[Senate Hearing 116-155]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-155
UNITED STATES POLICY AND POSTURE IN
SUPPORT OF ARCTIC READINESS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 3, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-283 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma,
Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RICK SCOTT, Florida JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri DOUG JONES, Alabama
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Readiness and Management Support
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska TIM KAINE, Virginia
JONI ERNST, Iowa JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee DOUG JONES, Alabama
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
March 3, 2020
Page
United States Policy and Posture in Support of Arctic Readiness.. 1
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Dan Sullivan................................ 1
Statement of Senator Tim Kaine................................... 5
Witnesses Statements
Anderson, James H., Performing the Duties of Deputy Under 6
Secretary of Defense for Policy.
O'Shaughnessy, General Terrence J., USAF, Commander, United 8
States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense
Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 32
(iii)
UNITED STATES POLICY AND POSTURE IN SUPPORT OF ARCTIC READINESS
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2020
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m., in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Dan
Sullivan (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Senators Sullivan, Fischer, Ernst, Kaine,
Shaheen, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN
Senator Sullivan. The hearing on the Subcommittee on
Readiness and Management Support will come to order.
The Subcommittee meets today to hear testimony on United
States policy and posture in support of Arctic readiness, which
is a key topic.
We are pleased to have Under Secretary James Anderson here
from the Department of Defense and the NORTHCOM [Northern
Command] commander, General O'Shaughnessy.
This hearing is a long time coming. Five years ago today,
to the day, I asked Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and then-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey,
about the previous administration's 2013 DOD [Department of
Defense] Arctic Strategy. Some of my colleagues will remember
this so-called strategy. It was 13 pages, half of which were
pictures, talked a lot about the environment, and it mentioned
Russia once, in a footnote. Not very much of a DOD strategy.
But, to his credit, during the hearing, Secretary Carter
stated, ``The Arctic is going to be an area of growing
strategic importance.'' General Dempsey then added that, ``The
Russians have just taken a decision to activate six new
brigades in the Arctic''--four of them were stationed there--
``and to develop a new Arctic Command.''
A lot has happened in the ensuing 5 years, but I actually
think we've come a long way on some important issues. There is
a lot at stake in America's Arctic, which is also home to my
State, the great State of Alaska. From resource development and
transportation routes, which are opening up due to receding sea
ice, to the region's strategic location, keeping the
environment protected, to the Arctic's cold-weather hardened
but very warmhearted people, my constituents, some of America's
most patriotic citizens, the Arctic is growing in its global
importance.
Since this day 5 years ago, and under the leadership of my
friend and mentor, Senator McCain--the late Senator McCain--and
now under Chairman Inhofe, Congress has mandated two updates to
the original DOD Arctic Strategy. They are much more
significant and serious documents. The full Armed Services
Committee has included over two dozen Arctic-related provisions
in the NDAAs [National Defense Authorization Acts] in the last
several years, including, importantly, authorizing six polar
security cutters for the Coast Guard, creating the need for a
strategic Arctic port in the region, and requiring each service
to detail how they're implementing the 2019 DOD Arctic
Strategy.
In that same time, however, we've seen Russia's push all-in
on controlling the Arctic. Russia has opened 16 deepwater
ports, 14 airfields, built Arctic military bases, and even
formed a new Northern Command. In fact, Vladimir Putin has
referred to the Northern Sea Route as the New Suez Canal and
has made major military investments to ensure this route for
Russia, and his government has even threatened to sink foreign
vessels that do not have a Russian pilot on board or a Russian
escort. The Russians also have built, now, 54 icebreakers, many
of which are weaponized, some of which are nuclear. The United
States, for our part, has two, and one is broken.
Secretary of State Pompeo, in a speech before the Arctic
nations in Finland, stated, ``These Russian provocative actions
are part of a pattern of aggressive behavior in the Arctic.''
Meanwhile, China has added themselves as a wannabe player
in the Arctic, as well. Currently, China has two medium
icebreakers. This December, they released plans to build their
first heavy-class icebreaker. In early 2018, China released its
own Arctic strategy--the ``Polar Silk Road,'' it was entitled--
in which they describe themselves as a, quote, ``near-Arctic
state.'' They created this made-up designation in spite of the
fact that China is 900 miles away from the Arctic Circle. As
Secretary Pompeo stated in his speech in Finland, ``There are
only Arctic states and non-Arctic states. No third category
exists. Claiming otherwise entitles China to exactly nothing.
In case our Chinese Communist Party individuals who are
watching, on behalf of the United States and Alaska and other
Arctic nations, let me be clear on one thing. There is no such
thing as a near-Arctic state.'' That's not going to--and I just
want to repeat that again. No such thing.
Let me be clear about another thing, as well. Great power
competition is outlined in our Nation's National Security and
National Defense Strategy, strategies that have strong
bipartisan support in the Senate. That great power competition
is coming to the Arctic. Congress, in a bipartisan way,
understands this. Secretary Pompeo certainly does. The media,
as evidenced by headlines that I will introduce for the record,
over the last year on the growing rivalry in the Arctic--and
I'm going to submit this for the record, all these headlines,
without objection--also is understanding this.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Sullivan. However, the one entity in Washington,
DC, that has been slow to recognize the challenges and threat
in the Arctic is actually the Department of Defense. So, today
we are holding this hearing focused on readiness in this
important region of America and our military's readiness to
respond. Simply put, we are not fully ready at all to conduct
great power competition in the Arctic or other cold-weather
environments, like those found in most of the countries where
the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy
recognize there is going to be near-peer competition, like
Russia and China and also North Korea. We're improving, but
we've got a long way to go.
I want to thank both our witnesses again--Secretary
Anderson, General O'Shaughnessy--for being here today to
participate in this hearing.
I especially want to thank General O'Shaughnessy for his
steadfast leadership, advocacy on Arctic issues. He certainly
is not one of the people in the Department that needs to be
reminded of the importance of the Arctic. I also want to thank
General O'Shaughnessy for his decades of exceptional service to
our Nation. Your great service is going to be missed, sir, and
we thank you so much for everything that you've done for our
Nation.
With that, I'd like to turn it over to my friend and
colleague, Senator Kaine.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM KAINE
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Welcome, to the witnesses.
I'm very glad we're having this hearing. This is the first
hearing this year of the Readiness Subcommittee. We'll be busy
in the next couple of months. I had the opportunity, over the
last recess, to visit the shipyard in Pearl Harbor. Whether
it's the Shipyard Industrial Optimization Plan, whether it's
workforce training, these are the kinds of issues that we
grapple with, and I'm really glad that Senator Sullivan has
pulled this hearing together today, because I know many of the
Committee Members--I know Senator King has done a lot of work
on Arctic issues. I haven't. So, I'm looking forward to really
climbing the learning curve.
When Secretary Seward helped purchase Alaska from Russia
during the Lincoln administration, they called it Seward's
Folly, and it wasn't too long after that that they realized
what a genius move it was. I think we're realizing, every day,
more reasons that it was a genius move, and certainly the
melting of the Arctic and the open sea lanes is turning it into
an area where--thank God we're an Arctic Nation, but it only is
a genius move if we take advantage of it.
I was at Elmendorf Air Force Base in April with a CODEL
[congressional delegation] on our way to Korea and North
Vietnam--or Vietnam--and we had a lengthy discussion. They were
really making the case for Arctic investments. I'm not going to
talk about one of my pet issues today, just because it's
probably not that productive, and that's the--we were getting
strong advice during that visit and during a subsequent visit
to INDOPACOM [indo-Pacific Command] that, ``Why doesn't the
United States ratify the UN Convention on Law of the Sea?''
Because our allies, both Arctic nations like Russia and those
claiming to be near-Arctic--and, you're right, there's no such
category--they use their ratification of the treaty to assert
claims in the Arctic that we cannot assert, absent being a
signator, nor can we undertake defensive posture to
illegitimate claims that are asserted without being a signator.
We have to get other nations to, sort of, do it. It would be
better--I think we'd be more successful if we did that ourself.
But, we'll save that for another hearing.
We have paid attention to the need for icebreakers, but the
posture and readiness is much more complicated, as Senator
Sullivan mentioned. How are we training our forces to be able
to fight and operate in the High North? How do we make sure
that there are not gaps between NORTHCOM, EUCOM [European
Command], and PACOM, each of which have critical
responsibilities? We want to make sure that nothing falls
through the cracks there as they work together in coordination.
Planning for other capabilities, improved communications, for
example, that have some specific needs in the Arctic zone.
Then, how are we cooperating with allies, Canada and other
Nordic countries, who have been good allies in a number of
ways?
So, that's what we're hoping that we will address today. I
think it will be a good discussion. I look forward to it.
I thank the Chair for pulling this hearing together.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
I want to, again, welcome our witnesses. You each will have
5 minutes for your opening statement. You can submit a longer
statement for the record.
Secretary Anderson, we will begin with you, sir. You're
recognized.
STATEMENT OF JAMES H. ANDERSON, PERFORMING THE
DUTIES OF DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
POLICY
Dr. Anderson. Thank you, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member
Kaine, distinguished Committee Members. Thank you for the
opportunity to be part of a hearing on United States policy and
posture in support of Arctic readiness. It is a privilege to be
here, together with my colleague, and to speak on behalf of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Department assesses long-term threats, risks, and
challenges within the global context of the National Defense
Strategy, the NDS. The NDS was released in 2018, and it is the
Department's guiding document, which articulates key military-
related challenges facing our Nation.
The NDS is clear that the primary challenge to the United
States' security and prosperity is the reemergence of long-term
strategic competition with great powers. As the Strategy makes
clear, the threats posed by China and Russia are immediate,
pressing, and of an order of magnitude that sets them apart
from other challenges. We are seeing this competition play out
in varying levels of intensity in key areas of the globe,
including the Arctic.
The 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy is anchored in the priorities
of the NDS and frames the Arctic in a broad geopolitical
context. The Strategy recognizes that competition in the Arctic
is important and it is one dimension of a broader global
competition with China and Russia.
We also acknowledge that the character of competition
varies between China and Russia, as they have vastly different
geography, interests, and capability related to the Arctic
region. Addressing competition in the Arctic requires the
Department to effectively implement the NDS, as well as to take
specific steps in the Arctic using a whole-of-government
approach, further supplemented and reinforced by allies and
partners.
The Department's end state for the Arctic is a secure and
stable region, where United States national interests are
safeguarded, the U.S. Homeland is defended, and nations work
cooperatively to address shared challenges. This end state
recognizes the distinctive and historic characteristics of the
Arctic security environment. It also reflects the deliberate
decisions made by Arctic nations to generally engage
constructively on shared challenges in the region.
The immediate prospect of conflict in the Arctic remains
low, but the Department maintains a clear-eyed approach to our
competitors' activities and their implications for U.S.
interests and our military operations. In making these
assessments, we begin with the fundamental difference between
Russia and China: Russia is an Arctic nation, China is not.
Russia and China are both increasingly active in the region,
although in different ways, for different reasons, and with
different implications for United States national security.
Russia's military investments in the Arctic contribute to
its territorial defense, but may result in greater operational
risk to forces that access the region. China seeks a role in
Arctic governance, despite it not having territory claims in
the region. There is the distinct risk that China may repeat
predatory economic behavior in the Arctic that it has exhibited
in other regions. Our focus is on achieving defense objectives,
rather than seeking to duplicate the capabilities or approaches
of our competitors.
The DOD Arctic Strategy establishes three defense
objectives, derived from the NDS, which guide the Department's
approach in addressing competition in the Arctic: defend the
Homeland, compete when necessary, and ensure common domains
remain free and open. Our network of allies and partners are
the cornerstone of the Department's approach to the region, and
a clear strategic advantage for the United States.
