[Senate Hearing 116-404]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-404
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPECTRUM
POLICY AND THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S LIGADO
DECISION ON NATIONAL SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 6, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-584 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RICK SCOTT, Florida JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri DOUG JONES, Alabama
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_______________
May 6, 2020
Page
Department of Defense Spectrum Policy and the Impact of the
Federal Communications Commission's Ligado Decision on
NationalSecurity............................................... 1
Members Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 1
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 5
Witnesses Statements
Deasy, The Honorable Dana S., Chief Information Officer, 7
Department of Defense.
Griffin, The Honorable Michael D., Under Secretary of Defense for 10
Research and Engineering.
Raymond, General John W., USSF, Chief of Space Operations, United 14
States Space Force, and Commander, U.S. Space Command.
Allen, Admiral Thad W., USCG, Ret................................ 19
Questions for the Record......................................... 56
Appendix A--
Letter from National Defense Industrial Association............ 69
Appendix B--
Background Paper............................................... 76
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPECTRUM
POLICY AND THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S LIGADO
DECISION ON NATIONAL SECURITY
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 2020
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
Cramer, McSally, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
Before starting the agenda, since a quorum is now present,
I ask the Committee to consider a list of 2,807 pending
military nominations. All these nominations have been before
the Committee the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report them?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Chairman Inhofe. Second?
Senator Shaheen. Second.
Chairman Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Inhofe. Opposed, no.
[No response.]
Chairman Inhofe. The ayes have it. I do not have a pen. So
I have to sign this. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON MAY 6, 2020.
1. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Jeffrey T. Jones II) (Reference No. 1366)
2. In the Air National Guard there are 13 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Michael W. Bank)
(Reference No. 1390)
3. In the Army there are 965 appointments to be major (list
begins with William P. Abbott) (Reference No. 1463)
4. In the Army there are 628 appointments to be major (list
begins with Davis M. Abt) (Reference No. 1464)
5. In the Army there are 628 appointments to be major (list
begins with Jamie E. Abel) (Reference No. 1465)
6. In the Army there are 40 appointments to be major (list begins
with Adesola O. Adepegba) (Reference No. 1466)
7. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to be captain
(Daniel M. Wiegrefe) (Reference No. 1482)
8. In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 6 appointments to be
colonel (list begins with Matthew S. Breen) (Reference No. 1487)
9. In the Marine Corps there are 395 appointments to be
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Brett D. Abbamonte) (Reference No.
1488)
10. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Jamal D. Snell) (Reference No. 1522)
11. MG Gary M Brito, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy Chief
of Staff, G-1 (Reference No. 1542)
12. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Katherine L. Jaudon) (Reference No. 1570)
13. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Carl P. Chebi) (Reference No. 1626)
14. Capt. Rick Freedman, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1629)
15. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Susan Bryerjoyner) (Reference
No. 1630)
16. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Mark A. Melson) (Reference No.
1633-2)
17. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Kelly L. French) (Reference No. 1640)
18. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Paul D. Sargent) (Reference No. 1654)
19. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Christopher C. Supko) (Reference No. 1657)
20. In the Marine Corps there are 106 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Joshua D. Anderson) (Reference No. 1658)
21. RADM Eugene H. Black III, USN to be vice admiral and
Commander, SIXTH Fleet/Commander, Task Force SIX/Commander, Striking
and Support Forces NATO/Deputy Commander, US Naval Forces Europe/Deputy
Commander, US Naval Forces Africa/Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander Europe (Reference No. 1695)
22. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (William A. Forbes) (Reference No. 1696)
23. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (James G. Buckley) (Reference No. 1697)
24. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Michael G. Matson) (Reference No. 1698)
25. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Kevan M. Mellendick) (Reference No. 1699)
26. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Andrew S. Morris) (Reference No. 1700)
27. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Andrew D. Cordey) (Reference No. 1701)
28. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Nicholas R. Leinweber) (Reference No. 1702)
29. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Sean A. McKay) (Reference No. 1703)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 2,807
Before the opening statement, let me just observe something
here, and this comes from the heart. I have been around here a
long time. I served in the House for 8 years. I started in the
Senate and was on the Senate Armed Services Committee starting
in 1994. I do not think I have ever seen a more impressive
group of witnesses on a specific subject who are better
qualified than this in all that time. I really mean it.
I mean, we talk about Mr. Deasy, who is the Department of
Defense Chief Information Officer. He was also the CIO of J.P.
Morgan Chase, the British Petroleum Company, and General
Motors. I mean, we have not had one like that before.
Dr. Griffin. Certainly he knows this issue as well as
anyone anywhere. He has been our NASA Administrator.
Then we have Admiral Thad Allen. He has been the chairman
of NASA's Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
National Advisory Board. That is GPS [Global Positioning
System], so he is the authority on that.
Then, of course, obviously the chief of our space
operations, General Jay Raymond.
It is a privilege to have you guys here, to have this much
quality here, this much authority because what we are going to
be talking about is an issue that could be really damaging to
our country if something is wrong.
I would say good afternoon to the Committee, and I
appreciate your being here.
Now because of the unusual circumstances, there is a new,
little required thing that we have to go through, so bear with
me.
Before we begin, I want to thank all of you for being here.
It is required that we are abiding by guidance from the
Office of the Attending Physician, Sergeant at Arms, and Rules
Committee as we hold this hearing today. Many steps were taken
to minimize the risk to our Members, our witnesses, our staff,
and the public. That means we are all 6 feet from one another.
You have also got cleaning supplies at your seats, and if
maintaining 6 feet of separation becomes a problem, then I
encourage you to use your masks. That we are here today under
these circumstances underscores the importance of the subject
that we are addressing today.
What we are going to do, we are going to have our opening
statements and then proceed on with 5-minute questions, and we
are going to have a second round of questions too.
This is a complex issue, but it ultimately boils down to
risk. I do not think it is a good idea to place at risk the GPS
signals that enable our national and economic security for the
benefit of one company and its investors.
After extensive testing and analysis, experts at almost
every Federal Agency tell us that Ligado's plan will interfere
with our GPS systems. This will certainly affect our
warfighters who rely on GPS for navigation, logistics, and
precision guided munitions, whether in training or on the
battlefield.
But this is about much more than risking our military
readiness and capabilities. Interfering with GPS will hurt the
entire American economy. We will have some good witnesses talk
about that and elaborate on that. Our farmers rely on GPS to
harvest their crops. Our truckers and airlines rely on GPS to
move supplies and people. Our banks rely on the GPS timing
function. Every American uses GPS every day, and at the end of
the day, economic security is national security.
Now, we all agree that we need to compete with China in the
5G development. No one is disputing that fact. We have been
working on that for months with the Department of Defense and
the telecom industry cooperating with each other and
accomplishing that very thing. That is not the issue.
Ligado's proposal is not tied to that work whatsoever. Now,
we are talking about the 5G, the competition with China. They
have tried to conflate their proposal with other mid-band
spectrum sharing discussions, but in reality, these two issues
are completely separate, completely separate from each other.
In answering the argument that GPS would be disrupted, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) says Ligado will be
forced to pay for any disruptions its service causes to GPS.
Now, the reality is that the FCC order only requires Ligado to
replace government-owned devices. That does not accomplish--if
it were doable. Ultimately, the burden of mitigating harmful
interference will be placed on the Department of Defense and
the American taxpayers would end up, as normally is the case,
having to pay for it.
A few powerful people made a hasty decision over the
weekend, in the middle of the national crisis and against the
judgment of every other agency involved, and without cluing the
President in on any of this. I have had conversations with him,
and I can assure you that is the case.
The FCC may not be in this Committee's jurisdiction, but
the effects of its decision really are. I think we all
understand that. I hope our witnesses will speak to the
enormous risk this decision has for everyone who relies on GPS
in America. With the technical and important nature of this
topic, we will structure this hearing with a consolidated
opening statement from the three Department of Defense
witnesses, followed by the fourth witness. This will allow a
detailed explanation of the national security implications of
the FCC's decision and what steps the military will need to
take to mitigate these effects.
The Department of Defense has provided materials to
accompany their statement that are available in front of you
and on display for the public view.
Now, this is very significant because some people are
familiar with this organization and some are not, but those who
are know that this is where all of the defense people are.
I plan to submit for the record a letter I received from
the National Defense Industrial Association, which is made up
of 1,700 businesses and 70,000 individual members, stating
their strong opposition to Ligado's proposal, along with a list
of 71 companies and associations that are opposed as well. The
FCC was fully aware of this. They received the letter from this
organization a week before their weekend vote.
[Please see Appendix A on page 69.]
You must believe that it could not get worse, but it is.
Ligado took over a bankrupt company in 2015 and has been trying
to obtain FCC licensing ever since. They waited until the whole
world was distracted by the virus, and when everyone was
looking the other way and unannounced to the public--and it was
not announced--in total secrecy on a weekend passed the most
controversial licensing bill I think in the history of the FCC.
I say this because the Federal Agency opposition was unanimous.
You never see that. We had all organizations, all Federal
Agencies opposing this, not just the military, but all of
government and the private sector, including the airlines, the
farmers, the truckers, the maritime manufacturers, opposed the
licensing and the FCC knew it. Hence, we had the weekend rushed
vote.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
thank the witnesses for appearing here today. This is a
critical issue for the Defense Department and our Nation, and
it is important that we learn from these witnesses.
We are holding this hearing in unusual circumstances. There
has been a great deal of discussion about whether we should be
here in person with risks not only to Senators, but to all the
support personnel who are needed to keep this institution
running. In addition, the compelling point is made that if the
Senate is in session, its predominant focus should be combating
the pandemic. But this is a hearing I think that is essential.
I want to commend Chairman Inhofe for establishing and
holding a weekly call so that Committee Members can be briefed
by Defense Department officials and ask questions regarding the
coronavirus. The Chairman ensured that we were able to conduct
oversight even in difficult circumstances. But phone calls
cannot replace a hearing, so when we plan future hearings, as
consideration of the annual defense bill allows, I would
certainly request that we consider these hearings in the
context of both physical and virtual participation. We also
should focus on the effects of the pandemic on the Department
of Defense and on threats that face the Nation.
Let me now turn to today's hearing about the decision by
the Federal Communications Commission, or FCC, to permit the
company Ligado to operate a land-based network that by its own
admission will interfere with DOD GPS systems, as well as those
in other Federal Agencies and the civilian sector.
Over 10 years ago, Ligado's predecessor, LightSquared,
applied to the FCC to permit a satellite-based 4G system with a
secondary land-based network in areas where satellite reception
could not be obtained. The application was denied because of
interference with the GPS system, and LightSquared was forced
into bankruptcy.
LightSquared and its spectrum license was then bought in
bankruptcy and reorganized as Ligado. In 2016, Ligado
resubmitted an amended licensing application to the FCC to
build a new ground tower-only transmission system. Ligado's
switch to a system of closely spaced, powerful ground tower
signals threatens to interfere with GPS. Despite jeopardizing
GPS and ignoring the scientific view of many Federal Agencies,
the aviation industry, and GPS-dependent companies, the FCC
granted the license without a public rulemaking to change from
a satellite-based network to one that is totally land-based.
I believe the FCC's decision to grant the license is
problematic for several reasons.
First, the Commerce Department's National
Telecommunications and Information Administration is supposed
to form a consensus among executive branch stakeholders like
the Defense Department and FCC, an independent commission. In
this case, the Department of Defense and other executive
departments, like the Department of Transportation, objected to
the application because of the interference with the GPS
signal. Yet, no consensus was reached before the license was
granted.
Second, the FCC license does not recognize the complicated
nature of the Defense Department's weapon systems. Ligado
maintains that DOD can simply replace affected GPS cards. But
there are hundreds of thousands of GPS chips embedded in DOD
weapon systems, and each chip is not only tuned to GPS, but
embedded with interconnected electronics, each tuned to each
other. Replacing a GPS card will also impact other features of
a weapon system. How many weapon systems are affected, how they
can be fixed, and the time and cost of the remedy is unknowable
at this point, but the process will be lengthy and expensive.
For a sense of what the FCC's decision could mean, we have
a real life example. In 1992, an FCC spectrum repurposing
decision eliminated the B-2 radar band for DOD. Moving that
radar to a new band took 30 years and $3 billion due to depot
cycle rescheduling and operational demands.
While the FCC order states that the onus is in Ligado to
fix problems, in reality the burden is actually on the Defense
Department to find which weapon systems are affected, how
severe the impacts are, and then negotiate with Ligado to get
them fixed. Clearly, such a process will compromise military
readiness.
The Defense Department is working on a new set of hardened
GPS chips called military grade user equipment, or MGUE, which
are jam-resistant to the power levels of the Ligado towers.
However, these chip sets will not be installed in our weapon
systems until the 2030s. The best course of action for national
security would be to stay the license application and
periodically review it until such time as the new chip sets can
be installed in critical weapon systems.
Finally, I have only discussed the problems the Defense
Department is facing as a result of the FCC decision. I have
not discussed the myriad of problems that will be faced by
literally everyone who uses GPS. I do not believe that the
FCC's decision to grant this license is in the best interest of
our national security or our Nation.
I look forward to today's discussion about the issue.
I again thank the witnesses and my colleagues for appearing
at this hearing in these unusual and demanding times.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We are going to have opening statements by our witnesses.
Before we do, without objection, I will ask unanimous consent
that we enter into the record the National Defense Industrial
Association. I have already referred to that--the industry
coalition letter with 68 signatories that strongly oppose it,
the Aerospace Industry Association letter on behalf of 300
leading aerospace and defense manufacturers and suppliers who
oppose the FCC's decision, the Air Line Pilots Association
International letter asking the Senate Armed Services
Committee, this Committee, to take action and stay this FCC
ruling, and the Transportation and Construction Coalition
letter stating that they oppose Ligado's proposed network, and
of course, the letter from Ligado. Without objection, they will
be made a part of the record.
[The information referred to can be found in Appendix A on
page 69.]
Chairman Inhofe. We will start with our opening statements,
with you, Mr. Deasy. You have been a great contributor to
everything that we do around here and that we stand for, and we
appreciate your taking the time to be here and really getting
involved in this issue. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANA S. DEASY, CHIEF INFORMATION
OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Deasy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
Members of the Committee. Good afternoon. I am Dana Deasy, the
Department of Defense Chief Information Officer.
Sir, as you stated in your opening, with me today on behalf
of the Department are Dr. Griffin, the Under Secretary for
Research and Engineering; and General Jay Raymond, Chief of
Space Operations, United States Space Force.
In place of reading individual opening statements, we have
prepared a short overview where Dr. Griffin will briefly
explain the technical issues associated with FCC's ruling to
allow Ligado to repurpose spectrum. Next, General Raymond will
then explain the military mission impacts of that order on the
Department's operations. I will briefly cover 5G and what
actions the DOD is taking to leverage this important
technology, as well as cover briefly how we are pursuing
sharing mid-band spectrum. Finally, I have a chart where I will
summarize the key takeaways.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
With that, I would like to turn to Dr. Griffin to begin.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Deasy follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dana Deasy
introduction
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished
Members of the Committee. I am Dana Deasy, the Department of Defense
(DOD) Chief Information Officer. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify on the national security risks posed to Global Positioning
System (GPS) operations resulting from the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) decision to authorize Ligado's license modification to
begin terrestrial wireless operations. Before we begin, I would like to
thank the Committee's leadership for the concerns you raised to the
President over the likely harm to military capabilities, particularly
for the U.S. Space Force, resulting from this decision.
unacceptable risks to gps
On April 19, 2020, the FCC unanimously adopted an Order that
approved Ligado's license modification to launch a nationwide, cellular
network by repurposing a portion of spectrum adjacent to the spectrum
segment used by the GPS L1 signal. Throughout this proceeding, the
Department made it clear that approving Ligado's plans would cause
harmful interference to millions of GPS receivers across the country,
both civilian and military. DOD senior leadership engagement on this
matter has been long-standing and consistent, as part of a coordinated
interagency approach for assessing the impact to reception of the GPS
L1 signal. The National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing
(PNT) Executive Committee (EXCOM), representing nine Federal agencies
who use GPS, began raising concerns to National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) about earlier versions of Ligado's
proposal and the harmful interference impacts for GPS in 2012. The PNT
EXCOM's nine Federal agency members, including DOD and the Department
of Transportation (DOT), also signed a joint letter in December 2018 to
NTIA, unanimously and unambiguously objecting to the latest Ligado
license modification request.
Starting in 2012 and spanning across several administrations,
multiple Secretaries of Defense have raised GPS interference concerns
about the plans of Ligado and its predecessor companies. In letters in
April and June 2019, the then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick
Shanahan sent letters to request that the FCC not allow the deployment
of the proposed Ligado system. The current Secretary of Defense Mark T.
Esper also sent a letter to the FCC Chairman on November 18, 2019,
requesting that the Commission not allow the terrestrial wireless
system proposed by Ligado to move forward.
In line with these concerns, on December 6, 2019, NTIA leadership
informed the FCC that they did not support the approval Ligado's
license modification request. On March 12, myself and Dr. Michael
Griffin, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, wrote
to NTIA to further reinforce DOD's conclusion that the FCC's approval
of Ligado's license modification request would cause unacceptable
operational impacts and adversely affect the military potential of GPS.
We asked NTIA to forward that letter to the FCC to be included in the
record of the Ligado proceeding. As recently as March 24, Deputy
Secretary of Defense David Norquist reiterated the Department's strong
opposition in a letter to the Department of Commerce.
After reviewing the details of the FCC's decision, DOD concludes
the final Order still does not ameliorate these serious concerns or
alter our findings that the Commission should have denied Ligado's
license modification request. Congress directed, under 10 U.S.C. 2281,
that the Secretary of Defense ``may not agree to any restriction on the
GPS'' proposed by the head of a U.S. Department or agency that would
adversely impact the military potential of GPS. Based on the tremendous
risk to GPS, DOD does not agree with the FCC's decision.
A key area of disagreement is the FCC's justification that the
Order placed ``stringent conditions'' on Ligado's network deployment
plans to ensure that GPS users would not experience harmful
interference. However, these conditions will not protect GPS receivers
against harmful interference and are thus unrealistic and unacceptable
to the Department. DOD already assessed these requirements during the
interagency review process, including evaluation by the PNT EXCOM. In
addition to the work of the PNT EXCOM, extensive and technically
rigorous testing and analysis was conducted over the past nine years by
DOD, the National Space-Based PNT Engineering Forum, the DOT Adjacent
Band Compatibility (ABC) Assessment and Air Force testing of eighty
(80) GPS L1 receivers in 2016. These efforts all reached the same
conclusion, which is that the Ligado proposal will disrupt GPS.
Testing supported by the nine Federal agency users of GPS receivers
who make up the PNT EXCOM concluded that the risk is far too great, and
far too many questions remain, for Ligado's proposal to be approved.
The DOT ABC Assessment highlighted the much lower power levels and
significant separation distances needed to effectively protect GPS
operations under the Ligado proposal. In the aggregate, these test
results clearly showed that the conditions in this FCC Order will not
prevent impacts to millions of GPS receivers across the United States,
with massive complaints expected to come. In fact, the Department
believes this FCC ruling increases the risk that American families and
businesses may turn to foreign space-based navigation and timing
systems like China's BeiDou and Russia's GLONASS, to replace the
functions of GPS if it becomes unreliable due to interference from
Ligado operations. This is fundamentally a bad deal for America's
national and economic security.
Unfortunately, the ``stringent conditions'' of the FCC's Ligado
Order fall short in many critical respects, including:
Guard Band: The Order includes the 23 MHz ``guard band''
to protect GPS L1 receivers from Ligado's terrestrial based network.
GPS receivers are designed to receive signals from space and would be
overpowered by this terrestrial network regardless of this protection.
Despite this guard band, many varieties of GPS receivers would still
suffer interference. To be clear, Ligado's proposal is to field a
terrestrial-based network. GPS has a satellite-based space segment that
transmits radio signals to users. This means that GPS L1 receivers are
designed to tolerate interference from space systems in adjacent
spectrum, but not to tolerate interference from terrestrial systems in
the adjacent band.
Power Levels: Another FCC condition is to require Ligado
to limit the power levels of its base stations significantly compared
to its original proposal to the FCC. However, even these substantial
reductions fail to meet the power levels that can be tolerated in bands
adjacent to GPS L1 signals that were studied by the DOT.
Coordination: The Order's conditions also include
coordination procedures, such as requiring Ligado to continuously
monitor the transmit power of base station sites and follow procedures
for responding to reports of interference. Coordination and
notification requirements normally work well with spectrum sharing and
DOD often champions such measures. However, there are millions of GPS
receivers in use by Federal agencies, industry and general consumers
that are mobile. Given the massive scale, there is no way to protect
those mobile operations. This challenge is compounded by the fact that
most GPS users would never know if Ligado disrupted their equipment in
the first place or who to call about a problem.
Government GPS Receivers: The FCC Order expects Ligado to
protect U.S. Government GPS receivers and to repair or replace affected
receivers identified before Ligado terrestrial operations commence. But
this overlooks the classified nature of military GPS use and the sheer
number of government receivers and military platforms affected. The FCC
expectation is unreasonable and could never be employed in real
practice. To avert significant mission impacts, the government would
need to undertake unprecedented accelerated testing, modification and
integration of new GPS receivers on existing platforms. This is cost
and schedule prohibitive and would significantly degrade national
security.
The inability of Ligado to meet these stringent conditions in order
to protect GPS is why the FCC should have rejected the Ligado proposal,
based on the extent that no practical solution or mitigation is
available that would permit Ligado to operate without high likelihood
of widespread interference. The bottom line is that there are too many
unknowns and the risks are too great to allow the proposed Ligado
system to proceed in light of the operational impact to GPS.
importance of protecting gps
A 2019 report sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology estimated that in the United States, GPS generated about
$1.4 trillion in economic benefits since the 1980s, with most benefits
accruing in the last decade because of the rapid growth in information
technologies, including advanced wireless services. DOD has a
responsibility to ensure the protection of GPS, including when
regulatory changes are contemplated (i.e., Ligado's request for license
modification). DOD is committed to a ``whole of nation'' approach to 5G
pilot experimentation. In February, President Trump signed an Executive
Order on ``Strengthening National Resilience through Responsible Use of
PNT Services.'' The Executive Order stated that it is U.S. policy ``to
ensure that disruption or manipulation of PNT services does not
undermine the reliable and efficient functioning of its critical
infrastructure.'' This national policy directive recognizes that
ubiquitous availability and reliability of GPS has made it an integral
part of the fabric of our society, ranging from the location features
in cell phones to navigation for vehicles and aircraft to routine
banking transactions. GPS allows us to pinpoint 911 calls, launch
precision airstrikes, prepare our forces for combat, and engage in many
other actions foundational to protecting the American public at large.
