[Senate Hearing 116-293]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-293
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REVIEW OF
VETTING POLICIES FOR INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY STUDENTS FOLLOWING THE
ATTACK ON NAVAL AIR STATION PENSACOLA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 4, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-284 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RICK SCOTT, Florida JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri DOUG JONES, Alabama
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
JONI ERNST, Iowa, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
March 4, 2020
Page
The Department of Defense Review of Vetting Policies for 1
International Military Students Following the Attack on Naval
Air Station Pensacola.
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Joni Ernst.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Gary C. Peters.............................. 2
Witnesses Statements
Reid, Garry, Director for Defense Intelligence, 3
Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security, Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense For Intelligence and Security.
Hooper, Lieutenant General Charles W., USA, Director, Defense 7
Security Cooperation Agency.
Questions for the Record......................................... 16
(iii)
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REVIEW OF
VETTING POLICIES FOR INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY STUDENTS FOLLOWING THE
ATTACK ON NAVAL AIR STATION PENSACOLA
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 2020
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joni
Ernst (Chairman of the Subcommittee), presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Senators Ernst, Scott,
Hawley, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JONI ERNST
Senator Ernst. Good morning, everyone. We will call this
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities to order.
The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities meets
today to receive testimony on the Department of Defense (DOD)
review of the December 6, 2019, insider attack on Naval Air
Station Pensacola in which three U.S. servicemembers tragically
lost their lives and eight more suffered injuries. It is
critical that we learn from the attack, understand the threat,
and take the necessary steps to ensure the protection of our
service men and women going forward.
I would like to welcome our witnesses: Mr. Garry Reid, who
serves as the Director for Defense Intelligence in the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and
Lieutenant General Charles Hooper, who serves as the Director
of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Thank you
both very much for being with us today, and we look forward to
your testimonies.
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) focuses on
strengthening alliances and attracting new partners as a key
component to more effectively compete with China and Russia
while countering the continued threat posed by radical
terrorist groups and rogue regimes. The NDS states that by
working together with allies and partners, we amass the
greatest possible strength for the long-term advancement of our
interests, maintaining favorable balances of power that deter
aggression and support the stability that generates growth. I
agree with the NDS.
That is why I have long supported critical security
cooperation programs such as the International Military
Training and Education (IMET). These programs provide our
partners from around the world an opportunity to train and
learn from the best here in the United States. Ultimately, our
partners return to their home countries with a greater
appreciation of the United States and impart lessons learned on
how to better organize and employ their own armed forces. These
programs improve our interoperability with key partners and lay
the foundation for enduring cooperation that will pay dividends
for years to come.
Over the past 20 years, more than 1 million international
military students have trained in the United States. Currently
the United States hosts over 5,000 students from 153 countries.
Many of the students who come to the United States are the same
troops who have fought or will fight alongside Americans down
range. Oftentimes they rise through the ranks and become
leaders in their own armed forces, with many becoming chiefs of
defense, ministers, or even presidents.
However, while the benefits of these programs are
invaluable, the tragic events at Pensacola highlight
unacceptable shortfalls in our security standards and vetting
procedures. The attacker, Saeed Alshamrani, arrived in the
United States in 2017 and harbored anti-U.S. sentiments which
he broadcasted on social media, all the while he was able to
purchase a firearm, access U.S. military installations, and
ultimately carry out a deadly attack against Americans. We must
do more to protect our military personnel and ensure the
security of our facilities.
Mr. Reid and General Hooper, we look forward to your
testimonies explaining the results of the Department of Defense
review and describing what corrective steps are being
undertaken. Your findings are critical to our efforts to ensure
the Department has the resources, the support, and the
authorities it needs. Thank you again for joining us. I look
forward to the discussion.
Before I hand it over to Senator Peters for his opening
remarks, I would like to remind everyone that later we will
close the hearing in order to discuss sensitive matters of
national security. At that point, we will ask for the public
and members of the press to exit the room. We appreciate your
cooperation and understanding. The intent is for us to break at
10:30 a.m., and we will then at that time clear the room.
Senator Peters and I will go vote. We do have a vote called for
10:30 a.m., and then we will reassemble those that have the
authority to stay in the room. We will reassemble. So thank you
very much.
Ranking Member Peters?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR GARY C. PETERS
Senator Peters. Let me begin by thanking Senator Ernst for
holding this hearing on changes made by the Department of
Defense in response to the December 6, 2019, attack at Naval
Station Pensacola that unfortunately and tragically resulted in
the death of three U.S. servicemembers and wounding of eight
other Americans. Our thoughts remain with the victims and their
families.
We have a responsibility to the victims to learn all that
we can from the attack and to implement changes that will
mitigate the risk of future occurrences to the greatest extent
possible.
Following the attack, the Department reacted quickly to put
in place additional safety measures.
The provision of training to foreign military personnel is
a comparative advantage of the United States over our near-peer
competitors like China and Russia. Such training not only helps
to improve interoperability with foreign partners, but also to
establish connections with junior officers that then go on to
hold significant leadership positions in their home countries
in the future.
Indeed, the International Military Education and Training,
or IMET, program is regularly cited by our military and
diplomatic leadership as the most effective and resource-
efficient tool that we have to build strong military-to-
military relationships with foreign partners.
Despite these clear benefits, we must ensure that such
training does not risk the safety of U.S. military personnel,
other foreign students, or the installations in which the
training is occurring.
On January 17, the Department announced new safety
measures, and I am looking forward to hearing about those new
safety measures from the witnesses today.
I want to thank the chair once again for holding this
hearing, and I look forward to the discussion.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
We will go ahead with our witnesses' opening statements,
and we will start with you, Mr. Reid.
STATEMENT OF GARRY REID, DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE,
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND SECURITY, OFFICE OF
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
Mr. Reid. Thank you, Chairman Ernst and Ranking Member
Peters, Senator Scott, other Members that may be joining us. We
appreciate the opportunity to testify today and address your
questions regarding our review of international military
student screening and vetting procedures.
