[Senate Hearing 116-148, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                ------                                S.
                                                  S.  Hrg. 116-148, Pt. 1
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                                   ON

                                S. 4049

     TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 FOR MILITARY 
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, 
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR 
                             OTHER PURPOSES

                               ----------                              

                                 PART 1

             U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

            U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

         U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                           AIR FORCE POSTURE

                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                              NAVY POSTURE

                          U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

                              ARMY POSTURE

                               ----------                              

        JANUARY 30; FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 3, 4, 5, 12, 26, 2020


         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
         
         
         
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]   




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
            2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM_Part 1
            
            
            
            
            
            

       U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND b U.S. NORTHERN 
  COMMAND AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND b U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. 
  TRANSPORTATION COMMAND b AIR FORCE POSTURE b DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
  BUDGET POSTURE b NAVY POSTURE b U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND b ARMY POSTURE




                                 ______


                                                 S. Hrg. 116-148, Pt. 1

                DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
                APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND
                    THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                                   ON

                                S. 4049

     TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 FOR MILITARY 
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, 
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR 
                             OTHER PURPOSES

                               __________

                                 PART 1

             U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

            U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

         U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                           AIR FORCE POSTURE

                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                              NAVY POSTURE

                          U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

                              ARMY POSTURE

                               __________

        JANUARY 30; FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 3, 4, 5, 12, 26, 2020

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
         
         
         
     
                 Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
                 
                 
                 
                              ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 56-187          WASHINGTON : 2024
           
                 
                 
                 
                 


                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma,          JACK REED, Rhode Island
             Chairman                   JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi            KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                   RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
TOM COTTON, Arkansas                    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota               TIM KAINE, Virginia
JONI ERNST, Iowa                        ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina             MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia                   GARY C. PETER
                                        JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
RICK SCOTT, FloridaS, Michigan          TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota              DOUG JONES, Alabama
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona                 
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     

                              John Bonsell, Staff Director
                            Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff 
                                   Director

                                  (ii)


                            C O N T E N T S



                            January 30, 2020

                                                                   Page

United States Africa Command and United States Southern Command..     1

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................     1

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     3

                           Witness Statements

Townsend, General Stephen J., USA, Commander, United States 
  Africa
  Command........................................................     4

Faller, Admiral Craig S., USN, Commander, United States Southern
  Command........................................................    13

Questions for the Record.........................................    53

                           February 13, 2020

United States Northern Command and United States Strategic
  Command........................................................    65

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................    65

                           Witness Statements

O'Shaughnessy, General Terrence J., USAF, Commander, United          65
  States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense 
  Command.

Richard, Admiral Charles A., USN, Commander, United States 
  Strategic
  Command........................................................    95

Questions for the Record.........................................   146

                           February 25, 2020

United States European Command and United States Transportation     163
  Command.

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   163

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   164

                           Witness Statements

Wolters, General Tod D., USAF, Commander, United States European 
  Command/
  North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Allied Commander
  Europe.........................................................   166

Lyons, General Stephen R., USA, Commander, United States            175
  Transportation Command.

Questions for the Record.........................................   211

                                 (iii)

  


                             March 3, 2020

                                                                   Page

Air Force Posture................................................   231

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker.............................   231

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   232

                           Witness Statements

Barrett, Honorable Barbara M., Secretary of the Air Force........   234

Goldfein, General David L., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force   235

Questions for the Record.........................................   280

                             March 4, 2018

Department of Defense Budget Posture.............................   297

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   297

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   298

                           Witness Statements

Esper, Hon. Mark T., Secretary of Defense........................   300

Milley, General Mark A., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of       310
  Staff.

Questions for the Record.........................................   361

                             March 5, 2020

Navy Posture.....................................................   399

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   399

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   400

                           Witness Statements

Gilday, Admiral Michael M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations.......   402

Modly, Hon. Thomas B., Acting Secretary of the Navy..............   417

Berger, General David H., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps...   418

Questions for the Record.........................................   451

                                  (iv)

  


                             March 12, 2020

                                                                   Page

United States Central Command....................................   467

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   467

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   468

                           Witness Statements

McKenzie, General Kenneth F., Jr., USMC, Commander, United States   470
  Central Command.

Questions for the Record.........................................   499

                             March 26, 2020

                                                                   Page

Army Posture.....................................................   513

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   513

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   514

                           Witness Statements

McCarthy, Honorable Ryan D., Secretary of the Army and              517
  McConville, General James C., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army.

Paper Hearing Questions for the Record...........................   532

Questions for the Record.........................................   567

                                  (v)


                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
 FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 
                                PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, 2020

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:59 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer, 
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer, McSally, 
Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, 
Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Rounds says it is time we start, 
and so we are going to start.
    Good morning. The committee today has received testimony 
from SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command] and AFRICOM 
[United States Africa Command]. This is a very significant 
meeting because in my narrow view we have the two comms that 
never were adequately resourced--I really believe that--
compared to the threat that we are facing.
    We have two great heroes here. We have General Steve 
Townsend, Commander of AFRICOM and Admiral Craig Faller, 
Commander of SOUTHCOM.
    This committee's top priority is to ensure the effective 
implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). That is 
this. We have been adhering to this to the letter in a very 
bipartisan way.
    We identified the competition with China and Russia. That 
is where the problem is. That is something that people were not 
really sensitive to until we came out with this document. 
China's and Russia's growing influence is not limited to Europe 
and the Indo-Pacific, and both countries clearly view Africa 
and Latin America as critical battlefields to fulfill their 
global ambitions and challenge the United States.
    This is particularly evident in Africa. Over the last 20 
years, I have conducted over about 160 African country visits 
working with that continent. I can tell you that it is no 
coincidence that China established the first overseas military 
base in Djibouti. You know, that is the first time. They have 
always done it in their own city limits before, but now it is 
Djibouti. Now they are as far south in Africa as Tanzania and 
all over the country. I visited Djibouti last February and saw 
firsthand what they are doing there, and they are active there.
    Elsewhere China is using cash and debt to trap the 
countries and to force them to put their infrastructure and 
potentially their sovereignty on sale.
    At the same time, Russia is using its military, 
mercenaries, and weapons sales to buy influence, exploit 
Africa's natural resources, and prop up leaders sympathetic to 
Russian interests and hostile to the United States.
    While the NDS states that competition with Russia and China 
should be DOD's [U.S. Department of Defense] top priority, it 
makes clear that we must maintain pressure on radical terrorist 
groups like al Qaeda and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria].
    Today, more than a dozen terrorist groups with ties to al 
Qaeda and ISIS are operating across Africa. Many of these 
groups have ambition to attack Americans and our partners. 
Without sustained pressure, the threat posed by these groups 
will grow.
    In SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR), China and 
Russia are pursuing a similar strategy by using economic and 
military means to expand their access and influence right here 
in our own hemisphere.
    China has increased its naval deployments to the region by 
70 percent over the last 5 years, and Chinese companies 
currently have over 50 active port projects in this region and 
there are more on the planning board.
    Russia props up oppressive regimes in places like Cuba, 
Venezuela, and Nicaragua that are hostile to the United States. 
They are also deploying advanced military assets to the region, 
including strategic bombers and warships.
    At the same time, many of the drugs that are poisoning the 
American cities are coming from Latin America. These drugs are 
trafficked by illicit networks.
    I would say in my opening statement that in both of these 
comms, I have been pretty outspoken as a conservative but one 
who has really been concerned because they do not seem to get 
the attention that some of the other comms do. I mean, you 
know, if you look at Africa, you have a total of 6,000 people 
there, but how much are you going to get accomplished with 
6,000 people? You look at CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]. What 
is that? Seventy-five thousand, INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command] is even bigger than that.
    So if the object here and people are talking about on the 
subject that is taking place is to reduce and to reposition 
people, you are talking about the two areas where there are not 
enough people to reposition. That is a narrow view, but that is 
mine.
    Senator Reed?

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
welcome our witnesses.
    But first let me extend my condolences to the families of 
the brave Americans who were killed in action in the attack on 
the Kenyan airbase earlier this month, as well as those who are 
recovering from those wounds, and also extend my condolences to 
the families of the two airmen who were recently killed in 
Afghanistan.
    Again, thank you to the witnesses for appearing here today. 
Both of you are leading commands during challenging times, and 
we thank you for your continued service. Please also extend our 
gratitude to the service men and women who, under your command, 
continue their outstanding service to the Nation.
    There is currently an effort underway to review U.S. Force 
posture around the globe in an effort to ensure the Department 
of Defense funding and forces are allocated in line with the 
National Defense Strategy. We understand that AFRICOM is the 
first combatant command to go through the review process and 
that SOUTHCOM will shortly follow.
    While it is wise and in fact necessary to take a hard look 
and methodological look at our investments in military 
activities around the globe, it would be strategically unwise 
to disengage from either Africa or Latin America in an effort 
to generate small, near-term budgetary gains. Given the 
relatively small number of forces under consideration, such a 
move would not generate the type of savings necessary for 
meaningful NDS investments and would likely come at a much 
higher cost in terms of increased long-term security risks.
    Our competitors recognize that investing in Africa and 
Latin America is in their long-term interests, as evidenced by 
Chinese and Russian military and economic activity that 
continues to grow across these continents year by year. General 
Townsend and Admiral Faller, I look forward to hearing your 
assessments regarding where and how United States interests are 
best served in the AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM areas of operation (AO, 
including where we may be able to gain efficiencies without 
undue risk to the U.S. interests, and where you believe it 
would be strategically responsible to do so.
    As you both note in your testimony, Latin America and 
Africa are beset by a vicious cycle of challenges that our 
competitors are seeking to leverage to their advantage. 
Countries with weak democratic institutions and rampant 
corruption are being overtly wooed by Chinese and Russian 
investments and covertly manipulated through information 
operations and a flood of disinformation. We are not only 
competing globally for influence and access, we must also work 
to ensure that new forms of military and economic colonialism 
do not take root in those regions. I am especially concerned 
about Chinese economic intentions and whether our partner 
countries are positioned to defend themselves against China's 
predatory lending practices.
    As you well know, the problems we face and the security 
solutions required are multidimensional. They do not lend 
themselves to geographic or bureaucratic boundaries and require 
well-resourced and well-integrated whole-of-government 
solutions. Continuing to restrict development aid, rebuff 
partners and allies, and constrain multilateral efforts, as the 
administration has repeatedly endeavored to do, all but ensures 
that present challenges in places like Latin America and Africa 
will continue to expand and travel to America's doorstep. I 
will be interested in your views on the importance of investing 
in diplomacy and development to foster long-term stability in 
these regions, as well as your assessment of the impact of 
significant force reductions on the interagency and 
international partners we coordinate with and depend upon to 
advance our objectives.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your service and thank you for 
your testimony.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    We will go ahead and start with opening statements, and we 
will start with you, General Townsend. Your statement will be 
made a part of the record. You may proceed.

   STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, USA, COMMANDER, 
                  UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

    General Townsend. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and 
distinguished members of the committee, good morning and thank 
you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    It is a privilege to be a part of and to lead America's 
finest men and women at United States Africa Command, an 
exceptional team dedicated to protecting America and advancing 
her interests on the African continent.
    I would like to take a moment to honor the memories of 
three exceptional Americans, United States Army Specialist 
Henry Mayfield, Jr.; Mr. Bruce Triplet; and Mr. Dustin Harrison 
who lost their lives in the service of our nation on January 
5th in Manda Bay, Kenya. To their families, our thoughts and 
prayers are with you. Your loved ones died while protecting the 
American people from the very real threat of al Qaeda and al 
Shabaab terrorist groups.
    I am here this morning with my battle buddy, shipmate, and 
friend, Admiral Craig Faller, to discuss shared challenges and 
opportunities in both our areas of responsibility while we 
further readiness of the joint force and our ability to fight 
across the globe.
    AFRICOM is critical to maintaining this ability as Africa 
overwatches a global crossroads with strategic chokepoints and 
sea lines of communication that are essential to global 
commerce and critical to United States operations in the world. 
Our future security and prosperity rest on this strategic 
access in times of crisis and ensuring these waters remain 
free, open, and secure.
    AFRICOM is engaged in an ongoing blank slate review. In 
concert with the Department of Defense, we have developed a 
prioritized list of objectives and actions to protect the 
Homeland and secure our strategic interests in Africa while 
ensuring the American taxpayers' investments are in the right 
areas.
    Africa is key terrain for competition with China and Russia 
who are aggressively using economic and military means to 
expand their access and influence. I believe Africa offers 
America a competitive edge over China and Russia, and we should 
take advantage of it.
    We will grow more efficient to contribute to higher defense 
priorities and refocus resources to global power competition, 
but we cannot take pressure off major terrorist groups like al 
Qaeda and ISIS. These groups and many others remain an 
inconvenient reality in Africa. While we should not try to 
confront each one, we should remain resolute in confronting 
those who threaten Americans and the American Homeland like al 
Shabaab, the largest and most violent of al Qaeda's branches. 
Today AFRICOM does that with a light and relatively low cost 
footprint by supporting African and international partners who 
are leading these efforts.
    In my first 6 months of command, I learned that small 
investments, a few troops, and a few bucks can go a long way 
and make a real difference in Africa. Our whole-of-government 
and partner-centric approach acts as a force multiplier to 
address Africa's many complex challenges. What AFRICOM 
accomplishes with a few people and a few dollars on a continent 
three and a half times the size of the continental United 
States is a bargain for the American taxpayer and low cost 
insurance for America in that region.
    A secure and stable Africa remains an enduring American 
interest. AFRICOM stands ready to protect and advance American 
interests and respond to crises in Africa.
    Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 
committee, for your continued support to our armed forces. I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Townsend follows:]

           Prepared Statement by General Stephen J. Townsend
                              introduction
A secure and stable Africa is an enduring American interest.
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of 
the Committee:
    I am honored and privileged to represent the members of United 
States Africa Command, an exceptional team dedicated to protecting our 
nation and advancing our interests. United States Africa Command has 
been engaged in a ``blank slate review'' since I took command in July 
last year, an effort which has accelerated since I provided my initial 
assessment to the Secretary of Defense in October. In concert with the 
Department of Defense, we have developed a prioritized list of 
objectives and actions to protect the Homeland, secure our strategic 
interests in Africa, and focus the American taxpayer's investment in 
the right areas. We are further refocusing United States Africa 
Command's approach on the objectives of the National Security, Defense, 
and Military Strategies. These foundational documents acknowledge the 
strategic importance of Africa and guide our mission: United States 
Africa Command, with partners, counters transnational threats and 
malign actors, strengthens security forces and responds to crises in 
order to advance United States national interests and promote regional 
security and stability.
    Africa is home to the fastest growing economies and populations in 
the world, sits at crossroads of international commerce and trade, and 
watches over the world's most important sea lines of communication. The 
U.S. plays a unique role in ensuring these strategic routes remain open 
to all. The international order we have helped create gives people 
everywhere the best hope for safe, secure, and prosperous lives. 
Africans recognize this and continue to look to the United States for 
leadership. Our future security, prosperity, and strategic access in 
times of crisis rest on free, open, and secure sea and air lines of 
communication around Africa. Simply put, a secure and stable Africa is 
essential for America's security.
                         strategic environment
    A Vast Continent. The land mass of Africa is larger than the United 
States, China, India, Japan, and all of Europe combined. This vast 
continent of opportunity and promise also includes strategic challenges 
from malign competitors and violent extremist organizations (VEOs). Of 
the 1.3 billion people who live in Africa, over two-thirds live in 
conditions of astonishing poverty. \1\ Poverty and food insecurity are 
exacerbated by natural resource degradation, shifting weather patterns, 
climate impact, infectious disease outbreaks, and conflict. Lack of 
economic opportunities and a search for a better life leads to internal 
displacement and refugees, which creates new challenges and conflicts 
over increasingly scarce resources. These factors and others have led 
to an uptick in migration to Europe in recent years, under dangerous 
conditions in many cases, and feed a lucrative market for VEOs and 
criminal networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 85 percent of Africans live off less than 5.50 USD per day, 
World Bank October 2019
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These challenges will be amplified as Africa's population continues 
to grow. By 2050, Africa's population is projected to double, and more 
than a quarter of the world's inhabitants will reside on the continent. 
By 2100, Africa's population is projected to almost double again. \2\ 
At that point, almost 1 in 3 people on the planet will live in Africa. 
This massive population growth will further strain resources, require 
job creation, potentially lead to surges in migration to Europe and 
beyond, and will increase political instability, communal conflict, 
trans-regional terrorism, and further marginalization of already 
vulnerable populations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/
Population Division World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nonetheless, Africa is also a land of opportunity. Over half of the 
world's farming land is in Africa, and when effectively managed, 
Africa's population growth and rich natural resources drive progress. 
Of note, 26 African nations hold reserves of minerals determined to be 
critical to the United States economy and national security. \3\ For 
2020, the World Bank projects six of the world's fastest growing 
economies to be in Africa, with Rwanda identified as the second fastest 
growing economy in the world (after Guyana) with 8.1 percent GDP 
growth. In conditions that promote a healthy business climate, these 
burgeoning markets present opportunities for U.S. trade and investment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Executive Order 13817, A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and 
Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals, December 20, 2017
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Africa and National Security. Located at the crossroads of the 
world, Africa watches over strategic choke points and sea lines of 
communication, including the Mediterranean Sea and the Strait of 
Gibraltar on NATO's southern flank, the Red Sea and the Bab al Mandeb 
strait, and the Mozambique Channel. These strategic pathways are 
essential to global commerce and critical to the operations of most of 
our Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands. These corridors 
facilitate one-third of the world's shipping, and are key to the 
movement of Africa's vast natural resources including energy and 
strategic mineral. African, United States, and global prosperity depend 
on unhindered access to these waters.
    Global Power Competition. \4\ China and Russia have long recognized 
the strategic and economic importance of Africa, and continue to seize 
opportunities to expand their influence across the continent. The 
National Defense Strategy directs us to prioritize great power 
competition with China and Russia due to the ``magnitude of the threats 
they post to United States security and prosperity today and the 
potential for those threats to increase in the future.'' The United 
States encourages constructive partners helping to develop Africa's 
economic, infrastructure, humanitarian, and security sectors to the 
benefit of all Africans. However, malign actors, unencumbered by 
international norms and professional military standards, leverage speed 
of action and access to economic and security arenas in many parts of 
the continent. Their coercive and exploitative activities undermine and 
threaten many African countries' stability. China is outpacing all of 
its competitors in Africa, where, with the construction of a military 
port and helicopter landing pads, it is converting its first overseas 
military base in Djibouti into a power projection platform. We know 
they seek to open more bases and their unprofitable seaport investments 
in East Africa and Southern Africa track closely with involvement by 
Chinese military forces. These Chinese seaports are not genuine 
commercial ports; these investments are geo-economic tools to increase 
the PRC's geopolitical influence throughout the continent. China 
continues to invest heavily in African infrastructure and currently 
maintains 52 embassies in Africa--three more than the United States and 
a 24 percent increase since 2012. China also leads its G20 partners in 
head of state and senior leadership visits to the continent over the 
last decade. In the last seven years, China has sold over two billion 
USD in arms to African partners. During the same period, Russia 
increased access agreements by 200 percent and remains the top arms 
dealer for the entire continent, selling nearly nine billion USD in 
arms to African partners. Russian private military companies (PMCs) 
have a highly destabilizing influence in Africa, as they are frequently 
employed to secure Russian investments at the expense of Africans, to 
prop up corrupt regimes and establish a broader Russian military 
footprint globally. In Libya, Russian PMCs almost certainly downed a 
United States unarmed, unmanned aircraft in November using a 
sophisticated Russian air defense system. From the 7th Forum On China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing in September 2018 where China 
pledged over 60 billion USD in investments, to the October 2019 Russia-
Africa Summit in Sochi where all 54 African countries attended with 
over 43 Heads of State, it is clear that China prioritizes Africa and 
Russia sees an opportunity to gain a strong position on NATO's southern 
flank. China and Russia's corrupt and exploitative investment and 
security assistance often prioritizes their own gains rather than 
building long-term African security capacity, and their activities 
often undermine transparency, accountability, and respect for human 
rights. Importantly, they erode United States influence and access over 
time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ I use ``global'' rather than ``great'' because China and Russia 
are ``global powers'' but they are not ``great powers'' in the way the 
United States is. Further, calling Russia ``great'' plays right into 
the Russian's hands as their dream is for Russia to be considered great 
like the United States and they are far from it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    VEOs Remain a Reality. Violent extremist networks are expanding in 
Africa at a rapid pace, due in large part to weak governance and 
disenfranchised populations while employing violence to exacerbate 
despair and hopelessness. They undermine public trust in local 
governments and militaries, eventually filling--via illegitimate 
means--security and public service voids while expanding their radical 
ideology. In general, African governments view VEOs as near-term 
threats to their capacity to govern effectively, protect their 
populations, and improve their economies. They also pose threats to 
U.S. interests. Most VEOs in Africa seek to strike at the United States 
in the region, and some aspire to strike the United States Homeland. 
United States Africa Command prioritizes efforts on the most capable 
VEOs today. In East Africa, we focus on al Qaeda's al Shabaab. Al 
Shabaab is the largest and most kinetically active al Qaeda network in 
the world. After a series of complex attacks targeting Somali and 
United States bases last year, in November al Shabaab's leadership 
publicly identified Americans and United States interests worldwide as 
priority targets--mirroring Usama bin Laden's declaration of war on the 
United States in 1996. The latest manifestation of this threat was the 
5 January 2020 attack by al Shabaab on United States Forces at the 
Kenyan Naval Base at Manda Bay, which killed three Americans and 
clearly demonstrated al Shabaab's willingness and capability to attack 
the United States outside of Somalia.
    While al Shabaab is most dangerous to United States interests 
today, ISIS is rapidly franchising VEOs in all corners of Africa and 
may become a pre-eminent threat to United States interests, as it did 
until western intervention in Iraq and Syria. In West Africa, the 
primary VEO threats are al Qaeda's Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal-Muslimin 
(JNIM) and ISIS networks in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. Unlike we 
have seen elsewhere, in this region, both al Qaeda and ISIS networks 
are working together to exploit under-governed regions, disenfranchised 
populations, and porous borders and threaten the security and stability 
of our African partners, our allies, United States commercial and 
security interests, and U.S. citizens. Kidnapping for ransom remains a 
pervasive threat throughout Africa where Americans and other Western 
partners are often targeted by VEOs to raise revenue or exact other 
concessions from Western countries. Left unchecked, this threat will 
continue to expand across Africa.
    Africa is a complex continent with a unique environment. There are 
numerous big challenges, but its potential is enormous. Today our 
African partners are under siege from new agents coming to strip them 
of their natural resources, trap them in unpayable debt, and undermine 
the international order. Chinese investment has brought some benefit to 
the continent through infrastructure projects that have improved roads 
and connected markets to transportation hubs. However, the United 
States offers a unique partnership, as we believe in investing in and 
fortifying our African partners to enable ``African solutions to 
African problems''--the bedrock of long-term self-sufficiency, 
security, and development.
            united states africa command strategic approach
United States Africa Command's operations are a bargain for America . . 
        .an ``ounce of prevention'' that is just pennies on the defense 
        dollar.
    The United States must continue to advance our national interests 
in Africa within the international order that underwrites global 
security and prosperity. Following our national strategic guidance to 
achieve U.S. foreign policy goals, United States Africa Command applies 
a partner-centric, interagency-based approach dating back to the 
inception of the command in 2007. In an era of global power 
competition, the combined efforts of the Department of Defense, 
Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 
the broader interagency, American businesses, and the charitable 
generosity of the American people are critical to achieving our 
objectives in the National Defense Strategy. This whole-of-government 
model defines United States Africa Command's strategic approach across 
three themes: we partner for success, compete to win, and maintain 
pressure on malign networks.
    First, we understand Africa's challenges cannot be resolved solely 
through the use of United States military power. United States Africa 
Command must Partner for Success with a diverse network that includes 
African nations, strategic allies, United States Government agencies 
and departments, and multinational coalitions to prevent, address and 
mitigate conflict in Africa. We emphasize military support to diplomacy 
and development as our security activities directly complement 
Department of State and USAID efforts to reduce the spread of harmful 
ideologies, strengthen governments to protect their citizens, and 
promote stability and security, good governance, and economic 
successes. Security is a key enabler of U.S. whole-of-government and 
whole-of-society efforts--a minimum security threshold must be met for 
diplomacy to work, economies to flourish, and development efforts to 
take root. On the other side, development and diplomatic engagement are 
necessary to consolidate military and other security gains. United 
States Africa Command helps African partners create this operational 
space in Africa to build the governance and economic growth necessary 
for them to repel malign actors and VEO influences.
    Second, we Compete to Win. We conduct our security activities to 
safeguard U.S. interests. We seek areas where our interests align with 
those of our allies and partners as we work together to achieve shared 
objectives. This is particularly true where we see unhelpful activities 
and pressure exerted by malign actors. Chinese, Russian and VEO 
activities on the continent are destabilizing and promote a disregard 
for human rights and inclusive economic growth that will upend the 
progress the continent has seen in the last ten years. United States 
Africa Command must continue to find ways to expand the competitive 
space and outpace Chinese and Russian influence to maintain our 
strategic access in Africa. America's values, our high standards of 
professionalism, our direct focus and commitment to addressing partner 
security needs, and our high-quality equipment and niche capabilities 
give us a qualitative advantage over these competitors in Africa . . . 
which our African partners actively seek.
    Most importantly, in order to counter potential threats to the U.S. 
and our core interests, we work closely with allies and partners to 
apply persistent Pressure on the Malign Networks of global and regional 
competitors, VEOs, and transnational criminal organizations. Our 
principal means for applying pressure is working with our African and 
international partners, increasing African security capabilities, 
information operations, and, only when necessary, using military force. 
Ultimately, in countries like Somalia that have seen progress over the 
course of a decade of investment, our use of force in Africa directly 
supports host government, African, and international partner efforts to 
provide the security required for development activities to bring about 
long-term stability and prosperity.
    This strategic approach allows us to protect our citizens and 
interests at home and abroad, advance American prosperity and values, 
and support allies and partners overseas so they become more self-
reliant and less dependent on U.S. security assistance.
                 priorities, partners, and competitors
    United States Africa Command advances United States strategic 
objectives by focusing on global power competition to maintain 
strategic access, by prioritizing efforts that protect the Homeland and 
U.S. personnel on the continent, and by responding to regional crises 
across our area of responsibility. United States security cooperation 
with African partners builds professional, capable militaries that can 
provide security which sets the conditions for economic growth and 
development. We achieve and maintain influence with our African 
partners through security cooperation, exercises, engagements, 
operations, and ``setting the theater'' or maturing infrastructure on 
the continent.
    Protecting United States personnel and facilities remains United 
States Africa Command's number one responsibility. Our mission to 
protect United States embassies and forces in Africa is central to our 
force posture. The Department of State has designated 32 diplomatic 
facilities worldwide as High Threat, High Risk posts--15 are in our 
area of responsibility, spread across an area 3.5 times the size of the 
United States. This critical mission requires heightened readiness and 
vigilance. Additionally, on any given day there are approximately 6,000 
Department of Defense personnel across the continent supporting U.S. 
interests, addressing global security challenges, and maintaining 
strategic access and influence. Even if the numbers of at-risk 
diplomatic posts and military personnel are reduced, the remainder will 
still require the backing and protection of the Department of Defense. 
Al-Shabaab's capability to reach outside the borders of Somalia to 
strike Americans in locations we once considered beyond their reach 
highlights the growing threat to our interests. After the 5 January 
attack in Kenya, we have taken swift measures to increase our force 
protection posture and harden our location at Manda Bay, while pursuing 
the attackers and their network. We are also taking a hard look at all 
our locations across the continent in light of this expanded threat.
    We benefit greatly from close coordination with a variety of U.S. 
and international partners. There are currently 28 representatives from 
13 different U.S. Government departments holding key positions on my 
staff. All United States Africa Command activities are closely 
coordinated with Defense Attaches and Chiefs of Security Cooperation in 
our embassies across Africa. In addition, United States Africa Command 
collaborates with the United States National Guard's State Partnership 
Program (SPP), where 15 African countries are paired with United States 
National Guard units. The SPP creates enduring bonds between Americans 
and Africans, and we are encouraged as more African countries apply to 
the program every year. Furthermore, foreign liaison officers 
representing 18 countries and multinational organizations are assigned 
to United States Africa Command headquarters providing key reach back 
capability within their Ministries of Defense and General Staffs. 
Outside the command, we regularly work with the African Union, European 
Union, NATO, United Nations, and the Regional Economic Communities in 
Africa on operations, exercises, engagements, security cooperation, and 
maturing the theater activities.
    In Africa, Counter-VEO is Global Power Competition. United States 
Africa Command prioritizes global power competition, even while we 
remain engaged in counter-VEO (C-VEO) operations. At AFRICOM, we 
recognize the strategic environment is changing and the Joint Force 
must orient the bulk of our efforts against China and Russia even as we 
counter VEOs that threaten America. In Africa, the C-VEO fight is a key 
component of global power competition as these efforts are not mutually 
exclusive. Our experience, training, equipment, advice, and other 
unique capabilities to support C-VEO efforts led by our allies and 
partners addresses immediate partner needs, builds relationships for 
the future, and is a distinct U.S. advantage that our competitors 
cannot match. Al Qaeda and ISIS influence is growing in Africa and al 
Shabaab's capability to threaten American interests in East Africa and 
the Homeland is on a dangerous trajectory. The international community 
is not making durable progress to contain priority VEOs in Africa, 
mainly because military activities remain insufficiently coordinated 
and lack a ``whole of coalition'' balance between military and non-
military investments. Outside of arms sales that they leverage to their 
own benefit, China and Russia do little to counter violent extremist 
groups seeking to destabilize Africa. However, as one African leader 
recently shared, ``a drowning man will accept any hand.'' In the 
absence of even limited United States C-VEO assistance, African 
partners are turning to our competitors to fill the void, including by 
accepting training and other military engagement opportunities 
overseas. In our highest priority countries, where U.S. interests are 
greatest, C-VEO assistance is a key tool in our global power 
competition toolkit.
    In Africa, Building Partner Capability is Global Power Competition. 
Building partner capability is also an important tool in global power 
competition, reinforcing the U.S. role as the world's elite 
professional fighting force and furthering American values, respect for 
human rights, and adherence to obligations and commitments. We have 
learned that we cannot surge trust. The enduring relationships built 
while we develop partner capabilities provide us with the long-term 
strategic alliances we need to address future challenges.
    United States Africa Command and its component commands conduct 
engagements and exercises throughout the region designed to strengthen 
key partnerships and improve partner capabilities in basic military 
skills, maritime security, C-VEO efforts, counter-trafficking, 
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and control of key infectious 
diseases. United States Africa Command leverages an interagency toolkit 
and coordinates a broad group of programs to complement our capability-
building efforts such as, among others, the Department of State's 
Global Peace Operations Initiative, Trans Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership, Africa Military Education Program, and the Women, Peace & 
Security Initiative. These programs help professionalize partner 
military and security forces and strengthen defense institutions 
through training on human rights, the rule of law, and prevention of 
violence against women.
    United States-facilitated exercises offer some of the best return 
on investment by advancing our force readiness and providing our 
African partners with exposure to American values, expertise, and 
professionalism. Our exercise program improves partners' capabilities, 
encourages self-sufficiency, and develops opportunities for burden 
sharing over the long-term. United States Naval Forces Africa completed 
Exercise Cutlass Express in November, combining for the first time with 
United States Central Command's International Maritime Exercise, 
creating the second largest maritime exercise in the world for little 
in the way of additional resources. This exercise also allowed United 
States Africa Command and United States Central Command to practice 
cross-boundary operations along our seam. The ability to attract large 
coalitions of partners and allies to exercises addressing shared 
security concerns is a unique U.S. advantage that sends a strong 
message to our partners and competitors.
    Another United States Africa Command niche capability with long-
term and high return on investment is United States professional 
military education and training. In 2019, African partners sent 763 of 
their best and brightest military leaders for training at professional 
military schools in the United States through Department of State's 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In 
addition, in August, United States Africa Command's Senior Enlisted 
Leader hosted the third annual and largest African Senior Enlisted 
Leader Conference with over 67 African partners from 29 countries. 
These are important stakeholders that our competitors dismiss--strong 
officer and enlisted leadership is a bedrock of responsible defense 
institutions and our African partners look to United States Forces as a 
model.
    United States Africa Command engages partners to establish the 
security environment required for economic opportunity and trade to 
flourish. With a whole-of-government approach, enhanced security 
fosters development and investment with United States initiatives such 
as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Prosper Africa, and the Better 
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act. Efforts 
like these open doors for United States companies to compete overseas 
and respond to China's increased economic engagement in Africa.
                          regional assessments
    In East Africa, we see opportunity in several countries and strong 
partners in others. Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Kenya are the top 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop contributors and some 
of our strongest African partners in the fight against al Shabaab in 
Somalia. Djibouti also contributes troops to AMISOM and hosts our 
largest presence on the continent at Camp Lemonnier, home to more than 
3,000 Americans supporting multiple United States combatant commands 
and other organizations. Thanks to our collective security and whole-
of-government efforts, we have seen real and tangible progress in 
Somalia over more than a decade, albeit slower than we would like. 
AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) have made gains in al Shabaab 
strongholds in the south, holding territory and establishing outposts. 
Gains are fragile, though, and at risk of stalling, so there is much 
work to be done. Al Qaeda's al Shabaab is a very real threat to 
Somalia, the region, the international community, and even the United 
States Homeland, but political friction between the Federal Government 
of Somalia and Somali Federal Member States threatens to distract 
Mogadishu from the fight. Somalia's Prime Minister Khayre called 2019 
Somalia's ``Year of Action,'' and has led encouraging security sector 
reforms replacing corrupt leaders with reform-minded officers. United 
States-trained ``Danab'' SNA units, along with U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts, are important to maintain momentum and secure hard-fought 
gains. Importantly, the European Union continues to fund AMISOM 
stipends at over 200M EUR per year. Underscoring the importance and 
urgency of the international effort, al Shabaab's 5 January Manda Bay 
attack--the group's first ever attack on a military base inside Kenya--
demonstrates their intent and capability to strike outside Somalia. It 
is critical that AMISOM remain in the fight, as the SNA requires more 
time and international support before they are able to counter al 
Shabaab themselves. In the next 6 months, I intend to review United 
States military operations in Somalia in detail to assess our progress 
and the way ahead.
    North Africa is home to some of our oldest friends and newest 
democratic partners. Morocco was the first country to recognize our new 
nation in 1777 and remains by our side through exercises, training 
programs, foreign military sales, and counterterrorism cooperation. 
We'd like to strengthen our security cooperation with Algeria as it 
enters a new era under its first new president in twenty years. Tunisia 
just completed its second free and fair presidential election since its 
2011 revolution. The Tunisians are strong partners in the fight against 
ISIS-Libya and complement our security cooperation investment dollars 
with national funds. However, much of the international community 
remains paralyzed in Libya as we watch a civil war play out with no 
real progress toward a political solution. As we continue to support 
the United Nations action plan, Turkey and Russia are weighing in 
heavily on opposing sides. Notably, Russia continues to harvest 
benefits from the instability in Libya--its military meddling has 
prolonged the conflict and exacerbated casualties and humanitarian 
suffering. Moscow continues to deny any Russian involvement in the 
conflict, but its private military companies (PMCs), such as the Wagner 
Group with strong links to the Kremlin, are leading the fight for the 
self-styled ``Libyan National Army'' against the UN-backed and United 
States-recognized Government of National Accord. Turkey's recent 
deployment of troops and hardware to counter Russian PMCs risks a 
significant escalation, as both Russia and Turkey are attempting to tip 
the scales in their favor. A potential bad outcome for both the United 
States and NATO is Russia gaining access to oil and military bases with 
long-range anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities on NATO's 
southern flank. Despite these frictions, United States Africa Command 
continues to keep pressure on ISIS and other VEOs as they seek to take 
advantage of the security vacuum created by the civil war in Libya. Our 
persistent focus on ISIS-Libya, in coordination with our interagency 
and African partners and at low cost in Department of Defense 
resources, continues to disrupt ISIS freedom of action as a regional 
terrorist threat. We will remain vigilant to counter VEO reconstitution 
efforts.
    In West Africa, we see functioning democracies, peaceful transfers 
of power, and an engaged regional organization in the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Senegal remains a stalwart, 
fully functioning democracy, focused on bolstering their defense 
institutions. Ghana hosts our West Africa Logistics Network, a unique 
shared-expense logistics hub that supports United States, African, and 
European partners across the continent. However, we also see a serious 
regional threat from VEOs emanating from the Sahel. Security is 
deteriorating rapidly, with a 250 percent increase in VEO violence 
since 2018 in Burkina Faso, Mali, and western Niger. Having quickly 
spread from northern Mali, al Qaeda's JNIM, ISIS-aligned groups, and 
other VEOs are now operating throughout the Sahel region. They are 
taking advantage of porous borders, weak governments, under-resourced 
and overextended militaries, and disenfranchised populations, and are 
now even threatening Gulf of Guinea countries. Our African partners are 
trying to help address this growing regional threat themselves through 
the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Accra Initiative and various ECOWAS 
initiatives. However, despite United States bilateral security 
assistance and generous pledges of support from the international 
community coordinated by the European Union, they cannot effectively 
control their own borders or address security and related governance 
challenges in the region without substantive external assistance from 
their Western partners. We praise our French partners who are assisting 
this African-led effort in a significant way with over 4,400 French 
troops deployed as part of Operation Barkhane. In our view, African and 
European partners must do more to roll back the VEO threat and there 
must be a better synchronization of efforts in West Africa. The window 
of opportunity to dig a firebreak and prevent the further spread of 
VEOs is months, not years. We applaud emerging plans by the French and 
Germans to develop new structures to improve coordination, 
synchronization, and effectiveness of international assistance, and 
improve African partner fighting capabilities. We encourage all 
approaches that will allow regional partners to be more self-
sufficient.
    In Central and Southern Africa, we again see some strong 
partnerships and a few opportunities. Botswana is a bright spot with 
its enduring democracy, continued stability, professional military and 
good relations with the United States In 2019, Rwanda became the 15th 
African nation to join the SPP, establishing their partnership with the 
Nebraska National Guard in December. South Africa is the second-largest 
economy in Africa and the largest United States trade partner on the 
continent. There is enormous potential for Mozambique, where the United 
States, France, and other partners have invested in an 11 billion USD 
liquid natural gas project that is located in the same areas as an 
increasingly violent group that has claimed links to ISIS. In addition, 
United States Africa Command support to USAID for Cyclone Idai relief 
and recovery efforts have opened a door with Mozambique for future 
security cooperation opportunities.
    China and Russia are in a position of advantage in central and 
southern Africa. Russia is testing its playbook for malign activity in 
the Central African Republic, where they are deploying PMCs, extracting 
minerals, and attempting to buy influence. In Mozambique, Moscow 
provided second-rate counterterrorism assistance in the hopes of buying 
oil and gas concessions. Russia also deployed strategic bombers to 
South Africa, and participated in the first-ever trilateral Chinese-
Russian-South African naval exercise MOSI in November 2019. ISIS and 
other spoilers look to exploit long-simmering grievances and gaps in 
governance in the region. We are exploring renewed military-to-military 
outreach in South Africa.
                            economy of force
    United States Africa Command continues to assess and implement 
reform efforts to maximize value from our precious resources. For 
example, we prioritize the warfighting readiness of assigned and 
allocated forces through refinement of our exercise program. We are 
committed to optimizing the effectiveness of our security cooperation 
assistance and activities and we must be innovative in how we use our 
assets in support of our strategic objectives. Honest assessments and 
prudent investments ensure the United States maximizes the impact of 
every taxpayer dollar while remaining the premier security partner for 
priority African Governments.
    U.S. foreign assistance should serve America's interests and should 
support countries that help us to advance our foreign policy goals. 
United States Africa Command's efforts are focused on priority nations 
and strategic objectives that are sustainable, consistent with our 
national-level guidance, maintain our strategic access and protect the 
Homeland and United States personnel on the continent.
    It is a commander's responsibility to ensure our world-class troops 
have the resources they need. We must protect our forces when we move 
them into uncertain environments. The pace of improved base defense 
capabilities against emerging threats has been too slow. We need to 
accelerate C-UAS technologies to Africa to improve local domain 
awareness and provide an additional layer of warning and force 
protection while also improving capabilities across the joint force. As 
previously mentioned, our exercises hone partner capabilities and 
encourage self-sufficiency and burden sharing. This small investment in 
relationships and the human capital of our partners can make a 
difference in a crisis. With the continued support of Congress, United 
States Africa Command can best provide our troops the protection they 
deserve while enabling engagements critical to war-winning activities 
in any theater.
                               conclusion
A secure and stable Africa is an enduring American interest.
    United States Africa Command remains ready to protect United States 
citizens, interests, strategic access, and respond to crises in our 
area of responsibility. The men and women of United States Africa 
Command, our partners on the continent, and our broad collection of 
stakeholders understand how important Africa is to the global economy 
and security environment. Strategic access to Africa, its airspace, and 
its surrounding waters is vital to United States national security. As 
outlined in our governing strategies, long-term global power 
competition with China and Russia and the need to limit the harmful 
influence of malign actors in the region is of utmost importance.
    In my first 6 months of command, and through our ongoing ``blank 
slate review'' process, I have learned that small investments in Africa 
go a long way. A few bucks and a few troops can make a significant 
difference and have proven to be the cornerstone of multinational 
efforts in the region. What United States Africa Command accomplishes 
with relatively few people and few dollars, on a continent 3.5 times 
the size of the continental United States, is a bargain for the 
American taxpayer. That said, United States Africa Command is 
diligently working to make our operations even more efficient and 
adjusting our posture and activities to ensure United States strategic 
access for today and tomorrow. Africa is key terrain for competition 
with China and Russia, and our support to C-VEO operations is 
necessary. While we can and will grow more efficient to contribute to 
higher NDS priorities, if the United States steps back from Africa too 
far, China and Russia will fill the void to our detriment. Violent 
extremist organizations will be able to grow unchecked, some will 
ultimately threaten the Homeland, and we will lose opportunities for 
increased trade and investments with some of the fastest growing 
economies in the world.
    Finally, it remains my honor to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
marines, coast guardsmen, civilians, and families of United States 
Africa Command. Our efforts have made the United States safer and 
advanced American interests while helping Africans do more for 
themselves. United States Africa Command is an investment in America's, 
Africa's, and the world's future.
    Thank you.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Townsend.
    Admiral Faller?

 STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                    STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

    Admiral Faller. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
Senators, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am 
honored to be here with my shipmate and good friend, General 
Steve Townsend.
    We also thank you for the steadfast support you provide to 
our men and women every day at SOUTHCOM, and I am truly 
grateful for the honor and opportunity to lead them.
    I am with Ambassador Jean Manes, our civilian deputy 
commander, former United States Ambassador to El Salvador; and
Sergeant Major Zickefoose, Command Sergeant Major for SOUTHCOM, 
two of the eyes and ears of our command.
    The western hemisphere is our shared home. It is our 
neighborhood and we are connected to the nations there in every 
domain, sea, air, space, land, cyber, and most importantly, 
culturally and with values. Over the last year, I have had the 
opportunity to visit our partners and see firsthand the 
opportunities and challenges that directly impact the security 
of our hemisphere.
    I have come to describe the challenges of a vicious circle 
of threats that deliberately erodes the security and stability 
of this region and the United States of America. This vicious 
circle is framed by systemic issues of young democracies, with 
weak institutions, rampant corruption, exploited by 
transnational criminal organizations often better funded than 
the security organizations they face, external state actors 
that do not share those values, China, Russia, and Iran, and 
violent extremist organizations. They are trying to advance 
their interests at the expense of United States and partner 
nation security.
    In fact, the aha for me over the last year is the extent to 
which China is aggressively pursuing its interests right here 
in our neighborhood. This vicious circle can be seen most 
acutely in the tragedy that is Venezuela. The human suffering 
of this once thriving democracy has driven 5 million people to 
flee to neighboring countries like Colombia, Brazil, Peru, 
Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, and more. These countries are 
dealing with this and the strains to their health care, 
education, and social services are palatable. Colombia alone 
spent $2.5 billion, a significant part of their GDP [gross
domestic product], over the last 2 years just to support the
migrants. While Russia, Cuba, and China prop up this 
illegitimate Maduro dictatorship, the democracies of the world 
look for a way to get the Venezuelan people what they deserve, 
a free and prosperous Venezuela.
    The only way to attack this vicious circle is as a team. In 
this neighborhood, a little goes a long way, and our partners 
are willing to contribute. But we need the right and focused, 
persistent military presence which might take the form of 
security force assisted brigades or small teams of special 
operation forces or marines to conduct specialized training or 
our National Guard forces forging long-term relations via the 
State Partnership Program or our maritime forces where presence 
at sea establishes sea control and
attacks these transnational criminal organizations, as we have
recently done with the deployment of littoral combat ship USS
Detroit.
    Deployments like the United States naval ship Comfort show 
the best outstretched hand of America, and that mission treated 
over 70,000 patients and extended our enduring promise as a 
trusted partner to the neighborhood.
    Security cooperation is a critical tool in a region with 
willing partners who thrive given the opportunity. 
International military education and training, IMET 
[International Military Education and Training], as a small 
investment, yields long-term returns. It builds lasting trusted 
relationships. As I speak, half of our nation's chiefs of 
defense are graduates of IMET programs.
    Finally, our people, our greatest asset. Joint Interagency 
Task Force South, JIATF-South in Key West, our southernmost 
base in the continental United States, holds significant 
strategic value in defending against a wide range of threats to 
U.S. national security. We are taking steps to improve the 
resiliencies of that headquarters building and to improve the 
quality of life of our military and civilian personnel who 
struggle in one of the country's most expensive economies.
    At our headquarters in Miami, we are also working to 
address the cost of living and housing concerns that create 
hardships for our families.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, thank you again for the 
opportunity to testify today. The SOUTHCOM team appreciates the 
support of Congress, and you continue to place trust and honor 
in us and we will not let you down.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Faller follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Admiral Craig S. Faller
    Strategic Environment. Thank you for your support to United States 
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). As our National Defense Strategy (NDS) 
directs, we are focused on sustaining our advantages in the Western 
Hemisphere--the most important of which are strong partnerships founded 
on shared democratic values. Recent trends illustrate that the Western 
Hemisphere--our shared neighborhood--is critical space in the global 
competition--and global challenges--posed by the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) and Russia. As the NDS notes, the U.S. derives immense 
benefit from a stable, peaceful hemisphere, and keeping our 
partnerships in the Western Hemisphere strong and vibrant will allow us 
to achieve the NDS objective of maintaining a favorable regional 
balance of power that reduces security threats to the Homeland.
    Beyond like-minded democracies throughout Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the region is home to 825 percent of all United States 
exports and key global infrastructure like the Panama Canal, sea lanes, 
and deep water ports that provide access to both the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans. It is directly connected to our Homeland in every 
domain--land, sea, air, space, cyber, and most importantly values--
which makes any threat or encroachment in this region particularly 
concerning. Latin America's strategic importance lies in its unique 
potential as both a vulnerability and an opportunity for our own 
security, prosperity, and efforts to address global challenges. \1\
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    \1\ R. Evan Ellis (2016). ``Thinking Strategically About Latin 
America and the Caribbean.''
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    Concerning Trends. Last year, the Chinese Government absorbed three 
more Latin American countries into its One Belt One Road Initiative, 
bringing the regional total to 19--more than half of all countries in 
the region. Beijing now has 29 government exchange programs with Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and continues to expand offers of 
professional military education, equipment donations, and funding for 
infrastructure projects. Russia once again projected power in our 
neighborhood, establishing a military footprint in Venezuela; deploying 
(for the first time) its most advanced nuclear-capable warship; and 
sending a research ship capable of mapping and cutting undersea cables, 
as well as two other naval research vessels to operate near our 
Homeland. Under Russian and Cuban tutelage, oppression in Venezuela is 
ever-increasing. The illegitimate former Maduro regime arbitrarily 
arrested for political reasons more than 2,000 individuals in 2019. 
Between January 2018 and May 2019, regime-aligned security forces 
killed more than 7,000 people, and many of these killings may 
constitute extrajudicial killings.
    These malign state actors are part of a vicious circle of threats 
that deliberately erode stability and security in the region. This 
vicious circle is framed by systemic issues of young democracies, often 
with weak governance and porous legal frameworks, exacerbated by a 
propensity towards patronage and corruption that is deliberately 
exploited by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), external 
state actors (such as the PRC and Russia), and violent extremist 
organizations (VEOs) to advance their own ends at the expense of United 
States and partner nation security. This vicious circle continues to 
negatively impact our Homeland, most acutely in the form of illegal 
immigration and illicit drug flows, but also in other, more harmful 
ways. Due to high levels of insecurity and frustration with government 
corruption, support for democracy and democratic institutions in Latin 
America and the Caribbean is at its lowest levels in 15 years, \2\ 
providing further openings for malign state actors to increase their 
influence. A number of countries are experiencing democratic 
backsliding, with others sliding towards outright authoritarianism.
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    \2\ 2018/2019 AmericasBaromter report, funded by USAID. Available 
at: https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2019/10/14/support-for-democracy-in-a-
slump-across-americas-according-to-new-survey/
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    Positive Trends. These threats are real, and they demand a sense of 
urgency. But so do the opportunities. Protests in Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru demonstrate that, while democracy 
may be troubled, citizens are exercising democratic rights to uphold 
their constitutions. Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador now recognize the 
Cuban threat to freedom, expelling thousands of Cuban officials, some 
even accused of instigating social unrest. Guatemala, Costa Rica, and 
El Salvador are doing more to stop the flow of drugs and irregular 
migration towards our border; Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago regularly 
deploy to regional disaster response efforts, to include supporting the 
Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian; and Colombia, Brazil, and Chile 
continue to grow their contributions to global security.
    Improving Performance & Accountability. The men and women of 
USSOUTHCOM are moving out to break the vicious circle of threats and 
sustain our security advantages in the Western Hemisphere. While doing 
so, we remain committed to making good use of every taxpayer dollar 
Congress entrusts to us. Over the past year we undertook a detailed 
review of all aspects of our organization to gain efficiencies and 
support the Department's reform efforts. I look forward to discussing 
how we are freeing up time, money, and manpower to invest back into our 
top priorities: strengthening our strategic partnerships, countering 
threats, and building the readiness of our team.
    Our Approach. The NDS highlights the importance of alliances and 
partnerships--which is exactly right for USSOUTHCOM, where 
strengthening partnerships is the best way to counter threats, enhance 
our collective readiness and capability to meet global challenges, and 
maintain the regional balance of power in favor of the United States. 
We also support the interagency, including the Department of State, 
U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Homeland 
Security, and the intelligence and law enforcement communities, 
reinforcing the importance of leveraging all tools of national 
security.
    We break the vicious circle and outcompete Beijing and other 
competitors by playing to our strengths of shared values, 
professionalism, and equipment built to last, and by investing in 
education, intelligence sharing, personnel exchanges, exercises, joint 
operations, and security cooperation. More than anything else, 
persistent presence matters in this fight. Like athletes, we have to be 
present on the field to compete, and we have to compete to win.
    Threats to our Neighborhood: Malign State Actors. As the Department 
of Defense has prioritized the Indo-Pacific region, Beijing has 
aggressively turned its attention to the Western Hemisphere, exporting 
corrupt business practices and disregard for international law and 
standards to countries already struggling with government corruption 
and weak governance. The competitive space is truly global and all-
domain as SOUTHCOM plays a vital role in the effort to outcompete the 
PRC and Russia. Nine nations in the Western Hemisphere (out of 15 
worldwide) still recognize Taiwan--a fact that has not gone unnoticed 
by Beijing, which is engaging in persistent (and successful) dollar 
diplomacy to lower that number to zero. With 19 Latin American and 
Caribbean nations now participating in the One Belt One Road Initiative 
and pledges of at least $150 billion in loans, the PRC is now the 
region's largest investor and creditor, practicing the same type of 
predatory financing and ``no strings attached'' largesse it has wielded 
in other parts of the world. On the defense side, this includes 
``gifts'' of equipment to regional militaries and aiming to copy our 
successful military education program.
    Beyond One Belt One Road, 25 out of 31 countries in the region host 
Chinese infrastructure projects. Most concerning, certain investments 
have strategic value for future military uses. Chinese investment in 
numerous deep water ports and infrastructure on both sides of the 
Panama Canal could enable the Chinese military to threaten sea lanes 
vital to global commerce and the movement of United States Forces. 
Fleets of Chinese-flagged fishing vessels routinely violate the 
sovereign rights of coastal states to conduct illegal fishing in the 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Latin American countries, while 
Chinese mining and infrastructure projects have created lasting 
environmental damage. Beijing sees immense value in South America's 
strategic location for space activity and is actively pursuing 
additional access to regional space infrastructure. With 
telecommunication projects in 16 countries, Huawei and ZTE provide the 
backbone of commercial and government communication systems, providing 
a backdoor for the Chinese Government to monitor or intercept official 
information we share with our partners. Beijing is also gaining real-
time, street-level situational awareness by selling surveillance 
technology through its ``Smart Cities'' initiative--the same technology 
the Chinese Communist Party uses to monitor and repress its citizens. 
\3\
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    \3\ Because of the intimate relationship between Chinese businesses 
and China's National Intelligence Law, citizens living in democracies 
in the Western Hemisphere could have their entire digital identity 
under the surveillance of the Chinese Communist Party.
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    Russia continues to play the role of ``spoiler,'' seeking to sow 
disunity and discredit the United States within our own hemisphere. As 
it does across the world, Russia meddles in regional affairs by 
spreading false information on its media platforms and engaging in 
malicious cyber activity. Russia's ability to disseminate 
disinformation is considerable; videos posted on Russia Today (RT) En 
Espanol's social media platforms received more views in 2019 than any 
other Spanish-language news source. While Moscow denies having a 
military presence in the region, Russian ``advisors'' continue to prop 
up the former Maduro regime. Beyond Venezuela, the sanctuary of cozy 
relationships with authoritarian governments in Cuba and Nicaragua 
provide Russia with footholds close to our Homeland, giving Putin 
strategic options. Cuba in particular is the gateway for Russia's 
access to the Western Hemisphere, allowing Russia to collect 
intelligence in close proximity to the United States.
    Iran, which has exported its state-sponsored terrorism to the 
Americas in the past, maintains facilitation networks and raises funds 
through its proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah. Some Hezbollah supporters cache 
weapons and raise funds, often via charitable donations, remittances, 
and sometimes through illicit means, such as drug trafficking and money 
laundering. Having a footprint in the region also allows Iran to 
collect intelligence and conduct contingency planning for possible 
retaliatory attacks against United States and/or Western interests.
    After more than six decades, Cuba remains a bastion for 
authoritarianism, an exporter of malign ideology, and an underlying 
driver of instability in the region. Cuban intelligence personnel 
support and counsel non-democratic leaders, including directly propping 
up the illegitimate Maduro regime in Venezuela. Cuba, Russia, and the 
PRC all collect intelligence against the United States and seek to 
undercut United States initiatives region wide. Although Cuba portrays 
the thousands of Cuban medical personnel it sends as humanitarian, such 
aid routinely includes intelligence collection, propagation of Cuba's 
failed ideology, and advancing a distinctly anti-United States agenda.
    The final malign actors--Maduro and his cronies in Venezuela--pose 
one of the most direct threats to peace and security in the Western 
Hemisphere. Emboldened by Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and Cuban 
protection and patronage, Maduro has allowed Venezuela to become a safe 
haven for the ELN, FARC dissidents, and drug traffickers while the 
Venezuelan people starve. If UN projections for 2020 hold, the number 
of Venezuelans fleeing their country could soon surpass the Syrian 
exodus. To date, nearly 4.8 million have fled, placing significant 
strain on Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and other host countries in 
the region. Colombia bears the brunt of this crisis and has generously 
stepped up to support the over 1.6 million refugees while at the same 
time having 7.8 million internally displaced persons of their own, the 
largest IDP population in the world. The consequences of the Venezuelan 
crisis will last generations; a post-Maduro Venezuela will require 
significant support to help Venezuelans address the decades of 
mismanagement, widespread insecurity, and corruption of defense and 
other institutions in order to realize the natural richness of their 
resources.
    What We're Doing. As I mentioned earlier, we have to be on the 
field to compete, and when we are on the field, our impacts are 
positive and long-lasting. In the absence of an enduring U.S. military 
presence, recurring rotations of small teams of Special Operations 
Forces, soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and 
national guard personnel help us strengthen partnerships and exchange 
critical expertise. The National Guard through the State Partnership 
Program (SPP) is uniquely positioned based on its dual military 
experience to provide a persistent and sustained presence to our 
partner nations by means of senior leader visits, exchanges, and 
cooperative training and exercises in areas ranging from humanitarian 
assistance to cyber. In Central America, our Joint Task Force-Bravo 
(JTF-B) and Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
(SPMAGTF) build collective response and security capability and 
readiness in Army and Marine Corps Reserve Forces and partner 
militaries. Expanding on the 2018 deployment, Brazil, Colombia, and 
Peru integrated into the SPMAGTF last year, building interoperability 
for expeditionary operations. Once again, these three partners also 
formed part of the hospital ship USNS Comfort's multinational team. The 
2019 Comfort mission delivered significant returns, providing world-
class medical care to nearly 68,000 patients in 12 countries, reducing 
suffering caused by the man-made crisis in Venezuela, and enhancing 
medical readiness in the United States Navy, our partners, and allies. 
JTF-B facilitates strategic access to Central America, builds enduring 
relationships with partner nations, and response to contingencies to 
create regional stability and security. JTF-B provided medical care to 
over 20,000 partner nation patients, rapid response capability for a 
wide range of contingencies, and assigned forces to participate in 
exercises.
    As directed by the NDS, we're deepening relations with ``regional 
countries that export military capabilities to priority regional and 
global security challenges.'' Recently designated a Major Non-NATO ally 
and the newest partner in the State Partnership Program (SPP), we work 
closely with Brazil on a range of priority missions. Chile exports its 
security expertise to both the Asia-Indo-Pacific region and Central 
America, and is actively partnering with us and United States Army 
South to
develop a concept for a combined, large-scale, combat-focused exercise 
later this year. Colombia--NATO's only global partner in the region--
seeks to share its humanitarian demining and counter IED expertise with 
NATO allies while also serving in South Korea as part of the United 
Nations Command, a legacy that stems from its participation in the 
Korean War. Panama has been a particularly strong supporter of United 
States efforts to hold global malign actors accountable, de-flagging 
numerous vessels suspected of carrying cargo in violation of United 
States and international sanctions. El Salvador punches well above its 
weight having supported coalition operations with 12 rotations to Iraq 
and Afghanistan and applying training and equipment received via the 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) in their current deployments 
to the UN Mission in Mali.
    In the face of the PRC's and Russia's global assault on 
international norms, engagement on shared values is more important than 
ever before. As I told this Committee last year, education, training, 
and security cooperation efforts like the SPP and the Combatant 
Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) 
Program and the Department of State's International Military Education 
and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) are game changers for us. With modest investments of 
time and money, these programs are helping us reinforce mutual 
understanding, shared values and culture, and doctrine. Along with 
IMET; our Human Rights Initiative; noncommissioned officer development; 
and Women, Peace, and Security programs
enhance the professionalism of the region's militaries and security 
forces. In particular, USSOUTHCOM's decades-long commitment to 
promoting respect for human rights has become a cornerstone of our 
strong partnerships with like-minded militaries. These efforts are 
among the most effective ways we can expand competitive space and 
outcompete any malign state actors, and encourage our partners to hold 
the PRC, Russia, and others accountable to the Inter-American values of 
peace, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights.
    Another way we blunt malign influence is by sharing information 
about Beijing's predatory economic practices, the security risks 
associated with Chinese technology, and activities by Russia, Iran, and 
their authoritarian allies that undermine regional sovereignty and 
security. In addition to expanding our information sharing efforts 
throughout the hemisphere, we are also working multilaterally with 
partners in the region to enhance our understanding of the security 
threats posed by the Venezuelan crisis, which in turn assists with 
multinational efforts to plan for longer term recovery and stability 
once free and fair democratic elections are held.
    We also support the NDS' focus on developing operational concepts 
to enhance Joint Force lethality while building interoperability with 
allied and partner forces. We leverage our science and technology 
portfolio in high-end multinational exercises like UNITAS and PANAMAX, 
providing opportunities for the Services to test new warfighting 
capabilities in a low-risk coalition environment. Through our 
Caribbean-focused Tradewinds exercise, we are now laying the groundwork 
for a combined task force that can counter a range of threats and 
enable sea control and denial operations. We conduct cyber training and 
capacity building with partners like Chile, Argentina, and Brazil in an 
effort to build defensive cyber capabilities and establish shared cyber 
situational awareness in the region. We continue to work closely with 
other U.S. combatant commands and the Joint Staff to ensure globally 
integrated plans, operations, and exercises reflect the threats and 
opportunities in this hemisphere.
    Threats to Our Neighborhood: TCOs and VEOs. As the NDS recognizes, 
``non-state actors also threaten the security environment with 
increasingly sophisticated capabilities.'' TCOs engage in a wide array 
of illegal activities that generate approximately two trillion dollars 
in illicit proceeds annually, including drug and weapons trafficking, 
human smuggling, money laundering, and illegal mining. We see these 
impacts directly in our Homeland; drugs have killed 700,000 Americans 
since 1999, \4\ costing our nation billions in criminal justice, 
healthcare, and productivity costs--in addition to the suffering caused 
by shattered and lost lives. Through corruption and violence, TCOs also 
challenge and erode the governance of partners that we rely on to 
advance regional and global security, threatening to reverse decades of 
successful U.S. policies and security investments.
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    \4\ https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html. From 1999 
to 2017, more than 700,000 people have died from a drug overdose.
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    Collectively TCOs exacerbate the already insecure environment 
facilitating opportunities for malign actors to expand influence, and 
VEOs leverage to move people and weapons through our hemisphere. This 
latter vulnerability is particularly troublesome; there is an 
interconnected system of pathways that spans our neighborhood, running 
through the Caribbean, and up and down North, South, and Central 
America. Many of these pathways lead directly into our Homeland, and 
anything can move on them--for the right price. This ongoing threat was 
illustrated in 2019 by several successful U.S. law enforcement 
operations against human smuggling networks, which continue to enable 
the movement of individuals with terrorist links, many of whom attempt 
to enter the U.S. Homeland illegally.
    What We're Doing. We're strengthening partnerships with countries 
that contribute military capabilities to regional security and beyond, 
with a focus on enabling combined operations and building 
interoperability to stop the flow of drugs to the U.S. Homeland, reduce 
the effectiveness of priority TCOs, and prevent VEOs from leveraging 
regional vulnerabilities to do us, or our partners, harm.
    Colombia sees the fight against cocaine trafficking as a shared 
responsibility, and one in which they are sacrificing blood and 
treasure to meet their commitment to halve cocaine production by 2023. 
Last year Colombia built a 20-nation coalition to conduct maritime 
counterdrug operations while working closely with Panama and Costa Rica 
to seize drugs headed to the United States. In 2019, Colombia also 
manually eradicated 82,000 hectares of coca plants, at the cost of 
almost 600 police and military killed or wounded, largely due to IEDs 
emplaced to protect the coca fields. Inside of Colombia, their security 
forces also disrupted and destroyed over 300 cocaine-producing labs, 
preventing over 400 metric tons of cocaine from ever leaving the 
country. Colombia continues assisting us with Central America's 
security challenges, training 5,700 military and police from six 
Central American countries through the United States Colombia Action 
Plan program since the program's inception in fiscal year 2013. We 
continue to enable Colombian operations against priority narco-
terrorist organizations like the ELN and FARC dissidents, yielding 
significant returns on security in Colombia and the United States.
    In the Caribbean and Central America, we continue to focus our 
capacity-building efforts on improving border security, drug 
interdiction rates, and institutional effectiveness. Jamaica has now 
integrated its self-funded maritime patrol aircraft into Joint 
Interagency Task Force South counterdrug operations, enhancing our 
operational reach and effectiveness. After receiving sustained training 
by Naval Special Warfare teams, Guatemala's Fuerzas Especiales Navales 
(FEN) is now entirely self-sufficient and responsible for more than 80 
percent of Guatemala's drug seizures. Like Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
Panama and El Salvador are applying United States-provided training and 
equipment to regularly interdict drug shipments more than 100 miles 
from shore, keeping those drugs off the streets of cities across 
America from LA, to Tulsa and Providence. Honduras, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador are leveraging our Civil Affairs support and Humanitarian 
Assistance Program to better address factors driving violence and 
migration to our doorstep. Additionally, the William J. Perry Center 
for Hemispheric Defense Studies is a force multiplier across the 
hemisphere, helping us deliver the right, focused support at the 
strategic level and reinforce accountability and transparency in 
defense institutions.
    In the counterdrug mission, we continue to deliver high returns on 
modest investment. Last year, the international and interagency ``team 
of teams'' at JIATF-South helped keep 280 metric tons of cocaine off 
U.S. streets. JIATF-South-led interdictions at sea account for almost 
four times the cocaine seized by all domestic and border enforcement 
efforts combined. In an operating area that is 11 times larger than the 
United States: the Coast Guard and JIATF-South continue to be among the 
best investments in the U.S. Government.
    In fiscal year 2020, thanks to congressional support, we are 
filling detection and monitoring (D&M) capability gaps through 
innovative solutions like the Multi Mission Support Vessel (MMSV). 
Having only recently deployed, the MMSV already has supported the 
disruption of over 3000 kilograms of cocaine, nearly 8,000 pounds of 
marijuana, and the detention of 17 drug traffickers, while also keeping 
a low profile vessel from reaching our shores. It also served as a 
capacity-building platform in the Dominican Republic, a key transit 
point for cocaine trafficking into major United States cities like 
Washington DC, Miami, and Philadelphia. We are also applying 
commercially-available technology like unmanned aircraft systems to 
increase the MMSV's ability to conduct D&M and provide information to 
partner nations who are conducting the interceptions. In addition to 
the MMSV, we now have one Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) deployed in the 
region that will provide needed naval capabilities and technological 
advantage. We look forward to future U.S. Navy ship deployments--these 
will be game changers.
    On the counterterrorism front, we continue to partner with SOCOM, 
and support the work of our interagency partners to stop individuals 
with known or suspected ties to terrorism who are attempting to exploit 
the region's weak border security to move into the U.S. Homeland. We 
deepened counter threat finance collaboration with the Treasury 
Department, supporting the designation of a Brazil-based member of al 
Qaeda last year. Additionally, our successful track record leveraging 
the DOD Rewards Program continues to deliver meaningful returns for 
minimal investment; in 2019, we paid $1.2 million for 72 rewards 
(information) that led to the neutralization of 97 terrorists, the 
seizure of 80 weapons caches, and the destruction of 22 drug labs.
    In the region, our strong partnership with Trinidad and Tobago 
continues to pay dividends for international efforts targeting 
extremist networks supporting ISIS and other dangerous groups. Our 
biometrics cooperation enabled Panama to identify and stop known or 
suspected terrorists last year, while we deepened collaboration with 
Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay to expose malicious activities 
by supporters of terrorist groups like Lebanese Hezbollah.
    Detention operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) 
support the global fight against violent extremism by keeping enemy 
combatants off the battlefield. As we take proactive steps to address 
infrastructure issues associated with continued detention operations, 
the JTF-GTMO team remains the epitome of professionalism, conducting 
safe, legal, and humane detention operations that protect our Homeland 
and U.S. troops serving in harm's way.
    Building Our Team. To deliver meaningful results for our Homeland's 
defense, we are focused on building an effective, efficient, and 
resilient team.
    For decades, USSOUTHCOM's modest budget and small footprint have 
encouraged us to embrace innovative, low-cost/high-return approaches. 
Over the last five years, we absorbed 25 percent cuts to our personnel, 
a 10 percent reduction to our Exercise program, and a steady decline in 
available assets and forces needed to support our mission. We've tried 
to absorb these cuts as smartly as possible to minimize operational 
impacts, and we continue to look internally to gain efficiencies, 
improve performance, and get the most from every taxpayer dollar.
    With this mindset, we are leaning forward to support the 
Department's current reform efforts. Our revised campaign plan drove a 
review of all fiscal year 2020
operations, activities, and investments. We eliminated over 200 lower 
priority events and are refocusing on priority threats and strategic 
partners. We've also revised our joint exercise program to make it more 
effective and more relevant. In 2019, we sharpened our emphasis on 
building readiness of U.S. Forces and supporting Joint Force 
experimentation. We are now reforming our other major exercises to more 
directly support the global competition with the PRC and Russia. Other 
areas we are examining for efficiencies include JTF-GTMO manning, 
contracts, and theater posture.
    At our headquarters, we streamlined internal processes, improved 
support to military and civilian families, and enhanced our training 
and professional development programs to build a more ready, results-
oriented organization. We continue to work closely with the Department 
of the Army and local South Florida community to address housing and 
high living costs impacting our men and women. At JTF-GTMO, we 
undertook a comprehensive review of existing facilities to determine 
long-term requirements for mission success, the safety of our forces, 
and operational efficiency. We are also taking steps to improve quality 
of life and resiliency of JIATF-South's headquarters building at Naval 
Air Station Key West. As the southernmost base in the continental 
United States, NAS Key West has significant strategic value in 
defending against a wide range of threats to U.S. national security. I 
look forward to working with the Congress on our housing issues in the 
year ahead to ensure our men and women get the support they need.
    Congressional Support. I'd like to repeat last year's invitation to 
members of this Committee to visit our neighbors and reinforce the 
message that we value this region and the role our partners play in 
keeping our neighborhood safe. Your presence, attention, and 
engagement, along with that of other key leaders, matters. I also want 
to thank Congress for passing a defense appropriation bill. Operating 
under a continuing resolution is disruptive to mission and personnel. 
Confidence in stable, predictable budgets will reassure friendly 
nations that we are reliable security partners.
    Broadly speaking, we need tools that allow us to maintain our 
competitive edge: persistent presence and engagement. We appreciate 
congressional support for initiatives that have streamlined security 
cooperation processes and help ensure we remain the security partner of 
choice. Your continued support to these security cooperation programs 
and capabilities like IMET and the Perry Center allow us to build trust 
and long-term relationships that strengthen partnerships and grow 
contributions to address regional and global threats. Similarly, 
support for analytic initiatives focused on open source/publicly 
available information helps mitigate reduced intelligence resources and 
provides a steady stream of useful information (especially about malign 
state actors) that we can share with partners.
    As this Committee is aware, while improving efficiency in the 
counterdrug mission, we still only enabled the successful interdiction 
of about nine percent of known drug movement. That is a small increase 
over previous years, but still significantly below where we need to be. 
We appreciate your continued support to creative solutions like the 
MMSV. As the U.S Coast Guard provides the bulk of our counterdrug 
forces, the acquisition and deployment of their Offshore Patrol Cutter 
will be critical to keeping drugs off our streets and ensuring the 
security of the Western Hemisphere. Each additional force package 
(maritime patrol aircraft, flight deck capable ship, embarked 
helicopter, and law enforcement detachment) enables the disruption of 
35 more metric tons of cocaine. \5\ Grey hulls, in particular, still 
serve as a powerful deterrent, sending a clear message to our 
competitors, and a reassuring one to our friends. They can also yield 
multiple cross cutting returns. For example, while participating in our 
UNITAS exercise last year, the USS Michael Murphy supported the 
interdiction of a low-profile submersible vessel carrying more than 
2,000 pounds of cocaine, simultaneously yielding a treasure trove of 
intelligence, demonstrating rules-based maritime behavior, and 
providing coalition training opportunities for the U.S. Navy.
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    \5\ USCG National Security Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, and/or 
the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship could fill this requirement, providing 
us with a game-changing edge, providing unique capabilities to engage 
drug traffickers where they are most vulnerable.
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    Conclusion. I'd like to close as I began: with a note of caution, 
and one of hope.
    Our ability to address global challenges at manageable cost depends 
on the security of our borders and the stability of our hemisphere--
both of which are under assault. Likewise, our ability to advance 
diplomatic and economic goals depends on the strength of both our 
partnerships and our shared values. We've seen what happens when we 
ignore security challenges in the Western Hemisphere. In the past 
decade, we've seen migration crises, the influx of deadly drugs, 
increased presence of malign actors, and negative trends in democracy.
    We're now in 2020. We need to be clear-eyed about both the security 
threats we face now and in the near future, and the significant 
opportunities that await only with our initiative and engagement in the 
hemisphere. There is no other region we depend upon more for our 
prosperity and security, and with which we are more closely tied 
through bonds of family, trade, and geographic proximity, than Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Our partners want to stand with us, and for 
our shared values. As I hope I've conveyed, the right, focused 
attention and modest investments go a long way in this part of the 
world, paying significant security dividends to both our global efforts 
and to our Homeland's defense. When we don't engage in our 
neighborhood, our competitors benefit, and our Homeland security pays 
the price. When we do engage, we reduce threats to the Homeland and 
limit opportunities for adversaries to operate in close proximity to 
us, and there is no better return on investment than that.
    Thank you for your continued support to the men and women of the 
USSOUTHCOM team and their families. I look forward to your questions.

    Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you, Admiral Faller.
    The comments I made in my opening statement I am very 
sincere about because a lot of people do not realize, when they 
look at all of the comms that we have around, did we ever have 
the right resources relative to the threats that are posed. I 
am going to ask you each the same question, which I have worded 
very carefully because we hear from so many people who are not 
aware of the threat to our national security that you would 
find in SOUTHCOM and in Africa. Why does it really matter in 
terms of our national security?
    I am going to start with you, Admiral Faller. You have 
touched on it. I know you believe in it, but the question would 
be, why should the American people care what China and Russia 
are doing in Africa and Latin America? Specifically, how does 
what they are doing threaten our national security? I know the 
President is very interested in this. He wants to make sure 
that we do not have resources in places that do not have a 
direct threat on our national security. I would like to have 
you restate what the direct threat is out there to our national 
security.
    Admiral Faller. Senator, this region matters. It is the 
cultural values. It is the extensive interaction we have in 
trade. We have a positive trade balance with the region, but 
that is eroding. We are the number one trading partner. China 
is fast catching us in that regard.
    Panama Canal, strategic access. Two-thirds of the traffic 
that goes through that has an economic direct tie to the United 
States.
    I look around the region and I see China working on 
multiple port deals, IT [information technology] 
infrastructure, dams, mining, logging, fishing, including 
significant illegal fishing, illegal mining and illegal 
logging. I look at the port access that they are pursuing in El 
Salvador, Jamaica, Bahamas. I ask myself the question why would 
China want to buy an island and lock up a 99-year lease for 
most of the coast of El Salvador, right here within a 2-hour 
flight of the continental United States. They are trying to 
achieve positional advantage right here in our neighborhood and 
that is alarming and concerning to me. It drives a sense of 
urgency with which I look at this competition.
    Chairman Inhofe. You know, the terrorists that are out 
there--we are not really talking about just locally there, even 
in El Salvador and the rest. You are the door to this country, 
right through your area, and I think you have stated that very 
well.
    The same thing to you, General Townsend. I may not have 
mentioned this in the opening statement, but if you are looking 
for places to save, I cannot see that you would find it there. 
I mean, you have a total of what? Six thousand to six thousand 
five hundred people in the whole continent. Of that, most of 
those, 4,000 of those, are in Djibouti. Of course, they have 
other missions outside of the continent of Africa.
    But when you go to West Africa, you have only got what? 
Twelve hundred to thirteen hundred people. It is not like the 
other comms with 75,000, 80,000, and 100,000 people if what you 
are trying to accomplish is to reduce our footprint around the 
world.
    Specifically in Africa, talking about how that directly 
affects our national security.
    General Townsend. Thank you, Chairman.
    You asked why should America care about Africa. For a lot 
of the same reasons that Admiral Faller talked about America 
caring about South America, although it is a little bit more 
geographically distant.
    The strategic access that America needs to the African 
continent rests on the fact that it is that global crossroads I 
talked about in my opening statement. There are also tremendous 
natural resources there, to include rare earth minerals that 
America needs. There is also a burgeoning population there, and 
there is good and bad news with that. It is a tremendous 
potential opportunity for the future, also significant risk. I 
think that in the past maybe we have been able to pay less 
attention to Africa and it would be okay for America. I do not 
believe that is the case for the future.
    As far as the threats go that you asked about, China and 
Russia are every bit as busy in Africa today and for the same 
reasons that Admiral Faller talked about them being busy in 
South America. They are acting on their own behalf for 
positional advantage and Russia, in particular, pursuing 
extractive ventures. China and Russia are seeking to counter 
the strategic access that we need for American security and 
American prosperity.
    Secondly, the violent extremist organizations that are on 
the continent both in the east and in the west. Some of those 
groups threaten the American Homeland today. Some of them will 
potentially be a threat in the future years.
    Chairman Inhofe. I appreciate that. I am glad you mentioned 
in your opening statement the IMET program because China 
realizes what we have done with that program, how well that has 
served us. They are now emulating that. They actually had a 
meeting in Beijing--I think they had all 52 countries 
represented there, talking about how they were going to expand 
that program, put more money in it. You are watching that, I am 
sure, very carefully throughout your whole area.
    General Townsend. Yes, Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay, good.
    Senator Reed?
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you again, General Townsend and Admiral Faller.
    I think it could be safely said that both of your COCOMs 
[combatant commands] are conducting economy of force 
operations. Is that right, General Townsend?
    General Townsend. That is what we are doing, both of us.
    Senator Reed. Admiral Faller?
    Admiral Faller. We are at a very low level of force. Yes, 
sir.
    Senator Reed. We have to do that, but we have to do it 
smartly and wisely and that means cooperation and collaboration 
across our government and also collaboration with other 
governments.
    General Townsend, the French are now conducting significant 
operations in the Sahel part of Africa. If we drew down, what 
signal would that send and what practical consequences might 
that have for their cooperation in the fight?
    General Townsend. Senator Reed, as you pointed out, the 
French are the lead international partner in the Sahel region 
of West Africa. They have about 4,500 troops there that are 
engaged in active operations every day to counter the threat 
that is there. The threat comes from both al Qaeda groups and 
ISIS groups there. That threat is very serious and that threat 
is on the advance, and I think the French would say--in fact, 
they have said publicly recently--that their efforts are not 
having the desired effect that they need. We are supporting 
both the French and the larger international effort there.
    There is a significant European effort there. Our position, 
the position of the Department of Defense, is that the 
Europeans need to step up and do more in the Sahel to help the 
French. The French are calling on Europe to step up and do 
more. I absolutely think that is the right thing to do. But as 
we see the violent extremists advancing, if we were to withdraw 
support from the French precipitously, then that would not go 
in a good direction. I think what we have to do is we have got 
to synchronize our support and the removal of support, if we 
decide to do that, with the arrival of European support. But 
there is a chance there that the French can offset that.
    Senator Reed. What you are saying is it would not be 
particularly coherent if we are telling the EU [European Union] 
to step up support of France as we reduce our support.
    General Townsend. I think there is certainly a timing issue 
there, Senator, absolutely.
    Senator Reed. Admiral Faller, following up the point that 
the chairman made, which I think is an excellent point, 
programs like IMET are just absolutely critical, and in your 
AO, China is aggressively pursuing these IMET options. You 
indicated that in certain countries--I think it was El 
Salvador--there is one IMET slot that the United States offers 
and 50 that the Chinese offer. Is that----
    Admiral Faller. Recently an example was provided along 
those lines where they have come in analyzing how many folks we 
were sending to Carlisle, and they were going five times over 
that to their war college in China, which they have copied from 
our program and translated it into Spanish. We talked to the 
students that come back from that to get a sense for the 
quality and the approach. It is all based off of the U.S. 
doctrine.
    Senator Reed. It has to be pointed out that the IMET 
program is funded by the Department of State. One of the 
critical programs we are talking about is not within DOD, which 
again suggests that this whole-of-government approach--we have 
to look not just at funding for your COCOM but are we putting 
the money in the State Department? Are we putting money into 
AID [U.S. Agency for International Development]? Are we putting 
money into various programs that will allow you to conduct a 
much more efficient economy of force operation? Is that fair?
    Admiral Faller. That is an accurate statement. We really 
depend on that IMET, Senator.
    Senator Reed. Going back to Africa, General Townsend, you 
indicated that the extremist threat is all through the 
continent, but my sense is that al Shabaab and others are still 
contemplating projecting power outside of Africa, which is a 
much more critical threat to the United States. Is that fair?
    General Townsend. Senator, that is accurate.
    Senator Reed. We are going to continue to focus on that 
threat to the United States particularly.
    General Townsend. I believe we should.
    Senator Reed. Finally, I think again the issue here is 
maintaining appropriate force and also maintaining the 
coordination with our government and with our allies. You are 
pursuing that, and I think you should continue to do so. Thank 
you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Rounds?
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your service to our 
country.
    I would like to begin by just talking a little bit about 
the disinformation and influence operations which Russia has 
used successfully in a number of different instances, but 
specifically what plans and actions that you have and your team 
have created to address the technological advances and the 
changing character of war to assure that America maintains a 
strategic advantage in your areas of operation.
    Admiral Faller. The disinformation campaign that Russia has 
been on is truly about, in all instances, painting the United 
States in an inaccurate light. One example is reporting that I 
was on the border of Venezuela about to lead an invasion force. 
Another example was they twisted it just enough in an article 
in RT [RT International] to say that I had said something that 
was at odds with the Vice President of the United States, which 
was complete baloney. Their largest by volume, outside of the 
Russian language, effort in social media is in Spanish. You 
have to ask what is the national interest of Russia in that 
disinformation here in our neighborhood and around the world, 
and it is concerning to us.
    We have countered within our means in information 
operations (IO), military information, and support a strong 
relationship with the State Department and alignment in 
messaging, information with some increased authorities in cyber 
to go after them and put the truth out and try to make a dent 
in that space. But more needs to be done clearly, and more 
should be done to take advantage of machine learning and those 
types of skills that the Department has embarked on to really 
get after to thwart their disinformation campaigns.
    Senator Rounds. General Townsend?
    General Townsend. Senator, not unlike SOUTHCOM, we see the 
same kind of disinformation campaigns and not just from Russia 
but from other actors such as Iran. Recently Iran announced 
that I was killed at the engagement at Manda Bay. I am glad to 
hear that is exaggerated.
    There is fairly low-tech warfare in Africa overall, but we 
do see armed UAVs [unmanned autonomous vehicles], unmanned 
vehicles armed, now being provided by multiple actors, China, 
Turkey, et cetera. We also see sophisticated air defense 
systems. We also see technologies that have I think even 
greater impacts like the Chinese smart city technologies where 
they are coming in and, in the interest of public safety and 
security, they are offering to equip African cities with camera 
systems, surveillance systems all over, facial recognition 
technologies. Of course, we know that all of those systems are 
reporting back to China first before they report to the African 
country where they are established. I think that the growth of 
high-tech is a concern certainly in Africa.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    I think part of the challenge we have is sharing that, 
look, the propaganda has never really quit from our 
adversaries. They understand its value. They are very good at 
it. They simply advance to using social media and other means 
in which to really bend things their direction. In doing so, 
they influence individuals who really in many cases share the 
same values that we share in this country.
    The IMET program has been mentioned several times here, and 
I think it is critical that we continue to be able to have 
communications and relationships with what is in many cases 
perhaps one of the most stable parts of any one of these 
nations' governments and that is their military. While their 
civilian leaders come and go, in many cases they have a stable 
force of professionals. The question is, do they find and do 
they understand the way that we do business to be appropriate 
and a better way than what our adversaries offer them?
    I would just like to once again offer each of you the 
opportunity to talk a little bit about IMET at this time in 
which I think some people question whether or not it is a valid 
program and how critical it is and how inexpensive it is for us 
to continue to have that relationship with the militaries from 
the different countries.
    Admiral Faller. The value is in the building of trust. You 
get to know your shipmate, your battle buddy. You share 
experience and doctrine. A recent example. In El Salvador, the 
new president came in, favorable connections to the United 
States, appointed a new chief of defense and minister of 
defense. The minister of defense is a Naval War College grad. 
The chief of defense is an Army War College grad. You can sit 
down around a roundtable and have a serious conversation 
without stilted talking points about the real challenges and 
opportunities and the complexity of making progress. That is 
just one of many examples I could cite, Senator.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    General Townsend. Senator, just like Admiral Faller has 
explained, IMET is invaluable to us. I think it is a long-term 
way to influence a government and a military by training those 
people who grew up to be the chief of defense, and that same 
kind of thing is found in Africa as well.
    I think the United States is their preferred partner for a 
number of reasons, not the least of which is our competence and 
capability but also our values. That is part of that. I think 
that is a strong thing that is imparted through IMET.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Townsend, Admiral Faller, let me begin by adding my 
condolences to those that have been expressed already for the 
servicemembers lost in the month of January. I want to 
particularly call out Captain Ryan Phanouf from Hudson, New 
Hampshire who was an airman lost in Afghanistan earlier this 
week. I know that all of New Hampshire mourns his loss and the 
loss of everyone and sends condolences to all of the families. 
Thank you.
    I want to begin, Admiral Faller, with where we are with 
drug interdiction. When you were here last year, we talked 
about the drug interdiction efforts which are still so 
important to States like New Hampshire where we have a huge 
opioid epidemic still and are seeing heroin now coming into the 
country. Can you talk about what progress has been made and the 
role that the USS Detroit has played in improving interdiction 
efforts?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, as we have discussed, the deaths 
due to the narcotics overdoses, drugs are too many and are a 
national security challenge. Those pathways that they come 
through just as easily are used by terrorists and other illicit 
materials. We cannot do enough to get after that challenge 
right here in our neighborhood and how it erodes communities 
across the country.
    Over the past year, we have focused on building our 
partners to get them more into the game. Fifty percent of our 
interdictions last year were partner-enabled, and nations like 
Colombia have stepped up to lead their own exercises and 
operations, recently an Orion operation where we had many 
metric tons which was lives saved here. Eighteen nations 
participated, Colombian led, and all we did with the United 
States was participate. That is a key effort, and we have got 
to do more there.
    In our own efforts, intelligence sharing is key--human 
intelligence and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance 
(ISR) from platforms. We need more intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance. Our human efforts were funded, but they 
were funded above our core budget in an unfunded requirement. A 
key area to look at and how do we get more efficient, but also 
apply leverage there.
    Then finally in our platforms, we depend on ships. At the 
end of the day, it has got to be a Coast Guard cutter. Our 
Coast Guard performed brilliantly, supplying more ships than 
they had even promised through the allocation process. Our Navy 
stepped up this year with the USS Detroit. We need more ships. 
We think the number of Navy ships would be about three to 
sustain the presence and pressure. The pressure matters on 
these nations, and that pressure has got to be at the source in 
coca eradication and at the street here in the United States. 
Colombia has made progress at that source site, eradicated 
cocaine with the Colombian chief of defense on the Ecuador 
border. They have made progress, and the result has been that 
deaths are down but still too many. We had almost a record year 
in interdictions but still not enough.
    Senator Shaheen. Good. Well, thank you for those efforts, 
and we hope that we can continue to do more to support them.
    This question is really for both of you. We have now, for 
the last 2\1/2\ years, had the Women, Peace, and Security Act 
in effect. DOD has made significant progress in implementing 
that. We just put $4 million for gender advisors into the 2020 
defense budget.
    Can you talk about the successes that you have seen both in 
SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM because of the effort to better integrate 
women and be able to appeal to those women in Africa, the women 
in Latin America who we need to address if we are going to be 
successful?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Senator. You asked me about 
Women, Peace, and Security at my confirmation hearing 6 months 
ago, and I told you I did not know much about it but I would 
look into it. I was able to actually attend one of these 
forums.
    At AFRICOM, Women, Peace, and Security is integrated into 
every event that we do. We see some advantages here. It is not 
just about promoting the role of women in the armed forces, but 
it has an impact across their societies as well. It is integral 
to everything we do, and we have had a communications 
symposium, which I was fortunate enough to attend. We have a 
female intel officer training program. There is a seminar that 
is about to kick off in a Flintlock exercise that we are about 
to start. Those are just some examples. We try to integrate 
some of that into every event.
    Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you.
    Admiral Faller. Similarly we integrate it in every event, 
Senator. Recently Ambassador Manes and I were in Colombia. We 
did a roundtable with some key women warriors from the 
Colombian Army. We had the chief of defense from Colombia, 
their chief of their army, their chief of the air force. In 
that audience of women--there were about 50 of them--were nine 
command sergeant majors. I will tell you what. They were 
getting after it, and it was motivating. Afterwards, the chief 
of the Colombian Army came and said, hey, can you do some more 
of that with us because it really brings out the competitive 
spirit. The reason why? We are better when we are integrated 
and stronger when we are integrated.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you both very much. I think it 
is a very important model for us to show to the rest of the 
world, particularly in developing countries in Africa and Latin 
America.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I would second that. Thank you, Senator Shaheen for those 
words.
    Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. We 
truly appreciate your efforts in some challenging regions that 
often are not hitting the headlines of our newspapers every 
day. Thanks to you, thanks for your teams.
    Sergeant Major, good luck to you on retirement. I still 
think Nebraska or Iowa is a great place to go.
    Admiral Faller, thank you for sitting down with me the 
other day. I really do appreciate that. We had a great 
discussion.
    I would like to go a little more into IMET. You have heard 
a number of my colleagues just talking about how important it 
is. We had an Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 
hearing just a while back, and you were able to visit with us 
about the importance of IMET at that particular subcommittee 
meeting. It has been in the press a lot lately. We all 
acknowledge that we can do better in vetting. But strategically 
can you talk to what that means for our partners strategically 
and what it does to assist not only those countries but the 
United States as well?
    Admiral Faller. The United States military education system 
is our strength. Like the education system in our country, our 
training education is sought after and valued, and it builds 
stronger partners that know and trust us, and the relationships 
that go with that last a lifetime.
    Just an example of that comes up time and time again. I 
have a Colombian brigadier general who is a full director of 
our exercise division at headquarters. He is a graduate of 
Leavenworth, Carlisle, the PathFinder School, the Advanced Army 
Armor School, and the Ranger School. He is an honor grad at 
Ranger School. The Colombians value that as do our partner 
nations.
    We can use more IMET. Our budget is about $10 million a 
year for 28 democratic countries. Secretary of Defense Esper 
visited SOUTHCOM last week. A priority of his is to seek more 
money. He is seeking a 50 percent increase in the IMET budget. 
We could spend that 50 percent increase in IMET next year in 
our schoolhouses at the Western Hemisphere Institute for 
security at Fort Benning, game-changer, the Inter-American Air 
Force Academy in Texas. These are schoolhouses that we do not 
think a lot about, in addition to Carlisle and Newport, Maxwell 
with the Air Force and the Marine Corps university. But all 
these schoolhouses work together to make a difference in 
strengthening the hemispheric security.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you.
    Yes, General Townsend.
    General Townsend. Senator, I could not say it any better 
than Admiral Faller just did.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you. No, I do appreciate that. Of 
course, our State Partnership Programs as well. Iowa is 
partnered with Kosovo, and I know a number of those officers 
that I worked with a decade ago--I have seen them rise through 
the ranks and we continue to stay in close contact. But those 
partnerships are very, very valuable. Thank you.
    Admiral Faller, I want to talk a little bit about the 
integration of missions that we see between SOUTHCOM and 
NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command]. Obviously, there has been a 
lot of attention on our southern border and what has continued 
to happen with drug cartels. Whether it is weapons crossing the 
border, whether it is the drugs that Senator Shaheen just 
talked about, all of that is very concerning.
    But what I would like to focus on in just the minute and a 
half that I have left is also the issue of human trafficking. 
Not only do we have illegal drug trade wreaking havoc across 
Iowa, a lot of our rural communities, but Iowa wrestles a lot 
with the serious problem of human trafficking. The Polaris 
Project in 2016 dubbed Des Moines, Iowa as one of the top 100 
human trafficking sites in the United States. That is not 
something we are proud of.
    Could you describe the resourcing and coordination 
challenges that exist when you are trying to address the threat 
between these different areas of responsibility between 
SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM?
    Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM work very closely 
together. General O'Shaughnessy and I traveled to Mexico City. 
We sat down with the head of their army and their navy to talk 
about how do we improve information sharing, how do we get 
after these ungoverned spaces that are spawning instability 
into North America and beyond and South America, Latin America, 
the Caribbean, and how do we help the Mexicans share 
information with Guatemala. It was a very productive meeting. 
We came up with tangible steps to do that.
    Then we went to Guatemala City the next day and had that 
same level of conversation with those nations to try to forge 
more coordination. At the heart of getting after these wicked 
problems that create instability here, including the human 
trafficking, is sharing intelligence, building trust, breaking 
down barriers, understanding and then ensuring that the right 
agency, law enforcement agency, other agencies, have the 
information they need to make an impact. That is a key element 
of what we are doing as we move ahead. Then we take that into 
exercise program which is also a similar element.
    We are adequately resourced to do this, but we are 
carefully looking at how we can become more efficient as we 
move forward.
    Senator Ernst. Very good. Well, please let us know if there 
is anything additional that we as Congress can help with.
    Gentlemen, thank you very, very much for your service to 
our country. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our 
witnesses.
    I want to add my comments of support for the families of 
Colonel Voss and Captain Phanouf. Colonel Voss, though a Guam 
resident, was based out of Joint Base Langley in Virginia. 
Thinking about his family and all those that you mentioned.
    Admiral Faller, I want to start with you on Venezuela. 
There is an article that was in The Wall Street Journal a 
couple of days ago that I would like to put into the record.
    [The information follows:]
                 How Putin Outfoxed Trump in Venezuela
  the trump administration underestimated how much support president 
nicolas maduro would receive from russia and cuba, as well as from u.s. 
                                 allies
By Jessica Donati, Andrew Restuccia and Ian Talley
January 27, 2020

    The Trump administration's bid to replace Venezuela's authoritarian 
leader Nicol s Maduro hit a roadblock after a meeting with Russian 
officials in Rome last year--and has never recovered.
    U.S. envoy Elliott Abrams arrived at the Westin Excelsior hotel 
hoping to persuade Russia to withdraw its support for Mr. Maduro and to 
recognize Juan Guaido as Venezuela's legitimate leader. Russian deputy 
foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov instead demanded the U.S. back down 
from military threats and lift the economic sanctions intended to force 
Mr. Maduro's hand.
    In the months that followed, the U.S. campaign spiraled into a 
foreign-policy debacle, thwarted by familiar adversaries, Russia and 
Cuba, as well as allies, Turkey and India-all countries that one way or 
another helped Venezuela sidestep U.S. sanctions, according to current 
and former U.S. officials and Venezuelan opposition activists. The 
European Union watched from the sidelines.
    The Trump administration, confident Mr. Maduro would fall, didn't 
foresee Russia leading the way for other countries to eclipse the 
sanctions. In turn, administration reluctance to impose sanctions on 
Russian enterprises and others kept Venezuela's oil and gold flowing to 
buyers.
    This month, in a sign of how much the opposition is floundering, 
Venezuela security forces blocked Mr. Guaido from entering the National 
Assembly building, where he was seeking re-election as leader. Mr. 
Guaido, in a blue suit, tried and failed to scale the spiked iron 
fence.
    Russia now handles more than two-thirds of Venezuela's crude oil, 
current and former administration officials said, including helping to 
conceal export destinations. The lifeline has helped Mr. Maduro slow 
the economy's free fall, consolidate his grip on power and weaken the 
opposition.
    Almost half of the $1.5 billion in Venezuelan crude exported to 
India in the 9 months after the U.S. sanctions was purchased by an 
Indian joint venture with Russia's oil giant, Rosneft, according to a 
Wall Street Journal analysis of data compiled by trade database Import 
Genius.
    The United Arab Emirates has imported around $1 billion in gold 
from Venezuela since gold sanctions were imposed in late 2018, 
according to Venezuela trade records. U.S. intelligence officials say 
the actual amounts are far higher, based on evidence that Venezuelan 
gold is leaving the country masked as originating from Colombia, Uganda 
and elsewhere. The exports land in Turkey, the U.A.E. and other gold-
trade hubs.
    The Turkish Embassy in Washington denied any oil or gold trade with 
Venezuela that breached U.S. sanctions. ``The allegations do not 
reflect the facts, and they are only speculative and hearsay,'' a 
spokesman said.
    The Russian Embassy in Washington declined to comment. It referred 
to past foreign-ministry statements criticizing the U.S. for 
interfering in Venezuela's affairs. Officials from India and the U.A.E. 
didn't respond to requests for comment.
    Administration officials acknowledge President Trump's frustration 
and say the White House continues to press for Mr. Maduro's ouster. Mr. 
Trump, pointing to America's superior economy and military, suggested 
in a recent interview with the Journal that the U.S. had the resources 
to outlast Mr. Maduro. ``We have a lot of options,'' the president 
said.
    Yet with an election, impeachment and attention turned to the 
Middle East, Venezuela has for now moved to a back burner, an 
administration official said.
    The stalemate allows Mr. Maduro to take a star turn as David to 
America's Goliath. He makes speeches and appearances nearly every day 
to show he remains comfortably in charge. He chided Mr. Abrams and 
other U.S. officials, saying they misled Mr. Trump that a regime change 
would be easy.
    ``They're trying to save their jobs because Trump is furious with 
the lies they've fed him on Venezuela,'' Mr. Maduro said in a recent 
address. ``They failed, and Venezuela triumphed.''
    Mr. Maduro's hold on the presidency has been costly for what was 
once Latin America's most-prosperous economy. Hyperinflation, high 
infant mortality rates and a shortage of medical supplies contribute to 
the humanitarian crisis there. Food, electricity and water shortages 
have driven an exodus of 4.5 million people.
    Mr. Abrams, the U.S. envoy, acknowledged this month that the 
yearlong U.S. effort to remove Mr. Maduro hit unexpected obstacles. 
``We underestimated the importance of the Cuban and Russian support for 
the regime,'' he said. ``The Russian role in the economy, particularly 
the oil economy, is larger and larger.''
    Mr. Guaido, in an interview, sounded a similar note. ``I think we 
did underestimate things,'' he said. He called on countries to help 
block gold exports from Venezuela. ``You have to try to bring pressure 
on those who support the regime,'' he said. ``Sanctions today are the 
only real tool we have.''
    Mr. Guaido's approval rating had fallen by more than 20 points to 
38%, according to Venezuelan pollster Datanalisis. Allegations against 
opposition members, including accepting bribes from Maduro cronies, 
have eroded confidence.
    Despite the setbacks, administration officials said there are no 
plans to abandon Mr. Guaido. Vice President Mike Pence last month 
summoned senior administration officials to a meeting in the White 
House's Situation Room. U.S. officials later hosted a conference with 
opposition leaders to try to reinvigorate them, people familiar with 
the gathering said.
    Mr. Guaido's backers see Russia as their principal obstacle and 
want the U.S., Europe and other allies to take a harder line on 
sanctions loopholes.
    ``Russia in my view has become the most important partner of 
Maduro,'' said Carlos Vecchio, the Venezuela ambassador to the U.S. for 
Mr. Guaido. ``A multilateral approach on sanctions is critical.''
    The EU hasn't introduced oil sanctions or prevented Maduro 
officials from traveling to the eurozone to raise money and support.
    Charles Shapiro, a former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela who is now 
president of the nonpartisan think tank World Affairs Council of 
Atlanta, said the Trump administration's predicament showed the 
difficulty of regime change without military force.
    ``And if you use military force,'' he said, ``there are all sorts 
of other problems.''
    The U.S. has warned officials in Russia, Turkey, the U.A.E. and 
India about sanctions violations in private meetings, U.S. officials 
said, but hasn't moved to blacklist companies or individuals suspected 
of breaking the sanctions.
    Policy options have split the administration. Some officials 
believe sanctions on Russia's oil firm Rosneft and other companies 
doing business with intermediaries could close loopholes that have 
allowed Mr. Maduro to survive.
    Others say they could undermine U.S. interests elsewhere, including 
Iran. India agreed to stop importing Iranian crude as part of 
Washington's pressure campaign against Tehran, but it continues to 
import Venezuelan oil. India pays for the deliveries in gasoline, a 
trade that the nation says doesn't violate U.S. sanctions.
    Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hasn't ruled out negotiations with 
Mr. Maduro.
    ``We will continue to tweak our policy to get the strategy just 
right, but we've seen no evidence that Maduro is remotely interested in 
having free and fair elections,'' Mr. Pompeo said recently about direct 
talks. ``As far as our strategy, the tack we'll take, I'm sure that 
will change over time.''
Long road
    Mr. Guaido, 36 years old, was virtually unknown in Mr. Trump's 
circles before he came to Washington with a delegation in December 
2018. Administration officials and opposition leaders made a plan to 
put Mr. Guaido in charge, and Mr. Pence was given a central role.
    Administration officials targeted Venezuela, in part to punish Cuba 
and win support among Cuban Americans, a potent Republican voting bloc 
in Florida. Republican Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Mauricio Claver 
Carone, the National Security Council's head for Latin American 
affairs, had roles in forging Venezuela policy.
    Cuba provides Mr. Maduro with intelligence and security services, 
helping to minimize defections in his government, U.S. officials said.
    When Mr. Guaido declared himself interim president in a widely 
watched oath of office ceremony a year ago, the U.S. swiftly recognized 
him as Venezuela's legitimate leader. Canada, Brazil, Argentina, 
Colombia, Chile, Peru and other South American countries followed. They 
supported Mr. Guaido on the grounds that Mr. Maduro's election to a 
second six-year term was a sham.
    Two days after Mr. Guaido's oath, Mr. Abrams was appointed as the 
top envoy to Venezuela. He was given one job: Remove Nicol s Maduro.
    Mr. Abrams rattled some at the State Department, in part for his 
involvement in the Iran-Contra affair, a covert operation in the mid-
1980s to sell weapons to Iran and use the proceeds to arm rebels in 
Nicaragua.
    Some career State Department staff feared that any heavy-handed 
U.S. intervention would derail Mr. Guaido's popular support, while 
political appointees questioned Mr. Abrams's support of Mr. Trump.
    In March, Mr. Abrams met with the Russian deputy foreign minister 
in Rome. After Russia refused to back Mr. Guaido, the U.S. envoy 
promised more sanctions and possible military action. After this 
article was published, Mr. Abrams said: ``I and all the others in the 
U.S. party had very low expectations of what could come from the 
meeting.''
    The realization that regime change wouldn't be easy came in April. 
The opposition planned to have Venezuela's top court recognize the 
National Assembly, headed by Mr. Guaido, as the legitimate 
representative of the Venezuelan people. That would give the country's 
armed forces legal grounds to abandon Mr. Maduro.
    Guaido supporters expected high-ranking Maduro officials to 
announce they were switching sides. The plan flopped, and White House 
frustrations erupted.
    In May, secret talks brokered by Norway opened in Barbados between 
Mr. Maduro and the opposition, which called for fair elections. In 
August, Mr. Maduro quit the talks.
    Looking back, the U.S. campaign originated with unrealistic 
expectations, current and former U.S. officials and Venezuelan 
opposition activists said.
    ``There was a firm belief, and briefed to the president, that all 
that had to be done was to recognize Guaido, and Maduro would fall,'' 
said Fernando Cutz, a former White House National Security Council 
official during the Trump and Obama administrations who was involved in 
U.S.-Venezuela policy.
    The administration's call for the Venezuelan military to defect and 
support Mr. Guaido was wishful thinking, said Michael Shifter, 
president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a nonpartisan think tank: 
``The last thing the military are going to do is follow orders from a 
foreign power, especially the U.S.''
    Mr. Trump complained to aides and allies that he was led to believe 
Mr. Maduro would be removed quickly, people familiar with the matter 
said.
    The president directed much of his anger at national security 
adviser John Bolton, those people said, adding that those frustrations 
contributed to Mr. Bolton's ouster in September.
Helping hand
    With Russia's help, Venezuelan oil output could return to 1 million 
barrels a day from a low of 650,000 to 700,000 barrels, Rapidan Energy 
Group, a geopolitical risk consulting firm, said in December. Rosneft 
is helping Petr centsleos de Venezuela SA, the state oil company, pay 
for overdue maintenance and the hiring of foreign experts, according to 
the group.
    Russia has provided Venezuela more than $300 million in currency 
over the past 18 months-dollars and euros that have become more scarce 
under the sanctions, according to the Journal analysis of data from 
Import Genius.
    Mr. Abrams said he still believed sanctions will work. ``The 
situation of the regime is untenable and many people in the regime 
clearly know it,' he said. ``They would not keep sending their money, 
their wives, their children, and their mistresses out of the country if 
they thought it was stabilizing.''
    Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin American program at the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, said the standoff 
this month at the National Assembly underscored the opposition's 
weakened state.
    ``At the same time,'' she said, ``the [Maduro] government has no 
real options for ending the economic, humanitarian and legitimacy 
crises that it faces.''
    The issue surfaced at a Trump re-election event this month in 
Florida, a battleground state with the largest population of 
Venezuelans in the U.S. Some of Mr. Trump's supporters in Florida have 
voiced frustration that Mr. Maduro remained in power.
    Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, speaking informally to a small 
group at the event, said the administration had expected the leadership 
change to happen faster, and that some officials sought more aggressive 
efforts, according to a person familiar with conversation.
    A spokesman for Mr. Ross declined to comment on the meeting but 
said the administration is looking at all options. ``The U.S. is 100% 
behind Guaido,'' Mr. Ross said Thursday in a TV interview.

--Jose de Cordoba, Alex Leary, Kejal Vyas and Vivian Salama contributed 
to this article.

