[Senate Hearing 116-511]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                        S. Hrg. 116-511

                  MATTERS RELATING TO THE BUDGET OF THE
                 NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________


                           SEPTEMBER 17, 2020

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services






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                 Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov

                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

56-586 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2024















                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                  JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi	     JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska		     JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas		     KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota	     RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa		     MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina	     TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska		     ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia		     MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota	     ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona		     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RICK SCOTT, Florida		     JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee	     TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                DOUG JONES, Alabama
                                     
                   John Bonsell, Staff Director
            Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director






                                  (ii)

  






                           C O N T E N T S

                              ___________

                           September 17, 2020

                                                                   Page

Matters Relating to the Budget of the National Nuclear Security       1
  Administration.

                           Member Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................     1

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     8

                          Witnesses Statements

Gordon-Hagerty, Hon. Lisa E., Administrator, National Nuclear         9
  Security
  Administration.

Lord, Hon. Ellen M., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition      23
  and Sustainment.

Richard, Admiral Charles A., USN, Commander, United States           26
  Strategic Command.

Questions for the Record.........................................    56


                                 (iii)








 
                  MATTERS RELATING TO THE BUDGET OF THE
                 NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2020

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. 
Inhofe, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer, 
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Hawley, 
Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, 
Peters, Manchin, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order. The 
Committee meets today to receive testimony on the National 
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) fiscal year 2021 
budget request and to address some concerning efforts to 
undermine NNSA's relationship with the Department of Defense 
(DOD). Arguably, this could go down as one of the most 
significant hearings that we have had, and we have had a lot of 
hearings.
    I want to welcome our witnesses, including the first two 
women ever to head up the Nation's nuclear enterprise. Our 
country is very fortunate to have your leadership in these 
challenging times. So we have the Honorable Lisa Gordon-
Hagerty, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration; and Honorable Ellen Lord, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Chair of the 
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC); and Admiral Charles Richard, 
Commander of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
    As this Committee focuses on implementing the National 
Defense Strategy--that is this right here. We have referred to 
this many times before, a great document that is put together 
on a bipartisan--and what we were attempting to do is 
consistent with that.
    When asked about the priorities for dealing with China and 
Russia, General Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, said--and this is a quote--I think the very number one 
priority for me and number one priority stated for the 
Department of Defense is the modernization, recapitalization of 
the Nation's nuclear triad, and I could not agree more. General 
Milley is exactly right and on target.
    Thanks to President Trump's decisive leadership, we are 
making great progress towards this goal. Unfortunately, we are 
here today to address a very real threat to our nuclear 
deterrent, but this threat is not from China or Russia. It is 
one of our own making regretfully.
    Coordination and transparency between DOD and NNSA is 
critical to the modernization of the triad, but there are those 
who are trying to weaken that coordination, and I want to be 
clear. They are undermining our national security in doing so.
    Recently I have learned that individuals from the 
Department of Energy (DOE) have worked behind the scenes with 
House Democrats on ill-advised legislation that would--I am 
going to mention four things here, very significant. I hope you 
will take note of them.
    That language that has been proposed from the House would 
bury the Nuclear Weapons Council in unneeded bureaucracy and 
bring its decision-making process to a grinding halt.
    It would, number two, prohibit all cooperation between NNSA 
and the Nuclear Weapons Council for maintaining the safety and 
security of our nuclear weapons.
    Number three, it would destroy the NNSA's congressionally 
mandated independence and drag us back to the dysfunction back 
during the Clinton years.
    Number four, it would do lasting and possibly irreversible 
harm to the President's efforts to preserve and improve our 
deterrent, an effort even former President Obama understood was 
necessary. We have heard our President talk over and over again 
about the significance of this and about the threat that is 
posed out there.
    In fact, I have a letter from the Department of Defense 
objecting to these provisions. The provisions that we are 
referring to that are being proposed in the House. I would like 
to enter into the record Secretary Esper--and I am going to go 
ahead and put his entire statement, without objection, into 
this record.
    [The information follows:]

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    Chairman Inhofe. But a couple sentences out of it. He said, 
after reviewing the recently House-passed fiscal year 2021 
appropriations bill and the national defense authorization 
bill, I would like to share with you my strong concerns with 
several related aspects of these bills. If left unaddressed, 
provisions affecting DOD, DOE, and NNSA put modernization of 
the United States nuclear deterrent at unacceptable risk. That 
is the Secretary of Defense.
    I also have a letter from the chair of the NWC, who is here 
with us right now, that objects to these provisions, and I 
would like to enter that into the record. That is this, and we 
will, of course, hear from her during the course of this 
meeting.
    [The information follows:]

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    Chairman Inhofe. It is not surprising that opponents of 
nuclear weapons support these efforts. We would expect them to 
do that. What bothers me is that people who should be doing all 
they can to support the critical work of the NNSA are instead 
trying to undermine it. As chairman of this Committee, I will 
not stand by idly and allow this to happen. The work is too 
important.
    I suppose we should have expected this sort of political 
maneuvering to continue after what happened earlier this year 
with the fiscal year 2021 budget request. We all remember that. 
Because of the certain individuals at the Department of Energy, 
what they did, the cutting the DOD out of the NNSA budget 
development process until the last minute, the budget 
coordination process broke down completely.
    I was in shock when that took place, and I found out that 
during this process, that the DOD is not even considered, not 
even consulted, not in any way. They were not knowledgeable of 
what the budget was until after it was already developed, and 
that is totally unacceptable. I mean, they are the customer, 
and I was surprised. People are surprised. Right now, the 
majority of people in the United States Senate are probably not 
aware of that.
    But in the process, these bad actors actively misled the 
U.S. Congress. There was no misunderstanding. They lied to us, 
and later they admitted it. One of the lies was they were 
talking about a slush fund of $6 billion to $8 billion that is 
out there. There was not a slush fund, and they knew it and 
they admitted it later.
    As a result, we had to go to the White House and save one 
of President Trump's top priorities. When we took our case to 
the President, he agreed with this. He was frustrated and 
annoyed that simple coordination could go so wrong. I applaud 
the President's decisive action to resolve that issue. We all 
thought that his clear direction would solve the near-term 
problem.
    Then to fix the longer-term problem, my friend, Senator 
Reed, and I drafted legislation to help DOD and NNSA improve 
their coordination efforts. These common sense provisions 
passed easily in the Committee. In our Committee, they passed 
25 to 2, and the two who voted against it were against the bill 
anyway, so you could say it was unanimously accepted. That is 
the language that we are talking about. These simple measures 
ensure that DOD and NNSA officials have the information 
required to do their jobs, keeping us safe and maximizing 
taxpayers' dollars. These provisions were and should remain 
uncontroversial.
    We know how this process should look. For example, DOD and 
the intelligence community work very closely to ensure 
intelligence programs meet the military needs. They are in 
total agreement on these things. That is what should be taking 
place in the other areas. It is a straightforward matter of 
good governance and effective civilian oversight.
    Our bill would do the same for the NNSA budget. Keeping our 
nuclear modernization efforts moving forward demands close 
cooperation between DOD and NNSA. The ability to see each 
other's program and budget details is the fundamental 
requirement for realistic future planning. Without effective 
coordination, nuclear programs will face unnecessary cost 
overruns and schedule delays. Dropping the ball on nuclear 
modernization means that we are disarming ourselves in slow 
motion, which puts us on a trajectory to fall further behind 
our adversaries.
    There was a time that we did not have adversaries that had 
that sophistication, this equipment, this technology, the 
resources that they have today. Truly they are ahead of us. We 
all know what happened and how that happened, and they are 
there. It is not like it was. I sometimes get criticized when I 
say I look back at the good old days of the Cold War when we 
knew there were two superpowers. We knew what they had; they 
knew what we had. That was easy. It is not the way it is today.
    That is why Congress legislated coordination between DOD 
and DOE in the first place all those years ago, and that is why 
the Nuclear Weapons Council exists today. That is the reason 
for it.
    All of you and all of DOD and NNSA want to work together 
more closely to ensure that nuclear modernization programs are 
correctly aligned and delivered on time, and we need the 
Department of Energy to join in this effort. There has been 
much talk, a lot it of inaccurate, about this issue. We have 
three members of the Nuclear Weapons Council here today to 
explain how we can improve DOD and NNSA coordination.
    I want to commend the three of you, all three of you, for 
the work in modernization in the Nation's nuclear deterrent. 
Your efforts in the Nuclear Weapons Council have been some of 
the most productive I have seen, maybe the most productive that 
I have seen, in the years that I have been here. Our nuclear 
forces are absolutely critical to our Nation's security, and I 
would hate to see all of your hard work undone by rogue actors 
who do not support our shared efforts. We cannot let personal 
agendas distract us from this critical mission.
    I thank you for appearing here today in a very difficult 
and very significant, perhaps the most significant, meeting 
that we have had in a long time.
    Senator Reed?

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me welcome the witnesses and also commend them for 
their extraordinary service.
    The President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request for 
defense-related activities at the Department of Energy is 
approximately $26 billion, which is an 8 percent increase over 
last year's enacted level. This $26 billion represents 
approximately 73 percent of the $35 billion budget request for 
the entire Department of Energy.
    Within the defense portions of the DOE budget, the fiscal 
year 2021 budget request of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, or NNSA, is $19.8 billion, which is an increase 
of $3 billion, or 18.3 percent over last year.
    Within the NNSA, the weapons activities account has been 
increased by $3.1 billion, or 25 percent, from fiscal year 2020 
to fiscal year 2021.
    While I understand the NNSA has facilities recapitalization 
and weapons modernization underway, we need to understand 
whether the NNSA can adequately execute such large increases to 
their budget.
    The Nuclear Weapons Council, or the NWC, has served since 
1946 as the forum where the Defense Department sets 
requirements for the production of nuclear weapons for the 
NNSA. Under Secretary Lord serves as the chair of the NWC.
    The fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act 
required that the council certify to Congress that the NNSA 
budget meets DOD's requirements when the President's budget is 
submitted. This year for the first time, the Nuclear Weapons 
Council could not make that certification. My understanding is 
that the $3 billion increase in NNSA's budget came too late in 
the process to allow the NWC to review it. I understand that 
the Nuclear Weapons Council has now developed planning guidance 
for review of NNSA budgets to avoid a repeat of last year. 
Under Secretary Lord, I am interested in hearing details of the 
guidance and whether this process has been followed for the 
fiscal year 2022 budget.
    Under Secretary Lord, while you are to be commended, indeed 
highly commended, for putting such guidance in place, I have 
concerns that because it is only a directive, it will not 
necessarily carry forward through future administrations. I 
would like to hear your thoughts on how this guidance can be 
institutionalized.
    A second concern I have is that while NNSA and DOD have 
worked through their process, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) will remain a wild card in the final budget 
deliberations. OMB sits in the NWC meetings but are not 
formally members of the council. I understand that no one is 
likely to have an answer to that dilemma, but the interaction 
among DOD, DOE, and OMB certainly caused much turmoil this 
year.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, last year's OMB budget 
process revealed to us that you carry as much as $8 billion, or 
40 percent of your budget, at your plants and labs as so- 
called costed or committed but not expended funds. The other 
term is ``no-year money.'' I would note that the DOE Office of 
Environmental Management is being cut $1.2 billion this year 
and being told to use their carryover to offset this cut. Has 
this $8 billion been clarified with OMB since it contributed to 
much of last year's confusion? I will ask you that when we get 
the opportunity.
    The NNSA is working to meet the requirements of both the 
2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews. This mission means a 
very high workload and many competing demands all at the same 
time. For example, NNSA plans to overhaul five weapon systems 
over the next 30 years. All of these programs will concurrently 
require nuclear and non-nuclear parts from NNSA's plants and 
labs that in many cases were built to accommodate maybe one or 
two programs, not four or five.
    In addition, I worry that there are concurrency problems 
given the recent issue of defective capacitors impacting 
multiple warhead programs with delays and costing more than 
$800 million.
    NNSA also has several complex construction projects 
underway. They are preparing to produce 30 pits per year at Los 
Alamos by 2026, which will require extensive new equipment, 
while at the same time constructing a $6.5 billion facility at 
Oak Ridge to handle uranium. In addition, the NNSA is 
repurposing the Savannah River site to produce additional pits. 
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, I am interested in NNSA's 
approach to ensuring all these projects are accomplished on 
budget and on time.
    Again, I thank the witnesses and look forward to the 
testimony.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed. That is a great 
statement. We are working so well together on this critical 
issue.
    We will go ahead and we will start with opening statements, 
and we will start with Lisa Hagerty.
    I have an apology to make to the Committee. I had an 
accident last week, and I cannot see out of my left eye. It is 
all going to be all right, but it sure is a difficult thing to 
deal with right now.
    We will begin with you, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, for your 
opening statement.
    He commented that I could only see to the right. Well, 
really nothing has changed.
    [Laughter.]
    Chairman Inhofe. You are recognized for your opening 
statement.

   STATEMENT OF HON. LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY, ADMINISTRATOR, 
            NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you. Chairman Inhofe, 
Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, thank you 
for the opportunity to testify before you today representing 
the extraordinary men and women of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration.
    I want to begin by stating that 2020 is an important year 
for NNSA as we celebrate our 20th anniversary. As a semi-
autonomous agency within DOE, the NNSA continues to achieve 
outstanding results in support of the Nation's nuclear 
deterrent. We are grateful for your strong bipartisan support 
of NNSA's national security missions and the people who execute 
them every day.
    Chairman Inhofe, a written statement has been provided to 
the Committee, and I respectfully request that it be submitted 
for the record.
    Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
    Despite the challenges associated with the COVID-19 
pandemic, I appreciate the bipartisan support and effort with 
the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
fully supporting the President's fiscal year 2021 budget for 
NNSA. The budget represents President Trump and this 
administration's commitment to restoring NNSA's infrastructure 
and modernization programs to ensure that America has a safe, 
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for many decades ahead, 
including recapitalization of the Nation's plutonium pit 
manufacturing capability that was shuttered 30 years ago.
    This funding also affirms the administration's continued 
work to provide militarily effective nuclear propulsion for the 
United States Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines 
and to reduce threats posed by nuclear proliferation and 
nuclear terrorism.
    This funding enables NNSA to use its scientific and 
technical expertise to verify and monitor treaty compliance and 
support international arms control initiatives. To be clear, 
this administration is committed to arms control efforts that 
advance U.S. and allied partner security, are verifiable and 
enforceable, and include partners that comply responsibly with 
their obligations.
    During the COVID-19 pandemic, we have all faced many 
firsts, many challenges, and many tests to our resiliency. 
Although NNSA's top priority remains the safety and health of 
our workforce, our unique set of responsibilities meant that we 
could not rely solely on teleworking to achieve our vital 
nuclear security missions. At the outset of this crisis, we 
identified several mission-critical operations that could not 
be performed remotely and have continued this work on site 
while always following national health and safety guidelines. 
Consequently, I am proud that throughout this pandemic, NNSA 
has not missed a single major deliverable or milestone.
    We have continued to achieve our missions while 
successfully maintaining as safe a working environment as 
possible. This success is the direct result of the adaptability 
and the dedication of the 50,000 men and women in the NNSA's 
workforce. I believe our response to the current environment 
demonstrates why we as NNSA and as a Nation are so very strong.
    Although I am beyond proud of the nuclear security 
enterprise's workforce resiliency and innovativeness throughout 
this crisis, I am conscious of the reality that many of our 
critical activities are on borrowed time due to the challenges 
of recapitalizing the enterprise's aging infrastructure and 
rebuilding our unique industrial base.
    Additionally, with more than one-third of our workforce 
eligible for retirement over the next 5 years, our ability to 
recruit and retain the next generation of highly skilled 
scientists and engineers is vital to our national security. To 
address this challenge, NNSA is pursuing an aggressive hiring 
strategy with the goal of adding an estimated 4,000 to 6,000 
employees annually across the enterprise. To meet this goal, we 
have broken the paradigm of traditional government hiring 
practices to reflect a more corporate approach working 
enterprise-wide. As a result of this new approach, we succeeded 
in hiring nearly 7,000 employees in fiscal year 2019 and are on 
track to meet our fiscal year 2020 goal despite COVID.
    In addition to executing short-term requirements, however, 
we must be focused on setting the conditions today for a 
resilient, responsive enterprise for the next 50 years and 
beyond. Key to this effort is adequate and sustained funding 
that will allow for long-term budgeting and planning. Again, we 
are grateful to Congress for your strong bipartisan support for 
our nuclear security missions.
    Finally, one area I would like to address in particular is 
our alignment with our customer, the Department of Defense. In 
May, DOD and NNSA signed the NWC Planning Guidance and Budget 
Certification Process, which was undertaken within existing 
statutory authorities and further strengthens our alignment. I 
have forwarded NNSA's budget proposal for fiscal year 2022 to 
the NWC describing how NNSA will continue to execute our 
critical strategic deterrent missions.
    NNSA is deeply committed to our national security missions 
and continued collaboration with DOD who is not only our 
customer but is also our partner in this critical endeavor. I 
would like to personally thank Admiral Richard and Under 
Secretary Ellen Lord and the members of the NWC for their 
continued support, professionalism, for their collegiality, and 
for their service to our great Nation.
    Thank you again for the strong support of this Committee 
and the opportunity to testify before you today. I stand ready 
to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Administrator Gordon-Hagerty 
follows:]

