[Senate Hearing 116-511]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-511
MATTERS RELATING TO THE BUDGET OF THE
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 17, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-586 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RICK SCOTT, Florida JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri DOUG JONES, Alabama
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
___________
September 17, 2020
Page
Matters Relating to the Budget of the National Nuclear Security 1
Administration.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 1
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 8
Witnesses Statements
Gordon-Hagerty, Hon. Lisa E., Administrator, National Nuclear 9
Security
Administration.
Lord, Hon. Ellen M., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 23
and Sustainment.
Richard, Admiral Charles A., USN, Commander, United States 26
Strategic Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 56
(iii)
MATTERS RELATING TO THE BUDGET OF THE
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2020
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Hawley,
Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich,
Peters, Manchin, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order. The
Committee meets today to receive testimony on the National
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) fiscal year 2021
budget request and to address some concerning efforts to
undermine NNSA's relationship with the Department of Defense
(DOD). Arguably, this could go down as one of the most
significant hearings that we have had, and we have had a lot of
hearings.
I want to welcome our witnesses, including the first two
women ever to head up the Nation's nuclear enterprise. Our
country is very fortunate to have your leadership in these
challenging times. So we have the Honorable Lisa Gordon-
Hagerty, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration; and Honorable Ellen Lord, Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Chair of the
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC); and Admiral Charles Richard,
Commander of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
As this Committee focuses on implementing the National
Defense Strategy--that is this right here. We have referred to
this many times before, a great document that is put together
on a bipartisan--and what we were attempting to do is
consistent with that.
When asked about the priorities for dealing with China and
Russia, General Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, said--and this is a quote--I think the very number one
priority for me and number one priority stated for the
Department of Defense is the modernization, recapitalization of
the Nation's nuclear triad, and I could not agree more. General
Milley is exactly right and on target.
Thanks to President Trump's decisive leadership, we are
making great progress towards this goal. Unfortunately, we are
here today to address a very real threat to our nuclear
deterrent, but this threat is not from China or Russia. It is
one of our own making regretfully.
Coordination and transparency between DOD and NNSA is
critical to the modernization of the triad, but there are those
who are trying to weaken that coordination, and I want to be
clear. They are undermining our national security in doing so.
Recently I have learned that individuals from the
Department of Energy (DOE) have worked behind the scenes with
House Democrats on ill-advised legislation that would--I am
going to mention four things here, very significant. I hope you
will take note of them.
That language that has been proposed from the House would
bury the Nuclear Weapons Council in unneeded bureaucracy and
bring its decision-making process to a grinding halt.
It would, number two, prohibit all cooperation between NNSA
and the Nuclear Weapons Council for maintaining the safety and
security of our nuclear weapons.
Number three, it would destroy the NNSA's congressionally
mandated independence and drag us back to the dysfunction back
during the Clinton years.
Number four, it would do lasting and possibly irreversible
harm to the President's efforts to preserve and improve our
deterrent, an effort even former President Obama understood was
necessary. We have heard our President talk over and over again
about the significance of this and about the threat that is
posed out there.
In fact, I have a letter from the Department of Defense
objecting to these provisions. The provisions that we are
referring to that are being proposed in the House. I would like
to enter into the record Secretary Esper--and I am going to go
ahead and put his entire statement, without objection, into
this record.
[The information follows:]
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Chairman Inhofe. But a couple sentences out of it. He said,
after reviewing the recently House-passed fiscal year 2021
appropriations bill and the national defense authorization
bill, I would like to share with you my strong concerns with
several related aspects of these bills. If left unaddressed,
provisions affecting DOD, DOE, and NNSA put modernization of
the United States nuclear deterrent at unacceptable risk. That
is the Secretary of Defense.
I also have a letter from the chair of the NWC, who is here
with us right now, that objects to these provisions, and I
would like to enter that into the record. That is this, and we
will, of course, hear from her during the course of this
meeting.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Inhofe. It is not surprising that opponents of
nuclear weapons support these efforts. We would expect them to
do that. What bothers me is that people who should be doing all
they can to support the critical work of the NNSA are instead
trying to undermine it. As chairman of this Committee, I will
not stand by idly and allow this to happen. The work is too
important.
I suppose we should have expected this sort of political
maneuvering to continue after what happened earlier this year
with the fiscal year 2021 budget request. We all remember that.
Because of the certain individuals at the Department of Energy,
what they did, the cutting the DOD out of the NNSA budget
development process until the last minute, the budget
coordination process broke down completely.
I was in shock when that took place, and I found out that
during this process, that the DOD is not even considered, not
even consulted, not in any way. They were not knowledgeable of
what the budget was until after it was already developed, and
that is totally unacceptable. I mean, they are the customer,
and I was surprised. People are surprised. Right now, the
majority of people in the United States Senate are probably not
aware of that.
But in the process, these bad actors actively misled the
U.S. Congress. There was no misunderstanding. They lied to us,
and later they admitted it. One of the lies was they were
talking about a slush fund of $6 billion to $8 billion that is
out there. There was not a slush fund, and they knew it and
they admitted it later.
As a result, we had to go to the White House and save one
of President Trump's top priorities. When we took our case to
the President, he agreed with this. He was frustrated and
annoyed that simple coordination could go so wrong. I applaud
the President's decisive action to resolve that issue. We all
thought that his clear direction would solve the near-term
problem.
Then to fix the longer-term problem, my friend, Senator
Reed, and I drafted legislation to help DOD and NNSA improve
their coordination efforts. These common sense provisions
passed easily in the Committee. In our Committee, they passed
25 to 2, and the two who voted against it were against the bill
anyway, so you could say it was unanimously accepted. That is
the language that we are talking about. These simple measures
ensure that DOD and NNSA officials have the information
required to do their jobs, keeping us safe and maximizing
taxpayers' dollars. These provisions were and should remain
uncontroversial.
We know how this process should look. For example, DOD and
the intelligence community work very closely to ensure
intelligence programs meet the military needs. They are in
total agreement on these things. That is what should be taking
place in the other areas. It is a straightforward matter of
good governance and effective civilian oversight.
Our bill would do the same for the NNSA budget. Keeping our
nuclear modernization efforts moving forward demands close
cooperation between DOD and NNSA. The ability to see each
other's program and budget details is the fundamental
requirement for realistic future planning. Without effective
coordination, nuclear programs will face unnecessary cost
overruns and schedule delays. Dropping the ball on nuclear
modernization means that we are disarming ourselves in slow
motion, which puts us on a trajectory to fall further behind
our adversaries.
There was a time that we did not have adversaries that had
that sophistication, this equipment, this technology, the
resources that they have today. Truly they are ahead of us. We
all know what happened and how that happened, and they are
there. It is not like it was. I sometimes get criticized when I
say I look back at the good old days of the Cold War when we
knew there were two superpowers. We knew what they had; they
knew what we had. That was easy. It is not the way it is today.
That is why Congress legislated coordination between DOD
and DOE in the first place all those years ago, and that is why
the Nuclear Weapons Council exists today. That is the reason
for it.
All of you and all of DOD and NNSA want to work together
more closely to ensure that nuclear modernization programs are
correctly aligned and delivered on time, and we need the
Department of Energy to join in this effort. There has been
much talk, a lot it of inaccurate, about this issue. We have
three members of the Nuclear Weapons Council here today to
explain how we can improve DOD and NNSA coordination.
I want to commend the three of you, all three of you, for
the work in modernization in the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
Your efforts in the Nuclear Weapons Council have been some of
the most productive I have seen, maybe the most productive that
I have seen, in the years that I have been here. Our nuclear
forces are absolutely critical to our Nation's security, and I
would hate to see all of your hard work undone by rogue actors
who do not support our shared efforts. We cannot let personal
agendas distract us from this critical mission.
I thank you for appearing here today in a very difficult
and very significant, perhaps the most significant, meeting
that we have had in a long time.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me welcome the witnesses and also commend them for
their extraordinary service.
The President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request for
defense-related activities at the Department of Energy is
approximately $26 billion, which is an 8 percent increase over
last year's enacted level. This $26 billion represents
approximately 73 percent of the $35 billion budget request for
the entire Department of Energy.
Within the defense portions of the DOE budget, the fiscal
year 2021 budget request of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, or NNSA, is $19.8 billion, which is an increase
of $3 billion, or 18.3 percent over last year.
Within the NNSA, the weapons activities account has been
increased by $3.1 billion, or 25 percent, from fiscal year 2020
to fiscal year 2021.
While I understand the NNSA has facilities recapitalization
and weapons modernization underway, we need to understand
whether the NNSA can adequately execute such large increases to
their budget.
The Nuclear Weapons Council, or the NWC, has served since
1946 as the forum where the Defense Department sets
requirements for the production of nuclear weapons for the
NNSA. Under Secretary Lord serves as the chair of the NWC.
The fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act
required that the council certify to Congress that the NNSA
budget meets DOD's requirements when the President's budget is
submitted. This year for the first time, the Nuclear Weapons
Council could not make that certification. My understanding is
that the $3 billion increase in NNSA's budget came too late in
the process to allow the NWC to review it. I understand that
the Nuclear Weapons Council has now developed planning guidance
for review of NNSA budgets to avoid a repeat of last year.
Under Secretary Lord, I am interested in hearing details of the
guidance and whether this process has been followed for the
fiscal year 2022 budget.
Under Secretary Lord, while you are to be commended, indeed
highly commended, for putting such guidance in place, I have
concerns that because it is only a directive, it will not
necessarily carry forward through future administrations. I
would like to hear your thoughts on how this guidance can be
institutionalized.
A second concern I have is that while NNSA and DOD have
worked through their process, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) will remain a wild card in the final budget
deliberations. OMB sits in the NWC meetings but are not
formally members of the council. I understand that no one is
likely to have an answer to that dilemma, but the interaction
among DOD, DOE, and OMB certainly caused much turmoil this
year.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, last year's OMB budget
process revealed to us that you carry as much as $8 billion, or
40 percent of your budget, at your plants and labs as so-
called costed or committed but not expended funds. The other
term is ``no-year money.'' I would note that the DOE Office of
Environmental Management is being cut $1.2 billion this year
and being told to use their carryover to offset this cut. Has
this $8 billion been clarified with OMB since it contributed to
much of last year's confusion? I will ask you that when we get
the opportunity.
The NNSA is working to meet the requirements of both the
2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews. This mission means a
very high workload and many competing demands all at the same
time. For example, NNSA plans to overhaul five weapon systems
over the next 30 years. All of these programs will concurrently
require nuclear and non-nuclear parts from NNSA's plants and
labs that in many cases were built to accommodate maybe one or
two programs, not four or five.
In addition, I worry that there are concurrency problems
given the recent issue of defective capacitors impacting
multiple warhead programs with delays and costing more than
$800 million.
NNSA also has several complex construction projects
underway. They are preparing to produce 30 pits per year at Los
Alamos by 2026, which will require extensive new equipment,
while at the same time constructing a $6.5 billion facility at
Oak Ridge to handle uranium. In addition, the NNSA is
repurposing the Savannah River site to produce additional pits.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, I am interested in NNSA's
approach to ensuring all these projects are accomplished on
budget and on time.
Again, I thank the witnesses and look forward to the
testimony.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed. That is a great
statement. We are working so well together on this critical
issue.
We will go ahead and we will start with opening statements,
and we will start with Lisa Hagerty.
I have an apology to make to the Committee. I had an
accident last week, and I cannot see out of my left eye. It is
all going to be all right, but it sure is a difficult thing to
deal with right now.
We will begin with you, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, for your
opening statement.
He commented that I could only see to the right. Well,
really nothing has changed.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe. You are recognized for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY, ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you. Chairman Inhofe,
Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you today representing
the extraordinary men and women of the National Nuclear
Security Administration.
I want to begin by stating that 2020 is an important year
for NNSA as we celebrate our 20th anniversary. As a semi-
autonomous agency within DOE, the NNSA continues to achieve
outstanding results in support of the Nation's nuclear
deterrent. We are grateful for your strong bipartisan support
of NNSA's national security missions and the people who execute
them every day.
Chairman Inhofe, a written statement has been provided to
the Committee, and I respectfully request that it be submitted
for the record.
Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
Despite the challenges associated with the COVID-19
pandemic, I appreciate the bipartisan support and effort with
the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
fully supporting the President's fiscal year 2021 budget for
NNSA. The budget represents President Trump and this
administration's commitment to restoring NNSA's infrastructure
and modernization programs to ensure that America has a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for many decades ahead,
including recapitalization of the Nation's plutonium pit
manufacturing capability that was shuttered 30 years ago.
This funding also affirms the administration's continued
work to provide militarily effective nuclear propulsion for the
United States Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines
and to reduce threats posed by nuclear proliferation and
nuclear terrorism.
This funding enables NNSA to use its scientific and
technical expertise to verify and monitor treaty compliance and
support international arms control initiatives. To be clear,
this administration is committed to arms control efforts that
advance U.S. and allied partner security, are verifiable and
enforceable, and include partners that comply responsibly with
their obligations.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, we have all faced many
firsts, many challenges, and many tests to our resiliency.
Although NNSA's top priority remains the safety and health of
our workforce, our unique set of responsibilities meant that we
could not rely solely on teleworking to achieve our vital
nuclear security missions. At the outset of this crisis, we
identified several mission-critical operations that could not
be performed remotely and have continued this work on site
while always following national health and safety guidelines.
Consequently, I am proud that throughout this pandemic, NNSA
has not missed a single major deliverable or milestone.
We have continued to achieve our missions while
successfully maintaining as safe a working environment as
possible. This success is the direct result of the adaptability
and the dedication of the 50,000 men and women in the NNSA's
workforce. I believe our response to the current environment
demonstrates why we as NNSA and as a Nation are so very strong.
Although I am beyond proud of the nuclear security
enterprise's workforce resiliency and innovativeness throughout
this crisis, I am conscious of the reality that many of our
critical activities are on borrowed time due to the challenges
of recapitalizing the enterprise's aging infrastructure and
rebuilding our unique industrial base.
Additionally, with more than one-third of our workforce
eligible for retirement over the next 5 years, our ability to
recruit and retain the next generation of highly skilled
scientists and engineers is vital to our national security. To
address this challenge, NNSA is pursuing an aggressive hiring
strategy with the goal of adding an estimated 4,000 to 6,000
employees annually across the enterprise. To meet this goal, we
have broken the paradigm of traditional government hiring
practices to reflect a more corporate approach working
enterprise-wide. As a result of this new approach, we succeeded
in hiring nearly 7,000 employees in fiscal year 2019 and are on
track to meet our fiscal year 2020 goal despite COVID.
In addition to executing short-term requirements, however,
we must be focused on setting the conditions today for a
resilient, responsive enterprise for the next 50 years and
beyond. Key to this effort is adequate and sustained funding
that will allow for long-term budgeting and planning. Again, we
are grateful to Congress for your strong bipartisan support for
our nuclear security missions.
Finally, one area I would like to address in particular is
our alignment with our customer, the Department of Defense. In
May, DOD and NNSA signed the NWC Planning Guidance and Budget
Certification Process, which was undertaken within existing
statutory authorities and further strengthens our alignment. I
have forwarded NNSA's budget proposal for fiscal year 2022 to
the NWC describing how NNSA will continue to execute our
critical strategic deterrent missions.
NNSA is deeply committed to our national security missions
and continued collaboration with DOD who is not only our
customer but is also our partner in this critical endeavor. I
would like to personally thank Admiral Richard and Under
Secretary Ellen Lord and the members of the NWC for their
continued support, professionalism, for their collegiality, and
for their service to our great Nation.
Thank you again for the strong support of this Committee
and the opportunity to testify before you today. I stand ready
to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Administrator Gordon-Hagerty
follows:]
Prepared Statement by The Honorable Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to personally appear before you, with my
colleagues Under Secretary Lord and Admiral Richard, to discuss the
budget request for the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA greatly appreciates the
Committee's bipartisan support for our nuclear security missions and
the people who execute our missions every day, the dedicated men and
women who make up our 50,000-strong NNSA workforce.
The Department's top priority is to support the President's agenda
and direction for defending the Nation. NNSA's diverse and enduring
missions are vital to the national security of the United States:
maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile,
reducing global nuclear threats, and providing the U.S. Navy's
submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear
propulsion. NNSA is the only organization that can accomplish these
unique missions on behalf of the American people. The COVID-19 pandemic
has presented a series of truly unprecedented challenges for the
nuclear security enterprise and its workforce. Despite these
challenges, NNSA has not missed any major deliverables or milestones.
The U.S. nuclear deterrent is the foundation of our national
defense, and its credibility serves as the ultimate insurance policy
against a nuclear attack. While the ultimate goal of eliminating
nuclear weapons has been an aspiration for generations, we must
recognize the reality of today's evolving and uncertain international
security environment. China and Russia are advancing their nuclear
capabilities, which challenge our advantages directly. The United
States must be responsive to the increasing desire for state and non-
state actors to reshape the world in their favor, doing so at the
expense of our Nation, allies, and partners, and at times in
contravention of international norms and rules.
The NNSA and Department of Defense (DOD) are inextricably linked.
To execute the Nation's nuclear weapons programs, NNSA, in partnership
with DOD through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), conducts activities
in a joint nuclear weapons acquisition process, also known as the Joint
Nuclear Weapon Lifecycle process. Using this process, the DOD and NNSA
partnership manages weapons modernization needs from concept assessment
to full scale production, and finally to retirement. With four warhead
modernization activities underway, NNSA is executing an unprecedented
variety of complicated component development and production projects
through this process and continues to make progress across all four
programs. NNSA and DOD remain in complete schedule alignment. However,
sustained funding and support are critical to remain in alignment while
meeting milestone and delivery targets.
Recognizing the benefits of a collaborative approach to strengthen
our national defense, NNSA supports joint budget planning with DOD. In
May 2020, the NWC adopted the Planning Guidance and Budget
Certification Process, which will ensure the planning of the annual
budget is formally coordinated between the NNSA and DOD.
While the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and its supporting
infrastructure are currently safe, secure, effective, and reliable,
they are aging. Competing interests over the past thirty years
postponed weapon and infrastructure modernization programs, which
directly contributed to erosion of our critical capabilities,
infrastructure, and capacity to ensure the deterrent's viability into
the future.
The need to now modernize our nuclear weapons stockpile and
recapitalize the supporting infrastructure needed to produce and
maintain that stockpile has reached a tipping point. Sixty percent of
NNSA's facilities are more than 40 years old and nearly forty percent
are in poor condition. Assessments of facilities throughout the
enterprise have identified numerous single-point failures. If not
appropriately addressed, the age and condition of NNSA's infrastructure
will put NNSA's deterrence mission, and the safety of its workforce,
the public, and the environment, at risk.
With support from the Administration and Congress, NNSA is
undertaking a risk-informed, complex, and time-constrained
modernization and recapitalization effort. NNSA relies on its own
industrial base within our nuclear security enterprise (NSE). NNSA
manages eight government-owned, contractor-operated facilities
throughout the country. This includes national security laboratories,
production plants, and sites that perform the research, development,
production, and dismantlement necessary to maintain and certify a safe,
secure, reliable, and effective nuclear stockpile.
nnsa's recent accomplishments
NNSA has made tremendous progress across the NSE with several
notable accomplishments. The President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget
Request of $19.8 billion demonstrates the Administration's strong
commitment to ensuring the Nation has a safe, secure and effective
nuclear deterrent; reducing the threat posed by nuclear proliferation
and terrorism; and safely and effectively powering the Nuclear Navy.
Reductions from the fiscal year 2021 budget request such as those
proposed in the House of Representatives will threaten NNSA's progress
on its nuclear modernization and infrastructure programs as many of
them are reaching critical stages.
Plutonium Pit Production: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
completed fabrication of five developmental plutonium pits, a key
component of nuclear weapons, in support of NNSA's strategic effort to
revitalize U.S. pit production capability.
NNSA's Life Extension Programs (LEPs), Modifications, and
Alteration: NNSA completed the final weapon refurbishment for the W76-1
LEP, extending the warhead's service life an additional 30+ years. NNSA
also delivered W76-2 warheads to the U.S. Navy. A modification of the
W76-1, the W76-2 provides a low-yield, submarine-launched ballistic
missile warhead capability as directed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR).
Infrastructure Investments: Construction of the Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF) continued unabated. Despite COVID-19 challenges, NNSA
remains on track to complete on budget. UPF has been on budget and
schedule for seven years due to Congress's continued support of the
budget request; however, funding below the fiscal year 2021 budget
request could jeopardize the track record if additional construction
risks are realized. Additionally, the Albuquerque Complex was ``topped
out''--meaning the highest and last piece of structural steel was
placed. This state-of the-art facility is anticipated for delivery in
2021, providing modern and efficient workspace for approximately 1,200
employees. Of significant note, NNSA completed four other line-item
capital construction projects valued at $170 million under budget and
ahead of schedule.
