Will the U.S. continue to
support these programs?
Answer. UNDP's programs significantly contribute to U.S. policy
goals of a sovereign, stable, and prosperous Iraq that is free from
foreign interference and capable of disrupting ISIS and other terrorist
networks. In the post-ISIS era, UNDP is coordinating with the Iraqi
government on drafting a U.N. Development Assistance Framework. The
framework will define goals and benchmarks for reconstruction and
development from 2020 to 2024. We have provided $265 million to UNDP's
Funding Facility for Stabilization for Iraq since 2015, not including
an additional $100 million recently announced for Anbar. The assistance
will accelerate the return of IDPs and rebuild lives through essential
services.
Question. Since the Foreign Affairs Manual change went into effect,
visa denials on public charge grounds have skyrocketed four-fold. Is
that because the change has made it easier for consulates to conclude
that immigrants are likely to become public charges? Did the State
Department conduct any studies or analyses of whether visa applicants,
their family members, or prospective sponsors would decline public
benefits as a result of the Foreign Affairs Manual change? If so,
please produce those studies to the Committee. If not, why not?
Answer. At this time, given ongoing litigation regarding the
changes made to the FAM guidance on public charge the Department cannot
provide information that may be the subject of proceedings in that
litigation.
The Department maintains data associated with immigrant and
nonimmigrant visa applicants found ineligible under public charge
grounds. Attached are immigrant and nonimmigrant refusals under the
public charge ground of inadmissibility aggregated by the nationality
of the applicant and the post that adjudicated the visa. This data
represents refusals for fiscal year 2017, fiscal year 2018, and year-
to-date for fiscal year 2019.
Question. Since the Foreign Affairs Manual change went into effect,
visa denials on public charge grounds have skyrocketed four-fold. Which
officials or staff within the State Department were involved in the
decision to revise the Foreign Affairs Manual? Did State Department
officials or staff consult with other Federal agencies or offices,
including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Justice, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health and
Human Services, the Social Security Administration, and/or the White
House? If so, please list the relevant Department officials, staff, and
other agencies, and describe any meetings, communications, or other
contacts.
Answer. At this time, given ongoing litigation regarding this
matter, the Department cannot provide information that may be the
subject of proceedings in that litigation.
Question. Since the Foreign Affairs Manual change went into effect,
visa denials on public charge grounds have skyrocketed four-fold. Does
the State Department maintain data concerning the number of visa
denials under the ``public charge'' ground of inadmissibility broken
down by racial or ethnic group, consular office, country of origin, or
any other categories? If so, please provide those disaggregated figures
to the Committee.
Answer. At this time, given ongoing litigation regarding this
matter, the Department cannot provide information that may be the
subject of proceedings in that litigation.
Question. Since the Foreign Affairs Manual change went into effect,
visa denials on public charge grounds have skyrocketed four-fold. Has
the State Department or individual subcomponents or units of the
Department, including individual consular offices, disseminated
additional guidance, instructions, memoranda, training, or other
information regarding the application of the ``public charge'' ground
of inadmissibility since January 20, 2017? If so, please provide those
documents to the Committee.
Answer. At this time, given ongoing litigation regarding this
matter, the Department cannot provide information that may be the
subject of proceedings in that litigation.
Question. There have been reports that immigrants are turning down
public benefits because of fear that they will face immigration
penalties. Did the State Department weigh that risk when deciding
whether to revise its Foreign Affairs Manual? Did it actually conduct
any studies of the effect of its actions on families and children?
Answer. At this time, given ongoing litigation regarding this
matter, the Department cannot provide information that may be the
subject of proceedings in that litigation.
Question. Last month the U.N. concluded the 63rd Commission on the
Status of Women, and adopted final agreed conclusions. The U.S.
consistently advocated for removing references to sexual and
reproductive healthcare from the outcome. This administration has
argued they have other priorities, like economic empowerment and
entrepreneurship. How can women develop and lead their own businesses
and participate in the economy if they are not able to have autonomous
control of their own bodies, supported by comprehensive access to
sexual and reproductive healthcare?
Answer. Protecting and respecting the sanctity of human life,
empowering women, and valuing women's dignity are not mutually
exclusive concepts. This Administration is committed to promoting
economic opportunities for women and girls while protecting and
respecting the sanctity of life around the globe.
Question. Youth around the world and in the United States, face
great challenges in terms of their sexual and reproductive health and
rights, such as unintended pregnancies and gender based violence.
Comprehensive sexuality education and the full range of healthcare
services are critical to ensure that young people, including adolescent
girls, can make informed decisions and lead healthy lives free of
violence now and into their futures. The public is deeply concerned by
U.S. statements last month at the U.N. Commission on the Status of
Women falsely claiming that these programs promote abortion for teens,
and that the U.S. was promoting ``abstinence only until marriage''
programs under the guise of ``sexual risk avoidance,'' when these
programs are proven to be ineffective, medically inaccurate,
stigmatizing and harmful to the health and rights of young people. How
will you and future leadership at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. address
this and ensure the U.S. is supporting evidence-based, medically
accurate comprehensive sexuality education and sexual and reproductive
health services for young people in future negotiations impacting the
health and rights of young people?
Answer. The United States fully supports culturally sensitive, age-
appropriate, optimal health-focused sex education that encourages
parent-child communication. Moreover, as the world's largest bilateral
funder of family planning, the United States remains committed to
helping women and adolescents thrive.
Question. The vast majority of U.S. assistance to the Northern
Triangle does not go to the governments directly--instead, it goes to
international organizations, non-profits and local civil society
organizations that are working to build capacity and improve
livelihoods on the ground. And these programs are working--for example,
USAID's agricultural investments in Honduras have helped lift 90,000
people out of extreme poverty. What is the rationale for cutting off
funding that is going directly to assist these vulnerable communities?
What improvements would the Administration like to see to these
programs? Please provide specific examples.
Answer. The Northern Triangle governments need to be more effective
in preventing illegal immigration to the United States. We are actively
engaging with the governments on additional steps they can take to
improve border security; combat human smuggling and human trafficking,
especially related to children; receive and reintegrate their returned
citizens; and implement public messaging campaigns to dissuade illegal
immigration to the United States. Likewise, we continue urging these
governments to make needed reforms to improve citizen security,
increase economic growth, improve democratic governance, and address
corruption and impunity.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Graham. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., Tuesday, April 9, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]