Furthermore, the Department utilizes GPS to protect and serve the
public by tracking national security and terrorist threats and building
readiness to protect the Homeland and our interests abroad. It is for
this reason that the DOD strongly opposes the Ligado license
modification request as not being in the best interest of our Nation.
united states and dod 5g leadership
DOD recognizes the importance of 5G as it relates to the economic
and national security of the Nation. Ligado portrays their solution to
be 5G, but because there is no evidence that they have a technically
viable 5G solution, they are misrepresenting their offering. The band
in which Ligado operates is not part of the FCC's 5G FAST Plan, which
is the Commission's blueprint for advancing U.S. interests in 5G.
The non-contiguous bands that Ligado could bring to market are
fragmented and impaired. Furthermore, Ligado's plans only target a
small subset of 5G specifications, mainly limited Internet of Things,
rather than the full range of high data rate, ultra-fast 5G services
needed to reach the full promise of 5G benefits for businesses and
consumers.
DOD recognizes the need to share spectrum where and when it makes
sense and wants to improve both technology and policy innovations to
advance 5G objectives. One example of why this approach works is our
success in advancing the FCC's 3.5 GHz Citizens Broadband Radio Service
sharing decision. This sharing framework for 3.55-3.65 GHz, which is a
vital air search radar band for Navy operations, is paving the way for
the FCC's first mid-band 5G spectrum auction in July 2020. This
``whole-of-nation'' approach is DOD's commitment to 5G pilot
experimentation. This work brings together government, industry and
academia to solve tough problems facing the Nation with regard to 5G,
spectrum access and sharing.
summary
DOD has conducted a balanced approach to assessing the risks and
benefits of new wireless industry proposals. This is why DOD applied
technical rigor and vigorous assessment to its conclusions on the
Ligado plans. The Ligado proposal and the risks posed to GPS
demonstrates that the FCC decision is misguided. Instead, the Ligado
solution causes more harm than good to the Nation's spectrum use. The
Department supports the President's 5G goals, however, we need to
ensure that regulatory decisions that increase wireless industry access
for cellular networks do not do so at the expense of GPS user
requirements. The FCC's Ligado decision is flawed and must be reversed.
As the Committees has so clearly expressed, this is a bad deal for
America.
I want to emphasize the importance of our partnerships with
Congress in all areas, but with a particular focus on protecting the
warfighter and ensuring the integrity of GPS to operate without harmful
interference. I look forward to continuing to work with Congress in
this critical area. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Inhofe. Dr. Griffin?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
Secretary Griffin. Thank you. I would like to take this
chart in clockwise order and first key off of the point Senator
Reed made, which is that GPS is, although designed originally,
developed, deployed, and sustained by the DOD, that GPS is now
a public utility. It services, of course, our national security
needs, as General Raymond will address, but it also services
the requirements of first responders navigating to a particular
address. Every time you use an ATM [Automated Teller Machine],
you are using the GPS timing signal. You are not asking where
the ATM is. You are using the timing signal that is provided in
order to conduct an encrypted transaction. Civil aircraft,
military aircraft, commercial shipping, our deployed troops,
credit card swiping machines, all of these things are, in one
way or another, dependent upon GPS.
It is forecast to be a $140 billion-plus industry by 2025.
It is over $100 billion today in economic value. A Department
of Commerce study estimated--and it is cited in my testimony--
$1.4 trillion of economic benefit generated by GPS since the
system was first deployed. So that is what is at risk.
How is it at risk? If you go to the upper right quadrant,
you can see on your chart that the fundamental aspect of the
GPS infrastructure, space and ground, the entire GPS
infrastructure, was designed under the assumption that GPS
radio navigation systems would be placed in a very quiet band
of the radio spectrum, that ground-based transmitters would not
be allowed in that spectrum because they would drown out the
very weak signals that come from satellites.
At this point with the FCC's decision, the goalposts have
been moved. Now receivers meant to detect the extremely weak
signals from satellites have to cope with very loud signals in
the band next door.
The practical effect of this, irrespective of who pays for
the changes in equipment that would have to occur--and again, I
will make Senator Reed's point for emphasis, that the Ligado
proposal proposes only to fix Federal receivers, whereas by far
the majority of use is in various aspects of the civil and
commercial sector. The replacement of that equipment,
regardless of who pays for it, provides a market niche
opportunity, a refreshing of equipment, that will be available
to our competitors. So rather than the installed based of
United States equipment holding sway, our competitors who have
their own global navigation satellite systems will be arguing
why, since the United States has damaged its own system--why
should we not buy from China or Russia. That is not an argument
I want to have.
Moreover, today GPS is the world standard for satellite
navigation. If we damage our own world standard, earned through
decades of investment and hard work, we should only expect that
users worldwide will find other standards. That will not be to
our benefit.
It is very difficult to give you an accurate technical
comparison of just how loud the Ligado signal is in comparison
to GPS, but on the lower right, I have tried. So the decibel
scale is what we use to measure loudness, if you will, whether
radio noise or acoustic noise. So the quietest possible sound
that can be heard might be represented by rustling leaves,
which are quoted at 0 to 10 decibels (dB) in the literature. On
the other hand, a jet taking off will create a sound 140 to 150
decibels. If you are standing right next to it, it will blow
out your eardrums. So if 0 decibels is barely audible and 140
or 150 decibels is a jet takeoff, then what we are trying to do
with GPS is to hear the sound of leaves rustling through the
noise of 100 jets taking off all at once. That is a comparison
that is actually favorable to Ligado. I could not put more than
100 jets on my chart. That is what we are trying to do here.
Finally, in the lower left quadrant of the chart, moving
clockwise, there are a number of myths that have been
promulgated in the media about the Ligado proposal. I chose
three of them to debunk, the first of which is the claim that
Ligado--a recent claim--is critical to the build-out of U.S.
5G. In fact, my number here is not quite right. In fact, Ligado
has about 3.5 percent of the sub-6 gigahertz spectrum in use
today, if we count that portion of the spectrum allocated to
the Citizens Broadband Radio Service, CBRS. 5G is about
capacity, latency, and scale. The Ligado proposal has
absolutely nothing to do with latency and scale, and its
capacity is on the order of 3.5 percent of the total spectrum
capacity. Ligado's existence, plus or minus, makes absolutely
no difference to the involvement of U.S. in the so-called 5G
race.
Second, the myth is that the Department of Transportation
testing, which is quoted in I think all of our testimonies--the
myth is that that testing was flawed, that it did not assess
receiver performance against the Ligado transmitter. That is
true, but that is not the right test. The right test is the
test to determine whether the band for satellite navigation has
been protected, and the DOT testing addressed protection of the
assigned GPS band in the most thorough manner I could have
imagined. We will talk more about that later. But it protects
the entire band and not just one transmitter and one receiver
in an artificial scenario.
A third myth that has been bandied about is the Ligado
stations are like a 10 watt light bulb. How can they possibly
interfere with GPS? Well, in case my jet noise analogy did not
get across, let me talk to you about something for which I used
to be responsible, the Hubble Space Telescope. The Hubble Space
Telescope was designed to detect extraordinarily dim objects,
so dim that on my decibel scale, a 10 watt bulb is 350 decibels
brighter. If you shined a 10 watt bulb down the barrel of the
Hubble Space Telescope, it would see nothing. It would be
completely blinded. That is exactly the situation that we have
with the GPS receiver trying to listen to GPS signals that are
170 decibels weaker than this 10 watt bulb. That is not a game
that we can win in GPS. We will have to redesign and redeploy
equipment, and the cost will be hundreds of billions of dollars
and decades of deployment time.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Michael D. Griffin
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and offer
testimony on the necessity of protecting the radio spectrum used by the
Global Positioning System (GPS). GPS is not just a critical pillar of
our national security, it is the foundation on which much of the United
States', indeed the world's, current and future economy is built. To
that point, if the recent decision of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to approve Ligado Network, LLC's license modification
petition is allowed to stand, it will undermine both our national
defense and economic security.
GPS was designed, built, operated, and is sustained by the
Department of Defense for the core purpose of providing precise
positioning, navigation, and timing information to our forces on land
and sea, in air and space.
But beyond its original purpose, GPS has proven to be so valuable
for civil and commercial applications that the military is now actually
a minority user. According to a recent study by Grand View Research,
GPS will be a $146.4 billion commercial industry by 2025, growing at 18
percent annually. In 2019, the Department of Commerce released a study
estimating that GPS has generated $1.4 trillion in economic benefits
since the 1980s. \1\
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\1\ ttps://www.space.commerce.gov/doc-study-on-economic-benefits-
of-gps/
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When you use the mapping app on your smartphone, swipe a credit
card to execute a secure point-of-sale transaction, or board an
airplane, you are relying on GPS. Just as with other parts of our
critical infrastructure, such as electric power, indoor plumbing,
railways, highways, gas stations, and the air traffic control system,
it has become a public utility--an almost unnoticed feature of the
civilized world that we take for granted, and can no longer do without.
GPS depends for its ubiquity and accuracy on more than two dozen
satellites in precisely known positions 12,500 miles above the Earth.
These satellites broadcast signals to earthbound and airborne receivers
which, knowing where the satellites are, can determine their own
positions, just as navigators in an earlier era used the known
positions of stars to determine their positions at sea. The GPS
satellites are essentially ``stars'' that shine with radio rather than
with visible light.
But signals from GPS satellites, as from all satellites, are
extremely weak, and earthbound GPS receivers must be highly sensitive
in order to use them. For this reason, they are assigned to portions of
the radio spectrum--frequency bands--reserved exclusively for their
use. Any nearby transmitter operating in or close to the frequency
bands that have been set aside for GPS would overwhelm their signals.
Such interference has been prevented by rules that have protected GPS
and the entire space communications band surrounding it for decades,
allowing it to become an integral part of the global economic
infrastructure, used literally by the entire world.
But the radio spectrum is valuable property, worth many billions of
dollars when portions of it are placed for auction by FCC. Thus,
unfortunately, some have proposed dismantling the rules that protect
GPS in order to allow earthbound operators to use frequency bands
previously reserved for space communications in general, and those
adjacent to GPS in particular.
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) conducted a testing
program developed over multiple years with stakeholder involvement,
evaluating 80 consumer-grade navigation, survey, precision agriculture,
timing, space-based, and aviation GPS receivers. This test program was
conducted in coordination with DOD testing of military receivers. The
results, as documented in the DOT ``Adjacent Band Compatibility'' study
released in March, 2018, demonstrated that even very low power levels
from a terrestrial system in the adjacent band will overload the very
sensitive equipment required to collect and process GPS signals. Also,
many high precision receivers are designed to receive Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) signals not only in the 1559 MHz to 1610 MHz
band, but also receive Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) signals in the
1525 MHz to 1559 MHz band to provide corrections to GPS/GNSS to improve
accuracy. With the present and future planned ubiquity of base stations
for mobile broadband use, the use of GPS in entire metropolitan areas
would be effectively blocked. That is why every government agency
having any stake in GPS, as well as dozens of commercial entities that
will be harmed if GPS becomes unreliable, opposed the FCC's decision.
There are two principal reasons for the Department's opposition to
Ligado's proposal. The first and most obvious is that we designed and
built GPS for reasons of national security, reasons which are at least
as valid today as when the system was conceived. The second, less well-
known, is that the DOD has a statutory responsibility to sustain and
protect the system. Quoting from 10 USC 2281, the Secretary of Defense
`` . . . shall provide for the sustainment and operation of the GPS
Standard Positioning Service for peaceful civil, commercial, and
scientific uses . . . '' and `` . . . may not agree to any restriction
of the GPS System proposed by the head of a department or agency of the
United States outside DOD that would adversely affect the military
potential of GPS.''
Leaving entirely aside the national security implications of
jamming our own military navigation system, if Ligado moves forward
with establishing its network, we in the United States will have
imposed a self-inflicted wound on GPS. Though other nations are
building or upgrading their own satellite navigation systems, ours is
the present world standard and the basis of hundreds of billions of
dollars in economic advantage for our Nation. While we set out to
redesign and refresh hundreds of millions of GPS receivers in our
installed national security and industrial base, others, especially
Russia and China, will be quick to take advantage of our mistake by
offering replacement systems that are not vulnerable to Ligado's
interference. A weakened GPS system offers our adversaries the
opportunity to replace the United States as the world standard for
satellite navigation. Both Russia and China will jump on that
opportunity.
The Department is not opposed to sharing the airwaves. Indeed, as
part of the DOD's 5G-to-Next G initiative, we will be working alongside
industry to test spectrum sharing technologies at military bases around
the country, while promoting collaboration across the interagency,
academia, and allies to develop, test, and deploy innovative solutions
for spectrum sharing. But, as the Chairman and Ranking Member rightly
noted in recent statements, Ligado has little to do with 5G. Although
Ligado portrays their solution as 5G, there is no evidence that they
have a technically viable 5G solution, and they are therefore
misrepresenting their offering. Denying Ligado's petition will not
affect the pace at which the Nation rolls out 5G technologies and
service.
We have built strong relationships across the government and
industry to ensure that the U.S. remains at the cutting edge of
communications technology. We must not allow this issue to cloud our
progress. We must not put the security and economic advantage of the
United States and its partners and allies at risk by allowing Ligado to
put forward a false choice between the protection of GPS and the
promotion of U.S. 5G competitiveness. One has nothing to do with the
other, and we can have both if we are smart enough to recognize that.
In light of the facts the choice is clear. The FCC must reverse its
decision on Ligado, and deny any similar future petitions which would
repurpose the radio spectrum adjacent to that assigned to GPS.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN W. RAYMOND, USSF, CHIEF OF SPACE
OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE, AND COMMANDER, U.S.
SPACE COMMAND
General Raymond. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and
Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to speak before you
today on a matter of national importance: the protection of the
GPS signal for use by our joint and coalition forces and the
whole Nation.
As both the Chief of Space Operations for the United States
Space Force and as the Commander of the United States Space
Command, I have the responsibility to the Secretary of the Air
Force for organizing and training and equipping forces to
provide GPS for the world and to the Secretary of Defense for
operating, integrating, and protecting GPS for our Nation. I am
proud to represent the airmen, soldiers, sailors, marines, and
space professionals who conduct these missions with such
expertise.
The very first GPS satellite was launched in 1978, and it
was integrated into warfare for the first time in Operation
Desert Storm. You all remember in early 1990s, 1990-1991 the
left hook. That was enabled by a GPS constellation that was not
even fully up and operating at the time. How do you navigate
through a featureless terrain at night in the desert? You do it
with GPS.
Now today--25 years ago last week, it became fully
operational. Today it represents the Department of Defense's
largest constellation where 31 satellites operating over 12,000
miles above the earth's surface provide precision positioning,
navigation, and timing services to 4.5 billion users and
warfighters globally. It is three times more accurate than it
was when it was first launched in the late 1970s.
However, this critical capability is irrelevant if the
signals coming off the satellite cannot be processed by the
receiver on the ground. These signals, after traveling 12,000
miles from space to reach earth, arrive very weak, less than a
millionth of a billionth of a watt. It is hard to get your head
around that small of a number. For receivers to be able to pick
up such faint signals, these signals have to operate in a
noise-pristine environment in that part of the spectrum. For
those that ride the Amtrak train--and I experienced this last
year--it is the quiet car. It is where people do not talk. It
is where emitters do not make noise because that signal is so
faint.
It is recognized globally as a zone reserved for satellite
signals coming from space, not for emitters operating on the
ground approximately a billion times more powerful than the GPS
signal. These ground emitters will interrupt, reduce the
accuracy of, or jam the GPS signal. We must preserve this
spectrum for space-to-ground signals. It is the global
standard, and it puts our space capabilities, which are the
gold standard, as Dr. Griffin talked about, at risk.
As we compete with China and Russia, we should not cede our
operational advantage.
Because of the magnitude of the power overmatch between the
ground antenna and the GPS signal, the mitigation steps the FCC
has required will not retire all of the risk. Specifically, the
23 megahertz buffer zone will not mitigate all the risk of
interference. We have a buffer zone today. It is the mobile
SATCOM services band at which this ground emitter is being
placed. What this 23 megahertz buffer zone really implies--it
is about a half of the buffer zone that we have today.
I have spent most of my military career integrating GPS and
other space capabilities into everything that we do as a joint
force, and today there is absolutely nothing that we do as a
joint force that is not enabled by space and specifically GPS.
In the Department alone, we have over a million GPS receivers.
They are integrated into our space launched vehicles. They are
integrated into our aircraft, our tanks, on ships, on
communication networks, and on our most important weapon
system, our people. GPS allows us to shoot, move, and
communicate with speed, precision, and over great distances. It
has revolutionized military operations, and it is employed in
every step of the kill chain to defeat our adversaries.
Some might ask what is the impact on the force if the
emitters are only located in the continental United States. In
my opinion, the impact is significant and it is unacceptable.
DOD mission areas that would operate under increased risks
include our most important mission, Homeland defense. Assured
GPS is critical to Homeland defense. It could impact military
and commercial space launch. We use GPS to safely launch those
rockets, and if they go astray, we blow those rockets up to
protect public safety. We do most of our training and building
of our readiness in United States (CONUS) to be able fight the
fight overseas. Most specifically, in our defense support for
civil authorities, like we are doing today with Covid or like
with wildfire suppression or hurricane relief or earthquake
relief, our forces rely on GPS to accomplish that critical
mission. These ground emitters could have multimodal impacts to
transportation hubs, airfield, seaports, and airports. Finally
these emitters could impact overlapping defense critical
infrastructure and key resource sectors like the defense
industrial base, transportation, emergency services, energy,
and communications.
The best advice I could give is to strongly oppose the use
of this spectrum that is reserved for space signals for
terrestrial emitters. In doing so--if we do not, we increase
the risk to our ability to conduct our critical Homeland
defense missions, we erode the gold standard of our space
capability, ceding advantage to Russia and China, we set a
dangerous precedent for repurposing this spectrum reserved for
space signals, and we go against the volumes of testing that
has been done, which indicate that these ground-based emitters
will impact the GPS signal.
I will now turn it over to Mr. Deasy to talk about the
spectrum.
[The prepared statement of General Raymond follows:]
Prepared Statement by General John W. Raymond
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today with my
esteemed colleagues and to reiterate the importance of the Global
Positioning System (GPS) to national security, public safety, and our
economic well-being.
As the Chief of Space Operations for the United States Space Force,
I am responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force for organizing,
training, and equipping the forces that provide GPS services to our
military forces, allies, and others who use it around the world. The
Space Force is designing, building, and deploying the satellites and
ground systems; operating the constellation; establishing and
maintaining standards for all civil and military GPS signals; and
developing the critical components for military GPS receivers. As the
Commander of United States Space Command, I am responsible for
directing daily GPS operations and ensuring the positioning,
navigation, and timing (PNT) services provided by the system are there
and available for use to our warfighters under all conditions.
From the launch of the first GPS Block I satellite in 1978, through
the accelerated fielding of GPS IIA satellites to support Desert Storm
in 1990, to today, the performance of the system and the services it
provides have continuously improved. On April 27, 2020, when we
celebrated the 25th anniversary of GPS at full operational capability,
today's GPS constellation delivers PNT accuracy three times as precise
as was required by the original military specification.
The next-generation of satellites we are deploying, GPS III, and
the new, more resilient and cyber-secure ground control system to
operate these new satellites, will improve that performance even
further. The first GPS III was successfully launched in December 2018
and the second in August of last year. In addition, this block of
satellites includes a new civil signal that increases the system's
international interoperability while protecting national security use--
evidence that our Nation sees GPS as global good and instrument of
national power that far exceeds its military utility.
GPS has long been the gold standard for the world for PNT and
provides military, civil, and commercial benefits previously
unimagined. The GPS enterprise helps fuel a $20 trillion economy that
depends on it not just for positioning but to synchronize financial and
cellular networks; enable robotic and autonomous systems; and create
unbounded economic opportunity.
In my role as the Commander of U.S. Space Command, I am also
responsible for protecting the GPS system, and the services it provides
to our military forces, from the threats any adversary might pose to
its use. For many other military space systems the Nation relies on for
its security and defense, this increasingly involves the need to
protect our systems from physical attack. Our adversaries are now
building counterspace weapons to kinetically attack our satellites from
the ground and in orbit.
This, however, is not the primary threat to GPS. The primary threat
to GPS, both in the past and for the foreseeable future, is electronic
attack or jamming of GPS receivers. Since the GPS
signal originates from 12,000 miles in space, it is incredibly weak
by the time it reaches the receivers that decode and process the
complex signal on the Earth's surface. Adversaries understand this and
build jammers in an attempt to deny our use of this signal in military
operations. In response, we train to recognize this threat, employ
special tactics to defeat the jammers, and operate sophisticated
systems to maintain our use of GPS services in conflict. This requires
great skill and comes at some risk to our forces, as they are required
to defeat these electronic weapons to execute their missions.
Here at home, anything that degrades the effectiveness and
reliability of GPS has the ability to prevent military forces from
training effectively to maintain readiness; and worse yet, keep us from
protecting and serving the public by responding to natural disasters
and providing humanitarian assistance, tracking national security
threats, and defending the Homeland.
Transmitters adjacent to the GPS spectrum have significant
potential to disrupt and degrade the operation of the approximately 1
million GPS receivers in the Department of Defense (DOD) inventory, and
therefore bring harm to military training, readiness, and DOD's ability
to conduct operations. Without solid data about the location of ground-
based transmitters and antennas, DOD cannot begin to fully understand
and work to mitigate the impact to existing systems, if any mitigation
is possible. Changes necessary to combat potential interference from
systems operating near the GPS signals could delay the development and
deployment of new GPS capabilities for years--and cost billions in U.S.
taxpayer investment.
GPS has also long been a critical technology that has supported the
Nation's public safety, law enforcement medical and medical responders.
It literally saves lives. While Americans at home are typically not
under threat of purposeful electronic attack, the GPS services they
depend on every day for life and livelihood are also threatened if the
GPS signal and its environment are not protected from disruption. As
with military forces conducting our critical Homeland Defense mission,
or training for combat in the United States, degradation of GPS signals
can affect safety of flight for aircraft and other segments of the
national transportation system; prevent first responders from finding
their way to emergencies or communicate when they arrive, and affect
the economic activity of every American.
By law the Secretary of Defense must raise concerns regarding
anything that would adversely affect the military potential of GPS. He
has done so. As the Commander of U.S. Space Command, I have been
assigned a Unified Command Plan mission of protecting and defending our
space capabilities. I cannot take direct action to protect America's
use of GPS in the Homeland, but I can provide awareness of the threats,
the impacts of those threats on our joint military forces, and strongly
advise against emitters that can negatively impact our ability to
operate our critical space capabilities that fuel our American way of
life and our American way of war.
Mr. Deasy. I am going to start by saying that DOD fully
supports the U.S. needing to be leaders in 5G, and there is a
right way we can go about it and there is a wrong way.
Ligado does not provide a 5G solution. It is not offering a
solution to be a 5G leader in America. The band in which Ligado
operates is not even part of the FCC 5G fast plan, which is the
commission's blueprint for advancing U.S. interests in 5G. The
non-continuous bands that Ligado could bring to market are both
fragmented and impaired.
DOD clearly recognizes the huge value of 5G not only for
commercial use but across the U.S. military as well.