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Minimization: NNSA completed two of
its largest ever, multiyear removal campaigns to the United States by
transporting approximately 700 kilograms of excess HEU from the United
Kingdom for downblending and over 200 kilograms of HEU spent nuclear
fuel from Canada. Additionally, U.S. industry producers were awarded
$60 million in fiscal year 2019 to support the establishment of
domestic supplies of the critical medical isotope molybdenum-99
produced without the use of HEU in support of NNSA's goal to minimize
the use of HEU in civilian applications. NNSA also completed the
Repurposed Enriched Uranium campaign to downblend over 12 metric tons
of HEU, resulting in a cumulative total of over 163 metric tons of HEU
downblended to low enriched uranium.
Space-Based Nuclear Detonation Detection: In support of DOD and
Department of State mission requirements, NNSA completed deliveries, in
accordance with U.S. Air Force schedules, of two nuclear detonation
detection sensor suites for space vehicle integration in preparation
for future launches. NNSA also provided technical support and early on-
orbit testing of two other sensor suites on Global Positioning System
III navigation satellites.
Nuclear Incident Response: NNSA provided nuclear incident response
capabilities in support of numerous major public events such as the
Super Bowl, Boston Marathon, Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade, and the
Pan-American Games in Peru. Last year, NNSA's Nuclear Emergency Support
Team (NEST) took delivery of three new fixed-wing Aerial Measuring
System aircraft, improving the program's reliability and range in
providing rapid, wide-area assessments of radiological or nuclear
events anywhere in the United States.
Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Contracts were placed by Naval Reactors
for reactor plant heavy equipment, including the lead ship reactor
core, for the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine. This
milestone helps ensure the Navy remains on track to construct, test,
deliver, and deploy the vessels on schedule.
Supercomputing: NNSA signed a $600 million contract for its first
Exascale supercomputer, El Capitan, slated to be delivered in 2022 and
operating in 2023 at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to
support NNSA's nuclear weapons programs. As a world leader in
supercomputing, NNSA's acquisition of El Capitan is a critical addition
to its next generation supercomputing systems.
Educational Partnerships: NNSA funded over $100 million in grants
and cooperative agreements with top universities across the country,
through programs such as the Stewardship Science Academic Alliances
Program and the Minority Serving Institution Partnership Program to
recruit the next generation of scientists and engineers for our NSE and
to conduct cutting-edge science in national security and
nonproliferation.
covid-19
This year, the COVID-19 crisis presented a series of truly
unprecedented challenges for the nuclear security enterprise and our
workforce. The health and safety of our employees is the Department's
main focus. Due to our critical national security missions, NNSA could
not and cannot temporarily cease operations and wait until the crisis
is over.
NNSA adopted a policy of maximum telework and social distancing to
safeguard the health and welfare of our workforce, while also
identifying a number of mission-critical activities that could not be
performed remotely and needed to continue on site. NNSA worked with its
sites to set priorities and relied on them to make decisions based on
the local situation and regulations to protect the workforce.
The crisis created significant disruptions, but the workforce
adapted and remained productive. Thanks to the steadfast commitment and
perseverance of the nuclear security enterprise, NNSA has not missed
any deliverables to the DOD during the COVID-19 crisis. Despite the
impact of the pandemic on international travel, NNSA has maintained
strong relationships with foreign partners through the implementation
of virtual engagements for technical exchanges, training, and
coordination to further enhance international nuclear security and
nonproliferation efforts.
At the outset of the pandemic, NNSA directed the management and
operating (M&O) teams to continue production of the essential
components and assemblies required to maintain critical missions. NNSA
worked with the M&O leadership team across the nuclear security
enterprise to quantify the costs of operating in the COVID-19
environment. These costs include:
Extra shifts to afford social distancing where possible
Associated additional guard force shifts to provide
security
Associated additional bus/shuttle transportation to work
sites
Associated time-costs for donning/doffing Personal
Protective equipment (PPE)
Additional costs for PPE
Additional costs for Weather and Safety leave, etc.
carryover
NNSA ended fiscal year 2019 with $8 billion in carryover balances,
of which $384 million were unobligated. As part of prudent management
practices operating the nuclear security enterprise, some carryover is
a reasonable expectation while executing our nuclear modernization
programs, and complying with multi-year international nonproliferation
commitments.
Carryover balances reflect the complexity of executing multi-
billion dollar projects, many of which require schedules of five years
or more. Carryover balances can accrue in earlier years as procurement
and contract management decisions are executed. Throughout execution of
these multi-billion dollar projects, carryover balances provide
contingency and responsiveness needed to keep projects on schedule. For
example, NNSA's recovery plans for the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370 are
being executed without slowing down these programs and without
requesting additional significant appropriated funds ($100 million or
more) by using management reserve and contingency carryover funding.
As another example, during fiscal year 2019, NNSA used carryover
balances to pay incentives to bring on craft laborers to support
construction of UPF to help maintain project schedules.
NNSA's uncosted balances in some Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
(DNN) programs are expected, given implementation of multi-year
international and domestic agreements. It takes several years to
execute international work. Most agreements also require obligating
dollars many years in advance to ensure work is completed. DNN closely
examines all balances to ensure funding is being responsibly set-aside.
As a result of this closer scrutiny, since fiscal year 2014, overall
DNN carryover balances have declined by 10 percent.
nnsa's fiscal year 2021 budget request
The President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request for NNSA is $19.8
billion. This is an increase of $3.1 billion, or 18.4 percent, over the
fiscal year 2020 enacted level. For the Nation to retain a credible
deterrent and prevent, counter, and respond to global nuclear security
threats, NNSA will require significant and sustained investments in its
nuclear security mission. We are mindful of the sustained financial
commitment and gratefully recognize the ongoing support of the American
people and Congress for this important mission.
weapons activities appropriation
The fiscal year 2021 budget request for the Weapons Activities
account is $15.6 billion, an increase of $3.14 billion, or 25.2
percent, over fiscal year 2020 enacted levels. This budget request
supports the Administration's goals to modernize the Nation's nuclear
weapons stockpile and infrastructure to meet DOD deterrent
requirements.
The fiscal year 2021 request is presented in a new proposed
structure that consolidates various funding sources, aligns current and
future workload, and improves transparency for interaction with
Congress regarding program execution and funding requests. The major
programs include Stockpile Management; Production Modernization;
Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering; Infrastructure and
Operations; Secure Transportation Asset; Defense Nuclear Security; and
Information Technology and Cybersecurity. Funding comparisons between
fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021 are done on a ``comparable''
basis as if the new structure was in place in fiscal year 2020.
These programs support the Nation's current and future defense
posture and the associated nationwide infrastructure of science,
technology, engineering, cybersecurity, and production capabilities.
This account provides for the maintenance and refurbishment of nuclear
weapons to continue sustained confidence in their safety, security,
reliability, and performance; continued investment in scientific,
engineering, and manufacturing capabilities to enable certification of
the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile; continued manufacturing of
nuclear weapon components; and continued maintenance and investment in
the nuclear security enterprise to be more responsive and resilient.
Stockpile Management
In fiscal year 2020, the science-based Stockpile Stewardship
Program supported informing the President for the 24th consecutive year
that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, reliable,
and effective without the need for nuclear explosive testing. This
remarkable scientific achievement is made possible through the work
accomplished by NNSA's world-class scientists, engineers, and
technicians, and through the investments made in state-of-the-art
diagnostic tools, high performance computing platforms, and modern
facilities.
For Stockpile Management, the fiscal year 2021 budget request is
$4.3 billion, an increase of $604.2 million, or 16.4 percent, over the
fiscal year 2020 enacted level. Included within this request is funding
to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile.
Activities include extending the expected life of weapons; maintenance,
surveillance, assessment, development, and program planning related to
the existing weapons stockpile; providing safe and secure dismantlement
of nuclear weapons and components; and providing sustainment of needed
manufacturing focused on increased efficiency of production operations.
B61-12 LEP: The B61-12 LEP will consolidate four variants of the
B61 gravity bomb and improve the safety and security of the weapon. The
B61-12 LEP achieved first production unit (FPU) for 105 of 112 weapon
components, including all nuclear components. A lifetime reliability
concern with base metal electrode capacitors necessitated a delay in
delivery of the system level FPU. Out of an abundance of caution and to
ensure weapons components meet the necessary long-term resiliency
standards, delivery of the system level FPU is now scheduled for the
first quarter of fiscal year 2022. The revised warhead FPU has received
concurrence by the USAF and NWC. After discovery of this technical
issue, NNSA conducted two internal reviews in addition to a third
congressionally mandated Independent Review Team (IRT) review. The IRT
completed their report, which was submitted to Congress in August. All
other major components, unaffected by the capacitor failures, are
continuing with production and readiness activities. The program is in
Phase 6.4, Production Engineering, and is on track to the system-level
FPU in the first quarter of fiscal year 2022. Program completion is
planned for fiscal year 2026.
W88 Alteration (Alt) 370: This program, which supports the sea-
based leg of the nuclear triad, is currently in Phase 6.4. This program
has completed its System-Level Final Design Review, 20 system-level
qualification tests, including the Commander's Evaluation Test 2 and
Demonstration and Shakedown Operation 29 flight tests. The same
technical issue impacting the B61-12 LEP also impacted the W88 Alt 370.
NNSA is aggressively managing the FPU for this program. NNSA's revised
FPU date is scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2021. All
other major components, unaffected by the capacitor failures, are
continuing with production and readiness activities.
W80-4 LEP: Currently in Phase 6.3, Development Engineering, NNSA is
continuing activities in support of the USAF Long Range Standoff (LRSO)
program. Funding in fiscal year 2021 represents the planned ramp-up of
production agency activities in conjunction with design activities as
the program transitions towards Phase 6.4, Production Engineering. NNSA
remains tightly integrated with the DOD cruise missile program----
through the NWC--to deliver on schedule.
W87-1 Modification Program: The W87-1 Modification Program will
replace the aging W78 warhead using a modification of the existing
legacy W87-0 design with planned first production in 2030 to support
fielding on the USAF's Ground Based Strategic Deterrent missile system.
The W87-1 Modification Program will deploy new technologies that
improve safety and security, address antiquated design and material
obsolescence, and improve warhead manufacturability. In fiscal year
2020, NNSA is continuing Phase 6.2, Feasibility Study and Design
Options, activities. The fiscal year 2021 budget request for this
program will support its transition from Phase 6.2 to Phase 6.2A,
Design Definition and Cost Study. Phase 6.2A activities include
continuing feasibility study of design options, beginning development
of the Weapon Design and Cost Report, and an independent cost estimate
conducted by NNSA's Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation
(CEPE).
W93/Mk7: NNSA is requesting $53 million in fiscal year 2021 to
initiate the warhead acquisition portion of the W93 program beginning
with Phase 1, Concept Study and refinement activities to include study
of future Navy ballistic missile warhead options and requirements in
collaboration with the U.S. Navy. The W93 will incorporate modern
technologies to improve safety, security, and flexibility to address
future threats--and will be designed for ease of manufacturing,
maintenance, and certification. All of its key nuclear components will
be based on currently deployed and previously tested nuclear designs,
as well as extensive stockpile component and materials experience. It
will not require additional nuclear explosive testing to certify.
Starting this effort in fiscal year 2021 is essential to maintain
synchronization with the Navy's program to design and build the new Mk7
reentry body.
Within Stockpile Management, the fiscal year 2021 budget request
includes $998.4 million for Stockpile Sustainment, an increase of $35.6
million, or 3.7 percent above the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. This
program sustains the stockpile in accordance with the Nuclear Weapon
Stockpile Plan by producing and replacing limited-life components such
as neutron generators and gas transfer systems; conducting maintenance,
surveillance, and evaluations to assess weapon reliability; detecting
and anticipating potential weapon issues; and compiling and analyzing
the information required to conduct the annual assessment process.
The request for Stockpile Management also includes $569 million for
Production Operations, an increase of $25 million, or 7.2 percent,
above the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. Included in this request is
funding to support continued growth of base capabilities, both
workforce and equipment, required to support the increased LEP workload
as these programs reach full-scale production rates.
Production Modernization
For Production Modernization, the fiscal year 2021 budget request
is $2.5 billion, an increase of $892.4 million, or 57 percent over the
fiscal year 2020 enacted level. Included in this request is funding
that focuses on the production of capabilities of nuclear weapons,
including primaries, secondaries, and radiation cases, and non-nuclear
components which are critical to weapons performance.
Primary Capability Modernization: NNSA's highest infrastructure
priority is to reconstitute plutonium pit production. Since the closure
of the Rocky Flats facility 30 years ago, the Nation has not had a
reliable pit production capability and has not produced a war reserve
pit for almost a decade. The Nation must be able to produce no fewer
than 80 pits per year within 2030 to support improving warhead safety
and to avoid the risk of plutonium aging causing a loss in confidence
in the performance of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The fiscal year 2021
budget request of $1.44 billion includes funding for plutonium
operations and the plutonium pit production projects at LANL and
Savannah River Site (SRS). This level of funding is required for NNSA
to produce no fewer than 80 pits per year during 2030, consistent with
federal law, national policy, and DOD requirements.
NNSA's two-site plan to achieve plutonium pit production at LANL
(30 pits per year) and the SRS (50 pits per year) is prudent and
necessary. This approach will require NNSA to fund activities at two
sites, and will provide necessary, critical, resilience against an
outage at a single site at moderate capacity.
NNSA continues to invest in Plutonium Facility-4 capabilities at
LANL to support an enduring 30 pit production capacity during 2026.
LANL has demonstrated progress in meeting production realization
efforts by fabricating 10 development pits over the last two years.
During fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021, LANL is transitioning to
the product realization process prove-in phase.
In fiscal year 2021, NNSA will continue to design, procure long
lead materials, and plan for demolition and equipment removal at the
proposed Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF), which
will produce no less than 50 pits per year during 2030. Currently, 285
project designers and support staff are working on the project. That
number is expected to increase significantly as SRS is required to
begin to hire and train the technical workforce needed to produce pits
at SRPPF. Training requires multiple years to meet the 2030 goal of 50
pits per year at SRPPF, and it must begin in fiscal year 2021. The
SRPPF Project is on schedule to receive Critical Decision-1 approval in
fiscal year 2021.
Secondary Capability Modernization: The fiscal year 2021 budget
request of $457 million for Secondary Capability Modernization
represents a 55.7 percent increase over the fiscal year 2020 enacted
budget. This funding supports NNSA's uranium, depleted uranium and
alloys, and lithium modernization efforts.
NNSA's uranium strategy invests in the reliability of key systems
to sustain casting, assembly, and analytical chemistry, which supply
the current stockpile with purified enriched uranium metal. It also
seeks to decrease mission dependency on the seventy-five year old
Building 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) by
relocating the facility's enriched uranium processing capabilities into
UPF and other existing facilities. In fiscal year 2021, nuclear
construction at UPF will reach its peak. The project has successfully
completed the first three subprojects under budget.
NNSA's Depleted Uranium (DU) Program will restart and modernize
lapsed DU alloying and component manufacturing capabilities at Y-12 and
invest in key new technologies to improve efficiency and reliability
and reduce lifecycle costs. The DU Modernization Program is also re-
establishing a reliable supply of purified DU metal by installing and
operating a DUF6 to DUF4 conversion process and re-establishing the
DUF4 to metal process. Funding in support of DU is also critical to
reestablishing component production capabilities at Y-12 needed to
support on-going warhead acquisition programs. These capabilities have
not been in operation for almost 20 years and are time urgent.
NNSA's Lithium Strategy supports the sustainment of existing
infrastructure and ensures the lithium processing needs of the nuclear
security enterprise are met through 2035. It also funds activities in
support of the Lithium Processing Facility (LPF) to meet NNSA's lithium
needs beyond 2035 by replacing the existing at-risk Lithium Processing
Building located at Y-12. Loss of this capability prior to programmatic
usability of LPF will impact on-going warhead acquisition programs.
Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment: The fiscal
year 2021 budget request of $457 million is an increase of $10.6
million, or 2.4 percent, above the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. The
mission of Tritium Modernization is to establish and operate a domestic
source of tritium to meet national security requirements, recycle
tritium gas to maintain required inventories, and sustain reliable
supply chain infrastructure and equipment to ensure delivery goals.
Since 2003, tritium production has met all production, delivery, and
schedule requirements. Currently, NNSA is ramping up production levels
at the Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar 1 and 2 reactors and is
confident that current tritium production plans will meet future
tritium delivery requirements. By early fiscal year 2021, two reactors
will be producing tritium with a combined total of 2,336 TPBARs, the
highest numbers to date. Beyond fiscal year 2021, NNSA will continue
the ramp up of tritium production to meet mission requirements. Funding
for the Tritium Finishing Facility is critical to managing risk by
modernizing our capabilities to finish, package, and ship gas
reservoirs.
This funding request will also continue efforts to make available,
when needed, the necessary supplies of enriched uranium for a variety
of national security needs. The Domestic Uranium Enrichment (DUE)
program schedule is driven by the nearest-term defense need--
unobligated low enriched uranium for tritium production. Other needs
for enriched uranium (e.g., research reactors, naval fuel) are
supported by this effort as well. NNSA is currently executing an
Analysis of Alternatives examining a wide range of options for meeting
the unobligated enriched uranium need. These options include an AC100
centrifuge and a smaller centrifuge being developed by Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, as well as other enrichment technologies and non-
construction options. The analysis has been impacted by COVID-19, but
NNSA looks forward to sharing the results with Congress as soon as the
analysis is complete.
Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering
The fiscal year 2021 budget request for Stockpile Research,
Technology, and Engineering (SRT&E) is $2.8 billion, an increase of
$229 million, or 9 percent above the fiscal year 2020 enacted levels.
This program provides the foundation for science-based stockpile
decisions, tools, and components; focuses on the most pressing
investments the nuclear security enterprise requires to meet DOD
warhead needs and schedules; enables assessment and certification
capabilities used throughout the enterprise; and provides the knowledge
and expertise needed to maintain confidence in the nuclear weapons
stockpile without additional nuclear explosive testing.
Assessment Science ($773 million) requests additional funding to
support subcritical experiments used to assess the state of the current
stockpile and certify warhead modernization programs and advanced
diagnostics for subcritical hydrodynamic integrated weapons experiments
that produce data for stockpile certifications.
Engineering and Integrated Assessments ($337.4 million) sustains
NNSA's capability for creating and maturing advanced toolsets and
technologies to improve weapon surety and support annual stockpile
assessments.
Weapons Technology and Manufacturing Modernization ($298 million)
develops the materials, technology and manufacturing solutions that
will significantly reduce the time and cost of planned and future
warhead modernization programs and manufacturing processes. This area
has already provided great benefits to the current stockpile and is
instrumental to a more responsive and resilient nuclear enterprise.
Inertial Confinement Fusion ($554.7 million) will continue to
maintain essential experimental capabilities and expertise in high
energy density science. These efforts continue to provide data to
reduce uncertainty in calculations of nuclear weapons performance and
improve the predictive capability of science and engineering models in
high-pressure, high-energy, high-density regimes.
The fiscal year 2021 request includes $732 million for the Advanced
Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, which continues NNSA's close
collaboration with DOE's Office of Science to implement the Exascale
Computing Initiative. The first NNSA Exascale computer will be located
at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The ASC Program supports
stockpile stewardship by developing and delivering predictive
simulation capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in addition to
deploying increasingly more powerful supercomputers at Sandia, Los
Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. Improvements in
high performance computing and artificial intelligence are essential
for NNSA next-generation simulation capabilities to support weapons
design and science-based stockpile stewardship.
The Academic Programs ($87 million) of Stockpile Research,
Technology, and Engineering are designed to support academic programs
in science and engineering disciplines of critical importance to the
NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise, such as nuclear science,
radiochemistry, materials at extreme conditions, high energy density
science, advanced manufacturing, and high performance computing. In
addition, building a diverse workforce will strengthen our stewardship
of the future. The role of the Academic Programs is three-fold:
1. Develop the highly trained technical workforce needed to support
core missions to replace the current generation of NNSA professionals,
2. Maintain technical peer expertise external to the nuclear
security enterprise for providing valuable oversight, cross-check and
review,
3. Enable scientific innovation to enhance the nuclear security
enterprise missions to strengthen the basic fields of research relevant
to the NNSA mission.
The Academic Programs enable robust and diverse research and foster
STEM educational communities through a variety of methods to achieve
the program goals.