    Senator Kaine. The title of it is unnecessarily 
provocative. The title is ``How Putin Outfoxed Trump in 
Venezuela.'' I do not think the title is a fair 
characterization. I think the article, though, is very, very 
good.
    Basically if I were going to title the article, I would 
title it how the United States underestimated the difficulty of 
what we were trying to do in Venezuela. I think the U.S. has 
done a number of good things. I think the Trump administration 
has. I could pick a few faults, but generally done good. But 
the core of the article is how we really underestimated how 
hard it would be.
    I just remember this last year when we were talking about 
it here and in the Foreign Relations Committee, there were sort 
of some real blue skies scenarios that were being painted by 
the administration about how Maduro is about to collapse. I 
went to Colombia and visited in Colombia, then went to the 
border in Cucuta in March, and everything I was hearing from 
the Colombians and everybody down there is this is not easy. It 
is going to be really, really hard. They were exactly right 
about how difficult it was going to be. Here on Capitol Hill we 
were getting blue skies scenarios from the administration about 
the imminent collapse of the Maduro Government. We just got it 
wrong. On the intel side, we just got it wrong.
    One of the things that is galling in the article is one of 
the reasons it is so hard is not just our adversaries. 
Venezuela is propped up by Iran and Cuba and China and Russia. 
The UAE [United Arab Emirates], Turkey, India, allies of ours 
have helped them evade United States sanctions and have helped 
prop them up, and they are one of the reasons why the Maduro 
Government has had some lasting power.
    I guess I just want to caution all of us on matters like 
this. These are tough situations, and we can do everything 
right and still find it very hard to accomplish what we want. 
That is not our fault. But we need to be very wary of blue 
skies scenarios and being told we will support this person and 
things are likely to work out our way. We are in for the long 
haul in these situations.
    I will tell, Admiral Faller, I would love to talk to you 
further. We have done European Reassurance Initiatives and 
Asian Reassurance Initiatives. It might be time to do an 
Americas Reassurance Initiative. I do not really like the title 
because ``reassurance'' already sounds defensive like no, no, 
no, we are really interested in you. I do not know that we have 
to be defensive about it. But we need to have a comprehensive, 
whole-of-government diplomacy and military and economic trade 
focus on the Americas because while we are focusing elsewhere, 
I know where our adversaries are focused. They are focusing on 
our own back yard.
    General Townsend, I want to ask you a question. There was a 
recent study of some challenges within the special operations 
community, and while it was special operations focused, a 
number of the areas of the study dealt with items in AFRICOM. 
There is a comprehensive review that SOCOM [U.S. Special 
Operations Command] put out last week looking at a variety of 
cultural and ethical challenges in the special operations 
forces, including some that led to scandals. Many took place in 
AFRICOM.
    One of the themes was extremely high operational tempos 
caused problems. Here was the finding, ``a trend of 
disaggregation at the individual and small team levels risks 
employing forces where operational requirements misalign with 
the four gen validation standards.'' I have been on the 
committee for 7 years. I think what that means is we had forces 
deployed in teams and sizes that lacked the oversight or the 
ability to do the missions they were assigned.
    Now, I think the recommendations are largely for SOCOM, but 
because SOCOM operates within combatant commands, what 
responsibility do you think the COCOMs have in making sure that 
the forces provided to you are appropriately resourced and led?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Senator.
    I am familiar with the study, and I am familiar with the 
conclusions of it. I agree with what that study talks about. As 
you are aware, most of the forces operating on the African 
continent these days are special operating forces (SOF), not 
exclusively but a lot of them.
    This phenomenon you mentioned correctly does not just apply 
to special operating forces. Over the course of this war, we 
have disaggregated formations time and time again and separated 
small teams from their higher echelons of command and 
leadership.
    Senator Kaine. Some of the recommendations here or findings 
are a little bit like the study about the McCain and Fitzgerald 
instances in the Pacific. I mean, there are some similar 
challenges about high OPSTEMPO [operations tempo] and other 
things leading to the problems.
    General Townsend. Right. So I think at the COCOM level, we 
absolutely need to do whatever we can to keep teams together 
and not disaggregate them. I am a firm believer in this. I have 
been in a command that has had my team disaggregated and 
scattered all over. So I am believer in keeping team integrity 
in every task that we can.
    Also, part of our blank slate review process that we are 
undergoing with the Department of Defense is to look at how we 
can reduce the operational tempo, particularly of SOF forces, 
but all forces, reduce their operational tempo so it is not 
just about trying to redirect resources but it is to return 
some resources to home station. The SOF operational tempo is 
still stretched. Even though it is now reaching a dwell of 
about 1 year deployed for 2 years at home, the goal is 1 to 3, 
and there is still some work to be done there.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
    Thanks, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator McSally?
    Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Townsend, I represent Arizona, and on January 5 
Dustin Harrison from Tucson was killed by al Shabaab terrorists 
at Manda Bay in Kenya. His wife Hope and his 2-year-old 
daughter Heaven are back home in Tucson grieving the loss of 
her husband and father.
    Now, I was a part of the team to stand up AFRICOM as my 
last assignment in the military, one of the more challenging 
assignments I had. So I am aware of the challenges you have on 
the continent.
    But some articles about the situation there was that it was 
a woefully undefended perimeter or surprisingly sparse 
security, given the level of assets, air assets and others, 
that you have there.
    I know an investigation is ongoing, and I do not want to 
put any more of our service men and women into harm's way. But 
what can you share about what is happening today to make sure 
an attack like that is not happening or the risk is not going 
to happen now and in the future? What can I share with Heaven 
and Hope to make sure that others are not going to be in a 
similar risk?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Senator.
    As I mentioned in my opening statement, I also offer our 
condolences. Those family members are in our thoughts and 
prayers for our fallen comrades.
    Also, thank you for pointing out there is an investigation 
going on, so I do not want to get in front of that. You know, 
you have worn a uniform so you know that frequently what we 
think we know at the start of an event is not what actually we 
discover after we have thoroughly investigated it.
    But there are some early conclusions, and I think it is 
self-obvious we were not as prepared there in Manda Bay as we 
needed to be. Al Shabaab managed to penetrate onto that 
airfield. A lot of people do not know but the base where our 
troops live is not where the airfield is. But they were able to 
get access to that airfield, kill three Americans, and destroy 
six aircraft there. So we were not as prepared, and we are 
digging into that to find out why that is the case.
    But since that event, there are about 120 infantrymen there 
on the ground now who are securing that place, and they have 
been working hard since January 6 to put in the appropriate 
level of defenses. I am confident that by the time they are 
done, Manda Bay will be much more properly defended.
    We are not just stopping there, though. We are looking 
across the continent because I think that we viewed, and the 
Kenyans viewed, Manda Bay as a safe area. The Kenyans have 
family housing there for their military. It is a resort area. 
So al Shabaab has shown their reach and the danger that they 
pose, and I think we need to take that seriously, and so I am 
looking with a clear eye at every location in Africa now.
    Senator McSally. Great. Thank you.
    I was at J-33 in that assignment running our 
counterterrorism operations. One of the challenges we had at 
the time--this was back in 2007 to 2010--we saw al Shabaab 
growing. We saw the training camps. We were watching hundreds, 
thousands of fighters being trained. At the time, they were a 
lawful legitimate target, but the Obama administration felt 
like they were not a real problem or risk. So we could not take 
them out.
    Last year, I think there were 67 strikes conducted in 
Somalia. Can you share what the impact of those strikes are, 
and is it whack-a-mole or what is the strategy here going 
forward in order to address this growing terrorist threat in 
East Africa?
    General Townsend. There is an international effort there 
that supports the Somali Government.
    Senator McSally. I know. We have been talking about that 
for a very long time.
    General Townsend. Yes, and the Somali national army, and so 
our role is in support of that. The two major tasks that we are 
doing is helping to train a specific part of the Somali 
national army, the Danab or special light infantry units, and 
we are also doing our counterterrorism strikes. They are meant 
to help the international effort and the Somali effort, but 
they are also meant to protect America.
    I do not believe that it is whack-a-mole. What we do is we 
keep an eye on al Shabaab every day, and we are looking for 
ways to reduce their capacity wherever we can. That effort to 
disrupt and degrade al Shabaab and their leadership and their 
mid-level leadership and higher-level leadership is a critical 
part of what we are doing.
    Senator McSally. Great. Thanks.
    Admiral Faller, I am out of time, but I will submit some 
questions for the record specifically about the drug flow 
coming up from your AOR to our country through my State, 
Arizona, and the latest tactics that the cartels are using and 
how we are countering them. But I will have to submit those for 
the record. Thanks.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to talk in a few minutes about China and Russia and 
their activities both in Latin America and in Africa.
    But, Admiral Faller, since we have been sitting here, eight 
Americans have died of drug overdoses in the last hour, 67,000 
people a year, one person a day in Maine.
    What is going on with China and Russia are threats. They 
are indirect threats. They are important. But we are talking 
about Americans dying, and you and I have talked about this in 
the past. I have heard from you and from other national 
security officials that we are picking up--we are interdicting 
about 25 percent of the drug shipments through the ocean to 
North America that we know of. Twenty-five percent of what we 
know of. To me, we are talking about allocating resources 
around the world for all kinds of threats. This is a direct 
threat killing Americans that we do not have enough ships. I do 
not get it. When do we get to interdicting the ships that we 
know are carrying drugs into this country to kill our people?
    Admiral Faller. It is a national security crisis.
    Senator King. Absolutely.
    Admiral Faller. It is actually worse statistics than you 
mentioned. We detect 25 percent. We are only interdicting 9 
percent. To interdict, we need greater partner capacity, as I 
mentioned in the answer to Senator Shaheen. We also need 
assets. At the end of the day, you have got to be on the field 
to compete. When the playing field is twice the size----
    Senator King. Well, who do we need to talk to to get those 
assets? The Secretary of Defense, the President, the Vice 
President, who? Where do we go? It is infuriating that we know 
what is coming. We know it out there, and the phrase I got was 
we have far more targets than we can action. That is a 
euphemism for we are woefully falling down on this 
responsibility.
    Admiral Faller. The Coast Guard stepped up in a big way. 
Our U.S. Navy used to have readiness challenges that has them 
stretched globally, and that has impacted their force 
allocation to us.
    Senator King. Is it people or ships? Do we just need more 
ships?
    Admiral Faller. It is not just ships, Senator. We need the 
intelligence, so we need the intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance assets (ISR). We have about 20 percent of what 
our need is there, and then that then turns into the ability to 
interdict. We also need our steady funding and our security 
cooperation so we can help our partner nations help themselves. 
So it is pulling this together in a full court press beyond 
ships that we can work together with partners and in our 
interagency and get the ``W'' back in front of whole-of-
government, Senator.
    Senator King. I appreciate that, and I know that you are 
working on this, but I just hope you will keep pressing. If you 
have to say there is this really obnoxious Senator that is on 
my back and I have got to do something, that is fine. I can 
fulfill that responsibility quite adequately.
    Let us talk about China for a minute. By the way, these 
charts from both of you are very helpful. It really graphically 
indicates what is going on.
    It seems to me China is following sort of a two-track 
strategy in both Africa and South America. One is what I call 
debt imperialism. They are getting these small countries in 
debt to them, and then they have got their hooks into them. 
General, is that part of what you are seeing happening in 
Africa?
    General Townsend. That is exactly what we are seeing. We 
are also seeing a new, more sophisticated development in that. 
So the debt trap diplomacy has now become known on the 
continent. Most African leaders are wise to it. Actually I 
would commend our State Department for helping get African 
leaders more savvy about what the Chinese are doing with some 
of these debt trap loans. The Chinese are adapting, though, and 
evolving their presentation, and they are becoming more 
sophisticated about it. So I am a little bit worried because 
they are getting smarter about it.
    Senator King. Well, that is a concern. But the other thing 
is sort of more direct. I think, Admiral Faller, you used the 
word positional advantage. Just looking at your chart, Jamaica, 
El Salvador, Ecuador, Chile, Belize ports. Ports. I mean, that 
is a strategic advantage. Whatever happened to the Monroe 
Doctrine? We are allowing an adversary--I will not say an enemy 
but an adversary--to establish significant positional advantage 
within our hemisphere. Admiral?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, it is not just the ports. It is IT 
infrastructure. It is space stations. It is cyber. It is safe 
cities, as General Townsend mentioned. China has figured out 
that the nations in Latin America and the Caribbean are cash 
strapped, so instead of trying to do arms sales, they are 
coming in with significant gifts. I could cite $17 million in 
one country in South America, $20 million in a Caribbean 
nation. These are 1-year gifts of trucks and boats and IT 
infrastructure, well beyond uniforms and PME [professional 
military education]. That is alarming to me as they build not 
just debt but dependency, and we are trying to build trust and 
teams.
    Senator King. Maybe our motto should be beware of Chinese 
bearing gifts and telecommunications equipment.
    Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate your 
testimony.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cramer?
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank both of you, both for your service and you being here 
today.
    I am going to ask each of you to elaborate on the topic 
that Admiral Faller just brought up in response to Senator 
King's first question because each of you and/or your 
predecessors have commented of the challenge, given the mass 
geography that you are responsible for, each of you, the 
challenges in ISR, Admiral, that you just raised. Are you 
getting the assets that you have asked for? Are you getting the 
assets you need? If not, why not, if you know?
    Then to putting a finer point perhaps or an additional 
point on that broader discussion that I want you to have with 
me. On December 20, with the signing of the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), of course, we began the process of 
standing up the sixth military branch in Space Force. Whether 
in ISR or whatever, but Space Force seems to me to fit right 
into this. What I am wondering about is--I know it is early, 
but time is short--have you been invited into the discussion or 
inserted yourself into the discussion of how to best man, 
train, and equip a Space Force to assist you? Maybe you can 
elaborate a little bit on your partner countries and what role, 
if any, they could play. I would ask, Admiral, to go first and 
then General Townsend.
    Admiral Faller. Intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance is a key part of our intelligence picture, and 
there is a global demand and we are short in this hemisphere. I 
mentioned we were meeting 20 percent of our goal. A good chunk 
of that 20 percent is using the Department of Homeland Security 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) assets. So it is a team 
effort. The DOD portion of that is probably closer to about 8 
percent, and so it is key. We recognize the global challenges, 
and we do the best we can with what we have. I think there are 
some advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence 
that we can use and should pursue, and we are going to work 
that.
    With respect to Space Force, we have excellent coordination 
with General Raymond and his team. It is a key interest like 
cyber in every nation that we deal with. Fundamental to this is 
information sharing into the space realm and space agreements 
that we are working with nations like Brazil, Chile, and other 
countries that will help counter China's efforts in that realm 
and continue to ensure that we have positional advantage. We 
cannot work fast enough in that arena, Senator, but we are 
working on it as hard as we can.
    Senator Cramer. Thank you.
    General Townsend. Senator, on your question about 
resources, I would say that my command, with one exception, is 
pretty adequately resourced for the tasks we are given to do 
today. As small as those resources are, I think it is adequate 
with the exception of ISR that you mentioned, and I know that 
every combatant commander that sits here in front of you will 
say the exact same thing. Admiral Faller briefed his level of 
resourcing. We are at about 25 percent of our known validated 
requirement for ISR.
    You mentioned the Space Force. Interestingly enough, I just 
met with General Raymond yesterday. We were discussing about 
the development of his new force, and we are in constant 
contact with Space Force and Space Command. They have recently 
deployed some folks to our headquarters to assist us with 
space.
    Everything we do, of course, on the continent has ties to 
space, and not only on our side but on our adversaries' side as 
well. I recently got a briefing, and the Chinese have somewhere 
between 13 and 16 space facilities on the African continent and 
the Russians have 5 or 6. So they are also investing heavily in 
space infrastructure on the African continent.
    Senator Cramer. Thank you both, and with that, I yield my 
time.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters?
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your ongoing service as well.
    You both highlighted in your written testimony the National 
Guard State Partnership Program and how that works to ensure 
bonds both at junior levels and senior levels with militaries 
in your region. In the last 4 years, the Michigan National 
Guard has completed 19 events with Liberia, one of their State 
Partnership counterparts, and they have also planned another 20 
events coming up in this next fiscal year.
    I had the opportunity to see some of that firsthand in 2017 
when I was in Liberia, and I know that the partnership 
certainly helps build relationships in West Africa as well as 
other places around the world.
    So my question to both of you is, how are you leveraging 
State Partnership Programs in your area of responsibility? When 
I look at the amount of money we are spending, roughly $3 
million in each of your areas, maybe you can give us a sense of 
what you are doing. Is that adequate resourcing? If not, what 
would be adequate and what would you do with it? General 
Townsend?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Senator.
    The State Partnership Program is a fantastic resource for 
us, and I did not have a good appreciation for it until I took 
this job. One of the first conferences I went to, all of the--
at the time--14 partnerships were present with their National 
Guard partners from the United States. It is very responsive. 
It is very flexible. What I like about it is the States and the 
countries do a lot of things sort of below the radar, and it is 
a constant kind of presence.
    We now have 15 partnerships in Africa. We have just added 
Rwanda and Nebraska. That is the new one, and the next one in 
the queue we are working up towards is Ethiopia. These 
countries want these partnerships. They talk to their 
counterparts on the continent that have them, and they realize 
the value of it. I cannot say enough good about the State 
Partnership Program.
    Senator Peters. Are they resourced enough?
    General Townsend. You mentioned we have $2.9 million, about 
$3 million that you mentioned. I think they are probably 
adequate right now. What I have not done is I have not done an 
analysis to see if we add Ethiopia, do we get more money, or is 
that another mouth to feed from the same $2.9 million. I have 
to look into that. I do not know the answer to that, and I will 
get back to you on that.
    Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    General Townsend. We anticipate receiving additional resources from 
the National Guard Bureau (NGB), but understand current appropriation 
for State Partnership Program (SPP) is relatively flat. In fiscal year 
2019 AFRICOM received about $2.9 million in SPP funding which allowed 
us to support 196 engagements of 250 planned. I support appropriating 
more resources to the NGB (title 10, USC section 341) to fund the 
valuable return on investment we receive through SPP.

    Admiral Faller?
    Admiral Faller. Similar extremely positive experience. It 
is a habitual relationship that aligns itself very well, and 
the year and after year builds friendships. The training that 
is provided, the equipment. Most of our exercise support for 
our major exercises comes from State Partnerships, and that is 
something that we depend on as our force provider. So it is a 
game-changer for us. We added Brazil and New York this year, 
and it was a big deal for the Brazilians and the New York 
National Guard.
    In terms of the funding levels, we are seeking to get guard 
partner reps established in every embassy as part of our 
embassy country teams. We are working through the funding with 
respect to that. We think there is an opportunity for some 
additional State partners within our headquarters to augment 
our force and to increase the understanding of how we can 
leverage partner expertise. Cyber is a particular area where 
some States are excellent in cyber. How do we better leverage 
that? I have to get back to you on a level of funding and I 
will take that for the record.
    But the authorities piece is also an area too. So we can 
use the flexible authorities.
    One quick story. Recently in Colombia and we have Oklahoma. 
It is not a State partner of Colombia, but the Oklahoma Guard 
has surged ISR support for 6 months to help augment Colombia in 
getting after FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] 
dissidents, the ELN [National Liberation Army], and 
narcotraffickers. Some tremendous successes with their MC-12's 
with just 30 guardsmen and one contractor support. Lost cost, 
high payoff.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    I have a very limited time. So it will be just a quick 
answer from each of you.
    We understand that climate change will have a significant 
impact on security issues across the planet. The Army War 
College just recently put out a report suggesting the 
challenges of climate change. In the brief time we have left, 
is there one specific concern related to climate change in your 
area that you think we should be focusing on. General, do you 
want to start?
    General Townsend. Yes. I think probably the desertification 
that we see expanding south from the Sahara into the Sahel and 
water management I think. Water is going to be huge point of 
friction on the African continent in the future.
    Admiral Faller. Recently in Central America--and we look at 
the impact on changes in weather to the coffee and the white 
corn and things like that. So we are really focused on how do 
we work with whole-of-government to support that stability 
necessary so people can stay home and find jobs.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Tillis?
    Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
    I was struck by some of your comments. I think even Senator 
King's comments led me to kind of aggregate. You accomplish so 
much with few people and few dollars. Admiral Faller, you said 
we do the best we can with what we have. I have heard 
``adequate'' used several times and ``probably adequate'' used 
one time.
    So when we have this discussion about why are you not doing 
more, I always wonder whether or not you all should just put a 
mirror down there and say because you are not giving us the 
resources to say ``more than adequate,'' thinking 
strategically, doing more, anticipating threats.
    To a large extent, the graphics were great, but what we are 
trying to do is catch up with a pace in China and against China 
and in Africa and South America where it looks like we are 
losing. The gap is narrowing and some points we are trying to 
catch up. Is that an adequate statement?
    Admiral Faller. We see our competitive advantage narrowing 
in this hemisphere, and we have got to maintain that 
competitive advantage and across all the elements of national 
power focused in the military. So what does it take to do that? 
Certainly more efficient use of resources we have, leveraging 
other things. I mentioned artificial intelligence a couple 
times. But at the end of the day, any athletic competition I 
have ever been in or anything I have ever done takes a person 
to compete. So zero in any math equation is either zero or 
unsolvable. We have to be present to make a difference.
    Senator Tillis. General Townsend?
    General Townsend. Senator, I think that our competitive 
advantage is not eroding. In some cases, they have an 
advantage. There are some areas we are just not going to out-
compete China in. One example is spending money in large 
amounts on the African continent to build infrastructure. We 
are not going to build bridges and dams and railroads and 
stadiums and palaces like they are doing. So we have to rely on 
our strengths, and I think our interagency and our military 
have a lot of those strengths. So I think that we also do not 
have to compete everywhere in Africa. We have to pick and 
choose where we are going to out-compete.
    Senator Tillis. If I have time, I am going to ask a little 
bit about that.
    We all have to take a look at what is happening around the 
globe. When all of a sudden we see the threat of Iran in the 
Middle East, we have to redeploy assets there. It has got to 
come from somewhere.
    ISR is something that is desperately needed across the 
board. I have had several discussions with your predecessors, 
Admiral, and they say the thing that is most frustrating to 
them is they have enough intelligence to know there is a lot of 
stuff moving across the border killing American citizens and 
there is not a damn thing they can do about it. You just do not 
have the resources on the water, on the ground to do it.
    I really do believe if you take a look at the number of 
people who are dying from narcoterrorism, it is remarkable to 
me, the hundreds of people who die every day in this country. 
If that was a terrorist organization doing that anywhere in the 
world, we would stand up a capability and rain down hell on 
them. But it is happening every single day.
    I want to ask you a question because I will run out of 
time. As you are looking north of your area of responsibility 
and then to the southern border of Mexico, how much better are 
we getting at securing that border so you are limiting the 
pathways that these drugs, guns, and victims of human 
trafficking? Are we starting to tighten and make any progress 
there within your area of responsibility? Any comments you can 
give on Mexico's contribution will be appreciated.
    Admiral Faller. We certainly look at the security as a 
required zone defense. So border security is almost like a goal 
line stand. You need your linebackers and your halfbacks as you 
move down. I think the pressure has worked. We have seen some 
positive indication.
    But clearly, given the migrant caravans that have recently 
come up, the connection between those caravans and 
transnational criminal organizations and narcotrafficking and 
the political instability. More needs to be done, and it has 
got to be those nations stepping up. The partners have to step 
up and our whole-of-government efforts sustained in a way. To 
get after sustainable security, it takes time to get some of 
these efforts up. We saw Ambassador Jean E. Manes make progress 
in El Salvador, but it was sustained, whole-of-government 
efforts.
    Senator Tillis. Finally, General Townsend, you wake up in 
the morning. What are the top three things that worry you most 
about your job?
    General Townsend. I think the first one is another event 
like a Manda Bay, an attack where we are just not looking for 
it.
    Then I think what al Shabaab might do next that we are not 
tracking on out of East Africa.
    Then just making sure I can do right by the soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and marines of AFRICOM.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Manchin?
    Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all especially for your service, but thanks for 
being here to bring us up to speed.
    Admiral Faller, I want to talk about Guantanamo just a 
little bit because we talked about the efficiencies and the 
things that you are trying to do there to get more 
accountability. My goodness, when it is costing $13 million per 
inmate--$13 million--what type of efficiencies do you think you 
can do to cut into that? How can we better operate? Do you not 
think it is time we look at repositioning these prisoners that 
would be more cost effective to the American taxpayers? West 
Virginians could do a lot with that $13 million. I can assure 
you on that one. So any thoughts you might have on Guantanamo, 
what direction we should go, policy for the long term, and then 
short-term efficiencies?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, the safe, humane, legal treatment 
of those detainees is a top mission of ours. We have a 
significant guard force aligned to that mission set, some 
1,800. As part of this combatant command zero slate review, we 
are going to take a hard look at if there is a better way, a 
more efficient way to conduct that mission set. That review is 
ongoing. I will report out to the Secretary of Defense soon.
    Senator Manchin. Let me just ask this question, and I am 
sorry to interrupt you, sir.
    Have you all looked to see if we are capable and able? I 
understand we have quite a few detainees in the United States 
prisons in some of our hardened facilities that would be more 
effective and efficient. The geopolitical ramifications of this 
thing--we just got to get more cost effective here and do the 
common sense thing. I cannot explain this back home.
    Admiral Faller. As we look at our review, we are looking at 
different models on what we can learn from. As to whether we 
would move that detention facility, that is a policy decision--
--
    Senator Manchin. I understand. I understand that.
    Admiral Faller. I just want to note, Senator, that we 
remind our team every day that the USS Cole, 9/11, and I know 
we are all deeply committed to ensuring that we do right by 
that. The United States needs the capability to deal with----
    Senator Manchin. How many new prisoners have you brought 
into Guantanamo this last year? How many new prisoners have you 
brought to Guantanamo?
    Admiral Faller. Sir, we have currently 40 and that number 
has remained steady.
    Senator Manchin. So we have not put any more there.
    Admiral Faller. We are not increasing it.
    Senator Manchin. We are not increasing at all. Where are we 
putting them, our combatants? When we capture these combatants, 
where do we put them?
    Admiral Faller. The detainees that are being taken off the 
battlefield in other areas are being dealt with by separate 
different----
    Senator Manchin. It is not $13 million a person you do not 
think. Do you?
    Admiral Faller. I do not know the cost in other areas, sir.
    Senator Manchin. I am sorry, sir, on that.
    General Townsend, if I can go to you. Just give me a 
comparison of basically of where we are. Troop-wise I think we 
are up to 80,000 in the Middle East. Deployment--we are up to 
80,000.
    General Townsend. I do not know the exact number.
    Senator Manchin. Okay. In AFRICOM, where are you in 
AFRICOM?
    General Townsend. Today on the continent we have about 
5,100 U.S. servicemembers and about 1,000 DOD civilians and 
contractors.
    Senator Manchin. We can say it is quite disproportionate. 
Right? There is a difference. Extreme organizations, Boko 
Haram, al Shabaab, al Qaeda, and many more. Basically the 
amount of manpower you have dealing with the influence of China 
now, you have got your hands full there and it looks like we 
are spread pretty darned thin not being able to stop this in 
Africa with what we see coming because it is not getting any 
less intense there and less violent and less threat to the 
United States of America, but most of everything we have is 
going towards the Middle East and also on fighting the drugs 
that are coming to this country, money going for different 
things besides the front line of defense so far as stopping the 
drugs coming into our country. Are you being hampered by the 
amount of resources you are able to call on?
    General Townsend. Senator, as I mentioned previously, I 
think that the tasks we are given today--we are adequately 
resourced with the exception of ISR. I think that the defense-
wide review that all of the combatant commands are 
participating----
    Senator Manchin. So in order to do the mission, you think 
at 5,100-plus you are in good shape.
    General Townsend. To do the tasks that we are assigned 
today. That is right, and I think the defense-wide review will 
potentially decrease the tasks that we have to do.
    Senator Manchin. You think the tasks will change? It is 
very mobile what is happening----
    General Townsend. The tasks we are assigned will change.
    Senator Manchin. Yes, and by that, it could change as far 
as the demand on resources. Right? Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Perdue?
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for your career and for your willingness to 
hang in there and take up these responsibilities.
    As I see it, the world right now has four naval pinch 
points. You guys own two of them, the Suez Canal and Panama 
Canal. The Malaccan Strait I would argue is one and now the 
South China Sea.
    Let us talk about the Suez for just a minute. If you look 
at what Russia has done in Syria with Latakia and Tortus and 
now what they are talking about in Berbera down near Djibouti 
where we have a base and now the Chinese have a base there, it 
is pretty obvious that Russia is increasing their operational 
tempo in Africa.
    General, tell me a little bit because one of the things I 
worry about most--I have been listening to this stuff for a 
while here, and the thing that I see beginning to develop is 
the opportunity that Russia and China join together in an area 
where we are under-deployed and it creates a real strategic 
challenge for us. Russia and China are members of the Shanghai 
Cooperative Organization, along with India and Pakistan, four 
nuclear powers. But Africa is one of the few places where I can 
see, other than the Arctic, that they have the potential to 
really come together and create a real headache for us.
    Would you share what Russia is doing in your AOR and how we 
should be thinking about it as we look toward the NDAA this 
next year?
    General Townsend. Yes, Senator.
    So we provided some handouts there----
    Senator Perdue. They are very helpful.
    General Townsend.--to kind of lay out graphically what 
Russia is doing, and you can see it is quite a bit.
    Senator Perdue. Yes, sir. Dramatically increased would you 
not say over the last 3 years?
    General Townsend. They have.
    I think Russia's goals are predominantly for their benefit 
for resource extraction. They also want to position 
particularly in northern Africa, particularly in Libya. They 
want a position on NATO's southern flank there. They also I 
think want to thwart what we are trying to do and present 
themselves as a great power alternative to the United States.
    What I see them doing with China, though, we are not really 
seeing a great level of cooperation with one recent exception. 
There was an exercise a couple of months ago in South Africa 
called Exercise Mosi where the South Africans, the Russians, 
and Chinese navies conducted an exercise on the very southern 
tip of the continent. That is the first visible sign of 
cooperation that we have seen. We are not seeing that in a 
great measure, but they are all over the continent and they are 
doing mostly resource extraction.
    Senator Perdue. One of the things we do not talk about 
here--and it is a follow-up real quick, and I need to get to 
Admiral Faller about South America with a couple of questions. 
But what are our NATO allies doing in Africa to help us stand 
up to the requirements that we are trying to fulfill in your 
AOR?
    General Townsend. Senator, as you are aware, NATO itself is 
not greatly active, but----
    Senator Perdue. I should have said the members of NATO.
    General Townsend. Members of NATO are very involved. In 
fact, in West Africa, we are a tertiary supporter of the 
French, buttressed by several other European countries there. 
In East Africa in Somalia, it is the European Union that is 
keeping the AMISOM [African Union Mission to Somalia] forces in 
the field by paying for their sustainment in the field. So the 
European partners are doing quite a bit. I believe there is 
room for them to do more, and I think our government has 
recently called on the Europeans to do more. So has France by 
the way.
    Senator Perdue. I am really concerned. Your charts are 
great. $145 billion already invested in Africa and a plan to 
get to $250 billion in South America within the next 5 years by 
China alone. I think these numbers are correct. We put in $8 
billion of aid into something called Power Africa, and I am 
making a point with this. We attracted something like $46 
billion of foreign direct investment to back that up. So we 
have employed over $50 billion with only $8 billion of our seed 
money in there. Leverage is a big part of this with our allies, 
and we have got to continue to do that, and you guys are right 
in the middle of that.
    Admiral, with regard to South America, 56 ports they have 
already invested in. I am worried about two things right now 
directly. In Argentina, the Georgia National Guard is a partner 
down there, and you in our meeting yesterday talked about this 
a little bit. But tell us a little bit about China's PLA 
[People's Liberation Army] managing that space station in 
Argentina, and then secondarily, what does the up-tempo mean in 
the Panama Canal Zone that China has really undertaken just in 
the last--since you have taken over in that AOR?
    Admiral Faller. As you state, beyond economic, China seeks 
to take their soft aims and turn them into hard power targets, 
and it is in space. It is in cyber. It is in port access. It is 
in access--generally, they signed into the previous Panama 
administration some 40 agreements for access, influence, 
including IT in Panama. Fortunately for us, the current team in 
Panama, the administration there, has changed policy and has 
recognized the threat that that could have on their 
sovereignty.
    We look up into the Caribbean. In one Caribbean nation, 
China has built a road across the country, 1,200 acres of 
access granted for Chinese use. The equipment was brought in 
under dubious circumstances. They parked it right next to the 
embassy so we could be reminded of that, and now they get to 
collect the tolls for 50 years on that road.
    Those are just three quick examples of what we see with 
Chinese influence.
    I pivot and look into Venezuela where China, Russia, Cuba 
working alongside each other to block the forces and voices of 
democracy particularly in cyber.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Jones?
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, General and Admiral, for being here. I apologize 
for being late. Demands on our time these days are a little bit 
overwhelming.
    General Townsend, first let me just say that I join my 
colleagues in sending condolences to you and the families of 
those killed and injured in the attack on Manda Bay. I 
especially want to point out and send our condolences to the 
family of Army Specialist Mitch Mayfield who was a valued 
soldier in the 1st battalion of the 58th Aviation Regiment out 
of Fort Rucker, Alabama. It is an amazing group down there, and 
he was certainly part of that amazing group.
    Admiral, I want to go back to something that I think you 
may have touched on briefly with Senator Shaheen concerning the 
USS Detroit and the littoral combat ships (LCSs) that are being 
used around. That ship was not made in Alabama, but we have a 
lot of the LCSs made down at Austal down in Mobile that are 
employed around the world. I would like, if you could, tell me 
a little bit more about how the LCS has been helpful in the 
operations in your area. Is it possible to use or would you 
want additional LCSs or other vessels like the EPF 
[Expeditionary Fast Transport] to help in your area of 
expertise?
    Admiral Faller. So our counternarcotics mission demands 
platforms for end game work and with law enforcement to take 
both the detainees we gain intel from and the drugs off the 
streets here in the United States Detroit has had success in 
that endeavor. They have an unmanned aerial vehicle Fire Scout 
embarked along with a helicopter. That is a great force 
package.
    We have also used the Detroit in a freedom of navigation 
operation off the coast of Venezuela in waters that Venezuela 
claims that international law does not recognize. Detroit did a 
magnificent job sailing close to the coast of Venezuela and 
providing that intelligence and reporting back to us.
    So the ships are multi-mission. The ships are capable. 
Unfortunately, we had a rocky start. I think the kinks are 
being worked out. The Detroit's performance since November has 
been above standards in all manners of reliability, and we 
welcome the deployment of the next littoral combat ship to the 
region. We could use more of these ships. They are well suited 
for the kind of missions in this hemisphere.
    Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you very much.
    As a former U.S. attorney, I am acutely aware of the drug 
problem that we have in this country and the importation of 
drugs, and I would like to do all we can. I have been concerned 
about the administration's diverting of some resources to what 
I think would be more appropriate for interdiction. But that is 
for another case, another discussion.
    I believe Senator Kaine mentioned an American reassurance 
initiative, and I want to give you a chance to talk about that 
a little bit more, Admiral. There has been discussion for years 
about developing a western hemisphere security initiative, but 
so far we have just not been able to get it down.
    Can you tell us what the status of those conversations is 
and what impact that may or may not have on the future in your 
area?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, proximity matters, and this is our 
neighborhood. When you can fly to Central America shorter 
flights than Washington, DC from Miami, it is telling of how 
closely connected we are, and there have been doctrines over 
the years. We had the Good Neighbor Policy for FDR [Franklin D. 
Roosevelt]. We have had the Monroe Doctrine. I think there has 
been discussion by others, the think tanks, and Senator Kaine 
has mentioned it. I think there might be a big idea for this 
hemisphere where we pull together the whole-of-government 
efforts necessary to recognize that these interior lines, in 
military speak, this neighborhood matters. China and Russia 
certainly recognize that.
    To the extent that it takes resources, some of that 
resources is just our time and attention, and a little goes a 
long way. If it was a stock, it would have a great P/E [price-
earnings] ratio and you would want to invest in it for the 
future, and the investments we have made are sound. I think we 
need to stay the course and look to where we can smartly 
increase and focus those investments. A big idea associated 
with something like, as you mentioned, a western hemisphere 
initiative might be a great way to start.
    Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you, sir.
    Now, I would like to encourage you to stay in touch with my 
office about it. We are right there in Alabama, right there on 
the Gulf of Mexico. So it is closer to us than a lot of folks. 
My office is more than willing to help initiate those 
discussions or help develop those. So stay in touch and let us 
know.
    So thank you very much to both of you for your service and 
for being here today.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral, General, thank you for your service. Thank you for 
being here today.
    Admiral, let me start with you. My State of Missouri has 
been deeply affected by the drugs coming into this country from 
Latin America. Your testimony has provided examples of certain 
Latin American countries who are stepping up their effort on 
the counternarcotics front.
    I am interested in who is maybe not pulling their weight. 
Can you give us some examples of places where countries could 
be doing more but are not doing so, have refused to do so, 
whether that is the result of corruption or other reasons?
    Admiral Faller. These transnational criminal 
organizations--$90 billion they took in last year to fuel 
instability across the region. They have ungoverned territory 
in countries across the region, and that bridges over into the 
NORTHCOM AOR. It is something we look at to the extent we 
influence and leverage and put pressure on our partners to do 
more.
    Unfortunately, the worst offender of the whole lot is not a 
country that we can cooperate with right now, and that is 
Venezuela. We look at Venezuela where the Maduro regime is 
being propped up by Cuba, Russia, and China and we see the 
narcotrafficking that has increased substantially in the air 
and over land from Colombia into Venezuela. Then it becomes 
extremely difficult to track as it leaves in commercial 
privatized shipping, private airplanes, and so we look at 
countries stepping up, and I think the international effort on 
pressure on Maduro and that illegitimate regime is a focus area 
where we can do more.
    Within the Central American countries, I would call out 
Panama, the relationship the Missouri Guard has with them. They 
have stepped up. Costa Rica has stepped up. You have got 
another blight of no democracy in Nicaragua which is another 
problem site. El Salvador has done more. Guatemala has done 
more. Some others can do more. They are working on it, but 
there is certainly more effect that we can have from some of 
our partners.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much. That is very helpful.
    General, let me turn to you. Secretary Esper has called on 
our European allies to do more in the Sahel, and he has said 
recently that additional contributions by European allies--I am 
quoting him here--could offset whatever changes we make as we 
consider next steps in Africa.
    I am wondering if you agree with that first, and then I am 
going to ask you to elaborate. But do you agree with that 
statement from the Secretary?
    General Townsend. I do agree with the statement that 
European contributions could in many ways offset what we are 
doing there.
    Senator Hawley. Could you give us just on that point, 
General, some specific examples of ways that you think our NATO 
allies could contribute more in the Sahel than they currently 
are doing?
    General Townsend. Well, sure. The French have called on 
their European neighbors to contribute more forces to the 
effort there trying to directly confront the violent extremist 
groups there in the Sahel, specifically Mali and Niger, Burkina 
Faso. I think that is something they can do and should do.
    Also, we are providing some support that European countries 
have, specifically NATO allies, a capacity to do. Airlift is 
one thing we are supporting the French forces with. Air 
refueling for French fighter aircraft is another thing. These 
are capacities that are resident in many European countries 
that they could provide. I think our Department is going to 
lead an effort to try to get some European partners to do some 
of those things and offset the support we are providing right 
now.
    I think they do not have the capacity to do some of the 
more technical types of support. We do some technical 
intelligence type of support that is fairly exquisite, and 
there are not a lot of countries that can do that at that same 
level. But they can mitigate a lot of the support that we 
provide.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
    General, let me ask you about China. I am very concerned by 
the PLA's presence in Djibouti. Do you worry that the PLA could 
use its forces there to contest our ability to transit the Bab 
al Mandeb or adjacent waterways in a future crisis?
    General Townsend. On a daily basis, I do not worry a great 
deal about the Chinese presence in Djibouti at their base, but 
the potential is there. So we keep an eye on it. We are not 
blind to that. But there is a potential there in some future 
crisis that they could potentially use that base there to cause 
problems.
    Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you, in your assessment 
what should we be doing now to assure our access to that 
maritime chokepoint in a future scenario?
    General Townsend. I think we are doing that to a great 
extent and that is competing, making sure that those countries 
that are there, Djibouti being one of them, Somalia being 
another one--those countries prefer the United States as a 
strategic partner. I am not saying that they should not 
interact with China or Russia at all, but what I want is at 2 
o'clock in the morning when the Secretary of State calls a head 
of state in Africa and says America needs to come in tonight, 
they yes to us and they do not say yes to the Chinese or the 
Russians.
    Senator Hawley. My time has expired.
    Admiral, I want to ask you a few questions about the 
Chinese activity in your AOR. I will submit those for the 
record.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Gillibrand?
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Townsend, General Esmail Qaani, who assumed the 
position as the head of Iran's Qods Force after Soleimani's 
killing, has vowed to strike back at the United States and 
called on Hezbollah to exact further revenge. The Voice of 
America reported earlier this month that Iran may seek to 
strike back in Africa, citing the rise of Iranian military 
influence on the continent and the potential of softer targets.
    What have you been doing to ensure the safety of our 
servicemembers and American citizens in Africa? Second, how 
have plans to reduce United States Forces in Africa accounted 
for the possible increase in future terrorist activity? How 
well equipped and trained are local forces in Africa?
    General Townsend. Senator, to your first question, we are 
following those reports. There is intelligence reporting that 
comports with that. Both the Qods Force and Lebanese Hezbollah 
I think are looking for opportunities to strike back at America 
wherever, and we think one of those places is certainly Africa. 
We are watching and listening carefully for that. We are not 
taking any specific measures yet. We do not really have a good 
enough picture to take actions, but we are watching and 
listening for that.
    Then on your second question, the quality of African 
security forces varies widely depending on where we are talking 
about in Africa. Some are exceptionally good and others are not 
so good, and the partners that we work with--we are trying to 
get them all to a level where they can at least be self-
sufficient would be the ideal, if they could handle their own 
security threats on their own.
    Senator Gillibrand. I took a CODEL [congressional 
delegation] a few years ago and we did stop in Chad to assess 
our support and how well they were doing to support Nigeria. Do 
you have any thoughts about how that relationship is 
developing? Is it moving forward or has it retreated?
    General Townsend. I think that relationship is pretty 
sound. There is a multinational joint task force that operates 
there. All of those countries around the Lake Chad basin are 
operating there. Chad has recently redeployed some forces from 
Nigeria, but that was part of a scheduled move, not some sort 
of breakdown in the relationship or the partnership there in 
the joint task force. So I think that that group is 
functioning.
    Senator Gillibrand. Okay.
    Earlier this month, the al Shabaab launch an attack on 
Manda airfield, killing an American servicemember and two 
contractors. The New York Times reported that al Shabaab used 
the attacks as a message to African forces that American troops 
would abandon them just as they did with the Syrian Kurds. At 
the same time, an African Center for Strategic Studies report 
stated that the activity of Africa's extremist groups has 
doubled since 2013.
    How has the decision to withdraw support from Syria 
impacted the resolve and trust of our African partners?
    General Townsend. I do not know that our decision to 
withdraw from Syria has affected their calculus. That has not 
come up in any discussions I have had with African leaders. But 
the thing that they are always looking for is can we count on 
you as a partner. But I have not heard that they are looking 
towards our withdrawal from Syria as some indication.
    Senator Gillibrand. Do you have any plans at this point or 
any strategies to reduce our forces in Africa? What do you 
think the impact of those reductions could be on our 
counterterrorism efforts?
    General Townsend. We are engaged in this blank slate review 
process with the Department of Defense, and I think that is a 
necessary and a good process to do to make sure that our 
resources are always pointed at our highest priorities. We have 
made some presentations and recommendations to the Secretary of 
Defense. He is still in a decision cycle, and I do not want to 
get in front of his decision about what may happen with our 
troop presence on the continent.
    I will say that there are threats to America that will 
emanate from the African continent, both global power and great 
power threats, as well as violent extremist organizations.
    Senator Gillibrand. A quick question in my remaining time 
on China. Both China and Russia have been making large economic 
investments in both Africa and Latin America in order to expand 
their influence around the globe. When we were in Africa, they 
were investing in Djibouti and doing a huge investment in the 
airfield there. This is yet another example of how the battle 
for world leadership in this century cannot be fought by just 
spending more money on weapons. Instead, we have to learn 
lessons from the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and build 
lasting relationships and partnerships.
    What role do your COCOMs play in any whole-of-government 
coordination aimed at aligning all of our levers of power 
towards a common goal in your respective AORs?
    Admiral Faller. What you cited about China and Russia is so 
key, Senator. We are seeing it in Cuba, 90 miles from Key West 
where China and Russia are working alongside certainly not for 
United States national interests or for any partnerships in the 
hemisphere.
    But our partnerships, our mil-to-mil partnerships, are key, 
and working with our partners to build strong institutions. It 
is these institutions that do the right thing and have trust 
and respect the rule of law and human rights. We have a human 
rights office in SOUTHCOM that we staff to work on these sorts 
of things that are part of professionalism and part of trust 
building.
    General Townsend. Senator, I would just say our level of 
resourcing is such that if we want to get anything done for 
America on the African continent, we have to do it as a whole-
of-government working with the Department of State and USAID. 
That is just in our DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] at AFRICOM how 
we operate every day.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cotton?
    Senator Cotton. I want to talk about the biggest and the 
most important story in the world, the Wuhan coronavirus. This 
coronavirus is a catastrophe on the scale of Chernobyl for 
China, but actually it is probably worse than Chernobyl which 
was localized in its effect. The coronavirus could result in a 
global pandemic.
    While you were all sleeping overnight, the number of 
diagnosed cases in China increased by 30 percent. Let me be 
clear. That is not new cases. That is just newly admitted 
cases. It is probably several orders of magnitude higher than 
that.
    Also while you were sleeping, China now has its entire 
border with Russia closed, 2,600 miles. Russia has closed that 
border. El Al has shut down travel between Israel and China. 
Air France has shut down travel between China and France, and 
that is in addition to all the other countries that have 
already shut down travel.
    From what we know so far--and there are still many 
unknowns--this virus could have both a long incubation period, 
as much as 14 days, and individuals could be contagious while 
asymptomatic, which was not the case with SARS [severe acute 
respiratory syndrome] in 2003.
    Furthermore, from some cases, it appears that the virus 
could be aerosolized, which means it does not require the kind 
of contact that you have with, say, a married couple kissing 
each other or a family living in close quarters in a hotel or 
apartment, but rather the distances we are all sitting apart 
right now.
    Yet, China is still lying about all of this. They have been 
lying about it from the very beginning, and you do not need 
their history of lying about SARS in 2003, though it is 
relevant here. You just have to see what has happened over the 
last 2 months. We now know that the first case manifested no 
later than December 1, even though China did not reveal it to 
the WHO [World Health Organization] until a month later on 
December 31st when they continued to hide it from their own 
citizens and they continued to say that it had been contained 
inside Wuhan. Today it is in every single province in China.
    They also claimed for almost 2 months until earlier this 
week that it had originated in a seafood market in Wuhan, that 
locals had contracted it from animals in, say, bat soup or 
snake tartare. That is not the case.
    The Lancet published a study last weekend demonstrating 
that of the original 40 cases, 14 of them had no contact with 
the seafood market, including patient zero. As one 
epidemiologist said, that virus went into the seafood market 
before it came out of the seafood market.
    We still do not know where it originated. It could have 
been another seafood market. It could have been a farm. It 
could have been a food processing company.
    I would note that Wuhan also has China's only biosafety 
level 4 super laboratory that works with the world's most 
deadly pathogens to include, yes, coronavirus.
    Now, look at China's own actions. They have quarantined 60 
million people--60 million--more than the entire population of 
our west coast. They have shut down schools indefinitely. 
Classes canceled nationwide indefinitely. Hong Kong, a part of 
China, has basically shut down all travel from the mainland.
    That is why it is essential that we immediately stop all 
travel on commercial aircraft between China and the United 
States, making exceptions, of course, for American citizens to 
come back as we just brought back yesterday, allowing a central 
trade to flow as long as crews on ships and aircraft are not 
allowed to go into the general population in America, and 
making exceptions, of course, for medical personnel to go into 
China to try to get a handle on this. It is essential that we 
take those steps and essential that we get to the bottom of 
China's deceit and incompetence on this measure.
    Gentlemen, I raise this with you because you are 
responsible in your combatant commands for some countries that 
have the most fragile public institutions, to include the most 
fragile public health institutions, in the world. So I ask, 
even though as of this morning there are not yet confirmed 
cases of coronavirus in your combatant commands, though I 
suspect there will be soon, what is your assessment about the 
ability of the governments in your combatant commands to handle 
a potential global pandemic like this. General Townsend?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Senator.
    There are not, that I am aware of, any confirmed cases as 
you mentioned, but there are some suspected cases. The first 
report of a suspected case I heard of is in Djibouti, which you 
would imagine with the significant Chinese presence there.
    The capacity of African nations to deal with this problem 
varies widely. For example, in eastern Africa, central east 
Africa, they have been dealing with Ebola and they have been 
dealing with Ebola largely on their own and doing a pretty good 
job of it. So I think capacity there, but anywhere else in 
Africa is probably not to that degree.
    Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller?
    Admiral Faller. The Venezuela crisis has already strained 
the social services of many of the nations. As you are aware, 
Senator, we had deployed the hospital ship Comfort twice in 1 
year to 12 different nations. In one 5-day span, it can do the 
equivalent of a whole month for a region of some of the major 
countries. So I would be extremely concerned. Like General 
Townsend, the capacities vary widely, but in many cases they 
are strained and to the limit. I would be very concerned if we 
saw this spread.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    As a defensive measure, I would just say again it is 
essential that we shut down all commercial air travel 
immediately between the United States and China. As an 
offensive measure, because that probably will not stop it 
entirely and because if it becomes a global pandemic, we have 
to deal with countries with very limited capabilities here, we 
need a Manhattan Project level effort to work with our best 
research scientists and laboratories in this country to develop 
a vaccine as quickly as possible.
    [Whereupon, at 10:51 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                 united states africa command (africom)
    1. Senator Inhofe. General Townsend, as of November 2019, the 
Nigerian Air Base 201 is in service to support intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, yet press reports 
have said the Administration is considering drawing down our presence 
in Africa. What is the right balance of ISR assets throughout the 
region to address rising violent extremism as well as great power 
competition?
    General Townsend. While different types of intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are better-suited for these two 
problem-sets, we are now evaluating what the right balance should look 
like through the Combatant Command Review process. In short, AFRICOM 
does not have sufficient ISR to accomplish our currently assigned tasks 
with an appropriate balance of effectiveness and risk.

    2. Senator Inhofe. General Townsend, due to the growing complexity 
of global priorities, demand for ISR capacity is stretched to its 
limits. How can we work with allies to collaborate on ISR priorities in 
Africa?
    General Townsend. We continually collaborate with partners to 
synchronize each of our independent ISR capabilities and capacities to 
maximize our combined collection efforts for our common strategic goals 
through formal and informal engagements. European partners can and 
should do more especially in West Africa.

    3. Senator Inhofe. General Townsend, France has been a critical 
partner in addressing violent extremism across the Sahel--deploying MQ-
9s as well as ground troops. In light of recent reports that the 
Administration is considering a drawdown of deployed troops, how can we 
marshal additional international support, including those countries 
that currently operate U.S. unmanned systems, to support our objectives 
in the region?
    General Townsend. Through our bilateral relationships as well as 
multinational forums, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the European Union, and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) we continue to advocate for increased 
European support to French led operations in the region. European 
partners can and should do more especially in West Africa.

    4. Senator Inhofe. General Townsend, given the amount of engagement 
by China and Russia in Africa, what is the risk to the National Defense 
Strategy and great power competition if we withdraw some forces?
    General Townsend. USAFRICOM's Campaign Plan nests within the NSS 
and NDS; stressing the great power competition challenges faced on the 
continent. China and Russia continue to challenge the United States 
power and influence in Africa. Russia continuously attempts to 
marginalize United States efforts in countries with Russian interests. 
China challenges United States efforts across the continent with their 
One Belt, One Road Initiative; providing infrastructure and high 
interest loans. If we withdraw additional forces in Africa, China and 
Russia will likely fill the vacuum.
               united states southern command (southcom)
    5. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Faller, as the region currently competes 
for a limited number of ISR assets, what is SOUTHCOM's vision for 
expanding U.S. ISR operations to ensure adequate surveillance of 
illicit trafficking routes and counter global and regional threats?
    Admiral Faller. We are always looking for innovative solutions to 
mitigate ISR shortfalls in this region. We are investing in contractor 
owned and operated vessels, government owned and contractor operated 
platforms, unmanned aircraft systems, and open source means to fill the 
ISR requirements for our counterdrug mission and to counter global and 
regional threats. With Congress' support we have been able to work with 
the Department of Defense's Counternarcotics policy office and U.S. Air 
Force to purchase commercial aircraft that can increase our 
surveillance capability against top threats in the region. Also with 
the support of Congress, we are leasing a multi-mission support vessel 
that is currently supporting counter drug detection and monitoring 
efforts. The vessel has an air surveillance radar, an unmanned aircraft 
system, and expanded partner nation command and control capability. 
Regional partners are leading interdiction efforts with the vessel by 
embarking their personnel and equipment.
    We are also developing a concept to deploy unmanned aerial systems, 
for ourselves, as well as for our partner nations that would increase 
our regional domain awareness. Other areas in which innovation is 
advancing awareness are the cyber and social media domain. We are 
exploring avenues to increase our capability to leverage and exploit 
publicly available information and open sources. The capability, if 
appropriately funded, will provide near-persistent and organic ISR for 
this AOR within the open source domain.

    6. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Faller, what is SOUTHCOM's future plan 
to equip allies and partners with unmanned ISR systems in order to 
provide more thorough situational awareness of regional threats?
    Admiral Faller. Partner nations throughout the region have 
expressed interest in acquiring unmanned ISR systems to improve domain 
awareness of their sovereign borders, as well as to detect and defend 
against transnational threats. Brazil has purchased an unmanned aerial 
system (UAS), and they plan to purchase more in the future. We are 
incorporating these types of systems into our strategic and theater 
plans, and building these purchases into our long-term security 
cooperation and foreign assistance plans. USSOUTHCOM complements those 
foreign assistance programs by supporting key partners like Colombia 
and Brazil acquiring and/or researching modernization programs for 
significant UAS systems such as the MQ-9 Reaper, Scan Eagle, and 
potentially Blackjack. We develop security assistance programs to 
support partner nations with smaller UAS requirements to support 
counter narcotics and border security--once partner nations have this 
capability it will improve our collective awareness of transnational 
threats in the region and allow us to counter those threats 
collectively as well. To date, Brazil has used its own funds to 
purchase Scan Eagle; Colombia has used a combination of 
counternarcotics, section 333, and FMF to acquire Scan Eagle and hand 
launched UAS like PUMA; and Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have 
acquired Raven and Puma UAS with section 333 funds.

    7. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Faller, how would you describe the role 
of unmanned systems for use in future missions of disaster relief and 
humanitarian aid?
    Admiral Faller. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have been deployed by 
several organizations in support of Humanitarian Assistance missions, 
including other Combatant Commands, non-governmental organizations, and 
State and local governments with great success. We have informally 
experimented with UASs during some humanitarian response efforts 
previously. UAS technologies enabled situational awareness for a 
continuum of response options to optimize minimal resources and maximum 
effect, saving lives and speeding recovery times.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                            border security
    8. Senator Tillis. Admiral Faller, what impact have the additional 
15,000 Mexican troops on the United States border and the additional 
Mexican Guard troops on Mexico's southern border made to the border 
security effort?
    Admiral Faller. Having a layered defense is the best approach to 
border security. At SOUTHCOM, we work with our partners in Central 
America to improve their regional security and border security efforts 
before threats reach the Mexican border. However, the Department of 
State is best capable to address this issue. The Government of Mexico 
does not coordinate migration issues with the Department of Defense.

    9. Senator Tillis. Admiral Faller, have these additional troops 
stemmed the flow of illegal immigration through Mexico and into the 
United States?
    Admiral Faller. I would defer to NORTHCOM for specific migration 
information associated with Mexican troop deployments.

    10. Senator Tillis. Admiral Faller, what, if anything, have the 
Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador 
done to prevent people from fleeing north?
    Admiral Faller. Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have made 
great advances in helping stop migrants headed toward our southwest 
border. On Jan. 15, 2020, a migrant caravan originated in San Pedro 
Sula, Honduras. Because of enforcement actions by Mexico, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador, the caravan never arrived at our southwest 
border. Their actions included apprehensions, repatriations, increased 
border security, and arrests of organizers and facilitators. That is 
just one example showing how these countries are working on this 
problem set together.
    Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador also continue biometrically 
enrolling caravan migrants. Guatemala was the first country in the 
region to sign an Asylum Cooperation Agreement with the United States 
in July of 2019. This agreement allows the transfer of third-country 
nationals from El Salvador and Honduras who are seeking asylum or other 
forms of protection in the United States to apply for asylum in 
Guatemala in order to prevent abuse of the asylum process and removes 
key incentives for attempting to illegally enter the United States 
Guatemala has been receiving ACA transferees since November 21, 2019.
    Ultimately, these countries will need to focus on citizen security 
so that their populations feel safe, and economic development so that 
the people have hope for a better life. USSOUTHCOM works with our 
partner militaries in the region to help train and equip them to better 
secure their nations, largely through security cooperation programs 
like 333 and joint, combine exercises--two programs at risk of 
sustaining cuts in fiscal year 2021.

    11. Senator Tillis. Admiral Faller, have there been any specific 
military-related cooperation efforts in this area between United States 
Southern Command and the Northern Triangle countries?
    Admiral Faller. Through our security cooperation efforts, we have 
trained and equipped various military units, to include partner nation 
air forces, armies, and navies, to perform border and maritime security 
functions and protect their own sovereign territory. USSOUTHCOM relies 
heavily on section 333 building partner capacity authorities to build 
and improve partner nation capabilities to counter shared threats that 
directly impact the security of the homeland. Further, our security 
cooperation programs are rooted in the fundamental respect for 
universal human rights and emphasize the importance of civilian control 
of the military. Through our Defense Institution Building programs, we 
strengthen the Ministries of Defense to assist partners implement 
policies and processes that allow for more informed decision-making, 
and align scarce defense resources with mission priorities to address 
national and regional security issues. This elevates the holistic 
output of our programs, ensuring our partner nations can similarly 
apply a whole-of-government approach to guarantee citizen security. We 
also share intelligence on transnational criminal organizations that 
threaten our shared interests, which in turn helps these partners 
develop their organic capabilities to identify and disrupt key criminal 
groups involved in the movement of drugs and people to our Homeland. 
Additionally, our civil affairs personnel work alongside other U.S. 
agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations and host nation 
agencies to mitigate facets of instability within the Northern 
Triangle. This improves host nation responsiveness to its population by 
addressing civil vulnerabilities in order to reduce the causes of 
migration and support capacity to conduct civil-military operations.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martha McSally
                        counter-drug operations
    12. Senator McSally. Admiral Faller, last year you discussed the 
Cartels' use of submersibles, naval tracks going further out to sea, 
and remote air fields to facilitate the flow of drugs. Please provide 
an update on the latest tactics that the drug cartels are using and how 
we're countering them.
    Admiral Faller. Drug traffickers continuously adjust their tactics 
to improve their concealment techniques, and have been moving toward 
secure communication devices and applications to coordinate drug 
shipments. They smuggle cocaine primarily via noncommercial maritime 
movements, using go-fast vessels, fishing boats, and low profile 
vessels that originate from Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. We are 
seeing an increase in illicit air traffic from Venezuela, indicating 
traffickers are increasingly using the permissive environment under the 
Maduro regime to move drugs toward the United States. The volume of 
known aerial drug flow from Venezuela in 2019 was about 11 percent 
higher than in 2018 and 94 percent higher than in 2015. Additionally, 
traffickers are now using larger, faster aircraft to more quickly move 
greater quantities of drugs while reducing their risk of interdiction. 
For example, at least 10 of the 55 aircraft identified by Guatemalan 
authorities in 2019 as involved in cocaine trafficking were jets 
designed to move small groups of people.
    In addition to traditional air and maritime movements, drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs) will continue to exploit the use of 
maritime container shipments to transport narcotics. To combat these 
ever-changing tactics, we rely on Joint Interagency task Force-South 
(JIATF-S) as the action arm of SOUTHCOM in the counter-drug fight. 
JIATF-S has seamless integration between the intelligence and 
operations directorates. Additionally, JIATF-S has Tactical Analysis 
Team (TAT) positions in key source and destination countries to 
facilitate increased information sharing between JIATF-S, foreign 
partners, and law enforcement. JIATF-S is working with SOUTHCOM and 
regional partners to deploy new ground-based radars to increase real-
time information flow an improve security response times and accuracy. 
JIATF-S has also developed a specialized container targeting cell that 
works directly with the National Targeting Center to counter the 
increased use of container shipments. Resourcing is key to the fight.
                            human smuggling
    13. Senator McSally. Admiral Faller, criminal organizations in your 
area of responsibility have become more involved in migrant smuggling. 
In fiscal year 2019, United States authorities apprehended nearly 
608,000 unauthorized migrants from the Northern Triangle at the 
southwest border. Families or unaccompanied minors made up 81 percent 
of those apprehended, many of whom were seeking asylum. Please provide 
an explanation of SOUTHCOM's role in countering these criminal 
smuggling operations, protecting potential asylum seekers, and securing 
our borders.
    Admiral Faller. Effectively addressing issues such as criminal 
smuggling operations, protecting potential asylum seekers, and securing 
our borders requires SOUTHCOM to leverage our partnerships with the 
interagency community and to take a whole-of-government approach. A key 
partner in this area is the U.S. Department of State and State's Bureau 
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Together 
SOUTHCOM and the Department of State use a wide range of tools to 
counter crime, illegal drugs, and instability abroad, including foreign 
assistance, bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, and 
reporting, sanctions, and rewards. Specifically, SOUTHCOM leverages our 
partnerships and contacts with partner nations to help develop and 
implement the architecture necessary for international drug control and 
cross-border law enforcement cooperation. SOUTHCOM works in unison with 
INL and our partner nations, international and regional organizations, 
non-governmental organizations, U.S. Federal, State, and local criminal 
justice entities to achieve these goals. All of our programs are 
consistent with security and governance priorities of the United States 
Strategy for Engagement in Central America and the Central America 
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and complement efforts under the 
Central American Governments' Alliance for Prosperity.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
                     united states southern command
    14. Senator Scott. Admiral Faller, we have watched over the last 2 
years as Russia and Cuba continue to prop up dangerous dictators like 
Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. Can you tell me the current status of 
their presence in Venezuela?
    Admiral Faller. Russia maintains several hundred military and 
civilian personnel throughout Venezuela. These personnel enhance 
Venezuela's military readiness by repairing Russian-origin equipment, 
improving intelligence and surveillance capabilities, training 
personnel, and advising on cybersecurity and domestic security. In 2018 
and 2019, Moscow deployed two nuclear-capable Tu-160 Blackjack bombers 
to Venezuela to demonstrate their support for the Maduro regime. 
Additionally, Russia has investments and joint ventures in the 
extraction of natural resources throughout the country.
    Havana's security and economic partnership with Caracas remains 
very strong. Cuba continues to provide to the Maduro regime an 
estimated 20,000 to 25,000 trainers, advisors, doctors, personal 
security forces, and intelligence agents who enable the regime's 
control and oppression of the Venezuelan people. Caracas, in exchange, 
helps fulfill Cuba's oil needs, as Havana remains heavily dependent on 
Caracas for energy.

    15. Senator Scott. Admiral Faller, do Russia and Cuba have plans 
beyond simply keeping Maduro in power?
    Admiral Faller. Moscow's and Havana's goals in Venezuela extend 
beyond keeping Maduro in power. Russia views a partnership with 
Venezuela as a key geostrategic objective. Russia hopes to extract oil 
through several joint ventures, and profit as an intermediary for 
Caracas' oil sales. Venezuela still owes $800 million to Russian oil 
firms, down from $2.3 billion in early 2019, as well as approximately 
$3 billion to the Russian Government. A close relationship with 
Maduro's regime also allows Moscow to deepen its security footprint, 
project power, and collect intelligence out of Venezuela, challenging 
United States interests in our near abroad. Moscow may also seek to 
expand its presence in the region beyond Venezuela, through other 
authoritarian regimes such as Nicaragua. Russia likely intends to 
maintain a lasting presence in Venezuela to support its economic 
interests and disrupt United States objectives.
    Cuba sympathizes ideologically with Maduro's regime and also seeks 
to keep Caracas as an economic lifeline. Cuba is heavily dependent on 
external support for vital resources, in particular oil from Venezuela. 
Cuba refines Venezuelan crude for its own use and for resale, bringing 
in needed foreign currency.

    16. Senator Scott. Admiral Faller, what is Communist China's role 
in Venezuela?
    Admiral Faller. Beijing provides economic and security support to 
Maduro's regime. China is Venezuela's largest creditor, with Venezuela 
facing $20 billion in debt. Beijing seeks to maintain a close 
relationship with Caracas in part to ensure payment of this debt 
through oil deliveries. Chinese state-owned enterprises have provided 
significant loans for infrastructure support, including improving 
Venezuela's 4G and 5G networks. Some of this support directly supports 
Maduro's repressive apparatus. For example, the assistance provided by 
Chinese state-owned firm ZTE enables the ``Carnet de la Patria'' 
system, tying food rations to political reliability. As of 2018, China 
had sold approximately $1 billion in military equipment to Venezuela, 
to include combat aircraft, light tanks, and other armored vehicles, 
and air search radars. Additionally, Beijing in 2019 provided to the 
Maduro regime 68 tons of humanitarian aid, mostly medical supplies.

    17. Senator Scott. Admiral Faller, what does Communist China want 
out of its support for Maduro?
    Admiral Faller. China remains deeply invested in Venezuela's 
natural resources, and wants to protect its investments and joint oil 
ventures. Chinese official foreign direct investment in Venezuela is 
over $3 billion, largely concentrated in the joint petroleum venture, 
Sinovensa, as well as in railroads, telecommunications, and mining. 
Beijing also wants to ensure Venezuela repays its $20 billion debt. The 
Chinese Government also tries to use its approach to Venezuela to 
portray itself as a responsible global power as opposed to foreign 
intervention in domestic disputes.
                      united states africa command
    18. Senator Scott. General Townsend, what are you seeing in Africa 
in terms of China's efforts to get control of strategic ports and 
industries?
    General Townsend. China is Africa's number one trading partner and 
is more reliant than any other nation on trade through the Red and 
Mediterranean Seas. Beijing seeks to secure its access to those trade 
routes and is aggressively pursuing military access to strategic ports 
in East and West Africa through infrastructure investments and securing 
port operator licenses. Beijing likely does not need full control over 
African nation's port facilities to achieve its goals for commercial 
and military access. These ports have political, commercial, military, 
and security objectives, therefore they need better networks of roads 
and rail lines that China has already started investing in.
    China invests in companies and infrastructure for natural resource 
extraction in African nations. The bulk of Africa's exports to China is 
raw materials. Though Beijing does not seek to directly control these 
industries, Chinese investments provides Beijing a platform to secure 
access to African industries and exert influence on African political 
and economic elites.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                 chinese investments near panama canal
    19. Senator Hawley. Admiral Faller, you wrote in your testimony 
that ``Chinese investment in deep-water ports and infrastructure on 
both sides of the Panama Canal could enable the [People's Liberation 
Army (PLA)] to threaten sea lanes vital to global commerce and the 
movement of United States Forces.'' Can you elaborate on this 
statement?
    Admiral Faller. Chinese companies, many with close ties to the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), manage ports on both sides of the Canal. 
While the Panama Canal Authority controls overall canal operations, 
Beijing could leverage its companies' access to the canal and 
associated critical infrastructure to slow or delay United States 
vessels' use of the canal during a crisis or during a political 
dispute. China leverages military modernization, influence operations, 
and predatory economics to coerce countries to its advantage and 
compete for influence.
        pla's ambitions in southcom area of responsibility (aor)
    20. Senator Hawley. Admiral Faller, how would you described the 
PLA's long-term ambitions in the SOUTHCOM AOR?
    Admiral Faller. China is competing with the United States for 
influence in the region and seeks to supplant the United States' 
standing as the region's partner of choice. Beijing's increasing 
economic engagement in the region over the past three decades is a 
deliberate strategy China has used in other regions to create favorable 
conditions for enhanced military-to-military cooperation, ranging from 
combined training to expanding deployments. The PLA is likely to:

    1.  Provide security along the growing number of trade routes 
associated with China's One Belt One Road Initiative, particularly 
against non-state actors, such as pirates;
    2.  Achieve Beijing's stated goal of building closer relationships 
with host government officials by providing military training modeled 
after the United States' International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) programs;
    3.  Engage in global humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
operations to gain recognition as a responsible and reliable 
international humanitarian aid provider;
    4.  Increase naval diplomacy, to include deployments of its 
hospital ship ANWEI, and pursue its long-term strategy to obtain naval 
bases overseas through construction, purchases, and long-term leases; 
and
    5.  Provide ``gifts'' of military equipment to foster closer 
security relations, follow-on foreign military sales, interoperability, 
and joint exercises and operations.
                   chinese activities in southcom aor
    21. Senator Hawley. Admiral Faller, China has been rapidly 
expanding its presence in Latin America. Can you describe the 
challenges posed by China's efforts, especially when it comes to port 
access and telecommunications infrastructure?
    Admiral Faller. Our main concern is that Chinese investment in deep 
water ports and infrastructure in the region could enable the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) to threaten sea-lanes vital to global commerce 
and the movement of United States Forces during a crisis. Beijing's 
focus on port development increases its global and regional economic 
access and supports its efforts to become Latin America's top trading 
partner. China is the top trading partner for five counties in the 
region and remains the regions second largest trading partner behind 
the United States. The Chinese Government will provide loans to develop 
ports and other critical infrastructure. When countries cannot pay back 
the loan, Beijing is not above taking ownership of the project, as we 
have seen in its handling of Sri Lanka's inability to pay for a port 
development loan. This enables Beijing to exercise economic pressure to 
resolve political or legal disputes.
    Chinese companies are the main telecommunications infrastructure 
provider for most countries in the region. These companies, such as 
Huawei and ZTE, are aggressively promoting 5G wireless networks and 
Safe City technology in Latin America and the Caribbean. Under Chinese 
law, Beijing can compel companies to share data with its security and 
intelligence services, including those companies doing business outside 
of China. Moreover, as National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien stated 
in February, we have evidence that Huawei has the capability secretly 
to access sensitive and personal information in systems it maintains 
and sells around the world. Adopting Chinese telecommunications 
technology could limit the United States' ability to share data with 
our partners because we would not be able to ensure the security/data 
integrity of these networks.
    Additionally, most of the precursor chemicals necessary to produce 
the illicit drugs that are trafficked to the United States originate 
from Chinese companies and are exported to ports in both the producing 
countries and in Central America.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                 libya
    22. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, what is AFRICOM's role in 
mitigating ongoing tensions in Libya, and what are the key United 
States strategic interests in resolving this conflict?
    General Townsend. USAFRICOM continues to support Ambassador Norland 
and the Department of State's Libya External Office efforts toward a 
diplomatic and political solution to the Libyan conflict. The United 
States has a strategic interest in a stable and prosperous Libya. An 
independent and secure Libya promotes economic growth and stability in 
the region.

    23. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, will the Trump 
Administration devote more military resources to supporting the Berlin 
agreement and supporting our military partners on the ground?
    General Townsend. The Department of Defense is currently directing 
a series of Combatant Command Reviews. AFRICOM is reviewing all of our 
military requirements and resources supporting the interagency and our 
African partners. We continue to emphasize military support to 
diplomacy and development engagement, which serves to consolidate 
military and other security gains.

    24. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, do you think that 
additional investment is helpful or necessary to support the Berlin 
agreement and support our military partners on the ground?
    General Townsend. From a military perspective, AFRICOM recognizes 
the potential value of additional investment and resources but those 
decisions will be guided by any future policy decisions. The Government 
of National Accord and our aligned forces benefit from U.S. engagement, 
including the assets we provide to bolster Ambassador Norland's 
engagements.

    25. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, in addition to potential 
military support, how do you think the United States should engage 
diplomatically in the conflict in Libya?
    General Townsend. AFRICOM continues to support the Libya External 
Office and all State Department engagements in Libya within our current 
resources and authorities. Ambassador Norland's recent travel to the 
Berlin conference shows how diplomacy can leverage our support for a 
peacefully negotiated resolution to the conflict in Libya.

    26. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, what does an escalation 
of violence in Libya mean to the United States and our regional 
partner's interests in the Maghreb?
    General Townsend. Further escalation of the Libyan conflict will 
likely exacerbate a series of political, economic, and security 
challenges for the United States and our regional partners. The 
widespread weapons proliferation, use of private military contractors 
and foreign fighters, and oil disruptions are already overwhelming 
Libya's institutions, resulting in ungoverned spaces that increase 
internal displacement and forced migration, and create opportunities 
for radical and extremist actors. These actors are also making use of 
private military companies and foreign fighters as combatants in order 
to obfuscate their activities. We expect these trends will continue to 
spill over into other fragile countries, as we observed in Mali in 
2012. Our regional partners--Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt--
would feel the majority of these effects, as would our European allies, 
who are the top recipients of Libyan migrants and largest importers of 
Libyan oil. Worsening violence would also hamstring Libya's greatest 
resource, hydrocarbons, causing ripple effects across global oil 
prices.

    27. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, what do you see as the 
most destabilizing factor in the Libyan conflict, and what should the 
United States strategy prioritize to encourage a peaceful outcome?
    General Townsend. The perpetuation and escalation of the Libyan 
conflict is a direct result of foreign interference. External actors 
have not only armed and supplied both sides, but are providing direct 
military support by providing reinforcements in the form of private 
military contractors and/or foreign fighters, air support, 
intelligence, and training. As long as external actors continue to 
replenish the forces of each side, the conflict will continue.
                    iranian proxy threat in southcom
    28. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, how have recent events 
impacted your force protection assessment of both United States Forces 
deployed forward and our partners, as it relates to the threat of 
Iranian proxies in SOUTHCOM?
    Admiral Faller. Lebanese Hezbollah does maintain a presence in our 
neighborhood, largely conducting logistical support, money laundering, 
and fundraising that we watch closely. In recent months, Argentina, 
Honduras, and Paraguay have designated Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organization, and Brazilian officials stated they plan to do the same. 
As the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, any increased 
Iranian presence this close to our homeland is cause for concern. We 
have seen an increased Iranian presence in Venezuela since its crisis 
deepened. We continue to watch the threat from Iran closely.

    29. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, what are actions you are 
taking to address these force protection concerns and keep both our 
servicemembers and our partners safe?
    Admiral Faller. Our actions include persistent threat information 
and intelligence sharing at the speed of relevance; education and 
training; key leader engagements; security cooperation; defense/
security institution building as well as the strengthening of our 
partner nation military and security forces to counter threats in order 
to enhance and operationalize security across the Joint Force. For 
example, we work with our partners to conduct subject matter expert 
exchanges to share best practices with military police teams that 
provide force protection and physical security support. We have also 
conducted a short-notice force protection assessment of our forward 
locations to ensure vigilance, adherence to procedures, rigorous 
training, and proper equipment.

    30. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, do you require any 
additional resources to protect our people and our assets?
    Admiral Faller. It is imperative that we remain vigilant against 
this threat. Increased human intelligence (HUMINT) capacity, a lower 
cost solution to technical ISR, provides a more penetrative capability 
to target groups, organizations, and networks to discern planned 
actions and intended outcomes of Iranian proxies that pose a more 
nefarious direct threat to United States security. We must also 
marginalize malign Iranian influence by continuously improving security 
cooperation and information sharing with our partners and maintaining 
persistent presence throughout the region.

    31. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, in your assessment, what 
regions within your area of responsibility are most susceptible to 
targeting by Iranian proxy groups?
    Admiral Faller. The Iranian Threat Network (ITN), to include 
Lebanese Hezbollah, views the entire region as a permissive operating 
environment. Because of the ITN's diffuse presence in the region, the 
group could target Western interests anywhere. The ITN could exploit 
migration flows through Central America or refugee streams out of 
Venezuela into neighboring countries to facilitate its terrorist-
related activities. Historically, Iranian proxies have operated in the 
``tri-border'' region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. They also 
have looked to carry out attacks in areas with a pronounced DOD and/or 
Israeli presence in the region.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                           population growth
    32. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, as noted in your posture 
statement, the population of the African continent is growing rapidly, 
projected to double by 2050 and double again by 2100. This population 
growth has the potential to exacerbate the extreme poverty present on 
the continent, especially among younger generations who both make up 
the majority of the population and who are most vulnerable to 
recruitment by violent extremist organizations. How can the military 
prepare for conflict in areas of highly concentrated large populations?
    General Townsend. The militaries of our African partners must 
prepare themselves to address these complex challenges by continuing 
their current efforts to professionalize their forces. Not just in 
terms of operational capability, but also in terms of solidifying 
command and control along with a respect for the protection of 
civilians, so that more and more militaries in Africa are sources of 
stability. DOD and DOS security sector assistance programs address both 
these aspects of professionalizing their armed forces.

    33. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, what role does interagency 
cooperation play in addressing these issues and what partnership 
programs exist for AFRICOM to address the results of population growth 
and poverty rates?
    General Townsend. In Africa, we see our work in the security sector 
as a critical enabler of our interagency partners' efforts across the 
continent. AFRICOM works closely with interagency partners across our 
area of responsibility; our embedded State and USAID experts reinforce 
that multi-level coordination to ensure our DOD programs are 
synchronized with broader Whole-of-Government efforts. Our long-
standing partnership improves responsiveness to the challenges posed by 
population growth and widespread poverty.
                              border wall
    34. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, the President has stated that 
he will fund the border wall with money appropriated by this Congress 
for military construction (MILCON) projects, including nearly $254 
million in fiscal year 2019 (fiscal year 2019) military construction 
funds from SOUTHCOM, and $124 million in fiscal year 2020 counterdrug 
money. How will these anticipated transfers affect overall SOUTHCOM 
readiness or will they at all?
    Admiral Faller. To date, SOUTHCOM funding has not been directly 
impacted by these transfers. However, the budget uncertainty that comes 
from these policy debates does impact our ability to plan internally, 
as well as with our partner nations.

    35. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, what are the consequences of 
withholding this funding?
    Admiral Faller. Right now, the only practical consequence we have 
observed is an increased uncertainty in our ability to plan and our 
ability to execute contractual obligations due to the slow movement of 
funding allocation.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                              border wall
    36. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, the Washington Post has 
reported that the Administration plans on diverting an additional $7.2 
billion in counterdrug and MILCON funding in the fiscal year 2021 bill 
to construct the President's wasteful and ineffective border wall. I 
understand you can't speak to the fiscal year 2021 budget, but SOUTHCOM 
is charged with deterring and defeating threats to defend the U.S. 
Homeland and our interests--many of the threats within SOUTHCOM's area 
of responsibility involve counterdrug efforts. Is a border wall the 
most effective military or defense investment we can make to prevent 
entry of illegal drugs into the United States?
    Admiral Faller. Border security is national security. DTOs are 
continuously adjusting and varying their techniques for smuggling 
illicit cargo into our homeland and we must therefore create a defense 
in depth to counter these illicit pathways. SOUTHCOM is charged with 
conducting detection and monitoring in support of law enforcement in 
the air and maritime domains, which is where our experience and 
expertise are focused. The United States-Mexico land border falls under 
the responsibility of United States Northern Command.

    37. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, what investments, 
capabilities, and resources, in your experience, have proved to be most 
effective in disrupting the movement of illegal drugs and preventing 
their entry into the United States?
    Admiral Faller. The most effective strategy in the fight against 
illicit trafficking in the air and maritime domains is fighting it as a 
team. We are taking a three-pronged approach to this mission--security 
cooperation to increase partner capacity, increased intelligence to 
better understand the threat, and increased assets to action that 
intelligence.
    Last year, our partners played a critical role in 50 percent of our 
drug interdictions, up from 40 percent the year before. Getting our 
partners in the game by training and equipping them through security 
cooperation programs is exactly the right approach as these threats 
affect us all, and we need to tackle them together. Security 
cooperation programs allow us to train, advise, educate, and equip our 
partner nations--enabling them to help us in this fight.
    In order for us to function as an effective team, we need more 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The ideal force package 
for maritime detection and monitoring includes long and medium range 
maritime patrol aircraft, using capable maritime radar and camera 
systems for detection, classification, and monitoring. The P-3 and P-8 
flying missions deep in the Eastern Pacific allow for interdiction of 
illicit conveyances far from shore, and outside dense fishing fleets. 
Medium range maritime patrol aircraft like the DH-8 and HC-130 are very 
capable platforms utilized closer to shore, but are nearly as 
effective. Similarly, persistent U.S. Coast Guard medium endurance and 
national security cutters in high threat areas, properly equipped with 
Airborne Use of Force (AUF) capable helicopters and Over-The-Horizon 
(OTH) small boats are the backbone of counter-narcotics operations in 
the source and transit zones. Creative solutions such as the Multi-
Mission Support Vessel (MMSV), the PALE ALE aircraft, and use of 
unmanned aerial systems like the MQ-9 contribute to the mission by 
filling in asset gaps.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                          combatting terrorism
    38. Senator Warren. General Townsend, the Sahel is experiencing a 
``devastating surge in terrorist attacks,'' according to officials from 
the United Nations, with terror-attack casualties in the region 
increasing five-fold since 2016. This challenge cannot be addressed by 
military power alone and investing in our civilian tools is a cost-
effective way to prevent further conflict--for every $1 we spend on 
prevention, we save $16 in response costs. How do investments in the 
State Department, USAID, and other civilian tools of national security 
support your goals of promoting security and stability in Africa?
    General Townsend. USAID and State lead U.S. efforts to support the 
long-term solutions to insecurity and instability including economic 
growth, development, and good governance. Additionally, USAID and 
State's work on capacity building directly supports security and 
stability, through professionalization of security forces via 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and institutional 
capacity building programs funded with Foreign Military Financing and 
Peacekeeping Operations funds, as well as social cohesion and counter 
violent extremism messaging.
                               migration
    39. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, as former SOUTHCOM Commanders 
General Craddock, General Hill, General McCaffrey, General Wilhelm, and 
Admiral Stavridis have noted, ``Improving conditions in Honduras, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador is a critical way to address the root causes 
of migration and prevent the humanitarian crisis at our border. This is 
a solution to many of the drivers that cause people to leave their 
country and move north.'' Do you agree with these senior military 
leaders that we need a comprehensive civilian-military effort to tackle 
the challenges in the Northern Triangle and advance our security 
interests?
    Admiral Faller. I do strongly agree that the challenges facing our 
partners in Central America are complex and require a comprehensive 
whole-of-government effort. Several factors contribute to individual or 
family units' decision to migrate to the United States. The United 
States Strategy for Engagement in Central America, and Central America 
governments' complimentary strategy, Alliance for Prosperity broadens 
our vision for how we achieve security. The plans prioritize three 
interconnected objectives: prosperity, governance, and security. A 
secure, democratic, and prosperous Central America will provide an 
environment in which all of its citizens choose to remain and thrive.

    40. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, what do you recommend that we 
do differently to tackle the challenges in the Northern Triangle and 
advance our security interests?
    Admiral Faller. The challenges in the Northern Triangle can be 
found all around the region and would truly benefit from a sustained, 
whole-of-government approach to address the threats and unlock the 
promise of this hemisphere. Getting our partners in the game by 
training and equipping them through security cooperation programs like 
section 333, and professionalizing militaries through Defense 
Institution Building is exactly the right approach. In order for us to 
be a reliable, trusted partner, these security cooperation programs 
must be part of long-term strategic plans, catered to the needs and 
capabilities of each country. This kind of out-year planning would 
require increased, multi-year, consistent funding that protects against 
the instability posed by things like government shutdowns and 
continuing resolutions. Programs like IMET and FMF through the 
Department of State funding are also a critical part of this holistic 
solution, as are economic development programs by USAID and the newly 
developed U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC), 
which is aimed at catalyzing market-based, private-sector development, 
spurring economic growth in less-developed countries, and advancing the 
foreign policy interests of the United States.

    41. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, new leaders in the Northern 
Triangle region are taking responsibility for addressing migration to 
the United States. For example, El Salvador's new president is 
prioritizing tackling the root causes of migration--from corruption to 
poverty. However, in spite of these commitments, the U.S. has not 
restored the majority of funding to the region that was cut off last 
spring. Given the Administration's focus on burden-sharing, are you 
concerned that continuing to withhold funding to the region could 
undermine efforts by these leaders, who will need our support to 
bolster efforts to curb forced migration?
    Admiral Faller. In light of the administration's policies toward 
the region, the Department of Defense is permitted to fund security 
cooperation programs that directly impact the national security 
interests of the United States. This includes programs that address 
improving partner nation security forces to counter transnational crime 
and secure porous borders. IMET, which is a critical tool in building 
and strengthening relationships and partnerships in the region in the 
long term, is also increasingly available. Both of these programs work 
in concert to enhance shared values and increase burden sharing 
throughout the region.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                          success in colombia
    42. Senator Jones. Admiral Faller, the United States has had some 
notable success in helping Colombia develop its own security forces, 
who now help other countries develop theirs. Are there lessons from 
this relationship we can export to our other train, advise, and assist 
missions?
    Admiral Faller. Colombia has invested a great deal of its own 
resources in treasure and blood over the last two decades to achieve 
the successes you note. Signed in 2000, Plan Colombia included both 
foreign and military assistance for Colombia. It had a great deal of 
bipartisan support in the United States that has been strategically 
sustained over the years. Efforts to assist Colombia were also 
international, with the European Union supporting social and economic 
programs. This sustained support has now enabled Colombia to export 
military and security training to seven countries in the hemisphere.
    The United States-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security (USCAP) 
is a collaborative arrangement between the United States and Colombia 
to conduct security cooperation capacity building training and 
investments in seven regional partner nations. Since 2013, there have 
been over 500 engagements and a total of 6,200 partner nation personnel 
trained. Just one example of how Colombia is training other nations 
through USCAP is the Regional Helicopter Training Center, which is a 
Spanish language initial entry rotary wing qualification course located 
in Melgar, Colombia. The center annually trains 50 Colombian military 
members and 24 Latin American partner nation students.



                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
 FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 
                                PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2020

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

   UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer, 
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, McSally, 
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 
Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. The meeting will come to order.
    I have already kind of explained the situation we have. You 
and I are both going to waive our opening statements, as are 
our witnesses. Then we get right into questions. I think we 
will be fine with the votes coming up that way.
    [Statement of General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy as prepared 
for delivery.]

 OPENING STATEMENT OF GENERAL TERRENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, USAF, 
 COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN 
                   AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished 
Members of the Committee: I am honored to be here today and to 
serve as the commander of U.S. Northern Command and North 
American Aerospace Defense Command. I am also pleased to 
testify alongside Admiral Chas Richard. Chas and his team at 
STRATCOM have been outstanding partners every step of the way.
    I will keep my remarks brief this morning, and I would ask 
that my full written statement be entered into the record. 
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are charged with executing the National 
Defense Strategy's number one objective: Defend the Homeland.
    Our adversaries have watched, learned, and invested to 
offset our strengths while exploiting our weaknesses. They have 
demonstrated patterns of behavior that indicate their 
capability, capacity and intent to hold our Homeland at risk 
below the nuclear threshold.
    The changing security envirnoment makes it clear that the 
Arctic is no longer a fortress wall, and our oceans are no 
longer protective moats. They are now avenues of approach, 
which highlights the increase in adversary presence in the 
Arctic.
    We need to invest in a capable and persistent defense that 
can deter adversaries, protect critical infrastructure, enable 
power projection forward and prevent Homeland vulnerabilities.
    To deter, detect, and defeat the threats arrayed against 
the Homeland today, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are transforming our 
commands and our way of thinking. We cannot defend the Nation 
against 21st century threats with 20th century technology. We 
must be able to outpace our adversaries using a layered defense 
infused with our latest technology.
    As such, our layered defense needs to establish awareness 
in all domains, from below the oceans to the highest levels of 
space, including the unseen cyber domain, which are all at 
risk. We need a layered sensing grid, with sensors in all 
domains, to detect and track threats from their point of 
origin.
    It requires the ability to discriminate between ballistic 
missiles, advanced cruise missiles, hypersonics and small 
unmanned aerial systems at the full ranges from which they are 
employed as well as the platforms from which they are 
delivered.
    We need an adaptable architecture for Joint All-Domain 
Command and Control, capable of fusing a myriad of sensors 
across the globe into accurate, decision-quality threat 
information, and at the speed of relevance for effective 
command and control.
    Lastly, we need the ability to deploy defeat mechanisms 
capable of neutralizing advanced weapons systems in order to 
defend the Homeland. We have put great effort into these areas, 
such as ballistic missile defense, and the need also exists to 
agressively defeat additional threats, to include the ever-
growing cyber and cruise missile threat.
    Consistent with these concepts, we are changing how we 
engage with industry. We are in partnership with the Defense 
industry to harness emerging technologies and also collaborate 
with the commercial industry to leverage existing and rapidly 
advancing technology in order to apply them to our current 
Homeland defense problem sets.
    We have shared our toughest challenges with a wide array of 
industry partners, ranging from traditional large defense 
companies to small and new commercial start-ups, so they can 
plug into our Homeland defense system of systems. we have 
received an overwhelming response from industry and we are 
optimistic. However, more needs to be done to keep pace with 
the advancing threats to our Homeland. We need to ensure we 
have complete awareness of what is happening in and around our 
great Nation and have the ability to defeat all threats.
    In line with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and to 
capture our sense of urgency, we have declared 2020 as the year 
of Homeland defense. We are mindful of the gravity of our 
mission and of the trust that you have placed in us. You and 
the Committee should have great faith in the men and women at 
USNORTHCOM and NORAD because together, we have the watch. Thank 
you for your support and I look forward to your questions.

        Prepared Statement by General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy
        
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 



   Prepared Statement by Admiral Charles A. Richard, USN, Commander, 
                    United States Strategic Command
                    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


    So that being the case, we will go ahead and just start 
with questions. I only have one that I really wanted to get to. 
I talked to both of you guys on other occasions about this, but 
what we ran up against--and this was kind of a surprise to a 
lot of us--the NNSA's [National Nuclear Security 
Administration] primary job is to build the nuclear warheads to 
meet the requirements of the Department of Defense (DOD). 
Earlier this year when we heard that the NNSA budget had been 
cut, we called the DOD and asked them what they thought, and to 
my surprise, when I got a hold of them, they said they did not 
know because they do not get it until after such time as--
actually I think Energy gets it first, and so they did not have 
it. I am not sure how it happened.
    Then I went back and I have talked to you folks about it. 
What are you really able to do if you do not hear about what 
the budget is before it is already signed off or in the process 
of being concluded? That is something we have a concern about.
    Then it reminded me back when I was first elected--and that 
was when David Boren had this job, and he called me. I remember 
this. This was way back in 1994. He called me up and he said, 
well, Inhofe, there is something I have been trying to get done 
for a long time and I failed. Maybe you can do it, and it was 
correcting this very problem that we are pointing out right 
now. So we may be addressing this.
    So the question I would ask you is do you agree this thing 
ought to be changed. You got to be in on this thing to know--
you remember what we did earlier this year. We had to go in and 
talk to the President because they had dropped the budget down 
about 8 percent on NNSA, and nobody was aware of it except the 
Department of Energy. So we went and talked to the President 
and had a meeting, and we brought it back up to just under the 
20 figure. So that is what happened there.
    Do the two of you agree that this is something that needs 
to be corrected after all these years?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I applaud yours and the 
Committee's leadership in addressing the necessary resources 
for the nuclear weapons complex. That, along with nuclear 
command and control and recapitalization of the triad systems, 
are essential for maintaining strategic deterrence, which is 
foundational to everything else we do inside the Defense 
Department.
    Chairman, you are well aware of the responsibility of the 
Nuclear Weapons Council to certify NNSA's budget, and I have a 
role in providing a recommendation to the Nuclear Weapons 
Council to that end.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
    Admiral Richard. If there are weaknesses--and you described 
one--in terms of our ability in a timely manner to do that, 
that is something that I will take up with the Secretary to 
address how we might be able to do that better.
    Chairman Inhofe. Why do we not do this for the record? We 
will just start this discussion going and not try to do it 
under the timelines we are dealing with today.
    So I will go ahead. I had one other area to bring up. Last 
summer, the Missile Defense Agency canceled their program to 
modernize the ground-based interceptors that were up in Alaska 
due to technical failures. The next generation interceptor, 
then, we find will not likely be fielded until 2030. I think 
that would be a good thing for you to answer on the record as 
to what about that gap, can we handle that gap, because 
everyone up here is going to be interested in that. Okay?
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Richard, I am terribly concerned that there has 
been no significant effort to extend the New START [Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty] agreement with Russia. Do you believe 
that New START treaty gives you critical value in planning 
strategic concerns based upon on-site inspections and deck 
relations, and if it is not extended, you will be at a 
disadvantage?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, as you know, New START treaty has 
been valuable to this Nation and to my command. The Russians 
are largely compliant with it. It does have the benefit of not 
only limiting the total number of strategic weapons to both 
nations' benefit, and it has the transparency and confidence-
building measures that you just described, all of which has 
been good for deterrence.
    However, it does not address a very large class of weapons 
that the Russians have a significant advantage in. It does not 
constrain novel systems, and it is a bilateral treaty.
    Ultimately a decision to extend a treaty is a political 
decision. I do provide best military advice down the lines of 
what I just offered to my department to contribute to that.
    Senator Reed. But if we do not do this, we will lose a 
great deal in terms of deterrence, in terms of, just as I 
mentioned previously, signaling for the first time in 40-plus 
years there is no arms control regime in the world, and that 
could lead to proliferation, not just eroded relationships 
between Russia and the United States.
    Thank you, Admiral. I just want to--in the context of 
moving quickly.
    General O'Shaughnessy, one of the issues that came up in 
our discussions and also in your testimony is the threat of 
cruise missiles to the United States. We are configured pretty 
well since the 1950s for ballistic missiles, but cruise 
missiles and other hypersonic weapon systems are more 
challenging.
    Give us an idea of what you think you need to be effective 
to deal with this cruise missile threat.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, Senator, for highlighting 
that important threat that we have facing us today as a Nation 
and something that we really have to invest in in order to 
maintain our competitive advantage and our ability to defend 
this great Nation over time.
    Specifically, I think as we look at the way we have been 
approaching the threats we have been looking and from the 
ballistic missile standpoint and then cruise missiles, kind of 
UASs--and I think we have to look at this more holistically, 
and really we need domain awareness over our entire territory 
and the approaches to it. Then if we are able to have that 
domain awareness with sensors from the undersea all the way up 
through space, we can then take that to be able to defend 
ourselves against all the threats, to include the cruise 
missile threat that you mentioned.
    Some of the things that we are doing right now to get after 
that, as an example in this year's budget, we are increasing 
our domain awareness capability with sensors within the 
National Capital Region. For example, with our wide area 
surveillance program, we have money this year for over the 
horizon radars that will not only be helpful for cruise missile 
threats but also hypersonic threats. We also have funding in 
place for some additional radars to give us the ability to 
truly see and understand the domain on the approaches to us.
    But this is just a start. Senator, what I would say is we 
have to invest into the future in understanding what is 
happening in and around our territory and really understanding 
our ability to have defeat mechanisms that can defeat these 
proliferated threats such as the cruise missiles.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
    I yield back all my time.
    [Laughter.]
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Fischer?
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Richard, your opening statement refers to an 
increase in both Russian and Chinese nuclear forces. On page 4, 
it states that China is likely to double the size of their 
stockpile by the end of this decade. On page 5, it states that 
Russia's overall nuclear stockpile is, ``likely to grow 
significantly over the next decade.''
    Does our current program of record for modernization expand 
our nuclear forces?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, it does not. We do not seek 
parity. It is not only in the statement in terms of what they 
are going to do, we could also back up and look at what Russia 
in particular has been doing over the last 15 years to expand 
and modernize her arsenal, all while we just extended life-
extended systems that we already have.
    So the recapitalization that we are asking for is one-for-
one. We do not seek more. We do not seek a greater number. We 
simply seek a sufficient number of capabilities to enable us to 
achieve national objectives.
    Senator Fischer. I have been struck by the reception that 
this budget has gotten. Earlier this week, a New York Times 
column summed up the budget's investment in nuclear 
modernization by saying, ``the President's spending proposal 
requests money for a new arms race with Russia and with China 
and restores nuclear weapons as central to military policy.''
    The truth is actually the opposite of that. There is no 
policy change, as you stated, that relates to nuclear weapons 
in this budget, and it is Russia and China that are expanding 
their arsenals while we are not. Is that correct?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, I must confess the whole concept 
that we are starting an arms race baffles me in terms of no 
nation has done more than the United States to reduce the 
reliance on nuclear weapons. No nation has divested more 
nuclear weapons than the United States has. We have waited 15 
years in some cases to the absolute limits of what our systems 
will go before we simply sought to replace like for like inside 
our triad. So I do not understand where the concept of an arms 
race comes in, and you are absolutely correct, ma'am.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    On page 12 of your prepared remarks, you state, ``our 
nuclear deterrent underwrites every U.S. military operation 
around the world and is the foundation and backstop of our 
national defense. I cannot overemphasize the need to modernize 
our nuclear forces and recapitalize the supporting 
infrastructure to ensure we can maintain this deterrent in the 
future. I am concerned that the oft-repeated message of the 
need to modernize and recapitalize has lost its impact and that 
collectively we have under-estimated the risks associated with 
such a complex and time-constrained modernization and 
recapitalization effort. Even seemingly small issues can have a 
disproportionate impact on the force. We cannot afford more 
delays and uncertainty in delivering capabilities and must 
maintain a focus on revitalizing our nuclear forces and the 
associated infrastructure.''
    I really appreciate your candor on this. As you know, we 
continue to hear calls to slow down, to cut funding, and to 
reexamine issues that have already been studied numerous times. 
I appreciate your clear description of the urgency that we 
have.
    Do you have anything you would like to add to that?
    Admiral Richard. No, ma'am, other than----
    Senator Fischer. I took the words right out of your mouth.
    Admiral Richard. Yes, ma'am. We chose those very carefully 
to accurately describe the situation this Nation faces. These 
capabilities are foundational to our survival as a Nation. It 
is a great credit that we have been able to take the--it is a 
once every other generation responsibility to recapitalize the 
strategic deterrent. We had wise leaders back in the 1980s who 
saw the need for this--leadership and resources. We have 
benefited with no nuclear use for up to 42 years in some cases 
with particular weapon systems, no great power war, and the 
return on investment that we achieved--the submarine is a great 
example, designed for 30 years. We thought that was what we 
were going to get. In fact, you wind up getting 42. What a 
credit to the people that designed it, built it, operated it, 
that we were able to take it out as far as we can. But in the 
submarine's case, we are literally reaching physics and 
engineering limits such that you cannot extend it. You can only 
take a piece of high-strength steel, pressurize it at great 
depths, then take that pressure back off before you just do not 
want to get in the tube anymore. That is the limits that we 
have reached, and it is our turn to provide that leadership for 
the next 40 or 50 years to give them the benefits that we have 
already received.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Thank you, General O'Shaughnessy, for your meeting with me 
yesterday. I would commend to my colleagues that they also 
contact you to have a classified briefing on what we need to do 
with our cruise missiles. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer,
    Since a quorum is now present, I ask the Committee to 
consider two civilian nominations and a list of 871 pending 
military nominations. All the nominations have been before the 
Committee the required length of time.
    First, I ask the Committee to consider the nomination of 
James McPherson to be Under Secretary of the Army and Charles 
Williams to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, 
Installations, and Environment.
    Is there a motion to favorably report these two civilian 
nominations out?
    Senator Reed. So moved.
    Chairman Inhofe. Is there a second?
    Senator Fischer. Second.
    Chairman Inhofe. Any opposition?
    [No response.]
    Chairman Inhofe. That does pass.
    Finally I ask the Committee to consider a list of 871 
pending military nominations. Is there a motion to favorably 
report these 871?
    Senator Shaheen. So moved.
    Senator Fischer. Second.
    Chairman Inhofe. Second.
    All in favor, say aye.
    [Chorus of ayes.]
    Chairman Inhofe. Opposed?
    [No response.]
    Chairman Inhofe. It carries.
    [The information referred to follows:]

 MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
 WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON FEBRUARY 13, 
                                 2020.
     1.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
commander (Colin R. Young) (Reference No. 1224)
     2.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (Mario A. Ortega) (Reference No. 1378)
     3.  LTG Thomas A. Bussiere, USAF to be lieutenant general and 
Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (Reference No. 1386)
     4.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade 
of brigadier general (list begins with Joseph R. Harris II) (Reference 
No. 1387)
     5.  BG Billy M. Nabors, ANG to be major general (Reference No. 
1388)
     6.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 24 appointments to the 
grade of brigadier general (list begins with AnnMarie K. Anthony) 
(Reference No. 1389)
     7.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 14 appointments to the 
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Dann S. Carlson) 
(Reference No. 1391)
     8.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade 
of major general (list begins with Steven J. deMilliano) (Reference No. 
1392)
     9.  BG Andrew J. MacDonald, ANG to be major general (Reference No. 
1393)
    10.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 11 appointments to the 
grade of major general (list begins with Todd M. Audet) (Reference No. 
1394)
    11.  BG Christopher E. Finerty, ANG to be major general (Reference 
No. 1395)
    12.  In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade 
of major general (Joseph B. Wilson) (Reference No. 1396)
    13.  Col. Ronald F. Taylor, ARNG to be brigadier general (Reference 
No. 1398)
    14.  BG Aaron R. Dean II, ARNG to be major general (Reference No. 
1399)
    15.  BG Michael S. Martin, USMCR to be major general (Reference No. 
1401)
    16.  In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 2 appointments to the 
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Douglas K. Clark) 
(Reference No. 1403)
    17.  LTG Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, USAF to be lieutenant general and 
Deputy Commander, Air Mobility Command (Reference No. 1441)
    18.  In the Air Force there are 5 appointments to be major (list 
begins with Joshua E. Erlandsen) (Reference No. 1443)
    19.  In the Air Force there are 44 appointments to be lieutenant 
colonel (list begins with Matthew G. Adkins) (Reference No. 1444)
    20.  In the Air Force there are 31 appointments to be lieutenant 
colonel (list begins with Jenara L. Allen) (Reference No. 1445)
    21.  In the Air Force there are 129 appointments to be lieutenant 
colonel (list begins with Daniel J. Adams) (Reference No. 1446)
    22.  In the Air Force there are 18 appointments to be colonel (list 
begins with Jennifer R. Bein) (Reference No. 1447)
    23.  In the Air Force there are 55 appointments to be colonel (list 
begins with Wesley M. Abadie) (Reference No. 1448)
    24.  In the Air Force there are 52 appointments to be major (list 
begins with Lior Aljadeff) (Reference No. 1449)
    25.  In the Air Force there are 294 appointments to be major (list 
begins with Jason K. Adams) (Reference No. 1450)
    26.  In the Air Force there are 52 appointments to be lieutenant 
colonel (list begins with Victoria M. Aglewilson) (Reference No. 1451)
    27.  In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to be major (list 
begins with Junelene M. Bungay) (Reference No. 1452)
    28.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant 
colonel (Christopher J. Nastal) (Reference No. 1453)
    29.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be major (Alexander 
Khutoryan) (Reference No. 1454)
    30.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be major (Daniel S. 
Kim) (Reference No. 1455)
    31.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be major (Marilyn 
L. Smith) (Reference No. 1456)
    32.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant colonel 
(Zachary J. Conly) (Reference No. 1457)
    33.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Audrey J. 
Dean) (Reference No. 1458)
    34.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to be colonel 
(Michael W. Brancamp) (Reference No. 1459)
    35.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Tracy J. 
Brown) (Reference No. 1460)
    36.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Kenneth A. 
Wieder) (Reference No. 1461)
    37.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant colonel 
(Chong K. Yi) (Reference No. 1462)
    38.  In the Army Reserve there are 11 appointments to be colonel 
(list begins with John C. Benson) (Reference No. 1467)
    39.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Ross C. 
Puffer) (Reference No. 1468)
    40.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Amanda G. 
Luschinski) (Reference No. 1469)
    41.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (June E. 
Osavio) (Reference No. 1470)
    42.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to be major (list begins 
with Yasmin J. Alter) (Reference No. 1471)
    43.  In the Army there are 3 appointments to be lieutenant colonel 
(list begins with Otha J. Holmes) (Reference No. 1472)
    44.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to be colonel 
(Shaun P. Miller) (Reference No. 1473)
    45.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to be major (Keith 
A. Stevenson) (Reference No. 1474)
    46.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Krista H. 
Clarke) (Reference No. 1475)
    47.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be colonel (Peter K. 
Marlin) (Reference No. 1476)
    48.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Angela I. 
Iyanobor) (Reference No. 1477)
    49.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant colonel 
(John J. Landers) (Reference No. 1478)
    50.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (David P. 
Frommer) (Reference No. 1479)
    51.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant commander 
(Catherine M. Dickinson) (Reference No. 1480)
    52.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be commander (Donald A. 
Sinitiere) (Reference No. 1481)
    53.  In the Navy there are 61 appointments to be captain and below 
(list begins with Stephen W. Aldridge) (Reference No. 1483)
    54.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be captain (Paul J. 
Kaylor) (Reference No. 1484)
    55.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant commander 
(Andrew S. Jackson) (Reference No. 1485)
    56.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to be major (list 
begins with Joseph P. Ball) (Reference No. 1489)
    57.  In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to be major (list 
begins with Donald K. Brown) (Reference No. 1490)
    58.  In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to be major (list 
begins with Christina L. Hudson) (Reference No. 1491)
    59.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to be major (list 
begins with James M. Shipman) (Reference No. 1492)
    60.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to be major 
(Christopher L. Kaiser) (Reference No. 1493)
    61.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to be major (list 
begins with Peter T. Graham) (Reference No. 1494)
    62.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to be major (list 
begins with Daniel E. Fuson) (Reference No. 1495)