As you will see up here on this chart, we are getting ready
to undertake a number of experiments to learn how best to
utilize this technology. If you start on the far right of this
slide, I point out some of the experiments we are getting ready
to work with: augmented virtual reality, distributed training,
smart warehousing and logistics, and eventually in a future
phase, we will even start looking at how to make smart ports
and bases.
The part of this chart I really want to draw your attention
to is in the middle. We have established a dynamic spectrum
sharing pilot and are examining methods to facilitate sharing
between 5G and DOD airborne radars in mid-band spectrum. Let me
simplify this for you.
What we need to be able to do in 5G is to ensure that when
civilians are using their car for 5G or in their home or using
it in the factory or an individual person is carrying it
around, that the work we do and the operations we run in the
military will not interfere, and vice versa. So that is what
the 5G experimentations are all about. We will be doing these
experimentations in conjunction with the National Spectrum
Consortium, which is partnering with government, industry, and
academia.
Finally, the last most important thing is one of the most
important areas of 5G is what is called the mid-band spectrum.
What is important here for all of you to understand is how do
we need to learn how to share that spectrum and make it
available for both DOD use as well as commercial use.
Next, in front of you on your very last chart, you have
what I like to call the key takeaways. If there is the one
chart today that you should keep with you to fully appreciate
what we have all shared with you, it is this chart.
First of all, Mr. Chairman, as you stated, this is about
risk. This is risk to the resource that is America's economic
engine and the vital nature of it for national security. The
repurposed license is a classic case of bait and switch. FCC
and Ligado want to move the goalpost by following terrestrial
transmitters in a space communications band despite unanimous
and unambiguous Federal opposition.
DOD and DOT both performed extensive testing and studies
evaluating the potential impact to 80 military and commercial
GPS receivers. Those studies concluded that Ligado's solution
will cause harmful interference to both.
The stringent conditions imposed by the FCC are inadequate
to protect GPS, impractical, and could never be employed in
real practice. The required guard band and reduced power levels
do not sufficiently protect GPS receivers, as you have heard
today from Dr. Griffin and General Raymond. Coordination
requirements are simply impractical. There are millions of
mobile GPS receivers in use, and there is no way to protect
those from their mobile operations. Notification of the event
of interference simply does not work. None of you would even
know in this room today if Ligado disrupted your individual GPS
device, nor would you know what to do if they did. FCC
expectation for Ligado to repair or replace affected receivers
is unreasonable and could never be employed in practice.
The American public and military rely on GPS to support a
wide range of critical applications and missions from
protecting our national security to our economic prosperity. We
have always been world leaders in GPS, and we never want to see
our country be forced to turn to foreign GPS providers.
As General Raymond clearly articulated, the FCC decision
will impact warfighter exercises, testing, training, and
Homeland defense.
GPS must remain a reliable service and always be available
when you need it most; a simple example we can all appreciate:
emergency services for a 911 call.
Ligado and 5G simply do not go together. They portray their
solution to be 5G. This is not how the U.S. will lead in 5G.
They only target a small subset of the 5G specifications.
In the next several months, DOD will be executing on
important 5G experiments with government and industry.
I will close by simply saying it is clear to the DOD that
the risk to GPS far outweighs the benefits of this FCC
decision, and the FCC needs to reverse their decision.
Thank you for your time. We look forward to your questions.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Deasy.
We now recognize Admiral Allen for any comments.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, USCG, RET.
Admiral Allen. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
provide testimony today with my distinguished colleagues from
the Department of Defense. My full testimony is submitted for
the record.
I am testifying today in my private capacity as a citizen
and the views expressed are mine. They are not intended to
represent any government agency or private firm. My testimony
is based on publicly available information. My views represent
my concerns and those of GPS civil users. I will try not to
repeat points previously made.
I have been involved in radio navigation and operations and
policy for more than 50 years. Fourty five years ago, I was the
commanding officer at Loran Station, Lampang, Thailand as the
war in Vietnam ended. Ten years ago as the Commandant of the
Coast Guard I personally turned the switch that decommissioned
the final Loran C operating chain in the United States.
My fellow panelists have presented a unified testimony
regarding the impact of the FCC order and authorization to
allow Ligado Networks to deploy a low-power terrestrial
nationwide network and the associated impacts on the Department
of Defense and national security. I endorse their
recommendations.
My purpose here today is to speak on behalf of the hundreds
of millions of civil users of GPS. From the timing of financial
transactions to power generation, synchronization of
telecommunications, high precision agriculture, intelligent
transportation systems, and air navigation and airspace
management, GPS has become vital to the Nation's general
welfare and common defense.
The risk to military systems, so clearly stated by this
panel, is also shared by civil GPS users. However, unlike our
military forces who have the ability to reduce risk through
encryption and other tools, civil users are a separate user
segment with greater receiver diversity and fewer risk
reduction options. The single point in government where the
interests of the civil GPS users are integrated with the
Department of Defense and brought into a consensus process is
through the position, navigation, and timing (PNT) Executive
Committee (EXCOM) and its supporting PNT Advisory Board. The
PNT Advisory Board approach for reducing risk to the civil
users has been a three-pronged strategy: protect the signal,
toughen the receiver, augment GPS with backup or complimentary
PNT services.
The impact of disruption or loss of a GPS signal varies
with the type of receiver. This could manifest itself in
anything from an ATM malfunction to the loss of navigation in
an intelligent transportation system, interference with an
unmanned aerial system, or disruption of electrical power
distribution. The uses of GPS range from a simple FITBIT to the
provisions of coarse timing for highly refined, parsed timing
services for financial transactions.
While there are a host of issues raised by the FCC Order
Authorization (OA), my written testimony addresses them
specifically. I wanted to hit five things here today.
The administrative process for this decision has never been
made public to gain comment on the allocation of spectrum of
the ancillary terrestrial component of the service or the
earth-based transmitters.
The lack of a transparent process to look at the competing
criteria as to how to measure disruptions in the GPS adjacent
band.
Third, the density of terrestrial antennas and the impact
on mobile devices moving through those fields.
Four, the OA shifts the performance burden to the receiver
rather than protecting the spectrum, as has been stated.
Finally, the assertion that the Ligado plan will
significantly accelerate or enhance the deployment of 5G
technology. There are no 5G standards for the spectrum as it
has not been used for 5G anywhere else in the world.
The concept contained in the OA that the impacts of
adjacent band interference can be measured and identified by
Ligado as they occur and then mitigated in a timely and
effective manner without prior testing strains credibility.
Tests that were utilized by the FCC were funded by Ligado, were
not conducted in a transparent fashion, and not widely
supported.
Further, the failure of the FCC to accept the standard
floor for tolerance of noise that was used by the Department of
Transportation in the adjacent band compatibility study is
equally quizzical and its summary dismissal is troubling. This
is a neutral guardrail for the spectrum. This approach rejects
the concept of first do no harm and replaces it with
consequence management after the event has occurred.
In closing, I would like to use the words of those close to
this issue in the air and on the ground. My good friend,
Captain Sully Sullenberger, and I spoke this morning about the
concerns of the aviation community. He said putting the narrow
commercial interest of one company ahead of our national
security and the needs of the country is wrong-headed and
dangerous. Wishful thinking and hoping that things will work
out is not an effective strategy and cannot repeal the law of
physics.
Closer to earth during a visit to my wife's family in
Illinois, I spent some time talking to corn and soybean farmers
who depend on GPS services for precision navigation. I asked
what happens when you lose GPS. I got a two-word response: we
quit. While you can reboot and begin planting again, if you are
flying a medevac helicopter or responding to a wildfire, it is
a much different problem. Spectrum is a national asset, a
precious asset, and it should be protected, not subject to
arbitrary and capricious decisions.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement by Thad W. Allen
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony today with my
distinguished colleagues from the Department of Defense.
I am testifying today in my capacity as a private citizen and the
views expressed by me are not intended to represent any government
agency or private firm. My testimony is based on publicly available
information. My views represent my concerns and those of the GPS civil
user community.
While my CV has been provided to the Committee, I would like to
note that I have been involved in radio navigation operations and
policy for more than 50 years. Forty-five years ago, I was the
Commanding Officer of a LORAN C Transmitting Station in Lampang,
Thailand as the war in Vietnam ended. Ten years ago, as the Commandant
of the Coast Guard I personally turned the switch that decommissioned
the final LORAN C chain operating in the United States.
My fellow panelists have presented unified testimony regarding the
Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Order and Authorization (OA)
to allow Ligado Networks LLC ``to deploy a low-power terrestrial
nationwide network . . . '' and the associated impacts on the
Department of Defense and national security. I endorse their testimony
and recommendations.
My purpose here today is to speak on behalf of the hundreds of
millions of civil users of GPS and Global Navigation Satellite Systems
(GNSS) in the context of the Committee's concerns regarding national
security. It is premised on a broader concept of national security that
extends to all elements of national power. The ubiquity of GNSS and GPS
specifically, make the provision of positioning, navigation, and timing
(PNT) services critical to the economic wellbeing and Homeland security
of the Nation. From the timing of financial transactions to power
generation, synchronization of telecommunication, high precision
agriculture, intelligent transportation systems, and air navigation and
airspace management, GPS has become vital to the Nation's ``general
welfare'' and ``common defense.'' As stated in a 6 December 2019 letter
from NTIA to the FCC, ``The accuracy and ubiquitous availability of the
Global Positioning System (GPS) is fundamental to the Nation's economy,
national security, and continued technological leadership.'' The letter
further states, ``A recent study sponsored by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) estimated the economic benefits of GPS
for private sector use at a range between $903 billion and $1.8
trillion as of 2017.''
The risk to military systems, so clearly stated by this panel, is
also shared by civil GPS users. However, unlike our military forces who
have the ability to reduce risk through encryption and other tools,
civil users are a separate user segment with greater receiver diversity
and fewer risk reduction options. The single point in government where
the
interests of civil GPS users are integrated with Department of
Defense and brought into a consensus process through the PNT Executive
Committee (EXCOM) and its supporting PNT Advisory Board (PNT AB). The
general approach for reducing the risk to civil users has been a three-
pronged strategy: Protect the signal, Toughen the receiver, and Augment
GPS with backup or complimentary PNT services (PTA).
The impact of disruption or loss of a GPS signal varies with the
type of receiver. This could manifest itself in anything from an ATM
malfunction, to the loss of navigation in an intelligent transportation
system, interference to an unmanned aerial system, or disruption of
electrical power distribution. The of uses GPS range from simple FITBIT
watches to the provision of coarse timing for highly refined, parsed
timing services for financial transactions.
While there are a host of issues raised by the FCC OA, I would like
to address five specific issues:
1. The administrative process by which this decision was made
2. The lack of a transparent process to resolve competing
criteria as to how to measure disruptions to GPS by adjacent band
interference
3. The density of terrestrial antennas required to provide the
anticipated service and associated impact.
4. GPS Spectrum Protection
5. The assertion that the Ligado plan will significantly
accelerate or enhance the deployment of 5G technology.
overview
The concept contained in the OA that impacts of adjacent band
interference can be measured and identified by Ligado as they occur and
then mitigated in a timely and effective manner without prior testing
strains credibility. Tests that were utilized by the FCC in the OA were
funded by Ligado, were not conducted in a transparent fashion, and not
widely supported. Further, the failure of the FCC to accept a standard
floor for the tolerance of noise that was used by the Department of
Transportation in the Adjacent Band Compatibility study is equally
quizzical and its summary dismissal in the OA is troubling. This
approach rejects the concept of ``first do no harm'' and replaces it
with consequence management following the event.
1. Administrative Process
An example of the normal process to convert satellite service
spectrum to terrestrial mobile broadband spectrum was the 2 GHz MSS
spectrum licensed to Dish Networks. In that instance, FCC proposed an
allocation for Fixed and Mobile Services (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) 7/15/2010, Report and Order 4/4/2011); developed service rules
to use the allocations (NPRM 3/21/2012, Order 1/30/2013); then modified
the Dish Network license after a public comment period to comply with
the service rules (4/3/2013)). Consistent with the 2000 Orbit Act,
which prohibits FCC from auctioning satellite service spectrum, Dish
Network's spectrum was not auctioned, but conversion of Dish's MSS
spectrum was conditioned on Dish bidding at least 1.564 billion dollars
in the H-block spectrum auction (which it did).
In contrast, conversion of Ligado's spectrum to provide terrestrial
wireless services is essentially free and, as wireless expert Tim
Farrar noted in 2011, could result in a multi-billion-dollar windfall
for the company with no recompense to the American taxpayer. In the
case of Ligado Networks, FCC did not follow the normal regulatory
process for reasons that remain unclear. Rather than following the
example of the Dish Network's process, and making an allocation to the
Mobile Service, FCC instead seems to have made a de facto allocation to
the Mobile Service without the normal public process being followed.
Specifically, Condition 2 of the attached conditions to the March 26,
2010 Memorandum Opinion and Order and Declaratory Ruling (DA 10-535)
required: ``Without regard to satellite service, SkyTerra shall
construct a terrestrial network to provide coverage to at least 100
million people in the United States by December 31, 2012; to at least
145 million people in the United States by December 31, 2013; and to at
least 260 million people in the United States by December 31, 2015.''
As evidenced by the past nine-plus years of the Ligado waiver request
and subsequent license modification proceeding, it is apparent to me
the use of the MSS L-band satellite service spectrum for terrestrial
wireless broadband service should have been the subject of a NPRM as
normally would be required under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). The only terrestrial service allowed in Ligado's spectrum is
satellite augmentation service (MSS Ancillary Terrestrial Component
(ATC), which is terrestrial fill-in for areas of poor satellite
reception such as urban areas subject to building blockage and other
impairments). FCC made it clear in 2003, when it adopted the original
MSS ATC rules, that stand-alone terrestrial service was not intended
for the MSS band. In that 2003 MSS ATC Order, FCC stated: ``We do not
intend, nor will we permit, the terrestrial component to become a
stand-alone service.'' Rather than go through the normal process of
making an allocation to the Mobile Service, which is the broad radio
service category under which terrestrial mobile broadband would
normally be provided, and then developing service rules to use that
allocation so that harmful interference isn't caused to other spectrum
users in the same or adjacent bands, the FCC avoided the public process
of making an allocation to the Mobile Service and the separate public
process of developing service rules to use that allocation.
2. Measuring Disruptions
Of note, harmful interference is defined in the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) Radio Regulations as interference which
`` . . . endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or of
other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly
interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance with
[the] Radio Regulations.'' This definition is consistent with the
definitions appearing in the FCC rules and the Federal Agency rules set
forth by the NTIA. However, what is not well understood is that the
requirement that one radiocommunications service not cause harmful
interference to another radio service is a last resort or capstone
requirement when rules that are designed to ensure compatible
operations between different radio services, and prevent harmful
interference, fail. The rules that ensure compatible operations are
normally developed in an FCC rulemaking process as noted earlier.
Because of the irregular process the FCC used, the public debate
over whether the FCC should make a terrestrial Mobile Service
allocation in the MSS L-band never occurred and, as a result, the
service rules proceeding (e.g., rules for use of the allocation), where
mechanisms and criteria to ensure compatibility between Ligado and GPS
would have been debated in a public comment process, never occurred.
Instead of a NPRM for service rules to use an allocation to the mobile
service that the FCC never made, FCC conditioned a 2011 Waiver for
LightSquared (now Ligado) so that it could not commence commercial
terrestrial operations until ``harmful interference concerns have been
resolved''. FCC likewise issued an April 2016 Public Notice and limited
the discussion only to showing harmful interference. Interference
protection criteria, such as a 1 dB drop in carrier-to-noise density
ratio (C/No), or equivalently an interference-to-noise ratio (I/N) of -
6 dB, on which the government test and analysis was based and which are
designed to prevent harmful interference, were completely ignored by
the FCC.
The National Advanced Spectrum and Communications Test Network
(NASCTN) testing on which the FCC relies tested only 14 receivers in a
total of 20 configurations, testing none in the important classes of
certified-aviation, non-certified aviation, space-based, cellular, and
military grade. The NASCTN tests did not consider the multiple
simultaneous stresses to receiver operation (e.g. motion, multipath,
limited view of the sky, other sources of interference), did not test
for reception of all GNSS signals even though most modern receivers can
receive all of them, and did not test all modes of receiver operation.
NASCTN admitted the limitations of its testing, indicating that its
objective was only ``to establish a test methodology,'' and ``testing a
set of devices that represents the comprehensive market in a
statistically complete manner is not practical in the timeframe of this
testing.''
As noted earlier, in limiting the considerations for Ligado's
proposed network to not cause harmful interference to GPS, the FCC
negated all test and analysis performed at significant expense and
effort by the U.S. Government and relied exclusively on testing funded
by Ligado.
3. Antenna density and mobile receivers
The OA also focuses on the impact of receivers in relation to fixed
towers and testing has been based on the distance of the receiver from
the tower. The density of antennas to provide the proposed service is
not clear. As a result, there is no clear path to assess the impact on
mobile receivers, those embedded in handsets or mobile platforms such
as aircraft, vehicles, unmanned systems, and emergency services that
may randomly come in close proximity to Ligado base stations. This
would also apply to Department of Defense resources deployed for
Homeland defense (HD) or defense support to civilian agency (DSCA)
missions. As the former Principal Federal Official for the response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the National Incident Commander for the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, I can personally attest to the need for
fully capable military forces when the situation dictates. The current
Defense support to the coronavirus pandemic response underscores the
domestic need for an effective and reliable military force.
4. GPS Spectrum Protection
The FCC's action in permitting the proposed Ligado network to
proceed apparently fails to recognize that permitting incompatible uses
of spectrum adjacent to that in which GPS operates destabilizes and
degrades the overall spectrum environment for GPS. This is contrary to
National Space Policy (June 28, 2010) and the October 25, 2018
Presidential Memorandum on Developing a Sustainable Spectrum Strategy
for America's Future, both of which provide direction to ``sustain the
radiofrequency environment'' in which critical U.S. space systems
operate. FCC engineers undoubtably know that all receivers take in some
power from adjacent band signals and if the adjacent band interfering
power is sufficiently strong, as is the case with Ligado's terrestrial
system, it can overload the receiver (in this case GPS) and result in
disruption of the received GPS signal. This is called receiver overload
or receiver blocking. It seems to me, given the importance of GPS to
the overall national interest, consideration should have been given to
protecting and sustaining the overall spectral environment in which GPS
operates.
5. 5G
Finally, much has been said about the potential to use Ligado's
spectrum to advance United States 5G objectives and enable a
competitive advantage against China in the ``race to 5G''. However,
Ligado's spectrum is not allocated to 5G or terrestrial services
anywhere in the world and, given the incumbent global satellite
operations (e.g., Inmarsat, Thuraya), will not be allocated for 5G.
There are no Third-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standards for
5G in the band nor any equipment available to use the band. Despite
Ligado's stated intention to start development of these 5G standards,
the reality is the use of Ligado's spectrum for 5G will create an
isolated market in the U.S. with almost no possibility of expansion for
global use. So, it is far from clear to me how our competitive position
relative to China would be enhanced by the FCC approval of the Ligado
license modification. In fact, since many telecommunications networks
rely on GPS for network timing, degradation of GPS could result in
greater reliance on foreign GNSS systems, such as the Russian
Federation's GLONASS or China's Beidou system, to the detriment of the
United States global competitive posture overall.
concluding thought
In March of 2016, General John E. Hyten testified before the House
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee of Strategic Forces, and
described the importance of GPS to the military and to the Nation. In
his testimony, General Hyten stated: ``I don't think that we should
infringe on the GPS spectrum. That is a critical capability, not just
for the military security of the Nation but for the entire economic
well-being of this Nation. We can't allow that to happen.'' GPS has
become more important and more ubiquitous since General Hyten
testified. Today, General Hyten's testimony is as relevant and
important as the day he testified. The overall national interest is
best served by ensuring that the national and global utility that is
GPS is not disrupted or degraded.
That is my personal commitment as well.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much, Admiral.
We are going to have a 5-minute round. Senator Reed and I
are going to recommend a second round of questioning because
there is a lot of stuff to cover here. I am going to take my
first 5 minutes with Director Deasy and General Raymond and
Admiral Allen and then save my other question for Dr. Griffin
for the second round.
Now, Director Deasy, the reason I bring this up is this is
the one thing that is mentioned more than anything else when
they are trying to defend what happened in the action of the
FCC. So I would ask you, even though it has been touched on,
can you describe the interagency process that caused the
Department of Defense to conclude that Ligado's proposal was
likely to interfere with GPS, and did the FCC consult you and
did they take your concerns seriously?
Mr. Deasy. So, sir, the way I would start that is when a
company, in this case Ligado, wants to repurpose the spectrum,
they submit that request to the FCC. The FCC, in turn, turns it
over to the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA). Sometimes those go through what is
called the Independent Radio Advisory Committee, the IRAC,
which has 19 members. In the case of evaluating Ligado's
request for repurposing the spectrum, it was turned over to the
PNT EXCOM which is made up of nine Federal Agencies. I co-chair
that along with the Department of Transportation.
The EXCOM--what they did was they, in turn, asked the Air
Force to conduct a series of independent studies and testing to
determine whether or not the request that Ligado had put forth
was reasonable and could be accepted. The testing took place
and was completed in about April of 2016, as I had mentioned in
my opening remarks. What that testing did was take a number of
commercial and military receivers, approximately 80, and they
tested them over a long, extensive period of time, and they
tested them to determine the levels of noise in which they
would see interference. They used the requirements of what
Ligado was specifying as acceptable, and in running those
tests, they clearly indicated that the results of the tests
caused interference in all cases.
So what was done with that information? In turn, that then
was turned back over in a form of a letter that I co-signed
with Department of Transportation in December of 2018. That
letter clearly cited the testing that was done by the Air
Force. In that letter, we say that it was unambiguous and
unanimously agreed across nine Federal Agencies that this could
not move forward.
Given that there was still concern raised and the fact that
our letter was not being acknowledged, we felt compelled to
follow up with four additional communications. One was back in
June of 2019 from then-Deputy Secretary Shananan to the FCC
stating the opposition. Secretary Esper in November of 2019
forwarded a letter also stating our concerns and opposition.
The IRAC sent to the NTIA on February 20th a letter from 12
agencies that were signed expressing concerns. Dr. Griffin and
myself furthermore sent an additional letter to NTIA in March
of 2020. Finally, Secretary Norquist sent a letter in March of
2020, of which the final letter went from NTIA to the FCC on
April 2020. Each of those letters made clear and cited the
testing that was done by the Air Force that this could not be
accepted, nor should it be recommended to move forward, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. The second part of that question was, were
you consulted by or asked by the FCC for your opinions, and did
they take them seriously?
Mr. Deasy. Sir, I will tell you that historically we have
had a very good working relationship with the FCC when it comes
to collaboratively studying requests like this. In the case of
this particular request, no, sir, there was not a give and
take, a back and forth that we typically go through. At the end
of the day, we were completely caught off guard when over that
weekend in April the decision was taken by the FCC to go ahead
and move forward.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Director.