Six of the seven other Arctic nations are either NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies or NATO enhanced
opportunity partners. Our allies and partners share the United
States' interest in maintaining a rules-based international
order, including in the Arctic region.
Although the Arctic presents unique challenges to the
Department, we believe we have the right strategic approach and
a strong network of allies and partners to navigate this
challenging and changing environment.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Anderson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. James H. Anderson
The 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy is anchored in the priorities of the
National
Defense Strategy (NDS), focusing on great power competition as the
principal challenge to long-term United States security and prosperity.
It describes the Department's desired end-state for the Arctic as ``a
secure and stable region where United States national interests are
safeguarded, the U.S. Homeland is defended, and nations work
cooperatively to address shared challenges.''
Strategic competitors are seeking to take advantage of the
increasing accessibility of the Arctic to expand their activities in
the region. Russia and China are both increasingly active in the
region, although in different ways, for different reasons, and with
different implications for United States national security. Russia's
military investments in the Arctic contribute to its territorial
defense, but may result in greater operational risk to forces that
access the region. China is seeking a role in Arctic governance,
despite the fact that it does not have territory claims in the region.
There is also a distinct risk that China may repeat the predatory
economic behavior in the Arctic that it has exhibited in other regions
to further its strategic ambitions.
DOD's focus, however, is on achieving our defense objectives,
rather than seeking to duplicate the capabilities or approaches of our
competitors--since doing so plays to their strengths and fails to gain
full value from our key advantages. To this end, the DOD Arctic
Strategy establishes three defense objectives that guide the
Department's approach to addressing strategic competition in the
Arctic.
1) Defend the Homeland;
2) Compete when necessary to maintain favorable regional balances
of power; and
3) Ensure common domains remain free and open.
Competition in the Arctic must be considered in the context of the
relationship between the Arctic and key regions identified in the NDS.
The Arctic is a potential avenue for expanded great power competition
and aggression, since it is located between the two key NDS regions
(the Indo-Pacific and Europe) and the United States Homeland. The
Arctic is a region through which the United States may project power to
advance favorable balances of power in these key regions. For example,
the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap illustrates the close relationship
between the Arctic and the regional balance of power in Europe.
Furthermore, competitors may be tempted to use malign or coercive
activities in the Arctic in an attempt to advance their objectives in
other regions.
The Department, both independently and in cooperation with allies
and partners, is taking steps to enhance the Joint Force's ability to
operate in the Arctic and project power through and beyond the region.
For example, we are pursuing enhanced domain awareness, regular
exercises and training, interoperable supporting infrastructure, and
extreme cold weather resilience with allies and partners. Of special
note, our cooperation with Canada through the North American Air
Defense Command (NORAD), a long-standing bi-national organization, is
vital for Homeland defense.
More broadly, our network of allies and partners is the cornerstone
of the Department's approach to the Arctic region and represents a
strategic advantage for the United States, which China and Russia do
not possess. Six of the seven other Arctic nations are either NATO
allies or are NATO enhanced opportunities partners. Our allies and
partners are highly capable and proficient in the Arctic region's
operating conditions, and they share the United States' interest in
maintaining and strengthening the international rules-based order--
including in the Arctic. Defense cooperation with allies and partners
complements broader United States Government cooperation in other
forums, such as the Arctic Council (which excludes matters related to
military and security from its mandate).
The Joint Force must have the proficiency to respond to regional
contingencies, both independently and in cooperation with allies and
partners. This will require agile and capable forces that are able to
conduct operations flexibly in the region. We recognize that this task
has implications for the Joint Force's capabilities, given that
operations in the harsh Arctic environment place unique demands on the
Joint Force.
The Department assesses global posture needs based on strategic
priorities, the Joint Force's operational capability needs, and other
factors. The Department balances the mission demands of a particular
region like the Arctic against other global demands, in a manner
consistent with the NDS. In accordance with DOD's Arctic Strategy, and
consistent with Section 1752 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2020, the Department is assessing infrastructure needs
in the Arctic to support operational flexibility and power projection.
The Department regularly re-evaluates its capability and infrastructure
needs as conditions, opportunities, and risks related to U.S. national
security evolve. The Department is reviewing potential strategic port
sites in the Arctic within the broader context of NDS priorities.
Although the Arctic presents unique challenges to the Department,
we believe the Department has the right strategic approach, and a
strong network of allies and partners, to navigate the region in an era
of strategic competition.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Secretary Anderson.
General O'Shaughnessy.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL TERRENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, USAF,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
General O'Shaughnessy. Well, Chairman Sullivan and Ranking
Member Kaine, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm
truly honored to be here today as the commander of U.S.
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
I'm also pleased to testify alongside Dr. Anderson, and
congratulate him on the White House's intent to nominate him as
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Chairman Sullivan, thank you for allowing us to submit our
written statements for the record.
Senator Sullivan. Without objection.
General O'Shaughnessy. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are charged
with executing the National Defensive Strategy number-one
objective: defend the Homeland. Our adversaries have watched,
they've learned, they've invested to offset our strengths while
exploiting our weaknesses. They've demonstrated patterns of
behavior that indicate their capability, their capacity, and
their intent to hold our Homeland at risk below the nuclear
threshold. The changing security environment makes it clear
that the Arctic is no longer a fortress wall and the Arctic
Ocean is no longer a protective moat. They are now avenues of
approach to the Homeland.
The increasing commercial and adversary presence in the
Arctic has created an immediate need to build Arctic awareness,
enhance Arctic operations, and strengthen the rules-based order
in the region. To meet this challenge, we need to invest in a
capable and persistent defense that can deter adversaries,
protect critical infrastructure, enable power projection
forward, and prevent Homeland vulnerabilities.
To deter, detect, and defeat the threats arrayed against
the Homeland today, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are transforming our
commands and our way of thinking. We cannot defend the Nation
against 21st century threats with 20th century technology. We
must be able to outpace our adversaries using a layered defense
infused with our latest technology. The Strategic Homeland
Integrated Ecosystem Layered Defense, or what we're calling
SHIELD, is the architecture we need to defend our Homeland
against adversary threats. The Arctic, particularly Alaska, has
a critical role to play in SHIELD.
As such, our layered defense needs to establish awareness
in all domains, from below the Arctic Ocean to the highest
levels of space where we're at risk. We need a layered sensing
grid with sensors in all domains which can detect and track
threats from their point of origin long before approaching our
sovereign territory. In other words, it requires the ability to
identify and eliminate the archers before the arrows are
released.
We need an adaptable architecture for joint all-domain
command and control (JADC2) capable of fusing a myriad of
sensors across the globe into accurate, decision-quality threat
information and at the speed of relevance for effective command
and control. The DOD, in coordination with the United States
Air Force in the lead, is using the 2021 budget to further this
capability of JADC2.
Lastly, we need the ability to deploy defeat mechanisms
capable of neutralizing advanced weapon systems in order to
defend our Homeland.
We have put great effort into industry coordination within
these areas. However, more needs to be done to keep pace with
the advancing threats to our Homeland. We need to ensure we
have complete awareness of what is happening in and around the
Arctic and our Nation, and have the ability to defeat all
relevant threats. A successful strategic approach is enhanced
by cooperation with allies and partners. We are strengthening
our Arctic alliances, stretching from Finland to the far
reaches of Nome, including our indigenous partners, in order to
compete when necessary to maintain favorable regional balances
of power and ensure common domains remain free and open.
Together, we are stronger, as highlighted by our great
binational NORAD command with Canada, and we are mindful of the
gravity of our mission and the trust that you have placed in
us. Aligned with the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy and
capturing our sense of urgency, we at USNORTHCOM and NORAD,
have declared 2020 as a year of Homeland defense, and are
moving forward with the implementation of a layered defense
ecosystem called SHIELD, in which the Arctic plays an
absolutely critical role. You and the Committee should have the
great faith in the men and women at USNORTHCOM and NORAD,
because, together, we have the watch.
Thank you for your support. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General O'Shaughnessy follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy, United States
Air Force
Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today and to
serve as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). I would like to begin by
thanking the Subcommittee for your steadfast support of our commands'
shared Homeland defense mission and for the opportunity to discuss the
significant challenges associated with operating in the Arctic.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are driven by a single unyielding priority:
defending the Homeland. In the years following the Cold War, our Nation
enjoyed the benefits of military dominance as well as geographic
barriers that kept our Homeland beyond the reach of most conventional
threats. Our power projection capabilities and technological overmatch
allowed us to fight forward, focusing our energy on the conduct of
operations overseas.
However, our key adversaries watched and learned, invested in
capabilities to offset our strengths while exploiting our weaknesses,
and have demonstrated patterns of behavior that indicate they currently
have the capability, capacity, and intent to hold our Homeland at
significant risk below the threshold of nuclear war. Eroding military
advantage is undermining our ability to detect threats, defeat attacks,
and therefore deter aggression against the Homeland. This is
emboldening competitors and adversaries to challenge us at home,
holding at risk our people, our critical infrastructure, and our
ability to project power forward.
The threats facing the United States and Canada are real and
significant. The Arctic is no longer a fortress wall, and our oceans
are no longer protective moats; they are now avenues of approach for
advanced conventional weapons and the platforms that carry them. Our
adversaries' capability to directly attack the Homeland has leapt
forward, and they are engaged in overt, concerted efforts to weaken our
national technological, economic, and strategic advantage. To address
this reality, our two distinct but complementary commands are taking
significant, vigorous steps to ensure our Homeland defense enterprise
is ready to deter, detect, and defeat threats now and well into the
future.
Throughout 2019, Russia continued to expand its military
infrastructure in the Arctic. Throughout the year, Russia lengthened
existing runways and built new ones at multiple airfields in the High
North. In September, Russia deployed a Bastion coastal defense cruise
missile unit to the Chukotka Peninsula, opposite the Bering Sea from
Alaska, for a first-ever training launch from that region. The missile
successfully struck a sea-based target more than 200 kilometers away,
according to the Russian Defense Ministry. When deployed to the Russian
northeast, this system has the capability not only to control access to
the Arctic through the Bering Strait, but also to strike land targets
in parts of Alaska with little to no warning.
Like the Russians, China also continues to invest heavily in the
Arctic, determined to exploit the region's economic and strategic
potential as a self-proclaimed ``near Arctic'' nation. In the last few
years, Chinese survey vessels have conducted several deployments to the
Bering and Chukchi Seas, providing familiarity and experience that
could eventually translate to Chinese naval operations in the region.
The Arctic is the new frontline of our Homeland defense as it
provides our adversaries with a direct avenue of approach to the
Homeland and is representative of the changing strategic environment in
our area of responsibility. More consistently navigable waters,
mounting demand for natural resources, and Russia's military buildup in
the region make the Arctic an immediate challenge for USNORTHCOM,
NORAD, our northern allies, and our neighboring geographic combatant
commands, United States European Command and United States Indo-Pacific
Command.
By fielding advanced, long-range cruise missiles-to include land
attack missiles capable of striking the United States and Canada from
Russian territory and expanding its military presence in the region,
Russia has left us with no choice but to improve our Homeland defense
capability and capacity. In the meantime, China has taken a number of
incremental steps toward expanding its own Arctic presence. In turn,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are strengthening the four pillars of our defenses
in the High North: domain awareness, communications, infrastructure
improvement, and sustainable presence in our own Arctic territory.
I want to reiterate my thanks to the Subcommittee for your constant
support as USNORTHCOM and NORAD have met our Homeland defense
challenges in the Arctic head-on. There are no easy solutions to the
challenges presented by the extreme climate, terrain, and distances
inherent in Arctic operations. However, due in no small measure to your
continued attention and advocacy for our commands' requirements, we
have seen significant attention, expertise, and resources brought to
bear on the Homeland defense mission in the Arctic from throughout the
Department of Defense.