The tragic loss of life that occurred at Pensacola Naval
Air Station on December 6, 2019, will never fade from our
memories. Three young and vibrant U.S. Navy sailors, Ensign
Kaleb Watson, Airman Cameron Walters, and Airman Mo Haitham,
were tragically taken from us, their families, and their loved
ones, paying the ultimate sacrifice to save others by
heroically confronting their attacker. Three of the eight
wounded were first responders from the Naval Security Forces
and the Escambia County Sheriff's Office. Their brave actions
to get control of the situation within 15 minutes of the
initial gunfire saved many more from the heavily armed shooter.
We are forever indebted to our fallen comrades and those that
took swift action to protect others from what was later
determined by the U.S. Department of Justice as an act of
terrorism.
We greatly appreciate the outstanding work of our Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies. It was the great
partnership between Naval Security Forces Pensacola and the
Escambia County Sheriff's Office that enabled such a swift and
effective response to this attack, saving countless lives.
In response to the attack, the Department of Defense
immediately implemented a safety and security stand-down. The
Secretary of Defense directed my office to take immediate steps
in two areas: one, to strengthen the vetting process for
international military students (IMS) immediately; and two, to
conduct a comprehensive review of the policies and procedures
in place for screening foreign students and granting them
access to our bases. I am here today to brief you on the
results of this work and, as you already mentioned, Madam
Chair, to follow up in a closed session to talk about some of
the national security details.
With regard to first task, we screened all current Saudi
Arabian military students immediately using new procedures that
we had recently put in place as part of our personnel vetting
transformation initiative which, as you have been previously
briefed, we are building towards a continuous vetting process
that relies on automated data record searches as a supplement
to the investigative process. We put this process into place
for the international military students, and it stays in place
today. We screened all of the Saudi students, and we are
continuing to work through the full population of roughly 5,000
current IMS.
These automated searches look at intelligence community-
derived data sets that include government data, commercial
data, and publicly available data. The results of these checks
are analyzed by trained security experts and analysts and used
as a basis for determination if further investigative action
could be required.
In this case, the review produced only a small number of
returns that required additional analysis within the Department
of Defense, but none that triggered any remedial action or
further investigation by Federal authorities relative to the
current population. It should be noted, however, that the
perpetrator of the attack and several of those associated with
the perpetrator were not subjected to this review because they
were already subjected to the ongoing FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation] investigation and, they were examined more
thoroughly through that process. As you may have been briefed,
that resulted ultimately in the removal of 21 Saudi Arabian
military officers from training in the United States for
misconduct, however, not related to the December 6 attack.
Moving on to the policy review, we found that the
Department of Defense has been overly reliant on the vetting
conducted by the Department of State as part of their
assessment of eligibility for the visa and that there is
insufficient information sharing in place between DOD and the
Department of State in that process.
We also found that DOD programs meant to detect and
mitigate events such as the Pensacola attack did not cover
international military students, for instance, our insider
threat programs. We learned that policies for international
military student possession of firearms varied at the
installation level and that at the Federal level there are ways
to bypass firearms restrictions for non-immigrant visa holders.
We are well underway to implement the 6 recommendations
derived from 21 findings contained in the report. Additional
screening and vetting measures are already in effect for all
current and future international military students. The
Secretary has issued new policies related to access credentials
and the possession of privately owned firearms and ammunition
for our international military students. We will build on this
with additional changes that reach across the entire student
populations and foreign affiliate landscape within the
Department of Defense.
To implement these recommendations, I have established a
vetting and security review improvement integration group, co-
chaired with General Hooper's office and the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency. We have four subordinate working groups
going through each of these recommendations and findings in
detail to implement the full set of proposals and ideas. We
will be happy to provide you these details in the closed
session.
In closing, it is important to note that this work is not
singularly focused on the tragic events that occurred at
Pensacola. Protecting our personnel and our military bases is a
top priority for Secretary Esper. Across the Department, we are
actively reinforcing our insider threat programs, improving
base security, and strengthening our counterintelligence
posture. Within the Federal Government, we are in the midst of
the most significant reform of the background investigation
process in decades, adopting new technologies, and improving
our awareness of personnel security threats.
We appreciate all the congressional support we have
received over the past several years to provide us the
resources and authorities for the full range of DOD security,
counterintelligence, law enforcement, and insider threat
programs. It is this ongoing work that enabled us to quickly
adapt the international military student vetting process. We
will continue to modernize this enterprise for all trusted
personnel that live, work, and do business on Department of
Defense installations around the world.
Thank you again for your interest in these matters, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reid follows:]
Prepared Statement by Garry Reid
Chairman Ernst, Ranking Member Peters, distinguished
Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to
testify today and address your questions regarding the
Department of Defense Review of International Military Student
Vetting and Screening procedures.
The tragic loss of life that occurred at the Pensacola
Naval Air Station on December 6, 2019, will never fade from our
memory. Three U.S. Navy servicemembers perished on that day,
and eight more were wounded, gunned down by a classmate in what
was later determined by the U.S. Department of Justice to be an
act of terrorism. This deadly attack shook the foundations of
our military partnerships--through which we derive strategic
advantages over our adversaries. The Pensacola military-
civilian community grieved over the senseless loss of three
young sailors eager to serve their country. The Department of
Defense implemented a safety and security stand-down to take
full stock of the situation. The Secretary of Defense ordered a
full security review. New policies were put in place. Slowly
our military departments took steps to resume training--
realizing however that things will never get ``back to
normal.''
The mission continues. Every day, around the globe, U.S.
and foreign military personnel train and fight side-by-side to
counter aggression and preserve freedom. As we mourn our fallen
comrades, we cannot allow the actions of one person to unravel
decades of security cooperation. Instead, we must take careful
account of the policies, processes, and procedures we use to
select more than 20,000 International Military Students for
training alongside our forces here in the United States each
year. Four days after the Pensacola attack, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense directed the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence and Security to take immediate steps to 1)
strengthen vetting for International Military Students (IMS);
and 2) to complete a 10-day review of policies and procedures
for screening foreign students and granting access to our
bases. I would like to give you the unclassified highlights of
this work, and offer a classified briefing to discuss some of
the details.