Secure Transportation Asset
The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) provides safe, secure
transport of the Nation's nuclear weapons, weapon components, and
special nuclear material throughout the nuclear security enterprise to
meet nuclear security requirements and support broader NNSA operations.
Nuclear weapon life-extension programs, limited-life component
exchanges, surveillance, dismantlement, nonproliferation activities,
and experimental programs rely on transport of weapons, weapon
components, and special nuclear material on schedule and in a safe and
secure manner.
The fiscal year 2021 budget request of $390 million supports
modernizing STA transportation assets, replacement of STA's now-
obsolete DC-9 aircraft, vehicle sustainment, replacement of armored
tractors, escort and support vehicles; and upgrade of the Tractor
Control Unit to accommodate for communications and security. Funding
also supports a commitment to a stable human resources strategy that
recruits and retains Federal Agents and staff with the requisite skills
to meet priorities and mission requirements.
The fiscal year 2021 request includes $102 million for development
and testing of the Mobile Guardian Transporter, which will provide a
replacement trailer system that will meet nuclear safety requirements,
address evolving potential security threats, and replace the current
Safeguards Transporter, which first entered service in 1997.
Improving Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations
An effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons
infrastructure is essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly to
shifting requirements. Such an infrastructure offers tangible evidence
to both allies and potential adversaries of U.S. nuclear weapons
capabilities and can help to deter, assure, and hedge against adverse
developments, and discourage adversary interest in arms competition.
The fiscal year 2021 budget request for Infrastructure and
Operations is $4.4 billion, an increase of $1.2 billion, or 37 percent
above the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. More than a third of NNSA's
facilities are over 60-years-old. It will take sustained, significant
resources and sound management practices to modernize NNSA's nuclear
weapons infrastructure.
The fiscal year 2021 budget request includes significant increases
in the Operations of Facilities, Maintenance and Repair of Facilities,
Infrastructure and Safety Recapitalization, and Construction accounts.
These increases support major efforts like the pit production mission
at LANL and LEP missions at Kansas City; and begin to address space
issues across the nuclear security enterprise as the sites are staffing
up to tackle these challenging missions.
The Programmatic Construction activities provide continued support
to major construction projects such as UPF, the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the Lithium Production
Capability, and U1a Complex Enhancements Project, among others. The
request also supports the initiation of design efforts for the High
Explosive Synthesis, Formulation, and Production project at the Pantex
Plant.
The Mission Enabling Construction activities support the transition
to construction for Nevada 138kV Power Transmission System Replacement
and two Emergency Operations Centers at LLNL and Sandia National
Laboratories.
Thanks to the support of Congress, NNSA is making progress in
repairing, replacing, and modernizing NNSA's facilities and stabilizing
deferred maintenance; yet much more remains to be done.
NNSA is deploying a new science-based infrastructure stewardship
approach that is improving infrastructure data quality. Part of this
approach includes the deployment of BUILDER, a system developed by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and recognized by the National Academy of
Sciences as a best-in-class practice for infrastructure management.
Using BUILDER-based calculations has provided us with a more
accurate and transparent understanding of NNSA's vast infrastructure.
Historical approaches had greatly underestimated the replacement plant
value of NNSA's facilities. For example, NNSA's replacement value was
previously estimated to be $55.4 billion and is now estimated to be
$124.3 billion. Deferred maintenance costs are tied to the replacement
plant value as it costs more to repair a more expensive facility.
Therefore, as expected, NNSA deferred maintenance increased with the
deployment of our new, more accurate, data-driven approach, from $2.5
billion as of fiscal year 2018 to $4.8 billion as of fiscal year 2019.
However, this is not an indication that NNSA's infrastructure
condition declined, merely that the values are more accurate. In fact,
the ratio of deferred maintenance to replacement plant value decreased
from 4.6 percent to 3.8 percent, an indication that NNSA's investments
have been successful. NNSA is using BUILDER to pinpoint infrastructure
investments that reduce the most risk to the mission. In addition, NNSA
is undertaking new initiatives and pilots to identify opportunities for
improved project execution and asset acquisition.
NNSA is making critical investments to stabilize and dispose of
high-risk excess facilities. For example, in fiscal year 2019, NNSA
completed its first large-scale process-contaminated disposition at
LANL Building 46-001. In fiscal year 2021, NNSA is investing $30
million for the disposition of ten facilities, including three process-
contaminated facilities.
Defense Nuclear Security Efforts
The Office of Defense Nuclear Security's (DNS) primary mission is
protecting the facilities, people, and assets that are critical to
achieving NNSA's important national security missions. Defense Nuclear
Security's fiscal year 2021 budget request is $826.9 million, an
increase of $51.9 million, or 6.7 percent, over the fiscal year 2020
enacted amount. This growth in funding supports increased security
personnel at LANL PF-4 as it transitions to 24/7 operations and initial
increased support at SRS in support of SRPPF. While NNSA faces
challenges replacing and refreshing aging physical security
infrastructure, it is making key investments to recapitalize this
infrastructure through the Security Infrastructure Revitalization
Program. Increased security requirements are associated with growth
across the nuclear security enterprise, including plutonium pit
production efforts. DNS is focused on countering the threat posed by
unmanned aircraft systems and aims to complete the installation of
counter unmanned aircraft systems at Y-12, the Pantex Plant, and the
Nevada National Security Site in fiscal year 2021.
Enhancing Cybersecurity
Information Technology and Cybersecurity enable every element of
NNSA's missions. The fiscal year 2021 budget request is $375.5 million,
an increase of $75.5 million, or 25.2 percent, over the fiscal year
2020 enacted level. This increase will continue cybersecurity
enhancements, bolster cybersecurity capabilities, and support the
continuation of IT modernization efforts. NNSA is making steady
progress in enhancing and upgrading components of the Enterprise Secure
Computing environment to ensure that nuclear security enterprise
missions can be completed without disruption. As NNSA mission
requirements expand in scope, IT and cyber programs require
modernization, expansion, and innovation in a commensurate fashion.
Cybersecurity is a defense and deterrence mechanism and a powerful
tool. In the current threat environment, NNSA cannot afford to neglect
its cybersecurity capabilities, which serve as frontline assets that
protect the information, systems, and networks on which NNSA depends to
execute its mission.
defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
The fiscal year 2021 budget request for the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation account is $2 billion, an increase of $86.6 million,
or 4.5 percent, over the fiscal year 2020 enacted level, after
adjusting for the $220 million fiscal year 2020 appropriation for the
termination of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX) project.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account activities address the entire
nuclear threat spectrum by helping to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond
to nuclear and radiological incidents around the world.
This appropriation funds five existing programs and expands NNSA's
nuclear forensics mission.
These six programs, as part of a whole-of-government approach,
provide policy and technical leadership to prevent or limit the spread
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related materials, technology, and
expertise; develop technologies to detect nuclear proliferation; secure
or eliminate inventories of nuclear weapons-related materials and
infrastructure; and ensure that technically trained emergency
management personnel are available to respond to nuclear and
radiological incidents and accidents.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts
The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation works to: remove or
eliminate vulnerable nuclear material; improve global nuclear security
through multilateral and bilateral technical exchanges and training
workshops; help prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and
radioactive materials; secure domestic and international civilian
buildings containing high-priority radioactive material; provide
technical reviews of U.S. export license applications; conduct export
control training for U.S. enforcement agencies and international
partners; strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's ability
to detect and deter nuclear proliferation; advance U.S. capabilities to
monitor arms control treaties and detect foreign nuclear programs; and
maintain organizational readiness to respond to and mitigate
radiological or nuclear incidents worldwide.
The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program provides an
integrated approach to addressing the risk posed by nuclear materials.
The fiscal year 2021 budget request is $400 million, an increase of
$37.2 million, or 10.2 percent above the fiscal year 2020 enacted
level. The request provides additional cooperative agreement funding
for establishing non-HEU-based molybdenum-99 production technologies in
the United States. Additionally, the request for M3 supports the
conversion of research reactors to low enriched uranium and the removal
and disposal of weapons-usable nuclear material, with priority on
removing surplus plutonium from the state of South Carolina.
The Global Material Security program works with partner nations to
increase the security of vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials
and improve their ability to detect, disrupt, and investigate illicit
trafficking of these materials. The fiscal year 2021 budget request of
$400 million is a decrease of $42 million, or 9.6 percent, below the
fiscal year 2020 enacted level. This reduction is a result of a funding
increase received in fiscal year 2020 for Cesium Irradiator Replacement
Program activities, to include addressing the container breach in
Seattle, and for efforts to partner with state and local governments to
train first responders. The requested funding includes efforts to
secure and protect at risk nuclear and radioactive materials both
domestically and internationally, remove and reduce radioactive
materials, prevent and investigate the illicit trafficking of
materials, and promote international and national best practices in
nuclear security and long-term sustainment of national programs. NNSA
is on track to replace all cesium-137 based blood irradiators in the
U.S. by the end of 2027.
The Nonproliferation and Arms Control program develops and
implements programs to: strengthen international nuclear safeguards;
control the proliferation of nuclear and dual-use material, equipment,
technology and expertise; verify nuclear reductions and compliance with
nonproliferation and arms control agreements and arrangements; and
address enduring and emerging proliferation challenges requiring the
development of innovative policies and approaches. The fiscal year 2021
budget request is $138.7 million. This request fully funds
implementation of our obligations, commitments, and authorities
pursuant to statutes and international agreements. It includes efforts
to strengthen the U.S. safeguards technology and human capital base to
meet projected U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency resource
requirements, facilitate the expansion of civil nuclear power while
minimizing proliferation risks through the conclusion of Civil Nuclear
Cooperation (``123'') Agreements and implementation of Administrative
Arrangements, maintain technical monitoring, verification, and analysis
capabilities to support implementation of strategic arms and nuclear
testing limitations initiatives, and strengthen domestic and
international implementation of export controls.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN
R&D) program supports innovative unilateral and multilateral technical
capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize foreign nuclear
weapons programs, illicit diversion of special nuclear material, and
nuclear detonations worldwide. The fiscal year 2021 budget request for
this program is $531.7 million. The funding requested strengthens U.S.
technical capabilities to detect, locate, and characterize foreign
nuclear programs and expands Nonproliferation Stewardship Program
efforts.
Nonproliferation Construction consolidates construction costs for
DNN projects. The fiscal year 2021 budget request is $148.6 million, a
decrease of $150.4 million, or 50.3 percent, below the fiscal year 2020
enacted level. The decrease reflects the completion of the MOX
contractual termination settlement. The $148.6 million will be used for
the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project, which supports the
dilute and dispose approach. This supports the execution of early site
preparation and long lead procurements activities, as well as
continuing the maturation of the design for all major systems
supporting the plutonium processing gloveboxes. NNSA will continue
looking at opportunities for improving the SPD project schedule.
The NNSA Nuclear Forensics Research and Development effort will
expand our capabilities and reflects NNSA taking a more active
leadership role in this area. The fiscal year 2021 budget request for
this program is $40 million, which includes consolidating $12 million
from DNN R&D. NNSA will focus on expanding nuclear forensics
capabilities in both research and development and operations. NNSA will
leverage its existing capabilities to develop advanced technical
nuclear forensics analysis capabilities within the Office of
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation to support interagency
response to a nuclear event.
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response
The fiscal year 2021 request for the Nuclear Counterterrorism and
Incident Response (NCTIR) Program is $377.5 million, an increase of
$5.4 million over the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. NCTIR includes
two subprograms: the Emergency Operations (EO) subprogram and the
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP) subprogram. EO
provides both the structure and processes the Department uses to
prevent, prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all-
hazards emergencies that threaten life and property. In addition EO
provides the framework for building, assessing, and improving
organizational resilience to ensure uninterrupted performance and
delivery of the Department's Essential Functions under any
circumstance. The Department's Emergency Operations program aligns and
complies with Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8), ``National
Preparedness,'' and PPD-40, ``National Continuity Policy''.
CTCP provides effective capabilities to respond to any nuclear or
radiological incident or accident in the United States or abroad by
applying the unique technical expertise found across NNSA's nuclear
security enterprise. Highly trained NEST personnel with specialized
technical equipment maintain readiness to support lead Federal agencies
to locate and defeat potential nuclear and radiological threat devices,
to effectively manage the consequences of nuclear or radiological
emergencies, and to support enhanced security operations for National
Special Security Events (NSSE).
NNSA's Aerial Measuring System (AMS) provides airborne remote
sensing in the event of a nuclear or radiological accident or incident
within the United States, as well as in support of regularly scheduled
NSSEs. With the support of Congress, NNSA completed procurement of
three fixed-wing AMS aircraft in fiscal year 2020 and is in the process
of procuring two rotary-wing AMS aircraft. The new airframes will
minimize the risk of mission failure due to unscheduled maintenance and
reduce future maintenance costs.
NNSA provides specialized technology, equipment, and training to
regional Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) teams at FBI field
offices in 12 major American cities, enabling these teams to identify
and mitigate the function of a nuclear or radiological device. As part
of the Capability Forward initiative, the fiscal year 2021 requested
budget will enable CTCP to enhance WMD device defeat capabilities in
the current 12 cities; increase the number of regional counter-WMD FBI
teams in major metropolitan areas from 12 to 14 by fiscal year 2022;
and enhance NNSA facilities to accommodate increased training
requirements.
Complementing these efforts, the fiscal year 2021 budget sustains
and improves the Nation's capability to understand and counter nuclear
threats, informing a range of policy and technical efforts to detect
and defeat adversary efforts to illicitly acquire nuclear capabilities.
This work informs the capabilities of the military, intelligence, and
national security communities by leveraging the technical innovation of
the nuclear security enterprise to achieve increased confidence and
accuracy in predictive modeling and new tools in support of the nuclear
incident response mission.
CTCP provides technical and operational capabilities in support of
the interagency National Technical Nuclear Forensic mission. The fiscal
year 2021 budget reflects an increased NNSA role in the nuclear
forensics mission. NNSA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
will continue to engage with the Committee and the relevant homeland
security committees to secure agreement on transitioning leadership of
this mission from DHS to NNSA. When nuclear materials or devices are
interdicted or, in the event of a nuclear detonation, NNSA responds
with national laboratory expertise and deployable field teams to
provide technical analysis in support of the attribution process.
CTCP maintains an operational nuclear forensics capability in three
distinct areas: (1) pre-detonation device disassembly and examination;
(2) post-detonation assessment; and (3) analysis and characterization
of nuclear materials. The program maintains readiness to deploy device
disposition and device assessment teams, conduct laboratory operations
in support of analysis of bulk actinide forensics, and deploy subject
matter expertise and operational capabilities in support of ground
sample collections that support attribution of a nuclear detonation.
As referenced above, in fiscal year 2021, NNSA's request expands
our national technical nuclear forensics work. CTCP is requesting $40
million to support this effort. This scope of work includes assisting
in the coordination of interagency nuclear forensics activities through
the National Nuclear Forensics Center. Without the requested funding,
many technical experts will continue to leave this NPR priority mission
to pursue other areas of work, posing a threat to U.S. national
security.
naval reactors appropriation
Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of submarines and
aircraft carriers is critical to the security of the U.S. and its
allies as well as the security of global sea lanes. The Office of Naval
Reactors remains at the forefront of technological developments in
naval nuclear propulsion by advancing new technologies and improvements
in naval reactor performance. This preeminence provides the U.S. Navy
with a commanding edge in naval warfighting capabilities.
The fiscal year 2021 budget for Naval Reactors is $1.68 billion, an
increase of $35.6 million, or 2.2 percent, over the fiscal year 2020
enacted level. The budget request supports the requirements for Naval
Reactors' three major projects--Columbia-class reactor plant
development, the refueling overhaul of a research and training reactor
in New York, and the construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling
Facility in Idaho. The budget request also ensures Naval Reactors can
support the operational nuclear fleet, continue research and
development efforts for future generations of nuclear-powered warships,
and make progress on both the recapitalization of laboratory facilities
and the environmental remediation of legacy responsibilities.
The fiscal year 2020 enacted level, $1.6 billion, does not reflect
the mandated transfer of $88.5 million from Naval Reactors to Nuclear
Energy for the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor. Naval Reactors
has requested funding in fiscal year 2021 to support these projects and
fund necessary reactor technology development, equipment, construction,
maintenance, and modernization of critical infrastructure and
facilities. By employing a small but high-performing technical base,
the teams at Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in Pennsylvania; Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site in New York; and the Naval
Reactors Facility in Idaho can perform the research and development,
analysis, engineering, and testing needed to support today's fleet at
sea and develop future nuclear-powered warships. These laboratories
also perform the technical evaluations that enable Naval Reactors to
thoroughly assess emergent issues and deliver timely responses to
ensure nuclear safety and maximize operational flexibility.
federal salaries and expenses appropriation
The fiscal year 2021 budget request for Federal Salaries and
Expenses (FSE) is $454 million, an increase of $19.3 million, or 4.3
percent, over the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. This budget will
support an additional 83 Full Time Equivalents (FTE), a one percent
cost of living increase, five percent benefit escalation, and funding
for training, travel, support services, and field and headquarters
security investigations, among other workforce needs.
The 2018 NPR highlighted the need to properly support civilian
personnel who protect the U.S. against nuclear threats. Effective
deterrence would be impossible without the vital contributions our
personnel make to the U.S.' nuclear capabilities and deterrence.
NNSA must have sufficient people, with the right capabilities and
security clearances, to ensure we can modernize the nuclear deterrent,
recapitalize an aging infrastructure, and continue to meet the
requirements of our nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs. A
skilled federal workforce is required to execute appropriate program
and project oversight as the NSE is busier than it has been since the
end of the Cold War. NNSA requires additional staff to support growing
mission scope, including: (1) initiating new modernization programs,
and (2) new unique high hazard, high scrutiny plutonium pit production,
domestic uranium enrichment, tritium, lithium, and high explosives
projects.
In 2018, before the updated requirements included in the NPR, two
independent studies concluded that the NNSA had unmet critical staffing
needs. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and NNSA's CEPE
separately arrived at the conclusion that additional federal staff
would be needed to meet the demands of the NNSA mission. Both studies
recommended NNSA hire additional staff above its previous statutory cap
of 1,690 FTE positions. In March 2019, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) endorsed OPM and CEPE's conclusions across multiple NNSA
functions.
Congress, recognizing NNSA's need to properly support its growing
workforce, appropriated $434.7 million for FSE (at NNSA's fiscal year
2020 request level), authorized an additional 200 FTEs, and raised the
Excepted Service cap by 200. With this strong support from Congress in
fiscal year 2020, NNSA has focused on external hiring to reach an end
strength of 1,858 FTE positions.
During my tenure, NNSA implemented an aggressive hiring strategy to
address staffing requirements across the NSE. When the COVID-19
pandemic made in-person recruiting events impossible, the NNSA team
pivoted to virtual recruiting and held three virtual job fairs since
June. The most recent virtual job fair in August included all of the
national security laboratories, plants, and sites, providing us with
the opportunity to interact with over 1,500 candidates who are
interested in joining the nuclear security enterprise. All of the labs,
plants, and sites are on pace to meet their fiscal year 2020 hiring
goals.
With a renewed focus on recruitment in multiple cities and college
campuses to support all program areas, NNSA is recruiting the personnel
needed to successfully meet its mission growth and commitments as
directed in the 2018 NPR.
conclusion
NNSA's diverse and enduring national security missions are crucial
to the security of the U.S., the defense of its allies and partners,
and global stability. The U.S. nuclear deterrent has been and will
continue to remain the cornerstone of America's national security. NNSA
has the unique responsibility to ensure its continued safety, security,
reliability, and effectiveness.
Nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear counterterrorism activities
are essential to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and
preventing malicious use of nuclear and radioactive materials and
technology around the world. Nonproliferation and counterterrorism both
rely on the technical expertise uniquely available from Defense
Programs activities. Providing naval nuclear propulsion to the U.S.
Navy is crucial to the U.S. to defend interests abroad and protect the
world's commercial shipping lanes. The fiscal year 2021 budget request,
fully supported by the Senate and House versions of this year's NDAA,
supports the Administration's recognition of the urgency to restore our
Nation's nuclear security enterprise. NNSA is mindful of the resources
entrusted to it and gratefully recognizes the ongoing support of the
American people and Congress for these important missions.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you so much. Excellent statement.
We will now hear from Ellen Lord.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN M. LORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT
Secretary Lord. Thank you. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member
Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today.
I am pleased to be joined by colleagues, Administrator
Gordon-Hagerty and Admiral Richard, to discuss what four
successive Secretaries of Defense have called the Department of
Defense's highest priority mission: ensuring that the United
States has a safe, secure, reliable, and credible nuclear
deterrent now and in the future.