Over the last year, our commands have worked alongside the military
Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure that our
warfighting requirements are met, with particular emphasis on improving
joint domain awareness and communications. In order to reclaim our
strategic advantage in the High North, it is critical that we improve
our ability to detect and track surface vessels and aircraft in our
Arctic approaches and establish more reliable secure communications for
our joint force warfighters operating in the higher latitudes. This
focus is now apparent in the 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy, which reflects
my command priorities and makes it clear that DOD must defend the
Homeland against threats emanating from our northern approaches.
As stated in the National Defense Strategy, a core Department of
Defense objective is to ensure that common domains remain open and
free. In pursuit of that objective, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are very proud
of our work with allies and partners to improve our shared presence and
interoperability in the region and update our information sharing
agreements with our Arctic allies and partners. Of note in the last
year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD leaders also conducted engagements with the
Danish Joint Arctic Command in Greenland and joined the United Kingdom
Ministry of Defense in direct staff talks. These collaborative efforts
help to reaffirm our commitment to our international partners while
enhancing USNORTHCOM and NORAD's defense capability.
We are leveraging the on-the-ground experience and expertise of our
warfighters in USNORTHCOM's Alaska Command along with leaders,
planners, and combatants from USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM as we prepare for
ARCTIC EDGE 20--the Nation's premier Arctic exercise. ARCTIC EDGE 20
will take full advantage of the unsurpassed capabilities of the Joint
Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JP ARC) and allow us to test our
capability to fight, communicate, and win in the harsh terrain and
climate of the High North. I am personally placing significant emphasis
on this important exercise, as the lessons we learn from ARCTIC EDGE 20
will play an important role in validating the requirements that will
allow us to deter, detect, and defeat potential adversaries along the
front line of our Nation's defenses.
Our adversaries have the ability to threaten our Homeland in
multiple domains and from numerous avenues of approach-and our commands
are especially focused on improving our ability to defend our northern
approaches. We cannot deter what we cannot defeat, and we cannot defeat
that which we cannot detect. In order to effectively defend the
Homeland, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have developed a Homeland Defense Design
(HDD) consisting of three main elements: a layered sensing grid for
domain awareness, an adaptive architecture for joint all-domain command
and control, and new defeat mechanisms for advanced threats. These
three elements are vital to deterring and defeating advanced threats to
the Homeland, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD are moving with a sense of
profound urgency to bring these capabilities into the fight.
Our need to improve our domain awareness begins with developing and
integrating advanced sensors capable of detecting and tracking threats
no matter where they originate. These sensors must be able to detect,
track, and discriminate advanced cruise missiles, ballistic missiles,
hypersonics, and small unmanned aerial systems at the full ranges from
which they are employed. The sensors must also detect and track the
platforms--aircraft, ships, and submarines--that carry those weapons. A
robust and resilient space layer is increasingly critical to provide
the earliest possible detection and fidelity of data required.
Stovepiped transmission of data from non-compatible sensors
presents a significant impediment to our ability to defend against
advanced threats. To overcome this issue, we need a robust architecture
for JADC2 to effectively gather data from a myriad of sensors across
all domains and share it seamlessly. The architecture must facilitate
rapid data fusion, processing, and analytics to feed decision makers at
all levels with accurate, decision-quality information at the speed of
relevance. Data from any sensor should feed any defeat mechanism, and
rapid data fusion and analysis should provide faster, more precise
solutions to all shooters. This architecture will facilitate high-tempo
decision cycles for agile, resilient, redundant, and joint command and
control. By leveraging a cloud architecture, big data analytics, edge
computing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, this network
should sense a threat from one node and engage it precisely and
expeditiously from another across vast distances and across all
domains.
Finally, we require new defeat mechanisms for advance threat
systems-to include the advanced cruise missiles capable of striking the
Homeland from launch boxes in the Arctic. As adversary threat systems,
employment doctrine, and operational competencies become more numerous,
multi-modal, and complex, our current defeat mechanisms will become
increasingly challenged. Additionally, the cost ratio of adversary
threat missiles to our missile defeat mechanisms is not in our favor.
We must flip the cost ratio back in our favor with deep magazine, rapid
fire, and low-cost defeat mechanisms.
While these capabilities will play a critical role throughout the
USNORTHCOM and NORAD areas of responsibility, they will be especially
vital in our northern approaches. As diminishing Arctic ice creates
opportunities for increased international commercial and military
presence, our adversaries will continue their efforts to exploit the
vast distances and inherent complexity of operating in the High North.
Our commands are working closely with tech and defense industry
partners to rapidly overcome our most pressing challenges in the
region.
Specifically, our commands are collaborating with large and small
companies from the commercial tech sector in order to leverage emerging
technologies and digital-age approaches with potential Homeland defense
applications. Under this iterative approach, our commands and our
commercial partners have developed a common understanding of our shared
challenges and opportunities over time. In turn, we are allowing our
Nation's innovators to apply their expertise and propose advanced,
innovative solutions using new but proven technology that can be
rapidly incorporated into the Homeland defense ecosystem in order to
improve our domain awareness, JADC2 architecture, and defeat
mechanisms.
We are also adapting and evolving how we work with traditional U.S.
defense industry. Rather than prescribing specific materiel solutions
to the challenges facing our commands, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are engaged
in ongoing two-way dialogue with defense industry innovators to share
our perspective on the changing strategic environment, emerging threats
to the Homeland, and operational requirements. We are working with our
industry partners to ensure they understand our specific challenges and
needs. In turn, our partners are identifying ways to bring new and
existing systems into the Homeland defense architecture and provide
tailored solutions to our unique challenges.
This approach has already shown game-changing potential. Over the
last several months, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have collaborated with the
defense industry, commercial tech partners, and the military Services
on successful field demonstrations of emerging sensor, information
fusion, and satellite communications technologies. For example, the
same technology that is capable of delivering high-speed internet and
voice communications to remote indigenous communities for the first
time has the clear potential to bridge some of the gaps in military
communications in the same region. I am excited and encouraged by the
results of these demonstrations, and we will continue to lead these
experiments and to solicit innovative proposals from established
defense industry and emerging tech partners.
There are no routine operations in the Arctic, but USNORTHCOM and
NORAD are firmly committed to defending our Homeland. Thanks in no
small measure to your support, the innovative spirit of our industry
and interagency partners, and the deep commitment of the men and women
I am proud to lead, I have no doubt that we will continue to deter and
defeat the threats facing our Homeland--to include those originating in
the Arctic. We have the watch.
Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, to both our witnesses.
I'm going to defer my first 5 minutes of questioning to
Senator King, who I know has another commitment but is also--
has a strong interest in these Arctic issues, and I want to
make sure he and other Members have opportunity to ask
questions. But, I appreciate him being here, very much.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
taking the initiative to move this issue forward, to keep it in
front of us, and to call this important hearing.
General, any evidence of China and Russia cooperating in
the Arctic?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, we certainly see areas
where China and Russia are cooperating at large, and we do see
some areas where China and Russia are cooperating specifically
in the Arctic. You look at the investment, for example, that
China has made with Russia in the Arctic. We do have some
concern of that, but we also have independent concern with each
of the activities that we see from China----
Senator King. But, their primary motivations seem to be
separate. The Chinese are mostly economic, the Russians are
defensive and military?
General O'Shaughnessy. That's broadly correct Senator. The
only thing I would add to that is, because of--20 percent of
the Russian GDP [gross domestic product] nominally comes from
the Arctic, that the Chinese investment will play a critical
role there, as well.
Senator King. By the way, I think, if we're going to take a
lesson from China declaring itself a near-Arctic nation, I'm
declaring Maine a near-Caribbean nation, just----
[Laughter.]
Senator King. You know, there's--it works just as well.
I'm worried about the operational seam that we've got--
we've got three of our combatant commands that come together,
and I just want to be sure----
Senator Sullivan. We have a chart for that, if you want to
explain it----
Senator King. Yeah.
Senator Sullivan.--a little bit more.
Senator King. Okay. Well, I don't want to steal your--but,
it's a very serious concern. I just want to be sure that the
three combatant commands are absolutely seamlessly working
together so that, in time of some crisis or difficult
situation, we don't have a confusion of leadership. Can you
assure me on that?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I will do two things.
First, I would acknowledge there--the seam is the lines on the
map, but I will assure you that we are working closely
together. One of the things that does help that, as the
NORTHCOM designation as the advocate for capabilities within
the Arctic gives us a lead role to try to bring these teams
together. I will say constant and regular communication,
especially between NORTHCOM and EUCOM, as we look at the
threats residing within the Arctic and through the Arctic. We
actually exercise that muscle. When I say that, I mean the
transfer of forces back and forth, the seamless ability to
command and control those forces, as well as just looking, not
only with our allies and partners and friends, but how that we
actually integrate together. I use an example: I went to the
U.K. to go to the staff talks with the U.K. as part of our tie-
in with EUCOM forces, met with Denmark is leadership, and we
also, operationally, are back and forth with our exercises, et
cetera. So, I should give----
Senator King. That's what I was going to hope, that there
are exercises to clarify ``what happens if'' as to who's in
charge and who's calling the shots.
General O'Shaughnessy. Absolutely, Senator. The way we look
at it is, although--there is a line on the map, of course, but
that line does not actually exist there, and so, we want to
make sure that our forces, as they operate, are not limited
because of a line that we arbitrarily put on the map.
Senator King. Now, you mentioned NORAD a couple of times,
and mentioned Canada. The bulk of the shoreline, outside of
Alaska, is Canada. Are they engaged? Are they taking this
seriously? Are they having hearings like this?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, absolutely. In fact, I
think, as the Trudeau administration has regained the--post the
election, regained power, one of their focus areas, in fact, is
the Arctic. With the NORAD--under the NORAD construct, of
course, we're fully engaged with our Canadian partners, and see
a resurgence in that partnership.
Senator King. Dr. Anderson, I met with the United States
Ambassador to Denmark recently. I think it's good news we're
opening a consulate in Greenland. I think that's a positive
development. Of course, Thule Air Force Base is an important
outpost up there.
Finally, I urge you to go to Iceland. Iceland may be the
second-most strategic place in the world. It's right in the
middle of----
Senator Sullivan. What is the most strategic place----
Senator King. I think it's--it's one of those other States
that is up in the----
Senator Sullivan. Okay, I'm just checking.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. It's the one Billy Mitchell designated. Was
that before or after his court-martial that he made that?
Voice. It was before.
Senator King. I see, okay. This has been going on for 6
years.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. But, Iceland is a tremendously strategic
spot. It's an unsinkable aircraft carrier right in the middle
of the--of that--of the gap, Greenland to England. We, I think,
mistakenly left it, left Keflavik, in the early part of this
century. I just hope that you'll keep Iceland in mind, keep the
rotational going, and perhaps think about a more permanent kind
of presence there because of its strategic position,
particularly with regard to Russian submarines.
Dr. Anderson. Oh, absolutely concur on the strategic
importance of that area, both Denmark, Greenland, and Iceland,
and the U.K., the--the GIUK gap, not only for subsurface
submarine activity, but also for access to the European theater
and defense also, obviously, of the Homeland. So, certainly
concur with your assessment.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the courtesy. I do have
to go to another Committee meeting. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Absolutely.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here.
I want to make sure I understood you correctly, Dr.
Anderson. Did I understand you to say that the potential for
conflict in the Arctic is low? Or did I misunderstand that?
Dr. Anderson. That is what I've said. Presently, our
assessment is that the potential for conflict, near term, is
low.