With regard to the first task, the Department of Defense
screened all current Saudi International Military Students
using ``Expedited Screening Protocol'' procedures that were
already developed within the Defense Counterintelligence and
Security Agency (DCSA) as part of our Personnel Vetting
transformation initiative. The term ``expedited'' refers to the
application of automated checks of multiple data sets--
including government data, commercial data, and publicly
available data. The results of these automated data checks are
reviewed and validated by trained security analysts. The intent
of this process was to determine if there was any information
that could be an indicator of elevated risk that was not
previously identified as part of the International Military
Student applicant screening and approval process.
This review produced a small number of returns that
required additional analysis within the Department of Defense ,
but none that triggered any remedial action or further
investigation by Federal authorities. It should be noted that
the perpetrator of the Pensacola attack, and several Saudi
Arabian officers that were associated with the shooter, were
not subjected to this internal Department of Defense review.
Separately, however, the Department of Defense worked closely
with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in support of their investigation into the
attack. On January 13th, the Attorney General announced the
results of this investigation, concluding that the shooter was
motivated by jihadist ideology, and that this was an act of
terrorism.
While there was no evidence of assistance or pre-knowledge
of the attack by other members of the Saudi military (or any
other foreign nationals) who were training in the United
States, during the investigation of the shooter we learned of
derogatory material possessed by 21 members of the Saudi
military who were training in the United States. The relevant
U.S. Attorneys offices independently reviewed each of the 21
cases involving derogatory information and determined that none
of the cases would, in the course of a normal Federal
investigation, result in Federal prosecution. Nonetheless, our
Service Secretaries and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
determined that these international military students failed to
meet the professional standards expected of students
participating in our foreign military training programs. The
Department of Defense worked with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
to withdraw the students from training and return them to Saudi
Arabia.
Regarding the 10-day review of policies and procedures, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
established a Vetting and Security Review (VSR) team, led by a
Senior Defense security policy official. A primary goal for
this review team was to more closely align screening and
security procedures for foreign students with those for U.S.
personnel. The review team included representatives from across
the DOD, including all four Military Services, the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, the Defense Counterintelligence
and Security Agency, and others. Participants brought expertise
in physical security, vetting, international affairs and
security cooperation, counterintelligence and law enforcement,
and many other disciplines. The Department of State and the
United States Customs and Border Protection also participated
in this review team and provided valuable insight. We focused
this initial review on International Military Students from the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia--with whom we have an outstanding
history of security cooperation. Follow on reviews will examine
all International Military Students and sending nations.
The review included an assessment of information obtained
and processed prior to the Saudi International Military Student
traveling for training to the United States, an assessment of
vetting procedures occurring prior to the Saudi International
Military Student departing for the United States, an assessment
of vetting procedures at the Saudi International Military
Student's point of arrival, and an assessment of vetting
procedures ongoing while the Saudi International Military
Student is in the U.S. We analyzed what information on the
Saudi International Military Student was available for
screening, which data holdings were checked, and how any
derogatory information identified in those checks was handled.
We analyzed the training requirements and credentialing
procedures for Saudi International Military Students. We looked
at firearms and physical security policy and procedures for
Saudi International Military Students.
After the team completed their review, they generated a 12-
page classified report that made six recommendations to address
their 21 findings. We found that for issues from security to
suitability, the Department of Defense is overly reliant on the
vetting conducted by the Department of State as part of the
assessment of eligibility for A-2 visas, and that there is
insufficient information sharing within Department of Defense
and between Department of Defense and the Department of State.
We also found that Department of Defense programs meant to
detect and mitigate events such as the Pensacola attack did not
cover International Military Students. We learned that
Department of Defense policies for International Military
Students' possession of firearms varied at the installation
level, and at the Federal level there are ways to bypass
firearms restrictions for non-immigrant visa holders.
We are well underway to implement the recommendations in
the report. Additional screening and vetting measures are in
effect for all current and future International Military
Students. The Secretary of Defense has issued new policies
related to access credentials and possession of privately owned
firearms and ammunition for International Military Students. We
will build on this with additional changes that reach across
the entire International Military Student and foreign affiliate
landscape in the Department of Defense. In my role as the
Defense Security Executive, I established a Vetting and
Security Review Improvement Integration Group, co-chaired by my
office and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to oversee
and coordinate these efforts. Four subordinate working groups
are working to implement the full set of recommendations. I
would be happy to provide further details on the report and our
efforts to implement the recommendations in a classified
setting.
In closing, it's important to note that this work is not
singularly focused on the tragic events that occurred at the
Pensacola Naval Air Station. Protecting our personnel and our
military bases is a top priority for the Secretary of Defense.
Across the Department of Defense we are actively reinforcing
our Insider Threat programs, improving base security, and
strengthening our counterintelligence posture. Within the
Federal Government, we are in the midst of the most significant
reform of the Background Investigation process in decades,
adopting new technologies and improving our awareness of
personnel security threats. We appreciate all of the
Congressional support we have received over the past several
years to provide resources and authorities for the full range
of Department of Defense security, counterintelligence, law
enforcement, and insider threat programs. It was this ongoing
work that enabled us to quickly adapt the International
Military Student vetting process. We will continue to modernize
our vetting and security enterprises for all trusted personnel
that live, work, and do business on Department of Defense
installations around the world.
Thank you again for your interest in these important
matters. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Ernst. Great. Thank you very much, Mr. Reid.
General Hooper, thank you.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHARLES W. HOOPER, USA,
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY
Lieutenant General Hooper. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman,
Ranking Member Peters, for convening this hearing today. I
acknowledge the presence of Senator Scott, ladies, and
gentlemen.
The training and education of foreign military personnel in
the United States is one of our most effective tools to
strengthen alliances and attract new partners. As a foreign
area officer and a career security cooperator, I have worked
alongside many foreign military leaders whose training in the
United States established an appreciation for American culture
and values and has shaped longstanding cooperation and
partnership with the United States.
While the value of these types of military training and
education programs cannot be overstated, I want to be
absolutely clear that nothing is more important than
safeguarding American lives. The incident in Pensacola was
tragic, and my heart remains with the families of those we lost
and with the people of Pensacola for the impact this event has
had on their community.
