[Senate Hearing 116-558]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                        S. Hrg. 116-558

                    NAVY AND MARINE CORPS READINESS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND
                           MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

                                 of the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________


                      WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2020

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services






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                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

56-588 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2024










                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                 JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi	     JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska		     JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas		     KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota	     RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa		     MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina	     TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska		     ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia		     MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota	     ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona		     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RICK SCOTT, Florida		     JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee	     TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                DOUG JONES, Alabama
                                     
               John Bonsell, Staff Director
        Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                          ___________

            Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support

                  DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska		     TIM KAINE, Virginia
JONI ERNST, Iowa		     JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia		     MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona		     TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          DOUG JONES, Alabama
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     

                               (ii)

  







                         C O N T E N T S

                           ___________

                         December 2, 2020

                                                                   Page

Navy and Marine Corps Readiness..................................     1

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator Dan Sullivan................................     1

Statement of Senator Tim Kaine...................................     5

                           Witness Statements

Braithwaite, Hon. Kenneth J., Secretary of the Navy..............     6

Gilday, Admiral Michael M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations.......    11

Berger, General David H., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps...    17

Questions for the Record.........................................    53

Appendix A--
  GAO--Navy and Marine Corps--Services Continue Efforts to           70
  Rebuild Readiness, but Recovery Will Take Years and Sustained 
  Management Attention.

                                (iii)









 
                    NAVY AND MARINE CORPS READINESS

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2020

                      United States Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Readiness  
                            and Management Support,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:18 a.m. in 
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dan 
Sullivan (presiding) Chairman of the Subcommittee.
    Subcommittee Members present: Senators Sullivan, Fischer, 
Ernst, Blackburn, Kaine, Shaheen, Hirono, Duckworth, and Jones.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

    Senator Sullivan. Good morning. This hearing of the 
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management will come to order.
    The Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the 
current readiness of the United States Navy and the United 
States Marine Corps. I want to welcome our three distinguished 
witnesses: the Honorable Kenneth Braithwaite, Secretary of the 
Navy; General David H. Berger, Commandant of the U.S. Marine 
Corps; and Admiral Michael Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations 
for the United States Navy.
    I would also like to thank Diana Maurer, Director of 
Defense Capabilities and Management, and her team at the 
Government Accountability Office for submitting the requested 
statement for the record for this hearing. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) is an invaluable resource to our 
work on the Committee.
    Some of the issues that I would like to address and cover 
today are COVID-19 and its impacts on the readiness of the U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps; the Navy and Marine Corps' pivotal role 
in countering great power competition, as highlighted in the 
National Defense Strategy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps' 
bold, new Force Design and planning guidance; a recent 
provocation of Russian military exercises, massive Russian 
military exercises, in the Arctic, and related to that, the 
role of the Navy and Marine Corps as they play an increasingly 
important role in protecting our strategic interests in the 
Arctic. Let me touch on these briefly.
    First, the impact of COVID-19 on Navy and Marine Corps 
readiness. Over the last few months, this Committee has 
received frequent and productive briefings on COVID-19 and on 
its impact on military readiness. As you are all aware, COVID-
19 reduced operations at Navy and Marine Corps depots, canceled 
or postponed vital exercises such as RIMPAC 2020, and changed 
the way in which we train our sailors and marines. I am looking 
forward to an update on these critical issues as it relates to 
the readiness of our Marine Corps and Navy team.
    Second, I would like to address the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy and the Navy's and Marine Corps' role in responding to 
the return of great power competition. Released in 2018, the 
National Defense Strategy I believe is still very much a 
bipartisan document and strategy which prioritizes the return 
of great power competition particularly with Russia and China, 
with China as the pacing threat. Thus far, in responding to the 
NDS' directives, the U.S. Navy and this Committee have 
advocated for building a 355-ship Navy and has heavily and 
rightfully in my view focused these investments on improving 
and expanding our Nation's submarine fleet, a key area of 
American strategic advantage.
    Third, as part of the Navy team's response to great power 
competition, the Marine Corps, under the Commandant's new 
planning guidance and his Force Design 2030 construct, has 
keenly focused on how to address the NDS' pacing threat: China. 
Specifically, General Berger has zeroed in on transforming our 
Marine Corps into a slightly leaner but more agile force. The 
Commandant's planning guidance calls for revolutionary change 
to the Marine Corps, at least in the Department of Defense 
(DOD) terms, and I commend him for his efforts on being one of 
the services' leading in terms of trying to implement the NDS. 
But the Commandant's strategy is not without its critics, and I 
would like to give the Secretary and General Berger the 
opportunity respond to some of those in this hearing.
    I would like to also address a recent incident. I was with 
the Secretary in Alaska where we saw a peer exercise of great 
power competition, the recent very large military exercises 
which took place inside the U.S. exclusive economic zone off 
the coast of the great State of Alaska. As some of you may 
already know, in late August the Russians conducted a major war 
game near Alaska. Over 50 Russian warships, about 40 Russian 
aircraft took part in these exercises in the Bering Sea. It 
involved multiple practice missile launches, submarines. The 
New York Times reported last month in an article I would like 
to submit for the record, a headline and byline, ``Are We 
Getting Invaded?'' United States boats face Russian aggression 
near Alaska. Russia has accelerated its provocative encounters 
in the North Pacific harassing American fishing vessels in 
United States waters, sending bombers towards Alaska's shores. 
I would like to enter this into the record. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]

                      ``Are We Getting Invaded?''
            U.S. Boats Faced Russian Aggression Near Alaska
 russia has escalated its provocative encounters in the north pacific 
 this year, harassing boats in u.s. fishing waters and sending bombers 
                        toward alaska's shores.
By Mike Baker

    ANCHORAGE--The crew of the Bristol Leader was laying out its long 
cod-catching line well within U.S. fishing territory in the Bering Sea 
when a voice crackled over the VHF radio and began issuing commands: 
The ship was in danger, it said, and needed to move.
    The warnings, coming in a mixture of Russian and accented English 
from a plane buzzing overhead, grew more specific and more urgent. 
There was a submarine nearby, the voice said. Missiles were being 
fired. Leave the area.
    Other U.S. fishing vessels that were scattered over 100 miles of 
open sea were getting similar messages. Capt. Steve Elliott stood 
dumbfounded on the trawler Vesteraalen as three Russian warships came 
barreling through, barking orders of their own. On the ship Blue North, 
commands from a Russian plane led Capt. David Anderson to contact the 
U.S. Coast Guard, wondering how to protect his crew of 27.
    ``It was frightening, to say the least,'' Captain Anderson said. 
``The Coast Guard's response was: Just do what they say.''
    The Russian military operations in August inside the U.S. economic 
zone off the coast of Alaska were the latest in a series of escalated 
encounters across the North Pacific and the Arctic, where the retreat 
of polar ice continues to draw new commercial and military traffic. 
This year, the Russian military has driven a new nuclear-powered 
icebreaker straight to the North Pole, dropped paratroopers into a 
high-Arctic archipelago to perform a mock battle and repeatedly flown 
bombers to the edge of U.S. airspace.
    As seas warmed by climate change open new opportunities for oil 
exploration and trade routes, the U.S. Coast Guard now finds itself 
monitoring a range of new activity: cruise ships promising a voyage 
through waters few have ever seen, research vessels trying to 
understand the changing landscape, tankers carrying new gas riches, and 
shipping vessels testing new passageways that sailors of centuries past 
could only dream of.
    Russia's operations in the Arctic have meant a growing military 
presence at America's northern door. Rear Adm. Matthew T. Bell Jr., the 
commander of the Coast Guard district that oversees Alaska, said it was 
not a surprise to see Russian forces operating in the Bering Sea over 
the summer, but ``the surprise was how aggressive they got on our side 
of the maritime boundary line.''
    In the air, U.S. jets in Alaska typically scramble to intercept 
about a half-dozen approaching Russian aircraft a year, outliers on the 
long-range nuclear bomber patrols that Russia resumed in 2007. But this 
year that number has risen to 14--on pace to set a record since the 
Cold War era. In the most recent case, last month, the United States 
responded to the approach of two Russian bombers and two Russian 
fighters that came within 30 nautical miles of Alaskan shores.
    Russians have refurbished and restored dozens of military posts in 
the Arctic region, including on Wrangel Island, some 300 miles from the 
coast of Alaska, and have laid plans for controlling emerging 
navigation routes that would bring traffic through the Bering Strait 
between Alaska and Russia.
    This summer, Russia's military operated in the Bering Sea, home to 
America's largest fishery, where boats haul up pots crawling with red 
king crab, and trawlers dump nets filled with 200 tons of pollock onto 
their decks. The area is the U.S. pathway to the Arctic waters where 
extraction companies have worked for years to capture the billions of 
dollars of oil and gas resources trapped under the sea floor.
    U.S. territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles from the Nation's 
shores, but commercial vessels operate even farther within the U.S. 
exclusive economic zone, a territory stretching some 200 miles offshore 
in which the country can harvest fish or natural resources without 
foreign competition but cannot prohibit the passage of international 
vessels.
    Russian military leaders have touted the exercises in the Bering 
Sea as unlike any they had done before in the region. They said the 
goal of the effort was to prepare forces to secure economic development 
in the Arctic region, and U.S. officials have acknowledged that the 
Russians have a right to transit the waters.
    Disputes over activities in exclusive economic zones around the 
world are not unusual, especially in the lucrative Arctic region, where 
several nations have contested the extent of their rights to dominate 
maritime economic activities.
    Before a 1990 boundary agreement, the issue was especially 
contentious in the Bering Sea, which narrows to just 55 miles between 
the coasts of Alaska and Russia in the Bering Strait.
    The August exercises occurred well south of the narrow strait, in 
an area where the sea is hundreds of miles wide.
    Tim Thomas, a U.S. captain on the fishing vessel Northern Jaeger, 
encountered the Russian activities on August 26 when his ship was 
operating more than 20 nautical miles inside the U.S. economic zone. 
After a Russian plane directed Captain Thomas to take his boat out of 
the area, he said, he responded that he was within the U.S. zone, not 
on the Russian side, and that the Russians could not order them to 
leave.
    At that point, he said, a Russian military ship joined in and 
issued similar orders.
    ``At this point, I'm going, `What's going on here? Are we getting 
invaded?''' Captain Thomas said in an interview.
    Captain Thomas said he contacted the Coast Guard, but the officers 
there, he said, seemed to be unaware of the Russian operations. They 
told him he was responsible for the safety of his crew. But he was 
reluctant to leave: They were finding some of the best fishing of the 
season, and the Russians had ordered him not to return to those 
productive grounds for nine days.
    The Russians, who were running a military exercise known as Ocean 
Shield that involved some 50 warships and 40 aircraft operating 
throughout the Bering Sea, were adamant, and their warnings grew more 
intense. U.S. officials have since said that a Russian submarine 
launched a cruise missile from the Bering Sea that day.
    As he considered the safety of the 130 people on his boat, Captain 
Thomas ultimately decided to leave. He estimates the forced departure 
cost his company more than $1 million in revenue.
    Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska, a Republican, who has pressed for 
years for a stronger U.S. presence in the Arctic and has warned about 
increasing Russian activity there, said the fishing boats should not 
have been forced to leave U.S. fishing territory. He said he was 
surprised by the scale of Russia's recent aggressive actions in the 
Bering Sea, noting that during the same exercise in August, fighter 
planes from the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, 
scrambled to respond to three groups of Russian aircraft that 
approached Alaska.
    ``I think they were testing us--flexing their military muscle,'' 
the senator said.
    Coast Guard officials said Russia had notified the U.S. Government 
that part of its exercise would include a portion of the fishing zone. 
But federal officials did not alert commercial fishing operators to the 
planned exercise.
    Coast Guard officials said they have been working to make sure 
future notifications reached the right people. They have also said that 
U.S. fishing vessels were not required to follow any orders from a 
foreign entity to depart American fishing grounds. But in a memo last 
month to those involved in the North Pacific fishing industry that 
outlined what had transpired in the Bering Sea, the Coast Guard also 
cautioned that ``safety of life at sea should always be paramount in 
managing the safe navigation of any vessel on the high seas, and is the 
responsibility of the mariner with firsthand situational awareness.''
    As Russia has ramped up its presence in the region, U.S. officials 
have accelerated their own efforts. The Coast Guard has long complained 
that its lone pair of aging icebreakers are struggling to stay in 
service but may now have the opportunity to build six new ones. (Russia 
has dozens.) The United States is also discussing a northern deepwater 
port, perhaps around Nome. Currently, the nearest strategic port is 
1,300 nautical miles away in Anchorage.
    Alaska already draws a relatively large portion of U.S. military 
spending, with bases serving the Air Force and the Army in or around 
both Anchorage and Fairbanks.
    Jets in Alaska scrambled repeatedly this year to intercept Russian 
aircraft moving toward U.S. airspace. But jets taking off from inland 
bases can take more than 90 minutes to reach the coast of Alaska, said 
Maj. Gen. Scott Clancy, a Canadian officer who is the director of 
operations at NORAD.
    General Clancy said the encounters were professional. In the 
encounter last month, the four Russian aircraft loitered in the area 
for about 90 minutes and never crossed into U.S. airspace. But General 
Clancy said it was clear the Russians were both testing the 
capabilities of NORAD and demonstrating their own, increasing the 
frequency and also the complexity of their approaches.
    ``This adversary--this competitor, Russia--has advanced on all 
fronts,'' he said. ``We find ourselves in another era of great-power 
competition. Russia obviously wants to be a competitor in that.''
    Lt. Gen. David Krumm, commander of the multi-force Alaskan Command 
and also the 11th Air Force, said that while the Arctic used to provide 
a natural buffer between the nations of the Far North, the new 
possibility of ice-free passage has changed that.
    ``We're at a pivotal point in the timeline of the Arctic,'' he said 
at a recent convention of the Alaska Federation of Natives, many of 
whose members reside in remote villages scattered throughout the 
northern region.
    General Krumm said the United States would need to invest in 
operations, equipment and training to prepare for the changing 
environment. Alaska, he said, has historically been viewed as a base 
from which to project American power elsewhere in the world, but the 
mission is changing.
    ``What we have to do now is be prepared to fight here and defend 
here,'' he said.

    Senator Sullivan. But I would like, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, 
an update on that, particularly the coordination that we need 
to improve between the Coast Guard, the Navy, and the Alaskan 
fishing fleets that were impacted by this.
    Finally, I would like to have a broader discussion today on 
the Arctic, as it has become an emerging area of great power 
competition, and to better understand the Navy and Marine 
Corps' role in protecting the Arctic homeland, safeguarding the 
Arctic region's global commons, and as the Navy and Marine 
Corps do across every part of the world. In this regard, I am 
hopeful to hear some positive news about a new Navy Arctic 
strategy, which this Committee has been encouraging all the 
services to produce Arctic strategies.
    I am hopeful that we could also have a discussion on not 
only the support for building six Polar-class icebreakers that 
our Nation needs but the discussion that the President started 
a couple months ago with his memo to senior national defense 
officials on where and how we should be basing Polar-class 
security cutters in America's Arctic. Mr. Secretary, you and I 
have had a lot of discussion on that.
    Finally and perhaps most importantly in this Committee, I 
would like a prediction of who is going to win the Army-Navy 
football game that takes place in a couple weeks. That is going 
to be very important, gentlemen.
    Thank you very much. I am looking forward to this hearing.
    I would now like to hear from my friend and colleague, 
Senator Kaine.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM KAINE

    Senator Kaine. Well, thank you, Chairman Sullivan. We find 
ourselves in very, very challenging times, and it is good that 
this Committee's work has continued and will.
    I want to welcome the distinguished witnesses. Thank you 
for your service. We are looking forward to the testimony and 
opportunities to exchange questions today.
    I echo the comments from Chairman Sullivan and offer thanks 
to Diana Maurer for her work at the GAO.
    I also want to do one other set of thank yous. This is 
probably the last opportunity that we will meet either as a 
subcommittee or even as a full committee prior to some changes, 
and we are losing two colleagues, Senator McSally and Senator 
Jones, who have served on the Committee in a wonderful way and 
on the Subcommittee as well. They were great public servants 
before they got here. They were great public servants while 
they were here, and I am sure they have great public service 
ahead of them. But I just wanted to acknowledge each of them.
    The chairman has done a really good job of putting the 
issues kind of up on the board that we need to discuss today: 
impacts on readiness from the ongoing pandemic, and lessons 
learned along the way that will help us going forward. What 
role will the DOD play in vaccine distribution and what plans 
are being made within the Navy family--Navy and Marine Corps--
over vaccines and how they will be deployed. Shipyard 
modernization plan and the looming threats that our bases face 
from the effects of climate change. I will not delve further 
into those now, and I will save those topics for my questions. 
We want to help the Department address what we need to do to be 
ready to operate in this challenging environment and respond 
and execute the full range of DOD responsibilities and 
missions.
    I look forward to your testimony today and thank you.
    Senator Sullivan. I would like to begin the testimony. Each 
of you will have 5 minutes to give an oral testimony. Your 
longer statements can be submitted for the record, if you so 
choose. Mr. Secretary, I would like to begin with you, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH J. BRAITHWAITE, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

    Secretary Braithwaite. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Before I begin, I would like to offer the Department of the 
Navy's condolences to you, sir, for the loss of your father, a 
great veteran of the United States Navy, and our thoughts and 
our prayers are with you, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Secretary Braithwaite. In May of 1943, American troops, 
aircraft, and ships were sent to the Aleutian Island of Attu to 
dislodge the imperial Japanese troops occupying our American 
soil. These young Americans were dedicated and brave, but 
unprepared and under-equipped. The only thing that prevented 
the operation from ending in total catastrophe was the fact 
that that landing was unopposed. In short, we, the United 
States military, got lucky.
    But that should never be accepted as good enough for our 
fleets, our force, or for our nation. As Secretary of the Navy, 
I am determined to ensure that our sailors and marines are 
never again sent into a situation without the right training, 
the right equipment, and the right leadership.
    Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Kaine, distinguished 
Members of the Committee, we appreciate your efforts to ensure 
funding stability over the past several years. This stability 
has enabled a greater focus on readiness across both services 
from the Navy's investments in shipyards and aviation 
maintenance to the Marine Corps' modernization initiatives 
within the Commandant's Force Design 2030. These efforts are 
increasing our expeditionary deployment capabilities and fleet 
readiness even in the face of this COVID-19 and other global 
challenges. More importantly, we are investing in the training, 
education, and resilience of our personnel. They and their 
families will always be our greatest resource.
    As I discussed during my confirmation hearing, I was 
concerned about the morale of the force and its underlying 
effects on culture across the entire Department. Thankfully, I 
found many efforts underway to address these concerns, and in 
consistent engagements with our sailors and marines around the 
globe, I have discovered our morale is better than I thought it 
might be. But it can get better as we direct the resources to 
make it better.
    We must prepare today for tomorrow, and we must continually 
adjust to the threat. Our existing fleet structure operates on 
the premise that we still live in a post-9/11 state where the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) flanks are 
secure, the Russian fleet is tied to the pier, and terrorism is 
our biggest problem. That is not the world of today. As the 
world changes, we must be bold, evolve, and change with it.
    Instead of perpetuating a structured design to support 
yesterday's joint forces command, we are aligning to today's 
threat to meet the unique maritime challenges of the Atlantic 
theater, we will rename Fleet Forces Command as the U.S. 
Atlantic Fleet and we will refocus our naval forces in this 
important region on their original mission, controlling the 
maritime approaches to the United States and to those of our 
allies. The Atlantic Fleet will confront the re-assertive 
Russian navy, which has been deploying closer and closer to our 
east coast, with a tailored maritime presence capability and 
lethality.
    Also, in order to improve our posture in the Indo-Pacific, 
we will reconstitute the first fleet assigning it primary 
responsibility for the Indo and South Asian region as an 
expeditionary fleet back to the capabilities and 
unpredictability of an agile, mobile, at-sea command. This will 
reassure our allies and partners of our presence and commitment 
to this region while ensuring any potential adversary knows we 
are committed to global presence to ensure rule of law and 
freedom of the seas.
    We are determined today to make the bold changes required 
to ensure that our forces are prepared to dominate any 
potential battlespace and return home safely tomorrow. As the 
great navalist, the 26th President of the United States, Teddy 
Roosevelt, once said, a strong Navy is not a provocation to war 
but the surest guarantor of peace.
    We look to you, our Congress, for the strong oversight 
partnership that has enabled our maritime strength ever since 
Congress authorized the construction of our first six ships, 
the mighty American frigates of 1794. So I would like to take 
this moment to announce that the next Constellation-class 
frigate will be named for one of those original six, a name 
selected by our first President, George Washington. The ship 
will be USS Congress to honor and recognize the work that you 
and your staff do every day to support our sailors, our 
marines, and the people of the United States of America.
    On behalf of the Department of the Navy, our marines, our 
sailors, our civilian workforce, and their families that serve 
at their side, thank you for what you do to enhance our 
readiness.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Braithwaite follows:]