Senator Shaheen. There was an interesting piece on--I think
it may have been 60 Minutes within the last couple of months,
about Russia's activities in Norway and the Arctic region, and
the threat that they pose to NATO. I guess I'm puzzled by that
comment, given everything that the Chairman said, and given
that piece and what else we have learned about Russia's
activities in the Arctic, why we're comfortable that the
potential for conflict is low. I don't know if you want to
answer that, or General O'Shaughnessy. Which of you--maybe both
of you could answer that.
Dr. Anderson. Well, maybe I can expand a little bit. We're
certainly in a competition with the Russian Federation. There
is no question about that, and that competition, you know,
spans a spectrum of information and diplomacy and economics,
export controls, the Russian espionage, and so forth, and so
forth.
But, when I was saying the potential for conflict is low,
what I'm referring to there is actual no-kidding kinetic
conflict. In that sense, presently, we assess that to be low.
Now, we are very mindful of Russian capabilities, Russian
intent, and--over the medium term and the long term--and we are
very clear-eyed about what we must do in order to deter Moscow
from any thinking or any belief that they may have something to
gain by military activity.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Well, I'm glad we're clear-eyed,
because I would hope that we are not caught off guard by what
Russia is doing, as we were in Georgia and as we were in
Ukraine.
I want to go to what we're doing to prepare for cold-
weather activities. We have the U.S. Army Cold Regions Research
and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) in Hanover, New Hampshire,
which I think does very good work. They are trying to do
everything possible to make sure that we can operate in cold-
weather climates. But, I wonder if you could--either of you
could provide an update on what the Army's doing in response to
the DOD Arctic Strategy that was published in June of 2019 to
take advantage of CRREL, in Hanover, and the other things we
need to do to prepare.
Dr. Anderson. So, I can--happy to start there. I mean, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has a--kind of a research facility
right outside of Fairbanks, where they look at a variety of
scientific and engineering challenges that pertain not only to
Alaska, but to the Nation as a whole. So, that would be one
example.
Clearly, the Army has forces, Active Duty and Reservists,
in Alaska. They train, more generally, for cold-weather
environments. So, I think, you know, across the board, as with
the other Services, they take the potential challenges and the
existing challenges of operating in that harsh and demanding
environment very seriously.
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would add to this
is, what I have seen just over the last couple of years is a
relative rapid rise in each of the Services' participation in
preparation to actually operate in the Arctic. That includes,
of course, the Army as a key force.
The examples that I would use is, as we find other areas of
the world you can deploy to with your current set of equipment,
with your--with the normal training that you would have, maybe,
at home station, the Arctic is not like that. You have to
specifically train to be in the Arctic. You have to have the
right gear, just as you mentioned. You have to--and it's
everything from your clothing to your facilities to even, you
know, the oil you use in your machinery. If you haven't been up
there actually doing it, actually training that way, you will
not be prepared to operate in the Arctic. So, I'm really
pleased that I see an increased activity in the Arctic
training, not just within--certainly in Alaska, JPARC Range, as
an example, a great training opportunity for our force--but
even with our NATO partners, as well. We see more and more, for
example, Army deployments to our NATO partners to be able to
operate in that environment. We see the Navy sailing in areas
that they haven't sailed in decades. We see the Air Force
committed to continuing to operate in this. We see the Marines
also preparing and participating. For example, ARCTIC EDGE,
which we have just--ongoing, just starting right now, we see
over 1500 personnel participating in that Arctic-focused
exercise.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, can I ask one more question?
Senator Sullivan. Absolutely.
Senator Shaheen. So, global warming is obviously having an
impact on the Arctic. It's an impact not just on the sea lanes
that will be open for longer periods of time because of
icemelt, but also on permafrost and what that's doing to the
infrastructure in the Arctic. Can you talk about what we're
planning to address that and with--in terms of cost, and
whether there are other--there's other potential for conflicts
that may be happening because we're going to see those sea
lanes open for longer periods of time, and the ability of some
of our competitors to get up there and present challenges to
the United States and our allies?
Dr. Anderson. So, I'm happy to start with that. I mean, as
has been mentioned, fortunately we're--we do have a icebreaker
program underway. We have six, total--three heavy, three
medium--that are in the pipeline. That will help with some of
the increased hazards resulting from warming trends. With
respect----
Senator Shaheen. I'm sorry to interrupt, but how many of
those are operational now?
Dr. Anderson. So, right now we have one heavy that is
operational, the Polar Star. It--there's another one, Polar
Sea, but it is tied up at port and being cannibalized to keep
the Polar Star operational. Then we have one medium one, the
Healy. They both date back to commissionings back in the late
1970s. But, fortunately, we have some new ones that are coming
forth. So, there is that piece of it. I would say, on the
military installations and--you know, every military
installation up in the High North, in Alaska, you know, they
have--they are looking very closely at the permafrost, the
thawing, other environmental hazards. Not related to climate
change, but Alaska suffered an earthquake in the fall of 2018.
So, all these sort of ecological/environmental implications are
something that commanders are dealing with.
I don't know if my colleague would like to expand a little
bit.
General O'Shaughnessy. Sure. First, let me mention the
Polar Security Cutter Program. That is incredibly important, I
think, to the Department of Defense, although, obviously, it's
our great Coast Guard brethren who will be doing that. But,
it's also worth noting, as we look at the--those coming online,
that their first ones will--first one will go to the Antarctic.
Right? We have to keep that in mind with respect to the
timeline that we're dealing with here, with respect to when
they're actually going to be relevant to the Arctic. I think
that's a key part. $551 million this year, though, from the
Department of Defense budget, supporting that program. So, I'm
very pleased that that continues to go forward, but I can't
emphasize enough how important it is to keep that on timeline.
To your point about some of the effects that we are seeing,
whether it be from the diminishing sea ice, the permafrost--
I'll use Barrow as an example, and one of my trips up there.
What I see when I--when we go up there is, it's--there's a
common set of challenges that we're faced with. When I go there
and see--it's not only the military installations that are
challenged now, it's the local population, it's indigenous
people, it's the local infrastructure. To me, this is something
we can work together, and we can find ways that--for example,
the road going to our--one of our key radar sites there is the
same road that the villages use. How do we approach this
together? Because they're very real impacts. We have to ensure
that we maintain our readiness, that we maintain our ability to
keep those military installations operating, whilst at the same
time I think we can partner with our local people and
communities to see how we can get after this together.
But, to your point, it--when you get out there and see it,
it is very real, the impacts that we're seeing, and we have to
make sure that's part of our cross-check, going forward.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you.
Thank you for the additional time, Mr. Chairman. That
raises a whole bunch of other questions, but I'm already over.
Senator Sullivan. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I just want to follow up on some of the climate questions.
I was able to go with Senator Heinrich into the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge a couple of summers ago, and we were on
Kaktovik, which Senator Sullivan knows well. The melting of sea
ice has put polar bears ashore. Also, the sea ice served as an
anti-erosion buffer to--just the erosion of tidal action; and
now that sea ice has melted, erosion--moving the little
airstrip. We were in Arctic Village, which is an Athabascan
village at the far south part of the range, and they're talking
about caribou migration is so different than what it was that
the traditional hunting of the caribou nearby--it's very hard
to get to the caribou in many years now.
So, I'm--I guess I want to know this. What planning
assumptions do you put in as you're looking at this? You know,
the National Defense Strategy, the NDS, much of it, as stated
by--has to be sort of an irreversible--we're going to be in
great power competition for a long time. If that's the case,
we're not going to change quickly. You have to make some
planning assumptions about climate, whether it's permafrost,
sea ice melt, rising sea levels, warming temperatures. What
assumptions are you putting into your planning documents about
the effect of climate change and then how it affects the
environment in which you need to operate?
Dr. Anderson. I think a big part of this has to do with
building in resilience to military installations, new ones and
refurbishing old ones.
Senator Kaine. But, what--and I get that, but, before I get
to resilience, because we do resilience planning at Norfolk,
too--you do resilience planning based on an assumption. You
know, there's going to be a 2 percent rise in temperature in
the next 30 years, or the, you know, flooding will become more
common in the streets. So, you do resilience planning based
upon assumptions. Is there a document that you use, as you're
making plans for operations in and through the Arctic, where
you are making some assumptions sort of based on most
reasonable-case scenarios about climate effects?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yeah, Senator, I would say that
there's multiple inputs, if you will, to the planning process,
all the way from NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration] and what they're able to provide us. What we're
seeing clearly, working with the Corps of Engineers very
specifically, on what we're seeing and what we can expect to
see as that continues to--those effects continue to enhance----
Senator Kaine. If I wanted to get a document, read it, and
see the assumptions that you're making, what is that document?
Where could I get them?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I think it's multiple
documents, and we can certainly provide those to you, multiple
sources that we're using to compile together the effects that
we're expecting.
Senator Kaine. I'll ask that one for the record, because
I'd like to take a look at that.
[The information referred to follows:]
General O'Shaughnessy. USNORTHCOM and NORAD planners work
year-round to study the strategic and operational environment
in the Arctic in order to understand how changes in the region
could impact our missions. Our subject matter experts review a
comprehensive list of references and research to include
academia, government, and private sector. In addition, we are a
part of the Arctic community of interest and maintain close
relationships with government organizations such as the Army
Corps of Engineers Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab
(CRREL), academic research institutions like the University of
Alaska Fairbanks, as well as allied and partner Arctic
institutes and organizations. USNORTHCOM and NORAD planners
also consult with our resident liaisons from across the
interagency community to maintain constant awareness of the
Arctic environment and issues as we update our plans. A
representative list of primary sources includes: Sources:
NOAA's annual Arctic Report Card--https://www.arctic.noaa.gov/
Report-Card The Government of Canada's Arctic Framework--
https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1560523306861/1560523330587
U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region--https://
media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-
ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF Compendium of Arctic Academic Research
Papers--https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Arctic Key
Partners: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Cold Regions Research
and Engineering Lab University of Alaska Fairbanks
``UArctic''--https://www.uaf.edu/uarctic/ The Arctic
Institute--Center for Circumpolar Security Studies--https://
www.thearcticinstitute.org/
Senator Kaine. General O'Shaughnessy, you stated that your
number one unfunded requirement is a request for $130 million
to provide, quote, ``an initial Arctic communication
capability.'' Tell us what that capability would give to
NORTHCOM that you don't have now.
General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, Senator.
One of the things that we find--very simple things become
hard, and one of those is communication, when you're in the
Arctic. If you're above about 65 degrees north, your satellite
communication starts to diminish, and above about 70 it becomes
extremely limited, except for some of our more exquisite
capability--for example, with submarines, et cetera.
Senator Kaine. Right.
General O'Shaughnessy. When we look at this, we find that
you could go about this with a--say, a DOD project to bring
communication, but, what we find is, this commercial world is
getting after this with the proliferation of LEO [low earth
orbit]. So, we find that a partnership with the commercial
world might bring us some capability sooner, significantly
sooner.
As we see, for example, the work that OneWeb and Starlink
are doing to proliferate LEO with satellites that will provide
literally the same connectivity that you get in your home right
today, broadband connectivity that would then be available in
the majority of the Arctic, we see that as an amazing game-
changing capability, all the way from, just, our basic
communication, but also, all of our sensors right now have
limited ability to connect in and are--frankly, are not that
resilient. It gives us the resiliency, it gives us the ability
to communicate. Think about search and rescue, think about--all
the things that normally would be easy become very hard in the
Arctic. Then there's a whole aspect that's on the civilian
side, in the impact to industry, the impact to the indigenous
people, of having that connectivity. So, we think, again,
shared challenges, shared solutions. We think a commercial
partnership would be key to this.