My colleague and I today will be sharing new procedures the
U.S. Government has put into place to reduce risk and improve
the training environment so that all U.S. foreign military
civilian personnel and their families remain safe and have the
opportunity to continue benefiting from our foreign military
training programs.
The training and education of foreign military personnel
alongside U.S. Forces, specifically in the United States, is
one of our most effective security cooperation tools. What
makes the U.S. approach to security cooperation different from
that of our strategic competitors is that the basis of our
approach is not the sale of goods and services but the enduring
relationship that comes along with it. At the heart of any
defense relationship is a human relationship that is built and
fostered through opportunities for U.S. and foreign military
students to train alongside one another. When international
military students attend training and education in the United
States, they are exposed to our values, our culture, and our
people. These experiences serve as the building blocks for our
long-term strategic and defense relationships.
In addition to building lasting relationships, these
training programs build the capacity of our allies and partners
to provide for their own defense and contribute to shared
security challenges. Education and training in the United
States is foundational to building an enduring interoperability
with our partners and allies.
Since the year 2000, over 1 million international military
students have been trained in the United States. We have
trained more than 28,000 Saudi students over the life of our
security cooperation relationship. It is worth noting that
close to 4,000 heads of state, ministers of defense, chiefs of
defense, and other general officers received training by the
United States. This delivers a lasting strategic return on our
security cooperation investments.
Recently, our own Secretary of Defense discussed his
personal experience training alongside foreign partners. He
attended West Point with students from other countries, trained
at the Hellenic Military Academy, and trained alongside an
officer from the African continent while he was on Active Duty.
These experiences have shaped his strong support for foreign
military training and education programs and informed the
Department's response to the incident in Pensacola.
International military students can receive training and
education in the United States under a variety of programs. The
Department of Defense and the Department of State both have
authorities and appropriations to fund military training in the
United States. Most of this training occurs at Department of
Defense facilities and schools.
The Department of Defense provides and funds international
military training and education under a variety of DOD programs
such as section 333 Global Train and Equip, the Counter-ISIL
[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] Train and Equip Fund,
the Afghan Security Forces Fund, the Regional Centers for
Security Studies, and the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism
and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program, which we now refer to
as the Regional Defense Fellowship Program.
The Department of State has three main programs to fund
U.S. training of foreign militaries for which the Department of
Defense is the main implementer: the International Military
Education and Training, or IMET, program; Foreign Military
Financing; and the Peacekeeping Operations account, which
includes the Global Peace Operations Initiative.
Department of State funding, via the IMET program, is
focused on the professionalization of partner nation military
forces. By emphasizing professional military education at every
level of an individual's career, we seek to develop
professional leaders with whom the United States can work and
foster enduring relationships that enable collaboration over
time.
The Department of State uses Foreign Military Financing to
fund training, which typically focuses on tactical or
operational subjects and is directly related to a procurement
made through other programs.
In addition, State funds training through the Peacekeeping
Operations account, which is almost exclusively conducted in
partner nations and is primarily for peacekeeping,
counterterrorism, maritime security, and military
professionalization purposes in select countries.
The programs I have discussed thus far are programs that
rely primarily on U.S. grant assistance. However, many of our
allies and partners use their own money to come to the United
States for DOD-provided training associated with procurements
of defense articles and services under Foreign Military Sales.
DSCA is responsible for ensuring transfers of defense articles
and services, to include the necessary training and education
to ensure the effective operation and sustainment of these
systems.
DSCA's role in supporting foreign military training
executed pursuant to these authorities is to implement and
administer these programs by providing policy guidance and
support to the U.S. Government stakeholders who are part of the
enterprise. These stakeholders include the geographical
combatant commands and the security cooperation offices at
embassies, the State Department's Political Military Affairs
Bureau, and the military departments whose schoolhouses run a
majority of the training and education programs. DSCA's support
ranges from annual security cooperation planning conferences to
issuing and maintaining DOD-wide guidance for the execution of
its security assistance and security cooperation programs.
For example, while DSCA is not directly involved in the
screening or vetting of international military students, the
agency issues policies and procedural guidance that requires
international military students to receive security and medical
screening in their home countries. However, due to this unique
individual nature of our bilateral relationships, each U.S.
ambassador determines the local security screening processes
for their individual posts. Meanwhile, any student who comes to
the United States under one of these programs is also screened
and vetted to determine their eligibility for a U.S. visa. The
visa application process includes screening against biographic
and biometric databases, an interagency counterterrorism check,
and at 37 posts worldwide, including those in Saudi Arabia,
screening by an Immigration and Customs Enforcement/Homeland
Security Investigations Visa Security Unit.
DSCA, the Department of State, and the Offices of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Policy, the military
departments, and our foreign partners are all critical to
ensuring the success of our foreign military training programs,
and we have been working hand in hand to update processes and
policy guidance in response to the events in Pensacola.
In closing, I want to reiterate how invaluable foreign
military training programs are to advancing our national
security objectives. International military students are here
as student visitors to learn skills and professions but also to
learn about our people, our culture, and our values. This
cannot be overstated. The human relationships forged between
our respective military members promotes long-term defense and
strategic relationships, increases our interoperability, and
enables partners to contribute to our shared security
objectives over the long term.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Hooper
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Charles W. Hooper
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Ranking Member Peters, for
convening this hearing today.
The training and education of foreign military personnel in the
United States is one of our most effective tools to strengthen
alliances and attract new partners. As a Foreign Area Officer and
career security cooperator, I have worked alongside many foreign
military leaders whose training in the United States established an
appreciation for American culture and values and has shaped long-
standing cooperation and partnership with the United States.
While the value of these types of military training and education
programs cannot be overstated, I want to be clear that nothing is more
important than safeguarding American lives. The incident in Pensacola
was tragic, and my heart remains with the families of those that we
lost and with the people of Pensacola for the impact this event has had
on the community. My colleague and I today will be sharing new
procedures the U.S. Government has put into place to reduce risk and
improve the training environment so that all U.S., foreign military,
civilian personnel, and their families remain safe and have the
opportunity to continue benefitting from our foreign military training
programs.