Lastly, General Raymond, you did touch upon this in your
opening statement. Is there anything you wanted to add in terms
of the impacts on the warfighter?
General Raymond. Thank you very much, sir.
The way I couch GPS, it is the DNA of our way of war. It is
systemic in everything that we do, and it is clear, without
question, that putting a ground emitter in with the space
signals will cause an eruption. I think that will increase risk
to force and risk to mission, and I outlined in my opening
statement the mission areas of Homeland defense, our most
critical mission, defense support of civil authorities, and
building the force, the training and the readiness that we
need. I think it is a risk that we should not accept.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first commend all the panelists for their very
cogent and coherent and compelling testimony. Thank you all.
Mr. Deasy, following on a thread that Admiral Cochran
introduced, under the Administrative Procedure Act, as I
understand it, is a significant action by a government agency
must be accompanied by a public rulemaking, which includes a
public comment period, response to those comments, and a
publication of an order, which is then subject to judicial
review. I consider the repurposing of the satellite program
initially licensed to LightSquared for a satellite spectrum and
then changed to a land-based system to be a very significant
public action.
Was there any kind of rulemaking proceeding prior to the
Ligado license of only a land-based network?
Mr. Deasy. No, sir. As I stated earlier, typically, as you
point out, something of this nature--there was a very formal
process that the FCC goes through. It is a very good process,
and they have used it for years, and in this particular case,
we did not see that process being followed. As a matter of
fact, I would go so far to say that to the best or our
knowledge--and I have talked to many people inside the DOD
about this--we think this is the first time ever where the FCC
has taken an arbitrary and independent decision where it
unanimously and unambiguously opposed by multiple Federal
Agencies.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you.
As you have pointed out, the National Technical Information
Administration, the NTIA, objected numerous times to the
decision. Three Secretaries of Defense, Secretary Carter,
Secretary Shananan, and Secretary Esper, have all written about
their opposition using the spectrum as the order directs.
So, Mr. Deasy, you would say this is a very unusual
process?
Mr. Deasy. I would go as far as to say that it is unheard
of and the first precedent of its kind.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Allen, you know the civilian sector very well. From
your perspective, you would also describe this as highly
unusual or, as Mr. Deasy said, unheard of?
Admiral Allen. I would concur with his remarks. The
original process should have been the allocation for the mobile
satellite service spectrum. If it was reallocated to
terrestrial antennas for re-broadcast, that should have been
subject to a notice of proposed rulemaking and public comment.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
One of the concerns that I have, because the spectrum is
always in play, if you will, is that this will set a very
dangerous precedent; i.e., as we look at 5G in the mid-range
spectrum, if the FCC operates in the same way by disregarding
expertise within the Federal Government, we could have a
situation where, instead of trying to reach a consensus, we
have the FCC basically assuming and determining everything
according to their own intuitions.
Admiral Allen, could you give a comment on this process,
this consensus process, which up until now worked but seems to
be breaking down?
Admiral Allen. Well, the current relationship is based on
an memorandum of understanding between the FCC and NTIA.
I would just offer this comment. The FCC was created--their
remit goes back to the 1920s and 1930s regarding radio and
television spectrum. We moved into a vast new era of
technology, and now there are decisions being made that impact
on spectrum and space operations and so forth. Independent
regulatory agencies were created to create an unbiased
representation and make decisions in the public interest.
The process we have right now is guided by National
Security Presidential Directive 39 that requires that the
equivalent of a deputies meeting, which the EXCOM is, to be
subordinated to the Department of Commerce and NTIA for
transmission to the FCC. I would submit to you that process
needs to be looked at.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Finally, General, as I understand the FCC order, Ligado
must provide an 800 number to call and have a stop button once
severe damages are detected. That is the remedy. So what does a
warfighter in the middle of a war zone do when he discovers his
system is going down? Does he get on the phone and dial an 800
number and make a complaint?
General Raymond. Sir, the warfighter is the 800 number that
the Nation calls for us to do our Nation's business. We do not
want the warfighter to have to call an 800 number to report
interference as they are doing our Nation's work.
Senator Reed. I concur entirely. But I think this might
underscore the absurdity, more than anything else. If this is
the remedy that the FCC is proposing for interference, which
would impact thousands and thousands of men and women deployed
overseas, this is--we will just stop it. It is highly unusual
and probably ineffectual.
General Raymond. I agree, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
thank you and the Ranking Member for having this hearing today
and also compliment both of you on keeping this Committee
informed and active during the past several weeks. So thank you
very much.
Mr. Deasy, there is a number of mitigation proposals that
are included in the FCC order, and it is my understanding that
the Department has expressed quite a few reservations on them.
There is a process that is being, I think, contemplated where
Ligado is going to work with agencies to identify potentially
affected devices for upgrade, repair, or replacement.
Can you walk us through some of the practical steps of how
this is going to work? I would also ask Secretary Griffin and
General Raymond to jump in on this question too.
To get it started a little bit, if you could maybe address
what sort of time, resources, personnel are going to be needed
to carry it out? Do you see any classification restrictions or
limits on proprietary data being an issue? Are GPS devices
easily removed or replaced? Are these integrated systems? I am
asking you to generalize on these, but if you could maybe walk
us through some of this and how you see it working or the
challenges that it would face?
Mr. Deasy. I will be happy to start. Then I think Dr.
Griffin is well placed to carry on this conversation.
I think the easiest way to break this down is to look
specifically at the order that FCC issued and, quote, the
stringent requirements they put in place. There are really four
that I would like to call out, and I think, Senator, these
touch upon what I think you are trying to get after.
The first one is what they call the guard band. It is this
23 megahertz. The idea is so Ligado has always recognized that
they know that their solution does cause interference. I mean,
I think that is something I think we cannot lose in this
conversation, which is why they have continued to figure out
how to lower their power and why they have created what is
called this guard band. They state because they are 23
megahertz away that that in itself clearly should be sufficient
to allow them to operate. I think Dr. Griffin gave some
compelling testimony today that clearly showed it simply will
not work and the noise that will be created.
The second thing they talk about is lowering the power.
Now, if you go back to the original LightSquared to the early
days of Ligado, they have continued to lower the power, and
they are doing that because they know that their solution will
cause interference to GPS. They tried to make this, quote, 10
watt light bulb sound so insignificant, but I think Dr.
Griffin's comment about the Hubble telescope was really quite
compelling. So it is unrealistic to think that they are ever
going to get to a power level that would make ground-based
terrestrial communications acceptable.
They talk about coordination. Now, what they are really
saying there is that as they stand up their terrestrial based
solution, they are going to, quote, coordinate and that if we
say there is a problem, they will address it. Well, this is how
you tell if there is a problem. They install a terrestrial
ground-based solution. They turn it on, and then we have to
report back to them what that interference is, where that
interference is causing problems. Think about the civil side of
that. How will that coordination actually take place? On the
military side, we will have a difficult enough time given the
millions and millions of GPS receivers. To your point, when you
start to talk about embedded receivers and assets that we have
inside the military, it is not like you can pull that asset out
and simply install a new one that will not cause interference.
This will cost--I cannot tell you specifically, ma'am, what the
dollars or the people requirements would be because we would
have to look at that on an asset-by-asset basis.
Then finally remediation. Simply put, if you read the order
carefully, the burden is actually on the Department of Defense.
We have to call out what the problem is and then, quote, once
we clearly identify the problems, they will remediate. Well,
remember, many of our assets are highly classified, and so the
very point of being able to go in and articulate what those
problems are and how they should go about remediating them is
simply not practical.
Senator Fischer. Mr. Secretary, do you or the General have
anything to add?
Secretary Griffin. I will be brief. What is not being
addressed when one talks about repair and replace, even among
the Federal receivers which Ligado promises to replace, is the
expense and the down time of doing so. Let me give you a
comparison.
Aviation-grade receivers are designed, because of the
cruciality of those--and, Senator Inhofe, like you I am a
pilot. The aviation-grade receivers in my airplane cost $10,000
or so apiece. They are much more cumbersome. They are larger.
They consume more power in order to produce a hardened design
to just this type of interference. The GPS receivers that go on
someone's tractor or first response vehicle or in the
automotive navigation system in your car or in a routine piece
of military hardware are not hardened like that, and the
expense of introducing new designs to make them so is not even
being discussed. It should be.
Senator Fischer. Also, we are talking about disruption, but
we are also talking about national security, which is a
definite threat that there is not time to address. Thank you,
sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to you
and Senator Reed for holding this timely hearing. I appreciate
the testimony of all of our experts today.
I guess this question is for you, Mr. Deasy. Was DOD
surprised by the FCC decision?
Mr. Deasy. The simple answer is yes. We had been in
communications with FCC back and forth over this matter for
some time, including the NTIA. Along this whole journey, if you
kind of go through that timeline I gave earlier, we are clearly
of the belief that they understood. They had received our
letters. They had received the NTIA letters and clearly knew
that there was a unanimous view across Federal Agencies not to
move forward. So I have to admit when I first read and heard
about this, I was very surprised, and as I talked to other
senior leaders across the DOT, likewise they have been just as
surprised.
Senator Shaheen. So reports had suggested that the FCC was
actually moving in a different direction, that they were going
to deny Ligado's request. Was that your expectation before the
turnaround?
Mr. Deasy. Yes. The head of C3 inside of my organization, a
gentleman by the name of Mr. Fred Moorefield, has been in
constant communications over a number of months, actually years
on this with both the NTIA and FCC. One of his responsibilities
was to give me weekly updates as to how the conversations were
progressing with FCC and NTIA. Every time we had the
conversation, it was all FCC and NTIA clearly understand our
position, and at no time did he suggest that he had an
indication or belief that it was going to move forward.
Senator Shaheen. The decision, as you have described and as
I have read, was made very unexpectedly, very hurriedly without
the kind of process that Senator Reed raised that is usually
expected. Is that correct?
Mr. Deasy. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. So what do you think the motivation of the
FCC is in making this decision? You must have some speculation
about that.
Mr. Deasy. Actually I do not. I would not have been
surprised if I had felt I clearly understood what the
motivations were because I frankly did not see this coming.
Senator Shaheen. Admiral, do you have any thoughts about
why the FCC would have made this decision so unexpectedly?
Admiral Allen. It is quizzical. If you look at the order
that was issued--I think it is 74 pages long--you do not write
that overnight. It had to be in preparation for quite a while.
The footnotes are extensive. You can agree or not agree with
the report. What astounded me was that had to be in the works
for quite a while and it happened suddenly. In my view, that
was a breakdown of communications and building a consensus
around proper rulemaking in a regulatory agency.
Senator Shaheen. So how does a decision like this happen?
When you have got virtually every other Federal Agency that is
concerned about this issue saying this is the wrong direction
to take, how then does one agency--and I appreciate it bills
itself as independent, and there are certain agencies that we
want to view as independent within government. But one would
also hope that we are all trying to move in the same direction
as part of government. So can anybody speculate on how this
happened and why this agency would have taken this position
given that, according to all of the research you all cited,
they are not a significant part of an effort in this country to
move to 5G?
[No response.]
Senator Shaheen. Nobody has any ideas.
Admiral Allen. It would appear to be a good topic for the
Committee of original jurisdiction.
Senator Shaheen. I would certainly agree with that.
So the next question is then what would you like to see
happen. What would you like to see this Committee do, and what
would you like to see Congress do to address this decision
which seems clearly against the interests not just of the
Department of Defense but of all of the commercial interests
that are involved here?
Mr. Deasy. I will start by simply saying it is on my key
takeaway chart. It is the last bullet that said that FCC needs
to reverse their decision.
Senator Shaheen. But has that happened before, and how
realistic do you think that is that the FCC on their own
motivation will reverse their decision?
Mr. Deasy. There is a petition that NTIA can file
requesting that the FCC go back, revisit that decision. We
would need to, obviously, present for the NTIA the necessary
information for that petition to be filed, but there is a
process that one can go through for them to reconsider their
decision. I believe we do need to go through that process.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you.
Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed, I look forward to joining
you on your letter.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me also add my
thanks to you and the Ranking Member for organizing and
allowing us to stay informed during the time in which we were
in our work periods at home. Thank you also for organizing this
full Committee discussion on the issue of spectrum and in
particular the issue in front of us today concerning the Ligado
application.
Mr. Deasy, I would like to spend my time with you today
focusing on the other spectrum issues that we have got.
Last year, in the National Defense Authorization Act, this
Committee had proposed section 214, which has become popular
all by itself in terms of the fact that it was not operational
by the time we got done. It had to do with allowing for
spectrum sharing. We recognize that DOD has a critical need for
spectrum and that only on an organized effort can we allow for
sharing of that mid-level of the spectrum.
This brings to light an area in the lower spectrum, but
most certainly the rest of the spectrum is also at risk as
well. We had proposed creating a tool last year--and we did not
realize the type of opposition we would find--creating a tool
so that we could fairly share spectrum which was critical in
our national defense.
Can you discuss a little bit with the Committee the need
for a tool that would allow us to appropriately share and at
the same time safeguard extremely critical portions in
geographic locations as well, but basically an opportunity to
share what is a very, very valuable resource, and that is that
mid-level spectrum?
Mr. Deasy. So I would start. I will be happy to comment on
section 214 and then possibly Dr. Griffin to talk about what it
is we are doing as far as moving forward with 5G from
experimentations.
You know, you make a very good point on section 214. The
Communications Act was passed back in 1934. There have been all
kinds of addendums to that act, and yet, throughout this, if
you look at the policies, the processes, the tools that have
been used where we go through in government to look at
repurposing spectrum, they are antiquated.
One of the reasons I was so excited about 214 was the
opportunity for these processes, these procedures, and the
tools to be updated. We need these tools because not only does
it help us to look at how do you repurpose spectrum, but allows
us to manage and incorporate how you actually have to operate
the spectrum.
For us to get to faster spectrum repurposing decisions--and
the key word there is ``faster''--we cannot do that without
moving towards dynamic spectrum sharing. To do that, 214
provided us the opportunity to modernize the tools, to
modernize the processes on how we go about doing this, sir.
Senator Rounds. In terms of national defense, would you say
that this particular discussion concerning the Ligado
application is perhaps just a shot over the bow as to how
serious these issues are and the need to revisit what we were
trying to do in 214 last year?
Mr. Deasy. I would say when it comes to the discussion of
national defense, I would defer to General Raymond to discuss
the views on that.
Senator Rounds. General Raymond?
General Raymond. I am not an expert on 214, but I will tell
you the use of spectrum is critical to our force. It is our
maneuver space. It provides us strategic operational and
tactical advantage. When you look at what kind of capabilities
we have, we have to be able to operate in that spectrum. We
have to be able to detect, characterize, and geolocate
interference. We have to be able to operate in that spectrum
that we train to do so every day, and it is absolutely critical
to our joint force.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General, one more question. With regard to the amount of
data that we are collecting right now with the platforms that
we already have within our system today, we are collecting huge
amounts of data, and the need for 5G is critical. Would it be
fair to say that the Department of Defense is looking at 5G as
a way to collect and to make our platforms even more capable
than what they are today and that the Department of Defense is
very interested in the deployment of 5G and not trying to stop
it, but rather, it is necessary and it just simply has to be
done correctly?
General Raymond. I agree wholeheartedly. You know, I go to
work every day, and the folks that I am privileged to lead go
to work every day trying to implement the National Defense
Strategy that says we are going compete, deter, and win. That
is what we do, and 5G is going to be critical to us. But I will
also tell you GPS is also critical to us in being able to
compete, deter, and win.
Senator Rounds. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. I would like to ask a very brief, non-
Ligado question because we do have the DOD's Chief of
Information Office here.
So DOD has seen a significant spike in cyber attacks and
misinformation directed at servicemembers and personnel as the
Pentagon shifts toward telework during this pandemic. Mr.
Deasy, what additional measures are being instituted in the
Department to combat the increased phishing and hacking that
has occurred during this current Covid-19 pandemic?
Mr. Deasy. So a couple things on that. You know, we
actually measure how often our network is probed, how many
spams we get, how many types of interference we get on our
network. We have clearly seen an uptick. One of the upticks we
have seen most is spear phishing, and that is specific Covid-
related emails that are coming in where the adversary is trying
to take the opportunity to use Covid as the topic to get people
to actively engage on.
However, with that said, when we look at other types of
activities that U.S. Cyber Command sees--I have a task force
where we meet every week, and in that task force, we discuss
the very things that you are bringing up--we are not seeing an
abnormal amount of other types of activities that our metrics
would suggest go above and beyond what we normally see other
than specifically in the spear phishing area. We are seeing an
uptick specifically related to Covid.
So what have we been doing? Because now we have moved to
teleworking and we are using technology known as VPN and other
types of tools that allow people to communicate from home, I
would say a couple things have been really important here.
Within the first week after we started moving to
teleworking, my office issued a letter, a memo that went out to
all employees. It included a small card--I do not have it with
me here today--that actually clearly listed the dos and don'ts
of what you should do from your home when you are teleworking
and what were the additional things to be thoughtful and
mindful of now that you are working from home.
Additionally, U.S. Cyber Command did stand up additional
task force teams to specifically look at the network and
traffic activity that was occurring because of teleworking,
ma'am.
Senator Hirono. So have you been able to identify whether
the spear phishing and some of these other cyber attacks are
emanating from any particular country?
Mr. Deasy. All I would say is to get into specifics of
where those attacks are coming from and what the motivations
are probably go beyond the classification of this discussion
today.
Senator Hirono. That is right. I understand.
So let us move on to some of the questions that are
relevant to this hearing.
The National Advanced Spectrum and Communications Test
Network, NASCTN, a multi-agency charter partnership that seeks
to provide a neutral forum for testing, modeling, and analysis,
performed a study to determine the impact of Ligado's proposed
networks on GPS. The FCC relied on the results of this study in
approving Ligado's application. I understand that DOD takes
issue with the NASCTN study. As an initial matter, Ligado
claimed in a filing made with the FCC that the tests it
commissioned at the NASCTN were done at the request of the DOD
Chief Information Officer's office. Is that true?
Mr. Deasy. There was a test and request made from my
predecessor that asked to look at what Ligado was proposing at
the time, and at the time, that testing was based on the
assumption that Ligado was still going to use satellite-based
communications towards the earth and only on exception would
they use terrestrial-based. So when we agreed to that, it was
agreed on the premise that their solution was still going to be
a primary satellite-based solution and not a terrestrial
ground-based solution.
Afterwards, the expression we have used today is they
changed the goalpost. They said they now wanted to go to a
terrestrial based. So basically the rules changed in the
process of how that test was originally conducted to what
Ligado wanted to do going forward, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. So in your view with the goalpost being
changed and the tests that NASCTN did were really not on point
to the giving of the license.
Mr. Deasy. I guess you would say they were on point for
what was assumed at the time, but where we are today was no
longer on point.
Senator Hirono. So you say that the FCC needs to reverse
its decision, and there is a process for asking for
reconsideration or reversal. Has that process begun?
Mr. Deasy. So what we have done from the DOD standpoint is
we have had communications on a regular basis with the NTIA. I
am actively getting engaged with the NTIA making a formal
request for them to do a file for re-petition.
Senator Hirono. What is the time frame for reconsideration
or reversal by the FCC?
Mr. Deasy. I, ma'am, would have to get back to you with the
specific dates. I do not know what those dates are.
Senator Hirono. Anyway, you are not going to let that time
expire before you take action.
Mr. Deasy. Absolutely not. I believe it is somewhere
towards the end of May that we have to have communicated that
re-petition.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Deasy. After the hearing on May 6, 2020, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) filed
a petition for reconsideration on the Ligado Order on behalf of
the Executive Branch on May 22, 2020. Petitions had to be filed
within 30 days of the Order. Under Section 405 of the
Communications Act, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
must take action on petitions for reconsideration within 90
days of their filing. This would include denying or granting
the petitions in whole or in part. The FCC is expected to
conclude on the matter by no later than August 20, 2020.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Cramer?
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed as
well. I just echo everyone's sentiment about what a great job
you have done keeping us engaged and involved and
communicating.
Thanks to each of you. I am sitting here a little bit--
well, I am curious. It is a good place to sit when you are
curious when you have four really smart people to ask questions
of. But some of the questions I have you are going to have to
speculate about because I want to ask you about what people
that support this, why they would have supported it. That may
seem a little bit unfair, but you are all I have.
One thing I want to get straightened out because I have
heard it said that the NTIA objected, but I have also read that
the NTIA did not recommend or could not recommend. Is there a
distinction there between not recommending and objecting, given
the NTIA's authorities? I do not know which one of you--maybe,
Mr. Deasy, you would know the answer to that. I used to be on
the Energy and Commerce Committee in the House. I was a
communications telecom regulator for 10 years. So I think there
is a distinction there. I just want to be sure.
Mr. Deasy. Yes. I am not sure I could legally tell you what
those distinctions are, but I will say that clearly what NTIA's
role is is to represent back the agency's view on this. So in
this case, you have a Position, Navigation, Timing EXCOM, which
is made up of nine Federal Agencies. Their job was to take our
view, put that in a formal letter, and then submit that view
back to the FCC. So I can tell you that their job in that case
was to submit the view of the PNT EXCOM.
Senator Cramer. Does the NTIA ever recommend a yea or a nay
to the FCC?
Mr. Deasy. I will have to ask other colleagues if they
know.
Senator Cramer. Does anybody know? All right. We will find
that out. I am curious about it because it does seem to me here
the process matters. You are all too smart for me to ask
technical questions of, so I am going to focus on process a
little bit.
The other thing that sort of perplexes me a little bit is
that, first of all, somehow five commissioners came to some
version of the same conclusion. That is another thing that just
because they either voted yes or did not object, it does not
necessarily mean they have the same degree of enthusiasm for a
decision. But nonetheless, it was 5 to 0. My reading tells me
NTIA did not object, nor did they recommend. I think they can
recommend.
But there are some other fairly important administration
folks that are concerned about national security that seem to
have supported the decision unless they have changed their
minds. That would be, of course, Secretary of State Pompeo and
Attorney General Barr. Does anybody know if they have changed
their minds or why they feel differently?
[No response.]
Senator Cramer. Okay. I will ask them. I guess that would
be the best thing to do.
The one other process question I have is how long was this
application in. Does anybody know when the application was
made? Because my sense is that there are volumes and volumes
and volumes and hours and hours and hours dedicated to this,
and we know about yours obviously. I would just be interested.
It just helps me to satisfy my curiosity. I have no doubt that
everything you have said is absolutely 100 percent accurate and
true. Do not get me wrong. But it does help me balance my
thinking when I hear a little more from someone else. I know
that is not your objective, but it is just kind of mine.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I will ask some questions other
places. Thanks for doing this. It is really important
information. What is really important is that other people hear
it.
Chairman Inhofe. Let me shed a little light on that. They
took over that bankrupt company in the year 2015. I have
reason, having looked at this quite a bit, to believe that they
had been working on their licensing for quite some time, and
while they have been looking at it, none of us that I know of
were aware that that was going on. So I just think there is a
level of security that they had among themselves. I am saying
that as nice as I can.