I would like to frame my remarks around three key points.
One, despite actions by the United States to lead the world
in reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, potential U.S.
adversaries have gone in the other direction.
Two, although effective today, the U.S. nuclear deterrent
remains dependent on aging weapons, platforms, delivery
systems, infrastructure, and nuclear command, control, and
communications, or NC3, systems built during the Cold War.
Three, DOD has embarked upon the first recapitalization of
our triad since the end of the Cold War, and we cannot do it
alone. The partnership between DOD and DOE and NNSA continues
to thrive through the interagency Nuclear Weapons Council, or
NWC.
Today we face a stark reality. The longstanding and
repeated warnings about the need to modernize and recapitalize
the U.S. nuclear deterrent is no longer a warning about the
future. The tipping point in recapitalization that we have long
tried to avoid is here, and we believe the condition of the
nuclear enterprise now poses possibly the greatest risk to
deterrence.
As the Under Secretary of Acquisition and Sustainment, I
serve as the chairwoman of the NWC, which oversees sustainment
and modernization of our nuclear weapons and supporting
infrastructure and ensures their alignment with DOD programs.
The NWC convenes every month to synchronize efforts between DOD
and NNSA. The NWC also reviews costs and schedules for options
related to the nuclear stockpile driving NNSA and the services
to meet requirements in ways that are both cost effective and
timely. As a result, the NWC's mission requires unprecedented
levels of cooperation and coordination between two independent
cabinet agencies to ensure that budget requests for nuclear
modernization are aligned and that Admiral Richard's
requirements are met.
Through our coordination in the NWC, NNSA's fiscal year
2021 budget request reflects the necessary funding needed to
meet DOD's requirements. The NWC recently convened to review
the House of Representatives' appropriations marks that will
affect the NWC's entire program of record, including the
ongoing B61-12 bomb, the W88 warhead, and W80-4 warhead
refurbishment efforts, as well as the longer- term
modernization programs.
On behalf of the NWC, I strongly urge full support for the
NNSA's budget request, as well as successful resolution of the
language in various fiscal year 2021 congressional bills that
would prevent the NWC from carrying out its statutorily
mandated responsibilities.
I want to thank this Committee for its longstanding
bipartisan support to our nuclear deterrent mission and the men
and women in uniform who are its backbone.
I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lord and Admiral Richard
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Ellen M. Lord and Admiral
Charles A. Richard
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement as
part of your hearing on matters relating to the budget of the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). We are pleased to join our NNSA colleague to discuss what four
successive Secretaries of Defense have called the Department of
Defense's highest priority mission: ensuring that the United States has
a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent--now and in
the future. As we continue to persevere through the COVID-19 pandemic,
we want to assure you that U.S. nuclear forces are fully manned and
fully ready today--in large part because they are backed by the world's
best scientists and engineers at DOE/NNSA.
As the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
(USD(A&S)) and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), we
both play key roles in the nuclear deterrent mission. In the interest
of brevity, we would like to frame our joint statement around three key
points:
1. Despite actions by the United States to lead the world in
reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, potential U.S. adversaries have
gone in the other direction and placed greater emphasis on modernizing
and expanding their nuclear weapons, delivery platforms,
infrastructure, and command and control.
2. Although effective today, the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains
dependent on aging weapons; delivery systems; infrastructure; and
nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems built during
the Cold War.
3. DoD has embarked upon the first recapitalization of our triad
since the end of the Cold War, and we cannot do it alone. The
partnership between DoD and DOE/NNSA continues to thrive through the
interagency Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), and the NWC has made
tremendous progress to align priorities, schedules, and investments
between the Departments to ensure the future viability of our Nation's
nuclear deterrent.
Today, we find ourselves fielding a smaller Cold War-era nuclear
arsenal to deter a more diverse set of nuclear-armed potential
adversaries. These potential adversaries are collectively fielding more
modern, technologically sophisticated, and varied nuclear forces, and
doing so at an alarming rate. Strategic competition among existing
nuclear powers has intensified, while challenges from newly established
or aspiring nuclear weapons States continue to grow.
Our nuclear deterrent underwrites every U.S. military operation
across the globe; it is the foundation and backstop of our national
defense. It has kept the peace among the Great Powers of the world for
over 70 years and has been strongly supported by each Administration
and Congress regardless of political party. Furthermore, assuring
allies and partners depends on their confidence in the credibility of
our extended nuclear deterrence. We cannot overemphasize the immediate
need to modernize our nuclear delivery systems and stockpile. To ensure
the deterrent is credible in the face of future threats, we must also
recapitalize NNSA's supporting infrastructure. Without consistent,
methodical, and immediate investment in NNSA's nuclear enterprise, we
will increase operational risk and degrade the Triad's flexibility to
address future strategic uncertainty--thereby endangering our ability
to meet the enduring national security objectives, shared by current
and previous Administrations, which have underwritten the safety of our
Nation for many decades.
The longstanding and repeated warnings about the need to modernize
and recapitalize the U.S. nuclear deterrent are no longer warnings
about the future. The tipping point in recapitalization, that we have
long tried to avoid, is here. Previous and well-intentioned directive
policy changes and de-emphasis of our nuclear deterrent resulted in
decades of deferred investments in nuclear warheads, delivery systems,
platforms, NC3, and supporting infrastructure. Although sustainment
efforts have allowed us to maintain a viable nuclear Triad and to defer
modernization investments for many years, continued delays are no
longer an option. The mounting programmatic risks are now being
realized and transferred to DoD as operational risk impacting strategic
deterrence, and we believe the condition of the nuclear enterprise now
poses possibly the greatest risk to deterrence.
Nearly all of the systems that compose the current nuclear
deterrent are well beyond their original service lives and can no
longer be cost-effectively life-extended to meet future requirements.
DoD is addressing challenges with our aging NC3, delivery systems, and
platforms. DOE/NNSA is facing similar challenges as the nuclear
warheads in the stockpile continue to age and are being sustained well
beyond their original service lives. Additionally, much of the DOE/NNSA
nuclear weapons production infrastructure dates to the 1950s or earlier
and requires investment to provide a safe, secure working environment
with the required capabilities and capacities; the majority of this
infrastructure is rated as being in no better than fair condition. As a
result, the community faces a situation where we must execute
concurrent acquisition and fielding of modern replacement systems in
each leg of the Triad while also investing in an updated nuclear
weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure.
As USD(A&S) and Commander, USSTRATCOM, we both serve on the NWC.
The NWC is a joint DoD and DOE/NNSA coordinating body established by
Congress to facilitate the alignment of requirements and to establish
priorities as the two Departments fulfill their shared responsibility
for providing the Nation's nuclear deterrent. The NWC's current
structure and business processes are working well and enable senior-
level attention and decisions on capabilities and capacities needed to
maintain and modernize an effective nuclear weapons stockpile that
meets the requirements of an increasingly challenging international
security environment. The NWC regularly convenes to synchronize efforts
between DoD and DOE/NNSA on the vision, strategy, and execution of the
nuclear program aligned with the National Defense Strategy. The NWC
also reviews costs and schedules for options related to the nuclear
stockpile, driving DOE/NNSA and the Military Departments and Services
to meet requirements in ways that are both cost-effective and timely.
The NWC fully supports DOE/NNSA's efforts to establish a responsive and
resilient nuclear security enterprise to meet U.S. deterrence and
assurance needs. A responsive enterprise ensures DOE/NNSA can attract
and retain a world-class workforce capable of responding to the dynamic
and uncertain future we face.
Across both DoD and DOE/NNSA, the Administration is taking strong
action to modernize our nuclear deterrent. The President's Fiscal Year
2021 Budget Request for DOE/NNSA fully supports the funding levels
necessary to continue the critical modernization efforts needed to
preserve our Nation's capability for deterring nuclear and non-nuclear
attacks; assuring allies and partners; achieving U.S. objectives if
deterrence fails; and hedging against an uncertain future. It also
supports critical programs to ensure they remain synchronized across
both Departments, and it puts us closer to ensuring the long-term
flexibility and credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. We recognize
this is a 20-year nuclear modernization journey that we should have
started 15 years ago.
The recent fiscal year 2021 budget marks and policy language
proposed by the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations,
should they be enacted in the final bills, would significantly
jeopardize DOE/NNSA's ability to meet DoD requirements, threaten the
critical infrastructure and technical skills required to provide an
effective and credible nuclear deterrent, and prevent the NWC from
carrying out its statutory role to coordinate nuclear weapons
activities between the two Departments. The NWC recently convened to
review the appropriations marks that would affect the NWC's entire
Program of Record, including the ongoing B61-12 bomb, W88 warhead, and
W80-4 warhead refurbishment efforts as well as the longer-term
modernization programs. We strongly encourage Congress to authorize and
appropriate the full budget request for DOE/NNSA and urge resolution of
the policy language in a manner that enables the NWC to continue as an
effective coordinating body for the Nation's highest priority defense
mission.
In closing, we thank this Committee for its longstanding,
bipartisan support for our nuclear deterrent mission and for the men
and women--both in and out of uniform--who are its backbone. We look
forward to responding to your questions.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Admiral Richard, let me, first of all, thank you for your
long, enduring service to our country. We appreciate and love
you very much. You are recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES A. RICHARD, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
Admiral Richard. Well, thank you for that, Chairman Inhofe,
and good morning to you, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished
Members of the Committee. It is an honor to be here today
alongside Ms. Lord and Ms. Gordon-Hagerty and a privilege to
represent the 150,000 men and women performing U.S. Strategic
Command's missions every day. I am constantly reminded by the
dedication of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
civilians who maintain the watch, particularly in these COVID
operating environments we are now that the people of U.S.
Strategic Command have a can-do attitude that I have rarely
seen elsewhere.
I want to thank the President and the Secretary of Defense,
Chairmen for their continued leadership and confidence.
I want to thank Congress and particularly this Committee
for your support in ensuring the Department, STRATCOM, and our
interagency partners, particularly the Department of Energy,
have the required resources necessary to execute our mission to
deter strategic attacks and guarantee the security of our
Nation and our allies. Congressional support, budget stability,
and on-time appropriations are essential requirements for a
long-term view approach to defense, allowing my command to
realize presidential guidance, interagency goals.
The President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget supports
implementation of the National Security Strategy, meets my
operational requirements, and responds to evolving existential
threats we face.
First, what I would like to do is offer that these
commitments are necessary because our country, our allies,
partners, and the current world order continues to confront
existential threats. Both China and Russia are investing
considerable resources to advance and expand their nuclear
arsenals, conventional forces, and they are adopting an
increasingly assertive posture threatening the use of force to
fundamentally alter the accepted international norms and rules
at the expense of our Nation and allies. North Korea and Iran
continue to conduct harmful activities regionally, causing
instability and threatening the United States, our allies, and
partners.
As a global combatant command, STRATCOM forces, my forces,
are prepared to respond to any contingency, and should
strategic deterrence fail, we stand ready to deliver a decisive
response. A powerful, ready triad, survivable nuclear command,
control, and communications with supporting infrastructure are
foundational to our strategic deterrence and assurance
strategies. They are fundamental to national survival, and this
part is important. This is my job is to set the conditions
strategic deterrence is holding that allow the rest of the
joint force to accomplish its mission.
Our Nation is at a critical juncture regarding the future
of our nuclear forces. We have led the world in reducing the
numbers and types of nuclear weapons in our arsenal while our
adversaries, potential adversaries, continue expanding their
strategic capabilities across multiple domains. It is now our
generation's turn to make the same wise investments required to
deter nuclear or other strategic attacks and great power war
for future generations.
Starting with our nuclear weapons complex, if we fail to
start investing wisely now, the result may be--and this is the
tipping point that we have referred to--the need to rebuild
nearly from scratch over one or more decades our human capital
and the technical expertise required to be a nuclear power.
Given stable and consistent funding, I remain confident NNSA
will meet the expectations we are asking and succeed in
addressing the bow wave of activities confronting us. We must
continue the Department's number one priority to recapitalize
our nuclear forces, including weapons construction and
maintenance with supporting infrastructure.
We do not pursue parity with our adversaries' arsenals nor
seek an arms race, but provide for a qualitative and
comprehensive approach toward a viable deterrent for the
future.
STRATCOM is focused on maintaining a safe, secure, and
effective deterrent force, providing tailored strategies to
meet our responsibilities. We were tested by COVID, rose to the
challenge.
I am grateful for your continued support which aids
development of the future force necessary to execute the
Department's highest priority mission.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral Richard.
We will now begin with questions. I will begin. The first
question I have would be for Secretary Lord.
Any decent coordination requires the DOD and NNSA to share
budget data well before it is developed and presented. Can you
tell me what changes that you have made in the NWC process for
reviewing the NNSA budget after last year's fiasco? Are there
any further steps that you are considering for improving the
process? Is there anything that we can do to make that easier
for you?
Secretary Lord. Yes, thank you. In May I signed out
planning guidance for the NWC to compel NNSA to share their
budget details by September 1 of each year so the Nuclear
Weapons Council could review it and understand how it pairs
with DOD's proposed budget. We did this year in early September
receive that budget, and in fact, just yesterday we had a
Nuclear Weapons Council meeting in which we reviewed details of
that.
What we have done additionally is come up with a construct
for a working group to do a budget deep dive. We actually have
an outline here that we put forth that talks about a September
22nd date for stockpile management, a 29th date for
infrastructure and operations, October 6th for stockpile RT&E,
and October 13th production modernization, with a goal of
coming back to the Nuclear Weapons Council and understanding in
depth the assumptions behind what is submitted to Congress.
What we plan to do is update our guidance, our planning
guidance, this year with a generic form of this to again help
guide the process so that we are well aligned.
I think it is worth pointing out that this working group
has not only NNSA representation and a variety of DOD
representation, but OMB as well. So in this way, we will
synchronize efforts and align.
Chairman Inhofe. Excellent.
Let me just ask a little bit further. Do you believe that
your policy and the Senate's NDAA language both aim to improve
transparency and accountability on the NNSA budget and ensure
that the Nuclear Weapons Council is not surprised 0 the way it
was the first year?
Secretary Lord. Yes.
Chairman Inhofe. That is good.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, do you believe that the DOD
and the NNSA coordination would improve if each better
understood the internal workings of the other?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Mr. Chairman, I believe that
the system that we have in place right now and with the
improvements that we have made throughout the NWC with the
signing of the materials in May will improve greatly the
transparency of the NNSA budget within the NWC. It is critical
that we continue to operate as we have been over the last
couple of years under Under Secretary Lord's leadership and
with the great partnership that we have throughout the NWC.
Chairman Inhofe. Very good.
Now, on the other hand, the recent legislation in the House
would prohibit NNSA from working with DOD in the Nuclear
Weapons Council and put the Secretary of Energy on the Nuclear
Weapons Council. Secretary Lord, how would this legislation
affect coordination between DOD and NNSA? Would this extra
layer of bureaucracy make it more or less efficient?
Secretary Lord. It would make it far less efficient and I
am afraid might destroy the relationship right now that we have
between DOD, as well as NNSA. There are also very problematical
cuts to the budget, $2 billion, in NNSA that would directly
impair our ability to deliver B61-12, which we are on record
with the first production unit in 2021, as well as the W80-4
warhead. There were also other cuts called out. In W93, it was
zeroed out; Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), $170 million;
Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), $60 million.
Essentially a lot of the language removes the semi-autonomous
nature of NNSA.
It also elevates the Nuclear Weapons Council to two cabinet
level positions, which I think is absolutely unfeasible,
particularly as we do have a cadence of monthly meetings that
focus on specific programs. We generate a lot of very specific
reports and do a lot of in-depth program reviews.
Chairman Inhofe. Excellent.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what damage would be done to
the DOD and the NNSA relationship if you were not allowed to
work through the Nuclear Weapons Council?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. The Secretary of Energy has
testified that he supports the elevation of the Nuclear Weapons
Council to support co-chairs of the Secretary of Energy and
Secretary of Defense. In my 30-plus years as a career civil
servant, in and out of Government, and working with the NWC,
what I can say is that the system that we have in place right
now and unless otherwise directed by Congress to change is
working well, and we are working at an operational level, if
you will, making the decisions necessary at the, if you will,
action officers, sub-cabinet level because it is important that
we can be decisive. With two cabinet officials, they certainly
are busy with the work of their respective departments. What I
can say is that the administration does oppose it.
Chairman Inhofe. That is very good.
The House appropriations bill cuts the President's request,
the NNSA request, by almost $2 billion. Now, we went through
this exercise once before, and we know what we had to do to get
back where we are supposed to be.
Madam Administrator, can you explain why your fiscal year
2021 budget request grew from the previous year and what the $2
billion cut this year would do to your programs? Would you be
able to meet the DOD requirements?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Sir, in a word, no, we would
not be able to meet the requirements of the Department of
Defense. We recognize that this is quite an aggressive
schedule, but I am confident that the NNSA can execute.
We developed the fiscal year 2021 budget based on risk-
informed, systematic requirements. We involved all of our
laboratories, plants, and sites leadership and prioritized what
the missions would be so that we could execute our roles and
responsibilities insofar as supporting the nuclear deterrent.
It was a result of a yearlong requirements-based budget to
prioritize those missions within NNSA that needed to be done.
Again, like I said, we had all of our labs, plants, and sites
involved in this from the outset.
It is interesting that we talk about the 18-plus percent
increase from fiscal year 2020 appropriated levels to fiscal
year 2021. There is a reason for this. Over the last 20 years
or so, the NNSA operated with basically one life extension
program, one modernization program. That was the 76-1. We are
operating right now with requirements for four major
modernization programs, and if authorized and appropriated,
there will be a fifth with the W93. So we are really
essentially waking up our system.
Over the last several decades with the lack of funding and
the lack of support that we had received from previous
administrations and previous Congresses, we are at a tipping
point. We have no more time. We must pursue this aggressive
strategy to recapitalize our infrastructure and make sure that
we have the men and women throughout our nuclear enterprise to
be able to execute these missions.
We are in a good position now. Again, I know it is an
aggressive schedule, but I have the commitment of our
laboratories, plants, and management leadership that we will be
able to execute these very important missions to maintain a
nuclear deterrent second to none.
Chairman Inhofe. Secretary Lord, we heard from Energy that
they have stated that they have all the information, budget
data information, sent to us for coordination. Now, this seems
to be different than what happened last year. So I would just
ask you the question. Have you received what you need to
execute the Nuclear Weapons Council's statutory responsibility
to review and approve the NNSA budget?
Secretary Lord. We have gotten what was submitted to
Congress--what will be. We still have a bit of work to do to
understand the intent and the scope of what those numbers
encompass. That is why we put this working group together that
I mentioned before. I believe we have about another month's
worth of work to do to make sure that we are fully aligned
between NNSA and DOD, and that is working along with OMB as
well.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes. That is good.
You know, I say to our Members on both sides of the aisle
that we have something at your desk I believe similar to what
is on the charts showing the state of disrepair that is out
there right now. This has been totally ignored in the past.
When you look at that, it is hard to believe that we could
expand our activity effectively with that infrastructure.
Administrator, do you agree that we urgently need to
modernize NNSA's nuclear weapons infrastructure?
I would also ask Admiral Richard, are increased investments
in the NNSA nuclear weapons infrastructure needed to maintain
our Nation's nuclear deterrent capabilities?
Let us start with the Administrator.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for putting those pictures up.
Let me start by saying more than 50 percent of our
enterprise is more than 40 years old, and one-third of it dates
back to the 1940s. So, therefore, time is of the essence to
recapitalize our infrastructure throughout the entire NNSA.
Long gone are the days where we would be able to just patch
these facilities.
For example, one of the pictures you have is perhaps of the
lithium facility at Y-12. Portions of the ceiling are falling
in. I think that is atrocious that we put potentially our
workforce at risk. We need to make sure that we have state-of-
the-art infrastructure so we can recapitalize our enterprise
and make sure that we can provide to the Department of Defense
the requirements that they so sorely need to maintain our
nuclear deterrent.
Our main priority is to remain completely aligned with the
Department of Defense, and the only way to do so is to make
sure that we have state-of-the-art facilities, together with
the workforce that is necessary to carry out our unique
missions, unique only to the NNSA.
Chairman Inhofe. That is very good. I really appreciate the
responses to these questions in a very straightforward way.