       Prepared Statement by The Honorable Kenneth J. Braithwaite
    In May of 1943, American troops, aircraft and ships were sent to 
the Aleutian island of Attu to dislodge the Imperial Japanese troops 
occupying our soil. These young Americans were dedicated and brave, but 
unprepared and underequipped. Our force was not ready for this type of 
fight in Arctic conditions.
    The amphibious landing on Attu was marred by embarrassing setbacks, 
stemming from a failure to appreciate the impact of cold weather and 
rough seas on our operating procedures, equipment, and people. Air 
sorties were scattered and unreliable due to poor visibility and high 
winds.
    Engines on landing craft froze, stranding their crews and the 
troops on board. Batteries failed because operators hadn't gained the 
experience that would teach them to keep them on trickle charge through 
cold water operations. Ice and rough seas threatened to destroy the PT 
boats and other small craft as they approached the landing site. Heavy 
fog resulted in multiple collisions.
    The only thing that prevented the operation from ending in 
catastrophe was the fact that the landing was unopposed. Our forces did 
not make contact with the enemy immediately, and so they were able to 
recover their battle readiness and execute the mission.
    In short: we got lucky. But that should never be accepted as good 
enough, for our fleet, our force, or our nation. As Secretary of the 
Navy I am determined to ensure that our sailors and marines are never 
sent into a situation without the right training, the right equipment, 
and the right leadership, to dominate the fight and return safely home.
    Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Kaine, distinguished Members of 
the Committee, we cannot be caught unprepared in any clime or place. 
The Department of the Navy must always stand ready with the personnel, 
platforms, and operational skills necessary to secure vital sea lanes, 
stand together with our allies, and protect the American people 
wherever and whenever necessary.
    The sailors, marines, and civilians of our forward-deployed, 
globally maneuverable team, are prepared and equipped to respond, from 
the Arctic to the Indo-Pacific to the Gulf. We intend to keep it that 
way. In partnership with Admiral Gilday and General Berger, I am 
determined to strengthen our people, build on the pride of service, and 
develop a ready force for the future.
    The reemergence of long-term great power competition, the evolving 
character of that competition, and the accelerating advancements in 
technology are spurring a period of transformation in the strategic 
environment, requiring us to adapt our integrated naval force design 
and operating concepts to new realities. As the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS) states, ``there can be no complacency--we must make 
difficult choices and prioritize what is most important.''
    Thus far this century, terrorist groups and rogue states have 
dominated our perception of the threat environment. These threats were 
lethal, but did not pose an existential threat to our national 
security. China and Russia present a different challenge, as each 
continues to develop sophisticated military capabilities backed by 
sizable economies. Their investments in surface, air, and undersea 
platforms have significantly increased the potential for kinetic 
conflict, while the
    leadership of both nations demonstrate increasing contempt for 
international law and the rules-based order that ensures the prosperity 
and security of all nations.
    A dominant naval force is central to the effective execution of the 
NDS in a changing world. We must be ready at all times to execute as 
one integrated naval force--Navy and Marine Corps seamlessly linked at 
every level--with common logistics, infrastructure, practices and 
support networks--executing a fleet-wide emphasis on resilient and 
combat ready forces.
    To make that happen, the Department of the Navy fiscal year 2021 
budget request prioritized recovering the readiness of the platforms 
that deliver victory in a major conflict, from amphibious ships and 
ground element equipment, to our agile destroyers and cruisers, and the 
heavy-hitting aircraft carriers, air wings and attack submarines that 
ensure continued freedom of action throughout the global commons.
    To meet the forward maneuverable force requirements of the NDS, the 
Marine Corps has put into motion an aggressive modernization of the 
Service. Force Design 2030 is not simply an improvement on its existing 
form and function; it is transformational. With a studied concentration 
on the future operating environment, the Marine Corps is reinvigorating 
the Fleet Marine Forces within existing resource constraints as an 
indispensable element to global maritime operations. We appreciate the 
Committee's advocacy for new training venues and opportunities that 
simulate the operational complexities of a contested maritime domain.
    We greatly appreciate the Committee's efforts to ensure funding 
stability and predictability over the past several years. This has 
given our force the agility and flexibility needed to address emerging 
threats, to invest in critical future capabilities for our integrated 
naval force, while shifting away from less beneficial and relevant 
spending. This stability has saved money for the American taxpayer and 
enabled a greater focus on readiness across the Navy and Marine Corps, 
enabling greater long term shipbuilding and maintenance planning, and 
fueling the Marine Corps transformation as the Nation's stand-in, 
fight-tonight force. These investments mark a commitment to creating 
asymmetric advantages across the entire Joint Force.
    The Department of the Navy is building on this foundation by 
aggressively pursuing better readiness, lethality, and capabilities in 
those areas of warfighting technology showing the greatest promise of 
delivering non-linear warfighting advantages. Across both services, we 
are executing force designs centered on Naval Expeditionary force 
deployment, giving us a sustainable edge and a resilient capability to 
deliver the integrated all-domain naval power required by the Joint 
Force.
    Hard experience has shown that this capability cannot be 
sustainably achieved through ``can do'' and ``make do'' improvisation. 
Our front line personnel may be determined, adaptive, and skillful 
enough to get the job done in the face of equipment shortfalls and 
intense battle rhythms, but relying on their adaptability is no 
substitute for genuine fleet readiness. We owe it to the sailors and 
marines out in the fleet to make sure they always have the tools they 
need to do the dangerous jobs we ask of them.
    The changes generated from the Readiness Reform and Oversight 
Council (RROC) and other relentless self-examination efforts have 
enabled us to improve readiness, training, and maintenance processes at 
every level. For example, we've implemented a uniform readiness 
assessment and certification process that must be followed before a 
ship can be certified to return to the fleet. We have also increased 
opportunities for shipboard certification and skills enhancement, while 
adjusting manning schedules to maximize safety and improve quality of 
life and professional effectiveness for our personnel while underway. 
These and many other changes will result in a better prepared, rested, 
and equipped force.
    We continue to pursue greater readiness in the development and 
maintenance of our fleet, particularly in our critical public 
shipyards. Through the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan 
(SIOP), the Navy has outlined a 20-year investment plan for the 
facilities and tools needed to improve shipyard performance, starting 
with shipyard-specific Area Development Plans (ADPs) already underway. 
We must stay committed to this objective.
    We appreciate the leadership of this Committee to provide direct 
hiring authority, which has been instrumental in helping naval 
shipyards achieve their accelerated hiring goal of 36,100 personnel--
one full year ahead of schedule. An extension of this authority 
granting an exception to the 180-day ``cooldown'' requirement before 
hiring retired members of the armed forces would further assist our 
shipyards in maintaining acceptable staffing and experience levels. 
Finally, the Navy has worked with the shipyards to develop their 
workforce by establishing new learning centers that reduced worker 
training time by 50 percent or more.
    We have also achieved greater aviation readiness for both the Navy 
and Marine Corps, including the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) efforts 
to meet the Strike Fighter aircraft availability goals for both 
services. The NAE is incorporating commercial best practices to improve 
performance on targeted production lines. For example, process reforms 
have improved organic depot capacity and repair speed, reducing the 
turnaround time for F/A-18E/F maintenance from over 100 days to 60 
days.
    The Department of the Navy appreciates the leadership of this 
Committee in helping ensure both aviation and systems readiness across 
our force. Towards that end, the Department requests assistance from 
the Committee to secure the necessary space to conduct critical combat 
training.
    Most prominently, expansion of the Navy's training range in Fallon, 
Nevada is imperative to maintaining our readiness in the skies and 
across every domain. We are concerned that Congress will not act on the 
Administration's legislative proposal to expand the Fallon Range 
Training Complex (FRTC) to provide the area needed to fully accommodate 
modern military training requirements this year. The FRTC is currently 
too small to accommodate realistic and safe training with precision-
guided munitions. This modernization is driven by real-world threats 
and the need for longer range stand-off release for training with 
precision guided munitions. Aircrews and special operations forces 
cannot fully exercise tactics and are unable to train in sufficiently-
realistic conditions, which compromises their safety and success in 
combat. In many cases, the first time a pilot is able to fully use the 
F-35's sensor and weapons systems suite is during combat. Expanding 
this range will allow us to send our sailors and marines into combat 
fully prepared by providing them with the training they need to win. 
Over the past 5 years, the
    Navy has worked exhaustively with key stakeholders, including 
Members of Congress, federal agencies, tribes, state and local 
government, and environmental groups. We need the authority from 
Congress not only for modernization, but to follow through on our 
promises to these groups.
    Unfortunately, Fallon is only one of the challenges we face with 
our training spaces. We continue to assess how proposed active offshore 
windfarm operations off the coast of California impact our aircraft 
navigation, communication, and weapons systems, with an expectation 
that other stakeholders are assessing prospective windfarm locations 
and impacts beyond the Navy's operating areas. Easements granted by the 
Department of the Navy to San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station and San 
Diego International Airport are soon expiring; we need to use these 
parcels of land for military training. Special use airspace supporting 
the Marine Corps ranges at Twenty-nine Palms is surrounded by congested 
commercial air routes, causing interruptions to military aircraft and 
artillery fire training. This is against a backdrop of historical Navy 
range closures and realignments occurring over the past three decades. 
If the Navy and Marine Corps are to remain the world's premier Naval 
force, this trend cannot continue.
    The threats to our Nation are real and as our adversaries close the 
technological divide, our greatest strength is our training. We ask 
that this and all other relevant Committees seriously consider the 
national security impact of any decisions made regarding any 
development or land use initiatives that may impact our training areas.
    We also recognize that we cannot meet the global challenges our 
Nation faces alone. Readiness requires presence and rapid capabilities 
in every part of the world, as well as specialized and localized 
knowledge to handle evolving and challenging situations. Just as 
Canadian troops joined in the operation to retake Kiska in 1943, the 
strategic maritime defense partnerships we maintain today with our 
partners and allies around the world extend the reach and power of our 
force. They underscore the importance of cooperation and coordination 
in maintaining the rules-based international order that enables so much 
of our global prosperity and security.
    Our personnel regularly train and operate alongside their foreign 
counterparts, test the interoperability of our systems, and build our 
collective readiness on the front lines of great power competition. In 
the critical Arctic region, the destroyer USS Thomas Hudner just 
completed Operation Nanook alongside our Canadian, French and Danish 
allies, as well as our vital partners, the United States Coast Guard. 
During my time as our Ambassador to Norway, I was proud to look to our 
United States Marines guarding NATO's northern flank alongside 
Norwegian soldiers.
    Operational exercises, international port calls, joint Marine force 
training, and other interactions generate the personal contact that 
builds understanding, respect, and trust across national and functional 
lines. Our sailors, marines and civilian personnel know that through 
their service they are front-line diplomats for our nation. Their 
professionalism and dedication promotes the connections that strengthen 
our collective security and cultivate shared ideals that send the 
message that the United States is a friend worth having.
    The Department of the Navy appreciates the dedicated oversight 
provided by this Committee following recent events that have potential 
impacts on the readiness of our fleet forces. As this Committee is 
aware, 2020 has brought its share of challenges and adversity. But 
failure in our mission is never an option, and we look forward to 
working with each Member of the Committee to ensure the continued 
readiness and lethality our nation needs to preserve the forward 
maneuverability, lethality, and resilience needed to ensure our 
nation's readiness.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the strength and agility of 
our people, as active duty and reserve servicemembers have responded to 
the call for medical, logistics, and security support wherever and 
whenever the American people have needed it. At the same time, our 
sailors, marines, and civilian teammates have continued to execute the 
NDS while maintaining the procedures and safeguards necessary to 
prevent the debilitating spread of the pandemic across our platforms 
and facilities.
    Like all Americans, the Navy and Marine Corps have had to adjust to 
this global pandemic, from preventing, mitigating, and recovering from 
positive cases detection of positive cases aboard ships, to changing 
the recruitment and training of our personnel, to helping our military 
families cope with longer separation and other challenges like virtual 
learning and social distancing. This pandemic has forced us to rethink 
and refine our recruitment, training, and personnel movements 
throughout the force, and it has taken a toll on our shipyard 
operations and deployment and maintenance schedules.
    Both the Navy and Marine Corps are actively implementing Force 
Health Protection measures in an effort to protect marines, sailors, 
civilians, contractors, and our military families. Across the 
department, we've implemented prevention, mitigation, and recovery 
guidance from the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). We have implemented--
and will continue to evaluate--active testing protocols to detect 
asymptomatic COVID-19 positive personnel, contain outbreaks aboard 
vessels or elsewhere in the fleet, and conduct surveillance to detect 
and treat the disease as early as possible.
    Within our shipyards, the Navy took aggressive steps at the start 
of the pandemic and continues to implement safety measures to minimize 
the spread of this disease and to protect the personnel, civilians, 
contractors, and families that power our naval enterprise and protect 
our nation. These steps include maximum telework opportunities for 
shipyard employees, administrative leave for high-risk individuals 
unable to telework, altered shifts to maximize social distancing, 
sanitization and hand-washing stations throughout the shipyard, cloth 
face coverings and face shields for the workforce, and screening checks 
at all workplace entry points.
    We're also working closely with our partners and suppliers in the 
defense industrial base to ensure the continued viability of the 
crucial businesses and infrastructure needed to ensure our ships, 
aircraft, and ground equipment are available when needed for the 
defense of our nation, both during this current challenge and long into 
the future. We must be transparent and honest about the potential 
impact this pandemic may have on certain aspects of our readiness. But 
we will never fail to maintain the global vigilance and readiness 
required to execute our global mission. That mission never abates, 
because the demand signal never fades.
    Finally, we must never forget that the greatest source of readiness 
and strength for our force will always be the men and women who wear 
the uniform, who comprise our civilian workforce, and the families that 
serve alongside them. We are committed to ensuring our sailors, 
marines, and civilians are trained and equipped to execute the mission 
and return home safely, and that their families are provided with the 
housing, medical attention, and education they need.
    Through a combination of non-monetary, quality of life, and 
customer service programs, we are increasing our responsiveness to the 
needs of the individual warfighter and their family, making continued 
service a viable and attractive option. We are increasing avenues for 
civilians with prior service through the Targeted Reentry Program, and 
expanding opportunities to serve in meaningful roles. We are also 
increasing opportunities for our personnel to learn, operate, and 
innovate with partners from the private sector, across the joint force, 
and alongside our allies.
    Our people must be confident that their leadership will look out 
for their interests and advocate tirelessly for their safety and well-
being. We remain committed to making sure we assess, monitor, and 
remediate issues of concern in all forms of military housing, including 
those managed by Public Private Venture (PPV) providers, with quick, 
effective, and engaged leadership and reinforced Department-level 
oversight.
    We are also determined to eliminate the scourges of sexual assault 
and sexual harassment from every part of our force. These behaviors are 
a betrayal of those who have stepped forward to serve in uniform and 
have a direct impact on our readiness. We will continue to work with 
this Committee to share best practices and ideas, relentlessly pursuing 
a future where no sailor, marine, or civilian teammate ever has to fear 
for their own safety while protecting us all.
    As leaders we must also do all in our power to ensure that our 
people feel respected and valued. In this moment of national reckoning 
with longstanding issues of racial injustice, we cannot and will not 
tolerate discrimination or racism of any kind. Our readiness, and the 
bedrock strength of our core values, depends on the elimination of any 
policies or practices seeming to tolerate or promote racial inequity in 
any aspect of the Navy and Marine Corps, from recruiting and assignment 
practices, to advancement and promotions, to our military justice 
system.
    As I wrote to the entire fleet in my first month as Secretary of 
the Navy, ``We must never forget that equal treatment, equal justice, 
and equal opportunity require continual determined effort. `United' is 
the most important word in `United States Navy and Marine Corps'.''
    Our sailors, marines and civilian teammates will always be our 
greatest source of readiness and strength in a challenging and changing 
world. On behalf of each of these brave patriots and the families that 
serve at their side, I would like to once again thank the leadership 
and membership of this Committee for your attention, interest, and 
ongoing support.

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    Admiral, would you care to make an opening statement, sir?

  STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, I would.
    Chairman Sullivan, again my condolences on your family's 
loss. Your dad was not only a sailor but a great friend of the 
Navy.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday. Ranking Member Kaine, distinguished Members 
of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity appear before 
you this morning with the Secretary of the Navy, as well as 
Commandant Berger. My wife Linda behind me joins me this 
morning.
    To be effective, the United States Navy has to be able to 
carry out two critical functions. The first is sea control and 
the second is power projection. Both of those missions are 
timeless. The Navy does not need to reinvent itself. The manner 
by which we carry out those functions and the equipment that we 
use to do it do change over time, but as Admiral Nimitz said in 
front of a joint session of Congress in October of 1945 at the 
dawn of the nuclear age, he called those missions timeless. 
President John F. Kennedy, in the wake of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, said the same thing, so for me, sea control and the 
capability to control the seas and to dominate the oceans is my 
primary focus.
    With respect to readiness, that covers two areas: readiness 
today, which I believe is the focus of this hearing, as well as 
our readiness tomorrow. The budget decisions that the Navy 
presents to the Secretary of Defense really balance across 
three big areas that are aimed at those two functions. That 
would be readiness, readiness today and readiness to the 
future. That would be lethal capabilities in order to control 
the seas and to project power, and the last is capacity, the 
size of the United States Navy.
    Today in the midst of a global pandemic, we have about 100 
ships deployed, and we have about 40,000 sailors at sea. That 
ranges from the Arctic Circle to the Cape of Good Hope, from 
the Black Sea in the Baltics to the Arabian Sea, the Atlantic 
and the Indo-Pacific. Our cyber warriors are standing vigilant 
watch right now as we speak. They are joined by our silent 
service under the seas that continue their constant patrols.
    I would be remiss if I did not talk about the civilian 
sailors who support us every single day so that we can control 
the seas. Those are our shipyard workers. Those are folks that 
work in production lines that keep our spare parts rolling to 
the waterfront, to our aviation squadrons, to our submarines, 
and to our ships. They are people that provide the Naval 
Academy, our academic institutions like the Naval Academy, the 
Naval War College, and the Naval Post-Graduate School that 
continue to churn out the best and the brightest that this 
nation has, and our boot camp which is operating at double its 
capacity.
    That said, the investments that keep that machine going 
every single day are also balanced against investments of the 
future. Think about hypersonics and laser energy. We just shot 
down an unmanned vehicle (UAV) with laser energy at sea just 
last months. We shot down an intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) from a destroyer with a standard missile just 2 weeks 
ago, so we are focused on the future and what we need to do to 
get there.
    Members of the Committee, we are grateful for the support 
you provide the United States Navy, our sailors, and our 
families.
    Again, I thank you for this opportunity this morning, and I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Gilday follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Admiral Michael M. Gilday
    Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished Members 
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on 
the Navy's current readiness.
    This hearing occurs during a critical time for our country. 
Multiple nations are attempting to undermine the existing international 
order that has benefited so many for so long. Our rivals are rapidly 
modernizing their militaries and eroding our advantages. Emerging 
technologies have provided them more ways to attack our shores. A 
global pandemic and economic crisis threaten global stability and 
security. The maritime environment--a vital source of our prosperity 
and protection--has become increasingly contested.
    America is a Maritime Nation--Our people depend on freedom of the 
seas
    Since the end of the Cold War, traffic on the seas has increased 
over four fold. Ninety percent of global trade now travels by sea, 
facilitating $5.4 trillion in U.S. commerce annually and supporting 31 
million American jobs. Ninety-five percent of global internet traffic 
travels along undersea cables, fueling our digital economy and 
accounting for $10 trillion in financial transactions per day. 
Competition for offshore resources such as aquaculture, energy, and 
rare-earth minerals is increasing across the globe. There can be no 
doubt that our economic vitality relies on free and open conditions at 
sea, and now those conditions--and our way of life--are under threat.
    Despite benefiting from decades of peace and stability, China and 
Russia are now using all elements of their national power to undermine 
the international order at sea. Both attempt to unfairly control access 
to rich sea-based resources outside their home waters. Both intimidate 
their neighbors and enforce unlawful claims with the threat of force. 
Both have constructed sophisticated networks of sensors and long-range 
missiles to hold important waterways at risk. China, in particular, is 
building a Navy to rival our own.
    Over the last decade, China has rapidly grown its Navy from 262 to 
350 ships that include modern surface combatants, submarines, aircraft 
carriers, amphibious assault ships, and polar icebreakers. Expanding 
their robust naval force with a multilayered fleet of Coast Guard and 
maritime militia vessels, they routinely harass neighbors to exert 
pressure at a level below traditional armed conflict. They have 
blanketed their regional waters with the world's largest missile forces 
in an attempt to intimidate their rivals. They have strengthened all 
dimensions of military power to contest us from the seafloor to space 
and in the information domain. They are extending their maritime 
infrastructure across the globe through aggressive investments, 
particularly in ports, to control access to critical waterways. We must 
move with urgency to sustain and grow our advantage at sea.
    U.S. Navy--Deployed Forward to Defend America and Protect our Way 
of Life
    The U.S. Navy is responding to this challenge by: demonstrating our 
global reach, enforcing common principles, sustaining the conditions 
that enable shared prosperity, strengthening our alliances and 
partnerships, and modernizing our fleet to control the seas in 
contested environments. Today, 39,903 sailors are currently deployed on 
nearly 111 ships and submarines to preserve freedom of the seas, deter 
conflict, and keep America safe. Together with the United States Marine 
Corps, our Navy is delivering Integrated All-Domain Naval Power across 
the globe, and we are doing this in the midst of a global pandemic.
    With parts of the world shut down in response to COVID-19, our 
operational tempo did not decline. Since the last time I appeared 
before you in March, the Navy has continued to steam and fly from the 
Arctic Circle to the Cape of Good Hope. Our hospital ships provided 
relief to American communities; we executed underway training events 
for deployment certification; and we conducted exercises alongside the 
Joint Force and our allies and partners.
    Since the COVID-19 outbreak, we have aggressively worked to keep 
our sailors and families safe, while sustaining fleet operations and 
supporting the whole-of-government response to the virus. Lessons 
learned from the outbreak aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt honed our 
COVID-19 Standardized Operational Guidance. Our sailors and their 
families adjusted and sacrificed to accomplish the mission. When the 
virus threatened the deployed USS Kidd, USS Ronald Reagan, and USS 
Makin Island, we quickly stemmed the spread of COVID-19 and the ships 
continued their missions, reflective of our strong learning 
organization.
    We are applying this same kind of adaptive mindset across our 
entire Navy. After identifying a potentially dramatic increase in 
gapped sea billets for fiscal year 2021 due to COVID-reduced 
accessions, we gradually and safely increased recruit training to meet 
our goals. All while adhering to strict Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention Guidance to keep our force safe. We also leveraged retention 
incentives, such as Advancement-to-Position, to keep sailors in 
critical jobs. These measures are improving our ability to fill 
operational requirements.
    When health protection measures reduced public shipyard 
productivity, we took swift action to protect our workers and mitigate 
impacts to maintenance. Meanwhile, our dedicated, patriotic shipyard 
workforce adapted to our COVID-19 protocols, came to work every day, 
and got our ships back to sea. We cannot thank them enough. To stay 
connected during the pandemic, our Information Technology workforce 
quickly increased network bandwidth, added virtual private network 
licenses, and supported the DOD Commercial Virtual Remote (CVR) 
environment roll-out. This enabled a large portion of the Navy 
workforce to get the mission done from home.
    We are aggressively working to mitigate the readiness impacts of 
COVID-19 and deliver a more ready fleet.
    Building a More Ready Navy
    Delivering the decisive naval power needed to maintain America's 
advantage at sea requires balanced investments across multiple elements 
of naval power. Naval power is not a function of ship numbers alone, 
nor is it simply a result of the lethal systems employed from those 
ships. It is also about the networks that connect them, the sailors 
that bring them to life, the concepts that shape how we fight, and the 
means to maintain, train, and equip our forces to win in combat.
    Readiness--the investments across the force that bring naval power 
to life--is the backbone of our Navy. For the past two decades, the 
Navy sustained the same operational tempo seen during the Cold War, but 
with a fleet almost half the size. Meeting the security demands of our 
nation with a smaller Navy and budget instability had a corrosive 
effect on our readiness.
    Over the last 3 years the Navy has implemented critical reforms and 
improved our readiness in new ways. With sustained funding and our 
learning culture, our readiness recovery was on an upward trend before 
COVID-19 struck. Measurable improvements were seen across the Navy, 
including:
      Operational billets filled to highest point in 6 years.
      Eighty percent mission capable rates sustained for F/A-
18E/F and EA-18G.
      On-time private shipyard surface ship maintenance 
availability completion rates improved from 37 percent in fiscal year 
2019 to 67 percent in fiscal year 2020.
      Public shipyard reduced maintenance delay days by over 80 
percent from fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2020.
      All 111 Strategic Readiness Review and Comprehensive 
Review (SRR/CR) Surface force readiness initiatives are implemented.
    COVID-19 will undoubtedly impact our continued recovery in fiscal 
year 2021--as the need to protect the force will likely cause some 
delays in on-time maintenance completion. However, we will continue to 
meet any challenge with the same adaptive mindset and learning culture 
that has kept our ships sailing throughout this pandemic.
    Congress can help support our readiness recovery by swiftly 
enacting our requests in the Fiscal Year 2021 President's Budget. 
Fiscal Year 2021 President's Budget sustains our trajectory by 
increasing funding in our readiness accounts. This means more time 
steaming and flying, more ammunition and spare parts, more effective 
maintenance, and better infrastructure and training for our sailors.
    A larger, more ready, more lethal fleet will need greater 
investments to operate and sustain. It also requires an unrelenting 
focus on reforms that deliver the force needed to deter and--if 
needed--fight and win. With your support and our sailors' 
determination, we will continue our momentum--even in the midst of this 
pandemic--to build a more ready Navy in the following ways.
    To build a more ready Navy, we're more robustly manning and 
strengthening the fleet. A lethal fleet depends on our sailors--the 
true source of our naval power. As we grow our fleet, we must bring in 
more personnel, which is why we are requesting an additional 7,300 
sailors in fiscal year 2021. We are grateful to Congress for the 
generous pay raises and personnel reforms. The Navy is leveraging 
both--alongside our Sailor 2025 initiatives--to better retain our 
incredibly talented force. Meanwhile, we continue to transform our 
MyNavyHR infrastructure to rapidly deliver services to our sailors at a 
reduced cost. This includes the DOD-leading mobile applications that 
help with the challenge of military moves and finding childcare or 
housing. Our personnel reforms are keeping sailors excited about the 
Navy and we are exceeding retention benchmarks.
    The strength of our fleet depends on the strength of our sailors. 
We are cultivating a Culture of Excellence (COE) across the Fleet, 
which strengthens the Navy's enduring standards of
    professional competence and personal character. It teaches our 
sailors to actively pursue what is right, rather than simply avoiding 
what is wrong. We saw COE at work during the tragic fire aboard USS 
Bonhomme Richard. Battling 1,200 degree heat, smoke and poor 
visibility, and a series of explosions, our sailors exemplified the 
initiative, integrity, accountability and resiliency central to our 
COE.
    We also launched Task Force One Navy in July under the COE 
framework to analyze and evaluate issues in our society and military 
that detract from Navy cohesiveness and readiness. The Task Force is 
hard at work and will release their report to me this month. Respect 
and the promise of opportunity are core to our Navy, and we will not 
stop until we rid discrimination and other biases from our ranks. This 
is a moral and warfighting imperative.
    To build a more ready Navy, we're better training the fleet. Our 
sailors must be better trained than their Chinese and Russian 
counterparts. Maintaining this competitive edge requires sustained 
investments in steaming days and flying hours as well as in virtual and 
constructive training. The Fiscal Year 2021 President's Budget 
increases funding for steaming days and flying hours and invests in 
advanced virtual environments. This delivers high quality training to 
the waterfront, modernizing our existing training through key programs 
like Ready, Relevant Learning which provides sailors the experience to 
hone their skills between underway operations.
    Maintaining the edge also requires providing the ranges our sailors 
need to train for the high-end fight. Currently, our premier Carrier 
Air Wing and SEAL training center--the Fallon Range Training Complex 
(FRTC)--is too small. Without expansion, our sailors cannot 
sufficiently train with longer-range weapons, or practice the tactics 
and techniques they will employ against a near-peer threat. We will 
continue to work with Congress, the local communities, and key 
stakeholders to ensure our aircrew and special operators can train 
effectively to win in combat.
    We are also fully funding all Surface Force readiness initiatives. 
The Navy has now fully implemented all 111 Strategic Readiness Review/
Comprehensive Review recommendations. One thousand four hundred thirty-
two junior officers have now graduated from our new Junior Officer of 
the Deck course with training aligned to International Maritime 
Organization's standards. We are broadening the use of instructor-led 
virtual reality training through the construction of two Mariner Skills 
Training Centers and the modernization of our Integrated Navigation 
Seamanship and Ship handling Trainers. All of these efforts are 
building a COE that prepares our teams to confidently perform under the 
most demanding conditions.
    The Navy is training and operating in the places that matter most 
for great power competition. Together with the Joint Force, we are 
providing credible deterrence and sharpening our warfighting advantage 
from the South China Sea to the Mediterranean. Additionally, we are 
keeping pace with the changing strategic environment by proactively 
steaming and flying in the Arctic region. Ice Exercise in the Arctic 
Ocean, Exercise Dynamic Mongoose off the coast of Iceland, and multiple 
exercises in the Barents Sea demonstrate our commitment to provide 
capability and presence in higher latitudes alongside our allies and 
partners.
    To build a more ready Navy, we're better maintaining the fleet. 
Delivering ships and aircraft from maintenance on time is vital to 
generating ready forces. Using data driven methods, we are reducing 
delays, improving operational availability, and saving taxpayer 
dollars. We have seen this type of success in our tactical aviation 
community. Eighty percent of our Super Hornets and Growlers remained 
mission capable throughout fiscal year 2020, a dramatic improvement 
from the 55 percent long-term average. With higher numbers of aircraft 
available, our aircrew are more ready to fly and fight than at any 
point over the last decade.
    Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, we were seeing dramatic 
improvements in ship maintenance, and the on-time delivery of ships in 
private yards continues to improve this year. To sustain improvement of 
ship maintenance in private shipyards, we modified contracting 
strategies, increased dry dock capacity, and worked to optimize 
facility and pier layouts. We also made adjustments to ship maintenance 
durations to account for available shipyard capacity and improved 
planning and directed maintenance to reduce growth and new work. 
Getting the durations right has reduced days of maintenance delay and 
increased on-time delivery. We are also leveraging authorities provided 
by Congress, such as the 3 year Other Procurement, Navy pilot program, 
to increase flexibility and stabilize demand for our shipyard 
workforces.
    In February of 2020, we were successfully reducing the maintenance 
backlog and better predicting the delivery of availabilities when the 
impacts of COVID-19 began to manifest. The COVID-19 pandemic and 
subsequent decline in our production workforce impacted the trajectory 
of further gains and current availabilities in execution. To mitigate 
additional impacts to ship maintenance in our private shipyards, we 
accelerated awards of contract options and improved the cash positions 
of the industrial base. For our public shipyards, we mobilized 1,352 
skilled Navy Reserve sailors, increased overtime usage, and rebalanced 
future workload and capacity. Still, we have much work to do.
    Submarine maintenance, in particular, remains one of our most 
pressing challenges. While we have driven submarine idle time down by 
50 percent this year, public and private shipyard capacity is still not 
adequate to meet requirements. We are aggressively working to modernize 
our public yards, reforms which will take many years. In the near term, 
we have better aligned work requirements with capacity, hired 
additional workers and accelerated their training, and partnered with 
private industry to increase capacity. In the longer term, we are 
continuing to explore innovative technologies such as hull crawling 
robots and cold spray repairs to more efficiently conduct maintenance.
    To build a more ready Navy, we're better sustaining the fleet. Our 
logistics enterprise and strategic sealift capacity are vital to a 
dynamic Joint Force operating forward in support of national interests. 
We are accelerating our sealift recapitalization strategy and improving 
the readiness of our Surge and Ready Reserve Force (RRF). Fiscal Year 
2021 President's Budget increases resources for sealift operations and 
maintains service life extensions, while executing the efficient 
replacement of the oldest and least ready vessels first.
    Sustaining the fleet for long-term competition also means making 
targeted investments in critical infrastructure like our public 
shipyards and aviation depots. Our Shipyard Infrastructure and 
Optimization Program (SIOP) takes a deliberate approach to refurbishing 
these vital national assets. Beginning with building virtual models of 
each shipyard, we are leveraging 21st century technology to improve 
productivity, safety, and quality-of-life for our talented workforce. 
Over the next year, we will use these models to drive investment 
decisions for major dry dock, facility, and equipment upgrades. We have 
already broke ground on a perimeter floodwall at Norfolk Naval Shipyard 
and are building a new lock system at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. These 
and many other investments will be important in keeping our Navy 
competitive for years to come.
    We are also optimizing and recapitalizing our aviation depot 
infrastructure, the Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs). Through a Naval 
Aviation Infrastructure Optimization Plan (IOP), we are developing a 
10-year Master Plan that provides our organic depots the capacity to 
sustain and modernize our aircraft, engines, components, and support 
equipment. Funding $3.5 billion over the next 10 years will ensure the 
Navy's ability to conduct maintenance on next generation aircraft while 
sustaining current aviation readiness gains. Additionally, Fiscal Year 
2021 President's Budget requests the largest funding for shore 
readiness in the past 4 years. These funds cover a range of critical 
needs, such as increased oversight of public-private venture housing to 
better serve Navy families and cyber infrastructure protection for our 
ashore and deployed units.
    To build a more ready Navy, we're better connecting the fleet. 
Maintaining readiness ashore and at sea requires strengthening our 
digital fleet. We are modernizing and transforming our Navy enterprise 
shore network infrastructure into a secure, resilient digital platform 
which includes a $1 billion investment across our Future Years Defense 
Budget. We are also laser-focused on delivering a resilient operational 
architecture for Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). The Naval 
Operational Architecture (NOA) serves as the digital backbone of our 
future fleet by connecting our sensors, platforms, and command and 
control nodes with the Joint Force. As we incorporate more unmanned 
systems into the fleet, the NOA will become even more vital to 
delivering the naval power we need to deter, fight, and win.
    Protecting our networked fleet also requires building cyber 
security and resilience into our platforms. To meet this end, Fiscal 
Year 2021 President's Budget requests over $1 billion to protect our 
forces from intrusions and will ensure that we can fight through and 
recover from cyber-attacks. Critical to the resiliency of our networked 
fleet is the ability to assure our capabilities in positioning, 
navigation, and timing (PNT). We are investing in alternate sources of 
PNT, like the Automated Celestial Navigation System, to ensure our Navy 
can fight and win in Global Positioning System (GPS) denied or degraded 
environments.
    To build a more ready Navy, we're better arming the Fleet. To fight 
and win at sea against a near-peer threat, we must arm the fleet with 
distributed payloads of increasing range and speed such as: the 
Maritime Strike Tomahawk, Joint Standoff Weapon Extended Range, the 
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, and the Standard Missile-6. When coupled 
with enhanced Air-to-Air and Air-to-Surface missiles along with MK-48 
torpedoes, our platforms will have the advantage they need against 
near-peer threats under, on, and above the seas.
    Concurrently, we are rigorously developing hypersonic and directed 
energy weapons to increase the lethality and defensive capability of 
the fleet. Hypersonic missiles change the risk calculus for our 
competitors by providing conventional sea-based prompt, global strike 
capability. Our Navy Laser Family of Weapons are also continuing to 
mature. The recent demonstration onboard USS Portland showed how we can 
disable an unmanned aerial vehicle using directed energy. We will 
continue to invest in laser technology and non-kinetic defensive 
systems to increase fleet survivability and free magazine space for our 
offensive missiles.
                               conclusion
    Let there be no doubt--America is a maritime nation--our security 
and prosperity are inextricably linked to the seas. For 245 years--in 
both calm and rough waters, your Navy has stood the watch to protect 
our homeland, preserve the freedom of the seas, and defend our way of 
life.
    Our competitors are increasing their naval power every day, and 
their malign behavior and growing presence on the waters places an 
enormous demand on our forces. Our global forward posture--necessary to 
deter conflict and meet our national objectives--requires a relentless 
focus on readiness to keep our ships and sailors strong. Sustaining our 
readiness recovery has never been more vital to our nation's future.
    Yet, it is important to remember readiness only partly delivers the 
maritime power our nation needs. Maintaining our advantage at sea also 
demands growing the fleet with manned and unmanned systems; developing 
weapons of greater lethality; connecting our fleet with resilient 
battle networks; mastering all-domain, fleet-level warfare; and 
empowering our sailors with intellectual overmatch to outfight our 
rivals.
    Without sustained funding that comprehensively grows U.S. naval 
power, we will lose the military advantage at sea on which our nation's 
prosperity and security depend.
    Our Navy remains the finest maritime fighting force in the world 
and our sailors--active and reserve, uniformed and civilian--are 
committed to keeping it that way. But we need your help.
    I am grateful to this Subcommittee for your support in this crucial 
work. I look forward to working with you as we ensure our nation's 
advantage at sea.