Senator Cramer. I understand, and I am sure you are right.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Again, I echo my
comments that I said to you personally yesterday. This was the
only Committee that I serve on--I serve on four--that had
weekly telephone conferences during the time we were away, and
they were really valuable. We had some spirited debate, and
sometimes I got an answer to a question I liked and sometimes I
did not. But this was the only Committee that was doing that
every week, and I really applaud the leadership of the chair
and ranking for that.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. You have made some really persuasive points,
but you have not persuaded me. The reason you have not is we
have only heard one side of the case. I tried a lot of cases in
my day before I got into this line of work, and I would never
make a decision and agree, yes, the FCC needs to reverse their
decision when the FCC is right in town and could have been at
this hearing or Ligado. If Ligado knew that we were concerned,
they would want to come and make their case. All of the
questions and concerns and the speculation is completely
unnecessary. There are two sides to this. The FCC reached a
unanimous decision, which is not that common for that body on
matters of controversy. They would have something to say about
all these questions. Because of your testimony, which has been
great testimony, I would have really tough questions for them.
But it is hard to convince an Armed Services Committee member
to reverse a decision based upon the presentation of one side
of the case.
Let me ask you a couple of questions. My understanding from
the timeline is that the EXCOM--is it the PNT EXCOM--looked at
testing that had been done beginning in 2016 and made a
recommendation in March of 2018 to oppose the Ligado proposal.
Is that basically right, that the PNT EXCOM unanimous decision
opposed the proposal that was made in March of 2018?
Mr. Deasy. Sir, I am personally not familiar with that
particular date. I am familiar with the date of December of
2018 in which we formally documented to NTIA the view of PNT.
Senator Kaine. I am reading from materials that have been
provided by the DOD. But it looks like testing was earlier. The
PNT EXCOM reached a unanimous decision in March, and then it
was communicated, Mr. Deasy, as you say, in December.
Was the proposal as tested and as opposed in March of 2018
and then communicated in December of 2018--was that exactly the
same proposal that the FCC ruled upon on April 20th?
Mr. Deasy. Throughout this process, there have been
multiple amendments to what Ligado had to propose.
Senator Kaine. You mentioned a couple. You mentioned the
idea of the buffer that they created and lowering power. So my
surmise is that the objection that was done in 2018 was based
upon a version of the Ligado proposal, but the FCC approval in
April of 2020 was based upon a proposal that had changed in
some ways. Is that correct?
Mr. Deasy. Well, the proposal, as far as I know--and, Dr.
Griffin, maybe you can speak to specific testing that was done.
The proposal in 2020 that was just recently approved with those
restrictions, when we go back and look at what was done on the
testing against those restrictions, nothing has changed.
Senator Kaine. Well, but that is not my question. So my
question is a real precise one, which is, is the proposal that
the FCC ruled on the same proposal that the PNT EXCOM
unanimously decided to approve--disapprove in March of 2018, or
were there changes? You were suggesting to me that there were
changes along the way.
Mr. Deasy. There have been changes along the way of which
we have continued to communicate and evaluate those. The letter
of 2018--I have to go back and----
Senator Kaine. Okay. Let me ask this. The April 2020 ruling
of the FCC had some conditions in it. Now, that was 16 days ago
that they reached that conclusion. Have you with the
significant testing capacity at your disposal--have you gone
back and rerun tests against the version of the FCC--that the
FCC approved with the requirements, the, quote, stringent
requirements they put on it? So have you done any more testing
since April 20th?
Mr. Deasy. I am not aware of any specific tests that have
been done, and I think the reason is those particular guard
bands, power levels, coordination, and remediations were all
the same that we had looked at previously.
Senator Kaine. Okay. I will want to get that in writing
because I want to make sure that the opposition in March of
2018 in fact applied to the proposal as it existed and was
approved in April 2020.
Senator Cramer indicated that he thinks the Attorney
General and Secretary of State are now in support of the Ligado
proposal before the FCC. Is that correct?
Mr. Deasy. That is what I had heard in the public.
Senator Kaine. Have you then sought to find out why that
would be the case?
Mr. Deasy. I have not personally, no, sir.
Senator Kaine. Are either of those members of this nine
member PNT EXCOM are State and DOJ, or are they not members of
that nine member task force?
Mr. Deasy. They are. The Department of State is a member of
that.
Senator Kaine. How about the Department of Justice?
Mr. Deasy. The Department of Justice is not a member of
that.
Senator Kaine. All right. I have exceeded my time. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed. I
want to add my voice to what Senator Kaine said. Thank you for
your commitment during our long break from Washington during
this pandemic for holding regular weekly conference calls, and
thank you for putting together this very important hearing.
I will associate myself with Senator Kaine's remarks again,
the second time, in that I think you make a pretty compelling
case. I have read through all these materials that we have had
for the hearing. But it is really important that we hear from
the unanimous FCC and from Ligado as well for us to make a
reasoned conclusion.
I will associate myself with Senator Kaine for a third
time. He is probably beginning to get anxious about this.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. About the Attorney General and the
Secretary of State. Senator Cramer has asked this. Senator
Kaine has asked this. Let me just ask Mr. Deasy and Dr. Griffin
directly. What do you see that Attorney General Barr and
Secretary Pompeo do not see? You oppose this proposal. They
support the proposal. So what is it that you see that they do
not see?
Mr. Deasy. Sir, you know, as a technologist for almost 40
years now, I see the science. I see the studies. I see the
results of what has been done, and the science clearly shows
everything we have talked about today in terms of the
interference. So that is what I see. I cannot speculate on what
Secretary Pompeo or Secretary Barr see.
Senator Cotton. So Senator Kaine raised this as well about
the testing. Has there been specific, realistic testing done
under the conditions proposed by the FCC in last month's order?
I have read a lot of the materials here. I have got Secretary
Esper's letter here, and there are a lot of conditional verbs
in that letter. There are a lot of conditional verbs in the
other material I have read here, things like ``may jeopardize
the effectiveness and reliability of GPS.'' It has the
potential to disrupt commercial GPS receivers. Has there been
testing on specific, realistic conditions of the FCC's order
that we can say, yes, it will interfere?
Secretary Griffin. There has not been any testing since the
order was issued 16 days ago. The testing that was done was
done not by the Department of Defense but by the Department of
Transportation, and it is as exquisitely well done as anything
that I think I have ever seen. They tested 80 receivers. They
tested them against the power levels that Ligado is claiming
today to use, and in answer to Senator Kaine's question, the
power level is the most significant single attribute against
which one would test.
The DOT tests, as I said in my earlier testimony, were
designed to elucidate what was necessary to protect the GPS
band. The issue of testing one transmitter against one receiver
and substituting one receiver after another in specific
scenarios is frankly a fool's errand. I can always put together
a different geometry, a different scenario, and then ask the
question again, would Ligado interfere with that? That is not
the way to go about it. The way that the Department of
Transportation did in its adjacent band compatibility test is
the way to go about it. Those results were unambiguous and they
were compelling. At the power levels that Ligado chooses to put
forward for its ground-based transmissions, GPS receivers
broadly speaking will be compromised.
Senator Cotton. I have one final set of questions here, and
Dr. Griffin, I will direct these towards you. They are on a
related matter.
In January, numerous media outlets, to include The
Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal, reported that the
Pentagon was going to block a set of rules that would have
limited the export of semiconductors, computer chips, and other
kinds of advanced microelectronics to Huawei. Is it correct
that the Department of Defense initially ``non-concurred,'' to
use the technical term, with these rule changes?
Secretary Griffin. I do not know if the Department of
Defense non-concurred. The Research and Engineering Under
Secretariat, my organization, non-concurred. We do not believe
that those particular restrictions were going to be beneficial
and we believed that they would hurt the United States semi-
conductor industry more than they would hurt China. If the goal
is to damage China, that is not the tool to use.
Senator Cotton. But Secretary Esper did not agree with
that.
Secretary Griffin. That is correct.
Senator Cotton. So this is just another concern that I
have, is that the Department of Defense could have an
exaggerated sense of scientific and technological certitude
that is not appropriately balancing the strategic imperatives
or the geopolitical challenges we face. I am not saying that
that is the case, but in light of that decision and in light of
the case I see here in front of me, much of which is
contingent, I think we at least need to continue to explore
that.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks for
the work during the break and the time that we had talking
about the coronavirus response at the Department.
What was the power level that was used for the DOT testing
please?
Secretary Griffin. DOT provided results for the original
Ligado power level I believe of 1500 watts and specifically to
the present case in the present FCC order, 10 watts.
Senator King. Can you put that in terms of deicbel-watts
(dBW)?
Secretary Griffin. dBW would be 10 dBW for the 10 watt
transmitter----
Senator King. So Transportation did--so the study did
include the 9.8 dBW analysis?
Secretary Griffin. Correct.
Senator King. That did find clear evidence of interference?
Secretary Griffin. Exactly so, sir. In fact, they published
carefully the power levels required to cause the suite of
receivers that were tested to lock up.
Senator King. Could you supply that data to this Committee?
Secretary Griffin. Absolutely.
Senator King. I would appreciate that.
I share some of the concerns that have been raised. The FCC
is--they are capable people. I do not always agree with them.
It is one of the few unanimous orders I have seen them
undertake. It is a 74-page order with 444 footnotes. It strikes
me that some serious thought went into it.
They have two concerns, as I understand the order. One is
the development of the Internet of Things. That is an important
part of the future development of 5G technology and, indeed,
the technology of the country. The second is efficient use of
spectrum.
What is the shadow cast by the GPS band? In other words,
how much spectrum are you seeking to tie up beyond the band
that is now specified as the GPS band?
Secretary Griffin. Neither the Department nor any Federal
Agency, of which I am aware, is asking for any additional
spectrum to be set aside for global navigation satellite
systems, of which GPS is one. What we are saying is that the
spectrum already set aside for those functions should be left
for those functions and not repurposed for terrestrial
transmitters.
Senator King. How wide is that? Because the chart that was
with my background shows a band between, it looks like, about
1552 and 1610.
Secretary Griffin. It is 1559 to 1610 megahertz, sir.
Senator King. Okay. So that is the band that you--that is
the inviolate band that you want to protect. Correct?
Secretary Griffin. Correct, sir.
Senator King. But the band that Ligado wants is, it looks
like, about 1522 to 1530. That is not within the band you just
defined.
Secretary Griffin. It is within the larger mobile satellite
services band, and this is the point----
Senator King. Well, that is my question. What is the,
quote, larger mobile services band? Because you told me a few
moments ago that the band you were interested in was 1559 to
16-something. Which is it?
Secretary Griffin. In order to protect--it is both. I am
sorry. I am not trying to obfuscate. There is a specific radio
navigation satellite services band that is housed within the
larger mobile satellite services band.
Senator King. What is that?
Secretary Griffin. I do not have that in my head.
Senator King. I am not trying to be argumentative. I am
just trying to understand this because I start with the premise
that an independent agency that reached a unanimous conclusion
on something that has been extensively litigated had some basis
for doing so. If your chart here of trying to hear rustling
leaves over 100 jets taking off is accurate, I just find that
hard to believe that they would have issued such an order if
that is in fact what we are talking about.
Secretary Griffin. I find it hard to believe too, which is
why we are here.
The reason that the satellite services are grouped together
is because all of the radio signals coming from satellites in
space are quite weak. So all of the weak signals are grouped
together. Not all of them are navigation signals. Some of them
are mobile satellite services of other kinds, but they do not
interfere with one another. If you put a ground-based
transmitter in the middle of a mobile satellite services band,
it has the capability of interfering with other services. In
this case, we are here talking about the interference with
navigation.
Senator King. Well, I think it is important that you
specify for us how wide the band you want to protect really is
because that then becomes a major policy question about access
to scarce spectrum. In other words, I accept your statements
and realize how important this is to the country and
particularly to the Department of Defense, but I just want to
understand the policy decision that we are being urged to take
here in terms of how much bandwidth are we being asked to
protect. If you could submit some response to that for the
record, that would be----
Secretary Griffin. I will give you those specific numbers,
but broadly speaking, we seek to protect the services reserved
for satellite communication.
Senator King. I understand that, but that goes beyond the
band that is defined, the 1559. The question is how much of a
buffer do you need to protect yourself from a relatively low
power terrestrial signal. We can talk about the physics. But I
want to know how much bandwidth you want us to protect. That is
all. I am not saying you should not do so, but I think we need
to understand that in terms of what it means for other
potential uses of that bandwidth.
Secretary Griffin. We will provide that number for the
record.
[The information follows:]
Secretary Griffin. Ligado's use of L-band spectrum would
cause significant harmful interference to GPS. The Department
does not seek for the entire 200 MHz to be unoccupied in order
to protect GPS. In fact, there are several mobile satellite
service (MSS) providers that operate in this frequency range
and provide service, such as Iridium. For example, Iridium's
portion of the L-band spectrum is 1617.775 - 1626.5 MHz and
consists of both uplink and downlink transmissions. The
Department continues to emphasize that GPS already coexists
with the satellite users in the range of spectrum dedicated to
satellite uses, including MSS (1525 - 1559 MHz) and the GPS/
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (1559 - 1610 MHz)
allocations. The FCC Order changes the conditions by allowing
terrestrial usage in this band range, which will create
interference for GPS users.
Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Perdue?
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your forbearance, guys. It is a big Committee
and a long afternoon, but I appreciate it.
General Raymond, as I understand it--and I want to be sure
I am clear on this--the GPS receivers are designed to tolerate
interference from space systems in general, but they are not
designed to deal with interference from terrestrial systems,
which by nature is generally much stronger. Is that correct?
General Raymond. The signals come down from space, and they
reach the ground at a very low power level. What is critically
important on this, as was just discussed on this, what I called
in my opening statement the quiet car, that having that noise-
pristine environment is to allow the GPS receiver on the
ground, whether it is handheld or in a weapon system, to be
able to pick up that faint signal and process it.
Senator Perdue. Right. This Ligado system is some 10
billion times stronger at the 1530 megahertz spectrum.
So the follow-up on that question is it looks to me like
1559 to the 1591 megahertz spectrum is what has been allocated
for GPS, but it looks to me like just commercial purposes bleed
over from as low as 1475 all the way up to 1675, that people
are getting signals outside of the band of GPS just by the
nature of bleeding of the GPS signal. Is that correct?
General Raymond. Again, as Dr. Griffin stated, that mobile
SATCOM services band is designed specifically for signals that
come from space to the ground. It is not just GPS. It is
commercial communication satellites and other types of
satellites that bring signals down, and that buffer is meant to
allow those signals that have to travel from space to ground to
be able to process by receivers.
Senator Perdue. But again, the point I am trying to make is
it is a broader spectrum that we are actually using in GPS than
what has been allocated just by the nature of the signal. Is
that correct?
General Raymond. Where you are using the GPS spectrum, part
of that spectrum, but the critical part of that is where we
embed that into the mobile SATCOM services to provide the
buffer needed to be able to protect the receivers to be able to
pick up that faint signal.
Senator Perdue. So if a commercial land-based terrestrial
emitter can cause this sort of interference that would cause
imprecision, as well as maybe even the loss of signal--and I
fully appreciate when you have precision weaponry that are
using GPS coordinates, those have to be precise. I get that. So
the question is, do we have defenses against an adversary? If a
commercial user can cause this sort of imprecision, obviously
an adversary can do the same thing with a land-based emitter. I
know this is not a classified environment, but if the answer is
classified, then I will accept that and take it offline and we
will try to do that.
General Raymond. I would say that we train for this. We
plan for this. We have tactics, techniques, and procedures to
be able to respond to this. In a combat environment, we can
drop a bomb on a receiver. There is a whole spectrum of things
that we can do, and in another room, I would be happy to share
that with you and provide more.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Secretary Griffin, how do you propose maintaining our
technological edge that we have got today? I think most of us
believe that militarily. But how do we then compete with--and
let us talk about it--China in terms of the technological
leadership that they are beginning to develop in 5G, given that
their immense investment in this, their vertical nature between
their commercial and their military development over there,
their lack of privacy requirements and so forth, and obviously,
Huawei's recent advancements in developing 5G networks around
the world? How do we balance those two together? I mean, I
think that is the real question here, even bigger than this
Ligado decision.
Secretary Griffin. Well, sir, I will start out by saying I
do not think we as Americans will prevail by trying to become
more like China.
Senator Perdue. Agree.
Secretary Griffin. We are the Nation that other people want
to come to, to send their students to. We are the Nation from
whom others are trying to steal intellectual property. We got
to this position by being the best innovators, by being the
people who knew how to get innovations into the marketplace.
We, the DOD, are, as Mr. Deasy pointed out earlier,
conducting a wide range of experiments at a variety of military
bases designed specifically to help advance the technology of
5G in company with our commercial telecommunications providers
by unleashing the market to do what they do best. I believe
that in the long run the United States will prevail in 5G.
Senator Perdue. I concur.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
Senator Duckworth?
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deasy, at the conclusion of the 2017 U.S. Air Force
white paper on the 1 decibel standard, it states that the 1
decibel interference protection criterion is the only
appropriate IPC for protecting GPS and other global navigation
satellite system receivers. Does the Air Force stand by this
conclusion?
Mr. Deasy. I am probably not the expert to answer that
particular question. Yes, Dr. Griffin?
Secretary Griffin. Thank you for that courtesy.
Senator Duckworth, the 1 dB, so-called 1 dB carrier to
noise standard, is the appropriate standard and, in fact, was
recognized as such by the FCC itself back in 2003. I can quote
from that if desired. Well, actually no. I will just take it
for the record. The point being that the FCC itself endorsed
that standard in multiple rulings back in the early 2000s as
the appropriate way to protect radio navigation systems.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
Secretary Griffin. To the best of my knowledge, the 1 dB
standard was the sole metric used in assessing interference
levels in the satellite navigation band. This protection
criterion, which limits additional noise to a 25 percent
increase over existing background noise levels, protects the
satellite navigation band as a whole, regardless of the source
of the increased noise. This is the most appropriate method of
protecting the satellite navigation band, because it is not
possible to assess the potential for inference by Ligado's
proposed operations on the millions of individual GPS receivers
in use on a case-by-case basis. The best approach is to protect
the band; with that, all users are protected.
Secretary Griffin. The point was made earlier that the
Communications Act of 1934 began in a world of radio and TV,
not in a world of satellite navigation services, and the same
methods which are used traditionally to protect existing
licensees from a new service are not applicable in a world of
radio navigation. So the 1 dB criteria is the one that I would
endorse.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous consent to include this
white paper for the record.
Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
[The information referred to can be found in Appendix B on
page 76.]
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Mr. Deasy, Secretary Griffin, General Raymond, stakeholders
who support Ligado's efforts have suggested that as early as
2016, the FCC--this is following up on the Chairman's question
earlier. Following the conclusion of this hearing, can you
provide me in writing a timeline and list of correspondence the
Department submitted to the FCC and/or NTIA on the Ligado case?
Mr. Deasy. Yes, we can, ma'am.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
This next question is for all the witnesses. What are the
potential national security implications if Ligado decides to
turn around and sell their spectrum band to another company? To
what extent will the Department be able to weigh in with its
future concerns? This is for the entire panel.
Admiral Allen. I will start. It is not a matter of
spectrum. It is a matter of the power. We keep talking about
spectrum. It is what you do inside the spectrum. I am a simple
sailor. I am not a technical person. If you have a ground
transmitter, it is a matter of how much power is transmitting
and whether or not it is going to affect the adjacent spectrum.
So I do not know what the intended use would be if there was a
resale. Right now, the intended use is to rebroadcast from a
terrestrial antenna at power that will bleed over and affect
GPS. It is not the spectrum. It is the power in the spectrum.
But I would defer.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Anyone else?
General Raymond. I agree. It depends on how the spectrum
would be used.
Senator Duckworth. But they could sell it.
General Raymond. Yes, they can sell it.
Senator Duckworth. How does that affect your ability to
weigh in on this in the future?
General Raymond. It would depend upon the proposal which is
made, as my colleagues have said.
The more compelling concern, though, in that regard is that
if this is approved for Ligado, then what is to stop its
approval from other companies seeking to repurpose spectrum
that they own that would be in these satellite communications
bands, which are reserved, as we have said, so that all of the
weak signals are grouped together. If Ligado is permitted to do
this, why should another company be denied?
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Finally, Admiral Allen, DOD has publicly stated that an
assessment of 80 GPS receivers conducted by nine departments
and agencies concluded that Ligado's proposal would, indeed,
cause harmful interference to military and commercial GPS
users.
How do you determine an acceptable level of risk for the
commercial expansion of spectrum bands adjacent to the GPS
spectrum used for military operations, emergency services, and
by commercial users? In your assessment, is that level
acceptable in the Ligado case? I guess this goes back to the
power issue that you were talking about.
Admiral Allen. Again, I am not going to try and get
technical here. There is a tension between the acceptable power
level and trying to protect the spectrum. Each individual
receiver will react differently based on the power that is
being transmitted. The position Ligado is taking is let us see
what the power transmission does and how we might mitigate
that. The presumption of the PNT EXCOM and the folks who have
been involved in this is we need to protect the spectrum, not
an individual receiver. That is the dynamic that has to be
resolved.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Admiral Allen. I would ask for comment.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
This does conclude our questions from those who are here.
We have a second round, so we will make time for Senator
Blumenthal when he gets here. I thought we would go ahead and
start a second round while we are waiting for Senator
Blumenthal.
The question I was going to ask you has already been
adequately answered, but I do have two questions that have come
from the Ligado spokespeople that I just would like to throw
out maybe to you, Director Deasy.
The first would be they state that the NTIA submission
relies on irrelevant and misleading data to support their
claims. Could you respond to that?
Mr. Deasy. So for them to make that claim would suggest
that the process that has been used for a very long time on
evaluating all repurposing requests is at fault. Simply put, it
is not. It is the process that has worked. It is the process we
have used for years in repurposing. So I am not sure why all of
a sudden now the process that has served the agencies well, FCC
well, and NTIA well, would suddenly now be in question.
Chairman Inhofe. All right.
The other question that has come from the other side with
some frequency is they state that the FCC order does not impact
DOD or Federal spectrum. Would you agree with that? This is
what they have stated.
Mr. Deasy. No, clearly disagree. I mean, by the fact that
we are sitting here today and you have General Raymond here
representing the military----
Chairman Inhofe. I understand that.
Mr. Deasy.--would clearly suggest that it definitely
impacts the military operations.
Chairman Inhofe. That is good.
Senator Wicker, we have finished our first round, but you
are here in time for the first round and the second round if
you want.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, as you know, I have been one
floor up chairing a Commerce Committee hearing, and I did not
know if I would be able to make it or not. I appreciate the
witnesses sticking with us this long.
Let me ask--is it Mr. Deasy? Where are you? Did I pronounce
that correctly?
Mr. Deasy. You did, sir.