_______________________________________________________________________
                                                                     
TOTAL: 871

    Now, for those who may have come in a little bit late, we 
are waiving opening statements. We are going to get right to 
the questions, and we are going to adhere to the 5-minute rule. 
Thank you very much.
    Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here and for your service.
    I want to follow up on Senator Reed's question about the 
New START treaty because, as he pointed out, we are less than a 
year from its expiration. We could extend it for 5 years 
without going through a whole Senate confirmation process, and 
it seems to me--while I recognize the concern that you 
expressed, Admiral Richard, that I have heard from other 
sources about the fact that it does not encompass a number of 
other weapons. The fact is we could extend it and work on those 
other weapons at the same time without losing the important 
information that we are currently getting from New START.
    So I wonder if you could describe how STRATCOM uses 
information from New START such as through inspections and data 
exchanges as you look at your day-to-day planning.
    Admiral Richard. Senator, so that insight gives us a much 
better idea of what the threat level is from that particular 
class of weapon systems are, which enables us to do a very 
calculated and thorough job of determining exactly how we deter 
the use of that, all very valuable and helpful. So I would 
desire to keep those attributes.
    But I am also required to do the same thing on the parts 
that are not included in the treaty. So better for me if we 
could down a path to address all of that.
    Senator Shaheen. Sure. But if we do not extend New START 
and it expires next February, you lose that information. Is 
that correct?
    Admiral Richard. That is correct, Senator.
    Senator Shaheen. I think this is probably for General 
O'Shaughnessy. Last August, 33 airmen from New Hampshire's Air 
National Guard spent several weeks on a remote Alaskan island 
near the Bering Sea. I am sorry Senator Sullivan is not here 
because they were part of a rotating group of airmen and 
guardsmen who were helping to build a new home for a group of 
indigenous people who have been displaced due to rising sea 
levels.
    Can you talk about what you see from climate change and 
what we are doing to try and shore up our infrastructure and to 
be prepared for the challenges we are going to face as climate 
change increases and creates more of these kinds of situations?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would talk to is the 
importance of the Arctic and specifically in this case Alaska 
not only, as you mentioned, with increased activity and the 
things that we are seeing and some problems with erosion that 
are very real--they are real from both a military aspect, as 
well as, of course, as you mentioned, the indigenous 
population.
    One of the things that we try to do is we partner, as you 
mentioned, with organizations that are tied to the indigenous 
people--for example, Tulikika and AFN has been a great 
partner--because I think we have common challenges of which we 
might have common solutions. We went to Barrow, for example, 
and saw some of the erosion as the ice has melted and now the 
waves are hitting the shore. That affects us and some of our 
radar installations just as much as it effects the local 
village, and so we are trying to partner with the local 
communities to truly understand what is happening and the 
impacts.
    But we also see it because simultaneously this is a 
critical part for us for the defense of our Homeland. If you 
look at it as an avenue of approach and we see the Arctic as an 
avenue of approach to our Homeland that we need to be able to 
defend, and we need to be able to operate out of. Therefore, 
you need infrastructure. You need the ability to actually bring 
your force in and sustain a force. You need to be able to 
communicate. You need to actually understand what is happening 
in that domain and have the domain awareness.
    These are very similar. We find multiple opportunities in 
some of the forums that we have led with our partners in both 
industry, local populations, local communities, all the way 
down to the villages that we find these common approaches that 
we might be able to solve. We are working, for example, in 
communications that might help us with the proliferation of LEO 
[low Earth orbit]. That would bring communication not only to 
us as a military but even to the remotest villages.
    Senator Shaheen. So, as you are looking at preparing 
budgets for future years, how are you factoring in the cost of 
those infrastructure needs that we have as we are seeing the 
impacts of climate change?
    General O'Shaughnessy. So what we are doing is we are 
trying to look at the infrastructure that we need, the 
infrastructure that we need to be able to defend our nation. 
This is actually not just with the United States We are working 
in partnership with Canada, and especially with my NORAD hat 
on, we are very interested in similar issues that we see from 
the Canadian front of having an infrastructure in place 
throughout the Arctic that will give us the ability to defend 
our nation. In doing so, we have to have the sustainability of 
that infrastructure going into the future.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
    Admiral Richard, I will start with you as we continue the 
discussion about modernization. As has been discussed, the 
ground-based strategic deterrent will replace the Minuteman III 
as the sole intercontinental ballistic missile starting about 
the mid-2020s. Congress has appropriated the funds to do that 
for this fiscal year.
    But while the GBSD will enter service this decade, the Air 
Force will continue to sustain the Minuteman III into the 
2030s. This is an old program from the 1970s, and I think some 
of the silos date back to maybe even the 1960s. I am concerned 
about failure to modernize with our nuclear deterrent, and I 
think that in the long run, this will be a lot more costly and 
makes it a risky gamble with our national survival.
    So just if you can, how are we balancing the maintenance 
issues that will occur as we continue to hold onto the 
Minuteman III and talk a little bit about that. Are you 
confident then that as we move into the new system, that the 
timeline is suitable as a deterrent?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, the short answer is yes. It is 
yet another example of why we have no margin left in terms of 
the need to recapitalize. In terms of sustainment of Minuteman 
III, I am not sure that it is often recognized the 
extraordinary levels the Air Force went to to be able to 
accomplish that. Unlike a submarine, which is designed to have 
depot level maintenance, the Minuteman III was not. It was 
designed to serve for a certain period of time and get 
replaced, and the Air Force went in after the fact and figured 
out how to take that and get a depot maintenance capability 
retrofitted into the weapon system that will then enable it to 
go till the crossover point. I think it is a great credit to 
the Air Force they were able to accomplish that. That is what 
gives me confidence, provided no further delay in GBSD, that 
this will work.
    Senator Ernst. Well, God bless the Air Force, you know, 
their extraordinary effort, and it just points to the fact, 
though, that as Congress, we need to be aware of these issues 
and make sure that we stay on top of it.
    General O'Shaughnessy, thank you for being here.
    I am going to redirect and talk about something that has 
not been brought up yet.
    At the SOUTHCOM posture hearing, I asked Admiral Faller 
about challenges with COCOM and interagency coordination to 
stop the flow of drugs and human trafficking over our southern 
border and entering into the United States. It is surprising 
but my home State of Iowa really sees one of the highest rates 
of human trafficking, and I know that there are many colleagues 
here that have those same concerns and same issues in their 
home States. We have also felt the pain and the pressure of 
illicit drugs that enter into the stream in our States.
    What I would like to hear from you is thoughts on how that 
interagency coordination is going, the collaboration that you 
might have with SOUTHCOM, and what are the efforts that we see 
to push back on some of the flows of drugs and human 
trafficking?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for 
highlighting that.
    One of the things that we do find is a very strong 
collaboration amongst the interagency. I think it starts with 
the Interdiction Committee and that is led, of course, by the 
Drug Czar and Admiral Schultz as the co-chairs, but it brings 
the entire interagency together with respect to the 
counternarcotics, counterdrug, and the transnational organized 
crime and the aspects of that. It is a great forum of which we 
all get together. Admiral Faller is there, as well as myself, 
to really bring the team together, if you will.
    In addition, as you mentioned, SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM have a 
great relationship. In fact, Admiral Faller is actually my 
cousin, as it turns out. So there is a great relationship 
there.
    Senator Ernst. Okay, good. Sounds a lot like Iowa.
    [Laughter.]
    General O'Shaughnessy. We see that we clearly have to work 
together as we do this.
    We actually went down together to Mexico City to meet with 
the Mexican leadership and especially looking at SEDENA and 
SAMARA and the great work that they are doing to help with both 
the migration flow and the counternarcotics problem.
    Then we went right from there to Guatemala, and we were 
able to work with the local Guatemalan officials and really see 
how do we stem this flow and how do we get to the roots to be 
able stem that flow.
    I think it is those kind of relationships and working 
together that is important, but is also important what we are 
doing on our actual border, and as you know, we are very active 
with respect to some of the work that we are doing to provide 
assistance. We are the lead Federal Agency but we provide great 
assistance because we see this as a national crisis, 68,000 to 
69,000 Americans killed last year. That is something that we 
have to be a part of the solution, and we are. We flew over 
5,000 hours in support of that last year, over 2,000 man-days 
of intelligence analysis. It is one of the things I think we 
bring as the military, that we can bring that expertise and 
bring that right to our interagency partners. We continue to 
find those areas where we can bring that value to the 
interagency process.
    Senator Ernst. I appreciate it so much. Thank you, 
gentlemen.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here and thank you for your 
service.
    Admiral, thanks particularly for your enormous contribution 
to our submarine force. I assume you continue to share the 
Navy's strategy and support it to achieve 66 submarines by 
2048.
    Admiral Richard. Senator, I do.
    Senator Blumenthal. I am somewhat disquieted, even dismayed 
by the apparent change of pace in construction reflected in 
this budget, dropping one of the submarines that was planned 
for this year at the Electric Boat shipyard. Do you share that 
concern that we may be falling off the necessary pace?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I am pleased that Navy is 
maintaining the highest priority on the Columbia-class 
submarine, which directly supports my mission set, and beyond 
that, I think that is just indicative of the difficult budget 
choices that Navy and the whole Department of Defense are 
having to make.
    Senator Blumenthal. But those budget choices reflect 
priorities, and the Virginia-class--and I agree with you 
completely about the Columbia-class and there is a lot of 
progress in the budget in that regard. But the Virginia-class 
is essential to our undersea superiority. Is it not?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, the Virginia-class submarine is 
the finest submarine in the world.
    Senator Blumenthal. We want to continue to build more of 
them.
    Admiral Richard. Absolutely, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. In that regard, I want to ask about 
hypersonic missiles which in your testimony you say, ``ensure 
our deterrence and conventional power remains strong in the 
future.'' Are you satisfied with the investment that we are 
making in hypersonic missiles, given the Russians and the 
Chinese investing so heavily in them? That can be a question 
for both of you.
    Admiral Richard. Senator, what I will start with, because 
there are two ways to answer--there are two aspects to your 
question. One is offensive use of hypersonics by us, plus there 
is a defensive piece, and I remind everybody the Russians have 
publicly reported that they have hypersonics on alert now. This 
is a very real thing.
    My command has had a longstanding requirement for 
conventional prompt strike. Hypersonic technologies would be an 
ideal way to go accomplish that, and I think that enables me to 
better deter threats to this nation. Also, I have 
responsibility for global strike already inside the Department 
of Defense, and I think we would be an ideal command because we 
have concepts, command, and control ready to go to use that to 
the best advantage.
    Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied, though, that we are 
investing sufficiently in all of the aspects of hypersonics 
both offensive----
    Admiral Richard. Senator, I am. I was actually very pleased 
in the priority. It is in line with the National Defense 
Strategy in terms of the priority that this budget submission 
puts in that and a couple of other technical areas.
    Senator Blumenthal. Are you concerned about a developing 
potential arms race in hypersonics?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, no. Again, it is do you have 
sufficient capability, technologies to meet our national 
objectives. I think we are on pace to do that.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I would highlight on the 
defensive side, one of the key aspects I think is the space 
sensing layer and the importance that we invest in that and 
continue to invest, which we are and this budget includes that. 
But we need to continue to invest in that space sensing layer 
because as we go from a ballistic missile to a hypersonic glide 
vehicle, for instance, it really changes the problem of 
maintaining custody of that weapon system throughout its entire 
flight, and the best way to get at that is the space sensing 
layer. So I strongly endorse continued investment in that for a 
defensive.
    It is also about awareness because unlike a ballistic 
missile where you know where it is going, the hypersonic glide 
vehicle--you do not necessarily know because it has the energy 
and the ability to maneuver. We have to be able to keep track 
of that, and so I can give the warning to Admiral Richard so he 
knows where that is going from the NORTHCOM and NORAD 
perspective.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, I agree with you that it 
introduces a potential game-changing technology and new 
challenges in terms of both defense and deterrence and offense, 
and I would like to ask for more information perhaps in a 
classified setting if we can arrange a briefing.
    I am also going to submit for the record, because we are 
adhering strictly to time limits, questions on the threats 
posed by cyber. I understand there was a recent cybersecurity 
conference that involved the National Guard, which I would like 
to learn more about, and also troops at the border. So I will 
be submitting questions for the record on those two topics.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
    Senator Cotton?
    Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard, I want to return to the 
budget for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The 
President's budget has it at just under $20 billion. Are you 
confident that that is a sufficient number to proceed with 
nuclear modernization?
    Admiral Richard. Senator Cotton, the short answer is yes. 
There is not a lot of excess margin that number, but it is 
sufficient.
    I will also offer that I have a very close relationship 
with NNSA. I just spoke to Ms. Gordon-Hagerty actually 
yesterday in a continuing series. I would point to that as an 
example of us making sure that she has the right resources.
    Senator Cotton. And if you take the warhead modernization 
program on the one hand and you take the triad modernization--
the delivery systems on the other hand, that is also a number 
that is satisfactory to keep those two things integrated over 
the next several years?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, yes, again with no extra margin. 
I would throw in nuclear command and control as the third piece 
of that that also needs to be synchronized.
    Senator Cotton. I would as well given the fact that we have 
woefully--woefully--undercapitalized our nuclear command and 
control and infrastructure over the last many decades.
    The one thing I hear you say, not much excess margin. To 
the extent that Congress does not meet that budget number of 
just under $20 billion, would we be introducing more risk into 
those programs for every dollar that we go below it?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, yes, and in fact, we are close 
enough into this recapitalization that we can also give you a 
number where you start to see points of no return, and they are 
not that far off. They are in the early 2030s, that if we do 
not recapitalize now, we simply lose the fundamental 
infrastructure and capacity that if we cross over, you cannot 
recover for like a decade no matter how much money you put at 
it. Those points are starting to come into view.
    Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, I want to talk about 
the Wuhan coronavirus. It is the Wuhan coronavirus, not some 
politically correct name that a bunch of politically correct 
bureaucrats at the World Health Organization have come up with, 
to give you a sense of their misplaced priorities.
    You were recently directed in your role as Commander of the 
Northern Command to begin prudent planning for a potential 
pandemic. I think it is very prudent to begin prudent planning. 
So could you talk us through what the role for Northern Command 
would be in such a situation and the extent to which you have 
already begun planning or even exercises for that scenario?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir. So, Senator, what we are 
doing first and the immediate actions we have taken have been 
in support of Health and Human Services with respect to housing 
some Americans coming home, and I think right now we have over 
600 still in our facilities in support of both the State 
Department bringing their folks home, as well as HHS. That has 
been going extremely well, and we appreciate the close 
coordination through the interagency to make that happen. It 
also is tied to 11 airports, of which we have facilities that 
are on standby in coordination with both the Department of 
Homeland Security, as well as HHS and CDC, as you would 
imagine. The ongoing collaboration continues to make sure we 
are part of the support structure that we would have here 
within the United States to be able to respond to this virus.
    Now, to your point about the global aspects of this and our 
role as NORTHCOM, we are, as you would expect, doing the 
appropriate prudent military planning to ensure that we are 
able to respond. The types of things that we are doing is, for 
example, we are running a BTC every single day and that 
includes representatives from all around the globe, all the 
geographic combatant commands that are in there to make sure 
that we see what is happening within their regions and that we 
are centrally managing that from our headquarters in NORTHCOM.
    We have plans in place, as you would imagine, that look for 
what is the scope that this could go to potentially and making 
sure that we are not caught by surprise.
    Both our role that we are doing in the day-to-day is very 
much informative to the role that we are doing for the planning 
and making sure that we are prepared for the worst case 
scenario that might happen and make sure we are doing that 
globally not just here in the United States.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. I think we are still at 
only 14 cases in the United States that have been confirmed by 
public health authorities.
    General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Cotton. Let us hope that remains the case. I think 
we are in a much better position than we were a few weeks ago 
when we had 20,000 people landing in the United States from 
mainland China every single day. So I commend the President and 
the administration for the travel ban put in place.
    But there are still around a million and a half Americans 
who traveled from--or a million and a half persons who traveled 
from mainland China starting in mid-November until the travel 
ban went into place. So we have even a fraction of what China 
reported, just overnight, 14,000 cases, which I should add were 
not newly discovered cases or the result of new scientific 
breakthroughs, but a political decision to finally start 
getting a little bit closer to the truth. Obviously, it is 
going to put a lot of emphasis and stress on the mission and 
the planning that you and your people have been doing. So thank 
you for that.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Heinrich?
    Senator Heinrich. Admiral Richard, congratulations on your 
assumption of command, and I would remiss if I did not invite 
you back to Sandia and Los Alamos. I know you have been there 
before.
    But during your confirmation hearing, you agreed that 
restoring plutonium pit production at Los Alamos is the 
military's top priority. However, in your answer you also 
stated that there are issues. Now that you have had a little 
time to work with NNSA and get up to speed on that, I would 
like to ask you to articulate what the specific issues and 
impediments are that you see in meeting the current goals.
    Admiral Richard. Well, Senator, when I talked about the 
weapons complex infrastructure, the plutonium pit would be the 
first thing that I would call attention to in terms of our 
nation's ability to generate that number of pits that is 
essential simply for the sustainment programs that we desire to 
go do. The concern actually again was funding. Step one is to 
provide adequate resources. I am very confident, particularly 
in the near term at Los Alamos, that with adequate funding we 
can deliver 30 pits per year by 2026, and I continue to work 
with NNSA and Ms. Gordon-Hagerty to make sure the longer-term 
plan is also--I have equal confidence in that.
    Senator Heinrich. One of my concerns with regard to that is 
if we are going to do pit production at two locations and the 
intellectual capital is currently pretty much all at Los 
Alamos, not losing, not poaching that capital to a second 
facility before we actually get job number one done. Do you 
share those concerns?
    Admiral Richard. Well, Senator, not only do I share them, 
but it is in the weapons complex and other areas writ large, do 
we have enough talent to be able to accomplish what we have to 
go do.
    So I work with Ms. Gordon-Hagerty closely on her stack of 
responsibilities with regard to that, as well as we do a number 
of things at United States Strategic Command to bring talent 
into the strategic deterrence area at large. I can give you a 
longer answer for a question for the record. But, for example, 
we have an academic alliance with over 70 colleges and 
universities where we are trying to encourage people to come in 
and develop expertise in national security strategic 
deterrence, and the weapons complex benefits from that.
    Senator Heinrich. As you have articulated, we are pushing 
up against very thin margins on all three parts of the triad. 
What are the consequences for your command if any one of those 
legs experiences a significant delay? And if that were to 
occur, how would you rebalance?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I thank you for that 
question.
    I think we all well know the commanders of Strategic 
Command have been repeatedly asked that question over time. 
Part of how we got to the point that we are at was by doing 
operational mitigations to make up for lack of earlier 
decisions to recapitalize.
    We are very close to turning that rheostat about as far as 
it is going to go. So the last remaining things that I have--
and you can refer to them as a hedge. Sometimes that is more 
thought of for the weapons complex. But the triad itself was 
built with an overlapping, interlocking set of attributes that 
are very complementary, and each leg makes up for the 
weaknesses in the other leg.
    I would get to the point where I--basically that is called 
inter-leg hedging. I would have to start taking the attributes 
of the triad apart, and I will lose attributes along the way. 
So I can cross-cover with one piece of the triad on another, 
but I may lose the survivability of the ballistic missile 
submarines. I may lose the flexibility and signaling for the 
bombers. That is about what is left for us to do.
    Senator Heinrich. Moving on real quick, I do not have a lot 
of time left. But you are familiar with my interest in 
hypersonics and more broadly in just maintaining the R&D focus 
to have a third offset, whether that is through the lens of 
hypersonics or directed energy or, for that matter, artificial 
intelligence.
    We are seeing a big bump in this budget in the area of 
hypersonics. It is a $3.2 billion overall number. It is a 23 
percent increase. How is that money going to be spent so that 
when you are scaling, that you are still efficient and spending 
it wisely?
    Admiral Richard. Well, Senator, that question would be best 
answered by the services that are responsible. All of them are 
working on it. I am pleased with the progress. I am working to 
make sure that when that capability is delivered, I am ready to 
receive it with concepts of operation and command and control, 
being able to immediately put it to use defending the nation.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Scott?
    Senator Scott. First, thank you both for your service.
    General O'Shaughnessy, I think we have all been following 
what Communist China has been doing around the world. I am from 
Florida, and so everybody in Florida is clearly watching what 
is happening in Latin America, especially Communist China's 
involvement in Venezuela but even in other countries with their 
investments. What they are trying to do is build relationships 
and make people dependent on them.
    How does Communist China's involvement in Latin America 
impact our national security?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Well, I think you bring up a good 
point because sometimes it is easy to forget about our own 
neighborhood, as we look at this global competition that we are 
in with China. Admiral Faller has done a really good job I 
think of highlighting that and the consequences thereof and the 
focus that we need to have not only within the Department of 
Defense but as a nation to that.
    Of course, we also see it, for example, in the Bahamas, 
which is even closer to home, where we see China is trying to 
get an influence with one of our closest neighbors and great 
partners.
    I think we have to be cognizant of it. We have to think 
about it from the aspect of what are the implications to us 
from a national security standpoint, and then what are the 
implications to us just as a nation as we see this global 
competition playing out in our own hemisphere close to home.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    Admiral Richard, do you think we have enough--whether it is 
Communist China or Russia in Latin America, do you think we 
have the right amount of assets there and the right amount of 
focus there, or do we need to put more focus based on what they 
are doing to try to have an impact close to our borders?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I applaud the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs' focus broadly on global integration, and when 
you take a global view of the competitions that we have, it 
drives visibility into those areas. So I think the Department 
is moving in the right direction to look at the totality of 
what we need to be concerned about and not just focus on one 
geographic region.
    Senator Scott. So Canada is about to make a decision on 5G 
on Huawei. It is my understanding that the military 
establishment in Canada has said that the Trudeau 
administration should not go forward with doing any business 
with Huawei with regard to their 5G.
    How would that impact our relationship with Canada if they 
do?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would say is clearly 
we see the security implications of 5G not only with Canada but 
with our allies and partners and even here at home. Clearly we 
see this as a national security implications at large, and 
making sure that we, with all our allies and partners--that 
they all go into any negotiations and ultimately procurement of 
infrastructure with clear eyes to truly understand what are the 
risks and then what can we do to mitigate those risks.
    I think as we do continue to work with Canada as a close 
ally and a partner, just like we have done with other allies 
and partners, we need to make sure that we are sharing all the 
intel that we have, which we are, and making sure that we 
provide them all the things that they need to make the proper 
decision and an informed decision to fully understand the risks 
that they take and ultimately the implications, to your point, 
that we might have here at home with what we can share with 
them, how we would share with them, and what the implications 
would be.
    I think as we look at Canada with the NORAD aspect of that, 
that becomes even closer to home because of our binational 
relationship we have with them and making sure that we 
understand the rippling effects of potential security concerns 
relative to Huawei, 5G, and we see as very real concerns.
    Senator Scott. So knowing the risks especially like with 
NORAD, what should Congress be doing to try to make sure that 
Canada makes the right decision and to follow the lead of their 
military establishment that Huawei should not be a partner for 
5G?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I think the continuation of what we 
are doing already, which is the great conversations and 
dialogue that we are having with our partner in Canada, again 
sharing the intel so that we make sure that they understand 
fully the risks that they might be taking on so that they can 
make a decision, their own sovereign decision that they will 
make, but it is an informed decision fully understanding the 
risks, the consequences, and ultimately what the rippling 
effects might be as a result of that from a national security, 
for their own security, and then for us together as a 
binational organization within NORAD as an example, and as we 
are tied with North America very much so the rippling effects 
through the binational, bilateral relationship.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
    Senator Manchin?
    Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I thank both of you for your service.
    I can only repeat to you what I have heard in talking and 
listening to people with expertise, and this is how they have 
kind of explained the Cold War coming to an end and where we 
are today and if we are on top of our game or if we are ahead 
of our game. Basically the United States in the 1980s took the 
position to be very aggressive in some of the weapons we 
designed. Russia could not keep up with what we were doing. It 
kind of forced them into a situation where they had to evaluate 
could we defend ourselves against America with the superior 
weapons they have designed. That is what was given to me, along 
those lines.
    Now, if you take it from the Cold War forward, have we 
still stayed on top of our game? It sounds to me as if 
hypersonic weapons and other future weapons have been more 
advanced by other countries such China, even Russia coming back 
into the scene in a real aggressive way, maybe North Korea to a 
certain extent. Are we going to be able to deter them from 
moving forward because of our superiority, or are we going to 
be playing defense to catch up?
    So however you can help me with that to understand it 
better.
    Admiral Richard. Let me start that in terms of, first, I go 
back to that was a choice by China and Russia to develop those 
weapons. We certainly could have done that and we did not. I 
think their actions in many cases speak louder than what they 
tell us in terms of what their intentions are. Again, this is a 
competition just like any other military competition, and I am 
confident that this nation has the ability to produce the 
capabilities we have to have. For deterrence, again the basic 
equation has not changed. Can I deny you your aim or can I 
impose a cost on you that is greater than what you seek? I can 
do that if necessary.
    Senator Manchin. Admiral and General both, the evaluation 
was given to me about the Cold War and the end of the Cold War. 
Is that accurate? We outpaced them so far that they had to come 
to the realization they could not compete and defend 
themselves?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, what I would offer, I would break 
that into a conventional piece and a strategic deterrence 
piece. On the conventional side of the house, in general I 
would say that that is in the main correct. What we were able 
to do on the strategic deterrence side is hold strategic 
deterrence. The whole goal on strategic deterrence is for 
nothing to happen, and we were successfully able to do that. So 
I would recharacterize that slightly in terms of a conventional 
force advantage that we achieved.
    Senator Manchin. General?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would add to that, 
though, as you fast forward to today, what we do see is our 
adversaries really investing in some of that conventional 
capability that does have the ability to hold us at risk and we 
have to, therefore, be able to defend against it. What I am 
referring to, for example, is the submarine that has very good 
capability that carries cruise missiles, some of the long-range 
aviation like the bombers----
    Senator Manchin. We have the USS West Virginia. I have been 
on it and spent some time with them. I appreciate it. You do an 
excellent job.
    General O'Shaughnessy. And so I think from our perspective 
we think a lot from the Cold War about the nuclear aspect and 
deterrence. I think as we reach today, we also have to factor 
in the conventional aspect of this and having peer adversaries 
that have the capability to reach out to us at home in ways 
that we did not have in the Cold War that we have to factor 
into our defense.
    Senator Manchin. My final question would be basically you 
are looking 30 years down the road--at least 30 years down the 
road--for the life of the weapons and the defense that we are 
doing with our triad. Are we looking at their capabilities and 
where they are looking 30 years down the road too and if they 
might be to the point to where they are advancing quicker, 
willing to make more sacrifices, spend more money to become an 
equal super power?
    The One Belt, One Road, as far as I am concerned, is China 
wants to be the only super power left by 2050. I hope Americans 
understand that, and I hope we in Congress understand it. That 
is what I am concerned about. I am determined in my life and 
for my children, whatever I can do and whatever decision can 
prevent that from happening because this is the greatest 
country on earth. There is no doubt what their mission is, what 
China's mission is.
    Admiral Richard. Sir, not only do I agree but I will give 
you a quick example. Columbia is going to be in service until 
2080. The Navy and the submarine force--and there are Air Force 
equivalents to this too--have long had very extensive programs 
that are looking 30 years down the road, and they are physics-
based--they are not necessarily intel-based--and looking at 
anything that could be developed into a threat so that we in 
parallel start working the countermeasure to that. I have great 
confidence in those programs. They have served us well.
    General O'Shaughnessy. And in my time, I would just quickly 
say that that is why the NDS implementation, which very clear 
focuses on this great competition and the competition with 
China in particular and Russia drives, us to make sure we do 
invest in those right resources that will allow us to compete 
appropriately going into the future, Senator.
    Senator Manchin. It is my confidence in military leaders 
like yourselves that gives me the confidence for my children 
and grandchildren. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blackburn?
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for your thoughtfulness and coming before us 
today.
    I want to talk a little bit about the hypersonics issue, 
circle back to that, because of Arnault Engineering Development 
Complex which is there in Tennessee, and of course, they are 
very much engaged in some of the work that we are trying to do 
as we look forward. I actually had some people in the office 
yesterday, and we discussed this and Arnault's importance to 
the Air Force.
    But one of the things that continues to come up as we talk 
about hypersonics is personnel and a trained workforce. General 
O'Shaughnessy, I would love to hear from you. Do you think we 
have what we need to meet the demand as we move forward, and 
how do we go about backfilling that? How do you change 
recruitment in order for us to be able to backfill that?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for 
highlighting that.
    One of the things we look at, first, there is a capability 
but then there is also a capacity. If you look at our entire 
defense industrial base, one of the things I think we have to 
really focus on is are we able to both have the technology and 
to make sure we are taking advantage of the emerging technology 
in the appropriate ways, but also do we have the capacity to 
turn that into actual weapon systems that can be relevant on 
the battlefield.
    Senator Blackburn. I am glad you mentioned that because I 
had noted in 2017 at a hypersonics conference--I think the 
Chinese had like 250 papers, and it was 10 times what we had 
had.
    So, Admiral Richard, as you look at this, are you 
attracting and training and retaining the experts that are 
going to be needed in order to meet the demand?
    Admiral Richard. Ma'am, the short answer is you are 
highlighting a challenge for the department across the board. 
It is not only in hypersonics that you talk about, but I could 
point to any number of other areas where we face an equivalent 
challenge.
    I had been very pleased in the efforts particularly by the 
services to reach out, develop, attract, and create this 
industrial base that we are going to have to have not only for 
hypersonics but for the capabilities writ large. They are 
working very hard on it.
    Senator Blackburn. Then human capital is one component, but 
then facilities, areas like Arnault Engineering, are important. 
So where are we on the sufficiency of our facilities and having 
what we need there?
    Admiral Richard. Again, I applaud service efforts to go 
after the capacity and the industrial base physical plant 
necessary to achieve the results that you are talking about. 
They are working very hard on both pieces of that.
    Senator Blackburn. Then highlighting another area, let us 
move over and talk about electromagnetic spectrum. As you know, 
this is something where I have spent a good bit of time working 
on how we proceed in this area, how we utilize expertise when 
it comes to working in a contested EW [electronic warfare] 
environment. Do we have that? Are we moving forward with the 
right type work, the visualization, the modeling, so that we 
are growing the expertise in this area?
    Admiral Richard. So, ma'am, let me start that.
    Senator, one, I applaud your interest and your leadership 
in terms of electromagnetic spectrum. That is yet another 
domain not unlike space and cyber that was permissive and we 
had freedom of maneuver for a very long period of time, and 
that has changed. So it too has to have a certain level of 
expertise. The services are working very hard on that.
    For example, if you would allow me to have a Navy flashback 
for a second. I am a joint commander now but just left the 
Navy. The submarine force, which I recently commanded, has been 
an emergency flank wide open trying to develop that expertise 
to the point that we have restructured the electronic 
technicians' rating to elevate greater numbers, better 
training, and I could go into more detail on that. You see all 
the services working like that right now.
    Senator Blackburn. Let me ask you this. Are we at a point 
where we should develop a concept of operations for EW?
    Admiral Richard. Yes, ma'am. You hit on a couple of things 
that we have to continue to work on. There are numerous 
concepts of operation. To be able to knit them together in a 
whole is----
    Senator Blackburn. Right, but we need one overriding 
strategy.
    Admiral Richard. One overarching piece----
    Senator Blackburn. And if you are reworking training and 
looking at a different utilization of expertise, then it seems 
to me we would be well served to move to one concept of 
operations that would enable each of our military divisions.
    Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I not only agree, but I 
would also highlight another point you made earlier that a key 
piece of that concept is going to be electronic battle 
management, electronic warfare battle management, the ability 
to visualize. We cannot be statically assigned anymore in our 
use of the RF spectrum. We have to be dynamic. We have to 
maneuver, and we are going to have to be able to visualize and 
understand it to accomplish that. Now, the concepts will start 
from there.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General O'Shaughnessy, one of the questions I ask quite 
frequently in these hearings is what does China want, and I 
want to ask you pointedly, what does China want in the Arctic?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Well, thank you, Senator, for 
allowing me to highlight a little bit of the Arctic and the 
importance of the Arctic. As it relates to one of our global 
competitors and potential adversaries, I think it is important 
to look at what is their desire in the Arctic.
    What we see initially is clearly an economic desire because 
of the natural resources there, and they want to be able to 
take full advantage of those resources.
    But we also see activity, for example, the Xuelong, one of 
their supposed scientific research vessels that potentially 
could be the precursor to increased submarine activity and 
those things from a more nefarious aspect.
    So we are looking at it clearly to understand what is it 
they are trying to do, but from our perspective, we are 
concerned about that as an avenue of approach. We are concerned 
about that as----
    Senator King. They are clearly highly interested. I was at 
an Arctic conference in Iceland a couple of years ago. There 
was a 40-person delegation from China, and they have designated 
themselves as a near-Arctic nation, which is like Australia 
saying--you know. But there they are.
    Now, let me follow up. There was a sentence in your 
presentation that got my attention. Finally, in the past year, 
we observed signs of nascent but growing strategic cooperation 
between China and Russia, including a combined bomber patrol 
last July and Chinese participation in multiple Russian 
exercises. I find that very important and concerning. Expand on 
that a bit please.
    General O'Shaughnessy. This was not particularly concerning 
the Arctic, but I will get back to the Arctic in the answer.
    What we do see is----
    Senator King. But the Arctic is one of the places where 
they may well find common cause.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Absolutely, and that is where I will 
move back to where I have some concern there.
    One of the things we do see is Russia actually has more 
advanced operational capability with respect to the longer-
range bomber force, and as we see them fairly routinely flying 
in and around our--Adak as an example. As we see them working 
with Russia and China together, we have concerns as we just 
look at that capability, and if they were to work together, 
they could potentially advance China's ability in that regard.
    Clearly in the Arctic, we also see the potential if they 
work together, but I think there is a little bit different 
approach because clearly Russia has concerns about China 
infringing on them from an economic standpoint. Yet, 
nonetheless, we see Russia with some very significant----
    Senator King. Russia is being very aggressive in the Arctic 
in terms of icebreakers, airstrips. I mean, that is a big part 
of where they are putting some of their major investments.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Exactly, and so that is where I was 
going with this answer is that we can actually see the 
potential for China to leverage Russia's capability and 
capacity and understanding to develop China's----
    Senator King. Do you have adequate sensors to determine if 
something is coming over the top?
    General O'Shaughnessy. We do not, sir.
    Senator King. And that is clearly a gap that needs to be 
addressed.
    General O'Shaughnessy. It is, Senator.
    Senator King. This hearing seems to be the hypersonic 
hearing, and I think that is important, and the budget is 
important, the additional resources. But we are behind. Russia 
and China are fielding hypersonic missiles now, and are we not 
4 or 5 years from there? And my concern is that some of that 
research should be going into defense because right now 
hypersonics are really a nightmare weapon for an aircraft 
carrier, for all kinds of targets. So are we going to put some 
money into how to defend ourselves against hypersonics, 
Admiral?
    Admiral Richard. The short answer is yes, and I think you 
see the budget priorities that are being developed to do just 
that.
    But I will also go back and offer particularly for Russia 
and China, we are defending today by deterrence. I can impose a 
cost on them that I think they will find unacceptable, to deter 
their use of that or any of their other novel weapon systems.
    Senator King. How do you deter? If we get into a conflict 
and they--I mean, I do not understand deterrence when they use 
a hypersonic to take out an aircraft carrier in the strait 
between Iceland and Scotland.
    Admiral Richard. Sir, I would have to go into a classified 
session to give you details of options that I could provide to 
redress that.
    Senator King. Well, I just hope that 23 percent budget 
increase--part of that goes to defense.
    Finally, very briefly, can hypersonics be nuclearized? Can 
a hypersonic missile carry a nuclear warhead?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, absolutely, yes.
    Senator King. So is this really triad 2.0? It is not a 
ballistic missile. It is not a submarine. It is not an 
aircraft. Or it could be, I guess, all three of those. But 
clearly we need to think about hypersonics in terms of the 
triad, in terms of our strategic deterrence.
    Admiral Richard. Absolutely, I will offer that it is not 
our policy or intent right now to nuclearize hypersonics. Other 
nations can choose to do what they wish in that area, and, yes, 
this is the competition. This has a lot of similarities to the 
introduction of the intercontinental ballistic missile back in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, and we are ready to address it.
    Senator King. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I 
appreciate your testimony.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cramer?
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I thank both of you for your service and for being here.
    I was going to start, Admiral Richard, with a question 
about GBSD, and you answered it beautifully for Senator Fischer 
and in your statements. But I will just emphasize the 
importance of doing all we can to keep it on track, if not even 
escalate a little bit, and that is reflected, of course, in the 
budget and I appreciate that.
    I want to ask both of you some questions about the standing 
up of Space Force, starting with you, of course, Admiral 
Richard, given the unique relationship between STRATCOM and 
space and space capabilities, and first, generally ask you, are 
you comfortable with how it is going in terms of the standing 
up of Space Force? And what and how are you communicating with 
Space Force in terms of helping them be successful in training, 
equipping, manning the force?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, I would draw a distinction 
between Space Command, the joint operational command, and the 
Space Force. My relationship is much more with Space Command. 
Senator, I would describe it as we are the proud parents. We 
were where those responsibilities came from. I am delighted 
that the decision the nation and the Department has made. It is 
putting necessary attention to our freedom of maneuver and 
action inside space. General Raymond and I speak frequently. We 
are setting up a set of war fighter talks here in the very near 
future. I am encouraged across the board that it improves 
mission performance overall, particularly his responsibilities 
as the sensor manager, looking across missile warning, missile 
defense, and space situational awareness. The nation wins 
because we are more effectively utilizing our assets.
    Senator Cramer. Very well said.
    General O'Shaughnessy, so again same, basically because 
obviously the relationship between Space Command and STRATCOM 
is special, but yours is awfully important as well.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
    I am excited about both the Space Force and United States 
Space Command. I think we are already starting to see some of 
the benefits of this. I think we as a nation are very fortunate 
to have a great American, Jay Raymond, leading both of these at 
this time and really chartering the course that these will take 
going into the future.
    Specifically for us for Homeland defense, from the NORTHCOM 
role we are very much tied from the U.S. Space Command side 
relative to those sensors. The very sensors that Admiral 
Richard mentioned are the ones that we are using for our own 
Homeland defense.
    The second aspect is we look at warfighting as space, a 
domain of warfighting, that occurs, and we are talking about 
that in really relevant ways, and clearly from a Homeland 
defense aspect, that has significant consequences.
    Then from a U.S. Space Force, excited about the potential 
there, as that has now been stood up, of how that is going to 
allow us to really focus like a laser on space going into the 
future.
    Senator Cramer. Well, just following up a little bit on 
that, one of the challenges I think, of course, is actually 
manning, training, and equipping this force. I think the 
services all play a role in that, which I think is somewhat 
unique to the way Space Force has been designed to be 
successful. I certainly look forward to anything that you can 
add to that discussion as well.
    As I run out of time, I want you to answer that if you have 
more to say about it, and then actually ask you about our 
northern tier bases--of course, I have three of them in North 
Dakota--and what we ought to be looking for in terms of 
capabilities to meet a potential Arctic conflict and to make 
sure that we are in sync with the strategy.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Well, I would start first on the 
Space Force. Clearly the intent is it is not just a pulling 
away from just the United States Air Force but actually looking 
within the Department of Defense where are our space experts 
and how do we actually bring them into the Space Force as well.
    That aside, relative to your question on the Arctic, we are 
actually excited about some of the things that we are actually 
doing right now in your State to support our Arctic operations. 
Clearly we see the future in our defense of our nation is very 
critically dependent on our ability to operate in the Arctic, 
our ability to have domain awareness. So, some of the things we 
are doing with over-the-horizon radars are critically important 
for us to have that domain awareness, that understanding of 
what is happening on the approaches to our nation and in 
cooperation with Canada through North America is critically 
important. Whether you are talking hypersonics--and the over-
the-horizon radars have great capability against the 
hypersonics so we can maintain that custody--or whether we are 
talking about the cruise missile threats and the bombers, those 
are all played because of some of the work that we are doing 
within your State.
    Senator Cramer. Well said, and I appreciate both of you and 
yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters?
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Richard and General O'Shaughnessy, your command 
areas play a very important role in defending the United States 
from the threat of ballistic missiles, and I note that the 
Missile Defense Agency's budget request discusses a layered 
approach to Homeland defense as the underlay to the current 
ground-based mid-course defense system that protects the 
continental United States. Specifically the MDA request 
discusses Aegis and THAAD as potential options for a layered 
Homeland defense approach. But I am also interested in the 
potential for transportable ground-based interceptors or other 
systems that can serve as an underlay to existing GMD system 
and add flexibility and depth in a cost-effective way.
    As you know, MDA has completed an environmental impact 
statement of three locations to host a potential third GMD 
site, including two fields at Fort Custer in Michigan, which 
were identified as the least expensive and least 
environmentally impacted site.
    But the question for both of you is, can you please discuss 
how you view the potential of a layered Homeland missile 
defense system, and what role would the three locations, which 
MDA has already studied, play in this layered system?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I will start with this.
    First, I will talk to one of the reasons that this demand 
signal is there, as we look at the cancellation of RKV and the 
resulting timeline between now and when an NGI, next generation 
interceptor, could be fielded. We have very significant 
concerns about that from NORTHCOM. We have been working closely 
with both MDA, as well as OSDR&E, Dr. Griffin. I am pleased to 
announce now that we are bringing time in as a variable within 
that discussion. What we are trying to do--we cannot wait 10 
years to get the next generation interceptor fielded. We are 
trying to bring that left, and so I think we will see, as the 
RFP actually gets released, we are actually looking to bring 
time left and get that fielded faster. I think we are in a good 
position there.
    But that brings you to part of that mitigation, as the 
threat continues to advance, is this layered defense concept, 
which we very much support, and you see money in the budget 
this year.
    The initial concept, to your point, was to bring in as an 
underlayer the ability to use, whether it be a THAAD modified 
potentially with additional boost capability or whether it be 
an SM-3 IIA missile that we could use in that regard is 
existing capability that we could bring into the Homeland 
defense architecture to provide that ballistic missile defense.
    But the follow-on to that is, okay, we will understand 
using that existing capability, but what is the capability we 
could actually develop that might not be what we need to deploy 
overseas but we could use specifically built for our Homeland 
defense. That gets into the point where the next iteration of 
the layered defense might be individual weapon systems that are 
designed to be fielded within the continental U.S. and in 
Alaska to defend the United States using maybe the technology 
that is in our current systems but portrayed a different way.
    I think all the work that has been done with all of the 
continental interceptor sites will go into potentially where we 
could put those, how we do those. So I think it is just part of 
the information that we now have as we look at this new 
approach with both the current GBI, the NGIs, this layered 
defense with the current system, additional system informed by 
some of the work that we have done to include within your 
State.
    Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
    Admiral, do you want to add anything?
    Admiral Richard. Just very quickly. Missile defense is 
deterrence by denial. We have a very clear national policy on 
what it is designed for and what it is not designed for, and so 
everything General O'Shaughnessy just talked about not only 
allows him to execute his mission responsibilities, but it is a 
part of the tailored deterrent strategies that I am required by 
the Nuclear Posture Review to develop. That is precisely the 
path I think we need to go down. I would throw in sensing is 
also a key piece as both of us have talked about.
    Senator Peters. One final question. I am the ranking member 
on the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee within 
this Committee, and one area that I have been focusing on are 
some of the ethics associated with the military application of 
artificial intelligence and automation in particular. I know 
there are a number of ethical concerns related to these 
weapons. I think the dilemma is represented by the threat that 
you both identified in your written statements of Russia's 
nuclear-capable autonomous underwater weapon, the Poseidon. I 
know what the threat is is all up to debate to talk about.
    But if we face time-sensitive threats in the U.S., are we 
at a tactical disadvantage if we require human involvement in 
our decision chain where our adversaries may not do that?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I will take that. What I 
would say is what we have to get away from is what we now have 
as either the human in the loop or sometimes the human is the 
loop in some of our systems to a human on the loop. What that 
will allow you to do is actually make those decisions at the 
speed of relevance because what can and should be done by 
machines and by AI and leveraging that will be done by that. 
But it will identify those key areas where we humans have to be 
the ones ethically, morally making those decisions. I think 
human on the loop is a concept we need to apply to leverage 
that capability while not preventing ourselves from operating 
at the speed of relevance.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. By the way, we have been notified the 
first vote is underway. So we are going to try to get to 
everybody here. Let us try to keep our remarks brief.
    Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
    Admiral, let me start with you. As you know, we are the 
proud home in Missouri of the Whiteman Air Force Base and the 
B-2 bomber. Let me ask you about the Air Force's budget request 
and the funding cuts for the B-2 defense management system. 
Does that decision cause you any concern about the B-2's 
ability to operate in high end threat environments to the end 
of its service life?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, I think it is a great example of 
some of the difficult decisions that we are going to have to 
make in trading or balancing near-term risks for long-term 
risks. Overall, the Air Force is way ahead on the bomber 
program. Bomber road map I think it is referred to I endorse. I 
think that is a very thoughtful approach, and the loss of the 
defensive management system--we will accommodate that risk for 
the greater gain the Air Force is going to provide overall.
    Senator Hawley. That sounds like a yes to me. You think 
that there is a risk that it will. There will be some detriment 
to its ability to operate in high end capacity.
    Admiral Richard. There is but I can manage it.
    Senator Hawley. What else do we need to ensure that the B-2 
maintains its ability to operate in those environments if this 
decision goes forward?
    Admiral Richard. That is part of the planning that I have 
to do. So we will use operational mechanisms to compensate for 
technological abilities of the aircraft. I retain full 
confidence that the B-2 can do the missions that I will ask it 
to do.
    Senator Hawley. Great. Well, I will be following up with 
you on that.
    General, let me turn to you for a second. Russian bombers 
make regular visits to our coastlines we know. What role would 
you say that the F-15EX could play in protecting our Homeland 
against these and other threats in the decades that are coming?
    General O'Shaughnessy. One of the things that we do see is 
it is not only the increasing frequency but also the complexity 
of how they are maneuvering and the missions that they are 
flying. Some of it has to do with where we would need to go to 
intercept them based on the length of their missiles that they 
carry, the range that the missiles now have. For example, the 
S-23 is an example of a long-range missile. What that means is 
we want to intercept them further out. We want to go further so 
that we can not only get the missiles. We want to hit the 
bombers so that they never actually get to launch them.
    So the F-15EX brings us that. It brings us that extended 
range that we can get with the F-15EX, as well as a much 
significant improvement in the number of missiles it can carry. 
So we see that from a Homeland defense aspect. We see that new 
platform as being well suited for the Homeland defense role in 
both our counter-cruise missile defense, our counter-airborne 
threats such as the Russian bombers.
    Senator Hawley. Great. That is great to hear.
    Admiral, let me come back to you and let us talk a little 
bit about nuclear policy. Are you confident that Beijing would 
stick to its announced no-first-use policy if there were a 
conflict with the United States?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, I think I could drive a truck 
through that no-first-use policy.
    Senator Hawley. Why do you say that?
    Admiral Richard. In other words, I am not trying to be 
flippant on a very serious matter. Right? The number of 
situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred 
that do not meet our definition of first use--I should back up. 
They are very opaque about what their intentions are. They are 
very different from the Russians. We have very little to go on 
in terms of how they interpret that relative to what we see 
from the other competitor.
    So what constitutes first use? Where might they say we are 
actually not--that is our territory. Therefore, it does not 
count as an attack against you.
    More broadly, the Soviet Union had a no-first-use policy. I 
do not think we took great comfort in that either, and so the 
declaratory policy things are not helpful in my mission area to 
deter.
    Senator Hawley. That is very helpful and I think is a great 
point for those who would advocate a no-first-use policy on our 
end as to why that that would be I think a very serious 
strategic mistake.
    Let me give you, Admiral, still on the same subject an 
opportunity to clarify something. A senior U.S. official 
recently was reported as saying--and I am quoting now--the sole 
reason the United States has nuclear weapons is to prevent 
others from using nuclear weapons. That does not seem to be 
exactly what our declaratory policy is. Can you clarify what 
our declaratory policy is?
    Admiral Richard. So the Nuclear Posture Review lays it out 
very clearly in terms of our strategic capabilities are 
designed to deter a strategic attack on the United States, 
which can be nuclear, but I think it wisely acknowledged the 
fact that it now may be possible to have a strategic attack 
against our vital interests that is non-nuclear, particularly 
in space and cyber.
    Senator Hawley. Right. So we will only consider the 
employment of nuclear weapons in extreme countries to defend 
our vital interests or those of our allies or partners, and 
those circumstances could include, as you just said, 
significant non-nuclear strategic attacks. Is that correct? Am 
I getting that correct?
    Admiral Richard. That is correct.
    Senator Hawley. Great.
    Admiral, I have got another question for you about the W-76 
TAC 2. I will submit that for the record because I am about out 
of time.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
    Senator Jones?
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for your service. In particular, Admiral 
Richard, as one Alabama native to another, thank you for your 
service. Alabama is very proud of you and so is the University 
of Alabama Roll Tide. I just thought I would throw that in real 
quickly. I know you appreciate that.
    The other thing that folks in Alabama are particularly 
proud of these days is our 117th air refueling wing, which as 
you know, won the prestigious STRATCOM Omaha Trophy this past 
year. I want to take the opportunity to congratulate Colonel 
Scott Grant, the commander there--he has just done an amazing 
job--Command Chief Master Sergeant Davis and the other airmen. 
I think sometimes our National Guard unit is going to get 
overlooked in the scheme of things, and I so much appreciate 
them winning that award. It is the first time a guard unit has 
won that.
    Can you talk a little bit about the critical role that the 
unit plays in the strategic deterrence mission that we have?
    Admiral Richard. Senator, I just would highlight. That is a 
very competitive award, and it speaks highly of that wing's 
ability to compete in that broad a competition.
    Air refueling is vital. I am not an airman, but no gas, no 
bombs, and so it is critical to my mission set for the bomber 
leg to have adequate tanking capacity. General O'Shaughnessy 
will tell you here in a second it is equally critical in his 
areas for Homeland air defense. It is something we pay very 
close attention to in terms of having capability in the right 
priority to meet those missions
    Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you.
    This past Monday, the President's Budget Request and the 
briefings that we got indicated that the Air Force intends to 
divest several aging aircraft, namely 17 B-1 bombers, 16 KC-10 
tankers, 13 KC-135 tankers. To replace the tankers, the budget 
asks for 15 KC-146's, but those are not going to be fully 
operational for another 3 years.
    So with the delay in the operational capability status of 
the KC-46's, does this in any way--does this divestiture of 
these legacy tankers pose any kind of threat to the reliable 
in-air refueling capability of the joint force? I will ask 
either or both of you that question.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I will start, Senator, and say in 
this year's budget, I think our United States Air Force made 
some difficult decisions in how do we get to the future faster. 
This is just one of those decisions where we are trying to 
divest yourselves of legacy platforms while moving to the 
future, in this case the KC-46. So while, yes, there will be an 
impact in the short term to the availability of tankers, we 
will be able to mitigate our way through that. We still are 
working closely,. In fact, I talked to the TRANSCOM commander 
just yesterday about this. I believe we will be able to 
mitigate that going forward. But it is crucial that we are able 
to get to the KC-46 and multiple other modern platforms that 
the Air Force is trying to get to.
    Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you. Thank you both for 
being here.
    Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I will yield back. 
Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. I appreciate it.
    We will now recognize Senator Sullivan. At the conclusion 
of his remarks, we will be adjourned. Senator Sullivan 
presiding.
    Senator Sullivan [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
    General O'Shaughnessy, I particularly appreciate your 
testimony. It was probably the most comprehensive, insightful 
description of our strategic interests in the Arctic that I 
have seen. In your testimony, you say the Arctic is the new 
front line of Homeland defense. It sounds like you are saying 
that the Arctic and Alaska are no longer a sanctuary from which 
we can safely project power, but it is more of a battle space 
area. Is that correct? What are the implications from your 
mindset as the NORTHCOM Commander?
    General O'Shaughnessy. That is exactly correct, Senator, 
and as always, I find myself well aligned with you relative to 
the importance of the Arctic. It is not only from the strategic 
location that it is, but now, to your point, it is clearly an 
avenue of approach to our great nation. As we look at what----
    Senator Sullivan. That impacts the whole nation.
    General O'Shaughnessy. It impacts the whole nation, 
absolutely.
    As we look at now Alaska where--I will just use the Russian 
long-range aviation. Whether it be hypersonics or whether it be 
the cruise missiles that can be launched from that long-range 
aviation, we clearly see that avenue of approach as being 
critical. So we have to, one, have awareness of what is going 
on in that space, and then we have to be able to defend in that 
space. The time that will be required to respond is short 
because of the pure geography.
    I think what we really need to think about in Alaska is how 
do we invest to have that domain awareness, having the right 
sensors and ability to understand what is happening, but also 
the ability to defend immediately and what are the systems that 
we could invest in that would allow us to have that persistent 
defense in Alaska because it is key terrain that will be 
important to us as a nation in any conflict whether that be 
with Russia or China going forward.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Let me go on to a little bit more detail. You know, it 
seems from whether it is Secretary Pompeo's speech in Finland 
at the Arctic Council, major publications like The New York 
Times, 60 Minutes--you know, there is a lot of discussion about 
the great power competition in the Arctic. I appreciate Senator 
King highlighting that in his questions for you.
    You know, unfortunately, this Committee has observed that 
the Pentagon is the organization that sometimes seems the 
furthest behind, with the exception of certainly your great 
advocacy, General O'Shaughnessy.
    In your personal opinion and the advocate for the 
capabilities in the region, what specific capabilities are you 
advocating for to ensure that we can both protect the Homeland 
in these avenues of approach that you talked about, but also to 
continue to project power from Alaska to not just PACOM but 
EUCOM, STRATCOM? And if you can talk on JPARC and even OCONUS 
KC-46 deployments, that would be helpful as well, in terms of 
capabilities.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, Senator.
    First, I would say we have to complete the next generation 
interceptor. We have literally holes in the ground right now 
that we need to fill with capabilities. So we need to bring 
that left, and we need to bring that as fast as possible.
    We need to augment that with additional ballistic missile 
capability that we could put in Alaska, whether that be SM-3 
IIA's, whether that be potentially THAAD deployments there. We 
need to bring that into Alaska. We need a sensing capability 
that will be persistent, that will be steady state, that will 
always be there. We have the technology today. We just have to 
deploy it to Alaska.
    The second thing I think we need--and I would applaud the 
Air Force for moving the additional fifth generation aircraft, 
the F-35's, to Eielson. It is now truly the fifth generation 
center of excellence, and therefore, you need a place to train. 
I think continued investment in the JPARC range is critically 
important not only for fifth gen, but for the Arctic, and 
Arctic Edge upcoming exercise we have with great 
participation--for example, from the marines--I think is 
critically important because the joint force needs to train in 
Arctic conditions.
    I make the observation that we can deploy a force anywhere, 
all over the world, and we can train that force very quickly 
and have them out the door in a matter of days. You cannot do 
that to the Arctic. If you are not training, if you do not have 
the right equipment, and if you are not versed in operating in 
the Arctic, you will not effectively be able to operate there. 
Our adversaries are operating there, and therefore, we need to 
be able to operate there as well. To your point, it is now a 
battle space, and so we need to be able to operate in Alaska in 
the Arctic in cooperation with Canada from the NORAD side.
    I think continued investment. The tankers are important 
because it is a strategic place where you can actually get to 
the European theater quicker than you can even get to the South 
China Sea from Alaska. Therefore, having that as a center where 
we have robust tankers is important, as well as the entire 
joint force I think just continuing to be able to operate.
    Senator Sullivan. The Secretary of Defense said that if you 
collocated the over 100 fifth generation fighters that we are 
going to have in Alaska with the OCONUS deployment of KC-46's, 
it would show that our adversaries--that we would have extreme 
strategic reach whether in PACOM or EUCOM. Do you agree with 
that?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I do believe there is a powerful 
synergy of bringing together the fifth generation with 
additional and modern day tanker capability.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question for both of 
you. Actually just two real quick ones.
    In our office call, you talked about your number one 
unfunded priority for some type of space-based communications 
for the Arctic. Can you just briefly touch on that?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, Senator, for allowing us 
to highlight that.
    One of my main concerns in the Arctic is communication. 
Basic communication that we normally use satellites for becomes 
challenged above about 65, even harder above 70.
    One of the things we find is the commercial technology is 
there, and so we have been working with commercial companies 
over the proliferation of LEO and finding ways that we might be 
able to bring that ability to have essentially broadband 
connectivity anywhere, for example, within Alaska. That is a 
huge implication for us to be able to operate if we can connect 
the force in areas that today we cannot connect the force even 
through our commercial partners.
    Whether it OneWeb or whether it is Starlink, we think, for 
example, in some of our partnership with Starlink over the last 
several experiments that we have done, for example, at Eglin 
where we are able to show our ability to connect that force 
with their satellites--this is not hypothetical. This is 
satellites that are in orbit today.
    Senator Sullivan. But it is your number one unfunded 
priority because that is not just protecting the comms in the 
Arctic. That protects the whole Homeland in terms of the avenue 
of approach concern that you talked about.
    General O'Shaughnessy. That is exactly right, Senator. It 
is my number one priority to have Arctic coms, and I think the 
proliferation of LEO and a Starlink or a OneWeb type solution 
is the way to get it fastest.
    Senator Sullivan. Final question for both you, gentlemen, 
and it is a just a quick answer on this. But I have been 
frustrated with Under Secretary Griffin. You know, I think we 
are seeing really smart guys in the Pentagon making dumb 
decisions. Let me give you one. It was already briefly touched 
on.
    This Committee has worked really hard in a bipartisan way 
with the administration fully supporting it to build up our 
missile defense. There has now been a decision recently, 
despite the fact that we just built 20 new silos at Fort 
Greely, to make those empty for the next 10 years. I cannot 
think of something that is unequivocally more--well, that is 
just going to harm our readiness in terms of missile defense. I 
mean, there is no dispute about that. 20 empty silos for 20 
years.
    How do we fix that gap, fill that, and correct what to me 
seems like just kind of a boneheaded decision at the upper 
levels of the Pentagon?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, first I will say that the 
unfortunate decision to cancel the RKV was the right decision 
that was made at that time----
    Senator Sullivan. But do you agree to have 20 empty silos 
for 10 years?
    General O'Shaughnessy. No, sir. What I am very dissatisfied 
with is it is going to take us 10 years to actually produce the 
next generation interceptor. We have been working very closely 
with MDA and Dr. Griffin personally. I met with him on Monday, 
and I am pleased to announce that we are going to bring this 
left. The way we will have to do that is we will have to find 
some trade space, but we have to put time as an important part 
of this because our adversaries are not waiting. Our 
adversaries are building capability and capacity, and so we 
have to be able to respond. So we are going to insert time into 
this so that we are going to have trade space developed so we 
can bring missiles to put, interceptors to put into those holes 
sooner.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Admiral, any views on that?
    Admiral Richard. I would just say that General 
O'Shaughnessy described that very well. We both have a role in 
setting the requirements for missile defense. Those 
requirements are valid, and General O'Shaughnessy just laid out 
how we are going to meet those.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, I believe this Committee will be 
supportive of any role that we can play in support to help fill 
that gap, which I think is important for the nation's missile 
defense overall.
    Thank you very much, gentlemen. We all appreciate your 
testimony.
    This hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:57 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                 counter-uas [unmanned aerial systems]
    1. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard, what are STRATCOM's defined 
counter-UAS requirements for the services to provide capability against 
current and future threats?
    Admiral Richard. Protect vital national security assets by 
detecting, identifying, tracking and defeating UAS threats.
    Attribution is another critical requirement in countering the UAS 
problem. We must boost the ability to attribute ``left of launch'' 
activities in order to truly stop the threat and achieve effective 
deterrence. A successful effort will involve whole-of-government, to 
include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), Intelligence Community, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) working together with DOD in the Homeland.

    2. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard what counter-UAS capabilities 
are fielded today and how effective are they against the current 
threat? Are you confident our strategic capabilities are defensible?
    Admiral Richard. Our counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities include 
kinetic and non-kinetic measures. Current C-UAS systems have had 
limited success; however, DOD is working to develop and field more 
effective capabilities. While there are challenges for C-UAS systems, I 
am confident we are on the right path to enhance the protection of our 
strategic assets. However, as mentioned above, we must not focus just 
on the defeat, we must also present an effective deterrent which is 
achieved through attribution.

    3. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard what capabilities are in the 
acquisitions process for the future and how long will it take until 
they are IOC? Are you confident our strategic capabilities will be 
defensible in the future?
    Admiral Richard. The services are exploring multiple kinetic and 
non-kinetic C-UAS capabilities, and are considering emerging threats 
such as swarms, pre-programmed control of UASs, and other control 
technologies like Wi-Fi. The United States Army has been identified as 
the C-UAS Executive Agent (EA); I would defer to them for specific 
programs and Initial Operational Capability (IOC) dates. I am confident 
they will facilitate necessary service development to effectively 
defend strategic capabilities.
    Additionally, over the last year, we have worked directly with OSD 
through the Senior Integration Group and now the EA at multiple levels, 
to address the issue of attribution and ``left of launch'' activities 
to achieve effective deterrence. We are also in the process of 
advocating inclusion of the concepts of attribution and deterrence 
within the overarching EA C-UAS Strategy.

    4. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard are you aware of any counter-UAS 
capabilities or innovations that might be available, but cannot be 
purchased because they do not specifically fall within defined 
requirements for a current program of record? If they exist, what would 
it take to be able to purchase those capabilities?
    Admiral Richard. Purchasing C-UAS capabilities does not appear to 
be hindered by bureaucratic procedures; the problem lies in the 
significant challenge of rapidly developing effective technological 
solutions to pace the threat. I defer to the EA to execute the 
evaluation and acquisition process for C-UAS innovations that do not 
fall within defined requirements for a current program of record.

    5. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard can you quantify what you are 
losing by not having the ability to buy off-the-shelf Counter-UAS 
technology that is ready today? Are U.S. strategic assets at greater 
risk because of our bureaucratic processes?
    Admiral Richard. While UASs pose an identifiable risk to our 
strategic assets, the DOD has an established process to gain approval 
to purchase off-the-shelf C-UAS equipment. The Services, led by the EA, 
are focusing appropriate resources and proactively developing C-UAS 
layered defense and interoperable technologies in response to the 
threat. I am confident in the EA's ability to streamline the 
acquisition process for fielding required C-UAS capabilities.

    6. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard do you believe current 
acquisitions processes will yield counter-UAS capabilities in time to 
defend against future threats?Would the answer change if you were able 
to make iterative adjustments to current programs of record?
    Admiral Richard if our current processes can take a decade to get 
you counter-UAS capability, how do you plan to keep up with new 
technological threats?
    Admiral Richard. I am confident the Army EA is addressing C-UAS 
requirements as rapidly as possible to meet existing and future 
threats. The EA is working with the Services to compress the timelines 
needed for modifying current C-UAS equipment to address the changing 
threats and capability gaps.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                          northcom / stratcom
    7. Senator Rounds. Admiral Richard and General O'Shaughnessy, 
electromagnetic spectrum plays a critical role in many DOD missions. 
Can you describe some of the ways that STRATCOM and NORTHCOM rely on 
spectrum to support their missions? What are some of the future 
spectrum warfighter needs that will be essential to competing with 
Russia and China on a future battlefield?
    Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM is highly dependent on the 
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to provide Strategic Deterrence and 
deliver Decisive Response, if necessary. Every aspect of our mission--
from sensor to shooter communications to data management and 
information flow--requires EMS access to meet deterrence objectives.
    Our adversaries have observed America's dominance on the 
battlefield and view our reliance on the spectrum as a vulnerability. 
They organize, train and equip forces to engage and maneuver within the 
EMS to gain military advantage. They are investing heavily to counter 
our radar, navigation, communications, and data link capabilities, and 
our technological advantages are eroding.
    We must develop future redundant electronic protection systems and 
resilient capabilities to counter the growing EMS threat. Additionally, 
we must continue efforts to develop an Electromagnetic Battle 
Management (EMBM) system that dynamically characterizes the EMS 
Operational Environment (EMOE), provides near real-time situational 
awareness, decision support, and command and control capabilities.
    General O'Shaughnessy. The electromagnetic spectrum serves a vital 
role in USNORTHCOM's missions and operations across our Area of 
Responsibility (AOR). USNORTHCOM relies on spectrum-dependent systems 
to provide command and control; voice and data communications; 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); advanced threat 
detection and targeting systems; electronic attack and electronic 
protection; and battlefield situational awareness and protection.
    Military operations in the future will see a widespread use of 
battlefield sensors, radars, and cloud-based systems leveraging 
advanced quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and machine 
learning for near real-time assessment and decision making. In light of 
this, we must be able to continue to operate through a congested, 
constrained, and contested spectrum environment for effective 
operations.

    8. Senator Rounds. Admiral Richard, STRATCOM is the combatant 
command responsible for the advocacy and coordination of joint 
electromagnetic spectrum operations in the Department of Defense, which 
requires the accounting and deconfliction of DOD, civilian, and 
adversary use of electromagnetic spectrum.
    What is STRATCOM's role in coordinating spectrum use by DOD and 
civilian entities? In your opinion, is the Department well-postured to 
share spectrum currently reserved for DOD use--does the Department have 
the appropriate modelling tools, capabilities, and policies to allow 
for spectrum-sharing with commercial telecoms?
    Does STRATCOM possess the required visibility into DOD, civilian, 
and adversary systems' use of electromagnetic spectrum to enable the 
Department's electronic warfare operations?
    Admiral Richard. All warfighting domains fundamentally rely on the 
electromagnetic spectrum. The DOD CIO serves as the lead for 
coordination, approval, and representation of departmental positions on 
all spectrum matters within the U.S. Government and in regional, 
national, and international spectrum management forums and 
organizations.
    USSTRATCOM's role is to advocate on behalf of CCMDs to ensure they 
have the capabilities necessary to maneuver in the electromagnetic 
spectrum, and the ability to train and exercise in operationally 
representative environments.
    Historically, the DOD, other government agencies and industry have 
viewed the spectrum in terms of exclusive blocks of airwaves off limits 
to one another. Improvements in spectrum sharing technologies are 
needed to enable real-time spectrum access by all EMS users. These 
technologies, when combined with modeling tools and policies, will 
facilitate the means to dynamically share spectrum and enable DOD 
operations at the same time in the same slice of airwaves.
    Dynamic sharing and the ability to maneuver in the spectrum 
requires the ability to monitor and understand an increasingly 
congested and contested electromagnetic operational environment. 
Electromagnetic Battle Management will be a key element of the 
Department's future Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). Until 
this capability is developed and implemented, our ability to 
characterize spectrum use at the level required to deconflict DOD and 
civilian EMS use will remain a challenge.
    We must continue to invest in personnel and technologies to enable 
Joint EMS Operations (JEMSO) from the tactical through Joint Task Force 
and combatant command levels. Maintaining a warfighting advantage 
requires superiority in the electromagnetic spectrum.

    9. Senator Rounds. Admiral Richard, mid-band spectrum, particularly 
between 3 gigahertz and 4.2 gigahertz where DOD operates many of its 
systems, has been widely discussed as important for commercial 5G 
implementation. NTIA recently released an initial report with DOD that 
found that it would be possible to do real time spectrum sharing that 
would protect the critical DOD systems that reside in this band, while 
providing attractive opportunities for commercial businesses. What are 
some examples of DOD systems in this area that support your missions? 
What will be some of the challenges and opportunities toward evaluating 
potential real time spectrum sharing of this band?
    Admiral Richard. Examples of systems in this spectrum range are 
Aegis SPY radars for the missile defense mission and some commercial 
SATCOM used by DOD for mission accomplishment. The Services (as 
capability providers), in conjunction with DOD CIO and the Joint Staff, 
evaluate challenges and opportunities in potential real time spectrum 
sharing.
    However, large high-power systems such as the Aegis SPY radar would 
be challenged to share spectrum real time while continuing to perform 
as designed for their mission. SATCOM, on the other hand, can provide 
specific channels in the spectrum to support some USSTRATCOM mission 
needs.
    A lack of advanced EMS modeling and simulation capability limits 
the ability to evaluate potential spectrum sharing implications. The 
ability to rapidly map radio frequency systems with their parametrics--
frequency, signal characteristics, spatial impacts, and mission 
purpose--would allow better frequency use comparisons for spectrum 
sharing considerations.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                         installation security
    10. Senator Tillis. General O'Shaughnessy, what proactive measures 
have you implemented to enhance force protection measures on our 
military installations to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks 
against DOD personnel and their families?
    General O'Shaughnessy. We continually assess the threat and adjust 
our protective posture to mitigate, reduce vulnerability, increase 
community awareness, and prepare for a rapid response to heightened 
threat conditions. We work closely with federal law enforcement 
agencies and have Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives 
assigned to our Headquarters. Commanders at all echelons are empowered 
to implement additional supplemental, site-specific actions to achieve 
a measured and sustainable protective posture consistent with our force 
protection priorities.
                         illicit tobacco trade
    11. Senator Tillis. General O'Shaughnessy, what impact has the 
increase of Mexican troops on the southern Mexican border have on 
illicit tobacco trade?
    General O'Shaughnessy. We partner with Mexico's Army and Navy (to 
include the Naval Infantry) to build ground-based and maritime 
capacities to enhance Mexico's ability to secure its Southern Border. 
While these military capacities are sometimes applied to operations in 
support of civil authorities, we do not focus our capacity development 
efforts to counter the trafficking of any specific commodity.
                           mission readiness
    12. Senator Tillis. General O'Shaughnessy, what issue(s) have the 
greatest impact on your mission readiness?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The rapid advancements of our adversaries, 
particularly in the areas of precision missiles, cyber, and increased 
maritime activity, present a challenge to our defensive capabilities. 
Adversary advancements in ballistic missile, hypersonic glide vehicles, 
and cruise missile capabilities, combined with increasing evidence of 
adversary intent, challenge our ability to detect, defeat, and deter 
aggression. Ever-increasing cyber threats also target our nation's 
infrastructure and add to the complexity of the threat environment.

    13. Senator Tillis. Admiral Richard, what issue(s) have the 
greatest impact on your mission readiness?
    Admiral Richard. [Deleted.]
                            personnel issues
    14. Senator Tillis. Admiral Richard, your command's mission demands 
expertise in highly technical and scientific fields, what challenges in 
terms of recruiting and retention concern you, and how do you intend to 
approach them?
    Admiral Richard. The Services undertake the bulk of recruiting 
efforts, evaluate retention incentives and track the skill sets needed 
to support our mission requirements. We work closely with them to 
ensure appropriate workforce strategic deterrent expertise remains 
available for our missions.
    The competitive marketplace for technical and scientific talent 
presents many recruitment challenges. With a robust economy, hiring 
officials face fierce competition with our private sector competitors. 
An additional challenge is the inability to secure job offers pending 
security clearance adjudications, which can take several months. Highly 
talented candidates either move on or lose interest while waiting for 
their clearance before a firm offer can even be made. Our workforce is 
multi-generational and we face the challenge of a large segment at, or 
nearing, retirement eligibility.
    Attracting and recruiting a highly talented workforce entails a 
three-pronged approach:
         First, we are utilizing our academic alliance to drive 
force renewal through student internship and recent graduate program 
opportunities. These initiatives can lead to full-time positions 
creating a pipeline of talent acquisition and succession. These 
programs provide outreach and partnership opportunities with 
educational institutions to brand USSTRATCOM as a premier employer.
        Second is the use of all available Direct Hiring 
Authorities (DHA) that apply to USSTRATCOM. This enhances our ability 
to offer non-competitive opportunities for critical talent in high-
demand fields such as Information Technology. DHA also provides 
opportunities for community outreach with business leaders, chambers of 
commerce and the wider public, to market immediate USSTRATCOM 
employment opportunities through venues such as social media and 
electronic job boards.
        The third focus is the continued development, training, 
education and mentoring of our current workforce talent.
        Additionally, USSTRATCOM will continue to sustain and 
foster a climate that inspires; promotes and values trust; focuses on 
diversity and inclusion; continues to offer training and development 
opportunities; and maintains a sincere quality of life focus for the 
workforce. There are also numerous resources available to USSTRATCOM 
geared to retaining a high-quality workforce, including recruitment, 
retention and relocation bonuses, performance incentives, flexible work 
schedules, a modern command facility, and a multitude of training and 
development opportunities.
                           command transition
    15. Senator Tillis. Admiral Richard, have any significant issues 
occurred during the transition of the responsibility of space 
operations from STRATCOM to United States Space Command (SPACECOM) 
following the establishment of United States Space Command last year? 
What is the current status of this transfer of space responsibilities?
    Admiral Richard. None to date. From the beginning, USSTRATCOM has 
been fully committed to providing the support required for USSPACECOM 
success. We expect this process to continue until USSPACECOM reaches 
full operational capability. All space related UCP responsibilities 
have been transferred to USSPACECOM.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                                  abms
    16. Senator Perdue. General O'Shaughnessy, I understand that the 
Air Force plans to conduct tests of ABMS every 4 months, with the next 
test occurring in April 2020. Given that the Air Force has primary 
responsibility to develop ABMS, how do you characterize NORTHCOM's 
specific role in the development of this system?
    General O'Shaughnessy. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are partnered with the 
Air Force on the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) to provide an 
operational, bi-national, and joint perspective and support for further 
development of an adaptive joint all-domain command and control 
capability in support of defending the Homeland. Due to COVID-19, the 
April 2020 test has been delayed until late summer; exact date is 
pending.
    Domain awareness, Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), and 
defeat capabilities that are developed for peer-level Homeland defense 
threats must go beyond customized single-threat, one-Service solutions, 
and instead be developed collaboratively by the Joint Force to address 
a range of threats. The ABMS and JADC2 align well with our 
understanding of both the all-domain operational environment and the 
decision superiority required for a capable defense of the Homeland. 
The range of threats to the Homeland creates an urgency to develop the 
JADC2 system that we need for the future and the rapid development 
cycle for ABMS aligns with that urgency.

    17. Senator Perdue. General O'Shaughnessy, how does NORTHCOM's role 
compare to the role other COCOMs have in the development of ABMS?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Due to the urgency of threats facing the 
Homeland, USNORTHCOM embarked on a campaign of rapid field prototyping 
and partnership with industry to further advance our Homeland defense 
capabilities. Our prototyping efforts last year were extremely 
successful and aligned well with the vision of combatant command-led 
Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) demonstrations every 3 months.
    We were excited to take operational lead for the ABMS Demonstration 
#1 in December 2019 and are partnered with United States Space Command 
for ABMS Demonstration #2 in 2020. We're looking forward to working 
with other combatant commands for future ABMS demonstrations to 
globally integrate the ABMS development efforts within the Department 
of Defense.

    18. Senator Perdue. General O'Shaughnessy, recent reports indicate 
that senior Army leaders have expressed reservations about ABMS. The 
Army Chief of Staff called the system ``Air-centric''. Additionally, 
the chief of the Army's Futures & Concepts Center said, ``ABMS cannot 
be the sole solution, because it doesn't account for, in some cases, 
the scale of unique requirements of all the other services.'' I 
understand that an Army unit was also involved in December's ABMS 
demonstration. To what extent was Army leadership involved in designing 
and planning the December demonstration of ABMS?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Army and Marine Corps partnered closely 
with the Air Force over the past year to develop joint fires 
capabilities that now have a central role in the Advanced Battle 
Management System (ABMS). In the December 2019 ABMS Demonstration, we 
worked closely with the Army and leveraged their capability to showcase 
command and control connections to an Army High-Mobility Artillery 
Rocket System unit, which conducted a simulated strike on a target 
generated by the ABMS. We also integrated an Army Air Defense Artillery 
Sentinel Radar system for detection and tracking of airborne threats, 
while connecting an Air Force Special Operations Command ground unit to 
demonstrate individual-level connectivity.
    During the ABMS Demonstration #2 in 2020, we anticipate the Army's 
participation in ABMS will grow considerably from their partnership in 
development of events on two of their major test ranges, Yuma Proving 
Ground and White Sands Missile Range, as well as increased connections 
to Army Fires units. Additionally, we are working closely with Army 
Futures Command to integrate its Integrated Air and Missile Defense 
Battle Command System capability into the Air Force's ABMS.

    19. Senator Perdue. General O'Shaughnessy, what will be the Army's 
involvement in future demonstrations?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I believe the Army's participation in future 
demonstrations is critical. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are currently working 
to integrate Army Futures Command emerging capabilities and infantry 
unit-level connectivity into the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management 
System (ABMS), along with expanding Integrated Air and Missile Defense 
Battle Command System connectivity. Ultimately, the Army's capabilities 
play an important role in development of a joint system-of-systems 
architecture where any sensor connects to the best shooter at every 
command and control node.

    20. Senator Perdue. General O'Shaughnessy, in Georgia, our Air 
National Guard JSTARS operators are highly-trained and mission-capable, 
and I believe that these operators can provide critical assistance as 
ABMS continues its testing and demonstrations. To that end, I am 
pleased that the Air Force has invited the 116th and 461st Air Control 
Wings of the Georgia Air National Guard to the April demonstration of 
ABMS. In your view, to what extent will current Air National Guard 
JSTARS operators improve your ABMS demonstrations and testing?
    General O'Shaughnessy. We are working closely with operators from 
the 116th and 461st Air Control Wings to further develop the 
operational concepts for the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). 
Our Blue Force team for ABMS Demonstration #2 will contain two Air 
Battle Managers (ABMs) from Robins AFB. In line with the Air Force's 
efforts to develop a multi-domain operator career field, we will work 
with the ABM community to create joint warfighters who can effectively 
operate across all domains simultaneously. The airmen from Robins AFB, 
along with others from the ABM community, bring valuable expertise that 
can be used to design and build the Joint All-Domain Command and 
Control system to ensure our competitive advantage against peer 
adversaries in the future.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
           submarine survivability post-w76-2 missile launch
    21. Senator Hawley. Admiral Richard, some have argued that firing a 
missile with the W76-2 would leave the firing submarine vulnerable to 
attack. Do you have any concerns about our forces' ability to safely 
perform split launches?
    Admiral Richard. Introduction of the W76-2 has not changed the 
operating patterns or objectives assigned to SSBNs and does not 
introduce any new vulnerabilities to the force. Our submarine force has 
trained extensively for decades and continues to train for this 
scenario, and I have full confidence that, if directed, they can and 
will successfully execute such a mission.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
        metrics from military deployment to the southwest border
    22. Senator Reed. General O'Shaughnessy, as I mentioned in my 
opening statement, I remain concerned with the military utility of the 
ongoing deployment of active duty forces to our southern border. Active 
duty troops are currently manning Mobile Surveillance Camera (MSC) 
stations owned and deployed by CBP. Could you tell us how many migrants 
active duty and guard troops have encountered or detected while manning 
the MSCs, and if so, where exactly have they been encountered between 
legal points of entry?
    General O'Shaughnessy. As of 27 May 2020, title 10 forces have 
detected 21,069 migrants in fiscal year 2020. Military personnel 
encountered a total of 780 migrants during that same timeframe. Of 
these, 128 were encountered by title 10 forces, and 652 were 
encountered by title 32 forces. These encounters were near El Centro 
and San Diego, CA; Tucson, Nogales, Ajo, and Yuma, AZ; Laredo, Del Rio, 
El Paso, Rio Grande City, McAllen, Weslaco, Harlingen, Brownsville, and 
Fort Brown, Texas.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                          troops at the border
    23. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, can you please 
provide this Committee an update on U.S. Military operations at our 
southern border?
    General O'Shaughnessy. We are assisting the Department of Homeland 
Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in four mission 
areas: 1) operating mobile surveillance camera assets for detection and 
monitoring, 2) operational support such as motor transport maintenance, 
heavy equipment operations, and crisis response force capabilities, 3) 
infrastructure support, to include barrier and fence repairs, and 4) 
aviation support, to include light and medium rotary-wing, fixed-wing, 
and unmanned aircraft systems. To maximize our direct support to DHS, 
our command and control structure is geographically-aligned with CBP 
sectors.

    24. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what are the current 
troop levels at the southern border?
    General O'Shaughnessy. As of 27 May 2020, there are 5,559 DOD 
personnel supporting the southwest border operations. Of those, 3,112 
are title 10 and 2447 are T32 forces.

    25. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, can you provide an 
updated cost estimate for troop deployments for fiscal year 2019 and 
quarter 1 fiscal year 2020?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the DOD Comptroller. The Services 
and DOD Comptroller capture costs associated with DOD support to our 
southwest border operations.

    26. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, can you tell us what 
resources--if any--have been diverted to execute this mission?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Joint Staff, in coordination with the 
Services, determines sourcing solutions of units supporting the 
southwest border mission. Two USNORTHCOM-allocated units have elements 
dual-purposed for southwest border support, meaning they can be 
diverted to another mission if required by a higher priority tasking. 
The first is the Aviation Brigade assigned to the Defense Chemical 
Radiological Force that is providing 10 UH-60 aircraft in support of 
DHS. The second is the Military Police Battalion assigned as the 
Homeland defense quick reaction force while also serving as part of the 
crisis response force for southwest border support. If a higher 
priority mission requires either of these forces, they can be diverted 
to that mission.

    27. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, are there any unique 
capabilities that the military is providing the Department of the 
Homeland Security that they cannot provide organically?
    General O'Shaughnessy. No. The support DOD provides to the 
Department of Homeland Security is not unique to DOD. However, DOD is 
providing support with capabilities and capacity that DHS lacks.

    28. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what is the criteria 
for withdrawal of troops from the border?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Secretary of Defense determines whether 
to support requests for assistance from Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). DHS currently does not 
have sufficient resources to meet all of their requirements on the 
southwest border.

    29. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, last year--as the 
Operational Commander when troops were initially deployed to the 
border--you said that you felt that your perspective was considered in 
the decision making process. What is your perspective now, and what is 
your current recommendation to this Committee on the deployment of 
active duty troops to the southern border?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I continue to believe border security is 
national security and that effective security reduces threats to the 
Homeland. While Homeland defense remains the core mission for 
USNORTHCOM, we are providing military support to the Department of 
Homeland Security to help fill their gaps on the southwest border.

    30. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what feedback are 
you getting from subordinate Commanders on the impact of border 
deployments on mission readiness and concurrent deployment commitments?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Deployments can have both positive and 
negative readiness consequences. Feedback received through subordinate 
component channels and deployed units indicates they have been able to 
conduct some individual-level training to help maintain or increase 
readiness levels.

    31. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, have these 
deployments compromised readiness in the force providing services and 
units?
    General O'Shaughnessy. As a combatant commander, I am a consumer of 
Service readiness. Monitoring and evaluating force readiness is a 
Service responsibility. That said, we continually seek ways to mitigate 
readiness impacts. We have been able to keep some units at home 
station, which enables them to maintain readiness and conduct normal 
training. For example, by dual-tasking aviation units for both 
detection and monitoring as well as crisis response force missions, 
pilots are able to fly and maintain proficiency vice standing alert. 
Marine Corps units are rotating more frequently so that they are able 
to conduct normal unit training at home station. All of these actions 
help to mitigate impacts to Service readiness.
     electro magnetic spectrum/cyber management and missile defense
    32. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, your testimony highlights 
our need to remain focused on hardening missile defenses and our strike 
capability in respect to non-kinetic threats, specifically those that 
exist in cyber space or along the electromagnetic spectrum. You stated 
that, ``Our adversaries have observed our use and dependence on the 
Electro Magnetic Spectrum, and have developed and organized their 
forces to achieve Electro Magnetic Spectrum superiority; it is 
essential we develop capabilities and appropriately organize to counter 
this threat. '' How are you testing and hardening your networks and 
lines of communication that allow you to provide critical missile 
defense, deterrence, and strike against an enemy who has specifically 
designed offensive capabilities to deny ours?
    Admiral Richard. Our testing and certification process for Electro-
Magnetic Pulse protection implements established DOD standards, which 
include system level, threat-relatable test protocols. We track the 
status of these assets and publish a report annually. Infrastructure 
improvements require testing and validation as well as periodic 
revalidation against threat relatable test protocols in order to 
maintain their certified status. For example, the upgraded test 
facility at Patuxent River NAS is expected to resume operations later 
this fall and the Air Force recently executed a long anticipated test 
on a B-52 this past January.

    33. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, can you speak to the 
relationship you have with CYBERCOM and the information sharing 
mechanisms that exist to communicate and respond to a non-kinetic 
attack--be it electronic warfare or cyber--on our missile defense 
architecture or our strike capability?
    Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM communicates with CYBERCOM on a 
continuous basis during steady-state operations and in crisis 
situations. USSTRATCOM's Cyber Operations Integrated Planning Element 
(COIPE) is provided to us by CYBERCOM specifically for the purpose of 
facilitating coordination and information sharing between our combatant 
commands. The COIPE collaborates on any intelligence or observations 
from the field that potentially indicate a threat in and through 
cyberspace to our critical mission systems, including our missile 
defense and strike capabilities.

    34. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, can you highlight how you 
interact with NORTHCOM and NORAD on missile defense in this regard?
    Admiral Richard. From a cyberspace perspective, the same 
interaction and relationships exist with NORAD/NORTHCOM as they do with 
CYBERCOM. We have an extensive amount of shared mission space with 
NORTHCOM when it comes to the Missile Defense System and we have 
processes in place to accomplish the mission.
    Day-to-day, our Joint Cyber Center and Cyber Operations Integrated 
Planning Element collaborates with their counterparts at NORAD/NORTHCOM 
and other combatant commands to stay current on any known or 
anticipated threats. We also receive updates from CYBERCOM and the 
Intelligence Community via multiple secure information sharing systems.
    During a crisis, we are able to coordinate operational control and 
direct the activities of organic cyberspace defense forces within each 
of our Commands. If the demand for defensive capability exceeds our 
capacity, we work with CYBERCOM to request additional support or more 
specialized forces. In this situation, USSTRATCOM would be working 
closely with NORAD/NORTHCOM to ensure we are not duplicating effort and 
are maximizing our defensive capability on critical mission systems.

    35. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, you are responsible for 
coordinating global missile defense planning with other combatant 
commands, services, and agencies that employ our Nation's missile 
defense capabilities. Can you expand on the maintenance of these 
complex relationships?
    Admiral Richard. We maintain these relationships through constant 
outreach and regular interaction with other combatant commands. We 
provide regional combatant commands recommendations in areas such as 
defense duration, defense sufficiency, allied/partner missile defense 
integration, and risk to the global force through the Missile Defense 
Executive Board (MDEB) and its associated subordinate groups to include 
the Operation Forces Standing Committee (OFSC). Our independent 
analysis informs combatant command operational plan updates and assists 
in their Integrated Priority List development.
    Additionally, we provide support to the Chairman regarding Global 
Force Management and other assessments such as the Capabilities Gap 
Assessment and the Annual Joint Assessment.

    36. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, how often you conduct 
exercises to stress test these relationships and lines of 
communication?
    Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM exercises all mission areas while 
simulating the need to conduct these missions in a denied and degraded 
cyber, space and EMS environment at least twice a year in our global 
series Tier 1 exercises (Global Thunder and Global Lightning). 
Additionally, we also exercise USSTRATCOM missions in support of other 
combatant command exercises while simulating these same contested EMS 
conditions.
    Our Global Storm exercises allow us to focus on specific objectives 
and procedures for operating in a contested EMS environment; these are 
conducted several times a year. During the last year we also conducted 
over 380 short duration (3-4 hour) training events which focus both 
inside USSTRATCOM and with other commands; these proficiency events 
test our battle staff members on various facets of command control.
    Finally, we have specific weekly exercises with combatant commands 
involving challenging ballistic missile scenarios to test and stress 
interactions and lines of communication.
    All of these numerous exercise opportunities improve our ability 
and readiness to successfully operate in future conflicts.

    37. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, in your current 
configuration and architecture, which area presents you with the 
greatest challenge to meeting the National Defense Strategy's intent: 
deterrence, detection, or strike?
    Admiral Richard. All of these areas are necessary, and all are 
challenged. We now face multiple actors across all domains who 
constitute a strategic threat to the United States, our allies and 
partners and we must recapitalize the capabilities associated within 
all areas that underpin our ability to meet National Defense Strategy 
objectives.
    While the problem has become more complex, the conceptual 
foundations of strategic deterrence remain sound, and we must continue 
the development of the next generation of deterrence experts. Likewise, 
the detection capabilities we employ today are the best in the world, 
but we must design and deploy the advanced measures, such as space-
based capabilities, required to address emerging threats such as 
hypersonic weapons.
    Finally, our strategic strike capabilities are safe, secure and 
ready, but they are rapidly approaching end of life. We must 
recapitalize our command and control architecture, each leg of the 
nuclear triad and continue development of our conventional hypersonic 
strike capability.

    38. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, what would you like 
congress to pay attention to so we can better support your mission?
    Admiral Richard. I thank Congress for your continuing support of 
USSTRATCOM's missions. An on-time budget ensures defense programs 
arrive on time and are available to meet our warfighting requirements. 
Continuing resolutions delay new program starts and impact critical 
programs such as the Columbia-class SSBN from fielding when required.
                           election security
    39. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, in your advanced 
testimony you talk about your efforts to open up lines of communication 
and integrate the numerous agencies involved in the defense of the 
Homeland from both kinetic and non-kinetic threats. You specifically 
mentioned that in December 2019, USNORTHCOM hosted a cyber-forum that 
addressed election security and brought together all the participating 
commands, departments, and agencies to ensure that you, ``are aligned 
and ready to defend our networks, critical infrastructure, and our 
democratic processes.'' This is an overlap of several issues I am 
deeply concerned about--the protection of the privacy of our citizens, 
the infrastructure that keeps our economy running, and the democratic 
institutions and election infrastructure that will allow American 
voices to be heard in 2020. Can you expand upon the cyber-forum that 
addressed election security, and your key takeaways for NORTHCOM?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The December 2019 cyber forum included 
participants from United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), United 
States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), as 
well as The Adjutants General (TAGs). Representatives from the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) also participated, and we continue to seek ways to improve 
information sharing with other federal partners.
    Two key takeaways from the forum were the need for better 
communication channels among all partners for improved situational 
awareness, as well as a clearly defined process for ensuring non-DOD 
partners understand how to levy DOD assistance. We used these takeaways 
during Super Tuesday voting, when USNORTHCOM, along with USCYBERCOM, 
NGB, DHS, DOJ, and the intelligence community conducted real-time 
election defense coordination against foreign threats.

    40. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what are the plans 
in the future to keep conversations like this going as we move toward 
the 2020 election and beyond?
    General O'Shaughnessy. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 
supports the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead federal 
agency for election security. In this role, we continue to work closely 
with DHS to defend not only the 2020 elections, but future elections as 
well. USNORTHCOM will continue to refine our processes and exercise 
scenarios with our federal partners to enhance communications and 
streamline support to DHS.

    41. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, in your testimony 
you state, ``Our adversaries--including state and non-state actors--
continue to actively target military networks, civilian critical 
infrastructure, and our democratic processes through network-based 
intrusions.'' I am proud to say that the Connecticut National Guard 
Election Task Force will be conducting cyber defense operations along 
with several other states during the 2020 elections.
    General O'Shaughnessy. The National Guard plays an essential role 
in defending against malicious cyber activities targeting elections. I 
applaud the efforts of all National Guard units supporting cyber 
defense of the 2020 elections.

    42. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, can you speak to 
your plan to integrate efforts such as those of the Connecticut 
National Guard--but also the role of CYBERCOM and the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency--to mitigate threats to our election 
infrastructure?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the lead 
federal response agency for cyber election security and has been 
sharing information and providing assistance to all organizations, 
including the National Guard, that request support. USNORTHCOM, in 
partnership with United States Cyber Command, is assisting CISA by 
providing intelligence information. Additionally, the National Guard 
Bureau (NGB) has been sharing information and conducting tabletop 
exercises with National Guard forces, and some states have already 
begun to execute support at the state level.
 the threat of information operations and need for cognitive security 
                                (cogsec)
    43. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, the Emerging Field 
of Cognitive Security (COGSEC) focuses on the evolving information 
environment and suggests that in the future, governments, social 
platforms, and non-state actors will be engaged in a continual arms 
race to influence--and protect from influence--large groups of users 
online. This field was highlighted by RAND analyst Dr. Rand Waltzman 
who previously testified in front of the SASC Cybersecurity 
Subcommittee in 2017. I am concerned about these efforts to exploit the 
cognitive biases of large public groups to support the execution of 
military objectives. This threat was crystalized in 2014 in Eastern 
Ukraine, in which information operations campaigns targeted both 
civilian and military members of Ukraine based on their cognitive 
biases to achieve a military objective, the annexation of Crimea. How 
can we protect our Homeland from non-kinetic attacks like we saw in 
Ukraine?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Our adversaries have the ability to threaten 
our Homeland in multiple domains--to include the information domain. 
Whether an attack originates in cyberspace or in the physical domain, 
USNORTHCOM and NORAD cannot deter what we cannot defeat, and we cannot 
defeat that which we cannot detect. Protecting our Homeland in the 
information domain requires a collaborative whole-of-government effort, 
and our contributions include intelligence support to information 
operations, cyber, and counter-messaging efforts in support of our 
interagency partners.

    44. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what counter measure 
are we taking now, or can we take in the future, to increase our 
defense of the Homeland in this increasingly complex operating 
environment?
    General O'Shaughnessy. As we defend the Homeland against threats in 
all domains, USNORTHCOM is focused on countering adversary narratives 
by, with, and through our fellow combatant commands and partners. In an 
age of rapidly advancing technology, strategic competition, and 
innovation, we cannot rely on antiquated technology or outdated 
approaches. We are bringing new thinking, new approaches, and new 
technologies to bear against our adversaries in order to defend our 
Homeland. One such initiative is through the USNORTHCOM-created 
Homeland defense Military Information Support Operations (MISO) 
program, which enables all combatant commands to conduct information 
operations as part of an integrated effort to improve our Homeland 
defense.

    45. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, great power 
competition includes being able to defend against adversaries like 
Russia, China, and Iran's ability to carry out non kinetic attacks on 
the Homeland. How do you see the problem of our adversaries conducting 
information operations within United States borders?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Our adversaries possess the capability to 
threaten our Homeland in the information domain. Defense against 
information operations requires a whole-of-government effort, and close 
collaboration with a wide range of partners. USNORTHCOM places a high 
priority on our support to the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Cyber Command, and other government partners to defend the Homeland in 
the information domain.

    46. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, over the past 10 
years, we have seen many attempts to destabilize the United States from 
the inside out and subvert faith in democratic institutions. In 
coordination with CYBERCOM what are you doing to protect the Homeland 
from these often invisible, but very meaningful threats to the 
Homeland?
    General O'Shaughnessy. In synchronizing efforts with USCYBERCOM, we 
are bringing new thinking, new approaches, and new technologies to bear 
against our adversaries to defend our Homeland. As we defend the 
Homeland against complex threats in all domains, USNORTHCOM understands 
the status quo is not acceptable and we are actively building a capable 
defense that provides a credible deterrent. In an age of rapidly 
advancing technology, rising strategic competition, and extraordinary 
innovation, we are working closely with our partners in the Department 
of Defense, to include USCYBERCOM and the National Guard Bureau to 
defend our networks and our elections infrastructure to protect our 
critical democratic institutions.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                       missile defense of hawaii
    47. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, in your written 
testimony you highlighted North Korea's successful tests of ICBMs 
capable of ranging to most or all of North America. How confident are 
you in the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System to 
defend the United States against ICBMs fired from North Korea, and does 
that confidence include ICBMs targeted at Hawaii?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I am confident we can defend against an ICBM 
threat from North Korea today, including threats to Hawaii. However, 
adversary capabilities continue to advance. We are on the ragged edge 
for the Ballistic Missile Defense System and need to modernize and 
advance our missile defense capabilities to keep pace.
                     homeland defense radar hawaii
    48. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy and Admiral Richard, how 
important is the Homeland Defense Raar-Hawaii (HDR-H) in terms of 
providing discriminating radar tracking information for the Ground 
Based Interceptors? Would there be additional vulnerabilities or risks 
to Hawaii from evolving missile threats without the HDR-H?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I remain confident in our ability to defend 
Hawaii today with the current Ballistic Missile Defense System and 
sensor suite, which includes the Sea-Based X-Band Radar and AN/TPY-2 
radars. In addition, the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) could 
provide some improved capability for Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) 
defense of Hawaii. Specifically, the HDR-H could provide further 
layered defense post-GBI engagement to track data to engage a threat 
not intercepted by GBIs.
    Admiral Richard. I defer to Commander, USNORTHCOM and NORAD to 
address the importance of HDR-H radar tracking information to Ground 
Based Interceptors and associated risks to Hawaii in the absence of 
this capability.
                           homeland security
    49. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, Homeland defense is the 
number one priority and focus of NORTHCOM and NORAD. In an era of cyber 
threats, misinformation campaigns, hypersonic weapons and the growth of 
space as a warfighting domain, how has the concept of Homeland defense 
evolved in the first part of the 21st century?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Given the changes in the global security 
environment, the speed and complexity of war has accelerated such that 
future conflict will involve all domains and will be trans-regional in 
nature. Accordingly, Homeland defense is now an important consideration 
for all combatant commands, given that defense at home and power 
projection abroad are acknowledged as interdependent efforts. Homeland 
defense concepts and capabilities must continue to be at the forefront 
of planning and operations across the Joint Force in order to ensure 
our ability to project power and influence abroad.

    50. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, what metrics do you use 
to measure the efficacy of programs foused on Homeland defense?
    General O'Shaughnessy. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are driven by a single 
unyielding priority: defending the Homeland. In order to defend against 
these 21st century threats, our Homeland defense enterprise must 
reflect the fact that the threats to the Homeland have expanded beyond 
the violent extremist threat that led to USNORTHCOM's establishment. 
Both USNORTHCOM and NORAD have refocused our efforts on deterring and 
defeating the complex nation-state threats and adversarial strategies 
that have eroded our military advantage; our defense priorities should 
continue to evolve to stay ahead of current and emerging threats 
identified in the National Defense Strategy. When acquiring 
capabilities to defend the Homeland, individual programs are measured 
and tested to ensure they meet established operational requirements.

    51. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, what additional tools, 
if any, does the United States need to develop further to address these 
evolving threats to the Homeland?
    General O'Shaughnessy. In order to effectively defend the Homeland, 
USNORTHCOM and NORAD have developed a Homeland Defense Design (HDD) 
consisting of three main elements: a layered sensing grid for domain 
awareness, an adaptive architecture for joint all-domain command and 
control (JADC2), and new defeat mechanisms for advanced threats, 
including cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and 
small unmanned aerial systems. These three elements are vital to 
deterring and defeating advanced threats to the Homeland, and 
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are moving with a sense of profound urgency to 
bring these capabilities into the fight.
                              north korea
    52. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, you have expressed STRATCOM's 
commitment to supporting DOD efforts to work with partners in the Indo-
Pacific region to reduce military tensions and support the achievement 
of the fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. Given the 
variety of messages the United States has received over the past year 
from North Korea's leadership regarding the direction of their nuclear 
program, what do you think the next steps are to achieve full 
denuclearization of North Korea, and what role can STRATCOM play in 
achieving that goal?
    Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM supports the Department's efforts to 
work with regional partners to reduce military tension. I defer to the 
State Department for their diplomatic efforts in achieving the final, 
fully verified denuclearization of North Korea.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                       new start and arms control
    53. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, can you tell explain how New 
START verification help you do your job at Strategic Command? For 
example, how do you use the 18 inspection per year and constant flow of 
information from Russia on the whereabouts of their nuclear weapons to 
help protect the United States?
    Admiral Richard. The verification regime enhances our ability to 
accurately assess Russian capabilities which significantly contributes 
to our understanding of their force structure and pace of 
modernization. For example, Russia's new Avangard hypersonic glide 
vehicle and Sarmat heavy ICBM will both be accountable under New START 
and we will be provided access to those systems via the verification 
regime.

    54. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, the Trump administration is 
proposing to negotiate a new arms control ageement that includes 
additional types of nuclear weapons not covered by New START and also 
includes China. My understanding is that such an agreement would be 
unprecedented and complicated. New START expires in less than a year. 
Do you think it's possible to negotiate and bring into force a new 
trilateral arms control agreement before New START expires on February 
5, 2021? Is there a specific point at which you will recommend that the 
President extend New START regardless of the status of the trilateral 
diplomatic effort? Is this country safer in a world where we have no 
controls over or insights into Russian strategic forces?
    Admiral Richard. I defer to the State Department regarding the 
specifics for negotiating agreements. China has reaped significant 
benefits by not being bound to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty, and has consequently built a substantial arsenal of medium- and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
    I support any arms control agreement that enhances the security of 
this nation. Russia has been largely compliant with New START (NST) as 
it sets a limit on the number of deployed strategic weapons they have. 
However, as a bilateral treaty, NST fails to account for thousands of 
non-strategic weapons and new systems in development outside of the 
treaty definitions. In a perfect world, having all of these attributes 
would make my job easier. When asked, my best military advice to the 
President will be NST has served us well and we should preserve those 
treaty attributes that are beneficial, seek to address those issues the 
NST does not address, and remain cognizant of the limits of military 
advice to diplomatic initiatives.
    Whether the world is safer without the insights provided by NST 
depends on the evolution of Russian strategy and their forces absent 
such an agreement, and how the United States strategy might need to 
adapt to address any changes. Our current strategy and planned 
modernization as stated in the Nuclear Posture Review includes 
posturing our nuclear force structure and stockpile to hedge against 
these prospective and unanticipated risks.

    55. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, how does STRATCOM approach its 
mission of deterring China diferently from the mission to deter Russia? 
What adversary presents the greater nuclear risk to the United States? 
Are you confident in your strategic deterrence capabilities vis-a-vis 
China? How does the fact that New START exists help you address the 
concerns you have with the risk presented by Russia?
    Admiral Richard. The deterrence strategies for Russia and China are 
broadly similar as both countries pose an existential threat to the 
United States. For China, our strategy is designed to prevent Beijing 
from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through 
the limited use of its nuclear capabilities or that any use of nuclear 
weapons, however limited, is acceptable.
    For Russia, the strategy is to ensure Russia understands that 
nuclear first-use, however limited, will fail to achieve its 
objectives, fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, and trigger 
incalculable and intolerable costs for Moscow. Any use of nuclear 
weapons, however limited, is unacceptable.
    While Russia has greater nuclear capability today, China's lack of 
transparency and refusal to participate in arms control agreements 
produces considerable uncertainty surrounding its intentions. China's 
ongoing nuclear modernization, which includes it likely doubling the 
size of its nuclear warhead stockpile by the end of the decade, is a 
glaring example.
    Our current strategy and planned nuclear force modernization, in 
support of the Nuclear Posture Review, includes posturing our forces 
and stockpile to hedge against prospective and unanticipated risks from 
Russia and China.
    New START helps address concerns regarding Russia. It provides a 
ceiling on specific strategic offensive arms and a verification regime 
(i.e., on-site inspections, database exchanges, notifications) that 
permits visibility into Russian strategic offensive capabilities.

    56. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, what military developments by 
China are most worrisome to you? If yo were asked for your military 
advice on which Chinese nuclear weapons systems you would most likely 
to see reduced or eliminated, which would you suggest?
    Admiral Richard. While the full answer to this question includes 
higher classification considerations, there are a number of 
unclassified Chinese military developments that concern me:
        China's investment in highly accurate medium- and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles suggests that Beijing believes it 
can fight and win a regional conventional war within the nuclear 
shadow.
        China is developing two new ICBMs to greatly increase 
the nuclear threat to CONUS. Once operational, the DF-41 road-mobile 
intercontinental ballistic missile will be able to strike most of the 
continental United States with multiple independently-targetable 
warheads. China is also developing the JL-3 next-generation submarine-
launched ballistic missile.
        Finally, China is investing in a defense industrial 
base capable of researching and developing next-generation strategic 
capabilities, such as low observable airframes, hypersonic weapons, 
quantum computing, artificial intelligence, counter-space, cyber, and 
nanotechnology.
        See classified response for additional considerations.
    My best military advice is informed by China's actions, not its 
words. Their ongoing nuclear modernization investments, their 
aggressive expansion activities in the South and East China Seas, and 
the assessment that China will likely double the size of its nuclear 
stockpile by the end of the decade, indicates China's leaders either no 
longer believe a small nuclear arsenal is sufficient to maintain a 
second-strike capability, or they are pursuing a more aggressive 
nuclear strategy.

    57. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, Russian officials confirmed 
that the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle an Sarmat heavy ICBM will be 
limited by New START. Can you confirm this to be the case? Why is it 
important that New START limits these systems--what is it about these 
specific systems that you find worrisome? If New START expires, will 
you be concerned with the loss of transparency into these brand new 
nuclear weapons?
    Admiral Richard. Yes. Russian leadership made several public 
statements affirming Avangard did in fact meet the treaty criteria for 
reporting. A United States team inspected the system in late November 
of last year. In addition, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 
himself stated that the Avangard and Sarmat systems will be accountable 
under New START (NST).
    It is important for these systems to fall under the NST limits 
because they are new strategic offensive capabilities. The NST imposes 
ceilings on these systems and provides transparency, to the benefit of 
both parties.
    The loss of the NST verification regime would reduce our ability to 
accurately assess Russian strategic capabilities, including new systems 
like Avangard, Sarmat, and others. The comprehensive deterrence 
strategy, as defined in the Nuclear Posture Review, includes the force 
structure and stockpile to hedge against prospective and unanticipated 
risks.
    A fully modernized nuclear Triad, including requisite NC3 
capabilities and low-yield nuclear weapons, provides the diversity and 
flexibility to tailor U.S. strategies for effective deterrence as the 
geopolitical landscape evolves.