Senator Kaine. Well, I'm very encouraged, because I don't
think we need to build our own, sort of, exquisite capacity
when there's commercial opportunities that are better. As long
as we can protect, you know, the security of information, I
think that's very positive.
I want to ask you one more question, and then I know
Senator Sullivan has many, and I'll probably come back to ask
one further in a second round.
Talk to us about the--we talked about the seams between
EUCOM, PACOM, and NORTHCOM--talk about the collaborative work
that you do with the Coast Guard. So, within the family, the
Coast Guard search-and-rescue capacity, the Coast Guard's ice
cutters--so, talk about the relationship with the Coast Guard.
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, first, I'd highlight just
the great coordination, not just within the Arctic, but at
large, between the Department of Defense and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)----
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
General O'Shaughnessy.--across the board. In fact, what I
often tell is, I actually meet with the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security as or more often than I meet
with the Secretary of the Department of Defense. I meet with
the Secretary of Defense quite often. So, it's a great partner
and collaboration, really, across the board.
But, specifically to our Coast Guard partners, Karl Schultz
and I--it's an example of our great program--we went to
Capstone together years ago. We are close friends ever since.
But, that brings a perspective of collaboration from the start.
What we find is, we have--again, it's these shared challenges
and shared work together. As we see the diminishing-ice
opportunities that are there, whether it be because of civilian
traffic or whether it be the northern sea route and some of the
challenges----
Senator Kaine. Right.
General O'Shaughnessy.--we think we might face with our
adversaries, that partnership with the Coast Guard is the key
partnership in the Arctic. I think as we continue to let the
polar security cutter--it's called the ``polar security
cutter'' for a reason, and that middle part of that's security,
because it's part of our national security. Whether it's
Department of Defense or Department of Homeland Security, that
collaboration together is going to be incredibly important. As
we go forward and finding those things that we can do together
right from the very beginning, we find an incredible synergy.
Senator Kaine. Just one comment, and then to, Senator
Sullivan, we had this quirky thing last year, when we had the
shutdown, where, you know--you know, it did--folks in the
military were getting paid, and folks in the Coast Guard
weren't, even though they're all part of our defense mission.
It just so happens the Coast Guard, because they report up
through DHS, were often on joint exercises with Navy and other
military, and they were the ones that were not getting paid,
which, you know, God willing, that never happens again, because
if it does, and it starts to be a recruiting challenge, like,
``Well, why would I want to go to this side of the house if I'm
going to be at risk, and I would be less at risk on the DOD
side.'' So, recruiting, retention, our Coast Guard is really
necessary to our defense mission, and maybe more in the Arctic
than anywhere else.
Senator Sullivan. Right.
Senator Kaine. There's inequities in there that we have to
be careful about, going forward.
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, if I might make one
comment, if you'd indulge me. One example--we have many
coastguardsmen on our staff.
Senator Kaine. Right.
General O'Shaughnessy. They're key and critical to that.
I'd make a highlight. I have, actually, one right--sitting
right behind me, Ken Boda--Captain Ken Boda.
Senator Kaine. I thought I noticed----
General O'Shaughnessy. Right?
Senator Kaine.--a different color uniform in----
General O'Shaughnessy. Why is that important? They bring a
different perspective, but an equally important perspective, as
we go forward. Captain Boda was actually the XO [executive
officer] on the Polar Star. He served on the Polar Sea. He was
on the Healy. Having that on our staff to inform us as we are
the advocates for the Arctic is priceless. I mean, literally
priceless. That coordination that we have, and the
collaboration, where Karl Schultz is sending us his very best
people to serve on our staff, to make sure that we can, in
fact, as we go forward, looking at this together with our Coast
Guard partners.
Senator Kaine. Excellent. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Well, as the Chair of the Subcommittee in
charge of the Coast Guard, I'm also very interested in these
issues, as well. We're actually working on a Coast Guard bill,
kind of pre-conferencing it right now with the House, that has
a pay-the-Coast-Guard provision that I'm very, very adamant
about, that that, what you just mentioned, Senator Kaine, won't
happen again.
Let me begin with a couple followup questions.
So, it is NORAD and NORTHCOM's number-one focus on the
unfunded priority list that Senator Kaine just mentioned, which
is the Arctic comms. Again, that deals with Homeland defense,
these avenues of approach. Just so I'm aware, General, is that
part of, or different than, the SHIELD layered defense that
you're talking about?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, that's part of it. Part of
the attempt that we're trying to do is, rather than buy
individual systems that are stovepipe and try to solve one
problem, we're really approaching this, with SHIELD, with this
architecture that could come together that could give us that
domain awareness ability to command and control and the defeat
mechanisms across all the threats, from ballistic missiles all
the way to counter-UAS [unmanned aircraft system]. That
communication piece of that, so this unfunded priority we have
for communications in the Arctic, would be a key part, and be--
insert into our ability to work SHIELD.
Senator Sullivan. That, of course, protects the avenues of
approach to the entire Homeland, not just an Alaskan-focused
issue, correct?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, you bring up a incredibly
important point. As we do talk about the Arctic, we must
remember, it's not just about the Arctic. It's about our
Homeland, it's about United States of America and, on the NORAD
side, United States and Canada, and protecting our sovereign
territory, and having the means to operate in battlespace that
is now, as we see advancing adversaries, they have the
capability that--and the intent to operate there. We must have
the same ability to operate if we're going to be able to defend
our Nation.
Senator Sullivan. I want to thank you. You've done a great
job, certainly in my State. I think the very important
constituents of mine, the Alaska Native population, the Alaska
Federation of Natives (AFN), have all honored you, I think,
even with your own Native name, which is a rare and distinct
honor.
But, on this Arctic comms piece, too, can you just unpack,
a little bit more, the potential that has for coverage in some
of the communities in my State, which, as you know, General,
it's not just a comms issue for the military, a lot of the
communities in Alaska don't have nearly the Internet or
telecoms coverage that the vast, vast majority of the lower 48
accept and take for granted. How can this unfunded priority
also help in that regard?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yeah, thank you for letting me
highlight that, Senator.
I'd start--I've actually had the incredible honor to
actually have four names----
Senator Sullivan. Wow.
General O'Shaughnessy.--the indigenous----
Senator Sullivan. That's more than me.
General O'Shaughnessy.--Alaska.
[Laughter.]
General O'Shaughnessy. We've had great partnership with
AFN.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
General O'Shaughnessy. Part of that, I think, is because we
really see this as finding those areas of common challenges
that we can work together. We find, the more that we peel the
onion back, and that the more things we actually find, that we
have these common interests, and we can get after it together.
To your point about these communications that work and--we
can look at this from a couple different aspects. One is, just
think about each of the individual villages that are currently
cut off, that could--you know, the schools, the health
facilities, the first responders, if they had the ability to
actually communicate.
Senator Sullivan. Yeah.
General O'Shaughnessy. But, then, from a more selfish
interest of the Department of Defense, think about if we could
link all those together with search-and-rescue capability, with
the ability to tie in those villages to part of our
infrastructure, maybe looking at some of the work that we've
done with the--on the Canadian side, with the Canadian Ranger
Program, and really taking full advantage of that expertise,
10,000 years of understanding the Arctic, and how do we
leverage that into our capability, capacity. So, again, I see
the future. I see so many opportunities specifically to the
communications package that we're looking to address. Part of
it is, in the end, it's a business. It's--we're looking in--to
go to the commercial. So, the more participants we can get
within that, the better business case we have. So, again, we
can look at it either from an altruistic standpoint, if we want
to work with our partners, or we can look at it, even with our
own self-interests in mind, having more people part of this
process actually makes a better business case. If you're OneWeb
or you're Starlink, you're much more interested if you have a
bigger population. Same as the reason why we're working with
industry to try to get the industry interested in this, as
well, because then it's more paying subscribers, if you will,
that will really allow this to take off. I think we are on the
verge of being able to make this happen, and I think it'll be
game-changing for the military, I think it'll be game-changing
for the local populations. I think it would be game-changing
for our partners, like the Coast Guard, to be able to
communicate, and on and on and on. So, I really want to
continue to pursue this capability.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Well, I think you have done--in
both your--full Committee and this Committee, your testimony
has done a good job of highlighting the importance of that. I
certainly am going to make a press in the NDAA, and I hope my
colleagues will recognize the importance of it. So, thank you
for that. I think it's been very well articulated, and I'm
hopeful that we can get that number-one unfunded priority for
NORTHCOM actually funded by the DOD.
Mr.--Secretary Anderson, I'm going to press a little bit. I
think your point on six of seven of the Arctic nations are
allies--that's actually a really good point. I've been a little
bit frustrated, as you probably gathered from my opening
statement, with regard to the Pentagon's approach to the
Arctic. I think there's areas where the Congress leads and the
Pentagon follows, where the Pentagon leads, the Congress
follows. I think this has, unfortunately, been the former. I
think we're starting to see, with advocates like General
O'Shaughnessy, a focus in the Pentagon that's needed, because
this is strategic terrain that is becoming more and more
important. That was what former Secretary Mattis mentioned.
One thing that I wanted to mention to you. You know, in the
first serious DOD Arctic Strategy, they talked about how we
need to protect our sovereign territory, our sea lanes, through
Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), kind of like what we
do in the South China Sea. Actually, we do FONOPs all over the
world. I've asked, particularly, our Navy leadership--this is
the goal, this is the stated strategy, this is what DOD says
it's going to do. However, it appears to me, with the lack of
icebreakers--one heavy--that--and even ice-hardened Navy
shipping--that the ability to do FONOPs in this key part of the
world to protect America's strategic interests is quite
limited.
You know, I like to brag about the fact that I had five
uncles and great uncles who served and fought in World War II.
One of my great uncles was a lieutenant in the Navy, did three
Murmansk runs. It was a very dangerous Navy duty during World
War II. That was all Arctic operations with the U.S. Navy. I'm
not sure the U.S. Navy can pull that off again right now.
What is your sense of the ability--now, granted, we're
starting to build icebreakers, but we don't even have ships
that can plow through ice, or ice-hardened ships. The
Department of Defense has said we're going to do Freedom of
Navigation Operations. Putin has said that the Arctic is the
new Suez Canal that he's going to control. He has 54
icebreakers. He's got all the cards. What are we doing to push
back on that situation, when our Strategy clearly states that
we should have the ability to do FONOPs?
By the way, in one of the hearings that we had with the CNO
[chief of naval operations] of the Navy, he said, ``Well,
Senator, we--we're up there a lot, the Navy is.'' I'm like,
``Really? How? Where?'' ``With subs.'' Well, I think it's great
that we've got subs up there, but a sub is not a FONOP. You
can't see a sub. The whole point of a FONOP is to demonstrate
presence. So, how do we address that, Mr. Secretary? Because I
think we're sorely lacking in that realm, as of now, even
though it is part of the Strategy.
Dr. Anderson. So, the--I mean, exercising Freedom of
Navigation Operations is certainty something that's central to
the Department and to the Nation. We do this around the globe,
in some areas certainly more than others, as your question
suggests. I cannot, you know, telegraph when we're going to do
FONOPs in the Arctic, but I will----
Senator Sullivan. Yeah, well, my question is, Can we do
FONOPs in the Arctic?
Dr. Anderson. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Very different question.
Dr. Anderson. Understood. So, I do--depending on----
Senator Sullivan. What's the answer?
Dr. Anderson. The Arctic, as, sir, the map behind you
suggests, is actually a quite large area, and I think we--the
Navy does have the capability, in, sort of, ice-free areas, to
do FONOPs in a very limited capacity, or more limited capacity,
in those that might be congested with ice. We've already talked
about, you know, the limitations there.