       Prepared Statement by The Honorable Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, 
thank you for the opportunity to personally appear before you, with my 
colleagues Under Secretary Lord and Admiral Richard, to discuss the 
budget request for the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA greatly appreciates the 
Committee's bipartisan support for our nuclear security missions and 
the people who execute our missions every day, the dedicated men and 
women who make up our 50,000-strong NNSA workforce.
    The Department's top priority is to support the President's agenda 
and direction for defending the Nation. NNSA's diverse and enduring 
missions are vital to the national security of the United States: 
maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, 
reducing global nuclear threats, and providing the U.S. Navy's 
submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear 
propulsion. NNSA is the only organization that can accomplish these 
unique missions on behalf of the American people. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has presented a series of truly unprecedented challenges for the 
nuclear security enterprise and its workforce. Despite these 
challenges, NNSA has not missed any major deliverables or milestones.
    The U.S. nuclear deterrent is the foundation of our national 
defense, and its credibility serves as the ultimate insurance policy 
against a nuclear attack. While the ultimate goal of eliminating 
nuclear weapons has been an aspiration for generations, we must 
recognize the reality of today's evolving and uncertain international 
security environment. China and Russia are advancing their nuclear 
capabilities, which challenge our advantages directly. The United 
States must be responsive to the increasing desire for state and non-
state actors to reshape the world in their favor, doing so at the 
expense of our Nation, allies, and partners, and at times in 
contravention of international norms and rules.
    The NNSA and Department of Defense (DOD) are inextricably linked. 
To execute the Nation's nuclear weapons programs, NNSA, in partnership 
with DOD through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), conducts activities 
in a joint nuclear weapons acquisition process, also known as the Joint 
Nuclear Weapon Lifecycle process. Using this process, the DOD and NNSA 
partnership manages weapons modernization needs from concept assessment 
to full scale production, and finally to retirement. With four warhead 
modernization activities underway, NNSA is executing an unprecedented 
variety of complicated component development and production projects 
through this process and continues to make progress across all four 
programs. NNSA and DOD remain in complete schedule alignment. However, 
sustained funding and support are critical to remain in alignment while 
meeting milestone and delivery targets.
    Recognizing the benefits of a collaborative approach to strengthen 
our national defense, NNSA supports joint budget planning with DOD. In 
May 2020, the NWC adopted the Planning Guidance and Budget 
Certification Process, which will ensure the planning of the annual 
budget is formally coordinated between the NNSA and DOD.
    While the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and its supporting 
infrastructure are currently safe, secure, effective, and reliable, 
they are aging. Competing interests over the past thirty years 
postponed weapon and infrastructure modernization programs, which 
directly contributed to erosion of our critical capabilities, 
infrastructure, and capacity to ensure the deterrent's viability into 
the future.
    The need to now modernize our nuclear weapons stockpile and 
recapitalize the supporting infrastructure needed to produce and 
maintain that stockpile has reached a tipping point. Sixty percent of 
NNSA's facilities are more than 40 years old and nearly forty percent 
are in poor condition. Assessments of facilities throughout the 
enterprise have identified numerous single-point failures. If not 
appropriately addressed, the age and condition of NNSA's infrastructure 
will put NNSA's deterrence mission, and the safety of its workforce, 
the public, and the environment, at risk.
    With support from the Administration and Congress, NNSA is 
undertaking a risk-informed, complex, and time-constrained 
modernization and recapitalization effort. NNSA relies on its own 
industrial base within our nuclear security enterprise (NSE). NNSA 
manages eight government-owned, contractor-operated facilities 
throughout the country. This includes national security laboratories, 
production plants, and sites that perform the research, development, 
production, and dismantlement necessary to maintain and certify a safe, 
secure, reliable, and effective nuclear stockpile.
                     nnsa's recent accomplishments
    NNSA has made tremendous progress across the NSE with several 
notable accomplishments. The President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget 
Request of $19.8 billion demonstrates the Administration's strong 
commitment to ensuring the Nation has a safe, secure and effective 
nuclear deterrent; reducing the threat posed by nuclear proliferation 
and terrorism; and safely and effectively powering the Nuclear Navy. 
Reductions from the fiscal year 2021 budget request such as those 
proposed in the House of Representatives will threaten NNSA's progress 
on its nuclear modernization and infrastructure programs as many of 
them are reaching critical stages.
    Plutonium Pit Production: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) 
completed fabrication of five developmental plutonium pits, a key 
component of nuclear weapons, in support of NNSA's strategic effort to 
revitalize U.S. pit production capability.
    NNSA's Life Extension Programs (LEPs), Modifications, and 
Alteration: NNSA completed the final weapon refurbishment for the W76-1 
LEP, extending the warhead's service life an additional 30+ years. NNSA 
also delivered W76-2 warheads to the U.S. Navy. A modification of the 
W76-1, the W76-2 provides a low-yield, submarine-launched ballistic 
missile warhead capability as directed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR).
    Infrastructure Investments: Construction of the Uranium Processing 
Facility (UPF) continued unabated. Despite COVID-19 challenges, NNSA 
remains on track to complete on budget. UPF has been on budget and 
schedule for seven years due to Congress's continued support of the 
budget request; however, funding below the fiscal year 2021 budget 
request could jeopardize the track record if additional construction 
risks are realized. Additionally, the Albuquerque Complex was ``topped 
out''--meaning the highest and last piece of structural steel was 
placed. This state-of the-art facility is anticipated for delivery in 
2021, providing modern and efficient workspace for approximately 1,200 
employees. Of significant note, NNSA completed four other line-item 
capital construction projects valued at $170 million under budget and 
ahead of schedule.
    Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Minimization: NNSA completed two of 
its largest ever, multiyear removal campaigns to the United States by 
transporting approximately 700 kilograms of excess HEU from the United 
Kingdom for downblending and over 200 kilograms of HEU spent nuclear 
fuel from Canada. Additionally, U.S. industry producers were awarded 
$60 million in fiscal year 2019 to support the establishment of 
domestic supplies of the critical medical isotope molybdenum-99 
produced without the use of HEU in support of NNSA's goal to minimize 
the use of HEU in civilian applications. NNSA also completed the 
Repurposed Enriched Uranium campaign to downblend over 12 metric tons 
of HEU, resulting in a cumulative total of over 163 metric tons of HEU 
downblended to low enriched uranium.
    Space-Based Nuclear Detonation Detection: In support of DOD and 
Department of State mission requirements, NNSA completed deliveries, in 
accordance with U.S. Air Force schedules, of two nuclear detonation 
detection sensor suites for space vehicle integration in preparation 
for future launches. NNSA also provided technical support and early on-
orbit testing of two other sensor suites on Global Positioning System 
III navigation satellites.
    Nuclear Incident Response: NNSA provided nuclear incident response 
capabilities in support of numerous major public events such as the 
Super Bowl, Boston Marathon, Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade, and the 
Pan-American Games in Peru. Last year, NNSA's Nuclear Emergency Support 
Team (NEST) took delivery of three new fixed-wing Aerial Measuring 
System aircraft, improving the program's reliability and range in 
providing rapid, wide-area assessments of radiological or nuclear 
events anywhere in the United States.
    Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Contracts were placed by Naval Reactors 
for reactor plant heavy equipment, including the lead ship reactor 
core, for the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine. This 
milestone helps ensure the Navy remains on track to construct, test, 
deliver, and deploy the vessels on schedule.
    Supercomputing: NNSA signed a $600 million contract for its first 
Exascale supercomputer, El Capitan, slated to be delivered in 2022 and 
operating in 2023 at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to 
support NNSA's nuclear weapons programs. As a world leader in 
supercomputing, NNSA's acquisition of El Capitan is a critical addition 
to its next generation supercomputing systems.
    Educational Partnerships: NNSA funded over $100 million in grants 
and cooperative agreements with top universities across the country, 
through programs such as the Stewardship Science Academic Alliances 
Program and the Minority Serving Institution Partnership Program to 
recruit the next generation of scientists and engineers for our NSE and 
to conduct cutting-edge science in national security and 
nonproliferation.
                                covid-19
    This year, the COVID-19 crisis presented a series of truly 
unprecedented challenges for the nuclear security enterprise and our 
workforce. The health and safety of our employees is the Department's 
main focus. Due to our critical national security missions, NNSA could 
not and cannot temporarily cease operations and wait until the crisis 
is over.
    NNSA adopted a policy of maximum telework and social distancing to 
safeguard the health and welfare of our workforce, while also 
identifying a number of mission-critical activities that could not be 
performed remotely and needed to continue on site. NNSA worked with its 
sites to set priorities and relied on them to make decisions based on 
the local situation and regulations to protect the workforce.
    The crisis created significant disruptions, but the workforce 
adapted and remained productive. Thanks to the steadfast commitment and 
perseverance of the nuclear security enterprise, NNSA has not missed 
any deliverables to the DOD during the COVID-19 crisis. Despite the 
impact of the pandemic on international travel, NNSA has maintained 
strong relationships with foreign partners through the implementation 
of virtual engagements for technical exchanges, training, and 
coordination to further enhance international nuclear security and 
nonproliferation efforts.
    At the outset of the pandemic, NNSA directed the management and 
operating (M&O) teams to continue production of the essential 
components and assemblies required to maintain critical missions. NNSA 
worked with the M&O leadership team across the nuclear security 
enterprise to quantify the costs of operating in the COVID-19 
environment. These costs include:
      Extra shifts to afford social distancing where possible
      Associated additional guard force shifts to provide 
security
      Associated additional bus/shuttle transportation to work 
sites
      Associated time-costs for donning/doffing Personal 
Protective equipment (PPE)
      Additional costs for PPE
      Additional costs for Weather and Safety leave, etc.
                               carryover
    NNSA ended fiscal year 2019 with $8 billion in carryover balances, 
of which $384 million were unobligated. As part of prudent management 
practices operating the nuclear security enterprise, some carryover is 
a reasonable expectation while executing our nuclear modernization 
programs, and complying with multi-year international nonproliferation 
commitments.
    Carryover balances reflect the complexity of executing multi-
billion dollar projects, many of which require schedules of five years 
or more. Carryover balances can accrue in earlier years as procurement 
and contract management decisions are executed. Throughout execution of 
these multi-billion dollar projects, carryover balances provide 
contingency and responsiveness needed to keep projects on schedule. For 
example, NNSA's recovery plans for the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370 are 
being executed without slowing down these programs and without 
requesting additional significant appropriated funds ($100 million or 
more) by using management reserve and contingency carryover funding.
    As another example, during fiscal year 2019, NNSA used carryover 
balances to pay incentives to bring on craft laborers to support 
construction of UPF to help maintain project schedules.
    NNSA's uncosted balances in some Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 
(DNN) programs are expected, given implementation of multi-year 
international and domestic agreements. It takes several years to 
execute international work. Most agreements also require obligating 
dollars many years in advance to ensure work is completed. DNN closely 
examines all balances to ensure funding is being responsibly set-aside. 
As a result of this closer scrutiny, since fiscal year 2014, overall 
DNN carryover balances have declined by 10 percent.
                 nnsa's fiscal year 2021 budget request
    The President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request for NNSA is $19.8 
billion. This is an increase of $3.1 billion, or 18.4 percent, over the 
fiscal year 2020 enacted level. For the Nation to retain a credible 
deterrent and prevent, counter, and respond to global nuclear security 
threats, NNSA will require significant and sustained investments in its 
nuclear security mission. We are mindful of the sustained financial 
commitment and gratefully recognize the ongoing support of the American 
people and Congress for this important mission.
                    weapons activities appropriation
    The fiscal year 2021 budget request for the Weapons Activities 
account is $15.6 billion, an increase of $3.14 billion, or 25.2 
percent, over fiscal year 2020 enacted levels. This budget request 
supports the Administration's goals to modernize the Nation's nuclear 
weapons stockpile and infrastructure to meet DOD deterrent 
requirements.
    The fiscal year 2021 request is presented in a new proposed 
structure that consolidates various funding sources, aligns current and 
future workload, and improves transparency for interaction with 
Congress regarding program execution and funding requests. The major 
programs include Stockpile Management; Production Modernization; 
Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering; Infrastructure and 
Operations; Secure Transportation Asset; Defense Nuclear Security; and 
Information Technology and Cybersecurity. Funding comparisons between 
fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021 are done on a ``comparable'' 
basis as if the new structure was in place in fiscal year 2020.
    These programs support the Nation's current and future defense 
posture and the associated nationwide infrastructure of science, 
technology, engineering, cybersecurity, and production capabilities. 
This account provides for the maintenance and refurbishment of nuclear 
weapons to continue sustained confidence in their safety, security, 
reliability, and performance; continued investment in scientific, 
engineering, and manufacturing capabilities to enable certification of 
the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile; continued manufacturing of 
nuclear weapon components; and continued maintenance and investment in 
the nuclear security enterprise to be more responsive and resilient.
Stockpile Management
    In fiscal year 2020, the science-based Stockpile Stewardship 
Program supported informing the President for the 24th consecutive year 
that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, reliable, 
and effective without the need for nuclear explosive testing. This 
remarkable scientific achievement is made possible through the work 
accomplished by NNSA's world-class scientists, engineers, and 
technicians, and through the investments made in state-of-the-art 
diagnostic tools, high performance computing platforms, and modern 
facilities.
    For Stockpile Management, the fiscal year 2021 budget request is 
$4.3 billion, an increase of $604.2 million, or 16.4 percent, over the 
fiscal year 2020 enacted level. Included within this request is funding 
to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile. 
Activities include extending the expected life of weapons; maintenance, 
surveillance, assessment, development, and program planning related to 
the existing weapons stockpile; providing safe and secure dismantlement 
of nuclear weapons and components; and providing sustainment of needed 
manufacturing focused on increased efficiency of production operations.
    B61-12 LEP: The B61-12 LEP will consolidate four variants of the 
B61 gravity bomb and improve the safety and security of the weapon. The 
B61-12 LEP achieved first production unit (FPU) for 105 of 112 weapon 
components, including all nuclear components. A lifetime reliability 
concern with base metal electrode capacitors necessitated a delay in 
delivery of the system level FPU. Out of an abundance of caution and to 
ensure weapons components meet the necessary long-term resiliency 
standards, delivery of the system level FPU is now scheduled for the 
first quarter of fiscal year 2022. The revised warhead FPU has received 
concurrence by the USAF and NWC. After discovery of this technical 
issue, NNSA conducted two internal reviews in addition to a third 
congressionally mandated Independent Review Team (IRT) review. The IRT 
completed their report, which was submitted to Congress in August. All 
other major components, unaffected by the capacitor failures, are 
continuing with production and readiness activities. The program is in 
Phase 6.4, Production Engineering, and is on track to the system-level 
FPU in the first quarter of fiscal year 2022. Program completion is 
planned for fiscal year 2026.
    W88 Alteration (Alt) 370: This program, which supports the sea-
based leg of the nuclear triad, is currently in Phase 6.4. This program 
has completed its System-Level Final Design Review, 20 system-level 
qualification tests, including the Commander's Evaluation Test 2 and 
Demonstration and Shakedown Operation 29 flight tests. The same 
technical issue impacting the B61-12 LEP also impacted the W88 Alt 370. 
NNSA is aggressively managing the FPU for this program. NNSA's revised 
FPU date is scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2021. All 
other major components, unaffected by the capacitor failures, are 
continuing with production and readiness activities.
    W80-4 LEP: Currently in Phase 6.3, Development Engineering, NNSA is 
continuing activities in support of the USAF Long Range Standoff (LRSO) 
program. Funding in fiscal year 2021 represents the planned ramp-up of 
production agency activities in conjunction with design activities as 
the program transitions towards Phase 6.4, Production Engineering. NNSA 
remains tightly integrated with the DOD cruise missile program----
through the NWC--to deliver on schedule.
    W87-1 Modification Program: The W87-1 Modification Program will 
replace the aging W78 warhead using a modification of the existing 
legacy W87-0 design with planned first production in 2030 to support 
fielding on the USAF's Ground Based Strategic Deterrent missile system. 
The W87-1 Modification Program will deploy new technologies that 
improve safety and security, address antiquated design and material 
obsolescence, and improve warhead manufacturability. In fiscal year 
2020, NNSA is continuing Phase 6.2, Feasibility Study and Design 
Options, activities. The fiscal year 2021 budget request for this 
program will support its transition from Phase 6.2 to Phase 6.2A, 
Design Definition and Cost Study. Phase 6.2A activities include 
continuing feasibility study of design options, beginning development 
of the Weapon Design and Cost Report, and an independent cost estimate 
conducted by NNSA's Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation 
(CEPE).
    W93/Mk7: NNSA is requesting $53 million in fiscal year 2021 to 
initiate the warhead acquisition portion of the W93 program beginning 
with Phase 1, Concept Study and refinement activities to include study 
of future Navy ballistic missile warhead options and requirements in 
collaboration with the U.S. Navy. The W93 will incorporate modern 
technologies to improve safety, security, and flexibility to address 
future threats--and will be designed for ease of manufacturing, 
maintenance, and certification. All of its key nuclear components will 
be based on currently deployed and previously tested nuclear designs, 
as well as extensive stockpile component and materials experience. It 
will not require additional nuclear explosive testing to certify. 
Starting this effort in fiscal year 2021 is essential to maintain 
synchronization with the Navy's program to design and build the new Mk7 
reentry body.
    Within Stockpile Management, the fiscal year 2021 budget request 
includes $998.4 million for Stockpile Sustainment, an increase of $35.6 
million, or 3.7 percent above the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. This 
program sustains the stockpile in accordance with the Nuclear Weapon 
Stockpile Plan by producing and replacing limited-life components such 
as neutron generators and gas transfer systems; conducting maintenance, 
surveillance, and evaluations to assess weapon reliability; detecting 
and anticipating potential weapon issues; and compiling and analyzing 
the information required to conduct the annual assessment process.
    The request for Stockpile Management also includes $569 million for 
Production Operations, an increase of $25 million, or 7.2 percent, 
above the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. Included in this request is 
funding to support continued growth of base capabilities, both 
workforce and equipment, required to support the increased LEP workload 
as these programs reach full-scale production rates.
Production Modernization
    For Production Modernization, the fiscal year 2021 budget request 
is $2.5 billion, an increase of $892.4 million, or 57 percent over the 
fiscal year 2020 enacted level. Included in this request is funding 
that focuses on the production of capabilities of nuclear weapons, 
including primaries, secondaries, and radiation cases, and non-nuclear 
components which are critical to weapons performance.
    Primary Capability Modernization: NNSA's highest infrastructure 
priority is to reconstitute plutonium pit production. Since the closure 
of the Rocky Flats facility 30 years ago, the Nation has not had a 
reliable pit production capability and has not produced a war reserve 
pit for almost a decade. The Nation must be able to produce no fewer 
than 80 pits per year within 2030 to support improving warhead safety 
and to avoid the risk of plutonium aging causing a loss in confidence 
in the performance of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The fiscal year 2021 
budget request of $1.44 billion includes funding for plutonium 
operations and the plutonium pit production projects at LANL and 
Savannah River Site (SRS). This level of funding is required for NNSA 
to produce no fewer than 80 pits per year during 2030, consistent with 
federal law, national policy, and DOD requirements.
    NNSA's two-site plan to achieve plutonium pit production at LANL 
(30 pits per year) and the SRS (50 pits per year) is prudent and 
necessary. This approach will require NNSA to fund activities at two 
sites, and will provide necessary, critical, resilience against an 
outage at a single site at moderate capacity.
    NNSA continues to invest in Plutonium Facility-4 capabilities at 
LANL to support an enduring 30 pit production capacity during 2026. 
LANL has demonstrated progress in meeting production realization 
efforts by fabricating 10 development pits over the last two years. 
During fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021, LANL is transitioning to 
the product realization process prove-in phase.
    In fiscal year 2021, NNSA will continue to design, procure long 
lead materials, and plan for demolition and equipment removal at the 
proposed Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF), which 
will produce no less than 50 pits per year during 2030. Currently, 285 
project designers and support staff are working on the project. That 
number is expected to increase significantly as SRS is required to 
begin to hire and train the technical workforce needed to produce pits 
at SRPPF. Training requires multiple years to meet the 2030 goal of 50 
pits per year at SRPPF, and it must begin in fiscal year 2021. The 
SRPPF Project is on schedule to receive Critical Decision-1 approval in 
fiscal year 2021.
    Secondary Capability Modernization: The fiscal year 2021 budget 
request of $457 million for Secondary Capability Modernization 
represents a 55.7 percent increase over the fiscal year 2020 enacted 
budget. This funding supports NNSA's uranium, depleted uranium and 
alloys, and lithium modernization efforts.
    NNSA's uranium strategy invests in the reliability of key systems 
to sustain casting, assembly, and analytical chemistry, which supply 
the current stockpile with purified enriched uranium metal. It also 
seeks to decrease mission dependency on the seventy-five year old 
Building 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) by 
relocating the facility's enriched uranium processing capabilities into 
UPF and other existing facilities. In fiscal year 2021, nuclear 
construction at UPF will reach its peak. The project has successfully 
completed the first three subprojects under budget.
    NNSA's Depleted Uranium (DU) Program will restart and modernize 
lapsed DU alloying and component manufacturing capabilities at Y-12 and 
invest in key new technologies to improve efficiency and reliability 
and reduce lifecycle costs. The DU Modernization Program is also re-
establishing a reliable supply of purified DU metal by installing and 
operating a DUF6 to DUF4 conversion process and re-establishing the 
DUF4 to metal process. Funding in support of DU is also critical to 
reestablishing component production capabilities at Y-12 needed to 
support on-going warhead acquisition programs. These capabilities have 
not been in operation for almost 20 years and are time urgent.
    NNSA's Lithium Strategy supports the sustainment of existing 
infrastructure and ensures the lithium processing needs of the nuclear 
security enterprise are met through 2035. It also funds activities in 
support of the Lithium Processing Facility (LPF) to meet NNSA's lithium 
needs beyond 2035 by replacing the existing at-risk Lithium Processing 
Building located at Y-12. Loss of this capability prior to programmatic 
usability of LPF will impact on-going warhead acquisition programs.
    Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment: The fiscal 
year 2021 budget request of $457 million is an increase of $10.6 
million, or 2.4 percent, above the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. The 
mission of Tritium Modernization is to establish and operate a domestic 
source of tritium to meet national security requirements, recycle 
tritium gas to maintain required inventories, and sustain reliable 
supply chain infrastructure and equipment to ensure delivery goals. 
Since 2003, tritium production has met all production, delivery, and 
schedule requirements. Currently, NNSA is ramping up production levels 
at the Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar 1 and 2 reactors and is 
confident that current tritium production plans will meet future 
tritium delivery requirements. By early fiscal year 2021, two reactors 
will be producing tritium with a combined total of 2,336 TPBARs, the 
highest numbers to date. Beyond fiscal year 2021, NNSA will continue 
the ramp up of tritium production to meet mission requirements. Funding 
for the Tritium Finishing Facility is critical to managing risk by 
modernizing our capabilities to finish, package, and ship gas 
reservoirs.
    This funding request will also continue efforts to make available, 
when needed, the necessary supplies of enriched uranium for a variety 
of national security needs. The Domestic Uranium Enrichment (DUE) 
program schedule is driven by the nearest-term defense need--
unobligated low enriched uranium for tritium production. Other needs 
for enriched uranium (e.g., research reactors, naval fuel) are 
supported by this effort as well. NNSA is currently executing an 
Analysis of Alternatives examining a wide range of options for meeting 
the unobligated enriched uranium need. These options include an AC100 
centrifuge and a smaller centrifuge being developed by Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, as well as other enrichment technologies and non-
construction options. The analysis has been impacted by COVID-19, but 
NNSA looks forward to sharing the results with Congress as soon as the 
analysis is complete.
Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering
    The fiscal year 2021 budget request for Stockpile Research, 
Technology, and Engineering (SRT&E) is $2.8 billion, an increase of 
$229 million, or 9 percent above the fiscal year 2020 enacted levels. 
This program provides the foundation for science-based stockpile 
decisions, tools, and components; focuses on the most pressing 
investments the nuclear security enterprise requires to meet DOD 
warhead needs and schedules; enables assessment and certification 
capabilities used throughout the enterprise; and provides the knowledge 
and expertise needed to maintain confidence in the nuclear weapons 
stockpile without additional nuclear explosive testing.
    Assessment Science ($773 million) requests additional funding to 
support subcritical experiments used to assess the state of the current 
stockpile and certify warhead modernization programs and advanced 
diagnostics for subcritical hydrodynamic integrated weapons experiments 
that produce data for stockpile certifications.
    Engineering and Integrated Assessments ($337.4 million) sustains 
NNSA's capability for creating and maturing advanced toolsets and 
technologies to improve weapon surety and support annual stockpile 
assessments.
    Weapons Technology and Manufacturing Modernization ($298 million) 
develops the materials, technology and manufacturing solutions that 
will significantly reduce the time and cost of planned and future 
warhead modernization programs and manufacturing processes. This area 
has already provided great benefits to the current stockpile and is 
instrumental to a more responsive and resilient nuclear enterprise.
    Inertial Confinement Fusion ($554.7 million) will continue to 
maintain essential experimental capabilities and expertise in high 
energy density science. These efforts continue to provide data to 
reduce uncertainty in calculations of nuclear weapons performance and 
improve the predictive capability of science and engineering models in 
high-pressure, high-energy, high-density regimes.
    The fiscal year 2021 request includes $732 million for the Advanced 
Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, which continues NNSA's close 
collaboration with DOE's Office of Science to implement the Exascale 
Computing Initiative. The first NNSA Exascale computer will be located 
at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The ASC Program supports 
stockpile stewardship by developing and delivering predictive 
simulation capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in addition to 
deploying increasingly more powerful supercomputers at Sandia, Los 
Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. Improvements in 
high performance computing and artificial intelligence are essential 
for NNSA next-generation simulation capabilities to support weapons 
design and science-based stockpile stewardship.
    The Academic Programs ($87 million) of Stockpile Research, 
Technology, and Engineering are designed to support academic programs 
in science and engineering disciplines of critical importance to the 
NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise, such as nuclear science, 
radiochemistry, materials at extreme conditions, high energy density 
science, advanced manufacturing, and high performance computing. In 
addition, building a diverse workforce will strengthen our stewardship 
of the future. The role of the Academic Programs is three-fold:
    1. Develop the highly trained technical workforce needed to support 
core missions to replace the current generation of NNSA professionals,
    2. Maintain technical peer expertise external to the nuclear 
security enterprise for providing valuable oversight, cross-check and 
review,
    3. Enable scientific innovation to enhance the nuclear security 
enterprise missions to strengthen the basic fields of research relevant 
to the NNSA mission.
    The Academic Programs enable robust and diverse research and foster 
STEM educational communities through a variety of methods to achieve 
the program goals.
Secure Transportation Asset
    The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) provides safe, secure 
transport of the Nation's nuclear weapons, weapon components, and 
special nuclear material throughout the nuclear security enterprise to 
meet nuclear security requirements and support broader NNSA operations. 
Nuclear weapon life-extension programs, limited-life component 
exchanges, surveillance, dismantlement, nonproliferation activities, 
and experimental programs rely on transport of weapons, weapon 
components, and special nuclear material on schedule and in a safe and 
secure manner.
    The fiscal year 2021 budget request of $390 million supports 
modernizing STA transportation assets, replacement of STA's now-
obsolete DC-9 aircraft, vehicle sustainment, replacement of armored 
tractors, escort and support vehicles; and upgrade of the Tractor 
Control Unit to accommodate for communications and security. Funding 
also supports a commitment to a stable human resources strategy that 
recruits and retains Federal Agents and staff with the requisite skills 
to meet priorities and mission requirements.
    The fiscal year 2021 request includes $102 million for development 
and testing of the Mobile Guardian Transporter, which will provide a 
replacement trailer system that will meet nuclear safety requirements, 
address evolving potential security threats, and replace the current 
Safeguards Transporter, which first entered service in 1997.
Improving Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations
    An effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons 
infrastructure is essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly to 
shifting requirements. Such an infrastructure offers tangible evidence 
to both allies and potential adversaries of U.S. nuclear weapons 
capabilities and can help to deter, assure, and hedge against adverse 
developments, and discourage adversary interest in arms competition.
    The fiscal year 2021 budget request for Infrastructure and 
Operations is $4.4 billion, an increase of $1.2 billion, or 37 percent 
above the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. More than a third of NNSA's 
facilities are over 60-years-old. It will take sustained, significant 
resources and sound management practices to modernize NNSA's nuclear 
weapons infrastructure.
    The fiscal year 2021 budget request includes significant increases 
in the Operations of Facilities, Maintenance and Repair of Facilities, 
Infrastructure and Safety Recapitalization, and Construction accounts. 
These increases support major efforts like the pit production mission 
at LANL and LEP missions at Kansas City; and begin to address space 
issues across the nuclear security enterprise as the sites are staffing 
up to tackle these challenging missions.
    The Programmatic Construction activities provide continued support 
to major construction projects such as UPF, the Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the Lithium Production 
Capability, and U1a Complex Enhancements Project, among others. The 
request also supports the initiation of design efforts for the High 
Explosive Synthesis, Formulation, and Production project at the Pantex 
Plant.
    The Mission Enabling Construction activities support the transition 
to construction for Nevada 138kV Power Transmission System Replacement 
and two Emergency Operations Centers at LLNL and Sandia National 
Laboratories.
    Thanks to the support of Congress, NNSA is making progress in 
repairing, replacing, and modernizing NNSA's facilities and stabilizing 
deferred maintenance; yet much more remains to be done.
    NNSA is deploying a new science-based infrastructure stewardship 
approach that is improving infrastructure data quality. Part of this 
approach includes the deployment of BUILDER, a system developed by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and recognized by the National Academy of 
Sciences as a best-in-class practice for infrastructure management.
    Using BUILDER-based calculations has provided us with a more 
accurate and transparent understanding of NNSA's vast infrastructure. 
Historical approaches had greatly underestimated the replacement plant 
value of NNSA's facilities. For example, NNSA's replacement value was 
previously estimated to be $55.4 billion and is now estimated to be 
$124.3 billion. Deferred maintenance costs are tied to the replacement 
plant value as it costs more to repair a more expensive facility. 
Therefore, as expected, NNSA deferred maintenance increased with the 
deployment of our new, more accurate, data-driven approach, from $2.5 
billion as of fiscal year 2018 to $4.8 billion as of fiscal year 2019.
    However, this is not an indication that NNSA's infrastructure 
condition declined, merely that the values are more accurate. In fact, 
the ratio of deferred maintenance to replacement plant value decreased 
from 4.6 percent to 3.8 percent, an indication that NNSA's investments 
have been successful. NNSA is using BUILDER to pinpoint infrastructure 
investments that reduce the most risk to the mission. In addition, NNSA 
is undertaking new initiatives and pilots to identify opportunities for 
improved project execution and asset acquisition.
    NNSA is making critical investments to stabilize and dispose of 
high-risk excess facilities. For example, in fiscal year 2019, NNSA 
completed its first large-scale process-contaminated disposition at 
LANL Building 46-001. In fiscal year 2021, NNSA is investing $30 
million for the disposition of ten facilities, including three process-
contaminated facilities.
Defense Nuclear Security Efforts
    The Office of Defense Nuclear Security's (DNS) primary mission is 
protecting the facilities, people, and assets that are critical to 
achieving NNSA's important national security missions. Defense Nuclear 
Security's fiscal year 2021 budget request is $826.9 million, an 
increase of $51.9 million, or 6.7 percent, over the fiscal year 2020 
enacted amount. This growth in funding supports increased security 
personnel at LANL PF-4 as it transitions to 24/7 operations and initial 
increased support at SRS in support of SRPPF. While NNSA faces 
challenges replacing and refreshing aging physical security 
infrastructure, it is making key investments to recapitalize this 
infrastructure through the Security Infrastructure Revitalization 
Program. Increased security requirements are associated with growth 
across the nuclear security enterprise, including plutonium pit 
production efforts. DNS is focused on countering the threat posed by 
unmanned aircraft systems and aims to complete the installation of 
counter unmanned aircraft systems at Y-12, the Pantex Plant, and the 
Nevada National Security Site in fiscal year 2021.
Enhancing Cybersecurity
    Information Technology and Cybersecurity enable every element of 
NNSA's missions. The fiscal year 2021 budget request is $375.5 million, 
an increase of $75.5 million, or 25.2 percent, over the fiscal year 
2020 enacted level. This increase will continue cybersecurity 
enhancements, bolster cybersecurity capabilities, and support the 
continuation of IT modernization efforts. NNSA is making steady 
progress in enhancing and upgrading components of the Enterprise Secure 
Computing environment to ensure that nuclear security enterprise 
missions can be completed without disruption. As NNSA mission 
requirements expand in scope, IT and cyber programs require 
modernization, expansion, and innovation in a commensurate fashion. 
Cybersecurity is a defense and deterrence mechanism and a powerful 
tool. In the current threat environment, NNSA cannot afford to neglect 
its cybersecurity capabilities, which serve as frontline assets that 
protect the information, systems, and networks on which NNSA depends to 
execute its mission.
             defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
    The fiscal year 2021 budget request for the Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation account is $2 billion, an increase of $86.6 million, 
or 4.5 percent, over the fiscal year 2020 enacted level, after 
adjusting for the $220 million fiscal year 2020 appropriation for the 
termination of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX) project. 
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account activities address the entire 
nuclear threat spectrum by helping to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond 
to nuclear and radiological incidents around the world.
    This appropriation funds five existing programs and expands NNSA's 
nuclear forensics mission.
    These six programs, as part of a whole-of-government approach, 
provide policy and technical leadership to prevent or limit the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related materials, technology, and 
expertise; develop technologies to detect nuclear proliferation; secure 
or eliminate inventories of nuclear weapons-related materials and 
infrastructure; and ensure that technically trained emergency 
management personnel are available to respond to nuclear and 
radiological incidents and accidents.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts
    The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation works to: remove or 
eliminate vulnerable nuclear material; improve global nuclear security 
through multilateral and bilateral technical exchanges and training 
workshops; help prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and 
radioactive materials; secure domestic and international civilian 
buildings containing high-priority radioactive material; provide 
technical reviews of U.S. export license applications; conduct export 
control training for U.S. enforcement agencies and international 
partners; strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's ability 
to detect and deter nuclear proliferation; advance U.S. capabilities to 
monitor arms control treaties and detect foreign nuclear programs; and 
maintain organizational readiness to respond to and mitigate 
radiological or nuclear incidents worldwide.
    The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program provides an 
integrated approach to addressing the risk posed by nuclear materials. 
The fiscal year 2021 budget request is $400 million, an increase of 
$37.2 million, or 10.2 percent above the fiscal year 2020 enacted 
level. The request provides additional cooperative agreement funding 
for establishing non-HEU-based molybdenum-99 production technologies in 
the United States. Additionally, the request for M3 supports the 
conversion of research reactors to low enriched uranium and the removal 
and disposal of weapons-usable nuclear material, with priority on 
removing surplus plutonium from the state of South Carolina.
    The Global Material Security program works with partner nations to 
increase the security of vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials 
and improve their ability to detect, disrupt, and investigate illicit 
trafficking of these materials. The fiscal year 2021 budget request of 
$400 million is a decrease of $42 million, or 9.6 percent, below the 
fiscal year 2020 enacted level. This reduction is a result of a funding 
increase received in fiscal year 2020 for Cesium Irradiator Replacement 
Program activities, to include addressing the container breach in 
Seattle, and for efforts to partner with state and local governments to 
train first responders. The requested funding includes efforts to 
secure and protect at risk nuclear and radioactive materials both 
domestically and internationally, remove and reduce radioactive 
materials, prevent and investigate the illicit trafficking of 
materials, and promote international and national best practices in 
nuclear security and long-term sustainment of national programs. NNSA 
is on track to replace all cesium-137 based blood irradiators in the 
U.S. by the end of 2027.
    The Nonproliferation and Arms Control program develops and 
implements programs to: strengthen international nuclear safeguards; 
control the proliferation of nuclear and dual-use material, equipment, 
technology and expertise; verify nuclear reductions and compliance with 
nonproliferation and arms control agreements and arrangements; and 
address enduring and emerging proliferation challenges requiring the 
development of innovative policies and approaches. The fiscal year 2021 
budget request is $138.7 million. This request fully funds 
implementation of our obligations, commitments, and authorities 
pursuant to statutes and international agreements. It includes efforts 
to strengthen the U.S. safeguards technology and human capital base to 
meet projected U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency resource 
requirements, facilitate the expansion of civil nuclear power while 
minimizing proliferation risks through the conclusion of Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation (``123'') Agreements and implementation of Administrative 
Arrangements, maintain technical monitoring, verification, and analysis 
capabilities to support implementation of strategic arms and nuclear 
testing limitations initiatives, and strengthen domestic and 
international implementation of export controls.
    The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN 
R&D) program supports innovative unilateral and multilateral technical 
capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize foreign nuclear 
weapons programs, illicit diversion of special nuclear material, and 
nuclear detonations worldwide. The fiscal year 2021 budget request for 
this program is $531.7 million. The funding requested strengthens U.S. 
technical capabilities to detect, locate, and characterize foreign 
nuclear programs and expands Nonproliferation Stewardship Program 
efforts.
    Nonproliferation Construction consolidates construction costs for 
DNN projects. The fiscal year 2021 budget request is $148.6 million, a 
decrease of $150.4 million, or 50.3 percent, below the fiscal year 2020 
enacted level. The decrease reflects the completion of the MOX 
contractual termination settlement. The $148.6 million will be used for 
the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project, which supports the 
dilute and dispose approach. This supports the execution of early site 
preparation and long lead procurements activities, as well as 
continuing the maturation of the design for all major systems 
supporting the plutonium processing gloveboxes. NNSA will continue 
looking at opportunities for improving the SPD project schedule.
    The NNSA Nuclear Forensics Research and Development effort will 
expand our capabilities and reflects NNSA taking a more active 
leadership role in this area. The fiscal year 2021 budget request for 
this program is $40 million, which includes consolidating $12 million 
from DNN R&D. NNSA will focus on expanding nuclear forensics 
capabilities in both research and development and operations. NNSA will 
leverage its existing capabilities to develop advanced technical 
nuclear forensics analysis capabilities within the Office of 
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation to support interagency 
response to a nuclear event.
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response
    The fiscal year 2021 request for the Nuclear Counterterrorism and 
Incident Response (NCTIR) Program is $377.5 million, an increase of 
$5.4 million over the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. NCTIR includes 
two subprograms: the Emergency Operations (EO) subprogram and the 
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP) subprogram. EO 
provides both the structure and processes the Department uses to 
prevent, prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all-
hazards emergencies that threaten life and property. In addition EO 
provides the framework for building, assessing, and improving 
organizational resilience to ensure uninterrupted performance and 
delivery of the Department's Essential Functions under any 
circumstance. The Department's Emergency Operations program aligns and 
complies with Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8), ``National 
Preparedness,'' and PPD-40, ``National Continuity Policy''.
    CTCP provides effective capabilities to respond to any nuclear or 
radiological incident or accident in the United States or abroad by 
applying the unique technical expertise found across NNSA's nuclear 
security enterprise. Highly trained NEST personnel with specialized 
technical equipment maintain readiness to support lead Federal agencies 
to locate and defeat potential nuclear and radiological threat devices, 
to effectively manage the consequences of nuclear or radiological 
emergencies, and to support enhanced security operations for National 
Special Security Events (NSSE).
    NNSA's Aerial Measuring System (AMS) provides airborne remote 
sensing in the event of a nuclear or radiological accident or incident 
within the United States, as well as in support of regularly scheduled 
NSSEs. With the support of Congress, NNSA completed procurement of 
three fixed-wing AMS aircraft in fiscal year 2020 and is in the process 
of procuring two rotary-wing AMS aircraft. The new airframes will 
minimize the risk of mission failure due to unscheduled maintenance and 
reduce future maintenance costs.
    NNSA provides specialized technology, equipment, and training to 
regional Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) teams at FBI field 
offices in 12 major American cities, enabling these teams to identify 
and mitigate the function of a nuclear or radiological device. As part 
of the Capability Forward initiative, the fiscal year 2021 requested 
budget will enable CTCP to enhance WMD device defeat capabilities in 
the current 12 cities; increase the number of regional counter-WMD FBI 
teams in major metropolitan areas from 12 to 14 by fiscal year 2022; 
and enhance NNSA facilities to accommodate increased training 
requirements.
    Complementing these efforts, the fiscal year 2021 budget sustains 
and improves the Nation's capability to understand and counter nuclear 
threats, informing a range of policy and technical efforts to detect 
and defeat adversary efforts to illicitly acquire nuclear capabilities. 
This work informs the capabilities of the military, intelligence, and 
national security communities by leveraging the technical innovation of 
the nuclear security enterprise to achieve increased confidence and 
accuracy in predictive modeling and new tools in support of the nuclear 
incident response mission.
    CTCP provides technical and operational capabilities in support of 
the interagency National Technical Nuclear Forensic mission. The fiscal 
year 2021 budget reflects an increased NNSA role in the nuclear 
forensics mission. NNSA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
will continue to engage with the Committee and the relevant homeland 
security committees to secure agreement on transitioning leadership of 
this mission from DHS to NNSA. When nuclear materials or devices are 
interdicted or, in the event of a nuclear detonation, NNSA responds 
with national laboratory expertise and deployable field teams to 
provide technical analysis in support of the attribution process.
    CTCP maintains an operational nuclear forensics capability in three 
distinct areas: (1) pre-detonation device disassembly and examination; 
(2) post-detonation assessment; and (3) analysis and characterization 
of nuclear materials. The program maintains readiness to deploy device 
disposition and device assessment teams, conduct laboratory operations 
in support of analysis of bulk actinide forensics, and deploy subject 
matter expertise and operational capabilities in support of ground 
sample collections that support attribution of a nuclear detonation.
    As referenced above, in fiscal year 2021, NNSA's request expands 
our national technical nuclear forensics work. CTCP is requesting $40 
million to support this effort. This scope of work includes assisting 
in the coordination of interagency nuclear forensics activities through 
the National Nuclear Forensics Center. Without the requested funding, 
many technical experts will continue to leave this NPR priority mission 
to pursue other areas of work, posing a threat to U.S. national 
security.
                      naval reactors appropriation
Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
    Nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of submarines and 
aircraft carriers is critical to the security of the U.S. and its 
allies as well as the security of global sea lanes. The Office of Naval 
Reactors remains at the forefront of technological developments in 
naval nuclear propulsion by advancing new technologies and improvements 
in naval reactor performance. This preeminence provides the U.S. Navy 
with a commanding edge in naval warfighting capabilities.
    The fiscal year 2021 budget for Naval Reactors is $1.68 billion, an 
increase of $35.6 million, or 2.2 percent, over the fiscal year 2020 
enacted level. The budget request supports the requirements for Naval 
Reactors' three major projects--Columbia-class reactor plant 
development, the refueling overhaul of a research and training reactor 
in New York, and the construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling 
Facility in Idaho. The budget request also ensures Naval Reactors can 
support the operational nuclear fleet, continue research and 
development efforts for future generations of nuclear-powered warships, 
and make progress on both the recapitalization of laboratory facilities 
and the environmental remediation of legacy responsibilities.
    The fiscal year 2020 enacted level, $1.6 billion, does not reflect 
the mandated transfer of $88.5 million from Naval Reactors to Nuclear 
Energy for the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor. Naval Reactors 
has requested funding in fiscal year 2021 to support these projects and 
fund necessary reactor technology development, equipment, construction, 
maintenance, and modernization of critical infrastructure and 
facilities. By employing a small but high-performing technical base, 
the teams at Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in Pennsylvania; Knolls 
Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site in New York; and the Naval 
Reactors Facility in Idaho can perform the research and development, 
analysis, engineering, and testing needed to support today's fleet at 
sea and develop future nuclear-powered warships. These laboratories 
also perform the technical evaluations that enable Naval Reactors to 
thoroughly assess emergent issues and deliver timely responses to 
ensure nuclear safety and maximize operational flexibility.
              federal salaries and expenses appropriation
    The fiscal year 2021 budget request for Federal Salaries and 
Expenses (FSE) is $454 million, an increase of $19.3 million, or 4.3 
percent, over the fiscal year 2020 enacted level. This budget will 
support an additional 83 Full Time Equivalents (FTE), a one percent 
cost of living increase, five percent benefit escalation, and funding 
for training, travel, support services, and field and headquarters 
security investigations, among other workforce needs.
    The 2018 NPR highlighted the need to properly support civilian 
personnel who protect the U.S. against nuclear threats. Effective 
deterrence would be impossible without the vital contributions our 
personnel make to the U.S.' nuclear capabilities and deterrence.
    NNSA must have sufficient people, with the right capabilities and 
security clearances, to ensure we can modernize the nuclear deterrent, 
recapitalize an aging infrastructure, and continue to meet the 
requirements of our nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs. A 
skilled federal workforce is required to execute appropriate program 
and project oversight as the NSE is busier than it has been since the 
end of the Cold War. NNSA requires additional staff to support growing 
mission scope, including: (1) initiating new modernization programs, 
and (2) new unique high hazard, high scrutiny plutonium pit production, 
domestic uranium enrichment, tritium, lithium, and high explosives 
projects.
    In 2018, before the updated requirements included in the NPR, two 
independent studies concluded that the NNSA had unmet critical staffing 
needs. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and NNSA's CEPE 
separately arrived at the conclusion that additional federal staff 
would be needed to meet the demands of the NNSA mission. Both studies 
recommended NNSA hire additional staff above its previous statutory cap 
of 1,690 FTE positions. In March 2019, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) endorsed OPM and CEPE's conclusions across multiple NNSA 
functions.
    Congress, recognizing NNSA's need to properly support its growing 
workforce, appropriated $434.7 million for FSE (at NNSA's fiscal year 
2020 request level), authorized an additional 200 FTEs, and raised the 
Excepted Service cap by 200. With this strong support from Congress in 
fiscal year 2020, NNSA has focused on external hiring to reach an end 
strength of 1,858 FTE positions.
    During my tenure, NNSA implemented an aggressive hiring strategy to 
address staffing requirements across the NSE. When the COVID-19 
pandemic made in-person recruiting events impossible, the NNSA team 
pivoted to virtual recruiting and held three virtual job fairs since 
June. The most recent virtual job fair in August included all of the 
national security laboratories, plants, and sites, providing us with 
the opportunity to interact with over 1,500 candidates who are 
interested in joining the nuclear security enterprise. All of the labs, 
plants, and sites are on pace to meet their fiscal year 2020 hiring 
goals.
    With a renewed focus on recruitment in multiple cities and college 
campuses to support all program areas, NNSA is recruiting the personnel 
needed to successfully meet its mission growth and commitments as 
directed in the 2018 NPR.
                               conclusion
    NNSA's diverse and enduring national security missions are crucial 
to the security of the U.S., the defense of its allies and partners, 
and global stability. The U.S. nuclear deterrent has been and will 
continue to remain the cornerstone of America's national security. NNSA 
has the unique responsibility to ensure its continued safety, security, 
reliability, and effectiveness.
    Nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear counterterrorism activities 
are essential to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and 
preventing malicious use of nuclear and radioactive materials and 
technology around the world. Nonproliferation and counterterrorism both 
rely on the technical expertise uniquely available from Defense 
Programs activities. Providing naval nuclear propulsion to the U.S. 
Navy is crucial to the U.S. to defend interests abroad and protect the 
world's commercial shipping lanes. The fiscal year 2021 budget request, 
fully supported by the Senate and House versions of this year's NDAA, 
supports the Administration's recognition of the urgency to restore our 
Nation's nuclear security enterprise. NNSA is mindful of the resources 
entrusted to it and gratefully recognizes the ongoing support of the 
American people and Congress for these important missions.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you so much. Excellent statement.
    We will now hear from Ellen Lord.