    58. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, are the vast majority of 
Russia's strategic nuclear delivery systems coered by New START today? 
90 percent of the systems? More than 90 percent? Do you think this will 
be the case in 2021 as well?
    Admiral Richard. One hundred percent of Russia's strategic nuclear 
delivery systems are accountable under New START (NST) today. NST does 
not impose any limits on the thousands of Russian non-strategic nuclear 
weapons or developmental systems designed to evade treaty restrictions.
    It would be improper for me to speculate regarding the outcome of 
ongoing discussions concerning NST extension.
                                 slcm-n
    59. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, the Pentagon is currently 
undertaking an analysis of alternatives for a ne nuclear-armed sea-
launched cruise missile as proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 
Did STRATCOM support President Obama's decision to retire the missile 
and warhead in 2010? If so, why?
    Admiral Richard. Under General Cartwright, USSTRATCOM led a study 
which ultimately recommended retirement of the TLAM-N [Tomahawk Land 
Attack Missile-Nuclear]. This recommendation was in-line with then 
President Obama's policy that the Nation needed to reduce nuclear 
weapons to the minimum required for deterrence and followed from the 
1991 Presidential Initiatives to remove nuclear weapons from all Navy 
vessels except Trident SSBNs.
    The 1991 decision drove reductions in TLAM-N funding due to the 
need to support higher priority programs, causing TLAM-N readiness to 
degrade incrementally and ultimately drove significant operational risk 
across the system. That operational risk was the reason TLAM-N was 
retired and a suitable replacement was not pursued.
    When TLAM-N was retired, the threat environment was perceived as 
more benign, and we determined the capability was not needed. Since 
then, adversaries have increased their reliance on nuclear weapons by 
expanding their arsenals, modifying policies for their use and adding 
new capabilities designed to complicate our deterrence strategy. Russia 
has undergone a nearly complete modernization of its strategic systems, 
while China has rapidly expanded their forces and will soon have a 
nuclear triad of their own.

    60. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, if a decision is made to 
renuclearize the Navy's attack submarine fleet with a SLCM, can you 
tell me what doing so would entail? In addition to the cost to acquire 
the missile and warhead, would there be additional certification, 
security, storage, and operational costs to maintain the capability?
    Admiral Richard. The Navy is conducting a SLCM Analysis of 
Alternatives (AOA) study; it is premature to presume answers to these 
questions at this time.
    If the AOA concludes the Navy attack submarine is the appropriate 
platform, the study would provide justification, trade-offs, and 
initial estimates of costs associated with acquisition, sustainment, 
certification, security, storage and operational cycle.
    I defer to the Navy to answer specifics on what is required and the 
associated costs of acquiring a SLCM-N capability.

    61. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, would arming attack submarines 
with nuclear SLCMs mean that each submarine could carry fewer 
conventional Tomahawks?
    Admiral Richard. My response is stated in the answer to Question 60 
above. I defer to the Navy for specific SLCM-N AOA questions.
                                  gbsd
    62. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, according to the 2018 NPR, the 
life of the Minuteman III ``cannot be extended further.'' However, in 
your testimony you did not say that and instead said that extending the 
life Minuteman III (through 2070) would be more costly than GBSD and 
that the Minuteman III cannot address future challenges and threats to 
the ICBM force. Why did the NPR claim that the life of the Minuteman 
III ``cannot be extended further?''
    Admiral Richard. The 2014 GBSD AOA determined that the cost of 
pursuing the GBSD program is comparable to a Minuteman III life 
extension program (LEP); and, more importantly, will deliver the 
improved reliability, security, and effectiveness required to meet 
current and future challenges--making replacement of the Minuteman III 
system a more cost-effective choice. The 2018 NPR subsequently 
reaffirmed the importance of maintaining an effective ICBM capability 
in meeting future deterrence requirements, and endorsed continuation of 
the GBSD program.
    We are six years removed from the correct decision to pursue GBSD 
over another Minuteman LEP, and GBSD must achieve Initial Operational 
Capability before the Minuteman III begins to age-out. USSTRATCOM 
continues to support GBSD as the most expeditious, economical and cost-
effective approach to maintaining the land-based portion of our 
strategic deterrent force.

    63. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, you stated in your testimony 
that the Minuteman III missiles ``will have increasing difficulty 
penetrating future adversary defenses.'' But don't the missiles contain 
a repertoire of countermeasures to overcome such defenses? Unlike the 
United States, have U.S. adversaries figured out a way to defend 
against a large-scale ballistic missile attack?
    Admiral Richard. Minuteman III has carried a single countermeasure 
system for decades. The 2014 GBSD AOA determined future adversary 
defenses will improve, and GBSD must deploy improved countermeasures to 
defeat emerging challenges.
    Today, no country can defend against a large-scale ballistic 
missile attack.
    Despite frequently criticizing the United States and allies for 
developing and fielding missile defense systems, potential adversaries 
have long made substantial investments in their own missile defense 
systems. Russia and China are also developing ASAT capabilities that 
could threaten United States space-based assets.
    For example, Russia maintains and modernizes its longstanding 
strategic missile defense system deployed around Moscow, including 68 
nuclear-armed interceptors, and has fielded multiple types of shorter-
range, mobile missile defense systems throughout Russia. In addition, 
Russia is developing a diverse suite of ground-launched and directed-
energy ASAT capabilities, and continues to launch ``experimental'' 
satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities to advance 
Russian counterspace capabilities.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
                             gbsd contract
    64. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Richard, can you explain why the Air 
Force decided to move forward with a sole source award for GBSD, rather 
than canceling the solicitation to rework the requirements and timeline 
to attract healthy competition?
    Admiral Richard. I defer to the Air Force to answer specific 
questions regarding the ongoing GBSD source selection acquisition 
process.
                           ftc investigation
    65. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Richard, the Federal Trade 
Commission issued a civil investigative demand to the company that won 
the GBSD contract, requesting information on its bid. Before moving 
forward with sole source negotiations, will the Air Force wait until 
the FTC investigation of the GBSD bid is complete?
    Admiral Richard. I defer to the Air Force to answer specific 
questions regarding any litigation related to the ongoing GBSD source 
selection acquisition process.
                     non-nuclear strategic threats
    66. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Richard, during your confirmation 
hearing you stated, ``The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review was very wise in 
acknowledging the possibility that strategic attacks could be other 
than nuclear and start to set a policy for us to address those.'' Since 
this is most certainly a strategic capability our adversaries are 
pursuing, would you recommend any policy shifts in order to better 
address deterring non-nuclear strategic attacks?
    Admiral Richard. No. The NPR stipulates that a critical role of 
U.S. nuclear forces is the deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear 
attack. Further the NPR recognizes U.S. nuclear capabilities make 
essential contributions to the deterrence of non-nuclear aggression. 
Accordingly, the NPR states the U.S. will maintain the range of 
flexible nuclear capabilities needed to ensure nuclear or non-nuclear 
aggression against the U.S., allies, and partners will fail to achieve 
its objectives.
    Despite frequently criticizing the United States and allies for 
developing and fielding missile defense systems, potential adversaries 
have long made substantial investments in their own missile defense 
systems. Russia and China are also developing ASAT capabilities that 
could threaten United States space-based assets.
    For example, Russia maintains and modernizes its longstanding 
strategic missile defense system deployed around Moscow, including 68 
nuclear-armed interceptors, and has fielded multiple types of shorter-
range, mobile missile defense systems throughout Russia. In addition, 
Russia is developing a diverse suite of ground-launched and directed-
energy ASAT capabilities, and continues to launch ``experimental'' 
satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities to advance 
Russian counterspace capabilities.

    67. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Richard, should the Department be 
investing in more research and development to counter non-nuclear 
strategic threats?
    Admiral Richard. The Department's current and projected R&D 
investments are appropriate. R&D programs for artificial intelligence, 
cyber, autonomy, quantum computing, hypersonics, directed energy and 
other innovative technologies will result in leading-edge capabilities 
to meet warfighter needs, defense priorities, and the means to counter 
evolving non-nuclear strategic threats.
                       national defense strategy
    68. Senator Duckworth. General O'Shaughnessy, please tell me what 
actions NORTHCOM needs to take in the coming year to better align 
itself with the National Defense Strategy and great power competition?
    General O'Shaughnessy. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are aggressively 
implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy and executing the top 
priority of the NDS: defend the Homeland. With that focus on the NDS, 
we are transforming the USNORTHCOM and NORAD headquarters and our 
components while placing a strong emphasis on integrating Homeland 
defense into global defense planning, exercises, and operations. We 
have also developed the Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for 
Layered Defense (SHIELD) to provide a persistent, purpose-built defense 
architecture. This forward-looking concept incorporates improved domain 
awareness, joint all-domain command and control, and advanced defeat 
mechanisms as critical pillars for defense of our Homeland.



                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
 FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 
                                PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2020

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                   UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND
                  UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room 
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, 
McSally, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Manchin, 
Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Our hearing will come to order.
    We meet today to continue receiving the posture statements. 
There will be quite a few more. It is the time of year, and we 
have General Tod Wolters--and I appreciate very much the time 
we spent together in Munich last week--and General Stephen 
Lyons. I appreciate the two and the years of service that you 
have donated and given to your country.
    As stated many times before, the Armed Services Committee's 
top priority is to ensure the effective implementation of the 
National Defense Strategy (NDS). We pretty much--it surprised 
me, Senator Wicker--how we have really stuck with that from the 
very beginning. It means that we must ensure that in this era 
of great power competition with Russia and China that our 
military services are resourcing our combatant commands to 
address the challenge of strategic competition.
    This is especially true of our two combatant commands 
(COCOMS) that are here today. EUCOM [European Command] is 
focused on deterring Vladimir Putin who has repeatedly shown 
his willingness to use force to achieve his political 
objectives. Then there is TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] 
whose focus on full spectrum mobility operations includes 
sealift and airlift, both of which face capability shortfalls.
    I just returned from the Munich Security Conference with 
several others here at this table. It was a great reminder of 
the importance of allies and partners as we deal with the 
challenges from China and Russia. There are great opportunities 
to work with our European friends especially in Africa, and I 
hope that we will continue to do that.
    America's commitment to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization] remains bipartisan and unwavering. We are 
matching our words with action especially through our posture 
investments in the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the 
upcoming exercises called Defender 20, which will be the 
largest movement of United States troops to Europe since the 
end of the Cold War. We are talking about, in addition to the 
10,000 already there, an additional 20,000, and so that is a 
large one. It is a record-setter.
    General Wolters, I look forward to hearing about your 
priorities going forward especially in the maritime domain 
where Russia is increasing activity, advancing submarines and 
in air and missile defense as China continues to threaten 
United States and allied forces with its missile arsenal.
    General Lyons, you recently stated that the aerial 
refueling fleet is the most stressed in the U.S. Transportation 
Command's arsenal. So we look forward to getting your thoughts 
on how we can address the shortfall, much of which is due to 
the problems that we have had with the KC-46. I am particularly 
sensitive to that because I was honored to come back from all 
the way to Washington State to come back to Altus Air Force 
Base in the KC-46. At that time--that was less than a year 
ago--I did not think there was any problem with it. Obviously, 
there is.
    Before we turn to Senator Reed, we would remind the members 
that we will have a classified, closed, informal briefing at 
2:30, and that is going to conflict with some of the votes.
    Senator Reed?

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
want to join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning. 
General Wolters is testifying for the first time before the 
Committee in his current position as Commander of United States 
European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or 
the SACEUR.
    General Lyons, I welcome your return to testify before the 
Committee on the posture of the U.S. Transportation Command.
    Let me thank both of you for the many decades of military 
service, and please extend our appreciation to the dedicated 
men and women serving under your command.
    The transatlantic relationship remains absolutely critical 
to U.S. national security. Our close bond with our European 
allies and partners is one of our greatest strategic 
advantages. In the fiscal year 2020 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress reaffirmed the unbreakable 
U.S. commitment to NATO.
    I am concerned, however, that significant cuts in the 
European Deterrence Initiative, or EDI, as proposed in the 
President's fiscal year 2021 budget request may send the wrong 
signal to our allies and our adversaries regarding our support 
for the transatlantic relationship.
    The EUCOM Commander faces a wide range of complex security 
challenges, including the reemergence of a revanchist Russia 
seeking to reassert a claim to great power status. Russia is 
actively undermining the rules-based international order that 
it views as contrary to its strategic interests. Russia has 
deployed its military aggressively to attempt to coerce its 
neighbors and undermine their sovereignty. Consistent with the 
2018 National Defense Strategy, EUCOM is developing the 
operational concepts, plans, and programs necessary for the 
strategic competition with Russia and to ensure our combat 
credible military deterrent against Russia's efforts to 
threaten the sovereignty of our allies and partners. General 
Wolters, the Committee will be very interested in whether you 
have the force posture in Europe and resources to meet this 
challenge.
    Additionally, Russia is engaged in a campaign of hybrid 
warfare, below the level of military conflict, to advance its 
strategic interests. Recent news reports have highlighted that 
Russia is, once again, conducting information warfare 
operations to influence the upcoming United States presidential 
elections to advance preferred candidates and sow division and 
undermine public faith in our democratic process. I would be 
interested in how EUCOM is working with CYBERCOM [Cyber 
Command] and other agencies to counter the Russian hybrid 
threat and what progress, if any, have we made on ensuring a 
coordinated, whole-of-government strategy to defend against 
Russian malign influence.
    A major test of both EUCOM and TRANSCOM will come this 
spring, as the Chairman has indicated, with the Defender-Europe 
20 exercise. This exercise is about the transportation of a 
division-sized combat force, the largest deployment of troops 
from the United States to Europe for an exercise in the past 25 
years. There are some of us that still remember Reforger. In 
total, some 37,000 U.S., NATO, and partner forces will 
participate in Defender. This exercise will highlight the 
combat-credible military deterrent provided by United States 
and allied forces against aggression in Europe.
    Now, turning to TRANSCOM, the men and women of TRANSCOM 
perform duties that sustain the entire Department of Defense 
(DOD) effort in protecting our Nation's security. With the 
competitive edge and its ability to deploy and sustain 
America's armed forces, TRANSCOM provides DOD with unique 
capabilities that we have come to expect and perhaps too 
frequently take for granted. TRANSCOM forces are busy 
supporting all of the combatant commanders every day, and 
without them, the United States would be at a significant 
disadvantage almost everywhere in the world.
    The Ready Reserve Force, or RRF, is a group of cargo ships 
held in readiness by the Maritime Administration (MARAD). But 
it is aging and will need to be modernized over the next 
decade. Three years ago, the Committee authorized the Defense 
Department to begin a program to recapitalize the Ready Reserve 
Force. This program will authorize DOD to purchase up to two 
foreign-built vessels while the Navy designed a family of 
auxiliary vessels for a number of uses, including 
recapitalizing the Ready Reserve Force.
    Then, 2 years ago, Congress authorized the department to 
buy five more foreign-built vessels as soon as the Department 
submitted a funded plan to build new ships for the RRF in U.S. 
shipyards, a plan we have yet to receive. General Lyons, I am 
interested in the status of the RRF recapitalization in fiscal 
year 2021.
    The Defense Department also needs to ensure that the Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet, or CRAF, program, which provides as much as 
40 percent of wartime airlift needs, remains viable and will be 
able to provide needed surge capacity in the future. General 
Lyons, I am interested in your views on the state of this fleet 
and if anything needs to be done to ensure their readiness.
    Our global transportation capability owned or managed by 
TRANSCOM has been one of our asymmetric advantages of many 
years now. However, we cannot assume that potential adversaries 
will allow us free rein in this area in the future. Last year, 
we received the report of the analysis of wartime 
transportation needs in the Mobility Requirements Study. It was 
clear to the Committee that the Department needed to continue 
the analytical effort to identify requirements because the 
study presented last year did not reflect implementation of the 
National Defense Strategy. General Lyons, perhaps you could 
give us an update on where TRANSCOM stands in updating this 
analysis.
    Finally, TRANSCOM also faces a unique set of cyber threats 
because of the command's extensive work with private sector 
entities in the transportation and shipping industries. General 
Lyons, I would like to get an update from you on where TRANSCOM 
stands in its effort to improve its cybersecurity posture.
    Again, let me thank the witnesses for appearing before the 
Committee today. I look forward to your testimony.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    We will now hear opening statements. We will start with 
you, General Wolters, and then General Lyons. Your statements 
should be around 5 minutes. Your entire statement will be made 
a part of the record. General Wolters?

          STATEMENT OF GENERAL TOD D. WOLTERS, USAF, 
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
                      ORGANIZATION SUPREME
                    ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

    General Wolters. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to 
appear before you, and on behalf of the men, women, and 
families that represent USEUCOM, we thank each and every one of 
you for your steadfast support. As all of you well know, it is 
an absolute privilege to serve alongside the patriots that 
represent the United States of America.
    In Europe, political uncertainty, energy competition, and 
diffusion of disruptive technology are stressing the 
established Western order. Threats and challenges, most notably 
Russia, Iran, and China, seek to take advantage of these 
conditions through aggressive action using all instruments of 
national power and are backed by increasingly capable military 
forces.
    Fully aligned with the National Defense Strategy 
implementation efforts, we confront these challenges by 
adapting our approach to most effectively employ our means. 
Together with the likeminded allies and partners, our team of 
patriots defend freedom in all domains across the area of 
responsibility and around the clock. Thanks to their efforts 
and the authorities and resources you provide, EUCOM continues 
to maintain positive momentum with respect to readiness and is 
postured to compete, deter, and effectively respond with the 
full weight of the transatlantic alliance.
    In 2019, NATO took significant military strides with 
improvements in command and control, indications and warnings, 
mission command, and by approving a new NATO military strategy 
titled ``Comprehensive Defense and Shared Response.'' NATO 
continues to adapt its force structure with the establishment 
of two additional NATO headquarters. Joint Forces Command 
Norfolk, which is focused on maintaining transatlantic lines of 
communications, and the German-led Joint Support Enabling 
Command focused on rear-area logistics coordination. These 
headquarters increase our ability to command and control, 
enable deployment, and sustain NATO forces in crisis or 
conflict.
    The European Union (EU), NATO, and EUCOM have made progress 
improving infrastructure and transit procedures to facilitate 
rapid movement of forces across the Euro-Atlantic. We will 
leverage many of these advancements to facilitate deployment of 
a division-sized force, as mentioned by the Chairman, during 
the United States-led exercise Defender-Europe 20, an exercise 
that showcases United States and allied commitment to 
collective security of the Euro-Atlantic.
    The United States' position in Europe is an invaluable 
cornerstone of national security. Today, United States 
servicemembers in Europe continue to generate peace alongside 
our allies and partners. We are grateful for sustained 
congressional interest and support through authorities and 
funding. Together with the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, 
coast guardsmen, and civilians of USEUCOM, your support 
demonstrates our Nation's continued commitment to defend the 
homeland forward and preserve peace for the 1 billion citizens 
in the Euro-Atlantic.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Wolters follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General Tod D. Wolters
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the dedicated men, 
women, and their families preserving peace in the Euro-Atlantic, it is 
an honor to testify before you today. It is a privilege to serve 
alongside these dedicated patriots in a mission that is essential to 
national security. Their selfless service and tireless commitment is an 
inspiration. Together, with likeminded Allies and partners, our 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians work 
to defend peace and prosperity around the clock.
    The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense 
Strategy (NDS) articulate how a free and prosperous Europe, defended by 
a capable and credible Euro-Atlantic Alliance, remains foundational to 
our security in an increasingly competitive strategic environment. 
USEUCOM's operations, activities, and investments are aligned with our 
strategies to meet the challenges of great power competition from both 
Russia and China. Enabled by deep and meaningful Ally and partner 
relationships, USEUCOM is ready to fight and win against capable 
adversaries should deterrence fail. We are proud of the collaborative 
work across the Joint Force to implement these strategies and are 
grateful for continued Congressional interest and support.
    In Europe, political uncertainty, migration, energy competition, 
and diffusion of disruptive technology are stressing the established 
democratic order. Competitors, most notably Russia, China, and Iran, 
seek to take advantage of these conditions through aggressive action 
using all instruments of national power, and are backed by increasingly 
capable military forces. An environment exists where adversary 
disinformation and destructive cyber campaigns can be amplified to 
foment instability. This nexus is testing national governments and 
multi-national institutions like the European Union (EU) and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
    risks and challenges in the useucom area of responsibility (aor)
    The USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) covers a large and diverse 
geographic area. It encompasses not only nations such as Russia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, and Israel, but a diverse set of perspectives from the 
Arctic, Iberian Peninsula, Mediterranean Sea, and Eastern Europe.
Russia
    Russia's sizable nuclear arsenal ensures they will remain a long-
term, existential threat to the United States. Russia's vast non-
strategic nuclear weapons stockpile and apparent misperception they 
could gain advantage in crisis or conflict through its use is 
concerning. Russia continues to engage in disruptive behavior despite 
widespread international disapproval and continued economic sanctions, 
and continues to challenge the rules-based international order and 
violate its obligations under international agreements. The Kremlin 
employs coercion and aggressive actions amid growing signs of domestic 
unrest. These actions suggest Russian leadership may feel compelled to 
take greater risks to maintain power, counter Western influence, and 
seize opportunities to demonstrate a perception of great power status.
    Over the past twelve years, Russia has invaded two neighboring 
states, violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, leading 
to the treaty's termination, developed new strategic platforms 
resulting in the Skyfallto deliverfor nuclear cruise missile accident 
that killed 7 Russian scientists last year, weapons, and abrogated its 
responsibilities under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe, all at the expense of strategic stability. Russia employs a 
below-the-threshold of armed conflict strategy via proxies and 
intermediary forces in an attempt to weaken, divide, and intimidate our 
Allies and partners using a range of covert, difficult-to-attribute, 
and malign actions. These actions include information and cyber 
operations, election meddling, political subversion, economic 
intimidation, military sales, exercises, and the calculated use of 
force. Russian state-sponsored cyber actors have attacked NATO member 
government and commercial data networks. Russian proxies continue their 
attempt to undermine democratic institutions through concerted election 
meddling against the United States, Allies, and partners.
    Beyond Europe, Russia is working to build influence in the Arctic, 
Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. They are pursuing a 
partnership of convenience with China to close off the current free and 
open international order. By probing United States, Allied, and partner 
response thresholds, Russian leadership plays a dangerous game fraught 
with the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.
    The Kremlin continues to maintain robust levels of defense 
spending, modernizing its forces across the board, with the intent of 
building a more flexible and rapidly deployable force to provide an 
enhanced capability to seize and maintain the initiative in both 
competition and conflict. Russia continues to rotate its forces through 
active conflicts in Syria and Ukraine to improve, test, and validate 
combat capabilities. Russia counts on its malign influence 
capabilities, conventional military, and nuclear forces to underwrite 
this aggressive approach. Modern Russian Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense (IAMD), cyber and electronic warfare systems, counter-space, 
and long-range precision fires capabilities are postured and employed 
to challenge United States and Allied warfighting systems, doctrine, 
and authorities.
Ukraine
    Following the purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia and 
its proxies continue their campaign to destabilize Ukraine's defense, 
economic, and political sectors with the intent of cementing Ukraine 
into the Kremlin's sphere of influence. Of particular concern is the 
ongoing conflict in the Donbas region, instigated and stoked by Russia. 
Even with the implementation of the Minsk agreements, ceasefire 
violations occur often. Russia also continues to undermine the 
government of Ukraine through cyber-attacks, support of illegitimate 
elections in eastern Ukraine, and aggressive actions in the Black Sea 
and Sea of Azov, including an attack on Ukrainian naval vessels. 
Contrary to Russian efforts, these coercive actions have energized 
Ukrainian civil society and reinforced aspirations to membership in 
Euro-Atlantic institutions like the EU and NATO. The recent election of 
President Zelenskyy further solidified this pro-Western course. Ukraine 
has enhanced its commitment to fighting corruption and enacting defense 
reform, including by meeting the requirements of our Ukraine Security 
Assistance Initiative (USAI).
Poland and Baltics
    Poland and the Baltics remain a strategic focal point for both NATO 
and Russia. For NATO, this is the region at the greatest risk of 
Russian aggression and miscalculated escalation due to historical 
grievances and geographic position. For the Kremlin, Polish and Baltic 
geopolitical alignment with the West are reminders of a withered sphere 
of control, of the rush toward NATO's open door, isolation of its 
Kaliningrad exclave, and lost access to the Baltic Sea from the Russian 
mainland. The Kremlin sees the region's substantial ethnic Russian 
population as a potential justification for intervention. It actively 
targets this population with extensive propaganda and malign influence 
operations. While NATO forces in the region currently help deter any 
overt Russian attack, Russian military forces in the Western Military 
District and Kaliningrad hold a geographic advantage and outnumber NATO 
forces postured in the region. Russia is actively employing malign 
information and cyber operations in an attempt to weaken regional 
stability and Alliance resolve. Allies in the region are deepening 
their knowledge and expertise in the cyber and information domains to 
the benefit of the United States and the Alliance. Poland's defense 
budget increases, burden-sharing basing offers with the United States, 
and on-going modernization that include Patriot and F-35 acquisitions, 
provide significant capability enhancements in the region and 
demonstrate resolve to meet and exceed the 2014 Wales Summit 
commitments.
South Caucasus
    The Kremlin exerts influence over countries in the South Caucasus 
through manipulation of regional tensions and enduring military 
conflicts with all instruments of national power. The Kremlin believes 
chronic instability in this area is central to regional hegemony. 
Russia maintains leverage over Georgia through its occupation of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including its attempts to alter the 
administrative boundary lines of occupied territories, interfere with 
the transit of people and goods within Georgia's sovereign territory, 
and complicate Georgia's NATO membership aspirations.
    Russia also maintains its political influence over Armenia and 
Azerbaijan by playing both sides of the enduring conflict in Nagorno-
Karabakh, while questionably serving as a neutral mediator in the Minsk 
Process peace negotiations. As an example of supplying both sides of 
the conflict, Russia provides military grant assistance to Armenia, a 
Collective Security Treaty Organization member, while simultaneously 
selling advanced military systems and hardware to Azerbaijan. Russia 
also influences support of operations farther abroad, such as 
convincing Armenia to deploy forces to Syria as part of the Russian 
contingent support for Assad's regime.
Balkans
    The Balkans remain a strategically important region where ethnic 
tensions within nations and between neighbors continue to foster 
regional instability and are primary targets of persistent Russian 
malign influence. Aside from historical and cultural ties with the 
Balkan region, Russia views the sustainment of social and political 
tensions in the region as a central tenet of its goal to prevent 
individual Balkan nations from progressing on a path toward Euro-
Atlantic alignment and integration. Nonetheless, Montenegro, and soon 
North Macedonia's accession into NATO represent tremendous success 
stories in spite of Russia's significant attempts to block and dissuade 
integration.
    Despite Kosovo declaring independence in 2008, Russia, China, and 
several other nations have yet to recognize its status as a sovereign 
nation. Kosovo, and neighboring Serbia, have not yet normalized 
relations, but despite tensions, we continue to encourage both parties 
to maintain dialogue to find a peaceful solution. The principal 
stabilizing force in Kosovo remains NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), which 
includes a small, but significant United States contribution. KFOR's 
presence will remain essential to stability while Serbia and Kosovo 
pursue a stable relationship through the planned 10-year transition of 
the Kosovo Security Forces.
    Serbia has attempted to find a balance between Russia and the West 
but finds its EU ambitions impeded by internal corruption, structural 
and economic challenges, EU-Russia sanctions, and the requirement to 
normalize relations with Kosovo. China has emerged as an alternative 
patron, engaging in both economic and defense support matters.
    Bosnia and Herzegovina remains mired in political and ethnic 
instability. Fueled by Russian influence, obstructionistsseek greater 
autonomy for Republika Srpska to weaken state-level authorities and 
frustrate progress towards further alignment with NATO and the EU. 
Nationalist politics and entrenched ethnic divisions between Bosniaks, 
Bosnian-Croats, and Bosnian-Serbs challenge Bosnia and Herzegovina's 
ability to chart a path towards lasting stability.
Turkey
    Acknowledging tensions and political disputes, Turkey remains a 
strategic United States Ally, critical to NATO and United States 
interests in Europe, EURASIA, and the Middle East. Home to the second 
largest military in NATO, Turkey borders a volatile region and is 
geostrategically located to assist in countering Russia. Turkey is also 
the only NATO member to share a border with Iran. Ankara continues to 
view the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) and its affiliates as their 
greatest security threat. From Turkey's perspective, continued United 
States support for the Syrian Democratic Forces remains the principal 
irritant to our bilateral security relationship. Turkey's intervention 
into Northeast Syria to address these security concerns degraded United 
States counter-terrorism efforts and further harmed our bilateral 
relationship.
    Turkey's purchase of the Russian produced S-400 air defense system 
is incompatible with Turkish procurement of the F-35, the S-400 cannot 
be integratedwith NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defense command and 
control network.
    Turkey's role in countering Russia, however, is pivotal. The 
relationship between Moscow and Ankara remains transactional. Both 
nations view the Black Sea region as their natural area of influence 
and they continue to clash in Libya and are in direct combat in Idlib, 
Syria. Both United States and Turkey's long-term strategic interests 
are best served by continuing to work together to improve counter-
Russia cooperation both bilaterally and through NATO.
Israel
    Israel continues to face a complex set of evolving security 
challenges spanning the spectrum of conflict. Regional instability is 
fueled by Iran's efforts to threaten Israel and Russia's expanded 
involvement in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean.
    Israel's adversaries, most notably Iran, Hamas, and Lebanese-
Hezbollah, have taken advantage of this turbulence. Iran has positioned 
forces to threaten and attack Israel, attempted to expand its 
influence, and increased lethal support to regional partners.
    Iran and its proxies have also made significant gains in asymmetric 
capabilities, including advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, 
and unmanned aerial systems. Iran remains committed to modernizing its 
military and continues to improve the range, lethality, and accuracy of 
its ballistic missile systems and has the region's largest ballistic 
missile arsenal with the capability of striking targets 2,000 
kilometers beyond its borders.
Mediterranean and Southern Flank
    While migrant and refugee flows from the Middle East and Africa 
have decreased, steady movement of people across Turkey and through the 
Mediterranean continue to stress European nations and the EU. Migration 
remains a major security and humanitarian concern for Allies and 
partners across Southern Europe and consumes scarce defense and 
security resources.
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
    VEOs remain a transregional threat with decentralized command and 
control, finance, and facilitation networks spanning from conflict 
zones into Europe. These extremists continue to take advantage of 
instability in North Africa, Iraq, and Syria to hide and husband 
resources in the face of coalition gains. VEO-inspired and organized 
attacks in Europe further complicate integration efforts, isolate 
refugee and migrant communities, and make these groups vulnerable to 
recruitment. Despite the death of al-Baghdadi, ISIS and other VEOs 
still require persistent global pressure to prevent a resurgence and 
preclude future attacks against the Homeland, Europe, and our global 
partners.
China
    China's aggressive economic and diplomatic activities in the 
USEUCOM AOR signal Beijing's desire to build influence in Europe to 
tilt the international order to its advantage. Seventeen Central and 
Eastern European nations have joined the China-led, 17+1 framework for 
cooperation. Many European countries, including the 17+1, are also 
signatories to China's One Belt One Road Initiative. China also pursues 
bilateral deals with targeted nations to build infrastructure and 
secure agreements enabling cost-effective global trade. Chinese foreign 
direct investment and Chinese-backed business ventures in Europe 
provide China an avenue to exert influence at the expense of long-term 
United States, Allied, and partner interests.
    Of particular concern are China's efforts to expand 5G networks 
into Europe through state-backed firms like Huawei and ZTE. These 
networks place intellectual property, sensitive technology, and private 
personal information at heightened risk of acquisition and exploitation 
by the Chinese government. This ongoing initiative, coupled with 
China's growing interest and investment in European ports and 
infrastructure, complicates steady-state and contingency operations. We 
continue to articulate this risk to European defense counterparts and 
highlight shared values, interests, and business practices that 
distinguish the United States as a partner of choice. We see 
encouraging signs from European nations as they become increasingly 
wary of strings attached to Chinese capital and investment.
     useucom operations, activities, investments, and opportunities
Strategy Implementation
    We confront challenges in the USEUCOM AOR by adapting our thinking 
and approach to meet assigned missions as detailed in capstone strategy 
documents and maintain laser-sharp focus on expanding the competitive 
space with Russia. USEUCOM acts as Coordinating Authority for the 
Russia problem set by overseeing the global coordination of day-to-day 
operations, activities, and investments. In this role, USEUCOM advises 
the Secretary of Defense on resource, force structure, and 
synchronization of Department of Defense activities to deter Russia and 
curb its global malign activities.
    USEUCOM tirelessly works with the U.S. interagency, Allies, and 
partners to address the evolving challenges posed by our adversaries. 
In this increasingly competitive security environment, we remain 
vigilant to ensure any challenge or challenger is met with a lethal, 
responsive, and resilient force, in all domains, in every strategic 
direction, and with a capable set of Allies and partners.
Support NATO's Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area
    USEUCOM's primary mission is to deter and ``posture'' to respond to 
aggression with the full weight of the NATO Alliance. In 2019, NATO 
took significant steps toward improving command and control and other 
military capabilities to meet the challenges and complexities of a 
dynamic security environment. NATO's Military Committee approved a new 
NATO Military Strategy, Comprehensive Defense and Shared Response. NATO 
continued implementation of the adapted NATO Command Structure with the 
establishment of two additional NATO headquarters: Joint Forces Command 
Norfolk, focused on maintaining trans-Atlantic lines of communications, 
and the German-led, Joint Support Enabling Command, focused on rear-
area security and logistics coordination. These headquarters increase 
our ability to command and control and will organize and enable the 
deployment and sustainment of NATO forces in crisis or conflict. The 
EU, NATO, and USEUCOM have made progress improving infrastructure and 
transit permissions to facilitate the rapid movement of forces and 
logistic support across the Euro-Atlantic. We will ``leverage'' and 
``proof'' many of these advancements during the United States led 
Exercise DEFENDER-Europe 20 this spring. The NATO Readiness Initiative 
will ensure NATO's ability to respond to aggression rapidly by 
identifying 30 battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat 
vessels, for use in 30 days. Finally, the forthcoming accession of 
North Macedonia as the 30th member of NATO demonstrates the vibrancy of 
the Alliance through its Open Door Policy while continuing to show the 
strength of purpose in defending shared values in the face of Russian 
malign influence.
    NATO members contribute to common defense through capability 
investments, support to Alliance members, and continued participation 
in operations, missions, and exercises. Poland's acquisition of F-35s 
and Patriot air defense capability, Romania's acquisition of High 
Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) long-range fires capability, 
and the fielding of F-35s by Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom are increasing interoperable combat power across the AOR. NATO 
members provide host nation support to forward-stationed United States 
Forces across the region and participate in Alliance and U.S. multi-
lateral exercises focused on enhancing responsiveness and 
interoperability. NATO members contribute forces to ongoing NATO and 
United States-led coalition missions advancing and securing our common 
interests in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria. NATO members help 
underwrite infrastructure investments, defraying costs of United States 
military construction in theater through the NATO Security Investment 
Program.
    As NATO fortifies its position against a resurgent Russia, 
ballistic missile threats from Iran, and the continued threat of 
international terror groups, United States leadership within the 
Alliance is critical for ongoing activities to address competition and 
ensure combat-credible military forces are trained and postured to 
deter any would-be aggressor. USEUCOM plays an important role in 
exercising this leadership through our support to ongoing NATO 
operations, missions and engagements as NATO adapts to ensure it is an 
Alliance fit for purpose.
    USEUCOM's participation in NATO operations and activities 
demonstrates U.S. commitment to the Alliance. United States soldiers 
stand ready in Poland as part of NATO's enhanced Forward Presence 
mission in one of four battlegroups holding the line against Russian 
aggression in Poland and the Baltics. United States aircrews fly 
alongside Allies as part of the Baltic Air Policing mission, helping to 
safeguard the sovereignty of Baltic airspace against Russian 
incursions. A U.S. destroyer operates as the flagship of Standing NATO 
Maritime Group One, responding to maritime challenges in the Atlantic, 
Mediterranean, and the Baltic Sea. The European Phased Adaptive 
Approach, including the Aegis Ashore in Romania and United States Aegis 
destroyer presence in the Mediterranean, provides the foundation of 
NATO's Ballistic Missile Defense capability.
    The support Congress provides through the European Deterrence 
Initiative (EDI) has been critical to our deterrence and posture 
successes in the USEUCOM AOR. Through EDI, we have enhanced our 
presence in the theater to assure Allies and deter adversaries. 
Increases of forward-stationed and rotational forces continue to 
improve our posture and enable us to compete and win in a multi-domain 
crisis or conflict. EDI funding for exercises, training, and building 
partner capacity programs enhance the readiness and interoperability of 
U.S. and Alliance forces. EDI funds have also improved our ability to 
respond using prepositioned stocks and improved theater infrastructure. 
Together, these improvements enable the rapid deployment and 
sustainment of forces. Section 333-funded Security Cooperation 
initiatives are pivotal components to EDI. Programs such as the Black 
Sea Maritime Initiative and enhancing Baltic Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense are potent, regionally-focused, components of a resilient 
theater posture.
    We continue to improve the infrastructure to enable swift response 
in any contingency. On the ground, we are establishing a U.S. armored 
division capability through the combination of forward-stationed and 
rotational forces. Army Prepositioned Stocks in Europe hold equipment 
and logistics for an Armored Brigade Combat Team and key enablers, 
facilitating increased lethality by rapidly integrating deployed units 
into operations. United States Army Europe, with extensive 
participation by NATO member states, will exercise this capability in 
the first deployment and exercise of a division echelon formation on 
NATO's eastern flank since the end of the Cold War in Exercise 
DEFENDER-Europe 20 this spring.
    In the air domain, we are improving the mix of 4th and 5th 
generation fighter aircraft stationed in the theater along with 
rotational forces from the U.S. to enhance our IAMD networks and 
underwrite our Allies' efforts to enhance air defense systems. The 
build-out of European Contingency Air Operation Sets and Deployable Air 
Base Sets enhance the resiliency of our forces.
    In the maritime domain, we see predictable Carrier Strike Group and 
Amphibious presence as key elements of an agile theater posture. The 
reactivation of U.S. Second Fleet provides necessary maritime command 
and control capability in the Atlantic, while reinforcing NATO's 
western flank.
    In the space domain, we are building an integrated planning element 
to leverage the capability USSPACECOM is building to ensure our ability 
to plan and execute multi-domain operations.
    We have leveraged the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) model to re-
affirm our commitment to Allies, deploy diverse military capabilities 
within the AOR to improve our deterrent posture, and demonstrate 
operational unpredictability to adversaries. DFE deployments have 
included posturing the HARRY S. TRUMAN strike group from the 
Mediterranean to the High North, deploying a Terminal High Altitude 
Defense (THAAD) battery to both Israel and Romania, Bomber Task Force 
missions throughout the AOR, and an F-35 deployment to exercise with 
European Allies, demonstrating our ability to rapidly generate 
significant combat power across the AOR.
    Rotational Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
maintain a presence on the ground in strategic locations across the 
theater. These forces work alongside Allies and partners to deter 
aggression and build host nation defense capacity, interoperability, 
and readiness. DFE enables us to improve posture and unit readiness 
simultaneously. In Eastern Europe, a rotational Armored Brigade Combat 
Team and Combat Aviation Brigade are deployed as part of Operation 
ATLANTIC RESOLVE to deter and are postured to respond if required. 
Rotational Marine Forces in Norway have improved an important position 
on NATO's northern periphery while training in Arctic conditions 
alongside our Norwegian allies. Additionally, the tangible improvements 
by individual European nations and the EU to enhance military mobility 
throughout Europe is increasing responsiveness and combat capability. 
The EU, in consultation with NATO and USEUCOM, is investing 6.5 billion 
euros for improvements to civilian and military dual-use transportation 
infrastructure across the continent.
    As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear 
Alliance. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to 
preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. The strategic 
forces of the Alliance are the supreme guarantee of the security of 
Allies and underwrite every U.S. military operation in Europe. Since 
2015, the Alliance has placed increased emphasis on the role of nuclear 
capabilities in its overall deterrence and defense posture, and 
continues to adapt its posture to ensure its nuclear capabilities 
remain credible, coherent, resilient, and adaptable to the changing 
environment.
    USEUCOM fully supports the continued modernization and 
recapitalization of our nuclear forces. Congress has recognized the 
importance of modernizing U.S. nuclear forces after decades of deferred 
recapitalization and has substantially funded these programs. USEUCOM 
fully supports recommendations in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review to 
deploy the W76-2 Low Yield Ballistic Missile and to pursue development 
of a modern, sea-launched nuclear cruise missile. These actions would 
address a perceived deterrence gap, raise the Russian threshold for 
nuclear use, and disabuse the Russian Federation of the misconception 
there is any path to victory through nuclear escalation.
Counter Russian Malign Influence
    Every day, USEUCOM and NATO compete to challenge and counter 
Russia's below-the-threshold strategy, and to counterbalance the multi-
faceted and capable military power which underwrite its malign 
approach. We bring potent assets to this ongoing contest through 
coordination with the U.S. interagency and multi-national partners. A 
key platform for competing with Russia on this front is the Russian 
Influence Group. USEUCOM co-chairs this effort with United States 
Department of State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to 
promote Whole of Government cooperation and to identify, attribute, and 
counter Russia malign activities. Congressional funding for information 
operations activities enables USEUCOM to challenge adversary narratives 
and disinformation on a daily basis. Our SOF forces are another vital 
element of this approach working with European Allies and partners to 
enhance defense institutions, border security, and resilience to 
Russian malign attacks.
    In the Cyber domain, our Cyber Component (Joint Forces Headquarters 
Cyber (Air Force)) and USEUCOM's Joint Cyber Center, in coordination 
with USCYBERCOM, continue to mature manning, facilities, and 
authorities to actively counter Russian cyber attacks. Together, these 
elements also assist with the enhancement of Allied and partner cyber 
capabilities. Recognizing worldwide cyber capabilities of China, Iran, 
and North Korea, we work with other combatant commands and interagency 
partners to enhance global cyber defenses and our ability to impose 
costs on aggressive adversary behavior.
    National Guard and Reserve forces maintain vibrant relationships 
and unique access with Allies and partners through the twenty-six-year-
old State Partnership Program (SPP). With more than 500 engagements, 
through 22 active programs annually, the SPP provides unique 
opportunities to cultivate regional expertise and strengthen personal 
relationships to improve readiness and alignment across the AOR.
    Recognizing the state of competition between Russia and the West, 
escalation control/management must be foundational to our approach as 
military forces deter and posture to defend. We make extensive use of 
authorized military-to-military channels for safety deconfliction and 
to maintain strategic stability while remaining operationally 
unpredictable.
Assist in the Defense of Israel
    USEUCOM underwrites the United States commitment to Israel's 
inherent right of self-defense from growing regional threats and our 
defense ties remain an important anchor of United States-Israel 
relations. USEUCOM conducts a robust series of exercises, activities, 
and senior leader engagements. We work closely with Israel's Defense 
Force to help maintain their qualitative military edge over any 
potential competitor. This assistance demonstrates our unwavering 
commitment to Israel, support for stability in the Levant, and the 
containment of Iranian malign activity.
Advance and Strengthen Strategic Relationships
    Our strong bilateral and multi-lateral ties with European Allies 
and partners are invaluable and enable advancement of our shared 
interests in Europe and further abroad. USEUCOM's strong military-to-
military relationships with defense counterparts across Europe signal 
continued United States commitment and are foundational to these 
national ties, particularly with countries such as Turkey, Ukraine, 
Georgia, and our Arctic partners.
    Turkey remains a key United States and NATO ally. Turkey's military 
strength and strategic position further United States and NATO 
interests. Our military-to-military relationships remain close.
    Along Russia's border, key United States partners see a brighter 
future to the West and resist Russia's efforts to hold them in a sphere 
of influence. Despite an ongoing Kremlin-sponsored malign influence 
campaign, violence by Russian-sponsored forcesin the Donbas region, and 
the purported annexation of Crimea, Ukraine continues to seek closer 
partnership with the United States. Security cooperation funding 
provided through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative enhances 
the capability of Ukrainian formations and EUCOM's stated mission to 
deter Russian aggression. American servicemembers on the ground in the 
Joint Military Training Group-Ukraine work shoulder-to-shoulder with 
Ukrainian forces, helping to build competence and confidence. NATO 
partnership mechanisms and funds reinforce these programs and present a 
unified and coherent approach in our collective support to Ukraine. 
Maintaining this positive momentum and continued USAI funding for 
lethal aid are essential to enabling Ukrainian forces' ability to 
defend their sovereignty against well-armed, Russian-backed forces.
    In the Caucasus, where Russian forces occupy the Georgian regions 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia continues to be a steadfast 
partner and contributor to global security. Georgia is the largest non-
NATO contributor to Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT--NATO's ongoing 
Afghanistan mission. Georgia's commitment of 870 soldiers in support of 
United States operations in Afghanistan demonstrates the enduring 
strength of our strategic partnership. USEUCOM assists Georgian forces 
in preparing for this mission through the Georgia Deployment Program. 
We continue to support Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity 
by improving their capability to generate and sustain capable defense 
forces through the Georgia Defense Readiness Program.
    In the Arctic, changing environmental conditions present new 
opportunities for exploration, trade, and interaction. USEUCOM supports 
Whole of Government efforts to preserve the region as a place nations 
act cooperatively to address shared challenges and where U.S. national 
interests remain secure. USEUCOM leverages its close relations with 
USNORTHCOM and European Arctic nations to build Arctic awareness, 
increase operations, and strengthen the free and open order to secure 
the Arctic. These bilateral and multi-lateral strategic relationships 
enhance Alliance efforts to deter Russian aggression and advance shared 
interests.
Enable U.S. Global Operations
    Europe and the United States remain the foundation for upholding a 
free and open international order. USEUCOM's unique geographic location 
is essential to enable global operations through synchronization, 
access, basing, and overflight permissions within Europe. From this key 
terrain, USEUCOM acts in support of multiple Combatant and Functional 
Commands, Allied, Coalition, and U.S. interagency operations. Basing, 
access, and overflight permissions are built upon mutual respect and 
trust between the U.S. and our sovereign Allies and partners, and 
should not be taken for granted. We work within the Whole of Government 
to maintain these relationships, permissions under bilateral 
agreements, and to resist Russian and Chinese strategic investments. 
Absent these agreements, we would be unable to meet our treaty 
obligations or protect vital national interests. Beyond strategic 
position, the shared values, trust, and longstanding relationships we 
have in Europe, with some of our most capable and willing Allies and 
partners on the planet, enable the U.S. to generate coalitions for 
worldwide operations in support of shared national interests.
    Most recently, European Allies and partners proved essential in our 
national efforts to deter Iranian aggression. Our Allies and partners 
enabled USEUCOM's rapid posture shift of United States Forces in 
response to potential contingencies in the Levant. Key partners 
provided indispensable access, basing, and overflight permissions that 
enabled our ability to protect American citizens and diplomats in 
harm's way, had the security situation deteriorated. This recent 
example highlights the value of European support to enable United 
States global operations that preserve and defend our national 
interests worldwide.
Conclusion
    The United States' position in Europe is an invaluable cornerstone 
of national security, built by our predecessors upon the wreckage of 
two world wars. Today, U.S. servicemembers in Europe continue to 
generate global peace and prosperity alongside our Allies and partners 
in the face of growing challenges. Revisionist actors, most notably 
Russia and China, present formidable, long-term challenges to 
preserving a Europe that is free, whole, and at peace.
    We appreciate Congressional interest in these challenges and your 
continued pledge to meet them through support, funding, and authorities 
. . . particularly potent are support for European Deterrence 
Initiative and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). EDI 
enables USEUCOM's ability to enhance U.S. and Alliance readiness and 
posture to quickly respond in crisis or conflict. USAI ensures Ukraine 
has the resources and training to deter further Russian aggression. 
USEUCOM sits in a strategically significant part of the world and the 
dedicated men and women of the command unceasingly strive to be good 
stewards of the trust our Nation has placed in us. Together with the 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians of 
USEUCOM, your support demonstrates our Nation's continued commitment to 
defend the Homeland forward and preserve peace for the one billion 
people living in the Euro-Atlantic.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    General Lyons?

 STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN R. LYONS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                 STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

    General Lyons. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Inhofe, 
Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Committee, it 
is my honor today to represent the men and women of the United 
States Transportation Command who at this very moment are 
employed around the globe conducting mobility operations 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
    Our mission at TRANSCOM is enduring, and that is to project 
and sustain the force globally at our time and place of 
choosing, thereby representing multiple options for our 
national leadership and multiple dilemmas for potential 
adversaries.
    With 85 percent of the force element stationed in the 
United States, it is TRANSCOM's job to move forces and materiel 
in support of the Secretary of Defense's strategic priorities. 
Our National Defense Strategy underscores the importance of 
advancing our national security interests, deterring potential 
adversaries, and should deterrence fail, responding with 
overwhelming force to win. Power projection is a distinct U.S. 
comparative advantage, but we are not alone in this effort. Our 
vast global logistics networks are underpinned by a deep bench 
of allies and likeminded partners that facilitate critical 
access basing and overflight activities.
    Today, I am confident in our ability to successfully 
execute our mission. This past year, with a no-notice alert, we 
moved the 1st Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division to CENTCOM 
[Central Command] in less than 5.5 days. In total, we moved 
over 42 Army brigades, refueled multiple bomber task force and 
fighter movements, delivered 1.9 million passengers, over 6,000 
patients, over 100,000 containers, and over 26 million square 
feet of cargo. Much of this activity largely went unnoticed. 
This is good news and a sign of sustained success across DOD's 
mobility enterprise.
    However, as the Chairman pointed out, our world is 
changing. The National Defense Strategy describes a future in 
which TRANSCOM must be able to project the joint force under 
all-domain persistent attack. We acknowledge that our success 
today does not guarantee success for tomorrow, and we are 
actively preparing to meet tomorrow's challenges working 
through contested environment war games, enhancing cyber 
defenses and resiliency, and improving the integration of the 
sustainment warfighting function across the joint operations.
    To maintain readiness today, our aerial refueling and 
sealift forces require attention so they can continue to meet 
current and future challenges.
    Before I close, I want to highlight the Department's 
ongoing work to improve the personal property program, an area 
of great interest for Congress. As directed by the NDAA, we 
have submitted a business case analysis and worked closely with 
the GAO [Government Accountability Office] on their report. 
Both reports underscore the need for change. The Department can 
no longer afford to operate a disparate confederation of 
government activities supervising its similarly disparate 
collection of hundreds of transportation providers. We are on 
track to restructure our relationship with industry through the 
award of a global household goods contract that will begin 
moving DOD families ahead of the 2021 peak season.
    My message for DOD families: we heard your call for 
improved accountability, transparency, and quality capacity, 
and we are committed to deliver.
    My message for industry providers: if you provide quality 
service for our military members, you have a place in the 
future program. We need every quality moving service, to 
include our small businesses, and appreciate all that you do.
    It is an exciting time to be the commander of USTRANSCOM, 
and I could not be more proud of the team of professionals that 
create the strategic comparative advantage called the joint 
deployment and distribution enterprise.
    I am pleased to join General Tod Wolters today and look 
forward to your questions. Thank you for your leadership and 
support to our amazing servicemembers.
    [The prepared statement of General Lyons follows:]

             Prepared Statement by General Stephen R. Lyons
                       delivering for our nation
    U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) exists as a combatant 
command to project and sustain combat power at a time and place of the 
Nation's choosing. Powered by dedicated Active Duty, National Guard, 
Reserve and civilian men and women, we underwrite the lethality of the 
Joint Force, we advance American security interests around the globe, 
and we provide our Nation's leaders with strategic flexibility to 
select from a range of options while creating multiple dilemmas for our 
potential adversaries.
    USTRANSCOM's mission is to conduct globally integrated mobility 
operations, lead the broader Joint Deployment and Distribution 
Enterprise, and provide enabling capabilities in order to project and 
sustain the Joint Force in support of national objectives. We 
accomplish this by balancing strategic mobility requirements for the 
Secretary of Defense and executing the Unified Command Plan roles and 
responsibilities assigned by the President. USTRANSCOM's mission is 
executed through three component commands and one subordinate command: 
the U.S. Army's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, 
the U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command, the U.S. Air Force's Air 
Mobility Command, and the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command.
    The National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the Joint Force to be 
strategically predictable with allies and partners while being 
operationally unpredictable to competitors. USTRANSCOM was custom built 
for such a mission. We enable dynamic force employment and deliver 
options daily. In 2019, USTRANSCOM executed 43 brigade-sized overseas 
movements totaling over 26 million square feet of military cargo in 
support of all six Geographic Combatant Commands. In the air, 
USTRANSCOM operated from all seven continents. We transported 1.9 
million passengers and 1.3 million tons of cargo, and during air-to-air 
refueling operations we dispensed 956.6 million gallons of fuel. Our 
aerial evacuation crews executed 6,609 patient movements, including 84 
with battle injuries. One evacuation in particular stands out as 
highlighting how USTRANSCOM integrates the incredible capabilities of 
our Joint Force to protect American interests globally. Last August, a 
U.S. soldier with life-threatening wounds required immediate evacuation 
from Afghanistan to a stateside hospital for complex trauma treatment. 
A team of 18 joint medical professionals--armed with key life-saving 
capabilities--made a 19-hr non-stop flight from Afghanistan to Texas 
aboard a USTRANSCOM aircraft. The soldier is alive today because of the 
U.S. values embodied in the Joint Force and enabled daily by 
USTRANSCOM.
    As envisioned in the NDS, our operational focus has shifted from 
routine force rotations in Southwest Asia to posturing for Great Power 
Competition globally. Our accomplishments from 2019 underscore 
USTRANSCOM's ability to respond anywhere in the world at scale, in 
order to assure our allies, deter our adversaries, and ensure our 
national leaders always have options.
                         strategic environment
    The world is changing. In the past, we were able to deploy our 
forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and employ them 
how we wanted. In the future, the NDS calls us to be able to project 
and sustain the Joint Force under persistent, all-domain attack. Our 
competitors, such as China and Russia, clearly recognize the United 
States' ability to rapidly scale and deliver the Joint Force globally 
as a strategic comparative advantage, and they seek to deny it. Today, 
adversaries are active in the cyber domain. They infiltrate contract 
value chains. They invest in critical global choke points. They attempt 
to erode geopolitical access. They develop increasingly potent anti-
access and area-denial weapons. These are clear indicators of their 
intent and reflect the changing character of war. In the future, 
strategic mobility will remain critical to delivering dynamic and 
credible response options to guarantee our national security interests. 
Strengthened by a historic past but with a critical eye towards the 
future, USTRANSCOM aims to remain ready to answer our nation's call.
                   ustranscom's warfighting framework
    The key to conducting globally-integrated mobility operations is 
the dynamic synchronization of our 1) global mobility posture, 2) 
global mobility transportation capacity, and 3) global command, 
control, and integration. These critical elements create USTRANSCOM's 
warfighting framework and allow USTRANSCOM to respond to strategic 
priorities in both time and space.
                        global mobility posture
    Global Mobility Posture is the foundation of power projection, 
starting in the Continental United States (CONUS) with Department of 
Defense (DOD) installations and the seaports, railways, and the 
highways that connect them. In close coordination with the Department 
of Transportation, the Strategic Seaport Program, Strategic Corridor 
Rail Network, and Strategic Highway Network provide 23 strategic 
seaports, 15 alternate seaports, 37,000 miles of strategic railways, 
and over 62,000 miles of interstate and major highways to project 
combat power from the fort, to the port, and on to the battlefield.
    Beyond our nation's borders, USTRANSCOM relies on a deep bench of 
allies and like-minded partners that have stood with us for over 75 
years in defense of freedom. These allies and partners provide access 
to key regions and support a substantial basing and logistics system 
which expands our nation's global reach. Through a flexible, redundant, 
and resilient global posture, USTRANSCOM enables the DOD to project and 
sustain a combat credible force that can deter adversaries, protect our 
national security interests, and when necessary, respond to win 
decisively.
                        global mobility capacity
    Global Mobility Capacity includes the transportation conveyances 
and platforms used to move troops, fuel, and equipment within global 
transportation networks, including rail, motor transport, sealift, 
aerial refueling, and airlift. 60-70 percent of USTRANSCOM's mobility 
capacity resides in the reserve component, underscoring the importance 
of a Total Force approach.
    USTRANSCOM is inextricably linked to the commercial transportation 
industry which provides important augmentation in peace and war. 
Utilizing commercial partners expands USTRANSCOM's global reach as well 
as access to valuable commercial intermodal transportation systems and 
freight management capabilities, but carries with it vulnerabilities we 
will need to mitigate. Emergency preparedness programs like the Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 
(VISA) augment USTRANSCOM's global mobility capacity during contingency 
operations. Incentive programs like the Maritime Security Program 
offset costs incurred to maintain a U.S.-flagged fleet, strengthening 
the American sealift industry for both economic trade and national 
defense. Currently, these programs are fully subscribed and funded. 
This year, on behalf of the Department, USTRANSCOM is leading a 
Congressionally-directed study on U.S.-flagged fuel tanker vessel 
capacity, evaluating accessibility to domestic and international 
tankers in order to satisfy the demands of the NDS in times of war.
    With 85 percent of the Joint Force based in CONUS, Global Mobility 
Capacity is critical in projecting overwhelming military force at a 
time and place of our Nation's choosing, and it serves as a deterrent 
to conflict by demonstrating our ability to credibly defend our 
security commitments. Overall, we assess USTRANSCOM's global mobility 
capacity as adequate, but with elevated and increasing risk. NDS 
requirements in daily competition and in times of war place high 
demands on aging mobility capabilities. When coupled with adversaries 
that have the capability and intent to contest our operations across 
all domains, it creates a daunting environment for future operations. 
Specifically, USTRANSCOM assesses elevated risk in our two highest 
priorities: Aerial Refueling and Sealift.
                            aerial refueling
    The aerial refueling fleet is USTRANSCOM's most-stressed capability 
and number one readiness concern. The aerial refueling fleet continues 
to underpin the Joint Force's ability to deploy an immediate force 
across all NDS mission areas and is comprised of KC-135, KC-10, and KC-
46 aircraft.
    The KC-46 is an important aspect of tanker modernization as it will 
enable us to project and employ the force in a complex battlespace 
against a high-end adversary. However, delays in delivery of capable 
KC-46s combined with reductions of KC-10s and KC-135s create a critical 
and deepening gap in taskable aerial refueling aircraft and aircrews 
for the next 5-7 years. This combination of factors elevates risk to 
not only wartime missions, but also in day to day global operations 
across multiple combatant commands. Reduced capacity limits options and 
constrains decision space for senior leaders in crisis, as they are 
confronted with an earlier mobilization timeline to generate adequate 
capacity. For Combatant Commanders to compete daily, the Department 
must retain sufficient operational aerial refueling capacity to provide 
adequate support to the Joint Force during the transition to the KC-46. 
As the timeline to field taskable KC-46s continues to evolve, 
USTRANSCOM recommends re-evaluating aerial refueling force structure 
plans annually.
                                sealift
    USTRANSCOM's number two readiness concern is the Strategic Sealift 
Fleet. The sealift fleet is responsible for moving approximately 90 
percent of wartime cargo. Sealift readiness rates have declined to 59 
percent compared against a goal of 85 percent, with vessel material 
condition and age as the primary factors. Most sealift ships are 
reaching the age where maintenance and repair costs are escalating and 
service-life extensions will not yield proportional increases in 
readiness. Starting in the mid-2020s, the sealift fleet will lose 1-2 
million square feet of capacity each year as ships reach the end of 
their useful life. That's enough space to move two to four Brigade 
Combat Teams in a single voyage. By the mid-2030s, over half the 
sealift fleet will be unusable, placing an unacceptable risk on the 
Joint Force, especially the Army, to deliver large-scale combat power 
over the ocean. To prevent this detrimental loss of capacity, the 
Department needs to recapitalize the fleet with newer and more reliable 
vessels. USTRANSCOM continues to support the Navy's plan to acquire 
used vessels as the near-term solution that yields the greatest value. 
Currently, Congress has provided authority to purchase seven vessels, 
and the Navy has provided funding for two in fiscal year 2021. This is 
an important first step to improve fleet reliability, but we have much 
work ahead to lay out a long-range plan.
    In September the DOD conducted the largest no-notice sealift 
activation exercise in the command's history, assessing the entire 
fleet and activating over half the surge sealift vessels. The exercise 
validated known concerns regarding the degraded readiness of the 
Organic Surge Fleet. Simply put, the surge fleet is challenged today to 
be immediately available for large-scale inter-theater force deployment 
without delays or impacts to force closure. These findings reinforce 
the need for recapitalization, appropriate levels of resourcing for 
maintenance and repair, and continued emphasis on readiness 
improvements.
                global command, control, and integration
    Global Command, Control, and Integration is central to our ability 
to make decisions at echelon to create desired mobility outcomes. It 
creates shared understanding in order to align scarce mobility 
resources consistent with the highest strategic priorities. Global 
Command, Control, and Integration is imperative to retain our strategic 
comparative advantage to project and sustain the Joint Force globally. 
As we prepare to confront the contested environments described in the 
NDS, we are working on several initiatives to strengthen mission 
assurance in the cyber domain, and advance decision making across the 
USTRANSCOM enterprise.
                     cyber domain mission assurance
    Cyberspace is a warfighting domain, without sanctuary, in which 
capable adversaries continuously attempt to degrade our Nation's 
ability to project the Joint Force globally. We continually evaluate 
our large and complex attack surface, evolve key cyber terrain, secure 
our cyber area of operations, and actively defend our ability to 
conduct global command and control. USTRANSCOM maintains a strong 
relationship with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and the Intelligence 
community, providing increased understanding of adversaries' intent. 
Several rigorous exercises matured our ability to request active 
defensive measures from USCYBERCOM, leveraging their unique authorities 
to assure our global command and control in a contested environment. In 
addition USTRANSCOM is pursuing numerous technical solutions to harden 
our key cyber terrain, to include a trusted transaction pilot with 
USCYBERCOM.
    In Great Power Competition, we acknowledge our commercial partners 
are both a strength and a potential target. Since 2017, we've 
contractually required our CRAF, VISA, and Universal Services Contract 
providers to perform annual self-assessments based on National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for 
cybersecurity, and we use these self-assessments to identify 
vulnerability trends and share best practices with industry. We 
continue to provide targeted recommendations to help our commercial 
partners improve their own cybersecurity. Lastly, we are reviewing data 
sharing requirements to limit our exposure to adversaries, and we're 
strengthening cybersecurity language in our information technology and 
software development contracts. Overall, we assess our transportation 
providers are taking cybersecurity seriously, and the NIST standards 
will help them improve their security and resiliency - but commercial 
companies will always be challenged to keep out advanced persistent 
threat actors.
                        advance decision making
    Information technology and computational processing continues to 
advance rapidly as we approach game changing capabilities like 
artificial intelligence, machine learning, and advanced analytics, all 
of which have enormous potential to improve USTRANSCOM mission 
outcomes. As we evolve to meet tomorrow's challenges, we are enhancing 
our ability to understand the operational environment, improving our 
ability to develop options, and advancing our ability to make decisions 
at echelon. Cloud computing, balanced cybersecurity, information 
sharing, innovation at echelon and warfighting outcomes serve as our 
guiding principles as we modernize our digital portfolio.
    The foundation for our success starts with data. USTRANSCOM fully 
endorses the DOD's Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure cloud 
capabilities and is an early adopter of cloud technology. We have 
migrated 14 programs to a commercial cloud environment. We are 
establishing an Enterprise Data Environment within the cloud, coupled 
with analytic technologies, to speed decision making, free up human 
capital, accelerate learning, reduce costs, and improve productivity.
                           defender-europe 20
    DEFENDER-Europe 20 exemplifies how USTRANSCOM employs this 
warfighting framework and addresses the contested environment described 
by the NDS to deliver national objectives. Over the next 4 months 
USTRANSCOM is executing the largest projection of force to Europe in 25 
years. 20,000 troops and 1.6 million square feet of military cargo will 
flow from 26 CONUS origins through a diverse network of ports, move 
across simulated contested waters under the watch of Second and Sixth 
Fleets, and arrive as a combat credible force in EUCOM. As we exercise 
the global posture, mobility capacity, and global command and control 
required to favorably shape Great Power Competition, DEFENDER-Europe 20 
is a powerful opportunity to deter potential adversaries, strengthen 
alliances and partnerships, and evaluate future contested environments.
                defense personal property program (dp3)
    After assuming command in August 2018, I received letters from 15 
members of Congress and more than 40 staff inquiries detailing 
servicemember concerns with the Defense Personal Property Program. 
Issues with industry accountability, a shortage of quality capacity in 
summer months, and a general lack of transparency within the Department 
were common--and accurate--criticisms. Since that time--and after 
personal consultation with Service leaders and industry executives--
USTRANSCOM worked to fundamentally restructure our relationship with 
industry to generate the quality capacity to meet DOD's peak demand and 
enable the Department to affix the accountability and responsibility 
missing in today's program.
    The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA included several DP3-related provisions, 
including a requirement for a Business Case Analysis (BCA) on the 
Global Household Goods Contract (GHC) and a GAO report on the effects 
of this contract on DOD Families. The BCA underscored the value of 
restructuring DOD's relationship with industry, while GAO's draft 
report makes helpful recommendations on overall DP3 management but 
highlights no flaws in our approach with GHC. The source selection 
process is underway and our initial review of proposals is encouraging, 
with credible candidates offering solutions to benefit DOD families at 
costs in-line with spending on today's program. We remain on track to 
award GHC to a single move manager this spring. Military Families have 
been our North Star throughout this process. Thank you for your 
continued support to improve the relocation experience for DOD 
families.
                           executive summary
    In summary, USTRANSCOM provides the DOD with the ability to project 
and sustain the Joint Force, deploying combat power to the right place, 
at the right time, and in the necessary scale to be immediate, lethal, 
and decisive. Operating around the globe and around the clock, our 
ability to project military forces is a distinct advantage unmatched by 
any nation, and it serves as the cornerstone of the Joint Force's 
ability to meet national objectives.
    Today, USTRANSCOM assesses our ability to execute the NDS as 
adequate, but with elevated and increasing risk, specifically in the 
areas of Aerial Refueling and Sealift. Improving mission assurance 
within the cyber domain remains a USTRANSCOM top priority. I thank 
Congress for their past and continued support of this organization as 
we work together to defend the Nation and advance American interests.
    Our purpose is enduring, but our success is not guaranteed. We must 
remain vigilant. Underwritten by the dedicated soldiers, sailors, 
marines, airmen, coast guardsmen, civilians, and commercial partners 
performing USTRANSCOM's mission, I am confident in our ability, and I'm 
proud to stand with them in our collective commitment to our nation's 
defense and dedication to America.
    Together, We Deliver!

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Lyons. I appreciate 
your bringing up that issue. We spent a lot of time on that in 
the defense authorization bill addressing that, and I think you 
are carrying it out exactly as we had intended you to do that.
    As I mentioned, General Wolters, we appreciate the briefing 
that we got in Germany, and you covered something I think that 
might be worth repeating here. In October 2019, the news report 
suggested that Russia deployed as many as 10 submarines for 
some of the largest fleet maneuvers since World War II. Can you 
describe, as you did this last week, how the pace and scope of 
Russia's maritime activity has changed in recent years and what 
implications that has for EUCOM?
    General Wolters. Yes, Chairman. We took note of the Russian 
undersea activity in the summer/fall of 2018 and compared it to 
what Russia executed in the summer/fall of 2019. What we saw 
was a 50 percent increase in the number of resources in the 
undersea that Russia committed to both those out-of-area 
submarine patrol operations.
    What we also witnessed was an improved degree of good order 
and discipline on behalf of the Russian sailors. This 
observation is one more reflection about how important it is to 
continue to improve our competitive edge to buy down the risk 
to ensure that we can operate with freedom.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. That is good.
    On that same trip we went through Rota, Spain, when they 
were talking about adding two United States destroyers to the 
four that are already there. Is that something you support? 
Where does that fall into what level of request you have for 
additional forces in EUCOM?
    General Wolters. Chairman, it is precisely in line with our 
request for two additional destroyers, and what I am also proud 
to report, with the support of this Committee through EDI, we 
have been in a position to where we have been able to improve 
and mature the infrastructure at Rota. If you asked me to 
accept two more destroyers tomorrow, we actually possess the 
infrastructure at Rota to be able to house those two additional 
destroyers, a reflection of the value of the funds for 
deterrence.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yes. They made that very clear.
    All right. General Lyons, I commented in my opening 
statement about the KC-46. Some of us went from here in 
Washington up to Seattle to fly the first ones down to Altus 
Air Force Base, and I remember at that time, we had the 
Secretary of the Air Force, Deborah James, there. I recall 
making an observation, and that was that in 1959, two wonderful 
things happened. Number one, I got married, and number two, the 
first KCs were actually delivered to Altus Air Force Base. At 
that time, we did not know that there was any problem. At 
least, I did not know, and I do not think anyone else did 
either because we were just rejoicing. The fact that that had 
lasted 60 years, and she even commented it looks like that is 
going to enhance the prosperity of Altus Air Force Base for the 
next 60 years. So that was something we were not aware of, and 
so now you got a problem, and that problem, of course, is what 
are we going to do to fill that function. I know you have given 
a lot of thought to it. Why do you not let us know where you 
are right now? You know, we have been doing this for years, 
getting rid of old things before we got the new ones online 
ready to perform. So kind of tell us where we are. What is that 
going to do with the preparations that we have already made for 
the KC-135's and the KC-10's to actually be downgraded?
    General Lyons. Chairman, thanks.
    As you mentioned in your opening comments, aerial refueling 
as a force element is the most stressed force element in the 
TRANSCOM portfolio, both for day-to-day operations, as well as 
for high-end conflict operations.
    I will defer to the Air Force on the particular 
programmatics and technical aspects of the KC-46 as it comes 
online.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yes, and I mentioned that to you before 
this meeting that we will be having the Air Force's posture 
hearing, and we will want to talk about that at that time too.
    General Lyons. Yes, sir.
    What I can describe is operationally. As we bring the KC-46 
on and we take on more jets and we convert more crews, when 
that capability is not usable and it is not today presentable 
to the joint force for some technical deficiencies, that means 
a dip in operational capability for the joint force in day-to-
day operations in the active component if in fact we continue 
to retire the KC-135 and the KC-10 at the rate that was 
proposed by the Air Force. So we are working very, very closely 
with the Air Force and the Department to retain a level of 
capability, of legacy capability, so we can continue to support 
joint operations.
    Chairman Inhofe. So you are retaining some that you had not 
planned on retaining had we not had the problem with the KC-46, 
I assume.
    General Lyons. Sir, we are working Air Force now. There was 
some number of planes that were retired, were programmed for 
retirement in fiscal year 2021, as you saw in the budget 
submission, that we believe must be retained, 13 KC-135's and 
10 KC-10's that we believe must be retained during the 
conversion.
    Chairman Inhofe. That is good.
    Senator Reed?
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    General Wolters, the European Command's strategy document 
states meeting the challenge of countering the Kremlin-
sponsored malign influence campaign necessitates a whole-of-
government solution. So do you assess currently that we have a 
synchronized campaign prosecuted in a unified manner to address 
malign influence, particularly directed at the 2020 election?
    General Wolters. Senator, I think our campaign momentum is 
improving in that area. As you are familiar with, we 
established 2 years ago the Russia integration group that bears 
the responsibility to represent USEUCOM with the United States 
and with many NATO nations to align a whole-of-nation, whole-
of-government activity and activities below the level of actual 
kinetic conflict to ensure that we can have better control of 
the information domain.
    I think we are to a point to where we expect to do better, 
and I think that is a good place for military leaders to be. I 
will tell you that I am pleased with the campaign momentum. I 
have had the opportunity to visit with many of the U.S. 
entities and national entities that represent whole-of-
government and whole-of-nation activity to provide more 
influence in the information domain, and I am pleased with the 
progress.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Can you just give me your assessment of the current state 
of alliance cohesion within NATO? I would assume that at a 
military level, there is one sort of analysis and at a 
political level, another. Can you touch on both?
    General Wolters. Senator Reed, the mil-to-mil [military-to-
military] alignment that I see with the United States and NATO 
with the North Atlantic extension through the Euro-Atlantic is 
as strong as I have ever witnessed. I have had the opportunity 
to serve in NATO since 1983.
    I am pleased to report that at the political level, as a 
result of recent documents that were approved at NATO at the 
political level, we are seeing greater cohesion as well. For 
the first time in over 6 decades, we at NATO approved the first 
NATO military strategy. It is a document that is classified 
NATO secret that codifies the threat and codifies the 
activities that we need to embrace to more comprehensively 
defend. All 29 nations agreed to that NATO military strategy, 
and I think that is a reflection at the political level and the 
military level of improving cohesion.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    General Lyons, we talked about the shipbuilding program. 
Can you just give us a quick sort of summary of where are at 
and where we have to go?
    General Lyons. Yes, Senator, I sure can.
    As you know, we depend on sealift to carry about 90 percent 
of our cargo capacity in a wartime scenario. Our current 
readiness of the fleet is below where we need it to be. You 
indicated that it is rapidly reaching end of useful life. We 
are working very closely with the Navy. You mentioned the 
authorization to buy seven used vessels. I anticipate we will 
purchase two, the first two, in 2021, working very, very 
closely with MARAD and the Navy. My view is we should have that 
first vessel in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021.
    Senator Reed. But we are far below what we would need for a 
surge--a significant military operation at this point. Correct?
    General Lyons. Yes, sir. That is correct. We need a much 
longer plan.
    Senator Reed. The Chairman touched upon the air refueling, 
which I think is another critical weakness. We talked about 
that in the office.
    One of the areas that is ubiquitous everywhere is cyber, 
and you are in the position where you not only have to have a 
military organization that you have to keep sort of ahead of 
the curve, but you have literally hundreds of private 
companies, some large, some small. Can you give us an idea of 
the cyber challenges that you are facing, and do we have a 
significant vulnerability there?
    General Lyons. Senator, the way I would characterize the 
cyber vulnerability is probably the most consequential to the 
mobility enterprise as we look at it. So we spend a lot of time 
on this particular issue looking at resiliency, looking at a 
number of other issues to harden our defenses, et cetera. 
Particularly with regard to the commercial carriers which is I 
think what you are asking, we have included contract language 
in all of our contracts. We check compliance. We have self-
reporting mechanisms. We believe that their level of cyber 
hygiene has increased significantly from this level of effort.
    I would not come here today and tell you that they could 
survive a threat from a persistent threat actor, and so we have 
sufficient resiliency in our contracts as well.
    Senator Reed. Just to follow on, do you have the ability to 
check, you know, send in teams, no-notice inspections? You 
know, the old line, a unit only does what the commander checks. 
If you are not checking, you could have everything in the 
contract you wanted and you would have nothing.
    General Lyons. Senator, we do not have the authority that 
you are describing.
    Senator Reed. Do you need that?
    General Lyons. There are some second and third implications 
on those kinds of activities.
    Senator Reed. Can you get back to us on that?
    General Lyons. I can, yes, sir.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    General Lyons. I often get asked the question as to whether 
we need additional authorities to 'inspect' commercial partner 
cyber compliance (implied is access to their networks, etc.). 
From a practical point of view, we don't have the technical 
expertise or bandwidth for such a mission, nor does USCYBERCOM. 
USTRANSCOM is not advocating for the authority to conduct 
nonconsensual intrusions into an industry partner's network. 
Our current authority is based upon our contractual 
relationship that our industry partners agree to voluntarily. 
There are several issues that impact the inspection of 
contractor networks. For instance, these carriers are U.S. 
companies and there are limits on the collection of U.S. 
persons. Additionally, the companies have Constitutional rights 
in their systems under the 4th Amendment, and the Posse 
Comitatus Act prevents DOD from serving in a law enforcement 
capacity unless authorized by law. However, all these issues 
are resolved if the contractor provides consent to inspect its 
network. Therefore, if we include the ability to inspect as 
part of the contract, the company is consenting to our 
inspection, and we are conducting that inspection for valid 
purposes unrelated to law enforcement or intelligence. The 
downside to gaining access via consent, including consent 
gained through contract, is that the company can withdraw their 
consent at any time. While that withdrawal may result in the 
government taking action under the Contract Disputes Act and 
may include termination, it will not result in government 
access to the network. Thus, the more stringent we make our 
access requirements, the more it may limit competition since 
some contractors may not compete for contracts if it means 
allowing full access to and monitoring of their IT systems. The 
Government can perform onsite NIST 800-171 compliance 
assessments without obtaining access to a contractor's 
networks. The NIST Handbook 162 provides guidance on how to 
perform assessments by reviewing policies and procedures, 
interviewing staff, observing contractor IT personnel 
performing their duties, and inspecting physical security and 
hardware environments. If we wanted to perform these 
assessments, we would need to update our contract language with 
the option to perform an inspection if the contractor provides 
consent. We are encouraged by the newly released Cybersecurity 
Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) and its provisions for 
third party assessments. As the CMMC program matures, we will 
consider adding the CMMC requirement in our contracts and 
requiring third party assessments of our contractors' 
compliance with NIST 800-171.

    Senator Reed. I am not surprised the 1st Brigade of the 
82nd conducted an outstanding operation. Thank you.
    General Lyons. Airborne, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Wicker?
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your great service to the United 
States.
    Let me ask you, General Wolters. The proposed OMB [Office 
of Management and Budget] fiscal year 2021 budget requests 
$705.4 billion for DOD. This represents three-tenths of 1 
percent over the current fiscal year. In other words, the 
proposed budget buys us fewer resources than the current year 
considering inflation. Am I correct there?
    General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Wicker. Let me just ask you this. Do we need fewer 
security resources in the European Command next year than we do 
this year?
    General Wolters. Senator, we need more.
    Senator Wicker. In addition to that, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Defense 
Strategy Commission have all endorsed 3.5 percent real growth. 
Is that also your opinion, General Wolters?
    General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Wicker. General Lyons, is that your opinion also?
    General Lyons. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Wicker. I appreciate the distinguished Chairman 
mentioning early on in his questioning Rota, Spain, and I am 
glad that he and his team visited there--a bipartisan 
delegation visited there just the other day.
    The DDGs are the workhorse of the Navy. General Wolters, in 
European Command how does a mere three-tenths of 1 percent 
increase over the current fiscal year affect what we are going 
to be able to do there with the DDGs, with the two extra DDGs?
    General Wolters. Senator, every cent counts. Those two 
additional DDGs would allow us the opportunity to continue to 
improve our ability to get indications and warnings in the 
potential battle space and also dramatically improve our 
ability to better command and control. Because of the 
flexibility of those resources, they can comprehensively defend 
in all geographical areas in support of Europe. Those 
destroyers are critical to improve the campaign to deliver 
peace, particularly in the areas of indications and warnings 
and command and control.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you for that. We are going 
to certainly try to help you I think up and down the dais here 
on a bipartisan basis on the resources that we need to defend 
America and Americans.
    It is interesting that the leader of EUCOM would mention in 
the first few seconds of his statement not only Russia but 
China. Could you enlighten us about where you are seeing 
increased problems with China and increased influence in the 
European theater from China?
    General Wolters. Senator, two areas. The first is seaport 
equities, and the second is 5G Huawei.
    What we have seen in several critical nations on the 
periphery of Europe is an economic majority on behalf of China 
and investment for seaports in critical nations like Belgium, 
Italy, France, and Greece. That is a large concern to all of 
the NATO nations. When you start to do the collective math, you 
discover that China has access to 10 percent of the shipping 
rights into and out of Europe. Those are daunting figures that 
should lead one to believe that we need to continue to be 
vigilant with respect to seaport equities on the economic side.
    The second issue happens to be Huawei and 5G. I am firmly 
aware of several European nations who have a tendency to lean 
towards Huawei and 5G. My concern goes back to the soldiers. 
Without the appropriate network protection, there is a 
potential compromise of technical data and personal data, and 
that is not to the good order and discipline of our United 
States soldiers and our NATO soldiers.
    Senator Wicker. Finally, General Wolters, a number of us 
have been involved on a member-to-member basis with our 
parliamentary brothers and sisters in the OSCE [Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe] Parliamentary 
Assembly. We have a great new Ambassador to the OSCE, 
Ambassador Jim Gilmore. To what extent is the OSCE organization 
important to you and to providing you information that you 
need?
    General Wolters. Very important, Senator, and I think it 
builds incredible trust for the Euro-Atlantic link. Your 
hearings that you held in Gdansk last year were a huge boost in 
trust not only between the United States and Poland but 
throughout all of NATO.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
    Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for your service and thank you for being 
here.
    Many of my colleagues and I have received briefings as 
recently as this morning from other departments and agencies in 
the administration about the coordinated response to the 
coronavirus. I am also concerned about the Department of 
Defense response to protect servicemembers and family members 
that are stationed at military installations abroad, the rapid 
spread of this virus, as well as the number of diagnoses and 
deaths in countries where Americans are stationed. A lot of 
Americans are stationed in, for example, South Korea. This is 
very, very concerning. I am focused on ensuring that the 
Department is reevaluating and updating procedures and actions 
necessary to keep our servicemembers and their families safe.
    General Lyons, your command manages the inter-theater 
movement of our servicemembers in and out of areas that have 
been impacted by the coronavirus, making you really uniquely 
positioned to address this issue. What action has your command 
taken to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and ensure the well-
being of our servicemembers and their families? Do you need 
additional resources? Is there more we can do to help you? What 
more do you think should be done?
    General Lyons. Senator, I agree with your concern. The 
Secretary of Defense has indicated that protection of the force 
is his number one priority regarding the coronavirus.
    U.S. Northern Command is the lead for the Department, 
working very closely in support of Health and Human Services. 
We are connected with them on a daily basis, a frequent number 
of times a day, and we are watching this very, very closely for 
any implications on global mobility.
    Senator Blumenthal. What specific actions are you taking?
    General Lyons. Inside the transportation enterprise, 
locations like Travis Air Force Base has become a receiver for 
potential folks coming out of the theater, particularly the 
Indo-Pacific. We are not taking particular health protection 
measures inside the command other than to protect the force, 
but in a more board sense, we are in support of Health and 
Human Services and that is done through the lead of USNORTHCOM.
    Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, do you feel you have 
been given the necessary resources and other tools to protect 
American servicemen and women and their families in Europe?
    General Wolters. Yes, Senator, and we have also been given 
the appropriate authorities. As we speak in Europe today, we 
have over 300 cases, and the nation that is of most concern is 
Italy with 6 reported deaths. We have restricted travel to 
certain zones, and we require all mil air arrival flights to be 
screened for the virus.
    Senator Blumenthal. Are you taking any additional steps to 
constrain travel by service men and women or their families on 
leave and so forth?
    General Wolters. We have in what we feel are the affected 
areas, in particular two states inside of Italy.
    Senator Blumenthal. Do you have plans to restrict travel in 
any other states?
    General Wolters. We anticipate the need may arise in 
Germany, but that is still to be determined.
    Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, in your posture 
statement, you highlight American servicemembers on the ground 
in the Joint Military Training Group Ukraine work, and you note 
they serve shoulder to shoulder with Ukrainian forces. Can you 
expand on the important efforts to deter Russian aggression 
there?
    General Wolters. Yes, Senator. The Joint Military Training 
Group initiated military training team activity on a rotational 
basis starting in 2016, and they also began about 6 months 
later to rotate military training teams in the special 
operations category. There are several phases of the long-range 
plan, and here we are 3\1/2\ years later and we are to phase 3, 
which puts those military training teams that represent the 
Joint Military Training Group--Canada and UK [United Kingdom] 
are other participants. Those teams are now in observer status 
because of the demonstrated expertise of the Ukrainian armed 
forces and the conventional force in the SOF [Special 
Operations Forces] side of the house. We are very pleased with 
the progress of the Ukrainian armed forces, and the stronger 
that they are and the more that they embrace democratic values, 
the greater the alignment with the West, which is exactly where 
need to head.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you very much, 
gentlemen. My time has expired. Thanks for your service.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Fischer?
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to thank both of you gentlemen for your 
service and also to thank the men and women who serve under 
you.
    General Wolters, how would you assess the progress that has 
been made in implementing the NDS [National Defense Strategy] 
and its emphasis on prioritizing strategic competition with 
Russia?
    General Wolters. Senator, I am very pleased. As I mentioned 
earlier on one of the questions from your colleagues, for the 
first time in many decades, we approved the NATO military 
strategy, and it looks very similar to the United States' 
National Defense Strategy. I believe this is one area that 
reflects the powerful alignment and a willingness on behalf of 
NATO to lean forward with respect to what we do across the full 
spectrum from competition to crisis to conflict, which is 
exactly what we called for in the NDS. So I am pleased with the 
ever-improving alignment in NATO and with our European nations.
    Senator Fischer. What do you think is the biggest challenge 
that you have in fulfilling the goals of the NDS in Europe?
    General Wolters. It is to do what we can to cure the malign 
influence on behalf of Russia, and that requires a more 
concentrated effort in the competition phase of embracing a 
potential foe. What we have heard throughout many of the 
questions today are the activities that we have to embrace in 
21st century military below the actual activities of kinetic 
conflict and understanding what we are doing and what the 
return on investment is, and we are making rapid improvement in 
those areas.
    Senator Fischer. So in order to improve, basically you need 
to work together more on your training?
    General Wolters. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Fischer. Do you feel that you have come together or 
are coming together with other NATO partners in facing what the 
threats are?
    General Wolters. We are, and the reflection of that is the 
approval of a NATO military strategy that actually codifies 
those threats and agreement on behalf of the 29 nations to 
identify those threats.
    Senator Fischer. You and I yesterday--we discussed the 
growing recognition that there is among the NATO partners on 
the important role of our nuclear deterrence in keeping the 
peace. Obviously, we all understand that our deterrent, the 
triad, is the bedrock of the security of this country.
    Can you tell us a little bit about what you are hearing 
from our NATO partners when it comes to the deterrence in 
private conversations, if you can share that, but also in 
public the support that you see?
    General Wolters. Senator, there is a greater degree of 
awareness of the importance of deterrence, and as we look at 
the success that NATO has had for the last 7 decades to deliver 
peace, one of the elements has to be the triad that exists from 
the United States and its representation to nuclear deterrence 
on the European continent. It has been very, very effective, 
and the nations understand more and more about that with each 
passing day as a result of embracing deterrence to a greater 
degree than we have in the past.
    Senator Fischer. Would you say that our partners in their 
embracing of this deterrence are also becoming better 
messengers within their own countries about the importance of 
not just a strong NATO, but of having that strong nuclear 
deterrence, that umbrella, that is so vital in their freedom as 
well?
    General Wolters. Absolutely, Senator. It has to do with the 
responsibility that we feel in NATO to generate peace not just 
inside of the boundaries of Europe but on the periphery. As we 
embrace missions for NATO mission Iraq and as we embrace 
Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan, we see how important 
it is to proliferate deterrence to the max extent practical to 
achieve greater peace.
    Senator Fischer. What are your views, sir, on adopting a 
so-called no-first-use policy? Do you believe that that would 
strengthen deterrence?
    General Wolters. Senator, I am a fan of flexible first-use 
policy.
    Senator Fischer. Do you believe developing ground-launched 
conventionally armed intermediate range weapons will enhance 
your ability to deter Russia?
    General Wolters. It will. It dramatically complicates an 
enemy's task.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thanks to the witnesses. I appreciated the opportunity to 
visit with you each before the hearing today.
    General Wolters, I want to ask you a question. In your 
testimony--I think it was maybe in a back and forth with 
Senator Reed--you talked a little bit about increased Russian 
sub activity in the Atlantic. The President's Budget proposes 
to cut the Virginia-class sub program 50 percent by only 
funding one of the two in the block buy. On February 13, the 
DOD used its general transfer authority to move $3.8 billion of 
Pentagon money to the general drug account for use on the 
southern border.
    Part of those funds that were moved was a reduction of $180 
million from the P-8 Poseidon aircraft program. As you know, 
that airplane is a modified Boeing 737 that is used as a sub 
hunter. It usually operates from Iceland or elsewhere in Europe 
to work with the fast attack subs like the Virginia-class to 
track Russian sub activity coming from the Greenland-Iceland-UK 
gap.
    Without commenting on the budget, I would like you to talk 
about the importance of both the Virginia-class sub and the P-8 
Poseidon in countering Russian sub activity.
    General Wolters. Senator, they are vital capabilities, and 
what they contribute to overall maritime patrol activity has 
proven over time to be very, very successful.
    We are lucky to be part of NATO. We lean on our brothers 
and sisters from a national perspective to ask them to take a 
look at the resources they can contribute when we are in 
situations with respect to some decrements in the maritime 
patrol area. Norway has been a great contributor on the P-8 
side of the house, and we see the effectiveness of that system. 
They are vital resources and very much needed to improve our 
overall deterrence posture.
    Senator Kaine. Both of those platforms, the Virginia-class 
and then the P-8 Poseidon.
    General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. General Lyons, I want to ask you a question. 
On pages 5 and 6 of your written testimony, you talk about 
military sealift issues. Again, Senator Reed asked you a little 
bit about it. There was an IG [Inspector General] report about 
military sealift command and readiness reporting, and one of 
the areas that they focused on was that the readiness reporting 
was coming from the ship captains and they were sort of doing a 
self-report about readiness. These are our assets, but the 
operation of the ship was contracted, and there was sort of a 
question about whether there was an incentive for the captains 
really to accurately report readiness. What is their incentive 
to say, hey, we are really not ready?
    What are you guys doing? You talk about in TRANSCOM the 
current readiness measurement, but what are you doing to make 
sure that the reporting of readiness from the ship level up is 
as accurate as it can be?
    General Lyons. Senator, it is a great question, and I 
concur with that assessment. A lot of activity has taken place 
and I think we have made a lot of improvements to elucidate the 
readiness that we see today. Part of that is the reason we are 
seeing such low readiness rates in the 50th and 60th percentile 
about our Ready Reserve Fleet readiness to generate as we 
discovered during our no-notice activation back in September.
    What I would say is really back about 3 years ago, in 2017, 
the military sealift commander really started to take this 
very, very seriously, deep diving. He has come up with a 
comprehensive readiness plan. The DOD IG reflected his findings 
in 2017 in a 2018 report that you are referring to, and there 
is a lot of work still to be done.
    Senator Kaine. Just to your written testimony, there is a 
goal of 85 percent readiness, but the current measure is at 59 
percent, and vessel material, condition, and age are the 
primary factors, and those continue to degrade readiness. You 
have some additional testimony about the sealift fleet will 
lose 1 million to 2 million square feet of capacity each year 
as the ships reach the end of their useful life.
    So tell the Committee a little bit in my remaining minute 
just about what are the plans to restore that readiness and 
hopefully get more near the 85 percent goal?
    General Lyons. It is a significant issue. It is a top 
priority for TRANSCOM. We are working very, very closely with 
the Navy on this.
    We have a fleet that is about 43 years old on average. If 
you compare that to the civilian industry, they are going to 
wash out their ships between 15 and 25, depending on the 
business case. It is no secret that when you retain a large 
fixed plant facility like one of our large sealift platforms, 
it becomes increasingly more expensive the older it gets.
    What we would like to see very much is a little bit less in 
terms of service life extension, in other words, extending 
these ships beyond 50 to 60 years. That is not returning the 
investment that we thought it would. We are a very strong 
advocate of the acquired use strategy. You granted the 
authorization to do seven. We need to execute what you granted 
us the ability to do, and then I think we need to come back to 
you with a long-range plan to consistently recapitalize over 
the next 15 to 20 years.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
    Thanks, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cotton?
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance 
and for your service.
    General Wolters, let us talk a little bit more about 
coronavirus and its impact in the European theater. I am 
reading here from a Stars and Stripes report on Sunday saying 
that at Vicenza, there has been a temporary closing Monday 
through Wednesday of all dependents schools, activity centers, 
fitness centers, theaters, and chapels. Is that report 
accurate?
    General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. Are there any updates from that report on 
Sunday in Stars and Stripes?
    General Wolters. Those facilities remained closed and 
travel to the two states are still prohibited in Italy.
    Senator Cotton. Do you expect that those facilities in the 
Vicenza community will reopen on Thursday as initially planned, 
or do you think that closure might have to be extended?
    General Wolters. Senator, I would give it about a 50/50 
right now about potentially extending the closure.
    Senator Cotton. How many United States troops do we have at 
Vicenza roughly speaking?
    General Wolters. We have got about 6,000 or 7,000.
    Senator Cotton. How many of those have accompanied spouses 
or children?
    General Wolters. Seventy to eighty percent.
    Senator Cotton. So maybe about 4,000 to 4,500 husbands and 
wives and then some larger number of children probably?
    General Wolters. Absolutely, and over 35,000 United States 
military members in Italy.
    Senator Cotton. And they are all mostly just sitting at 
home right now trying to avoid the coronavirus?
    General Wolters. Not mostly but there is a fair amount, 
yes, sir.
    Senator Cotton. Coronavirus has been present in Germany as 
well. In fact, that was one of the first European nations in 
which it appeared. It has not appeared in the numbers yet that 
have exploded in Italy in the last few days.
    First off, has there been any such closures at our military 
bases in Germany?
    General Wolters. Not yet, Senator, but we are anticipating 
an increase in the number of cases reported in Germany and we 
are prepared to execute.
    Senator Cotton. It is a troubling situation.
    Let us move to another troubling situation, which you have 
spoken about briefly as well, Huawei, the Chinese telecom 
company. You state in your written testimony that 5G networks 
by Huawei will place intellectual property, sensitive 
technology, and private personal information at heightened risk 
of acquisition and exploitation by the Chinese Government. You 
further say that this ongoing initiative, coupled with China's 
growing interest and investment in European ports and 
infrastructure, complicates steady state and contingency 
operations.
    It sounds like you consider the use of Huawei and 5G 
networks in Europe to be a threat to our national security. Is 
that correct?
    General Wolters. It is certainly a threat to the soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and marines in Europe.
    Senator Cotton. My next question was, is it a threat to the 
troopers that you lead?
    General Wolters. Affirm, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. Unfortunately, some European nations are 
moving forward with Huawei technology in their networks, most 
notably our NATO allies in the United Kingdom and Germany. What 
are we to do about that and how can we guarantee the security 
of our troopers, as well as our NATO command and control 
systems?
    General Wolters. Senator Cotton, it is vigilance, 
education, and going back to the basics with respect to network 
protection of the critical data on the technical side of the 
house and the personal side of the house for our soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and marines, not just in the U.S. but all of 
our NATO forces.
    Senator Cotton. Do your military counterparts understand 
the threat that Huawei poses?
    General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. So the problem may be at the political 
leadership level. A statement, not a question.
    Finally, I want to conclude on a somewhat related matter. 
We discussed this yesterday in our meeting. I want to bring 
everyone's attention to an alarming poll by the Pew Research 
Center among 16 NATO countries. Happily it shows that NATO's 
favorability rating is pretty strong, 2 to 1 in fact, 53 to 27 
of the peoples of these 16 countries have a favorable 
impression of NATO. Not surprisingly, NATO scored pretty low in 
Russia.
    Somewhat disappointingly though, when asked who should 
fight Russia if there were a conflict between a NATO ally and 
Russia, only 38 percent of peoples in these nations said my 
nation should fight Russia, whereas 50 percent said the United 
States should fight Russia. In some of the biggest NATO allies, 
it was even more alarming. In Italy, 25 percent said we will 
fight them. Seventy-five percent said you Americans go fight. 
In Germany, it was 34-63. That is a little better I guess but 
not too much.
    General Wolters, can the Europeans expect Americans to care 
more about their security and their kids than they care about 
their security?
    General Wolters. Senator, in my consultations at the mil-
to-mil level with chiefs of defense and ministers of defense, I 
see a very, very eager desire and willingness to fight the 
Russians, and those nations that I continually communicate with 
show that desire, if required, to protect themselves.
    Senator Cotton. I hear the same thing when I consult with 
European defense leaders, not surprisingly. These are men and 
women who have dedicated their lives to the service of their 
country and the defense of their country. So it is a really a 
political problem at the level of political leadership in 
Europe both in the leaders and the leadership that they show to 
their peoples to demonstrate that they have to be willing to 
fight as hard for their future and their security as they 
expect Americans to fight for them.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters?
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony here today and for 
your service as well.
    General Wolters, I would like to focus on the Baltics. In 
2017, I visited Latvia and Lithuania to observe the United 
States Army's Europe Operation Saber Strike exercise. The 
Michigan National Guard regularly participates in this exercise 
as Latvia's counterpart in the National Guard State Partnership 
Program, as you know.
    Similarly, Latvian forces participate in the Michigan 
National Guard's annual Northern Strike exercise, which is a 
joint multinational exercise hosted at Camp Grayling in 
Michigan.
    The Latvian military particularly benefits from this 
training in Michigan because it offers an opportunity for them 
to certify as JTACs [Joint Terminal Attack Controller], and as 
a result of this program, Latvia is one of only eight allied 
countries that are certified to call in United States close air 
support in combat. Part of the reason the Michigan National 
Guard and the Latvian military have a strong relationship is 
because the Latvian military is built around integrating 
reserve and their regular forces as a major component of their 
national defense strategy.
    So my question to you, sir, is, could you discuss how EUCOM 
tailors its training and partner strategies to support the 
Baltic States' reliance on these reserve forces and 
specifically the State partnership with our National Guard and 
how integral that is to all of this?
    General Wolters. Senator, I can.
    First of all, for the Baltics writ large the insertion of 
the four battalion-sized battle groups into Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland in the summer of 2016 has dramatically 
improved our all-domain security awareness. In particular, as 
you well know, with the participation of your Michigan Air 
National Guardsmen who have been very, very integral in the 
air-land integration piece, the lead nation in Latvia at that 
battalion-sized battle group happens to be Canada. We have many 
force elements that are intermixed amongst the other nations.
    The overall improvement day in and day out of those battle 
groups to be able to see the battle space and defend their 
sovereign territory is palpable, and they are doing so in all 
domains and all functions. Our next step is to make sure that 
those battalion-sized battle groups that represent generating 
peace in the Baltics are aware of all the activities in the 
southeastern sector of Europe, as well as the western portion 
of Europe. So we are very, very pleased with the continued 
transparency and alignment and very, very pleased with the air-
land integration that we have seen improving in Latvia for the 
last 2 years.
    Senator Peters. Well, thank you.
    My next question is related to the development of the next 
generation combat vehicle which is now taking place in Michigan 
with a cross-functional team. The first platform was intended 
to replace the Bradley fighting vehicle that the Army has just 
recently restarted the program. Much of the debate has 
basically focused on the tradeoff between armor and mobility 
and specifically how readily the vehicle can be positioned in a 
crisis zone.
    However, in the European theater, the size and weight of 
the vehicle could be equally problematic for its 
maneuverability through European terrain and civilian 
infrastructure, particularly the bridges there.
    General Wolters, you seemed to address this issue in your 
written statement where you mentioned the EU, in consultation 
with NATO, is investing 6.5 billion euros in the improvement of 
civilian and military dual use. However, I am concerned this 
approach may not address the core issue that I just mentioned.
    But my question to you is, what is more realistic? Should 
the next generation of combat vehicles be built to accommodate 
European infrastructure limits, particularly in Poland and the 
Baltics, or is the solution to reinforce transportation 
infrastructure throughout eastern Europe?
    General Wolters. Senator, I hate to give you this answer, 
but I think it is a little bit of both, and I know that General 
McConville leading our United States Army has his experts 
taking a peak at that. I know that he steps up even one more 
level. It gets into a discussion about armor versus mobility, 
and I think from a global perspective, there are some tradeoffs 
and from a regional perspective, there are some tradeoffs. It 
all has to do with the demonstrated capability of the nations 
in Europe, as well as other regions. I know that we are taking 
a very, very serious look at that.
    Senator Peters. My follow-up question is, how do our 
western European allies, who also produce heavy military 
equipment, how do they accommodate limitations in civilian 
infrastructure particularly in Poland and the Baltics?
    General Wolters. A greater degree of education on the 
challenges that we face from a bridging perspective in eastern 
Europe versus western Europe. It was an issue that all of 
Europe was very, very aware of in the mid-1980s, and they are 
getting themselves reacquainted with it today and they 
understand the imperative of making sure that we have bridging 
programs in the regions in the northeast and the southeast of 
Europe to ensure that we can shoot, move, and communicate fast.
    Senator Peters. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Gentlemen, thank you very much.
    General Lyons, we have already discussed a little bit of 
the KC-46's. So I will not dive into that. But just for note, 
our Iowa Air National Guard does have the 185th air refueling 
wing that operates the KC-135's. Certainly we want to make sure 
that this incredible unit is able to sustain operations 
ongoing, so it is something we will definitely want to discuss 
with the Air Force during their posture review.
    But, General Wolters, I am going to pick up where my 
colleague, Senator Peters, left off. He was talking about the 
State Partnership Program that his Michigan National Guard has 
with those Baltic State members while Iowa, our National Guard, 
has a partnership with Kosovo. I am just always very excited 
about that and have relationships that I have carried on for 
about the decade of time that the Iowa Army National Guard has 
been involved with those partners.
    As the only force that both the Kosovars and Serbians 
trust, how can KFOR [Kosovo Force] best posture itself to 
ensure that there is enduring stability between the two sides, 
Kosovo and Serbia?
    General Wolters. Thanks, Senator, and I cannot thank you 
enough for the contributions of your State to Kosovo.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you.
    General Wolters. As we sit today, KFOR is very, very active 
and engaged more so than they were 1 year ago as a result of 
the continued involvement of United States operations 
activities and investments in Kosovo and Serbia, as well as the 
NATO investments of operations activities.
    We typically rotate in NATO military training teams, but 
when they land at those locations, to be able to have a soft 
landing with the force element from your National Guard State 
Partnership Program affords us the opportunity to reintegrate 
at a much faster pace. We are very, very concerned about the 
security disposition in the Balkans. We are very, very pleased 
with the efforts of KFOR, and KFOR is far more capable today as 
a result of learning from the experiences of the State 
Partnership Program like yours as they reveal themselves in 
Kosovo.
    Senator Ernst. Great. Thank you, and obviously, a number of 
us here do support those State Partnership Programs.
    What is NATO's role for peacekeeping as the KSF [Kosovo 
Security Force] transitions into a full army? Will it be able 
to guarantee Kosovo's territorial integrity? Do you see that in 
their future?
    General Wolters. That is certainly the goal, Senator, and 
again, it is by, with, and through in a very, very tough 
neighborhood. As you probably know better than I, there are 
some very, very serious tendencies that exist between Serbia 
and Kosovo that we are seeing improve over the course of the 
last several weeks. Ambassador Grenell has been very, very 
aggressive on getting those security apparati to communicate 
with each other. So we hope for continued good news in that 
area with respect to the Kosovo-Serbia relationship with 
respect to taxation.
    Senator Ernst. Absolutely, and I think that there is undue 
pressure obviously coming from Russia in that region as well.
    General Lyons, if we could talk a little bit about 
autonomous vehicles and how that impacts logistics and 
delivery. I am really excited. I chair the Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, and we have talked 
extensively about autonomous systems and how that can help our 
operators. Like I had wonderful truck drivers that were out on 
the roads and how it would reduce their risk.
    Can you describe a little bit how you are leveraging and 
integrating these emerging technologies into some of the 
modernization efforts?
    General Lyons. Senator, I agree with you. There is enormous 
potential here for autonomous, and it can be a combination of 
manned/unmanned. Each of the services are working distinct and 
separate material development kinds of initiatives. You 
mentioned the one in the Army, which was a bit of a combination 
teaming. I think there is enormous potential to expand what we 
are doing in the air domain and then even potentially space 
domain in the future.
    Senator Ernst. Absolutely, and what is the best way to 
speed delivery of those types of systems into operations today? 
We oftentimes see large defense contractors--they are very slow 
moving, but this is a great emerging technology. How can we 
deliver that quicker?
    General Lyons. Ma'am, it is a great question. As indicated, 
each of the services are working these in the programmatic 
sense. As a combatant commander, I have the requirements out 
there, but the services present capability and so I cannot 
speak specifically to the timelines that they are working. But 
it is a great question.
    Senator Ernst. If you come up with the answer to that, let 
us know because I think we really need to be much more nimble 
on delivering emerging technologies to our men and women in 
uniform.
    General Lyons. I agree.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, gentlemen, very much.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Jones?
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for your service. We really appreciate you 
being here today.
    General Wolters, we have taken the first steps to begin the 
Defender-Europe 20 military exercise, the largest of its kind 
in 25 years. I think there are 18 countries participating 
across 10 countries.
    What are the biggest challenges you see in executing the 
Defender 20 program, and what are the key takeaways you hope to 
see coming out of the exercise?
    General Wolters. Senator, on the logistics side of the 
house, the environment in Europe has to be mature enough to be 
able to absorb 20,000 soldiers and get those soldiers to the 
right prepositioned locations to be able to grab the 
appropriate gear that they are supposed to get and get to their 
foxhole and be able to execute. What we want to do is count 
every second that it takes to get the soldier from the first 
point of entry all the way to his or her foxhole to be 
successful to adequately defend.
    We anticipate that there will be some snags. I want to 
applaud this Committee on the fact that 2 years ago we could 
not exercise Defender-Europe 20. We were not mature enough with 
respect to the prepositioned stockpiles to have a soldier show 
up at location X and be able to grab resources. Today we can do 
that. We know the fitness of the resources, and now we will be 
able to examine their speed with which they can get to the 
foxhole and be able to execute.
    Senator Jones. Is Turkey participating?
    General Wolters. Senator, they are as observers and they 
are in certain areas with respect to activity on the periphery 
of Georgia.
    Senator Jones. Just to follow up real quick, what, if any, 
response, reaction are you seeing from Russia, or do you expect 
from the Russians or any of our other adversaries?
    General Wolters. Senator, we have seen a fair amount of 
response from Russia. They are not overly pleased with 
Defender-Europe 20. We are concerned mostly about the readiness 
of our forces, and we are doing all that in accordance with 
international law in sovereign space, in sovereign seas, in 
sovereign land.
    Senator Jones. Thank you.
    General Lyons, we have got a air refueling wing in Alabama 
too, the 117th, winner of an Omaha trophy this year. In your 
remarks to the Atlantic Council, you were quoted as saying 
across TRANSCOM, the aerial refueling force element is the most 
stressed and probably the one that is pushing the red line or 
exceeding the red line.
    Now, were you speaking strictly about the number available 
aircraft there or also about the demands or the need for more 
crew?
    General Lyons. Senator, it is a combination of both. I 
spoke earlier about the iron, the tails, that we have to 
retain, legacy tails, during the conversion before the KC-46 
becomes available to the joint force. But I would also comment 
that--and this is true across all components, Reserve and the 
Guard--the high tempo of our airmen that are running these 
missions. Particularly in the Guard, I would say we do come 
very, very close. In some cases we penetrate the mob to dwell 
in that particular force element, and I would highlight, 
Senator, that the contributions that the Air Force Reserve 
makes in day-to-day competition is absolutely extraordinary 
between volunteerism--involunteerism that still exists in the 
CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility] and then long-term MPA 
[Mentor-Protege Agreement] pilots who we have flying every day.
    Senator Jones. I take it you could use more crew? Is that 
fair?
    General Lyons. Senator, crew is a friction point. There is 
no question about that.
    Senator Jones. What can we do to try to get more crew to 
the air refueling in the Guard or wherever it might be?
    General Lyons. Well, Senator, we are doing that today. The 
Air Force is working some of this as a combination of what the 
KC-46 will bring. Some of this is a function of what we must 
retain. Then there is obviously a certain level of friction 
between what systems, how many systems you can crew and then 
the associated output to the joint force.
    Senator Jones. Thank you.
    I think that is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I yield the 
remainder.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Tillis?
    Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your years of service.
    General Lyons, I want to start with you on the HHG 
[household goods] program. It is not in your lanes, but I have 
got a little history with military housing and trying to fix 
that problem and improve accountability and really put the 
family at the tip of the spear in terms of our focus. So I like 
the idea that you are moving forward with the program. It 
should reduce costs and improve service. That is really what we 
set out to do with military housing. We did it for a while.
    So with this program, can you tell me a little bit about 
how it is going to execute, what your expectations are for 
performance in the upcoming PCS [permanent change of station] 
season? And more importantly, I would like to know the 
mechanics. How does that family member who is coordinating the 
move--the spouse may be deployed somewhere--to what extent are 
they going to have power over really assessing the completeness 
and the satisfaction of the move?
    General Lyons. Senator, all great questions. You brought up 
the housing issue, and part of what got us into the housing 
issue was a lack of clear accountability with the private 
sector and the appropriate governance structure to manage that 
large contract. That is exactly what is driving us here in the 
household goods industry to restructure our relationship so 
that we do have defined levels of accountability, key 
performance parameters if you would, and that is the design of 
the global household goods contract. It is not designed to put 
any providers out of business. It is designed to gain 
accountability, clarify responsibility inside the Department, 
and then through a longer-range relationship with industry, 
incentivize the growth of capacity to meet the peak season. I 
think for family members, we owe them that.
    Now, we will not in the 2020 peak season see this come to 
fruition. We intend to award in 2020 and prepare for the 2021, 
and then there will be a rather long transition to grow this 
capacity over time. But key will be accountability and 
transparency for family members.
    Senator Tillis. I think that is important because we do a 
lot of housing town halls down at Fort Bragg and Camp Lejeune, 
and I have heard some rumblings about a less than satisfactory 
experience with the status quo. So I think you are right. I 
appreciate you taking the lead and trying to get it right and 
have a consistent experience across the globe. So I appreciate 
the work on that.
    I am interested. We will do it maybe with a meeting in my 
office if I could get with some of the people who are working 
on the contracting. I would like to see how they are going 
after key performance indicators, customer satisfaction, those 
sort of things built into it. Now we are trying to retrofit 
that into the housing program. It looks like you are going to 
be ahead of it. So I thank you for your work there.
    General Wolters, tell me a little bit about how well your 
area of responsibility, your partners are closing the gap on 
their cyber capabilities, how well we are actually 
coordinating, and your assessment of our--if you take a look at 
Russia, they are all over the place. Anytime I have traveled to 
that part of the world, you are talking about Russia, 
information campaigns, and their malign activities. Give me 
some hope on how we are either creating a gap or filling holes 
that we have right now.
    General Wolters. Senator, we are improving our strategic 
transparency and alignment in the cyber domain. I would say 
that over the course of the last 2 years, the NATO nations have 
done a much better job of understanding the challenges that 
they face on the defensive side of the house from a hygiene 
perspective. Once they have got their back yard in order, now 
they are in a position to understand where they start with 
respect to network protection. That truly has come about as a 
result of our USCYBERCOM's willingness to lead from the front.
    Senator Tillis. As you move into that answer, I would also 
like for you to talk about Huawei, ZTE, and whether or not we 
have gotten to a good place where clearly they are going to 
allow that infrastructure to be present. But in terms of 
critical infrastructure, are we getting to a good place?
    General Wolters. Senator, that is a great point and that is 
exactly where I was headed. The hygiene piece, the defensive 
cyber piece has to be applied with respect to what is about to 
become an issue in Europe with respect to proliferation of 5G 
activity in Huawei. Network protection is going to be job one. 
So we are right back to the basics. As you well know from your 
time with General Nakasone, he is keen on that, and we have 
seen a marked improvement in the manning for defensive cyber 
ops on the United States side in Europe, and we have seen an 
increase in manning on the defensive cyber ops side of the 
house for the NATO nations in Europe.
    Senator Tillis. Well, thank you, and thank you both. I have 
got a lot of questions. But, General Lyons, we will be in touch 
so I can get a little bit more insight into the direction of 
HHG. Thank you both for your time.
    General Lyons. Yes, sir. Happy to do so.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Lyons, we have touched several times on the 
transition of the KC-46. I want to put a finer point on it. In 
your testimony, you say this is your number one shortfall, and 
you go on to say it will create a critical and deepening gap in 
taskable aerial refueling aircraft and air crews for the next 5 
to 7 years. You do a very good job of outlining the problem, 
but then at the end of your prepared remarks, you say we 
recommend reevaluating aerial refueling force structure plans 
annually. Frankly, that does not reassure me.
    I want to know what is the plan. You have identified a 
serious problem here. We cannot project force if we cannot 
refuel those airplanes, and you have identified a 5 to 7-year--
you characterize it as a deepening gap. What do we do? Perhaps 
you do not need to give me a full answer here, but for the 
record, I would like to see an action plan not just 
reevaluation.
    General Lyons. Senator, we will be happy to work with the 
Air Force and come back to you on that with a joint plan.
    In the near term, we had agreed with the Air Force to 
retain 28 legacy aircraft to mitigate the conversion for the 
KC-46. The KC-46, as we receive that aircraft, as the Air Force 
receives that aircraft, will take some time to work through the 
technical, the Cat-1 deficiencies, as well as convert crews, 
and so you can appreciate there is going to be tension between 
crews. In some scenarios we are tail limited; in some scenarios 
we are crew limited. It is a bit of a combination. It is a very 
complex program for the Air Force to work. They are pushing as 
hard as they can with Boeing.
    Senator King. If you could give to the Committee a detailed 
analysis of what you identify as the gap, how many tails, how 
many crews, and what the solution is because if we have a 
crisis and need that capacity, saying well, you know, it was a 
complicated problem is not going to cut it.
    General Lyons. Senator, I agree, and the issue is not when 
there is conflict. Actually it is in day-to-day competition. So 
just to be clear, in today's day-to-day competition, that is 
where we are taking the reduction.
    Senator King. We are stressed right now.
    General Lyons. We are stressed today and that is where the 
10 and the 13 that are in the current fiscal year 2021 
reduction that we are working with the Air Force and the 
Department to bring those back.
    Senator King. I look forward to working with you on that.
    General Lyons. Yes, sir.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM continues to work with the United 
States Air Force (USAF) to retain sufficient aerial refueling 
capacity to support daily demands and crisis response to 
mitigate delays in KC-46 operational capability. Since my 
testimony, two significant events have occurred which have 
solidified the Department's way forward for the air refueling 
mission area. First, in early April Boeing and the USAF agreed 
on a fix to the most serious KC-46 deficiency for the Remote 
Visual System (RVS). With a known technical solution in hand, 
the USAF now believes they will deliver an RVS 2.0 solution to 
retrofit some KC-46 aircraft in fiscal year 2023 and have a 
fully capable KC-46 in production by fiscal year 2024. In light 
of this outcome, in March and April USTRANSCOM worked closely 
with the USAF to develop an acceptable reduction in KC 10 
capacity while sustaining KC-135 aircraft that I believe 
creates an acceptable action plan which I will describe more 
fully below. USTRANSCOM's ultimate objective is to balance 
retention of usable KC-135/KC-10 air refueling capacity while 
simultaneously building the foundation to rapidly assimilate 
fully capable KC-46s into the air refueling fleet. Over the 
last several years, the USAF identified a measured pace of KC-
10 retirements, as the KC-46 program progressed, provides a 
high-benefit cost savings given budget constraints. I support 
modest reductions in the KC-10 fleet which means accepting some 
near-term risk in air refueling capacity. I am now more willing 
to accept these measured reductions in April knowing a KC-46 
RVS 2.0 solution is identified and we're on a path to producing 
fully manned and operationally capable KC-46s. USTRANSCOM 
agrees with the USAF on a force structure profile that includes 
reductions in KC-10 aircraft. The agreed upon Primary Mission 
Aircraft Inventory profile; consists of not less than 50 KC-10s 
in fiscal year 2021, not less than 38 KC-10s in fiscal year 
2022, and not less than 26 KC-10s in fiscal year 2023 with full 
retirement of the KC-10 fleet in fiscal year 2024. Any further 
delays in fielding operationally capable KC 46 aircraft would 
cause USTRANSCOM to reassess this profile. The USAF has 
committed to retaining current KC-135 Total Aircraft Inventory 
of approximately 393 aircraft for fiscal year 2021 to fiscal 
year 2023 with adequate aircrews to mitigate the risk to daily 
competition missions. KC-135 reductions in fiscal year 2024 and 
beyond are conceptually on a one-for-one basis after we reach 
the current requirement of 479 capable air refueling aircraft. 
USTRANSCOM continues to support USAF efforts to recapitalize 
the air refueling fleet which will consist of 300 KC-135s in 
fiscal year 2029, at an average age of 67-years, and the full 
complement of 179 KC-46s. These adjusted retirement profiles 
assume funding is made available by Congress or the Department. 
We are working with the Department's senior leaders to realize 
this air refueling profile that accepts some modest risk in the 
near-term and delivers a more modern, capable air refueling 
fleet in the long-term.