But, it's something that--of course, as a matter of
principle, we take issue with any excessive maritime claim. We
submit to Congress every year an annual report of those nations
that are claiming excessively. We do quite a number of FONOPs
around the world. But, I take your point, and certainly
acknowledge that we do have limitations in the Arctic right
now.
Senator Sullivan. Are we focused on trying to address
those?
Dr. Anderson. I think the Cutter Security Program with the
Coast Guard, the development of those icebreakers is certainly
a large part of that.
Senator Sullivan. How about ice-hardened Navy ships?
Dr. Anderson. So, my understanding is that the Navy has
looked at this, and they have assessed that, to exercise their
Arctic Strategy, they do not have a requirement for ice-
hardened ships.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think that is even remotely
logical?
Dr. Anderson. Again, looking at the--at certain places in
the Arctic, we can certainly--and we do operate both in the
surface and the subsurface and above the air, to demonstrate
our overflight rights and our maritime freedom of the seas.
But, there are limitations.
Senator Sullivan. Yeah, I don't think that's logical. I
think the days of the Murmansk runs, which is a proud history
of the U.S. Navy that I'm proud that my family participated in,
couldn't do them right now. That's--we're going to wake up one
of these days and recognize that that's a severe limitation.
We've been beating the drum here, but I think we've got a lot
more work to do.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. A couple more items. So, I want to pick up
on this ``six of seven'' comment, Dr. Anderson, in your
testimony. I thought that was interesting. Six of the seven
other Arctic nations are either NATO allies or NATO-enhanced
opportunities partners. The Arctic Council excludes military
and security issues from its mandate. We do other work there.
But, talk a--I hadn't really thought about the fact that the
Arctic nations are generally NATO allies or security partners.
So, what is the current status? This question is actually for
either of you, about just, you know, the mil-to-mil cooperation
between us and those NATO allies and partners on Arctic issues.
Are they taking it seriously? Are they making the investments?
Do we do wargaming and other exercises to the extent that we
should?
Dr. Anderson. So, I would say absolutely yes, with the case
of our NATO allies and those enhanced partners. To cite a--kind
of a current example, right now Norway is leading the charge up
to a major exercise that's going to run from 12 to 20 March,
entitled Exercise Cold Response. There'll be some 15,000 allies
and partners, including some U.S. Forces, involved in that
exercise. Norway is--you know, it brings some strong
capabilities to the table. They are going ahead with the F-35.
We have a very strong bilateral relationship with Denmark, with
our access to Greenland, as mentioned earlier, with Thule.
Iceland also provides certain other contributions with some
non-NATO partners, with the Finns and the Swedes. Very strong
relationships there. A strong relationship between them and
NATO itself. This manifests itself in a wide variety of sort of
bilateral efforts and also key leader engagements.
So, I would say, in short, it's--we need them, and we
exercise with them in a robust way. This provides us a distinct
and clear advantage over the Russian Federation in the
competition space regarding the Arctic.
Senator Kaine. I mean, that is something that we need to
always remember, that we have these networks of alliances.
Russia and China just--that's not the way they do things. They
can purchase friendships through transactions, but they don't
have the real networks of alliances that we have, and that's
strong.
I am worried, though, about Russia. There's an awful lot of
a northern route around Russia, and so, what are we thinking
about when Putin says, ``Hey, look, this is the new Suez Canal,
the route from the Pacific over to the North Atlantic. You
know, if you don't either have, you know, a Russian ship or
you're not escorted by a Russian, we're going to cause you
trouble--you're going to have to pay a big toll to us to do
it?'' Is that something that we just have to accept, or what
are--what are the thoughts of the United States and our allies
in the Arctic nations about how we would maintain open sea, you
know, that is essential adjacent to the northern border of
Russia?
Dr. Anderson. I would--I'd say, broadly, that, you know,
those type of Russian claims, you know, where they demand to
have escorts on ships or they insist on putting pilots on
ships, I mean, that is completely unacceptable, and, you know,
our State Department has the--kind of, the diplomatic lead on
that to take issue in the appropriate forum. So, that is not
something that we accept as the status quo.
Senator Kaine. Okay.
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I----
Senator Kaine. General O'Shaughnessy?
General O'Shaughnessy.--I would just add to that. It's--and
I think it does start, as the Secretary mentioned, as, you
know--look, watching Secretary Pompeo, in May at Finland, where
he very clearly articulated that. I think that's where it
starts. But, then we have to continue to show--because our lack
of presence is a statement unto itself. Continuing to work with
our allies and partners with respect to continuing to enhance
our ability to operate there and actually operate there. For
example, our tie-in with Denmark is an example where their
Arctic Command has partnered with us at NORTHCOM, which defies
the seams mentioned earlier, with respect to COCOMs [combatant
commands], but--and we're, you know, sharing information back
and forth, we're doing exercises together. Those things are the
start of it. But, also, we're doing roundtable--for example,
the Arctic Council, of course, is not military, by design----
Senator Kaine. Right.
General O'Shaughnessy.--but we're able to use, kind of, the
Arctic Security Council to go and talk through those security
issues, to actually have that dialogue with our allies and
partners with respect to the very challenges that you
mentioned, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
That's all my questions.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. I'll probably go for 5 to 10
minutes.
Senator Kaine. Yeah. That's cool. Yeah. That's fine.
Senator Sullivan. Well, let me close out with a few more
questions. This has been a very informative hearing.
You know, gentlemen, we're talking FONOPs, which is really,
in essence, power projection, which is what our military is, in
many ways, all about. But, as you know, power projection also
relates to infrastructure and the ability to have ports and
other infrastructure that can support military assets.
General O'Shaughnessy, you know the challenge in Alaska.
The closest strategic port that could actually handle, say, a
Arleigh Burke-class Navy ship or a polar-class icebreaker, is
about 1,500 nautical miles from the Arctic Circle. So, that
would be about the equivalent of having, you know, Fort
Lauderdale cover the entire eastern seaboard up to Boston, in
terms of port capability. We wouldn't accept that. But, somehow
we accept that in the Arctic. So, it's the Port of Anchorage or
Dutch Harbor that could handle ships that are the size that can
project power. I'm not even talking an aircraft carrier. I'm
talking just destroyers and icebreakers.
So, previous Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer, former
Secretary Richard Spencer, had been to Alaska twice with the
Commandant of the Coast Guard. He clearly has advocated for and
said we need a strategic Arctic port. This Committee, two
different times, has passed legislation highlighting the need
for a strategic Arctic port that can, essentially, provide a
base where a Navy ship or a significant-size national security
cutter or polar security cutter can pull up, resupply, refuel.
We don't have any of that along the entire Arctic area of
responsibility on the west coast of Alaska, and yet, as we've
already discussed, Russia has probably close to a dozen or two
dozen of these kind of ports. What's your assessment and your
personal opinion, as the advocate for the Arctic, on the need
for strategic Arctic ports, whether it would be Nome or Port
Clarence, these places that you've become familiar with, or
reopening--which the former Secretary of the Navy was also
interested--Adak, which is a very strategic location, the
gateway to the Arctic, a critical potential base with a
deepwater port with regard to our Asia-Pacific interests--can I
get your assessment--actually both of your--gentlemen--on the
need for a strategic Arctic port, which this Committee and the
NDAA have twice said is something that is important?
Dr. Anderson. So, I'll start on that. As--we are working on
section 1754--or 1752, which is in the NDAA provision, to look
and assess for the need of strategic ports. So, that report
is--we're starting on that. We're going to deliver that by
June. You know, I'd certainly grant, in a matter of principle,
ports are important, but I'm going to reserve judgment until I
see the results of that analysis.
What's also going on is a particular study that the Army
Corps of Engineers, as you know, is doing on Nome. They have a
draft report, which has been issued, I think, in December.
We're awaiting the final report there to see what are the
options, the cost benefits of deepening that existing port so
that it could accommodate larger vessels.
Senator Sullivan. So, Mr. Secretary, just--and then I'd
like to hear from General O'Shaughnessy--your personal military
judgment. Doesn't necessarily have to follow the Secretary's.
But, I will say, this is kind of round two of this. This is a
classic example where the Pentagon has come back to us, saying,
``Aw, you don't really need anything.'' I mean, no kidding? I
think that's fundamentally ridiculous. Of course you need some
kind of port infrastructure capacity that can handle the very
ships that we need to protect our sovereignty. We can't even do
FONOPs in the region. We need a place to be able to--I'm not
asking for a Navy base or any--I'm just saying a place to park
ships. Fifteen-hundred nautical miles away from where the
action is, and we find that acceptable. I certainly hope--I
certainly hope the Pentagon is not going to come back, after
studying this again, saying, ``There's no need.'' I had
breakfast with the Secretary of Defense today. I don't think
that's his view. So, you guys might want to run that up the
food chain before you come back to this Committee again and
say, ``Eh, infrastructure looks fine.'' The infrastructure is
not fine. It doesn't exist, and we need it to exist.
General, what's your view on this?
General O'Shaughnessy. Well, first, Senator, when I think--
the infrastructure part you mentioned is not just the port, but
the broader--I mean, this is a microcosm of the broader
challenge with the infrastructure that we have to work in the
Arctic. That said, specific to your questions on the port, I
would say, one, I look forward to working on the response with
our colleagues, due in June, and then the following report, 90
days thereafter. That is a great opportunity for us to really
expand on this.
I will say, we have a stated requirement for fuel north of
Dutch Harbor. Where that becomes important, as you mentioned,
not only Anchorage, but Dutch Harbor, not--does give you some
capability, but it's----
Senator Sullivan. Dutch Harbor is quite, quite, quite a
ways from----
General O'Shaughnessy. It's, what, 1,000 miles----
Senator Sullivan.--Bering Strait.
General O'Shaughnessy.--from Barrow, as an example.
Senator Sullivan. Yeah.
General O'Shaughnessy. Right? So, that's--and part of the--
one thing we have to look at is, it's not just getting a ship
to Barrow, it's its ability to continue to operate once it gets
there, and not just have to turn around and go get gas.
As I mentioned, I have Ken on my staff, and he's been very
helpful as we look at some of the challenges, because we do
have capability now, for example, at Nome, where we're able to
get gas part of the year, but we use barges, and we go back and
forth, and so, that's----
Senator Sullivan. Again, that's not the same as the
ability----
General O'Shaughnessy. No, and----
Senator Sullivan.--to pull a ship up, that we expect in I
don't know how many eastern seaboard ports along America's
eastern seaboard, where you can do that with a Navy ship or a
Coast Guard cutter. Right now, you can't do it anywhere in the
entire U.S. Arctic. You can't pull a ship up----
General O'Shaughnessy. Sure.
Senator Sullivan.--to resupply or get fueled without
barging. So, I think we really need to look at this, gentlemen,
and take it seriously.
General O'Shaughnessy. The challenges you submit there are
quite real. When you look at--for example, about a third of the
time that the port is actually open in Nome, for example, when
we're doing these barge ops, you can't do it because of the
weather, and the winds over 10 knots, and the sea states, and
whatnot. So, we just--we have to look at the detail----
Senator Sullivan. Well, you would be able to do that,
obviously, if you had a port.
General O'Shaughnessy. Exactly. One of the things we've
done, just to preserve options as we do go forward, is, we work
with the Corps of Engineers. As we do look at the Nome study--
and we're not saying Nome is an answer, or if there is an
answer, but when we look at that study, we ensured that they
kept the 40-foot draft as part of that proposal. To your point
about the 40-foot draft would allow us to work DDGs [guided
missile destroyers], the polar security cutter, et cetera, as
we go forward here, at least so we have the numbers, we have
the understanding, so we can continue the work we're doing.