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN M. LORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
                  ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT

    Secretary Lord. Thank you. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member 
Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for 
the opportunity to testify today.
    I am pleased to be joined by colleagues, Administrator 
Gordon-Hagerty and Admiral Richard, to discuss what four 
successive Secretaries of Defense have called the Department of 
Defense's highest priority mission: ensuring that the United 
States has a safe, secure, reliable, and credible nuclear 
deterrent now and in the future.
    I would like to frame my remarks around three key points.
    One, despite actions by the United States to lead the world 
in reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, potential U.S. 
adversaries have gone in the other direction.
    Two, although effective today, the U.S. nuclear deterrent 
remains dependent on aging weapons, platforms, delivery 
systems, infrastructure, and nuclear command, control, and 
communications, or NC3, systems built during the Cold War.
    Three, DOD has embarked upon the first recapitalization of 
our triad since the end of the Cold War, and we cannot do it 
alone. The partnership between DOD and DOE and NNSA continues 
to thrive through the interagency Nuclear Weapons Council, or 
NWC.
    Today we face a stark reality. The longstanding and 
repeated warnings about the need to modernize and recapitalize 
the U.S. nuclear deterrent is no longer a warning about the 
future. The tipping point in recapitalization that we have long 
tried to avoid is here, and we believe the condition of the 
nuclear enterprise now poses possibly the greatest risk to 
deterrence.
    As the Under Secretary of Acquisition and Sustainment, I 
serve as the chairwoman of the NWC, which oversees sustainment 
and modernization of our nuclear weapons and supporting 
infrastructure and ensures their alignment with DOD programs. 
The NWC convenes every month to synchronize efforts between DOD 
and NNSA. The NWC also reviews costs and schedules for options 
related to the nuclear stockpile driving NNSA and the services 
to meet requirements in ways that are both cost effective and 
timely. As a result, the NWC's mission requires unprecedented 
levels of cooperation and coordination between two independent 
cabinet agencies to ensure that budget requests for nuclear 
modernization are aligned and that Admiral Richard's 
requirements are met.
    Through our coordination in the NWC, NNSA's fiscal year 
2021 budget request reflects the necessary funding needed to 
meet DOD's requirements. The NWC recently convened to review 
the House of Representatives' appropriations marks that will 
affect the NWC's entire program of record, including the 
ongoing B61-12 bomb, the W88 warhead, and W80-4 warhead 
refurbishment efforts, as well as the longer- term 
modernization programs.
    On behalf of the NWC, I strongly urge full support for the 
NNSA's budget request, as well as successful resolution of the 
language in various fiscal year 2021 congressional bills that 
would prevent the NWC from carrying out its statutorily 
mandated responsibilities.
    I want to thank this Committee for its longstanding 
bipartisan support to our nuclear deterrent mission and the men 
and women in uniform who are its backbone.
    I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Lord and Admiral Richard 
follows:]

  Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Ellen M. Lord and Admiral 
                           Charles A. Richard
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the 
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement as 
part of your hearing on matters relating to the budget of the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA). We are pleased to join our NNSA colleague to discuss what four 
successive Secretaries of Defense have called the Department of 
Defense's highest priority mission: ensuring that the United States has 
a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent--now and in 
the future. As we continue to persevere through the COVID-19 pandemic, 
we want to assure you that U.S. nuclear forces are fully manned and 
fully ready today--in large part because they are backed by the world's 
best scientists and engineers at DOE/NNSA.
    As the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 
(USD(A&S)) and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), we 
both play key roles in the nuclear deterrent mission. In the interest 
of brevity, we would like to frame our joint statement around three key 
points:
    1.  Despite actions by the United States to lead the world in 
reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, potential U.S. adversaries have 
gone in the other direction and placed greater emphasis on modernizing 
and expanding their nuclear weapons, delivery platforms, 
infrastructure, and command and control.
    2.  Although effective today, the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains 
dependent on aging weapons; delivery systems; infrastructure; and 
nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems built during 
the Cold War.
    3.  DoD has embarked upon the first recapitalization of our triad 
since the end of the Cold War, and we cannot do it alone. The 
partnership between DoD and DOE/NNSA continues to thrive through the 
interagency Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), and the NWC has made 
tremendous progress to align priorities, schedules, and investments 
between the Departments to ensure the future viability of our Nation's 
nuclear deterrent.
    Today, we find ourselves fielding a smaller Cold War-era nuclear 
arsenal to deter a more diverse set of nuclear-armed potential 
adversaries. These potential adversaries are collectively fielding more 
modern, technologically sophisticated, and varied nuclear forces, and 
doing so at an alarming rate. Strategic competition among existing 
nuclear powers has intensified, while challenges from newly established 
or aspiring nuclear weapons States continue to grow.
    Our nuclear deterrent underwrites every U.S. military operation 
across the globe; it is the foundation and backstop of our national 
defense. It has kept the peace among the Great Powers of the world for 
over 70 years and has been strongly supported by each Administration 
and Congress regardless of political party. Furthermore, assuring 
allies and partners depends on their confidence in the credibility of 
our extended nuclear deterrence. We cannot overemphasize the immediate 
need to modernize our nuclear delivery systems and stockpile. To ensure 
the deterrent is credible in the face of future threats, we must also 
recapitalize NNSA's supporting infrastructure. Without consistent, 
methodical, and immediate investment in NNSA's nuclear enterprise, we 
will increase operational risk and degrade the Triad's flexibility to 
address future strategic uncertainty--thereby endangering our ability 
to meet the enduring national security objectives, shared by current 
and previous Administrations, which have underwritten the safety of our 
Nation for many decades.
    The longstanding and repeated warnings about the need to modernize 
and recapitalize the U.S. nuclear deterrent are no longer warnings 
about the future. The tipping point in recapitalization, that we have 
long tried to avoid, is here. Previous and well-intentioned directive 
policy changes and de-emphasis of our nuclear deterrent resulted in 
decades of deferred investments in nuclear warheads, delivery systems, 
platforms, NC3, and supporting infrastructure. Although sustainment 
efforts have allowed us to maintain a viable nuclear Triad and to defer 
modernization investments for many years, continued delays are no 
longer an option. The mounting programmatic risks are now being 
realized and transferred to DoD as operational risk impacting strategic 
deterrence, and we believe the condition of the nuclear enterprise now 
poses possibly the greatest risk to deterrence.
    Nearly all of the systems that compose the current nuclear 
deterrent are well beyond their original service lives and can no 
longer be cost-effectively life-extended to meet future requirements. 
DoD is addressing challenges with our aging NC3, delivery systems, and 
platforms. DOE/NNSA is facing similar challenges as the nuclear 
warheads in the stockpile continue to age and are being sustained well 
beyond their original service lives. Additionally, much of the DOE/NNSA 
nuclear weapons production infrastructure dates to the 1950s or earlier 
and requires investment to provide a safe, secure working environment 
with the required capabilities and capacities; the majority of this 
infrastructure is rated as being in no better than fair condition. As a 
result, the community faces a situation where we must execute 
concurrent acquisition and fielding of modern replacement systems in 
each leg of the Triad while also investing in an updated nuclear 
weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure.
    As USD(A&S) and Commander, USSTRATCOM, we both serve on the NWC. 
The NWC is a joint DoD and DOE/NNSA coordinating body established by 
Congress to facilitate the alignment of requirements and to establish 
priorities as the two Departments fulfill their shared responsibility 
for providing the Nation's nuclear deterrent. The NWC's current 
structure and business processes are working well and enable senior-
level attention and decisions on capabilities and capacities needed to 
maintain and modernize an effective nuclear weapons stockpile that 
meets the requirements of an increasingly challenging international 
security environment. The NWC regularly convenes to synchronize efforts 
between DoD and DOE/NNSA on the vision, strategy, and execution of the 
nuclear program aligned with the National Defense Strategy. The NWC 
also reviews costs and schedules for options related to the nuclear 
stockpile, driving DOE/NNSA and the Military Departments and Services 
to meet requirements in ways that are both cost-effective and timely. 
The NWC fully supports DOE/NNSA's efforts to establish a responsive and 
resilient nuclear security enterprise to meet U.S. deterrence and 
assurance needs. A responsive enterprise ensures DOE/NNSA can attract 
and retain a world-class workforce capable of responding to the dynamic 
and uncertain future we face.
    Across both DoD and DOE/NNSA, the Administration is taking strong 
action to modernize our nuclear deterrent. The President's Fiscal Year 
2021 Budget Request for DOE/NNSA fully supports the funding levels 
necessary to continue the critical modernization efforts needed to 
preserve our Nation's capability for deterring nuclear and non-nuclear 
attacks; assuring allies and partners; achieving U.S. objectives if 
deterrence fails; and hedging against an uncertain future. It also 
supports critical programs to ensure they remain synchronized across 
both Departments, and it puts us closer to ensuring the long-term 
flexibility and credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. We recognize 
this is a 20-year nuclear modernization journey that we should have 
started 15 years ago.
    The recent fiscal year 2021 budget marks and policy language 
proposed by the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, 
should they be enacted in the final bills, would significantly 
jeopardize DOE/NNSA's ability to meet DoD requirements, threaten the 
critical infrastructure and technical skills required to provide an 
effective and credible nuclear deterrent, and prevent the NWC from 
carrying out its statutory role to coordinate nuclear weapons 
activities between the two Departments. The NWC recently convened to 
review the appropriations marks that would affect the NWC's entire 
Program of Record, including the ongoing B61-12 bomb, W88 warhead, and 
W80-4 warhead refurbishment efforts as well as the longer-term 
modernization programs. We strongly encourage Congress to authorize and 
appropriate the full budget request for DOE/NNSA and urge resolution of 
the policy language in a manner that enables the NWC to continue as an 
effective coordinating body for the Nation's highest priority defense 
mission.
    In closing, we thank this Committee for its longstanding, 
bipartisan support for our nuclear deterrent mission and for the men 
and women--both in and out of uniform--who are its backbone. We look 
forward to responding to your questions.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
    Admiral Richard, let me, first of all, thank you for your 
long, enduring service to our country. We appreciate and love 
you very much. You are recognized for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES A. RICHARD, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                    STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