    Senator King. General Wolters, a quick question. Do we have 
sufficient visibility of Russian submarines in the Atlantic? Do 
we know where they are?
    General Wolters. We do but not for 100 percent of the time.
    Senator King. I do not want whatever the missing percent is 
to be off the coast of Maine.
    General Wolters. I agree, Senator.
    Senator King. Or New York, not to be too parochial about 
it.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator King. I think it is unlikely--I hope I am right--
that Russian tanks are going to roll across the border into the 
Baltics. But what is our thinking and strategic thinking about 
a hybrid kind of activity involving Russian language, a kind of 
Crimea model? Is that a concern, and do we have a strategic 
response?
    General Wolters. It is very much a concern, Senator, and it 
has to do with the posture of our forces as we sit today in 
competition and attempt to effectively deter. We are improving 
in our ability to do so, and we have to do so to a point to 
where we compel any potential enemy of us to not take those 
first steps against us. NATO agreed in the NATO military 
strategy to also recognize a whole-of-government, whole-of-
nation approach, and that will allow us to dramatically improve 
our posture so that we can better see the battle space from an 
indications and warnings standpoint and better be able to more 
proactively deploy to defend.
    Senator King. And be prepared for a different kind, for not 
a traditional tanks rolling over the border invasion.
    General Wolters. Absolutely, Senator.
    Senator King. I think we should--I am sure you are--a lot 
of study on Crimea and how that played out and what the 
response could have been or might have been.
    General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
    Senator King. Final question. The attacks on the Saudi 
tanker field and also the Iranian missile in Iraq after 
Soleimani's death to me raise concerns about our ability to 
defend against--I do not know what you want to call them--
cruise missiles, low-level missiles, intermediate range, and I 
believe the Iranian missile was an ICBM. What is our capability 
to defend against those kinds of attacks? Because it did not 
work in Iraq and it did not work in Saudi Arabia.
    General Wolters. Senator, it is improving, but it has to 
get better. We have a plan that prefers to integrated air 
missile defense that comprehensively takes into account what 
happens at long ranges and long altitudes and short ranges and 
lower altitudes. It all has to be nested together from an 
indications and warnings standpoint and command and control 
standpoint.
    Senator King. So you would agree that this is a significant 
gap in our defense that we really need to get to work on in a 
hurry.
    General Wolters. It is a shortfall, Senator, and we need to 
continue to work on it.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Scott?
    Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for your service.
    With our NATO members that are now picking up the--you 
know, spending the money they were supposed to spend in the 
past, does it give us any opportunity to reduce our funding, or 
does it give us any opportunity to reduce our troop deployment 
in Europe?
    General Wolters. Senator, it could in the future.
    Senator Scott. Does it concern you that countries like 
Germany still do not want to pay their fair share, and does it 
impact our ability to defend? And does it give us a need to 
start thinking about where we should have troops and where we 
should not have troops? And are we thinking about should we be 
in Poland more than we should be in Germany?
    General Wolters. Senator, I believe all those are a 
concern, and in my mil-to-mil consultations with my German 
counterparts, they are just as concerned about meeting the 2 
percent as we are.
    Senator Scott. But there is no action that we need to be 
taking?
    General Wolters. I think the vigilance that we continue to 
show with respect to requirements collocated with defense 
spending needs to continue. Today what we have observed between 
fiscal year 2016 and 2020 is an actual increase across NATO of 
an additional $130 billion of funds for defense. That is 
positive and we need to continue on that track.
    Senator Scott. With Turkey buying the S-400 and it seems 
like cozying up to Moscow, does it impact your ability to rely 
on them as a partner?
    General Wolters. Senator, it has not to this point. Turkey 
remains a very reliable NATO ally.
    Senator Scott. And with Huawei, have you had to make 
changes on the types of information you are willing to share as 
a result of knowing that these countries are going to continue 
to use Huawei in 5G but also even in their existing 
infrastructure?
    General Wolters. Senator, we have not at this point because 
of the current posture with respect to 5G and Huawei and in 
particular UK. But my guess would be in the near future, we 
have to be more vigilant with respect to network protection and 
Huawei and 5G.
    Senator Scott. The investment that Communist China is 
making in Europe and all around the world--is that impacting 
our ability to be--not just the United States but other members 
to be able to defend against a Russian invasion but even what 
China is doing?
    General Wolters. Senator, it is not an impact today, but it 
could be in the future if we continue to see that economic 
equity increase with respect to seaports on behalf of China in 
Europe.
    Senator Scott. For them, it is mostly the seaports that is 
impacting in Europe?
    General Wolters. Today that is the biggest issue, Senator.
    Senator Scott. How about the supply chain? How dependent 
the world is on China as a member of the supply chain--does 
that cause you any concern?
    General Wolters. It does cause a concern, Senator. I have 
not seen those reflections yet in Europe, but I anticipate that 
we could.
    Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Sullivan?
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your service and your 
testimony.
    General Lyons, I think you mentioned at the outset your 
combatant command does so much great work. I think Alaska we 
have more understanding of that than most places and how you do 
it professionally, quietly, but critical to the whole military.
    I also thought the anecdote that you mention in your 
testimony about saving the life of one soldier was very 
powerful. So please tell the whole TRANSCOM civilian and 
military members that we respect and appreciate all that you 
are doing.
    I am glad you mentioned the personal property program in 
your opening statement. I am going to have a number of 
questions for the record that if you and your team can get back 
to me on relatively soon, I would appreciate that a lot.
    You know, you talk about also the most stressed capability 
and number one readiness concern is on the aerial refueling 
fleet and the tankers. So I mentioned this a number of times in 
this Committee. Billy Mitchell, when he was testifying in front 
of this Committee in the 1930s, the father of the United States 
Air Force, mentioned that Alaska was the most strategic place 
in the world because of our location to Asia, to Europe, to 
other places.
    Secretary Esper, when he was testifying here several months 
ago, said that we are going to have over fifth generation 
fighters located in Alaska starting in April with the F-35's 
coming to Eielson Air Force Base to collocate KC-46's with 100 
fifth generation fighters. The Secretary of Defense said that 
would provide the warning to our adversaries, particularly 
China and Russia, that we have extreme strategic reach.
    Right now, the Air Force is looking at their OCONUS 
decision on where to put the OCONUS KC-46 fleet. Almost 
everything is focused in INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command] with 
the exception of Alaska which, as you know, could be INDOPACOM, 
EUCOM, any com because where we are on the top of the world.
    Can you give me your sense on that? To me, this seems like 
a no-brainer. But I think it would help you with your most 
stressed capability and number one readiness concern if you put 
tankers in a place that can service EUCOM, PACOM, STRATCOM, 
NORTHCOM versus place them all in Guam, which is kind of 
conventional wisdom but in my view does not make any sense.
    General Lyons. Senator, thanks. There is no question about 
the strategic significance and location of the State called 
Alaska. As you and I have discussed before, the Air Force does 
have a basing methodology and a basing plan for the KC-46 as it 
comes online. I will defer to them on those particular 
discussions.
    Senator Sullivan. I am not telling you to make--but do you 
have a view on that? You call it the most stressed capability, 
aerial refueling. Does it help to have capability in a place 
that can help TRANSCOM reach other COCOMs other than just 
INDOPACOM?
    General Lyons. Senator, I would have to look at the 
analytics.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, I think the answer is yes. Maybe 
you can get back to me on that. It seems to me pretty damned 
clear.
    General Lyons. Senator, I will come back to you.
    Senator Sullivan. We want to help you with your most 
stressed capability and number one readiness concern. I think 
there is a way to do that, which is to make this decision, 
which to me seems like a no-brainer.
    General Wolters, I appreciated your reference on Arctic 
issues in your testimony. Even though that is not necessarily 
Alaska, we are kind of in the seams. Right? We got INDOPACOM 
forces. We got the threat from Russia. We got STRATCOM. We got 
TRANSCOM, NORTHCOM, everybody.
    Let me just mention, this Committee has been very focused 
on Arctic issues. The Chairman mentions great power 
competition. There has been an important Arctic focus. The 
problem is the Pentagon has been pretty slow to address some of 
these challenges and recognize it.
    We have two icebreakers right now. One is broken. That is 
the American capability. Russia has 54, and this article for 
the record, they just recently announced they have nuclear 
icebreakers and a Russian shipyard launches a cruise missile-
capable icebreaker.
    Can you talk to the challenges of the Arctic with regard to 
Russia and how you are addressing it?
    General Wolters. Senator, it is of great concern. As we 
crafted the NATO military strategy, its title is 
``Comprehensive Defense and Shared Response.'' One of the 
realizations was the fact that we need to be as focused in the 
Arctic as we are in the Baltics, as we are in the Black Sea, as 
we are in the Mediterranean, as we are in the central portion 
of the Atlantic. The Arctic needs to ensure that it gets the 
appropriate scrutiny and the appropriate resourcing.
    We are excited about the fact of NORTHCOM serving as the 
executive agent for capability development in the Arctic. We 
are also pleased that in the summer of 2019, DOD delivered 
their Arctic strategy. I know you drove that, Senator, and we 
appreciate that.
    It is vital. We see a lot of activity on behalf of Russia 
in the Arctic, and we also see activity on behalf of China in 
the Arctic. We think most of that has to do with money and 
commercial fishing activity.
    So it is of great concern and security exists on the 
periphery in Europe, and the Arctic is a big reason why we have 
to make sure that we maintain our vigilance.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and generals, both of you, thanks 
again for your service.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to both you, General Wolters, and you, General 
Lyons, for your service and for being here this morning.
    I want to begin, General Wolters, with the continuation of 
the discussion we had yesterday. I appreciated your taking time 
to meet with me. But earlier this month, the President informed 
Congress that he was going to divert another $3.8 billion from 
the Pentagon toward the border wall. This is on top of the $3.6 
billion that he took from military construction (MILCON) 
projects last year. These reprogrammings would eliminate, among 
other things, the military weapon systems. I know Senator Kaine 
referred to one of those. But that includes eight MQ-9 Reapers, 
which are an ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance] asset, and my recollection of previous 
conversations is that ISR assets are at a premium within the 
European theater and other areas.
    So can you discuss how the elimination of these weapon 
systems and MILCON projects are going to affect your campaign 
momentum?
    General Wolters. I would like to address the fact that we 
had 44 projects that were MILCON-related that were deferred 
because we could not get those projects on contract by 
September of 2019, and the total value of the 44 projects was 
approximately $1.3 billion, and they came in two buckets. One 
was a set of projects--25--that were European Deterrence 
Initiative MILCON projects. The other projects were baseline 
MILCON, 19. The EDI MILCON was about $771 million, and the 
MILCON base was about $550 million.
    When you take a look at all 44 of those deferred projects, 
which we hope will reappear one day, what you see is three 
major areas of reduction of campaign momentum. The first has to 
do with advanced airfield infrastructure on some of the NATO 
airfields in the farther eastern side of Europe. The second has 
to do with the infrastructure that supports prepositioned 
stockpiles for fuel and for ammunition. The final area of 
impact for campaign momentum is the modernization of 
infrastructure that supports a couple of military headquarters 
and schools. All those are important to campaign momentum. It 
slows the campaign momentum.
    Despite all that, Senator, we still maintain positive 
campaign momentum in the critical areas of indications and 
warnings, as you alluded to ISR, command and control and 
mission command. It just slows down the progress.
    Senator Shaheen. As you read the National Defense Strategy, 
what is a bigger threat to our national security? Is it a 
threat from Russia and China and the great power competition? 
Or is it a threat from immigrants coming across our southern 
border?
    General Wolters. Senator, both are threats. As the 
Commander of USEUCOM, I will tell you that I am most concerned 
about Russia.
    Senator Shaheen. That was a very diplomatic answer, and 
thank you. I am sorry. I should not have put you in that 
position. But I think it is an important point to make, that 
the threat that you are dealing with is one that has 
significant implications for our future when we look at Russian 
aggression and its potential to impact the United States.
    I want to go back, General Lyons. I know there have been a 
number of questions around the KC-46 and the delays in the 
aircraft and what that challenge means for us, and it is an 
issue for our National Guard, the 157th air refueling wing, 
which lost its last KC-135 because we thought the 46 aircraft 
would be arriving this year, and obviously, due to problems, it 
has been delayed.
    But last month, General David L. Goldfein sent a letter to 
Boeing asking them to review the remote vision system, which is 
probably the most prominent problem at this point, to give a 
design review by March 2020 and a flight demonstration by 2020.
    Can you tell us whether we have heard from Boeing at this 
point and what they have said with respect to that review of 
the remote vision system?
    General Lyons. Senator, I really appreciate General 
Goldfein's focus on this particular area, and I have relayed 
that to him as well.
    I know there have been many contacts between Boeing and the 
Air Force, and I do not want to get into the programmatics. I 
know there are some design issues that they are working 
through. I do not have a complete answer yet, and I will defer 
to the Air Force on the particulars of the program.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, can I ask, do we expect an answer 
from Boeing by the end of March?
    General Lyons. Yes, ma'am. I believe General Goldfein 
expects an answer. He said that explicitly and I believe that 
will come to fruition.
    Senator Shaheen. Okay, thank you.
    General Wolters, I want to go back to NATO because with 
Senator Tillis, he and I chair the Senate NATO Observer Group, 
which is an effort to try and make sure that the Senate is 
aware of what is happening with NATO and what we need to do.
    I wonder if you could give us an update on the new Cyber 
Operations Center that NATO is planning to be fully functional 
by 2023.
    General Wolters. We are very pleased, Senator. As you know, 
it all originated in Estonia, and it started with the 
involvement of the United States and the declaration by the 
United States CYBERCOM to have one United States single 
military commander responsible in the military for the domain 
of cyber, and the Europeans have embraced that. We are excited 
about the future, and NATO headquarters on the political side 
is also very excited.
    Senator Shaheen. I am out of time, but I will do a follow-
up question for the record on this.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. General Wolters, let us talk a little bit, 
if we could, about the European Deterrence Initiative. I assume 
that you would characterize this as a success. Is that fair to 
say?
    General Wolters. Yes, Senator, I would.
    Senator Hawley. Can you give us some specific examples of 
things that EUCOM would not have been able to do without EDI?
    General Wolters. Senator, the first largest example is we 
had started Defender-Europe 20, an exercise that brings over a 
division-sized force. We could not do that a year ago. We could 
not do it 2 years ago. We can do this exercise as a result of 
the benefit of EDI funds.
    Senator Hawley. Why would EUCOM have struggled to do some 
of these things without EDI? What specific obstacles has EDI 
helped you overcome in your judgment?
    General Wolters. First of all, it has funded the rotational 
brigade combat teams that go to Poland, and that teaches all of 
our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines how to lift and 
shift larger quantities of forces across the Atlantic and do so 
without any harm. That in itself is very important.
    We have also through EDI been able to fund our Army 
prepositioned stockpiles, our emergency contingency operation 
sets for the Air Force, and our deployable airbase systems for 
the Air Force.
    We have also been able to dramatically improve the airfield 
infrastructure and the reception infrastructure in the eastern 
part of Europe to where it is equipped today to safely receive 
those resources and effectively get those resources where they 
need to go for our soldiers and sailors and airmen and coast 
guardsmen and marines to be effective.
    Senator Hawley. That is an impressive record of success, 
and it is one of the reasons I think we need something similar 
in other theaters, INDOPACOM in particular as I have long 
advocated for.
    General, staying with you, Whiteman Air Force Base. My home 
State of Missouri, of course, is the proud home of B-2 and the 
proud future home of the B-21. Can you just speak to the role 
that you see the B-2 and one day the B-21 playing in deterring 
Russia from using nuclear weapons as part of any attempted fait 
accompli in the Baltics?
    General Wolters. Senator, those airframes are part of the 
critical triad, and I am firmly convinced that the nuclear 
deterrence umbrella that sits over Europe is part of the great 
success that we have had for the last 7 decades in NATO to be 
able to generate peace. I am excited about the future of the B-
21 because I think it will do more of the same with even a 
greater impact.
    Senator Hawley. Very good.
    Let me shift to China for a moment, if I could. In your 
written testimony, General Wolters, you said that China's 
efforts to build 5G networks in Europe, coupled with its 
growing interest and investment in European ports and 
infrastructure, complicate steady state and contingency 
operations.
    Can you just say more about that? How specifically do these 
Chinese activities complicate steady state and contingency 
operations?
    General Wolters. The equities that they have on the 
shipping capacity inside and outside of Europe is very 
alarming, and when you control the ability to take in and 
regulate resources, you have a large impact on what actually 
exists on the continent with respect to its ability to 
effectively generate peace and security. That is the concern.
    Senator Hawley. How do our European allies respond when you 
raise these concerns with them, as I am sure you do?
    General Wolters. With vigilance. In some cases they are 
surprised to the degree of equities that China has with respect 
to seaports, but in most cases, very concerned and vigilance 
increases once we get past the education stage.
    Senator Hawley. You also wrote that you are seeing 
encouraging signs--those are your words--from European nations 
as they become increasingly aware of the strings attached to 
Chinese capital investment. Can you give us a sense of what 
those encouraging signs are?
    General Wolters. Several nations not willing to accept 5G 
Huawei, and we have had reports of that in other nations being 
a lot more stingy and scratchy with respect to their 
willingness to engage in deliberations on port equities.
    Senator Hawley. Let me ask you for a second about our 
allies' contribution to NATO, which is something that has come 
up, rightly so, a number of times already this morning.
    I think that the progress towards the 2 percent mark is 
very important but only just a first step because the division 
of labor within NATO has to fundamentally change, and I think 
as this Committee has been saying now for some time. What is 
your assessment about what would need to happen for our 
European allies to get to the point where they are able to 
assume primary responsibility for their security in your 
theater?
    General Wolters. Senator, I think we need to continue on 
the current campaign that we are on. As you know, from 2016 to 
2020, in the cash portion of contributions for burden sharing, 
we have had a net increase of $130 billion. There is also the 
examination of contributions in capabilities, and in NATO we 
have been very, very vigilant with respect to our focus on 
improving our readiness, the ability of force elements to be 
more resilient, more responsive, and more lethal. That is all 
part of the equation with respect to European contributions to 
adequately defend, and we are improving.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, General. I look 
forward to seeing you both this afternoon.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Duckworth?
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Lyons, thank you for making the time to sit down 
with me earlier this month to talk about TRANSCOM and logistics 
more broadly.
    I want to touch again on the state of the sealift fleet in 
the U.S., and I know that Ranking Member Reed asked about the 
state of sealift in his question line. But I sort of want to go 
a little further into this. You said that our current readiness 
is lower than where we need to be, but you are working to 
recapitalize on sealift capability when you answered Ranking 
Member Reed.
    How do you ensure that this plan continues to be 
prioritized with the Navy and the DOD leadership when they are 
always balancing other higher cost programs and initiatives? I 
feel like this is sort of the plain sister and it needs a 
little bit more attention. How do you make sure that that 
priority is also placed on your particular recapitalization 
plan?
    General Lyons. Senator, first let me just publicly thank 
you for your leadership and leading our logistics efforts 
across the Department. I appreciate your particular interest 
here.
    I think this is a hard decision for the Navy. They have a 
lot of competing requirements, and Sealift is one of many.
    My own view on this, if you go back to the original 
recapitalization of sealift back when John Lehman was Secretary 
of the Navy, we had something which we have today, but we do 
not use, the National Defense Sealift Fund. I think the way 
that we are going to move in a positive direction is we are 
going to have to have an appropriation that feeds the National 
Defense Sealift Fund. It allows us the flexibility to 
capitalize on opportunities in the open market to continue the 
acquired use strategy, and I think that is what we need to do 
over a long period of time, over the next 15-plus years where 
we have 46 vessels aging out.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Another category of concern that I have in logistics is 
based around fuel. We have talked in the past about solutions 
for alleviating stress on the Air Force's tanker fleet, but 
this time I would like to focus on bulk fuel capacity for 
distribution and storage as an example.
    How would you work with the services' logistics arms to 
properly identify each of their needs and how to meet those 
needs as they come around and reframe to face near-peer 
competitors under the NDS? Because I feel like there is not a 
lot of really good communications between the services on what 
those bulk fuel needs and capacities. What do you need to do to 
push it forward into theater?
    General Lyons. Yes, ma'am. I mean, you are alluding to 
something that is very important across the department and fuel 
is liquid gold essentially. We require it for everything that 
we do in every single domain. We have got a study directed by 
Congress that we will complete this year in terms of assessing 
our ability to access maritime tankers, for example, in an end-
to-end value chain, to look also at the nodes. The way we look 
at it today in terms of global posture is very large, fixed-
base facilities. We need to see if that is the applicable way 
to go for contested environments and then assess where we need 
to go for the future for global posture and maritime 
transportation, as well as aerial refuel that we talked about.
    Senator Duckworth. I feel like this sort of reflects the 
struggle we had just a couple years ago when I was in the House 
about ammunition, you know, across the services, and that we 
were not talking to each other well enough before we did a 
whole audit. I feel like we are getting to the same issue with 
fuel. I mean, you cannot fight and win without class 3 and 
class 5. Right? I feel like we are sort of in the same problem 
with fuel. Am I correct in this sense that we have to do better 
with communicating among the services?
    General Lyons. Senator, I think you are absolutely correct. 
I think we need what I would characterize as a global 
innovative view of the end-to-end liquid energy supply chain to 
make sure that we have sufficient not just supply and posture 
but resiliency to continue to operate under a contested 
environment. I agree with you wholeheartedly.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    General Wolters, I would like to bring you into the 
discussion here. We have been hearing a lot about Defender-
Europe and what we hope to learn from this exercise. I am 
looking forward to hearing about not only the successes but 
perhaps more importantly the challenges that the exercise helps 
identify as well.
    How would you classify your level of concern going into 
Defender-Europe 20 whether from an overall capacity standpoint, 
from a lack of previous exercise familiarity, or due to other 
factors inside and outside our control, and how are you going 
to leverage that into lessons learned going forward?
    General Wolters. Senator, a great question, and I would 
like to extend a personal thanks to you for your support in the 
logistics area.
    As we speak, there are soldiers downloading at Bremerhaven 
for Defender-Europe 20 at this very moment.
    I am concerned about the bandwidth to be able to accept 
this large force, and I am also concerned about road and rail 
from the center portion of Germany to the east, all the way to 
the eastern border. Because we have the appropriate resources, 
we now possess a white team capability to examine our speed of 
move from west to east. We also have enough white cell 
individuals to assess how safely we get stuff through 
Bremerhaven and to the next point.
    Bandwidth with respect to size and speed are my greatest 
concerns.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    I am over time, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blackburn?
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I know you all are so happy to see me because I am the last 
one, and you will get to finish up and head off.
    I want to go back, General Wolters. You told Senator Reed 
that the Chinese controlled 10 percent of the shipping rights 
in and out of Europe. I would like for you to expand on that 
just a little bit, talk about do you think it is pretty much 
going to stay at that level, if it is going to increase, the 
rate of increase, a little bit more insight into what you think 
this means.
    General Wolters. The Chinese investment covers 10 percent 
of European shipping capacity, and I would contend that is a 
whole-of-government, whole-of-nation concern to make sure that 
Europe has the appropriate equities with respect to shipping 
capacity.
    Senator Blackburn. So you see that as a floor or a ceiling?
    General Wolters. I see that as the conditions that exist on 
the ground today, and I think the nations need to understand 
what that means with respect to their ability to effectively 
ship what their nation needs for their national interest, and 
an education process needs to follow fast.
    Senator Blackburn. Well, I think we see the need for that 
education process not only when it comes to infrastructure but 
the Belt and Road Initiative, the implications that that may 
have as we look at 5G and the rollout there, the implications 
that it has.
    So what is NATO going to do to address this? Because it 
does not matter if it is shipping and that infrastructure or 
building roads and connectors or 5G with that infrastructure. 
There is an issue, and being able to communicate with our 
allies over a Huawei network is a very difficult thing to do. 
So give me kind of a timeline and the steps that you all are 
taking to implement an education process.
    General Wolters. In the NATO political paradigm, there is a 
growing realization that this is an issue, and there will have 
to be a common understanding at the political level at NATO 
that this is an issue that NATO should embrace. I think that is 
the start of success to ensure that the national interest of 
the 29 nations in NATO are protected with respect to China 
proliferation, and we are at that phase. As a military member 
supporting NATO, it is my job to report the facts and that is 
what we are doing.
    Senator Blackburn. Okay. So who is receptive to this 
message? The first part of solving a problem is defining a 
problem. So you say there is awareness in defining this 
problem. Correct?
    General Wolters. Correct, and the first task is to ensure 
of the 29 nations which ones have concern and which ones still 
need more --
    Senator Blackburn. Okay, and out of those 29 nations, who 
is receptive to this and who are you getting pushback from? Are 
you at a 50/50 on this, or what is the standing there?
    General Wolters. Senator, I can only speak at the mil-to-
mil level not the political level for the 29 nations, and I 
would say that the majority of the nations are incredibly 
concerned about China proliferation.
    Senator Blackburn. I hope we can talk a little bit more 
about that this afternoon, if that would be okay.
    General Lyons, let me move to a couple of things with you, 
the NDS and cyber and space. Have they been identified as 
contested warfighting domains? Talk to me a little bit about 
how TRANSCOM is working with its private sector partners to 
improve their cybersecurity, their ability to defend because 
Senator Ernst asked you about autonomous vehicles and as we 
look at building out Space Command and artificial intelligence 
and autonomous vehicles, we know that the cyber component is 
going to be more relevant in those discussions. So talk with me 
for just a couple of seconds about that.
    General Lyons. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
    For USTRANSCOM, cyber is a very, very high priority. You 
asked specifically about our commercial providers. We have 
worked over the last several years now to instill contract 
language that I would characterize as at least brings our 
commercial providers up to a basic level of minimum cyber 
hygiene. I think we have been successful in that. I think we 
have been successful in gaining the attention and focus of the 
C-suite as an issue that they have to contend with whether it 
is for national defense or whether it is for their private 
equities, and so we are making progress.
    But as I said earlier, I would also say that when 
confronted with an advanced persistent threat actor, I do not 
think any of our commercial providers necessarily are in a 
position to protect themselves in that particular scenario. We 
very intentionally have multiple providers in each of the 
commodity areas so that if we lose one, we can count on others.
    Senator Blackburn. Are you increasing the standards of 
compliance for them?
    General Lyons. Yes, Senator, we are, and as you may have 
seen, the Department's cyber maturity model that they just 
rolled out will do significant good in that area.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
    The Committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
               Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                         household goods moves
    1. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, what are your expectations on 
accountability and transparency of moving companies in the household 
goods process this upcoming permanent change of station (PCS) season?
    General Lyons. Accountability and transparency are indispensable to 
the success of the Defense Personal Property Program. My expectations 
of moving companies on these principles are straightforward. I expect 
industry to abide by our program's business rules; to be forthcoming 
with DOD customers with information on the status or condition of their 
shipment; and to follow established processes to `make families whole' 
when things go wrong. When moving companies do not abide by these 
principles, my staff will follow business rules to hold them 
accountable. I also believe industry has a reasonable expectation of 
these principles from USTRANSCOM. I am committed to transparency with 
industry when it comes to the program's direction and will similarly 
hold my organization accountable for following our business rules. 
Ultimately, it is DOD families that are owed accountability and 
transparency. The Defense Personal Property Program exists for one 
reason, and one reason only: to provide a safe, quality relocation 
experience for DOD families as they prepare to serve at their next duty 
assignment.

    2. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, how different will family's 
experience be in the quality of service?
    General Lyons. For the 2020 Peak Season, we've instituted changes 
to Defense Personal Property Program business rules that address long-
standing pain points for DOD families. From a safety perspective, we 
require that all moving companies perform background checks on 
employees and meet local installation access requirements (whether they 
are serving homes on or off base). Recognizing that many issues center 
on communication, we require moving companies to be more responsive to 
customer inquiries, provide more lead time to customers before delivery 
appointments, and offer more information to customers on the status of 
their shipment while it's in transit. In instances of loss or damage, 
we'll give families more time to file claims and require that moving 
companies settle claims under a certain threshold faster. While many of 
these changes were inspired by our requirements for the Global 
Household Goods Contract (GHC), the structure of our current model 
limits the quality improvements we can make and many of our processes 
deter companies from participating in the program. Our current 
construct is a constraint to innovation and advancement, as we are tied 
to the capabilities of `the lowest common denominators' in the program. 
Additionally, the current model prevents us from capitalizing on 
existing capabilities in industry such as digital inventories, near 
real-time event status updates as shipments are in-transit, and mobile 
applications to provide families modern tools to manage all aspects of 
the move process (including claims). The GHC is an opportunity to raise 
the standard for DOD families, attract additional quality capacity to 
the program, and incorporate modern capabilities (which we take for 
granted in every aspect of our personal lives) into the Personal 
Property Program.

    3. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, where are you still experiencing 
shortfalls or limitations in improving household goods moves for 
military families?
    General Lyons. I see three limiting factors to improving the 
personal property relocation process for DOD families. The first 
relates to our existing business model. The transactional nature of our 
relationship with a disparate confederation of suppliers prevents us 
from capitalizing on existing capacity, limits investment in generating 
additional capacity, stymies our ability to hold industry accountable, 
and inhibits us from incorporating modern capabilities (the kind of 
convenient technology we take for granted in every aspect of our 
personal lives) into the Personal Property Program. The second relates 
to the similarly fractured nature of the DOD's management framework. 
The Department is taking steps to align and integrate activities, but 
more work is required to evolve from our current series of service-
centric activities into a truly Department-wide Personal Property 
Program. The third relates to the sustained, day-to-day executive 
leadership required to drive Personal Property reform across the 
Department. I've temporarily reallocated a member of the Senior 
Executive Service (SES) from my own staff to lead the Personal Property 
Program at USTRANSCOM. Meanwhile, I've submitted a request to the 
Department for an SES allocation to permanently lead the Personal 
Property Enterprise.
                global mobility capacity and positioning
    4. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, in light of force operational 
changes proposed by each of the services, how is your OCONUS [outside 
contiguous United States] mobility capacity or positioning impacted?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM's posture of forces globally is 
consistent with the National Defense Strategy and Globally Integrated 
War Plans. Our global mobility posture is critical and allows us to 
shift rapidly to the highest priority DOD missions. USTRANSCOM's robust 
global network relies heavily on access, basing, and overflight 
privileges we leverage as a result of our extensive network of allies 
and like-minded partners around the globe. We continually assess our 
global mobility capacity against requirements as war plans are updated 
in conjunction with the ever-changing geopolitical environment. The 
Mobility Capability and Requirements Study directed in the latest NDAA 
will evaluate the demands placed on the mobility enterprise, both in 
terms of capacity and forces. We will provide a status update to 
Congress in June and are scheduled to deliver the final report in Jan 
21.
              information warfare/ strategic communication
    5. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, it is great to hear that our 
allies in the region are maturing in their knowledge and expertise in 
the cyber and information domain, where can we improve to gain even 
more proficiency, effectiveness, or functionality, in light of Russia's 
propaganda activities?
    General Wolters. We must continue to array our resources and 
leverage a whole-of-government approach to best defend critical cyber 
infrastructure and compete to win in the information domain. A key 
platform for competing with Russia on these fronts is the Russian 
Influence Group. USEUCOM co-chairs this effort with U.S. Department of 
State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to promote whole-of-
government cooperation and to identify, attribute, and counter Russia 
malign activities. Our military-to-military security cooperation 
programs engage Allies and partners to improve alignment and strengthen 
our collective ability to compete in the cyber and information domains. 
Increased flexibility with security cooperation resources, policies, 
and processes to offer more tools, training, and equipment to Allies 
and partners would help sustain our positive momentum in these 21st 
century domains.

    6. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, you stressed your concerns of 
Chinese efforts to expand 5G Networks in Europe through Huawei and ZTE. 
Take a few seconds to explain regional or national security 
significance of your concern.
    General Wolters. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to gain 
influence abroad and access to sensitive information through the One 
Belt and One Road initiative, and other national means. CCP leaders are 
leveraging Chinese vendors, such as Huawei and ZTE, in this pursuit. 
Fielding 5G networks in Europe could provide an intelligence and 
information advantage to the CCP and other challengers in competition, 
crisis, or conflict. Leveraging these advanced technologies is one way 
the CCP is attempting to tilt the free and open international order in 
their favor.

    7. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, it is a positive achievement to 
note that European nations are becoming increasingly wary of strings 
attached to Chinese capital and investment. What do you need to double 
your efforts in this area to achieve intentional impact or broader 
messaging?
    General Wolters. In our increasingly interconnected and data-driven 
world, we must double efforts to communicate the vital importance of a 
trusted 5G network by leveraging a whole-of-government approach. 
Trusted networks and infrastructure are a critical requirement to 
protect sensitive information and competitive advantage. We must remain 
vigilant with respect to Chinese investment in shipping and logistics 
hubs across Europe and its potential implications to military mobility 
into and across the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Improving AOR-wide 
transparency on these activities helps Allies and partners fully 
understand the economic and security risks associated with continued 
increases in Chinese capital and investment.
                         relationship building
    8. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, in your view, how do we best 
operationalize the DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and 
Economic) model to strategically foster stability and relationships 
with countries in the South Caucasus, Balkans, or others? In other 
words, how do we pivot from a transactional to a more transformational 
relationship?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM supports and applies a whole-of-government 
approach across the theater. Our security cooperation exchanges, which 
bring leaders from across the AOR to the U.S. through the International 
Military Education and Training programs, and our well-established 
State Partnership Programs are both transformational examples of DIME 
in action. These programs develop multi-year cultural and regional 
expertise as well as foster lifelong relationships. This expertise and 
these relationships provide unique access and positively affect our 
ability to compete, deter, and defend in the South Caucasus, the 
Balkans, and across the Euro-Atlantic.
        north atlantic treaty organization (nato) observer group
    9. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, as the co-chair of the Senate 
NATO Observer Group with Senator Jeanne Shaheen, I am interested in 
maintaining consistent communication between Congressional leaders and 
the military leadership of our NATO allies. In your role as United 
States European Command (EUCOM) commander, how can Congress continue to 
ensure that U.S. NATO commitments continue to be upheld, and that the 
shared strategic objectives of alliance members are promoted?
    General Wolters. Sustained Congressional interest and support of 
NATO reassures Allies across the Euro-Atlantic and strengthens our 
ability to preserve peace. Congress' steadfast support of the European 
Deterrence Initiative continues to underwrite the positive momentum we 
have maintained with respect to readiness. EDI has been pivotal to our 
efforts to strengthen U.S. and NATO readiness by supporting operations, 
activities, and investments, which generate options for Allies and 
dilemmas for our challengers.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                defense personal property program (dp3)
    10. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, as you know I have paid close 
attention to the United States Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM) 
proposal to replace the current Defense Personal Property Program (DP3) 
with a sole-source Global Household Goods Contract (GHC) and worked to 
include a provision to conduct a Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report on the validity of this contract in the fiscal year 2020 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Historically, I have 
observed that when the Department of Defense (DOD) awards large sole-
source contracts it results in less competition for industry, the 
potential for greater cost, and decreased customer satisfaction with 
their service. How will the proposed GHC contract encourage competition 
to decrease cost and increase the value for the servicemember?
    General Lyons. DOD families are our North Star and are the reason 
we seek to change the program. The GHC is one aspect of a broader DOD 
reform plan to improve the relocation process for DOD families. 
USTRANSCOM, on behalf of the DOD, seeks to award the Global Household 
Goods Contract (GHC) to a single move manager in order to improve 
access to--and management of--quality capacity to meet peak demand and 
enable the Department to affix the accountability and responsibility 
currently lacking in today's program. While pursuing the GHC was never 
about saving money, I am encouraged by the bids we've received as they 
are in line with DOD spending in the current program. I acknowledge--
and will comply with--the DOD Appropriations language to provide a 
report on the impact of GHC to Service budgets. Regarding competition, 
the GHC single move manager will have the latitude to partner with 
companies it believes add value to the program on the terms and 
conditions those companies think make sense (versus being bound by the 
DOD's overly-complicated rule set, which is often cited as a deterrent 
to participation). The DOD currently pays competitive rates, but we're 
often told our program isn't worth the hassle. Far from excluding 
capacity, we seek to eliminate the barriers of entry and attract more 
agents, packers, and truckers to meet our demand. Revenue distribution 
is a common complaint in our current program, with agents and drivers 
routinely highlighting that non-asset owning companies retain in excess 
of 20 percent of billed revenue. Such `pass-thru' companies add cost to 
the DOD without adding value, and siphon income from the men and women 
who perform the hard work of moving military families. We've built a 
transparent pricing model to capture cost at a granular level for all 
services at origin, destination, and in-transit. This model includes a 
separate management fee paid directly to the single move manager 
contractor for each move processed. Additionally, it clearly identifies 
the revenue we expect the single move manager to generate and the 
revenue we expect to flow to those doing the work. Potential bidders 
are required to comply with all laws--including the Service Contract 
Act (SCA)--when submitting proposals; we expect SCA to increase wages 
for contractor employees performing services `at the curb.' The move-
manager will also be required to ensure a minimum of 40 percent of the 
total acquisition value of the domestic work performed flows down to 
subcontracted small businesses. DOD acknowledges that non-asset 
companies are at risk as a result of GHC. Many of these niche companies 
exist solely to exploit the gaps and seams in the current program and 
do so at the expense of the Services' MILPERS accounts without adding 
value.

    11. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, in your opening statement you 
stated, ``My message for industry providers, if you provide quality 
service for military members, you have a place in the future program. 
We need every quality moving service to include our small businesses 
and appreciate all that you do.'' How will the GHC contract continue to 
utilize the supply of quality small business moving companies around 
the country that currently exist in the DP3 program?
    General Lyons. Companies that provide quality capacity to the 
program will be relied upon for as long as DOD moves families around 
the globe. Far from excluding capacity, we seek to eliminate the 
barriers of entry and attract more agents, packers, and truckers to 
meet DOD demand. The majority of today's capacity comes from small 
business (agents, packers, truckers, etc.). This capacity will remain 
critical under the new construct. The GHC single move manager will have 
the latitude to partner with companies it believes add value to the 
program on the terms and conditions those companies think make sense 
(versus being bound by the DOD's overly-complicated rule set, which is 
often cited as a deterrent to participation). The DOD currently pays 
competitive rates, but we're often told our program isn't worth the 
hassle. Far from excluding capacity, we seek to eliminate the barriers 
of entry and attract more agents, packers, and truckers to meet our 
demand.

    12. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, when evaluating which moving 
companies are slated to stay in the new GHC program, what criteria will 
be used to eliminate bad actors, while retaining companies that have 
performed well in the DP3 system?
    General Lyons. When it comes to selecting companies for the GHC, 
USTRANSCOM will only select the single move manager contractor and--
with few exceptions--cannot dictate to the single move manager which 
subcontractors it hires. For example, the GHC single move manager is 
prohibited from subcontracting with a company that has previously been 
disqualified from DOD business in the past three years. Similarly, we 
will not mandate what companies they must use. Companies that enable 
the single move managers to meet the contract requirements and key 
performance indicators will thrive; conversely, companies that fail to 
meet contract standards will likely (and ideally) not be used to handle 
DOD shipments. Within the contract, we will apply a combination of 
financial penalties and incentives to drive industry performance. The 
most notable `penalty' will come in the form of inconvenience claims, 
where the GHC single move manager will compensate DOD families directly 
in instances of late pick-ups or missed delivery dates. The most 
notable incentive will come in the form of `award terms.' If--and only 
if--the GHC single move manager meets all Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs), the contractor can earn two additional years of contract 
performance without competition. The contract's KPIs were developed by 
USTRANSCOM and the Military Services to address longstanding pain-
points identified by DOD families. As the award terms may represent in 
excess of 25 percent of the GHC's lifecycle revenue, the GHC single 
move manager has a strong incentive to meet them--and, as previously 
mentioned, can only meet them if they employ quality companies.

    13. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, how will TRANSCOM protect 
high-performing small businesses in the transition to the GHC contract 
to help ensure that these businesses do not go out of business?
    General Lyons. Moving and storage companies achieve--and retain--
any `high-performance' label through their own merit. USTRANSCOM will 
take action to place companies that do not abide by DOD business rules 
into a `non-use' or `disqualified' status. Under GHC, all 
subcontracting decisions will be made by the GHC single move manager. 
Companies that enable the single move manager to meet the contract 
requirements and key performance indicators will thrive; conversely, 
companies that fail to meet contract standards will likely (and 
ideally) not be used to handle DOD shipments. Companies that provide 
quality capacity to the program will be needed as long as DOD moves 
families around the globe. Far from excluding capacity, we seek to 
eliminate the barriers of entry and attract more agents, packers, and 
truckers to meet DOD demand. The majority of today's capacity comes 
from small business (agents, packers, truckers, etc.). This capacity 
will remain critical under the new construct.

    14. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, in your opening statement you 
stated, ``after personal consultation with Service leaders and industry 
executives--USTRANSCOM worked to fundamentally restructure our 
relationship with industry to generate the quality capacity to meet 
DOD's peak demand and enable the Department to affix the accountability 
and responsibility missing in today's program.'' How has TRANSCOM 
worked with industry to develop the GHC contract and how will DOD 
ensure that best practices from industry are implemented by the winner 
of the GHC contract?
    General Lyons. DOD coordinated extensively with industry to develop 
GHC. The USTRANSCOM staff hosted two industry days to exchange 
information (which included opportunities for one-on-one meetings with 
interested companies); posted two requests for information to solicit 
formal industry input; posted two draft Requests for Proposal (RFP) for 
industry to share insights on; answered nearly 800 questions from 
industry on GHC; and posted the answers to those questions on the U.S. 
Government's official contracting website for all parties to review. 
Additionally, I personally hosted two sets of meetings with industry 
CEOs and association leaders to outline my vision for GHC. The GHC 
postures DOD to capitalize on industry best practices and innovation in 
a way the current construct simply cannot. The transactional nature of 
our relationship with a disparate confederation of suppliers prevents 
us from capitalizing on existing capacity, limits investment in 
generating additional capacity, stymies our ability to hold industry 
accountable, and inhibits us from incorporating modern capabilities (to 
include the modern, convenient technology we take for granted in every 
aspect of our personal lives) into the Personal Property Program. Until 
we fundamentally restructure our relationship with industry, the 
program will never generate the quality service DOD families deserve or 
the accountability Congress demands.

    15. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, how will the GHC contract 
affect rural and isolated states like Hawaii and Alaska where there are 
fewer shipping companies and higher transit costs?
    General Lyons. Taking Alaska as an example, the GHC rate structure 
enables bidders to propose Alaska-specific rates (and regional rates 
within Alaska). Under the current program, Alaska is divided into five 
distinct `rate zones' to allow providers to account for key 
considerations (logistical, labor, etc.) across the state. The rate 
zones under GHC are identical to the current program, meaning the GHC 
single move manager can account for differences in handling household 
goods shipments in Alaska. GHC represents an opportunity for quality 
providers in Alaska to sustain--or grow--their business. The majority 
of today's capacity comes from small business. This capacity will 
remain critical under the new construct. Far from excluding capacity, 
we seek to eliminate the barriers of entry and attract more agents, 
packers, and truckers to meet our demand.

    16. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, how has TRANSCOM considered 
these factors in the planned award of the GHC contract?
    General Lyons. The GHC outlines standard levels of performance, 
both at the program level (overall Key Performance Indicators) and at 
the individual service-member level. While GHC is clear on required 
service levels, DOD avoids being prescriptive in how industry should 
meet those standards; similarly, DOD does not force industry to apply 
common pricing across all markets. Many move managers and asset-based 
providers (as well as industry associations that represent them, like 
the American Moving and Storage Association) agree that DOD's business 
model is outdated and recognize the business opportunities associated 
with this change.

    17. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, once the GHC contract is 
awarded, there will likely be a destabilization of the industrial base 
as small contractors and vendors assess opportunities outside of the 
construct of the revised DP3 program. This destabilization may occur 
during the peak summer moving season when capacity needs are at their 
highest for the DOD. How will TRANSCOM ensure they have a stable base 
of contractors during the transition phase of the GHC contract, 
particularly during the initial peak summer moving season?
    General Lyons. Although it's the GHC single move manager 
responsibility to meet its contractual requirements, I agree USTRANSCOM 
shares the responsibility to establish the conditions in which the 
single move manager can succeed. One of the ways USTRANSCOM is setting 
favorable conditions is through the deliberate, responsible transition 
plan we've established. The current timeline envisions the GHC 
contractor managing shipments in the continental United States 
beginning in February of 2021--a full 9 months after contract award. 
The single move manager is required to handle 25 percent of total 
volume beginning in February 2021 and roll in additional shipments (25 
percent per month thru May 2021) until they are postured to support 100 
percent of continental U.S. shipments during the 2021 Peak Season. With 
an award planned for no earlier than 30 April 2020, this timeline gives 
the single move manager a full year to prepare (IT integration, 
staffing, training, etc.) for the 2021 peak season. We will wait until 
October 2021 (following peak season) to continue the transition to GHC 
and incorporate international shipments. While I believe a 9-month 
transition period before requiring the single move manager to accept 
any bookings is a responsible timeline, DOD will remain flexible and 
adjust the transition plan as needed. During transition and 
implementation phases, we will be driven by improvements and not the 
calendar.

    18. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, TRANSCOM currently uses a 
performance incentive program in the DP3 system in which companies are 
given financial penalties to regulate poor behavior. How will TRANSCOM 
maintain control and accountability over a large company that is 
awarded the GHC contract where financial penalties may not be as 
effective?
    General Lyons. To be clear, the DOD does not have effective 
performance management measures in the current program. DOD does not 
have a formal contract with any of our current providers and cannot 
hold them accountable in a meaningful way. Over time, DOD allowed the 
program to evolve in a manner that now favors industry, with suppliers 
exploiting business rules to generate revenue at the expense of 
military families & Service budgets. Implementing the GHC offers the 
Department the opportunity to set terms and conditions that favor DOD 
families and an avenue to hold industry accountable. As we restructure 
our relationship with industry, we will similarly restructure and align 
the DOD's management framework (the Service-owned Personal Property 
Processing and Shipping Offices around the globe) to provide the 
rigorous, centralized oversight required of a program that directly and 
personally impacts DOD personnel. Just as our transition period 
postures the GHC single move manager for success, the timeline also 
postures the DOD for success; we will use that time to appoint and 
train Quality Assurance Evaluators, Alternate Contracting Officer's 
Representatives, Ordering Officers, and Invoicing Officers to 
effectively manage and oversee the contract. These offices are the 
center of gravity for holding industry accountable. Within the 
contract, we will apply a combination of financial penalties and 
incentives to drive industry performance. The most notable `penalty' 
will come in the form of inconvenience claims, where the GHC single 
move manager will compensate DOD families directly in instances of late 
pick-ups or missed delivery dates. The most notable incentive will come 
in the form of `award terms.' If--and only if--the GHC single move 
manager meets all KPIs, the contractor can earn two additional years of 
contract performance without competition.

    19. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, it is my understanding that 
TRANSCOM is now preparing comments on the GAO report regarding the GHC 
contract that myself and Senator Tim Kaine requested last year. Do you 
believe that TRANSCOM will need to postpone the awarding of the GHC 
contract to respond and address concerns in the GAO report?
    General Lyons. No, the GAO report does not delay our planned GHC 
award. After 10 months of detailed data exchanges and more than one 
hundred requests for information, USTRANSCOM is confident GAO had 
access to all the relevant information in order to conduct an 
exhaustive review of our work on GHC and broader personal property 
reform efforts. GAO makes three recommendations in their report: 1) 
that DOD develop a process to track data during the first three years 
of GHC operations to more precisely determine overall Defense Personal 
Property Program (DP3) manpower requirements; 2) that DOD develop 
metrics for DP3 activities that fall outside of the GHC (for example, 
things like Service-retained counseling and processing timelines within 
the Military Claims Offices); 3) that DOD articulate the linkages 
between metrics and overall program goals. These recommendations are 
sensible and are consistent with USTRANSCOM's vision to evolve the 
program from a series of disparate Service-owned activities into a 
truly integrated, synchronized Departmental program. Moreover, the 
report confirms many of the issues USTRANSCOM has highlighted to the 
Department and Congress over the last two years. It is important to 
note that GAO issued no negative findings or recommendations regarding 
the single move-manager construct, nor did GAO recommend any changes to 
the acquisition strategy or overall timeline for GHC award and 
implementation.
                              kc-46 basing
    20. Senator Sullivan. General Wolters, on October 24, 2019, the Air 
Force announced the start of the Strategic Basing process for the Main 
Operating Base (MOB) 5 beddown of KC-46 aircraft. Alaska has the 
existing infrastructure to support aerial refueling operations, a 
robust current need for aerial refueling capability, and a strategic 
location which is in close proximity (but not too close) to three of 
five main threats prioritized within the 2018 NDS. These factors make 
my state an ideal platform from which to deploy a larger amount of 
combat power to multiple areas of operation. What benefit would EUCOM 
potentially gain from the basing of these aircraft in a geographically-
central and strategic location such as Alaska?
    General Wolters. From the perspective of USEUCOM's role as global 
coordinator for the Russia Problem Set, basing KC-46s in Alaska could 
further support dynamic employment of forces into and out of the 
USEUCOM AOR and increase strategic and operational dilemmas for Russia. 
Service Secretaries are the decision authority for basing of forces 
within the United States, in the case of KC-46s and Alaska, the 
decision rests with the Secretary of the Air Force.

    21. Senator Sullivan. General Wolters, what message might it send 
Russia - the main threat in EUCOM - if the United States Air Force were 
to co-locate the next generation tanker with over 100 5th Generation 
fighters in a place like Alaska?
    General Wolters. Co-locating next-generation tankers with a large 
number of 5th generation fighters in Alaska would send a strong message 
to Russia. Arraying combat power in this manner is one way to 
communicate our preparedness to defend the Homeland, and our ability to 
respond rapidly and at scale, to a violation of U.S. airspace along our 
Western borders. Such positioning of assets should be balanced with 
Russia's elevated threat perception and long-term counteraction.

    22. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, in your testimony under 
``Aerial Refueling'' you state, ``USTRANSCOM's most-stressed capability 
and number one readiness concern. The aerial refueling fleet continues 
to underpin the Joint Force's ability to deploy an immediate force 
across all NDS mission areas and is comprised of KC-135, KC-10, and KC-
46 aircraft.'' Given the substantial need for added aerial refueling 
assets and U.S. Air Force's desire to grow the number of its tanker 
squadrons as a part of the 386 squadron construct, does it not make 
sense for the U.S. Air Force to pursue additive basing actions (as 
opposed to replacement basing actions) for KC-46 tankers, especially 
when the tankers to be replaced are KC-135s?
    General Lyons. As the KC-46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging 
KC-135 and KC-10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided 
using the United States Air Force's Strategic Basing Process, which is 
led by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). This SECAF-led process 
accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the tanker fleet and is 
designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to include 
routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process 
strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent 
possible, while accounting for global air refueling demand to ensure 
the posture support Combatant Commander requirements. I appreciate the 
Secretary's transparent process and the efforts to identify where best 
to base the KC-46 to meet global demand. Although basing is important, 
USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC-46 will be an air refueling asset 
capable of supporting global missions.

    23. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, in your personal opinion, 
would the basing of a squadron of KC-46s at Kadena Air Force Base or 
Anderson Air Force Base result in them - largely or almost exclusively 
- being tasked for operations in a single area of operation?
    General Lyons. As the KC-46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging 
KC-135 and KC-10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided 
using the United States Air Force's Strategic Basing Process, which is 
led by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). This SECAF-led process 
accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the tanker fleet and is 
designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to include 
routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process 
strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent 
possible, while accounting for global air refueling demand to ensure 
the posture support Combatant Commander requirements. I appreciate the 
Secretary's transparent process and the efforts to identify where best 
to base the KC-46 to meet global demand. Although basing is important, 
USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC-46 will be an air refueling asset 
capable of supporting global missions.

    24. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, from your perspective, does it 
make strategic sense to pigeon-hole a low-density, high-demand aerial 
refueling asset like the KC-46 to one area of operation, or more 
importantly, to largely a single operation plan (OPLAN) within that 
area of operation?
    General Lyons. As the KC-46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging 
KC-135 and KC-10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided 
using the United States Air Force's Strategic Basing Process, which is 
led by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). This SECAF-led process 
accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the tanker fleet and is 
designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to include 
routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process 
strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent 
possible, while accounting for global air refueling demand to ensure 
the posture support Combatant Commander requirements. I appreciate the 
Secretary's transparent process and the efforts to identify where best 
to base the KC-46 to meet global demand. Although basing is important, 
USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC-46 will be an air refueling asset 
capable of supporting global missions.

    25. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, would you agree with Secretary 
Mark T. Esper when he said that basing KC-46s in a place like Alaska 
would provide ``extreme strategic reach''?
    General Lyons. I would agree with the Secretary on the value of 
``extreme strategic reach,'' with the context that strategic mobility 
assets like our air refueling fleet provide that every day around the 
globe. The home station of our mobility aircraft is but one component 
of global responsiveness. Across the broad spans of the Indo-Pacific 
region the elements of access, basing, and overflight to en route and 
forward locations are essential to position and employ combat 
capability and as important if not more so to where we home station 
mobility assets. The ability of USTRANSCOM to control and rapidly shift 
assets anywhere in the world to address emerging and high priority 
needs is also foundational to global responsiveness. So, using the 
notion of ``extreme strategic reach,'' mobility assets must operate not 
only across broad regions such as INDOPACOM, but globally with the 
responsiveness to fully leverage the combat power of the Department 
when and where it is needed - USTRANSCOM is uniquely capable of 
performing these tasks and that is my primary focus.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                            port of savannah
    26. Senator Perdue. General Lyons, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation recently announced the awarding of an additional $34.6 
million grant for critical infrastructure improvements at the Port of 
Savannah, building on the President's budget request of $93.6 million 
in federal funding in support of the Savannah Harbor Expansion Project. 
The Port of Savannah is the third largest container port in North 
America and is a strategic seaport within the National Port Readiness 
Network. The Port of Savannah is also one of the commercial ports used 
to transport U.S. forces from the United States to Europe as part of 
the Defender-Europe 2020 exercise. The Port of Savannah's participation 
in this exercise emphasizes the increased capabilities an expanded Port 
of Savannah can provide for the future deployment needs of the U.S. 
military. To what extent does the expansion of major commercial ports 
like the Port of Savannah improve military readiness and support your 
command's mission of efficiently transporting large U.S. troop 
formations in times of war and times of national emergency?
    General Lyons. There are two primary operating terminals at the 
Port of Savannah, Garden City Terminal and Ocean Terminal. Garden City 
Terminal is a purpose-built container terminal, and Ocean Terminal is a 
dedicated breakbulk, heavy-lift and roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) facility. 
The DOD Strategic Seaport Program Port Readiness Plan (PRP) for the 
Port of Savannah currently only includes infrastructure at Ocean 
Terminal. As you may already be aware, the Savannah Harbor Expansion 
Project is essentially a dredging effort which will increase the 
shipping channel depth from 42 feet to 47 feet. The primary objective 
of this project will be to allow the port to berth and service the 
larger container vessels coming through the Panama Canal from Asia, 
more than likely bound for Garden City Terminal. DOD surge deployments 
would rely on a variety of military and commercial vessels to deploy 
unit cargo and combat equipment. The largest of these is typically the 
Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) from the U.S. Navy's 
Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Fast Sealift Ship (FSS) vessels from 
the Maritime Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force. The maximum 
water draft of these vessels ranges from 35 feet to 37 feet which means 
that the current (pre-Harbor Expansion Project) channel depth of 42 
feet already meets DOD's needs. In general, most port expansion efforts 
are understandably focused on enhancing the infrastructure supporting 
contemporary commercial port business, which is predominantly 
containerized cargo. The cargo DOD must move through our Strategic 
Seaports is mostly oversized, overweight equipment, rolling stock, 
tracked vehicles and some containers. As a result, the most suitable 
facilities for DOD movements are typically breakbulk, heavy-lift and 
RORO facilities like Savannah's Ocean Terminal, rather than purpose-
built container facilities like the Garden City Terminal. The condition 
of the existing Strategic Seaport facilities which DOD relies upon is 
currently being assessed as directed within the fiscal year 2020 NDAA. 
We anticipate this report will be delivered to Congress by the end of 
July 2020. Additionally, USTRANSCOM periodically assesses the 
sufficiency of the existing Strategic Seaports to meet DOD's 
requirements, to determine if there is a need to bring additional ports 
into the Strategic Seaport Program. Based on the current assessment, we 
have access to sufficient seaport capacity on each coast (East / West / 
Gulf) to meet rapid deployment needs.
         joint surveillance target attack radar system (jstars)
    27. Senator Perdue. General Wolters, JSTARS aircraft have been 
active in supporting the National Defense Strategy (NDS) around the 
world. The 116th Air Control Wing, based out of Robins Air Force Base, 
deployed to Germany this past fall. With the return of great power 
competition, the 116th Air Control Wing's deployment to Germany 
provides needed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
capabilities in support of our military's forward-deployed forces in 
Europe. The 116th Air Control Wing's deployment sends an additional 
signal to our NATO allies that the United States remains committed to 
the collective defense of the Alliance in the face of both near-peer 
and emerging threats. To what extent does the forward deployment of 
JSTARS aircraft and its ISR capabilities in the EUCOM area of 
responsibility (AOR) improve United States and NATO readiness in the 
face of near-peer competitors?
    General Wolters. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS) is a critical contributor to USEUCOM and NATO's Indications 
and Warnings framework. It provides a unique capability to establish 
and maintain patterns of Russian movement within the AOR and provides a 
distinctive capability to reassure our NATO Allies and deter Russia.

    28. Senator Perdue. General Wolters, JSTARS aircraft also need 
avionics upgrades in order to become fully-compatible with European 
defense systems. Can you provide an update on what upgrades are 
necessary to ensure JSTARS can remain fully operational in the EUCOM 
AOR?
    General Wolters. Three specific avionics upgrades must be completed 
for JSTARS to be fully compatible with European defense system 
mandates. By European Union mandate, VHF radios must be upgraded with a 
8.33kHz channel spacing frequency, aircraft must be equipped with the 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out capability, and the 
aircraft's Identification Friend or Foe equipment must be equipped with 
Mode 5 capability.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                      nato cyber operations center
    29. Senator Shaheen. General Wolters, can you provide an update on 
the operational status of the NATO Cyber Operations Center, as well as 
your expectations regarding its long-term impact?
    General Wolters. As a component of NATO's Command Structure, the 
Cyber Operations Center (CyOC) maintains positive momentum towards full 
operational capability in spring 2022. The CyOC is integrated with 
baseline activities and current operations across the Alliance. It 
plays a critical role in NATO's comprehensive deterrence and defense 
activities. At full capability, the CyOC will provide NATO an 
operational theater cyberspace component. In this role, it will be 
responsible for persistent, centralized, and comprehensive cyberspace 
situational awareness and a focal point for the coordination of NATO 
military activities in cyberspace.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                     european deterrence initiative
    30. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, the United States 
continues to build interoperability is through deliberate efforts like 
the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), which you highlight in your 
posture statement. You state that this initiative is ``critical to our 
deterrence and posture successes'' and allows you to ``enhance the 
readiness and interoperability of U.S. and alliance forces.'' But the 
President's budget request cuts security cooperation funding within the 
EUCOM AOR by around 40-percent. Additionally, funding for EDI was cut 
by over 1 billion dollars in this year's proposal. Are you concerned 
about these drastic funding cuts?
    General Wolters. To ensure alignment of ends and means, EDI must 
continue to be an annual request until either the base budget fully 
accounts for ongoing activities to compete with Russia, or the security 
environment changes significantly. Maintaining EDI funding levels 
sustains positive momentum with respect to posture and readiness. EDI 
funding is pivotal to fully implement the National Defense Strategy and 
our efforts to compete with Russia and counter malign influence.

    31. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, how will these proposed 
cuts impact your ability to partner with, and conduct exercises with, 
our EUCOM allies?
    General Wolters. EDI resources enable USEUCOM to compete and deter 
adequately. USEUCOM will work with Allies and partners to balance and 
prioritize exercise objectives and to determine appropriate levels of 
participation in due course of our exercise planning process. We will 
continue to work relentlessly to get the most out of resources 
available. Where required, we will adjust the scale and scope of our 
operations, activities, and investments to best meet the objectives 
laid out in the National Defense Strategy with available means.

    32. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, how does security 
cooperation within EUCOM--including joint exercises, subject matter 
exchanges, and other military-to-military engagements--contribute to a 
strong and peaceful European continent?
    General Wolters. Security cooperation reinforces efforts to 
preserve peace and improves collective preparedness should conflict 
occur. These efforts improve partners' ability to participate in 
Coalitions and project security. Security cooperation bolsters 
relationships between U.S., and partner nations, and provides a network 
of valuable security relationships to be leveraged in competition, 
crisis, or conflict.

    33. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, General Wolters said in his 
posture statement that, ``European Deterrence Initiative funds have 
also improved our ability to respond using prepositioned stocks and 
improved theater infrastructure. Together, these improvements enable 
the rapid deployment and sustainment of forces.'' Can you expand on how 
the EDI has improved TRANSCOM's ability to project and sustain combat 
power in Europe?
    General Lyons. Infrastructure improvements initiated first by the 
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) and continued through EDI largely 
serve to expand the scalability and resiliency of the Global 
Distribution Network in Europe. Any one particular project cannot 
showcase the impact; it is a layered approach that improves the state 
of our network as improvements are made over the years. To list a few 
improvements as examples, added multimodal infrastructure capacity in 
Romania enables transload of combat power from large vessels to 
aircraft in a region where such a capability was limited in the past. 
Improved transit facilities in Italy mitigated an ammunition 
distribution capability shortfall in that region of the AOR. Placement 
of deployable air base systems and rapid airfield damage repair kits in 
Germany, Denmark, Romania, Norway, Spain, Iceland, and Hungary will 
significantly increase our ability to deliver to both dispersed 
airfields and those damaged by enemy fire.
    General Wolters.
  transcom modernization and survivability in the era of great power 
                              competition
    34. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, TRANSCOM has consistently 
delivered over nearly 20 years at war, deploying and sustaining our 
forces across the global. General Lyons, you rightfully highlight in 
your posture statement that while this is an impressive logistical 
display, it has been done largely uncontested. You point out the 
critical requirement that TRANSCOM must `` . . . be able to project and 
sustain the Joint Force under persistent, all-domain attack.'' How are 
we modernizing Maritime Sea Lift Command and Air Mobility Command to be 
more resilient to the realities of a contested mobility environment?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM continues to analyze the operational 
environment and explore modernization opportunities in the near, mid, 
and long-term in order to maintain our comparative military advantage 
in power projection. Our ability to project the force under persistent 
all domain attack requires us to understand adversarial capabilities 
and intent, upgrade platforms with defensive countermeasures, modernize 
C2 architecture, and most importantly, integrate the sustainment 
warfighting functions with the other warfighting functions like 
protection, fires, and maneuver. The Mobility Capabilities and 
Requirements Study, as well as wargames and global exercises, continues 
to highlight the need to balance force modernization efforts with 
mobility capacity in order to operate in contested environments as 
described in the National Defense Strategy. For maritime sealift, the 
DEFENDER 20 exercise afforded the opportunity to integrate Military 
Sealift Command sealift forces with Commander, Second Fleet and 
Commander, Sixth Fleet surface forces to ensure freedom of movement. 
The U.S. Air Force is working to improve integration of Mobility Air 
Forces with electronic warfare training and Joint All Domain Command 
and Control. As a joint force, we are training to operate in a new 
environment where our logistics are consistently under attack, and to 
mitigate the effects to our joint deployment and distribution 
enterprise. Operating in a contested environment now and in the future 
requires USTRANSCOM to drive required force development efforts through 
established planning and budgetary processes to mitigate risk and 
enable our transport platforms to operate successfully.

    35. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, how have we adjusted our 
land based and maritime pre-positioned stockpile posture to address the 
challenges created by great power competition?
    General Lyons. USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM have enhanced pre-positioned 
stockpiles, including ammunition and deployable air base systems, in 
their respective AORs. Pre-positioning these assets enables TRANSCOM 
high demand / low density strategic mobility assets to be available for 
other critical movements during conflict. We continue work with 
INDOPACOM to analyze fuel posture in the Indo-Pacific AOR and identify 
any necessary fuel posture changes to overcome the challenges posed by 
great power competition. In addition to fixed fuel posture, we are also 
looking at ways to optimize our afloat pre-positioned fuel posture as 
part of the same study.
               climate change and artic power projection
    36. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what is TRANSCOM doing to 
adjust to the realities of climate change as it relates to the United 
States' ability to conduct power projection into the Artic and utilize 
previously unavailable sea lines of communication?
    General Lyons. USNORTHCOM serves as the executive agent for 
capability development in the Arctic. USTRANSCOM supports the DOD 
Arctic Strategy as well as geographic combatant commands and Service-
led efforts to ensure access to Arctic waters and infrastructure as it 
relates to our nation's ability to project power. As described in the 
DOD Arctic strategy, Russia and Canada both claim the right to regulate 
Arctic waters in excess of the authority permitted under international 
law. There is also increased activity in the region to include Russian 
commercial and military investment and Chinese presence.

    37. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what are the unique 
challenges that you face when deploying and sustaining forces in the 
Artic?
    General Lyons. USNORTHCOM serves as the executive agent for 
capability development in the Arctic. The harsh environment and, in the 
USNORTHCOM AOR, limited infrastructure in the high north is expected to 
complicate deployment and sustainment of forces in support of homeland 
defense. USTRANSCOM supports USNORTHCOM planning through scheduled 
OPLAN reviews and development of the Theater Distribution Plan, a key 
element of the Campaign Plan and associated bi-annual review.

    38. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, how are we coordinating with 
our partners and allies that provide us with critical nods in the 
Global Deployment Network--such as airfields and seaports--to ensure 
they are investing in climate resilient infrastructure?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM coordinates through the Services to 
ensure that host nation funded construction planned for DOD OCONUS 
installations is designed and constructed to the same standards as U.S. 
funded construction, including provisions for climate resiliency. As an 
example, we coordinate with the Services to ensure that new host nation 
funded infrastructure at DOD OCONUS installations is constructed 
outside of the 100-year flood plain where possible. Regarding 
commercial airfields and seaports, the DOD's ability to influence 
investment in climate resilient infrastructure is very limited. Many of 
our partners and allies recognize the importance of investing in 
climate resilient infrastructure and have taken appropriate action to 
do so. Factoring in climate resiliency in construction, renovation, and 
area development plans has become a standard engineering practice that 
my command benefits from. This will ensure the viability of the 
commercial deployment and distribution nodes that are so very critical 
to USTRANSCOM missions.
                      conflict in eastern ukraine
    39. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, in your posture statement 
you point out that, ``Russia and its proxies continue their campaign to 
destabilize Ukraine's defense, economic, and political sectors with the 
intent of cementing Ukraine into the Kremlin's sphere of influence.'' 
United States reassurance and efforts to strengthen our partnership 
with Ukraine is essential to their ability to resist malign efforts to 
undermine their sovereignty. Can you provide this Committee with an 
update on what EUCOM is doing to deter Russian aggression - both 
kinetic and non-kinetic - and to counter Russia's propaganda and 
misinformation campaign?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM supports and applies a whole-of-government 
approach to competition and deterrence. A key platform for countering 
malign Russian influence is the Russian Influence Group (RIG). The RIG 
is an interagency network co-led by USEUCOM and the U.S. Department of 
State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. The RIG operates along 
six lines of effort: support democratic governance and the rule of law; 
assess and respond to disinformation/propaganda; strengthen NATO's 
capability, capacity, and resolve; disrupt the Kremlin's mobilization 
of local support; constrain informal actors with opaque funding, and 
counter the Kremlin's coercive use of the energy sector.
    Our military-to-military security cooperation programs engage 
partners to improve alignment and strengthen our collective ability to 
compete and deter. As a member of the Multinational Joint Commission-
Ukraine, Strategic Communications Sub-Committee, USEUCOM coordinates 
and provides training on core strategic communications competencies. 
The Joint Multi-national Training Group-Ukraine is a United States-led, 
dedicated training mission focused on improving Ukrainian forces' 
ability to conduct wide-area security and combined arms maneuver at the 
brigade level. Ukraine participates in multiple United States-sponsored 
joint exercises in the Black Sea, improving interoperability with NATO 
air and maritime forces, and strengthening deterrence and defense in 
the Euro-Atlantic.

    40. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, what progress has been 
made in the last year specifically in the cybersecurity realm to 
improve the capabilities of Ukrainian forces?
    General Wolters. In March 2019, United States DOD delivered, 
installed, configured, and tested equipment for a Cyber Security 
Operations Center (CSOC) to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) currently 
being accredited by Ukrainian authorities. It is scheduled for initial 
operational capability later this year, and the CSOC will provide an 
ability to protect and monitor classified and unclassified networks. In 
November 2019, U.S. DOD facilitated the assignment of a Defensive 
Cybersecurity Advisor to the AFU to accelerate the development of their 
defensive cybersecurity program. Cyber training and education centers 
are in the early stages of development and will be the platform to 
train and educate Ukraine's cyber force.

    41. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, what metrics should 
Congress use to measure the effectiveness of United States efforts in 
Ukraine?
    General Wolters. The key metric of effectiveness is Ukraine's 
continued independence, sovereignty, and the ability to conduct free 
and fair elections. Continued progress on civilian oversight of the 
military, reforms to command and control, human resources, and defense 
industry practices are other appropriate metrics for assessing the 
success of United States efforts in Ukraine.

    42. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, how would you assess our 
current support for Ukrainians?
    General Wolters. United States servicemembers at the Joint Military 
Training Group-Ukraine work shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukrainian forces 
to inform and support Ukraine's military planning efforts and increase 
combat capability. Ukraine continues to benefit from International 
Military Education and Training funding, and we view this as a critical 
investment in Ukraine's future. Sustained Congressional support for 
assistance to Ukraine continues to be impactful. Since 2014, Congress 
has appropriated more than one billion dollars to Ukraine in security 
assistance funds. This consistent, visible support is a demonstration 
of our commitment to Ukraine. Earlier this year, Ukraine concluded it's 
first-ever Foreign Military Sales purchase of defensive Javelin anti-
tank missile systems. The flexibility Congress has provided by allowing 
50 percent of fiscal year 2020 Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative 
funds to be committed over two years has been significant. This 
provision has improved our ability to target Ukraine's defensive 
equipment needs, including the acquisition of Mark VI Patrol Boats, 
which enhance Ukraine's defense capabilities. The flexibility to 
obligate all of the fiscal year 2021 Ukraine Assistance Initiative 
funds over a multi-year period would further enhance the Department's 
ability to better support Ukraine's capability needs.
                   defense personal property program
    43. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, in January the DOD Inspector 
General released their report on the Personal Property Relocation 
Program. It stated that, ``TRANSCOM can improve how it holds Moving 
companies accountable for poor performance in its current structure of 
the moving program.'' Have you identified a viable candidate in the GHC 
selection process who can fully handle the entire PCS process?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM is working through the process of 
evaluating proposals to make an award no earlier than 30 April, at 
which time we will determine and announce the winning company. During 
this time, information cannot be shared about the selection process. 
However, USTRANSCOM is confident the proposals received include the 
requisite details to handle the elements of the PCS process that 
industry has historically supported (i.e., packing, transport, delivery 
of household goods, etc.). The GHC integrates those functions performed 
by commercial entities now, as the government will continue to maintain 
ordering of services and a strong accountability program for contractor 
performance.

    44. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what contingencies exist if 
the GHC goes thru and results in a similar failure of performance to 
that seen in the privatization of military housing?
    General Lyons. A contract alone is not a solution--the success or 
failure of a contract ultimately comes down to an organization's 
ability to manage and oversee the contract. Learning from military 
housing issues, DOD has made a single organization--USTRANSCOM--
responsible for management and oversight of GHC. To be clear, DOD does 
not have effective performance management measures in the current 
program. DOD does not have a formal contract with any of our current 
providers and cannot hold them accountable in a meaningful way. Over 
time, DOD allowed the program to evolve in a manner that now favors 
industry, with suppliers exploiting business rules to generate revenue 
at the expense of military families and Service budgets. Implementing 
the GHC offers the Department the opportunity to set terms and 
conditions that favor DOD families and an avenue to hold industry 
accountable.

    45. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, I have read that TRANSCOM 
may be looking to end the Personal Property Relocation Advisory Panel, 
in what many believe is a premature move, as this panel would be 
beneficial to help disseminate information during the GHC transition 
and provide feedback from family members. Why do you believe this is a 
good plan?
    General Lyons. In the fiscal year 202020 NDAA, Congress directed 
DOD to establish a Military Relocation Advisory Committee consisting of 
members of USTRANSCOM, military services, moving companies, and 
consumer representatives who are either members of the Armed Forces or 
spouses of members of the Armed Forces. At my request, OSD delegated 
establishment and management of this Committee to USTRANSCOM. My staff 
is currently coordinating with the Services to identify their nominees 
for this Committee, which may include the representatives they have 
currently designated to participate in the PPRAP. We will continue to 
host PPRAP sessions until the Military Relocation Advisory Committee is 
fully operational.

    46. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, last year, I asked you to 
commit to prioritizing the needs of military families as you consider 
reforms to DP3 and that you to provide Congress an update on how 
families' input is being implemented to improve the process. Can you 
provide an update on where your command stands on this issue?
    General Lyons. For the 2020 Peak Season, we've instituted changes 
to Defense Personal Property Program business rules to address long-
standing pain points for DOD families. Key actions include: From a 
safety perspective, requiring that all moving companies perform 
background checks on employees and meet local installation access 
requirements (whether they are serving homes on or off base). The 
safety and security of DOD families is paramount. We recognize that 
many issues center on communication, we require moving companies to be 
more responsive to customers. Moving companies must maintain a call 
center during specified hours; respond to customer inquiries within 30 
minutes; provide e-mail updates on the status of the shipment 
throughout the process; and provide a single point of contact for all 
aspects of the moving process. Requiring moving companies to provide 
pre-shipment weight estimates 10 days prior to pack-out, and to perform 
automatic shipment reweighs in the event the actual shipment weight is 
within 10 percent of a customer's weight entitlement. This provides 
families with the information to avoid exceeding weight entitlements 
and excess cost scenarios. Providing more lead time to customers before 
delivery appointments. Previously, moving companies were only required 
to provide two-hour notice--and if a family didn't respond fast enough 
to accept the shipment, it was placed into storage. For Peak Season 
2020, companies are required to provide 24-hour notice and make at 
least two attempts to schedule the delivery before it goes into 
storage. We have established a baseline for inconvenience claims (where 
none currently exists) and streamlined the process for customers. 
Inconvenience claims are payable with moving companies miss their 
assigned pick-up or delivery dates. When applicable, customers will be 
paid the baseline rate--which is tied to the local meals and incidental 
per diem rate--without having to document and provide receipts for each 
expense. We've preserved the process for customers to seek 
reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs in the event their expenses 
exceed the per diem baseline (any amount above and beyond that baseline 
may be reimbursed when supported with receipts). We are providing more 
time for families to submit loss and damage claims (from 75 days to 180 
days) and requiring that moving companies settle claims faster (any 
claim under $1,000 within 30 days, and any other claim within 60 days). 
Historically, moving companies made the decision on whether to repair a 
broken item or pay the customer an amount equivalent to repair costs. 
For Peak Season 2020, we empower DOD families to make that decision. 
Finally, we clarified rules that the moving company (and not the 
subcontracted agent) was responsible for any damage to a family's 
residence (customers have up to 5 days to identify damage to real 
property). Although moving will never be an enjoyable process for 
families, the GHC does posture the Department to improve availability 
of quality capacity to meet peak demand; communication throughout the 
process; service standards `at the curb;' clear accountability when 
things go wrong; and improved claims process in the event of loss, 
damage, or inconvenience. To the point of your question, we are wholly 
focused on delivering an improved relocation experience for DOD 
families. While pursuing the GHC was never about saving money, I am 
encouraged by the bids we've received as they are in line with DOD 
spending in the current program. I acknowledge--and will comply with--
the requirement in the fiscal year 202020 NDAA to provide a report on 
the impact of GHC to Service budgets. We remain on track to award the 
GHC no earlier than 30 April.

    47. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what specific actions have 
you taken in the interim to address the issues military families face 
moving under the current system?
    General Lyons. For the 2020 Peak Season, we've instituted changes 
to Defense Personal Property Program business rules to address long-
standing pain points for DOD families. Key actions include: From a 
safety perspective, requiring that all moving companies perform 
background checks on employees and meet local installation access 
requirements (whether they are serving homes on or off base). The 
safety and security of DOD families is paramount. We recognize that 
many issues center on communication, we require moving companies to be 
more responsive to customers. Moving companies will be required to 
provide pre-shipment weight estimates 10 days prior to pack-out, and to 
perform automatic shipment reweighs in the event the actual shipment 
weight is within 10 percent of a customer's weight entitlement. 
Providing more lead time to customers before delivery appointments. For 
Peak Season 2020, companies are required to provide 24-hour notice and 
make at least two attempts to schedule the delivery before it goes into 
storage. Established a baseline for inconvenience claims (where none 
currently exists) and streamlined the process for customers. 
Inconvenience claims are payable with moving companies miss their 
assigned pick-up or delivery dates. USTRANSCOM preserved the process 
for customers to seek reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs in the 
event their expenses exceed the per diem baseline (any amount above and 
beyond that baseline may be reimbursed when supported with receipts). 
Finally, we will provide more time for families to submit loss and 
damage claims (from 75 days to 180 days) and requiring that moving 
companies settle claims faster (any claim under $1,000 within 30 days, 
and any other claim within 60 days).

    48. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, have the metrics improved?
    General Lyons. Customer Satisfaction Scores--the metric typically 
associated with DP3--have improved--2017: 90.8 percent (full calendar 
year)--2017 Peak Season: 83 percent to 85.8 percent--2018: 91.4 percent 
(full calendar year)--2018 Peak Season: 84.3 percent to 86.9 percent--
2019: 93.7 percent (full calendar year)--2019 Peak Season 89.3 percent 
to 91 percent. Although we saw improvements in satisfaction this past 
year, our current model limits the quality improvements we can make. 
Our current construct is a constraint to innovation and advancement, as 
we are tied to the capabilities of `the lowest common denominators' in 
the program.

    49. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what oversight and 
accountability measures have you implement to incentive better 
performance?
    General Lyons. In addition to adjusting business rules to address 
longstanding pain-points identified by DOD families, USTRANSCOM has 
taken steps to improve accountability where possible within our 
currently flawed framework. Rather than relying on a disparate network 
of Shipping Offices to be the primary enforcers, the Personal Property 
Staff at USTRANSCOM has taken on a much more active role in 
investigating and holding industry accountable for poor performance and 
violations of business rules. In the first 3 months of 2020, for 
example, we've put moving companies into a non-use status for 
defrauding the U.S. Government by impersonating servicemembers to 
complete satisfaction surveys; for failing to declare Common Financial 
and Administrative Control in the international market, which 
disadvantaged its competitors; and for failing to maintain insurance on 
storage facilities, which put DOD families' possessions at risk. In 
several cases, military investigative services and the Department of 
Justice are involved. Regarding oversight, USTRANSCOM holds routine 
workshops with the Services to develop and refine business processes, 
hold monthly calls with Military Spouses, and reinvigorated the General 
Officer Steering Committee to ensure senior Service leaders have 
visibility and oversight of program operations. Most notably, I've 
reorganized staff to improve program oversight. I've elevated the 
Defense Personal Property Program to an independent staff section 
within USTRANSCOM and have assigned a member of the Senior Executive 
Service to lead it. That Director reports to directly to me and is 
responsible for advocating for DOD families during the relocation 
process, and for integrating the operational, financial, contractual, 
policy, and IT aspects of the Defense Personal Property Program.

    50. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, the fiscal year 2020 NDAA 
directed GAO to conduct a study on this issue in order to inform the 
best way forward and ensure we avoid the same challenges that we did 
with the transition to privatization housing, and your posture 
statement mentions a draft of such a study. When do you expect that 
this study will be completed and transmitted to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee?
    General Lyons. The GAO report was released on 6 April.

    51. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, can you share some of the 
GAO's preliminary findings?
    General Lyons. After 10 months of detailed data exchanges and more 
than one hundred requests for information, USTRANSCOM is confident GAO 
had access to all the relevant information in order to conduct an 
exhaustive review of our work on GHC and broader personal property 
reform efforts. GAO's report contains two findings: 1) USTRANSCOM did 
assess cost implications of moving to GHC but may not have accurately 
calculated some costs because of unanswered questions on counseling and 
how overseeing contractor performance will be performed. 2) USTRANSCOM 
has developed performance metrics for some, but not all DP3 activities. 
GAO makes three recommendations in their report: 1) that DOD develop a 
process to track data during the first three years of GHC operations to 
more precisely determine overall Defense Personal Property Program 
(DP3) manpower requirements; 2) that DOD develop metrics for DP3 
activities that fall outside of the GHC (for example, things like 
Service-retained counseling and processing timelines within the 
Military Claims Offices); 3) that DOD articulate the linkages between 
metrics and overall program goals. These recommendations are sensible 
and are consistent with USTRANSCOM's vision to evolve the program from 
a series of disparate Service-owned activities into a truly 
synchronized Departmental program. Moreover, the report confirms many 
of the issues USTRANSCOM has highlighted to the Department and Congress 
over the last two years. It is important to note that GAO issued no 
negative findings or recommendations regarding the single move-manager 
construct, nor did GAO recommend any changes to the acquisition 
strategy or overall timeline for GHC award and implementation.

    52. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, did you agree with GAO's 
preliminary findings and recommendations?
    General Lyons. I agree with GAO's findings. Like all things, 
though, context is critical--my staff is working with the GAO team to 
ensure the findings are framed correctly. I do agree with the three 
recommendations. Although USTRANSCOM concurred with--and will take 
action on--all recommendations, USTRANSCOM did submit a list of 31 
technical issues to correct in GAO's narrative; while none alter GAO's 
very sensible recommendations, the edits are necessary to ensure an 
accurate report. At GAO's request, USTRANSCOM also performed a 
sensitivity review to remove all acquisition sensitive information, 
thus ensuring a publicly releasable report.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                     russia's goals in the pacific
    53. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, in addition to Russia's 
influence in your area of operations, it has expanded influence into 
the Pacific as well. What is your assessment of Russia's strategy and 
goals in the Pacific?
    General Wolters. Russia seeks to regain its status as a global 
power by expanding its diplomatic, security, and economic footprint, 
and challenging United States dominance. Russia's strategy for 
projecting power in the Pacific region includes increasing bilateral 
engagements, pursuing defense sales agreements, participating in 
combined military exercises, and endorsing expanded membership in 
regional and international organizations, such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization. As the global coordinator for the Russia 
Problem Set, USEUCOM's Russia Strategic Initiative works closely with 
USINDOPACOM to coordinate our strategy across geographic combatant 
commands.
                          sealift requirements
    54. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps has released new planning guidance recognizing the need for 
distributed operations because of adversary precision strike 
capabilities. To support these operations, he calls for the use of 
``inter-theater connectors and commercially available ships and craft 
that are smaller and less expensive'', thereby increasing affordability 
and allowing acquisition at a greater quantity. How do you envision 
engaging American carriers who operate ships in the Pacific trades, 
including U.S. flag ships not enrolled in the Maritime Security 
Program, to not only support the Commandant's desires but also ensure 
the TRANSCOM mission has adequate sealift capabilities in the Pacific?
    General Lyons. The Maritime Security Program (MSP) and the 
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) provide DOD with assured 
access to commercial U.S. sealift ships, mariners, and global 
intermodal capability that, when augmented with our reserve organic 
fleets, allow us to project and sustain the force with substantial 
inter-theater sealift capability. Additionally, American carriers 
participating in the VISA program provide 300+ non-MSP vessels, which 
are generally smaller and more uniquely capable to support smaller 
scale missions, shorter range requirements, and when required, support 
to distributed operations. Specifically, seven VISA participants 
operating in the Pacific provide over 1 million combined square foot of 
capacity and can help support the Geographic Combatant Commands' more 
localized intra-theater requirements. USTRANSCOM will continue to 
leverage both MSP and VISA in meeting Combatant Commander requirements 
as well as to fill inter-theater and intra-theater gaps identified 
through exercises, wargames, and other planning events. USTRANSCOM will 
continue to engage industry for their support and solutions through our 
industry outreach events we conduct throughout each year.
                             military moves
    55. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, thank you for your attention to 
DP3 and your efforts in ensuring our military members receive their 
belongings in a timely manner. Can you provide an update on the fiscal 
year 2020 NDAA requirements for the business case analysis on the GHC?
    General Lyons. The Business Case Analysis (BCA) on GHC was 
submitted to defense committees as directed on Friday, 17 January 2020. 
The BCA underscores the value of restructuring the Department of 
Defense's relationship with industry and implementing a single move-
manger construct to generate quality capacity to meet peak demand, 
improve industry accountability, and enable DOD to properly align 
responsibility within the Department. The BCA also highlights risks 
associated with this construct and outlines the steps we have taken--
both during the source selection process and in realigning DOD's 
overall management framework--to mitigate them. We shared the Business 
Case Analysis with the GAO to assist in their report on the Global 
Household Goods Contract, and GAO assessed the BCA using its own 
Assessment Methodology for Economic Analysis. GAO's methodology 
identifies five key components of an economic analysis: objective and 
scope; methodology; analysis of effects; transparency; and 
documentation. GAO assessed that the BCA informed decision-makers and 
stakeholders, while fully meeting four of the components and partially 
meeting the fifth (documentation). A summary of GAO's assessment of the 
BCA is in Appendix II of its report.
                            aerial refueling
    56. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, what are the current plans in 
terms of follow-on tankers based with the Hawaii Air National Guard 
(i.e., replacement/recapitalization plans for the eight KC-135s); will 
they be KC-46s or KC-Y/Z?
    General Lyons. As the KC-46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging 
KC-135 and KC-10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided 
using the United States Air Force's Strategic Basing Process, which is 
led by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). This SECAF-led process 
accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the tanker fleet and is 
designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to include 
routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process 
strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent 
possible, while accounting for global air refueling demand to ensure 
the posture support Combatant Commander requirements. I appreciate the 
Secretary's transparent process and the efforts to identify where best 
to base the KC-46 to meet global demand. Although basing is important, 
USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC-46 will be an air refueling asset 
capable of supporting global missions.
                           pearl harbor c-17s
    57. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, what are your thoughts on having 
the C-17s at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam under operational control 
of INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command] versus TRANSCOM?
    General Lyons. The C-17 is a global asset. TRANSCOM's Operational 
Control (OPCON) of C-17s allows agile global support to all Combatant 
Commanders. Our current Command to Command agreement with INDOPACOM 
concerning C-17s allows INDOPACOM to perform their mission and allows 
TRANSCOM to support global requirements.

    58. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, what are your thoughts on 
swapping ``ownership'' of the C-17s at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam 
from Active Duty tails to Hawaii Air National Guard tails, similar to 
the transfer of the C-17s at Elmendorf Air Force Base from Active Duty 
to Air National Guard that occurred in Alaska?
    General Lyons. Assigning C-17s to the 176th Airlift Wing at Joint 
Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) was the result of a unique situation 
with force structure changes at JBER. In order to maintain maximum 
access to limited C-17 resources, I suggest retaining forces at Joint 
Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam as is.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                              coronavirus
    59. Senator Warren. General Wolters, the AOR for EUCOM includes 
Italy, which reportedly has over 500 cases of the Novel Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) and 14 deaths as a result. Other countries in the EUCOM AOR 
with confirmed cases of COVID-19 include Austria, Belgium, Croatia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom. In your testimony regarding the protection of 
servicemembers and their families in Europe, you noted that EUCOM has 
``restricted travel to certain zones and we require all mil-air arrival 
flights to be screened for the virus'' and ``in particular, two states 
inside of Italy.'' You also noted that that you ``anticipate the need 
may arise in Germany, but that is still to be determined.'' While the 
most senior global health security position at the National Security 
Council (NSC) has been vacant since 2018, on February 27, 2020, Vice 
President Mike Pence appointed Dr. Deborah L. Birx, the Coordinator of 
the United States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS and U.S. 
Special Representative for Global Health Diplomacy, to serve as the 
White House Coronavirus Response Coordinator. Given the global public 
health threat posed by COVID-19 and the need for an integrated inter-
agency response, how will your commands work with Dr. Birx's office to 
protect servicemembers and their families residing in the EUCOM AOR?
    General Wolters. In the time since this question was posed, the 
health crisis brought about by COVID-19 has gripped the world. USEUCOM 
coordinates daily with counterparts in the Joint Staff and Office of 
the Secretary of Defense to synchronize our efforts, preserve the 
health of the force and families, and supports the whole-of-government 
response to COVID-19.

    60. Senator Warren. General Lyons and General Wolters, please 
explain the established procedures that your commands would follow in 
the event that servicemembers or their families are found to be 
infected with the Novel Coronavirus.
    General Lyons. Per USTRANSCOM Force Health Protection Guidance for 
Novel Coronavirus and current CDC recommendations, Servicemembers and 
their families would be directed to self-isolate and contact their 
health care provider for further medical care related guidance. In 
parallel, appropriate public health officials will be contacted to 
initiate contact tracing and additional notification of exposure if 
necessary. Servicemembers are also directed to contact their supervisor 
for formal notification to Command Leadership. Further, the command is 
actively engaged in social distancing through telework and alternate 
means of communication in order to reduce the risk of transmission 
within the organization.
    General Wolters. USEUCOM has activated its existing pandemic 
response plan, and on March 7, 2020, we confirmed our first case of 
COVID-19. Our military treatment networks are fully integrated with 
host-nation health authorities to share information, evaluate, and 
treat servicemembers, civilians, and family from across the USEUCOM 
AOR. Public health teams, throughout the USEUCOM AOR are closely 
monitoring those infected, those shielded, and those most at risk to 
determine when they should return to duty and normal activities.

    61. Senator Warren. General Lyons and General Wolters, the most 
recent unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, published in January 2019, observed, 
``The growing proximity of humans and animals has increased the risk of 
disease transmission. The number of outbreaks has increased in part 
because pathogens originally found in animals have spread to human 
populations.'' The Director of National Intelligence also assessed that 
``the United States and the world will remain vulnerable to the next 
flu pandemic or large-scale outbreak of a contagious disease that could 
lead to massive rates of death and disability, severely affect the 
world economy, strain international resources, and increase calls on 
the United States for support.'' Have your commands assessed the 
potential adverse impact to the readiness of U.S. Forces due to the 
Novel Coronavirus outbreak?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM working with our Components are closely 
watching the COVID-19 pandemic development and continue to provide 
applicable force health protection guidance as the situation unfolds in 
order to safeguard mission assurance. In addition, USTRANSCOM will 
continue to support the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the Joint 
Staff to assist in determining the risk to force presented by the Novel 
Coronavirus.
    General Wolters. USEUCOM remains laser-focused on the deterrence 
and defense of the Euro-Atlantic. We have taken prudent measures to 
preserve the health of our force and our families. USEUCOM has 
supported national efforts to combat COVID-19 and stands ready to 
continue to assist national efforts. While we have prudently modified 
some activities to prevent the spread of the virus, we continue to 
sustain our essential deterrence and defense activities, and our 
conventional and nuclear forces remain ready. Best practices and 
lessons identified during COVID-19 will continue to strengthen our 
future posture and readiness to confront the invisible threat of a 
pandemic.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                          in flight re-fueling
    62. Senator Jones. General Lyons, given the proposed divestment of 
aerial refuelers, can you imagine a scenario, short of full-scale 
conflict, that the in air refueling apparatus fails? If so, describe 
the scenario.
    General Lyons. No, I do not see a scenario where the air refueling 
apparatus fails. While the air refueling mission is the most stressed 
mission in USTRANSCOM and is my #1 warfighting readiness priority, I 
have full confidence that the men and women from the Active Duty, 
Reserve, and Guard components that execute the air refueling mission, 
will continue to find a way to get the job done. However, additional 
divestments in legacy air refueling platforms prior to the fielding of 
an operational taskable KC-46 exacerbates the challenges for this 
already stressed mission set; additional divestments will result in 
reduced output to meet global demand until the KC-46 is fully 
operational. Retaining capacity until the KC-46 is usable is crucial to 
be able to project the force around the globe in times of crises. Hard 
choices would be made on supporting the highest priority global 
missions that would elevate risk and early mobilization of Reserve 
Forces may be required, but not approach mission failure.



                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
 FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 
                                PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2020

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                           AIR FORCE POSTURE

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room 
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Roger F. Wicker, 
presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer, 
Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer, McSally, 
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Manchin, and 
Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

    Senator Wicker. Well, this hearing will come to order.
    Senator Inhofe's plane will arrive later this morning, and 
I am privileged to open the hearing in his behalf today and to 
recognize the ranking Member, Senator Reed.
    The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the 
posture of the U.S. Air Force and its fiscal year 2021 budget 
request.
    This is Senator Inhofe's statement, which I am happy to 
read on his behalf.
    We welcome Barbara Barrett, Secretary of the Air Force, and 
General David Goldfein, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Thank 
you both for your distinguished service and your continued 
willingness to serve our great Nation.
    The National Defense Strategy directs our Nation's military 
to prepare for the return of great power competition. This 
means we must be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat 
our near-peer adversaries like Russia and China.
    In order for the Air Force to achieve that goal, it must be 
properly manned, trained, and equipped. At the end of the Obama 
administration, the Air Force was at a historic low in 
readiness and size. Less than 10 percent of combat squadrons 
were ready to deploy and even less were prepared for a peer 
fight.
    We commend the progress you have made in rebuilding 
readiness, but more needs to be done. A high state of readiness 
is crucial for our Nation to demonstrate peace through 
strength.
    While our force has suffered from being ill-prepared, our 
adversaries moved out and recapitalized both their conventional 
and nuclear forces with alarming speed. China and Russia 
present a credible threat to America and our allies. In fact, 
in some areas they have even surpassed us.
    You both have testified that the Air Force is too small and 
too old to do what the Nation asks. We agree with you and the 
many independent studies that show the Air Force needs to grow 
and modernize. But, we are concerned that your current budget 
is inadequate to allow you to reach the requirement of 386 
squadrons.
    Given the need to grow, there is concern that this year's 
budget request takes a risk by divesting the aircraft we need 
today in the hopes of buying modern capability in the future. 
Historically, that approach has failed to achieve the desired 
results.
    We understand that much of those decisions were caused by a 
flat budget that falls well short of the 3 to 5 percent growth 
recommended by the National Defense Strategy Commission report. 
In fact, it does not even keep up with inflation.
    Any successful modernization strategy needs to focus on 
results and meeting the needs of tomorrow's fight, but should 
also maintain forces capable of deterring and defeating an 
adversary today.
    We look forward to working with you to ensure that we meet 
the needs of today's warfighters while modernizing to ensure we 
regain our advantages for the future.
    Senator Reed?