I would only conclude by asking Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, what
kind of problems do you have on this COVID-19? How has that
impaired your ability to do your job?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Mr. Chairman, COVID-19
established unprecedented realities for our entire nuclear
security enterprise. My number one priority is for the health
and safety of our workforce. Throughout COVID, however, we did
not have the opportunity to maximum telework. We did do our
best, however. Because of our unique missions throughout NNSA,
we had to maintain the nuclear weapons complex. In so doing,
however, we provided resources necessary and direction to our
entire enterprise to support ongoing activities. I am heartened
to say that we did not miss one major milestone or one delivery
to the Air Force or to the Navy throughout this time. However,
those challenges had to be prioritized. There were some
missions that certainly fell below the priority line so that we
could continue to maximize telework where possible and protect
our workforce, which again is our number one priority.
That said, we do have some challenges ahead of us. We are
going to have other missions that had been put essentially on
hold, and we are going to have to make up for lost production.
So we do have challenges ahead, but we recognize the great work
of men and women of our workforce and what they have been able
to do to ensure that the Department of Defense receives the
necessary support throughout COVID.
Chairman Inhofe. Good. That is very good.
John Bonsell just reminded me, Admiral, that I asked you a
question but did not give you a chance to answer that question.
Your answer to the question is very important to be a part of
the record of this meeting.
Admiral Richard. Chairman, I thank you for that. The short
answer to your question is yes. In fact, it is an emphatic yes.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty just gave you some details of the
condition of this infrastructure. I want to applaud you for
your interest in this question. Remember, some of this stuff
dates back to the Manhattan Project, and it goes beyond--Ms.
Lord just gave a very good summary of individual impacts. I
offer that those programmatic impacts transfer to me as
operational risks that I have to take in terms of capabilities
that are not available for me to use to execute what the Nation
has asked me to do.
But it is even more fundamental than that. This strikes at
the core of our credibility as a nuclear weapons state. The
point here is that both our allies and our competitors watch
what we do, and it is important for us to demonstrate our
commitment to this mission set. If we do not recapitalize now,
we are going to cross these points of no return where we will
not be able to reassemble either the human talent or the
physical plant for unlimited amounts of money for very long
periods of time so that I and future STRATCOM commanders can
have the capabilities needed to execute this mission.
Chairman Inhofe. That is good.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you again to the witnesses.
Under Secretary Lord, what triggered a lot of this
attention, activity, and today's hearing in some respect was
the fact that you could not, for the first time, certify--the
NWC--the adequacy of the budget and our ability to respond to
these concerns.
I think it would be helpful if you could just give us a
brief summary of what happened.
Secretary Lord. So what happened last year was we did not
have sufficient insight until a few days before the President's
budget dropped to understand how well aligned the NNSA's and
DOD's budgets were. So that led us to write a February 10th,
2020 letter saying that we were unable to certify the budget.
We then dug in and did the work that frankly we are doing
right now on the 2022 budget so that by May 26th, I could
certify the budget.
Senator Reed. As you have indicated, you have received
information from the Department of Energy about the budget, but
you suggest that it is not fully complete and you need more
information. Is that accurate?
Secretary Lord. Well, they submitted--NNSA--what they were
compelled to do, yes. However, in order to understand what is
contained in those numbers, because we are talking about
multiple programs on all three legs of the triad, we need to
have conversations because, for instance, when you look at the
$2 billion mark there is right now, it might not be intuitively
obvious how that would affect certain programs because it is a
lot of the infrastructure and it is a lot of the supporting
work that is done. So we need to make sure that not only the
direct costs, if you will, that affect our weapons
modernization or maintenance of the stockpile are addressed but
also the indirect costs that allow you to have the workforce, a
trained workforce, that allows you to have the facilities
required and so forth.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, one of the areas that caused
much confusion last year was the point I made in my 0
statement, the no-year money. This is monies that NNSA--for
example, apparently there is money from 2007 on international
agreements that still have not been spent. We learned this year
there could be as much as $8 billion in money sent to the labs
and plants, committed or costed but not spent. It is still
there and it is still available. That is about 40 percent of
your budget.
The Department of Defense generally has very clear
guidelines about spend rates so that this type of accumulation
does not take place.
Can you give a more detailed explanation of this carryover
or no-year money?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. Thank you, Senator Reed.
NNSA has worked significantly to minimize our carryovers
and have worked to make sure that this process is transparent.
In fact, I am pleased to say that for the fiscal year 2019
budget, NNSA has net funds of only $384 million for $15.6
billion budget. That is significant.
Despite the fact that there is this question about whether
or not we have $8 billion in carryover despite its being an
impressive number, in fact, it is a reasonable amount for NNSA,
given that we are executing 5-year plan funding for a profile
of over $100 billion. In fact, it is a prudent management
approach, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
actually agrees with this. We are, in fact, one of the federal
agencies--we are at or below the common figures for carryover
throughout the Federal Government. We are consistent with or
even lower than other federal agencies.
This carryover is used for long-planned life extension
programs, infrastructure activities, including capital
construction projects such as the Uranium Processing Facility
(UPF).
In terms of the nonproliferation issues and the multiyear
projects, those are international projects that cannot be
executed in a year or in the year in which they were funded.
Many of these returns of highly enriched uranium or separated
plutonium to keep the world safer take multiple years to
execute. For example, we had a multiyear effort we just
completed with the United Kingdom. That was over 7 years in
order to complete, so where it might look like it is no-year or
carryover money, in fact it is dedicated to or committed to
specific programs.
Senator Reed. There are other offices in DOE like the
Office of Environmental Management that has received a
decrement. Could they use carryover money either NNSA or other
carryover money?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. I am not quite sure about the
other carryover money, sir. However, these monies are again
obligated to programs that are ongoing, long lead time
procurements or long construction projects like our capital
construction projects such as UPF.
Senator Reed. One of the impressions I had last year was
that OMB's interpretation of the carryover money was critical
to the decisions that were made. Are they fully in agreement
with your position?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. Admiral Richard, for a final question. As we
all know, we are recapitalizing the triad, a huge, huge
undertaking and one we have not done in decades. There is the
likelihood, because of a little bit of rustiness in our system,
that there is going to be some slippage.
Can you talk about the contingency plans you have if you
encounter slippage?
Admiral Richard. Well, Ranking Member, one, I thank you for
the question, and the answer is initially I have been very
impressed by both the services and the Department of Defense's
ability to minimize the chance that there is going to be
slippage. In fact, I would prefer that we continue to ask the
question, what is it going to take for these programs to come
in on time, instead of assuming that there is going to be a
slippage inside that.
Part of how we got to the point to delay the
recapitalization of the triad as long as we did is we have
already used just about all the available operational margin.
So if we keep going, I will, one, expend the remaining hedges
that are inside our triad, which are put there for a number of
risks, including operational, technical, and geopolitical.
Those will not be available because we will have expended them
early on programmatic. Then beyond that, I will have to start
to revisit what elements of our strategy I cannot execute.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Since we will have some of our members on Webex and are not
here physically and we are not real sure, certain if some
others may be here, I will go ahead and go down the list as if
everyone were here and then catch the next one in line.
Senator Wicker would be next, I understand he is not
present by Webex, so Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am here in my
office. Thank you for holding this extremely important hearing.
Administrator, I would like to look at the House budget in
a little more detail. I know you touched on it with the
chairman. But when we are looking at that proposed funding at
$1.9 billion below the level that was requested for the fiscal
year 2021 budget, many of the larger cuts seem to be falling on
plutonium modernization efforts and infrastructure.
Can you describe the impact that this cut would have on
your mission?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Nice to see you, Chairman
Fischer, even by Webex. Thank you.
I would like to touch in more detail on the proposed cuts
and the implications they would have from the House Energy and
Water Development (HEWD) $2 billion. The impacts, like you
said, would also affect our plutonium pit production.
Bottom line is that with the cuts, no matter how small they
may be in individual programs, in the aggregate they make a
profound difference in being able to modernize and recapitalize
our capabilities throughout the nuclear weapons enterprise.
Insofar as the plutonium pit production, that will take us
off course. Now, recognizing we do have an aggressive schedule
to make 26 pits in 2026 at Los Alamos and indefinitely, as well
as 50 pits per year at the proposed Savannah River plutonium
production facility in 2030, this would take us off our
schedule. We are committed to Congress and to our Department of
Defense counterparts that we will be able to commit to
producing not less than 80 pits per year in 2030. This proposed
cut in the HEWD mark will affect that, and we will not be able
to make that commitment any longer should the 2021 proposed
HEWD mark go forward.
Additionally, we have other responsibilities. Let me just
say that is a $500 million, or a half a billion, cut to our pit
production, and those highest impacts will make sure again that
we will not be able to make our commitments for the 87-1 and
the other programs for which pit production is important.
The mark, although it fully supports the 87-1 and the 80-4
LEPs, the two life extension programs, those cuts would have
negative impacts across our entire enterprise. While it fully
supports that, it cuts non-nuclear production at Kansas City,
and it cuts programs for our Y-12 canned subassembly, the
secondaries for our nuclear explosive package. So those cuts
will cause major delays in all of our programs and actually
result in increased costs to the taxpayer in the future.
One of the other cuts that is most notable is to the UPF,
the uranium processing facility, at Y-12. This is a program
that has been on target and on schedule and on budget for the
last 7 years. The UPF is a signature capability that actually
shows that we are committed to major capital construction
projects. This facility will replace the old 92-12 at Y-12,
which was built in the Manhattan Project days. So long gone are
the days where we have just built facilities. Now what we are
doing is we are completing a comprehensive conceptual design
plan, and we are moving forward. The cuts of $150 million----
Senator Fischer. Administrator, if I can interrupt you a
little bit to get another point in that I would like to make.
Critics of the fiscal year 2021 budget request for NNSA--they
described it as, quote, trying to do far too much too quickly.
They called for the reductions in order to, in their words,
give NNSA more breathing room.
But is it not true that consistently underfunding the NNSA
and delaying these programs--that has created the urgent
situation that we now find ourselves in? That is now the need
for significant resources that we are looking at in this budget
because underfunding the NNSA is not the solution. It is the
opposite I believe is what has caused this problem in the first
place.
Would you agree with that?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. I would, and even the GAO had
described that NNSA would encounter a bow wave of requirements
that would impact us in the not too distant future, and in
fact, that bow wave has hit us today.
Senator Fischer. Right.
Secretary Lord and Admiral Richard, how does the Department
of Defense view that risk associated with this level of funding
for NNSA?
Secretary Lord. I will say, Senator, that it is a very,
very significant risk, and it will begin in the next couple of
years. This is not a risk out late this decade or in the early
2030s. Very significant.
Admiral Richard. Ma'am, I would offer that it risks to de-
synchronize the delivery system from the weapon, delaying both,
making them cost more, and depriving me of capabilities I need.
Senator Fischer. Admiral, what do you hear from allies who
are obviously following this discussion very closely?
Admiral Richard. It is our commitment to them is what
requires these capabilities to be present. Without these
capabilities, that conversation gets much more difficult.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Next would be by Webex Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a number of questions for Administrator Gordon-
Hagerty. Administrator, you have previously noted that it was
your, ``intention to ensure that NNSA's primary customer, the
Department of Defense, receives the necessary support to
execute its vitally important national security missions.''
Would you say that you have achieved your intent?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Hirono, I would say
that based on our fiscal year 2021 request, we will be in a
place where we will be able to move forward in supporting the
critical missions of the Department of Defense and providing
them with the resources necessary to defend our Nation and to
maintain a nuclear deterrent that is second to none.
If, however, we do not receive the resources necessary in
the 2021 and future budgets, we will not be able to commit
those requirements--be able to maintain those requirements and
our commitments to the Department of Defense.
Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, and Under Secretary Lord,
do you agree that the Department of Energy is providing the
necessary support provided that we provide the necessary funds
to meet the needs of the Department of Defense?
Secretary Lord. Senator, we are currently working through a
lot of details on the 2022 budget to understand that. In terms
of the 2021 budget, that does need to be fully funded. If not,
we will not meet the needs of DOD. Thank you.
Senator Hirono. Admiral, do you agree?
Admiral Richard. Ma'am, as a member of the Nuclear Weapons
Council, I agree and concur with what Ms. Lord said.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Again, for the Administrator. The DOE is supporting efforts
to develop new nuclear reactor designs for our commercial use,
but your fiscal year 2021 request includes a decrease in
funding for defense nuclear and nonproliferation programs by
6.2 percent.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how are you ensuring new
nuclear materials technologies and expertise are prevented from
becoming a proliferation concern?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Actually, Senator, our budget
for fiscal year 2021 request is in reality a 4.5 percent
increase over the fiscal year 2020 appropriated funds. The
difference, however, is the termination of the MOX facility. We
did not need resources since we had terminated it in the last
year and a half. So in fact, we are continuing on a very
productive path for nonproliferation efforts throughout the
Department of Energy/NNSA defense nuclear nonproliferation.
We are working very closely with the commercial side and
the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy about
proliferation-resistant reactor technologies and other matters.
So we are working very closely because we are committed to
defense nuclear nonproliferation efforts and the technical
expertise that is resident in Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
(DNN).
Senator Hirono. Can you just very briefly describe some of
the specific efforts that NNSA has undertaken to address
advanced reactor and fuel cycle technology in terms 0 of
nonproliferation policy and technology?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. Again, we are working
very closely with the Office of Nuclear Energy in the
Department of Energy that works on advanced nuclear fuel cycles
and the fuels that support them.
Insofar as the defense nuclear nonproliferation, we are
working on proliferation-resistant technologies. We are also
working other programs such as going from HEU, highly enriched
uranium, to low-enriched uranium proliferation- resistant
technologies, and we are supporting programs throughout the
world in returning those materials or going from highly
enriched uranium to low-enriched proliferation- resistant
technologies for those reactors so that they can continue to
operate safely and securely.
Senator Hirono. Madam Administrator, I think you can tell
by my questions that I have concerns about nuclear
proliferation, which is one of your missions to make sure that
does not happen. NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation mission is
very important to prevent our adversaries from acquiring
nuclear weapons or weapons usable materials technology and
expertise.
What are the biggest challenges facing NNSA in preserving
its long-term foundational nuclear nonproliferation
capabilities, especially with respect to NNSA's ability to
counter emerging or over-the-horizon proliferation risks?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. We are working with numerous
friends and allies around the world and other countries to
ensure that we can do what is possible and necessary to secure
nuclear materials around the world and to stop potential
adversaries becoming proliferant nations. We have a robust
program where we work with over 100 countries around the world.
We have removed thousands of kilograms of highly enriched
uranium and separated plutonium from around the world through
take-back programs and securing those facilities around the
world as well.
Defense nuclear nonproliferation is one of our three
signature missions in the NNSA. It has my full support. We have
got a great leadership team, and we again at NNSA are unique in
our skill set and the technical expertise resident throughout
NNSA to be able to carry out these functions worldwide.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you all for appearing today. This is
one of the most important hearings we do every year because
there is nothing more fundamental to our Nation's security than
our nuclear weapons.
Some people will say why do we spend so much money on
weapons that we never use, to which I reply, one, we spend not
much money on these weapons relative to our entire Department
of Defense, but two, more fundamentally we use our nuclear
weapons every single day and we have for 75 years to prevent
the kind of horrific world wars we saw in the last century.
That is why I said 3 years ago, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, at your
confirmation hearing, that you hold one of the most
consequential if not the most prominent positions in our
Federal Government.
I want to commend you on your leadership over these last
few years. I think the NNSA has been focused and is beginning
to recover from years of neglect before you took office, and
that is due in large part to your efforts.
Could you give us a quick high level review of the tasks to
which you committed in that hearing 3 years ago and where
things stand now at NNSA?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Cotton, some of the
priorities that I laid out at my confirmation hearing nearly 3
years ago were the following: to regenerate and recapitalize
our plutonium pit production capability that, as I mentioned in
my opening statement, was shuttered 30 years ago. That is
simply untenable that we have no capability to produce the
critical components for a nuclear explosive package throughout
the nuclear security enterprise. I committed to that. We are
well on our way to producing the 10 war reserve pits in 2024,
20 in 2025, and 30 in 2026 at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory. We have got a great team there. We are making great
progress in plutonium pit production and recapitalization.
One of the other things I committed to was the Savannah
River plutonium facility, and what we are doing is working so
that we can attain a capability to produce not less than 50
pits per year in 2030. I recognized at that time and I
recognize it today that recapitalizing a facility that was
shuttered from the previous MOX facility and being able to
produce a capability here in the United States to manufacture
plutonium pits was our number one priority and it is my
commitment today.
The second thing I committed to was reenergizing--
recruiting and retaining a world-class workforce. As I
mentioned, more than 30 percent of our workforce is eligible
for retirement in the next 5 years. That is simply untenable
that if we are going to maintain a second-to-none nuclear
deterrent, we need the best and brightest scientists,
engineers, technicians, back office support to be able to
conduct and execute our highly important missions. I am happy
to say that we put together a corporate approach pretty much
breaking the paradigm of the government bureaucracy hiring
processes. We committed to hiring 7,000 people this last year,
and we exceeded those numbers, and even amidst COVID, we have
exceeded the numbers for our planned fiscal year 2020 hiring.
Those were some of the priorities that I promised and I
committed to, and I think we are well on our way by the great
men and women throughout the NNSA enterprise.
Senator Cotton. Thank you very much.
No amount of leadership, though, can modernize our nuclear
weapons. For that you need money. There has been a lot of back
and forth today about the budget request and how it came about.
The bottom line is, though, you need this money, our Nation
needs this money to maintain our nuclear deterrent, $19.8
billion was the request for the upcoming fiscal year which
starts in a couple weeks. Regrettably, we are going to pass a
short-term spending bill, but when we do finally pass that full
year spending bill, is $19.8 billion adequate in your opinion
to modernize our nuclear weapons and perform NNSA's other
important missions?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, sir. If appropriated at
the 2021 request, which is $19.8 billion, that will serve as
the new floor for the NNSA enterprise. We are committed to
supporting the four or possibly five modernization programs for
the Department of Defense, committed to providing militarily
effective nuclear propulsion for the United States Navy, as
well as our commitment to defense nuclear nonproliferation and
arms control efforts. But that is assuming that we will receive
that $19.8 billion. If we do not receive that, I cannot commit
to you that we continue to remain aligned with the Department
of Defense for their missions to execute our nuclear deterrent.
Senator Cotton. What will be your request for fiscal year
2022?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Sir, I am not at liberty to
talk about the fiscal year 2022----
Senator Cotton. I thought I might slip it by you.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. I guess not.
I would note that a 2 percent increase, which is just the
rate of inflation, would be $20.2 billion, though.
Ms. Lord, very briefly. You have sent a letter to the
Committee that says that the House's legislation from the
Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee would provide
insufficient funds to execute the activities necessary for our
nuclear weapons stockpile.
Could you explain briefly what the near-term impacts on the
readiness would be if we adopted the House's approach?
Secretary Lord. Yes, Senator. The nearest-term fallout from
that would be a delay in the B61-12 in 2021 would be the first
impact. We would also see an effect on the W80-4 warhead, and
then if the W93 was zeroed out, we could not support the U.K.
in the alignment of programs we have where we support them with
non-nuclear as well as science and technology. The LRSO, very,
very important to us because we have zero margin with Air-
Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) timing out. That $170 million
mark would be catastrophic, as well as ground-based strategic
deterrent, our intercontinental ballistic missile replacing
Minuteman III where again we have zero margin. That $60 million
mark would not allow us to meet the time frame we need.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. Those are all dire consequences
for the American people, not to mention our British allies.
Secretary Lord. Absolutely.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today, and thank you for your
service to our Nation.
In February, I led a letter to the Secretary of Defense
expressing frustration with the Navy budget proposal that
included funding for only one Virginia-class submarine. The
public reports indicated that $1.6 billion in funding from the
Virginia-class program was diverted to the National Nuclear
Security Administration.
I agree with my colleagues that the funding for the NNSA is
vital to our national defense, but the diversion of this $1.6
billion directly undermines our nuclear defense. The Secretary
of the Navy was briefed on the connection between the Virginia-
class and the Columbia-class program when he recently visited
the Electric Boat Shipyard at Groton at Quonset Point, and I
think he agreed--and I certainly advocate strongly--that
actually the Virginia-class program reduction to one submarine
will negatively impact the Columbia program given that
Virginia-class work will develop the capability and capacity
for Columbia-class execution within the supplier class and our
shipyards. So the two programs are connected.
The $1.6 billion was diverted from Virginia-class reducing
the cadence to one rather than two submarines a year. I know
that my colleague, Senator Reed, has asked about the $8 billion
that remained in the budget as carried-over funds. But I am
interested in why that $1.6 billion in funding was diverted.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, if I may ask you, were you involved in
the decision to divert money from the Virginia-class program to
NNSA? Did you specifically request it? Given that you had $8
billion left over, why did you need it?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Blumenthal, the $8
billion of carryover is for long lead construction for other
programs. As I mentioned, we have 5-year programs that total
more than $100 billion. So that is a prudent carryover mark.