    Admiral Richard. Well, thank you for that, Chairman Inhofe, 
and good morning to you, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished 
Members of the Committee. It is an honor to be here today 
alongside Ms. Lord and Ms. Gordon-Hagerty and a privilege to 
represent the 150,000 men and women performing U.S. Strategic 
Command's missions every day. I am constantly reminded by the 
dedication of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and 
civilians who maintain the watch, particularly in these COVID 
operating environments we are now that the people of U.S. 
Strategic Command have a can-do attitude that I have rarely 
seen elsewhere.
    I want to thank the President and the Secretary of Defense, 
Chairmen for their continued leadership and confidence.
    I want to thank Congress and particularly this Committee 
for your support in ensuring the Department, STRATCOM, and our 
interagency partners, particularly the Department of Energy, 
have the required resources necessary to execute our mission to 
deter strategic attacks and guarantee the security of our 
Nation and our allies. Congressional support, budget stability, 
and on-time appropriations are essential requirements for a 
long-term view approach to defense, allowing my command to 
realize presidential guidance, interagency goals.
    The President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget supports 
implementation of the National Security Strategy, meets my 
operational requirements, and responds to evolving existential 
threats we face.
    First, what I would like to do is offer that these 
commitments are necessary because our country, our allies, 
partners, and the current world order continues to confront 
existential threats. Both China and Russia are investing 
considerable resources to advance and expand their nuclear 
arsenals, conventional forces, and they are adopting an 
increasingly assertive posture threatening the use of force to 
fundamentally alter the accepted international norms and rules 
at the expense of our Nation and allies. North Korea and Iran 
continue to conduct harmful activities regionally, causing 
instability and threatening the United States, our allies, and 
partners.
    As a global combatant command, STRATCOM forces, my forces, 
are prepared to respond to any contingency, and should 
strategic deterrence fail, we stand ready to deliver a decisive 
response. A powerful, ready triad, survivable nuclear command, 
control, and communications with supporting infrastructure are 
foundational to our strategic deterrence and assurance 
strategies. They are fundamental to national survival, and this 
part is important. This is my job is to set the conditions 
strategic deterrence is holding that allow the rest of the 
joint force to accomplish its mission.
    Our Nation is at a critical juncture regarding the future 
of our nuclear forces. We have led the world in reducing the 
numbers and types of nuclear weapons in our arsenal while our 
adversaries, potential adversaries, continue expanding their 
strategic capabilities across multiple domains. It is now our 
generation's turn to make the same wise investments required to 
deter nuclear or other strategic attacks and great power war 
for future generations.
    Starting with our nuclear weapons complex, if we fail to 
start investing wisely now, the result may be--and this is the 
tipping point that we have referred to--the need to rebuild 
nearly from scratch over one or more decades our human capital 
and the technical expertise required to be a nuclear power. 
Given stable and consistent funding, I remain confident NNSA 
will meet the expectations we are asking and succeed in 
addressing the bow wave of activities confronting us. We must 
continue the Department's number one priority to recapitalize 
our nuclear forces, including weapons construction and 
maintenance with supporting infrastructure.
    We do not pursue parity with our adversaries' arsenals nor 
seek an arms race, but provide for a qualitative and 
comprehensive approach toward a viable deterrent for the 
future.
    STRATCOM is focused on maintaining a safe, secure, and 
effective deterrent force, providing tailored strategies to 
meet our responsibilities. We were tested by COVID, rose to the 
challenge.
    I am grateful for your continued support which aids 
development of the future force necessary to execute the 
Department's highest priority mission.
    Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral Richard.
    We will now begin with questions. I will begin. The first 
question I have would be for Secretary Lord.
    Any decent coordination requires the DOD and NNSA to share 
budget data well before it is developed and presented. Can you 
tell me what changes that you have made in the NWC process for 
reviewing the NNSA budget after last year's fiasco? Are there 
any further steps that you are considering for improving the 
process? Is there anything that we can do to make that easier 
for you?
    Secretary Lord. Yes, thank you. In May I signed out 
planning guidance for the NWC to compel NNSA to share their 
budget details by September 1 of each year so the Nuclear 
Weapons Council could review it and understand how it pairs 
with DOD's proposed budget. We did this year in early September 
receive that budget, and in fact, just yesterday we had a 
Nuclear Weapons Council meeting in which we reviewed details of 
that.
    What we have done additionally is come up with a construct 
for a working group to do a budget deep dive. We actually have 
an outline here that we put forth that talks about a September 
22nd date for stockpile management, a 29th date for 
infrastructure and operations, October 6th for stockpile RT&E, 
and October 13th production modernization, with a goal of 
coming back to the Nuclear Weapons Council and understanding in 
depth the assumptions behind what is submitted to Congress.
    What we plan to do is update our guidance, our planning 
guidance, this year with a generic form of this to again help 
guide the process so that we are well aligned.
    I think it is worth pointing out that this working group 
has not only NNSA representation and a variety of DOD 
representation, but OMB as well. So in this way, we will 
synchronize efforts and align.
    Chairman Inhofe. Excellent.
    Let me just ask a little bit further. Do you believe that 
your policy and the Senate's NDAA language both aim to improve 
transparency and accountability on the NNSA budget and ensure 
that the Nuclear Weapons Council is not surprised 0 the way it 
was the first year?
    Secretary Lord. Yes.
    Chairman Inhofe. That is good.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, do you believe that the DOD 
and the NNSA coordination would improve if each better 
understood the internal workings of the other?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Mr. Chairman, I believe that 
the system that we have in place right now and with the 
improvements that we have made throughout the NWC with the 
signing of the materials in May will improve greatly the 
transparency of the NNSA budget within the NWC. It is critical 
that we continue to operate as we have been over the last 
couple of years under Under Secretary Lord's leadership and 
with the great partnership that we have throughout the NWC.
    Chairman Inhofe. Very good.
    Now, on the other hand, the recent legislation in the House 
would prohibit NNSA from working with DOD in the Nuclear 
Weapons Council and put the Secretary of Energy on the Nuclear 
Weapons Council. Secretary Lord, how would this legislation 
affect coordination between DOD and NNSA? Would this extra 
layer of bureaucracy make it more or less efficient?
    Secretary Lord. It would make it far less efficient and I 
am afraid might destroy the relationship right now that we have 
between DOD, as well as NNSA. There are also very problematical 
cuts to the budget, $2 billion, in NNSA that would directly 
impair our ability to deliver B61-12, which we are on record 
with the first production unit in 2021, as well as the W80-4 
warhead. There were also other cuts called out. In W93, it was 
zeroed out; Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), $170 million; 
Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), $60 million. 
Essentially a lot of the language removes the semi-autonomous 
nature of NNSA.
    It also elevates the Nuclear Weapons Council to two cabinet 
level positions, which I think is absolutely unfeasible, 
particularly as we do have a cadence of monthly meetings that 
focus on specific programs. We generate a lot of very specific 
reports and do a lot of in-depth program reviews.
    Chairman Inhofe. Excellent.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what damage would be done to 
the DOD and the NNSA relationship if you were not allowed to 
work through the Nuclear Weapons Council?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. The Secretary of Energy has 
testified that he supports the elevation of the Nuclear Weapons 
Council to support co-chairs of the Secretary of Energy and 
Secretary of Defense. In my 30-plus years as a career civil 
servant, in and out of Government, and working with the NWC, 
what I can say is that the system that we have in place right 
now and unless otherwise directed by Congress to change is 
working well, and we are working at an operational level, if 
you will, making the decisions necessary at the, if you will, 
action officers, sub-cabinet level because it is important that 
we can be decisive. With two cabinet officials, they certainly 
are busy with the work of their respective departments. What I 
can say is that the administration does oppose it.
    Chairman Inhofe. That is very good.
    The House appropriations bill cuts the President's request, 
the NNSA request, by almost $2 billion. Now, we went through 
this exercise once before, and we know what we had to do to get 
back where we are supposed to be.
    Madam Administrator, can you explain why your fiscal year 
2021 budget request grew from the previous year and what the $2 
billion cut this year would do to your programs? Would you be 
able to meet the DOD requirements?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Sir, in a word, no, we would 
not be able to meet the requirements of the Department of 
Defense. We recognize that this is quite an aggressive 
schedule, but I am confident that the NNSA can execute.
    We developed the fiscal year 2021 budget based on risk- 
informed, systematic requirements. We involved all of our 
laboratories, plants, and sites leadership and prioritized what 
the missions would be so that we could execute our roles and 
responsibilities insofar as supporting the nuclear deterrent. 
It was a result of a yearlong requirements-based budget to 
prioritize those missions within NNSA that needed to be done. 
Again, like I said, we had all of our labs, plants, and sites 
involved in this from the outset.
    It is interesting that we talk about the 18-plus percent 
increase from fiscal year 2020 appropriated levels to fiscal 
year 2021. There is a reason for this. Over the last 20 years 
or so, the NNSA operated with basically one life extension 
program, one modernization program. That was the 76-1. We are 
operating right now with requirements for four major 
modernization programs, and if authorized and appropriated, 
there will be a fifth with the W93. So we are really 
essentially waking up our system.
    Over the last several decades with the lack of funding and 
the lack of support that we had received from previous 
administrations and previous Congresses, we are at a tipping 
point. We have no more time. We must pursue this aggressive 
strategy to recapitalize our infrastructure and make sure that 
we have the men and women throughout our nuclear enterprise to 
be able to execute these missions.
    We are in a good position now. Again, I know it is an 
aggressive schedule, but I have the commitment of our 
laboratories, plants, and management leadership that we will be 
able to execute these very important missions to maintain a 
nuclear deterrent second to none.
    Chairman Inhofe. Secretary Lord, we heard from Energy that 
they have stated that they have all the information, budget 
data information, sent to us for coordination. Now, this seems 
to be different than what happened last year. So I would just 
ask you the question. Have you received what you need to 
execute the Nuclear Weapons Council's statutory responsibility 
to review and approve the NNSA budget?
    Secretary Lord. We have gotten what was submitted to 
Congress--what will be. We still have a bit of work to do to 
understand the intent and the scope of what those numbers 
encompass. That is why we put this working group together that 
I mentioned before. I believe we have about another month's 
worth of work to do to make sure that we are fully aligned 
between NNSA and DOD, and that is working along with OMB as 
well.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yes. That is good.
    You know, I say to our Members on both sides of the aisle 
that we have something at your desk I believe similar to what 
is on the charts showing the state of disrepair that is out 
there right now. This has been totally ignored in the past. 
When you look at that, it is hard to believe that we could 
expand our activity effectively with that infrastructure.
    Administrator, do you agree that we urgently need to 
modernize NNSA's nuclear weapons infrastructure?
    I would also ask Admiral Richard, are increased investments 
in the NNSA nuclear weapons infrastructure needed to maintain 
our Nation's nuclear deterrent capabilities?
    Let us start with the Administrator.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Thank you for putting those pictures up.
    Let me start by saying more than 50 percent of our 
enterprise is more than 40 years old, and one-third of it dates 
back to the 1940s. So, therefore, time is of the essence to 
recapitalize our infrastructure throughout the entire NNSA. 
Long gone are the days where we would be able to just patch 
these facilities.
    For example, one of the pictures you have is perhaps of the 
lithium facility at Y-12. Portions of the ceiling are falling 
in. I think that is atrocious that we put potentially our 
workforce at risk. We need to make sure that we have state-of-
the-art infrastructure so we can recapitalize our enterprise 
and make sure that we can provide to the Department of Defense 
the requirements that they so sorely need to maintain our 
nuclear deterrent.
    Our main priority is to remain completely aligned with the 
Department of Defense, and the only way to do so is to make 
sure that we have state-of-the-art facilities, together with 
the workforce that is necessary to carry out our unique 
missions, unique only to the NNSA.
    Chairman Inhofe. That is very good. I really appreciate the 
responses to these questions in a very straightforward way.
    I would only conclude by asking Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, what 
kind of problems do you have on this COVID-19? How has that 
impaired your ability to do your job?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Mr. Chairman, COVID-19 
established unprecedented realities for our entire nuclear 
security enterprise. My number one priority is for the health 
and safety of our workforce. Throughout COVID, however, we did 
not have the opportunity to maximum telework. We did do our 
best, however. Because of our unique missions throughout NNSA, 
we had to maintain the nuclear weapons complex. In so doing, 
however, we provided resources necessary and direction to our 
entire enterprise to support ongoing activities. I am heartened 
to say that we did not miss one major milestone or one delivery 
to the Air Force or to the Navy throughout this time. However, 
those challenges had to be prioritized. There were some 
missions that certainly fell below the priority line so that we 
could continue to maximize telework where possible and protect 
our workforce, which again is our number one priority.
    That said, we do have some challenges ahead of us. We are 
going to have other missions that had been put essentially on 
hold, and we are going to have to make up for lost production. 
So we do have challenges ahead, but we recognize the great work 
of men and women of our workforce and what they have been able 
to do to ensure that the Department of Defense receives the 
necessary support throughout COVID.
    Chairman Inhofe. Good. That is very good.
    John Bonsell just reminded me, Admiral, that I asked you a 
question but did not give you a chance to answer that question. 
Your answer to the question is very important to be a part of 
the record of this meeting.
    Admiral Richard. Chairman, I thank you for that. The short 
answer to your question is yes. In fact, it is an emphatic yes.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty just gave you some details of the 
condition of this infrastructure. I want to applaud you for 
your interest in this question. Remember, some of this stuff 
dates back to the Manhattan Project, and it goes beyond--Ms. 
Lord just gave a very good summary of individual impacts. I 
offer that those programmatic impacts transfer to me as 
operational risks that I have to take in terms of capabilities 
that are not available for me to use to execute what the Nation 
has asked me to do.
    But it is even more fundamental than that. This strikes at 
the core of our credibility as a nuclear weapons state. The 
point here is that both our allies and our competitors watch 
what we do, and it is important for us to demonstrate our 
commitment to this mission set. If we do not recapitalize now, 
we are going to cross these points of no return where we will 
not be able to reassemble either the human talent or the 
physical plant for unlimited amounts of money for very long 
periods of time so that I and future STRATCOM commanders can 
have the capabilities needed to execute this mission.
    Chairman Inhofe. That is good.
    Senator Reed?
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you again to the witnesses.
    Under Secretary Lord, what triggered a lot of this 
attention, activity, and today's hearing in some respect was 
the fact that you could not, for the first time, certify--the 
NWC--the adequacy of the budget and our ability to respond to 
these concerns.
    I think it would be helpful if you could just give us a 
brief summary of what happened.
    Secretary Lord. So what happened last year was we did not 
have sufficient insight until a few days before the President's 
budget dropped to understand how well aligned the NNSA's and 
DOD's budgets were. So that led us to write a February 10th, 
2020 letter saying that we were unable to certify the budget.
    We then dug in and did the work that frankly we are doing 
right now on the 2022 budget so that by May 26th, I could 
certify the budget.
    Senator Reed. As you have indicated, you have received 
information from the Department of Energy about the budget, but 
you suggest that it is not fully complete and you need more 
information. Is that accurate?
    Secretary Lord. Well, they submitted--NNSA--what they were 
compelled to do, yes. However, in order to understand what is 
contained in those numbers, because we are talking about 
multiple programs on all three legs of the triad, we need to 
have conversations because, for instance, when you look at the 
$2 billion mark there is right now, it might not be intuitively 
obvious how that would affect certain programs because it is a 
lot of the infrastructure and it is a lot of the supporting 
work that is done. So we need to make sure that not only the 
direct costs, if you will, that affect our weapons 
modernization or maintenance of the stockpile are addressed but 
also the indirect costs that allow you to have the workforce, a 
trained workforce, that allows you to have the facilities 
required and so forth.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, one of the areas that caused 
much confusion last year was the point I made in my 0 
statement, the no-year money. This is monies that NNSA--for 
example, apparently there is money from 2007 on international 
agreements that still have not been spent. We learned this year 
there could be as much as $8 billion in money sent to the labs 
and plants, committed or costed but not spent. It is still 
there and it is still available. That is about 40 percent of 
your budget.
    The Department of Defense generally has very clear 
guidelines about spend rates so that this type of accumulation 
does not take place.
    Can you give a more detailed explanation of this carryover 
or no-year money?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    NNSA has worked significantly to minimize our carryovers 
and have worked to make sure that this process is transparent. 
In fact, I am pleased to say that for the fiscal year 2019 
budget, NNSA has net funds of only $384 million for $15.6 
billion budget. That is significant.
    Despite the fact that there is this question about whether 
or not we have $8 billion in carryover despite its being an 
impressive number, in fact, it is a reasonable amount for NNSA, 
given that we are executing 5-year plan funding for a profile 
of over $100 billion. In fact, it is a prudent management 
approach, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
actually agrees with this. We are, in fact, one of the federal 
agencies--we are at or below the common figures for carryover 
throughout the Federal Government. We are consistent with or 
even lower than other federal agencies.
    This carryover is used for long-planned life extension 
programs, infrastructure activities, including capital 
construction projects such as the Uranium Processing Facility 
(UPF).
    In terms of the nonproliferation issues and the multiyear 
projects, those are international projects that cannot be 
executed in a year or in the year in which they were funded. 
Many of these returns of highly enriched uranium or separated 
plutonium to keep the world safer take multiple years to 
execute. For example, we had a multiyear effort we just 
completed with the United Kingdom. That was over 7 years in 
order to complete, so where it might look like it is no-year or 
carryover money, in fact it is dedicated to or committed to 
specific programs.
    Senator Reed. There are other offices in DOE like the 
Office of Environmental Management that has received a 
decrement. Could they use carryover money either NNSA or other 
carryover money?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. I am not quite sure about the 
other carryover money, sir. However, these monies are again 
obligated to programs that are ongoing, long lead time 
procurements or long construction projects like our capital 
construction projects such as UPF.
    Senator Reed. One of the impressions I had last year was 
that OMB's interpretation of the carryover money was critical 
to the decisions that were made. Are they fully in agreement 
with your position?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Absolutely.
    Senator Reed. Admiral Richard, for a final question. As we 
all know, we are recapitalizing the triad, a huge, huge 
undertaking and one we have not done in decades. There is the 
likelihood, because of a little bit of rustiness in our system, 
that there is going to be some slippage.
    Can you talk about the contingency plans you have if you 
encounter slippage?
    Admiral Richard. Well, Ranking Member, one, I thank you for 
the question, and the answer is initially I have been very 
impressed by both the services and the Department of Defense's 
ability to minimize the chance that there is going to be 
slippage. In fact, I would prefer that we continue to ask the 
question, what is it going to take for these programs to come 
in on time, instead of assuming that there is going to be a 
slippage inside that.
    Part of how we got to the point to delay the 
recapitalization of the triad as long as we did is we have 
already used just about all the available operational margin. 
So if we keep going, I will, one, expend the remaining hedges 
that are inside our triad, which are put there for a number of 
risks, including operational, technical, and geopolitical. 
Those will not be available because we will have expended them 
early on programmatic. Then beyond that, I will have to start 
to revisit what elements of our strategy I cannot execute.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Since we will have some of our members on Webex and are not 
here physically and we are not real sure, certain if some 
others may be here, I will go ahead and go down the list as if 
everyone were here and then catch the next one in line.
    Senator Wicker would be next, I understand he is not 
present by Webex, so Senator Fischer.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am here in my 
office. Thank you for holding this extremely important hearing.
    Administrator, I would like to look at the House budget in 
a little more detail. I know you touched on it with the 
chairman. But when we are looking at that proposed funding at 
$1.9 billion below the level that was requested for the fiscal 
year 2021 budget, many of the larger cuts seem to be falling on 
plutonium modernization efforts and infrastructure.
    Can you describe the impact that this cut would have on 
your mission?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Nice to see you, Chairman 
Fischer, even by Webex. Thank you.
    I would like to touch in more detail on the proposed cuts 
and the implications they would have from the House Energy and 
Water Development (HEWD) $2 billion. The impacts, like you 
said, would also affect our plutonium pit production.
    Bottom line is that with the cuts, no matter how small they 
may be in individual programs, in the aggregate they make a 
profound difference in being able to modernize and recapitalize 
our capabilities throughout the nuclear weapons enterprise.
    Insofar as the plutonium pit production, that will take us 
off course. Now, recognizing we do have an aggressive schedule 
to make 26 pits in 2026 at Los Alamos and indefinitely, as well 
as 50 pits per year at the proposed Savannah River plutonium 
production facility in 2030, this would take us off our 
schedule. We are committed to Congress and to our Department of 
Defense counterparts that we will be able to commit to 
producing not less than 80 pits per year in 2030. This proposed 
cut in the HEWD mark will affect that, and we will not be able 
to make that commitment any longer should the 2021 proposed 
HEWD mark go forward.
    Additionally, we have other responsibilities. Let me just 
say that is a $500 million, or a half a billion, cut to our pit 
production, and those highest impacts will make sure again that 
we will not be able to make our commitments for the 87-1 and 
the other programs for which pit production is important.
    The mark, although it fully supports the 87-1 and the 80-4 
LEPs, the two life extension programs, those cuts would have 
negative impacts across our entire enterprise. While it fully 
supports that, it cuts non-nuclear production at Kansas City, 
and it cuts programs for our Y-12 canned subassembly, the 
secondaries for our nuclear explosive package. So those cuts 
will cause major delays in all of our programs and actually 
result in increased costs to the taxpayer in the future.
    One of the other cuts that is most notable is to the UPF, 
the uranium processing facility, at Y-12. This is a program 
that has been on target and on schedule and on budget for the 
last 7 years. The UPF is a signature capability that actually 
shows that we are committed to major capital construction 
projects. This facility will replace the old 92-12 at Y-12, 
which was built in the Manhattan Project days. So long gone are 
the days where we have just built facilities. Now what we are 
doing is we are completing a comprehensive conceptual design 
plan, and we are moving forward. The cuts of $150 million----
    Senator Fischer. Administrator, if I can interrupt you a 
little bit to get another point in that I would like to make. 
Critics of the fiscal year 2021 budget request for NNSA--they 
described it as, quote, trying to do far too much too quickly. 
They called for the reductions in order to, in their words, 
give NNSA more breathing room.
    But is it not true that consistently underfunding the NNSA 
and delaying these programs--that has created the urgent 
situation that we now find ourselves in? That is now the need 
for significant resources that we are looking at in this budget 
because underfunding the NNSA is not the solution. It is the 
opposite I believe is what has caused this problem in the first 
place.
    Would you agree with that?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. I would, and even the GAO had 
described that NNSA would encounter a bow wave of requirements 
that would impact us in the not too distant future, and in 
fact, that bow wave has hit us today.
    Senator Fischer. Right.
    Secretary Lord and Admiral Richard, how does the Department 
of Defense view that risk associated with this level of funding 
for NNSA?
    Secretary Lord. I will say, Senator, that it is a very, 
very significant risk, and it will begin in the next couple of 
years. This is not a risk out late this decade or in the early 
2030s. Very significant.
    Admiral Richard. Ma'am, I would offer that it risks to de-
synchronize the delivery system from the weapon, delaying both, 
making them cost more, and depriving me of capabilities I need.
    Senator Fischer. Admiral, what do you hear from allies who 
are obviously following this discussion very closely?
    Admiral Richard. It is our commitment to them is what 
requires these capabilities to be present. Without these 
capabilities, that conversation gets much more difficult.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
    Next would be by Webex Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I have a number of questions for Administrator Gordon- 
Hagerty. Administrator, you have previously noted that it was 
your, ``intention to ensure that NNSA's primary customer, the 
Department of Defense, receives the necessary support to 
execute its vitally important national security missions.''
    Would you say that you have achieved your intent?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Hirono, I would say 
that based on our fiscal year 2021 request, we will be in a 
place where we will be able to move forward in supporting the 
critical missions of the Department of Defense and providing 
them with the resources necessary to defend our Nation and to 
maintain a nuclear deterrent that is second to none.
    If, however, we do not receive the resources necessary in 
the 2021 and future budgets, we will not be able to commit 
those requirements--be able to maintain those requirements and 
our commitments to the Department of Defense.
    Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, and Under Secretary Lord, 
do you agree that the Department of Energy is providing the 
necessary support provided that we provide the necessary funds 
to meet the needs of the Department of Defense?
    Secretary Lord. Senator, we are currently working through a 
lot of details on the 2022 budget to understand that. In terms 
of the 2021 budget, that does need to be fully funded. If not, 
we will not meet the needs of DOD. Thank you.
    Senator Hirono. Admiral, do you agree?
    Admiral Richard. Ma'am, as a member of the Nuclear Weapons 
Council, I agree and concur with what Ms. Lord said.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you.
    Again, for the Administrator. The DOE is supporting efforts 
to develop new nuclear reactor designs for our commercial use, 
but your fiscal year 2021 request includes a decrease in 
funding for defense nuclear and nonproliferation programs by 
6.2 percent.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how are you ensuring new 
nuclear materials technologies and expertise are prevented from 
becoming a proliferation concern?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Actually, Senator, our budget 
for fiscal year 2021 request is in reality a 4.5 percent 
increase over the fiscal year 2020 appropriated funds. The 
difference, however, is the termination of the MOX facility. We 
did not need resources since we had terminated it in the last 
year and a half. So in fact, we are continuing on a very 
productive path for nonproliferation efforts throughout the 
Department of Energy/NNSA defense nuclear nonproliferation.
    We are working very closely with the commercial side and 
the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy about 
proliferation-resistant reactor technologies and other matters. 
So we are working very closely because we are committed to 
defense nuclear nonproliferation efforts and the technical 
expertise that is resident in Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 
(DNN).
    Senator Hirono. Can you just very briefly describe some of 
the specific efforts that NNSA has undertaken to address 
advanced reactor and fuel cycle technology in terms 0 of 
nonproliferation policy and technology?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. Again, we are working 
very closely with the Office of Nuclear Energy in the 
Department of Energy that works on advanced nuclear fuel cycles 
and the fuels that support them.
    Insofar as the defense nuclear nonproliferation, we are 
working on proliferation-resistant technologies. We are also 
working other programs such as going from HEU, highly enriched 
uranium, to low-enriched uranium proliferation- resistant 
technologies, and we are supporting programs throughout the 
world in returning those materials or going from highly 
enriched uranium to low-enriched proliferation- resistant 
technologies for those reactors so that they can continue to 
operate safely and securely.
    Senator Hirono. Madam Administrator, I think you can tell 
by my questions that I have concerns about nuclear 
proliferation, which is one of your missions to make sure that 
does not happen. NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation mission is 
very important to prevent our adversaries from acquiring 
nuclear weapons or weapons usable materials technology and 
expertise.
    What are the biggest challenges facing NNSA in preserving 
its long-term foundational nuclear nonproliferation 
capabilities, especially with respect to NNSA's ability to 
counter emerging or over-the-horizon proliferation risks?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. We are working with numerous 
friends and allies around the world and other countries to 
ensure that we can do what is possible and necessary to secure 
nuclear materials around the world and to stop potential 
adversaries becoming proliferant nations. We have a robust 
program where we work with over 100 countries around the world. 
We have removed thousands of kilograms of highly enriched 
uranium and separated plutonium from around the world through 
take-back programs and securing those facilities around the 
world as well.
    Defense nuclear nonproliferation is one of our three 
signature missions in the NNSA. It has my full support. We have 
got a great leadership team, and we again at NNSA are unique in 
our skill set and the technical expertise resident throughout 
NNSA to be able to carry out these functions worldwide.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator Cotton?
    Senator Cotton. Thank you all for appearing today. This is 
one of the most important hearings we do every year because 
there is nothing more fundamental to our Nation's security than 
our nuclear weapons.
    Some people will say why do we spend so much money on 
weapons that we never use, to which I reply, one, we spend not 
much money on these weapons relative to our entire Department 
of Defense, but two, more fundamentally we use our nuclear 
weapons every single day and we have for 75 years to prevent 
the kind of horrific world wars we saw in the last century. 
That is why I said 3 years ago, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, at your 
confirmation hearing, that you hold one of the most 
consequential if not the most prominent positions in our 
Federal Government.
    I want to commend you on your leadership over these last 
few years. I think the NNSA has been focused and is beginning 
to recover from years of neglect before you took office, and 
that is due in large part to your efforts.
    Could you give us a quick high level review of the tasks to 
which you committed in that hearing 3 years ago and where 
things stand now at NNSA?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Cotton, some of the 
priorities that I laid out at my confirmation hearing nearly 3 
years ago were the following: to regenerate and recapitalize 
our plutonium pit production capability that, as I mentioned in 
my opening statement, was shuttered 30 years ago. That is 
simply untenable that we have no capability to produce the 
critical components for a nuclear explosive package throughout 
the nuclear security enterprise. I committed to that. We are 
well on our way to producing the 10 war reserve pits in 2024, 
20 in 2025, and 30 in 2026 at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory. We have got a great team there. We are making great 
progress in plutonium pit production and recapitalization.
    One of the other things I committed to was the Savannah 
River plutonium facility, and what we are doing is working so 
that we can attain a capability to produce not less than 50 
pits per year in 2030. I recognized at that time and I 
recognize it today that recapitalizing a facility that was 
shuttered from the previous MOX facility and being able to 
produce a capability here in the United States to manufacture 
plutonium pits was our number one priority and it is my 
commitment today.
    The second thing I committed to was reenergizing--
recruiting and retaining a world-class workforce. As I 
mentioned, more than 30 percent of our workforce is eligible 
for retirement in the next 5 years. That is simply untenable 
that if we are going to maintain a second-to-none nuclear 
deterrent, we need the best and brightest scientists, 
engineers, technicians, back office support to be able to 
conduct and execute our highly important missions. I am happy 
to say that we put together a corporate approach pretty much 
breaking the paradigm of the government bureaucracy hiring 
processes. We committed to hiring 7,000 people this last year, 
and we exceeded those numbers, and even amidst COVID, we have 
exceeded the numbers for our planned fiscal year 2020 hiring.
    Those were some of the priorities that I promised and I 
committed to, and I think we are well on our way by the great 
men and women throughout the NNSA enterprise.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you very much.
    No amount of leadership, though, can modernize our nuclear 
weapons. For that you need money. There has been a lot of back 
and forth today about the budget request and how it came about. 
The bottom line is, though, you need this money, our Nation 
needs this money to maintain our nuclear deterrent, $19.8 
billion was the request for the upcoming fiscal year which 
starts in a couple weeks. Regrettably, we are going to pass a 
short-term spending bill, but when we do finally pass that full 
year spending bill, is $19.8 billion adequate in your opinion 
to modernize our nuclear weapons and perform NNSA's other 
important missions?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, sir. If appropriated at 
the 2021 request, which is $19.8 billion, that will serve as 
the new floor for the NNSA enterprise. We are committed to 
supporting the four or possibly five modernization programs for 
the Department of Defense, committed to providing militarily 
effective nuclear propulsion for the United States Navy, as 
well as our commitment to defense nuclear nonproliferation and 
arms control efforts. But that is assuming that we will receive 
that $19.8 billion. If we do not receive that, I cannot commit 
to you that we continue to remain aligned with the Department 
of Defense for their missions to execute our nuclear deterrent.
    Senator Cotton. What will be your request for fiscal year 
2022?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Sir, I am not at liberty to 
talk about the fiscal year 2022----
    Senator Cotton. I thought I might slip it by you.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Cotton. I guess not.
    I would note that a 2 percent increase, which is just the 
rate of inflation, would be $20.2 billion, though.
    Ms. Lord, very briefly. You have sent a letter to the 
Committee that says that the House's legislation from the 
Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee would provide 
insufficient funds to execute the activities necessary for our 
nuclear weapons stockpile.
    Could you explain briefly what the near-term impacts on the 
readiness would be if we adopted the House's approach?
    Secretary Lord. Yes, Senator. The nearest-term fallout from 
that would be a delay in the B61-12 in 2021 would be the first 
impact. We would also see an effect on the W80-4 warhead, and 
then if the W93 was zeroed out, we could not support the U.K. 
in the alignment of programs we have where we support them with 
non-nuclear as well as science and technology. The LRSO, very, 
very important to us because we have zero margin with Air-
Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) timing out. That $170 million 
mark would be catastrophic, as well as ground-based strategic 
deterrent, our intercontinental ballistic missile replacing 
Minuteman III where again we have zero margin. That $60 million 
mark would not allow us to meet the time frame we need.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you. Those are all dire consequences 
for the American people, not to mention our British allies.
    Secretary Lord. Absolutely.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you all.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here today, and thank you for your 
service to our Nation.
    In February, I led a letter to the Secretary of Defense 
expressing frustration with the Navy budget proposal that 
included funding for only one Virginia-class submarine. The 
public reports indicated that $1.6 billion in funding from the 
Virginia-class program was diverted to the National Nuclear 
Security Administration.
    I agree with my colleagues that the funding for the NNSA is 
vital to our national defense, but the diversion of this $1.6 
billion directly undermines our nuclear defense. The Secretary 
of the Navy was briefed on the connection between the Virginia-
class and the Columbia-class program when he recently visited 
the Electric Boat Shipyard at Groton at Quonset Point, and I 
think he agreed--and I certainly advocate strongly--that 
actually the Virginia-class program reduction to one submarine 
will negatively impact the Columbia program given that 
Virginia-class work will develop the capability and capacity 
for Columbia-class execution within the supplier class and our 
shipyards. So the two programs are connected.
    The $1.6 billion was diverted from Virginia-class reducing 
the cadence to one rather than two submarines a year. I know 
that my colleague, Senator Reed, has asked about the $8 billion 
that remained in the budget as carried-over funds. But I am 
interested in why that $1.6 billion in funding was diverted.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, if I may ask you, were you involved in 
the decision to divert money from the Virginia-class program to 
NNSA? Did you specifically request it? Given that you had $8 
billion left over, why did you need it?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Blumenthal, the $8 
billion of carryover is for long lead construction for other 
programs. As I mentioned, we have 5-year programs that total 
more than $100 billion. So that is a prudent carryover mark.
    With regard to the alleged transfer of resources from DOD 
to DOE/NNSA, no, I was not involved in those kinds of 
discussions. I was involved, however, in the internal 
deliberations in the Department of Energy to secure the 
resources necessary for the $19.8 billion request.
    Senator Blumenthal. So you did not request the $1.6 
billion.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Sir, we requested the $19.8 
billion, and internal deliberations in the executive branch 
asked us to recover that. So those were discussions throughout 
the entire executive branch, including OMB and DOD.
    Senator Blumenthal. What was the $8 billion--and I know 
Senator Reed has asked about this issue, but I want to dig into 
it a little bit more. What was the $8 billion obligated to do, 
obligated but unspent, as you put it? Why are we appropriating 
money in that way for projects that really should be funded on 
a yearly basis?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Unlike the Department of 
Defense, we are funded on a yearly basis. We have long lead 
procurements and efforts to purchase large activities and large 
procurements. We also have long lead programs, construction 
programs, such as the uranium processing facility at Y-12. We 
need additional resources, and we also purchase types of 
projects, if you will, so project management. So if we are 
spending money, if we are executing a 3 to 5-year program and 
we are spending those resources, we will not be able to 
complete those necessary, critical missions to support the 
nuclear enterprise.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, I just want to point out that we 
are imperiling the Columbia-class program, which is obviously 
vital to modernizing our nuclear triad by undercutting the 
Virginia-class program and reducing the cadence to one 
submarine rather than the two in fiscal year 2021. So I do not 
know what the analogy would be, robbing Peter to pay Paul, but 
one way or the other, it is a risky strategy and I would urge 
all of you to support restoring the two submarine cadence.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Rounds?
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me begin by simply thanking the Chairman and Ranking 
Member for having this very important meeting today and to be 
able to share with the American people the challenges that we 
have with regard to maintaining the 0 nuclear deterrent.
    Let me begin--let me also say thank you to all of you for 
your service to our country.
    Secretary Lord, the Chairman explained in his opening 
statement about how DOE had cut the NNSA and DOD out of the 
budget process in fiscal year 2021. We are talking about trying 
to improve a process for the future.
    So let me just ask you. The process to finish the fiscal 