But, then, as we look at, also, the common challenges we
have, this is yet another example of--we have, both from the
military standpoint, certainly with the use--with a facility
such as that, we look at the commercial side that would have
uses such as that. So, we see this--this is a shared effort,
going forward. That's the way I think we should look as--both
within the Department of Defense and the broader Federal
Government, and then the local government, as we make these
analysis about the necessity for a port and what that would
look like, I think we have to look broader than just the pure
DOD military application. Sir, I thank you and Senator
Murkowski for the work that you've done with the Civil Work Act
and the bill that you put on--there that allows to look at
those with a national security lens as we go forward.
So, I look forward to continuing to work this issue. This
is an important issue. I think you've hit some of the key parts
that we know we need to work on infrastructure at large, and
clearly this is part of it. I've had the great opportunity to
talk to the harbormaster, for example, Joy, talk to her just to
really understand the details so I can inform OSD [office of
the Secretary of Defense] and advocate for what we really need,
not just to be able to get there, but then to be able to
operate once we're there.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I think that's a really insightful
answer, and I do want to mention--and I think the Corps has
been working well with this--just the way in which this study's
being done. As you know--and you know, Mr. Secretary--it's
actually being partially funded by the Corps and partially
funded by the City of Nome. So, they're all-in to even help the
DOD actually do the study. My view, long held, as you have on
the East Coast, I think it's a series of ports that we should
be looking at to protect our--America's strategic sovereign
interests along western Alaska, whether it's Nome or Port
Clarence or Kotzebue or even up in Barrow, that can handle
these kind of ships, which, again, is something that I believe
is kind of expected, accepted, just a given on the East Coast,
and even most of the West Coast, but not in America's Arctic. I
think we need to start working to change that.
Related to that, as we look to--the Coast Guard has
announced that the first two polar security cutters will be
based in Seattle, where the one that's functioning, the one
that is broken, are currently homeported. Beyond that, my own
view--and maybe this is more of a Coast Guard view--or Coast
Guard issue, where, as I mentioned, I chair the Subcommittee in
charge of the Coast Guard--but, I think it would make sense,
beyond that, to have these other Coast Guard security cutters
based in a place that needs them. You mentioned the Antarctica
mission. To me, that's not the priority for America. The
priority for America is defend our own sovereignty. Do you have
any views on that, General, in terms of going forward--granted,
this is a little bit further out--but to have Coast Guard
assets, particularly the polar security cutters, based in the
Arctic, that can respond to the needs and missions there?
General O'Shaughnessy. Well, Senator, I certainly wouldn't
tell the Coast Guard, you know, where to base their force, but
what I would say is----
Senator Sullivan. But, you are the advocate for the Arctic.
General O'Shaughnessy. For the Arctic. As such, and with
our partnership with the Coast Guard, what I would advocate for
is the presence. Right? Whether that means that they base it in
Alaska or they just make the presence available in Alaska,
clearly some work to be done there. But, what we have to make
sure we have is that the time that it's actually available to
do missions needs to be part of that calculation.
Senator Sullivan. Good. Thank you.
I have one final question. It relates to this previous
posterboard we had, dealing with the gaps in the different
COCOMs. There has been some discussion--and I think it's at
fairly senior levels within the Department of Defense--that, if
you look at the significant Alaska military-based forces--
Alaska-based military forces--as you know, they're
operationally--they're OPCON [operational control] to PACOM.
Yet, right now we have, for example, the 1st Stryker Brigade
that's in Iraq. As you know, we're getting two squadrons of F-
35s here, starting in a couple of months. To address this issue
of seams within COCOMs, what's your sense on whether or not the
specific Alaska-based forces that are in NORTHCOM, OPCON to
PACOM, biggest threat from EUCOM, and critical role, given
Alaska's role in missile defense, to STRATCOM [Strategic
Command], what's your sense about a more service-focused
orientation on operational control of these forces as a way to
make them much more of a global force ready for deployment,
given their strategic location and their ability to deploy in
several different theaters, not just PACOM? Do you have a sense
on that? I know it's a topic that's being discussed at the
senior levels of the Pentagon.
General O'Shaughnessy. Right. I would just say, broadly,
that, as we look at this, I think we have to look at it from a
new lens. Right? I think the current alignment----
Senator Sullivan. From what? I'm sorry.
General O'Shaughnessy. A new lens. The current alignment
was in a different security environment. I think, as we look at
the security environment we find ourself today, as articulated
by the NDS, very clearly talks about the changing nature of our
adversaries that can hold us at risk. As we look at that, our
ability to respond to that, I think we have to look at the UCP
at large--Unified Command Plan at large--and then the
assignment of forces within there.
Senator Sullivan. Do you have a personal opinion on this?
General O'Shaughnessy. My personal opinion, and which I've
shared with the senior DOD leadership, is, I do believe that
those forces that are currently within my AOR [area of
responsibility], but then assigned to a different COCOM, ought
to be service-retained. By that, I'm not saying we need to own
them in NORTHCOM. I'm just saying we give the Secretary of
Defense the flexibility by retaining them in the Services, and
then they can be assigned--allocated as they need to, based on
the current----
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Secretary, do you have a view on
that? I know it's a complicated topic that does relate to the
almost unique aspects of the strategic location of the Alaskan
forces. They can get anywhere in the northern hemisphere in
about 7 hours. But, also, the seams that I talked about with
regard to the different COCOMs, and how that plays out with the
ability to use them for global force protection and global
force deployment.
Dr. Anderson. So, I would say, generally, I'm--you know,
I'm aware that the UCP is reviewed every couple of years, and
this is exactly the type of seam issue that is deserving of
attention. I would also say, generally, that, you know, there's
an emphasis within the building to make sure that we have the
appropriate-size--right-size immediate-response force and
contingency response force. So, in that context, I tend to
align my thinking, in a--kind of a preliminary sense, with what
the General just articulated, in terms of having those forces
assigned to the service.
Senator Sullivan. Final question. I asked this today, at
the broader hearing, from the Secretary of the Air Force and
Chief of Staff of the Air Force on the--in the full Committee.
This goes to the question we were just talking about. But,
given the strategic location of Alaska, the Air Force is
looking at its OCONUS [outside the continental United States]
bed-down decision of the KC-46. The Secretary of Defense has
testified that if you colocated KC-46s that are at the seams--
PACOM, EUCOM, NORTHCOM, STRATCOM--colocated with over 100
fifth-generation fighters, which we will be having in Alaska,
here, in the next 2 years, you would have a message of extreme
strategic reach to our potential adversaries on what they see
in Alaska--KC-46s colocated with 100 fifth-generation fighters.
Do either of you have a view on that? The other locations the
Air Force is looking at are purely in the PACOM region. Again,
it kind of cabins the ability for strategic reach when you put
an asset like KC-46s solely in one AOR, when, as you know, your
colleague, the TRANSCOM [transportation command] Commander,
recently said that the KC-46 refueling capability was their
most stressed asset that they have for their global force-
protection capabilities. Do you have a view of that, General?
Personal opinion?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yeah, Senator, what I would say is--
I'll leave the basing decision to the Air Force, as there's a
lot that would go into that, but what I will absolutely agree
with you on is the strategic value of having access to them
from Alaska. As you mentioned, you tie it to that fifth-gen, it
does make a powerful statement. One of the things I was really
shocked at when I was in PACAF [Pacific Air Forces], that I
didn't realize--as we were looking at deployments, it was
actually quicker to go from Alaska to a regional right in EUCOM
than it was to go, say, to the South China Sea. That really--it
was kind of eye-opening to me to really understand the--you
know, when you look at a traditional map a lot, and it doesn't
convey the strategic value of Alaska, as articulated by Bill
Mitchell in 1935, as you mentioned, first point.
Then, the second point, I think, as you mentioned, is the
leveraging, not only the ability to deploy, but also the
ability to train, and you look at the JPAR and the ability to
operate there. One of the continuous challenges we have is the
ability to get tanker support for those operations that are
happening at JPARC Range. As we see, hopefully, a steady
increase in our use of the JPARC Range, not only for the fifth-
generation Center of Excellence, but I would start thinking
about, as a Arctic Center of Excellence----
Senator Sullivan. Yeah.
General O'Shaughnessy.--of using that there. I see the
value of having that tanking capability there, as well.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, do you
have a view on that--Under Secretary Rood--you know, this is an
Air Force decision. He was in Alaska about 2 months ago, and, I
think, saw the strategic rationale of that colocation that the
Secretary of Defense testified would show our adversaries
extreme strategic reach. Do you have a view on that yet, sir?
Dr. Anderson. I would certainly concur with the Secretary
of Defense and his assessment there. The Chairman also
testified, in so many words, so he sent a powerful message,
that, indeed, if they were colocated, that they would have that
reach, and it would be powerful message.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
Well, gentlemen, thank you very much.
I want to thank Senator Kaine for his patience on this
hearing. It's a lot of questions from me, but I think it's very
informative.
For both of you, really appreciate all the work.
If Members have additional questions in the next 2 weeks,
they will submit them for the record. If you can, respectfully,
answer those as quickly as you can, that would be much
appreciated.
Otherwise, very informative. Again, General O'Shaughnessy,
I can't thank you enough for your great service to our Nation,
my State, the people of Alaska, but the people of America, and,
of course, the people--men and women of the Air Force.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
arctic naval access
1. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Anderson, please provide a list of
Arctic region ports in Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.
Dr. Anderson. Arctic region ports in the requested countries
include:
Canada: Churchill, Iqaluit, and Nanisivik.
Kingdom of Denmark: Runivik, Faroe Islands; Nuuk,
Greenland; Copenhagen; Aarhus; Frederikshavn; Esbjerg; Korsor;
Fredericia; and Svendborg
Finland: Helsinki and Turku
Iceland: Reykjavik
Norway: Olavsvern, Tromso, Kristiansand, Ramsund, Oslo,
Market, Bodo, Stavanger, Haakonsvern, Narvik, and Harstad
Sweden: Stockholm, Visby, Gothenburg, Stromstad,
Uddevalla, Lysekil, Varberg, Malmo, Ystad, and Helsingborg
2. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Anderson, to which of these ports does
the U.S. Navy currently have access?
Dr. Anderson. The U.S. Navy has access to all the ports listed
above [response to question #1] through requests to our Arctic Council
partner nation governments and/or naval counterparts.
3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Anderson, which of these ports would
be able to supply fuel to the U.S. Navy if an agreement was struck
between the United States and the host government?
Dr. Anderson.
Canada: Nanisivik and Iqaluit would be the two primary candidates
for refueling.
Nanisivik is not yet at full operational capability
(FOC); the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) will be sending an Arctic offshore
patrol ship to this location this summer to attain FOC.
There are also a small number of other ports used by the
mining industry, such as the one at Milne Inlet. The U.S. Navy could
gain access to these ports through a request with the RCN (for
Nanisivik) or the Government of Canada.
However, Nanisivik does not currently have tugs boats
available, which would complicate access.
Denmark: No host nation fuel exchange agreements (FEA). All fuel
orders are placed via DLA Energy's Ships' bunkers Easy Acquisition
(SEA) Card program (SEA Card). Arctic-region visits include:
Runivik--Faeroe Islands (a DDG was in port in October
2019, and similar operations could be mounted with a 10-14 day lead
time to the Country Team for coordination)
Nuuk--Greenland (recent DDG port visit, and similar
operations are possible with significant lead time to ensure tugs,
fenders, and associated fueling requirement are available)
Copenhagen (fueling not an issue, recent DDG port visits)
Aarhus (no ships have been here in recent years)
Frederikshavn (naval base, no recent port visit)
Esbjerg (no recent port visit)
Korsor (naval base, no recent port visit)
Fredericia (no recent port visit)
Svendborg (recent DDG port visits)
Finland: Fuel is available via acquisition cross-servicing
agreements (ACSA) order for marine naval fuel (F76) through DLA Energy
International Agreements. Fuel purchases may also be made via the SEA
Card.