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Admiral.
    General Berger?

 STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE 
                          MARINE CORPS

    General Berger. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity for us 
to appear this morning.
    From one marine to another, as we talked last night, just 
know that if one marine hurts, all of us hurt. So we are all 
thinking about you and your family.
    For the Ranking Member Kaine and the rest of the Members, 
this is a good opportunity and timely for us to be here this 
morning to talk about readiness.
    I am in the same spot as the CNO. I think readiness is job 
one for a service secretary. But it is also a balance, as he 
highlighted, of today's readiness, what we have to provide 
combatant commanders now, this afternoon, balanced against the 
force that we have to prepare for the future. The cold, hard 
truth of it is if you are a service chief that every dollar you 
spend on a legacy piece of equipment or on trying to prepare 
something for this afternoon is a dollar that you have to 
consider for the future. This is the tension that every service 
chief has always been challenged with.
    That said, I think you should be very confident--this 
Subcommittee should be very confident that all your Navy and 
Marine units that are deployed around the world are ready this 
afternoon. They are ready for any crisis, any contingency, and 
we are working very hard to make sure that we are going to stay 
in front. There is no adversary that is going to overtake us.
    The readiness. I will just offer you I probably will break 
precedent in my view of readiness, how I view it. I do not view 
readiness as availability only. It is more than just having a 
platform, a ship, an aircraft, a piece of equipment available. 
I think you expect us to be ready in terms of are you manned, 
are you trained, are you equipped, are you ready for the 
threat. When we think of readiness, we are talking about 
readiness in terms of ready for what, ready when.
    I am also grateful for all the support this Committee has 
given us because 5, 6 years ago, we were in a tough spot 
readiness-wise. We had rode the force hard and we needed the 
resources to build our readiness back. We are back where we 
need to be thanks to the support of the Members on this 
Subcommittee and the Congress writ large. I am very grateful 
for that.
    Lastly, I would just touch on the same thing I think that 
Admiral Gilday mentioned, which is our readiness in a sort of 
unconventional way, and that is cyber readiness. Of course, 
that is offensive and defensive. I would just highlight that 
because those threats clearly are not going down. In fact, they 
are increasing. But you would be very proud of the cyber 
mission force that every day is tackling the challenges that 
you wanted to tackle. On the defensive side, I think we have 
all the means, the resources in terms of the training and the 
people and the equipment to prepare all our networks for the 
challenges that another adversary is going to pose. In both 
cases, I think we are very focused on it, and that is going to 
be an enduring task for all of us.
    Chairman, I would yield the rest of my time to the topics 
that you want to focus on, sir.
    [The prepared statement of General Berger follows:]

             Prepared Statement by General David H. Berger
                              introduction
    Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished Members 
of this Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation and opportunity to 
address what many defense professionals conclude is job one for a 
service chief--operational readiness. In an era of great-power 
competition, this requires establishing the appropriate service culture 
necessary to generate and sustain readiness not only for the demands of 
the present, but also for the uncertainty of the future. Therefore, 
generating a ready force, and not simply an available force, remains my 
priority.
    Your invitation clearly articulated five specific items of interest 
for the Subcommittee, and I intend to address each with as much detail 
and precision as possible. However, before turning to those individual 
topics, I should acknowledge that my understanding of the term 
``readiness'' may break somewhat with precedent. For the record, I do 
not think availability is synonymous with readiness. Today's readiness 
does not assure future readiness or ensure operational advantage. Every 
dollar consumed by the current force to make existing and in some cases 
legacy capabilities ready via their availability comes at the expense 
of future readiness and investments in to the creation of a modern 
force. Legacy forces with antiquated capabilities can be maintained at 
high rates of availability, yet that does not mean they are ready. This 
readiness schema was most famously articulated in Dr. Richard Betts' 
seminal work--Military Readiness in 1995. As the Members of this 
Subcommittee know, Dr. Betts' articulated a model to determine 
readiness based on three simple questions: a) For what, b) For when, 
and c) Of what. I will address the topics you identified in your 
invitation letter using this paradigm.
     readiness iaw national defense strategy and force design 2030
    I have commented publicly on numerous occasions over the past year 
that the Marine Corps is not optimized today to meet the demands of the 
2018 National Defense Strategy. The exploitation of maritime gray zone 
operations by the People's Liberation Army Navy and the Peoples Armed 
Force Maritime Militia, coupled with their increasingly aggressive 
pursuit of conventional and hybrid capabilities, have fundamentally 
transformed the environment in which the U.S. military will operate for 
the foreseeable future. Add to this the continuing threat posed by 
Russia, by rogue regimes such as Iran and DPRK, as well as by non-state 
actors and we have a complex problem set that answers the first of Dr. 
Betts' questions--ready for what?
    The Marine Corps is prepared to respond rapidly to any crisis or 
planned contingency related to China or Russia with naval expeditionary 
forces from Marine Expeditionary Units to Marine Expeditionary Forces, 
with capabilities such as 4th or 5th GEN aviation squadrons or with any 
other combined arms formation desired by fleet commanders and 
Geographic Combatant Commanders, and in accordance with established 
timelines. This answers Dr. Betts' second question--for when.
    Our forward deployed units in the Pacific, whether shore-based or 
afloat, are prepared to immediately respond to any crisis, and have a 
demonstrable record of success. However, successful response is not the 
acme of skill or triumph. We must modernize our force in accordance 
with our Force Design 2030 report and in the process make our 
adversaries respond to our competitive capability advantages as well as 
the advantages achieved through innovative concepts such as the 
existing Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations Concept and soon to be 
released Competition Concept. While this may sound ambitious, it is 
well within our ability and resources. As with our record of success 
responding to crises, the Marine Corps and the Naval Service as a whole 
have a record of success driving change as evidenced by Chinese and 
Russian modernization efforts focused on overcoming the advantages 
created by our traditional power projection and forcible entry 
capabilities. Our adversaries responded to our obvious military 
advantages, and adapted their operational and strategic approaches as 
well as their anti-access and area denial capabilities to counter us, 
and now it is time for us to respond and counter those advantages in 
order to restore our competitive advantages per the NDS. Making legacy 
platforms better will not force our near peer adversaries to change 
course.
    As noted in my Force Design 2030 Report, we will transition our 
ground fires capabilities from a short-range cannon-based force to one 
oriented on long-range precision rocket fires--to include an anti-ship 
missile capability. These long-range fires will provide our traditional 
ground formations and naval expeditionary units with the modern 
capabilities required for any contingency against Russian Battle Task 
Groups or Peoples Liberation Army Navy--Marine Corps units, whether in 
Europe, Asia, or elsewhere globally. Those modernization efforts will 
further enable the forward deployment of a new capability--the Marine 
Littoral Regiment. These units, once augmented with anti-ship missiles, 
a light amphibious warship for mobility and sustainment, air defense 
capabilities, Group 5 UAS, and fully trained for expeditionary advance 
based operations will provide our joint force and fleet commanders with 
forces prepared to deter adversary aggression by denial and by 
detection, as well as a counter-gray zone competition maritime force. 
While EABO discussions have increasingly focused on application in the 
Indo-Pacific, we should not forget their efficacy in the high north in 
support of larger Navy Anti-Submarine Warfare efforts, or in contested 
littoral environments elsewhere around the world.
    To be clear, our naval expeditionary forces and FMF in general will 
be uniquely capable of EABO--but not solely defined as an EABO force. 
Our Marine Expeditionary Units will remain capable of the full range of 
crisis response functions. In fact, once enhanced with unmanned surface 
and undersea vehicles, anti-ship missiles, amphibious combat vehicles, 
long-range unmanned ISR capability, and 5th GEN STOVL aircraft, we will 
provide our fleet and theater commanders with a distinct all-domain 
capability for use in traditional conflict as well as day-to-day 
competition. Since the technologies enabling the anti-access strategies 
pursued by Russia and China are also steadily proliferating in the 
arsenals of lesser powers--notably including Iran and some of her non-
state proxies--these capabilities will increasingly be needed for the 
effective execution of naval expeditionary operations in a widening 
range of crises and contingencies.
    Based on lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, as well 
as from the experiences of the Israeli Defense Forces in Gaza and 
Lebanon, coalition forces in eastern Ukraine, and the experiences of 
allies and partners in Mali, Libya, and across the East and South China 
Seas, we are modernizing our infantry battalions and traditional 
reconnaissance units to create more distributable formations with much 
greater organic lethality in accordance with units traditionally 
associated with special forces and commando units. To support such a 
transition, we will need to fill our ranks with the highest-caliber 
individuals capable of out-thinking sophisticated enemies. Our current 
manpower system was designed in the industrial era to produce mass. War 
still has a physical component, and all marines need to be screened and 
ready to fight. However, we have not adapted to the needs of the 
current battlefield.
    With this in mind, I am glad to bring to the Committee's attention 
two initiatives designed to address this evolving manpower landscape. 
The first is the planning direction I gave to our new Deputy Commandant 
for Manpower & Reserve Affairs. The essential element of that guidance 
is to transition the Marine Corps' approach to human resources from an 
industrial age manpower approach to a modern talent management system. 
This effort is just beginning. As we learn more, I look forward to 
updating you and your colleagues across Congress.
    The second initiative involves how we approach training and 
education. Here we face a requirement to reform and re-invigorate our 
approaches to learning. The Marine Corps has always prided itself on 
producing innovative and adaptable thinkers, planners, and warfighters. 
This does not occur automatically or by chance, however. Rather, it 
results from regular re-evaluation and reform of training and education 
institutions, personnel, and curricula to ensure they remain at the 
cutting edge of military thought and learning technique. We have 
recently published our first top-level doctrinal publication since 
1995, and not coincidentally, it is about Learning. Based on the 
thinking contained in this document we are taking a hard look at the 
selection and standards governing entry into our professional military 
education schools, the quality and qualifications of the faculty who 
teach there, the curriculum they teach, and the learning approaches 
they use. A major emphasis of this review focuses on the expansion of 
active adult learning techniques and the provision of as many 
opportunities as possible for students to make tactical and operational 
decisions in environments that realistically approximate those they may 
face in today's rapidly changing world. Among other elements, this 
approach implies a greatly increased focused on the use of wargames and 
other decision-forcing tools in the classroom. In our service-level 
training events, a similar focus on requiring marines at all levels to 
make decisions in the face of thinking enemies in conditions as close 
to those of combat as we can safely manage. We have been running these 
large force-on-force exercises for over a year now with great success, 
and are considering options for broadening them further, to include 
integration with existing Joint exercise and training programs.
    These major initiatives merely scratch the surface of the changes 
we will need to make in our training programs--all of these changes 
will generally point in the direction of producing more highly 
qualified individual marines with a range of more diverse skillsets. 
From the skills our infantrymen will need to ensure their lethality and 
survivability on a more distributed battlefield, through the expanded 
capabilities for information operations our force design demands at a 
number of levels, to the entirely new (for us) skillsets associated 
with the employment of anti-ship missiles and other forces in seamless 
integration with the ships and aircraft of the Navy, our training 
institutions will need to branch out and step up in a number of very 
critical and consequential areas. My recent decision to elevate our 
Training and Education Command to three-star level, making its 
commanding general a full peer to my Deputy Commandants overseeing 
other critical functions within the Service headquarters, is by no 
means a full solution to the challenges of change in training and 
education, but it does symbolize my determination to effect that change 
and place the immediate authority and responsibility for it in the 
hands of an officer I know will rise to the challenge.
    Finally, let me address Dr. Betts' third question--of what. While I 
have already commented on the current and future readiness of our naval 
expeditionary forces, we must not forget the total force--specifically 
the readiness of our reserve component forces. Discussions on the 
readiness of the Marine Corps are incomplete without a conversation 
about our reserves--a force we utilize as both an operational and 
strategic reserve. As with the rest of our force,we are in the process 
of reconceiving and redesigning the reserve portion of our total force. 
This process is ongoing, and has not yet matured to a point where I 
could provide significant detail to the Subcommittee; however, I remain 
committed to doing so once the latest force design planning is 
complete.
        logistics, infrastructure, and training range readiness
    As has been documented via a series of war games over the last few 
years, the operational logistics system, both ground and aviation is 
insufficient to meet the challenges posed by peer/near-peer conflict 
especially in the Indo-Pacific where significant distances complicate 
sustainment of a deployed force.
    While we are making some gains in maintaining legacy equipment and 
aircraft readiness, it is clear to me that this will lead us on a road 
to irrelevancy against peer/near peer threats. Readiness is not about 
availability of equipment; rather, it is about our ability to persist 
and prevail against peer/near peer threats. The readiness assessments 
of today are more about our ability to source forces against Combatant 
Commander requirements. This is an argument about what we can do vice 
what we should do. Vice the linear path of today, we must develop new 
readiness metrics that incorporate numerous additional factors to 
facilitate assessing the service's readiness glide slope into the 
future. To those who say we must focus on our ability to fight tonight 
vice an uncertain future, I say you are presenting a false dichotomy. 
We must focus on and assess our ability to fight tonight, every night, 
in perpetuity.
    Many across the joint force are working to overcome these 
challenges; however, there is much to be done and time is not on our 
side. While that is ongoing, my focus is on how to most effectively 
connect the Fleet Marine Force with my partners in the Navy to the 
evolving Joint Logistics Enterprise. The distributed battlefields of 
today strain our systems to the limits. This will only get worse 
considering the dynamic, evolving threats that could be arrayed against 
us unless we take action. I can assure you this has my highest 
priority.
    At present our installations are more of an indication of where we 
have been as a service than where we are headed. Just as the Fleet 
Marine Force (FMF) is evolving, we must challenge our assumptions 
concerning how we deliver installation management and support. We 
execute these critical tasks as part of a complex network of local, 
state and national governments not to mention our partners in the Navy 
and the remainder of the Joint Force. The more we understand our place 
in that system and how we can influence the important players, the 
better our regions, bases and stations will be positioned to facilitate 
the readiness of the FMF both now and into the future. As there is no 
one size fits all option, we will have to be comfortable adapting 
enterprise solutions to local conditions. As a result of the rising 
peer and near peer threats that have several of our bases and stations 
inside the Weapons Engagement Zone, the service's efforts to protect 
the force will be far more significant than they have been in the past, 
requiring greater partnerships with the Navy and the Joint Force.
    Based on anticipated funding levels and the additional budget 
uncertainty introduced by the COVID-19 response, there will be no risk 
free options. Our force design efforts for the future provide the 
necessary context to make the difficult choices about the present for 
our installations as well as help us to prioritize installation related 
funding for the future. We can no longer accept the inefficiencies 
inherent in antiquated legacy bureaucratic processes nor accept 
incremental improvements in our regions, bases and stations. In order 
for our installations to change effectively, we must more fully 
understand the implications that Force Design 2030 will have on the FMF 
across multiple time horizons so our future installations can be 
resourced to meet those objectives. In coordination with partners both 
inside and outside the service, we will evolve our regions, bases and 
stations to meet the readiness requirements in the air, on land and at 
sea of the future force while continuing to provide world-class support 
to the force today.
                                posture
    While some use the word posture simply to describe geographic 
location, it is more helpful if understood in the broader context of 
forces, footprints, and agreements. At present, we are in operationally 
suitable locations across the Indo-Pacific. Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii and 
Australia provide our forward deployed forces with a competitive 
advantage, and our forces afloat are capable of global response. 
However, the success of our future force will be measured in part by 
its ability to remain mobile in the face of contested operating spaces. 
While this capability is certainly relevant across multiple scenarios, 
it assumes a particular sense of urgency in the littoral regions of the 
Indo-Pacific and in an era of precision-strike missiles, sensing 
technology, counter reconnaissance capabilities, and the proliferation 
of unmanned systems. This makes it imperative that we redouble our 
engagement with capable allies such as the Japan Self-Defense Force and 
the Australian Defence Force, to refine how and where we work together 
to confront the shared security threats posed by China, Russia, DPRK, 
and others. Similarly, we remain committed to a rotational presence in 
places like Alaska even as we continue to explore opportunities to 
establish a more permanent forward presence such as with a potential 
active or reserve component Group 5 UAS DET. Meanwhile, extensive 
training and exercises will continue in Norway and with other European 
partners.
                   resources and resource shortfalls
    As I have previously discussed with each of you and stated publicly 
in my Force Design 2030 Report, I think I have sufficient resources 
available to generate the ready forces required by the NDS, the Fleet 
Commanders, the Combatant Commanders, and as expected by our partners 
and allies. This will require continued Congressional support and 
ultimately Congressional authorization to re-scope existing programs-
of-record in accordance with our new force structure. I choose the word 
``think'' vice ``know'' simply because our infrastructure, training, 
and education requirements may require additional funding, but I am not 
prepared to speak with precision regarding those resource needs at this 
time. Additional funding for experimentation would accelerate the 
development of our future force, and allow for accelerated wargaming, 
experimentation, and learning. The future Marine Corps requires heavy-
lift helicopters, protected mobility, and 5th generation aircraft--but 
we need the flexibility to adjust programs of record to match the 
design of our future force. As two of these programs fall within the 
category of ``blue dollars,'' savings reaped from those could 
potentially be applied to existing and anticipated shortfalls within 
the SCN account to fund the procurement of new light amphibious 
warships and unmanned systems or to fund MQ-9B maritime Group 5 
capabilities--all of which have the Secretary's and CNO's support.
                       technology and innovation
    We face tremendous challenges in fielding new capabilities quickly 
and at scale; I would like to partner with Congress to identify the 
resources necessary to make serious investments to rapidly close the 
military-technological gap. To be clear, it is not just a matter of a 
straight budget plus up. It is about creating the multi-dimensional 
structures, the cross-functional partnerships, and the innovative 
culture that can leverage the new technologies to transform how the 
marines operate. We just need to be smarter about how we invest the 
money we have. We need to be able to procure an adequate number of new 
systems to enable robust field experimentation, which supports further 
concept development, and allows for further refinement of requirements 
before moving to full-scale production/employment. Our existing 
institutions dedicated to these functions, to include the wargaming and 
analysis capacity that precedes and guides any effective 
experimentation, may not be adequate to the demands of rapid and 
thoroughgoing change that we now face. They are an essential 
contributor to readiness as I have defined it here, and increasing 
their capability and capacity will not be without cost.
    We risk readiness when we follow antiquated processes that do not 
keep pace with the compressed timeframe of the operating space created 
by today's technology. To be most effective, the MLR must be built 
around human-machine teaming, leveraging AI and unmanned systems to the 
maximum extent possible. We have prioritized the related concept 
development and wargaming to stay on track to deploy three MLR by 2027. 
That being said, far more analysis and experimentation at scale will be 
required so that this new, novel operational concept can be analyzed 
and tested in realistic scenarios. We will need the support of Congress 
to make adjustments to the MLR in stride as we incorporate lessons 
learned, to include from the perspective of how the MLR supports the 
Joint Force as well as its integration with allies and partners, such 
as Japan's Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade.
    How do we balance innovation and readiness? Precisely by developing 
a clear sight picture, by collapsing the operating space between them 
and by creating continuous on-ramp opportunities. To be competitive we 
must be opportunistic, and to be opportunistic we must be agile enough 
to course correct with speed and agility.
                               conclusion
    While Force Design 2030 will continue to inform our divestment and 
investment decisions going forward, we should view it as the first step 
in a longer journey to address the evolving threats posed by near-peer 
competitors, rogue regimes, and non-state actors. Risk is inherent when 
you employ strategic shaping to implement priorities as described by 
the NDS. Yet, through continued collaboration with your Committee and 
with Congress as a whole, as well as with the other services and with 
stakeholders from industry to academia, the marines are well positioned 
to carry out a generational transformation. Over the next 2 years, I 
intend to focus on Phase III of Force Design 2030--Experimentation. 
Specifically, I will prioritize efforts to analyze, test, and stress 
the systems, structures, and platforms required for Force Design 2030 
implementation; to reform training and education to support the 21st 
Century warfighter; and to overhaul our outdated personnel and 
retention model to ensure we attract--and keep--the best marines our 
nation has to offer.
    In conclusion, the Members of this Subcommittee should remain 
confident that their Marine Corps and Fleet Marine Forces remain ready 
to respond to crisis globally or deploy in accordance with pre-planned 
contingency timelines--today, and in response to any threat whether 
from China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, or any other state or non-state 
actor. In order to counter adversary maritime gray zone activities and 
deter aggression by denial and detection, the Marine Corps must 
modernize. This will require no additional top-line increase, but will 
require authorization to modify current requirements and established 
programs-of-record. I understand that this is not a small ask, and that 
any such change could be perceived as ``a loss'' or signal a potential 
decrease in funds or jobs in some of the states you represent. I 
understand that I am asking you to potentially support a position 
contrary to self-interest, and am prepared to do everything possible to 
minimize the impacts of those required changes. While I have testified 
specifically to Marine Corps readiness, we should not forget that your 
Fleet Marine Forces remain part of a larger joint force; thus, any 
discussion of readiness must be understood as a subset of that larger 
readiness discussion. The Marine Corps and Navy are a team--and one 
cannot be completely ready without the other.

    Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, General.
    I will just begin. I appreciate the comments about my dad. 
You know, I come from a family with a long tradition of naval 
service. My dad accomplished a lot in his life, but his 
proudest accomplishment, no doubt, was his service in the U.S. 
Navy. His cousin, Bruce Wilhelm--he was a naval aviator, an 
academy grad who won the distinguished Flying Cross during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. You can read about that. He was actually 
highlighted in a movie. He was later killed in a training 
accident. Finally, my dad's uncle, Tom Sullivan, was a 
lieutenant in the Navy. He did three Murmansk runs during World 
War II, some of the most dangerous service in the U.S. Navy 
during the war.
    I mention the Murmansk runs, and, General, as you know, it 
is the 70th anniversary of the Chosin Reservoir battle right 
now. A lot of Americans do not know a lot about that battle. 
But I mention that because those are very important cold 
weather operations that our Navy and Marine Corps did quite 
well at a critical moment in history.
    Mr. Secretary, perhaps you can begin by talking about the 
Navy's upcoming Arctic strategy to get back to the roots 
whether Murmansk operations or Chosin Reservoir type operations 
were--we have a Navy and Marine Corps that can operate well and 
protect America's strategic interests in some of the coldest 
places in the world that are now increasingly becoming the 
places where great power competition are going to be taking 
place in the future.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to.
    As you know, I am a student of the Arctic, an advocate for 
the Arctic. I first went to your great State as a U.S. Navy 
pilot stationed in Adak, Alaska at the Naval Air Station and 
flew anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missions throughout the 
Arctic Circle.
    Most recently, I was the United States Ambassador at the 
Kingdom of Norway, and I spent most of my time above the Arctic 
Circle right near Murmansk.
    I have seen with my own eyes how the Arctic has changed in 
those 35 years. Today it is navigable 365, and there are other 
nations in the world that have recognized its importance to us. 
It should be an alarm to all of Americans as an Arctic nation 
that we should have a more formidable presence to ensure rule 
of law and freedom of the seas in that part of the world.
    Most recently the USS John McCain was doing just that, a 
freedom of navigation exercise, near the Bay of Peter the Great 
and was engaged by a more assertive Russian navy.
    The United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps has 
had a recommitment to the Arctic. We operate in the Arctic 
today much more than we have historically although, as you 
know, the Navy has operated consistently in the Arctic since 
the inception of our submarine force. It is just that you 
cannot see our vessels. Today we need that visible presence. As 
the Chief of Naval Operations talked about just a few moments 
ago, power projection, sea control, and the ability to ensure 
to our partners and allies and to our own people that we, the 
United States Navy, have that first and foremost in our minds.
    We are about to release an Arctic strategy that you and I 
talked about during our recent trip to Alaska and the 
importance of how that blueprint will recommit ourselves in a 
much more visible way to activities in the Arctic.
    But we must recognize that if we do not step forward 
quickly, those who have challenged us on the stage of great 
power competition are there. I have seen it. Russia has re-
militarized the Arctic. China has recommitted itself to build 
icebreakers to be able to move its product from its homeland to 
Western markets in half the amount of time that it has 
historically had to.
    The United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps, 
Senator, is committed to being present in the Arctic in a much 
more visible way than we have historically been.
    Senator Sullivan. Can I ask just two quick follow-ups maybe 
for you and Admiral Gilday? The Russian exercise that I 
mentioned--it did catch our fishing fleet by surprise. I know 
that there has been an after-action. But you know, our fishing 
fleet was ordered out of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 
which of course is our EEZ where they fish. They should not be 
ordered out of that by Russians. They were buzzed. They were 
harassed.
    What are we doing in terms of an after-action to make sure 
that that does not happen again? Our fishing fleet--you know, 
my State is what I call the super power of seafood. Actually 
over 60 percent of all seafood harvested in America comes from 
Alaska's waters. What are we doing to make sure that that does 
not happen again?
    Mr. Secretary, do you have any follow-up on the President's 
memorandum on icebreakers and home-porting those in different 
parts of the Arctic?
    Secretary Braithwaite. Well, again, as I mentioned, the USS 
John McCain was just recently in the Arctic to ensure freedom 
of navigation, and I would invite the Chief of Naval Operations 
to go into a little more detail.
    Some of it, of course, is classified as you and I have 
discussed, and the CNO and I would be happy to talk with you 
privately at any time that would be convenient to you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    You may know that I recently went to Finland to see the 
icebreakers in question that the President has directed us to 
purchase. We are looking within the Department of the Navy of 
how we can facilitate that. Part of commissioning those ships 
means that they become United States naval vessels, and there 
are requirements that we have to have U.S. naval personnel in 
command of those vessels. So I have asked the CNO to look into 
the process by which we can facilitate that.
    You and I agree we need to build icebreakers. We cannot 
build them as quickly as we need them. Today the Coast Guard 
maintains two icebreakers, and that is all that we have.
    Senator Sullivan. One is broken.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Yes, sir. One is broken. We do need 
icebreakers, and the Navy recognizes--it is not a mission that 
is central to the United States Navy, but it is one that we 
rely on the Coast Guard to provide. In this instance, per the 
executive order, we are looking at ways to procure those.
    CNO, do you have any thoughts you would like to offer?
    Admiral Gilday. Thanks, Mr. Secretary.
    Sir, in terms of the Navy's presence in the Arctic--the 
Navy and the Marine Corps--I would say that over the past year, 
we have done some 20 exercises in the high north. That ranges 
from unilateral, joint exercises that the U.S. conducts alone, 
some of it in the training range in Alaska, to bilateral 
exercises with some of our closest allies and partners to 
multilateral exercises. Now our operations above--in the high 
north are not extraordinary, but they are beginning to become 
part of our day-to-day business. I think that is directly tied 
to the National Defense Strategy, the Chairman's role as the 
global integrator to posture the globe against those primary 
competitors, namely in this case, China and Russia that would 
include the Arctic.
    With respect to the incident that happened in late August, 
I share your concern, Senator. I actually meet with the U.S. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Commander later on this week. I 
know they are looking at what potentially happened with 
communication breakdowns potentially to our fishermen, perhaps 
miscommunication between agencies in the U.S. Government. But 
U.S. fishermen should not feel threatened by another nation in 
our own EEZ in terms of fishing. I think our continued presence 
up there will have some blunting effect to that, but I think 
perhaps more needs to be done, including through the Arctic 
Council, to have honest discussions about it.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Admiral.
    Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Secretary Braithwaite, I want to talk to you about the 
announcements you have made today about the 1st Fleet and the 
Atlantic Fleet. I will spend 1 minute on the 1st Fleet and then 
minutes on the Atlantic Fleet.
    The 1st Fleet, as I understand your announcement--it will 
take the sizable real estate that is now covered by the Seventh 
Fleet out of Japan and divide it into two fleets because of 
increased activity at the seam between the Pacific and the 
Indian Oceans. Do I understand that correctly?
    Secretary Braithwaite. Yes, sir. That is exactly right.
    Senator Kaine. This is something that you have worked out 
with U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), with the 7th Fleet, and you 
are still making decisions about manpower, but it will likely 
be an expeditionary fleet without, at least at the start, a 
land-based headquarters (HQ). Is that correct?
    Secretary Braithwaite. That is correct. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, and that is to emphasize the 
growing importance of this region and the strategic alliances 
that the United States has with nations like India and others 
in the Quad in that part of the world.
    Secretary Braithwaite. That is exactly right, Senator.
    As you know--and you have traveled in that region--it is 
vast, and for the 7th Fleet, which is home-ported in Japan, 
although it is also a sea base, it has formidable challenges to 
move all the way through the Western Pacific down through the 
approaches of the Indian Ocean all the way over to the Northern 
Arabian Gulf.
    Senator Kaine. Let me move to the Atlantic Fleet question, 
which affects Virginia significantly.
    The Atlantic Fleet was the fleet headquartered in Norfolk 
until I believe Secretary Rumsfeld during the war on terror 
reconstituted the Atlantic Fleet as the Fleet Forces Command, 
and it was not just a name change. There were some different 
areas of focus.
    Right before I came to the Senate in 2011, the 2nd Fleet, 
which was based in Norfolk and provided coverage in the 
Atlantic, was decommissioned because the United States 
perceived that Russia would no longer be a naval threat.
    Well, not so fast. In 2018, during my service on the 
Committee, the Navy recommissioned the 2nd Fleet in Norfolk 
because of the increased Russian threat in the Atlantic.
    Your proposal today to reconstitute the Fleet Forces 
Command, which was focused on the war on terror to the Atlantic 
Fleet, as I understand it, is to recognize the reality of this 
increased Russian presence and the fact that the great power 
competition is now sort of the dominant concern of the National 
Defense Strategy. Is that correct?
    Secretary Braithwaite. That is correct, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. Let me ask this. My folks in Hampton Roads 
will wonder whether reconstituting Fleet Forces Command as the 
Atlantic Fleet will cause them either to lose jobs or personnel 
or investment levels in that region. Should they be worried 
about that?
    Secretary Braithwaite. No, Senator. There are no loss of 
jobs. There is no loss of revenue to the Tidewater region.
    Senator Kaine. I understand that you will be going to the 
region to have discussions with folks in the area about this 
proposal that you have announced today.
    Secretary Braithwaite. I will. That is correct, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. That is very helpful.
    If I understand now with the structure that you are putting 
on the table, the Pacific Fleet would have the 1st, 3rd, and 
7th Fleets reporting through it. Correct?
    Secretary Braithwaite. That is correct. Yes, sir.
    Senator Kaine. You are contemplating that the 5th Fleet 
would still report through CENTCOM?
    Secretary Braithwaite. That is correct.
    Senator Kaine. The Atlantic Fleet would have the 2nd and 
4th Fleets reporting through it. Is that correct?
    Secretary Braithwaite. That is correct, although we still 
have----
    Senator Kaine. You would suggest the 6th Fleet would be 
reporting through United States Forces Europe?
    Secretary Braithwaite. That is correct. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. Because that fleet does so much in tandem 
with NATO allies in that theater.
    Secretary Braithwaite. That is correct.
    Senator Kaine. Okay.
    Let me ask now--I will move to one other topic and I will 
save the others for a second round. Vaccine deployment.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Yes.
    Senator Kaine. We are grappling with a lot of vaccine 
deployment issues nationally, but also it is very, very 
critical that vaccine--thank goodness it is being developed 
rapidly--that the vaccine be deployed rapidly in a way that 
will keep our military forces active and healthy.
    Talk a little bit about the DOD discussions about vaccine 
deployment issues and how you are approaching it. Did you learn 
things with respect to how you did testing, wide testing, 
through the DOD family that have given you lessons about how to 
do vaccine deployment and how to phase the deployment of 
vaccines throughout the Navy and Marines?
    Secretary Braithwaite. Yes, sir, Senator. I am extremely 
proud of the Department of the Navy. Both the Marine Corps and 
our Navy have done a phenomenal job in the aftermath of the 
lessons we learned from USS Teddy Roosevelt. We are applying 
some of those lessons in the testing, as you mentioned, to what 
our rollout strategy will be around the vaccine. Of course, 
some of those discussions are still going on with the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) team as we determine how quickly 
we will get those vaccines, how quickly we will roll those out. 
I know the CNO is in discussions with our Surgeon General to 
how we will do that for the Navy, as well as the Commandant for 
the Marine Corps.
    I would invite the CNO if he had any thoughts on this 
specifically to comment.
    Admiral Gilday. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Sir, there are two related but separate plans that are in 
development right now very closely with the the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The first one deals with 
the distribution of vaccines, and so there are two that DOD is 
looking at. One is Moderna and the other is Pfizer. As you 
probably know, the Pfizer requires--Pfizer's are going to be 
shipped in GPS-tracked coolers----
    Senator Kaine. Separate refrigeration, yes.
    Admiral Gilday. Right, and once it is thawed, it is good 
for about 5 days.
    The Pfizer medicine will be distributed here in CONUS at 10 
different locations across the DOD. Every medical treatment 
facility in the military will receive that vaccine. Then we 
will also have three or four out-CONUS overseas locations that 
will receive the Moderna vaccine, which is allowed to be 
refrigerated for up to 30 days, and so you have a little bit 
more flexibility.
    The second piece of this is the vaccination plan itself. 
And it is kind of tied to lessons learned from testing. We 
actually developed a prioritization for testing. We were 
building the airplane as we were flying it, as we were trying 
to get testing capability out.
    This time we have a better sense of what that 
prioritization structure ought to look like. At the top are 
health care workers and then emergency and safety personnel at 
our installations, those people who are likely to come in 
contact with people that are infected, and then our strategic 
forces. I think maybe your cyber mission forces, the crews on 
strategic missile submarines, and then the forces that will 
deploy within the next 3 months.
    We have a good count of what those numbers are, and if 
there is anything we are really good at, it is mass 
immunization in the U.S. military. We feel pretty confident, 
sir, that once we get the vaccine distributed, that the 
vaccination piece, now that we have the prioritization well 
thought out, will happen pretty quickly.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Senator Sullivan. Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to each of you for being here this morning 
and for your service.
    Secretary Braithwaite, I want to follow up on the 
conversation you and Senator Sullivan were having about the 
importance of being able to operate in cold climates and the 
importance of the Arctic going forward because in New 
Hampshire, we have the U.S. Army's Cold Regions Research and 
Engineering Lab. They do amazing research, and I wondered to 
what extent you share that kind of research across branches. Do 
you get information from the Army about research that is being 
done at CRREL that would be helpful to the Navy?
    Secretary Braithwaite. We do. Of course, under a new joint 
approach, the service secretaries and I--we talk. The service 
chiefs talk all the time. Our respective research arms have 
exchange and interplay as well.
    Senator Shaheen. Admiral Gilday, I appreciated your 
comments on the importance of our civilian workers especially 
at our shipyards. We have had the opportunity to visit the 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and everyone appreciated that.
    I am very interested in ensuring that the shipyard 
optimization plan goes forward as envisioned. Are you 
comfortable that the resources are going to be there to keep 
that plan on time? What has been the impact, if any, of COVID-
19?
    Admiral Gilday. With respect to the plan, ma'am, it has 
been a priority of the Department and certainly the Secretary 
since he has been in the seat.
    I will tell you, in terms of putting our money where our 
mouth is, right now across the four public yards, we have nine 
MILCON projects that are underway, so four of those are up at 
Portsmouth. There is a couple in Puget Sound and a couple more 
in Hawaii and so forth. But those are progressing on track and 
funded.
    Across the FYDP, we have outlaid $3.5 billion, which is not 
a trivial amount given the fact that--this is for Shipyard 
Infrastructure and Optimization Program (SIOP)--given the fact 
that our typical MILCON budget a year is about a billion. So 
$3.5 billion over the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP), and 
that is progressing pretty well with respect to the work and 
the planning associated with it. There is a big project in 
Hawaii that we just made congressional notification on a week 
ago. I am confident that we are heading in the right direction, 
that is, the right degree of prioritization and resources 
against the plan, ma'am.
    With respect to workforce itself, so the workforce, as you 
know, is an older workforce. We were very conservative, 
particularly in the spring, and we wanted to make sure that 
safety was our number one priority. And so we did see probably 
with respect to production--we saw a dip in our production 
capability at the public yards with respect to the work that 
was being done. It went down to the 70s with respect to 70 
percent of the workforce on the job every day. That is now back 
at 90 percent.
    When we look at lost man-days with respect to that time 
period, it is about 2 percent of the man-days across the four 
yards that we would expect to complete a year.
    We have mitigation efforts in place. That includes 
overtime, which buys us back 2 or 3 percent. Contracting, so 
going to local contractors outside of those public yards that 
can do some of that work for us. Also, we have mobilized about 
1,300 reservists that have unique skill sets that we could 
bring into the yard.
    The mitigation plan, again safety first, and right now we 
are watching it very closely. But I think that we are stable 
right now. I would describe our repair efforts in the public 
yards as stable. I am very comfortable with where we are.
    Senator Shaheen. Do you expect to be delayed in terms of 
where we had hoped to be with the optimization plan as the 
result of COVID?
    Admiral Gilday. I have not seen any delays to military 
construction (MILCON) projects as a result of COVID. I am sure 
there have been some slight delays but nothing that has popped 
a red flag at my level to raise significant concern.
    Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you.
    Also, this is I think both for you, Admiral, and for the 
Secretary. One of the challenges that we have is our shrinking 
industrial base as we look at the needs going forward. I assume 
that COVID is going to have an impact on that. I know we have 
small businesses in New Hampshire that are part of our defense 
industrial base in the State that are facing real challenges as 
the result of this pandemic.
    Are you concerned about the impact of the pandemic on more 
of those businesses that we are going to rely on for our 
industrial base? Do you have any thoughts about how we can do 
more to ensure that we have the support that we need through 
the industrial base?
    Secretary Braithwaite. Senator, as I mentioned to you, you 
know, I am a product of Philadelphia and the shipyard closure 
there and what a negative impact that it has had not just on 
the greater Philadelphia region but on our industrial base writ 
large across our country. We need to protect every shipyard we 
have. The Chinese, ma'am, have 25 shipyards to our one, and I 
am a student of history. When you go back and you see the 
element that kept the United States capable during World War 
II, it was our industrial might. It was our ability to build 
back the ships that we were losing. We need to maintain the 
sacred industrial base that we have today.
    I would give kudos to our Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Jim Geurts, who has done an incredible job of crafting a plan 
to look to those second and third tier suppliers to ensure that 
there is consistency in getting the product into the yards. As 
the CNO has indicated, our shipyard workers, both in our public 
yards and in our private yards, have done an amazing job of 
continuing to be there engaged through the fact that they are 
dealing with antiquated systems, they are dealing with older 
ships that require more work, and especially in the midst of a 
global pandemic. They have done a phenomenal job. As the CNO 
has indicated, we really have not missed a beat. We will have 
some slowdowns I am sure, and the CNO can go into some more 
detail on that. But overall I believe that the Department of 
the Navy has a great record under the leadership of Jim Geurts 
of doing the work to ensure that we have consistency to those 
yards.
    Admiral Gilday. Thank you, sir.
    Just a couple of comments to amplify some things that the 
Secretary said.
    I think that the apprenticeship programs that we have that 
are associated with each of our shipyards and local community 
colleges, whether it is Hawaii or Washington or New Hampshire 
or Virginia, have been phenomenal. Those 4-year programs that 
produce some of the best and brightest in the yards that 
hopefully we can keep around for 30 years, because it is a 
family business in many cases--it is eye-watering to meet those 
young people. Actually they are not just young people. They are 
people from all walks of life, and some of them are middle-aged 
that just have decided that they want to give more back to the 
country.
    But that program collectively produces about 1,000 workers 
a year, and over the past 3 years, we have increased the number 
of shipyard workers from about 33,000 to almost 37,000. We have 
been on the increase, and we are changing that demographic. As 
you know, there are either young people in the shipyard or 
there is older people in the shipyard, but we missed a 
generation, and so we are trying to rebuild.
    I am very optimistic about where we are headed with the 
workforce. When you visit those shipyards--and I know that you 
do--it is an uplifting experience when you meet those people, 
salt of the earth, and they love what they are doing.
    With respect to the supply chain, that remains a concern 
for us. Senator Kaine mentioned this during his opening 
remarks. With respect to opportunities that we have seen during 
COVID, the relationship that we have, the opaqueness that has 
dissolved with vendors during COVID, has been something that I 
have not seen in my career. Again, as the Secretary said, 
Assistant Secretary Geurts can speak to this in more detail. 
But we have our eye on more than a quarter of a million parts, 
and you know, it only takes one to take down a ship or an 
aircraft or a submarine. But we have our eye on those vendors 
that are struggling and other vendors that have stepped up to 
fill the gap in places. We have seen a bit of both. We have 
seen some failures that have been troubling. We have also seen 
some great innovation.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. Certainly ensuring that 
those businesses get paid as expeditiously as possible is 
really important right now. I know that that has been a focus 
of DOD, so thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Sullivan. Gentlemen, I am going to have to step out 
for a brief minute. Senator Kaine will be taking over, but I am 
sure we are going to have a number of additional questions. We 
have a number of Senators on the line as well. I am going to 
next call on Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and before you 
leave, I would like to also extend my condolences to you for 
the loss of your dad.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Senator Hirono. Mr. Secretary, you were talking a bit about 
the Arctic. This will be a yes or no question. Is it time for 
the United States to ratify or the Senate to ratify United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Mr. 
Secretary?
    Secretary Braithwaite. Senator, I think we need to do some 
more work to make sure that it is the right time, to be very 
honest with you.
    Senator Hirono. UNCLOS has been hanging around for decades, 
and I would say it is the right time, especially as I think our 
country is disadvantaged by not being part of UNCLOS especially 
as the Arctic is seeing a lot more activity, shall we say. I 
think one of the reasons that the Arctic has become navigable 
is because of global warming.
    For General Berger, I would like to offer my condolences, 
General, for the eight marines and one sailor who tragically 
perished in an amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) accident at the 
end of July. I realize that the investigation is occurring. Can 
you tell me when the investigation into this accident will be 
completed?
    General Berger. The initial portion of the investigation is 
done, ma'am. I think probably within 30 days the endorsement 
chain will be complete.
    Senator Hirono. Since the initial phase has been done, can 
you tell us what led to this accident very briefly?
    General Berger. I cannot, ma'am, because I have not seen 
the investigation. As long as it remains in the endorsement 
chain, in respect of the due process, I do not poke into that.
    As you are well aware, ma'am, we took initial measures 
within the first 30 days, but as far as the final 
recommendations, the final opinions and recommendations, I have 
not seen them yet.
    Senator Hirono. I know the vehicle that was involved in the 
accident is to be replaced by the amphibious combat vehicle 
(ACV). We probably would need to get some kind of an update on 
how all of that is going.
    Mr. Secretary, I do not want to get into a long discussion 
with you, but it came as news to me that I thought I heard you 
say that you are taking some ships from the 7th Fleet based in 
Japan to be located in the Indian Ocean. Is that what you said? 
This is a proposal or is it already being implemented?
    Secretary Braithwaite. No, Senator. That is not what I 
said.
    We are going to re-commission the 1st Fleet, which like the 
7th Fleet would operate in the greater Pacific region under the 
command and control of the United States Pacific Fleet 
headquartered in Hawaii. It would not necessarily take ships 
from the 7th Fleet or from the 3rd Fleet. It would be a 
sharing. That is how our numbered fleets operate predicated on 
the demand and the threat that emanates in the part of the 
ocean in which those respective fleets operate.
    The 1st Fleet would be expeditionary. We are still 
determining from where that fleet would operate from. But its 
major focus would be on the Western Pacific and the Eastern 
Indian Ocean.
    Senator Hirono. Mr. Secretary, is this the proposal or has 
the decision already been made to do this?
    Secretary Braithwaite. The decision has been made, yes, 
under my Title----
    Senator Hirono. Did I hear you say that this was in 
consultation with INDOPACOM people?
    Secretary Braithwaite. It is in consultation with INDOPACOM 
through the Chairman's office and the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you.
    Now, you were asked some questions about the importance of 
the continuation of the modernization program at the shipyards, 
and so I just want to reiterate my support of the importance of 
going ahead with those plans even though I know with COVID we 
have had delays, et cetera because of manpower issues relating 
to COVID.
    Let me turn to you once again. You visited Palau which was 
I think--I think that was very important. You were the first, I 
believe, Secretary of the Navy to visit Palau in October. You 
emphasized the importance of United States military presence in 
the Indo-Pacific as, of course, China continues its 
destabilizing activities in the area. So the recent activation 
of the Marine Corps? Camp Blaz in Guam is also an important 
part of the military's force laydown in this region.
    I wanted to ask you, can you provide some insight into how 
the U.S. and Palau can build on our partnership with Palau 
through joint use facilities in the Pacific? Because I believe 
the new President of Palau has written to us saying that he 
would welcome that kind of effort.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the 
question.
    I had never been to Palau before.
    Senator Hirono. Oh, I am sorry.
    Secretary Braithwaite. No, no. I went as Secretary of the 
Navy. It is a beautiful country. I had never been there before. 
I was a Navy pilot and I flew extensively throughout the 
Western Pacific, but I had never been to the beautiful islands 
of Palau, and what a gorgeous country it is.
    The thing that struck me--I went in the wake of Secretary 
Esper. He and I had discussed the opportunity to not only 
reassure those who are partners and allies like Palau, who is 
on the cutting edge, the tip of the spear of Chinese aggression 
in that part of the world----
    Senator Hirono. Yes.
    Mr. Braithwaite.--that we are with them.
    I personally went with members of my team to look at the 
infrastructure there to see how we could support U.S. naval 
vessels operating periodically from there.
    During my trip, I also visited Guam, Senator, and the same 
reasons to see how we could ensure a more forward presence of 
naval forces and enhance our presence there.
    That process is ongoing. Palau continues, as you have said, 
to be receptive to receiving more U.S. naval vessels. While I 
was there, we had some operating in the region. I was able to 
interact with them, and the support that they received was 
again indicative of Pacific island nations.
    Also, as I think through the uniqueness of Palau, they are 
COVID-free, Senator, and one of the things that we are dealing 
with now is our sailors, our marines have been deployed on 
ships without any port visits. You know, it was kind of one of 
those additional bonuses of my trip by Palau where we have 
forces operating at sea who are COVID-free. It would be almost 
bubble to bubble to be able to see our ships go into Palau.
    All of those things indicate that Palau is a nation that we 
need to continue to support and recognize their partnerships, 
their friendships with us and how we can enhance that.
    Senator Hirono. Yes. I hope that we can do more with all of 
our compact nations. That would include Palau, the Marshall 
Islands, and the Commonwealth of Micronesia.
    So yes? Is my time being called?
    Senator Kaine [presiding]. I need to move to Senator 
Duckworth, Senator.
    Senator Hirono. Okay. Thank you so much.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. I will submit other questions for the 
record.
    Senator Kaine. Senator Duckworth I believe is with us via 
Webex.
    Senator Duckworth. Yes. Thank you so much, Senator Kaine.
    I want to open by acknowledging the Department of the 
Navy's leadership in removing the Confederate flag from Navy 
and Marine Corps installations. Commandant Berger, you 
specifically led the way for other military services in a move 
that I felt displayed great concern for all of your marines and 
sailors and great personal moral courage. Your expectation that 
the marines and sailors assist you in rooting out symbols that 
cause division in the ranks sets a clear standard of 
leadership, and this is a readiness issue and I think you have 
made that very clear.
    Additionally, your recognition that the Confederate arm's 
battle flag can cause feelings of--and I quote--pain and 
rejection clearly states a truth that other senior leaders have 
failed to acknowledge for so long. The Confederate flag was 
carried by those who took up arms against the United States to 
keep black Americans in chains. It is imperative that all of 
our servicemembers feel welcomed and valued. Banning displays 
of the Confederate flag shows respect for black servicemembers 
who already face well documented barriers to service in the 
military and inclusion in the ranks.
    Commandant, your actions represent one of the many 
important steps that our armed services can take to improve the 
inclusion of all servicemembers, as well as discipline and unit 
cohesion. I applaud your leadership.
    I also applaud you, Admiral Gilday, for your subsequent 
call for a Navy order banning the display of the Confederate 
flag from public spaces aboard Navy installations.
    Now that we get into my question, I actually want to focus 
on a region that is personally important to me, Southeast Asia 
in particular. The National Defense Strategy, the NDS, focuses 
significant attention on countering the rise of China and our 
own readiness to operate in this large, geographically diverse, 
distributed and maritime region is absolutely key to executing 
the vision that is laid out in the NDS.
    General Berger, I was pleased to see your acknowledgement 
in your written statement that our operational logistics 
system, both ground and aviation, is insufficient to meet the 
challenges posed by peer and near-peer conflict especially in 
the Indo-Pacific. I am very concerned about our ability to 
sustain our troops while they execute the vision of warfighting 
that is laid out in the NDS, but the logistics function of 
warfighting receives far less attention than fires and 
maneuver. Your admission that the Marine Corps has work to do 
when it comes to logistics gives me greater confidence that you 
are thinking realistically about this problem set.
    I think that your recognition of readiness, particularly in 
the Indo-Pacific, implies more than simply maintaining legacy 
equipment is a really important one. Our services plan to 
operate in smaller and more distributed formation across a 
large and geopolitically complex region, perhaps with limited 
COMs, it is clear that the military services will have to 
rethink the way they sustain warfighters in theater.
    General Berger, from your perspective what are the biggest 
challenges to reforming the Marine Corps' current operational 
logistics [inaudible] to meet the needs of distributed 
[inaudible]? Sorry for the long [inaudible].
    General Berger. I think I understand the question, Senator.
    We have a big challenge because of two factors I think. One 
is the distances, which you highlighted. The second is that we 
have enjoyed a protected back side in terms of our logistics 
chains for 70 years. We have not been challenged. We are now. 
We have to assume that any adversary is going to contest our 
logistics supply chains.
    In terms of what do we have to do about it, I will offer 
just two or three thoughts.
    First of all, we got to be able to distribute laterally at 
the tactical to operational level, sustainment, supplies, 
equipment, people in a way we have not been challenged to do in 
the past, and we got to do it, again, in a contested 
environment. By contested, I mean in a region where an 
adversary can see us and can interdict you. We have to have 
everything from the surface craft to the aircraft and probably 
in the future I would suspect a fair portion of that would be 
in unmanned. We have to have better distribution mechanisms 
than we have right now.
    From the operational to strategic, we have enjoyed a secure 
line all the way back to the continental United States (CONUS), 
as you pointed out for years. It has not been challenged. That 
is now becoming a problem. From the strategic to the 
operational, we got to push the supplies forward, and then 
operationally at the tactical laterally, we are going to need 
different means to move supplies and equipment and people 
laterally within the second or first island chain or within 
Europe or within U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
    Senator Duckworth. Well, thank you.
    Are there policies or programs that my colleagues and I 
should be considering at our level to address these challenges 
and better adapt to an environment and style of warfighting 
that is very different from what we have seen in Afghanistan 
and Iraq? So what can we do here at our level here in the 
Senate in terms of particular programs that will help you 
basically bring your readiness level in those logistical 
networks, especially when you are talking about doing it 
horizontally in a contested environment? What can we do to 
support you? Are there particular programs that you would 
emphasize?
    General Berger. There are, ma'am. I think the combination 
of oversight and resourcing for our unmanned surface and aerial 
systems is probably the biggest area. I am sure there are 
others. But you asked me here, I would say that one comes to 
mind. We have to move very quickly to develop and field the 
unmanned surface vessels and unmanned aerial systems that will 
move those supplies because we will never get there if we rely 
only on manned systems.
    We have a lot of learning to do there. We have a lot of 
experimentation to do there. But if there is one area I would 
ask for support there, that would be it.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday. As the CNO, can I add----
    Senator Kaine. Admiral Gilday, do you want to weigh in? 
Admiral Gilday, you can weigh in and then I will move to 
Senator Jones, if that is okay, Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Yes. My next question was actually going 
to be to ask Admiral Gilday for his input. Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday. Thank you, ma'am. I appreciate the 
opportunity to amplify on what General Berger so eloquently 
spoke to.
    We have a legislative proposal right now in consideration 
by--in conference with the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) that would allow the Navy to buy used sealift vessels 
instead of investing in new sealift vessels to increase the 
number of used vessels that we can buy. As you know, that is a 
growing capability gap for us, as you highlighted, and we need 
to close it quickly. We can do so at a tenth of the cost by--we 
have already done the market analysis. We know which ships we 
would go after at a tenth of the cost of buying new. For $30 
million instead of $300 million with a minor upgrade in a U.S. 
shipyard, we will have the sealift that we need to move ground 
forces where they need to be in order to bring effects to bear.
    The other thing I would mention is the Future Naval Force 
Study Assessment that was completed recently and will be 
briefed to staff up here on the Hill tomorrow. One of the big 
takeaways I think are logistics vessels, and the numbers 
increase significantly with respect to the requirement. I think 
it is noteworthy and something that we at the Department need 
to put a higher priority on with respect to procurement.
    Thank you, ma'am.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. [Inaudible] we do not have 
enough hulls in the water nor heavy lift capabilities, and that 
is it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Kaine. Senator Jones?
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me first--I want to echo Senator Duckworth's comments 
about the removal of the Confederate battle flag and those 
symbols. In my career, I have seen, especially coming from a 
State like Alabama, words matter. Symbols matter. They can have 
deadly consequences on occasion, so I appreciate your efforts 
without an act of Congress to remove those symbols.
    I want to talk just a moment about readiness in a different 
way, not from adversaries attacking or whatever, but from 
security on our own installations here in the United States on 
our soil. One year ago this coming Sunday, there was a shooter, 
a terrorist attack at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, 
Florida. I met a few months ago with Ben Watson and his son 
Adam to talk about their terrorist attack.
    Ben's son, Ensign Kaleb Watson, was the officer on deck 
that morning and was one of the first people the shooter 
encountered. Though he had been a captain of the rifle team at 
the Naval Academy, per installation rules Kaleb did not have a 
weapon that day. He and two other young men, Airman Mo Haitham 
from Florida and Airman Apprentice Cameron Walters of Georgia, 
died that day. Ben and his wife Sheila wanted to be here today 
but were unable to because of COVID restrictions, but they are 
watching in Alabama. I believe and Kaleb's family believes that 
things could have been different that day in December of 2019. 
Things should have been different.
    Secretary Braithwaite, you and I have talked about this 
some. For one thing, the law enforcement officer who drove 
Kaleb to the hospital with his injuries got lost on the base. 
That just should not happen.
    Now, my office has been asking the Navy since April 6th 
about its investigation report. We finally got that last week, 
a week and a half ago, a redacted version. And one of the 
things that was clear, even before the report came out, is this 
has happened too many times on our military installations. Too 
many American troops have lost their lives to shooters on U.S. 
military bases on U.S. soil. As someone in the Senate like 
Senator Kaine and others who send folks to the academies and 
they are going to be on these bases, as someone who encourages 
our young men and women to join the armed forces to serve their 
country, that is disturbing that we are putting them in harm's 
way at a place where they should be most secure.
    There have been investigation reports about all of those 
instances and shootings, and there have been recommendations. 
What we see from the Pensacola report is that many of those are 
just not being followed, especially with regard to planning, 
training, and assessment of response plans for situations just 
like this. I for one believe that is inexcusable.
    Ben and Sheila Watson are watching today from Alabama, and 
they have made it their mission to do everything they can to 
prevent losing more of our sons and daughters. I tried to help 
in my time here on the Armed Services Committee.
    I asked for the Committee to include in the Senate version 
of the NDAA language that would require the Secretary of 
Defense to implement within 90 days of all applicable 
security--emergency response recommendations to protect 
military installations and language requiring the Secretary of 
Defense to ensure that each installation conducts or develops a 
plan to conduct live emergency response training with first 
responders. I very much hope that those requirements make it 
into the final bill that we are going to see shortly.
    I am going to ask each of you today--and this is just brief 
answers because I have got a couple more I would like to ask--
can you tell me that it is currently a priority--currently a 
priority--to make absolutely certain that on every Navy and 
Marine Corps installation, that all applicable security 
recommendations and regulations have or will be implemented and 
followed? If that is not a priority, would you commit to making 
one? Secretary Braithwaite?
    Secretary Braithwaite. Senator, first and foremost, Kaleb 
is a hero. I was in Pensacola 2 weeks ago with the leadership 
there, and I was in the very place where Kaleb was shot. I 
cannot imagine the anguish that his family, being a father 
myself, must feel.
    In 31 years in uniform of our country as a naval officer, 
every time I went aboard a base, I always felt safer because I 
presented my identification card. Although there is no easy 
answer to this, we are committed to ensuring that we get to the 
root problem of all of these. In some instances, it is because 
people do have guns on our installations. In other instances, 
it is because people do not have weapons on our installations.
    We are working diligently to figure out the right approach 
to this so a hero like Kaleb Watson never loses his life.
    Senator Jones. I will come back to the other two real 
quick, but I want to follow up on the comment about the 
weapons.
    One of the recommendations is that there be a uniform 
policy with regard to weapons on there. Is that something that 
you intend to try to follow to develop a uniform policy of 
weapons on base?
    Secretary Braithwaite. Well, the uniform policy--I mean, we 
are one Department of the Navy, and it should be uniform. But 
remember, the shooting in Pearl Harbor was just the opposite. 
It is because the individual who was on duty had a weapon and 
used that weapon to attack others with it. Again, there is not 
an easy answer to say one or the other.
    What we are committed to is ensuring that those people who 
are armed are appropriately trained, that there is the cross-
integration both on base and off base so what happened in 
Escambia County does not happen again on any other base. That 
is what we are committed to do.
    Senator Jones. Mr. Chairman, if you could bear with me, I 
would like to just get a quick answer from Admiral Gilday and 
General Berger on the question about a commitment to the 
security of those installations and following those 
recommendations. Admiral?
    Senator Sullivan [presiding]. Sure.
    Admiral Gilday. First of all, Senator, I completely agree 
with you that the incident was inexcusable.
    Secondly, taking a deeper look at this, besides as you 
mentioned the memorandums of understanding (MOUs) that we are 
looking at and the training that we are doing with first 
responders at all our installations now that we had not been 
doing to the degree we should have been doing is underway 
regardless of whether any legislation comes out.
    The third thing is I commit to you, sir, that this is a 
priority for the Navy.
    Senator Jones. Thank you.
    General Berger?
    General Berger. Senator, I can affirm the same. It is a 
priority right now. It will remain a priority.
    Senator Jones. Thank you all.
    Mr. Chairman, let me say, first of all, it has been an 
honor serving on this Committee for the last 2 years with both 
of you and all the other Members of this Subcommittee, as well 
as the general committee. I will miss it, but I know the work 
is in good hands.
    Mr. Chairman, let me say to you specifically, let me also 
offer my condolences. I lost my dad about 11 months ago. He was 
also a Navy guy, so I feel the pain and I feel the loss, and it 
can never be replaced.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Jones. Thanks for your 
kind words.
    Thanks for your great service on this Committee. You know, 
I think the witnesses know there are certain Senators who dig 
into these issues, really care. The issues of civilian 
oversight for our military are critical, and you certainly have 
been one of those and we appreciate your service. We know that 
you have a lot left in terms of giving to your country and your 
State. Thanks very much for your great service on this 
Committee.
    Gentlemen, I would like to continue with a second round of 
questioning. General Berger, I would like to dive in a little 
bit more with regard to the Force Design 2030 plans that you 
have put forward that I highlighted in my opening remarks. To 
be respectful and also to give you an opportunity, as you 
know--and I think this happens anytime someone is trying to 
break glass in terms of a broad-based strategy that recognizes 
challenges that are new and very significant. I happen to agree 
wholeheartedly with the National Defense Strategy and the 
National Security Strategy of this administration. I think one 
of the unwritten stories in the media is how bipartisan the 
support is for that strategy. But then the services now have to 
start implementing it, and I think that is always a difficult 
challenge.
    I think the Marine Corps, under your leadership, has really 
taken that to heart, and I happen to appreciate it. But it is 
not, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, without its critics. 
I am going to read just a couple lines from a detailed piece in 
``the National Interest'' from former Secretary of the Navy Jim 
Webb, who has a lot of respect in the Marine Corps, of course, 
as a combat veteran from Vietnam. But he says a couple things 
in his piece. Quote: After the centuries it took to establish 
the Marine Corps as a fully separate military service, this new 
strategy could reduce its present role by making it again 
subordinate to the funding and operational requirements of the 
U.S. Navy. That is one criticism.
    Another, he talks about the plan to dramatically alter the 
entire force structure of the Corps to focus on China, ignores 
the unpredictability of war. He also says there is no greater 
danger in military strategy than shaping a nation's force 
structure to respond to one specific set of contingencies, 
giving an adversary the ability to adjust and adapt beforehand.
    Do you want to comment on those comments? I know there are 
some other former commandants who have also been critical, and 
I want to offer this as an opportunity for you to make the case 
of what you are trying to do with the 2030 Force Design.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Mr. Chairman, if I may----
    Senator Sullivan. Sure, Mr. Secretary. As the Secretary of 
the Navy, you certainly--both of you--I would welcome really 
all three of you. Former Secretary Webb obviously incorporates 
the Navy in general. So I would welcome--actually it is a good 
point, Mr. Secretary--all three of you to respond.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to 
say first and foremost, Secretary Webb is an incredible patriot 
and a great American.
    Senator Sullivan. He is, no doubt.
    Mr. Braithwaite.--and an individual I hold in extremely 
high regard.
    Senator Sullivan. He is a former Member of this Committee.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Yes, sir, and an incredible 
accomplished marine, a graduate from the U.S. Naval Academy 
where I was fortunate to follow in his wake, and a gentleman 
who I consider a friend and somebody that I have had 
discussions with.
    But I would say that General Berger is a visionary, and I 
could not say this during my confirmation hearing because I was 
told to throttle back a little bit. But I generally do not 
throttle back, Senator. I lean in pretty heavy when I know and 
believe in my heart and in my head something is right. Dave 
Berger is the visionary that the Department of the Navy needs 
today. It is his vision and his humble leadership of going up 
against all of the challenges that he has now encountered to 
see something come to fruition that is long overdue.
    The world has changed in the last 20, 40, 60 years, but 
what has been proven is the concept that a combined Navy/Marine 
Corps team, not one subordinate to the other. The Marine Corps 
and the Navy in the Commandant's vision are one equal paired 
together. His vision gives a combatant commander another tool 
in the toolbox in order to fight the fight if you have to do 
that, that takes the Marine Corps from being land-centric to 
being a capable amphibious force again. His vision is 
predicated on those of Commandant Russell and Commandant Fuller 
who, through the fleet marine force concepts of the 1930s, 
created the success of the amphibious marine oriented combat 
capabilities, coupled with the United States Navy, and being 
able to take the fight to the Japanese and win World War II.
    So I wanted to be on record to say as the Secretary of the 
Navy, I am proud to be with our Commandant whose vision is the 
one that we need for the challenges that we see emerging in 
great power competition.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Senator Kaine, if you are okay with it, I am going to go a 
little long for General Berger and Admiral Gilday to be able to 
respond and add to what the Secretary said.
    You know the criticisms, General. If you can take this 
opportunity to address what former Secretary Webb and others 
have been saying and how you, Admiral, view this new force 
design for the Marine Corps.
    General Berger. Chairman, I think the feedback--my view--
the feedback from Secretary Webb and others is helpful. This is 
elevating the discussion. This is an ongoing debate that will 
continue for years. So it is not hurtful. It is actually 
helpful.
    I met with Secretary Webb, as I have with the others who 
want to provide feedback. I met with him in Arlington, and we 
talked for probably 2 hours. I did not know him that well, but 
it was a great discussion. I know him now, did not know him 
that well before.
    We talked in three broad areas. First of all, does the 
Marine Corps need to change? Second, if it does, does it need 
to change now? The third part was the changes that we are 
considering right now, the direction we are headed--are those 
the right changes? So in basic order kind of marine-like, we 
broke it down into three categories.
    I did not see any daylight between us on do we need to 
change. To the point you made earlier, we have to change.
    Now, do we need to change now or can we wait to change in a 
year or 2 when things are a bit clearer? This is as much a 
judgment call as anything, but my assessment is we cannot wait. 
We have adversaries that are moving quickly. If we wait a year 
or 2 for a clear, 90 percent picture, we will not catch up. In 
my opinion, we cannot wait.
    So then it came down to the changes themselves, which you 
highlighted. Here there are going to be differences of opinion. 
But what I emphasized to him is this is just--where we are 
right now is on the front end not the back end. We have a lot 
of experimentation, a lot of learning to do. We cannot wait to 
move out.
    We had a great, healthy discussion, and I take all the 
input from everybody else not in a negative sense but in a 
positive sense. It elevates the discussion. But in my 
assessment, my professional opinion, we have to change. We have 
to move out now, and we have to preserve enough to learn in the 
future over the coming years to make sure we get it right.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you. General.
    Admiral, would you care to comment?
    Admiral Gilday. Thank you, Senator.
    I go back to what I said in my opening statement, sea 
control and power projection, and so Nimitz said it was 
timeless. President Kennedy said it is timeless. If you look at 
the missions of the NDS today, they require those functions 
from the Navy and Marine Corps team.
    What General Berger is doing is giving us another, as the 
Secretary said, tool in the toolkit so what changes today is 
not only what we fight with but how we are going to fight. We 
have to look at that fight in every domain from the seabed to 
space. The Marine Corps brings a terrestrial capability to the 
problem of sea control, a function that we still value.
    If the nation believes that we need a United States Navy 
and a United States Marine Corps forward so that the fight 
stays forward and not in this country, then that is an 
investment that you want to double down on because what General 
Berger is bringing is an asymmetric advantage to that 
particular function, something that the enemy is going to be--
it is going to be difficult to find, difficult to pin down, and 
difficult to take on. It gives us many more options. It 
presents more options, as the Secretary said, to a combatant 
commander to confuse an enemy and to come at him with multiple 
vectors, with multiple tools in the toolkit.
    So it goes without saying, Senator, I am a huge supporter. 
I think we are headed in the right direction. That is not to 
say that there still will not be friction within the Department 
of the Navy in terms of where we put our next dollar with 
respect to capabilities, and you will be asking the same 
question on whether a capability for the Marine Corps with 
respect to sea control is worth it or whether you get more 
flexibility, more maneuverability, better effects through 
another investment. I think we have to be open-minded about 
that, and I think we have to look at, at the end of day, the 
capability gaps you have to close in order to give you sea 
control.
    Senator Sullivan. Great, and your point, General, I think 
is a really good one, that all of this, whether it is from 
former Secretary Webb, former Senator Webb as well, and former 
commandants, it does elevate the discussion. I think the 
discussion also needs to be here which is why I have 
highlighted it in terms of the Armed Services Committee's 
civilian oversight responsibilities, and I think it is going to 
continue. I appreciate--this really is kind of the beginning of 
an important discussion at the highest levels of our government 
because it is a really important undertaking that the Navy and 
Marine Corps are advancing right now as part of our National 
Defense Strategy, and I commend all three of you for the 
seriousness with which you have undertaken this at this moment.
    Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am glad you took 
extra time on this question because I think it is a very, very 
important one.
    General Berger, I want to echo comments made by Senators 
Duckworth and Jones about your courage in taking the stance you 
took last spring with respect to display of the Confederate 
battle flag on Marine installations. Because you have such 
family ties to Virginia, this was not a decision taken by an 
outsider or imposed by somebody who does not deeply understand 
the dimensions of this issue. Frankly, your ties to Virginia I 
think are such that the decision that you made and the way you 
articulated it maximized the acceptability of it within your 
ranks, and so I want to echo those comments.
    Your willingness to take courageous stands when you need to 
bears upon this last question as well. Change is needed. Should 
change happen now or can we wait on it? I think the answers to 
those first two questions--I think you have answered them 
correctly. Exactly the dimensions of all the change that is 
needed, that is a profitable area for a lot of discussion now 
and in the future. But your willingness to take big steps 
forward is one of the reasons that you are in the position that 
you are in and that we have confidence in your leadership.
    A few questions. The Navy has developed a shipyard 
infrastructure optimization plan, and that was to deal with 
this lack of capacity at shipyards. The original plan was 
estimated as a $21 billion investment over 20 years. The GAO 
suggests that is likely an underestimate because a number of 
costs were probably not included in the original estimate.
    I guess, Admiral Gilday, what I would like to ask you, is 
the SIOP still on track with respect to both time and funding? 
If so, why are we not seeing it in budgetary requests to 
Congress?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would argue that we are. I mean, as 
I talked about the investments in nine MILCON projects underway 
right now, $3.5 billion in MILCON at the four shipyards 
themselves invested over the FYDP, typically we are spending a 
billion a year on MILCON. I think relatively speaking we are, 
sir, making it a high priority.
    We understand the importance of it. These dry docks on 
average, as you know, are over 100 years old, and we have 
neglected them for too long. This is a strategic decision by 
the Department to make this a priority and put the money where 
we need to or we cannot sustain the fleet of the future. As you 
know, we are challenged to sustain the fleet that we have now.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Admiral.
    Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 2020 NDAA required the 
Department to submit military installation resilience plans to 
help our bases prepare for extreme weather events, whether it 
is sea level rise in Hampton Roads or whether it is drought or 
wildfire conditions in other parts of the country. In the wake 
of destruction observed over the last several years at Camp 
Lejeune, China Lake, and elsewhere, has the Department 
completed any military installation resilience plans, and when 
can we on the Committee expect to see them?
    Secretary Braithwaite. Senator, thank you for that 
question. You and I spoke about this in detail both during my 
confirmation hearing and in meetings between now and then.
    Our Department has looked into this. I mean, the 
devastating destruction of Hurricane Florence on Camp Lejeune 
or the earthquake at Naval Air Station China Lake--you all have 
been wonderful to help offset our losses there so that we can 
rebuild some of those structures. As you know, Senator, a lot 
of those structures on our military bases are old. They are 
antiquated. They were built before there were codes in place to 
ensure that our buildings could withstand a hurricane of a 
certain severity or an earthquake.
    We are in the process of developing the plans. Our 
installations are working on those. I do not know if the CNO 
has any specific thoughts on this or the Commandant, but it is 
important to us as we look forward because we cannot be a ready 
force unless we ensure that we are operating from bases that 
are resilient and those homes on those bases where our 
dependents live, which of course have a personal impact on our 
readiness, have the ability to sustain damage as well.
    Senator Kaine. Can I ask either Admiral Gilday or General 
Berger? Do you know when any of these plans are likely to be 
done so that we can review them on the Committee?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I do not. I am not satisfied right 
now, where we are, the pace that we are acting on these plans. 
There are discrete projects that we have ongoing, one down in 
Norfolk Naval Shipyard right now in terms of dealing with the 
rising water tables in the vicinity of the dry docks as an 
example, others at the Naval Academy where we are seeing rising 
water levels. So we are reactive and not proactive.
    I owe you a better answer for the Navy, and I owe the 
Secretary a better answer as well in terms of when we can 
present those plans to both him and you.
    Senator Kaine. General Berger?
    General Berger. Sir, some of them are complete, not all, 
and we prioritized the ones that we had to do first, which is 
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, where we had to rebuild. So every 
contract in the last 18 months that you all have resourced to 
rebuild Camp Lejeune is to the new regulations for resiliency. 
They are prioritized. We will provide you the detailed 
breakdown, sir.
    Senator Kaine. That would be helpful. I think this is a 
serious matter for the Committee because the resilience plans 
will enable us not just to exercise oversight on are you trying 
to be resilient, but it will help us prioritize investments. We 
would hate to rebuild something in a way that is substandard 
and does not really meet the conditions that are likely to be 
there in 10 or 20 years. Rebuilding one off or being reactive 
one off to dangers or emergencies is not the same as having a 
forward-looking plan that is likely to involve a more efficient 
use of the dollars that are so competitively sought. I would 
like follow-up on that from both the Navy and the Marines.
    [Please see Appendix A on page 70]
    Here is the last question I would like to ask. I am over, 
Mr. Chair, but with an indulgence, and I would like each of you 
to address it. It is sort of like a lessons learned during 
COVID question.
    COVID and the pandemic has been horrible. The death toll, 
the economic effect--it has been horrible. Nevertheless, even 
in a horrible time you learn some lessons. Americans are doing 
much more telehealth than they did before, and that has 
actually had some significant benefits for people who might 
have a hard time accessing health care institutions because 
they live so far away. We have been able to do some Committee 
work virtually. So there have been some lessons learned that we 
would not want to just snap back to the status quo ante when 
this public health emergency is over.
    In each of your spaces, I would love you to talk about 
maybe some lessons learned since the beginning of March as we 
have dealt with COVID that you think could be--that could lead 
to sort of continuous improvement or changes you have had to 
make that you will not want to undo when we are over this 
public health emergency. If you could each address that 
question, that is the last question that I have.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Senator, thank you. I will answer 
the question first because I will tell you that I believe the 
Department of the Navy, both the Marine Corps and the United 
States Navy, have done an incredible job.
    You know, this caught the Department off guard, as it did 
the entire world, The Navy, in particular, struggled through 
some of the early weeks of this because the close proximity in 
which our sailors live aboard ship made this a real threat to 
our ability to operate at sea. That was even more important 
aboard--or more challenging aboard our submarines.
    Admiral Gilday has done an incredible job to lead the 
effort to not only identify ways to mitigate the risk but to 
keep our ships operating. We have over 100 ships today that are 
at sea deployed, and there are cases of COVID aboard some of 
those ships. But he and the leadership of the Navy have done an 
incredible job. It is an amazing story of resiliency to be able 
to address the issue, to isolate the issue through contact 
tracing, through all of the protocols that the CDC and the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) have put out through social 
distancing, masks. When I go aboard a ship, everybody is masked 
up. I will let the CNO talk to more of the details. But we are 
today a better force prepared for nuclear, biological, chemical 
warfare in the future because of the lessons we have learned 
from this pandemic.
    As you and I talked about, you know, carbon footprints and 
the ability to have our workforce telework, that is another 
great--we have finally busted through the fact, as a former 
military guy, you got to form up in front of the flagpole every 
morning to get credit for actually being on the job. I think we 
have thought beyond that now to a point where we are more 
realistic in the fact that we can do work from afar, we can be 
productive.
    But I would invite the CNO who, believe me, is an 
incredible leader who has done an incredible job on this. I am 
very proud to be his wingman.
    Admiral Gilday. Thanks, sir.
    Sir, a couple things. One of the things that strikes me the 
most aboard ship right now is just the change in behaviors. It 
is almost like cultural change onboard ships because, as the 
Secretary said, you are operating in such close quarters, and 
your success or failure comes down to individual 
responsibility. That means that every sailor now understands 
that as a leader at whatever level they are at on a ship, that 
they have a responsibility to their shipmates that is tangible. 
They also have a responsibility to hold other people 
accountable if they are not following the protocols and the 
standards that they should be. So with respect to the culture 
of excellence that we want to have in the Navy and the kind of 
leadership that we want people to exhibit, I think that has 
been a positive.
    There have been a lot of second order effects to 
telecommuting. So excess capacity with respect to leased spaces 
where we can recoup over $100 million a year in spaces that we 
just do not need. So another byproduct has been a realization 
of--I think a better realization of what is core and what is 
non-core in terms of what we really need to be focused on and 
working on and how we use that teleworking force.
    Another is an acceleration of information technology (IT) 
capabilities. I do not want to say the specific company, but 
capabilities that would have taken us--you can imagine--years 
to field that have been accelerated by the Secretary of Defense 
to weeks and months that have put us in a much better place.
    I will also mention real briefly training at sea. Because 
now we operate in COVID bubbles, we have said, well, gee, why 
are we just in kind of a single production line with ships to 
get ships trained and qualified. Why can I not do that with six 
ships at once, get a lot more out of the trainers, become a lot 
more efficient, and actually increase the numbers of ships that 
I am generating for the Secretary to present to the Secretary 
of Defense to use out there at sea? I think overall it has 
caused everybody to think a little bit more innovatively and to 
be a little bit more efficient in terms of how they think about 
using their time.
    Senator Kaine. General Berger?
    General Berger. Sir, I will be pretty short.
    This is a virus, not the first virus that your military has 
operated in. The pandemic is once every 100 years, but this is 
not an operating environment that is new. You would expect us, 
in other words, not to take a knee but to operate through it, 
and that is what has happened.
    A couple of things to highlight. You asked for lessons 
learned. There is not an exercise or training event that we do 
in the military we do not take away nine days to Sunday 
afterwards. We do after-action reports like nobody else, and we 
have a long list. I will just mention one or two.
    Recruit training. We had to continue recruit training, but 
we cannot be taken to our knees. What we learned that we were 
going to continue, to your question, Senator, is spread out the 
racks in the squad base, put washstands outside the chow hall, 
take specific measures that we are going to keep in place 
afterwards because normally, typically every officer candidate 
class, every recruit training class gets some kind of crud in 
the first 2 weeks and it shuts them down. We have not had that 
problem. Why? Because we are basically quarantining them for 2 
weeks before the first day of training. Why would we not 
consider continuing that later on so that when training starts, 
everybody can train instead of half the squad being sick? To 
your point, some of these measures we need to keep in place 
afterwards.
    I will just finish with I would echo the same as Admiral 
Gilday. This Committee, this Subcommittee would be very proud 
of the small unit leaders. This is where discipline matters. We 
have not had large outbreaks because we are a disciplined 
force. We follow orders. We very much trust our leaders, and 
they have not let us down.
    Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, I am so glad I asked that 
question.
    Senator Sullivan. Yes, a great question.
    Senator Kaine. That is really important.
    One of the first visits that I did when we were in our kind 
of initial months of COVID and when we were home during April 
and the Senate was closed was I went to the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital in Richmond, the McGuire VA, 
which is dealing with a lot of these issues. It did not really 
strike me until I walked into that massive facility that there 
was not a single thing that they did that they did not have to 
rethink. I mean, touching an elevator button, the arrangement 
of tables in the cafeteria, how do you check in if you are a 
patient coming in. Every last thing that is done in that 
facility, which is tens of thousands of square feet--it is 
massive--they have had to rethink, and onboard a ship or a sub, 
close quarters, people working in such close proximity to each 
other, that is even magnified.
    But I just think it is really important for us in this 
Committee and across the board that we do the lessons learned. 
It would be foolish if we went back to the status quo ante. One 
of the things we did, for example, is we used to, as a Federal 
Government, reimburse telehealth visits at a lower 
reimbursement rate than office visits. We made an emergency 
change to allow an equalization of reimbursement rates for such 
visits, and that has dramatically advanced telehealth. It would 
be foolish to go back to the status quo ante when this is done 
because then we would sacrifice all that learning and slide 
back to a second best.
    There is going to be a lot of need for us to look at the 
changes that have been forced upon us and say, hey, this needs 
to be the going-forward norm. There are some things we will be 
glad to let go, but there is also, as you point out, General 
Berger, why would you not have a 14-day quarantine period now 
forever to avoid just the common kinds of infectious viruses or 
whatever that can take down a recruiting class early in their 
time in. So we are going to really need to do this, and you 
guys have offered some great examples that can, I think, 
inspire that work. So I really appreciate it. Thank you.
    Senator Sullivan. Yes, a great question and great answers.
    General Berger, I mentioned I did see I think it was a New 
York Times article or something that talked about the changes 
to Marine Corps recruit training, how it is still working, and 
in my view some of the best recruit training anywhere in the 
world. So kudos to the Marine Corps and the rest of the 
Department of the Navy for doing such great work.
    I am going to end here with just a couple additional 
questions. I appreciate the patience of the three of you 
gentlemen.
    General, I wanted just one additional question on the Force 
Design. You speak in your testimony of modernizing Marine Corps 
infantry and reconnaissance units. As an infantry and 
reconnaissance officer myself and I am a United States Marine 
Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) marine officer 
currently, I am interested in what you stated in your testimony 
that we are modernizing our infantry battalions and traditional 
reconnaissance units to create a more distributable formation 
with much greater organic lethality in accordance with units 
traditionally associated with special forces and commando 
units.
    Can you unpack that a little bit more in terms of, again, 
your Force Design and what Marine infantry and reconnaissance 
units can anticipate in MARSOC as well?
    General Berger. Senator, like you, I have the same 
background.
    Senator Sullivan. Yours is a little bit more distinguished 
actually--a hell of a lot more distinguished.
    General Berger. We have common ground.
    I believe if we are going to compete and we are going to 
deter, first of all, then much of who has an advantage is 
decided in the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance sort of 
effort that both sides in any competition are going to do. I 
think we were relying more and more and more on your forward 
expeditionary forces to paint a picture of what is happening in 
front of them because deterrence is really the foundational 
element of the strategy. To do that effectively, you have got 
to have good reconnaissance forward to understand what is 
happening in front of you to give decision-makers the space, 
the situational awareness to make good calls.
    As we reshape the Marine Corps, we will reshape our 
reconnaissance effort and our reconnaissance units and infantry 
units as well. Infantry training will be longer. The product of 
infantry training on the enlisted side will be at a higher 
level than we are producing right now. Right now, in other 
words, you complete basic training and you go through infantry 
training. You join your first unit. The rest of the way is on 
the backs of the platoon sergeant in that first platoon. We 
need to take that marine to a higher level so that the whole 
platoon, the whole battalion can get to a higher level. We need 
to get to that higher level because they are going to be more 
distributed. We are going to rely on them to make higher level 
decisions.
    As you know, sir, from your service, we ask captains to 
make decisions now that lieutenant colonels, battalion 
commanders made a decade ago. Why? Because they have the 
capabilities now. We have to get them to a higher training 
level now.
    Infantry training both on the officer and enlisted side, 
more extensive, longer. Reconnaissance forces, better 
capabilities, a deeper reach, and the ability to commit to 
communicate, to sense, and to distribute what they are sensing 
back and laterally to the rest of the force. I think you are 
going to see a lot of our investments in ground, aerial, and 
surface reconnaissance so that we can give the combatant 
commander, the fleet commander a better picture of what is in 
front of us.
    Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you for that.
    Mr. Secretary, we talked briefly on the Arctic and 
icebreakers. I wanted to dive in a little bit more.
    You know, I authored language in the NDAA a couple of years 
ago that Congress put forward the authorization to build 6 
Polar-class icebreakers between the Coast Guard and the Navy. 
As I mentioned, the President put forward a memo a couple 
months ago on how we operationalize that, what ways we look at 
that, and then importantly from my perspective, where you would 
want to home-port some of these Polar-class icebreakers that in 
my view should have much more than just icebreaking capability, 
should have intelligence capability, should have weapons 
capability, the way the Russians are certainly viewing their 
massive icebreaking fleet. I think the latest number is 56, and 
as you mentioned, we have two. One is broken, so we have a long 
way to catch up.
    But on this issue, to me it is a no-brainer that you would 
at least home-port some of these icebreakers that we are 
building in the Arctic of America.
    You and I had a great visit when you came up to Alaska. I 
really, really appreciated that. I know my fellow Alaskans 
certainly enjoyed meeting you in Ketchikan and Adak and Kodiak 
and Anchorage.
    But do you have a view on this? The President has actually 
asked his national security team. I have talked to you, the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), National Security Advisor, the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps--or I am sorry--Commandant of 
the Coast Guard. I am a little bit biased, but I think it makes 
strategic sense for America. If you are going to have 
icebreakers, you need to base them in the place where the 
action is and that is the Arctic not in Florida or other places 
where there is no ice. Do you have a view on where we should be 
basing these? I know the President has asked that in the memo.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Mr. Chairman, I always have an 
opinion. You know that.
    Senator Sullivan. Good. Love to hear it especially if it is 
the right answer.
    [Laughter.]
    Secretary Braithwaite. However, as you and I also 
discussed, the United States Coast Guard does not fall under 
the command and control of the Department of the Navy.
    Senator Sullivan. I am asking you in your personal opinion.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Of course, we could change that. You 
could change that and I would be happy to incorporate the Coast 
Guard as part of the Department of the Navy----
    Senator Sullivan. I am not committing to that right now.
    Mr. Braithwaite.--as a sister maritime service. I think 
that would be wonderful. It does not take anything away from 
Homeland Security, but I love the Coast Guard. They are 
incredible partners, and we would like to see them get all the 
resources they need.
    I have seen some of the efforts in the shipbuilding when I 
have been down to Huntington-Ingalls and building a new 
national security cutter.
    You know, as far as home-porting those ships, if they fell 
under the control of the United States Navy, of course, we 
would home-port them closer to where they would be required to 
fulfill their mission. But I am not in a position, Mr. 
Chairman, to make a determination for the Coast Guard on where 
they should put those icebreakers.
    If we are the ones who end up operating those icebreakers, 
I think as the executive order has indicated, that is something 
that we, the Department of the Navy, would come back and work 
with you, Mr. Chairman, on figuring out the best placement 
where we would have the kind of support--I know going into 
Kodiak, I was extremely impressed with the Coast Guard facility 
there, meeting with the station commander, again a phenomenal 
base with the infrastructure to support additional ships being 
home-ported there.
    Again, there are a lot of options here, but there is a lot 
of work to be done. Unfortunately, it is not an A to Z quick 
answer.
    Senator Sullivan. I am going to press you a little bit. Do 
you have a personal opinion on this issue of where you would 
home-port icebreakers----
    Secretary Braithwaite. So, Mr. Chairman----
    Senator Sullivan.--to defend America's interest in the 
Arctic?
    Secretary Braithwaite. You and I both served. You still 
serve in the uniform of our nation. For 31 years, I wore the 
cloth of the U.S. naval officer very proudly, and in my role as 
now the Secretary of the Navy, I still fall under the command 
and control of the President of the United States and I have to 
follow the lawful orders of those appointed over me. Again, as 
the Secretary of the Navy, I have personal opinions and I have 
professional requirements of how I conduct myself each and 
every day.
    In this case, the Coast Guard has the authority to operate 
those vessels, and I think they are the ones who would have to 
determine where they wanted to home-port them.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me turn to--Senator Kaine, I just 
have a couple more questions.
    Mr. Secretary, on the USS Bonhomme Richard, I guess the 
Navy made the decision just a few days ago that this is going 
to be a ship that is decommissioned. Can you just give us a 
little quick understanding of what actually happened--it is 
obviously an issue that this Committee has a lot of interest 
in--and then why you made that decision recently on the 
decommissioning and what that does to our capability both from 
a Navy and Marine Corps perspective? That is quite an important 
ship.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Absolutely, Senator. First of all, 
the investigation is ongoing, and our Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS) have done a remarkable job in 
working through all the details of something that is not 
straightforward. There was such extensive damage on that ship. 
Both the Chief of Naval Operations and I went out to visit the 
ship shortly after the incident. The amazing performance of the 
crew to save that ship--what they did is just remarkable and a 
testament to the training that they receive in damage control 
and firefighting.
    I am a businessman, Mr. Chairman, and at the end of the 
day, there is a return on investment, and the return on 
investment of what it would have taken to rebuild that ship, 
working very closely with the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Esper 
wanted to see that ship come back and for all the right reasons 
to send the right message to say, you know, we do not give up 
our ships very easily. We have a battle flag that hangs in 
Memorial Hall at the Naval Academy that says don't give up the 
ship. But using logic and looking at what it would have 
required to put that ship back together, it would have been a 
foolish investment of our American taxpayer dollars to invest 
in a ship that was over 20 years old instead of looking at the 
options of building another ship in the future that would have 
more relative capabilities embracing the technologies that are 
emerging.
    I would invite the CNO to go into some of the particulars 
of what we have determined. The ship was not to deploy until 
2022. Talking with the Commandant about how we can ensure that 
we have the right assets to come in in the deployment plan and 
to offset the loss of the ship, we are working all those now. 
But, CNO, do you have any thoughts about the Bonhomme Richard?
    Admiral Gilday. Thanks, sir. Just a couple.
    Sir, the ship is 22 years old. About 60 percent of it was 
so heavily damaged it would have to be replaced. If we try to 
rebuild the ship into a Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), return 
it to its original state, it would take 5 to 7 years. It would 
be straining the industrial base. We think there is one 
shipyard on the Gulf coast who could do that kind of work, and 
it would cost almost as much as a brand new ship.
    If we took a look at other options like repurposing it, 
could it be a command and control ship, could it be a hospital 
ship, could it be a sealift vessel, it costs us less money to 
buy one new than it would be to restore or to repurpose 
Bonhomme Richard to another function.
    For those reasons, sir, the $30 million to decommission was 
the best decision I think. The Secretary has all the 
consequential decisions come to his desk, and I supported that 
recommendation that we decommission her.
    In terms of near-term impacts operationally, we have 
mitigated those. I think longer term--let us say out to 3 to 5 
years--we are taking a look at what those other options could 
be. Do we accelerate the production of a big deck vessel? What 
would that mean with respect to the amphibious force that we 
are building for the future? You know, what are the priorities 
that we want to take a look at within the Department? What is 
the demand signal from the Secretary of Defense and the 
combatant commanders for those vessels. So that is work to be 
done that is ongoing right now, but in the near term, there 
will not be any operational impact. We have mitigated that with 
moving some other deployment schedules around.
    Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you for that answer, and we 
are going to look forward to the report when it is done, both 
if it is classified or unclassified, on what happened and some 
of the actions. I know there were a lot of sailors that 
undertook very heroic actions to save that--tried to save that 
ship.
    Let me ask another for all three of you gentlemen. As you 
know, here in the Senate we have got a number of important 
bills that we are trying to finish up prior to the end of this 
Congress, both the COVID relief bill and the NDAA and a final 
appropriations bill. Importantly, that is going to have 
military appropriations, but it is not for sure we are going to 
be able to get there. There is a lot of work that is being done 
to try to get a compromised bipartisan bill. If we do not get 
there and we have to settle for a continuing resolution, which 
is certainly not ideal--it is better than a government 
shutdown, but it is not ideal--I would like the three of you to 
weigh in on what you think the impacts of a CR would be on Navy 
and Marine Corps operations. I think sometimes it is not well 
understood that even though it is continued funding, it is 
very, very disruptive for our military operations and 
readiness, which is the whole point of the oversight of this 
Subcommittee.
    Mr. Secretary, we will start with you.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman, and 
really, thank you for this question.
    When I worked on the Hill, we rarely ever had a CR. I 
worked for Senator Arlen Specter. Passing our appropriations 
bills, our authorizing bills is extremely important especially 
to an organization like the Department of the Navy. So this 
does impact us.
    We are looking at ways now that if in fact we do have a CR, 
how we minimize the impact. But it will affect readiness. We 
asked for an anomaly, and it appears that we have received that 
to continue to build the Columbia-class, our follow-on 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), to replace the Ohio-class. 
Without that anomaly, we would not be able to replace the 
Ohios, which are 35-40 years old. On behalf of the Department, 
we would like to thank Congress very much for that relief.
    But the particulars of this--I mean, the way that we 
operate our fleet, steaming hours, flying hours, all that will 
be impacted. Pay to our sailors, to our marines--there will be 
significant impact, you know, in the hazardous and special pay 
spaces.
    I would invite the Commandant or the CNO to talk to some of 
the more specifics of what they see is the operational leads 
for their respective services.
    Senator Sullivan. Admiral?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, so as the Secretary mentioned, 
across a number of accounts, you begin to see the effects 
accumulate over time. So with a 72-day CR, it is about $1 
billion. It primarily affects our operations and maintenance 
accounts. So think steaming hours, flying hours. You want to 
keep these people, in the era of great power competition, on 
the cutting edge and the best that they can be, and you cannot 
when you are dealing with fiscal year 2020 levels of spending.
    You see that begin to manifest itself more acutely at the 
6-month point where we have decisions to make with respect to 
moving money around with the next steps with the USS Gerald R. 
Ford, an aircraft carrier that we want to get operational in 
fiscal year 2022, as fast as we can, or with the ongoing 
overhaul on George Washington, a refueling overhaul, or a new 
start overhaul on the John C. Stennis, a carrier that is 
waiting to go into maintenance. Military personnel (MILPERS). 
You begin to see the effects more acutely in those accounts as 
well where you cannot hire the people you want to hire in 
numbers to get to where you want to be at the end of the fiscal 
year.
    A 12-month CR--the impact of that is in the order of about 
$18 billion for the United States Navy across a number of 
accounts. Over time you begin to see significant impact with 
respect to both near-term readiness and investments that we are 
trying to make in the future.
    Senator Sullivan. General, do you have anything to add to 
that? That is a really staggering number you mentioned, $18 
billion.
    General Berger. Chairman, I think if you asked any leader 
who has anything to do with executing the budget if you could 
have one thing, what would you ask for, they would say stable, 
predictable funding. They would not ask for a dollar amount. 
They would just say some predictability, some stable, 
predictable funding.
    I would boil it down in the same two buckets as the CNO: 
readiness and modernization. We will get by. We have gotten by 
so far on this CR on readiness without any negative impacts. It 
will begin to impact going into the next few months. The CNO 
just really accurately highlighted those areas. They are 
similar to ours.
    My bigger concern, frankly, or my major concern is 
modernization. We are turning our ship to make a Marine Corps 
that we will need 10 years from now. That involves new starts. 
If we do not have the appropriations bill on time, you are 
going to delay the modernization in the Marine Corps and to the 
detriment of our readiness. It is going to be for us sort of a 
double whammy. Not a good picture.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you. I appreciate it.
    I have one final question, gentlemen. Again, I appreciate 
the comments about my father. One of the favorite things I got 
to do with him every year was go to the Army-Navy game. As a 
member of the Board of Visitors of the Naval Academy, I was 
honored to be appointed by that by the former chairman of this 
Committee, Senator McCain. So it looks like the game is going 
to continue, which is great, and I would appreciate a 
prediction. If you cannot make it in your professional 
capacity, Mr. Secretary, maybe your personal view on who is 
going to win that game. It is a very important question for the 
Nation. If the other two uniformed leaders, the Admiral and 
General, also have a view, I would welcome that.
    Secretary Braithwaite. Mr. Chairman, as a proud member of 
the United States Naval Academy class of 1984, my personal and 
professional opinion on this one converge. We will beat Army at 
West Point. We have a record of playing there three times. The 
first Army game in 1890, the Navy won, and we played it at West 
Point. We went back to Army during World War II when we were 
under some of the same pressures as we are today with COVID.
    When Secretary Ryan McCarthy and I talked about where we 
should play the game, we were committed to ensuring that every 
cadet and every midshipman would get to attend that game. Being 
a Philadelphian, I live about an hour outside the city, it is 
always great to go back to Philadelphia, but Philadelphia would 
not allow us to go beyond 7,500, which does not cover all of 
the corps cadets or the brigade of midshipmen. Secretary 
McCarthy and I, working with the CNO and the Army Chief of 
Staff and the respective superintendents of both the United 
States Military Academy and the United States Naval Academy, 
determined that we will play the game even if we have to play 
it in a parking lot outside the Meadowlands. This is an 
uninterrupted tradition that has gone on since 1890 in the 
midst of the Spanish influenza, World War I, World War II, and 
we are not stopping now.
    Navy will beat Army on December 12th once again for the 
fourth time that we play at West Point, Army's home team. That 
is why we went to West Point. Go Navy. Beat Army.
    Senator Sullivan. Are there any dissenting opinions from 
the Admiral and General on that view?
    Admiral Gilday. No, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. I did not think so.
    Well, listen, gentlemen, I appreciate very much your time 
and your professionalism and your service to our nation. This 
has been a very, very informative hearing. I know that there 
will be additional questions for the record. We will keep the 
record of this hearing open for 2 more weeks for additional 
questions, and the Committee asks respectfully if you get 
questions for the record, if you could try to get them back to 
the Committee in short order, again we appreciate it, and thank 
you for your service.
    This hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
  nds and the navy and marine corps role in great power competition--
                       initial usmc force design
    1. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Gilday, in your personal opinion, what 
specific capabilities do you believe would be most effective in a 
potential 1st Fleet to help counter China and to reassure our allies in 
region?
    Admiral Gilday. In order to improve our posture in the Indo-
Pacific, we will reconstitute the first fleet, assigning it primary 
responsibility for the Indo and South Asian region as an expeditionary 
fleet back to the capabilities and unpredictability of an agile, 
mobile, at sea command. This will reassure our allies and partners of 
our presence and commitment to this region, while ensuring any 
potential adversary knows we are committed to global presence to ensure 
rule of law and freedom of the seas. The first fleet will share 
resources and capabilities with Seventh Fleet and Third Fleet to 
posture against primary competitors (Russia and China) by delivering 
sea control and projecting power from the sea across all domains. The 
Navy continues to review our organizational structure and force 
posture, in coordination with combatant commanders and our allies and 
partners, to ensure we can most effectively meet the maritime 
challenges we face around the world.