year 2022 budget is just weeks away. Can you give me some 
insight into how the process has gone in this current year?
    Secretary Lord. Yes, Senator. In this current year, I think 
we have done a very good job of collaborating and sharing 
information. We are just at the beginning of that process, as I 
mentioned, in early September. We did obtain the numbers just 
yesterday. We had a Nuclear Weapons Council meeting----
    Senator Rounds. You just got the--you just received them 
yesterday? Is that in a timely fashion?
    Secretary Lord. We received the numbers themselves in early 
September. We got a lot of the discussion around what they 
actually contain yesterday in a Nuclear Weapons Council 
meeting, and we are kicking off--we did kick off yesterday a 
working group with members from NNSA, from DOD, as well as OMB 
to really do a deep dive into the details of that. We will come 
back in about 4 weeks and talk about that at the Nuclear 
Weapons Council to make sure that the programs that DOD is 
putting in our budget are supported fully by NNSA. At this 
point, NNSA has been extremely forthcoming. So I have very high 
expectations that we have entered a new era here, given our 
planning guidance and the further details that we are 
memorializing in terms of how these action groups are to work.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    You know, we have talked a number different weapon systems 
today, and sometimes I think it goes by and there are Americans 
right now at home that may very well have the opportunity to 
listen or to follow the discussions that we have had. I am not 
sure that all of the different weapon systems--if we have ever 
taken the time to actually share just how critical they are and 
what they really mean to our Nation's defense. I think Senator 
Cotton shared very well the fact that what we are talking about 
today is the fact that for 75 years this nuclear deterrent has 
helped us to not be in a nuclear war because we have been able 
to make it very clear to our near-peer adversaries that we can 
protect ourselves and that we have capabilities to inflict 
great damage on them. Part of what we are trying to do here is 
to make sure that there is no misunderstanding anyplace in the 
world that we still have the nuclear deterrent necessary to 
hold them at bay.
    You spoke briefly about the B61-12 and about the LRSO. Can 
you share with the American public and with this Committee 
today--it sounds like we are creating new weapon systems where, 
in essence, we are upgrading. Can you share a little bit with 
the American public today just exactly what that B61-12 means 
to our country? We have ways of delivering but if we do not 
have that weapon system, then we are not finishing the plan. 
Can you share a little bit what just those two weapon systems--
how critical they are to the defense of our country?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, it may be more appropriate for me 
to answer that question as I am the operator.
    Senator Rounds. That would be fair.
    Admiral Richard. What you are describing are two of the 
weapon systems that are used in the air leg of the triad. 
Right? Sometimes it is better to think of the attributes that 
each leg provides as opposed to the specific weapon system. It 
is interlocking. What the air leg, in particular, provides--it 
is the visible piece of the triad. It is the piece that we can 
use in times, steady state or crisis, to change and show, 
signal to a competitor to change their decision calculus and 
cause them not to do something. So both of those go very 
directly to our ability to use that piece of the triad in the 
way it was intended.
    Senator Rounds. The B-21, the newest proposed stealth 
bomber that will be based at Ellsworth Air Force Base and 
others, is one that would be able to carry this particular type 
of a weapon system. Is that correct?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, that is correct.
    Senator Rounds. In other words, it is one thing to have the 
platform available. It is another thing to actually have a 
modern weapon system that could be delivered. It is a critical 
part of that part of our defense in the triad.
    Admiral Richard. To meet the requirements that I have asked 
of the U.S. Air Force, you have to have both of those. They 
were put together with forethought. They are very 
complementary. It is the capabilities of LRSO that allow B-21 
to be designed the way that it is and vice versa.
    Senator Rounds. Let me go on. In all of the scenarios so 
far that we have had, we not only include B-21's, we include B-
52's, 60-year-old B-52's, as a part of our long-term plans, and 
yet, that is a non-stealth bomber. It also requires a weapon 
system which is upgraded and capable. Can you share how that 
connects with what we are talking about today with the LRSO?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I applaud your knowledge and 
detail on this subject. You are right. The 4 B-52's not only 
are 60 years old today, but we are going to have to fly them 
until they are 100 years old. If I remember correctly, the last 
pilot of a B-52 had not been born yet, and so against the 
increased threat environment that we anticipate by the time 
that that weapon system completes what we are going to ask for 
it to do, LRSO is a necessary capability to keep that viable 
and to continue to allow me to have that stack of options and 
attributes to be able to offer to national leadership to 
accomplish the mission.
    Senator Rounds. Just to make it clear, we are talking about 
the long-range standoff weapon, one that can be delivered from 
outside of an area where they could actually get to our B-52 
bombers since they can see them on a radar.
    Admiral Richard. Senator, quite correct.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yes. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you to the witnesses. This has been helpful.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, I want to follow up on 
questions that Senator Blumenthal was asking, and this is 
probably both for you and Secretary Lord on this budgetary 
matter and the funds from the second Virginia-class sub which, 
as you know, is constructed both in Connecticut and Virginia.
    Obviously, it sounds as if your testimony is you were 
asking for a budgetary allocation to do the job at the NNSA. 
You were not saying take it out of the Virginia-class sub. You 
were making a case for what you thought you needed.
    But when we see $1.8 billion taken out of the DOD budget 
for the second Virginia-class sub and then we see an $8 billion 
unspent amount within the NNSA, it is sort of like, well, wait, 
why do we need to get rid of the second Virginia-class sub if 
there was that much that was unspent funding at the end of 
fiscal year 2019? You have explained long-term contracts, I 
sort of get that concept. But that does seem like a lot of 
unspent funding.
    Do you know what your current projection is for the amount 
of unspent funding as we get ready to close the fiscal year 
2020 budget?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Not in terms of unspent. 
Again, let me see if I can do a better job of explaining what 
carryover is. Even though it is a big number, it is a 
reasonable number because our 5-year planning profile is over 
$100 billion. In fact, GAO says that that is a prudent 
management approach to take, to have this, quote/unquote, 
carryover funding.
    Senator Kaine. But does that mean the 5-year planning 
profile--the total budget is about, you know, just breaking it 
down on average about $20 billion a year.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Correct, sir.
    Senator Kaine. I mean, $8 billion out of a $20 billion 
annual budget--that seems like a lot of carryover. Again, I 
understand that you have maybe some longer-term contracts than 
others do. But do you know what you are projecting the unspent 
amount to be at the end of this fiscal year that concludes 
within a matter of 2 weeks?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. I can tell you that at least 
for--I do not have the numbers for fiscal year 2020. But I can 
tell you confidently that the amounts that we had just for 
fiscal year 2019, as of right now, for unspent and unobligated, 
if you will, was a mere $384 million over a nearly $16 billion 
budget.
    Senator Kaine. That was not only unspent but you say 
unspent and unobligated. You had not decided how to program 
that money.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. That is right. If programs 
were executed ahead of schedule. But again, we are making 
commitments to the taxpayer about making sure that our funding 
is appropriately spent on the important missions carried out by 
NNSA.
    Senator Kaine. Do you believe the unspent amount at the end 
of fiscal year 2020 will be in the basic same ball park as the 
fiscal year 2019 number?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. I am confident that it will 
not exceed that. However, sir, I have to say----
    Senator Kaine. It will exceed $8 billion.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Well, in terms of the long-
term programs that we administer, yes. So it is not a carryover 
where it is not obligated. It is obligated for programs for 
this 5-year spend plan of nominally $100 billion. We are, in 
fact, lower than most other agencies in terms of our uncosted 
carryovers. I would be happy to provide you with those 
resources.
    Senator Kaine. That would be helpful.
    Admiral Richard, one of the debates that we had during the 
NDAA this year revolved around additional funding for nuclear 
testing. I am not on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of SASC. 
But is there a deficiency in existing nuclear weapons testing 
that requires that we pursue a different course?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, as you know, I am required to 
annually certify whether or not there is a need for testing, 
and the answer at this time, there is no condition--nothing has 
changed. Right? There is no condition where I would recommend 
the need for nuclear testing.
    But I would say, though, that it is important for the 
Nation to maintain an ability to do a nuclear test should an 
issue arise in the future and have been formally documented in 
making that recommendation.
    Senator Kaine. Another question, Admiral Richard. Thank you 
for that. Should we end up with a continuing resolution, as has 
been discussed, it is my understanding there is a request for 
an anomaly to allow the Secretary of the Navy to enter into a 
procurement for up to two Columbia-class subs.
    Do you have a sense of how tight the timeline is for 
production of the Columbia-class and the retirement of the Ohio 
class boats? Are you concerned that the lack of an anomaly may 
threaten the current plan?
    Admiral Richard. So, Senator, one, your question is better 
directed actually to the Navy who is directly responsible for 
that. I, of course, closely monitor the progress the Navy is 
making in the delivery of the Columbia system. I am pleased 
with the efforts that they are making, and I would support 
Navy's request. They are doing a very good job of asking for 
what they need to deliver this capability.
    Secretary Lord. If I may, Senator. Working very closely 
with the Navy on the Columbia, as I am the milestone decision 
authority on that, we have zero margin on the Columbia, and I 
would strongly support an anomaly. We need to get the funding. 
We need to continue the work we are doing.
    Senator Kaine. Great. Thanks to all the witnesses.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine,.
    Senator Cramer?
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thanks to all of you for your service and for being here.
    You know, like the Chairman, I serve both on the Armed 
Services Committee and the Environment and Public Works 
Committee, have jurisdiction over sort of all sides of this. 
Also like the Chairman, I am all for you 1,000 percent. Unlike 
the Chairman, I am a freshman.
    But I also have, as you know, in North Dakota, Admiral, two 
of the three legs of the triad. I appreciate your being there 
so quickly after your confirmation. I have been to Minot. I was 
just thinking about it. In just recent months, I have been 
there with Secretary Esper. I have been there with the Vice 
President. I have been there with Secretary Brouillette. I 
mean, it is clear that this is a very high priority, 
modernization.
    With that backstop, I am very concerned about the GBSD. I 
continue to ask that question. Are we still on 0 track for 
GBSD? I really appreciated your response earlier about 
modernization and about the rest that the vice chairman asked, 
Senator Reed. I like your attitude. I just want to be as 
confident as you are that we are on track, we will remain on 
track, and is there anything, whether it is the budget or the 
NDAA from either side, that would put that at jeopardy?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, first, let me offer the 
responsibility for that lies with the Air Force. Right? I think 
they have been very good about asking for what they need.
    That said, I was just at Hill Air Force Base. I received a 
number of detailed briefings from the program manager for GBSD. 
I was impressed with the leadership forward thinking the way 
that they are approaching that program, and we are just at send 
that man ammo--if we give him stable, secure funding, I have 
confidence he is going to deliver for us.
    Senator Cramer. Certainly if you wanted to answer that.
    Secretary Lord. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
    GBSD just went through milestone B, as I think you well 
know. I too have very recently been to Hill Air Force Base to 
meet with the team. It is an excellent team making great use of 
digital engineering. They are really at the forefront of modern 
software engineering. They have very little margin in the 
program, but they are moving forward with Northrop Grumman very 
well.
    The one issue we have and where we may very well need 
Congress? support is in terms of the infrastructure in terms of 
command and control in the silos themselves. We do have a lot 
of money allocated through the MILCON methodology, and whereas 
we have 500 separate items that need to be updated, that would 
be rather onerous to have 500 different or so projects. We are 
looking at consolidating that to streamline it. So we are very, 
very interested to see what comes out of conference, but we 
would ask that we move some of that money out of MILCON to give 
us the flexibility on the program execution side to move 
forward along the timelines. As Admiral Richard said earlier, 
it is our job in Acquisition and Sustainment to not transition 
programmatic risk over to operational risk, and I am afraid if 
we do not move some of that money out of MILCON, that is 
exactly what we would be doing.
    Senator Cramer. I am completely supportive, and I agree. We 
cannot have 500 different MILCON projects. That makes no sense. 
Every now and then, common sense can prevail if we work hard at 
it, so I appreciate that.
    Speaking of that, I have to admit coming into this hearing 
I had some questions, and after listening to you all, I have 
more. So we are going to have to get together. I know I am 
trying to get together with each of you hopefully fairly soon 
because--as much confusion as there is, however, over the NNSA/
DOE/DOD budget process, particularly the Weapons Council budget 
process, it pales in comparison to the dysfunction of Congress? 
appropriations process. So I am never discouraged. I know we 
can get this right.
    I will just say this, and then I will wrap up and we will 
get together and answer specific questions later. But just the 
very words `semi-autonomous' cause me some concern. Do not get 
me wrong. I appreciate it and I understand it. But autonomy 
implies a lack of accountability. `Semi' provides an out. I 
just want to make sure we have specificity.
    One of the questions that I am going to ask you guys is you 
reference early September often when asked the question about 
when did you get the NNSA budget, and you also, of course, know 
that there is a statutory deadline. I mean, was it early 
September or was it before the September 1st deadline in the 
law?
    Secretary Lord. September 4.
    Senator Cramer. September 4th. Okay.
    So we have at least 4 or 5 more days that we can work on 
and get this down even better, and that is my goal. Let us get 
it done. Let us get it right. Let us have both the type of 
semi-autonomy that is important, as well as the accountability 
that is important and the transparency that is important.
    I am going to ask this, and then again, you can answer it 
later. I do want to explore a little bit the OMB position on 
some of these things. We have not talked a lot about it. You 
were asked, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, sort of at the end of one of 
the questioning--I do not remember whose question it was--
whether on this carryover issue, which you described and put 
the context I think in a good way that helps us better 
understand it. I still think there is some confusion about it. 
But you said that OMB supports your position. I have not seen 
that and maybe it is not necessary that I see that. It is not a 
change in policy. It is more of a practice, an ongoing 
practice. So I would be interested to know whether that really 
is their position.
    We have not talked about some of OMB's objections relating 
to sort of the implication of separations and the separation 
between the executive and legislative branches as it relates to 
the budgeting process. So maybe later, when we sit down 
together, we can explore some of that a little bit more because 
like I said, the one area where OMB has weighed in pretty 
heavily on this is they do not want to see anybody imposing 
executive rights, and I do not disagree. But I like it better 
when we are all communicating.
    With that, I will just----
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Be happy to.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
    By Webex, Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is an 
important hearing, and it has already been very interesting. 
One of the interesting things I learned is that the B-52 is 
older than the Senator from South Dakota.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator King. I think that is an important matter that has 
come before us today.
    I think this is a very important hearing because 
deterrence, which has been the fundamental policy that has kept 
this country and the world safe from the use of nuclear weapons 
for 75 years, is based upon two elements: will and capacity. 
This hearing today really is about both of those pieces. It is 
about rebuilding the capacity of the credible deterrent, but by 
providing this budget support, it demonstrates the will of the 
country. That is why I think this hearing is so important and 
this budget is so important.
    I think it is also important for people to remember and 
realize that has already been testified, there is a great deal 
of money in here for nonproliferation. It is sort of the twin 
goal of our entire nuclear policy.
    I do have one specific question, Admiral. It may be out of 
your lane, but it certainly relates to this subject. The New 
START treaty expires a couple of months into 2021. Can you give 
us any information as to where we are on that? Are there 
discussions ongoing? What are the nature--are we making 
progress? Is there the likelihood of an extension or indeed a 
renegotiation of that treaty?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, one, it is good to see you again, 
sir.
    Second, to answer your question, it would be Ambassador 
Billingslea and the team over at the Department of State that 
could give you the authoritative answer to that.
    What I want to add, though, is that that process is so 
important to me and important to STRATCOM. As I have testified 
before, I will support any arms control agreement that enhances 
the security of this Nation. I have dedicated my deputy 
commander, Lieutenant General Bussiere, as a member of 
Ambassador Billingslea's team to ensure that he has the best 
available operational uniformed military support that I know 
how to provide to that process. Over.
    Senator King. Well, thank you for that. I appreciate your 
engagement on that point, and I think that is very important.
    Then finally, I do want to follow up as Senator Kaine and 
several others have asked about this carryover. I understand 
the justification, but if it is a carryover of that magnitude 
each year, then I would suggest that perhaps at least some 
portion of that money could be reallocated, for example, to 
that second Virginia-class submarine. I will look forward to 
seeing the written responses on that and talking with my 
colleagues about it.
    But again, I want to thank you all for a very impressive 
hearing, incredible level of knowledge and detail, and you all 
are really doing a significant service to this country and I 
want to thank the three of you for your testimony today and 
most especially for your service.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
    Senator Heinrich?
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
    Under Secretary Lord, it was almost 75 years ago in the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 that Congress ended the Manhattan 
Project and transferred stewardship of the nuclear stockpile 
from the Army to civilian control.
    Do you see any compelling reason today to move the weapons 
program back to the Pentagon or should NNSA stay where it is 
today inside DOE?
    Secretary Lord. As long as we have the status quo in terms 
of our ability to work together, particularly with respect to 
working on budgets together, I think the system is very good.
    Senator Heinrich. Do any of you disagree? Do you think the 
system right now is working? Admiral?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, I absolutely concur.
    Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, I 
appreciate our recent phone call and all the work that you are 
doing, and I appreciate your explaining the Nuclear Weapons 
Council's process to develop a requirements-based budget for 
NNSA.
    The one thing that does concern me is that DOE's 
environmental cleanup program is funded from the same budget 
account, but they do not have a seat at your table. Clearly, we 
saw that with the fiscal year 2021 budget request for cleanup 
and how much cleanup suffered as a result, including almost a 
50 percent cut in the request for cleanup at Los Alamos, 
something that I find just completely unacceptable.
    Since environmental cleanup is uniquely a DOE 
responsibility, not a NNSA responsibility, how will the 
Department balance the budget priorities to ensure that we are 
meeting those obligations in the future and make sure that 
those priorities, as well as the priorities of maintaining the 
deterrent are met?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Heinrich, I know you 
have a robust conversation regularly with Secretary 
Brouillette, as well as we do. Secretary Brouillette is 
managing the budget for the entire Department of Energy. I 
advise him on NNSA requirements, and then he takes budget 
requests and program requests from the other under secretaries 
which then pretty much fill out the entire Department of 
Energy. I know he is fully focused and completely focused on 
environmental cleanup not only at Los Alamos but in other 
places around the United States, both Idaho and Hanford, 
Washington in particular. So he is focused on ensuring that we 
have the resources necessary to clean up the legacy facilities 
of the prior NNSA Atomic Energy Commission in DOE and the 
defense nuclear sites.
    Senator Heinrich. So I will, obviously, continue this 
conversation with the Secretary as well, but I just think, 
given what we saw last year, that we have cause for concern 
here and it is something I am going to continue to raise and 
hopefully we will see better numbers this year.
    Administrator, I am pleased to hear of your commitment to 
maintain the Mesa complex at Sandia Labs as the Nation's 
premier facility for trusted, rad hard microelectronics.
    But let me ask you about the Z machine at Sandia, which 
continues to provide one of the critical pieces of our 
stockpile stewardship program by simulating pressures and 
radiation environments that previously required actual 
underground testing.
    Do you agree that pulsed power science is important to 
NNSA's mission, and what do you see as the future role of 
pulsed power science for maintaining our strategic deterrent?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Pulsed power science is, 
indeed, one of the attributes and contributions to our robust 
research, development, and testing program at NNSA.
    The Z machine is an experimental workforce, for want of a 
better term. However, it is aging, and just like with many 
other legacy systems throughout the NNSA enterprise, time is of 
the essence to focus on how we will eventually be replacing 
that system. However, in the interim, we are finding ways of 
being able to maintain and upgrade that system. So, again, we 
wholeheartedly agree that pulsed power is in fact an important 
approach to informing us about the stockpile.
    It also attracts the best and brightest future scientists 
and engineers that will work in NNSA because of the unique 
nature of pulsed power.
    Senator Heinrich. Last quick thing. The new facility, the 
Albuquerque Complex project--what are we looking at as an 
expected date for when NNSA staff will begin to occupy that 
structure?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Well, I am happy to say, 
first of all, thank you again. A couple years ago, we broke 
ground together at that. I am also happy to say that I 
participated in the topping out event a couple of months ago, 
and just 3 or 4 weeks ago, I walked the facility for the third 
time.
    I am very excited about it. It continues despite COVID and 
the challenges we have. We have an outstanding relationship 
with the Corps of Engineers. We continue construction and we 
fully expect to occupy that in 2021 as planned, and that will 
house 1,200 of our finest NNSA employees in facilities that 
they have been living in, otherwise 1950s barracks which are 
completely unacceptable for our workforce. This will be a 
state-of-the-art facility for 1,200 of our finest NNSA 
employees.
    Senator Heinrich. I am looking forward to 2021. Thank you.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Administrator and all of you, thank you for being here. 
Administrator, I want to start by saying thank you for your 
great work. You have done an excellent job in this role, and 
the people of Missouri I know are grateful.
    I want to talk a little bit more about some of the national 
security campus issues in Missouri.
    But first, can I just ask you about some troubling news we 
recently learned? It appears, based on public reporting, that 
the Sandia National Laboratories may have violated federal law 
by sending employees to racially segregated diversity training 
at a resort no less that encouraged some of the crudest gender 
and racial stereotyping imaginable. May I add it was paid for 
apparently with taxpayer money?
    I asked for an inquiry and a full accounting of the monies 
that have been spent on this. The Secretary of Energy, I was 
very pleased to see, directed a full investigation.
    Can I have your commitment that you will fully support the 
investigation into these trainings, the federal taxpayer funds 
expended, the locations of these trainings, and the entire 
affair?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, sir, you may.
    NNSA welcomes the opportunity for a diverse workforce and 
inclusive environment for all of our employees, but what has 
been portrayed in the media is very disheartening and very 
distressing to me. If it is accurate, it is not appropriate for 
our workforce. You have my word that NNSA will fully commit to 
and support the Secretary's initiative to do the thorough 
review on diversity inclusion and inequity training.
    Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that.
    Let us talk about the Kansas City National Security Campus 
(KC NSC), which of course is in my home State of Missouri. It 
is doing extraordinary work manufacturing the non-nuclear 
components of the NNSA warhead program.
    Can you just elaborate on how cuts to the NNSA's budget 
request proposed by the House would affect that work at KC NSC?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Hawley, the non-
nuclear components are all produced at Kansas City National 
Security Campus, as you rightfully stated.
    The cuts would have a devastating effect because the non-
nuclear components are critical to every one of our life 
extension programs, every one of our ongoing systems to support 
the Department of Defense. So that would have considerable 
impact, and it would also delay the deliveries to the 
Department of Defense. So, yes, they would be profound if we 
saw the cuts that are proposed in the HEWD mark.
    Senator Hawley. Let me just follow up on that last point 
you just made about how the proposed cuts might affect the 
ability to meet production requirements in coming years. You 
are saying that those would be adversely affected, to put it 
mildly.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Every single one of our 
systems would be adversely affected.
    Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that, and thank 
you for your continued support for that outstanding work that 
is done there at KC NSC.
    Admiral, can I just shift to you for a second? You said 
earlier this week I think that China's nuclear force structure 
is--and I am quoting you now--increasingly inconsistent with a 
stated `no first use' policy. How would the cuts to the NNSA's 
budget request proposed by the House impact our ability to 
maintain deterrence as China grows its nuclear forces?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, that is accurate in terms of what 
I said. I think it is worth reminding you and the Committee we 
are on a trajectory to go to a place that the Nation has never 
been before where we will face two peer nuclear-capable 
adversaries that have to be deterred differently. That is what 
fundamentally starts to set the requirements for the 
capabilities that I need. These cuts would jeopardize those 
capabilities right at the moment of greatest need later in the 
decade.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you for that. Thank you for your 
clarity on this issue. I just want to say for my part as I see 
it, I think there is every reason to believe that China will 
use its nuclear forces to advance its imperial agenda, which is 
really what it is, including in the region. We need to prepare 
for that possibility, and fully funding the NNSA is I think 
vital.
    Admiral, finally if I could, how would it impact our 
deterrent if nuclear weapons infrastructure could consistently 
provide updated capabilities on timelines similar to the W76-2?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, thank you for mentioning the W76-
2. I think it is an example that shows we can move fast. Right? 
We still know how to do this. That is an example of where the 
threat changed. New capability was needed. We provided it on an 
operationally responsive timeline and closed a potential hole 
in our deterrence strategy. We should be able to do that more. 
That is a type of hedging strategy that enables you to react 
inside what somebody is attempting to do, and that capability--
I acknowledge some of the other stuff would be more complicated 
than a W76-2, but that enhances deterrence by our Nation's 
ability to do that.
    Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you 
all for being here.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Manchin?
    Senator Manchin. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    My question was along the same lines as what Senator 
Heinrich had spoke to you about. I was concerned because the 
1946 Congress established the Atomic Energy Commission as a 
civilian controlled agency tasked with managing U.S. nuclear 
weapons. This as done to set a clear separation of control of 
our nuclear weapons program between the military and the 
civilians. I think we all agreed. I think you all have answered 
that pretty much what you think and what you feel how we are 
going, and it is working and you do not see the need to change, 
but you need to see the transparency. I believe, Secretary 
Hagerty, you spoke to that and you believe that we are moving 
in the right direction and you are able to get things on track. 
I felt good about that.
    My question would have been do you agree the Secretary of 
Energy must maintain clear control and accountability for the 
Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's 
budget?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
    Secretary Lord. Yes. I believe things are working well.
    Senator Manchin. Admiral Richard?
    Admiral Richard. I am very satisfied from my position in 
terms of the way the NWC is working in coordination between the 
two Departments.
    Senator Manchin. Good.
    Secretary Hagerty, do you believe the NNSA has fixed the 
issues that will be able to meet the DOD requirements to field 
an effective nuclear deterrent over the next several decades?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Sir, with the appropriate 
funding, sustained and appropriate funding, I believe we will. 
I am confident in that.
    Senator Manchin. Secretary Lord, as chair of the Nuclear 
Weapons Council, it is your job to ensure the alignment of the 
NNSA weapons and DOD delivery systems. In a recent letter to 
the leadership of both congressional defense committees, 
Secretary of Defense Esper outlined his disagreement with 
section 1644 of the House NDAA. That section would create a 
cabinet secretary co-chair structure for the NWC, and it seems 
to me, would certainly increase disparity in needed 
communication between DOD and DOE Secretaries. However, I know 
the NWC has been effectively carrying out its duties since 1986 
and as a military liaison committee before then.
    So which is it? Is the NWC so ineffective that we need to 
elevate its business to the cabinet secretary level? Or do we 
need to let the NWC keep its current authority?
    Secretary Lord. We need to let the NWC keep its current 
authority. I will say that from a Department of Defense 
perspective, we give in-depth briefings to Secretary Esper and 
his key staff quarterly and that I believe he is very well 
informed and obviously signs off on all key decisions. However, 
I believe you need the depth of understanding that the NWC 
chair brings in terms of programmatics and the specifics of 
each of these programs, as well as the specificity in terms of 
understanding that the Administrator of the NNSA has.
    Senator Manchin. To follow up, how does maintain the 
authority of both DOD and DOE while increasing the coordination 
of these crucial agencies?
    Secretary Lord. I think having hearings such as these is 
very helpful so that everyone has the same fact base to deal 
with and understands exactly our monthly cadence of meetings 
and how we exchange information.
    Senator Manchin. Thank you all very much. Thank you for 
your service too.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
    Senator Shaheen, who got here just in time.
    Senator Shaheen. I did. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Just be advised that after your remarks 
and questions, if other Members are not here, we will conclude 
this meeting.
    Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I was not here because I 
was at a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee on China 
and the threat that China poses in the future.
    I guess I would like to start, Admiral Richard, with you 
because earlier this week, you indicated that over the next 
decade China will expand and diversify its nuclear forces, 
likely at least doubling its nuclear warhead stockpiles.
    Can you elaborate more on those efforts and the challenge 
that presents to the United States?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, one, that is accurate. That is 
not only the position of USSTRATCOM, but other portions of the 
executive branch have come to the same conclusion.
    But I would offer that simply I think it is a mistake to 
consider China some sort of lesser included case relative to 
Russia. We just used a number of weapons estimate. I think it 
is important to remember China will not tell us how many they 
have. They do not have a level of transparency that either us 
or Russia has right now.
    But that is a relatively crude way to describe what a 
nation is capable of doing. You have to look at much more than 
that. What are the delivery systems? What are their 
capabilities? What are their command and control? What is their 
readiness? In China, they will not even tell you their 
doctrine. You have to add all of that up.
    The trajectories that I see their nuclear on is concerning 
to me. We have seen what they have done on the conventional 
side of the house. As I just said, we are on a path by the end 
of the decade, if not sooner, to face two peer nuclear-capable 
adversaries who have to be deterred differently. We have never 
faced that challenge before in our Nation's history.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. That lays out the 
challenge quite dramatically and I think speaks to the 
importance of agreements like the New START treaty.
    Back in February, I asked you about how STRATCOM uses the 
information that is gained from New START. Can you talk about 
how important you think that is to give us insights into what 
the Russians are doing? I am going to ask the other panelists 
also if you could speak to that because what we know about 
current negotiations and why it might be important to extend 
that treaty.
    Admiral Richard. Senator, we have talked about this in the 
past. With additional time at STRATCOM, it is reinforced to me 
that the transparency that we achieve out of the New START 
treaty is something that is of value to both sides. It adds to 
security of both participants in the treaty.
    The actual progress? I would refer you to Ambassador 
Billingslea, as I just mentioned previously. That process is so 
important to me that I have dedicated my deputy 0 commander, 
Lieutenant General Bussiere, to the team to make that expertise 
available to Ambassador Billingslea so that I am supporting 
that to the best level I know how.
    Senator Shaheen. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, can you also 
speak to what information we get that benefits our national 
security from participation in New START?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Shaheen, in fact, we 
play a vitally important role in NNSA. In fact, as Ambassador 
Billingslea and his team are negotiating with their Russian 
counterparts, we play a vitally important role, so important 
that just last week I hosted Ambassador Billingslea and the 
entire New START team of negotiators at several NNSA national 
security laboratories, plants, and sites so they could see 
firsthand the important role that NNSA plays should a New START 
agreement be extended, recalling that the New START agreement 
currently only covers strategic arms, what we would envision 
and Ambassador Billingslea and the State Department and the 
President of the United States is looking at is a treaty with 
Russia that will cover all warheads. In that, of course, NNSA 
plays a central role in that.
    Senator Shaheen. Yes. I understood that that was the hope 
of the Administration. Can either you or Admiral Richard give 
us any insights into how those negotiations are going, and if 
we cannot get an agreement that includes those other weapons, 
that includes China, is there a benefit to extending New START 
and allowing us to continue to have insights on verification 
into what Russia is doing while we have more time to negotiate?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. What I can say is that I know 
that Ambassador Billingslea and his team have provided with 
Russia framework for how the future negotiations will continue 
and what the proposed treaty would look like and improvements 
in the treaty. I believe they are waiting for a Russian 
response. I would defer to Ambassador Billingslea and the State 
Department for further details on that.
    Senator Shaheen. Admiral Richard, can you speak to whether 
you think there is a benefit, if we cannot get everything we 
want, to going ahead and extending New START to allow us to 
continue to have that verification insight while we are able to 
work to still negotiate an expansion of what New START covers?
    Admiral Richard. Ma'am, as I have said before, there are a 
number of things that the New START treaty provides that 
enhance my ability to go do my job. You just named one of 
those. But there are some additional things that also need to 
be considered. I look forward to the Department of State 
finding us a path that enables us to achieve all of that.
    I would particularly like to highlight what Ms. Gordon-
Hagerty said. Those attributes that she mentioned would be very 
beneficial to my ability to accomplish my mission and to this 
Nation's security.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
    I am out of time, but let me just also say for Ms. Lord, 
thank you very much for what you continue to do to try and 
ensure that we have a defense industrial base at the end of 
this pandemic and to supporting particularly our small 
businesses who are very important to that industrial base.
    Secretary Lord. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    By Webex, Senator Jones.
    Senator Jones. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, thank you for your service. Thank 
you for being here. Secretary Lord, thank you also for being 
here. I want to echo what Senator Shaheen said about your work 
to help us get through this pandemic with everything intact. I 
really very much appreciate that.
    I do want to extend a special welcome to my fellow 
Alabamian, Admiral Richard. Thank you for your service. Thank 
you for being here. Thank you on behalf of all Alabamians for 
that service, but especially the thousands of men and women in 
uniform in Alabama today, whether active or in the guard, and 
the some 300,000 veterans that we have. They send a special 
warm welcome and thank you for your service. I really--and we 
all do--very much appreciate it.
    I just have one question, Admiral Richard, because Senator 
Shaheen really went through the questions that I had with 
regard to the New START treaty.
    Admiral Richard, I would like to ask as STRATCOM Commander, 
what do you see as the most significant areas of risk to 
successfully transitioning from the Minuteman III to the GBSD 
system. What are we doing and how can we help you mitigate 
those risks?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, those risks come up in two 
dimensions. Right? One is in the time dimension. It is in the 
actual transition from the old system to the new system to 
continue to provide me the attributes that the intercontinental 
ballistic missile leg provides. The Air Force could give you 
the specifics. I would offer I am impressed with the way that 
program is executing and that stable, predictable funding is 
the biggest single thing under our control to address that.
    The other piece that I would invite our attention to is it 
is the simultaneity of the transitions that are occurring. 
Right? The transition you just described occurs simultaneously 
with the transition over on the submarine side and just after a 
transition on the bomber side. So it is important to hold all 
of these things on schedule because we only have so much 
capacity, and if we de-synchronize how we are doing these, we 
run the risk of the aggregate being unexecutable as opposed to 
any individual line. Over.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Admiral. I really appreciate it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield the balance of 
my time. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. First of all, let me thank our witnesses. 
It just has been very enlightening. We are very fortunate to 
have you three at the helm of the most important thing that is 
going on in the world today. We thank you very much for the 
time that you spent and the honesty and the straightforward 
witnessing that you shared with us. Thank you very much.
    We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
             Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
          nuclear weapon modernization program funding impacts
    1. Senator Inhofe. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, could you specify 
which nuclear weapons modernization programs will be affected by cuts 
to the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) budget in the 
House Appropriations Fiscal Year 2021 spending bill?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    2. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Lord, during your testimony you stated 
that the House-proposed cuts to the NNSA's budget would indirectly 
affect the B61-12 and the W80-4. Could you explain what impacts you 
were referring to and the extent to which these impacts could delay 
delivery?
    Secretary Lord. The Weapons Activities portion of the National 
Nuclear Security Administration budget reflects the totality of funding 
required to deliver warheads to the Department of Defense. Though the 
program lines for the B61-12 and W80-4 were not specifically cut, 
significant cuts to the infrastructure portion of the budget could 
drive impacts to these programs. Of particular concern are cuts to 
canned subassembly efforts at the Y-12 Facility and non-nuclear 
component production at Kansas City National Security Campus and Sandia 
National Laboratories--any one of which could potentially drive 
delivery delays to stockpile modernization programs. Delays to the W80-
4 warhead have significant implications to the DOD's Long-Range 
Standoff cruise missile system as these programs are closely tied to 
deliver the required capability to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) 
by 2030. Ensuring schedule alignment between the warhead and cruise 
missile is imperative to meeting DOD requirements. Delays to the B61-12 
program also carry significant impacts to our ability to meet 
commitments to North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allies and partners.