With regard to the alleged transfer of resources from DOD
to DOE/NNSA, no, I was not involved in those kinds of
discussions. I was involved, however, in the internal
deliberations in the Department of Energy to secure the
resources necessary for the $19.8 billion request.
Senator Blumenthal. So you did not request the $1.6
billion.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Sir, we requested the $19.8
billion, and internal deliberations in the executive branch
asked us to recover that. So those were discussions throughout
the entire executive branch, including OMB and DOD.
Senator Blumenthal. What was the $8 billion--and I know
Senator Reed has asked about this issue, but I want to dig into
it a little bit more. What was the $8 billion obligated to do,
obligated but unspent, as you put it? Why are we appropriating
money in that way for projects that really should be funded on
a yearly basis?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Unlike the Department of
Defense, we are funded on a yearly basis. We have long lead
procurements and efforts to purchase large activities and large
procurements. We also have long lead programs, construction
programs, such as the uranium processing facility at Y-12. We
need additional resources, and we also purchase types of
projects, if you will, so project management. So if we are
spending money, if we are executing a 3 to 5-year program and
we are spending those resources, we will not be able to
complete those necessary, critical missions to support the
nuclear enterprise.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I just want to point out that we
are imperiling the Columbia-class program, which is obviously
vital to modernizing our nuclear triad by undercutting the
Virginia-class program and reducing the cadence to one
submarine rather than the two in fiscal year 2021. So I do not
know what the analogy would be, robbing Peter to pay Paul, but
one way or the other, it is a risky strategy and I would urge
all of you to support restoring the two submarine cadence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by simply thanking the Chairman and Ranking
Member for having this very important meeting today and to be
able to share with the American people the challenges that we
have with regard to maintaining the 0 nuclear deterrent.
Let me begin--let me also say thank you to all of you for
your service to our country.
Secretary Lord, the Chairman explained in his opening
statement about how DOE had cut the NNSA and DOD out of the
budget process in fiscal year 2021. We are talking about trying
to improve a process for the future.
So let me just ask you. The process to finish the fiscal
year 2022 budget is just weeks away. Can you give me some
insight into how the process has gone in this current year?
Secretary Lord. Yes, Senator. In this current year, I think
we have done a very good job of collaborating and sharing
information. We are just at the beginning of that process, as I
mentioned, in early September. We did obtain the numbers just
yesterday. We had a Nuclear Weapons Council meeting----
Senator Rounds. You just got the--you just received them
yesterday? Is that in a timely fashion?
Secretary Lord. We received the numbers themselves in early
September. We got a lot of the discussion around what they
actually contain yesterday in a Nuclear Weapons Council
meeting, and we are kicking off--we did kick off yesterday a
working group with members from NNSA, from DOD, as well as OMB
to really do a deep dive into the details of that. We will come
back in about 4 weeks and talk about that at the Nuclear
Weapons Council to make sure that the programs that DOD is
putting in our budget are supported fully by NNSA. At this
point, NNSA has been extremely forthcoming. So I have very high
expectations that we have entered a new era here, given our
planning guidance and the further details that we are
memorializing in terms of how these action groups are to work.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
You know, we have talked a number different weapon systems
today, and sometimes I think it goes by and there are Americans
right now at home that may very well have the opportunity to
listen or to follow the discussions that we have had. I am not
sure that all of the different weapon systems--if we have ever
taken the time to actually share just how critical they are and
what they really mean to our Nation's defense. I think Senator
Cotton shared very well the fact that what we are talking about
today is the fact that for 75 years this nuclear deterrent has
helped us to not be in a nuclear war because we have been able
to make it very clear to our near-peer adversaries that we can
protect ourselves and that we have capabilities to inflict
great damage on them. Part of what we are trying to do here is
to make sure that there is no misunderstanding anyplace in the
world that we still have the nuclear deterrent necessary to
hold them at bay.
You spoke briefly about the B61-12 and about the LRSO. Can
you share with the American public and with this Committee
today--it sounds like we are creating new weapon systems where,
in essence, we are upgrading. Can you share a little bit with
the American public today just exactly what that B61-12 means
to our country? We have ways of delivering but if we do not
have that weapon system, then we are not finishing the plan.
Can you share a little bit what just those two weapon systems--
how critical they are to the defense of our country?
Admiral Richard. Senator, it may be more appropriate for me
to answer that question as I am the operator.
Senator Rounds. That would be fair.
Admiral Richard. What you are describing are two of the
weapon systems that are used in the air leg of the triad.
Right? Sometimes it is better to think of the attributes that
each leg provides as opposed to the specific weapon system. It
is interlocking. What the air leg, in particular, provides--it
is the visible piece of the triad. It is the piece that we can
use in times, steady state or crisis, to change and show,
signal to a competitor to change their decision calculus and
cause them not to do something. So both of those go very
directly to our ability to use that piece of the triad in the
way it was intended.
Senator Rounds. The B-21, the newest proposed stealth
bomber that will be based at Ellsworth Air Force Base and
others, is one that would be able to carry this particular type
of a weapon system. Is that correct?
Admiral Richard. Senator, that is correct.
Senator Rounds. In other words, it is one thing to have the
platform available. It is another thing to actually have a
modern weapon system that could be delivered. It is a critical
part of that part of our defense in the triad.
Admiral Richard. To meet the requirements that I have asked
of the U.S. Air Force, you have to have both of those. They
were put together with forethought. They are very
complementary. It is the capabilities of LRSO that allow B-21
to be designed the way that it is and vice versa.
Senator Rounds. Let me go on. In all of the scenarios so
far that we have had, we not only include B-21's, we include B-
52's, 60-year-old B-52's, as a part of our long-term plans, and
yet, that is a non-stealth bomber. It also requires a weapon
system which is upgraded and capable. Can you share how that
connects with what we are talking about today with the LRSO?
Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I applaud your knowledge and
detail on this subject. You are right. The 4 B-52's not only
are 60 years old today, but we are going to have to fly them
until they are 100 years old. If I remember correctly, the last
pilot of a B-52 had not been born yet, and so against the
increased threat environment that we anticipate by the time
that that weapon system completes what we are going to ask for
it to do, LRSO is a necessary capability to keep that viable
and to continue to allow me to have that stack of options and
attributes to be able to offer to national leadership to
accomplish the mission.
Senator Rounds. Just to make it clear, we are talking about
the long-range standoff weapon, one that can be delivered from
outside of an area where they could actually get to our B-52
bombers since they can see them on a radar.
Admiral Richard. Senator, quite correct.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses. This has been helpful.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, I want to follow up on
questions that Senator Blumenthal was asking, and this is
probably both for you and Secretary Lord on this budgetary
matter and the funds from the second Virginia-class sub which,
as you know, is constructed both in Connecticut and Virginia.
Obviously, it sounds as if your testimony is you were
asking for a budgetary allocation to do the job at the NNSA.
You were not saying take it out of the Virginia-class sub. You
were making a case for what you thought you needed.
But when we see $1.8 billion taken out of the DOD budget
for the second Virginia-class sub and then we see an $8 billion
unspent amount within the NNSA, it is sort of like, well, wait,
why do we need to get rid of the second Virginia-class sub if
there was that much that was unspent funding at the end of
fiscal year 2019? You have explained long-term contracts, I
sort of get that concept. But that does seem like a lot of
unspent funding.
Do you know what your current projection is for the amount
of unspent funding as we get ready to close the fiscal year
2020 budget?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Not in terms of unspent.
Again, let me see if I can do a better job of explaining what
carryover is. Even though it is a big number, it is a
reasonable number because our 5-year planning profile is over
$100 billion. In fact, GAO says that that is a prudent
management approach to take, to have this, quote/unquote,
carryover funding.
Senator Kaine. But does that mean the 5-year planning
profile--the total budget is about, you know, just breaking it
down on average about $20 billion a year.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Correct, sir.
Senator Kaine. I mean, $8 billion out of a $20 billion
annual budget--that seems like a lot of carryover. Again, I
understand that you have maybe some longer-term contracts than
others do. But do you know what you are projecting the unspent
amount to be at the end of this fiscal year that concludes
within a matter of 2 weeks?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. I can tell you that at least
for--I do not have the numbers for fiscal year 2020. But I can
tell you confidently that the amounts that we had just for
fiscal year 2019, as of right now, for unspent and unobligated,
if you will, was a mere $384 million over a nearly $16 billion
budget.
Senator Kaine. That was not only unspent but you say
unspent and unobligated. You had not decided how to program
that money.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. That is right. If programs
were executed ahead of schedule. But again, we are making
commitments to the taxpayer about making sure that our funding
is appropriately spent on the important missions carried out by
NNSA.
Senator Kaine. Do you believe the unspent amount at the end
of fiscal year 2020 will be in the basic same ball park as the
fiscal year 2019 number?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. I am confident that it will
not exceed that. However, sir, I have to say----
Senator Kaine. It will exceed $8 billion.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Well, in terms of the long-
term programs that we administer, yes. So it is not a carryover
where it is not obligated. It is obligated for programs for
this 5-year spend plan of nominally $100 billion. We are, in
fact, lower than most other agencies in terms of our uncosted
carryovers. I would be happy to provide you with those
resources.
Senator Kaine. That would be helpful.
Admiral Richard, one of the debates that we had during the
NDAA this year revolved around additional funding for nuclear
testing. I am not on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of SASC.
But is there a deficiency in existing nuclear weapons testing
that requires that we pursue a different course?
Admiral Richard. Senator, as you know, I am required to
annually certify whether or not there is a need for testing,
and the answer at this time, there is no condition--nothing has
changed. Right? There is no condition where I would recommend
the need for nuclear testing.
But I would say, though, that it is important for the
Nation to maintain an ability to do a nuclear test should an
issue arise in the future and have been formally documented in
making that recommendation.
Senator Kaine. Another question, Admiral Richard. Thank you
for that. Should we end up with a continuing resolution, as has
been discussed, it is my understanding there is a request for
an anomaly to allow the Secretary of the Navy to enter into a
procurement for up to two Columbia-class subs.
Do you have a sense of how tight the timeline is for
production of the Columbia-class and the retirement of the Ohio
class boats? Are you concerned that the lack of an anomaly may
threaten the current plan?
Admiral Richard. So, Senator, one, your question is better
directed actually to the Navy who is directly responsible for
that. I, of course, closely monitor the progress the Navy is
making in the delivery of the Columbia system. I am pleased
with the efforts that they are making, and I would support
Navy's request. They are doing a very good job of asking for
what they need to deliver this capability.
Secretary Lord. If I may, Senator. Working very closely
with the Navy on the Columbia, as I am the milestone decision
authority on that, we have zero margin on the Columbia, and I
would strongly support an anomaly. We need to get the funding.
We need to continue the work we are doing.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thanks to all the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine,.
Senator Cramer?
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all of you for your service and for being here.
You know, like the Chairman, I serve both on the Armed
Services Committee and the Environment and Public Works
Committee, have jurisdiction over sort of all sides of this.
Also like the Chairman, I am all for you 1,000 percent. Unlike
the Chairman, I am a freshman.
But I also have, as you know, in North Dakota, Admiral, two
of the three legs of the triad. I appreciate your being there
so quickly after your confirmation. I have been to Minot. I was
just thinking about it. In just recent months, I have been
there with Secretary Esper. I have been there with the Vice
President. I have been there with Secretary Brouillette. I
mean, it is clear that this is a very high priority,
modernization.
With that backstop, I am very concerned about the GBSD. I
continue to ask that question. Are we still on 0 track for
GBSD? I really appreciated your response earlier about
modernization and about the rest that the vice chairman asked,
Senator Reed. I like your attitude. I just want to be as
confident as you are that we are on track, we will remain on
track, and is there anything, whether it is the budget or the
NDAA from either side, that would put that at jeopardy?
Admiral Richard. Senator, first, let me offer the
responsibility for that lies with the Air Force. Right? I think
they have been very good about asking for what they need.
That said, I was just at Hill Air Force Base. I received a
number of detailed briefings from the program manager for GBSD.
I was impressed with the leadership forward thinking the way
that they are approaching that program, and we are just at send
that man ammo--if we give him stable, secure funding, I have
confidence he is going to deliver for us.
Senator Cramer. Certainly if you wanted to answer that.
Secretary Lord. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
GBSD just went through milestone B, as I think you well
know. I too have very recently been to Hill Air Force Base to
meet with the team. It is an excellent team making great use of
digital engineering. They are really at the forefront of modern
software engineering. They have very little margin in the
program, but they are moving forward with Northrop Grumman very
well.
The one issue we have and where we may very well need
Congress? support is in terms of the infrastructure in terms of
command and control in the silos themselves. We do have a lot
of money allocated through the MILCON methodology, and whereas
we have 500 separate items that need to be updated, that would
be rather onerous to have 500 different or so projects. We are
looking at consolidating that to streamline it. So we are very,
very interested to see what comes out of conference, but we
would ask that we move some of that money out of MILCON to give
us the flexibility on the program execution side to move
forward along the timelines. As Admiral Richard said earlier,
it is our job in Acquisition and Sustainment to not transition
programmatic risk over to operational risk, and I am afraid if
we do not move some of that money out of MILCON, that is
exactly what we would be doing.
Senator Cramer. I am completely supportive, and I agree. We
cannot have 500 different MILCON projects. That makes no sense.
Every now and then, common sense can prevail if we work hard at
it, so I appreciate that.
Speaking of that, I have to admit coming into this hearing
I had some questions, and after listening to you all, I have
more. So we are going to have to get together. I know I am
trying to get together with each of you hopefully fairly soon
because--as much confusion as there is, however, over the NNSA/
DOE/DOD budget process, particularly the Weapons Council budget
process, it pales in comparison to the dysfunction of Congress?
appropriations process. So I am never discouraged. I know we
can get this right.
I will just say this, and then I will wrap up and we will
get together and answer specific questions later. But just the
very words `semi-autonomous' cause me some concern. Do not get
me wrong. I appreciate it and I understand it. But autonomy
implies a lack of accountability. `Semi' provides an out. I
just want to make sure we have specificity.
One of the questions that I am going to ask you guys is you
reference early September often when asked the question about
when did you get the NNSA budget, and you also, of course, know
that there is a statutory deadline. I mean, was it early
September or was it before the September 1st deadline in the
law?
Secretary Lord. September 4.
Senator Cramer. September 4th. Okay.
So we have at least 4 or 5 more days that we can work on
and get this down even better, and that is my goal. Let us get
it done. Let us get it right. Let us have both the type of
semi-autonomy that is important, as well as the accountability
that is important and the transparency that is important.
I am going to ask this, and then again, you can answer it
later. I do want to explore a little bit the OMB position on
some of these things. We have not talked a lot about it. You
were asked, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, sort of at the end of one of
the questioning--I do not remember whose question it was--
whether on this carryover issue, which you described and put
the context I think in a good way that helps us better
understand it. I still think there is some confusion about it.
But you said that OMB supports your position. I have not seen
that and maybe it is not necessary that I see that. It is not a
change in policy. It is more of a practice, an ongoing
practice. So I would be interested to know whether that really
is their position.
We have not talked about some of OMB's objections relating
to sort of the implication of separations and the separation
between the executive and legislative branches as it relates to
the budgeting process. So maybe later, when we sit down
together, we can explore some of that a little bit more because
like I said, the one area where OMB has weighed in pretty
heavily on this is they do not want to see anybody imposing
executive rights, and I do not disagree. But I like it better
when we are all communicating.
With that, I will just----
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Be happy to.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
By Webex, Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is an
important hearing, and it has already been very interesting.
One of the interesting things I learned is that the B-52 is
older than the Senator from South Dakota.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. I think that is an important matter that has
come before us today.
I think this is a very important hearing because
deterrence, which has been the fundamental policy that has kept
this country and the world safe from the use of nuclear weapons
for 75 years, is based upon two elements: will and capacity.
This hearing today really is about both of those pieces. It is
about rebuilding the capacity of the credible deterrent, but by
providing this budget support, it demonstrates the will of the
country. That is why I think this hearing is so important and
this budget is so important.
I think it is also important for people to remember and
realize that has already been testified, there is a great deal
of money in here for nonproliferation. It is sort of the twin
goal of our entire nuclear policy.
I do have one specific question, Admiral. It may be out of
your lane, but it certainly relates to this subject. The New
START treaty expires a couple of months into 2021. Can you give
us any information as to where we are on that? Are there
discussions ongoing? What are the nature--are we making
progress? Is there the likelihood of an extension or indeed a
renegotiation of that treaty?
Admiral Richard. Senator, one, it is good to see you again,
sir.
Second, to answer your question, it would be Ambassador
Billingslea and the team over at the Department of State that
could give you the authoritative answer to that.
What I want to add, though, is that that process is so
important to me and important to STRATCOM. As I have testified
before, I will support any arms control agreement that enhances
the security of this Nation. I have dedicated my deputy
commander, Lieutenant General Bussiere, as a member of
Ambassador Billingslea's team to ensure that he has the best
available operational uniformed military support that I know
how to provide to that process. Over.
Senator King. Well, thank you for that. I appreciate your
engagement on that point, and I think that is very important.
Then finally, I do want to follow up as Senator Kaine and
several others have asked about this carryover. I understand
the justification, but if it is a carryover of that magnitude
each year, then I would suggest that perhaps at least some
portion of that money could be reallocated, for example, to
that second Virginia-class submarine. I will look forward to
seeing the written responses on that and talking with my
colleagues about it.
But again, I want to thank you all for a very impressive
hearing, incredible level of knowledge and detail, and you all
are really doing a significant service to this country and I
want to thank the three of you for your testimony today and
most especially for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Under Secretary Lord, it was almost 75 years ago in the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 that Congress ended the Manhattan
Project and transferred stewardship of the nuclear stockpile
from the Army to civilian control.
Do you see any compelling reason today to move the weapons
program back to the Pentagon or should NNSA stay where it is
today inside DOE?
Secretary Lord. As long as we have the status quo in terms
of our ability to work together, particularly with respect to
working on budgets together, I think the system is very good.
Senator Heinrich. Do any of you disagree? Do you think the
system right now is working? Admiral?
Admiral Richard. Senator, I absolutely concur.
Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, I
appreciate our recent phone call and all the work that you are
doing, and I appreciate your explaining the Nuclear Weapons
Council's process to develop a requirements-based budget for
NNSA.
The one thing that does concern me is that DOE's
environmental cleanup program is funded from the same budget
account, but they do not have a seat at your table. Clearly, we
saw that with the fiscal year 2021 budget request for cleanup
and how much cleanup suffered as a result, including almost a
50 percent cut in the request for cleanup at Los Alamos,
something that I find just completely unacceptable.
Since environmental cleanup is uniquely a DOE
responsibility, not a NNSA responsibility, how will the
Department balance the budget priorities to ensure that we are
meeting those obligations in the future and make sure that
those priorities, as well as the priorities of maintaining the
deterrent are met?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Heinrich, I know you
have a robust conversation regularly with Secretary
Brouillette, as well as we do. Secretary Brouillette is
managing the budget for the entire Department of Energy. I
advise him on NNSA requirements, and then he takes budget
requests and program requests from the other under secretaries
which then pretty much fill out the entire Department of
Energy. I know he is fully focused and completely focused on
environmental cleanup not only at Los Alamos but in other
places around the United States, both Idaho and Hanford,
Washington in particular. So he is focused on ensuring that we
have the resources necessary to clean up the legacy facilities
of the prior NNSA Atomic Energy Commission in DOE and the
defense nuclear sites.
Senator Heinrich. So I will, obviously, continue this
conversation with the Secretary as well, but I just think,
given what we saw last year, that we have cause for concern
here and it is something I am going to continue to raise and
hopefully we will see better numbers this year.
Administrator, I am pleased to hear of your commitment to
maintain the Mesa complex at Sandia Labs as the Nation's
premier facility for trusted, rad hard microelectronics.
But let me ask you about the Z machine at Sandia, which
continues to provide one of the critical pieces of our
stockpile stewardship program by simulating pressures and
radiation environments that previously required actual
underground testing.
Do you agree that pulsed power science is important to
NNSA's mission, and what do you see as the future role of
pulsed power science for maintaining our strategic deterrent?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Pulsed power science is,
indeed, one of the attributes and contributions to our robust
research, development, and testing program at NNSA.