                         usmc force design 2030
    2. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, in your testimony you talk 
about two new operating concepts, the ``Expeditionary Advanced Base 
Operations Concept and soon to be released Competition Concept.'' Can 
you describe both of these concepts in a bit more detail, specifically 
the ``Competition Concept?''
    General Berger. ``Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations'' (EABO), 
which was co signed by the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of 
the Marine Corps in March 2019, originated as a classified naval 
concept to directly support the Navy's Distributed Maritime Operations. 
EABO involves the employment of mobile, low-signature, and persistent 
naval expeditionary forces from austere, temporary locations within 
contested or potentially contested areas. EABO is a method by which 
marines temporarily utilize an area, always with the intent to return 
to the sea. The purpose of EABO is to support allied and partner 
nations in competition to counter malign behavior and, if necessary, 
deny enemy actions. Since the publication of the concept, the Navy and 
Marine Corps have aggressively evaluated and developed the concept 
through wargaming, while incorporating what we have learned into a 
predominantly unclassified tentative manual to drive further 
experimentation.
    With respect to drafting a concept for competition, the Marine 
Corps issued Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-4, ``Competing'' in 
December 2020. It explains that Western nations and other political 
actors often use binary ``war'' or ``peace'' labels to describe 
interactions. Instead, most actors use means other than violence in 
their competitive interactions to achieve their goals.
    The publication, ``Competing,'' explains to marines where they fit 
in this competition continuum. Marines are an integral part of the 
Nation's strategic competition with other actors. Indeed, marines are 
always competing, even when they are not fighting in combat. 
Additionally, understanding unleashes creativity, and as marines 
understand the nature of competition, their innovative spirit will lead 
to the development of new thinking and techniques to gain competitive 
advantages. Competing means that marines impose costs on adversaries, 
while simultaneously reassuring allies on a daily basis as a means to 
make conflict less likely.