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let 
me join you in welcome Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein 
to the Committee this morning to testify on the plans and 
programs of the Department of the Air Force in our review of 
the fiscal year 2021 President's Budget request. We are 
grateful certainly to all the men and women of the Air Force 
for their service and to their families for their continued 
support.
    I want to particularly note that this will probably be 
General Goldfein's last appearance before the Committee as Air 
Force Chief of Staff. I want to thank you, General Goldfein, 
for your many years of distinguished and dedicated service to 
the men and women of the United States Air Force and to this 
Nation. Thank you very much, sir.
    In preparing this budget request, the Air Force faced 
difficult decisions in balancing the need to modernize and keep 
the technological advantage over near-peer competitors and the 
need to support ongoing operations and sustain today's 
readiness. This budget request tries to maintain that balance 
by increasing funding to address readiness concerns and 
munitions shortfalls but also funding technologies for the 
future fight and modernization of our strategic deterrent 
capability. I am interested in the witnesses' views on what the 
most difficult decisions were. I also understand that the 
Secretary of Defense has asked the military departments to 
undertake a review to find resources, and I would like to know 
the status of that review.
    I would also note that because significant levels of 
funding are being transferred to build the wall on the southern 
border, some Air Force modernization efforts will not proceed 
as planned, making it harder to find savings to apply to high 
priority programs and activities. I am interested in hearing if 
the Air Force has a plan to mitigate this issue.
    This year, the Air Force is proposing to retire and realign 
a number of aircraft systems, presumably to free up resources 
for other programs. The budget request would reduce or alter 
force structure for A-10's, B-1's, C130's, KC-135's, KC-10's, 
Global Hawks, and Reapers. Any Air Force proposal deserves our 
careful consideration, but we must consider it against the 
recent history of abrupt Air Force changes of direction on such 
programs as A-10, U-2, Global Hawk, JSTARS, Compass Call, 
AWACS, light attack aircraft, and C-27 airlift aircraft, 
several of which I will admit were reversed by congressional 
action. I hope the witnesses will provide the Committee with 
their reasoning for these retirements and realignments and 
assurances that decisions are well thought out before 
disruptions to the force structure begin.
    Perhaps most troubling to me among the force structure 
adjustments is the planned reductions in the air refueling 
tanker force in the near term. The Commander of TRANSCOM 
recently testified before this Committee that the scarcity of 
available tankers has sorely taxed his command's ability to 
keep up with the peacetime demand, let alone manage support for 
major contingency operations.
    As we all know, while the KC-46 is being accepted by the 
Air Force and taking air crews, it is only operating with 
significant restrictions. Coupling that with the early 
retirement of KC-135's and KC-10's creates significant risk in 
our refueling capability. I want to hear why you have proposed 
this in the face of TRANSCOM's significant concerns.
    I am also interested in hearing about your continuing 
effort to improve the shortfalls within the remotely-piloted 
aircraft operator community and how the Air Force has addressed 
shortfalls within the larger pilot community and maintenance 
personnel. Certainly, if the Air Force were to retire a large 
number of Global Hawks and Reapers, that action would help the 
shortfall by reducing demand for pilots. However, I am 
interested to know whether you have had a reduction in demand 
for Reaper support from the combatant commanders and how their 
input has affected your decision.
    Two years ago, the Air Force budget request proposed to 
truncate the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, 
or JSTARS, modernization program and replace it with a 
combination of other systems, including unmanned systems and 
overhead sensors. That program has since been named the 
Advanced Battle Management System, or ABMS. I look forward to 
receiving an update on progress of the ABMS system.
    Again, there are many issues to cover, and I thank both 
Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein for being here today and 
look forward to your responses.
    Thank you.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, you submitted a 
joint statement, which will be entered into the record at this 
point.
    Would each of you like to make a brief 5-minute opening 
statement? Secretary Barrett?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARBARA M. BARRETT, SECRETARY OF THE 
                           AIR FORCE

    Secretary Barrett. Thank you very much. Chairman Wicker, 
Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee, thank you for 
inviting us to appear before you today.
    I also would like to acknowledge and thank David Goldfein 
whose final appearance before this Committee for this purpose 
will be today. I would like to thank him for the incomparable 
service that he has provided to the United States Air Force, 
making the Air Force better and our Nation better. It has been 
a great privilege to serve with General Goldfein.
    The international security environment changes 
unpredictably. China and Russia challenge American capabilities 
with new technologies and new systems. Iran and North Korea 
threaten regional and global stability, while violent extremism 
remains a global menace.
    The National Defense Strategy calls for the Air Force as a 
critical component of a joint force to deter and, if needed, 
defeat these threats. This fiscal year 2021 budget request sets 
the course for the Air Force we need to accomplish these aims.
    Specifically, the United States Air Force invests in a 
future force that allows us to connect the joint force, 
dominate space, generate combat power, and conduct logistics 
under attack. We will continue to present ready forces to 
combatant commanders as we defend the Homeland, ensure 
strategic deterrence, and counter violent extremism.
    Finally, we will strengthen the foundation of our forces, 
our airmen, as we develop and care for our people and their 
families. This budget submission shifts force design to create 
irreversible momentum toward achieving the mission of the NDS 
[National Defense Strategy] while growing strong and resilient 
leaders and families.
    The top policy priority for the department is the 
successful launch of the United States Space Force. The space 
domain is integral to the joint team success in all warfighting 
domains. The Department of the Air Force supports a lean, agile 
service to preserve access to space for America and our allies 
while deterring and, if necessary, defeating malicious actions.
    Our most important investment is in connecting the joint 
force. We are developing the technologies to connect every 
sensor, every shooter, and every echelon of command to enable 
seamless, joint, all-domain operations. This battle network is 
essential to defeating current and future threats.
    We are also directing pivotal resources to recruit and 
retain the best people our Nation has to offer. We are an 
inclusive and diverse force and are modernizing our promotion 
system while investing in the professional development of 
airmen.
    The Air Force is expanding ongoing efforts to support and 
care for families. We are tackling privatized housing and PFAS 
challenges. Along with our sister services, we encourage State 
reciprocity for occupational licensing for spouses and for 
quality schools for our children. We are investing in 
professionally designed and advised programs to reduce suicides 
and sexual assaults.
    To fund the Air Force we need, we must divest some aging 
legacy systems. This budget retires limited numbers of 
aircraft, consolidating resources to increase readiness in 
remaining aircraft, or invest in recapitalization and 
modernization efforts.
    We thank the Committee and the entire Congress for fully 
funding the recovery efforts to rebuild Tindall and Offut Air 
Force bases.
    We will seek additional support as our installations and 
personnel assist with the ongoing novel coronavirus quarantine 
and responsive efforts.
    With your continued support, America's Air Force stands 
ready to deter, defend, and defeat any adversary.
    We look forward to your questions.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
    General Goldfein?

STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF 
                         THE AIR FORCE

    General Goldfein. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to 
present my last budget submission for the first time with 
Secretary Barbara Barrett, the 25th Secretary of the Air Force. 
She is an inspiring leader who cares deeply about airmen and 
their families, and this hearing allows me the opportunity to 
publicly thank her on behalf of all active, Guard, Reserve, and 
civilian airmen who stand the watch, own the high ground, and 
follow her lead. Thank you, ma'am.
    So my bottom line up front. This budget, building on the 
last three, offers the most aggressive package of strategic 
trades we have made as a service in over 2 decades to achieve 
complete alignment with the National Defense Strategy and 
secure our Nation's military superiority over the next decade.
    Secretary Esper's guidance for this budget build was 
crystal clear. Build an Air Force that can compete, deter, and 
win shoulder to shoulder with our joint teammates and our 
allies and partners against a nuclear peer in an era of great 
power competition. This budget is designed to achieve this 
objective and we are asking for your support to make the tough 
but necessary trades we will discuss today.
    In numerous war games against our best assessment of the 
threat in 2030 and beyond, as Secretary Barrett stated, we 
found that investment in four key areas produced the Air Force 
needed to prevail.
    First, this budget connects the joint force in ways we are 
not today connected in order to truly fight as a joint team. 
Under the leadership of our Chairman, General Mark Milley, the 
Joint Chiefs and the combatant commanders are fully engaged in 
developing a new doctrine of warfare called joint all-domain 
operations. Under this warfighting construct, the Air Force is 
the designated lead service to connect platforms, sensors, and 
weapons from all domains, all services, and our allies and 
partners so we can truly operate at the speed of relevance. We 
call it joint all-domain command and control, or JADC2 for 
short, and we are moving out quickly with advanced battle 
management, sir, as the pathfinder.
    Every 4 months, we host a demonstration and link joint 
capabilities that are not currently connected to advanced joint 
all-domain operations to the next level, and I look forward to 
describing what we have achieved to date and where we are 
headed during questioning.
    Second, we must dominate space, and while you will have a 
follow-on hearing in April with Chief Jay Raymond and Secretary 
Barrett focused on the Space Force and Department of the Air 
Force investments, I want you to know that it is my top 
priority to make Chief Raymond and his new service successful.
    Our third area of focus is generating combat power 
beginning with our nuclear enterprise. This budget moves us 
forward to recapitalize our two legs of the triad and the 
critical nuclear command and control that ties it all together.
    Fourth, this budget invests in a new way of approaching how 
we keep our joint team deployed and sustained in contested 
combat environments. We must assume our logistics enterprise 
will be under attack.
    The foundation of this budget submission is the greatest 
treasure in our Nation's arsenal, our airmen. We look forward 
to working with this Committee to ensure that we keep the faith 
with the airmen that will defend the Nation, and we support 
their families entrusted to our care.
    As this Committee is aware and was stated, the 2021 top 
line is relatively flat from last year, well short, as the 
chairman stated, of the 3 to 5 percent growth required to 
properly support the National Defense Strategy. In a flat 
budget environment, if a service is to move forward, it must do 
two things. It must make better use of what it has by 
connecting all platforms, sensors, and weapons in a battlefield 
network, JADC2, and it must find internal savings to pay for 
new capabilities.
    So we held our own night court and identified $21 billion 
across the FYDP by retiring the oldest of our legacy weapon 
systems that are either not survivable or do not contribute 
significantly to the 2030 peer fight, and not one of these 
trades is easy. Every weapon system we are asking to retire has 
performed well in the current fight, but many are at the end of 
their service life or have no future in a nuclear peer fight. 
This is today's hard reality, and not surprisingly, of the 
services, the Air Force has the largest classified portfolio of 
investment. This makes the story harder to tell since most of 
what we are retiring is unclassified and visible, while many of 
our game-changing investments are classified.
    I want to thank many of you for taking our classified 
briefing and offer it to any of you or your staff between now 
and end game. When you see what we are trading for, our budget 
submission will make more sense.
    If we are to achieve truly meaningful gains for our 
Nation's security through implementing the NDS in a flat budget 
environment, we must work together on these hard choices.
    Chairman, I am honored to be the 21st Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force, and if we go to war against a nuclear peer, I am 100 
percent confident that we have what we will need to win. I can 
say that because of decisions made by my predecessors, men like 
John Jumper and Mike Ryan, such as the lead time required for 
building an Air Force. I believe one of my jobs is to ensure 
that when Chief 24 sits in front of this Committee in 2030, 
that Chief will be able to state with equal confidence that our 
Nation's Air Force has what it needs to win. With your support, 
we can achieve this goal.
    Secretary Barrett and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Barrett and General 
Goldfein follows:]

 Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Barbara Barrett and General 
                           David L. Goldfein
              air force design for great power competition
    The international security environment is rapidly changing and 
becoming increasingly complex. China and Russia present real and 
growing threats to the national security of the United States and our 
allies. They continue to employ aggressive tactics to coerce neighbors, 
suppress dissent, and undermine freedom. Iran and North Korea seek 
outsized regional influence through violent extremism or the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons. These and other nations are pursuing capabilities 
specifically designed to limit or negate the advantages of the United 
States and our allies.
    The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) reoriented United States 
defense strategy to focus primarily on great power competition with 
China and Russia. This shift profoundly changes the conversation on 
United States defense strategy, plans, and programs. We are developing 
new operational concepts to focus on more fully integrating joint 
military capabilities across warfighting domains. We will employ U.S. 
military forces in more distributed ways as we build technologies to 
connect those forces into advanced battle networks.
    The United States Air Force has been working to align with the NDS 
for several years. In 2018, we needed Congress' help to recover from 
the damaging effects of sequestration and halt declining readiness 
across the force. The NDS and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) were also 
released in 2018, and we began to align future conventional and nuclear 
forces design with the guidance in these documents.
    In 2019, we continued readiness recovery, making significant gains 
across multiple aircraft and spacecraft fleets and mission sets. The 
Air Force also worked with Congress to make essential decisions on two 
important programs--the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS) and the Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) satellite system--
that set the tone for future modernization. The plan for recapitalizing 
these platforms had to change as they would not have survived in future 
conflict given the emerging threats. We moved away from developing 
large, vulnerable aircraft and satellite systems, and instead pursued 
the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) and Next-Generation OPIR. 
These systems are essential to robust Joint All-Domain Command and 
Control (JADC2) and the networked future force.
    The Air Force's 2020 budget submission was our first informed by 
and focused directly on 2018 National Defense Strategy implementation. 
The demands this strategy placed on the Air Force drove Congress to 
ask: what forces are required to successfully execute the NDS? The Air 
Force We Need study assessed the baseline capacity required to meet NDS 
objectives, assuming current capabilities and concepts, at medium risk 
based on Combatant Commander Operational Plans and Timelines. As we 
established this baseline, we also made key organizational changes to 
drive toward future capabilities and concepts. Significantly, we helped 
launch the U.S. Space Force which now stands as an equal branch of the 
military.
    In preparation for the 2021 submission, the Department of the Air 
Force conducted an exhaustive review of our portfolios and made hard 
decisions to better align with the NDS. Some choices required 
investments in the future at the expense of legacy platforms. In doing 
so, we will accept calculated short-term risk to pursue the Secretary 
of Defense's goal of irreversible momentum toward NDS implementation. 
We conducted multiple, complex wargame scenarios to assess alternative 
warfighting approaches against a peer adversary. We shared the results 
with Congress over the past year and talked openly about the 
implications for our Air Force. This 2021 budget reflects current 
analysis on the Air Force We Need for the future.
    To achieve the objectives of the NDS, the United States Air Force 
will pursue an integrated design and field modernized forces that can:
      Connect the Joint Force so we can more seamlessly 
integrate as a Joint team,
      Dominate Space through support of our sister service, the 
United States Space Force,
      Generate Combat Power to blunt any attack against the 
U.S. or our allies, and
      Conduct Logistics Under Attack to sustain high-tempo 
operations as long as needed.
    In each of these areas, we will work with Congress and our sister 
services, industry, academia, allies, and partners to develop and field 
innovative solutions. While focusing on the four key investment areas 
above, we will also continue to provide Combatant Commanders with Ready 
Forces to conduct Strategic Deterrence, Homeland Defense, and Counter 
Violent Extremism.
    Finally, Developing and Caring For Our People and Their Families is 
an enduring imperative. American parents have entrusted their sons and 
daughters to our care. It is our sacred duty to ensure they are 
properly organized, trained, equipped, and courageously led. It is also 
our responsibility to take care of their families. With the enduring 
support of Congress, we will continue to provide them the resources and 
support they deserve.
               united states air force design priorities
Connect the Joint Force
    Modern warfare is increasingly all-domain. Conflicts are not 
limited to the air or space or land or sea or cyber. Rather, they 
involve engagement in and effects across many or all domains, 
simultaneously. To prevail, the future joint force must be prepared to 
employ Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), where individual military 
activities are more than synchronized or deconflicted. Instead, 
activities in one domain enhance the effectiveness of those in other 
domains and compensate for vulnerabilities.
    Joint All Domain Operations as a new Joint Warfighting Concept 
creates simultaneous dilemmas for adversary forces, overwhelming them 
with too many threats to counter successfully. The Air Force will 
generate windows of superiority in air and cyberspace, with the joint 
force converging on the most important targets at speed and scale. When 
the Air Force employs in concert with Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and 
Space Force capabilities, opponents will have to defend their forces 
across all domains, all the time.
    The Air Force will enable JADO by helping connect all forces into a 
cohesive battle network in ways they are not connected today. For 
example, our fifth-generation aircraft cannot easily share data with 
some legacy fighters, sensors on many Navy ships cannot cue Army Air 
Defense Artillery batteries, and soldiers and marines in battle cannot 
always access real-time video feeds from our international partners. 
The key to this effort is to build on our Advanced Battle Management 
System investments. ABMS is the foundation of true Joint All-Domain 
Command and Control which enables convergence of joint combat power. 
JADC2 connects sensors, systems, and weapons from different services 
and nations to allow the seamless sharing of information to all 
friendly forces. Our fiscal year 2021 budget includes funding to 
develop the network, connectivity, and infrastructure for this critical 
capability while working closely with joint, interagency, and 
international partners.
    The Air Force is leading efforts to develop JADC2, and early 
experiments are already yielding positive results. A recent 
demonstration in Florida connected Air Force aircraft, Space Force 
sensors, Navy surface vessels, and Army Air Defense Artillery units to 
successfully defeat a simulated cruise missile attack. This joint team 
achieved 26 of 28 connectivity objectives and a series of firsts in 
this initial effort to effectively employ JADC2 in an operational 
setting directly supporting the Commander of USNORTHCOM/NORAD in 
defense of the Homeland. This fiscal year 2021 budget accelerates JADC2 
experimentation, and the next demonstration is planned for April 2020.
    To achieve true JADC2, this budget invests in digital engineering 
and common data architecture to connect our Air Forces with Army, Navy, 
Marine Corps, Space Force, and international teammates. Success in 
modern warfare requires a digital infrastructure with more open data 
systems than we have today. As part of these efforts, we will continue 
investments in the Digital Air Force initiative as we transition from 
in-house communications networks to an Enterprise Information 
Technology as a Service framework, using best practices of industry. 
This allows airmen to focus more on warfighting and less on maintenance 
of our networks. The fiscal year 2021 budget expands investments in 
technology solutions that streamline non-essential tasks for our 
airmen.
Dominate Space: The United States Space Force
    Maintaining a position of advantage in space is essential to 
winning in future conflicts. The President formally declared space a 
warfighting domain in March 2018 with the announcement of the new 
National Space Strategy. On 20 December 2019, the President and 
Congress established the United States Space Force as the newest branch 
of the Armed Forces, an historic milestone for our Nation. The standup 
of the U.S. Space Force is a critical priority for the Department of 
the Air Force. The Air Force will aggressively support our sister 
service as they develop the capabilities, warfighting doctrine, and 
expertise needed to outpace future threats.
    While the Space Force will eventually drive budgets, personnel, and 
operations of our space capabilities, the Air Force retains many 
systems and personnel in the near term. We will work with our joint 
teammates to support the transition of space systems and the 
professionals who employ them.
Generate Combat Power
    To prevail in future conflict, the joint force must generate 
sufficient combat power to blunt an attack against the U.S. or its 
allies. The Air Force will deliver rapid, lethal warfighting capability 
to combatant commanders. Air forces are expected to arrive first 
because we fly into theater and are then called to halt enemy activity 
while follow-on joint and allied forces are brought to bear. This 
budget continues critical recapitalization across multiple missions to 
include the B-21, KC-46, F-35, F-15EX, HH-60W, and T-7 fleets along 
with the critical munitions and sensor suites required for Joint All-
Domain Operations.
    In addition, this budget modernizes existing platforms that will 
fly well into the next two decades. Examples include a modernized B-52 
with new engines and upgraded radar technology and munitions delivery 
options; updated F-16s with advanced fire control radars and datalinks; 
and the venerable A-10 which will provide close air support to ground 
forces well into the 2030s. Connecting these platforms, sensors, and 
weapons through ABMS and JADC2 will maintain their viability and combat 
lethality.
    The fighter force is one example of how this budget invests in a 
new way of generating combat power. The Next-Generation Air Dominance 
(NGAD) program is maturing novel technologies for the networked, multi-
domain joint force. NGAD will integrate legacy and future platforms 
with a mix of manned, unmanned, and optionally-manned aircraft.
    This budget continues to fund Air Force investments in the 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, 
systems, and capabilities that enable current joint force operations. 
At the same time, it lays the foundation for an architecture that will 
eventually link sensors, shooters, and decision makers. The Air Force 
seeks to balance both near- and long-term risk by right-sizing the ISR 
available to dominate today's fight, while building the ISR enterprise 
necessary to provide decision superiority to the joint force in the 
future.
    This budget takes full advantage of breakthroughs in digital design 
technology by investing in three critical areas: digital engineering, 
agile software development, and open systems architectures. Recent 
application of digital design technology in the T-7 program resulted in 
an 80 percent reduction in assembly hours versus conventional aircraft 
design and manufacturing methods. This engagement with industry will 
allow us to develop smaller fleets of new aircraft much faster with 
rapid technological innovation and adaptation. It is not good enough to 
procure better airplanes and satellites; rather, we must design and 
build systems differently today.
    This budget submission pursues advanced technologies and 
incorporates them into our weapons and platforms. These technologies 
include hypersonic, directed energy, autonomy, cyber, propulsion, and 
mass weapon payload systems. These future capabilities will complement 
existing systems to allow us to achieve effects against enemy targets, 
kinetically or non-kinetically, in all domains, at speed and scale 
previously unseen.
    Even as we generate combat power in new ways, humans will still 
operate in many of our combat aircraft. This will place them in harm's 
way and potentially require their rescue from hostile areas. Recovering 
isolated personnel remains a no-fail mission, so we are continuing our 
efforts to modernize our rescue aircraft. In 2019, we began testing our 
first HH-60W aircraft. This budget continues acquisitions as we 
recapitalize the helicopter fleet. In 2021, we will retire the first 27 
legacy HH-60 aircraft.
Conduct Logistics Under Attack
    Since the end of World War II, the United States has relied on 
established, fully-supplied, and well-defended bases. Today, American 
forces are extremely efficient in deploying large numbers of people, 
materiel, and weapons systems across the globe to fight from a small 
number of forward operating bases with well-developed infrastructure.
    Our assessment, in line with the NDS, indicates that future 
battlefields will not allow us to fight this way, so we must be 
prepared to move to win. The Air Force will invest in forward-based 
stocks to enable forces to rapidly deploy to distributed forward 
locations. These locations will vary in size, setup, and security, so 
we must be postured to protect our forces and make it difficult for 
enemies to target them.
    Logistics will need to be lean and agile, allowing us to rapidly 
move people and materiel to and within a theater. As we reinvent 
logistics, the Air Force is investing in future transportation 
platforms and autonomous capabilities. We will continue to develop and 
field future vertical lift to move smaller amounts of equipment quickly 
to many more places than in the past. In these efforts, we are closely 
engaged with our sister services and industry to reimagine what is 
possible. These capabilities will be integrated with our battle 
networks, so we are taking steps to reinforce supply chain security 
with the components, subcomponents, materials, and software 
incorporated into defense systems and equipment.
    In addition to developing future capabilities, we will continue 
investing in our existing and modernized mobility aircraft fleets. The 
joint force will depend upon the KC-46 to provide force extension and 
power projection. The Air Force continues to work closely with the 
contractor to reach full mission-capable status. This budget retires 
sixteen KC-10s and thirteen KC-135s in fiscal year 2021 while 
maintaining the required 479 tanker aircraft. We are also looking 
closely at the right mix between modernized and legacy tactical airlift 
platforms.
Ready Forces
    The United States Air Force fields capabilities the Nation relies 
upon every day. Airmen are always on duty: standing the watch in 
missile launch facilities; conducting intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance missions; patrolling and defending the cyber domain; 
delivering nuclear command, control, and communications capabilities; 
and guarding our skies. As we modernize to counter growing threats, we 
must also ensure that forces remain ready and able to offer options to 
our Nation's leaders.
    The demand for Air Force capabilities across the globe remains 
high. Over 28,000 airmen deployed worldwide last year as part of the 
joint team to deliver America's air, space, and cyber power. In 2019, 
our servicemembers flew more than 75,000 strike sorties and employed 
more than 11,000 weapons in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Mobility 
forces conducted more than 27,000 airlift and refueling sorties across 
the United States Central Command area of responsibility, offloading 
more than 590 million pounds of fuel and moving more than 226 million 
pounds of cargo. Air Force personnel deployed in support of NATO 
collective defense missions in Poland and the Baltic States, filled 
continuous bomber rotations in the United States Central Command and 
United States Indo-Pacific Command areas of responsibility, and brought 
humanitarian assistance to millions of people in need around the world.
    Despite this operations tempo, a major success story over the past 
several years has been the improved readiness across our force 
following the harmful effects of sequestration. We have increased 
mission capable rates across our pacing squadrons--our most in-demand 
units--and are continuing our efforts across all fleets. This budget 
requests $17 billion in sustainment and support for weapons systems and 
$9 billion for 1.2 million flying hours to train and hone combat 
proficiency.
    The Air Force is also expanding investment into harnessing the 
power of data and the efficiencies it brings to operations. Predictive 
maintenance initiatives have yielded faster and cheaper maintenance for 
our C-5 and KC-135 fleets, and this budget expands the initiative to 
other aircraft. We are digitizing data from years of maintaining legacy 
platforms, such as the B-52, to preserve and extend some of our oldest 
aircraft.
    In 2018, we faced major readiness deficits which negatively 
impacted the morale of our airmen. With the support of Congress, we 
have made major improvements to readiness over the past three budget 
years and are now more ready than at any time in the last decade. The 
momentum is undeniable.
Strategic Deterrence
    Nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission of the 
Department of Defense--our deterrent underwrites every U.S. military 
operation around the world and is the foundation and backstop of our 
national defense. As the steward of two-thirds of the nuclear triad, 
the Air Force needs the continued support of Congress to maintain the 
Nation's credible and effective strategic deterrent. This need is even 
more critical today, due to the on-going evolution and fielding of 
other countries' strategic nuclear capabilities, including hypersonic 
weapons, which continue to challenge U.S. and allied security.
    The Air Force is making significant investments in modernization 
and recapitalization programs that address both delivery platforms and 
weapons. Modernized versions of existing weapons, such as guided bombs, 
and modern replacements for existing capabilities, such as the Long-
Range Standoff Weapon, will be joined by new technologies that provide 
advanced capabilities to the joint force. These systems are being 
fielded on a tight schedule that depends on stable requirements and 
resources to ensure our national strategic deterrence mission does not 
fail.
    The Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile weapon system has 
served as the bedrock of nuclear deterrence since 1962. However, this 
system's service life can no longer be extended. The Ground-Based 
Strategic Deterrent developed in this budget represents a modern, 
sustainable design with the capabilities to ensure the Nation maintains 
its most responsive leg of the nuclear Triad well into the 21st 
century.
    Our nuclear-capable bomber force represents the most flexible leg 
of the nuclear triad. The Air Force's future bomber, the B-21 Raider, 
is proceeding on schedule and on cost, and the initial test aircraft is 
progressing toward first flight. The Raider will be the core of our 
future nuclear-capable bomber fleet, and we are committed to fully 
funding the program in its current development phase to maintain our 
aggressive and critical timeline for bringing it online. Combined with 
the Long Range Standoff Weapon, investments in this budget for B-21 
development and B-52 modernization will maintain America's capability 
to deter adversary aggression, assure allies, and project combat power 
across the full spectrum of conflict.
    To modernize the Nation's strategic and bomber forces, we propose 
an acceptable reduction in near-term capacity to increase overall 
capability. The B-1 fleet is nearing the end of its service life. For a 
period of time last year, only 12 of the 55 aircraft in the B-1 fleet 
were fully mission-capable. We propose retiring 17 B-1 aircraft in 
fiscal year 2021 to invest in the most mission-capable bombers.
    2020 is the Year of Integrated Base Defense, focusing on training 
and equipping our airmen to defend bases as our primary power 
projection platforms as we guard our Nation's critical installations 
and infrastructure. This fiscal year 2021 budget continues developing 
and deploying the technology to fully integrate the command, control, 
and communications capabilities essential to effective base defense.
    Congress has recognized the importance of modernizing U.S. nuclear 
forces after decades of deferred recapitalization and has fully funded 
these programs. We request continued support to modernize and sustain 
the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
Homeland Defense
    Our ready forces that support the Homeland defense mission include 
radars and early warning systems, alert aircraft and aircrew, and 
supporting infrastructure. This fiscal year 2021 budget invests across 
all these areas. The centerpiece of the overall Department of Defense 
budget, Joint All-Domain Command and Control, is the most essential 
investment we can make to enable the Commander USNORTHCOM/NORAD to have 
the situational awareness and the ability to bring joint all-domain 
capabilities to bear. We continue to partner with this team daily on 
the number one mission in the NDS: defense of the Homeland.
    Defense of the Homeland includes defeating malicious threats 
online, where we must counter direct aggression as well as indirect 
sources of influence. Air Force cyber warriors are constantly at work, 
under the newly-reactivated 16th Air Force, to ``Defend Forward'' with 
actions to deter adverse action and defend friendly networks and 
information. We are also closely examining all friendly systems and 
capabilities to identify and mitigate potential cyber vulnerabilities 
and reduce the potential for adversary exploitation.
    To successfully execute the Homeland Defense mission, the Air Force 
will continue upgrading limited numbers of existing aircraft to include 
modernizing the radars in some F-16s. These updated legacy aircraft 
will be complemented by new-build F-15EX aircraft which are 
significantly more capable and cost-effective than the F-15Cs they will 
replace, aircraft already many years past their designed specifications 
and no longer candidates for service life extensions. The F-15EX will 
help eliminate the gap between the fighter aircraft we have and the 
fighter aircraft we need while leveraging other Nations' investments in 
updating the F-15 program. Ultimately, the Air Force must field a 
robust fighter force, anchored by the F-35, able to detect and defeat 
threats across a wide spectrum. Homeland defense requires a mix of 4th- 
and 5th-generation capabilities, and we are investing to achieve that 
future force.
    Engagement across the globe also contributes to the Homeland 
Defense mission. As we build a network of partners, allies, and 
emerging security partners, we enlist help in deterring aggression and 
containing threats. We will continue to provide training and assistance 
to foreign nations through military equipment sales, training programs, 
and personnel exchanges. The Air Force remains committed to 
collaboration with key allies and partners, and we have accelerated and 
expanded combined participation in air and space operations, exercises, 
wargames, and education.
    Residing at the intersection between the United States Homeland and 
two critical regions--Indo-Pacific and Europe--the Arctic is an 
increasingly vital region for United States national security 
interests. The Air Force has more missions and investments in this 
region than any other U.S. military service. We are a cornerstone of 
the Nation's defense in this region with installations positioned 
across Alaska, Canada, and Greenland and composed of large air bases, 
training complexes, and a constellation of more than 50 early-warning 
radars and missile defense facilities. We are continuing our 
investments to include the upcoming beddown of the F-35 at Eielson AFB, 
placing more 5th-generation aircraft in Alaska than anywhere else in 
the world. In addition to modernizing the world-class Joint Pacific 
Range Complex, we continue to build interoperability with Arctic allies 
and partners. Sustained future investment in modernized missile 
defense, enhanced space capabilities, and improved domain awareness 
will ensure the Joint Force can respond to contingencies in, and from, 
the Arctic.
Counter Violent Extremism
    Countering violent extremist organizations (VEO) is a critical and 
complex mission that requires interagency and international 
cooperation. The military is one source of power available for this 
task, and the Air Force is at the leading edge of these efforts. Airmen 
of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) are engaged worldwide 
to counter VEOs. They are coordinating airstrikes, conducting direct 
action missions, employing munitions, and providing persistent armed 
overwatch and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
capabilities.
    We are also working to build partner capacity and help foreign 
forces combat VEOs in their own homelands. The Air Force, working with 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has split the Light Attack 
experiment into two separate but linked efforts. First, building on the 
fiscal year 2019 approval to procure several AT-6 and A-29 aircraft, we 
are establishing two experimental detachments at Hurlburt Field and 
Nellis AFB. Using these aircraft as prototypes, we will continue 
development and fielding of a coalition-friendly battle network that 
increases interoperability and allied and partner contributions. 
Second, we will partner with U.S. Special Operations Command through 
our air component, AFSOC, to build requirements and rapidly field armed 
overwatch aircraft to support ongoing and future counter-VEO and 
counter-terrorism missions.
    These two efforts are complementary as the Light Attack experiment 
feeds technology and tactics, techniques, and procedures for this fight 
while we improve support for our Special Operations Forces engaged in 
combat operations. We appreciate the support of Congress as we continue 
this important work.
Developing Our Airmen
    Our platforms and systems may be the best in the world, but our 
most valuable assets are our people. With the support of Congress, we 
have grown our force over the last three budget years by 7,820 airmen 
on the way to an active force of 333,700 for a total force of 699,013 
authorized end strength to include Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and 
civilian airmen. Our fiscal year 2021 budget adds 1,500 additional 
personnel in F-35 and refueling operations, maintenance, and combat 
support.
    Additionally, we are currently developing detailed plans to 
transfer more than 6,000 personnel into the U.S. Space Force in fiscal 
year 2021. We will continue developing this cadre of Space 
professionals across more than 15 career fields who will eventually 
form the core of a Space Force that will protect U.S. interests in 
space well into the future. During the transition, members eligible for 
transfer will be provided options, depending on their specialty code, 
their preferences, and Service needs. We also anticipate that airmen 
will continue to provide support to the Space Force across numerous 
other functions, to include legal, chaplain, and medical career fields.
    The Air Force is continuing our efforts to develop the joint 
leaders essential to our future force. In order to develop and promote 
the right kind of leaders, we have established criteria by which we 
assess performance and potential. Underpinned by a foundation of 
impeccable character, we ask of our leaders:
      How well do they accomplish their mission?
      How well do they lead their airmen or space 
professionals?
      How do they manage the resources they have been assigned?
      How have they improved their unit?
    We have also reformed our promotion boards, expanding the Line 
category into six competitive sub-categories in order to better match 
personnel with requirements. Furthermore, we are eliminating below the 
primary zone promotions to better align the experience and rank of our 
officer corps with those of our sister services while allowing our 
leaders more time to develop the excellence and expertise they will 
need.
    Diverse, resilient, and ready airmen are the bedrock of the 
Department's readiness and lethality. We are continuing efforts to 
increase representation of diverse servicemembers through a number of 
initiatives. These include the Rated Diversity Improvement Strategy, 
the Air Force Junior ROTC Flight Academy, recruiting efforts at 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and the Aviation-
Inspiration-Motivation (AIM) High Outreach Program which engages young 
females through interaction with Air and Space Force role models. 
Increasing the overall diversity of our force is a warfighting 
imperative, and we are committed to fielding and developing a diverse 
Air Force.
Caring for Our People and Their Families
    While we develop our people, we must also care for them and their 
families. The Air Force, along with our sister services, continues to 
address numerous challenges. These include suicide and sexual assault, 
aircrew retention, personnel retraining, spouse employment 
opportunities, quality of schools and Privatized Military Housing, and 
PFAS issues affecting our installations and the communities that host 
them.
    Suicide and sexual assault continue to be insidious threats to our 
force. Suicide devastates families and units, and it affects the entire 
Service. Sexual assault is a crime against a fellow airman, one which 
is unacceptable and unthinkable. We will continue to devote resources 
and invest in programs, such as the True North initiative, which are 
designed to increase resiliency and connectedness among our airmen. We 
will reinforce a culture of dignity and respect where our people feel 
protected, valued, and supported.
    Shortages across our aircrew career fields persist as threats to 
readiness. We have seen signs of progress in addressing these complex 
and critical issues, but much work remains. We must increase 
production, absorption, and retention of aircrew and their families. 
The Air Force is employing lessons learned from Pilot Training Next, 
now in its 3rd major iteration, to streamline undergraduate pilot, 
combat systems officer, and air battle manager training programs.
    Absorbing new aircrew into mission-ready units and providing 
necessary experience remains a challenge. Total Force partnerships help 
us place newly-trained members in highly-experienced units as we strive 
to balance experience levels across the force. These efforts require 
retaining aircrew, especially pilots, in higher numbers than in recent 
years. We are expanding the Career Intermission Program to provide 
flexibility and choice to our aircrews as they reach critical career 
decision points.
    Our investments in this budget will involve some mission changes 
for some units, to include our Reserve and Air National Guard forces. 
Aircraft type or mission changes will require new skills, and we are 
committed to retaining and retraining personnel as we adjust 
capabilities. We are expanding efforts to ease transitions from Active 
to Reserve and Guard components, allowing increased flexibility along a 
continuum of service. Even with changing aircraft or missions, there 
are no plans to inactivate any wings at this time.
    Airmen could not make the necessary sacrifices to serve without the 
support of their families, and the Air Force is making investments to 
address crucial quality of life concerns. Alongside our sister 
services, we will continue to advocate for reciprocal professional 
licensing for spouses and improved quality of schools. We have recently 
implemented the Support of Military Families initiative, which will 
explicitly consider such issues when the Department of the Air Force 
makes basing decisions.
    A vital part of caring for our airmen and their families is 
providing a safe, secure environment for them to live and work. We are 
addressing serious challenges with Military Privatized Housing and have 
directed considerable resources toward correcting substandard living 
conditions. This budget increases manning at the base level, providing 
personnel required for proper oversight of our Project Owners and 
advocacy for our residents. We will also continue to address the root 
causes of mold or moisture issues in many of our housing units. Along 
with our sister services, we are preparing to institute a Privatized 
Housing Tenants' Bill of Rights to further empower residents. We are 
committed to regaining the trust of families who have been let down, 
and we will continue this work for as long as it takes to get it right.
    PFAS is a national issue that requires national solutions. The 
Department has already spent $447.5 million identifying, investigating, 
and responding to PFAS releases; taken drinking water response actions 
at 23 installations to improve safety; and completed 165 of 189 
required CERCLA PFAS Site Inspections. To enable our continued work, 
this budget requests $304 million for the Environmental Restoration 
program as part of the total $851 million Environmental Program request 
at Active and Guard bases.
Moving Forward
    The message of the National Defense Strategy is crystal clear: a 
more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined 
with a robust constellation of allies and partners, will sustain 
American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that 
safeguard the free and open international order. Failure to meet our 
defense objectives will result in decreasing U.S. global influence, 
eroding cohesion among allies and partners, and a loss of military 
advantage.
    To align the U.S. Air Force with this direction, we are putting 
forward an aggressive budget based on a new blueprint for joint 
warfighting. Joint All Domain Operations and the command and control 
networks required to connect the joint team form the centerpiece of 
this strategy. If we are to achieve the vision of the NDS, the joint 
force must fight together and deliver all-domain capabilities in a way 
that overwhelms our adversaries. We must acknowledge that all global 
military operations are connected to and rely on a safe, secure, and 
effective nuclear arsenal. We appreciate Congress' support with on-time 
budgets and the willingness to take prudent near-term risk to build a 
winning, networked force of the future. With this budget, the Air Force 
makes significant contributions to achieving irreversible momentum 
toward implementing the National Defense Strategy.

    Senator Wicker. Thank you very much to both of you.
    We will begin now with a 5-minute round.
    General Goldfein, these savings of $21 billion found in 
night court, is that within the Air Force or the total defense 
budget?
    General Goldfein. Air Force and it is over the whole FYDP.
    Senator Wicker. Well, in doing what you had to do with the 
budget submission and understanding that you had to make some 
tough decisions, where do you see the most risk in this budget?
    General Goldfein. Sir, I think the two hardest decisions we 
made at end game were two weapon systems that we are asking to 
retire some number of them, and I will talk about both, KC-
135's, KC-10's, and also the A-10.
    When it came to the KC-135 and the tanker portfolio, this 
is the classic tension between a combatant commander that is 
looking at a 2-year problem to solve and a Service Chief that 
is trying to build a force that wins in 2030. That tension has 
always been there and it always will be there.
    When we looked across the portfolio of tankers, the 
congressional mandate is that we never go below 479. Secretary 
Mattis used to say, hey, before anybody says the ``risk'' word, 
you have to answer three questions: to who, for how long, and 
what is your mitigation. This is risk to the combatant 
commander who testified about that risk. This is going to be 
until the KC-46 comes on line, which we expect to be in 2023 to 
2024. Our mitigation is that the retirement we are asking for 
in the KC-135 represents 3 percent of the overall KC-135 fleet, 
and we have committed to the combatant commander and the 
Secretary of Defense that if we go to a high end contingency, 
we will put every KC-46 we have into the fight. We will not use 
it for day-to-day operations, but it will be made available for 
a contingency. So we think it is a reasonable risk portfolio 
going forward.
    On the A-10, also as we looked at that right at end game, 
on the A-10 we are putting almost a billion dollars into that 
weapon system, about $880 million, to re-wing, new avionics. We 
are going to keep that weapon system flying, albeit with 
smaller numbers, well into the 2030s.
    Those are the two areas that I think are a significant 
risk.
    Senator Wicker. On the tankers, what will happen between 
2021 and 2023?
    General Goldfein. Sir, we will manage the force like we do 
all other areas where we have shortfalls. What the TRANSCOM 
commander was laying out for you was the stacked requirements 
that he has to deal with day to day, and so just like we are 
short in bombers, fighters, tankers, ISR, command and control, 
the Secretary of Defense managed those forces against all of 
the demand signal, and in certain areas, he tells the combatant 
commanders they can have less of what they are asking for. We 
will do the same thing in the tanker force between now and when 
the KC-46 comes on line.
    Senator Wicker. Secretary Barrett, with a budget decrease 
of approximately $12 billion from last year, are you 
comfortable with how the funding is allocated among personnel, 
equipment modernization, and operations and maintenance?
    Secretary Barrett. Senator, while we would like very much, 
of course, to have more funds, the reality is with these funds 
we believe that the allocation is appropriately designed.
    Senator Wicker. General Goldfein, the Air Force requires 72 
fighter aircraft per year to begin to recap its nearly 30-year-
old, on average, aircraft. General Goldfein, you have said this 
is a minimum.
    When do you believe we will be able to achieve this number, 
and given the importance of extending the range of our aircraft 
in any potential conflict and the comments from TRANSCOM, how 
do you balance the current air--you have spoken about the air 
refueling already. But if you would comment on the first 
portion of that question.
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Seventy-two is the number we 
need to be able to drive aircraft age down to about a 17 to 18-
year average age which we think is sustainable. Without the 3 
to 5 percent growth or some growth in the budget, to be honest 
with you, sir, I do not know at what point we would ever get to 
72 fighters a year.
    I will thank this Committee, though, because there was some 
lean years there where we were buying 20 to 30 airplanes total 
in several years, and so at least we are up into the 50s and 
the 60s now, so we are doing better. But I do not know at what 
point we will get to the 72 aircraft per year, if the budget 
stays flat.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
    Senator Reed?
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to follow up a bit on the tanker issue. First, thank 
you for your thoughtful response, General. It was very 
insightful.
    Madam Secretary, I presume that you are really focused on 
getting the KC-46 in the air and operational working with the 
contractor Boeing. Can you give us some insight as to what you 
are doing, and can we be confident that in 2023 it will be 
fully operational?
    Secretary Barrett. We are meeting every day on that topic. 
It is really one of the highest priorities in the building, 
including meetings just yesterday afternoon. The Chief has been 
very much involved as well and working directly with the 
company.
    At the moment it is not meeting all the requirements. It is 
able to be used for passenger transport, for cargo transport, 
and for aeromedical evacuation purposes and for some training. 
But we do look forward to having the remote visual system 
repaired to be usable, and we are looking to have some solution 
even by the end of this month on a way forward, and the Chief 
has been very much involved in that.
    Senator Reed. General, I understand from your response to 
Chairman Wicker that part of the contingency plan would be to 
essentially put the KC-46 in operation if there was a stress to 
the system. Doing the numbers, would that give us the capacity 
to engage in a significant contingency operation?
    General Goldfein. Sir, it would definitely reduce the risk. 
I think the TRANSCOM Commander, if he was here to tell you, we 
are living every day with the tanker shortage, and the KC-46 is 
not going to completely fill that in. However, because we are 
buying at 12-15 per year, every one of those tankers with crews 
would be made available in a high end contingency. It would 
certainly be able to overcome, for that period of time that we 
use them, the retirement that we are asking for.
    If I could just add on to----
    Senator Reed. Yes, please.
    General Goldfein.--Secretary Barrett's point.
    I wrote a letter to the CEO 3 days ago, and he came to see 
me--Mr. Calhoun, and he committed to me that the KC-46 was his 
top military priority and he was going to do what was required 
to fix it. I have seen a change in the behavior of that company 
since he took over, and so that is why we are more confident 
sitting here today that we have a serious fix on the table. We 
are in final negotiations so we cannot go into any more detail 
than that. But I will say that it is looking better today than 
it was even 6 months ago.
    Senator Reed. Just to follow up. I have no expertise with 
aircraft as you do. But today we will not use them in 
operational because of the visual system, et cetera. But in a 
contingency operation, we are prepared to use them. Would that 
require a significant modification in the way the aircraft 
approaching to refuel would operate? Again, are we just at this 
point being abundantly cautious or there is still some profound 
problem with the system?
    General Goldfein. No, sir. There are profound problems with 
the system. I would not be comfortable putting them into----
    Senator Reed. This contingency would be--there would be no 
other choice. We got to throw these in the mix, but it is going 
to be hope for the best.
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I will tell you I have been 
pulled out of a really lot bad places by some courageous tanker 
crews really low on gas. We want that tanker to be able to plug 
that receiver.
    Senator Reed. We had a chance, General, to speak yesterday 
about the sustainment costs of the F-35. I think most people 
would be--I know I was a bit surprised when the current 
sustainment cost is about $39,000 an hour. I know you are 
working to get it down. But that raises the question of can we 
afford to buy more aircraft if we cannot afford to fly them. 
Can you comment very briefly on sustainment costs?
    General Goldfein. I can, sir. I met with all of the CEOs, 
to include Lockheed Martin and all of the subcontractors, and I 
told them in no uncertain terms both as the largest customer, 
as a Joint Chief that represents my fellow Chiefs who also have 
bought this aircraft and my international Air Chiefs who have 
bought onto this, the current flying hour costs are 
unsustainable.
    We met. I gave them a list of requirements. They did a 180-
day sprint with the Joint Program Office. I then went down and 
spent an entire day at Lockheed Martin with the leadership 
there and brought 27 stars with me. We went through a full day, 
and like what we have seen in Boeing. I believe Lockheed Martin 
has taken a serious look at sustainment costs, and their plan 
right now is to lower sustainment costs to $25,000 per hour by 
2025. We are going to hold them to that.
    Senator Reed. Well, we are going to keep watch on your 
efforts and wish you well.
    I will submit a question for the record, General, with 
respect to the MQ-9 industrial base. We talked about it 
yesterday. We looked and it appears to us that after fiscal 
year 2020, there are no MQ-9's in the budget, and we just want 
to get a better picture of where we are going with that asset. 
I will send it for the record.
    Thank you, sir.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Wicker. General, what can the KC-46 not do in the 
next 2 years?
    General Goldfein. For normal refueling, what is happening 
with the remote visual system is a couple things. One, the boom 
operator struggles to see about the last 10 feet between the 
boom and the aircraft. It is a focus issue on how the system 
was designed. What is happening then is you start--there is the 
high potential for striking the aircraft around the receptacle 
if you cannot actually see it very closely at end game. That, 
as you might imagine, is not a good thing. While I would accept 
that with a highly trained crew in a high end contingency, I 
would not accept that for day-to-day operations. This is a 
hardware problem requiring a hardware fix.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you.
    Senator Fischer?
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Barrett, General Goldfein, first of all, thank 
you so much for your service to this country.
    I also want to express my appreciation for the robust way 
this budget funds nuclear modernization.
    I want to thank you both for the attention that the Air 
Force has paid to the rebuilding of Offut Air Force Base as 
well. Your teams have been valuable partners as we have worked 
together to secure the funds necessary to repair, replace, and 
rebuild following the historic flooding that occurred in 
Nebraska a year ago.
    Secretary Barrett, the 55th wing is the number one provider 
of large, fixed-wing Air Force ISR in the Nation. This is a 
capability that is in constant demand. I hear it from our 
combatant commanders. The newly contested environments that we 
are faced with now mean that we need to think creatively about 
integrating these platforms like the RC-135 into future 
networks.
    Given that fact, how are you working to ensure the 
continued capability of the RC-135 as we look into the future 
time frame?
    Secretary Barrett. Thank you, Senator.
    The RC-135 is pivotal to our ISR capabilities. As you know, 
training capability was lost during the floods at Offut. So I 
want to thank you for the funding to help get that back up so 
that we can renew the training.
    The other key thing that is happening with that platform 
and others is the computer connectedness, building that as an 
element, a node on the network for our combatants.
    Senator Fischer. The Air Force laid out a future road map 
for the ISR mission in the ISR dominance flight plan. What 
progress has been made in implementing the points of that plan? 
General?
    General Goldfein. Yes, thank you, ma'am.
    The most progress we have done is actually how we have tied 
to distributed ground system where we do all the analytical 
work in the ISR into this battlefield network, this advanced 
battle management, because it used to be that we would have 
platform sensors or weapons from all of our services that were 
operating independently, and then the universal translator 
across weapon systems was a phone or a chat room operating at 
human speeds. That is not going to work in the next fight. We 
have got to be able to work seamlessly at machine speeds, and 
that is what advanced battle management system does, and the 
RC-135 is a significant player in that.
    Senator Fischer. You had mentioned the ABMS and the JADC2, 
and the fiscal year 2021 budget makes significant investments 
in that next generation networking capability. How is the Air 
Force working to ensure integration of existing platforms with 
these new capabilities that are coming on line?
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. That is the foundation of 
this, is how do we take existing capabilities, in addition to 
new capabilities, and connect them in.
    When this Committee supported our move from Joint STARS 
into a battlefield network solution for the future, we took 
those savings and we put it into demonstrations and connected 
capability that is no longer PowerPoint slides with lightning 
bolts that are aspirational. We turned this into real 
capability. We are no longer talking about cloud capability. We 
actually built a cloud. We contracted with industry and all the 
services are connected in. We are not just talking about common 
data architecture. We built the unified data library, and now 
we are connecting and sharing.
    Every 4 months, we connect portions of the enterprise, and 
we do a demonstration. We operate at machine speeds. What we 
are learning is that each of the weapon systems that we are 
connecting now jumps in its capability when you can connect it 
into a common architecture.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Secretary Barrett, the Air Force is still conducting an 
analysis of alternatives, and I believe this is the second 
study that we have had for that for the recapitalization of the 
E-4B. It is my understanding that the AOA will conclude soon.
    What is the Air Force's plan to move forward after the AOA 
finishes? I ask this because this has been an issue of constant 
study, and I believe the first AOA was directed back in 2008. 
The challenges of maintaining that outdated airframe are only 
getting harder, and I think it is vital that the Air Force move 
forward after this AOA concludes and this issue should not be 
studied indefinitely. Can you speak to this, please?
    Secretary Barrett. We have found that sometimes studies are 
a never-ending process. I can assure you that we will review 
that study at its conclusion and make a decision based on its 
recommendations.
    Senator Fischer. We always want to make sure that we have 
all the information available at the time, but we do need to 
move forward. Thank you.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
    Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here. General Goldfein, we 
appreciate your service and we will miss you, even though you 
may not miss us and these hearings.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Shaheen. I want to go back to the KC-46 because 
that is a continuing concern for us in New Hampshire with the 
157th air refueling wing, and we lost our last KC-135's over a 
year ago now. While the 46's have replaced them and we are 
seeing the planes come in and we hope to have all 12 new 
tankers by the summer, as you know, they are not flying and we 
are hearing from our Air Guard that they would like to fly some 
missions.
    So I have two questions. The first is, is the biggest 
challenge still remaining the remote vision system? Do you have 
any sense from Boeing based on your communications back in 
January when this is going to get resolved and how long it will 
take to address that in the tankers that have already been put 
out?
    General Goldfein. Yes, thank you, ma'am.
    So right now, we are in final negotiations with the company 
on the fix. So I have got to be a little careful about how much 
detail I go into.
    But I did have a conversation, a follow-up conversation, 
with the CEO and told him that not only the quality of a 
serious hardware fix is important but also time because the 
longer we wait to get that aircraft operational, the longer we 
are having to extend KC-135's, KC-10's, and it continues to add 
up. So, we are going to be holding them not only to a really 
serious fix but also to time. Right now we are targeting 
initially about the 2023 to 2024 time frame to have the fix in 
place and operational. Then there will be some kind of retrofit 
time plan that we will have to work.
    Senator Shaheen. So that is significant.
    General Goldfein. It is.
    Senator Shaheen. I know that last week, Dr. Will Roper 
testified that--and General Lyons said that we are below the 
mark on both tanker capacity and tanker capability right now.
    So if we are talking about 3 or 4 years before we are going 
to get up to capacity, what are we assuming is going to happen 
with the units like the 157th that would like to do missions? 
Are there other things that they can do as we look at the 
potential to utilize the KC-46 for medical missions or other 
things?
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. So two missions that we are 
in the process of certifying now. It can do lift. We bought it 
for not heavy lift, but it can do lift missions and it can also 
do aeromedical. We are still in the process of certifying it 
for that. As soon as it is certified, we will start using it 
for those missions as we then go into the long-term fix for the 
remote visual system.
    To your units, as you know, we took the Active Duty 
manpower out of the total force unit and moved it. Our plan is 
to have that available right now for the tankers that are 
operational and then as soon as we get the KC-46 online and the 
fixes in place, that manpower comes back.
    Senator Shaheen. So that manpower is not going to come back 
until 2023-2024?
    General Goldfein. As soon as we can get a fix, and I will 
just tell you that Boeing has heard loud and clear that time is 
of the essence.
    Senator Shaheen. Three or four years does not sound like 
time is of the essence to me, so I hope that this Committee 
will do what we can to address that as well because that is 
unacceptable. I mean, it really is.
    Secretary Barrett, I want to go back to PFAS, which you 
mentioned in your opening statement, which we know is a 
concern. Again, I appreciate the commitment that the Air Force 
has made to address the situation at the former Pease Air Force 
Base. But I wonder if you have gotten an update from the Navy, 
who is the lead in developing a fluorine-free fire fighting 
foam, and where they are on that. The NDAA that we passed this 
year said that we needed to phase out all of the fluorine-
containing foam by 2024. Do you know where we are on that?
    Secretary Barrett. I know the Navy is working and doing 
experiments with other foam additives. They have not yet, it 
seems, come upon a solution that meets the requirements to 
extinguish fires, intense fires, in contained areas. Of course, 
the Navy is very concerned about fires aboard ships. So they 
are very attentive. Right now, so far the PFAS formula is the 
one that is most effective at fire extinguishing.
    We no longer use the PFAS in our training. When we do use 
any containing product, we contain it, and we are working 
diligently to clean up the problem that has been caused by the 
Air Force as every community around the country has been doing. 
But we take it very seriously. The health and safety of our 
communities is among the most important things that we work 
with.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    My time is up, but I just want to also thank you for 
committing, as did former Secretary Wilson, to address the 
occupational health study at Pease, and if there are more 
resources needed and we can be helpful with that, I hope you 
will share that with our office.
    Secretary Barrett. Thank you.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Cotton?
    Senator Cotton. Secretary Barrett, General Goldfein, thank 
you for your appearance here again today.
    General Goldfein, I want to go back to something you said 
in your opening statement. I want to see if we can put it a 
little more bluntly and just not beat around the bush on it. 
You and Secretary Barrett and your whole team have done a lot 
to try to identify what our Air Force needs to fight the future 
fight. That is going to require some divestments, some cuts in 
current programs.
    An issue is that over here in current programs, you got a 
bunch of stuff that flies around right now that we can all see, 
or maybe more importantly, that sits on the ground in our 
States and employs people in our States. Over here, you have a 
bunch of stuff that is super secret, very classified, very 
cutting edge that we cannot see. Is that right? So you are 
talking about making cuts to the stuff that we can see and 
spending money on the stuff we cannot see. Is that the crux of 
the matter that you are getting at?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
    Senator Cotton. I do not think anyone doubts that we need 
all this super secret stuff over here. We have had a number of 
hearings on it. We created Space Force in part to address it. I 
just think it is important that we lay that out there and make 
it very plain so when we get down to brass tacks on the NDAA or 
we get down to brass tacks on the defense spending bill, that 
we all on this panel remember and that the other Senators in 
the Senate remember that the secret stuff is very needful and 
the public stuff that has been with us for a long time and very 
comfortable may need to be trimmed back to pay for the secret 
stuff.
    That is not a strategy issue. That is a political issue for 
all of us to deal with, and that is not endorsing any single 
kind of cut that you may have to make here or any single kind 
of program you may spend here. We may have different thoughts 
on that. We may want to tinker around the edges. But, I think 
it is really clear that we just be up front about the dilemma 
that the Air Force faces, which is at root a political dilemma 
that we all should handle in a responsible and sober fashion 
given the threats that we face in the future.
    General Goldfein. Thanks, sir.
    Senator Cotton. I now wanted to speak about spectrum, 
specifically the mid-band spectrum. Secretary Esper said that 
DOD is willing to explore sharing that spectrum, and we know 
that some of your systems like AWACS operate there. Can you 
talk to us about what mid-band capabilities that you are 
concerned about and how critical the spectrum is to those 
capabilities? I will throw that open to either one of you.
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir, and I will back up exactly what 
Secretary Esper says. We cannot vacate, but we can look at 
sharing. It does affect in the mid-band our AWACS and other 
command and control assets, and it certainly impacts where we 
are going with battlefield networks. But we do think that there 
is a strategy ahead for sharing.
    Senator Cotton. So talk to us a little bit more about what 
not vacating but sharing would look like.
    General Goldfein. Meaning we have to operate in that 
spectrum. So there may be ways to parcel and share some 
portions of it, but we cannot leave it. There are some that are 
asking us to give that up, and that is not something I could 
ever advise you to do.
    Senator Cotton. Okay.
    Secretary Barrett, did you want to----
    Secretary Barrett. I would just say that sharing it has to 
be--the only sharing we can do is a sharing where the fidelity 
of our signals is not intruded. So what use others would have 
of it can only be made where it does not intrude in the signal 
that we are using.
    Senator Cotton. Any thoughts on the kind of costs we are 
looking at here?
    General Goldfein. Sir, I know that they are taking a look 
at it. I have not seen any costs that I could give you yet. We 
can take that one for the record, if you like.
    Senator Cotton. Yes, please do.
    Secretary Barrett, did you want to add?
    Secretary Barrett. No, thank you.
    Senator Cotton. One final question that is really on point. 
Unfortunately, some of our allies are moving forward with 
Huawei products in developing their 5G wireless systems, even 
countries where we have some of your airmen positioned. What 
are your concerns about their personal and operational security 
if the countries in which they are based are developing 5G 
systems using Huawei products?
    Secretary Barrett. It is a great disappointment to have 
allies that are using Huawei. Alternatively, we have not been 
forthcoming with good alternatives to the Huawei system. So we 
need to up our game to have as competitive a system, a more 
competitive system so that we are providing that. But it does 
put our signals at risk and our airmen at risk.
    Senator Cotton. Yes, I agree. I will say that we have not 
been particularly effective at providing alternatives. I mean, 
we--I would say the entire West, the United States Government, 
allied governments, and our businesses--although I would say in 
all their defenses, it is hard to compete against a company 
like Huawei, which is an arm of the Chinese Communist Party and 
enjoys effectively unlimited subsidies. So when our allies are 
saying things like, well, we have to go with a reasonable cost 
provider, the only reason why Huawei is a reasonable cost 
provider is not that they are the best company or they have the 
brightest minds or most effective manufacturing techniques. It 
is because their bills are paid by the Chinese Communist Party, 
and that is something that we as policymakers should take into 
account when we are trying to identify possible alternatives.
    General, I know this is your last posture hearing. Maybe it 
will not be your last hearing. I am sure you hope it is. But if 
it is not, it has been an honor to be able to serve with you 
these last few years, and we thank you for your service to the 
Nation.
    Senator Wicker. General, we customarily invite retired 
experts with a lot of wisdom to come back. So I dare say this 
will not be your last hearing, but it will be on a voluntary 
basis.
    Thank you, Senator Cotton.
    Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Chairman.
    I want to join in expressing my appreciation and thanks--I 
am sure everybody on the Committee shares it--for your 
extraordinary service to our Nation and look forward to seeing 
you back again voluntarily.
    Madam Secretary, I appreciate your focus on PFAS 
contamination and leading that effort. Is there a specific 
budget item for cleanup involving Air Force bases and 
facilities?
    Secretary Barrett. Senator Blumenthal, we have spent almost 
a half billion dollars in cleanup to date and will continue. I 
do not know what the exact number is for this year, but we will 
continue that cleanup effort and work with the communities for 
cleanup.
    Senator Blumenthal. Maybe you could provide that number.
    The second point on this issue. Have you made a 
recommendation to the FAA that they eliminate their current 
requirement, as I understand it, that PFAS be used in the fire 
fighting foam on civilian airports around the country?
    Secretary Barrett. We have not made that recommendation to 
the FAA.
    Senator Blumenthal. Would you make it?
    Secretary Barrett. It looks like something we would look 
at. Let me say that.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I hope you will look at it 
and make that recommendation because I think it could be 
important in speeding their consideration of ending the PFAS 
requirement.
    I am very interested in the discussion that you had with 
Senator Cotton about the classification issue. I will just 
restate--you may have heard me say it in our classified 
briefings--that the American public needs and deserves to know 
more so that it can appreciate the threats to the Nation and 
what you are doing to address those threats. I share your view 
that a lot of the super secret stuff is vitally important. The 
Nation needs to understand more about it and I think could well 
be told more about it without compromising our security.
    I want to go from the super secret to the more mundane at 
the Air National Guard in Connecticut where NP-2000 propellers 
are currently in use. I am sure you are familiar with this 
issue because it is longstanding. The replacement of those 
legacy propellers is essential to the safety--literally the 
safety--of the men and women of our Air National Guard who fly 
those C-130H aircraft. Can the replacement of those propellers 
be expedited and accelerated, General?
    General Goldfein. Yes, thank you, sir. I will tell you I 
have been down there. I have looked at the propeller. I have 
watched it going in. It is an excellent propeller. We have, as 
you know, replaced all of the pre-1971 C-130H engines with that 
new propeller. At the same the same time, on the post-1971, we 
have adjusted our overhaul and our depot procedures to cover 
the safety issues associated with the older propeller. But we 
are studying and looking at whether we want to look at the MP-
2000 for expanded use, and we look forward to working with you 
on that.
    Senator Blumenthal. I hope that we can follow up on that 
issue. I do not have time to cover it fully here, but I hope 
that we can talk more about it.
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. On again the Air National Guard at 
Bradley, as you may know, $60 million has been invested in that 
Air National Guard base, and yet the C-130H modernization is 
going to be impaired by the diversion of $169 million going to 
the border wall instead of two cargo planes for that base. I 
want to know what can be done to overcome the obstacles that 
are created. These obstacles are presented in longer form by 
letter that I have received from General Evon of our 
Connecticut Air National Guard, the acting general. I would 
like to put it in the record if there is no objection, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Senator Wicker. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]
      
    
    
    Senator Blumenthal. I am sure you are familiar with the 
situation. So I would like to ask you what is the impact of 
diverting $169 million of C-130J procurement.
    General Goldfein. Sir, we are working through all of the 
mitigation efforts relative to the money that has gone towards 
the wall. I think the best I could tell you is that when the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was asked to describe the impact, 
his answer was this amount of dollars relative to the 
strategic, immediate defense of the Nation did not have a 
significant impact I believe were his words. That is where we 
as Joint Chiefs are now relative to that issue.
    Senator Blumenthal. Finally, although my time has expired, 
I would like to ask a question for the record, not to be 
answered here but in writing, about also the impact on the F-35 
program of apparently diverting money from the 48 F-35's 
requested in the budget. I know that you put 12 additional F-35 
aircraft on the unfunded priorities list. I think that we need 
to explore what the impact is going to be on procurement 
timelines in that program. Senator Reed has rightly raised the 
issue of the sustainment costs, but the building and 
manufacturing costs I think also need to be considered.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal, and we will 
look forward to that answer on the record.
    Senator Ernst?
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, Secretary Barrett. Good to see you as always. 
General Goldfein, thank you very much for your service. We 
certainly do appreciate it.
    As we just spoke, General Goldfein, I would like to address 
the issue of the KC-135's. A lot of discussion here today about 
the 46's and the 135's, and I would like for you to state just 
so the folks back home in Iowa understand where we sit. The 
185th Air National Guard, the air refueling wing is one of the 
highest performing units in all of the Air National Guard. If 
you could just explain for those folks where they sit with 
their KC-135's, and at this point, we are a little bit thankful 
we do not have the 46's right now. So thank you.
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. I can tell you that there 
will be no impact or no change to the 185th in terms of the 
135's relative to the planned retirements.
    Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you very much for that. We 
discussed that with TRANSCOM last week as well. I think many of 
us are very, very concerned about that, and then how we do get 
to a point where we are transitioning to those 46's. That is 
yet to be seen, but we do appreciate your attention to that 
matter.
    Secretary Barrett, we are in an exciting time where we have 
a lot of new and emerging technologies out there, and these 
technologies can augment our Air Force capabilities, which will 
help us anticipate and respond to various threats. We are 
pretty lucky that tech development in our civilian sector has 
boomed, and the Air Force now has a new way of taking a look at 
some of this technology, and as we move into acquisitions. It 
is kind of like an Air Force Shark Tank. Can you maybe tell us 
a little bit about that and how that is developing and how we 
are able to see some of those technologies and apply them to 
today's modern Air Force?
    Secretary Barrett. Thank you very much, Senator. In fact, 
just last week I participated as a judge--we both participated 
as judges in Spark Tank, which was an evaluation of innovations 
that members of the air staff throughout the Air Force had come 
forward with ideas that were money saving or new inventions, 
new capabilities. That is inside the Air Force.
    In addition, we are working very closely with pitch days 
for businesses and innovations outside of the Air Force.
    Both of these are developments, ideas from the creative 
mind of Dr. Will Roper in acquisitions to think of ways of 
inspiring innovation and creativity and rewarding people that 
are initiating new ideas. So both internally within the Air 
Force, externally to small companies outside who have maybe in 
the past found doing business with the Department of Defense 
daunting but are excited about presenting their technologies, 
and instead of having months and years to get a contract with 
the Defense Department, one participant described it as they 
can get a contract from the Defense Department faster than they 
can order a beer in New York City. So there are some new 
processes that inspire people to want to do business with the 
Defense Department especially with new technologies and 
innovations.
    Senator Ernst. That is outstanding. Can you describe some 
of the businesses that are taking advantage? Are they large 
businesses, small businesses?
    Secretary Barrett. These are almost all very small 
businesses. They are small businesses with good ideas.
    The internal ones were people that saw damage being done to 
equipment and to stores and figuring out a way of loading cargo 
aircraft without doing damage, people that saw in test ranges 
the ability to move the threat that had been positioned--there 
were four standing threats but much easier, much better 
training if they can move those threats. There were a number of 
great ideas of ways to make the training better, cut costs, 
reduce waste, and have a better Air Force.
    Senator Ernst. So you do believe this is a positive step 
forward.
    Secretary Barrett. Absolutely.
    Senator Ernst. Fantastic.
    Just very briefly, General Goldfein, autonomy. We have been 
discussing this with your colleagues in the Navy as well. The 
Air Force labs also do great work in this area. Can you 
briefly--very briefly--explain some of the technologies we are 
seeing come from that?
    General Goldfein. I will describe one very quickly, 
Skyborg, which is the Valkyrie drone system that we use 
successfully. In the upcoming demonstration in April, we are 
going to use it to be a universal translator between fifth 
generation capability in Navy and Army, and so Loyal Wingman 
technology where the manned platform and the unmanned platform 
are actually working as a team is where our future lies.
    Senator Ernst. Excellent. My time has expired, but I would 
love to visit more about that at another point. Thank you, 
General Goldfein, for your service. We certainly do appreciate 
it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
    Senator Heinrich?
    Senator Heinrich. Secretary, General, Space Force Vice 
Commander Lieutenant General David Thompson recently indicated 
that the U.S. Space Force will propose the consolidation of 
current space acquisition organizations under an entity called 
Space Systems Command. As you are aware, Congress specifically 
mandated that the Space Rapid Capabilities Office act as an 
independent agency. We did that to ensure that it continues to 
be able to adapt and innovate quickly.
    What consequences would this kind of consolidation have on 
the organization's ability to innovate as Congress intended?
    Secretary Barrett. Our mission will be to design the 
systems so that we optimize creativity and adoption of 
technology in the use of our space assets.
    Senator Heinrich. So I am sorry. Say that again.
    Secretary Barrett. We will be designing things with that 
intent to have optimized technology for our space resources.
    Senator Heinrich. So you think by consolidating Space RCO 
into this broader capabilities office, you are actually going 
to be improving their ability to----
    Secretary Barrett. So I am not speaking to specifically 
that consolidation, with which I am not really familiar.
    Senator Heinrich. Because my concern is that one of the 
reasons why Congress has historically--General, do you want to 
jump in here?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
    Senator Heinrich. We have been trying to protect this 
entity because it innovates quickly, and bureaucracy has a 
tendency to want to swallow things that innovate quickly.
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Amen.
    The Secretary's direction to us has been crystal clear. 
While there will be a lot of discussions about administrivia 
and bureaucracy, our job is to deliver capability and deliver 
it fast at the speed of relevance because that is exactly what 
the threat countries are doing. Space RCO, as designed--and you 
had a huge hand in putting that together--needs to stay 
independent and it needs to be able to move fast without a lot 
of lines and boxes that all get a chance to vote on what they 
are doing. So we specifically built that on the model of our 
Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, same board procedures, 
same authorities to move fast, and so we want to keep it 
independent.
    Senator Heinrich. That was the answer I was hoping I might 
hear.
    I want to move on to PFAS, and, Secretary Barrett, I do not 
know how to say this other than I am--you know, I heard you 
earlier say that you are working with communities. But in the 
case of Clovis, New Mexico, I am sort of beyond frustrated by 
the utter lack of communication and any level of coordination 
at this point between Air Force leadership and local government 
elected officials for the City of Clovis. We recently received 
a response letter to the entire delegation. It was wholly 
inadequate. This is a community that has bent over backwards 
for decades with great pride to host the Air Force in their 
community, and they feel like they are getting absolutely 
stonewalled right now.
    So I want to ask you if I can have your commitment that you 
will direct whoever the appropriate Air Force personnel are to 
establish direct communications with local officials in Clovis 
to work together to remedy the PFAS situation there.
    Secretary Barrett. You have my commitment.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you very much.
    I also want to ask you with regard to the authorities that 
were given to the Air Force in the most recent NDAA, if you 
will work with New Mexico and State and local officials to find 
a permanent PFAS solution and actually use those authorities 
that Congress gave the Air Force in the NDAA.
    Secretary Barrett. We are doing research now and will 
continue to do that. It is a Navy lead, but the Air Force is 
working it as well.
    Senator Heinrich. Because one of the things we did when 
this issue popped up is ask the former Secretary, you know, 
what can you do and what can you not do. She was very blunt 
about what she could not do. We changed much of that in the 
NDAA, and we would like to see you use those authorities.
    I want to move on to MQ-9's, and Congress obviously 
appropriated a lot of money for MQ-9 training. That money was 
taken by the President to pay for a third century technology 
being deployed along our southern border. I want to know what 
the plan is because these folks are training in very 
substandard conditions over a sinkhole in a building that could 
not pass code enforcement in a third world country.
    General Goldfein. Sir, we are working through the 
mitigation right now. As you know, it has been fairly recent 
that we are working our way through this.
    I just go back to the question we were asked as Joint 
Chiefs, which is describe the impact relative to defend the 
Nation and the immediate significant strategic impacts. That is 
where the Chairman gave his answer, and so that is where the 
Joint Chiefs are right now.
    Senator Heinrich. Yes. I understand the strategic impacts. 
I think it is just reprehensible when you walk through that 
facility to see our best and brightest training in a facility 
that is not safe, that you could not get to pass code in any 
community in the United States, where there is duck tape on the 
walls, and these are our best and brightest.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Cramer?
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank both of you for being here and both of you for your 
service. A special thank you to General Goldfein again. I never 
ceased being amazed at the talent that replaces really good 
talent, but I also never cease being concerned by the loss of 
excellent talent. I am concerned but grateful to you for your 
service.
    Also thank you for last week. I did take advantage of the 
invitation to participate in the classified discussion, and I 
would encourage all of my colleagues who have not taken 
advantage of that to do that. It was very helpful. It created a 
lot of answers but a lot of questions as well.
    So with that in mind, I am just throwing a few of them and 
let each of you respond, if you will.
    With regard to the here-to-there strategy--and you 
referenced I think quoting General Mattis the ``risk'' word and 
talked a little bit about it. But my specific parochial 
interest, of course, is the ISR mission specifically, the 
Global Hawk wing at Grand Forks, to some degree as well the MQ-
9's, but particularly the Global Hawk wing at Grand Forks and 
the retirement of the block 20s and block 30s at Beale and how 
that affects the folks in Grand Forks and in North Dakota and 
would love to hear anything you can tell us and tell them about 
the future of that base and its mission.
    Also, while you are talking about that, maybe ask the 
question about the Arctic and the Arctic fight. We have had a 
lot of discussions in this room, with others as well, but I 
would give you the opportunity as well to maybe give us some 
insight into what is being planned.
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I will do ISR and then the 
Secretary will take Arctic.
    On the ISR portfolio, so as you saw when we sat down, there 
are certain capabilities that we are bringing together in a 
classified realm and we are connecting capabilities that today 
are not connected. Because almost every platform out there, 
whether it flies, orbits, submerges, runs, rolls, it is a 
sensor. But we have not been able to tie together those sensors 
to be able to fuse data in ways that can make this common 
operational picture, and so now, as we tie things together, we 
are finding that we get far greater fidelity on what it is that 
we are doing. So a combination of space capabilities, you know, 
missions that we are doing in the air today that we are 
migrating into space, classified capabilities, and pulling 
these all together with common digital engineering and common 
data architecture is actually improving our ISR and allow us 
now to take some risk when it comes to individual platforms. 
That is our strategy for the future.
    Senator Cramer. So can you expand a little bit then on what 
the future to Grand Forks specifically may look like in light 
of this?
    General Goldfein. So what you will see in this budget is 
the retirement of the older Global Hawks, and with all of 
these, we want to make sure that we work with the communities 
and with you, sir, and with all of the Senators to make sure 
that we minimize impact on the base as we go forward because 
Grand Forks, like many other bases, is key strategic terrain. 
It is key to the Arctic strategy because of its location. It 
also supports some of our ground-based intercept radar feeds 
that are so important to us. So we want to make sure we 
mitigate the impacts to Grand Forks.
    Senator Cramer. Madam Secretary?
    Secretary Barrett. The Arctic is of increasing importance 
to the United States, and it has been important for a long 
time, but ever more increasing now. As a result, the Arctic 
strategy is a key element of the Air Force and the Department 
of Defense's effort, but the Air Force more than other elements 
because 80 percent of the Arctic defense is provided by the Air 
Force or Department of Air Force elements.
    So you know from my background, I have paid quite a bit of 
attention to the Arctic. One of my first visits was to Thule. I 
spent time in Finland and later this week, I will be visiting 
the Minot operations and later this month be in Alaska also 
looking at those facilities. So it is a very important topic 
and of increasing importance to us.
    Senator Cramer. Thank you.
    In my remaining seconds, I might just ask in general as we 
look at the DOD budget--and I know you have a heart for a 
discussion about the pass-through part of your budget and how 
that may work and how people view the budget. I mean, the Air 
Force always seems to me, with its being the tip of the spear 
and the highest priority in DOD operations, to sort of be at 
the short end of the stick budget-wise. I mean, are you 
generally satisfied with what we have in terms of the entire 
budget for the Air Force?
    Secretary Barrett. Well, we have to live within the top 
line, so we have had to make a lot of trades that we wish we 
would not have to. The pass-through is an especially 
disconcerting matter because it does create a misperception. We 
are looking at that as something that we will come to Congress 
with a proposal in the next budget on how that should be 
treated in recognition of a Space Force and the reconstruction 
that will be occurring through the Department of the Air Force.
    Senator Cramer. It is a conversation whose time has come. 
Thank you.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
    Senator Peters?
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    To our witnesses, thank you for your testimony today. 
General Goldfein, I would like to join some of my colleagues in 
wishing you all the best in the years ahead. It has been a 
pleasure working with you these past years, and we will look 
forward to your next adventure, whatever that may be.
    Secretary Barrett, I would like to discuss the issue of 
PFAS with you, as several of my colleagues have mentioned. As 
you know, PFAS is very dangerous to human health, and the 
contamination has been identified at the former Air Force base 
at Wurtsmith in Oscoda, Michigan. It is something you and I 
have discussed many times in my office, and I appreciate your 
openness to that discussion. Also, I have discussed this with 
Assistant Secretary Henderson who visited the former base on my 
invitation, and we have also discussed it a great deal.
    I want to just say I appreciate your recent letter 
confirming the little over $13 million will be going towards 
cleanup at Wurtsmith. That is $13 million out of the $60 
million that we appropriated for the country. So I appreciate 
that commitment to the former base.
    My question to you is, could you provide me an update on 
how the remediation money is going to be spent and will that 
have an impact on the timeline at the former Wurtsmith Air 
Force Base?
    Secretary Barrett. Senator, I do not know the sequence of 
the spending and the impact on Wurtsmith. But I know that we 
are working closely with the communities. Our mission is to 
preserve and protect the safety and health and to involve all 
of government so that we have solutions that engage with the 
needs of the community as well.
    Senator Peters. Well, if I may ask if you could have 
someone get back to us as to specifically how you see that 
money spent and what the timeline would be, it certainly would 
be very much appreciated by the community. The community 
appreciates the additional resources and they are anxious to 
see what the details are regarding the money.
    Secretary Barrett, I also would like to talk to you a 
little bit about the F-35 basing decision, something we have 
also talked about a great deal, and the basing of F-35's at the 
Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Michigan. Since we have 
been in these discussions, President Trump has made a number of 
comments, and I would like to get an update, if I could, from 
you. President Trump recently said--and I am going to quote 
from President Trump--and that is why we are giving strong 
consideration to deploying some of our mighty F-35's to 
Selfridge Air National Guard Base, and you know what that 
means. Right? You know what that means. That is a big deal.
    He goes on to say, quote, so Selfridge, you are going to 
see a lot of very fast planes. Actually they are totally 
stealth. So maybe you will not see them coming in. Okay? You 
will not see them come in but they are coming in. End of quote.
    That certainly got a lot of folks very interested in Macomb 
County especially in Michigan, and I know the Air Force 
recently finalized the environmental impact statement relating 
to the basing decision. So I know the choice is with you.
    If you could just provide us an update on the Air National 
Guard's F-35 basing process, where we are on it.
    Secretary Barrett. I think as we have discussed, there is a 
very deliberate process with criteria and a down select 
process. We are in that process now, and therefore it is 
inappropriate for me to go into detail about the participants 
in the search. But we are going through a very deliberative and 
pre-established and approved. That does include an evaluation 
of the environmental impact, the costs that are going to be 
required, the facilities that are there, and we are looking at 
the community interest and involvement.
    Senator Peters. The environmental impact study has been 
finalized, so you are well down the path.
    Secretary Barrett. Yes, and comparing those of the various 
contestant bases.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    The last question. I am concerned about the recent 
reprogramming of the $1.3 billion from the National Guard and 
Reserve equipment account that was reprogrammed to support the 
construction of the southern border wall. As both of you know, 
that funding provides the National Guard resources to mitigate 
key readiness shortfalls. Two specific programs that benefit 
from those funds that are being shifted to the southern wall 
are MQ-9 upgrades to support domestic operations and the KC-135 
modification to improve survivability. Those are two platforms 
that we have in Michigan. The 127th wing operates eight KC-
135's. The 110th wing supports MQ-9. They are both, as we 
discussed here today already, in high demand and play a very, 
very important role in national defense. It makes me skeptical 
as to the impact on readiness.
    Will the Air Force reprioritize how it approaches National 
Guard modernization priorities when these funds have been 
reprogrammed away from key National Guard units?
    Secretary Barrett. Senator, we will be evaluating the 
impact. All of the deferred projects are important, but the 
President's has declared an emergency on the southern border. 
The Chairman has indicated there is no immediate, significant 
strategic diminution of readiness as a result of this 
transition. But the application of reassigning the resources 
is--nothing further is expected beyond what has been announced.
    Senator Peters. I am out of time. Thank you.
    Senator Wicker. Senator McSally? I am sorry. Senator Perdue 
scooted away from the dais, and I was looking for you.
    Senator Perdue. Well, first of all, I have used 5 seconds 
now already.
    Senator Wicker. Reset the clock.
    Senator Perdue. I want these two to know--I am going to say 
this for the public record. They know personally privately how 
much I personally think of each of them in their careers and 
appreciate so much each of them individually. You guys are at 
the turning point in the U.S. military right now in so many 
ways.
    I just have three issues I want to get at real quick, but 
just two quick questions. One is I think this whole thing that 
you are in the middle of, this transition, is what we have 
already said, visible current capability versus classified 
replacement capability. Obsolescence--we know we have maturing 
assets all over the Air Force. I am very concerned about one 
specific thing I will get in just a second.
    The second thing, in terms of the JSTARS capability moving 
to an ABMS, picking up--ABMS capability picking up the JSTARS 
capability, is this whole development of new technology versus 
an old acquisition structure. You got AI in here, and AI, as I 
understand it--it is machine learning, so the more data you 
give it, the faster it learns. Well, that does not necessarily 
fit an acquisition structure.
    So Will Roper just recently--he is the Acquisition Chief, 
as you know, Chief. We have come so far in ABMS, that we 
realize it is bigger than just replacing the capability that 
JSTARS provides. If get ABMS is right, you just built the 
military's Internet of Things. That is super exciting, et 
cetera. But this does not fit the traditional acquisition 
structure.
    The third thing is how do we interact. Given all of that, 
Congress is funding--we have an oversight called the NDAA. We 
try to give direction. We do not want to become bureaucratic. 
But right now, I am very concerned. So in the first few months, 
you have had one demonstration in December. You got another one 
coming in April. My concern is in the first two gates we had--I 
think it was August 30th or somewhere in there--the AOA was to 
be completed. Within 6 months after that, Secretary, you are to 
give us an update, as I understand that. Now, I understand this 
is somewhat fast moving.
    The next thing is a briefing in January of some sort here.
    I realize this is a classified topic but, Secretary, I need 
your commitment today that the Air Force will abide by the 
current NDAA, the public law that exists today that relates to 
JSTARS and ABMS, specifically section 236 and section 147, and 
that we can expect to receive the AOA, or analysis of 
alternatives, and the capability development document. Can you 
commit to that today?
    Secretary Barrett. I am not confident that I can commit to 
it today, but we will evaluate it. May I get back with you even 
later today?
    Senator Perdue. Well, absolutely, but what we are talking 
about is a new NDAA. We are preparing for the new NDAA. So if 
changes need to be made to the structure of oversight, now is 
the time. You are new in this. This is your first cycle. It is 
the Chief's last cycle. So we have got the best of both worlds 
here, but let us get this right, because this cannot be an 
acquisition process that we wake up in 3 years and realize it 
is 3X in cost and 10 years late, just to be blunt. It's really 
unacceptable that we do not get these reports on time when we 
have asked for that and we had commitments of predecessors to 
do that.
    The second thing, Chief, the events that we are doing now, 
the demonstrations, the capability that JSTARS has--the two I 
am concerned about is GMTI, ground-moving target indicators, as 
you have spoken before about, and then battle management. We 
get some feedback from other services that, well, we are headed 
in the wrong direction or we need to adapt this. Can you talk 
about specifically those two capabilities, and then what does 
that mean in terms of the organic force structure at Robbins to 
help facilitate the headquarters development there of ABMS?
    General Goldfein. Sure. I will hit the last part first. 
There is no intent to reduce the size of the force at Robbins, 
and we are committed to working with you on that.
    Senator Perdue. I apologize to interrupt. But you are 
talking about the force of JSTARS, and there is a gap as JSTARS 
matures out and you replace it with ABMS, there is a gap of 
capability. We know it exists today. But in terms of organic 
force structure, I accept your answer. I appreciate that. Can 
you address the other part of that?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. But to the gap, once we 
determined that we could fly Joint STARS well into the late 
2020s and into 2030, that actually filled the gap. So this 
whole plan is to ensure there is no gap because there can be no 
gap for the warfighter.
    Senator Perdue. Very good.
    General Goldfein. But we have to ensure that we can get 
them this information on day one of the fight, which you were 
very helpful.
    What we are trying to do here is incredibly disruptive, and 
it is disruptive in the eyes of the adversary. What we did to 
bring on a new way--this goes to your point about the current 
acquisition system. We brought in 12 pioneers from industry and 
put them on the advanced battle management system. We have the 
designer of Uber on our payroll, and so we are using industry's 
best practices, and industry is in here with us doing this.
    The next demonstration we are going to do at Nellis Air 
Force Base where all the Joint Chiefs will go to it, we are 
going to be doing live fly connective capability at Yuma, at 
Eglin, off the shore, at White Sands, at Nellis Air Force Base. 
We are going to have three supported commanders, and we are 
going to have a number of firsts. If we do this right, about 60 
percent of it will work.
    Senator Perdue. So will the next demonstration have GMTI 
and battle management demonstrated in that demonstration?
    General Goldfein. It will but it will do it, not from where 
we want to eventually take it. It will do it in an interim 
step.
    Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
    General Goldfein. I will just leave it at that.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
    Next is Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I add my thanks to you, General, for your service and my 
best wishes on your impending retirement.
    Madam Secretary, I was pleased to hear about your pitch 
days where you encourage small businesses to pitch their ideas. 
Where do these pitch days occur?
    Secretary Barrett. They have been taking place around the 
country. I attended one in San Francisco. They are in a variety 
of cities around the country.
    Senator Hirono. Nothing in Hawaii yet.
    Secretary Barrett. Not that I know of.
    Senator Hirono. Think about that.
    Secretary Barrett. Yes, I will put that on the list.
    Senator Hirono. I want to add my concerns to those 
expressed by some of my colleagues about the reprogramming of 
DOD money to go to the wall on the southern border. So I just 
want to express that. At some point, I think it does have a 
negative impact on readiness and other aspects of what the DOD 
is supposed to be focused on.
    Madam Secretary, the National Defense Strategy highlights 
great power competition with China and Russia and it includes 
North Korea, Iran, and transnational violent extremism. Four of 
these five threats are in the Indo-Pacific AOR. I am glad to 
see the focus on the region given its growing importance to our 
national security.
    What concerns you most with regard to the Indo-Pacific 
region as the Secretary of the Air Force?
    Secretary Barrett. A key issue there is the vastness of the 
territory, and logistics, being prepared to position, station 
our capabilities through that area.
    Senator Hirono. Yes. It is the biggest AOR.
    Do you believe then that additional assets and investments 
are needed for the Air Force to maintain its competitive 
advantage against our adversaries in this part of the region--
or this part of the world?
    Secretary Barrett. There is a significant review of how we 
are positioned for the greater peer threat.
    Senator Hirono. When is that review going to----
    Secretary Barrett. I think there is continual review.
    Senator Hirono. So do you think that this review will 
result in more concentration of certain assets in the Indo-
Pacific Command area?
    Secretary Barrett. I do not want to predict the outcome of 
it, but I would anticipate that the realities will be a 
significant part of how those assets will be decided.
    Senator Hirono. I hope so. General, do you agree?
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. So the Chairman is leading us 
through global integrated exercises that is looking at global 
campaigns because a China or a Russia campaign will not be 
confined within that geographic area of responsibility. So we 
are working our way through what does the command and control 
look like which is why this JADC2 is so important for how we 
look at this new way of warfighting going forward. We are doing 
that review now.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you.
    This is for Secretary Barrett. Last fall, the Air Force 
indicated Barking Sands, a specific missile range facility, in 
Kauai as the preferred location for a Pacific-based space 
controlled squadron operated by the Hawaii Air National Guard. 
I have not heard much else since that initial announcement. Can 
you advise what the status of the space controlled squadron is 
and when will the unit be activated?
    Secretary Barrett. Senator, I do not know the answer to 
that. May I get back with you?
    Senator Hirono. Yes, thank you.
    So for both of you, as the Air Force prepares for a future 
possibility of conflict with a near-peer adversary, I 
understand you are investing in agile combat employment where 
you would launch, recover, and maintain aircraft away from main 
bases using partner nations, military fields, or civilian 
airfields. Secretary Barrett, what nations in the Pacific 
theater, if any, have been approached thus far as possible 
locations for these agile combat employment teams and assets? 
Or if the General would like to respond.
    General Goldfein. Well, I would just say we are really 
blessed that my successor has been nominated publicly, and that 
is General Brown. This is his concept of operations that he 
will no doubt, if confirmed, bring into the seat. I actually 
went to his Pacific Air Chiefs conference, and this was a 
central topic of discussion. I will tell you that from the 
Philippines to Singapore to--I mean, I could go around the 
region, and all of them are talking about this new concept of 
employment.
    Senator Hirono. Great. We will have an opportunity to talk 
with General Brown about that.
    General Goldfein, what are your thoughts on having the C-
17's at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam under operational 
control of INDOPACOM versus TRANSCOM?
    General Goldfein. I think the decision has been made to 
actually chop all of the strategic lift to TRANSCOM for the 
purposes of global mobility. This is part of the global 
integrated exercise. We have just been working through this as 
well in Central Command as well. So TRANSCOM through the last 
directive from the Chairman has been given operational control 
of strategic lift. You know, General Lyons is the one that 
manages that for the globe.
    Senator Hirono. I do have some questions for the record 
relating to how we are dealing with the issues of suicide and 
sexual harassment. So I will submit those for the record.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Hirono. We will look 
forward to those answers on the record.
    Senator McSally?
    Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Good to see you both again and thanks for your service. I 
appreciate all you are doing to ensure our Air Force is ready 
for the high end fight, but we also have an obligation when our 
troops are on the ground to have the best capability overhead 
for combat search and rescue and close air support. So on to 
our beloved A-10.
    General Goldfein, is the Air Force committed to complying 
with all laws on the books and the intent of Congress related 
to the A-10?
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am, we are.
    Senator McSally. Thanks.
    When I first got to Congress, if they had gotten their way 
in the last administration, we would have no A-10s flying right 
now. So we stopped that in fiscal year 2016. In fiscal year 
2017, I took a different approach. I said we need to make sure 
that we think about this as we develop the F-35 and we have a 
thoughtful sequential approach.
    So we required in section 134 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA 
two reports. I wrote this and it made it into law. The first 
was for the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to 
submit the F-35 IOT&E report to Congress and to you. Then the 
second was a report by the Secretary of the Air Force 
specifically after the IOT&E report was delivered, not later 
than 180 days--and I am going to read this--the Secretary of 
the Air Force shall submit to Congress and the defense 
Committees a report that includes the views of the Secretary 
with respect to this report, including any issues or concerns--
I am kind of summarizing here--a plan for addressing any 
deficiencies, carrying out the corrective actions, and the 
short-term and long-term strategies for preserving capability 
of close air support and combat search and rescue.
    This also included the fly-off competition that I mandated, 
and that has been conducted between the A-10 and the F-35.
    So the final paragraph in that fiscal year 2017 NDAA says, 
the Secretary of the Air Force may not retire, prepare to 
retire, or place in storage or on back-up aircraft inventory 
any A-10 aircraft--any A-10 aircraft--until a period of 90 days 
has elapsed following the report, the second report.
    So, first, IOT&E after the fly-off competition, then the 
Secretary of the Air Force report. No A-10 can even be planned 
to be put into storage. I wanted to add ``thought about,'' but 
we could not enforce that. But I think you get the point.
    The question is--and these are just kind of yes and no, 
General Goldfein, have you received the initial operation test 
evaluation report for the F-35?
    General Goldfein. No, ma'am.
    Senator McSally. Neither have we, so you have not been able 
to then inform any planning by the Secretary for the second 
report because we do not yet have the first report. Right?
    General Goldfein. Correct.
    Senator McSally. So this Committee and the Air Force does 
not have any plan for addressing deficiencies potentially from 
the IOT&E report.
    General Goldfein. Correct.
    Senator McSally. And also we do not have the plan for 
corrective action. Right?
    Finally, neither the Air Force or the Committee has the Air 
Force's short-term and long-term strategies for preserving 
close air support and combat search and rescue. Correct?
    General Goldfein. Right.
    Senator McSally. So based on your answers and based on the 
law we wrote, I just think it is premature to plan to retire 
even one A-10, never mind the 44 that are planned to retire in 
this year's budget. So how do you justify the planning starting 
for this when we have not met the intent of the law yet?
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. The DOT&E report--the fly-off 
is complete. They are holding that report until they 
deliberate. The director informed me that he would deliver that 
to this Committee in September, the first month of the fiscal 
year. We understand the timeline that is in the law, and we 
will absolutely comply with the law.
    What we put in the budget was where we will need to work 
with you on because--and the question is timing, as you brought 
up. Will there be time in that fiscal year to be able to move 
forward on any retirements and still be in compliance with the 
law? So that was our thinking.
    Senator McSally. Yes, I got it. Look, we made it, I 
thought, very clear, like we should not even start having a 
conversation to plan anything related to the floor we have of 
the number of A-10 now until this is all complete. What is your 
plan going forward related to the A-10?
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. I will tell you straight up. 
You saved the A-10. Nobody else can make that claim, and as a 
result of your efforts and the efforts of this Committee, we 
are putting almost a billion dollars into the A-10. We are 
going to be doing the wings, the avionics, the radios, and we 
are going to keep that airplane in the inventory flying well 
into the 2030s.
    The challenge we faced is what I said in my opening 
statement, which is we have to transition to the future while 
we are continuing to apply fire power against the current 
fight. There is no better weapon system to do that than the A-
10. So the investment that we are making is a good investment. 
We just got to take a look at what the cost would be if we keep 
the entire fleet, and that is what we have got to work with you 
on to do that.
    Senator McSally. And we will. Thanks.
    In my remaining time, I want to talk about the President 
recently reprogrammed resources. Look, as a veteran, as a 
border Senator, we need to support our military and secure our 
border. These should not be choices and obstruction to stop 
happening.
    But I want to specifically ask about the F-35, the money 
that is being reprogrammed. We plused up from your 48, we 
plused up 14, so we funded 62. What is the impact on the Air 
Force F-35 and specifically any impact to Luke Air Force Base?
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. There will be no impact to 
Luke Air Force Base. The money that was diverted was for long 
lead items for aircraft that actually did not come through in 
the budget. So we put 12 in the unfunded request for this year, 
but that was long lead items for certain parts. It was not 
procurement for the aircraft. So no impact on Luke.
    Senator McSally. So we are still going to have 62 come off 
the production line this year.
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator McSally. Great. Thank you. Appreciate it.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator McSally.
    General, did your attorneys advise you that you are 
compliant with Senator McSally's provisions in the NDAA with 
regard to the A-10?
    General Goldfein. Sir, they did, and they did that based on 
again time. The fact that the report that Senator McSally is 
referring to was going to be delivered in the first month of 
the fiscal year and the number of months ahead of that, there 
was time to work with this Committee on the retirement of those 
aircraft in this timeline.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, and thank you, Senator McSally.
    Senator Manchin?
    Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank both of you for your service and congratulations on 
your retirement, General. Some day I hope to be there.
    Anyway, as you can imagine, the 13 States that qualify for 
the C-130J recapitalization as appropriated in fiscal year 2017 
and 2019 are eager to hear where the Air Force is in this 
process. Our staffs were told in November we would get some 
kind of an update this winter. It has not come yet.
    In the meantime, I have inquired about the Air Force's 
strategic basing scoring process for the decision both because 
I am interested from an oversight perspective and as someone 
who has to prioritize what I push for as an authorizer and an 
appropriator. I asked the Air Force if Congress would be 
allowed to know the score of its National Guard location 
particularly as it relates to others, and I was told no. The 
Air Force responded to my request for information the strategic 
basing process uses score sheets to determine a location's 
viability for a basing bed-down decision.
    However, the score sheets alone do not provide the full 
context of decision criteria and are no longer used in the 
basing process once candidate locations have been selected. 
Once selected, site surveys are conducted in each candidate 
location as part of the holistic assessment of its suitability. 
The Secretary of the Air Force also leverages inputs from Air 
Force corporate leaders, Chief of Staff, and military judgment.
    I understand what you need to do what is best for the Air 
Force, and we all need to support you to do what is best for 
the Air Force, and I am not one who ascribes, just because I 
have something in my State, that is the best. If they are not 
performing, I am the first to say either get with it or get out 
of it.
    So with that being said, I am very proud of the 130th air 
wing in Charleston where we score really high on the score 
sheet, but might not be selected. So I want to make sure that 
we have a fair shot at this.
    So my question to you, Madam Secretary, is the Air Force 
needs to show its work. Do you understand the Air Force process 
limiting my ability to do oversight? Do you think it is too 
subjective what I am asking in response?
    Secretary Barrett. Senator, the process is a complex one 
and goes through a variety of criteria, some of which are not 
easily measurable in quantifiable terms.
    Senator Manchin. If I could just say--I do not mean to 
interrupt you, but time is limited. In that, I know any type of 
performance is based on past performance, how well the 
readiness, maintenance, being able to complete the missions, 
and that is what I think to me would be at the top of the list 
of looking if they have been performing, not just saying I am 
going to do it better if you do this for me, but have they 
performed in the past. We are hoping that is a high score too, 
but we would like to see that.
    Secretary Barrett. Past performance is deeply valued, and 
West Virginian's demonstrated their ability to produce and 
perform. So we appreciate it very much.
    The criteria are spelled out for the initial cut, and then 
there are site visits and things that are lot less----
    Senator Manchin. Will we be able to see any of that as an 
appropriator and as legislators? Will be able to see the 
process you are going through, or is that not available?
    Secretary Barrett. I do not know whether it has been made 
available in the past, but I would be happy to take a look----
    Senator Manchin. Would you consider that? Maybe you could 
get back with me on that?
    Secretary Barrett. I would be happy to.
    Senator Manchin. First of all, I want to say I am for the 
wall. I am just not for the executive branch appropriating 
money as they see fit, and here is my concern. What really 
angers me is the $1.3 billion cut from the National Guard and 
Reserve equipment account; $205 million, which is cut from the 
Air Force Reserve; $395 million cut from the Air National 
Guard.
    So, Secretary, I would ask you, did you agree to the 
reprogramming request or were you involved in that decision?
    Secretary Barrett. The Air Force worked with the Department 
of Defense to minimize the disruption that would be caused by 
the reappropriation of those funds.
    Senator Manchin. Were Governors and the TAGs--were they 
consulted on the reprogramming?
    Senator Manchin. I do not think they were.
    Senator Manchin. Yes, I do not think so. From what we are 
hearing, they were not either.
    The reprogramming of the $365 million. That is four fewer 
C-130J's for fiscal year 2020, affect the ability to support 
TRANSCOM airlift missions in the event of a conflict. It really 
puts us in jeopardy and behind the 8 ball there because we are 
flying 0-H's now, and we are hoping that you are going to 
refurbish them with new avionics, propellers, and engines and 
things that need to be done. We are behind. I am really 
concerned about this.
    General, you might want to state on that I guess. What are 
your plans to ensure there are no gaps in readiness?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I will tell you that we are 
right now still working through the impacts. The Chairman was 
asked to give his assessment of the impacts on not only 
readiness but the strategic ability to defend the Nation, and I 
think you saw his response and that is where the Joint Chiefs 
are.
    Senator Manchin. Well, there is no doubt there is going to 
be an impact. We all know that. How severe is going to be--we 
will be back here next year, if money is taken again from what 
we appropriate, we go through and do our job, and then all of a 
sudden it vanishes and we are back to square one again. I do 
not have a problem voting for the wall. I sure have a problem 
with money being taken for what is needed for us to defend our 
country.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
    Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, General, thank you for being here. Thank 
you for your service.
    General, let me start with you. My home State of Missouri 
is very excited and proud to receive the B-21, which will form 
a critical part of our nuclear triad and also our conventional 
global strike capability.
    Let me ask you this, how do you envision the B-21 helping 
to defeat a Chinese fait accompli scenario involving Taiwan 
when you consider both its nuclear and its conventional 
capabilities?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. You know, very often I tell my 
slide builders, the next slide I see that has a big red dome 
over China or Russia, I am going to execute choke on on the 
slide builder. China cannot put a big red block of wood over 
itself. It can put a block of Swiss cheese over itself, and our 
job is to know where the holes are and how to get in and how to 
hold targets at risk. That is what the B-21 does.
    Senator Hawley. Let me ask you about the number. You 
previously stated, General, that the Air Force requires at 
least--I think your words were--at a minimum 100 B-21's. You 
have also said you are in lockstep with various analyses 
showing the Air Force may need more than 100 B-21's. So give us 
your best estimate. How many B-21's does the Air Force actually 
require to cover now and above its nuclear and conventional 
missions?
    General Goldfein. Our assessment--and that has been backed 
up by independent assessments--is that a moderate risk force is 
220 bombers, of which 145 would be B-21's.
    Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
    General, Missouri is also home to the 139th airlift wing, 
which does incredible work to ensure that the joint force has 
the tactical airlift it needs. We are very proud of that as 
well. Can you tell us how you see the Air National Guard 
airlift with units like the 139th enabling distributed 
operations in the Indo-Pacific and Europe?
    General Goldfein. That unit, like all of our Guard units--
that is one of the beauties of the way the Air Force is 
organized. You know, when I have traveled around as the Air 
Component Commander in Central Command, I would go to the 
cockpit of a C-17 or a C-130, and I would say, okay, who is 
Active, who is Guard, who is Reserve? And all three hands would 
go up. Such is the nature of how we are integrated.
    We could not do the Nation's business without our Guard and 
Reserve. Could not do it.
    Senator Hawley. Let me ask you about modernizing the C-130H 
and the expanding number of C-130J's. How might doing those 
things for the Air National Guard enable those units to support 
the kind of operations we have been talking about?
    General Goldfein. Well, both in the C-130J, which is just a 
phenomenal weapon system--I think we are running out of letters 
in the alphabet for the C-130. So the C-130J is just 
incredible. The upgrades we are doing on the C-130H with the 
new avionics is going to keep that weapon system flying as 
well.
    When we get back to Senator Hirono's point about agile 
combat employment, part of your ability to be able to move to 
win is your tactical lift. We are taking a fresh look at where 
do the C-130's live and how do they play relative to being able 
to move very quickly around a battlefield. I think that is 
going to become more important as we go forward.
    Senator Hawley. Very good.
    Let me ask you about the LRASM missiles. The fiscal year 
2021 budget, General, says the Air Force is planning to buy, I 
think, 129 LRASMs between now and fiscal year 2025. I am just 
curious. Does the Air Force have any other advanced anti-ship 
weapons in its inventory besides the LRASMs?
    General Goldfein. That is the only one I can talk about in 
the unclassified realm, and I will tell you, sir, that the 
munitions story is actually a really good news story. Based on 
additional money that was given to us, we have been able to 
grow the munitions bins and some preferred munitions in ways 
that we have not done for years. Just to give you an example, 
in fiscal year 2018, we were at 44 percent for JDAMs. We are 
now at 88 percent. Just to give you an example of how we have 
done the munitions bins.
    Senator Hawley. Let me ask you just about the LRASMs in 
particular. Considering the vital role that they play, 
particularly in defeating Chinese surface forces, do you think 
129 is enough? Do we need to be buying more?
    General Goldfein. We always need to be buying more. Sir, I 
will tell you that we balanced that against all the other 
requirements. Right now, I will tell you that some of the 
lowest stock numbers we have are in air-to-air missiles, and so 
we have been focusing there recently.
    Senator Hawley. Let me ask you--General, shifting topics 
just slightly. Over the last 5 years, the Air Force has, I 
think, pretty dramatically improved its ability to conduct 
distributed operations in the European theater. Is it fair to 
say that a lot of those improvements were made possible by the 
European Deterrence Initiative? Is that a fair statement?
    General Goldfein. Yes.
    Senator Hawley. Can you just speak just briefly about how 
EDI has helped the Air Force adopt a more resilient posture in 
Europe?
    General Goldfein. So the Army focused on prepositioned 
stocks. We focused on access and basing because an air force is 
expected in the operational plan to arrive quickly because we 
can fly into theater, halt enemy activity, and stabilize the 
situation for follow-on activity. So therefore we need bases 
that we can operate from. So we put our money into access and 
basing, and that has allowed us to have a much larger 
footprint.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you for that.
    I will just say, Mr. Chairman, this is why I continue to 
believe that something similar to a dedicated funding stream is 
vital for INDOPACOM. Thank you.
    Thank you, General. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am not sure to whom to address this question, but I am 
curious about $77 million for Space Force OCO. I think of OCO 
as overseas contingency operations. Are we 77 million people up 
in space? I am just curious. What is the $77 million for OCO 
for Space Force?
    Secretary Barrett. Well, in just our conference, it seems 
likely that is places like Thule, the Arctic. Alaska is 
considered OCO, so those would be----
    Senator King. People manning space-related facilities? Is 
that what we are talking about?
    Secretary Barrett. So the space-related facilities and the 
manning of them.
    Senator King. If you could give me a little more robust 
information, I would appreciate it.
    Secretary Barrett. I would be happy to.
    Senator King. Madam Secretary, how are we doing on the 
sustainment cost of the F-35? Are we going to be able to afford 
to keep it?
    Secretary Barrett. It is one of the topics of great 
attention. It is being driven down, but it is, from our 
perspective, too slowly and still too high. We have a 
commitment that by the year 2025, it would be at $25,000 per 
hour, and we anticipate that that will be achieved.
    Senator King. But you continue to make this a priority? It 
is a serious ongoing issue. We are not going to be able to 
sustain this important asset indefinitely at the kind of costs 
that we are talking about now.
    Secretary Barrett. Agreed.
    General Goldfein. Sir, if I could jump in as well. I met 
with the CEO for Lockheed Martin and all the CEOs who are 
partners in this and told them that the current flying hour 
costs are unaffordable, and the sustainment enterprise was not 
scaled to the size of the fleet. So we worked through about a 3 
to 4-month sprint both with the Joint Program Office and the 
company, and I went to Lockheed and walked through all the 
things they are doing in the sustainment enterprise. I will 
tell you that they made some significant changes to the point 
where I am more confident that we are going to be able to drive 
to that lower flying hour cost than we were 6 months ago.
    Senator King. Could you supply for the Committee some data 
and material on this issue?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
    Senator King. Because I think it is one we just do not want 
to let it get away from us.
    General Goldfein. I would be happy to.
    Senator King. Madam Secretary, I noticed there is an 
increase in end strength of about 1,500 people. I hope some of 
those are maintenance personnel because I understand that is a 
bottleneck in terms of readiness. How are we doing on 
maintenance personnel, techs to keep these airplanes flying?
    Secretary Barrett. Historically that has been a confining 
topic. Some good news is that in the Active Duty Force, our 
maintainers are up to speed. At this point, we are still 
working on the Guard and Reserve account.
    Senator King. How are we doing on recruiting? Are you 
meeting goals? General?
    General Goldfein. We are, sir.
    The good news on that on the maintenance is we have 
actually filled in what was a 4,000 shortfall. We got that down 
to zero. We still have some work to do in the Guard and Reserve 
on maintainers.
    When it comes to recruiting, we are meeting our numbers. 
One of the things we have done recently is we have gone to 
total force recruiting. We pooled Guard and Reserve and active 
into one recruiting command, and so now when you go to a strip 
mall, you do not see three different storefronts. You see one, 
United States Air Force. Because, quite frankly, for the 
Secretary and I, when a young man or woman wants to join the 
Air Force, we do not really care which component they join. 
They are joining us.
    Senator King. Because we have an integrated force in 
reality.
    General Goldfein. Because it is an integrated force.
    Senator King. Now, the Army is doing some work on 
diversifying the geography of their recruiting. As you know, in 
New England or in the northeast, there are very few military 
facilities left, and we really do not want the military to be 
regionalized. Are you attending to that issue?
    General Goldfein. We are, sir, and we are also looking at 
it especially through how do we hire civilians. You gave us 
authority to direct hire civilians faster, and so this is a 
competitive market. This is a fight for talent, and so now with 
those authorities, we are able to go to universities, many of 
them in New England, and direct hire folks into the Air Force. 
Especially I think as Chief Raymond looks at how he builds the 
Space Force, there are some really creative things that we 
might be able to do there with the authorities that you have 
given us.
    Senator King. I appreciate that, and if you need additional 
authorities or if there are other bottlenecks, let us know.
    One final question. General Lyons was here a week or 2 ago 
and talked about the impending gap in refueling capacity, which 
he identified as one of the most serious threats that we face. 
We cannot project power unless we have refueling capacity. Is 
there a plan? How are we going to meet that 5- to 7-year 
problem that appears to be imminent?
    General Goldfein. So the first thing is, in terms of 
mitigation, we have committed to him and the Secretary of 
Defense that if we were in a major contingency, every KC-46 
would be put into the fight. We are comfortable that it is 
capable of doing operations in a high-end fight.
    Senator King. Even with the deficiency.
    General Goldfein. Even with the deficiency. I would not put 
it into day-to-day operations, but I would put it in a high end 
fight.
    When we took a look at the retirement numbers, what we are 
talking about is 3 percent of the entire KC-135 fleet. We are 
managing risk across the board. We are managing shortages in 
bombers, tankers, ISR, fighters, command and control, and so 
tankers is one area that we are having to manage, and so that 
is why in the beginning, I mentioned that that was one of the 
most difficult decisions we had to make end game was to ask for 
us to take risk in the tanker business.
    Senator King. I appreciate--and I had asked some General 
Lyons some further backup on the plans----
    General Goldfein. Yes.
    Senator King.--because for want of a nail, the horse was 
lost--you know, the battle. We do not want to lose a battle 
because we cannot get our airmen and their horses to the 
battlefront.
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Wicker. General, we talked about this earlier, and 
Senator King brought it back up. The Ranking Member and I are 
just wondering. The refueling can be done. It is just trickier?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. So I flew in the airplane 
twice, and let me describe it for you.
    Senator Wicker. Did you do a refueling?
    General Goldfein. We did. Actually I refueled a C-17. I got 
to fly the remote visual system, got to see it in all different 
lighting conditions.
    There are operational workarounds that allow me to tell you 
that I would put it in the fight, but I would not accept that 
aircraft today in terms of what we are paying the company to 
deliver, and so what happens is that the receptacle on the 
airplane, at the last 10 feet or so as you are now trying to 
connect with an airplane, the last 10 feet, it is difficult for 
the boom operator to actually focus in and see those last 10 
feet. So we are seeing more strikes around the receptacle 
before it actually plugs in.
    The worse case conditions would be blue skies, sun at your 
back because what happens is there is a glare that now bounces 
off the airplane that makes it harder to see. Well, you check 
about 20 degrees away, and you can mitigate that risk. But I 
ought not be having to mitigate that risk in daily operations. 
We ought to get what we paid for.
    Senator King. Mr. Chairman, I flew the boom on a tanker 
once.
    Senator Wicker. That does not give me a comfort level.
    Senator King. No. It will because there was not another 
airplane attached.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Wicker. If the other Senators will defer to Senator 
Reed.
    Senator Reed. Just to very briefly. There are two aspects 
to this. One if flying the tanker. The other is the aircraft 
that is approaching to refuel.
    General Goldfein. Right.
    Senator Reed. If we are not training on a regular basis 
these aircraft to refuel with the KC-46, to suddenly put it 
into the fight is not going to be particularly effective 
because all the other aircraft will be coming up there for the 
first time, and it will be a problem.
    General Goldfein. These airplanes, though, sir, will be 
involved in tests. So they will be doing refueling as we work 
through the tests of the fix that we are hoping to get to. So 
we would not be starting nor would I put a crew in that was not 
trained for the mission. In terms of mitigation on why we would 
retire some tankers, part of the mitigation is that we would 
put the KC-46 into the fight.
    Senator Reed. This is a continuing conversation, but the 
concern I have, just briefly, is that in the fight, which will 
be sudden and quick and now these aircraft, the KC-46, is 
suddenly a primary refueler, you would have literally hundreds 
of aircraft and pilots who have never approached this before. 
That is not the way you usually operate.
    Senator Wicker. They would have in training. Would they 
not?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. But I will tell you if you are 
up at the receiver, quite frankly I have refueled on every 
different kind of tanker out there, plus I have refueled on 
remote visual systems off a Dutch tanker. When you are on the 
receiving end, all you need is a stable boom. Because you are 
training on refueling all the time, the boom is the boom is the 
boom. It is not going to matter that much for the receiver. We 
just got to make sure that when that fighter, bomber, what have 
you comes off and they are low on gas and they are in really 
bad territory like I have been that that connection happens and 
they get the fuel passed that they need.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you for allowing us to interject 
there.
    Senator Sullivan?
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Goldfein, I do want to thank you, like many others, 
for your exceptional service to our Nation. I think you are 
going to be sorely missed, and you really, really, really have 
done a great job. I do hope you come back, and I appreciated 
the breakfast and the briefings just a couple of weeks ago as 
well.
    Madam Secretary, we look forward to getting you to Alaska, 
hosting you. The whole State is looking forward to having you 
up there. You will see why Billy Mitchell called it the most 
strategic place in the world, see our great airmen and JPARC. 
You can probably see Russia too if it is a clear day. So we are 
really looking forward to that.
    I am going to continue the theme here on the KC-46. This 
might be a really dumb, basic question, but for now, just 
following up on this discussion we just had, like is there any 
way to just take the boom hardware from the KC-135? I mean, 
that works. You cannot do that as an interim replacement until 
they figure out what the heck--you know, as Senator Shaheen 
said, time is of the essence. You said it. But 4 years does not 
seem like time is of the essence. Is there no fix to help? I 
mean, the KC-135 is a workhorse. It works pretty well.
    General Goldfein. Sir, there is no option to just swapping 
the boom because the boom is not the problem. The visual system 
that allows the boom operator to be able to connect with the 
receiver is the problem. So what we have to have----
    Senator Sullivan. You cannot use a KC-135.
    General Goldfein. No.
    Senator Sullivan. Okay.
    General Goldfein. No, because in the 135 there is a huge 
window in the back where the boom operator is laying down 
looking at----
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask on the other issue. You will 
not be surprised to hear my continuing advocacy on the issue, 
but it is not just me. On the OCONUS bed-down decision on the 
KC-46. You know, this Committee has weighed in in a number of 
NDAAs--so the Congress has weighed in because they become law--
talking about characteristics. General Goldfein, I raised this 
in the last hearing. You know, strategic location, the ability 
to serve several COCOMs, how the air combat power, 24/7 NORAD 
mission that routinely intercepts Russian bombers, world class 
training, three Red Flag exercises a year, 100 fifth generation 
fighters, C-17, C-130's, F-16's. These are all characteristics 
that this Committee has said are important.
    I just had breakfast this morning with the SECDEF. He in 
his confirmation hearing mentioned that you collocate 100 fifth 
generation fighters and KC-46's in a very strategic location, 
that would send the message of extreme strategic reach to our 
adversaries, particularly our great power adversaries.
    Do either of you care to comment on this upcoming decision 
as it relates to these congressionally mandated 
characteristics, which certainly favor in my view one of the 
locations you are looking at?
    Secretary Barrett. My ability--in the line of decision-
making, I will await the input and analysis. But those, no 
doubt, are going to be elements that will be considered.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
    Just building on that--and again, General Lyons recently 
testified--it just last week I think. As you have already 
heard, he said the air refueling fleet--that is the most 
stressed capability and number one readiness concern, the 
ability to deploy the force across all national defense 
strategy mission areas.
    Again, to me, if you put the KC-46's in a place that can 
strategically reach not just PACOM, but PACOM, EUCOM, STRATCOM, 
NORTHCOM, which is what Alaska presents, it helps with that 
stress. I think that is actually an important concern.
    Would either of you care to comment on that? He did in the 
classified briefing, just for the record. You can take a look 
at what he said, which was I think along the lines of what I 
have been arguing.
    General Goldfein. No, sir. I would align with that.
    Senator Sullivan. Madam Secretary, do you want to wave that 
one off too?
    Secretary Barrett. No further comment on it.
    Senator Sullivan. Just as you are making the decision, take 
a look at his testimony also I think helps.
    General Goldfein and Madam Secretary, I just want one final 
quick question on the JPARC and the fifth generation center of 
excellence. You know, I just asked my staff. I did not know 
that numbers are this big, but as you probably know, JPARC is 
13 times larger than Nellis, and as we have increasing offsets 
that are needed for good training with the fifth generation 
aircraft and the ability to expand that air space, which in 
Alaska we are doing, and it is not that controversial as it is 
in the Lower 48 to expand air space. Can you comment on that?
    General Goldfein. Sure. I will just say it is critical 
strategic terrain, and the larger air space becomes more 
important as we end up engaging at longer ranges, which is what 
fifth generation is all about and what comes after that. So I 
see actually more of an effort to ensure that we can replicate 
the higher end threat at JPARC and Nellis and Utah in these 
ranges.
    The good news is that software-defined radios are giving us 
more inexpensive ways of replicating higher end threats, which 
has been challenging in the past. So one of the things we are 
looking at right now is how do we scale very quickly in that 
range space to put a robust array out to be able to replicate a 
high end threat. I think over the next couple of years we are 
going to be able to do it.
    Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Tillis?
    Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here, and, General Goldfein, I 
wish you the very best in what I hope is just a change of jobs, 
not a real retirement.
    But I want to start back maybe on the KC-46. We know we are 
going to have some down at Seymour Johnson. We have got the 
hangar project. I know that it was originally slated for later 
this year--where we are with the hangar project, where we are 
with the deployment. There was one project that was affected 
with some of the reprogramming of the MILCON money. I think it 
was a relatively low dollar item, but I believe it did have to 
do with the ultimate deployment of the tankers. So if I can get 
an update on that, I would appreciate it.
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Right now I have not been 
briefed that it would have any impact on the bed-down timing, 
but let me take that to make sure. Can I get back to you?
    Senator Tillis. Yes. I know at the time that we were going 
through those discussions, it did not look like it was on the 
critical path. I would like to know when it would be as we work 
to backfill that funding. Thank you.
    I know that we recently, I think as recently as last week, 
put out the tenant bill of rights for our military housing 
situation. It looks like it may be a good start, but there are 
some who feel like it needs to go further. Can you give me an 
update specifically with Air Force, what progress we are making 
and what priority this is for you. Secretary Barrett?
    Secretary Barrett. It is a very high priority. My first 
visit as Secretary was to go to a base and to do a walk-through 
of housing. I have gone through a number of base housing 
facilities and have been very much involved in this process.
    We signed out the bill of rights, but only 15 of the 18 
elements. The three elements that were not on the bill of 
rights, in contrast with what were the directed 18, were three 
things that we could not unilaterally do. They were mandate the 
disclosure of maintenance records back 7 years. In some cases, 
there are not 7 years of records, so we have to work on that. 
The dispute resolution technique, because again in some cases 
the housing provider has bonds that they cannot reach in the 
dispute resolution process. The third item is withholding of 
the rent. So those three items we are working through as a 
contractual matter, and we will anticipate having solutions to 
those as well as time goes on.
    In the meantime, we are withholding payments to these 
contractors, in some cases, significant amounts of payments. So 
there is a financial involvement. We I believe do have their 
attention at this point, and there is apparently a good faith 
effort to move this forward.
    Senator Tillis. Very good. After the NDAA, I know that you 
all tried to move forward with the promulgation of the tenant 
bill of rights. We are looking for feedback on additional 
things that we should put into this NDAA to help us get rid of 
what I think is an unacceptable situation with a lot of our 
military families in housing. So thank you for that.
    One other parochial issue and if I have time, I may have 
one other question, otherwise I will submit it for the record. 
North Carolina has the most historically black colleges and 
universities is the Nation. We have 11. We have the largest at 
NCA&T, and we have the most affordable down at Elizabeth City 
State. They have got a program specifically focused on aviation 
science. They are doing a good job there. They have got a great 
collaboration with the Coast Guard. We are working right now to 
help out with maybe some runway upgrades, and they also have 
the college student pre-commissioning initiative there that I 
think has been very good for talent building.
    One thing that I would be interested in getting your 
commitment to is just considering whether or not we could have 
an Air Force ROTC program down there, just to take a look at 
it. I had some of my staff down visiting with the chancellor 
recently. It is an impressive program. We have got a record of 
collaboration with the Coast Guard and I would like you all to 
give that a look. Can I get your commitment to take a look at 
that?
    Secretary Barrett. Full commitment.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you.
    Last thing. I will submit the question I had on the EQ-4 
and some movement to manned versus unmanned platforms for the 
record.
    I got a great briefing from the Army on their taking 
advantage of some of the provisions in the NDAA around talent 
management. They look like they are really moving aggressively. 
Can you all give me an idea of how we are going to look a year 
from now or in the coming months with the Air Force?
    General Goldfein. Sir, we are going through the largest 
overhaul of our officer talent management and enlisted talent 
management since about the early 1980s. So, not only are we 
using technology for the purposes of managing career paths, but 
we have busted the single line of the Air Force promotion 
category into six categories. We are defining what behaviors 
that we desire and what constitutes a competitive career for 
the purposes of promotion. So a year from now, it is not going 
to look anything like it does today.
    Senator Tillis. Good. If we can get an opportunity, I would 
love to have maybe a briefing in the office. I thought it was 
very helpful for us to do that. We can get into greater detail.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both.
    Senator Wicker. And thank you, Senator Tillis.
    Thank you to our distinguished witnesses. We look forward 
to continue working with you.
    This marks the conclusion of our hearing, and the hearing 
is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                           talent management
    1. Senator Tillis. Secretary Barrett, the National Defense Strategy 
called for ``broad revision of talent management among the Armed 
Services.'' The Army has taken the lead on this effort by deploying its 
Talent Management Task Force. When should we expect to see a similar 
shift in Air Force culture and subsequent execution of Air Force talent 
management reform?
    Secretary Barrett. Over the past several years, the Air Force has 
implemented significant changes and new processes to its talent 
management system. Similar to the Army's Talent Management Task Force, 
the Air Force has the Talent Management Innovation Cell: a small, full-
time team focused on creating innovative adjustments to policy and 
procedures to drive mission-focused behaviors and cultural change.
    One of our first moves revolutionized the assignment matching 
process with a new platform called Talent Marketplace. Modeled after 
the Nobel Prize winning National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), this 
platform created greater transparency, agility, and responsiveness in 
how we manage assignments while increasing each airman's voice and 
optimizing how we develop and employ our talent.
    Additionally, this past year we established six distinct 
competitive categories for active component field grade line officers. 
The new structure builds developmental agility to meet evolving mission 
needs, ultimately providing our joint partners and allies with better 
professional warfighters across our full spectrum of capabilities. The 
change also recognizes and caters to the need to deliver the 
appropriate education, training and unique career field experiences to 
build the bench of officers we need at all levels. This was the first 
major change to the officer development and promotion process since the 
establishment of the Air Force as a separate service in 1947.
    Another significant change made last year was implementing a board 
only process by removing the testing requirement for enlisted personnel 
meeting E-7 thru E-9 promotion boards. This optimizes our ability to 
select the best senior noncommissioned officers based on the whole-
person concept, with emphasis on performance. Similarly, for officers, 
this year we will exercise the authority to re-order officer promotion 
lists based on merit, helping us incentivize performance on a much 
greater scope than previously possible. Through all of this, we are 
modernizing our performance evaluation systems to better assess airmen 
according to what we value in performance; provide better insight into 
performance through lifetime evaluator averages; and yield more 
transparent feedback to airmen.
           air force rotc at elizabeth city state university
    2. Senator Tillis. Secretary Barrett, North Carolina has the most 
Historically Black College and University (HBCU) out of any state. Of 
our 11 HBCUs, Elizabeth City State University offers a four-year 
Bachelor of Science in Aviation Science Program that produces pilots, 
navigators, avionic technicians, and flight instructors to name a few. 
Elizabeth City State University and the U.S. Air Force could benefit in 
a myriad of ways with an Air Force ROTC Program. Do I have your 
commitment to consider establishing an Air Force ROTC program at 
Elizabeth City State University?
    Secretary Barrett. I am pleased to let you know this year Air Force 
Junior ROTC has partnered with Elizabeth City State University, 
enabling the Air Force to capitalize on the school's great aviation 
programs and continue to develop tomorrow's aviators. The Air Force is 
committed to diversity in our programs and currently has formal 
relationships with 46 HBCU's nationwide. This includes seven host Air 
Force ROTC Detachments and 39 cross-town relationships. North Carolina 
is well represented and leads in this area with two HBCU hosts 
(Fayetteville State University and North Carolina A&T State University) 
and six HBCU cross-town relationships.
                              isr programs
    3. Senator Tillis. Secretary Barrett, what is the replacement costs 
of the EQ-4 for a similar but manned platform, the EQ-11? Particularly, 
how is the MQ-9 Reaper and its longevity affected by this program 
replacement?
    Secretary Barrett. The cost to procure an E-11A Bombardier Global 
6000 aircraft and integrate the Battlefield Airborne Communications 
Node (BACN) payload onto the aircraft is $101.9 million. There is no 
correlation between the E-11A and the MQ-9 mission sets, thus there is 
no impact to MQ-9.
    The E-11A has multiple advantages over the EQ-4B to include 
operational flexibility allowing rapid deployments to anywhere in the 
world with a runway greater than 6,500 feet; the capacity to double its 
current payload size as new warfighter requirements emerge; and it has 
ample available power supply (four 40 kVA generators on E-11A versus 
one 25 kVA generator on an EQ-4B) to operate a larger and more capable 
payload. The EQ-4B requires time consuming mission planning and site 
setup to deploy, and it offers no additional space and power for 
equipment.