Helsinki (recent DDG port visit)
Turku (no recent port visit)
Iceland: No host nation fuel exchange agreements. Fuel is available
through DLA Energy Contract with orders through the SEA Card or through
the use of a competitive Open Market ``spot buy'' process.''
Reykjavik (multiple port calls within in the last year)
Norway: Fuel is available via ACSA order for F76 & F44 through DLA-
E International Agreements.
Olavsvern (no recent port visit)
Tromso (Fuel also available via DLA Energy Contract,
recent DDG port visit)
Kristiansand (Fuel also available via the SEA Card, no
recent port visit)
Ramsund (Fuel also available via the SEA Card, no recent
port visit)
Oslo (Fuel also available via the SEA Card, recent DDG
port visit)
Bergen (Fuel also available via the SEA Card, no recent
port visit)
Bodo (Fuel also available via the SEA Card, recent DDG
port visit)
Trondheim (Fuel available via DLA Energy Contract, recent
LHD [landing helicopter dark] and LCC [amphibious command ship] port
visit)
Stavanger (Fuel also available via the SEA Card, no
recent port visit)
Haakonsvern (Fuel also available via the SEA Card, recent
DDG port visit)
Narvik (Fuel also available via the SEA Card, recent DDG
port visit)
Harstad (Fuel also available via the SEA Card, recent DDG
port visit)
Sweden: Fuel is available via ACSA Order for F76 & Aviation Grade
fuel (F44) through DLA Energy International Agreements. Fuel purchases
may also be made via the SEA Card, except in Visby.
Stockholm (recent DDG port visit)
Visby (we have access, but the SEA Card option is not
available and we can only leverage the ACSA, no recent port visit)
Gothenburg (no recent port visit)
Stromstad (no recent port visit)
Uddevalla (no recent port visit)
Lysekil (no recent port visit)
Varberg (no recent port visit)
Malmo (no recent port visit)
Ystad (no recent port visit)
Helsingborg (no recent port visit)
*Note for the ACSA/FEA locations.
ACSA orders require 14 days advance notice. The fuel is
owned by the country in question and support is not guaranteed.
Locations supported are primarily host nation military
ports, but support may be provided elsewhere (DLA Energy International
Agreements would need to ask the host nation)
The U.S. DOD customers will request fuel at a specified
location from the Ministry of Defense (MOD) or the Military (MIL). The
requests are usually relayed at the tactical level.
The MOD/MIL will provide a response if it can provide the
support.
If it can provide the support, U.S. DOD customers will
lift fuel, verify/populate the information on fuel sales slips, and
then sign the sales slips.
*Note for the SEA Card Locations.
The SEA Card program is administered by/through DLA
Energy and either uses current bunker contracts with civilian companies
or creates a one-time contract with civilian companies through a
competitive quote Open Market ``spot-buy'' process.
SEA Card locations do not guarantee fuel. There is always
the possibility that no vendor bids on the request or that the fuel
specifications the vendor submits are not acceptable.
4. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Anderson, which of these ports
currently has the capacity to host an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer of
the Navy?
Dr. Anderson. The following ports have the capacity to host a Navy
Arleigh Burke-class destroyer:
Canada: Nanisivik and Iqaluit. Note, use of Nanisivik is
currently limited by a lack of tugs.
Kingdom of Denmark: Runivik (Faroe Islands), Nuuk
(Greenland), Copenhagen, and Svendborg
Finland: Helsinki and Turku
Iceland: Reykjavik
Norway: Olavsvern, Tromso, Ramsund, Oslo, Market, Bodo,
Haakonsvern, Narvik, and Harstad
Sweden: Stockholm, Visby, Gothenburg, Stromstad,
Uddevalla, Lysekil, Varberg, Malmo, Ystad, and Helsingborg
5. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Anderson, for how many months out of
the year is Nome open?
Dr. Anderson. The Port of Nome is typically open for approximately
5 months each year, normally from May through September; however, this
is dependent upon weather and ice conditions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
arctic readiness
6. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, during the hearing we
both agreed on our concern for the severe lack of infrastructure the
U.S. military has in the Arctic and what effect that has on the
readiness of our forces and U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) ability
to defend the Homeland. That lack of infrastructure extends in to the
civilian presence in Alaska, which adds additional strain on military
capabilities. In your personal opinion, can you expand on what
infrastructure improvements are required in the Arctic to ensure we are
ready to operate in the region?
General O'Shaughnessy. Improving our infrastructure in the Arctic
will have significant benefits for USNORTHCOM's homeland defense
mission in the northern approaches. For example, a deep-draft Arctic
Port could help extend maritime operational reach and endurance for
surface combatants operating in the Bering and Chukchi Seas. NORAD and
USNORTHCOM are also working with partners and industry on improvements
at the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC). During the fiscal
year 2021 budget cycle, USNORTHCOM successfully advocated for funding
of simulators and weapons testing at JPARC to ensure personnel from
across the joint force are able to train in tough Arctic conditions.
Eielson AFB Patriot site improvements completed in fiscal year 2019
will enable the deployment of a Patriot Minimum Engagement Package,
while the ongoing Cold Rapid Airfield Damage Repair test is moving
forward with a goal of enabling sustained cold-weather aviation
operations at northern airfields. Finally, I would stress that our
Homeland defense mission in the High North requires an adaptable
architecture for joint all-domain command and control, improved domain
awareness, and defeat mechanisms to counter advanced adversary weapons.
7. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, in your personal
opinion, what infrastructure and capabilities would be required of the
U.S. military if they are required to not just operate, but fight and
win against a near peer adversary in the Arctic region?
General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. Northern Command's Strategic Homeland
Integrated Ecosystem Layered Defense (SHIELD) initiative, which will
include a modern sensor network for domain awareness, Joint All-Domain
Command and Control (JADC2), and defeat mechanisms that can neutralize
our adversaries' advanced weapons systems, will provide the capability
to deter, detect, and defeat threats against our Homeland. In addition
to the infrastructure priorities described in my response to question
#6, we must continue to invest in capabilities suitable for Arctic
operations. Those requirements, including the U.S. Coast Guard's Polar
Security Cutter program, will provide us a persistent surface presence
needed to protect our national interests in the Arctic and deter our
adversaries' military expansionism.
8. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, as we discussed in the
hearing the closest Department of Defense Strategic Port is located
1,500 miles from the Arctic Circle in Anchorage, Alaska. What is your
personal opinion on the need for a Strategic Arctic Port where the Navy
and Coast Guard would be able to refuel and resupply while operating in
the Arctic region?
General O'Shaughnessy. USNORTHCOM has a requirement to provide fuel
to surface combatants north of Dutch Harbor. We have worked with the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers throughout the drafting of their Port of
Nome feasibility study, and in May 2019, I wrote to the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works to articulate the national
security benefits associated with establishing a 40-foot deep draft
port at Nome. A 40-foot controlled depth would allow access by surface
combatants, including U.S. Navy destroyers and U.S. Coast Guard Polar
Security Cutters. A commercial port facility capable of servicing these
military vessels would play a key role in meeting current and future
operational requirements in the Arctic.
9. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, during the hearing you
briefly highlighted the strategic value of basing 5th generation
tankers such as the KC-46 with the 100 combat coded 5th generation
fighters the U.S. Air Force will have based in Alaska. In your personal
opinion, can you expand on the strategic global force projection that
would give our Air Force and what strategic dilemmas that would pose to
our adversaries?
General O'Shaughnessy. Air assets based in Alaska can be mobilized
rapidly to deploy to either the Eurasian Arctic or to the Indo-Pacific
region for response to aggression from either of our near-peer
adversaries. The ability to position aircraft in Alaska that are
readily postured for NORAD operations and potential overseas
contingencies provides a strong deterrent, defends the continent, and
protects our national interests around the globe.
10. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, NORTHCOM's top
unfunded priority is the deployment initial Arctic communication
capability, and you have cited this as a necessity due to the severe
lack of communication capacity in the Arctic. In your personal opinion,
how does this lack of communication capability affect military
operations in the Arctic?
General O'Shaughnessy. The ability to communicate underpins every
successful military operation. Our assets in the Arctic face
significant communications challenges as a result of the harsh climate,
adverse weather conditions, and a lack of communications architecture
in the High North. To address this critical issue, we are partnering
with the Services, defense agencies, and industry to explore the
potential for a proliferated low earth orbit satellite constellation to
provide voice and data communications throughout the Arctic region.
11. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, in the hearing you
stated that the deployment of Arctic communications infrastructure will
be game-changing for the military and will also make a significant
impact on local populations, such as those in Alaska. Can you expand on
the potential benefit that local populations could receive from the
deployment of this capability?
General O'Shaughnessy. Commercial low earth orbit (LEO) satellite
communication has strong potential to support military operations in
high latitudes. In addition, this commercial capability, once in place,
can be leveraged by isolated Arctic communities for high-speed internet
and voice communications. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working closely with
industry partners to evaluate ways in which commercial LEO could help
to resolve the significant technical challenges that have historically
hindered reliable communications for military and civilian users in the
High North.
12. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, the United States Navy
regularly performs sub-surface operations in the Arctic, but lacks the
capability to operate on the surface or support the U.S. Coast Guard in
the Arctic. In your personal opinion, if the U.S. Navy had surface
capabilities in all weather and ice conditions year round in the Arctic
what strategic advantage would that provide? What message are we
sending to our adversaries by not having this capability?
General O'Shaughnessy. Deterrence is a critical element of Homeland
defense and we must ensure our adversaries know we have the capability,
capacity, and will to defend the Homeland in the maritime domain. This
visible presence will include U.S. Coast Guard Polar Security Cutters
and U.S. Navy surface combatants. We are working closely with the U.S.
Navy to ensure USNORTHCOM's operational requirements in the High North
are met. I strongly support the Navy's requirement for ice-capable
future surface combatants.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
china's intentions in the arctic
13. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, what do you assess as
China's near and long term military goals for the Arctic region?
General O'Shaughnessy. We assess China's near-term military goal
for the Arctic region is to develop baseline knowledge and establish
familiarity with the operating environment. In its 2018 Arctic White
Paper, China stated its policy goals are ``to understand, protect,
develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to
safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international
community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable development of the
Arctic.'' We also assess that China desires to be acknowledged globally
as an Arctic-relevant country in a manner that will limit concern among
established Arctic nations. Over the longer term, China recognizes the
military-strategic importance of the polar regions and seeks sufficient
military capability and capacity to secure its access to the natural
resources and emerging shipping routes of the region. China calls
itself a ``near-Arctic'' state, and in the same 2018 Arctic White
Paper, China asserts: ``States from outside the Arctic region do not
have territorial sovereignty in the Arctic, but they do have rights in
respect of scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, laying
of submarine cables and pipelines in the high seas and other relevant
sea areas in the Arctic Ocean, and rights to resource exploration and
exploitation in the Area, pursuant to treaties such as UNCLOS [United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] and general international
law.''
14. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, how does the President's
Fiscal Year 2021 budget request address those specific threats?
General O'Shaughnessy. The President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget
supports necessary investments in homeland defense that allow
USNORTHCOM and NORAD to address a wide range of threats, to include
those related to China's activities in the Arctic. Investments in
domain awareness, joint all-domain command and control, and advanced
defeat mechanisms, as well as in DOD science and technology programs,
will improve our ability to detect, deter, and if necessary, defeat
current and future threats. USNORTHCOM and NORAD rely on these
integrated, multi-domain capabilities and essential investments in
modernization, lethality, and innovation to meet current and future
homeland defense challenges in the Arctic.
[all]