The training and education of foreign military personnel alongside
U.S. Forces, and specifically in the United States, is one of our most
effective security cooperation tools. What makes the U.S. approach to
security cooperation different from that of our strategic competitors
is that the basis of our approach isn't the sale of goods and services,
but the enduring relationship that comes along with it. At the heart of
any defense relationship is a human relationship that is built and
fostered through opportunities for U.S. and foreign military students
to train alongside one another. When international military students
attend training and education in the United States, they are exposed to
our values, our culture, and our people. These experiences serve as the
building blocks for our long-term strategic and defense relationship.
In addition to building lasting relationships, these training
programs build the capacity of our allies and partners to provide for
their own defense and contribute to shared security challenges.
Education and training in the United States is foundational to building
an enduring interoperability with our partners and allies.
Since the year 2000, over one million international military
students have been trained by the United States. We have trained more
than 28,000 Saudi students over the life of our security cooperation
relationship. It is worth noting that close to 4,000 Heads of State,
Ministers of Defense, Chiefs of Defense, and other General Officers
received training by the United States. This delivers a lasting
strategic return on our security cooperation investments.
Recently, our own Secretary of Defense discussed his personal
experience training alongside foreign partners. He attended West Point
with students from other countries, trained at the Hellenic Military
Academy, and trained alongside an officer from the African continent
while he was Active Duty. These experiences have shaped his strong
support for foreign military training and education programs and
informed the Department's response to the incident in Pensacola.
International Military Students can receive training and education
in the United States under a variety of programs. The Department of
Defense and the Department of State both have authorities and
appropriations to fund military training in the United States. Most of
this training occurs at Department of Defense facilities and schools.
The Department of Defense provides and funds international military
training and education under a variety of DOD programs such as Section
333 Global Train and Equip, the Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund, the
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Regional Centers for Security
Studies, and the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism and Irregular
Warfare Fellowship Program, which we now refer to as the Regional
Defense Fellowship Program.
The Department of State has three main programs to fund U.S.
training of foreign militaries for which the Department of Defense is
the main implementer: the International Military Education and Training
(or IMET) program, Foreign Military Financing, and the Peacekeeping
Operations account, which includes the Global Peace Operations
Initiative.
Department of State funding, via the IMET program, is focused on
the professionalization of partner nation military forces. By
emphasizing Professional Military Education at every level of an
individual's career, we seek to develop professional leaders with whom
the United States can work and foster enduring relationships that
enable collaboration over the long-term.
The Department of State also uses Foreign Military Financing to
fund training, which typically focuses on tactical or operational
subjects and/or is directly related to a procurement made through other
programs.
In addition, State funds training through the Peacekeeping
Operations account, which is almost exclusively conducted in partner
nations and is primarily for peacekeeping, counterterrorism, maritime
security and military professionalization purposes in select countries.
The programs I have discussed thus far are programs that rely
primarily on U.S. grant assistance. However, many of our allies and
partners use their own money to come to the United States for DOD
provided training associated with procurements of defense articles and
services under the Foreign Military Sales program. DSCA is responsible
for ensuring transfers of defense articles and services, to include the
necessary training and education to ensure the effective operation and
sustainment of these systems.
DSCA's role, in supporting foreign military training executed
pursuant to these authorities, is to implement and administer these
programs by providing policy guidance and support to the U.S.
Government stakeholders who are part of the enterprise. Those
stakeholders include the Geographic Combatant Commands and the security
cooperation offices at embassies, the State Department's Political
Military Affairs Bureau, and the Military Departments, whose
schoolhouses run a majority of the training and education programs.
DSCA's support ranges from annual security cooperation planning
conferences to issuing and maintaining DOD-wide guidance for the
execution of its security assistance and security cooperation programs.
For example, while DSCA is not directly involved in the screening
or vetting of international military students, the Agency issues policy
and procedural guidance that requires international military students
to receive security and medical screening in their home country.
However, due to the unique individual nature of our bilateral
relationships, each U.S. Ambassador determines the local security
screening process for their post. Meanwhile, any student who comes to
the United States under one of these programs is also screened and
vetted to determine their eligibility for a U.S. visa. The visa
application process includes screening against biographic and biometric
databases, an interagency counter terrorism check, and, at 37 posts
worldwide, including those in Saudi Arabia, screening by an Immigration
and Customs Enforcement/Homeland Security Investigations Visa Security
Unit.
DSCA, the Department of State, the Offices of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence and Policy, the Military Departments, and
our foreign partners are all critical to ensuring the success of our
foreign military training programs--and we have been working hand-in-
hand to update processes and policy guidance in response to the events
in Pensacola.
In closing, I want to reiterate how invaluable foreign military
training programs are to advancing our national security objectives.
International military students are here as student visitors to learn
skills and professions, but also to learn about our people, our
culture, and our values. This cannot be overstated. These human
relationships forged between our respective military members promote
long-term defense and strategic relationships, increase our
interoperability, and enable partners to contribute to our shared
security objectives over the long term.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
We will go ahead and start with our rounds of questions,
and we will get as many questions in as we can prior to
breaking for the vote. I will go ahead and start with a couple
of questions about acquisition of weapons in the United States.
Mr. Reid and General Hooper, thanks again for being here
today to testify. This is an important topic.
I would like to begin by talking about the ability of
foreign international military students to acquire weapons in
the United States. According to the FBI, the Pensacola shooter
used a hunting license to legally purchase a 9 millimeter Glock
45 pistol. Mr. Reid, can you discuss the ways in which foreign
nationals, foreign students can obtain a weapon either on or
off a military base?
Mr. Reid. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair.
As we mentioned, we had variances in our policies that did
not specifically proscribe international military students from
obtaining, purchasing, and handling firearms while they were
enrolled in the training. Secretary Esper has issued new
guidance that makes that a clear prohibition and is a condition
of them accepting the opportunity to train in the United States
going forward that they will sign this acknowledgement
statement that they are no longer--regardless of any State,
local, and Federal laws, that they are proscribed by the
Secretary as a sponsor of that training. So we have put that in
place.