Senator Wicker. There has been some discussion about a test
that was conducted by the National Advanced Spectrum and
Communications Test Network. I suppose, Mr. Chairman, we have
had some discussion about that already today. I will try not to
cover too much ground that has already been covered.
This is a network that is administered in part by the
Department of Defense. Is that not correct, sir?
Mr. Deasy. When you say ``administer,'' I assume you are
meaning that we are users of that and have a responsibility to
coordinate our use of that with civilian. Yes.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Apparently this NASCTN network has come up with some data
that is at least to an extent supportive of the FCC's action.
Is that fair to say?
Mr. Deasy. I particularly cannot comment on that. I am not
sure if others here on the Committee can.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, let me just ask the question
for any member of the panel. It has been suggested that this
National Advanced Spectrum and Communications Test Network,
NASCTN--it came up with a flawed conclusion. I just wondered.
Does anyone on the panel suggest that this network is somehow
compromised by the fact that the FCC is the one that requested
the study and that Ligado paid for the study? Does anyone make
that claim?
Mr. Deasy. I think I can go back and answer your earlier
question.
Senator Wicker. Okay, all right.
Mr. Deasy. It was similar to a conversation earlier that we
had.
So there was a request that the former CIO made for the
study to be done in conjunction with Ligado. At the time that
that study was done, Ligado's primacy was that they were still
going to be primarily a satellite-based solution with only on
an exception as an as-needed basis a terrestrial based
solution. So under those assumptions, the study said that if
indeed you are going to communicate from satellite down to
earth, we could see where we could work in acceptable
solutions.
What changed was Ligado then changed the rules and said
actually what we want to do is not be primarily from out of
space satellite, but instead we want to move to a primary
terrestrial based solution.
Senator Wicker. At what point was that?
Mr. Deasy. I, sir, would have to take that for the record
and get back to you with what specific point that was. I do not
happen to have that in front of me. But it was when that change
occurred that that then changed the fact that we obviously no
longer could say their solution was acceptable based on testing
that had been done.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Deasy. Ligado originally proposed to use this spectrum
as a Mobile Satellite Service with an Ancillary Terrestrial
Component (ATC) that required the terrestrial network to only
serve as a supplement to a main satellite-based network when
the satellite is not in view. The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) stated in a 2003 Order: ``We do not intend,
nor will we permit, the terrestrial component to become a
stand-alone service.'' The Department of Defense (DOD)
supported the FCC Order. However, the FCC in 2010 required
Ligado's predecessor to deploy a nationwide terrestrial mobile
service, contrary to rules that prohibit this use on a
standalone basis. Subsequently, DOD began to conduct tests
based on the impact of the Ligado terrestrial network. The
National Advanced Spectrum and Communications Test Network
(NASCTN) worked with Ligado to do testing but because of time
only a limited number and types of receivers were tested, for
which the results were inconclusive. By the time the NASCTN
study was completed in 2017, the Department of Transportation
(DOT) assessment was already under way of a wider array of GPS
receiver types. DOD supported the findings of the 2018 DOT
report, which evaluated power levels that can be tolerated by
GPS devices. The findings of the Ligado-funded tests were not
sufficient to determine the impact to the wide range of
affected GPS receivers. This resulted in DOD reaching out to
the FCC to reaffirm that the Department objections to the
granting of the license modification request to Ligado.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Is it your opinion, sir, that there is such a thing as
harmful interference on the one hand and an acceptable level of
interference with GPS on the other hand, or is all interference
unacceptable in your view?
Mr. Deasy. Simply put, all interference is unacceptable
because you do not know at the point in time that the
interference occurs, the nature of that receiver that is
impacted. If the nature of that receiver impacted at the time
of that interference is one that is used for emergency
services, for example, I think we would all say that is
completely unacceptable that emergency services could not be
always dealt with in a reliable manner. So the nature of your
question is it depends on what it is we are talking about and
the type of receiver.
Senator Wicker. Well, there is a term that is used by the
experts called ``noise'' in this regard, and it has been
likened to me if I am on an airplane and I am listening to a
movie on my tablet, if I hear a buzzing from the fan or some
other noise that I can hear but still listen to the movie, that
that is an example of non-harmful interference. Am I getting
anywhere? Does that make any sense to you? Is that an argument
that carries any weight at all?
Mr. Deasy. I think the analogy that Dr. Griffin used
earlier describing the 100 jets and the rustling leaves is
getting at to what you are pointing out. Sir, did you want to
cover that?
Secretary Griffin. I think the point being made is the
level of the noise. So if the level of the noise is a fan
overhead while you are trying to listen to a movie and the
movie is comparable to or louder than the fan, yes, you can
hear the fan but it is not going to ruin the movie for you.
Senator Wicker. Is there such an analogy in this subject?
Secretary Griffin. Yes, sir. The analogy I gave earlier
while you were up chairing the Commerce Committee hearing--and
I understand that--is the levels we are talking about here is
listening to GPS is quite literally like listening to the
rustle of leaves through the noise of 100 jet engines at
takeoff power. So in this case, the noise is enormously
stronger, incomparably stronger than the signal we are trying
to hear, and so the noise must be kept out of the band we are
trying to protect, which is the navigation services band.
Senator Wicker. Well, if it is that level of intensity, I
would agree.
Let me ask you. If these issues could be resolved between
the FCC and DOD to your satisfaction, is there something to be
said for our economy, for our society in having the use of this
L-band of spectrum for low power 5G network, or are we talking
about something that basically would be of no service to the
public?
Secretary Griffin. Well, sir, all spectrum is useful.
Senator Wicker. So we can resolve this in a way that would
be sufficient to you, that would be satisfactory to you----
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Wicker, I am going to interrupt
for a moment because we have one member who has not had his
first turn.
Senator Wicker. Okay. I am sorry. I thought I was the last
show.
Chairman Inhofe. We will get back to you.
Senator Wicker. That concludes my questions, Mr. Chairman,
and I appreciate the indulgence of the chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman. I
apologize for my absence, but I was at the same committee
hearing that our colleague was chairing.
I have just a few questions, and I think I can probably lay
claim to the perhaps most layman-esque, I think is maybe the
most charitable way to characterize them.
But I am thinking as a member of the Commerce Committee
where we have just been having a hearing, and normally the FCC
is considering consumer issues. To come here and find that the
FCC has approved a license for a system that you regard as a
grave national security threat leads me to wonder, well, the
Russians and the Chinese do not need FCC licenses. Do they? So
is this discussion not a sign that our GPS system is hugely
vulnerable to malign interference if something as obvious as
the Ligado application approved by the FCC poses this grave
danger? Are there not other dangers?
General Raymond. If you do not mind, I will jump in on this
one.
I think there is a full spectrum of threats to space
capabilities, everything from low-end reversible jamming in
this case all the way up to high-end direct ascent ASATs. As
the U.S. Space Command Commander responsible with the Unified
Command Plan (UCP) mission of protecting and defending those,
we are concerned about all those.
As I mentioned earlier--and I would be happy to take this
offline and come talk to you in another setting--we have
tactics, techniques, and procedures that we use to be able to
mitigate the risk and to fight through this in certain
conditions. I would love the opportunity to share that with
you.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I would welcome that opportunity.
Thank you, General. Because I will tell you just as kind of the
layman here I am wondering how the FCC can open this grave
national security threat, and yet the Chinese and the Russians
have access to the same kind of technology and they do not need
anybody's permission to interfere.
Let me go to the next question. Why are you here? What do
you want? I know that others on the panel have asked General
Raymond and others. Senator Shaheen asked the question. Let me
just put it very bluntly, what do you want us to do? I
understand the FCC can reconsider its position. I will tell you
from my many years of experience with the FCC, that kind of
reversal would be highly unusual. But anyway, we cannot
petition for reconsideration. So maybe you can tell us what you
would like us to do and why. General Allen?
Admiral Allen. Just repeating what I said earlier,
recognizing this is not the Committee of original jurisdiction,
it would be a referral to them to consider appropriate action.
Senator Blumenthal. A referral to the----
Admiral Allen. Commerce.
Senator Blumenthal. To the Commerce Committee. I am on the
Commerce Committee. You have the Chairman sitting here. I do
not know that you need a referral. We are both hearing you. But
there would have to be legislation. Is that what you are
saying?
Admiral Allen. Again, I am with you as far as being a
layman on some of these things. It occurs to me that it is
either a reconsideration, a court action, or legislation.
Senator Blumenthal. So you are not asking that we have an
amendment in the NDAA.
Admiral Allen. Oh, no. I am just raising the possibilities.
That is all, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Of an amendment in the NDAA or
something in the Commerce----
Admiral Allen. I am not here to represent the Department of
Defense. I am here to represent the civil----
Senator Blumenthal. I understand.
By the way, thank you for your service, your wonderful
service in the Coast Guard and all of your service.
But I do not know, Mr. Chairman. I am kind of at a loss,
assuming that we are alarmed and outraged, where do we go from
here. An amendment in the NDAA?
Chairman Inhofe. I can answer your question. Since you
mentioned my name, it is perfectly appropriate to do so.
You talked about something being unprecedented in terms of
the FCC, and that may be true. But also unprecedented is a
decision that was made, brought to the FCC by Ligado in a form
that was immediately objected to by everyone--everyone, without
one exception--coming to the military, to DOD, and we are
addressing those who are responsible for this. All of them
objected in a very strong way. We have a letter with 19
Senators' signatures that objected the same way after they had
heard the evidence. This thing--and this is unprecedented too.
The decision that was made by the FCC was made on a Sunday
night. I went back and checked. I have never found a case at
least in the history that we could find of the FCC, number one,
that has been done on a weekend. It has never been done on the
weekend before. Number two, that was done without any public
participation or knowledge that it was being made. To be
specific, I took the initiative to find out why to make sure
that no decision would be made until we got back into session.
On a Thursday, there was a letter that came from the group that
represents all of the defense industry a week before and the
weekend before all this happened. Yet, they went ahead and did
that. That is unprecedented. I talked to the administrator on
that Monday after it happened and pointed this out to him.
So in answer to your question, what I would want to do from
what I have heard--and I have been in this issue for quite a
while and certainly for all the time that Ligado since 2015
became involved because of their purchase of----
Senator Blumenthal. LightSquared?
Chairman Inhofe. Yes. That we wanted to get this thing
reversed. I am absolutely convinced that we do.
So they came, after they had been invited by this
Committee, to come and review the decision that was made and
the comments by not just--this is interesting--not just DOD but
also the private sector, airlines and others coming forth. I
covered this in some of my opening statements. But that is the
genesis of the presence of these witnesses.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.
I do not want to prolong the hearing. But I look forward to
talking to you about the potential remedies and how we square
them with the license that has already been issued by the FCC.
But I do understand and appreciate the national security
difficulties that have been raised here, and I think that a
bipartisan approach here is well merited. Thank you for having
this hearing.
Chairman Inhofe. This has been bipartisan I want you to
know. You were not here but it has been, equal numbers on each
side.
Senator Blumenthal. I followed it from afar, and I actually
heard your opening statement. So I thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Very good. Thank you.
Now, we did announce at the very beginning that we would
have a second round of questions, which we will do and we will
get to you again, Senator Wicker. But I have already had my
second round of questions. Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I think we have reached a point where we have
explored practically everything, but just a point that I keep
coming back to is that had the FCC followed what is the norm,
which would be to publish a proposed rulemaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act, that would have given every
stakeholder the opportunity to comment on the mitigation
proposals, question the science, indeed suggest by doing some
testing that their scientific conclusions are wrong. Is that
accurate, Mr. Deasy?
Mr. Deasy. Yes, sir. That is accurate. The process is
clearly one of give and take. The public has a chance to weigh
in. Agencies can weigh in. I think it is really important.
Though we keep talking about the DOD here, this is all agencies
that are sharing this view just not the DOD.
As I have studied this and have asked the question, how
does this typically work--so you have what I said earlier. You
have the request that FCC makes over to NTIA that involves
Federal Agencies' equities. In this case, obviously Ligado
clearly does, and then we have a chance to work with the
various agencies to express our views. We have the science that
we bring into it. There is typically a give-and-take period
back and forth between FCC and the various agencies that are
impacted by this to try to reach a conclusion. That give-and-
take period has not taken place.
Senator Reed. Another way to look at this. You had some
clues that something was happening at the FCC. I presume that.
But you did not have, before you even in sort of an informal
information-only sort of--the substance of the proposal and the
timing of the decision. That was a complete surprise to you--
not just you. When I speak of ``you,'' I speak of every Federal
Agency. Is that accurate?
Mr. Deasy. Yes. As I stated, I had been tracking this
literally every week inside of my own organization who has been
in constant communications with both the FCC and the NTIA. The
last what I had heard was it was still under review but no
final decision had taken place until it became announced
publicly.
Senator Reed. The final decision was taking place.
Again, as you point out very appropriately--this is DOD-
focused obviously, but the impacts go to the banking community,
go to FITBIT users--I do not want to go too far beyond my
technological base, which is very narrow. But we are talking
about most citizens are so totally dependent upon GPS that they
do not even think about it any longer. The directions from the
cell phone as they are driving to someplace they have not been
before, all that is GPS-related, and that could be affected.
Mr. Deasy. Yes. It is interesting. I just happened to write
down just a few of the industries just to give you a breadth,
that are impacted by this: aviation, safety and operational
problems, satellite communications providers, defense
providers, FedEx, UPS, Iridium, weather information companies,
ability to use helicopters, low/high altitude aircraft, UAS
devices. So the list goes on, and I know that the week of that
decision when it was released was the same week that a very
large number of companies inside the transportation and
aerospace industry had written their objection as well. But
yes, to your very point, it is very broad number of industries
that are impacted by this.
Senator Reed. Just a final point of clarification too. As I
understand it--again, I will be happily corrected--the real
impact will come where they place their towers, which, the plan
would be principally in the United States unless they go
overseas. This will not have an affect on areas outside the
United States basically. Is that fair?
Mr. Deasy. Yes. The proposal was to repurpose CONUS or
inside of the United States.
Senator Reed. Right. So for the specific warfighter
effects, which would be located in the United States, but this
is where we train. If systems do not work here, then what is
the sense of deploying them anyplace else? Is that a fair
statement, General?
General Raymond. Yes, sir.
I would add one other thing. We have talked at length about
the spectrum and the quiet part of that spectrum. This is a
globally recognized standard. I mean, across the globe,
countries do not put ground-based emitters in that part of the
spectrum. So the other thing we need to be concerned about is
the precedent-setting that this might have, and if other
countries then go do that, it could have more global impacts.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Chairman, just one more question if
I may?
Chairman Inhofe. Well, yes. I know that for a second
round----
Senator Blumenthal. Oh, I am sorry. I apologize.
Chairman Inhofe.--Senator King has made a request to be
heard.
Senator Blumenthal. I apologize.
Chairman Inhofe. He is here.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Will autonomous vehicles--is GPS what tells autonomous
vehicles where they are and who they are passing and where they
are on the road? Is that a GPS function?
Secretary Griffin. Yes.
Senator King. So a minor perturbance in GPS could have
catastrophic consequences for an autonomous vehicle. Is that
correct?
Secretary Griffin. As autonomous vehicles are developed,
yes. They would want to be completely certain that GPS was not
being interfered with.
Senator King. It would not take much of an interference to
go from one lane to the other at a bad moment.
Secretary Griffin. It does not.
Senator King. Additional question about the testing. The
testing showed actual interference. In other words, this is not
the precautionary principle at work. It is not we are worried
about interference. We found interference. Is that correct?
Secretary Griffin. The Department of Transportation testing
to which I referred examined the level of power that would
actually cause receivers to lose lock. So yes, sir. That is
interference. It is not hypothetical. It is not propositional.
It is they actually lost lock.
Senator King. They lost lock at 9.8 dBW.
Secretary Griffin. Or no, much lower levels. The only
receivers tested which did not lose lock were those that go in
cell phones for a couple of reasons which are interesting to
note. First of all, the cell phone transmitter frequencies that
are--the cell phones themselves are located in different bands.
But the filters in cell phone receivers are very narrow-banded
for what they want to do. So it is a special design that does
not exist in most of the rest of the installed base. You have
asked a very good question there.
The certified aviation receivers that one buys, when I was
talking earlier, the $10,000 receiver that you buy for your
certified airplane--those were just barely capable of dealing
with the 10 watts. For all the other classes of receivers, the
common, garden variety receivers that were being discussed a
moment ago that are in your automobile, those die at factors of
100 or more below the 10 watt level.
Senator King. As I read the order, did the receiver
manufacturers not end up expressing that they were all right
with this decision? Did Ligado not effectively make concessions
that they ended up getting a sign-off from those companies?
Secretary Griffin. Ligado says that they got that sign-off,
but when you talk to the companies, the companies are on the
list of those that Dana Deasy was just providing that have
objected to this order. So none of us, of course, have been in
the deliberations between these various companies and Ligado,
but I think it says something when they have together and
separately objected to this decision.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I suspect because this is an adjudication and
not a rulemaking that the Congressional Review Act would not
apply, but I do not know the answer to that.
Chairman Inhofe. I have heard suggestions that it might and
it might not, and I do not have an answer to that.
Senator King. I assume somebody has appealed, has requested
reconsideration before the commission. Is that true?
Mr. Deasy. Yes, that is what we are currently discussing
with NTIA. They are the ones that would have to issue the
appeal, and there is a date that that has to occur by. That is
a current conversation we are in with them is that process and
what is it that they will need to put that appeal into effect.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Let me suggest where I think we are right
now. Senator Blackburn has not been heard. Senator Blackburn,
we have all been through the first round and we are on the
second round now. Is that all right if she goes ahead? Why do
you not go ahead on your first round?
Senator Blackburn. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had to
go preside.
I was disappointed to have to leave the hearing because
this is something that I have followed. The LightSquared/Ligado
issue is something that I followed since I was in the House. I
do think it is a decision that the FCC lingered with for a
longer time than we had expected, and we may not all agree with
where they arrived at the decision.
I really wish, Mr. Chairman, we had somebody from them here
that would provide us a little bit of insight into this.
LightSquared started on this years ago. So this is not a new
issue, and it was an issue that I think they almost fought
their way to a resolution on it. I do wish we had heard from
the FCC today.
I think there are a couple of things that are significant
as we look at this issue. As we had the NDAA conference
committee last year and as I handled and worked with Chairman
Wicker on the section 214 language, we looked at how we move
forward. I think we would all agree or I would certainly
agree--you all--General Raymond may disagree with me--I do not
think that DOD needs more spectrum. I will tell you that. I
think you have plenty of spectrum. Indeed, I think that you
need to give some of that back for commercial entities.
I think we need a reconsideration of how you work with
commercial entities as we talk about how you develop uses for
21st century approaches for 5G, for supercomputing, for
artificial intelligence. As we talk about the Space Force and
the utilizations that are going to be there, it is going to
require an enormous amount of partnership. It is going to
require brain power that we are going to need to bring in from
the outside to complement what we have. So we have to be very
attentive to this.
With that said and as we look at the transition of what was
LightSquared and all their baggage and issues that they brought
with them into Ligado, my question--and, Mr. Deasy, I guess it
is best coming to you. Do you trust Ligado? Do you trust them
to keep their word? Do you trust that they are not going to
interfere with GPS? Do you trust that they are going to fly
below your system and not be a source of interference?
Mr. Deasy. So trust in this case all comes down to the FCC
order and the mitigations.
Senator Blackburn. Do you yourself? Do you at DOD trust
that Ligado is going to be true to what they have told the FCC?
Mr. Deasy. I have seen no evidence that they will be able
to achieve what is in the FCC order.
Senator Blackburn. So you look at the legacy of baggage
that they have had throughout their history and feel that it
will affect what we have to have work. We do not have room for
error when we talk about 21st combat systems. Would you agree
with that?
Mr. Deasy. I would.
Senator Blackburn. Making certain that this works
appropriately is going to be an imperative. It is not an
option. It is an imperative. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Deasy. I would.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you. I yield my time.
Chairman Inhofe. All right. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Let me just make a comment here. It has come up, you know,
why were not other people invited? It is quite appropriate.
First of all, the FCC is not in our jurisdiction, but what is
in our jurisdiction, something that is called to our attention
that is a real threat to our Nation. I mean, that is what we do
here. So it is very appropriate to have people who are experts
analyze the threat and inform us so that we can get answers.
Now, the proper jurisdiction is the Committee that is
chaired by Senator Wicker, and he may decide to have a hearing
and that would be a different type of hearing altogether. We
are here analyzing the threat to our country, and that is what
I think we should be doing.
Now, we have gone through now--and I know that there has
been a request from Senator Blumenthal to be heard and you are
recognized.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just very briefly. I noticed looking at the parties on one
side and the other, there are private parties who oppose this
license and the decision by the FCC. From what I have heard
from my colleagues, there are serious questions about the
regulatory propriety. In fact, listening to the Chairman, the
procedural legality of how this license was granted, and I sort
of had a flashback to my days as a State attorney general when
I actually did some agency challenges. One went all the way to
the United States Supreme Court, and I recall well arguing that
this rule was adopted in the dead of night without the proper
comment period.
I guess my question is, is it not likely that this action
by the FCC will be challenged in the Federal courts based on
possible procedural questions if it was adopted with all of the
kind of irregularity that has been cited here? I can tell you
from my own experience when there are challenges in the courts,
they take years sometimes to resolve. So are we here somewhat
prematurely?
Mr. Deasy. I would say this. I cannot speculate what
industry will do in terms of whether there will be lawsuits
pursued out of this. I can tell you that there is a process
that I understand we need to follow in objecting to this, which
is done through the NTIA. I cannot speak personally. I am not
an expert enough to know the legal approaches that would need
to be taken here outside of our approach to go back and get
this appealed through the NTIA, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Are you aware of any groups or
companies? I mean, I presume they would be aggrieved. They
would suffer a harm. They would have a legal right to be heard.
Since they were not given a comment period or any other
previous right, it seems to me they would have a pretty
colorable case in court. So I wonder whether you have heard
about any effort in that regard.
Mr. Deasy. I have only heard that there are companies that
also provide other forms of satellite communications that come
up against the spectrum here that we are talking about that
have reached out and expressed concern that if this request
goes through, that it will cause harm to them.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Others? Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just say I think Senator Blumenthal and Senator King
and Senator Blackburn have at least raised a number of issues
that need a further look.
I have information here that this has been pending for some
years at the FCC and that in April of 2016, the FCC asked
Federal Agencies with concerns about the proposal to submit
specific technical information to support those concerns and
that a draft order was provided to all concerned by the FCC in
mid-October of last year. So we need to find out if that is a
fact.
We need to look at this guard band, 23-megahertz guard band
between the proposed Ligado band and the GPS band, and see if
that is helpful, if it solves a problem. We need to look at the
fact that Ligado reduced its power levels by over 99 percent to
get to this stage of the game. Senator King is right. I believe
that some folks have signed off on this. My information is
NovAtel, TopCon, Leica Geosystems, Hexagon, Deere, Garmin, and
Trimble have notified the FCC that they did not oppose the
granting of Ligado's application to modify its license.