The Z machine is an experimental workforce, for want of a
better term. However, it is aging, and just like with many
other legacy systems throughout the NNSA enterprise, time is of
the essence to focus on how we will eventually be replacing
that system. However, in the interim, we are finding ways of
being able to maintain and upgrade that system. So, again, we
wholeheartedly agree that pulsed power is in fact an important
approach to informing us about the stockpile.
It also attracts the best and brightest future scientists
and engineers that will work in NNSA because of the unique
nature of pulsed power.
Senator Heinrich. Last quick thing. The new facility, the
Albuquerque Complex project--what are we looking at as an
expected date for when NNSA staff will begin to occupy that
structure?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Well, I am happy to say,
first of all, thank you again. A couple years ago, we broke
ground together at that. I am also happy to say that I
participated in the topping out event a couple of months ago,
and just 3 or 4 weeks ago, I walked the facility for the third
time.
I am very excited about it. It continues despite COVID and
the challenges we have. We have an outstanding relationship
with the Corps of Engineers. We continue construction and we
fully expect to occupy that in 2021 as planned, and that will
house 1,200 of our finest NNSA employees in facilities that
they have been living in, otherwise 1950s barracks which are
completely unacceptable for our workforce. This will be a
state-of-the-art facility for 1,200 of our finest NNSA
employees.
Senator Heinrich. I am looking forward to 2021. Thank you.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator and all of you, thank you for being here.
Administrator, I want to start by saying thank you for your
great work. You have done an excellent job in this role, and
the people of Missouri I know are grateful.
I want to talk a little bit more about some of the national
security campus issues in Missouri.
But first, can I just ask you about some troubling news we
recently learned? It appears, based on public reporting, that
the Sandia National Laboratories may have violated federal law
by sending employees to racially segregated diversity training
at a resort no less that encouraged some of the crudest gender
and racial stereotyping imaginable. May I add it was paid for
apparently with taxpayer money?
I asked for an inquiry and a full accounting of the monies
that have been spent on this. The Secretary of Energy, I was
very pleased to see, directed a full investigation.
Can I have your commitment that you will fully support the
investigation into these trainings, the federal taxpayer funds
expended, the locations of these trainings, and the entire
affair?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, sir, you may.
NNSA welcomes the opportunity for a diverse workforce and
inclusive environment for all of our employees, but what has
been portrayed in the media is very disheartening and very
distressing to me. If it is accurate, it is not appropriate for
our workforce. You have my word that NNSA will fully commit to
and support the Secretary's initiative to do the thorough
review on diversity inclusion and inequity training.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that.
Let us talk about the Kansas City National Security Campus
(KC NSC), which of course is in my home State of Missouri. It
is doing extraordinary work manufacturing the non-nuclear
components of the NNSA warhead program.
Can you just elaborate on how cuts to the NNSA's budget
request proposed by the House would affect that work at KC NSC?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Hawley, the non-
nuclear components are all produced at Kansas City National
Security Campus, as you rightfully stated.
The cuts would have a devastating effect because the non-
nuclear components are critical to every one of our life
extension programs, every one of our ongoing systems to support
the Department of Defense. So that would have considerable
impact, and it would also delay the deliveries to the
Department of Defense. So, yes, they would be profound if we
saw the cuts that are proposed in the HEWD mark.
Senator Hawley. Let me just follow up on that last point
you just made about how the proposed cuts might affect the
ability to meet production requirements in coming years. You
are saying that those would be adversely affected, to put it
mildly.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Every single one of our
systems would be adversely affected.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that, and thank
you for your continued support for that outstanding work that
is done there at KC NSC.
Admiral, can I just shift to you for a second? You said
earlier this week I think that China's nuclear force structure
is--and I am quoting you now--increasingly inconsistent with a
stated `no first use' policy. How would the cuts to the NNSA's
budget request proposed by the House impact our ability to
maintain deterrence as China grows its nuclear forces?
Admiral Richard. Senator, that is accurate in terms of what
I said. I think it is worth reminding you and the Committee we
are on a trajectory to go to a place that the Nation has never
been before where we will face two peer nuclear-capable
adversaries that have to be deterred differently. That is what
fundamentally starts to set the requirements for the
capabilities that I need. These cuts would jeopardize those
capabilities right at the moment of greatest need later in the
decade.
Senator Hawley. Thank you for that. Thank you for your
clarity on this issue. I just want to say for my part as I see
it, I think there is every reason to believe that China will
use its nuclear forces to advance its imperial agenda, which is
really what it is, including in the region. We need to prepare
for that possibility, and fully funding the NNSA is I think
vital.
Admiral, finally if I could, how would it impact our
deterrent if nuclear weapons infrastructure could consistently
provide updated capabilities on timelines similar to the W76-2?
Admiral Richard. Senator, thank you for mentioning the W76-
2. I think it is an example that shows we can move fast. Right?
We still know how to do this. That is an example of where the
threat changed. New capability was needed. We provided it on an
operationally responsive timeline and closed a potential hole
in our deterrence strategy. We should be able to do that more.
That is a type of hedging strategy that enables you to react
inside what somebody is attempting to do, and that capability--
I acknowledge some of the other stuff would be more complicated
than a W76-2, but that enhances deterrence by our Nation's
ability to do that.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you
all for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
My question was along the same lines as what Senator
Heinrich had spoke to you about. I was concerned because the
1946 Congress established the Atomic Energy Commission as a
civilian controlled agency tasked with managing U.S. nuclear
weapons. This as done to set a clear separation of control of
our nuclear weapons program between the military and the
civilians. I think we all agreed. I think you all have answered
that pretty much what you think and what you feel how we are
going, and it is working and you do not see the need to change,
but you need to see the transparency. I believe, Secretary
Hagerty, you spoke to that and you believe that we are moving
in the right direction and you are able to get things on track.
I felt good about that.
My question would have been do you agree the Secretary of
Energy must maintain clear control and accountability for the
Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's
budget?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
Secretary Lord. Yes. I believe things are working well.
Senator Manchin. Admiral Richard?
Admiral Richard. I am very satisfied from my position in
terms of the way the NWC is working in coordination between the
two Departments.
Senator Manchin. Good.
Secretary Hagerty, do you believe the NNSA has fixed the
issues that will be able to meet the DOD requirements to field
an effective nuclear deterrent over the next several decades?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Sir, with the appropriate
funding, sustained and appropriate funding, I believe we will.
I am confident in that.
Senator Manchin. Secretary Lord, as chair of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, it is your job to ensure the alignment of the
NNSA weapons and DOD delivery systems. In a recent letter to
the leadership of both congressional defense committees,
Secretary of Defense Esper outlined his disagreement with
section 1644 of the House NDAA. That section would create a
cabinet secretary co-chair structure for the NWC, and it seems
to me, would certainly increase disparity in needed
communication between DOD and DOE Secretaries. However, I know
the NWC has been effectively carrying out its duties since 1986
and as a military liaison committee before then.
So which is it? Is the NWC so ineffective that we need to
elevate its business to the cabinet secretary level? Or do we
need to let the NWC keep its current authority?
Secretary Lord. We need to let the NWC keep its current
authority. I will say that from a Department of Defense
perspective, we give in-depth briefings to Secretary Esper and
his key staff quarterly and that I believe he is very well
informed and obviously signs off on all key decisions. However,
I believe you need the depth of understanding that the NWC
chair brings in terms of programmatics and the specifics of
each of these programs, as well as the specificity in terms of
understanding that the Administrator of the NNSA has.
Senator Manchin. To follow up, how does maintain the
authority of both DOD and DOE while increasing the coordination
of these crucial agencies?
Secretary Lord. I think having hearings such as these is
very helpful so that everyone has the same fact base to deal
with and understands exactly our monthly cadence of meetings
and how we exchange information.
Senator Manchin. Thank you all very much. Thank you for
your service too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Shaheen, who got here just in time.
Senator Shaheen. I did. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Just be advised that after your remarks
and questions, if other Members are not here, we will conclude
this meeting.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I was not here because I
was at a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee on China
and the threat that China poses in the future.
I guess I would like to start, Admiral Richard, with you
because earlier this week, you indicated that over the next
decade China will expand and diversify its nuclear forces,
likely at least doubling its nuclear warhead stockpiles.
Can you elaborate more on those efforts and the challenge
that presents to the United States?
Admiral Richard. Senator, one, that is accurate. That is
not only the position of USSTRATCOM, but other portions of the
executive branch have come to the same conclusion.
But I would offer that simply I think it is a mistake to
consider China some sort of lesser included case relative to
Russia. We just used a number of weapons estimate. I think it
is important to remember China will not tell us how many they
have. They do not have a level of transparency that either us
or Russia has right now.
But that is a relatively crude way to describe what a
nation is capable of doing. You have to look at much more than
that. What are the delivery systems? What are their
capabilities? What are their command and control? What is their
readiness? In China, they will not even tell you their
doctrine. You have to add all of that up.
The trajectories that I see their nuclear on is concerning
to me. We have seen what they have done on the conventional
side of the house. As I just said, we are on a path by the end
of the decade, if not sooner, to face two peer nuclear-capable
adversaries who have to be deterred differently. We have never
faced that challenge before in our Nation's history.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. That lays out the
challenge quite dramatically and I think speaks to the
importance of agreements like the New START treaty.
Back in February, I asked you about how STRATCOM uses the
information that is gained from New START. Can you talk about
how important you think that is to give us insights into what
the Russians are doing? I am going to ask the other panelists
also if you could speak to that because what we know about
current negotiations and why it might be important to extend
that treaty.
Admiral Richard. Senator, we have talked about this in the
past. With additional time at STRATCOM, it is reinforced to me
that the transparency that we achieve out of the New START
treaty is something that is of value to both sides. It adds to
security of both participants in the treaty.
The actual progress? I would refer you to Ambassador
Billingslea, as I just mentioned previously. That process is so
important to me that I have dedicated my deputy 0 commander,
Lieutenant General Bussiere, to the team to make that expertise
available to Ambassador Billingslea so that I am supporting
that to the best level I know how.
Senator Shaheen. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, can you also
speak to what information we get that benefits our national
security from participation in New START?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Shaheen, in fact, we
play a vitally important role in NNSA. In fact, as Ambassador
Billingslea and his team are negotiating with their Russian
counterparts, we play a vitally important role, so important
that just last week I hosted Ambassador Billingslea and the
entire New START team of negotiators at several NNSA national
security laboratories, plants, and sites so they could see
firsthand the important role that NNSA plays should a New START
agreement be extended, recalling that the New START agreement
currently only covers strategic arms, what we would envision
and Ambassador Billingslea and the State Department and the
President of the United States is looking at is a treaty with
Russia that will cover all warheads. In that, of course, NNSA
plays a central role in that.
Senator Shaheen. Yes. I understood that that was the hope
of the Administration. Can either you or Admiral Richard give
us any insights into how those negotiations are going, and if
we cannot get an agreement that includes those other weapons,
that includes China, is there a benefit to extending New START
and allowing us to continue to have insights on verification
into what Russia is doing while we have more time to negotiate?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. What I can say is that I know
that Ambassador Billingslea and his team have provided with
Russia framework for how the future negotiations will continue
and what the proposed treaty would look like and improvements
in the treaty. I believe they are waiting for a Russian
response. I would defer to Ambassador Billingslea and the State
Department for further details on that.
Senator Shaheen. Admiral Richard, can you speak to whether
you think there is a benefit, if we cannot get everything we
want, to going ahead and extending New START to allow us to
continue to have that verification insight while we are able to
work to still negotiate an expansion of what New START covers?
Admiral Richard. Ma'am, as I have said before, there are a
number of things that the New START treaty provides that
enhance my ability to go do my job. You just named one of
those. But there are some additional things that also need to
be considered. I look forward to the Department of State
finding us a path that enables us to achieve all of that.
I would particularly like to highlight what Ms. Gordon-
Hagerty said. Those attributes that she mentioned would be very
beneficial to my ability to accomplish my mission and to this
Nation's security.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
I am out of time, but let me just also say for Ms. Lord,
thank you very much for what you continue to do to try and
ensure that we have a defense industrial base at the end of
this pandemic and to supporting particularly our small
businesses who are very important to that industrial base.
Secretary Lord. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
By Webex, Senator Jones.
Senator Jones. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, thank you for your service. Thank
you for being here. Secretary Lord, thank you also for being
here. I want to echo what Senator Shaheen said about your work
to help us get through this pandemic with everything intact. I
really very much appreciate that.
I do want to extend a special welcome to my fellow
Alabamian, Admiral Richard. Thank you for your service. Thank
you for being here. Thank you on behalf of all Alabamians for
that service, but especially the thousands of men and women in
uniform in Alabama today, whether active or in the guard, and
the some 300,000 veterans that we have. They send a special
warm welcome and thank you for your service. I really--and we
all do--very much appreciate it.
I just have one question, Admiral Richard, because Senator
Shaheen really went through the questions that I had with
regard to the New START treaty.
Admiral Richard, I would like to ask as STRATCOM Commander,
what do you see as the most significant areas of risk to
successfully transitioning from the Minuteman III to the GBSD
system. What are we doing and how can we help you mitigate
those risks?
Admiral Richard. Senator, those risks come up in two
dimensions. Right? One is in the time dimension. It is in the
actual transition from the old system to the new system to
continue to provide me the attributes that the intercontinental
ballistic missile leg provides. The Air Force could give you
the specifics. I would offer I am impressed with the way that
program is executing and that stable, predictable funding is
the biggest single thing under our control to address that.
The other piece that I would invite our attention to is it
is the simultaneity of the transitions that are occurring.
Right? The transition you just described occurs simultaneously
with the transition over on the submarine side and just after a
transition on the bomber side. So it is important to hold all
of these things on schedule because we only have so much
capacity, and if we de-synchronize how we are doing these, we
run the risk of the aggregate being unexecutable as opposed to
any individual line. Over.
Senator Jones. Thank you, Admiral. I really appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield the balance of
my time. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. First of all, let me thank our witnesses.
It just has been very enlightening. We are very fortunate to
have you three at the helm of the most important thing that is
going on in the world today. We thank you very much for the
time that you spent and the honesty and the straightforward
witnessing that you shared with us. Thank you very much.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
nuclear weapon modernization program funding impacts
1. Senator Inhofe. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, could you specify
which nuclear weapons modernization programs will be affected by cuts
to the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) budget in the
House Appropriations Fiscal Year 2021 spending bill?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
2. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Lord, during your testimony you stated
that the House-proposed cuts to the NNSA's budget would indirectly
affect the B61-12 and the W80-4. Could you explain what impacts you
were referring to and the extent to which these impacts could delay
delivery?
Secretary Lord. The Weapons Activities portion of the National
Nuclear Security Administration budget reflects the totality of funding
required to deliver warheads to the Department of Defense. Though the
program lines for the B61-12 and W80-4 were not specifically cut,
significant cuts to the infrastructure portion of the budget could
drive impacts to these programs. Of particular concern are cuts to
canned subassembly efforts at the Y-12 Facility and non-nuclear
component production at Kansas City National Security Campus and Sandia
National Laboratories--any one of which could potentially drive
delivery delays to stockpile modernization programs. Delays to the W80-
4 warhead have significant implications to the DOD's Long-Range
Standoff cruise missile system as these programs are closely tied to
deliver the required capability to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
by 2030. Ensuring schedule alignment between the warhead and cruise
missile is imperative to meeting DOD requirements. Delays to the B61-12
program also carry significant impacts to our ability to meet
commitments to North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allies and partners.
3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Lord, in addition to the elimination
of funding for the W93 weapon, you noted that a $170 million reduction
in funding for the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile would be
``catastrophic''. Could you elaborate on the projected effects of this
cut on the LRSO program?
Secretary Lord. Funding shortfalls in the LRSO program create three
significant issues that will increase cost and could jeopardize
production schedule. First, full funding is necessary to maintain
current test schedule alignment between the DOD LRSO and National
Nuclear Security Administration W80-4 warhead programs; jeopardizing
this alignment increases risks to both programs. Second, LRSO Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) is scheduled to be just-in-time to replace
the Air-Launched Cruise Missile stockpile reductions, and funding
reductions will leave minimal margin to address issues discovered
during development or fielding. Finally, if the $170 million is not
retained, the LRSO and proven B-52 delivery platform will be unable to
hedge against potential issues encountered during the development of
the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), Columbia ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN), or B-21 Raider programs.
national nuclear security administration budget data
4. Senator Inhofe. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, you mentioned that
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recognizes NNSA's approach
to carryover balances as a prudent strategy for managing the NNSA's
budget and regularly reviews NNSA's carryover balances. Can you
elaborate on how NNSA adheres to GAO best practices with regard to
carryover balances?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
5. Senator Inhofe. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, at the end of
fiscal year 2019, NNSA's carryover balance of $8.2 billion was 54
percent of its $15.2 billion appropriation. In contrast, the Department
of Energy's (DOE) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
(EERE) had carryover balances of approximately $3.8 billion, which
represented 166 percent of its fiscal year 2019 appropriation of $2.3
billion. Some have expressed concerns with the percentage of NNSA's
carryover balances, but there doesn't seem to be the same level of
concern with EERE's carryover. How many DOE offices, as a percentage of
their individual annual appropriations, hold carryover balances larger
than NNSA, and are there other offices with carryover balances in
excess of their typical annual appropriation?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
6. Senator Inhofe. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, can you provide
examples of the international work NNSA is doing to prevent nuclear
proliferation and how carryover balances are used to execute that
critically important work?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
7. Senator Inhofe. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, if NNSA's ability
to carryover funds from year to year were restricted, what impacts
would that have on the Administration's efforts to execute these types
of activities?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
national nuclear security administration budget
8. Senator Sullivan. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, last week, the
Secretary of Energy sent a letter to Members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee providing an update that the preliminary fiscal year
2022 budget request for the Department of Energy (DOE) and National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has been shared with the Nuclear
Weapons Council to ensure it aligns with Department of Defense (DOD)
priorities. Are you and the Secretary of Energy aligned with this
preliminary budget request?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
9. Senator Sullivan. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, in your personal
opinion, are there any priorities not proposed to be adequately funded
in the fiscal year 2022 DOE/NNSA budget request?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
10. Senator Sullivan. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, in your
personal opinion, what additional resources or attention is needed, if
any, for the NNSA budget to meet its modernization milestones?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
nuclear weapons council
11. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Lord, based on your preliminary
review of the proposed fiscal year 2022 DOE/NNSA budget request, do you
have all the information you need and do you have any concerns with the
proposed funding levels provided to the Nuclear Weapons Council?
Secretary Lord. Per the Nuclear Weapons Council Planning Guidance,
DOE/NNSA has submitted congressional control-level budget information
for analysis. The NWC subsequently chartered the Budget Certification
Working Group (BCWG), composed of DOD functional experts in nuclear
weapons and delivery systems to analyze the sufficiency of the draft
NNSA Fiscal Year 2022 budget request. I believe the NWC has received
appropriate insight into the fiscal year 2022 request and has provided
a response to the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration, and the Office of Management and Budget. Because the
Fiscal Year 2022 Budget request is still an internal executive branch
deliberative document, I am not able to comment on whether the NWC has
concerns with the proposed funding.
12. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Lord, does the Nuclear Weapons
Council have any unfunded requirements? If so, what are they?
Secretary Lord. The Nuclear Weapons Council remains focused on its
statutory responsibility to provide guidance for NNSA budget
formulation. The fiscal year 2021 funding levels reflect the required
funding needed to sustain and modernize our nuclear stockpile to meet
DOD's requirements for our number one priority mission. The NWC
continues to monitor closely the NNSA infrastructure recapitalization
efforts, as the infrastructure underpins our very ability to field
weapons on the necessary timelines. We remain concerned over the age-
out of facilities, production capabilities and capacities of critical
components, as well as NNSA's ability to attract and retain a world-
class, specialized workforce.
13. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Lord, in your personal opinion, how
much impact do you think the Nuclear Weapons Council has on the outcome
of the NNSA budget request?
Secretary Lord. Congress' efforts to provide the NWC with
transparency into the NNSA budget request have strengthened the
partnership between the Department of Defense and the NNSA in executing
this critical national security mission. To fulfill the NWC's statutory
requirements, the NWC approved the first-ever NWC Planning Guidance in
May 2020 that provided priorities and principles for the NNSA budget
formulation process. In my opinion, the NWC can make a tremendous
impact on the interdepartmental budgetary alignment for our nuclear
deterrent as long as the Planning Guidance and early budget analyses
are implemented. We have begun the fiscal year 2022 budget review, and
I am pleased with the level of transparency and trust that our
partnership has achieved.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
weapons activities funding levels
14. Senator Cramer. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, please provide a
breakdown of NNSA weapons activities funding levels for each fiscal
year between 2017 and 2021 as contained in both the President's budget
requests and enacted appropriations.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
nuclear weapons council meetings & dates
15. Senator Cramer. Secretary Lord, in preparation for the fiscal
year 2021 President's budget request, how many times did the Nuclear
Weapons Council formally meet in both 2019 and 2020 to review the
proposed DOE/NNSA budget request? Please provide dates.