With regard to the shooter in Pensacola, as you noted--and
you have likely seen the same things I have seen coming out of
the FBI and ATF [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives] where in most States in this country, if you have a
valid hunting license, there is no further requirement for any
documentation, which seems to go against other statutes that
proscribe non-immigrant visa holders from doing that. I am not
an expert on either one of these areas, but we understand that
to be the case.
We are working with ATF right now. I believe from our
department, we intend to put forward changes to legislation to
close down what looks like a loophole there. I understand that
ATF is looking at it very similarly.
All of this, of course, we are talking about the legal
purchase, but if you know a little bit about the firearms in
general, purchasing from an individual is different from a
firearms dealer, and many of these restrictions that we just
talked about--they vary when it is just individual-to-
individual sales. Then that does not even get into the non-
legal acquisition of firearms. There are clearly many ways in
this country to obtain a firearm.
What we have taken action on from the Secretary is to make
it very clear to all of our military partners that any use of
firearms while they are here in training--first of all, they
are proscribed from the purchasing, as we mentioned. We
acknowledge, however, that there are many traditions on many of
our bases for skeet shooting and other firearms-related sport
activities. The Secretary has granted the installation
commanders the discretion to approve those actions, should they
comport with and be consistent with the training environment
and should there be no other reason for the commander to
disapprove that. We put that down in their hands to do that
different from the acquisition of the weapon that we already
talked about.
We have not completely prohibited any of them from ever
handling a firearm. We have received concerns from many members
and partner nations about some of these sport activities, and
we are open-minded about how those possibilities may work in
the future, but they will be at the discretion of the local
commander and with that awareness on a limited specifically
approved basis.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Certainly I do not believe that through
school activities or those sporting activities, most of the
training may require different weapons to be handled, but
certainly that would be different than the acquisition of a
weapon.
My time is expiring. I would like to move on to Ranking
Member Peters for questions, and then we will go on to the
other Members of the Subcommittee.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Reid, I just want to kind of drill down a little bit
more on your answer on dealing with firearms as to how that is
actually going to be enforced. Now, you do testify that it is
very easy to get a firearm in the United States right now. Even
when you have this prohibition, how are you going to be working
with State and local authorities to actually enforce it was my
first question.
The second part is that even legal purchases--you mentioned
the person-to-person, but under our background check laws, I
think roughly 40 percent of weapons are sold without any kind
of background check if you do it online or if you go to gun
shows. So how are you going to deal with those challenges?
Mr. Reid. Thank you, Senator Peters.
We are coming at it from a couple of angles, again working
with ATF and working within the enterprise that forms the
National Instant Crime Check System, there are pathways for us
to create alerting functions within there for certain
populations. We are exploring that with ATF. But as you already
mentioned, it is not going to stop everything.
Within our own department, we have put in place additional
programs and procedures going down at the installation level
with our insider threat programs, training and educating the
full student population on things that would be indicators of
nefarious or undesirable behaviors, such as off-book firearms
activities. We put some filters in place so our entire student
body in our cadre are more attuned to recognizing where there
may be indicators of this behavior.
We are also--General Hooper is probably better to
describe--putting in additional measures with the host nation
governments, particularly the Saudi Government, on training
controls and supervision of the training population that will
give us an additional layer of observation. So we are tackling
it in that way and through the technical side working within
the legal framework.
Senator Peters. Let me pick up on that. Has Saudi Arabia
made any commitments with respect to vetting their personnel
before they actually are sent to the United States? If I heard
your testimony correctly, this individual was posting things on
social media prior to coming to the United States. Is that
accurate?
Mr. Reid. I will go to the first part, and Senator Ernst
mentioned it I believe. Through the investigation, the FBI
uncovered that the attacker had posted in the few month time
period preceding the attack some jihadist type rhetoric. I am
not aware of any posting by this person before they came here.
Do you want to address the Government?
Lieutenant General Hooper. Sir, as to the first part of
your question, the answer to your question is yes. The Saudis
have agreed to do a number of things differently, and they have
been very willing to work with the United States on improving
their own internal vetting processes. This includes increased
psychological and behavioral testing prior to nomination to
uncover potential ideological, social, or family issues or
anxieties. They are also providing their nominations to us
ahead of time with greater lead time to allow our own U.S.
vetting sufficient time to operate.
Finally, we will be asking the Saudis to consider the
individual's personal opinions or attitudes towards the U.S.
Government, U.S. officials, U.S. policies, and Western culture
and respect for persons of different race, gender, religion,
national origin, or sexual orientation when screening them for
training in the United States.
Senator Peters. You mentioned that right now the focus is
screening all current Saudi personnel in the United States and
that eventually it will go to the entire population. How are
you prioritizing that?
Mr. Reid. Senator, we are about two-thirds of the way
through the 5,000, roughly, population currently in the
country. We are prioritizing on the basis of our terrorism high
threat categorization that comes out of the Director for
National Intelligence of our high threat terrorism locations,
correlating that with the student populations, and working that
as a priority scheme.
Senator Peters. Then you will engage in continuous
monitoring. Walk me through how you plan to continuously
monitor these 5,000 individuals.
Mr. Reid. From the technical point of view, the database
search functions that I have already described--we have the
ability to query and to set alerts within those data sets, much
like we do for our own continuous vetting population for our
national security populations.
We are additionally pursuing and working through a pilot
right now on a social media monitoring and alerting function
through commercial vendors. We have had a lot of people offer
that to us, and I will tell you, frankly, when we put it to the
test and tried to do it on scale, you are sometimes
dissatisfied with the fidelity of the results. Of course,
anytime we are talking about social media, you have a host of
issues about identity resolution and matching that to a person
and the credibility of the information. But we are pursuing
that at the direction of the Secretary to be more proactively
monitoring on the social media front.
Some of the databases we are already monitoring derive from
some social media sources, but it is not comprehensive, so we
are pursuing that.
The third means of monitoring is a non-technical means that
I already described, Senator, which would be through our
insider threat awareness programs that exist at the
installation.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Senator Ernst. Senator Scott?
Senator Scott. Thank you, Senator Ernst, for holding this
hearing.
Thank each of you for being here.