    3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Lord, in addition to the elimination 
of funding for the W93 weapon, you noted that a $170 million reduction 
in funding for the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile would be 
``catastrophic''. Could you elaborate on the projected effects of this 
cut on the LRSO program?
    Secretary Lord. Funding shortfalls in the LRSO program create three 
significant issues that will increase cost and could jeopardize 
production schedule. First, full funding is necessary to maintain 
current test schedule alignment between the DOD LRSO and National 
Nuclear Security Administration W80-4 warhead programs; jeopardizing 
this alignment increases risks to both programs. Second, LRSO Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC) is scheduled to be just-in-time to replace 
the Air-Launched Cruise Missile stockpile reductions, and funding 
reductions will leave minimal margin to address issues discovered 
during development or fielding. Finally, if the $170 million is not 
retained, the LRSO and proven B-52 delivery platform will be unable to 
hedge against potential issues encountered during the development of 
the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), Columbia ballistic missile 
submarine (SSBN), or B-21 Raider programs.
          national nuclear security administration budget data
    4. Senator Inhofe. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, you mentioned that 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recognizes NNSA's approach 
to carryover balances as a prudent strategy for managing the NNSA's 
budget and regularly reviews NNSA's carryover balances. Can you 
elaborate on how NNSA adheres to GAO best practices with regard to 
carryover balances?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    5. Senator Inhofe. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, at the end of 
fiscal year 2019, NNSA's carryover balance of $8.2 billion was 54 
percent of its $15.2 billion appropriation. In contrast, the Department 
of Energy's (DOE) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
(EERE) had carryover balances of approximately $3.8 billion, which 
represented 166 percent of its fiscal year 2019 appropriation of $2.3 
billion. Some have expressed concerns with the percentage of NNSA's 
carryover balances, but there doesn't seem to be the same level of 
concern with EERE's carryover. How many DOE offices, as a percentage of 
their individual annual appropriations, hold carryover balances larger 
than NNSA, and are there other offices with carryover balances in 
excess of their typical annual appropriation?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    6. Senator Inhofe. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, can you provide 
examples of the international work NNSA is doing to prevent nuclear 
proliferation and how carryover balances are used to execute that 
critically important work?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    7. Senator Inhofe. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, if NNSA's ability 
to carryover funds from year to year were restricted, what impacts 
would that have on the Administration's efforts to execute these types 
of activities?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
                               __________