    3. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, in your testimony you talk 
about creating a new ``Marine Littoral Regimen,'' which will be 
``augmented with anti-ship missiles, a light amphibious warship for 
mobility and sustainment, air defense capabilities, Group 5 UAS, and 
fully trained for expeditionary advance based operations'' and designed 
to ``deter adversary aggression by denial and by detection, as well as 
a counter-gray zone competition maritime force.'' Can you give a 
potential real world situation where you believe this new capability 
would be especially useful? How do you envision its use?
    General Berger. I envision Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) being 
task-organized and dispersed across key maritime terrain in the Indo-
Pacific region. The MLR capabilities will augment and reinforce a host 
nation's ability to monitor, expose, and challenge malign behavior, but 
the MLRs will be fully capable of operating without host-nation support 
if required. Many potential scenarios exist throughout the competition 
continuum in which MLRs might be employed and task-organized with 
additional naval, joint and coalition capabilities.
    As an example, the People's Republic of China (PRC) uses its 
Maritime Militia and Coast Guard vessels to intimidate and harass 
United States allies and partners in their Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZ). The MLR is designed to conduct activities during gray zone 
competition to disrupt, channel, and restrict enemy activity by 
identifying and exposing malign behavior, reinforcing partnered 
nations, holding key maritime terrain, and holding adversary assets at 
risk, ultimately encouraging de-escalation. These capabilities 
contribute to safeguarding territorial waters and supporting economic 
sovereignty of our allies and partners, while maintaining a free and 
open Indo-Pacific region.
    Additionally, the MLR provides persistent capabilities to deter 
further malign activity, aggression or escalation beyond gray-zone 
competition. The MLRs will be highly mobile, constantly changing their 
positioning and posture to increase ambiguity and increase the 
adversary's challenge of monitoring and targeting MLR units, thus 
reducing an adversary's confidence and encouraging off-ramps from 
conflict.

                    readiness and covid-19--training
    4. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, Admiral Gilday, and 
General Berger, what joint training exercises involving Naval and 
Marine forces have been postponed or canceled as a result of COVID-19 
and what plans are in place to mitigate the lost opportunities from 
these canceled or delayed training events?
    Secretary Braithwaite* and Admiral Gilday. Although COVID-19 did 
force some cancellations/postponements of our joint and mult-national 
exercises this last year, many were able to be de-scoped (e.g. 
cancelling port visits) or modified thru the use of virtual means and 
other physical barriers to still enable the critical interaction/
collaboration required in strengthening our alliances and partnerships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    General Berger. Although the force initially experienced impacts 
early in the pandemic, training has resumed and the Service continues 
to deploy Global Force Management units without delay through the 
implementation of risk mitigation and force health protection measures. 
Despite initial cancellations, adjustments to the planned exercises 
allowed the Marine Corps to close the gap and maintain a trained and 
ready force to support current tasking.
    Provided below are exercises impacted by COVID-19 along with their 
adapted accomplishments:

      Service Level Training exercises Weapons and Tactics 
Instructor Course 20-2, Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) 3-20, 
Mountain Warfare Exercise (MWX) 3-20, and Adversary Force Exercise 
(AFX) 3-20 were canceled due to COVID-19 from March to May 2020.
      o  ITX 5-20, MWX 5-20, and AFX 5-20 were re-scoped to capture the 
lost training from June to July 2020.