    4. Senator Tillis. Secretary Barrett, if we are expanding the 
mission set of EQ-11s, how will this affect their planned service life/
longevity, lifecycle of logistics, and survivability?
    Secretary Barrett. The E-11 role will not significantly increase, 
even with the retirement of EQ-4 Block 20, since it flies the majority 
of BACN support today. Retiring the EQ-4 remotely piloted aircraft in 
favor of the E-11A manned platform consolidates the current mixed 
fleet. A single aircraft fleet will provide enhanced capability and 
improved reliability to combatant commanders and reduce operating 
costs. Our budget request procures five additional E-11A aircraft at a 
rate of one per year, purchases/integrates BACN payload capability, and 
provides initial maintenance and sustainment support as required. The 
E-11A is more suited to the BACN mission and is survivable in this 
role.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
                         tyndall air force base
    5. Senator Scott. Secretary Barrett, can you give us an update on 
the rebuilding efforts at Tyndall AFB after the devastation of 
Hurricane Michael?
    Secretary Barrett. Rebuilding efforts at Tyndall Air Force Base are 
on schedule. We are spending over $362 million in Facility Sustainment, 
Restoration, and Modernization-funded, in-progress, repair projects, 
and the installation is transitioning from planning and design to 
acquisition of the $3 billion military construction program this 
spring. We expect to begin awarding construction contracts later this 
year. The Tyndall Program Management Office is closely monitoring what 
effects COVID-19 will have on reconstruction timelines; for now, 
reconstruction continues to proceed.

    6. Senator Scott. Secretary Barrett, does the Air Force still plan 
to make the rebuilt Tyndall a more modern and technologically-advanced 
base, and do you have the resources for that?
    Secretary Barrett. We will rebuild Tyndall Air Force Base as the 
Air Force's first Twenty First Century Installation. The base will 
benefit from modern construction techniques and the rebuild will 
incorporate advanced technologies. The end state will result in an 
installation resilient to future climatic threats. Presently, the Air 
Force is resourced to deliver the new Tyndall Air Force Base, but will 
keep Congress informed as contractor bids open this summer.
                            military housing
    7. Senator Scott. Secretary Barrett, can you give me an update on 
the base housing problems and how the solutions are working out to 
date?
    Secretary Barrett. The most important part of taking care of our 
airmen and space professionals and their families is providing a safe, 
secure environment for them to live and work. We continue to work 
closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other 
Services to share ideas, develop policies, and implement strategies to 
improve housing for our Service Members. Since my 3 December 2019 
hearing before this Committee, we have taken a number of steps to 
address housing concerns through our Military Housing Privatization 
Initiative Improvement Program. This program includes five lines of 
effort: empower residents, integrate leadership, improve 
communications, improve oversight, and standardize policies. Air Force 
leadership reviews a 51 item action plan on a weekly basis and we have 
addressed 38 (74 percent) of the actions to date. We will complete nine 
additional items in 2020, and complete the final four by March 2021.
    Empower Residents
    As of 3 April 2020, the Air Force toll-free housing call center has 
received 49 calls from residents and has resolved all but one issue, 
which is still being worked. As of 1 April 2020, residents of 61 of our 
63 installations can submit work orders electronically, and residents 
at 60 of our 63 installations can view the current status of their work 
order requests online. We are working with the other project owners to 
provide those capabilities at the remaining sites.
    In our fiscal year 2020 budget, we added a Resident Advocate 
position at each installation with more than 100 housing units. We 
classified and funded these positions in January 2020, and 
installations are currently in the process of hiring.
    Integrate Leadership
    We continue to emphasize that the health and safety of members is 
commander's business and we have codified commander roles and 
responsibilities in the new Air Force Instruction on housing published 
on 18 March 2020.
    Additionally, the Air Force is negotiating a revised incentive fee 
structure that raises the bar for project performance and provides a 
greater voice to installation commanders in determining whether project 
performance warrants the payment of incentive fees.
    Improve Communications
    The Air Force is revising the annual resident satisfaction survey 
to ensure residents are being asked consistent and precise questions 
about their experiences with privatized housing. Effective this year, 
the Air Force, rather than project owners, will administer the annual 
resident satisfaction survey, thereby allowing the Air Force greater 
visibility into the survey process and results.
    The Air Force revised its housing policies to require clear 
identification of the Military Housing Office staff, established 
Resident Councils, and clarified roles and responsibilities of the Air 
Force Military Housing Office personnel, project owner personnel, and 
Resident Advocates.
    Improve Oversight
    Our fiscal year 2020 budget also adds 148 new permanent positions 
for the Military Housing Offices to provide additional oversight of the 
entire privatized housing portfolio. Those new positions have been 
added to the installation's unit manning documents and hiring is 
underway.
    Quality and Performance Challenges
    In October 2019, the Air Force directed Balfour Beatty Communities, 
LLC (BBC) to submit a performance improvement plan to address its 
maintenance and work order practices at each of the 21 Air Force 
installations it manages. The Air Force approved the plan in February 
2020, and the Air Force will hold face-to-face progress reviews of the 
plan to ensure compliance and meaningful implementation and 
improvement.
    We have identified a fourth installation where facility design, 
construction, or materials are a key contributor to moisture and mold 
growth: Randolph Air Force Base, Texas. The Air Force now has 
additional oversight resources at four installations--Randolph Air 
Force Base, Texas; Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; Keesler Air Force 
Base, Mississippi; and MacDill Air Force Base, Florida--to assist in 
ongoing housing quality improvement efforts.
    At MacDill Air Force Base, Clark Realty has experienced systemic 
moisture issues due to breaches or a lack of vapor barriers in 241 
housing units constructed by the Air Force prior to privatization. 
Since 2017, Clark Realty has treated the mold and completed $4.7 
million in repair projects to correct the underlying causes of systemic 
moisture issues in 294 homes. An additional 68 homes are scheduled for 
repair with work to be completed in 2022 at a cost of $6.8 million. 
Additionally, the Air Force has put a Corrective Action Plan in place 
at MacDill to address work quality issues.

    8. Senator Scott. Secretary Barrett, the Tenant's Bill of Rights 
falls short of the expectations we laid out in last year's NDAA. Air 
Force families in Florida have faced and are still facing numerous 
problems with base housing. What are you doing to make sure military 
families are being fully supported?
    Secretary Barrett. On February 25, 2020, I joined the Secretary of 
Defense and the Secretaries of the Army and Navy in jointly issuing the 
Military Housing Privatization Initiative Tenant Bill of Rights. In 
doing so, we committed to work expeditiously to develop the processes 
to implement 15 of the 18 tenant rights established by the Fiscal Year 
2020 NDAA, to work with the project owners to incorporate these rights 
into appropriate legal documents, and to ensure all tenants are aware 
of their rights. Fourteen of these fifteen tenant rights are now 
available to our tenants. The remaining right is an electronic work 
order system for tenant requests; this capability is available at 61 of 
63 Air Force installations and will be available at the remaining two 
installations by 1 October 2020. The remaining three rights require 
additional work. Specifically, maintenance history, dispute resolution, 
and withholding of rent present implementation challenges as they 
require project owner, bond holder, and investor consent. We are also 
working closely with the DOD, the other Services, and project owners in 
an effort to implement these rights as expeditiously as possible.
    Since my 3 December 2019 hearing before this Committee, we have 
made progress on several additional measures to ensure military 
families have safe and habitable housing. Perhaps most significantly, 
in our fiscal year 2020 budget and as supported by the NDAA, we have 
added a Resident Advocate position at each of our installations with 
more than 100 housing units to assist our military residents with 
disputes, to connect them to the proper resources for their various 
needs, to include Exceptional Family Member Programs, and to 
communicate their needs to the installation leadership team. These 
positions were classified and funded in January and installations are 
in the hiring process at this time.
    Our fiscal year 2020 budget also added 148 permanent positions to 
our Military Housing Offices to provide additional oversight of the 
privatized housing portfolio. Those positions have been added to the 
installation's unit manning documents and they are hiring the permanent 
personnel at this time.
    The Air Force toll free housing call center has been in place since 
May 2019 and as of 3 April 2020 has received 47 calls from residents, 
resolving all but 1 issue which is still being worked.
    We have also been working with project owners to ensure residents 
can submit work orders electronically and can view the status of their 
work order requests. As of 1 April 2020, residents of 61 of 63 
installations can submit work orders electronically and residents at 60 
of our 63 installations can view the current status of their work order 
requests on-line. We are working with other project owners to provide 
these capabilities at the remaining sites.
    Finally, the Air Force has developed a pamphlet for housing 
residents that provides information on dispute resolution resources (to 
include legal assistance), clarifies the availability of legal 
assistance, and provides contact information for legal assistance. 
Additionally, on 1 May 2020, the Air Force implemented an interim 
policy on displaced families.
    As we move forward in this endeavor, our focus will remain on 
oversight, sustainment, and the long-term success of the privatized 
housing portfolio in order to provide safe and healthy housing for our 
air and space professionals.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                                 isr-t
    9. Senator Hawley. General Goldfein, what are the Air Force's plans 
for developing an ISR architecture that is persistent and resilient 
enough to provide targeting data for large numbers of targets near 
Taiwan in the early days of a potential war with China?
    General Goldfein. The Air Force has developed a Sensing Grid 
Concept as part of its development efforts for Joint All-Domain 
Operations. The concept includes the need for a resilient architecture 
that supports numerous targets in a wide range of scenarios and 
integrates data from an assemblage of sensors, platforms, people, 
devices, content, and services. This architecture will deliver accurate 
and timely characterization of the environment, to include 
identification and tracking of targets, enabling the Joint Force to 
maintain decision advantage during joint operations. In order to fully 
build out the concept, we are evaluating technologies against a range 
of threats in a range of scenarios through studies, modeling and 
simulation, experiments, and recurring combatant command-sponsored 
demonstrations. As our ``build, demonstrate, and adapt'' approach is 
getting underway, it will help us realize a Sensing Grid and Joint-All 
Domain Command and Control vision preparing the USAF for the next war 
rather than for a specific war.

    10. Senator Hawley. General Goldfein, what is the right mix of 
stealth and attritable assets in an ISR architecture that is persistent 
and resilient enough to provide targeting data for large numbers of 
targets near Taiwan in the early days of a potential war with China?
    General Goldfein. The Air Force has developed a Sensing Grid 
Concept as part of its development efforts for Joint All-Domain 
Operations. The concept will also require a yet undetermined mix of 
stealth, attritable, and manned/unmanned platforms to characterize 
numerous targets in an equally wide range of scenarios. We are 
evaluating technologies against various threats in a range of military 
operations under various environmental constraints. Studies, modeling 
and simulation, experiments, and recurring combatant command sponsored 
demonstrations will inform what the right mix is to enable the Sensing 
Grid concept and Joint-All Domain Command and Control vision. This will 
prepare the USAF for the next war rather than for a specific war.
                       advanced anti-ship weapons
    11. Senator Hawley. General Goldfein, what advanced anti-ship 
weapons does the Air Force have in its inventory besides LRASM?
    General Goldfein. Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is the only 
anti-ship weapon in the Air Force inventory.

    12. Senator Hawley. General Goldfein, how many non-LRASM advanced 
anti-ship weapons does the Air Force have or plan to procure within the 
FYDP?
    General Goldfein. The Air Force does not plan to procure additional 
non-LRASM advanced anti-ship weapons within the FYDP. LRASM is the sole 
anti-ship weapon the Air Force is procuring.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                 f-35a
    13. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, given the importance of 
the F-35A for the Air Force, I was pleased to see that the Air Force 
included procurement funding for 12 additional F-35A aircraft on its 
unfunded priorities list. But if the F-35A is such a priority, why is 
the Department diverting $156 million in F-35A advanced procurement 
funding--already appropriated by Congress in fiscal year 2020--to the 
border wall?
    Secretary Barrett. Although the Air Force cannot speak to OSD 
priorities, the $156 million for F-35A advanced procurement were un-
executable fiscal year 2020 dollars and therefore had no significant 
impacts on F-35 procurement timelines.

    14. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, how will this diversion 
increase risk to procurement timelines for the F-35A?
    Secretary Barrett. We do not foresee any increased risk to 
procurement timelines.

    15. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, how will this impact the 
readiness of our fifth-generation fleet?
    Secretary Barrett. We do not foresee any impacts to the F-22 or F-
35A fleets at this time.

    16. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, as adversaries like 
Russia and China build their 5th generation aircraft inventories, do 
you believe the air superiority the Air Force has previously enjoyed is 
challenged?
    General Goldfein. While adversary build-up of 5th generation 
aircraft doesn't preclude our ability to gain and maintain air 
superiority in and of itself, it does change the landscape and we 
should be mindful. Conceptually speaking, air superiority is much more 
involved than just aircraft platforms. This is why we remain focused on 
developing a family of capabilities that operate in and across the air, 
space, and cyberspace domains, so that we can wield air superiority at 
a time and place of our choosing.

    17. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, can you expand on the 
role and capability that a 5th generation tactical fighter aircraft 
like the F-35A provides in a near peer fight?
    General Goldfein. The role and capabilities of the F-35A and F-22 
are critically important to U.S. success in a near peer fight. These 
weapons systems enable air dominance in highly contested battlespaces 
that challenge our legacy fleet. Fifth generation aircraft use stealth 
to enable freedom to maneuver where legacy systems cannot, and use 
sensor fusion to quickly and accurately locate and identify threats and 
increase battlespace awareness across multiple domains. All these 
capabilities are essential to enhance our lethality across the Joint 
operational spectrum.

    18. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, can you expand on how our 
allies acquiring the F-35 facilitates interoperability, and strengthens 
our ability to deter and respond to the growing 5th generation fighter 
threat?
    General Goldfein. Integrated operations with allies and partners 
that employ the F-35 will be dramatically more lethal, survivable, and 
sustainable. A highly capable and connected force that can train and 
fight together with common capabilities and tactics is critical to 
outpacing and deterring our advancing adversaries.

    19. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, within our own Joint 
Force construct, can you speak to the capabilities gained by all the 
services moving to an F-35 variant and what advantages that affords us 
on the battlefield?
    General Goldfein. The F-35 is the quarterback of the joint force, 
using stealth and sensors to provide battlespace awareness for Joint, 
all-domain operations. With all three Services operating the F-35 we 
can deploy from main and forward operating air bases, the deck of an 
aircraft carrier, an amphibious assault ship, or takeoff from austere 
locations and provide the Joint Force integrated fifth-generation 
combat power virtually anywhere on the globe.

    20. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, can you provide an 
update on the plan to improve the Advanced Pilot Training program and 
ensure our 5th Generation pilots remain ready and capable of operating 
the F-35A?
    Secretary Barrett. The Air Force is actively pursuing innovations 
to modernize pilot training in light of the changing capabilities 
provided by 5th generation aircraft, as well as changing student 
learning methods and adaptation of technology to learning. The Advanced 
Pilot Training program (APT-X) explores how incorporating the T-7 into 
undergraduate pilot training drives instructional changes. APT-X is in 
the developmental phase, currently focused on developing syllabus 
requirements. Rather than simply plugging the T-7 into the existing 
training structure, adapting instruction to the new aircraft 
capabilities will enable undergraduate pilot training to prepare 
students to meet changing operational needs.
                          c-130h modernization
    21. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, last week, TRANSCOM 
Commander Gen Lyons testified that 60-70 percent of TRANSCOMs mobility 
capacity resides in the reserve component, including 50 percent of all 
tactical airlift. In 2006, the Air National Guard began exploring a 
modernization effort to install the NP-2000 propeller system made by 
Collins Aerospace in Windsor Locks onto the C-130H aircraft to 
modernize an outdated propulsion system. Over a decade later, the NP-
2000 program has been implemented at a snails pace. As you know, the 
legacy propellers are the same propellers that failed on a Marine Corps 
KC-130T in 2017 causing the death of 17 of our servicemembers. Last 
year, I sent a letter along with 16 of my Senate colleagues to the 
department of the Air Force asking you to expedite the approval of the 
new blades for the Air National Guard C-130H fleet. The current 
modernization pace will have this effort completed by 2034, considering 
the risk and proven undependability of the legacy system, this is 
unacceptable. In light of previous mishaps and the subsequent 
revelation of the serious risk to our Air Force C-130H aircrews while 
flying the legacy propeller, what is the proposed timeline for 
installation of the NP-2000 propeller on the C-130Hs like the ones we 
have in Connecticut?
    Secretary Barrett. Currently the NP2000 program is approved to 
produce, install, and sustain 44 total C-130H aircraft. The Air Force 
has already modified 12 aircraft. NP2000 installations for the 
remaining 32 aircraft started in March 2020, beginning with the Air 
National Guard unit in Reno, Nevada. Modification schedules are based 
on deployment timelines and mission profiles. At current funding 
levels, we project completing these remaining 32 aircraft in fiscal 
year 2022. If we continue to receive funding at the current rate beyond 
that, we are projected to complete NP2000 installs on the remainder of 
the C-130H fleet (up to 115 additional aircraft) in fiscal year 2034.

    22. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, due to the risk 
associated with the legacy propeller, would you support an increase to 
3-4 aircraft per month if Congress appropriated additional funding to 
support the increased production costs?
    Secretary Barrett. Should congress appropriate additional funds, it 
is possible the Air Force could accelerate the modification.

    23. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, the fiscal year 2021 
President's Budget plans to retire 45 C-130Hs and 5 squadrons--4 in the 
Guard and 1 in the Air Force Reserves. What are the impacts to 
TRANSCOM's ability to meet the 300 tactical airlift identified by the 
Mobility Capability Requirements Study as required to meet the National 
Defense Strategy?
    General Goldfein. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 
2018 (MCRS-18) identified the current fleet of 300 Total Aircraft 
Inventory (TAI) as ``sufficient'' to meet the requirements of the 
National Defense Strategy (NDS). Within all AF core functional areas 
(as directed/guided by the NDS) there is a spectrum of risk that can be 
assessed based on simultaneity, theater specificity, and joint/
coalition collaboration. Theater risk thresholds are currently being 
refined and will inform the congressionally mandated MCRS-20. United 
States Transportation Command (USTC) and the Air Force are working in 
concert to balance the risk we take in reducing the tactical airlift 
fleet with being able to reasonably meet NDS intent and theater 
requirements.
    The AF's decision to reduce the tactical airlift fleet below 300 
TAI is based on taking an acceptable amount of risk within this mission 
set (as established by MCRS-18 and as anticipated by MCRS-20 
preliminary findings) as well as the need/direction to focus resources 
on the future force and near-peer competition.

    24. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, can you expand on the 
rationale behind this decision and what risk is being assumed?
    General Goldfein. The NDS has provided clear guidance that our 
focus should be on winning the future fight against near-peer 
competition, and that we should not be funding programs on legacy 
platforms that do not contribute to that guidance. Specifically stated 
``we cannot expect success fighting tomorrow's conflicts with 
yesterday's weapons or equipment'' (NDS, pg. 8)
    Investing in capabilities to win future high-end competition 
requires the Air Force to take risk in force structure that has a less 
defined role in high-end competition. Given the current capability of 
the tactical airlift fleet, the AF is taking a measured amount of 
acceptable risk that we believe is excess capacity in terms of the 
fleet's contribution to the future fight.
                c-130j funding diversion to border wall
    25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, in addition to my 
concerns about C-130H modernization and the need for upgraded NP2000 
propellers in order to improve the safety of our Air National Guard 
aircrews, I am also deeply concerned about the diversion of 
congressionally-appropriated fiscal year 2020 funds for the C-130J. One 
hundred sixty-nine million dollars that will go to the border wall, 
instead of two cargo planes for the Air National Guard. The Adjutant 
General in Connecticut--General Evon--expressed that this diversion 
will negatively impact the Connecticut National Guard, and unfairly 
disadvantage the Air National Guard as a whole. In addition to 
supporting the tactical airlift required to meet the needs of the 
National Defense Strategy, the Air National Guard provides a unique 
capability to provide domestic support during natural disasters. What 
is the impact of the recent decision to divert $169 million of C-130J 
procurement funding to the border wall on the readiness and 
capabilities of the Air National Guard?
    Secretary Barrett. The diversion of C-130J procurement funding 
reduces the total from four aircraft to two. That change essentially 
delays the Air National Guard's ability to recapitalize a fourth 
operational C-130H unit to the C-130J. A basing action currently 
underway in the Air Force's Strategic Basing Process will recapitalize 
three of the ANG's existing 13 operational C-130H units.
    Each Air National Guard operational squadron is currently comprised 
of eight total aircraft; seven Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) and 
one Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI). Thus, a minimum of seven (eight 
preferred based on training/readiness, mission taskings and depot/
modernization) is required in order to recapitalize a unit. Procurement 
totals below this threshold can still be fielded as BAI at existing ANG 
C-130J units and contribute to aircraft availability and unit 
readiness. Mixing C-130Hs & C-130Js at the same unit is not feasible 
since C-130H and C-130J aircraft have significant differences and 
separate qualifications for Operations and Maintenance personnel.

    26. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, how will this decision 
degrade our ability to meet the 300 tactical airlift requirement 
identified to execute the National Defense Strategy?
    General Goldfein. The diversion of C-130J procurement funding 
reduces the total from four aircraft to two. That change essentially 
delays the Air National Guard's ability to recapitalize a fourth 
operational C-130H unit to the C-130J. A basing action currently 
underway in the Air Force's Strategic Basing Process will recapitalize 
three of the ANG's existing 13 operational C-130H units.
    Each Air National Guard operational squadron is currently comprised 
of eight total aircraft; seven Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) and 
one Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI). Thus, a minimum of seven (eight 
preferred based on training/readiness, mission taskings and depot/
modernization) is required in order to recapitalize a unit. Procurement 
totals below this threshold can still be fielded as BAI at existing ANG 
C-130J units and contribute to aircraft availability and unit 
readiness. Mixing C-130Hs & C-130Js at the same unit is not feasible 
since C-130H and C-130J aircraft have significant differences and 
separate qualifications for Operations and Maintenance personnel.The 
Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2018 (MCRS-18) identified 
the current fleet of 300 TAI as ``sufficient'' to meet the requirements 
of the NDS. Within all Air Force core functional areas (as directed/
guided by the NDS) there is a spectrum of risk that can be assessed 
based on simultaneity, theater specificity, and joint/coalition 
collaboration. Theater risk thresholds are currently being refined and 
will inform the congressionally mandated MCRS-20. United States 
Transportation Command (USTC) and the Air Force are working in concert 
to balance the risk we take in reducing the tactical airlift fleet with 
being able to reasonably meet NDS intent and theater requirements.
    The AF's decision to reduce the tactical airlift fleet below 300 
TAI is based on taking an acceptable amount of risk within this mission 
set (as established by MCRS-18 and as anticipated by MCRS-20 
preliminary findings) as well as the need/direction to focus resources 
on the future force and near-peer competition.

    27. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, will this cut in funding 
impact the C-130H modernization efforts?
    General Goldfein. No. This TAI reduction does not change the Air 
Force's four-pronged approach to C-130H modifications (safety, 
compliance, modernization, partial recapitalization).

    28. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, given the constrained 
fiscal environment and recent cuts to the C-130J program, would you 
agree that C-130H modernization and the installation of the NP-2000 is 
a good way to meet National Defense Strategy requirements?
    General Goldfein. The NP-2000 propeller does not affect the Air 
Force's ability to meet the requirements of the National Defense 
Strategy.
                  hypersonic research and development
    29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, both Russia and China 
are developing credible hypersonic weapons programs that present 
significant challenges to the United States ability to maintain 
strategic deterrence. The fiscal year 2021 President's Budget allocates 
$3.2 billion towards the development of hypersonic weapons. The Navy, 
Army, and Air Force are all involved in the development of hypersonic 
weapons, including the Air Force's Hypersonic Conventional Strike 
Weapon and the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon. I am fully 
supportive of maintaining our qualitative edge in this technology, and 
accelerating hypersonic defense capabilities. From an oversight 
perspective, the rapid growth in hypersonic research has the potential 
to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate 
capabilities and increase costs. I am very interested in how these 
efforts are being economized, how information is being shared between 
services, and your thoughts on the role hypersonic should play in the 
future of our National Defense Strategy. Given the lack of defined 
mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, can you speak to how the 
Air Force is conducting responsible and coordinated research, 
development, training, and evaluation to ensure that there are not 
redundant efforts in development and cost?
    Secretary Barrett. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is 
committed to minimizing redundant efforts in research, development, 
training, and evaluations by collaborating with the Department of the 
Army (DA), Department of the Navy (DON), Missile Defense Agency (MDA), 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), and Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon 
(ARRW), our flagship hypersonic weapon prototype program, is built upon 
a hypersonic glide vehicle made possible through decades of Air Force 
Research Laboratory (AFRL) Science and Technology (S&T) investment most 
recently matured through a joint AFRL/DARPA Tactical Boost Glide 
advanced development demonstration program. The ARRW program is 
dependent on the success of the Tactical Boost Glide program to deliver 
the glide vehicle which is concurrently being integrated with a 
tactical booster and warhead to demonstrate and deliver an 
operationally relevant prototype by fiscal year 2022. As part of the 
DAF/DARPA efforts, an Executive Steering Group has been developed to 
ensure an efficient transition of the glide vehicle design and test 
data to the ARRW prototyping program.
    To reduce the risk, the Air Force invested in a second hypersonic 
prototype, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW). This 
prototype was based on the flight-tested OSD Conventional Prompt Strike 
(CPS) Hypersonic Glide Vehicle and is also the basis of near term Army 
and Navy Hypersonic Weapon programs. To ensure cooperation and 
reduction in duplication or competition for scarce resources across the 
Services, the DAF signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between OSD, 
DA, DON, DAF, and MDA for Hypersonic Boost Glide Technology 
Development. The MOA created a multi-service and agency board of 
directors that has resulted in a sharing of knowledge, analysis, and 
test results, as well as early industry involvement to transition 
laboratory designs to industry for the CPS Hypersonic Glide Body. In 
fiscal year 2020, the DAF made a decision to halt HCSW after conclusion 
of the Critical Design Review and focus resources on ARRW. With the 
decision to halt the HCSW program, the DAF continues to support the 
Army Hypersonic Project Office by developing co-use agreements for the 
accredited HCSW classified Local Area Network/Wide Area Network and 
development infrastructure that currently connects the prime contractor 
Lockheed Martin facilities at Sunnyvale, Denver, and Huntsville.
    Additionally, the DAF works closely to harmonize S&T investments, 
critical test infrastructure investments, and lessons-learned across 
on-going hypersonics programs across the DOD.

    30. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, what are you doing to 
develop and implement an integrated science and technology roadmap for 
hypersonics that promotes information sharing?
    General Goldfein. The DAF has a robust continuing investment in S&T 
as well as a targeted acquisition-focused weapon prototype program. The 
Air Force Research Lab's (AFRL) High Speed Strike Weapon (HSSW) 
Technology Maturation portfolio manages a deliberate technology and 
experimentation investment in hypersonics. For example, in HSSW, AFRL 
is investing in multiple enabling technologies such as tactical solid 
rocket boosters; air-breathing hypersonic propulsion systems; fuzes for 
hypersonics applications; and guidance, navigation, and control 
components for hypersonic vehicles. These investments also include 
advanced technology demonstrations such as the AFRL/DARPA Tactical 
Boost Glide and the AFRL/DARPA Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon Concept 
development demonstration program.
    Furthermore, the DAF is working with OUSD(R&E) on the completion of 
the Hypersonics S&T Roadmap. The effort includes the combined S&T 
activities throughout the DOD from DAF, DA, DON, MDA, and DARPA to 
minimize duplication of efforts and ensure the services are informed 
investors across the FYDP.
    Finally, the DAF is working with academia and international 
partners to ensure collaboration amongst our national academic 
institutions and with our allies. In the S&T community, the Air Force 
Office of Scientific Research is leading the way with the Boundary 
Layer Transition (BOLT) project which looks to provide better design 
tools for hypersonic vehicles. BOLT consists of researchers from 
universities, NASA, and international partners such as The German 
Aerospace Center. Additionally, the DAF is partnering with OSD's Allied 
Partner Initiative to further develop the AFRL/DARPA Hypersonic Air-
Breathing Weapon Concept demonstrator towards a scramjet powered 
hypersonic weapon prototype.

    31. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, how do you assess that 
the fielding of offensive hypersonic weapons affect strategic 
stability?
    General Goldfein. Strategic stability fundamentally depends on the 
ability of the United States and its strategic competitors, China and 
Russia, to either deny the benefit of aggression or impose unacceptable 
costs. The nuclear deterrent capabilities of the United States, China, 
and Russia are the basis of strategic stability. My assessment is 
hypersonic weapons are unlikely to impact the effectiveness of our or 
their nuclear deterrence postures, and that strategic stability will be 
sustained even as hypersonic weapons are fielded.

    32. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, what more do you think 
that Congress should be doing to ensure that we are keeping pace with 
our near peer adversaries in hypersonics? Do you agree that we are 
approaching a ``hypersonics arms race'' with Russia or China?
    Secretary Barrett. Though the United States has a long history in 
hypersonic research and development, we may no longer maintain the 
technological advantage to field the first operational hypersonic 
weapon. China and Russia are developing and testing their own 
hypersonic weapons and are close to fielding an operational capability.
    The Air Force needs steady and predictable funding for the ARRW to 
stay on track to deliver an early operational capability in Fiscal Year 
2022, which we anticipate will be the Nation's first operational 
hypersonic weapon.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                       air force power projection
    33. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, please explain the concept of 
Agile Combat Employment.
    General Goldfein. Agile Combat Employment (ACE) is an operational 
concept, first championed by PACAF and now evolved across every MAJCOM, 
which enables distributed employment of air power. ACE focuses on the 
ability to disperse, recover, and rapidly resume operations in a 
contested or austere environment. It involves rapid deployment to a 
variety of locations, and involves a fusion of operations with command 
and control, logistics, protection, and base operating support 
functions. It is a modern effort facilitating a shift away from the 
hyper-efficient, specialized operations of recent decades towards the 
redundancy, resiliency, decentralized control and decentralized 
execution required to enable an effective campaign against a near-peer 
adversary.

    34. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett, regarding Agile Combat 
Employment, what nations in the Pacific theater have been approached 
thus far as possible locations for these forward projected teams and 
assets?
    Secretary Barrett. At this time, we are examining and refining 
potential location options through analysis and wargaming support. 
Factors in play in the trade space are bases, force structure, platform 
ranges and Air Base Defense design among other factors. That said, the 
Air Force has already engaged key allies and partners like the FVEYs, 
Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore to discuss the Concepts of 
Operations for Agile Combat Employment and where opportunities may 
exist for aligning concepts and capabilities.

    35. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, will the Hawaii Air National 
Guard receive KC-46s or KC-Y/Z as backfills for their current 8 KC-
135s?
    General Goldfein. The Hawaii Air National Guard is not slated to 
recapitalize within the first 179 KC-46As.

    36. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, if not, what is the 
replacement or recapitalization plan for the 8 KC-135s the Hawaii Air 
National Guard operates?
    General Goldfein. The KC-135 aircraft will continue to remain a 
critical part of our tanker inventory for the foreseeable future. 
Across the total force, we will work to ensure the KC-135s are 
modernized. This effort includes all Total Force units, to include the 
Hawaii Air National Guard.
                     suicide rates in the air force
    37. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, the Air 
Force had 137 suspected suicides last year, the highest number since 
the service began tracking suicide in 2008. This 2019 figure includes 
Active Duty, Reserve, Guard and Air Force civilians and compares to 103 
suicides across the service in 2018 a 33 percent increase. The report 
noted that aircraft maintenance and security forces are consistently 
the career fields with the highest number of suicide deaths. I 
understand you have been beta testing the ``True North Task Force'' on 
a few bases. What does this task force do?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. The Air Force takes the 
physical and mental health of our airmen and space professionals 
seriously and is committed to suicide prevention. Airmen, space 
professionals and their families face various situations that impact 
their Comprehensive Airman Fitness (physical, mental, social, and 
spiritual). We seek to provide our forces with the resources and 
culture to seek help and successfully decrease the risk of harming 
themselves and others, increase mission readiness, and ultimately save 
lives.
    In December 2016, Task Force True North was created to beta test 
initiatives that bring resiliency resources closer to our airmen and 
drive a culture that accepts, embraces, and drives help-seeking 
behavior. The three primary elements of the concept are to 1) engage 
forces and families early; 2) normalize help-seeking behavior as a 
strength; and 3) decentralize--push help to where our forces are (at 
the squadron or group).
    The Task Force identified four beta test installations. At the 
Maintenance Groups and Mission Support Groups at each of those 
installations, they embedded a contract Licensed Clinical Social Worker 
at each squadron, a contract Mental Health Technician at each group, 
and a Religious Support Team (a Chaplain and Religious Affairs Airman) 
at each group. Additionally, they installed an installation Program 
Manager at the Wing, and provided funding assistance to create an 
integrated installation Welcome Center with Wing Commander-owned 
sponsorship and on-boarding program.
    In September 2018, the Air Force Community Action Board, Chaired by 
the VCSAF, directed the Task Force to begin program actions to initiate 
a DAF wide expansion beginning in fiscal year 2021. The first expansion 
set in fiscal year 2021 rolls it out fully to all four beta test 
installations and targets an additional 12 installations. The fiscal 
year 2021 budget begins a long effort to scale the program across the 
DAF. The key to scaling the program is two-fold: 1) identify the 
installations within the DAF with the historically highest risk for 
negative outcomes; and 2) identify the unit types within the DAF with 
the historically highest risk for negative outcomes. The roll-out 
begins at the top of the installation priority list and couples that 
with the highest priority units and builds the embedding effort to fill 
those unit needs first. Once those highest priority units are addressed 
in the first group of expansion installations, the roll-out progresses 
to the next highest priority units at those installations, and so 
forth.

    38. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, have 
there been any indicators of success thus far?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. The True North team has 
certainly reflected indicators of success. True North Team's impact is 
assessed in two ways: 1) output numbers of airmen seeking help; and 2) 
a qualitative assessment provided by the RAND Corporation.
    The output numbers are collected via monthly reports submitted by 
the embedded mental health providers and the Religious Support Teams at 
each installation. These monthly reports reflect the immediate impact 
of embedded behavioral health providers, demonstrating a clear demand 
signal on the part of our personnel. Although anticipated that it could 
take up to 6 months for personnel to begin engaging the services of the 
embedded provider, reports from some units reflected that within a 
month unit personnel were waiting in line to speak with the embedded 
provider. By the one year point, across the 12 groups in the beta test, 
the embedded Licensed Clinical Social Workers were conducting 300-600 
individual engagements per month, spending 240-385 hours per month in 
counseling sessions. Likewise, the Religious Support Teams were 
conducting 170-270 individual engagements per month.
    The key issues addressed by the embedded providers and the 
Religious Support Teams were: relationships, anxiety, depression, life 
skills, work stress, coping skills and substance (i.e. alcohol) use. 
Engaging these types of issues early--before they become toxic--is 
critical to reducing negative outcomes such as suicide, domestic 
violence, workplace violence and child maltreatment.
    Additionally, the DAF contracted RAND to conduct a qualitative 
analysis of the beta test impact. After interviewing leadership 
(squadron, group and wing), providers, and airmen, they concluded there 
was great value in the combined effect of the welcome centers, mental 
health providers and spiritual providers. The DAF is awaiting release 
of the final report.
    Other indicators of success, such as genuine decreases in negative 
outcomes, lasting culture change, and potential decreases in long-term 
VA care costs, must be measured over many years and the data are 
therefore many years away.

    39. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, when 
will results of the beta test be available?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. As of Friday, 19 June, RAND 
reported that they were in the process of sending the draft final 
report to SAF/PA. This is part of the review process, because in order 
for it to be released, it needs three AF reviewers that are outside of 
the sponsoring office and SAF/PA assists. This part of the process 
typically takes little time, so they expect the actual report to 
release soon. They did not provide a date for release.

    40. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, what do 
you need from Congress to help save lives?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. Funding promising solutions 
to increase airmen and space professional resilience, connection, and 
help seeking are critical to saving lives. The fiscal year 2021 True 
North budget begins a long effort to scale the program across the DAF. 
Funding for the program has increased significantly from $9.9 million 
in fiscal 2019 and 2020 to $53.3 million in the fiscal year 2021 budget 
request. This is just the start. We are preparing to assess the True 
North needs of our Guard and Reserve Total Force members while pursuing 
a comprehensive approach to suicide prevention that leverages 
partnerships with academia, industry, and other government 
organizations. We need Congress to continue to fund these efforts to 
increase the readiness and lethality of our Force.
                   sexual harassment and retaliation
    41. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, a 
recent Pentagon report on sexual assault at the Air Force Academy 
estimated that 90 percent of sexual assaults went unreported and that 
reporting rates consistently declined over the past 6 years. I am on 
the Board of Visitors at the Air Force Academy and I remain concerned 
that not enough has been done to combat this culture. How will the Air 
Force fix this issue at the Academy and across the Air Force?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. USAF Academy reporting was 
consistent from academic year 16/17 to 17/18 (23 reports each year) 
with a rise in academic year 18/19 (40 reports). With the rise in 
prevalence, the DAF began a comprehensive, integrated, and holistic 
approach to violence prevention that addresses common factors 
underlying interpersonal and self-directed violence (ISDV): sexual 
assault, domestic violence, child maltreatment, suicide, and workplace 
violence. The DAF initiated a 3-phase sexual assault prevention 
strategy that focuses on systematically addressing risk factors for 
sexual assault using proven policy and programs.
    1. Developing a comprehensive strategic plan including proactive 
universal and selected development and interventions to address ISDV 
prevention at various points across the DAF lifecycle for airmen and 
space professionals (accession, basic and tech training, operational 
unit, and Professional Military Education (PME); delivering more 
effective problem solving skills (e.g. coping and emotion regulation) 
and fostering a culture of connectedness to prepare air and space 
professionals to face any adversity;
    2. Relying on evidence-based research/interventions to reduce 
perpetration, victimization, and re-victimization. As an example, 
research shows these adapted interventions can reduce sexual assault 
victimization and perpetration by 50-60 percent; and,
    3. Ensuring integrated policy, processes, and assessments, while 
providing functional leadership for installation-level prevention 
strategists and collaborating with others to mobilize best practices 
and maximize results.
    This approach is a paradigm shift for how the Department has been 
addressing sexual assault prevention. It focuses on what Air and Space 
professionals are, can, and will do rather than relying on what leaders 
tell them to do. The DAF is focused on reducing prevalence while 
increasing victim reporting to seek care.
             air force's advanced battle management system
    42. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, the DOD 
Budget for fiscal year 2021 requests investment in Joint All-Domain 
Command and Control JADC2 to ``create an agile, interoperable Joint 
Force that can fight with a fully networked platforms, sensors, 
weapons, and command and control capabilities'' even in contested 
environments. The backbone of this JADC2 effort appears to be the Air 
Force's Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). The Air Force has 
requested a budgetary increase to pay for increased experimentation and 
technology advancement of the JADC2 system. Will the Air Force continue 
to be the lead on the supporting infrastructure for the entire Joint 
Force? If not who will maintain and continue to build out the JADC2 
system?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. The Department of the Air 
Force leads the development of the Advanced Battle Management System 
(ABMS), the battle network of the joint force that enables Joint All-
Domain Command and Control (JADC2). ABMS also connects with 
complementary networks across each of our sister Services. The 
Department of the Air Force is working closely with the Department of 
Defense's JADC2 Cross Functional Team--led by DOD Chief Information 
Officer Dana Deasy and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen 
John Hyten--as they ensure each Service builds interoperable 
capabilities that support JADC2. The Department of the Air Force is 
also the lead for the development of the DOD Concept for Global Command 
and Control on behalf of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.

    43. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, how do you plan to mitigate 
cyber attacks on the JADC2 system?
    General Goldfein. The ABMS is being developed with security from 
the beginning rather than as a consideration once the technology has 
been built. All ABMS software will be developed using our platformONE 
approach, following the software principles described in the ``DOD 
Enterprise DevSecOps Reference Design'' published in August 2019, where 
DevSecOps refers to the continuous iteration of development, security, 
and operations. This reference design incorporates security into the 
development pipeline and enables a continuous Authority to Operate (c-
ATO) and the transportability of reliable code across multiple 
platforms in secure software ``containers.''
    Software developed for ABMS will include continuous monitoring and 
robust authentication measures at all layers. Further, the meshONE 
network is software defined, meaning it is rapidly configurable which 
will provide added security protection to re-form the network or 
isolate potential threats. Finally, ABMS is also developing zero trust 
capabilities that extend beyond the traditional, but limited, 
``perimeter defense'' approach to an in-network defense approach. 
Together, these methods ensure a robust and multi-faceted approach to 
technological development, deployment, and execution of the 
capabilities that will make up the battle network for JADC2.

    44. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, are you getting support for 
this effort from the whole of government?
    General Goldfein. Secretary Barrett, Chief Raymond, and I could not 
develop these critical capabilities nor develop them at the speed of 
relevance were it not for the continued support and leadership of 
Congress. The authorities and resources provided to the Department of 
the Air Force from Congress for the ABMS have enabled us to truly 
pursue the required integration of our capable, but too often 
disconnected, platforms our warfighting leadership and combatant 
commanders need to fight and win in the National Defense Strategy 
environment. The ABMS team is also partnering with the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community agencies, and 
the Coast Guard on key initiatives.

    45. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett, does the Air Force have all 
the authorities it requires to succeed with JADC2?
    Secretary Barrett. At this time, the Department of the Air Force 
has all the authorities it requires to pursue JADC2 through ABMS 
development. In the event additional authorities are required, the 
Department will propose them through the appropriate channels.
                         space control squadron
    46. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, last 
Fall, the Air Force indicated Barking Sands Pacific Missile Range 
Facility in Kauai as the preferred location for a Pacific-based Space 
Control Squadron operated by the Hawaii Air National Guard. What is the 
status of this Space Control Squadron?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. We are currently conducting 
the environmental analysis and anticipate completion in the summer of 
2021. After a thorough review of the environmental impacts, we 
anticipate a final basing decision in late summer or early fall of 
2021.

    47. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, when 
will the unit be activated?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. We anticipate activating 
the squadron in fall of 2021.
                          space force creation
    48. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, with 
the creation of Space Force, is the Air Force currently adequately 
manned to cover the personnel needs of both the Space and Air Force?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. Even with the creation of 
the Space Force, the Department of the Air Force is too small for what 
our Nation needs. Our Air and Cyber, as well as Space, missions require 
more personnel than requested in the Fiscal Year 2021 President's 
Budget but our approach and budget request recognize fiscal realities 
and the need to balance manpower with readiness and modernization.
    Over the Future Years' Defense Plan, we plan for moderate end 
strength growth for both the Air and Space Forces while balancing those 
missions amongst cost limitations. For the Space Force, we project 
additional growth and end strength transfers from the Air Force, Army, 
and Navy to meet the demands of today's space missions and the mission 
growth required to effectively protect, defend and provide space 
capabilities in a contested domain.
    The Department will continue evaluating and striking a balance for 
the right number of personnel against mission, readiness, 
modernization, and fiscal dynamics.

    49. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, you 
can't grow airmen with specialized Space control education overnight 
and will need to train airmen in space operations. What do you 
anticipate the need for increased personnel to be and by when?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. Last year, we briefed we 
needed an additional 1,900 billets to stand up the Space Force. This 
number represents essential requirements to stand up not only our 
Headquarters but mission-focused capabilities, which we are addressing 
through establishing key Centers or Center-equivalents for the space 
domain--Doctrine Center; Warfare Center; Intelligence Center; 
Professional Military Education (PME) Center; Test Center; and 
Personnel Center.
    As the question states, there are additional manpower requirements 
coming in the next several years based on the need to add space control 
units and capabilities to account for cand forecast threats. As our 
servicematures and threats by our adversaries grow, our projections 
will be similarly updated to best reflect the resources required to 
protect and defend our interests in space.
    We are taking a ``clean sheet'' approach to infuse innovation and 
improvement, streamlining processes to reduce costs, save money, and 
appropriately steward Department resources. Across the FYDP, we are 
using existing resources to establish the Space Force within existing 
DOD topline, made possible by the support of Congress and the DOD.

    50. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, when 
will Space Force achieve budgetary independence from the Air Force or 
will it?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. Program Objective 
Memorandum process will allow Gen Raymond to independently advocate for 
Space Force mission requirements, funding needs, and other key 
resources essential for a separate service. Having an independent 
budget will allow us to continue to advocate for DOD resources so we 
can protect and defend the space domain.
    Moving forward, the Space Force must have stable and consistent 
funding to enable it to address growing threats in the space domain. 
The Space Force is committed to minimizing cost and bureaucracy, but 
its end strength and budget should reflect rising threats from our 
adversaries.
    Under one Department, the Space Force will continue to have close 
ties to the Air Force. The Space Force will leverage the Air Force for 
more than 80 percent of its enabling functions like business systems 
management, financial management, and auditing to significantly reduce 
cost and avoid duplication of support functions.

    51. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, what do 
you envision the role of the Air National Guard to be under the Space 
Force?
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. National Guard and Reserve 
space units play a critical role in space missions today. Both Reserve 
and Guard units provide strategic depth for U.S. space operations, 
while also recruiting and retaining personnel with unique civilian 
experiences across this enterprise.
    At this time, existing Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve 
space units are aligned with and can continue to integrate effectively 
with the U.S. Space Force for the foreseeable future.
    We have the unique opportunity to consider a clean sheet, 21st 
century approach to Active Duty /Reserve Component roles and human 
capital management specially designed for our mission set. We are 
currently developing and analyzing innovative options for the new 
Service, and will discuss the options with Congress once our analysis 
is complete.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                          jrotc flight academy
    52. Senator Jones. Secretary Barrett, in last year's NDAA, Congress 
encouraged the Air Force to continue and to expand the JROTC Flight 
Academy program, and Congress appropriated funds for the program in the 
fiscal year 2020 bill. This very successful program provides a 
phenomenal opportunity for a diverse pool of young people to gain 
pilot's certifications and to help address the pilot shortage in both 
civilian and military aviation.

    Please provide an update on the fiscal year 2020 Flight Academy 
program.
    Secretary Barrett. The Air Force Junior Reserve Officer Training 
Corps (JROTC) Flight Academy is in its third year of execution. The Air 
Force funded 200 Air Force JROTC cadets to attend the Flight Academy in 
summer fiscal year 2020 (fiscal year 2018 funded 120 and fiscal year 
2019 funded 150). Additionally, this year approximately 20 ROTC and 10 
Civil Air Patrol Cadets will attend. The program has also grown to 17 
partnering universities, of which 4 are Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities. Moreover, this year the program reached 51 percent 
overall diversity for the first time (fiscal year 2018 equals 40 
percent and fiscal year 2019 equals 45 percent), the largest growth in 
demographic groups was young women. This number remains significant as 
AFJROTC boasts almost 900 high schools and 125,000 cadets. As you know, 
overall AFJROTC cadets are 58 percent minority and 40 percent female. 
Air Force JROTC has requested $250,000 through the Air Force Rated 
Diversity initiative, for communication and marketing as the Air Force 
continues to work to reach these underrepresented communities and to 
pull a more diverse talent pool towards aviation.

    53. Senator Jones. Secretary Barrett, is the Air Force committed to 
funding this program for fiscal year 2021?
    Secretary Barrett. Yes, the Air Force remains committed to adding 
$8.4 million in fiscal year 2021 which provides for 400 scholarships: 
300 AFJOTC cadets, 20 ROTC, 20 Civil Air Patrol, and for the first 
time, 10 USAFA cadets and 50 young people who will compete for slots 
through a collaborative effort between Air Force JROTC, Air Force 
Recruiting Service and several Nation-wide ``affinity'' groups such as 
Women in Aviation and the Organization of Black Aerospace 
Professionals.

    54. Senator Jones. Secretary Barrett, have you considered its 
expansion and if so, please describe your plans.
    Secretary Barrett. The Air Force continues to look for ways to 
develop a diverse talent pool. As such, the Air Force views JROTC as an 
``untapped human resources asset'' for the Nation. Investing in these 
cadets brings a positive return on investment for the Air Force and the 
Nation. The long-term goal for the program is to maintain funding for 
500 scholarships annually, with 400 earmarked for Air Force JROTC and 
100 allocated for other Air Force student groups.
                     space command basing decision
    55. Senator Jones. Secretary Barrett, Space Command was 
reestablished in 2019 as a combatant command. The Air Force has still 
not announced the location of that combatant command's headquarters. By 
every measure, Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville is the best choice to be 
the home of SPACECOM HQ. Can give me an update on the process and 
timeline for this basing decision?
    Secretary Barrett. With the establishment of the United States 
Space Force, the Department of the Air Force, on behalf of the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, re-evaluated the basing action for United 
States Space Command. Our revised approach leveraged best practices 
from the Department of the Air Force strategic basing process and the 
Army's recent Futures Command stationing action.
    We announced the revised approach with the screening and evaluation 
criteria on 15 May. The revised approach expands the number of eligible 
locations for the USSPACECOM headquarters, and gives communities an 
opportunity to self-nominate based on the approved screening and 
evaluation criteria.
    We anticipate making a final selection for the preferred location 
and reasonable alternative(s) in early 2021 subject to compliance with 
the National Environmental Policy Act. In the meantime, Peterson Air 
Force Base, Colorado, will remain the provisional location for the 
headquarters of U.S. Space Command until a permanent headquarters 
location is selected and facilities are ready in approximately six 
years.
                      aerial refueling shortfalls
    56. Senator Jones. General Goldfein, in order to alleviate the 
already high stress on the aerial refueling fleet and to assure we have 
the capacity to meet the needs of a high-intensity conflict if we are 
going to retire our tankers before their replacements are operationally 
ready, has the Air Force considered options to increase capacity, 
rather than just ways to manage a decrease in capacity, such as 
aircraft leases or commercial air refueling service contracts?
    General Goldfein. Yes, the Air Force is actively considering 
options to increase the aerial refueling fleet capacity. We are 
currently working in coordination with United States Transportation 
Command and Air Mobility Command on assessing the feasibility, 
affordability, and advisability of using contractor-operated aerial 
refueling aircraft to support Air Force receiver requirements. A 
business case analysis is required to analyze the current tanker air 
refueling shortfall to determine whether commercial contract air 
refueling might be a viable option for the Air Force.



                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
 FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 
                                PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 2020

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in room 
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, 
Cramer, McSally, Scott, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Manchin, 
Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. The meeting will come to order.
    The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the 
Department of Defense (DOD) Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request.
    I welcome our witnesses and thank them for their service, 
both Dr. Mark Esper and General Mark--we've got a pair of 
``Marks'' this morning.
    This Committee's top priority is ensuring the effectiveness 
and implementation of the National Defense Strategy. That's our 
vote that we have been adhering to for a long period of time 
now, about 3 years.
    Unfortunately, under the last administration, we asked our 
military to do more with less, and that got us into trouble. 
Between 2012-2017, we lost $150 billion to sequestration, our 
defense budget and the readiness of our forces were devastated. 
I think we all understand that. As a result, when President 
Trump came to office, he inherited an American military in 
crisis. Thankfully, he delivered on his promise to begin 
rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces.
    Last year, President Trump negotiated the highest level of 
defense spending ever, a downpayment towards getting our 
military back to where it needs to be. But, that's not enough. 
We face a more dangerous world today than we anticipated we 
would. Since then, the Russians have invaded Crimea, backed 
Assad in Syria, sent mercenaries to Libya, and violated the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty [INF Treaty]. China 
began building islands in the South China Sea, harassing its 
neighbors more frequently, and accelerating its military and 
nuclear modernization.
    The bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission Report 
said, if we're going to adequately fund the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS) and take on these threats, it's going to take a 
3 to 5 percent net increase above inflation each year. Now, 
we're not doing that, but that's what we committed to. We had a 
meeting here. Everyone adheres to the logic of this contract 
that we agreed to. But, we're not carrying through with it. 
That should mean the budget request would have been, if we had 
adhered to that, $775 to $790 billion this year. Instead, we've 
got a budget agreement that provides $740.5 billion for all 
that we've got to do for our military defense. That's not your 
fault, not you guys, but the Congress needs to do more, be more 
realistic about what it's going to take to maintain a force 
capable of deterring and, if needed, defeating our enemies.
    We're trying to do more while spending less, and the math 
just doesn't work that way. That's why we've--you've seen so 
many stories about how we can't buy necessary equipment. That's 
why we can't do the training that we need to do. That's why we 
can't give our troops the tools that they need to keep the 
peace. It's all in the NDS.
    We can pay them now, or we can pay them later, and leave 
the debt to our children and grandchildren to pay. They'll be 
doing so in the more dangerous world if we don't fix the budget 
tragedy that we're facing right now.
    I know you've tried to do the best you can within the 
limits of what you have been given. I appreciate that you're 
already have found a lot of savings, and you are to be 
applauded for that. That's hard to do with the decreasing 
budget which we have today.
    On that happy note, I look forward to continuing to work 
with you to make sure our troops have the resources that they 
need to fight and win.
    Senator Reed.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses today, thank 
them for their service to the Nation, and I look forward to 
their testimony.
    Before we consider the details of the budget request, I'd 
like to address some broader concerns I have with the 
Department.
    The National Defense Strategy Commission Report, released 
in November 2018, expressed significant concern about the 
balance of power between civilian and military leadership at 
the Department of Defense. Specifically, the Commission Report 
stated, ``Civilian voices have been relatively muted on issues 
at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy, 
undermining the concept of civilian control.''
    Unfortunately, the situation has only gotten worse since 
the Commission issued its report. The Office of the Secretary 
of Defense is without Senate-confirmed leadership in many of 
its most important positions. In the Policy Office, of the 
seven positions requiring Senate confirmation, there are only 
two confirmed individuals, and one of these is now serving as 
the Acting Under Secretary. We just received the nomination for 
Under Secretary of Personnel and Readiness, after a 2-year 
vacancy. Then, on Monday, the administration withdrew the 
nomination of Elaine McCusker to be the Department's 
Controller. These vacancies continue to challenge the 
Department's ability to effectively respond to national 
security challenges and undermine civilian inputs into the 
decision making process.
    With political appointees largely absent, a large amount of 
work in the Department is now being done by career civil 
servants, and they, too, are beleaguered. Congress shares the 
blame in adding to civilian workforce woes with headquarters 
cuts. However, pay freezes, hiring freezes, exemption from 
collective bargaining, and having career civil servants carry 
the weight of defending political decisions is likely to lead 
to a hollowing out of the workforce whose experience and 
expertise we desperately need.
    Furthermore, October 23rd of last year, I should say--last 
year, not this year--I joined Chairman Inhofe and our House 
Armed Services Committee (HASC) counterparts in sending you, 
Mr. Secretary, a letter expressing concern about the 
Department's failure to properly empower and staff the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 
and Low Intensity Conflict in order to fully exercise its 
congressionally mandated responsibilities for oversight and 
advocacy of Special Operations Forces. This is another position 
that has had an Acting Principal for more than half the 
administration, and it's unacceptable, frankly, that we still 
haven't received a response to our letter, more than 4 months 
later.
    Now, turning to the budget request before us, the fiscal 
year 2021 budget, the Department of Defense seeks $636.4 
billion for the base budget and $69 billion in overseas 
contingency operations funds, of which $16 billion is 
designated to pay for base requirements. In its base budget 
request, the Defense Department highlights resources targeted 
for the modernization of a more lethal force that is prepared 
for a high-end fight against near-peer competitors and to 
operationalize the National Defense Strategy, including 
investments in the space and cyber domains, the 
recapitalization of our nuclear deterrent, and the largest-ever 
research and development (R&D) budget for artificial 
intelligence, directed energy, and hypersonic weapons. The base 
budget request also supports the quality of life for our 
servicemembers by sustaining family support initiatives and by 
authorizing a 3 percent pay raise. However, it is clear that 
the base budget request will not cover all the Defense 
Department's requirements. So, once again, we have been 
presented with an overly generous use of the OCO account. I 
acknowledge that both Congress and other administrations have 
included elements of base funding in OCO accounts in the past, 
but overloading the OCO request with $16 billion worth of 
activities that truly belong in the base budget is difficult to 
justify.
    I would also highlight that this year's budget reflects the 
outcomes of the Secretary's defense-wide review. The Department 
submitted a report to Congress in January that stated, ``In an 
era of flattening budgets, it is more important than ever that 
we find creative ways to fund NDS-driven activities.'' The 
review identified more than $5 million in savings from defense 
programs that were deemed a lower priority or inconsistent with 
the priorities of the NDS. Mr. Secretary, let me commend you 
for taking this review on. It's a tough job, and you did it 
thoroughly, and you did it with quite a bit of energy.
    Now, these savings will be taking, however, from, among 
other things, health affairs, DOD schools, and cooperative 
threat reduction programs. So, I'm interested in hearing more 
about the analysis behind the programs that were cut or 
eliminated, and the areas in which these resources were 
reinvested.
    Scrutinizing current programs to determine which ones 
support the Department's priorities and which ones should be 
reduced or eliminated is appropriate and necessary, and again, 
I commend you. However, it is somewhat disingenuous to argue 
that flat defense budgets have forced the Department to realign 
funds internally to support NDS implementation, when the 
Department is making affirmative decisions to divert funding 
from NDS priorities. For example, the Department recently 
approved the transfer of $3.8 billion from National Guard 
equipment, additional combat aircraft, ISR [intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets, and amphibious ships 
in order to pay for the President's border wall. In addition, 
the budget request before us proposes significant cuts to 
initiatives like the European Defense Initiative (EDI). This is 
after funding for several military construction projects in EDI 
was taken out last year to, again, pay for the wall. Our close 
bond with our European allies and partners is one of our 
greatest strategic advantages and key to countering the near-
peer competitor competition of Russia. However, the cut to EDI 
sends exactly the wrong message to our allies and our 
adversaries.
    It is the responsibility of this Committee to ensure the 
men and women we send into harm's way have the resources 
necessary to complete their mission and return home safely, and 
I'm proud that this Committee, under the Chairman's leadership, 
has always worked in a bipartisan fashion during this process. 
I look forward to working with all the Committee Members to 
come to a reasonable agreement again this year.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    We will now have opening statements from Secretary Esper 
and General Milley. Your entire statement will be made a part 
of the record, and you are recognized.

     STATEMENT OF HON. MARK T. ESPER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

    Secretary Esper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members 
of this Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in 
support of the President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2021. 
I'm joined today by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Mark Milley.
    The 2018 National Defense Strategy provides a clear roadmap 
for the Department of Defense to address the reemergence of 
long-term strategic competition from near-peer competitors, 
China, then Russia. Throughout the Pentagon and across the 
Joint Force, the NDS guides our decisions and actions as we 
adapt the force to simultaneously contend with the threats of 
today while preparing for the challenges of tomorrow. We do 
this by increasing the readiness and lethality of our 
warfighters, strengthening our alliances and partnerships, and 
reforming the way the Department does business. Additionally, 
we have placed renewed emphasis on taking care of our 
servicemembers and their families.
    The Department is grateful for the strong support provided 
in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) and DOD appropriations, which allowed us to make vital 
investments in our military's modernization, enabled the 
creation of the Space Force, and provided our servicemembers 
with the largest pay increase in a decade. Our continued 
success is contingent upon predictable, adequate, sustained, 
and timely funding, and I encourage Congress to pass a full-
year spending package for all fiscal year 2021 on time to avoid 
the debilitating effects of another continuing resolution.
    The Department's total fiscal year 2021 budget request is 
$705.4 billion. This represents a minor increase from fiscal 
year 2020 enacted amount of $704.6 billion, but does not keep 
pace with inflation. Given this flattened funding level, we 
were required to make many tough decisions to ensure our 
highest priorities were adequately funded. To enable our 
decision maker, we conducted a comprehensive defense-wide 
review aimed at reallocating resources from programs and 
activities that offer a low return on investment relative to 
the goals and objectives of the NDS. Over a 4-month period, we 
conducted over 20 review sessions examining almost $100 billion 
in programs, agencies, and activities that make up the fourth 
estate. This review generated $5.7 billion in fiscal year 2021 
savings that were reinvested back into readiness and lethality 
efforts.
    Each of the military services is also instituting a similar 
review process across their budgets to achieve the same outcome 
of realigning resources and finding savings that can be 
reinvested into higher priorities.
    Additionally, I have initiated the process of conducting 
full reviews of all combatant commands to properly align our 
global military posture to the NDS. This effort will enable the 
Department to shift greater emphasis to our highest-priority 
region, the Indo-Pacific, or allow us to return troops home to 
build readiness. Thus far, we have ongoing reviews of AFRICOM 
and SOUTHCOM, and will expand to other commands over the coming 
months.
    My recent decision to deploy elements of an Army Security 
Force Assistance Brigade to Africa to replace units from an 
Infantry Brigade Combat Team is an example of how this process 
is enabling us to better match resources to the mission of each 
combatant command.
    The Department's fiscal year 2021 budget request reflects 
the same disciplined adherence to the NDS. To preserve our 
overmatch, we have made significant investments into several 
critical technologies that will alter the future battlefield. 
Our RDT&E budget is the largest in our history and prioritizes 
hypersonics, microelectronics, 5G communications, autonomous 
systems, and artificial intelligence. We are moving forward 
with a long-overdue recapitalization of the Nation's nuclear 
triad, with key investments in the ground-based strategic 
deterrent, the B-21 stealth bomber, the Columbia-class 
submarine, and improved nuclear command, control, and 
communications systems, to name a few. We are also enhancing 
our missile defense capabilities to protect against the growing 
threat of advanced enemy missile systems.
    This budget request expands our capacity to defend our 
interests in space as we consolidate much of our space 
enterprise into the Space Force. It also advances the 
Department's cyber capabilities, allowing us to protect our 
digital infrastructure while disrupting covert foreign malign 
activity. This includes defending the integrity of our 
democracy by assisting in the security of our elections.
    Finally, in the traditional air, land, and sea domains, we 
are focused on modernizing our formations by divesting from 
platforms and equipment that are no longer suited for the 
emerging strategic environment. The Department appreciates this 
Committee's advocacy of the National Defense Strategy, and we 
value Congress's guidance on reform.
    I now ask for your support so that we may fully implement 
our decisions and move forward with the investments needed to 
ensure America's military maintains our competitive advantage, 
continues to deter war, and preserves our Nation's security.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Esper follows:]

        Prepared Statement by Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper
                              introduction
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the 
Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the 
President's budget request for fiscal year 2021.
    The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) provides a clear roadmap 
for the Department of Defense (DOD) to address the re-emergence of 
long-term strategic competition from near-peer competitors: China, then 
Russia. Throughout the Pentagon and across the Joint Force, the NDS 
guides our decisions and actions as we adapt the force to 
simultaneously contend with the threats of today, while preparing for 
the challenges of tomorrow. We do this by increasing the readiness and 
lethality of our warfighters, strengthening our alliances and 
partnerships, and reforming the way DOD does business. Additionally, we 
have placed renewed emphasis on taking care of our servicemembers and 
their families.
    The DOD is grateful for the strong support provided in the Fiscal 
Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the Fiscal Year 
2020 DOD Appropriations Act. This legislation supported vital 
investments in our military's modernization, enabled the creation of 
the Space Force, and provided our servicemembers with the largest pay 
increase in a decade. Our continued success as a Department is 
contingent upon predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding. 
We encourage Congress to pass a full-year spending package for fiscal 
year 2021 on-time to avoid the debilitating effects of another 
Continuing Resolution.
    The DOD's total fiscal year 2021 budget request is $705.4 billion, 
consisting of $636.4 billion for base requirements with an additional 
$16 billion categorized as overseas contingency operations for base, 
and $53 billion for overseas contingency operations. After removing 
disaster relief emergency funding, this year's budget request 
represents a minor increase from the fiscal year 2020 enacted amount of 
$704.6 billion, but does not keep pace with inflation. Given this 
flattened funding level, we made many tough decisions to ensure our 
highest priorities were adequately funded.
    To guide our decision making, we initiated a comprehensive Defense-
Wide Review (DWR) aimed at reallocating resources from programs and 
activities that offer low return on investment relative to the goals 
and objectives of the NDS. Over a 4 month period, we conducted over 20 
review sessions, examining almost $100 billion in programs, agencies, 
and activities that make up the ``Fourth Estate.'' This review 
generated $5.7 billion in fiscal year 2021 savings for reinvestment in 
areas such as nuclear modernization, space, missile defense, hypersonic 
weapons, artificial intelligence, and 5G communications.
    Additionally, to make room for investments in future capabilities, 
each of the Services has divested some legacy systems. These were 
necessary measures to ensure our highest priority programs were 
sufficiently resourced. I urge Congress to support these tough choices, 
as the alternative is to underprepare for the challenges of great power 
competition.
    The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget request is directed toward 
achieving irreversible implementation of the NDS by focusing on 
strengthening military readiness and lethality; advancing critical 
modernization efforts across all domains: air, land, sea, space, and 
cyber; prioritizing nuclear deterrence recapitalization; enhancing 
missile defense capabilities; and providing our servicemembers and 
their families with the quality of life they deserve.
                         strategic environment
    Today's global security environment remains complex and volatile. 
The re-emergence of great power competition has challenged the United 
States military's long-held competitive advantage in certain key areas. 
Meanwhile, rogue regimes continue to foster regional instability, while 
terrorist organizations seek out sanctuary in new parts of the world. 
It is critical that the DOD maintains the momentum provided by the last 
few budgets, which enabled vital investments in modernization and 
lethality, and enhanced our military's deterrence capability.
    The Department's highest priority remains China, as its government 
continues to use--and misuse--its diplomatic, economic, and military 
strength to attempt to alter the landscape of power and reshape the 
world in its favor, often at the expense of others. The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) continues to invest heavily in the modernization 
and expansion of its military in areas such as space, cyber, electronic 
warfare, undersea warfare, fighter aircraft, bombers, long-range 
missiles, and other anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
    China's goals are clearly stated: by 2035, the CCP's leaders seek 
to complete its military modernization, and, by 2049, become a 
preeminent global military power. What is most troubling is that China 
is pursuing these objectives by any means necessary, including forced 
technology transfer, intellectual property theft, cyber espionage, and 
commercial acquisitions. Once Beijing obtains and develops these 
technologies, it leverages them to intimidate or coerce smaller states, 
while simultaneously narrowing the United States' competitive 
advantage. When American companies fall victim to state-backed cyber 
theft, are forced to surrender intellectual property, or are undercut 
by a Chinese corporation selling below cost, it erodes our important 
industrial and innovation bases and diminishes our military overmatch.
    As part of its efforts to manipulate the long-standing free and 
open international order to its advantage, Beijing continues to 
militarize features in the South China Sea, threatening freedom of 
navigation and the free flow of commerce throughout the region. Through 
its Belt and Road Initiative, China is expanding its political and 
economic ties across Asia, Europe, South America and Africa, with the 
less publicized objective of expanding the People's Liberation Army's 
influence and reach.
    Meanwhile, Russia remains intent on upending international norms 
and reasserting regional dominance by violating the sovereignty of 
neighboring states, breaking treaty obligations, and engaging in 
malicious cyber operations on a global scale. Moscow continues to press 
forward with the rapid modernization of its military. Its sophisticated 
coordination of drones and cyber attacks during its invasion of 
Ukraine, as well as its recent public display of new nuclear hypersonic 
systems, validate our concerns about Russia's burgeoning military 
capabilities and intentions to undermine the NATO alliance.
    Concurrently, North Korea seeks to build legitimacy through the 
development of a variety of nuclear, conventional, and unconventional 
weapons, and by growing its ballistic missile capabilities. Our forces 
on the Korean Peninsula remain at a high state of readiness, alongside 
our Republic of Korea counterparts. While we support continued 
diplomatic efforts to bring about lasting peace in Korea, we remain 
prepared to fight and win tonight, if required.
    In the Middle East, the United States remains committed to working 
alongside our allies and partners to advance our strategic priorities 
for the region: ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS, supporting a 
strong and independent Iraq, and deterring Iranian aggression. The 
United States' actions over the past year, including the deployment of 
additional defensive forces to the region, the defeat of ISIS' physical 
caliphate, and the operations that resulted in the deaths of terrorist 
leaders Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Qasem Soleimani, were essential to 
restoring deterrence and degrading our enemy's military capabilities.
    Guided by the NDS, the DOD seeks to right-size our force 
disposition in all theaters over the long-term to better compete with 
China and Russia. Concurrently, we must sustain efforts to counter 
rogue regimes such as Iran, while bolstering the capability of our 
allies and partners to maintain regional stability. Enhancements to our 
posture in the Middle East in recent months are consistent with this 
strategy.
                       build a more lethal force
    The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget request is focused on designing a 
future force that is dominant in all warfighting domains. This is 
particularly important at a time when our strategic competitors are 
developing advanced capabilities to challenge our areas of traditional 
military overmatch. We must continue to invest in modernization to 
solidify our competitive advantages and build new areas of asymmetric 
advantage.
Nuclear Modernization
    The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the need for the nuclear 
triad, validating DOD's long-overdue recapitalization of the nation's 
nuclear armed missiles, submarines, bombers, dual-capable aircraft, and 
related infrastructure to keep the U.S. nuclear deterrent secure, 
effective, and reliable for decades to come. Most of the Nation's 
strategic nuclear delivery systems, built in the 1980s and prior, are 
reaching the end of their service life in the 2025 to 2035 timeframe, 
with all currently fielded systems having been extended well beyond 
their original service lives. The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget invests 
$28.9 billion to sustain and modernize all three legs of the triad with 
key investments in the ground-based strategic deterrent, the B-21 
stealth bomber, the Columbia-class submarine, and enhanced nuclear 
command, control and communications (NC3) systems.
Missile Defeat and Defense
    The Department is committed to implementing the 2019 Missile 
Defense Review, which calls for comprehensive missile defense 
capabilities, flexibility and adaptability, tighter offense-defense 
integration and interoperability, and highlights the importance of 
space. The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget funds enhancements to U.S. 
Missile Defeat and Defense (MDD) capabilities to defend the Homeland, 
deployed forces, allies, and partners against an increasingly complex 
adversarial missile threat. This budget request increases missile 
defense capacity and capability to keep pace with adversary missile 
systems, while investing in new approaches to a layered defense of the 
Homeland.
    The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget includes $20.3 billion for MDD, 
which includes $9.2 billion for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), $7.9 
billion in regional and strategic missile defense capabilities outside 
of the MDA, and $3.2 billion in missile defeat or left-of-launch 
activities. Notable investments include the development of the next-
generation interceptor, and increased funding for the Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense System and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
Ballistic Missile Defense.
Critical Technologies
    We are in the midst of rapid technological change that has the 
potential to fundamentally alter the character of war. Our adversaries 
are systematically and strategically developing and fielding advanced 
systems, eroding the advantage the United States military has 
maintained in conventional warfare. Maintaining technological 
superiority is essential to our future security. To ensure we lead in 
the development and fielding of new systems that harness these 
advancements, we must prioritize critical technology investments.
    The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget reflects this commitment by 
investing $106.6 billion in research, development, testing, and 
evaluation (RDT&E), the largest RDT&E budget in our history. The DOD's 
focus on research and technology efforts to bring advanced capabilities 
to the field will ensure we maintain overmatch against near-peer 
competitors. This budget request maximizes the amount of money we can 
effectively and responsibly spend on these critical and emerging 
technologies. Select efforts include:
      Hypersonics--Accelerates development of Army Long Range 
Hypersonic Weapon; increases funding for Navy Conventional Prompt 
Strike, and Air Force Advanced Rapid Response Weapon ($3.2 billion).
      Microelectronics/5G--Accelerates our access to both 
advanced commercial and specialty microelectronics while adopting a 
zero-trust security paradigm; hastens our mastery of ``ubiquitous 
connectivity,'' so that we can fully leverage the power of 5G 
technologies for our mission, while preventing our adversaries from 
using it against us ($1.5 billion).
      Autonomy--Enhances speed of maneuver and lethality in 
contested environments; develops human/machine teaming ($1.7 billion).
      Artificial Intelligence (AI)--Continues the AI 
investments that focus on next-generation AI R&D (research and 
development) at DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], 
expands the intelligence AI pathfinder Project Maven, and accelerates 
fielding of AI capabilities at scale to meet warfighter needs through 
the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) ($0.8 billion).
    More so than any other emerging technology, AI is transforming our 
society and affecting the ways in which we do business, interact 
socially, and conduct war. Our competitors have also recognized the 
transformative potential of AI and are investing heavily in it as they 
modernize their military forces. Maintaining a competitive advantage in 
AI is essential to our national security.
    The DOD is committed to employing AI in a responsible and lawful 
manner that promotes our Nation's values. As such, I have approved the 
implementation of the DOD's AI Ethics Principles to ensure the 
development and use of AI is guided by an ethical framework. These 
principles will help guide, inform, and inculcate the responsible use 
of AI--in both combat and non-combat systems--by the Department to help 
maintain our technological edge, while upholding our values. By 
adopting these Principles, DOD will lead the way in the responsible use 
of AI across the entire government and with our allies and partners.
Space
    The NDS recognizes that space is fundamental to U.S. prosperity and 
national security. Great power competitors are increasingly developing 
weapons to disrupt satellites and other space-based capabilities. The 
Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA created the sixth branch of the military, the 
United States Space Force (USSF), within the Department of the Air 
Force, to organize, train, and equip military and civilian personnel to 
maintain freedom of operation in, from, and to space. As the first new 
military service established in over 70 years, the USSF will protect 
and defend our military capabilities and economic interests in the 
space domain as our near-peer competitors continue to expand their 
presence in space.
    The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget invests $18 billion in the space 
warfighting domain. These investments will enable the expeditious 
building of USSF, reduce risk to satellite communications jamming, 
build resiliency in global positioning systems, improve space-based 
missile warning capabilities, and increase our space launch capacity.
    To manage DOD space forces efficiently and holistically, the 
Department's vision remains to consolidate the preponderance of space 
missions, units, resources, and personnel from the existing Military 
Services into the new USSF. These transfers are critical to unifying 
today's disparate space-related research, development, acquisition, 
fielding, and operations into a single organization led by a single 
leader. The DOD's goal is to transfer the appropriate space-related 
assets into the USSF no later than fiscal year 2022, consistent with 
law.
Cyber
    Cyber attacks represent a long-term threat to our national strength 
and military advantage. Persistent and sophisticated adversaries are 
continuously targeting our systems and networks through malicious cyber 
activity. This challenge is equally applicable to public and private 
networks across the United States. A proactive DOD cyber approach is 
necessary to guard against these threats by defending forward to 
protect our infrastructure and disrupt covert foreign malign activity. 
This includes defending the integrity of our democratic processes by 
assisting in the security of our elections.
    The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget invests $9.8 billion into 
cyberspace activities that continue to build on the goals laid out in 
the DOD Cyber Strategy. This request improves cybersecurity by 
mitigating key cyber deficiencies and strengthening our defensive 
capabilities to counter adversary efforts to exploit U.S. technology. 
While robust defensive cyber capabilities are our priority, the joint 
force is also improving offensive capabilities to engage threats at a 
time and place of our choosing.
    The Cyber Operations budget includes $2.2 billion to support the 
Cyber Mission Force (CMF), consisting of 133 teams working as the 
operational arm of U.S. Cyber Command, to carry out cyberspace 
operations in defense of the Nation's interests. Cyberspace domain 
investments, underpinned by digital modernization efforts, provide our 
CMF the tools necessary to execute offensive and defensive cyberspace 
operations.
Air
    In the air domain, we continue procurement of the Joint Strike 
Fighter aircraft and modernization programs for existing Navy and Air 
Force strike fighter aircraft and bombers. We also include a cost-
effective mix of 4th generation fighter aircraft by procuring 24 
additional F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and capitalizing on existing Foreign 
Military Sales production lines to procure 12 F-15 EX aircraft. This 
will increase readiness of the Navy and Air Force fighter fleet and 
relieve pressure on the aging legacy platforms. Additionally, we 
continue procurement of the KC-46A aerial refueling tanker, which will 
replace aging legacy tankers.
Sea
    In the sea domain, the DOD remains committed to building a Navy of 
at least 355 ships. The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget request procures 
eight surface and subsurface battle-force ships, including one 
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and one Virginia-class 
submarine. Importantly, we remain focused on the readiness of our 
current fleet--our top priority--by allocating an additional $3.4 
billion into the Navy's operations and maintenance account relative to 
fiscal year 2020 (excluding disaster relief emergency funding).
    To maintain our maritime dominance and freedom of maneuver, we are 
exploring a range of alternative ``future fleet'' designs that are 
capable of meeting the demands of the NDS, while remaining compatible 
with future warfighting doctrine, threat developments, and budget 
constraints. In concept, the future fleet must prioritize integrated 
Navy and Marine Corps operations; distributed awareness and lethality; 
survivability in a high-intensity conflict; adaptability in a complex 
world; the ability to project power, including through precision long-
range fires; and demonstrate presence, providing a visible deterrent to 
potential adversaries while reassuring our allies and partners.
    The composition of the future force will emphasize fewer large 
surface platforms, more and smaller surface combatants, lightly/
optionally-manned ships, and an ample submarine force. Just as the Air 
Force and Army are integrating more remotely piloted aircraft and 
optionally manned ground vehicles, the Navy must begin to integrate and 
deploy lightly/optionally-manned ships. Future analysis and 
experimentation will drive the NDS-based force structure for the Navy 
and Marine Corps, and will inform the direction of future shipbuilding 
plans.
    One of my top priorities is ensuring that the Department has a 
robust, data-driven review of the future integrated naval force. To 
that end, I have initiated a war game and analysis process led by the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense to evaluate proposals from across the DOD, 
to possibly include experts from the Naval War College, Naval 
Postgraduate School, and Marine Corps University. The Department of the 
Navy intends to continually iterate the recent Integrated Naval Force 
Structure Assessment and align what it learns with the annual planning, 
programming, and budgeting process.
Land
    In the land domain, the DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget improves the 
lethality and survivability of ground forces by divesting legacy 
systems and investing in modernized combat systems that will be needed 
by the future Joint Force. Building on the research and development 
investments made over the past 2 years, we continue to prioritize 
funding for the development and testing of long-range precision fires, 
future vertical lift, ground combat vehicles, air and missile defense, 
the network, and soldier lethality systems to replace many of the 
Army's aging platforms. This budget will ensure our ground forces 
remain ready and lethal by upgrading 89 M-1 Abrams main-battle tanks, 
procuring over 4,200 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles and 72 Amphibious 
Combat Vehicles, and upgrading over 150 Stryker Vehicles.
Joint Warfighting Concept
    In addition to developing these capabilities we must also modernize 
how we fight. Our budget request supports the creation of a new Joint 
Warfighting Concept to enable our transition to All-Domain Operations 
by aligning our personnel, equipment, training, and doctrine.
    This concept builds on the recent experimentation conducted by the 
Services as we develop a new approach to integrating our warfighting 
capabilities. As part of this effort, the Air Force is leading the 
Department's new Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) 
initiative, which is critical to linking any sensor to any shooter on 
the battlefield in real time.
Dynamic Force Employment
    Our military's force posture must be adaptable to account for the 
uncertainty that exists in the strategic environment. Dynamic Force 
Employment (DFE) provides options for proactive and scalable use of the 
Joint Force in response to emerging security requirements. DFE will 
allow the DOD to compete more effectively by employing military forces 
outside of the steady-state pattern of deployments our adversaries have 
come to expect. This concept will induce unpredictability into our 
operational decisions, and demonstrate the capability to rapidly 
reposition forces in response to changing security conditions.
               strengthen allies and attract new partners
    The United States' competitive advantage is not only a result of 
our unrivaled warfighters and state-of-the-art weapons and equipment, 
but also our unmatched network of alliances and partnerships. Forged 
over decades of shared values, interests, and sacrifice, these 
relationships provide us a strategic edge our adversaries cannot match. 
The United States military works every day to strengthen and expand the 
alliances and partnerships that form the backbone of the free and open 
international order, which has enabled security and prosperity for 
millions around the world.
Indo-Pacific
    The Indo-Pacific remains the DOD's number one priority region. We 
have an enduring commitment to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific in 
which all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty and 
able to pursue economic growth consistent with accepted international 
rules and norms. We are committed to enhancing this shared vision 
alongside our allies and partners in the region.
    However, an increasingly aggressive China continues to undermine 
regional stability through its coercion of neighboring states, 
illegitimate maritime claims, and predatory economic practices. Unlike 
the Communist Party of China, the United States respects the 
sovereignty of all nations, regardless of their size or strength. Our 
approach continues to prove itself superior to Beijing's, as evidenced 
by our growing partnerships across the region.
    For example, last November in Vietnam, I announced the provision of 
a second high-endurance cutter to enhance the Vietnamese Coast Guard's 
capabilities and build greater trust between our Nations. In Thailand, 
I signed Joint Vision 2020 with the Prime Minister in order to chart a 
course for increased interoperability and expanded exercises and 
training between our forces. In December, I signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Singapore announcing the establishment of a fighter 
training detachment in Guam, which will deepen our defense cooperation.
    That same month, the United States hosted the second ever India 2-
Plus-2 Ministerial, where the world's two largest democracies continued 
to strengthen our ties and finalized important agreements that will 
expand our ability to co-produce and co-develop critical technologies. 
Our burgeoning defense relationship, evidenced by the new Tiger Triumph 
annual amphibious exercise, will be crucial to improving our military 
interoperability.
NATO
    The United States' leadership has been critical to getting the 
world's strongest military alliance back on the right trajectory. 
President Trump succeeded in elevating the issues of burden sharing and 
readiness, securing widespread agreement that NATO members must do 
more. As a result, our NATO allies invested an additional $130 billion 
into defense since 2016, and are projected to reach $400 billion by 
2024. Additionally, the number of member states that currently meet the 
2 percent GDP commitment has doubled over the past 3 years.
    Last December, NATO reached its goal of identifying 100 percent of 
the contributions for the NATO Readiness Initiative. This plan provides 
the alliance with the capability to have 30 mechanized battalions, 30 
combat vessels, and 30 air squadrons ready to fight in 30 days.
    In fiscal year 2020, the United States military will deploy over 
20,000 troops to participate in Defender 2020, one of the largest 
military exercises in Europe in the last 25 years. Defender will 
demonstrate our force projection capabilities, exercise the Army's 
ability to conduct Division-level maneuvers, and enhance 
interoperability with our allies and partners in the region, thereby 
deterring conflict.
Middle East
    In the Middle East, we remain committed to supporting a regional 
constellation of strategic partners to ensure the enduring defeat of 
ISIS, deter Iranian malign activities, and support a strong and 
independent Iraq.
    The United States maintains its leadership role in the 82-member 
Defeat-ISIS coalition. Together, the United States and its partner 
forces have destroyed ISIS's physical caliphate and liberated millions 
from its barbaric rule. United States troops deployed to Iraq and Syria 
continue to work alongside our allies and partners to ensure the 
enduring defeat of ISIS.
    After months of escalating acts of aggression from the Iranian 
regime, the United States military took decisive action to protect our 
personnel and interests, which included a no-notice deployment of 3,500 
soldiers from the Army's 82nd Airborne. The DOD also helped 
internationalize the response by leading the development of the 
International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) in September 2019, 
which protects freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of 
Oman. The IMSC currently includes contributions from seven nations and 
continues to deter malign activity in the Strait of Hormuz.
    In Afghanistan, we remain committed to ending the war through a 
political agreement that ensures Afghanistan cannot be used as a safe 
haven for terrorist groups to attack the United States. On February 29, 
the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban that paves the 
way for intra-Afghan negotiations in pursuit of a permanent ceasefire 
and lasting peace. If the Taliban honors the arrangement, the United 
States will reduce its military presence to 8,600 troops within a 
matter of months, in line with commensurate reductions from other NATO 
allies that contribute forces. If progress continues, the United States 
and its partners will further reduce our presence over the next 14 
months until all United States and coalition forces are out of 
Afghanistan. The entire process will be conditions-based, and should 
the Taliban renege on its commitments, we will adjust our withdrawal 
timeline accordingly. Throughout the course of our drawdown, we will 
retain the necessary capabilities to protect our servicemembers and 
support the Afghan security forces.
International Professional Military Education
    The DOD is committed to expanding our International Professional 
Military Education (IPME) to deepen our defense relationships and build 
partner capacity. IPME, provided principally via the International 
Military Education and Training program, is a low-cost program that 
builds long-term relationships with future foreign leaders, 
strengthening our alliances and partnership throughout the world. In 
concert with the State Department, I plan to increase participation by 
10 percent in fiscal year 2021. As we do so, we will ensure rigorous 
vetting of the students selected to participate, much like we do for 
the U.S. recruits with whom they train.
                         reform the department
Defense-Wide Review
    The DOD is aggressively pursuing reforms to free up time, money, 
and manpower to reinvest back into our highest NDS priorities. Our most 
significant reform effort, the Defense-Wide Review, consisted of an 
extensive review of 50 Defense-Wide organizations and activities. In 4 
months, we made over 120 programmatic decisions generating $5.7 billion 
in fiscal year 2021 savings, $0.2 billion in Working Capital Fund 
efficiencies, and another $2.1 billion in activities and functions 
realigned to the Services, demonstrating the DOD's commitment to 
responsible stewardship of American taxpayer dollars.
    Moving forward, we will institutionalize the Defense-Wide Review to 
ensure we remain focused on increasing performance, decreasing cost, 
and remaining aligned with our priorities. To this end, we have 
established a new governance model over most Defense-Wide agencies and 
activities led by the DOD's Chief Management Officer who will now: 
review current year budget execution and develop a consolidated annual 
program and budget for Defense-Wide organization and accounts; conduct 
bottom-up reviews of Defense Agencies and Field Activities (DAFAs); and 
reform business operations and evaluate DAFA performance against 
measureable business goals.
    Additionally, each of the Military Services has instituted a 
similar budget review process to achieve the same outcome of realigning 
resources and finding savings that can be reinvested into higher 
priorities.
    We value Congress' guidance on reform, and we now ask for its 
support to fully implement our decisions. We look forward to working 
with Congress to ensure that necessary adjustments are made in the 
Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA and the Fiscal Year 2021 DOD Appropriations Act 
so that we may realize these savings and continue investing in NDS 
priorities.
Operational Reviews
    The DOD has also initiated a full review of all military forces, 
programs, and activities within each combatant command to ensure 
alignment with NDS priorities. This effort will enable the DOD to shift 
greater emphasis to our top concern--China--or allow us to return 
troops to home station to build readiness. Thus far, we have ongoing 
reviews of United States Africa Command and United States Southern 
Command. My recent decision to deploy an Army Security Force Assistance 
Brigade to Africa to relieve a Brigade Combat Team is the first of many 
decisions to rebalance the force for great power competition.
    In parallel with this initiative, we are reviewing all major 
operational plans to ensure they are aligned with our policy 
objectives, starting with China and Russia. This integrated civil-
military review process will ensure we remain ready for any crisis 
today, while also identifying key gaps, shortfalls, and limitations in 
our plans that need to be mitigated.
                                 audit
    The DOD owes accountability and transparency to the American 
people, as the taxpayers deserve a level of confidence that their money 
is being spent effectively. In 2018, the DOD completed its first-ever 
consolidated financial statement audit, covering almost $2.8 trillion 
in assets. Now an annual institutionalized process, a second audit was 
subsequently completed in 2019, which showed that over 25 percent of 
the first year's findings have already been corrected, and there was no 
evidence of fraud or abuse.
    The audit is about more than just compliance and financial 
management. Qualitative changes are happening every day that will, over 
time, result in real change to the way the Department does business. 
The DOD workforce's understanding of audit requirements continues to 
grow, and, as efficiencies are gained, value is being realized. The 
audit is helping galvanize change that advances cybersecurity, property 
management, inventory, and readiness, for the benefit of the warfighter 
and the American people.
                                 people
    We recognize that our people--servicemembers, military families and 
DOD civilians--are our most valuable resource and the key to 
accomplishing the objectives outlined in the NDS. It is critical that 
we remain committed to taking care of our people so they can focus 
maximum attention and energy on accomplishing the mission. Everything 
we do depends on the dedication and skill of the men and women who 
sacrifice their own comfort and safety to safeguard the freedom we 
enjoy every day.
    The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget supports a three percent military 
pay raise and an increase in end strength of approximately 5,600 
personnel. To enable our ability to continue to attract, develop, and 
retain a highly talented workforce, we are pursuing several initiatives 
to improve quality of life for our people.
Military Housing Privatization Initiative
    The DOD has an obligation to ensure our servicemembers and their 
families have access to safe and secure housing. Under the Military 
Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) legislation enacted in 1996, 
the DOD began privatizing installation family housing. Following 
significant initial improvements to on-base housing units many years 
ago, the DOD reduced its oversight activities over a period of several 
years, resulting in cases of sub-standard living conditions for some 
residents living in privatized housing.
    Since early 2019, we have taken extensive action to improve the 
quality of installation housing. Senior DOD leaders now meet regularly 
with key executives from each of the MHPI partners to ensure our 
initiatives continue to progress. Improvements to date include the 
development of a universal lease framework, increased training for 
installation commanders and housing personnel, and the hiring of 
additional housing staff across the Military Departments, to include 
resident advocates. Additionally, the DOD recently released a Tenant 
Bill of Rights to protect and empower our servicemembers and their 
families. Fifteen of the 18 rights will be fully available by May 1, 
2020. The three remaining pertain to legal agreements between the 
Department and the housing providers that the DOD cannot unilaterally 
change. We are working aggressively to resolve these issues, and, if 
needed, will request Congressional support. In the meantime, 
servicemembers and their families can leverage their military 
department's procedures to address and resolve issues, while we work 
toward formal, uniform solutions.
    The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget increases funding for Military 
Housing Privatization Support by $54.6 million, an 82 percent increase 
over the fiscal year 2020 budget request. This funding increase enables 
enhanced oversight of MHPI housing consistent with the Fiscal Year 2020 
NDAA requirements, to include staff augmentation and additional 
training, improved quality control measures, and database development 
and management.
Military Spouse Employment
    Military spouses living in the United States face an average 
unemployment rate of 24 percent, nearly 7 times the current national 
rate. Many employers are hesitant to hire military spouses due to the 
frequent permanent change of station moves associated with military 
life. Furthermore, military spouses face significant financial hurdles 
when they are required to renew their occupational licenses following a 
move to a new state. These employment challenges impact the readiness 
of the force and adversely affect servicemember retention.
    The DOD continues to work with State governments to develop 
policies and legislation that grant state-to-state licensure 
reciprocity or other methods to ease credentialing for military 
spouses. Many states have enacted positive changes, and we are calling 
on them to continue this trend. To support spouses' careers and 
encourage a high quality of life for military families, I recently 
directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments to include 
military spousal hiring assistance and other family considerations as 
criteria in future basing decisions.
Access to Childcare
    Childcare is a workforce issue that directly impacts the 
efficiency, readiness, and retention of the total force. Earlier this 
month, I issued a directive prioritizing uniformed servicemembers for 
childcare at on-base Child Development Centers. The Department is 
committed to ensuring quality care and meeting the increased demand for 
child care services due to frequent deployments and high operational 
tempo. I will be pursuing other initiatives along these lines in the 
coming months.
                               conclusion
    We cannot lose sight of the significance of the challenges we now 
face. It is clear by the actions of today's revisionist powers and 
rogue regimes that the free and open international order, which has 
provided peace and prosperity for decades, is under duress. America's 
adversaries are intent on eroding our military's longstanding 
overmatch, undermining our robust architecture of allies and partners, 
and degrading our standing as the global partner of choice.
    The Department of Defense is up to this challenge. With the support 
of Congress and delivery of on-time appropriations, we will have the 
means to continue to aggressively implement the NDS. By building a more 
lethal force, strengthening alliances and partnerships, and carrying 
out aggressive reforms, we will ensure America's military maintains our 
competitive advantage, continues to deter war, and preserves our 
Nation's security.
    Thank you.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Esper.
    General Milley.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT 
                        CHIEFS OF STAFF