              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
            national nuclear security administration budget
    8. Senator Sullivan. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, last week, the 
Secretary of Energy sent a letter to Members of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee providing an update that the preliminary fiscal year 
2022 budget request for the Department of Energy (DOE) and National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has been shared with the Nuclear 
Weapons Council to ensure it aligns with Department of Defense (DOD) 
priorities. Are you and the Secretary of Energy aligned with this 
preliminary budget request?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    9. Senator Sullivan. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, in your personal 
opinion, are there any priorities not proposed to be adequately funded 
in the fiscal year 2022 DOE/NNSA budget request?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    10. Senator Sullivan. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, in your 
personal opinion, what additional resources or attention is needed, if 
any, for the NNSA budget to meet its modernization milestones?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
                        nuclear weapons council
    11. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Lord, based on your preliminary 
review of the proposed fiscal year 2022 DOE/NNSA budget request, do you 
have all the information you need and do you have any concerns with the 
proposed funding levels provided to the Nuclear Weapons Council?
    Secretary Lord. Per the Nuclear Weapons Council Planning Guidance, 
DOE/NNSA has submitted congressional control-level budget information 
for analysis. The NWC subsequently chartered the Budget Certification 
Working Group (BCWG), composed of DOD functional experts in nuclear 
weapons and delivery systems to analyze the sufficiency of the draft 
NNSA Fiscal Year 2022 budget request. I believe the NWC has received 
appropriate insight into the fiscal year 2022 request and has provided 
a response to the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security 
Administration, and the Office of Management and Budget. Because the 
Fiscal Year 2022 Budget request is still an internal executive branch 
deliberative document, I am not able to comment on whether the NWC has 
concerns with the proposed funding.

    12. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Lord, does the Nuclear Weapons 
Council have any unfunded requirements? If so, what are they?
    Secretary Lord. The Nuclear Weapons Council remains focused on its 
statutory responsibility to provide guidance for NNSA budget 
formulation. The fiscal year 2021 funding levels reflect the required 
funding needed to sustain and modernize our nuclear stockpile to meet 
DOD's requirements for our number one priority mission. The NWC 
continues to monitor closely the NNSA infrastructure recapitalization 
efforts, as the infrastructure underpins our very ability to field 
weapons on the necessary timelines. We remain concerned over the age-
out of facilities, production capabilities and capacities of critical 
components, as well as NNSA's ability to attract and retain a world-
class, specialized workforce.