      Task Force Ellis, a I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 
task-organized force, under Operational Control of the Pacific Fleet 
and embarked aboard the USS Comstock deployed from July to November 
2020.
      o  The deployment started 90 days after the scheduled departure 
in April and many objectives were significantly re-scoped due to the 
host countries of Fiji and the Federated States of Micronesia 
cancelling the medical and humanitarian support.
      o  The Task Force supported Exercise Valiant Shield in Guam and 
was able to gain valuable training and familiarization with Mark VI 
patrol boats.

      Korean Marine Exercise Program 20.3 (KMEP), a continuing 
and annual series of exercises to advance interoperability between the 
Republic of Korea Marine Corps and USMC were temporarily suspended from 
July to August 2020.
      o  KMEP 21.1 resumed in Sep 2020 and has continued without COVID 
impacts.

      Rim of the Pacific, a Pacific Fleet national exercise 
scheduled to take place from July to August 2020 was modified to an at-
sea exercise only, which cancelled the amphibious portion for the 
service.
      o  Marine Forces Indo-Pacific Command found alternate means to 
support the exercise with an F/A-18 airpower demonstration and assault 
support lift with MV-22s.

      Exercise UNITAS (latin for unity), a fully integrated, 
multi-national amphibious exercise in South America focused on 
humanitarian assistance and sea basing was delayed 30 days from Sep to 
Oct 2020 and modified to an at-sea exercise only.
      o  Marine Forces Southern Command adjusted to the changes and 
hosted partnered nation representatives from Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Dominican Republic in Camp Lejeune, NC for amphibious tabletop 
exercises.
    Overall readiness and service-level training exercises are key 
areas where the Service continues to fight through the COVID 
environment, adapt to rapidly changing conditions and deploy ready 
forces worldwide.

            balancing readiness and covid--successes stories
    5. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, Admiral Gilday, and 
General Berger, it's important to keep our forces the best trained in 
the world and the pandemic made extremely difficult. Can you highlight 
how you are balancing the need to keep the force ready with the desire 
to also keep the force healthy?
    Secretary Braithwaite* and Admiral Gilday. Since the COVID-19 
outbreak, we have aggressively worked to keep our sailors and families 
safe, while sustaining fleet operations and supporting the whole-of-
government response to the virus. Lessons learned from the outbreak 
aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt honed our COVID-19 Standardized 
Operational Guidance. Our sailors and their families adjusted and 
sacrificed to accomplish the mission. When the virus threatened the 
deployed USS Kidd, USS Ronald Reagan, and USS Makin Island, we quickly 
stemmed the spread of COVID-19 and the ships continued their missions, 
reflective of our strong learning organization. We are applying this 
same kind of adaptive mindset across our entire Navy. We continue to 
aggressively work to mitigate the readiness impacts of COVID-19 and 
deliver a more ready fleet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    General Berger. The Marine Corps continues to balance risk to force 
versus risk to mission. Initially, policy was heavily weighted toward 
protecting the force due to the unknown risks/threats. As our 
understanding of the pandemic has matured, policy is being refined to 
delicately strike a balance within the risk calculus. Through rigorous 
protocol testing, contact tracing and persistent mitigation measures, 
the Marine Corps has been able to maintain a low infection rate while 
accomplishing readiness objectives.
    The COVID impact to readiness in the Defense Readiness Reporting 
System (DRRS) remains low and Force Health Protection (FHP) measures 
continue to be effective. Units are adapting their pre-deployment, 
deployment, post-deployment and training procedures to the additional 
FHP measures. The Marine Corps' efforts are shifting to meet FHP 
conditions while responsibly expanding our ability to train and deploy.
    The service has taken a proactive stance toward risk to force 
through discovery learning, effectively balancing disease risk-
mitigation protocols while creating maneuver space through policy, 
autonomy, and risk-based assessments and decisions.
    Using effective, aggressive contact tracing and testing protocols, 
the Marine Corps rapidly contains and mitigates against further spreads 
along with the dissemination of lessons learned from localized upticks 
in cases. In light of the number of cases spanning the last 10 months 
worldwide, active mil cases remain steady around .5 percent, 
hospitalizations represent less than 1 percent of active cases and 
recovery rate exceeds 99.99 percent. Due to the extremely limited 
impacts of COVID-19 to training, overall readiness and deployment 
cycles, the Marine Corps continues to be the nation's force in 
readiness.

    6. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, Admiral Gilday, and 
General Berger, are there any specific challenges or success stories 
that you would like share with the Committee?
    Secretary Braithwaite* and Admiral Gilday. Yes, I can share two 
recent challenges and how the Navy has dealt with them. First, after 
identifying a potentially dramatic increase in gapped sea billets for 
fiscal year 2021 due to COVID-reduced accessions, we gradually and 
safely increased recruit training to meet our goals. All while adhering 
to strict Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Guidance to keep 
our force safe. We also leveraged retention incentives, such as 
Advancement-to-Position, to keep sailors in critical jobs. These 
measures are improving our ability to fill operational requirements. 
Second, when health protection measures reduced public shipyard 
productivity, we took swift action to protect our workers and mitigate 
impacts to maintenance. Meanwhile, our dedicated, patriotic shipyard 
workforce adapted to our COVID-19 protocols, came to work every day, 
and got our ships back to sea. We cannot thank them enough. To stay 
connected during the pandemic, our Information Technology workforce 
quickly increased network bandwidth, added virtual private network 
licenses, and supported the DOD Commercial Virtual Remote (CVR) 
environment roll-out. This enabled a large portion of the Navy 
workforce to get the mission done from home.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    General Berger. The Marine Corps was able to quickly adapt to the 
COVID-19 environment and ensure the entry level training continued to 
deliver fully trained new Marines to the Fleet Marine Force despite the 
challenges presented by the pandemic. At the onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic, both Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRDs) postponed shipping 
new recruits in order to implement mitigation measures. The 
postponement only lasted two weeks, and both MCRDs began receiving and 
training new recruits under new COVID-19 protocols. The combination of 
implementing off-site Restriction of Movement (ROM) facilities and 
practices, adjusting the shipping schedule to allow for smaller 
platoons to enable social distancing, and introducing COVID-19 
mitigation measures within the recruit training environment resulted in 
the both MCRDs training a combined total of over 30,000 new marines in 
Fiscal Year 2020.
    In addition to the mitigation measures taken at recruit training, 
the postponement of leave following recruit training (known as ``Boot 
Leave'') and the introduction of the Minimum Exposure Movement Plan 
reduced the chance of exposure to COVID-19 for newly graduated marines 
by allowing them to travel from recruit training to Marine Combat 
Training and their Military Occupational Specialty schools in a 
controlled environment. This precaution enabled the training pipeline 
to continue without disruption.
    The Marine Corps' Training and Education Command also utilized the 
Council on Recruit Basic Training to instantiate a weekly COVID-19 
synchronization meeting with key leadership from each Service's entry-
level training Commands to discuss issues brought on by the pandemic. 
The weekly meeting has driven readiness across the services due to the 
sharing of information and lessons learned.
                         continuing resolution
    7. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, Admiral Gilday, and 
General Berger, what are the potential adverse impacts on the U.S. Navy 
and Marine Corps if a continuing resolution is passes instead of a 
defense budget this year? What are the impacts on Navy and Marine Corps 
readiness? What are the other impacts, to include modernization 
efforts?
    Secretary Braithwaite* and Admiral Gilday. I am very grateful to 
Congress for passing the fiscal year 2021 Appropriations Omnibus in 
December 2020, which prevented more serious impacts from an extended 
continuing resolution (CR). During CRs, new starts and rates of 
operations are constrained, which delays critical investments required 
to deliver a more ready, more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovative 
force. CRs are disruptive and result in lost time as well as increased 
administrative workload with non-value added work that detracts from 
the business of the Department, including oversight and management, and 
slows investing in the Navy force. The longer a CR lasts, the greater 
the impact on Navy programs and people. CRs erode, and in some cases 
reverse, the Navy's readiness recovery effort that began in fiscal year 
2017. I appreciate Congress providing the much-needed funding stability 
by passing the fiscal year 2021 Appropriations Omnibus.
    General Berger. The fiscal year 2021 budget request reflects 
significant changes in priorities of Marine Corps investments toward 
future capabilities and increased readiness. As CRs persist through the 
fiscal year, they constrain our ability to balance operational 
readiness with building a more ready, lethal force to compete with a 
peer threat.
    Continuing resolutions generally allow for funding at approximately 
the prior year's level. That is going to significantly hamper the 
Marine Corps this year and over the next few years because we are 
significantly ramping up our research and development as well as our 
procurement.

    8. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, what the impact of a 
continuing resolution on your Force Design 2030 implementation plans?
    General Berger. Under a CR, where we must spend at the prior year's 
level, we cannot increase our investment spending and pursue our 
newest, most high priority programs at the level we budgeted for.
    Under a CR, we cannot begin ``new starts.'' One example of a new 
start in this year's budget is the Light Amphibious Warship. This new 
class of warship will provide the needed maritime maneuver and 
logistics in the INDOPACOM region. We need it for our marines to get to 
the fight and maneuver once there. However, under a CR, we cannot begin 
that ``new start'' program, and the program is delayed until we receive 
our budget. That equates to real consequences for countering the peer 
threat.
    Moreover, we cannot begin our MILCON projects under a CR. In fiscal 
year 2021, the Marine Corps is investing approximately $500 million in 
projects on Guam as we rebalance our forces in the Pacific.

                defense posture review initiative (dpri)
    9. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, to the extent possible, can 
you inform the Committee of any recent status updates Fiscal Year 2020 
NDAA requiring a review of the current DPRI plan on this effort?
    General Berger. OSD Policy has the lead on responding to the 
reporting requirement, which has been delayed due to COVID manning 
restrictions. OSD Policy expects to provide the report to the 
Committees early next year.

        don arctic surface capabilities--ice-hardened navy ships
    10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, former Secretary of 
the Navy Richard Spencer said in visiting Alaska last year, ``We need 
to have an on-sea presence now that we have a blue water Arctic more 
times than not.'' Do you believe that the U.S. Navy can have the 
sustainable and credible Arctic presence we currently and will need 
without ice-hardened vessels?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. U.S. naval forces currently participate in 
a wide variety of surface exercises in the Arctic region and we will 
continue to expand our participation, as needed. The Navy Department is 
restoring skills and knowledge of cold-weather surface ship operations 
through research, by participating in training events, and by planning 
and executing exercises in the high latitudes of the Alaskan Arctic and 
the North Atlantic Arctic with other services and with our allies and 
partners. The Department will evaluate and modernize existing and 
future forces to provide manned and unmanned operational presence and 
patrol options in cold weather and ice-diminished Arctic waters. We 
will improve hydrographic surveys and sensors to support the fleet. In 
a Blue Arctic, the Department must have a more credible presence in 
Arctic waters. This means ensuring that Arctic operations are 
considered in our design and modernization plans, and that our defense 
industrial base can build and sustain forces for the Arctic. We will 
build upon these efforts to maintain enhanced presence, strengthen 
cooperative partnerships, and build more capable naval forces for the 
Arctic Region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.

         arctic--need for icebreakers and homeporting in alaska
    11. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, given that Alaska is 
America's Arctic, in your personal opinion, does it not make the most 
sense to homeport at least some of the nation's icebreakers in Alaska?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. The Department of Homeland Security 
submitted their report on ``Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the 
Arctic and Antarctic Regions''--which includes an analysis on 
homeporting options for Coast Guard icebreakers. The USCG has the lead 
in assessing homeporting requirements for icebreakers. Where 
applicable, the DOD will continue supporting the DHS in its studies.

    12. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, I understand that the 
Department of Homeland Security submitted a report on leasing 
icebreakers and that report specifically discusses leasing 
opportunities. Recognizing that this is a priority of the President, 
how can the Navy best streamline the process of leasing one or more 
icebreakers within the next 12 months? In this regard, do you commit to 
making the Navy move faster on federal acquisition and sole source 
procurement through the public interest exception in the federal 
acquisition regulations (FAR)?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. The Navy and Coast Guard have chartered an 
icebreaker study team that is examining the authorities available 
related to vessel leasing and any required modifications and associated 
acquisition means. The study team is maturing courses of action 
associated with the acquisition strategy in the most expeditious means 
possible in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations.

                         strategic arctic port
    13. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, as you know well, the 
Arctic has the need for some type of port infrastructure. The nearest 
DOD Strategic Seaport is the Port of Anchorage, 1500nm away from the 
Arctic Circle. That's like asking Boston to cover Miami. Given this 
disparity, why is it important--from a capability, capacity, and 
strategic messaging standpoint--for our nation to have a Strategic 
Arctic Port?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. As you are aware, DOD is currently 
finalizing the study on this very issue, per Section 1752 of the Fiscal 
Year 2020 NDAA, ``Department of Defense Designation of Strategic Arctic 
Ports.'' The Section 1752 study will inform the Department's overall 
evaluation of Arctic infrastructure and capability needs, in the 
context of global mission demands and defense priorities. I can relay 
that we are considering all options in terms of how to best ensure our 
security interests in the region, and the SECDEF-level decision is 
forthcoming. Along with the greater DOD, the Department of the Navy 
remains committed to working closely with you on this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.

    14. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, what is DOD's status 
on designating a strategic Arctic port pursuant to the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. As mentioned, DOD is finalizing the study, 
per Section 1752 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, ``Department of Defense 
Designation of Strategic Arctic Ports.'' Despite the continued COVID-19 
limitations on the workforce, the Department of Defense has made 
significant progress on completing its requirements under Section 1752 
and will deliver its report as soon as it is approved by DOD 
leadership. The Section 1752 study will inform the Department's overall 
evaluation of Arctic infrastructure and capability needs, in the 
context of global mission demands and defense priorities. I can relay 
that we are considering all options in terms of how to best ensure our 
security interests in the region, and the SECDEF-level decision is 
forthcoming. Along with the greater DOD, the Department of the Navy 
remains committed to working closely with you on this issue.

    15. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, Admiral Gilday, and 
General Berger, a provision in the Senate-passed Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA 
allows the Secretary of Defense to designate sites for a Strategic 
Arctic Port. Have the Navy and Marine Corps given input into this 
report? If so, what was that input?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. Yes, while considering the provisions 
within Section 1752 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, the Department of the 
Navy provided analysis to inform the overarching DOD report.
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy provided input. Navy's inputs will be 
reflected within the impending DOD report.
    General Berger. The Marine Corps' input to the report is as 
follows:
    The Marine Corps, as an expeditionary force, is prepared to operate 
``in every clime or place.'' This includes providing Marine Air Ground 
Task Forces (MAGTF's) to serve with the Navy for the full range 
of operations in the Arctic region. The marines routinely conduct cold 
weather training in the continental United States (Marine Corps 
Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, CA) and overseas in 
cooperation with partner nations (e.g., exercise COLD RESPONSE with 
Norway) utilizing a prepositioned equipment set in Norway. 
Additionally, the marines deploy to Alaska when training opportunities 
arise that will enhance USMC capabilities and readiness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     MAGTF--The Marine Corps' principal organization for 
conducting missions across the range of military operations. MAGTFs 
provide combatant commanders with scalable, versatile expeditionary 
forces able to respond to a broad range of crisis and conflict 
situations. They are balanced combined-arms force packages containing 
organic command, ground, aviation, and sustainment elements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
strategic competition in the arctic, arctic fonops, and cost imposition 
                           on our adversaries
    16. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, in your nomination 
APQs you included three separate iterations of your experiences in 
Norway with you witnessing first hand ``great power competition'' in 
the Arctic. Can you talk about these experiences and why--as you have 
said--the U.S. needs to do FONOPs in the Arctic?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. The United States is an Arctic nation, and 
developments in the complex Arctic security environment have direct 
implications for U.S. national security interests. The Arctic is 
strategic terrain and is a potential corridor between the Indo-Pacific 
region, Europe, and the United States Homeland. The United States, 
working with allies and partners, must deter strategic competitors from 
seeking to change the existing rules-based order unilaterally.
    Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) demonstrate that the 
United States does not acquiesce in excessive maritime claims across 
the globe. These challenges help preserve the balance of rights and 
freedoms reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and thus 
the global mobility of U.S. Forces. As a matter of principle, the 
United States should fly, sail, and operate wherever international law 
allows, including in the Arctic domain, which encompasses international 
straits, territorial waters, and high seas, and the rights and freedoms 
associated with each under international law.

    17. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, the NDS references 
``expanding the competitive space'' with regard to increased work with 
interagency. Shouldn't this also be taken literally in terms of Russia 
and the Arctic, especially with the importance they place on the 
region?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. The Department of the Navy recognizes 
effectively expanding the competitive space requires the combined 
actions of the interagency to employ all dimensions of national power. 
The integration of naval power with the joint forces, interagency 
teammates, allies, and partners is key to the preservation of peace and 
protection of the northern maritime crossroads and gateway to our 
shores. We will work in concert with interagency efforts to identify 
opportunities and build partnerships that promote transparency and 
integration. While we focus on cooperation, we must also ensure we are 
prepared to compete effectively and efficiently to maintain favorable 
regional balances of power. Naval forces will operate across the Arctic 
Region to prevail in day-to-day competition and deter coercive behavior 
and conventional aggression.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.

    18. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, given the great 
importance of the Arctic to both Russia and China--and the high cost of 
construction, couldn't the United States use investments in the Arctic 
to force our adversaries to react and impose great costs on them? While 
peaceful and legal under international law, what effect might U.S. 
FONOPs have in this regard?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. Consistent with the National Defense 
Strategy and our Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic, we will work 
closely with our joint and interagency partners along with regional 
allies and partners to reduce transit times, preserve mobility, and 
meet logistical demands. The Department of the Navy will ensure any 
investments correlate with future operational needs. The underlying 
principles of Freedom of Navigation Operations to challenge excessive 
maritime claims are unchanged by this approach.
     u.s. navy use of commercial shipyards for repairs (seward and 
                               ketchikan)
    19. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, given the growing 
maintenance backlog, doesn't it make sense for the Navy to try and look 
at additional shipyards for more minimal maintenance issues--especially 
small commercial ones like JAG Alaska in Seward or the Ketchikan 
Shipyard that we saw--to help reduce the Navy's large backlog?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. In fiscal year 2020, the Navy's non-nuclear 
surface ship maintenance backlog, as measured by Days of Maintenance 
Delay (DMD), was reduced by 84 percent. The Navy is dedicated to drive 
improvement by executing a variety of initiatives aimed at improving 
maintenance outcomes from planning to execution, including sustaining 
and increasing the ship maintenance and repair industrial base.
    While improving shipyard capacity is only one factor that 
influences on-time delivery from maintenance availabilities, Navy has 
been focused on identifying and working with potential industry 
partners outside of homeports. Non-homeport shipyards have recently 
been utilized to augment the capacity of a ships homeport private 
sector capacity. These non-homeport shipyards are helpful in providing 
surge capacity to meet maintenance demands when schedules and 
capacities otherwise limit flexibility in meeting Navy requirements.
    The Navy has comprehensive processes in place to assess, certify 
and then contract for the execution of non-nuclear surface ship 
maintenance and modernization. These processes begin with the 
assessment of capacity, capability, and facilities through the Master 
Ship Repair Agreement (MSRA) and Agreement for Boat Repair (ABR) 
certifications. The Navy regularly engages with companies, including 
those outside of homeports, to aid in these certification processes. 
Ultimately, while the execution of maintenance availabilities outside 
of Navy homeports can be beneficial it must always be weighed against 
the impact to crew, family, and oversight costs.

    20. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, does the Navy and 
Marine Corps have any current plans to utilize small, largely 
commercial shipyards for needed repair work in order to help reduce the 
backlog? If so, would you be able to provide a Subcommittee a plan to 
do this?''
    Secretary Braithwaite*. Sustaining and increasing the U.S. ship 
maintenance and repair industrial base is among the Navy's top 
priorities. The utilization of non-homeport firms to provide increased 
capacity and meet surge requirements above homeport capacity is the 
optimal use of non-homeport shipyards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Due to the costs and impacts on the crew associated with the 
execution of availabilities outside of a ship's homeport, the preferred 
option is to grow the homeport industrial base through steady and 
predictable workload. However, due to the nature of maintenance work, 
operational schedules and emergent requirements will at times require 
mitigation. The utilization of non-homeport ``surge'' capacity for the 
execution of this scope, which cannot be satisfactorily absorbed within 
a ship's homeport, is a desirable option for the Navy.
            air combat live virtual constructive capability
    21. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite and Admiral Gilday, 
given the emphasis on readiness for the near-peer fight (China-Russia), 
does the Navy have a requirement for Live, Virtual Constructive (LVC) 
Synthetic Inject to Live (SITL) to replicate the Near Peer threat 
capability and density in the air combat domain? If no, why not?
    Secretary Braithwaite* and Admiral Gilday. The Navy has Live 
Virtual Constructive (LVC) requirements for the air combat domain as 
well as a vision for the larger LVC construct which includes all 
applicable warfare domains in which the Navy shares a role. The Navy 
established the Fleet Training Wholeness Committee following a USFF 
training analysis in 2016 and began making investments towards LVC and 
training wholeness in PB18 and subsequent budgets. The Committee's 
strategy, roadmap, and investment decisions are guided by Fleet and 
TYCOM requirements in order to not only replicate the threat capability 
and density in the air combat domain, but also mitigate OPSEC 
vulnerabilities, geographic/airspace constraints, and opposing force 
gaps.

    22. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite and Admiral Gilday, a 
LVC-SITL capability was demonstrated by ``SLATE'' (Secure LVC Air 
Training Environment) to the Navy just over 2 years. What acquisition 
process is being used to consider the range of alternatives and when 
will the Navy or OSD CAPE conduct an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
specifically to address adding SITL-LVC capability to the Fleet?
    Secretary Braithwaite* and Admiral Gilday. The Navy conducted an 
Analysis of Alternatives to include applying encryption technology to 
the TCTS I/P5 system and new systems development. The findings were 
used in the development Scope of Work for TCTS II that provides a 
design solution addressing both Navy and Air Force Air Combat 
Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) requirements and provide a pathway 
to LVC. The TCTS II contract was awarded following a full and open 
competition, and the TCTS II open architecture, government data rights, 
and technical data packages enable future competition of production 
systems and capability upgrades. TCTS II delivers initial Synthetic 
Inject to Live (SITL) capabilities allowing mission operators to inject 
constructive threats into the secure, advanced training environment. 
TCTS II's architecture enables affordable incorporation of additional 
LVC capabilities, as they become available, and as DoN requirements, 
infrastructures and investments support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  acv
    23. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, now the Marine Corps is 
testing and, finally, close to fielding the ``Amphibious Combat 
Vehicle'' or ACV. Can you tell me about how important this capability 
is to the Marine Corps, the status of the program, and how it fits into 
your force design?
    General Berger. The capability provided by the Amphibious Combat 
Vehicle (ACV) is aligned with the National Defense Strategy (NDS), 
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), and Commandant's Planning Guidance 
(CPG) as a power projection enabler and key source of protected 
mobility for ground combat formations of the Fleet Marine Force. The 
ACV can self-deploy from amphibious ships in situations where 
connectors are not optimal to deliver intact combat units to a point of 
decision without the requirement for arrival and assembly and provide 
the offshore flexibility for rapid penetration, raids, and 
redeployment. In December 2020, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RDA) approved the ACV for 
Full-Rate Production.

    24. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, how will the ACV acquisition 
enhance the operational capabilities and effectiveness of the Corps' 
Fleet Marines, especially when compared to the Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAV)?
    General Berger. The ACV is a modern, fully amphibious armored 
personnel carrier that will provide otherwise dismounted ground combat 
formations with a greater range of maneuver options in the littoral 
operating environment, along with significantly improved lethality, 
protection, and command and control when compared to the AAV.
                  usmc rotary wing and tritons (uavs)
    25. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, you have previously 
identified the need for more analysis before reducing the F-35 fleet, 
has a similar pause been extended to the proposed divestment of rotary 
wing systems at this time? If not, can you commit to pausing any rotary 
wing divestment actions until this Committee has the chance to review 
the complete aforementioned study or similar information you can 
provide at an earlier date?
    General Berger. As stated in my ``Force Design 2030'' report, 
issued in March 2020, I am confident in the divestment of three heavy 
helicopter squadrons, three medium-lift tiltrotor squadrons and at 
least two light attack helicopter squadrons. The redesign of the Marine 
Corps, across all elements of the force remains our imperative if the 
Nation expects the Marine Corps to respond globally to crisis in an 
advanced adversary threat environment. To accomplish that end, within 
available resources, requires choices, carefully considered and 
balanced across all elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF). Studies will continue to inform our progress, but to delay 
will offer competitors an advantage in gaining and maintaining a 
qualitative edge over our expeditionary forces. I will ensure that you 
receive a briefing on the study outcomes, which will offer me one 
perspective on appropriate force size.