I think this panel consists entirely of Americans of good
will. I have to believe the unanimous decision of the FCC was
arrived at by Americans of good will. To me this has been a
very valuable 3 hours, Mr. Chairman, but I would agree to the
extent that other Members have said that there are some things
we still need to get to. Unlike Senator Blackburn, who was
involved heavily in this in the House, this is a matter of
fairly recent--that has recently come to me. I do not recall
having wrestled with this in the past.
So I would just make those observations. If anybody on the
panel wants to respond to the statements that I have made, I
would be happy to hear that. But I would just make that
observation, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay. There has been an invitation for
comments from the panel. Let me make a couple comments first.
Senator Blumenthal, when I was making my comments, I had
never looked to see what rules and laws the FCC operates under.
I was talking about past history and talking about what is
normally appropriate. When an organization such as the National
Defense Industrial Association with 1,700 businesses, 70,000
individual members, and they have strong opposition to the
proposal, along with some 71 companies, and then all of the
groups--we have a long list. I do not have it in front of me. I
was looking for it--of all the airlines and everybody else who
is objecting to this, with that type of objection, it seemed to
me, as the Chairman of this Committee and as just an
individual, that the FCC was adequately warned of this
opposition, this strong opposition--I have never seen such
united opposition to any proposal--that they would not go ahead
and do something and particularly do it on a weekend. This has
not happened before.
So I was thinking really of what is right and what is
wrong, not what is legal and what would stand in court. To me
that was just a no-brainer. It should not have happened, and I
told that to the director of the FCC when I was surprised to
find on a Monday morning that it had been done on the weekend.
Now, Senator Wicker, I have said several times this is not
our jurisdiction. It is your jurisdiction in the Commerce
Committee, and I think you have voiced a lot of things. This is
not a hearing on this. This is in response to the threat that
has been posed and become obvious to us. But obviously, if you
want to hold a hearing on this, it would be certainly within
your purview to do that.
Any other comments? You know, we could wear ourselves out
on this thing.
Senator Blumenthal. I would just comment, Mr. Chairman. I
was not in any way questioning your version of what happened
here. I was just thinking that it sounds like a court challenge
waiting to happen, and I guess it is on us to try to ask some
of these questions of the private parties. That was the reason
for my question.
Chairman Inhofe. That is very fair, very fair.
If nothing else, we are adjourned. I wanted to go ahead and
get adjourned before somebody else came in.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe. But let me just say to you folks and make
sure--I ask unanimous consent it be on the record. I thank you
very much, all four of you. You offered a level of expertise
that I do not think many of us really understand. I know I do
not.
But I do know that when you get so many people in
opposition to something with the veracity of that opposition,
it is something that does concern me. There is nothing more
important going on than a threat to this country. You know, I
have got 20 kids and grandkids that are going to be here a lot
longer than I am that are equally concerned.
So thank you so much for the time that you have taken and
thank you for being here.
[Whereupon, at 5:44 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
iridium questions
1. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Deasy, Dr. Griffin, Admiral Allen, and
General Raymond, the global satellite operator Iridium Communications
runs a key command-and-control facility in Fairbanks, Alaska. Iridium
has supported the Department of Defense (DOD), warfighter, and Federal
agencies with secure, critical and reliable satellite communications
for nearly 20 years. Iridium operates in a spectrum even closer to what
Ligado is seeking to repurpose than Global Positioning System (GPS).
What is your assessment of Iridium's support to DOD, and could the
Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) decision undermine Iridium's
network? How specifically?
Mr. Deasy. Yes, the Federal Communications Commission's decision
would likely undermine Iridium's satellite communications services. The
Department of Defense (DOD) relies on Iridium for secure, hand portable
communications solutions, such as unlimited unclassified and classified
voice, data, paging, broadcast services and push-to-talk combat
networking capabilities through a secure DOD-owned and operated ground
infrastructure. Iridium also offers a positioning, navigation and
timing capability that is complementary to GPS. The out of band
emissions from Ligado will potentially affect all Iridium's services,
including positioning, navigation and timing capabilities. We assess
the deployment of Ligado's planned network will put the over 130,000
Iridium devices used globally by warfighters and Federal and coalition
partners at significant risk of degradation.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
Admiral Allen. Like GPS, Iridium operates in a spectrum band
adjacent to Ligado's. Iridium's low earth orbit constellation of
satellites supports a broad spectrum of critical communications based
services for the military, civil government and private sector. In
addition to support for the warfighter, the maritime transportation
systems relies heavily on their service for distress and calling, asset
tracking, telephony, and machine to machine data transfers. Aviation
safety systems also rely on these services. Iridium and the Satellitte
Safety Alliance are opposed to the FCC action and have made numerous
filings on the FCC docket.
General Raymond. Iridium has been supporting the DOD with 24/7
resilient global coverage satellite communications for over 20 years
and was recently awarded a seven (7) year, $739 million fixed-price
contract to continue the delivery of global Iridium services to the
warfighter. DOD's Iridium service operates independently of Iridium's
commercial service via the use of a dedicated gateway station in Hawaii
and secure handheld portable communications devices. Today, there are
over 130,000 devices in use by globally deployed warfighters, Federal,
and coalition partners. Additionally, through a separate investment
between the Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services (EMSS) Program, the U.S.
Army, and the Department of Energy, the EMSS Program delivers Iridium-
unique position, navigation and timing (PNT) services as a compliment
to GPS. The FCC Ligado decision could potentially impact both Iridium's
commercial services and EMSS services. Specifically, the upper end of
Iridium's spectrum (1626.5 MHz) is directly adjacent to the Ligado
Uplink spectrum (1627.5 MHz) and there is a very real chance Ligado's
new 5G network could directly interfere unacceptably and substantially
with Iridium's own functions. Testing is required to assess negative
impact.
2. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Deasy, Dr. Griffin, Admiral Allen, and
General Raymond, how critical is Iridium's satellite network as
reliable back up for GPS and in what ways does the FCC's decision
endanger GPS' only proven substitute?
Mr. Deasy. The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) decision
to approve the Ligado license modification request will impact
Iridium's capability because the Ligado signal will cause interference.
The FCC Order imposes power limits, guard band and coordination
requirements for repair and mitigation of harmful interference that
fall short of protecting Iridium's adjacent band operations. Iridium
satellite positioning, navigation and timing is available today as one
of the few reliable commercial alternatives or companions to
traditional GPS. Iridium provides an ``on-demand'' capability that is
robust and demonstrates the ability to meet the timing requirements for
U.S. critical infrastructure, to include the uniformed services. For
example, DOD and the U.S. Coast Guard rely on Iridium position accuracy
to support mission tracking requirements. Ligado's out of band
emissions would likely cause a negative impact.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
Admiral Allen. Iridium is not currently used as a backup for GPS,
its communications services are critical in passing GPS data to safety
and other systems. Their satellite constelation and infrastructure
offer complementary PNT services.
General Raymond. Iridium satellite PNT is available today as a
commercial alternative or companion to traditional GPS. The Space Force
is partnering with the U.S. Army and the Department of Energy to expand
the use of this capability. While Iridium's service is not equivalent
to GPS, it provides a PNT capability that is robust and has
demonstrated the ability to meet the timing requirements for U.S.
critical infrastructure in a nationwide exercise. For example, position
accuracy has been demonstrated to meet the tracking requirements of the
U.S. Coast Guard. For applicability to other U.S. Government agencies
as compared to GPS, additional classified details can be provided. The
Iridium PNT channel is immediately adjacent to Ligado's Uplink spectrum
that starts at 1627.5 MHz. Therefore, adverse impact to Iridium's PNT
service may be significant, potentially neutralizing its usefulness. As
the DOD continues to develop the next generation of PNT capabilities,
we cannot ignore the availability of a viable alternative PNT source to
ensure operational flexibility.
3. Senator Sullivan. General Raymond, I understand the Space Force
is responsible for managing the Iridium partnership with DOD and other
Federal agencies. How do you do characterize the threat posed to
Iridium by the FCC's decision?
General Raymond. There is a very real possibility that the Iridium/
Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services (EMSS) downlink can be degraded or
even jammed, adversely impacting EMSS users who operate globally. There
has been no significant testing for potential interference in those
regions where repurposed Ligado spectrum will be used for 5G services.
This is a knowledge gap that needs to be better understood.
missile defense priorities--hypersonic and ballistic missile tracking
space sensor
4. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Griffin, section 1683 of last year's
enacted National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), states that the
development of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Missile Tracking Space
Sensor (HBTSS) is primarily assigned to the Missile Defense Agency for
development. It appears the funding for this capability has been moved
over to the Space Development Agency. If true, this disregards the law
enacted in the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA. Please explain, in detail, why
you made this decision and exactly how you plan reverse it, in order to
ensure that the Department fully complies with the law?
Secretary Griffin. On May 29, 2020, the Department of Defense
delivered letters of certification to the heads of the Congressional
Defense Committees in response to section 1683(a) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92)
noting that we are in compliance with the direction that the Secretary
of Defense to assign the Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
with principal responsibility for the development and deployment of a
hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor (HBTSS) payload.
Additionally, my team is developing a memorandum of understanding
between MDA and SDA to formalize their roles and responsibilities in
this effort. This represents a best possible case for delivering needed
capabilities to the warfighter on the fastest timeline possible.
missile defense priorities--next generation interceptor
5. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Griffin, in his testimony before SASC
earlier this year, General Terrence O'Shaughnessy, Commander, U.S.
Northern Command, stated, ``Eroding military advantage is undermining
our ability to detect threats, defeat attacks, and therefore deter
aggression against the Homeland. This is emboldening competitors and
adversaries to challenge us at home, holding at risk our people, our
critical infrastructure, and our ability to project power forward.'' In
your view, how does the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Next
Generation Interceptor (NGI) specifically address General
O'Shaughnessy's concerns about schedule in order to continue to pace
the threat and protect our Homeland?
Secretary Griffin. Yes, the NGI acquisition strategy provides for:
Joint Requirements Oversight Council-approved threshold and objective
requirements to provide trade space allowing Offeror's to balance
performance and schedule; NGI evaluation criteria to provide for
assignment of strengths to proposed designs that deliver prior to the
threshold operational need date of fourth quarter fiscal year (4QFY)
2028; incentive fee for accelerated successful development, test, and
successful flight test over baseline proposal; and the carrying of two
NGI contractors through Critical Design Review.
6. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Griffin, given the decision to cancel,
what is the likelihood that the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) will
deliver within the next 10 years?
Secretary Griffin. Based on previous kill vehicle and interceptor
development timelines, the Missile Defense Agency is highly confident
in successful delivery within 10 years. In addition, responses provided
by industry to Government Requests for Information indicates the mean
first article delivery is up to 12 months earlier than the baseline (or
objective) date proposed.
7. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Griffin, what specifically is included in
the NGI RPF to ensure the deployment of new interceptors as soon as
possible?
Secretary Griffin. The NGI RFP includes the following to ensure
deployment of new interceptors as soon as possible: Joint Requirements
Oversight Council-approved threshold and objective requirements
allowing Offeror's to balance performance and schedule; NGI evaluation
criteria to allowing proposals to be awarded strengths based on designs
that deliver prior to the threshold operational need date of fourth
quarter fiscal year (4QFY) 2028; incentive fee for accelerated
successful development, test, and successful flight test over baseline
proposal; and provisions to allow two NGI contract awards to maintain
competition through Critical Design Review.
8. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Griffin, what is the earliest NGI will be
positioned at Fort Greely?
Secretary Griffin. The NGI Top Level Requirements and solicitation
establishes a threshold first article delivery date of fourth quarter
fiscal year 2028. Offerors may propose an objective date that is
earlier than this threshold date. In addition, the NGI Incentive Fee
Plan provides incentives for successful delivery of the first article
up to 12 months earlier than the baseline (or objective) date proposed.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martha McSally
scope of order's mitigation attempt
9. Senator McSally. Mr. Deasy, how do you interpret the FCC's use
of the term ``installations'' and, in your opinion, does that include
ranges and proving grounds as well?
Mr. Deasy. In my opinion, the FCC use of the term ``installations''
does include ranges and proving grounds, consistent with national
policy frameworks. However, that is not sufficient. Notably, most
military GPS receivers are not restricted to only specific defined
areas of operations such as installations and are often used on
airborne and mobile platforms that operate in the United States. The
Department of Defense (DOD) believes that the FCC Order failed to
recognize the broad usage of GPS by DOD.
10. Senator McSally. Mr. Deasy, how would the placement of towers
impact ranges like the Barry M. Goldwater Air Force Range or the Army's
Electronic Proving Ground in Arizona?
Mr. Deasy. Any GPS military receiver on a military installation
would be at risk if a tower were placed in or around the range. Such
interference from higher powered Ligado terrestrial operations would,
for example, cause military GPS receivers not to be able to lock onto
the relatively weak signals from GPS. The Commission's conditions that
were placed on Ligado would not prevent this from occurring to those
receivers.
11. Senator McSally. Mr. Deasy, is it clear how DOD and the FCC
will be able to mitigate those issues?
Mr. Deasy. No, the mitigation techniques outlined in the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) Order do not protect global positioning
system (GPS) receivers from harmful interference. The FCC highlights
specific reductions in power levels, a 23 MHz guard band and conditions
for repair and mitigation that are intended to mitigate issues with
GPS. These will not be sufficient to protect military GPS usage,
particularly in light of the large number of embedded systems on
complex platforms and classified mission usages. From a DOD
perspective, the results of the PNT EXCOM study, which was based on 1
dB protection criteria, underscore that the only thing that can protect
GPS is to reduce the power to a level that Ligado has chosen not to
accept. The Department of Transportation assessment on Adjacent Band
Compatibility also verified that the mitigation approach imposed by FCC
will not protect a multitude of GPS users.
satellite communications
12. Senator McSally. Dr. Griffin, a lot of the discussion related
to the Ligado spectrum has rightly focused on GPS, but GPS is not the
only incumbent service operating in the L-band, there are also
satellite voice and data services. Can you provide some real-world
examples of what interference to satellite voice or data service might
actually look like, and their implications on DOD operations?''
Secretary Griffin. I have no data to assess the impact of Ligado's
operations in the L-band spectrum to other than users of satellite
navigation services. However, based on the fact that voice and data
services operate at much higher power levels that GPS signals, I
strongly doubt that there will be any significant impacts on such
services from Ligado's operations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
technical information relating to gps interference
13. Senator Reed. Mr. Deasy, in the fall of 2019, the Federal
Communications Commission contacted Federal agencies, providing the
draft order and asking concerned agencies to submit specific technical
information to support those concerns. Did the Department of Defense
respond to that request and if so, can the Department provide a copy of
the correspondence?
Mr. Deasy. On November 22, 2019, 11 Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee (IRAC) members, including the three Military Departments,
signed a response to the FCC draft order. The joint response strongly
opposed the FCC's granting of the license modification to Ligado,
citing unresolved technical and regulatory issues that require
resolution. The IRAC review began after the FCC provided the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) a draft of the
Ligado Order in October 2019. As this is a pre-decisional document, DOD
would defer questions about its release to NTIA.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
coast guard operations
14. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Allen, aviation groups have
expressed concerns that Ligado's plans would interfere with helicopter
GPS receivers and satellite communications when operating within one of
their towers. The U.S. Coast Guard's Homeland defense and search and
rescue missions requires its helicopters to fly in dense urban areas
and in proximity to cell towers deployed on our coasts. Under what
conditions could the Ligado proposal, with the mitigations approved by
the FCC, impact the Coast Guard's use of helicopters in Homeland
defense and search and rescue missions?
Admiral Allen. This answer is my personal opinion and should not be
interpreted as the position of the Coast Guard. Coast Guard operations
and the operations of all emergency response organizations at the
Federal, State, and local level will be impacted by the FCC action.
Coast Guard helicopters and other aircraft that use Traffic Terrain
Awareness and Warning Systems that detect and warn of physical
obstacles rely on certified GPS receivers when path deviations occur.
Ligado has stated in their application which has been approved in the
FCC action that the requirement for aircraft ``operating within 500
feet of an object require flight by visual reference rather than
relying on instruments, including GPS.'' In other words, the FCC order
assumes that it is ``good enough'' for pilots to use visual references
in lieu of certified systems that use the GPS signal. As stated in the
Petition for Reconsideration filed by the Airline Pilots Association,
International (APAI) on May 20, 2020, ``Certified aviation GPS
receivers must continue to reliably operate at the edge of, below or
outside of obstacle clearance zones. Such would be the case when
vertical or lateral airline flight path deviations occur during
instrument approaches to landing in conditions such as wind shear,
turbulent or rough weather, high winds, during emergency situations
such as an engine failure on takeoff, or during collision avoidance
maneuvers near an airport at a low altitude.'' They further state, ``
In any of the cases mentioned above a proper aviation risk assessment
would require accounting for situations where compromised GPS
navigation guidance or a false or missed Terrain Awareness and Warning
System alert associated with Ligado's interference would present a
severe hazard to safety of flight such as an increased risk of
collision with the ground or another aircraft.'' So, in my opinion,
whether is it a Coast Guard aircraft or anyother aircraft operating
under similar conditions, the risk is unacceptable. As noted by the
APAI, the FCC created and relied on ``an ad hoc standard for harmful
interference . . . this is an arbitrary and unacceptable way to go
about analyzing any threat to the Nation's air transport system.''
Accordingly, it is hard to see how Coast Guard and Homeland defense and
search and rescue missions will not be put in jeapordy.
federal aviation administration operations and civil aviation
15. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Deasy, Dr. Griffin, Admiral Allen, and
General Raymond, letters entered into record from aviation experts have
raised serious concerns about the impact that Ligado's operations will
have on Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certified GPS receivers
when aircraft are operating within 250 foot of a Ligado tower. Aviation
GPS is critical for position reporting for FAA surveillance and pilot
coordination between aircraft flying at a low level, and any potential
disruption is profoundly concerning. Where did the model of a 250 foot
radius of concern with respect to Ligado originate, is the model
correct, and what impact would the Ligado tower have on aircraft in
that area?
Mr. Deasy. DOD CIO would defer to the Federal Aviation
Administration and their expertise in addressing the rationale behind
the 250 foot radius model and the impact on aircraft.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
Admiral Allen. The 250 foot radius was proposed by Ligado to the
RTCA (formerly the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics), an
aviation group that develops standards for the FAA. RTCA analyzed the
proposal but did not reach consensus or agreement on the proposal. See
RTCA Paper No. 333-16/SC159-1055 at this site https://www.rtca.org/
sites/default/files/sc-159--wg6--response--ligado. pdf
General Raymond. While the DOD operates numerous FAA-certified
aircraft with GPS receivers, the Space Force defers to the FAA for
official responses about FAA operations and civil aviation.
16. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Deasy, Dr. Griffin, Admiral Allen, and
General Raymond, what aircraft and GPS receivers are of particular
concern with respect to potential interference from Ligado, and why?
Mr. Deasy. DOD CIO would defer to the Federal Aviation
Administration and their expertise in addressing the rationale behind
the 250 foot radius model and the impact on aircraft.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
Admiral Allen. There are many filings on the docket regarding
impacted receivers. However, the most critical in my view are aviation
receivers, especially non-certified receivers used in helicopters,
general aviation, and unmanned systems.
General Raymond. Space Force defers to the FAA for official
responses about FAA operations and civil aviation.
17. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Deasy, Dr. Griffin, Admiral Allen, and
General Raymond, what requirements has the FCC imposed on Ligado with
respect to its towers and civil aviation requirements?
Mr. Deasy. The Federal Communications Commission Order states that
Ligado shall be prohibited from operating any base station antenna in
its lower downlink band, 1526-1536 MHz, at a location less than 250
feet laterally or less than 30 feet below an obstacle clearance surface
established by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
Admiral Allen. The FCC Order and Authorization imposes several
requirements on Ligado; however, the measures imposed do not mitigate
the interference threat to GPS reception. They constitute after the
fact consequence management when a receiver is impacted and do not
protect the GPS signal.
General Raymond. Space Force defers to the FAA for official
responses about FAA operations and civil aviation.
18. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Deasy, Dr. Griffin, Admiral Allen, and
General Raymond, do you believe that Ligado's mitigation plans are
adequate to ensure that aviation safety and traffic management are not
negatively impacted? If not, what are the specific shortcomings of
these mitigations and what additional measures are necessary for FAA
GPS operations?
Mr. Deasy. DOD CIO would defer to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and their expertise in addressing the impacts to
aviation safety and traffic management and the specific additional
measures necessary for FAA GPS operations.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
Admiral Allen. No, I do not. Even at the reduced power levels
proposed by Ligado, the DOT Adjacent Band Compatibility Study
indeicates the levels are still execeedingly high relative to the weak
GPS signal. It is a matter of physics, there isn't a realtistic way to
accommodate terrestrial broadband in a band adjacent to GPS. Since the
issue can't be mitigated, to establish a process whereby users notify
Ligado of interference after it has occurred is consequence management
and not a responsible mitigation measure.
General Raymond. Space Force defers to the FAA for official
responses about FAA operations and civil aviation.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
global positioning system impacts
19. Senator Hirono. Mr. Deasy, Dr. Griffin, Admiral Allen, and
General Raymond, what types of activities do the military and civilian
populations rely on GPS for and how will the interference from Ligado's
network impact those activities?
Mr. Deasy. From a military perspective, GPS is essential for a wide
range of activities, such as readiness training, emergency response,
operations, and support of homeland defense. GPS capabilities are also
heavily integrated throughout Department of Defense operations and
applications, including precision weapons, air, land, and sea
navigation, communications and network synchronization, command and
control, civil engineering, and surveillance applications. Many of
these military missions are in direct support of civil authorities,
which would impact the ability to provide assistance to the civilian
population. Ligado's network impacts poses unacceptable risk of harmful
interference to GPS which could disrupt any of these military
applications. Specifically, each GPS satellite contains multiple atomic
clocks that contribute very precise time data to the GPS signals.
Precise time is crucial to a variety of capabilities, such as
communication systems, and electrical power grids.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
Admiral Allen. I would defer to my DOD colleagues regarding
impacted military activities. Regarding civilian populations, as stated
in my written testimony, global navigation satellite services (GNSS) of
which GPS is the US service, are ubiquitious in all aspects of civil
life, from personal devices to critical infrastructure to aviation
systems to intelligent transportation systems. Notable examples include
emergency service vehicles, low flying aircraft including search and
rescue aircraft, precision agriculture, power transmission, cell phone
network operations, and the timing of financial transactions.
General Raymond. The military and civilian populations rely on GPS
for nearly all aspects of everyday life, to include agriculture,
construction, package delivery, synchronizing networks to include
banking and ATMs, weather forecasting, drones, emergency response, and
more. GPS is a critical to a multitude of U.S. military operations
which include homeland defense, training and building military
readiness, and humanitarian and disaster relief efforts. Interference
from a ground-based network would degrade GPS users' ability to get
accurate location and time, putting all of these activities at risk.
The FCC's decision places the economic burden on businesses and
government agencies to assess and mitigate the risk to public safety
and productivity.