    13. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Lord, in your personal opinion, how 
much impact do you think the Nuclear Weapons Council has on the outcome 
of the NNSA budget request?
    Secretary Lord. Congress' efforts to provide the NWC with 
transparency into the NNSA budget request have strengthened the 
partnership between the Department of Defense and the NNSA in executing 
this critical national security mission. To fulfill the NWC's statutory 
requirements, the NWC approved the first-ever NWC Planning Guidance in 
May 2020 that provided priorities and principles for the NNSA budget 
formulation process. In my opinion, the NWC can make a tremendous 
impact on the interdepartmental budgetary alignment for our nuclear 
deterrent as long as the Planning Guidance and early budget analyses 
are implemented. We have begun the fiscal year 2022 budget review, and 
I am pleased with the level of transparency and trust that our 
partnership has achieved.
                               __________

              Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
                   weapons activities funding levels
    14. Senator Cramer. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, please provide a 
breakdown of NNSA weapons activities funding levels for each fiscal 
year between 2017 and 2021 as contained in both the President's budget 
requests and enacted appropriations.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
                nuclear weapons council meetings & dates
    15. Senator Cramer. Secretary Lord, in preparation for the fiscal 
year 2021 President's budget request, how many times did the Nuclear 
Weapons Council formally meet in both 2019 and 2020 to review the 
proposed DOE/NNSA budget request? Please provide dates.
    Secretary Lord. The Nuclear Weapons Council formally met on January 
4, 2020, and February 26, 2020, to review the DOD/NNSA Fiscal Year 2021 
budget request.
    department of energy & office of management and budget positions
    16. Senator Cramer. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, please provide a 
copy of Secretary of Energy Brouillette's letter to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee dated September 16, 2020. Does NNSA support the 
positions outlined in this letter? If not, please explain.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
    17. Senator Cramer. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, please provide 
the Administration's official position on the Senate-passed fiscal year 
2021 National Defense Authorization Act Sections 3111 and 1652 
(S.4049). Does NNSA agree with these objections? If not, please 
explain.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
                               __________

            Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
        national nuclear security administration infrastructure
    18. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the Uranium 
Processing Facility (UPF) construction project at Y-12 Security Complex 
is currently on budget and on schedule. What are NNSA's biggest lessons 
learned from the massive undertaking of the UPF project when it comes 
to management of uranium requirements across the complex, to include 
program management?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    19. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how will NNSA 
ensure UPF systems can interface with other facilities' systems--e.g., 
in Buildings 9215, 9204-2E, and 9995--and ensure that all systems are 
able to support full-scale operations?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    20. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, are you 
confident the electrorefining process being developed for UPF will be 
effective and scalable for the planned metal production capacity?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    21. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, as exemplified 
by Y-12's 75-year-old Building 9212, more than half of NNSA's 
facilities are over 40 years old, and 30 percent date back to the 
1940s. Could you please give specific examples of potential 
consequences to the stability of our nuclear enterprise if our 
infrastructure is not modernized?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    22. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, could you 
please explain why general infrastructure projects such as office 
spaces or parking lots are integral to the successful execution of 
warhead programs and other priority defense programs?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    23. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Secretary 
Lord, Admiral Richard, if the NNSA does not receive the resources it 
needs to recapitalize this infrastructure, will you or your successors 
be able to field an effective deterrent?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
    Secretary Lord. The NNSA's infrastructure underpins our Nation's 
nuclear deterrent by producing the very components necessary to provide 
the Department of Defense with warheads and weapons to field on our 
delivery platforms. Without consistent, methodical, and immediate 
investment in NNSA's nuclear infrastructure, operational risk will 
increase and will degrade the Triad's flexibility to address future 
strategic uncertainty--thereby endangering our ability to field an 
effective deterrent to meet the enduring national security objectives, 
shared by current and previous Administrations.
    Admiral Richard. Continued underfunding of infrastructure 
recapitalization and deferral of required facility maintenance are some 
of the greatest risks to our future deterrence capabilities. Critical 
stockpile and infrastructure requirements are ``must-do'' not ``nice-
to-have,'' are already late-to-need, and have zero margin to execute in 
time to meet our essential capabilities.
    Without these required infrastructure investments, there will be 
points of ``no return'' in the early 2030s where we will lose 
fundamental capabilities, preventing us from fielding an effective 
deterrent. If we continue on this trajectory, we will be unable to 
recover for a decade or more, no matter how much is invested.

    24. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what 
specifically is the NNSA doing to continue to reduce the deferred 
maintenance backlog across its facilities?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    25. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, does this 
year's budget request contain sufficient funding to reduce the deferred 
maintenance backlog across NNSA's facilities?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    26. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, do you require 
anything from Congress to permanently eliminate the backlog?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
               nonproliferation research and development
    27. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA makes 
significant investments in Tennessee to maintain our nuclear 
capabilities, and I appreciate the trust the administration places in 
our skilled workforce. With respect to nonproliferation research and 
development (R&D), however, there's uneven distribution of funding 
across laboratories engaged in nonproliferation, even after accounting 
for staff numbers. Can you elaborate on how the NNSA distributes its 
nonproliferation R&D funding across the national laboratory enterprise?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
                           tritium production
    28. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what is the 
status of NNSA's production of tritium at the Tennessee Valley 
Authority Watts Bar 1 and 2 reactors?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
                     depleted uranium modernization
    29. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, why is funding 
for the Depleted Uranium Modernization Program vital to ongoing warhead 
acquisition programs?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
                      domestic uranium enrichment
    30. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, in your 
opening statement, you discussed the NNSA's ongoing Analysis of 
Alternatives with respect to domestic uranium enrichment. I strongly 
support this program and the great work done by Oak Ridge National Lab. 
How has the COVID-19 pandemic specifically impacted this analysis and 
when can Congress expect the final results?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
                       nuclear defense workforce
    31. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Lord, U.S. nuclear forces are 
fully manned and fully ready because they are backed up by the world's 
best scientists and engineers at NNSA. How does the fiscal year 2021 
budget request support the critical need to recruit and retain these 
high-value members of the nuclear defense workforce? What gaps remain, 
in authorities or funding?
    Secretary Lord. Ensuring our Nation's safe, secure, and effective 
nuclear deterrent requires a suite of military capabilities, unique 
infrastructure, and a highly specialized workforce. Both DOD and NNSA 
face stiff competition from the private sector for top talent in 
technical fields. Additionally, as our aging workforce enters 
retirement, it is critical that we enable knowledge transfer and 
training of our newest generation of workforce. The Fiscal Year 2021 
President's Budget requested funding to continue work on building the 
world-class facilities we owe our top scientists and engineers in 
conducting this critical mission. These facilities, coupled with 
meaningful work on stockpile modernization, will enable us to attract 
and retain the top-talent we need across both departments. Today, our 
departments are employing veterans and candidates from graduate 
fellowship programs, and utilizing excepted service authority to 
direct-hire talent from industry to increase hiring and build a 
diversified workforce. The Nuclear Weapons Council remains engaged in 
issues facing the future of our workforce and will soon receive an 
update from NNSA and the Military Services that will provide insight 
into challenges and identify potential opportunities for DOD support.
                               __________

                Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                          carry over balances
    32. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA has 
continued to defend the $8 billion in prior-year carryover balances 
that were available to cost at the time the agency's fiscal year 2021 
budget was submitted. In order to spend down these carryover funds as 
well as significantly increased funding in fiscal year 2021, assuming 
NNSA receives its requested appropriations, NNSA will need to quickly 
ramp up its spending rates in order to ensure that only an appropriate 
amount of funds are carried over at the end of fiscal year 2021. To 
what extent will NNSA achieve this increased spend rate through 
maintenance and operating contractor hiring, and how quickly can these 
hiring plans be executed?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    33. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, to what extent will 
the NNSA achieve this increased spend rate through larger or more near-
term procurements, and how quickly can these procurements be executed?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    34. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, if the NNSA enters 
fiscal year 2022 with significant carryover balances in excess of 
thresholds, how would the agency justify that carrying these funds over 
to finance future years' activities is a better use of funds than 
procuring the planned Virginia-class submarine?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
                            depleted uranium
    35. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA requires a 
sustainable supply of depleted uranium (DU) metal and the manufacturing 
capabilities to make DU and alloyed DU weapon components for stockpile 
modernization. NNSA has a very limited supply of several forms of DU 
and does not currently have the full range of capabilities it needs to 
manufacture nuclear weapon components from DU. We know from past 
experience, such as with Fogbank a decade ago, that restarting efforts 
to produce strategic materials and components can led to delays and 
cost overruns for stockpile modernization programs. We also understand 
that the schedules for reestablishing DU supply and manufacturing 
capabilities are very tight, with no margin for error. Finally, this is 
a joint effort between the NNSA and the DOE Office of Environmental 
Management, which has two different contracting and management 
approaches. What is NNSA doing to manage the risk of DU capabilities 
not being ready in time to meet stockpile modernization needs?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    36. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, are all affected 
programs aware of the risks?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    37. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what are NNSA and 
DOD contingency plans if there are shortages in material or 
manufacturing capabilities are not ready in time?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    38. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, with respect to DU-
niobium alloy in particular (where NNSA's capabilities are most 
limited), what are NNSA's contingency plans if NNSA is not producing 
qualified DU-niobium alloy ingots by October 2023?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    39. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, with respect to DU-
niobium alloy in particular (where NNSA's capabilities are most 
limited), what are NNSA's contingency plans if there are delays in 
developing new technologies, such as direct casting and cold hearth 
melting, or they never reach sufficient maturity?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    40. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, with respect to DU-
niobium alloy in particular (where NNSA's capabilities are most 
limited), what are NNSA's contingency plans if there are delays or 
disruptions to the re-establishment of NNSA's depleted uranium 
tetrafluoride supply at the Portsmouth site?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    41. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how will the effort 
be managed at the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) 
Portsmouth site where the tails from past enrichment will be converted, 
in other words who will be in-charge of the operation given this a new 
de-conversion line is being installed in an existing EM facility and 
who will review the costs and timelines to install this extra NNSA 
line?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

                 kansas city national security complex
    42. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, according to an 
internal NNSA April 2020 independent review of the commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) technology issue affecting the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370 
programs, the B61-12 program had anticipated shortfalls in testing 
capacity at the Kansas City National Security Complex as well as 
schedule impacts associated with the concurrent B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 
370 programs due to the lack of sufficient experienced staff for two 
simultaneous programs. However, the independent review team stated 
that, ``[a]s a result of inadequate leadership engagement at senior 
levels, the B61-12 LEP did not receive the schedule relief or, 
alternatively, the additional and early resources necessary for program 
success.'' Similarly, the Government Accountability Office's July 2020 
review of the W80-4 LEP (GAO-20-409) found that the program's schedule 
risk analysis called for a more conservative schedule than NNSA 
leadership approved, particularly for delivery of the first production 
unit. What lessons has NNSA drawn from the experience of the programs 
currently in production that may be applied to the W80-4 LEP and the 
W87-1 Modification program?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    43. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what plans does 
NNSA have to fully characterize and mitigate the risks of similar COTS 
qualification issues for the W80-4 LEP and W87-1 Program?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    44. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what assurances can 
NNSA offer that the schedules for the W80-4 LEP and W87-1 Program are 
not overly ambitious and will not lead to more problems with testing 
capacity and redesign when these programs reach their production 
phases?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    45. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how do you measure 
concurrency of operations within the Kansas City Complex amongst the 
various programs underway to minimize concurrency risk?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    46. Senator Reed. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how stable are your 
testing laboratories for the size and timelines of work underway and do 
you plan to move any of these operations inside the Kansas City Plant 
for vertically integrated quality assurance?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
                               __________

           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                          cares act oversight
    47. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, congress appropriated 
nearly $10.6 billion in the CARES Act for the Defense Department to 
mitigate disruption and respond to COVID-19. I remain concerned about 
the effective and transparent implementation of this funding. I have 
spoken with small defense suppliers in Connecticut, who have shared 
that the Pentagon's accelerated payments to improve cash flows are not 
reaching smaller suppliers--while the prime contractors are telling me 
that they are unaware of which suppliers within their supply chains 
have received this critical funding. This lack of communication from 
the Pentagon and lack of clarity among our defense industrial base is 
completely unacceptable. I understand that the large primes are 
responsible for paying their suppliers--but what are you doing to 
ensure that these accelerated funds are truly supporting the supply 
chain in a timely manner?
    Secretary Lord. Of the funds provided by the CARES Act, most were 
specifically for the Military Healthcare system, development of 
vaccines, and procurement of personal protective equipment (PPE) for 
use by the military. Approximately $2.45 billion was appropriated to 
provide support to the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), including $1 
billion for industrial expansion under the Defense Production Act (DPA) 
and $1.45 billion to maintain the liquidity of Defense Working Capital 
Funds. Of the $1 billion allocated to DPA in the CARES Act, $209.7 
million went to expanding the medical supply and device industrial 
base, and the remainder was dedicated to both the DIB and guaranteeing 
Defense Finance Corporation loans. These DPA funds were not available 
for reimbursement of costs incurred by the DIB for cleaning, supplier 
disruption impacts, the cost to redesign workspaces and factory floors 
to meet CDC guidelines on social distancing, and other related costs.
    Separately, on March 20, 2020, the Department increased the 
customary progress payment rate for eligible fixed price contracts from 
80 percent to 90 percent for large businesses and 90 percent to 95 
percent for small businesses. The increased progress payment rate has 
resulted in a cash infusion to prime contractors and their suppliers of 
nearly $3.3 billion through October 30. From the outset, the Department 
has actively encouraged prime contractors to flow down increased 
payments to its suppliers. Major defense contractors report that they 
targeted accelerated payments to struggling companies in their supply 
chain, even before receiving financing from the increased progress 
payment rate. The Department has frequent meetings with industry 
associations, including those who represent small businesses, and we 
have not heard of any payment flow down issues, in fact we have been 
receiving inputs to the opposite--that payments have flowed down and in 
many instances small businesses that may otherwise would have closed 
were able to stay open. I would encourage any company that is 
experiencing payment issues to address these with their cognizant 
contracting officer.

    48. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, do you have a strategy to 
improve the disbursement of any future relief funding to ensure that it 
targets our smallest and most fragile suppliers?
    Secretary Lord. Yes. On August 17, 2020, Defense Pricing and 
Contracting issued updated section 3610 guidance to improve the 
disbursement of future relief by requiring prime contractors to 
represent that ``all impacted subcontractors have been afforded an 
opportunity to submit a request for reimbursement of section 3610 paid 
leave costs, and as appropriate are incorporated into the contractor's 
section 3610 reimbursement request for the contractor to pay to the 
subcontractor.

    49. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, will you commit to 
providing more information and greater transparency about the 
disbursement of CARES Act funding to the supply chain?
    Secretary Lord. Yes, I will continue to advocate and support 
transparency related to CARES Act disbursements. This information has 
been provided weekly, now bi-weekly since May 2020, to all four 
congressional defense committees. The August 17, 2020, updated 3610 
guidance instructs to DOD contracting officers to specify the amount to 
be reimbursed to each affected subcontractor when issuing the 
modifications where subcontractor leave is included in the section 3610 
reimbursement. This was done for transparency and to ensure funding was 
allocated to all of our suppliers.

    50. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, it's been reported that you 
estimate the DOD may need as much as $20 billion in emergency funding 
to reimburse defense firms for lost work hours and disrupted supply 
chains. Can you expand on this assessment and some of the challenges 
you are seeing in the industrial base that brought you to this 
conclusion?
    Secretary Lord. Industrial base challenges include situations where 
telework was not possible for the contractor workforce, especially in 
production and testing facilities. As a result, we had work that was 
essentially put on hold and the Department is going to have to make up 
for lost production to avoid delays. Other challenges faced by our 
suppliers were reduced efficiencies as a result of reconfiguration of 
the production floor for social distancing. Suppliers also experienced 
time lost to clean areas exposed to COVID in addition to delays of 
component parts being required from other disrupted facilities and 
suppliers. In addition, the cost impact associated with section 3610 is 
significant.

    51. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, what are the impacts on 
national security if we don't address these challenges?
    Secretary Lord. Funding will have to be taken from existing program 
execution originally identified for hardware purchases to offset COVID 
related expenses. This will adversely impact the Department's support 
to our critical Warfighter needs.

    52. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, the CARES Act appropriated 
$20 million for the DOD Office of the Inspector General to conduct 
increased oversight of DOD operations and activities in response to 
COVID-19. In July, the Office of the Inspector General published a 
COVID-19 oversight plan. Do you believe this plan provides an effective 
roadmap for accountability?
    Secretary Lord. Yes, I do. We have been actively engaged with the 
DOD IG as it performs audits of our response to COVID-19. The 
Department is also actively supporting the numerous audits by the 
Government Accountability Office concerning our COVID response. I 
believe we have been very proactive and working to ensure that each 
action related to COVID-19 is properly identified and every dollar 
appropriated for COVID-19-related requirements is properly spent.
    Accountability must also be built into the processes and procedures 
that practitioners use on a daily basis. With that in mind, my office 
has issued numerous policy memoranda, deviations to the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulations Supplement, and other guidance documents to 
promote fair, consistent, and accountable execution of contract actions 
related to COVID-19.

    53. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lord, is there anything in the 
plan that you believe should be changed or added?
    Secretary Lord. The IG operates wholly independently from of other 
parts of the Department. Thus, I am in no position to formulate 
opinions on whether there are parts of the IG's oversight plan that 
should be changed or added.
                               __________

            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                       nuclear explosive testing
    54. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Admiral Richard, 
the United States has not conducted a nuclear weapons test since 1992. 
The Trump administration's National Defense Strategy states, ``The 
United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless 
necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal, and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare 
or maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing.'' The Washington Post 
reported on May 22, 2020, that during a meeting at the White House, the 
Trump administration considered a ``demonstration'' nuclear test 
explosion as a way to convince Russia and China to join trilateral 
nuclear arms control negotiations. The U.S. Special Envoy for Arms 
Control, Marshall Billingslea, said in a June 24, 2020 press briefing 
that he is ``unaware of any particular reason to test at this stage'' 
but he also said ``I won't shut the door on it because why would we.'' 
This year, have you participated in any interagency discussion about 
the United States conducting a nuclear explosive test? If yes, please 
identify the most recent date on which the matter was discussed.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
    Admiral Richard. As the Commander of the United States Strategic 
Command, I am required by Title 50 U.S. Code Sec. 2525 to annually 
certify the safety, reliability, performance and military effectiveness 
of the stockpile and to state whether or not one or more underground 
nuclear explosive tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified 
in the stockpile.
    This assessment is the result of continuous ongoing discussions 
with the heads of each national security laboratory and the National 
Nuclear Security Administration rather than as a specific topic of 
discussion. The last such discussions were October 6, 2020 at the 
Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) Stockpile Assessment Team presentation 
at the 103rd SAG Plenary. No specific operational or technical reason 
for the U.S. to conduct a nuclear test has been identified at this 
time. While there are no identified conditions requiring resumption of 
underground nuclear testing, the Nation must be able to reconstitute 
this capability should a need arise. I am concerned that we do not have 
sufficient readiness to conduct such a test, on a relevant timeline 
and/or of sufficient fidelity, should conditions warrant a need to 
return to underground nuclear explosive testing.

    55. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, in your prepared 
written testimony, you wrote, in part, ``the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile remains safe, secure, reliable, and effective without the 
need for nuclear explosive testing.'' At this time, does the NNSA 
require additional financial resources to conduct a nuclear explosive 
test in the event the United States Government decided to take this 
action?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

    56. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, absent a technical need or the 
need to protect the United States from armed attack, do you support a 
U.S. resumption of nuclear explosive testing? Please explain your 
reasoning.
    Admiral Richard. To date, there are no identified conditions 
requiring the resumption of underground nuclear testing. I do, however, 
fully support continued funding for NNSA and the national security 
laboratories to ensure we are rapidly able to reconstitute this 
capability should a future issue arise requiring resumption of nuclear 
explosive testing.
    Title 50 U.S. Code Sec. 2525 requires me to annually assess the 
safety, reliability, performance and military effectiveness of each 
nuclear weapon type in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; the 
assessment includes a determination as to whether or not underground 
nuclear explosive testing is required.

    57. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Admiral Richard, 
what do you assess would be the likely response from Russia and China 
in the event of a United States resumption of nuclear explosive 
testing?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
    Admiral Richard. I am not in a position to speculate as to what 
Russia or China's likely response would be if the United States resumed 
underground nuclear explosive testing. I would expect their decision to 
be made in their own national interests given the specifics of any 
hypothetical scenario.
                                  iran
    58. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Admiral Richard, 
has the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) and Iran's subsequent suspension of its adherence to certain 
JCPOA provisions, on balance, reduced or increased the amount of time 
it would take Iran to develop enough fissile material for one nuclear 
weapon (i.e., breakout time)?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
    Admiral Richard. [Deleted.]

                            new start treaty
    59. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Admiral Richard, 
barring any superior, replacement accord that is ready for signature by 
the United States and Russian Governments by February 5, 2021, is the 
extension of the New START Treaty for another five years under its 
current terms in the national security interest of the United States?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty did not respond in time for printing. 
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
    Admiral Richard. I support any arms control agreement that enhances 
the security of this Nation. Russia has been largely compliant with New 
START (NST) as it sets a limit on the number of deployed strategic 
weapons they have. However, as a bilateral treaty, NST fails to account 
for thousands of non-strategic weapons and new systems in development 
outside of the treaty definitions. Having all of these attributes would 
make my job easier.
    I endorse efforts to address the Treaty's shortfalls, to include 
directing my deputy commander's in-person support to the 
Administration's negotiating team. When asked, my best military advice 
to the President will be NST has served us well and we should preserve 
those treaty attributes that are beneficial, seek to address those 
issues the NST does not address, and remain cognizant of the limits of 
military advice to diplomatic initiatives.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Exposure                  Marine Corps Installation                  State                   PRV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding              MCAS YUMA AZ                                  ARIZONA                           $1,751,321
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding              MARCORPRCUITDEP SAN DIEGO CA                  CALIFORNIA                           $11,993
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding              MCB CAMP PENDLETON CA                         CALIFORNIA                        $4,196,785
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding              MCSF BLOUNT ISLAND                            FLORIDA                             $806,429
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding              MCB HAWAII KANEOHE                            HAWAII                         $ 217,016,749
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding              HDQTRS 4TH MARDIV NEW ORLEANS                 LOUISIANA                        $ 1,399,334
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding              MCAS CHERRY POINT NC                          NORTH CAROLINA                 $ 501,785,354
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding              MCB CAMP LEJEUNE NC                           NORTH CAROLINA                 $ 208,326,613
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding              MCRD/BEAUFORT PI SC                           SOUTH CAROLINA               $ 1,403,525,324
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding              MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO VA                 VIRGINIA                        $ 10,115,032
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TOTAL             ............................................  ...................           $2,348,934,934
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                 [all]