This happened in my home State. One thing that has
surprised me is why do people not call this terrorism. It is
like nobody wants to use the word ``terrorism,'' and clearly,
this was somebody that post jihadist information and clearly
was anti-America. But people want to talk about this being an
incident or something like that. I do not know how anybody
could think it was not terrorism. Why is there a reluctance to
call this terrorism?
Mr. Reid. I will speak for myself, Senator, but also for
the Department. We fully recognize the conclusions of the
Attorney General that this was an act of terrorism. I know
within the Department of the Navy and the honors and
recognitions they bestowed upon the three fallen sailors
recognize that they fell at the hands of a terrorist attack. I
have not experienced any pushback on our side, and if I
referred to it differently, it was in no way to downplay the
fact that it was--I spent 28 years in special operations
fighting terrorism, so I am very sensitive to that. Thank you.
Senator Scott. General, does the Department feel like if
you call it terrorism, it hurts what we are trying to do?
Lieutenant General Hooper. Sir, I concur with my colleague
that it has been unequivocally identified as an act of
terrorism.
Senator Scott. What everybody talks about is how having the
training here helps build long-term relationships and all that,
and it sounds really good. My concern, though, is when you talk
to people that have been part of this--there are a lot of
countries that participate--and they will say that there are
countries where, yes, we have long-term relationships after the
fact because we train together. But I have not to date found
one person that has said they had a long-term relationship with
Saudi nationals that they trained with. I think all of us know
the importance of our relationship with Saudi Arabia. It is an
ally. It is clearly somebody that we rely on to work with in
the Middle East.
Should we look at countries differently? Because if you
listen to your testimony, especially yours, General, you talk a
lot about the importance of this relationship. I hear that, but
I never hear that about Saudi Arabia. Are there countries that
we ought to say that maybe we should not be doing this or there
is something different that we ought to be doing, we should do
more of it in their home country, things like that?
Lieutenant General Hooper. Sir, in answer to your question,
the defense attache from Saudi Arabia and I have had multiple
discussions about this perception of Saudi students in
Pensacola and at other training installations. He has expressed
his concern over this, and he has come to us with solutions on
how the Saudis intend to address this. Then I will discuss how
we intend to address this issue.
Among the steps that the Saudis have committed to are
increased cultural awareness training before their students
begin training in the United States, to increase their
security, religious, ideological awareness, and U.S. personnel
will deliver part of this training.
Second, we will be distributing a code of conduct, and they
will be distributing a code of conduct detailing what the
kingdom leadership expects of their students while in the
United States.
Third, there will be increased supervision of Saudi
students by both local liaison officers and more personal
engagement and oversight by the Saudi defense attache who, as
you know, is the senior Saudi defense official in the United
States. We are working with the Saudis to ensure that their
liaison officers are sufficiently senior in rank to ensure
their effectiveness and authority in this role, and I can tell
you personally that, in consultation with the Navy, I have
conveyed to the Saudi leadership that we will not accept
anything less than a colonel at Pensacola, a Saudi colonel to
be the liaison officer at Pensacola.
In addition, the Department of Defense, in collaboration
with the Department of State, has reviewed existing standards
of conduct for international military students and is
transmitting to Saudi Arabia a conduct expectations document to
further inform their vetting.
Beyond just these dos and don'ts, this explanation of the
Department of Defense expectations emphasizes the importance of
attitudes, to your point, sir, towards the United States and
respect for persons of all backgrounds.
In addition, the Department is reviewing our international
military student sponsorship program to determine how to
increase Saudi participation. These programs will further
promote cultural awareness and strengthen relationships among
Saudi, U.S., and other international military students.
These are unique steps that we are taking with respect to
this perception that you have articulated about Saudi students.
Senator Scott. I know my time is up. We will have other
time later.
Senator Ernst. Yes. We will have additional time.
The vote has been called, so this will be a natural
breaking point. We will go ahead and transition. Senator Scott
and I will go vote, and Senator Peters has already moved that
direction. We will reconvene as soon as I return, and we will
start on the closed portion of the hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 10:42 a.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
foreign student military training programs protocols
1. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, Deputy Secretary Norquist directed the
Department of Defense (DOD) to screen all current international
military students (IMS) using expedited screening protocols already
developed by the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency (DCSA).
Could you please explain what those protocols are and whether they
constitute all the new ways the United States Government will better
screen foreign military students in the future?
Mr. Reid. The Expedited Screening Protocol (ESP) is a methodology
for reviewing data holdings within the U.S. Government and other
commercially and publicly-available data sources for information that
indicates affiliations with foreign intelligence, susceptibility to
foreign influence, or associations with terrorism. Trained security
analysts review and validate these data checks to determine whether
there is any information that could indicate an elevated risk.
ESP is not the only way in which DOD is improving the screening and
vetting of IMS. Under my role as the Defense Security Executive, I have
established a Vetting Enhancement Working Group (VEWG), with
participants from across the DOD, the Department of State, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, the National Vetting Center, and other Federal
agencies. This working group is identifying additional information to
collect on potential IMS and their accompanying family members,
including biographic and biometric information. Collecting this
additional information will allow the DOD to screen nominated IMS using
additional data holdings.
2. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, are these protocols all developed or is
that development process ongoing?
Mr. Reid.The ESP is fully developed and implemented, and was
previously used in the military accessions process. It is now also
being applied to screen IMS nominated to attend training in the United
States, beginning with IMS from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). The
VEWG is developing additional enhancements to the screening and vetting
process.
3. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, if these expedited protocols do
constitute all the new ways the United States Government will vet
applicants in the future, how was it possible to apply those protocols
to all the foreign students in this country in such a short time? The
Secretary decided to allow the remaining 850 Saudis to stay in the U.S.
and resume training only a few weeks after the terrorist incident at
Pensacola.
Mr. Reid. The ESP is enabled by custom search tools that can
process bulk queries of multiple data sources. ESP exists within the
Defense Expedited Screening Center (ESC), comprised of IT specialists
and certified security analysts. DOD prioritized ESP capacity to focus
on KSA IMS immediately after the Pensacola attack, and quickly
completed screening using those protocols on that population. We are
now applying ESP procedures to the remaining non-KSA population of
International Military Students.
4. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, could you provide a description of how
the remaining 850 Saudis underwent expedited screening, including if
their mobile devices were reviewed and if their families and close
associates were vetted?
Mr. Reid. The ESC worked collaboratively with the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to compile a roster of all IMS present for
training in the United States as of the date of the Pensacola terrorist
attack. IMS that were previously identified as persons of interest in
the FBI's investigation of the Pensacola attack were not included in
this group and not processed through ESP. All other IMS data was
entered into the ESP system to cull data sources for any alert flags
based on the search parameters. Results were reviewed and validated by
ESC analysts and provided to DSCA and the sponsoring Military
Department. Three alerts triggered additional examination by DOD
counterintelligence and security officials, who subsequently determined
no further action was required because the information gleaned from ESP
was either previously known and assessed as acceptable, or because it
was determined to be not relevant or applicable. This is consistent
with established ``alert resolution'' methodologies employed by DOD for
our own employees that are enrolled in continuous evaluation. . Mobile
phone searches were not employed in the screening process. Mobile phone
searches are an investigative tool, rather than a screening tool, and
were only conducted by the FBI on individuals identified as persons of
interest in the FBI investigation.
5. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, in the past, were only the DOD and the
State Department making the decisions about who could be admitted to
the U.S. and if so, doesn't that create a problem when both these
departments have an intense interest in having these programs fully
subscribed?
Mr. Reid. The U.S. Senior Defense Official / Defense Attache (SDO/
DATT) in each country is responsible for review and acceptance of IMS
nominated by the partner nation. The U.S. Ambassador has overall
responsibility for the IMS vetting process, which is driven by
collection of IMS information necessary to process their visa
application. Following the Pensacola terrorist attack, the Secretary of
Defense assessed that the Department was over-reliant on the visa
process for vetting IMS, and directed the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence and Security and the Defense Counterintelligence and
Security Agency (DCSA) to establish additional vetting procedures
grounded in best practices applied to U.S. national security personnel
vetting and Insider Threat programs. DCSA is, by Executive Order,
established as the single vetting service provider for the Federal
Government and operates within guidelines established by ODNI as the
Security Executive Agent and OPM as the Suitability and Credentialing
Executive agent. USDI&S, DCSA, and DSCA, in close collaboration with
the Department of State, are currently developing additional vetting
procedures for International Military Students that will be sequenced
with the visa process, and imposed on all IMS as a condition of their
enrollment in a U.S. based training program and their access to Defense
Department facilities, bases, and installations. These measures will
ensure that DCSA stays in the lead for the conduct of IMS vetting ahead
of any decision about whether to issue a visa or admit an IMS to the
United States.
6. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, why not let other elements of the
intelligence community have the final say, elements whose only interest
is keeping out people that should not be here?
Mr. Reid. The Intelligence Community plays an extensive role in the
vetting and decision making process for IMS through both the visa
screening process led by the Department of State and through the ESP
screening conducted by the DOD. The Department of Defense has the
authority and interest in ensuring International Military Students are
fit to participate in our training programs and access our
installations, which is not an Intelligence Community role.
Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense has tasked the DCSA to lead ESP
and other vetting enhancements, recognizing that the DCSA is the
primary vetting services provider in the U.S. Government, accountable
to, and trusted by, the President of the United States and Directors of
National Intelligence and the Office of Personnel Management for
execution of background investigations.
7. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, it is my understanding that the
Ministry of the Interior in Saudi Arabia is the key intelligence
agency. Did that entity decide who was coming to the U.S., or was it
their diplomats?
Mr. Reid. Regardless of how a particular prospective military
student is nominated, the U.S. Ambassador and the Senior Defense
Official accredited to partner nations make the final decision on who
is selected for training in the United States.
8. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, who in Saudi Arabia should be deciding
who can apply to be a foreign military student in the U.S.?
Mr. Reid. For DOD, the critical relationships that fuel our
military cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are the daily
engagements between the DSCA Director and the Saudi Ambassador and
Defense Attache in Washington DC, and the corresponding relationships
between our SDO/DATT and the Royal Saudi Air Force and Ministries of
Defense and Interior in Riyadh.
9. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, before Pensacola, were the family
members and close associates of the student applicants being examined?
Mr. Reid. Before the Pensacola shooting, the DOD did not conduct
additional vetting on students' family members beyond that conducted by
the Department of State as part of the visa process. We defer to the
Department of State for the specifics of that process.
10. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, are they now and will they be in your
future plans?
Mr. Reid. The ESP includes checks of close family members listed on
the students' visa applications for potential security risk indicators
related to the students themselves. As part of the Vetting Enhancement
Working Group, DOD is looking to expand the specific checks performed
on those family members and expand the category of family members
covered by those checks.
11. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, you announced that new vetting
procedures will include mechanisms for the continuous monitoring of IMS
while enrolled in U.S.-based training programs. Please explain how that
will work. Does it include social media?
Mr. Reid. Continuous monitoring of IMS has several elements. We are
implementing a process in which ESP checks are conducted throughout the
student's time in training, and any newly-discovered indicators of
potentially elevated risk are reviewed to determine whether the
individual should continue training in the U.S. or be sent home.
Additionally, students are enrolled in DOD's Identity Matching Engine
for Security and Analysis, which checks nightly for new criminal
activity and terrorism connections. We are also imposing new insider
threat awareness training and reporting, because those near a student
will often be the first to see behaviors of concern. International
Military Students are also required to report international and
significant domestic travel during their training, which may trigger
additional screening.
DOD has conducted three social media pilots oriented on the IMS
population since the Pensacola attack and found each lacking in the
level of detail and applicability we were looking for. Additional
pilots are in development. The continuing challenges are identify
resolution, access to social media Application Program Interfaces, and
the dynamic nature of the social media landscape. We intend to continue
these efforts to identify an acceptable solution.
12. Senator Scott. Mr. Reid, will the students families and close
relations part of the vetting and monitoring?
Mr. Reid. IMS family members that require access to DOD facilities
and installations will be subjected to the same screening standards as
all others afforded these privileges.
[all]