20. Senator Hirono. Mr. Deasy and Dr. Griffin, what efforts, if
any, did the Department of Defense make to work with Ligado to allow
its proposed network to co-exist with the Department's GPS
applications?
Mr. Deasy. The Department of Defense began assessing the impact of
Ligado and its predecessor companies since the start of this proceeding
17 years ago and continued to express its concern with the viability of
their proposed network to operate without adversely impacting GPS.
Throughout this process, the Department engaged with policymakers and
other stakeholders to address these issues, including by providing
feedback regarding key concerns. DOD met with Ligado on multiple
occasions, evaluated their proposals and recommended that they reduce
their power levels in order to protect GPS. Like other Federal agency
stakeholders, the Department was surprised by the timing of the Federal
Communications Commission decision, and understood there would be a
continued dialogue regarding the parameters of the proposed license
modification. In addition to the Air Force testing, the Department
agreed to set up testing at the National Advanced Spectrum and
Communications Test Network (NASCTN) to try to further advance our
understanding of whether the Ligado proposed network would impact GPS.
As a result, all testing completed to date show there will be
interference to GPS receivers.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
21. Senator Hirono. Mr. Deasy and Dr. Griffin, a number of major
GPS manufacturers, including Garmin, Trimble, and Deere, entered into
agreements with Ligado to allow their GPS receivers to co-exist with
Ligado's network. What is different about the Defense Department's GPS
receivers that won't allow them to work once Ligado's network goes
live, while Garmin's, Trimble's, Deere's receivers will continue to
operate?
Mr. Deasy. Several major GPS manufacturers, including Trimble,
Deere and Garmin, have informed FCC that their GPS receivers cannot co-
exist with Ligado's network. They dispute Ligado's characterization
that they reached ``co-existence'' agreements and are raising concerns
about major interference problems posed by the FCC Order and Ligado's
planned network in their latest filings to the FCC. For example, Garmin
told the FCC that their settlement agreement with Ligado reflects its
concern about certified aviation devices, preserves its ability to
petition the government for protection of these devices, and maintains
its ability to advocate for the use of a standard based on a 1 dB
interference protection metric. Given the Department's diverse use of
GPS for missions critical for national security, we agree with the
manufacturers that the risk of interference is too high and that all
the mitigation techniques in the FCC Order are not sufficient to
protect the operation of GPS receivers.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
22. Senator Hirono. Mr. Deasy, Dr. Griffin, and General Raymond, I
understand that Ligado has committed to upgrading or replacing
government GPS receivers that are susceptible to interference. What
would it take--in terms of cost, schedule, and operational impact--to
upgrade or replace Defense Department GPS receiver's that are
susceptible to interference from Ligado's network?
Mr. Deasy. There are approximately 1 million GPS military specific
receivers in the Department of Defense inventory. Many of these are
embedded in weapons systems and platforms that will make replacement
impractical given the time it would take to recertify and requalify the
systems. This is cost and schedule prohibitive and would significantly
degrade national security. Simple ``in-kind equipment replacements'',
even if authorized, will result in non-reimbursable testing and
integration costs. This includes additional time and effort related to
tracking the particular assets and taking the systems off-line in a way
that does not disrupt mission-critical operations.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
General Raymond. As stated in the February 14, 2020 Interdepartment
Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) Memo on National Security Impacts,
there are approximately 1 million GPS receivers currently in the DOD
inventory. Since the FCC order does not protect GPS services as a
whole, but only GPS receivers proven to be susceptible to interference,
the DOD would need to spend taxpayer dollars to test and analyze
platforms with GPS equipment in order to determine which equipment
would need to be replaced. ``Modification or replacement of GPS
receivers within DOD has historically taken approximately a decade due
to the sheer receiver numbers, complications with how receivers are
integrated in thousands of platforms and systems, depot and scheduling,
and global operations.'' Military operations would be impacted as
assets would be taken out of service for testing and evaluation, and
warfighters would be distracted from the mission of national defense.
[Reference: IRAC Memo on National Security Impacts, Feb 14, 2020]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
testing methods
23. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Deasy, the Department of Defense and
other Federal agencies used an internationally accepted method to test
for GPS interference while Ligado tested for interference using another
standard. The FCC ultimately agreed with Ligado's findings. Can you
highlight for us the differences between the international accepted
testing model and the one used by Ligado?
Mr. Deasy. The internationally recognized interference protection
criteria of 1 dB is the approach the Department used. Both the
Department of Transportation (DoT) Adjacent Band Compatibility
Assessment and Air Force testing were based on this protection criteria
and demonstrated that Ligado will cause harmful interference to GPS
operations. Ligado's performance-based metric approach is new and
untested. Specifically, Ligado, as part of their tests, relied solely
on varying the power until they saw a change in the performance of the
receiver. Given the variance in all the different types of GPS
recievers, this is not a sufficient methodology to determine the impact
to the wide range of potentially affected capabilities. Further, the
Ligado approach does not correlate with the definition of ``harmful
interference'' defined by the telecommunications regulators. Ligado
tested a limited amount of GPS receivers to determine if the power
levels actually affected performance. The government tested 80 receiver
types, while Ligado only tested 14. The government-supported test
results (i.e., DoT, Air Force testing) developed an ``interference
tolerance mask'' for categories of receivers based on a 1 dB
degradation in the reception of the GPS satellite signal. An
interference tolerance mask defines, for a particular receiver, the
maximum received aggregate interference power that can be tolerated to
protect GPS. This approach is recognized and established based on years
of study domestically and internationally.
24. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Deasy, why is the DOD and interagency
method more reliable?
Mr. Deasy. The Department of Defense considers a standardized
interference protection criteria based on internationally agreed-upon
protection criteria is the correct approach. To this end, the
Department supports the use of the 1 dB interference protection
criterion (IPC) for GPS. Use of this IPC is consistent with protection
afforded by other radiocommunications services and is the only reliable
mechanism to ensure adequate protection for civilian and military GPS
receivers.
impact on continental united states dod operations
25. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Deasy, what would the everyday impact be
on training operations, electronic warfare test ranges, disaster
response, and other DOD operations here in the United States if this
proposal went forward?
Mr. Deasy. The impact of harmful interference caused by Ligado's
planned operations would include disruptions to the wide range of
activities supported by GPS capabilities, including safety of aircraft
flight and training operations. Such interference would put at risk our
ability to test electronic warfare capabilities and create impediments
to first response and disaster relief operations. The Department cannot
accept negative operational and mission impacts to our warfighting
capabilities.
air force testing
26. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Deasy, it is my understanding that the
Air Force conducted a thorough series of tests on several dozen
receivers and concluded that the type of signal proposed by Ligado
would result in significant GPS interference. The Air Force's memo on
this study is classified--but can you discuss, in general terms, the
findings of that memo?
Mr. Deasy. The Air Force tested 80 different receivers and found
that Ligado would still interfere with GPS operations. The Department
will provide a classified briefing on the results of these tests if
requested.
way forward
27. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Deasy, Ligado has claimed that their
proposed use of L-band spectrum would cause no harmful interference to
GPS whatsoever, while on the other side, DOD and other entities appear
to be arguing that an entire 200MHz wide swatch of spectrum should
remain completely unoccupied in order to protect GPS. Is there any
middle ground?
Mr. Deasy. Ligado's use of L-band spectrum would cause significant
harmful interference to GPS. The Department does not seek for the
entire 200 MHz to be unoccupied in order to protect GPS. In fact, there
are several mobile satellite service (MSS) providers that operate in
this frequency range and provide service, such as Iridium. For example,
Iridium's portion of the L-band spectrum is 1617.775 - 1626.5 MHz and
consists of both uplink and downlink transmissions. The Department
continues to emphasize that GPS already coexists with the satellite
users in the range of spectrum dedicated to satellite uses, including
MSS (1525-1559 MHz) and the GPS/Global Navigation Satellite Systems
(1559-1610 MHz) allocations. The FCC Order changes the conditions by
allowing terrestrial usage in this band range, which will create
interference for GPS users.
impact of similar systems on gps
28. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Deasy, I have read that Iridium's mobile
system is just as close to the GPS spectrum band as is Ligado, with
terminals physically located next to the GPS receivers, with no GPS
interference. Is this true, and if so, can you explain how the Iridium
and Ligado systems are different?
Mr. Deasy. Mobile satellite service (MSS) and GPS can co-exist and
have done so for decades. Iridium is only providing a satellite-based
service (i.e., MSS) without any terrestrial component. Conversely,
Ligado is primarily seeking to deploy a terrestrial-only offering in
spectrum set aside for satellite use (e.g., MSS.). The fundamental
difference between the two is the change from satellite to terrestrial,
which creates the risk.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
scientific studies
29. Senator Warren. Dr. Griffin, the Department of Transportation
(DOT) study examined fluctuations in noise level using an interference
threshold of 1db, while the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
chose instead to look at key performance indicators. The FCC relied on
these indicators as being more closely tied to actual degradation. The
National Advanced Spectrum and Communications Test Network (NASCTN), a
multi-agency partnership of which the Department of Defense (DOD) is a
member, found through testing that GPS recognition of interference of
1db is not correlated to the performance of that GPS device. Please
explain why your agency relies on the DOT methodology for interference
rather than the FCC's key performance indicators, despite this finding
from NASCTN.
Secretary Griffin. The 1 dB protection criterion (previously
embraced by the FCC, as noted in my testimony) has been adopted
nationally and internationally because it protects the satellite
navigation band, without regard to particular transmitter-receiver
combinations, geometrical arrangements, transmission paths, weather
conditions, and other case-specific situations. The NASCTN testing was
designed to assess the performance of specific receivers under specific
test conditions. It was not designed to assess the effect of strong
adjacent band signals on the noise floor within the satellite
navigation band. The latter approach is the most appropriate in
situations where hundreds of millions of users in as many case-
dependent situations must depend upon the reception of very weak
signals in a frequency band where protection from external interference
had previously been promised.
process
30. Senator Warren. Mr. Deasy and Dr. Griffin, the FCC's order: (1)
requires Ligado to lower power levels to 10 watts; (2) ensures the
company will repair and replace government devices in the event of
potential harmful interference; (3) mandates that the company reduce
power levels further in the case of potential harmful interference to a
specific GPS receiver operating on a military installation; and (4)
includes an agreement between Ligado and six private GPS companies.
These concessions show a potential willingness to adopt safeguards for
the protection of GPS receivers. Did DOD propose additional safeguards
and requirements that, if adopted, would satisfy its concerns for the
safety of GPS equipment? If so, did Ligado adopt these recommendations?
Mr. Deasy. The Department of Defense (DOD) evaluated the reduction
of power, the repair and replacement conditions and the guard band
requirements in the Order and found them to be unacceptable. Given the
vast number of weapon systems that utilize GPS and the classified
nature of the missions, these conditions do not address what is needed
to protect military equities. The Department of Transportation (DoT)
Adjacent Band Compatibility (ABC) study, which was supported by the
Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing National Executive
Committee (PNT EXCOM), identified an acceptable power level to protect
GPS, which Ligado chose not to implement. DOD is a co-chair of the PNT
EXCOM and fully endorses the results of the DoT study. Additionally,
the GPS manufacturers that Ligado reached agreements with are on record
at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as stating that Ligado
and the Order mischaracterized the nature of those agreements. The
manufacturers continue to assert that the 1 dB metric is appropriate to
protect all GPS receivers. Further, DOD recognizes that the potential
for interference will not be limited to specific installations, given
the nature of the Department's missions and operations, such as
airborne capabilities and operations throughout the US&P. The
Department supports the GPS manufacturers' assertion of protection
needed to prevent harmful interference to protect GPS and does not
believe the Order's mitigation methods are sufficient.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
31. Senator Warren. Mr. Deasy and Dr. Griffin, non-Federal spectrum
rests entirely within the jurisdiction of the FCC. The FCC received
input from the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), DOD, the United States Air Force (USAF), and the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The FCC also relied on neutral
testing by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
assessments by the FAA, and analysis by engineers and experts. Please
explain the specific concerns, unaddressed by the FCC, that necessitate
the unusual step of subverting the FCC's clear authority in these
matters.
Mr. Deasy. In 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) expressed its
concern about the impact of the Ligado network to GPS via traditional
interagency coordination procedures established through the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). Furthermore, the government testing
indicated that the power levels of Ligado were too high and would cause
harmful interference to GPS. None of the mitigation conditions, which
Ligado proposed and the FCC accepted, were effective for DOD use of
GPS. As part of the interagency coordination, the views of DOD and
other agencies were communicated via the Space-Based Positioning
Navigation & Timing National Executive Committee (PNT EXCOM) and
correspondence submitted by NTIA, including letters written by the
Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the DOD CIO.
DOD inputs to the interagency process were submitted per 10 U.S.C.
2281, which provides that the Secretary of Defense may not agree to any
restriction on GPS proposed by the head of a department or agency of
the United States that would adversely affect the military potential of
GPS. Specific concerns were consistently communicated as part of the
process, including that the power levels are too high to be protective,
the guard band is insufficient and the mitigation and coordination
measures fall far short of needed protections.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
potential impact on military operations
32. Senator Manchin. General Raymond, the FCC order requires Ligado
to work with DOD, but it fails to require Ligado to adjust their
deployment if DOD does not agree with it. What do you believe would be
the most dangerous results to military capabilities and readiness if
the Ligado plan is allowed to continue?
General Raymond. The FCC order would put critical stateside
military operations at risk and impact the military's ability to
``train like we fight.'' This risk to military operations include our
ability to defend our Homeland, training necessary to build our
military readiness, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief campaigns. In addition, the DOD integrates and tests weapon
systems, including ground and aerial vehicles within the United States.
FCC's order will deter the DOD from focusing on its mission in order to
test, evaluate, and replace affected GPS equipment in its inventory.
FCC's order also threatens critical civilian infrastructure that DOD
relies on - our warfighters need us to protect these capabilities, so
they can focus on the mission.
satellite time and location
33. Senator Manchin. Dr. Griffin, Satellite Time and Location could
be a potentially alternate way to provide reach for GPS signals into
hard-to-reach areas such as large buildings and constricted streets
within urban environments. What is your opinion on using Satellite Time
and Location to supplement GPS, and would the Ligado plan pose a risk
to these capabilities as well?
Secretary Griffin. I am sorry, I am not familiar with ``Satellite
Time and Location''.
air force memo on ligado concerns
34. Senator Manchin. Mr. Deasy, from the Department's view, where
is the White House on this decision and has there been further
communication since the hearing between DOD and the White House and/or
DOD and the FCC? If so, please describe the details of those
communications.
Mr. Deasy. The Department of Defense has been closely communicating
with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) as they filed a petition for reconsideration on the Federal
Communication Commission's Ligado Order on behalf of the Federal
Agencies. NTIA has oversight for Federal spectrum management issues and
is the principal advisor to the President on telecommunications policy
issues.
opening of the 6 ghz band
35. Senator Manchin. Dr. Griffin, currently, in the 6 GHz band,
there are nearly 100,000 critical infrastructure fixed microwave links
providing mission critical communications to our Nation's electric
grid, oil and gas networks, water and wastewater systems, railroads,
and public safety and law enforcement communications, including 911.
Given the U.S. military's reliance on the Nation's critical
infrastructure for mission assurance, does DOD have concerns with the
FCC's Final Report and Order to open the 6 GHz band to unlicensed
operations?
Secretary Griffin. I am not familiar with the FCC Final Report and
Order opening the 6 GHz band to unlicensed operations, and am not able
to comment.
36. Senator Manchin. Dr. Griffin, has DOD discussed the 6 GHz band
with other Federal agencies or the White House National Security
Council? If not, does it plan to?
Secretary Griffin. I don't know.
37. Senator Manchin. Dr. Griffin, does DOD have concerns regarding
no real world testing of unlicensed devices prior to the band opening
up?
Secretary Griffin. I don't know.
38. Senator Manchin. Dr. Griffin, does DOD have specific concerns
with unlicensed devices operating in the band without an Automated
Frequency Control system?
Secretary Griffin. I don't know.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
2020 air force memo
39. Senator Duckworth. Dr. Griffin, paragraph 46 of FCC's Order
references a February 2020 U.S. Air Force (USAF) memorandum that was
endorsed by the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy,
Department of Commerce, NASA, Department of Interior, Department of
Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, the
National Science Foundation, DOT, U.S. Coast Guard, and FAA. With
regard to this memo, ``Ligado states that the claims of threats to
military use are unsupported, inappropriately rely on a 1 dB metric for
its interference analysis, and ignore Ligado's amended 2018 license
modification application in which Ligado reduced its proposed operating
power levels from 32 dBW to 9.8 dBW . . . '' Was the 1 dB standard the
only metric used to test interference and, if so, why?
Secretary Griffin. To the best of my knowledge, the 1 dB standard
was the sole metric used in assessing interference levels in the
satellite navigation band. This protection criterion, which limits
additional noise to a 25 percent increase over existing background
noise levels, protects the satellite navigation band as a whole,
regardless of the source of the increased noise. This is the most
appropriate method of protecting the satellite navigation band, because
it is not possible to assess the potential for inference by Ligado's
proposed operations on the millions of individual GPS receivers in use
on a case-by-case basis. The best approach is to protect the band; with
that, all users are protected.
40. Senator Duckworth. Dr. Griffin, did the range of power levels
tested for interference include the current agreement's power levels of
9.8 dBW and the former requested power levels of 32 dBW?
Secretary Griffin. Yes, the DOT testing to which the FCC refers did
address Ligado's proposed reduced power level of 9.8 dBW.
41. Senator Duckworth. Dr. Griffin, was there interference at the
lower levels tested?
Secretary Griffin. The DOT report to which the FCC referred showed
that interference would occur at the lower 9.8 dBW level, and indicated
the ranges from Ligado base stations at which such interference would
occur.
42. Senator Duckworth. Dr. Griffin, is there anything in the
amended agreement that has not been tested and would offer reason to
believe that interference can be mitigated?
Secretary Griffin. I know of no economically and operationally
viable approach to mitigating interference to GPS receivers from Ligado
base stations.
high-precision devices
43. Senator Duckworth. Dr. Griffin, paragraph 91 of FCC's Order
states, ``Our analysis should not be construed to say that there is no
potential for harmful interference to any GPS device currently in
operation or in the marketplace. Indeed, the RAA testing shows that
there is potential for harmful interference to some devices,
particularly high-precision devices.'' What systems would you
categorize as containing High-Precision GPS Devices?
Secretary Griffin. As a ``term of art'' in connection with GPS
devices and systems, ``high precision'' usually refers to survey-
quality receivers, where extreme accuracy is necessary.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
federal communications commission-ligado decision
44. Senator Jones. Mr. Deasy, according to your testimony, at one
time, the Air Force agreed to Ligado's request for a waiver because the
proposal was primarily using satellite transmitters. That suggests that
there might be some terrestrial transmissions that could be acceptable.
Please explain what the Air Force contemplated accepting at that time
and whether that would still be acceptable.
Mr. Deasy. In 2008, the Air Force agreed to the waiver before
Ligado pursued its terrestrial network in a meaningful way. In 2011,
Ligado, then under the name of LightSquared, began to pursue a
nationwide terrestrial network proposal that no longer met the agreed
upon conditions with the Air Force. It also increased the potential for
interference to GPS. There was never a Memorandum of Understanding or
formal position agreed to by the Air Force, as alleged by Ligado.
45. Senator Jones. Mr. Deasy and Dr. Griffin, is there any power
level Ligado could use that would be acceptable to the Department of
Defense?
Mr. Deasy. The Department of Transportation (DoT) Adjacent Band
Compatibility study recommended a range of tolerable power levels (-29
to -40 dBW range) needed to protect GPS. The output of Ligado
transmitters is expected to continue to be substantially larger than
what was proposed by the study. Ligado is proposing a system based on
+10 Watts. The range of acceptable power limits was endorsed by the
National Executive Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation
and Timing (PNT EXCOM), of which DOD is a member.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
46. Senator Jones. Dr. Griffin, could a wider guard band provide
sufficient protection against interference, and if so, how wide would
it need to be?
Secretary Griffin. I do not know. To the best of my knowledge,
testing has not been performed to assess how wide a guard band would
have to be to keep the noise threshold in the GPS band within the 1 dB
protection criterion. It is certain that Ligado's proposed terrestrial
base station operations within its allocation in the satellite
communications band will violate that criterion.
47. Senator Jones. Dr. Griffin, what action is required or
authorized by the Department of Defense's statutory obligation under
title 10 U.S.C. 2281 not to ``agree to any restriction of the GPS
System proposed by the head of a department or agency of the United
States outside DOD that would adversely affect the military potential
of GPS.''
Secretary Griffin. I cannot comment on actions the DOD should, or
is authorized, to take based upon 10 USC 2281.
48. Senator Jones. Mr. Deasy, when DOD submitted its objections to
Ligado's request, was it responding to the version of the proposal
which was ultimately approved by the FCC?
Mr. Deasy. No, the final version of Ligado's proposal approved by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was not shared with the
Department of Defense (DOD) or the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration. DOD remains concerned with the version
approved by the FCC, as there have been many iterations of the Ligado
proposals regarding impact to GPS.
49. Senator Jones. Mr. Deasy, Dr. Griffin, Admiral Allen, and
General Raymond, Ligado says that high precision receivers should be
able to co-exist in adjacent spectrum; that GPS receivers in
helicopters and other certified aviation are protected; that 9.8.dBW is
the relevant safe power level to protect certified civilian aviation,
and that the modifications to their proposal also protect military
aviation applications. If you disagree, please explain why.
Mr. Deasy. The Department of Transportation Adjacent Band
Compatibility test results have shown that high precision GPS receivers
are most vulnerable to the Ligado network. High precision receivers are
very sensitive and are used for a multitude of applications, both
government and civil.
Secretary Griffin. I defer to Mr. Deasy.
Admiral Allen. The publicly available DOT Adjacent Band
Compatibility Study concluded the power level of the Ligado
transmission is too high. In addition, the April 10, 2020 NTIA letter
to the FCC mentions the numerous times Ligado has admitted in publicly
filed comments that there would be harmful interference to GPS
receivers, including high precision receivers. Commerce Department
studies on the value of GPS to the Nation clearly indicate that the
relative value of Ligado's network pales in comparison.
General Raymond. The Ligado signal is a billion times more powerful
than our GPS signal once it leaves the earth. Extensive testing by
multiple agencies over the past decade has shown that 9.8 dBW does not
protect all types of GPS receivers. This is especially true of high
precision receivers. Space Force defers to FAA on the impacts to
certified aviation receivers for civilian use.
50. Senator Jones. Dr. Griffin, Ligado says there is a long-held
understanding between FCC, NTIA, and the Air Force that GPS receivers
are not entitled to protection outside their designated band. How do
you respond?
Secretary Griffin. I know of no such understanding. But as noted in
my testimony, the goal is not to assess the protection level for
individual receivers, but to protect all GPS receivers by protecting
the satellite navigation band. The long-established 1 dB protection
criterion does that.
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