Secretary Lord. The Nuclear Weapons Council formally met on January
4, 2020, and February 26, 2020, to review the DOD/NNSA Fiscal Year 2021
budget request.
department of energy & office of management and budget positions
16. Senator Cramer. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, please provide a
copy of Secretary of Energy Brouillette's letter to the Senate Armed
Services Committee dated September 16, 2020. Does NNSA support the
positions outlined in this letter? If not, please explain.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
17. Senator Cramer. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, please provide
the Administration's official position on the Senate-passed fiscal year
2021 National Defense Authorization Act Sections 3111 and 1652
(S.4049). Does NNSA agree with these objections? If not, please
explain.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
national nuclear security administration infrastructure
18. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF) construction project at Y-12 Security Complex
is currently on budget and on schedule. What are NNSA's biggest lessons
learned from the massive undertaking of the UPF project when it comes
to management of uranium requirements across the complex, to include
program management?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
19. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how will NNSA
ensure UPF systems can interface with other facilities' systems--e.g.,
in Buildings 9215, 9204-2E, and 9995--and ensure that all systems are
able to support full-scale operations?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
20. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, are you
confident the electrorefining process being developed for UPF will be
effective and scalable for the planned metal production capacity?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
21. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, as exemplified
by Y-12's 75-year-old Building 9212, more than half of NNSA's
facilities are over 40 years old, and 30 percent date back to the
1940s. Could you please give specific examples of potential
consequences to the stability of our nuclear enterprise if our
infrastructure is not modernized?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
22. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, could you
please explain why general infrastructure projects such as office
spaces or parking lots are integral to the successful execution of
warhead programs and other priority defense programs?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
23. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Secretary
Lord, Admiral Richard, if the NNSA does not receive the resources it
needs to recapitalize this infrastructure, will you or your successors
be able to field an effective deterrent?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
Secretary Lord. The NNSA's infrastructure underpins our Nation's
nuclear deterrent by producing the very components necessary to provide
the Department of Defense with warheads and weapons to field on our
delivery platforms. Without consistent, methodical, and immediate
investment in NNSA's nuclear infrastructure, operational risk will
increase and will degrade the Triad's flexibility to address future
strategic uncertainty--thereby endangering our ability to field an
effective deterrent to meet the enduring national security objectives,
shared by current and previous Administrations.
Admiral Richard. Continued underfunding of infrastructure
recapitalization and deferral of required facility maintenance are some
of the greatest risks to our future deterrence capabilities. Critical
stockpile and infrastructure requirements are ``must-do'' not ``nice-
to-have,'' are already late-to-need, and have zero margin to execute in
time to meet our essential capabilities.
Without these required infrastructure investments, there will be
points of ``no return'' in the early 2030s where we will lose
fundamental capabilities, preventing us from fielding an effective
deterrent. If we continue on this trajectory, we will be unable to
recover for a decade or more, no matter how much is invested.
24. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what
specifically is the NNSA doing to continue to reduce the deferred
maintenance backlog across its facilities?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
25. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, does this
year's budget request contain sufficient funding to reduce the deferred
maintenance backlog across NNSA's facilities?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
26. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, do you require
anything from Congress to permanently eliminate the backlog?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
nonproliferation research and development
27. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA makes
significant investments in Tennessee to maintain our nuclear
capabilities, and I appreciate the trust the administration places in
our skilled workforce. With respect to nonproliferation research and
development (R&D), however, there's uneven distribution of funding
across laboratories engaged in nonproliferation, even after accounting
for staff numbers. Can you elaborate on how the NNSA distributes its
nonproliferation R&D funding across the national laboratory enterprise?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
tritium production
28. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what is the
status of NNSA's production of tritium at the Tennessee Valley
Authority Watts Bar 1 and 2 reactors?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
depleted uranium modernization
29. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, why is funding
for the Depleted Uranium Modernization Program vital to ongoing warhead
acquisition programs?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
domestic uranium enrichment
30. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, in your
opening statement, you discussed the NNSA's ongoing Analysis of
Alternatives with respect to domestic uranium enrichment. I strongly
support this program and the great work done by Oak Ridge National Lab.
How has the COVID-19 pandemic specifically impacted this analysis and
when can Congress expect the final results?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
nuclear defense workforce
31. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Lord, U.S. nuclear forces are
fully manned and fully ready because they are backed up by the world's
best scientists and engineers at NNSA. How does the fiscal year 2021
budget request support the critical need to recruit and retain these
high-value members of the nuclear defense workforce? What gaps remain,
in authorities or funding?
Secretary Lord. Ensuring our Nation's safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent requires a suite of military capabilities, unique
infrastructure, and a highly specialized workforce. Both DOD and NNSA
face stiff competition from the private sector for top talent in
technical fields. Additionally, as our aging workforce enters
retirement, it is critical that we enable knowledge transfer and
training of our newest generation of workforce. The Fiscal Year 2021
President's Budget requested funding to continue work on building the
world-class facilities we owe our top scientists and engineers in
conducting this critical mission. These facilities, coupled with
meaningful work on stockpile modernization, will enable us to attract
and retain the top-talent we need across both departments. Today, our
departments are employing veterans and candidates from graduate
fellowship programs, and utilizing excepted service authority to
direct-hire talent from industry to increase hiring and build a
diversified workforce. The Nuclear Weapons Council remains engaged in
issues facing the future of our workforce and will soon receive an
update from NNSA and the Military Services that will provide insight
into challenges and identify potential opportunities for DOD support.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
carry over balances
32. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA has
continued to defend the $8 billion in prior-year carryover balances
that were available to cost at the time the agency's fiscal year 2021
budget was submitted. In order to spend down these carryover funds as
well as significantly increased funding in fiscal year 2021, assuming
NNSA receives its requested appropriations, NNSA will need to quickly
ramp up its spending rates in order to ensure that only an appropriate
amount of funds are carried over at the end of fiscal year 2021. To
what extent will NNSA achieve this increased spend rate through
maintenance and operating contractor hiring, and how quickly can these
hiring plans be executed?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
33. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, to what extent will
the NNSA achieve this increased spend rate through larger or more near-
term procurements, and how quickly can these procurements be executed?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
34. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, if the NNSA enters
fiscal year 2022 with significant carryover balances in excess of
thresholds, how would the agency justify that carrying these funds over
to finance future years' activities is a better use of funds than
procuring the planned Virginia-class submarine?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
depleted uranium
35. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA requires a
sustainable supply of depleted uranium (DU) metal and the manufacturing
capabilities to make DU and alloyed DU weapon components for stockpile
modernization. NNSA has a very limited supply of several forms of DU
and does not currently have the full range of capabilities it needs to
manufacture nuclear weapon components from DU. We know from past
experience, such as with Fogbank a decade ago, that restarting efforts
to produce strategic materials and components can led to delays and
cost overruns for stockpile modernization programs. We also understand
that the schedules for reestablishing DU supply and manufacturing
capabilities are very tight, with no margin for error. Finally, this is
a joint effort between the NNSA and the DOE Office of Environmental
Management, which has two different contracting and management
approaches. What is NNSA doing to manage the risk of DU capabilities
not being ready in time to meet stockpile modernization needs?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
36. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, are all affected
programs aware of the risks?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
37. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what are NNSA and
DOD contingency plans if there are shortages in material or
manufacturing capabilities are not ready in time?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
38. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, with respect to DU-
niobium alloy in particular (where NNSA's capabilities are most
limited), what are NNSA's contingency plans if NNSA is not producing
qualified DU-niobium alloy ingots by October 2023?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
39. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, with respect to DU-
niobium alloy in particular (where NNSA's capabilities are most
limited), what are NNSA's contingency plans if there are delays in
developing new technologies, such as direct casting and cold hearth
melting, or they never reach sufficient maturity?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
40. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, with respect to DU-
niobium alloy in particular (where NNSA's capabilities are most
limited), what are NNSA's contingency plans if there are delays or
disruptions to the re-establishment of NNSA's depleted uranium
tetrafluoride supply at the Portsmouth site?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
41. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how will the effort
be managed at the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM)
Portsmouth site where the tails from past enrichment will be converted,
in other words who will be in-charge of the operation given this a new
de-conversion line is being installed in an existing EM facility and
who will review the costs and timelines to install this extra NNSA
line?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
kansas city national security complex
42. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, according to an
internal NNSA April 2020 independent review of the commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) technology issue affecting the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370
programs, the B61-12 program had anticipated shortfalls in testing
capacity at the Kansas City National Security Complex as well as
schedule impacts associated with the concurrent B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt
370 programs due to the lack of sufficient experienced staff for two
simultaneous programs. However, the independent review team stated
that, ``[a]s a result of inadequate leadership engagement at senior
levels, the B61-12 LEP did not receive the schedule relief or,
alternatively, the additional and early resources necessary for program
success.'' Similarly, the Government Accountability Office's July 2020
review of the W80-4 LEP (GAO-20-409) found that the program's schedule
risk analysis called for a more conservative schedule than NNSA
leadership approved, particularly for delivery of the first production
unit. What lessons has NNSA drawn from the experience of the programs
currently in production that may be applied to the W80-4 LEP and the
W87-1 Modification program?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
43. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what plans does
NNSA have to fully characterize and mitigate the risks of similar COTS
qualification issues for the W80-4 LEP and W87-1 Program?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
44. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what assurances can
NNSA offer that the schedules for the W80-4 LEP and W87-1 Program are
not overly ambitious and will not lead to more problems with testing
capacity and redesign when these programs reach their production
phases?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
45. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how do you measure
concurrency of operations within the Kansas City Complex amongst the
various programs underway to minimize concurrency risk?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
46. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how stable are your
testing laboratories for the size and timelines of work underway and do
you plan to move any of these operations inside the Kansas City Plant
for vertically integrated quality assurance?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
cares act oversight
47. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, congress appropriated
nearly $10.6 billion in the CARES Act for the Defense Department to
mitigate disruption and respond to COVID-19. I remain concerned about
the effective and transparent implementation of this funding. I have
spoken with small defense suppliers in Connecticut, who have shared
that the Pentagon's accelerated payments to improve cash flows are not
reaching smaller suppliers--while the prime contractors are telling me
that they are unaware of which suppliers within their supply chains
have received this critical funding. This lack of communication from
the Pentagon and lack of clarity among our defense industrial base is
completely unacceptable. I understand that the large primes are
responsible for paying their suppliers--but what are you doing to
ensure that these accelerated funds are truly supporting the supply
chain in a timely manner?
Secretary Lord. Of the funds provided by the CARES Act, most were
specifically for the Military Healthcare system, development of
vaccines, and procurement of personal protective equipment (PPE) for
use by the military. Approximately $2.45 billion was appropriated to
provide support to the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), including $1
billion for industrial expansion under the Defense Production Act (DPA)
and $1.45 billion to maintain the liquidity of Defense Working Capital
Funds. Of the $1 billion allocated to DPA in the CARES Act, $209.7
million went to expanding the medical supply and device industrial
base, and the remainder was dedicated to both the DIB and guaranteeing
Defense Finance Corporation loans. These DPA funds were not available
for reimbursement of costs incurred by the DIB for cleaning, supplier
disruption impacts, the cost to redesign workspaces and factory floors
to meet CDC guidelines on social distancing, and other related costs.
Separately, on March 20, 2020, the Department increased the
customary progress payment rate for eligible fixed price contracts from
80 percent to 90 percent for large businesses and 90 percent to 95
percent for small businesses. The increased progress payment rate has
resulted in a cash infusion to prime contractors and their suppliers of
nearly $3.3 billion through October 30. From the outset, the Department
has actively encouraged prime contractors to flow down increased
payments to its suppliers. Major defense contractors report that they
targeted accelerated payments to struggling companies in their supply
chain, even before receiving financing from the increased progress
payment rate. The Department has frequent meetings with industry
associations, including those who represent small businesses, and we
have not heard of any payment flow down issues, in fact we have been
receiving inputs to the opposite--that payments have flowed down and in
many instances small businesses that may otherwise would have closed
were able to stay open. I would encourage any company that is
experiencing payment issues to address these with their cognizant
contracting officer.
48. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, do you have a strategy to
improve the disbursement of any future relief funding to ensure that it
targets our smallest and most fragile suppliers?
Secretary Lord. Yes. On August 17, 2020, Defense Pricing and
Contracting issued updated section 3610 guidance to improve the
disbursement of future relief by requiring prime contractors to
represent that ``all impacted subcontractors have been afforded an
opportunity to submit a request for reimbursement of section 3610 paid
leave costs, and as appropriate are incorporated into the contractor's
section 3610 reimbursement request for the contractor to pay to the
subcontractor.
49. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, will you commit to
providing more information and greater transparency about the
disbursement of CARES Act funding to the supply chain?
Secretary Lord. Yes, I will continue to advocate and support
transparency related to CARES Act disbursements. This information has
been provided weekly, now bi-weekly since May 2020, to all four
congressional defense committees. The August 17, 2020, updated 3610
guidance instructs to DOD contracting officers to specify the amount to
be reimbursed to each affected subcontractor when issuing the
modifications where subcontractor leave is included in the section 3610
reimbursement. This was done for transparency and to ensure funding was
allocated to all of our suppliers.
50. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, it's been reported that you
estimate the DOD may need as much as $20 billion in emergency funding
to reimburse defense firms for lost work hours and disrupted supply
chains. Can you expand on this assessment and some of the challenges
you are seeing in the industrial base that brought you to this
conclusion?
Secretary Lord. Industrial base challenges include situations where
telework was not possible for the contractor workforce, especially in
production and testing facilities. As a result, we had work that was
essentially put on hold and the Department is going to have to make up
for lost production to avoid delays. Other challenges faced by our
suppliers were reduced efficiencies as a result of reconfiguration of
the production floor for social distancing. Suppliers also experienced
time lost to clean areas exposed to COVID in addition to delays of
component parts being required from other disrupted facilities and
suppliers. In addition, the cost impact associated with section 3610 is
significant.
51. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, what are the impacts on
national security if we don't address these challenges?
Secretary Lord. Funding will have to be taken from existing program
execution originally identified for hardware purchases to offset COVID
related expenses. This will adversely impact the Department's support
to our critical Warfighter needs.
52. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, the CARES Act appropriated
$20 million for the DOD Office of the Inspector General to conduct
increased oversight of DOD operations and activities in response to
COVID-19. In July, the Office of the Inspector General published a
COVID-19 oversight plan. Do you believe this plan provides an effective
roadmap for accountability?
Secretary Lord. Yes, I do. We have been actively engaged with the
DOD IG as it performs audits of our response to COVID-19. The
Department is also actively supporting the numerous audits by the
Government Accountability Office concerning our COVID response. I
believe we have been very proactive and working to ensure that each
action related to COVID-19 is properly identified and every dollar
appropriated for COVID-19-related requirements is properly spent.
Accountability must also be built into the processes and procedures
that practitioners use on a daily basis. With that in mind, my office
has issued numerous policy memoranda, deviations to the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulations Supplement, and other guidance documents to
promote fair, consistent, and accountable execution of contract actions
related to COVID-19.
53. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, is there anything in the
plan that you believe should be changed or added?
Secretary Lord. The IG operates wholly independently from of other
parts of the Department. Thus, I am in no position to formulate
opinions on whether there are parts of the IG's oversight plan that
should be changed or added.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
nuclear explosive testing
54. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Admiral Richard,
the United States has not conducted a nuclear weapons test since 1992.
The Trump administration's National Defense Strategy states, ``The
United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless
necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal, and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare
or maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing.'' The Washington Post
reported on May 22, 2020, that during a meeting at the White House, the
Trump administration considered a ``demonstration'' nuclear test
explosion as a way to convince Russia and China to join trilateral
nuclear arms control negotiations. The U.S. Special Envoy for Arms
Control, Marshall Billingslea, said in a June 24, 2020 press briefing
that he is ``unaware of any particular reason to test at this stage''
but he also said ``I won't shut the door on it because why would we.''
This year, have you participated in any interagency discussion about
the United States conducting a nuclear explosive test? If yes, please
identify the most recent date on which the matter was discussed.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
Admiral Richard. As the Commander of the United States Strategic
Command, I am required by Title 50 U.S. Code Sec. 2525 to annually
certify the safety, reliability, performance and military effectiveness
of the stockpile and to state whether or not one or more underground
nuclear explosive tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified
in the stockpile.
This assessment is the result of continuous ongoing discussions
with the heads of each national security laboratory and the National
Nuclear Security Administration rather than as a specific topic of
discussion. The last such discussions were October 6, 2020 at the
Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) Stockpile Assessment Team presentation
at the 103rd SAG Plenary. No specific operational or technical reason
for the U.S. to conduct a nuclear test has been identified at this
time. While there are no identified conditions requiring resumption of
underground nuclear testing, the Nation must be able to reconstitute
this capability should a need arise. I am concerned that we do not have
sufficient readiness to conduct such a test, on a relevant timeline
and/or of sufficient fidelity, should conditions warrant a need to
return to underground nuclear explosive testing.
55. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, in your prepared
written testimony, you wrote, in part, ``the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile remains safe, secure, reliable, and effective without the
need for nuclear explosive testing.'' At this time, does the NNSA
require additional financial resources to conduct a nuclear explosive
test in the event the United States Government decided to take this
action?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
56. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, absent a technical need or the
need to protect the United States from armed attack, do you support a
U.S. resumption of nuclear explosive testing? Please explain your
reasoning.
Admiral Richard. To date, there are no identified conditions
requiring the resumption of underground nuclear testing. I do, however,
fully support continued funding for NNSA and the national security
laboratories to ensure we are rapidly able to reconstitute this
capability should a future issue arise requiring resumption of nuclear
explosive testing.
Title 50 U.S. Code Sec. 2525 requires me to annually assess the
safety, reliability, performance and military effectiveness of each
nuclear weapon type in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; the
assessment includes a determination as to whether or not underground
nuclear explosive testing is required.
57. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Admiral Richard,
what do you assess would be the likely response from Russia and China
in the event of a United States resumption of nuclear explosive
testing?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
Admiral Richard. I am not in a position to speculate as to what
Russia or China's likely response would be if the United States resumed
underground nuclear explosive testing. I would expect their decision to
be made in their own national interests given the specifics of any
hypothetical scenario.
iran
58. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Admiral Richard,
has the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) and Iran's subsequent suspension of its adherence to certain
JCPOA provisions, on balance, reduced or increased the amount of time
it would take Iran to develop enough fissile material for one nuclear
weapon (i.e., breakout time)?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
Admiral Richard. [Deleted.]
new start treaty
59. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Admiral Richard,
barring any superior, replacement accord that is ready for signature by
the United States and Russian Governments by February 5, 2021, is the
extension of the New START Treaty for another five years under its
current terms in the national security interest of the United States?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
Admiral Richard. I support any arms control agreement that enhances
the security of this Nation. Russia has been largely compliant with New
START (NST) as it sets a limit on the number of deployed strategic
weapons they have. However, as a bilateral treaty, NST fails to account
for thousands of non-strategic weapons and new systems in development
outside of the treaty definitions. Having all of these attributes would
make my job easier.
I endorse efforts to address the Treaty's shortfalls, to include
directing my deputy commander's in-person support to the
Administration's negotiating team. When asked, my best military advice
to the President will be NST has served us well and we should preserve
those treaty attributes that are beneficial, seek to address those
issues the NST does not address, and remain cognizant of the limits of
military advice to diplomatic initiatives.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exposure Marine Corps Installation State PRV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding MCAS YUMA AZ ARIZONA $1,751,321
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding MARCORPRCUITDEP SAN DIEGO CA CALIFORNIA $11,993
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding MCB CAMP PENDLETON CA CALIFORNIA $4,196,785
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding MCSF BLOUNT ISLAND FLORIDA $806,429
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding MCB HAWAII KANEOHE HAWAII $ 217,016,749
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding HDQTRS 4TH MARDIV NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA $ 1,399,334
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding MCAS CHERRY POINT NC NORTH CAROLINA $ 501,785,354
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding MCB CAMP LEJEUNE NC NORTH CAROLINA $ 208,326,613
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding MCRD/BEAUFORT PI SC SOUTH CAROLINA $ 1,403,525,324
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO VA VIRGINIA $ 10,115,032
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL ............................................ ................... $2,348,934,934
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[all]