    26. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Braithwaite, the current RQ-4C 
Triton Program of Record calls for 68 aircraft. Following the planned 
Air Force divestment from the RQ-4 Global Hawk, has this outlook 
changed? Can you describe how decisions related to the Global Hawk, 
which we know is substantially similar to the Triton, could impact 
supply chain readiness and costs? Even if your acquisition plans remain 
unchanged, how might divestment of the Global Hawk impact Triton 
readiness over the short- and the long-term?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. Divestiture of U.S. Air Force RQ-4 air-
vehicles/support will likely lead to rate impacts at all levels of the 
common supply chain. In turn, this will likely increase Department of 
the Navy (DoN) Triton costs for production, spares/repair parts, and 
sustainment/depot support. The Triton program has already realized 
increased costs for shared/common services at the Northrup-Grumman (N-
G) Operations Support Center, Mission Systems Lab Services, and SIPR 
infrastructure at N-G Rancho Bernardo, CA facilities. Loss of 
additional core air-vehicles/support systems is anticipated to drive 
higher (TBD) costs to the DoN. Additionally, Triton would likely incur 
a higher share of common engine sustainment recurring costs through the 
Oklahoma City and Rolls Royce facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regarding supply-chain readiness, the planned shared investment by 
both programs in establishing organic repair capability for common 
subsystems such as landing gear, brakes, flight controls, and 
electrical distribution has already been delayed due to budget 
reductions to both programs. With Global Hawk divestment, and the 
existing Service resource challenges for the planned investment in 
organic repair capability, the Triton will likely need to rely on 
commercial suppliers for repair/sustainment. While the risk to Triton 
short-term readiness is low, it is not yet fully clear how USAF Global 
Hawk divestment and the reliance on commercial suppliers will impact 
the mid/long-term event horizon.
    The DoN will continue to assess these impacts in context to the 
current MQ-4C program. This assessment will look at the overall force 
structure and long-term readiness/sustainment to balance overall DoN 
ISR requirements/priorities, appropriated resources, and any updates to 
the National Defense Strategy.
                               __________

              Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
             marine corps high mobility engineer excavator
    27. Senator Perdue. General Berger, in 2019, the Marine Corps 
validated a formal requirement to procure and maintain 120 High 
Mobility Engineer Excavators (HMEE) to replace its aging, trailer 
transported Backhoe Loader (BHL). As you know, the HMEE is a self-
deployable multi-mission system that can travel at over 55 mph, be up-
armored and ford over 30 inches of water. It is ideally suited to 
support the full spectrum of Marine Corps missions with survivability, 
mobility, counter-mobility and humanitarian/disaster relief 
capabilities. Given its importance, Congress included and additional 
$10.2 million in the Fiscal Year 2019 Defense Appropriations Bill to 
help accelerate fielding of the HMEE.
    Can you please describe the ways that the HMEE fully supports the 
Marine Corps' new operating concepts of Expeditionary Advance Base 
Operations (EABO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment 
(LOCE)?
    General Berger. Combat Engineer formations will employ the HMEE to 
support assured mobility while operating ashore within a contested 
maritime environment. Tasks include route reconnaissance, obstacle and 
debris removal, and limited material handling utilizing the front 
bucket, rear ditching bucket, forklift attachment, and associated hand 
tools. The HMEE's self-mobility will provide a valuable material 
handling and construction tool at a smaller total footprint. While 
specific future engineer formations and mission sets are still being 
developed through the Force Design process, we expect HMEE will help us 
balance the requirements of assured mobility against maintaining a 
light footprint in contested littoral spaces.

    28. Senator Perdue. General Berger, in what ways does the HMME 
support security cooperation and humanitarian/disaster relief missions 
the Marine Corps is often called upon to support?
    General Berger. The HMEE is one of several Engineer Equipment 
resources the Marine Corps can use to support security cooperation and 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) missions. 
Traditionally, the Marine Corps utilizes Engineer Equipment to clear 
debris, deliver supplies, perform emergency earthmoving operations such 
as constructing berms and dikes, and even rescue stranded civilians. 
Our response forces employ tailor made equipment sets for each mission, 
dependent upon the situation.

    29. Senator Perdue. General Berger, given this formal requirement 
was validated after the release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 
please further describe why the HMEE is important to Marine Corps units 
for future mission success.
    General Berger. The HMEE will be an important tool for future 
Engineer formations that are divesting of large equipment in favor of 
lighter, more agile equipment sets. The HMEE bridges the gap between 
our current small and large excavators, while also adding self-
deployment, limited forklift capabilities, and pneumatic hand tools to 
emplace and clear obstacles. As the Marine Corps develops its future 
Engineer capabilities, the HMEE will continue to play an important role 
in the Combat Engineer, Littoral Combat, and Engineer Support 
Battalions
                               __________

             Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                   amphibious assault vehicle program
    30. Senator Hirono. General Berger, do you foresee any issues with 
maintaining the safety of the current AAV program until it is replaced 
with the next generation Amphibious Combat Vehicle?
    General Berger. While we wait for the Amphibious Combat Vehicle to 
be fully fielded, we will continue to support AAV readiness through an 
enduring AAV Sustainment Working Group. The Marine Corps is prudently 
addressing maintenance for the AAV and its sub-systems, tracking supply 
chain issues, and carefully monitoring the supportability of the AAV 
repair parts supply chain with the Defense Logistics Agency. 
Additionally, we have conducted a thorough review of our operator and 
maintainer manuals.

    31. Senator Hirono. General Berger, to what extent have AAV 
operations resumed?
    General Berger. AAV waterborne operations have only resumed for 
mission essential MOS qualifications at the Assault Amphibian School 
(AAS) and testing by the Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch. All other AAV 
waterborne operations have remained suspended pending the results of 
on-going investigations. All other AAV non-waterborne operations 
remains in effect.
    Specifically, AAS has resumed AAV water operations on five separate 
occasions since the mishap, each time to train entry-level marine 
students and only after a deliberate review of required safety 
measures. Fleet Marine Force units, Training and Education Command, and 
Headquarters Marine Corps stakeholders have clarified and improved 
safety requirements for swim qualification, egress training, life 
preserver use, and vehicle safety checklists. AAS has reinforced these 
requirements through expanded implementation of emergency breathing 
devices, safety boats, and certification of instructor personnel.

    32. Senator Hirono. General Berger, how has July's accident 
affected maintenance and training for AAVs?
    General Berger. A thorough and detailed review of all training, 
operator, and maintenance manuals and references has been directed 
which has resulted in a more comprehensive, detailed inspection process 
and maintenance actions that address the aging of our fleet of AAV's. A 
more inclusive, thorough analysis of training and doctrine has led to 
improved training standards and requirements for the AAV and training 
systems such as the Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer. These actions 
have been implemented across the Fleet Marine Force and Supporting 
Establishment and all reference materials are being updated.
    AAV waterborne training remains focused on the essential 
occupational and licensing actions necessary to complete initial 
training at the AAS and all other AAV non-waterborne training remains 
in effect. Service-wide efforts addressing AAV maintenance remains on-
going to action our AAV materiel maintenance way ahead.
                             climate change
    33. Senator Hirono. Secretary Braithwaite, Admiral Gilday, and 
General Berger, can you provide a comprehensive list of the domestic 
and overseas installations that are likely to be affected by rising sea 
levels and extreme weather events over the coming decades and if not, 
can you provide a timeline for when such a list can be made available?
    Secretary Braithwaite* and Admiral Gilday. We are seeing extreme 
weather events, droughts and sea level rise. Super storm Sandy caused 
$50 million in damage at Naval Weapons Station Earle. More recently, 
Hurricane Irma severely impacted Naval Air Station Key West in 2017, 
Hurricane Florence caused $3.6 billion in damage at Camp Lejeune in 
2018, and Hurricane Sally caused $521 million in damage at NAS 
Pensacola.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Wildfires in 2018 forced the evacuation of Naval Air Station Point 
Mugu, and burned approximately 1,200 acres at Camp Pendleton.
    Droughts can have broad implications for base infrastructure, 
impair testing activities, increase the number of black flag day 
prohibitions for testing and training, and contribute to heat-related 
illnesses.
    Naval Station Norfolk is experiencing sea level rise averaging 
4.6mm per year, with a 5.1mm increase in 2017. Sea level rise, land 
subsidence, and changing ocean currents have resulted in more frequent 
nuisance flooding and increased vulnerability to coastal storms.
    The ten most vulnerable Marine Corps installations (in no 
particular order) are:
        Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, CA
        Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC
        Marine Corps Base Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan
        Marine Corps Base Hawaii, HI
        Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, SC
        Marine Corps Support Facility Blount Island, FL
        Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC
        Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA
        Marine Corps Reserve Forces, New Orleans, LA
        Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, CA
    The sixteen most vulnerable Navy installations (in no particular 
order) are:
        Naval Air Station Key West, FL
        Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA
        Naval Base Guam, Guam
        Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam, HI
        Wahiawa Annex, HI
        Naval Magazine Indian Island, WA
        Naval Base Coronado, CA
        Naval Base San Diego, CA
        Joint Base Anacostia Bolling, DC (Transferred to the 
Air Force in fiscal year 2020)
        Washington Navy Yard, DC
        Andersen Air Force Base, Guam
        Naval Support Facility Indian Head, MD
    General Berger. In the Report to Congress entitled ``Climate 
Impacts on Installation Resiliency'' from December 2020, installations 
were identified as susceptible to either flooding or hurricanes as 
detailed in the tables below. These tables include the Plant 
Replacement Value (PRV) for each installation, which is the cost to 
construct a replacement facility aboard that installation using current 
building codes, design criteria, and materials. PRV is calculated based 
on the size of the current facility, published DOD unit costs for that 
type of facility, the local area cost factor, design, contingency, and 
Supervision, Inspection, and Overhead (SIOH).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Exposure                    Marine Corps Installation                        State                PRV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding               MCAS YUMA AZ                                      ARIZONA                      $1,751,321
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding               MARCORPRCUITDEP SAN DIEGO CA                      CALIFORNIA                      $11,993
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding               MCB CAMP PENDLETON CA                             CALIFORNIA                   $4,196,785
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding               MCSF BLOUNT ISLAND                                FLORIDA                        $806,429
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding               MCB HAWAII KANEOHE                                HAWAII                                $
                                                                                                     217,016,749
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding               HDQTRS 4TH MARDIV NEW ORLEANS                     LOUISIANA                    $1,399,334
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding               MCAS CHERRY POINT NC                              NORTH CAROLINA              $501,785,35
                                                                                                               4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding               MCB CAMP LEJEUNE NC                               NORTH CAROLINA              $208,326,61
                                                                                                               3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding               MCRD/BEAUFORT PI SC                               SOUTH CAROLINA              $1,403,525,
                                                                                                             324
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding               MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO VA                     VIRGINIA                    $10,115,032
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       ................................................  TOTAL                       $2,348,934,
                                                                                                             934
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Exposure                    Marine Corps Installation                        State                PRV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hurricane              MCSF BLOUNT ISLAND                                FLORIDA                     $26,825,049
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hurricane              MCLB ALBANY GA                                    GEORGIA                      $6,669,957
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hurricane              MCB HAWAII KANEOHE                                HAWAII                      $49,953,534
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hurricane              HDQTRS 4TH MARDIV NEW ORLEANS                     LOUISIANA                       $10,936
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hurricane              HDQTRS 4TH MAW NEW ORLEANS LA                     LOUISIANA                      $412,821
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hurricane              MARCORRESFOR NEW ORLEANS LA                       LOUISIANA                    $7,839,283
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hurricane              MCAS CHERRY POINT NC                              NORTH CAROLINA               $3,671,715
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hurricane              MCB CAMP LEJEUNE NC                               NORTH CAROLINA              $339,774,30
                                                                                                               6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hurricane              MCAS BEAUFORT SC                                  SOUTH CAROLINA                 $997,334
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hurricane              MCRD/BEAUFORT PI SC                               SOUTH CAROLINA              $23,952,391
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hurricane              MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO VA                     VIRGINIA                     $3,568,912
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       ................................................  TOTAL                       $463,676,23
                                                                                                               8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The difference in PRV values between each table is due to the fact 
that facilities aboard each installation would be affected differently, 
depending on exposure type (either flooding or hurricane). To identify 
installations susceptible to flooding exposure, fiscal year 2019 end of 
year data from the internet Navy Facility Assets Data Store (iNFADS) 
was correlated with a geospatial data query for buildings in the United 
States and Territories where buildings are located within 100 year USA 
Flood Hazard Areas set by FEMA. Of note, this FEMA data only considers 
locations in the United States, so overseas locations are not 
represented. Hurricane exposure was assessed for all buildings within 
the hurricane-prone region, as identified by UFC 3-301-01, Structural 
Engineering, with a Facility Condition Index below sixty. An assessment 
could be made of the flooding risk for overseas Marine Corps 
installations with the appropriate authorization and funding.

    34. Senator Hirono. Secretary Braithwaite, Admiral Gilday, and 
General Berger, given how long it can take to properly execute military 
construction projects, what actions are being taken now to mitigate 
future effects of climate change on domestic installations and 
installations overseas?
    Secretary Braithwaite* and Admiral Gilday. The DON mitigates the 
risk of environmental impacts through a combination of historical 
information, design criteria and statutory requirements to design 
facilities and plan installations. 10 USC 2864 requires all major 
military installations to have a Master Plan. Unified Facilities 
Criteria (UFC) 2-100-01, Installation Master Planning, is issued under 
the authority of DODI 4165.70, Real Property Management, implementing 
the requirement for Installation Master Plans. In accordance with the 
Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, the UFC was changed to specifically incorporate 
planning for the effects of climate change. Design and construction 
utilize the latest code requirements and ultimately result in delivery 
of more resilient facilities better capable of withstanding future 
events; therefore, every installation has prescribed mitigations to 
combat climate change. Depending on the size of the mitigation and the 
severity of the consequence if the project is not completed, the 
installations can use either their local controls or compete for 
centralized or line item appropriated funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    General Berger. Installations apply a variety of mitigation 
measures to maintain continuity of operations, ranging from exercising 
emergency action plans to evacuating personnel and weapons platforms 
during floods, to long-term design adaptations and facility development 
which reinforces and raises building above the historic mean-high water 
of the 100-year flood plain.
    When new facilities are planned, facilities are sited outside of 
the 100-years floodplains whenever possible. Where it is not possible 
to avoid a floodplain due to mission requirements, the Department of 
the Navy designs new facilities in accordance with the requirements in 
UFC 3-21-01, Civil Engineering, and the Navy and Marine Corps include 
floodplain mitigation measures in the facility design.

    35. Senator Hirono. Secretary Braithwaite, Admiral Gilday, and 
General Berger, how will domestic and overseas ports, airfields, and 
other logistics nodes be impacted by climate change in the coming 
decades?
    Secretary Braithwaite* and Admiral Gilday. If our current sea level 
rise models hold true then some ports will be subject to increased 
flooding, requiring prioritized investment (to overcome impacts to 
operations). Similarly, logistics functions will need risk evaluations 
for decisions about additional protection or relocation to other 
installations. The Navy will attempt to minimize impact, maintain 
logistics capabilities, and ensure individual missions are not 
compromised (based on threat) to deliver maximum lethality.
    Consequence Management at Naval installations around the world is 
predicated upon risk posed by all hazards, not just climate change. 
Each installation (port, airfield, logistics node or base) has 
evaluated risk based on impact to their mission. If a risk presents a 
negative impact to the mission, mitigation measures are evaluated and 
an optimized solution is pursued, either through construction funding 
or other means to provide a deterrent to the threat. Therefore, on an 
annual basis every installation performs this consequence management 
evaluation to ensure appropriate mitigation measures are applied 
judiciously. Climate Change is just one threat that the Navy addresses 
and is evaluated based on impact to the mission.
    General Berger. The Department of the Navy views the effects of 
climate change as a significant installation resilience issue which 
impacts readiness, and incorporates climate resilience as a cross-
cutting consideration for planning and decision-making processes, not 
necessarily as a separate program or specific set of actions. The 
Marine Corps uses programs within the DOD Office of Local Defense 
Community Cooperation (OLDCC), formerly the Office of Economic 
Adjustment, to ensure installation resiliency through collaboration 
with surrounding states and communities. Specially, the recently 
authorized Installation Resiliency Authority will enable the Marine 
Corps to provide technical and financial assistance through OLDCC to 
defense communities to analyze and implement action that enhance the 
resiliency of essential transportation, logistical, or other necessary 
resources outside of the military installation that are required in 
order to maintain, improve, or rapidly reestablish installation mission 
assurance and mission-essential functions.
                             strategic fuel
    36. Senator Hirono. Secretary Braithwaite, the ability to 
effectively resupply disparate small units is critical to operations in 
the Indo-Pacific. A recently release INDOPACOM study, conducted by IDA, 
highlights our adversaries' increasing ability to threaten the supply 
chains that provide fuel. Do you agree with the conclusion that 
posturing fuel in theater closer to the point of need is required?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. The assessment of the IDA study as it 
applies to the entire Indo-Pacific Theater is best answered by 
USINDOPACOM. However, from the Navy perspective, it reinforces studies 
and war games that my own staff, the CNO, and the Commandant have also 
conducted. It is true that posturing fuel in theater is a part of the 
needed solution. However, it is only part of the solution because 
forward staged fuel is static and vulnerable to interdiction. 
Distributed Logistics envisions intra-theater networks to deliver to 
point-of-need. Potential solutions that the Naval team are working on 
include a more effective, and smaller tactical distribution capability 
that accounts for the contested environment that we need to be capable 
of operating in. Examples of this include but are not limited to the 
``Stingray'' (MQ-25) aerial refueling drone and the Next Generation 
Logistics Ship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.

    37. Senator Hirono. Secretary Braithwaite, what steps are being 
taken to protect the integrity of our fuel supply chains?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. From an end-to-end supply chain perspective 
this question is best answered by the Joint Staff with input from the 
Services and various DOD Agencies, to include DLA-Energy. The Navy is 
working closely with the Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint Staff, and 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to address challenges of 
supporting the Navy and Marine Corps in peacetime as well as in 
contested environments. The Navy Petroleum Office focuses on these 
issues on a daily basis. The Navy is also developing new capabilities 
that enable Naval operations as mentioned above, as well as developing 
advanced capabilities supporting ship -to-shore fuel movement and more.
                               __________

               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                         installation security
    38. Senator Jones. Admiral Gilday, is it your understanding that 
once the short started firing in Pensacola, everything went according 
to plan from the Navy's perspective?
    Admiral Gilday. From a security response perspective, installation 
security forces at Naval Air Station Pensacola followed standard 
operating procedures and pre-planned responses for an active shooter 
situation in accordance with Navy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. 
The Naval Air Station Pensacola security response was immediate and 
first responders were in the building within five to seven minutes 
after the shooting began. Responding Navy Security Force units 
established a perimeter and engaged the threat using their government-
issued weapons. Escambia County Sheriff Deputies quickly arrived on 
scene and supported Navy Security Forces. The Navy and county first 
responders followed their training and did everything they could to 
mitigate injuries and loss of life.

    39. Senator Jones. Admiral Gilday, can you answer as to whether 
anything about installation security and emergency response procedure 
at NAS Pensacola has changed since December 6, 2019?
    Admiral Gilday. Standard installation security and emergency 
response procedures at Naval Air Station Pensacola have not changed as 
a result of the shooting. However, the Department of the Navy's 
investigation into the shooting is complete, and we are in the process 
of implementing the report's recommendations for physical security and 
force protection at Naval Air Station Pensacola and all Navy 
installations worldwide.

    40. Senator Jones. Secretary Braithwaite, Admiral Gilday, and 
General Berger, the NASP shooting investigation report recommends 
requiring that installation Naval Security Forces qualify as Category 
III/IV weapons qualified personnel. What does that mean and how will 
that help prevent or mitigate attacks?
    Secretary Braithwaite* and Admiral Gilday. Navy personnel who are 
authorized to be issued a military weapon are assigned within one of 
four categories. The category defines the weapon qualification criteria 
based on the type of armed mission an individual is assigned. The 
categories with examples are as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Category I. Personnel who are issued a military weapon primarily 
for personal protection. This category includes most officers, chief 
petty officers, officer accession personnel, enlisted accession 
personnel, aircrews, shipboard armed watch standers, and Military 
Sealift Command (MSC) personnel who are armed in the course of their 
duties. Personnel/units in this category are those non-security 
personnel/units whose mission exposes them to potential hostile fire, 
thus requiring them to be armed for self-defense.
    Category II. Personnel who are issued weapons primarily to maintain 
security of Department of Defense (DOD) assets. This category includes 
law enforcement, non-expeditionary security forces, contract security 
forces, armed watch standers, rovers and security reaction force 
personnel.
    Category III. Personnel who are issued weapons for combat support 
and expeditionary operations. These units are attached to, or in direct 
support of, ground combat elements. This category includes, but is not 
limited to, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command.
    Category IV. Personnel who are issued weapons for special missions. 
This category includes, but is not limited to: explosive ordnance 
disposal teams in support of special operations forces; convoy support 
personnel; F-18 aircraft squadrons attached to a Marine wing; 
designated marksmen; visit, board, search and seizure personnel; and 
nuclear weapons security for shore facilities.
    At this time, there is no intent to change the weapons 
qualification criteria for our Navy Security Forces. Our Navy Security 
Forces, who are category II personnel, are armed, qualified and highly 
trained to respond quickly to a variety of emergency situations. As 
stated, categories III and IV are designated for specialized weapons 
training for combat support in expeditionary operations.
    General Berger. In accordance with DOD and Service policy, Category 
III weapons include missiles, rockets, grenade launchers, and mortars. 
Category IV weapons include semi-automatic or non-automatic shoulder-
fired weapons, handguns, and recoilless rifles. The aforementioned 
weapon categories are appropriate for base defense operations for 
Marine forces performing security functions in a deployed/hostile 
environment, with primarily Category IV weapons maintained at our 
installations supporting installation defense. For law enforcement (LE) 
and security functions aboard Marine Corps installations, Category III 
weapons include grenade launchers capable of deploying non-lethal 
munitions, and Category IV weapons including the service pistol and 
shotgun. The shotgun is also capable of employing non-lethal munitions. 
Category II weapons include crew-served weapons systems, and automatic 
and semi-automatic small arms used by Marine Corps LE personnel, such 
as the M4/M16 service rifle. Marine Corps LE personnel, which includes 
Marine Military Police, 0083 civilian Police Officers, and 1811 
Investigators, assigned to Marine Corps Provost Marshal Offices (PMO)/
Marine Corps Police Departments (MCPD) as gate sentries, patrol units, 
and Special Reaction Team personnel, are qualified on the weapons 
appropriate for LE and security functions specific to each PMO/MCPD 
mission aboard the installation on which they are assigned. The primary 
being the service pistol, service rifle, and shotgun. Marine Corps LE 
personnel are further required to train and qualify with the assigned 
weapons carried on their person and maintained while on duty. Marine LE 
personnel also receive training on these categories of weapons during 
entry-level training, sustainment training, and pre-deployment 
training. The weapons issued to our Marine Corps LE personnel providing 
LE and security aboard Marine Corps installations provides an immediate 
and sustained response to an active threat aboard Marine Corps 
installations, acting a deterrent against those planning an attack. 
Installation commanders and tenant unit commanders exercise discretion 
through authorities granted by DOD and Service policies for selectively 
arming personnel with the appropriate weapons system to serve other 
security functions outside of what is provided by Marine Corps LE 
personnel aboard Marine Corps installations.

    41. Senator Jones. Secretary Braithwaite, we use an app called HERO 
911 in Alabama with our schools, and I'd like to see the Defense 
Department consider something similar. The intent is to get the closest 
first responders to the scene of an attack ASAP, in order to neutralize 
the shooter and minimize casualties. The NASP report recommends 
requiring regional and installation commanders to coordinate with 
civilian authorities to integrate geographically bounded Wireless 
Emergency Alert notifications into a Standard Operating Procedure for 
crisis response. Would you be willing to investigate and, if 
practicable, implement an app that automatically summons all verified, 
registered law enforcement with a certain radius of a base during an 
active shooter event?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. The Navy has been in coordination with DOD 
and other Services on the Next Generation 911 (NG911) requirements and 
standards defined by the National Emergency Number Association (NENA). 
Significant infrastructure upgrades are required to align the 
telecommunications framework to complement existing information 
technology modernization initiatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    My staff is continuously looking for new technologies to reduce 
response times to an active shooter incident. The Navy currently has 
great working relationships with the local law enforcement agencies 
surrounding our Navy installations.

    42. Senator Jones. Secretary Braithwaite*, do you have the 
authorities and resources to look into such an application, or will you 
need to work with the Armed Services Committees to achieve this?
    Secretary Braithwaite*. The Navy has the authorities to review 
existing technologies. At this time, there is no need for additional 
support from the Armed Services Committees.

    43. Senator Jones. Secretary Braithwaite, Admiral Gilday, and 
General Berger, the NASP investigation report recommends that the Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO) develop a uniform policy ``to arm qualified 
NSF personnel and other individuals for personal protection not related 
to performance of an official duty or status.'' Can you state what you 
believe this policy should be?
    Secretary Braithwaite* and Admiral Gilday. The safety and security 
of our military and civilian personnel, family members and base 
visitors is our top priority. Current Navy policy provides guidance 
regarding personal firearms safety, control and accountability. The 
policy further provides a process for the registration, accountability, 
storage, and transportation of personal firearms, when approved by the 
Navy Installation Commanding Officer. The current policy does not allow 
the transportation of loaded or concealed handguns, shotguns, or rifles 
on Navy installations except by duly authorized law enforcement 
personnel or by military personnel in the performance of their official 
duties. Individual state licenses or permits that authorize individuals 
to carry concealed handguns are not recognized or valid on Navy 
installations. Navy Installation Commanders have the authority to 
approve privately owned firearms on their respective installations for 
use at MWR recreational locations (i.e. hunting, target practice, 
etc.).
    Our Navy Security Forces, comprised of military active duty and 
reservist, and civilian personnel are trained and equipped to protect 
our personnel within our Navy installations, ships, and facilities. 
Navy Security Forces are armed, qualified and highly trained to respond 
quickly to a variety of emergency situations.
    Consistent with the recommendations from the NASP investigation, 
the Navy's policy is under revision and will be consistent with 
guidance provided in DOD policies. At this time, I do not intend to 
authorize the carrying of personal firearms for personal protection.
    General Berger. The Marine Corps published Marine Corps 
Administrative Message 719/19 on 31 December 2019 that authorizes 
qualified Marine Corps law enforcement (LE) personnel (58XX Military 
Police, 0083 Police Officers, and 1811 Investigators) possessing 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 926 billion credentials under the LE Officer Safety Act, to 
carry a privately owned firearm (POF) for personal protection not 
related to the performance of official duties while aboard Marine Corps 
property. A draft Marine Corps Bulletin (MCBUL) is also being staffed 
that supports existing Service efforts to provide this capability to 
Marine Corps personnel that are not designated as LE personnel. The 
MCBUL would authorize the broader Marine Corps population (non-LE 
personnel) among the total force meeting DOD, DON, Service, and 
statutory requirements for the concealed carry of a POF for personal 
protection not related to the performance of official duties while 
aboard Marine Corps property.
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    * These responses were received on June 9, 2021, Secretary Thomas 
W. Harker assumed the position of Acting Secretary of the Navy on 
January 21, 2021.

                           APPENDIX A

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