    General Milley. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to join Secretary Esper here today.
    It's my distinct honor and privilege to represent the 
almost 3 million soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, 
coastguardsmen, and civilians of the United States Armed 
Forces, the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led military 
force in the world, and it would not be possible without your 
continued support.
    This budget is a strategy-driven budget. It is driven by 
the NDS, which you are fully aware of and I fully support. We 
stand really and capable to deter war, defend our Homeland from 
attack, support our allies; and, if deterrence fails, we are 
fully capable today to fight and win our Nation's wars against 
any potential adversary, anywhere on the Earth's surface, at 
any time.
    But, our competitive advantage has eroded, and no one 
should have any doubt about that. China and Russia are 
increasing their military capabilities to outmatch the United 
States and its allies in order to exert their global influence, 
and China's objective is to do that by mid-century.
    North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations fuel 
regional instability and pose direct threats to partner nations 
and United States citizens. While the nature of war is 
constant, advanced technologies have stressed our Industrial 
Age capabilities, concepts, and processes, and the changing 
character of war is happening in a very, very fundamental way.
    Additionally, we are recovering from readiness shortfalls 
and modernization deferments from 20 years of continuous 
warfare and a decade of fiscal instability. This year's budget 
builds on previous readiness and modernization gains, and I 
believe the fiscal year 2021 budget submission is the best 
allocation of resource in a balanced way to support the 
National Defense Strategy. It builds a more lethal force. It 
strengthens allies and partners, and it reforms the Department 
for greater performance and affordability. It also prioritizes, 
as the Secretary said, the Indo-Pacific region to deter Chinese 
aggression, maintain stability, and ensure access to common 
domains in order to preserve a free and open international 
system, for which my parents fought for in the second World 
War. It continues in Europe to counter Russian aggression, and 
it will continue to allow the United States military, in 
concert with our allies and partners, to deter a provocative 
North Korea and Iran from aggressive action in their regions. 
All the while, it provides money to continue our 
counterterrorist operations in various parts of the world. In 
short, President's Budget 2021 supports a ready, agile, and 
capable joint force that can compete, deter, and win across all 
domains today and in the future, and it targets specific 
investments in readiness, modernization, leader development, 
support to our people and their families. It invests in our 
readiness recovery that was built over the last 3 years. With 
this Committee's support, all the services are scheduled to 
meet their readiness recovery goals in this Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP). It funds modernization for great-power 
competition across all warfighting domains, and it improves the 
safety, security, and reliability of our very critical nuclear 
enterprise. It invests in and stands up the Space Force, and 
increases resiliency, deterrence capability, and warfighting 
options in both space and cyberspace. It funds joint all-domain 
command-and-control to improve our interoperability across all 
the services and with our allies, and it invests in the 
advanced technologies that the Secretary mentioned to address 
the more complex threats and the faster pace as the character 
of war changes.
    This budget also invests in our most valuable asset. The 
most valuable asset of the United States military is our 
people. It also funds the facilities, infrastructure, family 
support, and quality-of-life programs in a balanced way. It 
invests in education and talent management in order to develop 
our junior leaders with the values and intellectual agility to 
fight and win future conflicts. The lieutenants and ensigns of 
today will be the generals and admirals of tomorrow.
    Ultimately, our military needs sustained, predictable, 
adequate, and timely funding to retain its competitive 
advantage in this era of great-power competition, with the 
understanding that we must be good stewards of the resources 
entrusted to us by the American people and by Congress.
    I want to thank this Committee for your continued support 
to all of our military. I look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Milley follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General Mark A. Milley
                              introduction
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of this 
Committee, it is an honor to testify before you today on the 
President's Budget for fiscal year 2021.
    It remains my distinct honor and privilege to represent the 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of the United States Armed 
Forces--the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led military force in 
the world. America's servicemen and women stand watch in the air, land, 
sea, space, and cyberspace defending our Nation and protecting the 
values bestowed upon us in the Constitution.
    The United States military is a vital component of U.S. national 
power to deter great power war and protect the security of our Nation. 
Should deterrence fail, we are prepared to fight and win our Nation's 
wars against any potential adversary.
    The last four defense budgets Congress passed have done much to 
address readiness shortfalls, and reduce the backlog of deferred 
procurement and modernization, resulting from sequestration in the 
Budget Control Act of 2011, repeated continuing resolutions, and 
simultaneously fighting two contingencies. Still, readiness and 
modernization challenges remain. Our competitors are making steady 
gains and are closing the gap in all warfighting domains. It requires 
sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely budget authorizations and 
appropriations to effectively compete in an era of great power 
competition.
    I applaud the Bipartisan Budget Acts of 2018 and 2019 for improving 
predictability by authorizing a funding baseline in two-year periods. I 
especially thank Congress for an on-time fiscal year 2019 
appropriation. Unfortunately, continuing resolutions for fiscal year 
2020 reduced predictability again. I urge Congress to continue 
providing two-year funding baselines to improve our planning, and to 
pass an on-time appropriation for fiscal year 2021 so our Department 
can most effectively apply taxpayer dollars to our national defense.
    The President's Budget for 2021 requests $705.4 billion, consisting 
of $636.4 billion for base requirements and $69 billion for Overseas 
Contingency Operations. It is a product of many hard funding choices. 
It aligns resources to the strategic objectives outlined in the 
National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and 
National Military Strategy (NMS), and delivers a ready, agile, and 
capable Joint Force that can compete, deter, and win across all domains 
today and in the future.
    Specifically, the Department's President's Budget 2021 request 
makes investments in four priority areas: improving Joint warfighting 
readiness, developing the future Joint Force; developing Joint leaders; 
and supporting our troops and their families. These investments 
prioritize capability and capacity while reforming the department for 
better performance and accountability. They also reaffirm our 
commitment to existing Allies and partners, while helping attract new 
partners to advance U.S. interests around the world. President's Budget 
2021 provides the best balance of resources to address the security 
challenges we face today and in the future.
                         strategic environment
    As we begin the third decade of the 21st century, we are in an era 
of great geostrategic change and face a complex range of challenges. 
International institutions and norms are under attack and the free and 
open order that has brought prosperity and great power peace since the 
Second World War is being challenged every day. We face threats to the 
Homeland and our national interests from state and non-state actors 
across every domain--land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. While the 
nature of warfare is constant, the character of war frequently changes 
due to advances in technology and how humans apply technology in the 
conduct of war.
    The NDS provides guidance for how we use military force today and 
in the future. It emphasizes the return of great power competition and 
prioritizes our efforts for long-term competition with China and 
Russia. It also directs us to deter and counter the regional influence 
of North Korea and Iran while consolidating our gains against violent 
extremist organizations (VEOs). This strategic framework--not meant to 
be predictive of future conflicts--informs our planning, capability 
development, risk assessments, and investments. Each of the challenges 
outlined in the NDS threaten our national interests to preserve great 
power peace, and protect the American people, our Homeland, and the 
American way of life.
    China seeks to undermine the free and open Indo-Pacific, our global 
alliance structure, and the status quo of powers around the world, by 
ignoring international norms, standards, and laws. Additionally, the 
Chinese Communist Party exports authoritarian practices around the 
world to undermine United States interests. They assert control of 
disputed spaces in the Indo-Pacific region through a campaign of low-
level coercion and use of ``through a campaign of low-level coercion 
and use of ``through a campaign of low-level coercion and use of 
``through a campaign of low-level coercion and use of ``
    Russia is attempting to undermine the credibility of our NATO 
alliance, and United States credibility globally. Opportunism is a 
cornerstone of their behavior in the strategic environment to exploit 
political instability and uncertainty. Moscow uses information warfare, 
cyber operations, and political influence to achieve their objectives 
around the world. We have seen examples of revanchist behavior in their 
invasions of Georgia and Crimea, activities in the Donbas, and backing 
of authoritarian regimes in Syria and Venezuela. Since 2016, we have 
worked to counter their efforts to sow doubt in democratic processes 
and to exacerbate societal divisions in Europe and the United States.
    China and Russia have invested in capabilities designed to nullify 
our strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses--specifically targeting 
our ability to project power and operate freely around the world.
    Despite the diplomatic thaw between the United States and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea threatens our 
regional Allies and our Homeland with nuclear and ballistic missile 
capabilities. We must have a force posture to deter and defend against 
these threats, as well as Pyongyang's extensive conventional forces. 
The Joint Force must maintain readiness on the Korean Peninsula, as 
well as in defense of our Homeland, to be prepared for multiple 
contingencies.
    Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, including 
groups that threaten United States personnel overseas and in our 
Homeland. Iran has taken advantage of instability to expand its 
influence through partners and proxies to challenge the interests of 
the United States and our Allies and partners. Tehran also uses covert 
and overt military action to restrict our military and economic access 
to the Middle East, especially threatening freedom of navigation along 
commercial maritime routes. Recently, the Iranian regime's attacks have 
become more aggressive and they are taking steps to resume development 
of nuclear weapons. Iran continues to develop cruise and ballistic 
missiles, improve their intelligence capabilities, and undertake 
malicious cyber activities intended to challenge our competitive 
advantage. to develop cruise and ballistic missiles, improve their 
intelligence capabilities, and undertake malicious cyber activities 
intended to challenge our competitive advantage.
    Violent extremism is a generational, transregional struggle 
requiring sustained political, fiscal, and military solutions. While we 
have achieved significant progress in our counterterrorism efforts, the 
threat to the United States and our Allies remains. With a coalition of 
like-minded nations, we continue to apply military pressure against 
VEOs in Afghanistan and Syria to protect the American people from 
terrorist attacks against the Homeland. Our military strategy remains 
to work by, with, and through Allies, partners, and local forces; 
however, a coordinated, whole-of-government approach is necessary to 
address the underlying conditions of violent extremism.
    To meet these priority challenges, the Department requires a 
flexible and agile Joint Force with the capability and capacity to 
respond to any contingency now and in the future. We must be able to 
adapt quickly to the rapid evolution in advanced technologies to 
compete and win against potential adversaries. Our President's Budget 
2021 request targets specific investments in readiness, modernization, 
leader development, and support to our people and families to retain 
overmatch in an era of great power competition.
                  improve joint warfighting readiness
    The U.S. Armed Forces are prepared to defeat any adversary that 
threatens the Homeland or its vital national security interests around 
the world. Investment in readiness is essential to maintain this 
posture, and readiness continues to be a focus of our budget request 
this year.
    The President's Budget 2021 builds on readiness improvements from 
fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2020 with a funding profile that meets 
readiness recovery goals for all Services within the Future Years 
Defense Plan (FYDP). The President's Budget 2021 requests $125.1 
billion to robustly fund readiness across the Joint Force, augmented by 
cooperation with our Allies and partners. This represents an increase 
of $9 billion, or 7.8 percent, over fiscal year 2020 enacted levels to 
continue readiness recovery and meet global readiness needs. The 
President's Budget 2021 funds major readiness accounts to grow 
operational availability and recover from years of wartime operations 
and budget instability. It will replace aging equipment with 
accelerated procurement of newer gear, improve training of ground and 
aviation elements, and invest in manpower with critical skills. 
Specific readiness status and major priority investments by Service 
follow.
    U.S. Army: Recent budgets have reversed readiness declines and 
facilitated modest gains, achieving and sustaining the Army's highest 
readiness levels in the last 3 years. Since 2016, the Army's non-
deployable rate has decreased from 15 to 6 percent, and over the last 
year, active component Brigade Combat Team average readiness is holding 
steady at 74 percent. Despite significant progress recovering core 
mission readiness, global operational demands continue to challenge the 
Army's ability to sustain its gains and to achieve the readiness levels 
needed to meet contingency planning requirements.
    The President's Budget 2021 budget enables the Army to maintain its 
current tactical readiness levels while improving its strategic 
readiness. The President's Budget 2021 budget produces modest end 
strength growth to build cyber operations and electronic warfare (EW) 
capabilities, and increases funding for ground and air readiness--
resourcing training strategies at 100 percent for the Active Component 
and 80 percent for the Reserve Component. The budget proposal also 
enables the Army to improve training, support, and command facilities 
through the activation of a 4th Corps headquarters.
    U.S. Navy: Navy readiness bottomed out in June 2018 and has trended 
slowly upwards after the implementation of a readiness recovery 
strategy. By October 2019, the Navy improved mission-capable rates for 
all aircraft types and achieved the desired 80 percent mission capable 
rates for F/A-18 E/F and EA-18G primary mission aircraft inventory. 
However, complete readiness recovery requires continued sustained 
implementation and funding of the recovery initiatives to address 
challenges in supply, munitions, and infrastructure. In the long term, 
the Navy must balance sustainment of the current and growing force with 
the need to increase capacity and field new capabilities.
    The President's Budget 2021 implements the NDS and prioritizes 
readiness recovery of force elements required in a major contingency 
while sustaining a combat-credible force forward. The Navy prioritizes 
funding for its people--growing its end strength by 3,970 personnel 
over the 2020 projected level. This growth will eliminate shortfalls in 
critical warfighting readiness specialties, align manpower to force 
structure as the Navy grows the Fleet, and reduce manpower gaps at sea. 
The Navy is focused on data-driven process improvements that drive the 
implementation of industry best practices for aviation readiness and 
ship maintenance. Maintaining and improving public and private shipyard 
infrastructure capacity is essential to shipbuilding and conducting 
required maintenance of a growing Navy. Planned Naval Shipyard 
investments and completion of Naval Shipyard optimization analyses are 
a necessary step to minimize maintenance delays, increase on-time 
deliveries, and incentivize private shipyards to grow much-needed 
shipbuilding capacity. maintenance of a growing Navy. Planned Naval 
Shipyard investments and completion of Naval Shipyard optimization 
analyses are a necessary step to minimize maintenance delays, increase 
on-time deliveries, and incentivize private shipyards to grow much-
needed shipbuilding capacity.
    U.S. Marine Corps: Funding increases have enabled the Marine Corps 
to sustain its role as a ready, agile, and expeditionary force ready to 
meet global demand. Current unit readiness remains high for deployed 
forces and total force readiness continues to trend upward. However, 
the Marine Corps has entered a period of transformation to build a 
force that is postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving 
future operating environment and align with the NDS.
    As an inherently naval force, President's Budget 2021 enhances the 
Marine Corps' capability through naval integration. It prioritizes 
investments that incorporate revolutionary warfighting concepts, such 
as littoral operations in contested environments, expeditionary 
advanced base operations, and distributed maritime operations. The 
President's Budget 2021 invests in ground combat capabilities by 
divesting known legacy and low-demand programs that do not meet future 
operating requirements and reinvests these funds in capabilities that 
enable a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness to operate inside 
contested maritime spaces. Marine aviation continues to advance through 
ongoing and comprehensive readiness recovery efforts to increase the 
capacity and quality of mission capable aircraft.
    U.S. Air Force: Fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2019 funding 
contributed to readiness improvements across various platforms by 
investing in pilot training and production, depot maintenance, and 
aviation spare parts, while increasing flying hours. Increased aircraft 
mission capable rates have resulted in over 75 percent readiness of the 
Air Force's pacing squadrons. However, aging programs, such as the 
legacy tanker fleet, and programs that lack sufficient sustainment 
capacity to support total inventory, prohibit additional improvements 
in the Air Force's readiness. The President's Budget 2021 divests of 
programs like these and reinvests in new procurement and advanced 
technology to improve readiness, address future threats, and lower 
aircraft sustainment costs.
    The number one priority of the Air Force is multi-domain command 
and control. This investment allows current and future platforms to 
instantly share important data, and increases effectiveness, 
survivability, and lethality. The Air Force is also continuing to 
leverage data analytics, innovation, industry best practices, and 
cutting-edge technologies to reduce sustainment costs, increase 
efficiency, and improve weapon system reliability. The President's 
Budget 2021 addresses operational training infrastructure shortfalls 
through targeted near-term investments and a long-term funding strategy 
to upgrade both its live and synthetic training infrastructure.
    U.S. Space Force: We are expeditiously building the newest branch 
of the Armed Forces--the Space Force--as a co-equal Service under the 
Department of the Air Force. To complement U.S. Space Command, which 
the President established as a unified combatant command in 2019 to 
integrate Joint Force operations in the space domain, the Space Force 
will focus on the title X responsibilities of manning, training, and 
equipping U.S. Forces to maintain a competitive advantage in space. We 
expect the Space Force to be an agile and lean organization that will 
initially grow its membership from the U.S. Air Force, and eventually 
other Services pending Congressional approval. There is much work to do 
to establish the mechanisms to commission, enlist, appoint, train, 
equip, and support members of this new military service. We look 
forward to working with Congress in these areas to create the world's 
most capable Space Force.
                   developing the future joint force
    To effectively compete and deter in a time of great power 
competition, we must modernize existing capabilities, accelerate the 
evolution of advanced technologies, and develop and implement joint 
warfighting concepts.
    Analytical assessments, like the Joint Military Net Assessment, the 
Chairman's Risk Assessment, and Contingency Planning Guidance, allow us 
to assess risk, estimate the future operating environment, and make 
comprehensive, threat-informed decisions. Based on these assessments, 
the Joint Force has prioritized the following capability areas as 
critical to achieve the NDS objectives and counter tomorrow's expected 
challenges.
    Nuclear Deterrence: As the Department's top priority, President's 
Budget 2021 robustly supports the nuclear enterprise under the NDS and 
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. It invests in nuclear modernization to 
improve the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear 
enterprise, and supports simultaneous recapitalization of capabilities 
across all three aging legs of the nuclear triad and sustainment of 
legacy systems. Key investments are in the Ground-Based Strategic 
Deterrent, the B-21 bomber, the Columbia-class submarine, Long-Range 
Stand Off Weapon, missile warning, and resilient assured Nuclear 
Command, Control, and Communications.
    Space: The President's Budget 2021 requests funding to increase our 
resiliency, deterrence capability, and warfighting options in the space 
domain. It includes funding to modernize existing space assets, 
diversify offensive and defensive space control capabilities, and 
improve space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR). The budget also requests continued funding for the Space 
Development Agency's first project to develop a new data transport 
layer to enhance connectivity among our warfighting platforms. As they 
move forward, they will set an example of how the Department can move 
quickly and leverage industry best practices and innovation in 
developing new space capabilities.
    Cyber: The President's Budget 2021 request prioritizes the defense 
of DOD Information Networks, improves offensive and defensive 
cyberspace operations capabilities, and matures our cyberspace command 
and control structure. It continues to build, train, and equip Cyber 
Mission Forces. It also makes investments in next-generation encryption 
to secure DOD communications, and invests in secure, cloud-based 
information technology for the Department's business and mission 
operations through the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure Cloud 
contract.
    Command and Control: The President's Budget 2021 increases 
investment in Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) to create an 
agile, interoperable Joint Force that can fight with fully networked 
platforms, sensors, weapons, and command and control capabilities, even 
through contested environments. The Air Force's Advanced Battle 
Management System (ABMS) and our collective digital modernization 
efforts across the Department increase our speed, agility, and 
capability to fight and win in all-domain operations.
    Air: The President's Budget 2021 requests funding to modernize air 
capabilities, while divesting legacy air programs. It maintains 
tactical aviation capacity through continued procurement of both 4th 
and 5th generation aircraft, including F-35, F/A-18 E/F, and F-15EX 
aircraft. It invests in developing Next Generation Air Dominance 
platforms to meet future Joint Force requirements. President's Budget 
2021 reduces the size of the B-1 fleet, but funds selective legacy 
bomber upgrades, to improve aviation readiness, while investing in 
development of the future nuclear-capable bomber, the B-21 Raider. It 
also requests funding to build the future tanker fleet.
    Sea: The President's Budget 2021 requests funding for a battle 
force of 306 deployable ships in fiscal year 2021, including funding to 
recapitalize the Columbia strategic ballistic missile submarine, our 
Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent. The President's Budget 2021 
invests in a more lethal and innovative maritime force through 
increased research and development for maritime strike tomahawk, the 
hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike weapon, unmanned systems, a 
family of lasers, cyber and information warfare capabilities, and 
Marine Corps expeditionary equipment. Our budget request also includes 
key readiness investments in ship depot maintenance and ship 
operations. research and development for maritime strike Tomahawk, the 
hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike weapon, unmanned systems, a 
family of lasers, cyber and information warfare capabilities, and 
Marine Corps expeditionary equipment. Our budget request also includes 
key readiness investments in ship depot maintenance and ship 
operations.
    Land: Further developing long-range fire capabilities remains a 
priority in the land domain. The Army and Marine Corps intend to field 
an initial ground-launched cruise missile capability in the next few 
years. The President's Budget 2021 also invests in the recapitalization 
of combat vehicles with the fielding of the Joint Light Tactical 
Vehicle, which provides increased protection and restored payload 
characteristics compared to the legacy High-Mobility Multi-Wheeled 
Vehicle (HMMWV) fleet. Army Combat Vehicle and Marine Corps Amphibious 
Combat Vehicle investments will help meet the Joint Force's operational 
needs in the face of the changing character of modern land warfare.
    Missile Defeat and Defense: The President's Budget 2021 strengthens 
missile defense of the Homeland, deployed forces, and our allies and 
partners. It supports continued investment in the modernization of 
critical near-term layered capabilities to meet the threats of today 
while building additional capacity and lethality to outpace evolving 
threats. Additionally, this budget is aligned with the Missile Defense 
Review which places emphasis on Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense and 
reduces risk by pursuing multiple developmental efforts. These 
investments support a flexible, adaptable, and expanded missile defense 
architecture on the ground, in the air, and from the sea that leverages 
space technology.
    Advanced Technologies: Great power competition requires the 
Department to be on the cutting edge of advanced technologies. 
Hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence (AI), and autonomous 
systems are a few of our key advanced technology investment areas. 
President's Budget 2021 represents the Department's largest-ever 
investment in research, development, testing, and evaluation. Through 
this infusion of funding, we will draw on the power of America's 
industrial base and technology sector as partners in our modernization 
and innovation efforts.
    The President's Budget 2021 increases our investment in hypersonic 
weapons development. This request supports promising long-range 
conventional and advanced rapid-response strike capability development 
in each military department, including the Army's Long-Range Hypersonic 
Weapon, the Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike, and the Air Force's 
Advanced Rapid Response Weapon. Hypersonic weapons provide an offensive 
capability against time-sensitive and high-value targets. They 
challenge adversary sensors and interceptors, and complement existing 
cruise and ballistic missile capabilities. Hypersonic weapons provide 
an offensive capability against time-sensitive and high-value targets. 
They challenge adversary sensors and interceptors, and complement 
existing cruise and ballistic missile capabilities.
    President's Budget 2021 also increases our investment in AI 
research, prototyping, and fielding. The Joint Artificial Intelligence 
Center (JAIC) and Project Maven are leading cross-Service AI efforts, 
while each Service leads projects focused on their unique needs. 
Funding for the JAIC provides a common foundation upon which multiple 
organizations can develop, test, certify, and share AI capabilities. 
JAIC also provides a single point of contact for government, industry, 
academia, and other Allies interested in collaborating with DOD on AI. 
Project Maven's application of AI to full-motion video exploitation 
demonstrates how the Department can to rapidly develop, test, and field 
AI capabilities to address operational problems. We are rapidly 
expanding our AI efforts to logistics, cyber operations, command and 
control, and semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles, while we refine 
how humans will interact with this technology in our future.
    The President's Budget 2021 also requests funding for autonomous 
and remotely piloted systems in the air, on and under the sea, on land 
and in space. These systems increase the capacity of our force, allow 
us to focus human efforts on more complex tasks, and enhance our speed 
of maneuver and lethality in contested environments. Combined with 
developments in piloted and optionally-piloted platforms, our advanced 
autonomous systems will enhance our speed of maneuver and lethality in 
contested environments.
    Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC): Advances in technology and great 
power competition are driving us to refine our Joint Warfighting 
Concept. The JWC will provide a threat-informed capability development 
roadmap for all-domain joint maneuver warfare. We will harness the 
innovation within our force, the intelligence community, industry, and 
other sectors of America to develop and test this concept to ensure it 
reflects the best ideas for the future fight. President's Budget 2021 
invests in Joint wargames and experiments so we can accelerate our 
learning and adapt concepts and capabilities faster than our 
adversaries.
                         develop joint leaders
    In order to retain our competitive advantage into the 2030s and 
beyond, we are refining Professional Military Education (PME) and 
talent management to develop Joint Leaders with the skills, values, and 
intellectual agility to fight and win the wars of tomorrow.
    Our President's Budget 2021 complements measures we are taking to 
reorient the PME enterprise to prepare Joint leaders to operate 
globally, across all domains, and in an environment where the character 
of war is constantly changing. Measures include shifting PME curricula 
from a predominantly topic-based approach to instead focus on outcomes, 
and modifying instruction to emphasize ingenuity, military 
professionalism, and historical insights in the art and science of 
warfighting. The Joint Chiefs and I are committed to ensuring our PME 
enterprise can continuously assess, adapt, and innovate.
    Our collective talent management enterprise, based on individual 
Service personnel processes, must likewise continuously assess, adapt, 
and innovate. The positive benefits of adaptation and innovation in our 
PME enterprise are sub-optimized if we do not wisely identify and 
nurture the development of the human talent in the Joint Force. Our 
best and brightest must be identified, assigned to schooling, and 
employed in such a way that maximizes both their potential and the 
benefit for the Joint Force. Careful selection of who goes to school 
and when, who teaches them, assessments of cognitive abilities, and 
purposeful post-PME assignments require adaptation and innovation to 
realize this vision.
    The increased speed, complexity, and ambiguity of today's strategic 
environment require that we develop strategically-thinking joint 
warfighters who can critically and creatively apply military power to 
inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated operations, and 
fight under conditions of disruptive change. Through rigorous, 
specialized military education combined with enhanced talent management 
approaches, we will provide the Joint Force intellectual overmatch and 
competitive advantage in all domains.
                          troops and families
    The United States military is the strongest in the world because of 
our people. We maintain a resilient and adaptable military by providing 
unwavering support, care, and leadership to our troops and families, to 
include our extended family--the civilian employees who serve across 
the Joint Force. troops and families, to include our extended family--
the civilian employees who serve across the Joint Force.
    The President's Budget 2021 requests funding for family support 
initiatives, to include child care for over 160,000 military children 
and various youth programs serving more than 1 million dependents. 
President's Budget 2021 also requests a significant investment in a 
variety of military spouse programs. These include family advocacy, 
financial readiness, and the Military OneSource network. We are also 
implementing programs to offset the costs of acquiring and transferring 
professional licenses for our military spouses.
    In broad terms, President's Budget 2021 focuses on improving our 
facilities infrastructure and maintenance to support operational and 
training readiness, while also providing our military families safe, 
high-quality residences. In recognition of the deficient conditions 
with some of our base housing, each of the Services has enhanced 
oversight of their public-private housing partnerships consistent with 
the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA requirements.
    America's military operates globally and at a high operational 
tempo. We must keep the trust of our servicemembers and their families 
by ensuring that they continue to receive superior quality of life 
benefits. Our All-Volunteer Force will continue to be the greatest in 
history only if we continuously affirm how much we value the service 
that our military and civilian members provide their country.
                               conclusion
    The United States Armed Forces is a flexible and adaptable force 
ready to deter, fight, and win our Nation's wars. The President's 
Budget 2021 budget request increases the lethality of the force by 
improving readiness, developing the Joint Force of the future, 
developing Joint leaders, and taking care of our troops and their 
families. I appreciate the support of Congress to provide sustained, 
predictable, adequate, and timely funding so America's Armed Forces 
will achieve all-domain dominance now and into the future.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Milley.
    Because of a scheduling problem, we'll begin our questions 
with Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 
consideration. I have to go preside over the Senate in 10 
minutes, known as presiding officer duty, which Lieutenant 
Esper and Lieutenant Milley could relate to staff duty, back in 
their days. It's a duty, not an honor, and only the most junior 
personnel get to pull it.
    Secretary Esper, I want to commend your remarks at the 
Munich Security Conference about the threat that Huawei poses 
to the United States and our NATO allies. Unfortunately, it 
doesn't seem like all of our NATO allies got the message or 
agree with it. Could you talk about the threat that Huawei's 
presence in Europe, especially in nations where we have troop 
presence, threatens our security and NATO security?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. Since my first NATO 
Ministerial--Defense Ministerial, in June of last year--so, 
I've been to three or four now--I've had a common message, one 
of many, and this is the threat that Huawei technology imposes 
on our networks. The message has been that if countries--if our 
NATO allies incorporate Huawei technology, it may very well 
have a severe impact on our ability to share information, to 
share intelligence, to share operational plans, and for the 
alliance to conduct itself as an alliance. The fact of the 
matter is, some countries get it, many more don't. It's a 
continual process, where we're trying to work. I think we also 
need to work together, some countries, on alternatives to 
Huawei, because otherwise we will find the alliance 
compromised, in due course.
    Senator Cotton. Should some of our allies in Europe move 
forward with Huawei in their networks, will we have to at least 
consider our force posture in those countries, given what it 
means for the security and privacy of our troops and their 
families?
    Secretary Esper. I think, Senator, depending on how they 
move forward, we're going to have to assess what they've done 
and how they've done it, and make an assessment for each 
country, and then, from there, decide what we're going to do 
with regard to those things I mentioned--information-sharing, 
intelligence-sharing, and so forth.
    Senator Cotton. Okay. Last month, there were media reports 
that the Department of Defense had reservations about a 
regulation related to Huawei that the Commerce Department has 
proposed. That regulation has now moved forward--those 
objections. Could you just make clear for us, and maybe all the 
people that work for you directly, what the Secretary's 
position is on Huawei?
    Secretary Esper. Well, I'm very concerned about Huawei and 
other Chinese technologies, so I think we need to take a very 
careful eye with regard to our export controls--Chinese 
technology in general, Huawei specifically--and I think we need 
to be very conscious of Chinese technology in our system. By 
the same token, I also want to--I need to balance the equation 
and make sure we understand our own technology companies and 
ensuring that we have access to that, as well. But, overall, 
I'm very concerned about Chinese technology, espionage, 
cybertheft, you name it, that's ongoing, and has been for many 
years in our country.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    On the topic of espionage, let's turn to Russia, and 
specifically the Open Skies Treaty, and how they use that, and 
how they cheat on it in their own country. Specifically, 
refusing to allow us to fly Open Skies flights over 
Kaliningrad, their strategically located enclave in Europe, and 
also around and near Georgia. Other witnesses in the past in 
front of this Committee, like General Dunford, General Milley's 
predecessor, Vince Stewart, former head of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), have testified that Russia has been 
cheating on the Open Skies Treaty, that we don't get much 
benefit out of it as long as they're cheating, that--even 
called it a relic of the past. Do you think that the Open Skies 
Treaty still serves United States interests, given the fact 
that Russia continually cheats on that treaty?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, they have been cheating for many 
years. I raised this at the Defense Ministerial last month with 
all of our NATO partners, that we need to speak out more 
clearly about Russian noncompliance. You mentioned Georgia and 
Kaliningrad. Those are two good examples. We've also been 
denied access to military exercise over-flights. There are some 
other issues, that we cannot discuss in this session, which we 
should come and talk to you about. But, I have a lot of 
concerns about the treaty as it stands now.
    Senator Cotton. So, I noted the President's Budget did not 
include money to recapitalize the Open Skies Treaty aircrafts, 
the OC-135s. But, I've also heard that there may be, as early 
as next month, the possibility of contracts announced to 
modernize those aircraft. What can you tell us about that use 
of funds?
    Secretary Esper. At this point in time, until we make a 
final decision on the path forward, I'm not prepared to 
recapitalize aircraft. I want to make sure we understand what 
the direction is. I would note that many of our allies that are 
in the Open Skies Treaty--and I've talked to them a lot; this 
is important to many of our NATO allies--that they have the 
means to conduct the over-flights. We still have the means to 
conduct over-flights. I was at Offutt Air Force Base just last 
week. I had a chance to walk on--to walk about one of the OC-
135s and talk to the crew and take a look at the aircraft. But, 
at this point in time, we're holding until we get better 
direction.
    Senator Cotton. Good.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
    Mr. Secretary, let me return to some of my comments in the 
opening statement about the vacancies in the Department. There 
are two significant issues. One, as I highlight, civilian 
control of the military, which you need civilians to do that. 
Also, institutional capacity, people who have been on the job, 
have the credibility and the legitimacy of being confirmed and 
are not acting. Can you tell us why we have so many unfilled 
positions and acting personnel? We've--speaking for the 
Chairman--I think he's done a remarkable job of getting people 
through when they get up here. So, could you comment?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. Let me, first, give you a 
rundown on the numbers.
    So, of 60 confirmed slots--it was 58 until the NDAA was 
passed, we added 2 new Space positions--so, of 58, 39 are 
currently filled, we have 2 nominees waiting on the floor for a 
vote, we have 4 nominees in committee, we have 2 intents to 
nominate, we have 4 more that are right behind them, and then 
we have 5 more in the process. So, of the balance, there are--I 
think that's six in the balance that we have to identify 
positions for.
    Now, as you know, many of us have been in this town a long 
time. You--it becomes more challenging as you get into the 
fourth year of a first term, in terms of finding people. That 
is a challenge, and we also have challenges with moving people 
through the process. These are long processes. So, with regard 
to where we are, I don't think the situation is as dire as some 
may think, and we have very capable people in the positions. 
I've gotten the chance to work with them, both in their current 
role and my previous role as Secretary of the Army, and we have 
very capable DOD civilians--career civilians who also help out.
    At no time have I had any concerns about civilian control 
of the military, to be frank. I know that's part of the NDS 
review. When I came in, my first week or two on the job, I 
instituted a number of changes, where the uniform and civilian 
leadership works together, sits together in weekly meetings. 
We, together, review our National Defense Strategy 
implementation. We, together, review OP PLAN implementation or 
development. We have a much better integration today between 
civilians and military than we did, I think, 9 months ago.
    Senator Reed. In regard to the nominations that are coming 
up to us, I don't think I'm alone when I was surprised that 
Elaine McCusker's nomination was withdrawn. From everything I 
have heard, she's a very capable and experienced individual. In 
fact, that's why she was nominated in the first place. To your 
knowledge, can you tell us why her nomination was withdrawn?
    Secretary Esper. Well, Elaine is a very capable and 
dedicated public servant, but the President has the right to 
choose his members, who he's going to nominate.
    Senator Reed. So, it was the presidential decision, not a 
recommendation by you or anyone else in the Department of 
Defense.
    Secretary Esper. Well, it was a PPO decision. At this 
point, I don't have any more fidelity at this juncture.
    Senator Reed. Well, again, I think one of the concerns we 
go back to is that your role, as Secretary of Defense, you 
should have a critical voice in all these nominations. That 
goes with the territory, and----
    Secretary Esper. Sure.
    Senator Reed.--you should have it, and if you didn't have 
it in this case, I think that is a problem, which I hope we can 
address.
    The other area I spoke in my opening remarks was a Special 
Operations and Long-Intesity Conflict (SOLIC) position, and you 
realize that, over several years, through several NDAAs, we've 
tried to build up the capacity of the SOLIC to be a secretary-
like individual. Again, we have a--someone who's an acting 
position. That's been since last June, when Secretary West 
retired. So, can you promptly provide the Committee with a plan 
for implementing, not just getting a person in place, but 
making that person act like a Service Secretary?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. First of all, thanks again. 
I think you brought this up a month ago when we sat down 
together, and I was not tracking it. That's on me. I have a 
high regard for SOLIC. Believe it or not, I worked as an IMA 
[Individual Mobilization Augmentee] reern bservist in SOLIC 
many, many years ago. But, since then, we've taken a number of 
actions, so we're pushing forward on the nominee. We are 
looking at--we are going to reconsolidate SOLIC back in the 
Pentagon. I have tasked the SOLIC to provide a number of 
recommendations on section 922 implementation. We will begin 
frequent meetings between the SOLIC and myself and/or the 
deputy on a routine basis. So, we're--and then, also committed 
to recruiting and retaining more talent in SOLIC. So, I think 
we're taking a number of steps to integrate SOLIC and to 
achieve what was in law that you talked about.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Secretary Esper. And I look forward to updating you on this 
as we go forward.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Just a different topic here, but due to exceptional staff 
work on both the majority and minority side, we discovered, 
about 2 years ago, that many of our allies were not paying for 
fuel, the Saudis and Emirates, for example. It was about a $300 
million bill. The Emirates, when confronted with it, paid up. 
The Saudis are still paying. But, just today, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has released a report indicating 
that the Department has failed to secure reimbursement for more 
than $1 billion worth of support to other nations. I have no 
time left, but can you, briefly--very briefly--comment, and 
also indicate what you're going to do to collect the money, 
basically?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I've tried to track that number 
down. I can't find the billion-dollar number. I am tracking 
that with regard to payments. They are caught up at this time. 
They've reimbursed us for approximately $113 million. There is 
still approximately $38 million outstanding in flying costs. 
But, I want to pull the thread a little bit more on that 
billion-dollar number to make sure I'm not missing something, 
and that----
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Secretary Esper.--GAO report is helpful.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Fischer.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary and General Milley, there's been a lot of 
reporting about the reduction in funding for the Virginia-class 
submarine in connection with the National Nuclear Security 
Administration's (NNSA) budget increase. Critics of nuclear 
modernization are equating concern for the Navy's shipbuilding 
plan with opposition to funding the NNSA, and are using some 
recent comments made by Acting Secretary Modly and also you, 
General Milley, to suggest that DOD does not support the 
current budget request for NNSA. Now, I share the concern for 
the Navy's shipbuilding budget, and Congress will have an 
opportunity to look at that. But, I know that you are both very 
strong supporters of nuclear modernization, and also, Admiral 
Richard was before this Committee when he was here several 
weeks ago testifying that there was no excess margin in the 
NNSA's budget. So, I just want to be clear on this. Do you both 
support the requested level of funding for nuclear 
modernization at the NNSA?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I do, and if you don't mind, I'll 
give a little bit explanation. I think it's vitally critical 
that we recapitalize our nuclear triad. That's why we placed 
that as number-one defense priority, in terms of our funding. 
That means not just the platforms--the B-21, the ground-based 
strategic deterrent, and the Columbia-class submarine--but also 
nuclear command/control, and a few other things, like long-
range strike. But, you also have to have the packages, the 
warheads, et cetera, the plutonium pits go with that. So, it's 
critical that those be funded and moved quickly forward so we 
can have them paired up in time to recapitalize, ensure that 
the strategic deterrent is modeginning in the year 2030.
    Senator Fischer. And there's no room for pausing----
    Secretary Esper. Ma'am, there----
    Senator Fischer.--the production----
    Secretary Esper.--there is no room for margin. I have been 
working with our folks at OSD [Office of the Secretary of 
Defense] and Admiral Richard to try and actually build margin 
into our current fleet so that we have some room. But, it's 
critical that we meet that timeline.
    Senator Fischer. General Milley?
    General Milley. I absolutely support fully funding the 
nuclear enterprise. It's the number-one priority. It's kept the 
peace--world peace, actually, from great-power war for going on 
7\1/2\ decades. So, I absolutely support that. I think what 
we're talking about is the HASC's testimony from last week. I 
was not involved in the decision to move the money from the SSN 
(attack submarines), but I fully support fully funding our 
nuclear enterprise.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you. I think it's important that the 
record reflect that.
    Mr. Secretary, section 1039 of the 2013 NDAA requires the 
Nuclear Weapons Council to certify NNSA's budget and ensure 
it's adequate to meet requirements. Conferees clearly stated, 
in the accompanying report, their expectation that, through 
this provision, the Nuclear Weapons Council will, ``take an 
active role in shaping and reviewing the NNSA budget as it is 
prepared for submission to Congress and negotiated with the 
Office of Management and Budget during the budget review 
process''.
    This year, the certification letter submitted pursuant to 
this provision read, ``NNSA is unable to provide detailed 
budget information to support certification in advance of the 
budget release of the President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget 
Request by the Office of Management and Budget. The NWC cannot 
perform the analysis required to produce a budget certification 
letter without this information''.
    I think it's obvious that the process is not working but 
what is your view of the situation, and how can we resolve this 
to ensure the intent of the provision is being met?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I completely agree. I think 
this--we need to let the Nuclear Weapons Council work. I think 
that looking at budgets needs to begin very, very early, 
arguably in the late summer of the year before. I would like to 
have a look at that, as well. I want to make sure that we're 
prioritizing the right thing so that we have a capable 
strategic deterrent. I think if that were the case, then we 
would have been in a much different situation. We have already 
got agreement from NNSA to do that in DOE [Department of 
Energy], and I got an agreement also from OMB to support us on 
that. So, I think it's very important, and we intend to 
implement that, going forward.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you. As you stated earlier, this has 
to work together. It has to be on time in order to meet our 
number-one priority of the NDS.
    Also, Mr. Secretary, in the time since the budget was 
released, we've heard complaints, including many here in 
Congress, about things that either weren't included or were 
perceived to be underfunded in this budget: ships, aerial 
refueling tankers, Stars and Stripes, rumors about a withdrawal 
from Africa, the European Deterrence Initiative, the list goes 
on and on. You've heard those. What's forgotten, sometimes, is 
that it is Congress that sets the funding level, not the 
administration.
    So, Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say that these tradeoffs 
are the result of the lower top-line that was approved by 
Congress?
    Secretary Esper. They are, Senator. I would still scrub my 
budget really hard year after year, regardless, because I think 
it's necessary to do defense-wide reviews. But, as the Chairman 
mentioned up front, we have to get back on the trajectory of 3 
to 5 percent annual real growth if we're going to modernize the 
force and implement the NDS.
    I was shown a number, a few days ago, that if you'd go back 
to the Budget Control Act--I think it was August 2011--and the 
amount of funding we would have had if we hadn't gone that 
course, it's somewhere between 450 to 550 billion dollars lost 
that we could have put into modernization, and so, that's the 
catchup we have to look at, at this point in time.
    Senator Fischer. Okay.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here, and for your service.
    Secretary Esper, I appreciate all of the comments that 
you've made about your efforts to find additional funding 
within your budget, given the constraints that you're looking 
at. But, as you're aware, I'm sure, last year the Department 
realigned $6.1 billion for its budget towards constructing a 
border wall along the United States southern border with 
Mexico. More recently, the administration is going to divert 
another $3.8 billion from the Pentagon toward the border wall. 
They're taking that from a number of programs, in--as Senator 
Reed outlined in his opening statement, including eight MQ-9 
Reapers, which I--we heard, from General Walters, are very 
important as they're looking at ISR [Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] along the eastern European 
border.
    So, I guess--explain to me how we can feel comfortable with 
raiding the Defense budget at a time when you're telling us you 
have needs and are expecting a shortfall based on a flatter 
budget for 2021. Why should we assume, if you can divert that 
kind of money for the border wall, that we should give you 
additional funding to address other areas of need?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, as you know, the southwest border 
was declared a national emergency by the President, based on 
what has been happening down there.
    Senator Shaheen. And, as I'm sure you know, the Congress 
actually voted that we did not agree with that designation, 
and, in fact, it's only because the President vetoed it that 
that didn't change. I think there are some real questions about 
whether taking money that has been appropriated by the 
Congress, signed into law for another use, is actually legal 
and constitutional.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator, I understand. It's with the 
declaration of the national emergency and--we were asked to 
support Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Border security 
is national security. With that, it is our understanding under 
the law that, as directed, we were able to transfer that money 
to support that, much like we do many other things, whether 
it's fighting wildfires or helping with floods, whatever the 
case may be. But, I think the larger issue is with regard to 
modernizing the force. We're talking about making some big 
investments that are going to require a divestiture of things 
we've done in the past in order to invest in the things we need 
in the future. I think the demands there pale in comparison to 
what is being used to support DHS on the wall.
    Senator Shaheen. We had the Acting Secretary of DHS before 
the Appropriations Subcommittee last week, and he showed us 
numbers that indicated there are significant dollars there for 
additional construction on a border wall that they are not 
likely to use in the next year. So, it's hard for me to 
understand how we can justify taking money that we need from 
our military to construct a wall along the southern border. I'm 
not going to ask you to respond to that, because I'm going to 
be running out of time, but I think it's a very real question. 
I certainly hope that we won't see, past this year, any further 
effort to take money from our military. I hope you will commit 
to that.
    Secretary Esper. Senator, at this time, we don't foresee 
the need, at this time, to draw upon these sources next year, 
and I will follow up with the Secretary to find out, because we 
want to support DHS, but not over-support DHS, if that makes 
sense.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    I want to commend you on, the day that you were sworn in, 
appointing a commission to deal with PFAS [Per- and 
Polyfluoroalkyl Substances] contamination. It is an issue for 
us in New Hampshire, as I know you're aware, as it is in so 
many other States. I'm sure you know that the Fiscal Year 2020 
NDAA included a provision to phase out the use of fluorine-
containing firefighting for military use by 2024. Can you give 
us an update on where the military is in finding an 
alternative?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. We're working that issue hard. 
It's--to replacement, it's, what, the AFFF [Aqueous Film 
Forming Foam], I think. It's an acronym.
    Senator Shaheen. Right.
    Secretary Esper. The three things we're focusing on is the 
replacement for that; number two, making sure we're taking care 
of our people and then the communities that they live in or 
near; and then, number three, making sure we understand the 
health effects on humans from these foams. So, the task force 
has been working very hard since I launched them, integrating 
well with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other 
parts of the Government. I hope to have a report come up here 
very soon, within a week or two, to update you on that and the 
progress we're making. I know we have some hard marks to make, 
in terms of replacing the current foam with a new mechanism. 
But, we've been putting a lot of dollars into researching that. 
I want to say, we went from $139 million last year to $200 
million this year requested to tackle PFOS 
[perfluorooctanesulfonic acid], PFOA [perfluorooctanoic acid].0
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate your 
continued commitment. I think it's something that we all need 
to work on.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, first, let me begin by thanking you and your 
families for your decades of service. It is not unnoticed, and 
we most certainly appreciate what you have done.
    General Milley, I'd like to begin with you. I--part of the 
discussion--and Senator Shaheen has started this discussion 
with regard to the resources that we have, and the need for 
those resources--I'd like to give you an opportunity to talk a 
little bit about modernization, but also I want to talk about 
readiness today.
    I want to preface it by simply sharing that, over the last 
number of years, this Committee has received reports about the 
challenges we have in readiness of our Armed Forces today, and 
the fact that, over a period of years, and the fact, as you've 
both alluded to, we've had--or we've been at war for 20 years, 
and that takes its toll. When it comes to the equipment that 
our young men and women use, I'm just going to list them out, 
and I'd like to have you, if you could, give us an update:
    B-1s: May of last year, we had six of them that were 
actually operational.
    F/A-18s: At one point a little over a year ago, it was 
reported that less than 40 percent, or at about 40 percent, 
were operational.
    F-15Cs: You were limited to about 2 Gs, in terms of 
maneuvering, less than what a King Air would do in regular 
aviation.
    You've got approximately--on F-22s, you've got perhaps 125 
remaining that might be operational at a time, a percentage of 
those.
    With regard to your nuclear submarines, your attack 
submarines, you've got four of them right now that are at dock. 
I believe the Boise may be in drydock now, but, nonetheless, 
clearly we've got a shortfall there of nuclear attack 
submarines that are sitting, waiting for their half-life to 
begin.
    Along with that right now, I think you've got somewhere 
around 31 BCTs [Basic Combat Training] in the Army. I'd like to 
know--I think, at one point, we had as few as--less than single 
digits, the numbers that were ready to ``fight tonight.''
    General Milley, are we making progress? And can you give us 
an update, just on these particular ones, with regard to where 
we may have improved on those numbers over the last couple of 
years?
    General Milley. Thanks, Senator, for the opportunity.
    What I'd like to do, if I could, is get you the specific 
numbers. They're on this card, but this card's classified. So, 
actual readiness data, by type weapon system, with numbers that 
you're talking about, is classified information. We don't want 
the enemy of our country to know all that. On the one hand.
    On the other hand, I can tell you that it has improved, and 
I would put it in the--about a third or so--as I look at these 
numbers, about a third improved over the numbers that you 
probably saw anywhere between 12 and 24 months ago. So, there 
is--there's two steps forward, one step backward in some of 
this stuff, in terms of readiness, and we monitor it very, very 
closely every month. It has improved, and I can get you the 
exact data, if you'd allow me to do that in a classified way.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    [Deleted.]

    Senator Rounds. Well, that's fine, sir, but I just want to 
make it clear, the numbers that I gave you, I received in a 
non-classified session. Matter of fact, in open session, just 
like this.
    General Milley. Okay.
    Senator Rounds. The reason for my point is not to be 
critical, but, rather, to point out how important it is that we 
have the resources available to you----
    General Milley. Sure.
    Senator Rounds.--to continue to make those improvements, 
and----
    General Milley. Well, readiness is our number-one--in terms 
of the amount of money that we're putting towards this budget 
and in past budgets, we're trying to radically improve the 
readiness of the force, the ``fight tonight'' sort of thing, 
and, at the same time, you have to have balance for 
modernization, for the changing character of war, against those 
investments that the Secretary talked about earlier.
    Senator Rounds. Well, and I think the fact that we're 
modernizing our nuclear weapon systems is probably absolutely--
--
    General Milley. Sure.
    Senator Rounds.--it is absolutely critical, because right 
now, based upon our nonmilitary capabilities----
    General Milley. Right.
    Senator Rounds.--they fear our military because of our 
nuclear capabilities as much as anything else.
    General Milley. There's no question about it, that the--
``peace through strength'' is not just a bumper sticker. It 
matters in the whole idea of deterrence. You have to have the 
capability, and the will to use it, and your enemy's got to 
know that you have the capability and the will. So, the 
capability's important. That goes right into the readiness 
piece, and we want to make sure that our enemies know that we 
are ready. In my opening statement, I said we are ready. I 
don't expect you to take it on faith. I'd like to report out, 
in a classified way, exactly how ready, by type system, if I 
could.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Secretary Esper. Senator, if I may, what you're looking at, 
it is a tradeoff between current readiness and future 
readiness, and Senator Fischer draw this out. I talk about the 
$450 to $550 billion of lost funding. That's really important 
when you're trying to recapitalize, whether it's the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, but particularly big capital 
projects, like shipbuilding. If you don't have that funding, if 
it's not predictable and steady for the industrial base, they 
just can't--you just can't build. What you do is--so, what 
you're doing is--as you know, it's like driving an old car; you 
reach the point where you're putting so much maintenance into 
the old car, you've got to buy the new one, or else it's a 
losing battle.
    Senator Rounds. No question, sir, and you're making the 
point that I think we want to have made----
    Secretary Esper. Right.
    Senator Rounds.--which is--and you can't do it without 
continued resources on an expected basis year to year. I think 
you are making progress, and I was hoping to be able to share 
some of that progress, but to say, if given the appropriate 
resources, we are making improvements, and will continue to. 
But, I agree, it's readiness versus modernization in many, many 
cases, and that tradeoff is tough to handle once in a while.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    We're all monitoring the coronavirus closely, and I 
appreciate the Department taking this seriously and working to 
keep our servicemembers and their families safe. While in 
Hawaii we do not have any confirmed cases, we are a gateway for 
travelers from China, South Korea, Japan, so we must be 
exceptionally vigilant and coordinated.
    Mr. Secretary, will you commit to me that the DOD will act 
quickly on requests made by the State of Hawaii to assist with 
response, in the event it is needed--I know there are some 
factors we have to meet--pursuant to the National Response 
Framework and DOD Directive 3025.18?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am, under title 10. Of course, 
title 32 would require action by the Governor first.
    Senator Hirono. Yes, I understand.
    Secretary Esper. Okay.
    Senator Hirono. That's my question.
    So, Mr. Secretary, you say in your posture statement that 
the Indo-Pacific remains DOD's number-one priority region. I 
have a series of questions about the threat in this region, 
and, as I have only, now, 4 minutes left, I'd really appreciate 
your answers to be very brief, and a yes or no would be great.
    In your statement, you say North Korea is seeking to build 
legitimacy through the development of a variety of nuclear, 
conventional, and unconventional weapons, and by growing its 
ballistic missile capabilities. Is the threat of North Korea's 
ballistic missile capabilities becoming increasingly dangerous?
    Secretary Esper. It's becoming increasingly complicated as 
they seek to modernize the----
    Senator Hirono. Yes.
    Secretary Esper.--full range of missile systems.
    Senator Hirono. So, I'd say that's a yes.
    You say in your posture statement that the fiscal year 2021 
budget request is directed toward achieving an ``irreversible 
implementation of NDS'' which includes enhancing missile 
defense capabilities pursuant to the 2019 Missile Defense 
Review. That's correct, isn't it?
    Secretary Esper. Yes. We are putting additional money into 
missile defense and defeat.
    Senator Hirono. And do the North Korean long-range 
ballistic missiles pose a threat to the United States, which, 
of course, includes Hawaii?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, if our intelligence is correct, they 
would.
    Senator Hirono. Yes, and you also state, your budget 
request, ``increases missile defense capability and capacity to 
keep pace with adversary missile systems,'' while investing in 
a layered defense of the Homeland. But, Mr. Secretary, in spite 
of 4 years of authorizations and 3 years of appropriations from 
Congress, and your own 2019 Missile Defense Review, you have 
zeroed out the HDR Hawaii, which is the radar for Hawaii, which 
is part of a system that provides layered defense of the 
Homeland. Is this decision to zero out the funding for HDRH 
[Homeland Defense Radar Hawaii] a decision to not build this 
radar at all in Hawaii?
    Secretary Esper. Not necessarily, Senator. As you know, 
there--for many years now, we've had a problem with State and 
local authorities giving us permission to get onto that site 
and do what we need to do, if I recall correctly, and it 
seemed--the latest report we had at the time of building the 
budget is, we probably wouldn't see any resolution for another 
year or two or three.
    Senator Hirono. So, does that mean that we can expect you 
to request--I am very familiar with certain delays with regard 
to the siting. So, does this mean that we can expect a request 
of money for the HDRH in fiscal year 2022?
    Secretary Esper. I think, when we see a light at the end of 
the tunnel with regard to getting clearance to build, yes, 
ma'am.
    Senator Hirono. Okay. That's good to know.
    Because, otherwise, the decision to zero out the HDRH and 
reprioritizing the funds from DOD's number-one priority region, 
as you say, for another purpose, really doesn't make sense.
    I'd also like to have a commitment from you now that you 
will not seek to repurpose F-20 funding for this radar that is 
still being used to continue the HDRH Hawaii contract.
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I'm not sure I can make that 
commitment, because I'm not sure I fully understand what you're 
asking. But, again, our----
    Senator Hirono. Well----
    Secretary Esper. What we're trying to do is, in the era of 
tight budgets, make sure we don't put money against something 
that has no possibility of being effected in the near term.
    Senator Hirono. Well, I don't know what you mean by the 
``near term,'' because----
    Secretary Esper. Well, in the----
    Senator Hirono.--this radar----
    Secretary Esper.--upcoming fiscal year----
    Senator Hirono.--this radar is part of a system, and was 
supposed to be pretty much operational by 2023, which means 
that it's--aside from the delays that I understand that's 
occurred, we're supposed to be on track, because that's what 
the National Defense Strategy calls for. So, in 2020, there was 
some $188 million. This is being expended right--even as we 
speak. So, I would like to know that you are not going to 
repurpose this funding that's already there----
    Secretary Esper. Well, Senator, if I recall the----
    Senator Hirono.--for other purposes.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. If I recall the issue 
properly, it's--developing of the system is one thing, but if I 
develop a system and I can't put it somewhere, that it has no 
effect, it's wasted money.
    Senator Hirono. Well, you know that this contract is--as 
far as I know, Lockheed Martin is already building this radar. 
So, there is already a contract for them. This thing was 
supposed to be, in fact, operational in 2023. So, if we don't 
go ahead with this, I think that you're going to have some 
contractual things to deal with. But, you know, what I'm 
hearing from you is, aside from the delays that were caused by 
the siting, mainly, of this radar, that you have a commitment 
to pursue the radar and have it built in Hawaii as a part of 
our missile defense system.
    Secretary Esper. I am making a commitment to you that we, 
of course, intend to defend all 50 United States and 
territories with radars and effectors as necessary. What I 
don't under---what I need to come back to you with is a better 
understanding where things lie. It's one thing to build a 
radar, but if I invest hundreds of million dollars in the radar 
and then not--cannot place it somewhere, then it's wasted 
money.
    Senator Hirono. Of course I realize that. That's not what 
I'm asking.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst is recognized.
    Senator Fischer is presiding.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being with us this 
afternoon.
    There are a few things that I'm very interested in as the 
chair of Emerging Treats and Capabilities, and, of course, one 
of those is hypersonics. Secretary Esper, if I could focus on 
that for a moment. A key component of our NDS is assessing and 
recalibrating our posture with regards, of course, to the 
great-power competition. China has a leg up--I can't--we can't 
dispute that--in developing technologies like a hypersonic 
aircraft and missiles. The technology could give users the 
tactical long-range capability to hit targets yet with such 
speed and surprise that defending against them is very, very 
difficult. Great concern to all of us.
    So, how is the DOD investing in deconflicting research 
priorities across the services--we have a lot of research going 
on out there--to limit the duplicative spending on hypersonics?
    Secretary Esper. Thank you, Senator.
    First of all, you're correct, hypersonics is one of our top 
priorities, in terms of developing capability, lethality in 
that field. We are doing very innovative work. I would tell you 
it's more innovative than what you would see coming out of 
Russia or China. I can----
    Senator Ernst. Right.
    Secretary Esper.--assure you of that.
    Senator Ernst. Good.
    Secretary Esper. We have maximized every dollar. We put 
into this year, I think it's $3.2 billion, and over the FYDP, 
to make sure that we get inventory out in the field as soon as 
possible. Each of the services has a variety of programs. DARPA 
[Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] has programs, as 
well. Through either collaboration between the services or 
through work through our R&E shop under Dr. Griffin, we're 
working very hard to make sure there's not duplication, but, 
more importantly, sharing. We see a lot of sharing between the 
services. So, I'm very confident that, in the next few years, 
we'll be deploying hypersonic weapons, as the commanders need 
them, throughout the theater, but in the Indo-Pacific theater 
in particular.
    Senator Ernst. Okay. Just to be clear, you said it's $3.2 
billion over FYDA----
    Secretary Esper. No, ma'am, it's $3.2 billion this year.
    Senator Ernst. This year, okay, and is that--you feel that 
that is sufficient----
    Secretary Esper. I asked multiple times to make sure, ``Is 
that every single dollar we can put against it and effectively 
use?'' In other words, there's no more--one more extra dollar 
would be a wasted dollar. I was assured multiple times that 
that was the max we could put into that.
    Senator Ernst. Okay, and--thank you, Secretary. How does 
this fit into our nuclear modernization efforts?
    Secretary Esper. It certainly gives us--we're talking about 
conventional systems here--it gives us a--an incredible strike 
capability below the nuclear threshold, which is important, to 
reach out at long ranges to strike somebody with precision, at 
speeds of 5, 10 times the speed of sound, with great 
capability. It's going to give us a lot of reach, which is what 
we'll need in the--in a conflict against a near peer.
    Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Thank you.
    Mr. Secretary, I know that we're embracing innovation at 
every level possible--and I appreciate that--within the DOD, 
and we're modernizing to give our warfighters that tactical 
advantage over our adversaries. Of course, another area I'm 
interested in is quantum information systems technology. Again, 
one of Mr. Griffin's areas. But, we are exploring options for 
quantum integration in a variety of areas. However, we hear, 
from various industry, that DOD requirements are too broad for 
the current scope of research. What the industry leaders are 
recommending is that the DOD refine their requirements, and 
this can help drive unified efforts to advance rapidly first in 
the narrow area instead of slowly across a very large spectrum. 
Can you speak a little bit to some of the advances we're seeing 
in quantum information systems?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. Quantum definitely is a top 
priority. It's probably in the top tier, if you will. Dr. 
Griffin's very passionate about this. I'll have to go back and 
get you an answer. Typically, what we ask of industry, though, 
is--they ask us not to give them requirements, per se, and they 
ask us to tell them the solution we're looking for, help us--
tell them the problem we're trying to solve, and help them--let 
them help us develop the solution. So, this is a little bit 
different than what I typically hear, so I'd like to----
    Senator Ernst. Okay.
    Secretary Esper.--run this down and come back to you on it.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. Where there is a clear mission payoff, and 
technology is mature enough that we have clear performance 
metrics that will get us to that mission payoff, the Department 
is ready to push ahead and advance quickly. But the state of 
the art for most quantum technologies is not there yet. In some 
cases, our system analysis shows us that the speculated 
potential of the technology does not translate directly into a 
military mission payoff. In other cases, where we still 
anticipate a clear military mission impact, the technology 
readiness level is not yet mature enough to warrant immediate 
acceleration.
    The most significant advances, from a military standpoint, 
are the refinement and miniaturization of portable atomic 
clocks. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to military 
timing needs, and progress has been made on a number of form-
factors and performance levels. Small, low-power versions of 
high-performance atomic clocks have recently been developed 
under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Atomic 
Clocks with Enhanced Stability Program. Other, chip-scale 
atomic clocks are now available commercially due to years of 
Department of Defense research investments, and we continue to 
fund even higher performance atomic clocks for new military 
applications. These will play an important part for position 
navigation and timing resilience of our joint forces in GPS-
denied environments.
    Several quantum sensors have demonstrated amazing precision 
in laboratory experiments and are on a path toward rapid 
maturity for military application. As one example, we have seen 
impressive progress with quantum gyroscopes and accelerometers. 
These have the potential to be incorporated in future strategic 
grade inertial guidance systems at a fraction of today's cost.
    In quantum computing, both academic and commercial progress 
in quantum computing hardware continues to be a national 
strength. Google, IBM, Microsoft, Honeywell, and several 
venture-capital-backed startups have been making significant 
investments in the field. Because there are big open questions 
about the military utility of these machines, and because the 
computer science of quantum algorithm development is so early 
in its development, our research labs are partnering with 
industry leaders to understand which military computational 
problems can be addressed using these new quantum computing 
machines.
    Finally, in the defensive role, great progress is being 
made to develop new public cryptographic standards and update 
our cryptographic systems to ensure that the U.S. military is 
not vulnerable to attack from a quantum computer should our 
adversaries ever gain access to a large enough machine.

    Senator Ernst. And certainly, we'd love to partner on that. 
It's just critical that, in some of these areas that we see in 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, a lot of the discussions 
that we have, that are very focused on advancing technology and 
working with industry partners, small businesses, and so 
forth----
    Secretary Esper. Right.
    Senator Ernst.--in that area.
    But, I do appreciate you both, gentlemen, very much for 
being here today, and look forward to working further with you.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you.
    Senator Fischer [presiding]: Senator Jones.
    Senator Jones. Thank you both for being here, and for your 
service. I really appreciate your opportunity to come here.
    Secretary Esper, it would come as no surprise to folks here 
that I have been advocating Redstone Arsenal to be the head of 
Space Command. You and I have talked about that----
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator Jones.--a good bit, and in May of 2019, before you 
were even the Acting Secretary, the list was winnowed down. 
There was a series of visits, an extensive process that was 
winnowed down to a few sites, and Redstone Arsenal was a part 
of those. Space Command was supposed to be announced in the 
fall. It wasn't, and we're still--now we're in March, it's 
still not, and then, yesterday, Lieutenant General Thompson 
testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the 
Air Force had been directed--and he emphasized the word 
``directed''--to go back and open this up. He said open up the 
aperture and look at all of them, including some nontraditional 
locations, and that they would establish the criteria, which I 
thought had already been established months, if not a couple of 
years, ago, and that none of these--the list--Redstone Arsenal 
and others were on there. So, you know, a cynical person would, 
in today's world, think that there was some political electoral 
politics coming into this--into play into this, because 
Congress has wanted to do this, and we've been supportive, but 
now we're going to get delayed again in opening this process 
up.
    So, I have a series of questions. Number one, did this come 
from the White House? If so, who? If it didn't--or if it did, 
was there pushback? If not, if it came from you or others--tell 
me how that process up to open this up again, because a lot of 
folks have been looking at this for a long time.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. It came from me.
    Senator Jones. All right.
    Secretary Esper. I'm the responsible party. During my talks 
on the Hill, prior to my nomination--more particularly, after 
my hearing here--I visited the House, and I heard from members, 
on both sides of the aisle, that they felt that the process 
that had been run was unfair and not transparent, and there 
were a number of complaints. So, I directed, at that time, that 
we pause in place. I took a briefing on it, along with Deputy 
Secretary Norquist, and we did not feel, as well, that it was 
transparent enough, that enough States, Members, et cetera, had 
a chance to participate. So, we directed that it be revisited 
and a different approach be taken, where they outline the 
criteria, the screening criteria by which a place would meet as 
a qualifying material, that we would go out to all members and 
offer them to nominate locations, if you will. We'd screen from 
there. But, do a very iterative, transparent thing, where 
members can also comment on the criteria, we would update at 
various points in time, and then keep narrowing it down, much 
like we did on Futures Command, till you get to the final site, 
so that everybody had confidence that it was fair and there 
were no politics involved in it, and that it was the best site 
for the mission at hand.
    I regret to say that that process began late. I had another 
revisit with them, about a month ago, which is what probably 
prompted that testimony. But, I'm the one that did it. It was 
my initiative, simply to make sure that there was transparency 
and buy-in and consent from members who were----
    Senator Jones. How long will the process take now?
    Secretary Esper. It's going to take several months. I 
think--I don't see anything being announced--if it helps to 
assure you, I don't see anything being announced before the 
election.
    Senator Jones. All right. Great.
    Secretary Esper. In fact, I would probably--regardless, I 
think it's best to keep it out of the election, for the reasons 
that you cited.
    Senator Jones. All right.
    Let me ask you about some--a concern that I think has been 
raised by a couple of folks here, and that is the transfer of 
funds to build the border wall. Taken out of that was $261 
million out of Mobile, Alabama, at Austal, to build an EPF 
[Expeditionary Fast Transport], which is, I think, a very, very 
important ship, and it was one that is in part of this 
transition. Austal, as you know, is the only shipbuilder that's 
delivering ships to the Navy on time and on budget. Was any 
consideration given to how that might impact folks like down in 
Mobile when these decisions were made? And the first part of 
that question, though, is--I want to make sure I understood the 
reasons. The reasons for this part of the money is strictly for 
trying to close off drug smuggling. It has nothing to do with 
immigration, but drug smuggling. Is that correct?
    Secretary Esper. It's--under this authority, the 284 
authority, it's directed at counterdrug, narcotrafficking 
routes, if you will, in support of DHS. That's the provision of 
law under which it falls.
    Senator Jones. All right, and I'll----
    Secretary Esper. I'm sorry.
    Senator Jones. Talk to me about Austal.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. So, what we tried to do in this 
process is to make sure that we could find, as best as 
possible, a way to look at the problem that was objective and 
apolitical, and that we could stand behind. The staff came up 
with--as they looked at it, is the fact that the items that 
were either not requested in the fiscal year 2020 budget or 
items that were ``early need,'' either. So, either ``excess to 
need'' or ``early to need'' was a very clean-cut line that 
took--did not take politics or anything like that into account, 
and it was very objective. That was the standard by which we 
went. I consulted with my Service Secretaries. The Chairman 
consulted with the Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, and that 
was the basis upon which we made the decision, recognizing 
fully that there are a lot of different players and equipment 
and things caught up in that, but that was the way we 
approached it.
    Senator Jones. All right. Well, I will--out of time, but I 
will have some questions for the record, including maybe a 
little bit more of an explanation on the Space Command, and 
also a report, the current conditions of facilities used by the 
Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps at minority-serving 
institution, another on the commitment to the Junior ROTC Pilot 
Program--Scholarship Program that we're doing, and also----
    Secretary Esper. Great program, by the way.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, and also, review a report about 
the Department of Defense Child Development Center. So, I'll 
have those for the----
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator Jones.--questions for the record.
    Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Senator Fischer. Senator Cramer.
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Thank you, Secretary and General, for your service, for 
your appearance today.
    A special thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your recent trip to 
Minot, and please thank Leah, as well. It was an exceptional 
day for the airmen and missileers in Minot. I hope you took 
something away from it, as well.
    Since we're on the topic, and since the----
    Secretary Esper. I went there in the winter, so----
    Senator Cramer. You--well, the fact you came in February 
does add to your ``street cred,'' without a doubt, but you also 
got to see them at their best, in the toughest conditions, 
working with some very old equipment----
    Secretary Esper. Right.
    Senator Cramer.--as you noticed, no doubt--some very old 
airplanes flown and maintained by some very young airmen, and 
some very old missiles maintained by some very young 
missileers, and so, we appreciate that--the priority of 
modernization, obviously.
    With regard to the missiles, specifically, you know, ` 
since the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent] has been on 
the planning board, I've pressed pretty hard about the 
timeline, and particularly knowing there are detractors here 
and there, and, of course, the lack of competitive--added to 
that. If you could just give an update on GBSD, the progress, 
and what you see, if any, challenges there might be, and what 
risks we run if there is a delay.
    Secretary Esper. Thank you, Senator. Yes, we continue to 
move forward on GBSD. It's vitally important as the land-based 
leg of the triad, as you know. What concerns me most is the 
same thing that I discussed with Senator Fischer, is, we have 
no margin left with regard to the timeline. It's utterly 
important that we move out quickly. I share your concerns about 
lack of competition, so we're going to have to be very clever. 
Under Secretary Lord is working on a number of ways by which we 
keep the pressure on the contractor to stick to cost and stick 
to performance and timeline, to schedule associated with that, 
because there is no margin with regard to replacing that. We 
tend to have this recapitalization problem coming all together 
at around the same time.
    But, that said, I'm also looking for ways to build margin 
in that leg of the triad. Are there different things we can do 
to extend it? And then, as you know, I have--personal concern 
after speaking to folks there is to make sure we maintain the 
health and vitality and readiness of the missile force, itself. 
A very important mission, and a very tough mission, when you 
have a chance to get down one of those silos and experience 
what they go through.
    Senator Cramer. It is that.
    General Milley, with regard to this, I think the Secretary 
referred to the divest--to divest of some of the things of the 
past, to invest in things of the future. We hear a lot lately 
in this budget about the risk associated with getting from here 
to there, and the divestiture of some of those legacy systems. 
One of the things that comes up often, of course, is the ISR 
demands in the theater. I think pretty much every combatant 
commander I've talked to says we're woefully short, and yet, 
some of the legacy systems that are being targeted for 
retirement to make room for modernization include some very 
important ISR assets. I'd be interested in, your take on all 
that, if you're comfortable with, for example, Global Hawk, 
future MQ-9, whether the risk is worth it, or what the risk 
might even be.
    General Milley. Well, it depends on what adversary or enemy 
you're talking about. So, many of the ISR systems that we have 
today that are in very high demand are very, very useful 
against terrorists, insurgents, against fixed sites, et cetera, 
and they have clear penetration capability when there's no 
significant air defense threat or there's no other types of 
threats. If you're talking about great-power competition, which 
is what this NDS talks about and what this budget is all about, 
that's a different type of ISR. So, we're trying to divest 
ourselves of the ISR that is not particularly useful against a 
Russia or China, or even high dense air defense systems of an 
Iran or a North Korea, and invest in those ISR systems that do 
have penetration capability. That's why you see some of the 
``divest in order to invest.'' Now, there's no need--it makes 
no sense to me to continue to buy stuff that isn't in alignment 
with the NDS. So, it's a ``depends'' question on what your 
enemy is.
    With respect to the quantity or capacity relative to the 
COCOMs [combat commands[, you'll never find a combatant 
commander who has enough ISR. It's just not going to happen. We 
are--we have been, every single year, year in and year out for 
20 years, always been short of ISR. We continue to build it. 
You're never going to buy your way out of the problem, because 
it has to do with information and having to do with knowledge 
and decision-making. So, we will always be chronically short of 
ISR. But, the key, though, for the ``divest to invest'' is, it 
depends on who you're going against. We need to invest in the 
capabilities that are worthwhile against a China or a Russia.
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, both of you. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Senator Manchin.
    Senator Manchin. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Thank both of you all for your service. I appreciate very 
much your being here today.
    Secretary Esper, I support the wall, and I have always 
supported the wall. But, I really have a problem with the 
funding, which I think you all know our position on. It should 
be appropriated by us. That's our job. The reprogramming of the 
$3.8 billion of appropriated funds to support the border wall--
and the reason it troubles me is that it's--$1.3 billion of 
that is taken out of the National Guard and the Reserve 
equipment. The National Guard is--every one of us have an 
affinity with our National Guards.
    So, how do we justify the disproportionate cuts to the 
Guard despite knowing the vital and ever-growing role in 
aspects of national security? And I know about Homeland 
security. But, the Guard's our front-line defense in Homeland 
security.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I--thank you, I appreciate that, 
and I think, with regard to your first remark, we would agree, 
our preference would be that this be funded through DHS.
    Senator Manchin. Right.
    Secretary Esper. But, that said, we are where we are, and 
DOD will support DHS in this regard. As I was saying to Senator 
Jones, when we try to find a clear line, objective line by 
which to draw the sources, we came up with the one with regard 
``either to need'' or ``excess to need.'' And, as things popped 
out, it became obvious that the impact would be on the National 
Guard. It's no pleasure for me----
    Senator Manchin. Yeah.
    Secretary Esper.--to have to make that----
    Senator Manchin. I know.
    Secretary Esper.--decision, as a former guardsman myself, 
but it--we tried to not play----
    Senator Manchin. Well, also, Secretary, you have said that 
your Night Court Program has been very successful at freeing up 
money. Could nothing be freed up there, on the Night Court?
    Secretary Esper. Well, we--I spent 22 sessions over 4 
months, and we found $5.7 billion out of $99 to free up. I--
we're going to--we've started again this year. So, I did find 
$5.7 to put into our NDS priorities, Senator.
    Senator Manchin. Well, let me--another thing I would just 
say, since the TAGs and the Governors are so intertwined----
    Secretary Esper. Right.
    Senator Manchin.--have they had any forewarning of this 
whatsoever?
    Secretary Esper. No, sir. The only forewarnings that went 
out were the consultations I had with the Service Secretaries 
and that the Chairman had with General Lengyel and the Service 
Chiefs.
    Senator Manchin. I'll--another question is, I've just been 
briefed on the Afghan fighting that's going on, attacks from 
today--I think the 4th. I just got briefed on that. Maybe you 
could bring me up to where we are in Afghanistan with the 
Taliban right now. Also, the peace agreement, do you think it 
might hold? Because it hasn't helped very long, and what 
direction and what do I tell West Virginians and people that 
have been upset about the problems in releasing 5,000 enemy 
fighters? That did not go over well in the State of West 
Virginia.
    Secretary Esper. Sir, I'm not sure I can do it justice in 2 
minutes and 12 seconds, but I'll say this much. It's my view--
and I--I'll let the Chairman--I'll save time for the Chairman--
--
    Senator Manchin. Sure.
    Secretary Esper.--to speak. But, my view is, the best, if 
not only, path forward is through a political agreement. We 
have an historic opportunity here. We signed, on Saturday in 
Qatar--I was in Kabul at the same time--this agreement that 
lays out a framework by which we could proceed toward an 
eventual intra-Afghan negotiation. It was supposed to happen, 
at this point, 5 days from now, and the results, so far, have 
been mixed.
    Senator Manchin. What kind of signals will we get today? 
I'm pleased to see at least we've supported defending the 
Afghan fighters. We didn't just leave them.
    Secretary Esper. Which is what--what has allowed us, under 
the document, under the agreement, to defend them. It's the 
commitment I made to the Afghans when I was there on Saturday.
    Senator Manchin. Right.
    Secretary Esper. We will continue to defend the Afghans, 
support them. The Taliban, to their--are honoring their piece, 
but--in terms of not attacking United States and coalition 
forces, but not in terms of sustaining a reduction of violence. 
Our Special Envoy is over there now. He's going to be pulling 
the parties back together. The critical thing, in the next 5 
days--few days, will be getting the conditions set for them to 
sit down with regard to negotiations.
    Senator Manchin. Will we see any retreat whatsoever once we 
hit the Taliban today? From their aggressiveness against the 
Afghan fighters?
    Secretary Esper. You know, the Chairman and I spoke to 
General Miller earlier on this.
    Do you want to comment?
    General Milley. Yes, Senator. Bottom line is, there was a 
variety of attacks over the last 24 to 48 hours. They're all 
beaten back. They're at small little outposts. We did use 
United States air in support of our Afghan allies.
    What is important, though, for the agreement--we're on day 
4. This was small, lower-level attacks out on checkpoints, et 
cetera. But, the Taliban have signed up to a whole series of 
conditions, of which--I believe the Committee and all the 
Members of the Congress have all the documents associated with 
this agreement. You can go through all of it, and, of 
significance, there's no attacks in 34 provincial capitals, 
there's no attacks in Kabul, there's no high-profile attacks, 
there's no suicide bombers, there's no vehicle-borne suicide, 
no attack against United States Forces, no attack against 
coalition. There's a whole laundry list of these things that 
aren't happening. Yes, there were significant numbers of 
attacks, small attacks. They were all beaten back, and we will 
continue to support----
    Senator Manchin. Well, we've seen that they've been able--
we've seen that they've been able to control their field 
fighters, right?
    General Milley. We saw that over the 7 days, where they 
were able to----
    Senator Manchin. So, but----
    General Milley.--go from a high of about 125 attacks a day 
down to about 15 a day. They issued out instructions not to 
attack. That's correct.
    Senator Manchin. So, we don't know what the cause is.
    Secretary Esper. Well, keeping that group of people on 
board is a challenge. They've got their range of hardliners and 
softliners, and so they're wrestling with that, too, I think.
    Senator Manchin. Please keep us informed. I appreciate it.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator Fischer. Senator Perdue.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here.
    General Milley, I want to address--and both of you, 
actually, on this thing--you mentioned ISR just now, and I 
agree 100 percent. One of those--perfect examples. I want to 
lead into my question about asset allocation. As JSTAR [Joint 
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar] is going to ABMS 
[Advanced Battle Management System], and then the JDC2 [Joint 
All-Domain Command and Control] development, this is a lot of 
moving parts, very rapidly, and I'm shocked at, really, the 
progress we've made in the last year. I know we're not in a 
classified environment; I'm not going to go there. I want to 
know--first, Secretary, if you don't mind--the allocation of 
resources, after we take about 14 or 15 percent for overhead in 
the DOD, the--what's remaining after that, we allocate almost a 
third, a third, a third. Is that consistent with the NDS 
refocus on the maritime that General Mattis talked about, back 
in 2016--or 2017, relative to standing up to our major 
competitor, China?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. It's--first of all, it's not 
cleanly a third and a third and a third. There is a traditional 
background. Normally, Navy----
    Senator Perdue. It's very close.
    Secretary Esper.--Navy has the highest, Army usually has 
the lowest, Air Force in between, and there's a lot of 
different things----
    Senator Perdue. Well, actually--I'm sorry to correct, but 
I--the 2021 budget, Army and Navy are almost equal.
    Secretary Esper. Oh, I--no, sir, they're quite different--
--
    Senator Perdue. Okay. Well, let's--we'll take that 
offline----
    Secretary Esper. Okay.
    Senator Perdue.--but, I'd like to see that, because the 
numbers I have are a little bit different.
    Secretary Esper. The Navy's at 207----
    Senator Perdue. Correct.
    Secretary Esper.--billion, and the Army at 177.
    Senator Perdue. Okay. Go ahead. I'll----
    Secretary Esper. So, anyways, I--that said, it--that is 
where it is. What--as the Chairman and I have talked about 
this, we've talked about with the chain of command, what we 
need to do, I think, is, first of all, have--update our war 
plans--they haven't been updated--and have OP PLANS that are 
relevant in the post-NDS environment, number one.
    Number two--and the Chairman's working on this--we need a 
new joint warfighting concept that takes into account all 
domains of warfare. The Joint Staff is working on that right 
now. I think, once we have updated war plans that--and we have 
a new warfighting concept, and we have a good sense of what 
future systems will look like, I do think we need to look at 
that reallocation. But, to kind of scramble it up right now, I 
think would be premature.
    Senator Perdue. That's a great characterization. I accept 
that. I have all the respect in the world for you two, and I'm 
not questioning your authority at all. I know this is a moving 
target right now.
    The shipbuilding plan, though, was due with the budget. I 
know it's on your desk, and I know that--I think I understand 
all the reasons why. It's a tough decision. You've got the 
Columbia-class requirement sitting right there as the number-
one priority. I wouldn't argue with that at all. That's going 
to be about 25 percent--in some years, as much as 30-plus 
percent--of the total shipbuilding budget.
    But, I want to highlight some numbers that are just 
shocking today. I mean, today China has about 345--I think 
these numbers are correct--345 service ships, ours to 295. Over 
the next 15 years, their plan right now, based on what we are 
seeing publicly, is, they're taking it to 435, and we have a 
355 plan, comes from 16. Is the 355 consistent with the NDS? 
And, secondarily, is that being looked at seriously in the 
shipbuilding--the 30-year shipbuilding plan that we're going to 
see when it comes out of your office?
    Secretary Esper. Well, on the plan, I think the Navy's 
going to brief me sometime in the next few days on what their 
proposal is with regard to the plan.
    With regard to the number, I'll echo what the CNO [Chief of 
Naval Operations] says. The--the CNO says he--355 is the 
number, but we need to look at effects and capabilities. But, 
if you want to stick to the number, I actually--my gut feeling 
is, we need more than 355, not just to deliver effects, but we 
need presence.
    Senator Perdue. But, is that a function of lethality, as 
well, given we're not hamstrung by INF anymore, and with ranges 
and new capabilities that we're also----
    Secretary Esper. I think, as I've laid out in my plan, my 
thinking--because we're going to do--we're going to run some 
internal wargames to look at our range of options. The Navy has 
some ideas. Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) has 
some ideas. Some think tanks have done some good work. I think 
some core principles we've worked around is, we have to have 
more ships, but smaller. We need to have, I believe, more 
attack submarines. We need to move more quickly into unmanned, 
and, in all cases, we need to have distributed sensors and 
shooters, we need to have the ability to be survivable in this 
environment, and there are a number of other things. But, 
again, I was just meeting with the CNO and the Acting Secretary 
yesterday on this. We agree that you--lethality is critical at 
range, but, for the Navy, it's also presence. You have to have 
enough surface combatants available at any one time to have a 
presence, to show + assurance, deterrence, et cetera, which is 
why my instinct is that we need more than 355.
    Senator Perdue. Well, we have many more combatant 
commanding areas at other than the Indo-Pacific that we are 
responsible for today.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. Many responsibilities, whether 
it's counterdrug----
    Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
    Secretary Esper.--or maintaining freedom of the seas, and 
all that. We have the world's greatest Navy, and we need to 
keep it that way.
    Senator Perdue. General Milley, going to one other thing. 
We're talking about finding every billion dollars, right? And 
you've railed about this, and I have, too, so has the 
Secretary. You've got 23 seconds. Go after CRs [continiuing 
resolutions]. Tell us exactly what continuing--12 of the last 
13 years, we have hamstrung the military with a continuing 
resolution for at least the first quarter of the fiscal year. 
We're in the 6th month of our fiscal year, we haven't even 
started this process yet. So, we're facing down another CR this 
year. It'll be the 13th in 14 years, and so, we are estimating, 
now--your service directors--surface commanders have told us, 
roughly, in aggregate, it's about $5 billion per quarter.
    General Milley. Per quarter.
    Senator Perdue. Per quarter.
    Secretary Esper. Lost buying power.
    Senator Perdue. So, General Milley, tell us how it really 
affects our readiness and our recapitalization efforts. 
That's--over 10--that's $50 billion. I mean, that takes care of 
a lot of these long-term shipbuilding issues that we're talking 
about.
    General Milley. Well, I'm already over time, and I haven't 
even started, but----
    Senator Perdue. No, you go, sir.
    General Milley.--I would just tell you that it's a very 
ineffective, inefficient way of managing the taxpayers' money, 
because industry can't rely on a steady cashflow and stream and 
predictability in industry. Then we, in terms of programming 
and acquisition, et cetera, our program managers can't rely on 
steady building, as well. So, it's a very inefficient way. 
We're budgeting, basically, 9 out of 12 months, or 6 out of 12 
months of a year, and that's just no way to run a railroad 
station, sir. It's just not a good way to do it.
    Senator Perdue. Well, thank you.
    General Milley. CRs are not good.
    Secretary Esper. I do.
    Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
    Secretary Esper. Just a quick follow-up. I--one thing the--
that the DOD is going to come with you soon, Senator, is a 
legislative provision. Other departments of the Federal 
Government have it. It would seek legislative authority to 
transfer any expired Navy funds, which otherwise would go back 
to Treasury, back into the SCN account. Our conservative 
estimate is, this would free up another billion dollars a year 
that we can go back and--put back into shipbuilding. Otherwise, 
it goes back into the Treasury, and it would be money that 
you've already appropriated and authorized to us for this 
purpose.
    Senator Perdue. I want to indulge the Chairman for one last 
comment on this.
    We're working with OMB, too, and I think there are 
opportunities in there. We're going to give some freedom, and 
our appropriators to give you some freedom, within the current 
rules, that they've never envisioned before, because they never 
realized how expensive this is, to give you some latitude that, 
when you are in a CR, you're not as hamstrung as you are today. 
But, I agree with General Milley, this is an absolute travesty.
    Secretary Esper. Particularly important for the shipyards.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you.
    Senator Fischer. Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thank you, to our two witnesses, to the Chairman and the 
Secretary. I appreciate each of your service.
    Testimony today has been about this budget being directed 
toward the National Defense Strategy. General Milley said, 
about something, ``Why would I purchase something not aligned 
with the National Defense Strategy?'' And we've also heard, 
``in an era of tight budgets.'' So, where in the National 
Defense Strategy is there a phrase ``a border wall on America's 
southern border''?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, there's--Homeland security is in 
the National Defense Strategy. It's----
    Senator Kaine. It is, but is there a mention of a border 
wall on the southern border?
    Secretary Esper. I don't believe so, but nor is there----
    Senator Kaine. You're right.
    Secretary Esper.--mention of dealing with floods and 
putting out wildfires and----
    Senator Kaine. Right. I just read the NDS, and you're 
talking about--this is a budget that is focused on the NDS. The 
National Defense Strategy has a 14-page synopsis. The border 
wall on the southern border is not mentioned. The southern 
border of the United States is not mentioned. There's one 
mention of a border in the 14-page public synopsis, and it is 
this: ``Russia has violated the borders of other nations.''
    So, when you come and tell me that this is focused on the 
NDS, I've got a real problem with that, and I know that that's 
maybe above decisions or other people's decisions, but $6 
billion came out of the Pentagon's budget last year, 3\1/2\ for 
MILCON and 2\1/2\ coming to--from the--into the counterdrug 
fund and then into the border wall.
    You have done a reprogramming, I believe, of $3.9--There 
have been earlier questions about that--$3.8 into this 
counterdrug fund. There's also been a report in the Washington 
Post that there's another shoe to drop, and about $3.7 billion 
is likely to be taken out of MILCON. Is that accurate? Should 
we expect to see that?
    Secretary Esper. That is not an accurate number, but it is 
a possibility that that could happen. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. So, the number may not be accurate, but it 
is--is it likely that we're going to see another tranche taken 
out of MILCON?
    Secretary Esper. We could. I don't want to put an estimate 
on it, at this point in time.
    Senator Kaine. So, I mean, it's just--I can't imagine a 
scenario in which this Committee--I'll just say it bluntly--
would allow a Democratic President to take money out of the 
Defense budgets used for nondefense priority. I cannot imagine 
it. I appreciate, Secretary Esper, that you, in response to 
Senator Manchin, said the preferred way would be to have a 
tough appropriations battle, appropriate money for the border 
wall, and then spend the money appropriated for the DOD within 
DOD accounts. I think that makes perfect sense. But, you know, 
it's just--it's hard for you to look us in the eye and say, 
``This is very focused on the NDS,'' when I can't find mention 
of the border wall or the border in the NDS, and when earlier 
witnesses have testified, though this be an emergency, it's not 
a military emergency.
    Let me dig into another issue. When you do the--just using 
the $3.8 figure--you do that transfer within the DOD into the 
counterdrug fund, and then use that for the wall. Is that 
transfer subject to the transfer authority that we give you, 
where there's a general transfer authority in the 
Appropriations Act, where you can transfer up to $4 billion a 
year within DOD accounts, with notice to Congress, but without 
approval. Is that $3.8 transfer within that $4 billion transfer 
authority?
    Secretary Esper. I think so, Senator, but I'd want to come 
back with you to affirm it.
    Senator Kaine. I'd love that.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. The $2.2 billion of the transfer was 
within the $4 billion in general transfer authority provided in 
section 8005 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
2020.
    The $1.6 billion was within the $2 billion special transfer 
authority provided in section 9002 of the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2020.

    Senator Kaine. But, my belief that it is, too. So, you have 
$4 billion of transfer authority. We're a few months into the 
fiscal year. It's often the case that transfer authorities are 
most needed at the end of the fiscal year. You've used $3.8 
billion of the transfer authority by the beginning of March, 
when we have a whole lot of months left in the fiscal year. So, 
for example, how much in the President's Budget for DOD is 
coronavirus response if we need to maintain people in place on 
South Korean bases and on bases in Italy, bases in Germany, 
bases in other places around the world, our troops and our 
families? It's probably not in the President's Budget. But, 
that would be the kind of thing for which we give you transfer 
authority. But, you've now almost bumped up against the limit 
of your transfer authority out of that $4 billion to build 
money at the wall, and we still have, you know, 8 months left 
in the fiscal year. Isn't that right?
    Secretary Esper. Your assessment is correct, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. Would it make your job easier if we 
eliminated your transfer authority and said, any transfer 
authority, you had to come to us for permission? The $4 
billion, you can do it without our permission. Over $4 billion, 
you have to get our permission. If we had said you can't do any 
transfers without Congress's position, would that actually help 
you? Because it would enable us to say you've got to get it 
through appropriations. If you want something for a wall, if 
you want to fight climate change, if you want to fight gun 
violence, you've got to get it through appropriations. Because 
if you had to come back to us to ask for authority to do that 
$4 billion transfer, then we could actually keep the money in 
the budget that is directed toward the National Defense 
Strategy.
    Secretary Esper. Senator, as--there's no head of any 
organization that wants his or her hands tied by narrowing the 
options. You always want to expand your options in your 
maneuver space. So, no, not necessarily.
    Senator Kaine. But, in an odd way, aren't your hands kind 
of tied in this way? I mean, if money can be taken out of your 
budget to use for DHS or to battle climate change or gun 
violence, if it can be taken out of your hands, that's sort of 
a tying of your hands, in terms of putting together a budget 
that promotes the National Defense Strategy, isn't it?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I recognize what you're saying. 
Like I said, the President has declared a national emergency. 
We've been tasked to support DHS, and it's--if it's legally 
available, we intend to support DHS.
    Senator Kaine. I appreciate your answers.
    Thanks, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Senator McSally.
    Senator McSally. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Good to see you again, Secretary Esper and General Milley.
    I want to talk about the killing of terrorist leader Qasem 
Soleimani. It's been about 2 months. I agreed with that 
important decision to take out that terrorist leader who has a 
lot of American blood on his hands. Despite the ridiculous 
politicizing that we saw at the time, people almost cheering 
that we were about to go to war with Iran. Unfortunately, it 
should have been a unifying issue. It's now been 2 months. Can 
you share at all what you've seen? I believe that that was a 
body blow. We heard, from you and others, that it was a body 
blow, the impact that that's having on Iran's terrorist 
activities, their threats in the region, their proxy forces, 
and the threat to us and Israel?
    Secretary Esper. I think, Senator, that--as you well know, 
the--he, Soleimani, was a terrorist leader of a terrorist 
organization who killed many, many Americans, wounded thousands 
more, killed his own people, killed people throughout the 
region, a very capable adversary. But, I think it's clear that 
taking him off the battlefield has set back the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian Government 
with regard to spreading their malign activity throughout the 
region. I think, by the same action, we have restored 
deterrence, to a degree. For all those things, I still believe 
it was the right call made by the Commander in Chief.
    Senator McSally. As do I. Thanks.
    General Milley, you got anything to add to that?
    General Milley. I would add that--absolutely think it was 
the right goal, and I second the idea that we reestablished 
deterrence. I think that's really critical. We can talk about 
that in a classified forum, exactly what makes me believe that. 
But, I do believe that's been reestablished.
    Senator McSally. Thanks.
    Staying on Iran, the reports of coronavirus there--again, 
another talitarian opaque country. I don't believe anything 
they're reporting or the way they're going to handle it. But, 
there's been reports that 23 members of Parliament, 10 percent 
of their Parliament, a senior advisor to the Supreme Leader, 
Vice President, Deputy Health Minister, all contracted the 
virus. Are you seeing anything related to the impact, 
especially with Iraq, with our forces in the region, or how 
that may further put pressure on the regime, both internally 
from their own people as they are failing to deal with this?
    Secretary Esper. I think that, Senator, becomes a factor. 
Obviously, as we see this unfold, authoritarian countries 
having a problem with transparency and being forthright with 
their folks. Quite honestly, though, my attention has been 
focused on the three priorities I've been outlining internally 
to my commanders. One is protection of our force, our 
servicemembers and their families. Number two, safeguarding our 
mission capability, and number three, supporting the 
interagency.
    Senator McSally. Great. Thank you.
    I want to totally change topics here on military sexual 
assault. So, last year I worked with your predecessors, and I 
championed reforms that made it into the NDAA specifically 
focused on improving the process from a report forward, the 
investigative process and the support, going forward, after a 
report has been made. When I went to Yuma, in Arizona, I had 
heard they had no special victims counsel there full-time, that 
oftentimes victims were waiting a significant amount of time 
before they get to meet with a special victims counsel (SVC), 
which they often wanted before their first, you know, meeting 
with investigators. So, I put in the bill that they needed to 
have an SVC available within 72 hours, every single victim. We 
now have a full-time one at Yuma, for example, but we're seeing 
this all over the country now. Victims are able to get their 
special victims counsel quicker, and have a more immediate 
response. We're also hearing other reports of just increases to 
NCIS [Naval Criminal Investigative Service] and how that's 
having a positive impact.
    So, just a question. Given the successes, we still need to 
prioritize implementation of those provisions. Can you report 
back to me on anything else you're seeing in the field and the 
implementation?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. First of all, your efforts and 
assistance in establishing the Sexual Assault Accountability 
Investigative Task Force are directly helping servicemembers. 
We have a lot of good information data so far, both factually 
and anecdotally. The Department has approved all 22 
recommendations in the four critical focus areas. They are all 
now policy, which I'm pleased to report, and we're in the 
process of implementation across the board. The task force 
continues to meet the track implementation. So, a lot of this 
is moving on. It's critical to reducing timelines for cases and 
ensuring the best evidence for consideration. I'd love to come 
back or send a team up to update you. But, it's all, it seems 
to me, moving in the right direction, generally, and it's 
having an impact.
    Senator McSally. Great. Thanks.
    The next thing we want to now focus on, obviously, is 
prevention, stopping these crimes----
    Secretary Esper. Right.
    Senator McSally.--from happening in the first place, and 
we've talked extensively about this. I don't know, General 
Milley, if you want to pipe in and--you know, in your long 
experience in the military, how we get to the front end in 
preventing these crimes from happening, in the age groups where 
it's happening. We know exactly what we need to get after, but 
what we've been doing for training and prevention is just not 
working.
    General Milley. I--again, I want to thank you for your 
personal leadership. But, the key here is the chain of command, 
and commanders and noncommissioned officers, starting at the 
senior levels, but also going all the way down to team 
sergeants and team leaders and first-line supervisors. Everyone 
is, as the Sergeant Major of the Army used to say, ``not in my 
squad'' sort of thing, or ``not in my squadron,'' or ``not in 
my battalion.'' This takes ownership, and you have to embrace 
it completely, and it's a function of good order and discipline 
of the force for which commanders, and commanders alone, are 
personally responsible and should be held accountable, for the 
good order and discipline of their force. Regardless of whether 
it's sexual assault or drugs or crimes of violence or whatever 
the--whatever it is, the key here to success is commanders.
    Senator McSally. Thanks.
    I'm over my time. I look forward to continuing to working 
with you on this issue.
    Thanks.
    Senator Fischer. Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Madam Chair.
    Thank you both for your service and for being here today.
    I sent a letter last month, along with Senator Murphy, to 
express my frustration that the Navy budget included funding 
for only one Virginia-class submarine, and reports that you 
signed off on a decision to shift $1.6 billion in funding from 
Virginia-class submarine construction to the National Nuclear 
Security Administration. I'm not here to ask any questions 
about it, because I hope that you continue to believe, as you 
expressed when you pivoted--Groton--the last time you were 
there, Mr. Secretary, that the undersea warfare superiority of 
the United States cannot and should not be compromised, that we 
need to meet the goals for submarine production, and that, 
hopefully, two Virginia-class submarines for fiscal year 2021 
will be accomplished. But, I'm concerned, also, about the delay 
in delivering the Force Structure Assessment and 30-Year 
Shipbuilding Plan that apparently is still on your desk or 
somewhere in the Pentagon for approval. I expect that both will 
be delivered to Congress and the Navy as soon as possible, both 
in a classified and unclassified version. I hope that's true. 
Would you confirm that it is?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I've been briefed, about a week 
ago, on the INFSA, the Integrated Naval Force Structure 
Assessment. I have yet to be briefed on the 30-Year 
Shipbuilding Plan. Of course, they cover different timelines, 
different horizons.
    But, what I want to do is step back and look at, not just 
one view, in terms of the future fleet, but I want to take in a 
range of views. So, I regret that it's late. I don't have a 
good reason why. But, what I want to do is give you a full, 
good assessment of what I think the future is, and I'll give 
you a quick note on this.
    I am a big believer in attack subs. I believe it's an 
advantage we have, a distinct advantage we need to grow, both 
in terms of capability and capacity. I was very impressed by 
the trip I had up to Groton. But, the numbers I see right in 
that--in at least the INFSA right now for attack subs, I think 
the number needs to be higher. So, what I want to do is take a 
broad look at this, in light of an approved OP PLAN, in light 
of other ideas out there, and make sure that, before I sign off 
on it, albeit late--while it may be late, I want to make sure I 
get it right, or at least I'm comfortable with it, because I do 
think we need a bigger fleet, and I think we need to put more 
emphasis on attack submarines.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, you couldn't find a more 
enthusiastic and passionate supporter of a bigger submarine 
fleet, and I hope we have an opportunity to discuss it----
    Secretary Esper. The Chairman's with me, too, on that.
    Senator Blumenthal.--before our markup in May on this 
Committee.
    I want to shift slightly to a point that's been raised by 
at least one of my colleagues, Senator Hirono, the coronavirus 
impact on not only our servicemen and women and their families, 
grave and important as it is, but also on, for example, F-35 
production. Right today, the supply line in Japan was 
completely shut down. That's just one example of our defense 
industrial base that could be gravely impaired by coronavirus. 
I'd like, from you and the Chairman, an assessment of what the 
impact is likely to be, what you're doing about it, and what 
your plans are to be more specific.
    By the way, I was disappointed by a report that I saw--I'm 
not vouching, necessarily, for its accuracy--that you indicated 
that American military commanders were warned overseas, ``not 
to surprise President Trump on the coronavirus''. So, maybe you 
can respond.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. First of all, that--I was 
disappointed by that story, as well. It's completely wrong. 
It's bad reporting, at its worst. I've been very clear with my 
commanders, both privately and publicly--I said this at a press 
conference Monday--our three priorities, in this order, are: 
protection of our servicemembers and their families; number 
two, safeguarding our missions, which could include production; 
and then, number three, support the interagency. The commanders 
have all the authorities they need, and I'm providing them 
resources, to make decisions. They've made any number of 
decisions. I don't think I've had to make one. My one request 
of them--and the Chairman will vouch for this--is, ``If you're 
going to make a very big decision, a high-profile decision, 
give me a heads-up, because I want to make sure that we're 
integrated across the interagency, that HHS [Health and Human 
Services] knows, that State knows--indeed, the White House 
knows, and that Congress knows,'' because that's what I've got 
to do. I've got to make sure we're integrated across. So, that 
was a bad report, completely false.
    Chairman, if you want to add anything on that----
    General Milley. Senator, thanks. Two things. One is, I was 
in the VDC. All the Secretary said--it was to Abrams, General 
Abrams, over in Korea--all he said was, ``Hey, look-it, if 
you're going to make the decision of imposing this emergency 
declaration that he has authority to do, please give me a 
heads-up so I can make sure everybody here in DC is informed.'' 
That's all it was. It wasn't any kind of thing where--trying to 
squelch people. So, that was a mischaracterization. I read the 
article, and I was in the thing, and I--it struck me as very 
odd.
    But, more importantly is the impact on the military. On the 
uniform military, we have a demographic that's different than 
society at large--young, healthy, fit. To date, we've only 
got--unless there's some new ones today or something--but, the 
reporting I've got as of 24 hours ago is, we've got one uniform 
member that's come down with it over in Korea. A couple of 
family members. We're screening lots of people. So, in terms of 
the numbers relative to the whole, very small impact.
    Secondly is on exercises. There are exercises, mostly in 
Indo-Pacific, that we're taking a hard look at. One of the CPXs 
[Command Post Exercises], for example, at the request of the 
ROK [Republic Of Korea] Chairman, was canceled over on the 
Peninsula of Korea. There are some other exercises that are 
being looked at to scale down or canceled or postponed. So, 
there might be some impact on exercises.
    But, broadly speaking right now, the impact on the 
uniformed military is very, very minimal. Break. We are also 
preparing to help whatever the Nation needs, and we've got all 
kinds of plans, and we're able to support other agencies, as 
necessary and as required by the President and Congress.
    Secretary Esper. To include our medical research 
institutes, et cetera. We're all--all hands are in, in terms of 
supporting this effort to come up with the solutions.
    Senator Blumenthal. My time is expired. I want to thank you 
both. I want to suggest, respectfully, that telling the 
American people more about those plans, to use your word, would 
be reassuring. You know, the enemy here really----
    Secretary Esper. It's panic. It's lack of information.
    General Milley. Lack of information, lack of panic, and----
    Senator Blumenthal. Exactly.
    General Milley.--and these aren't classified plans and all 
that kind of stuff. This is stuff that we could easily----
    Senator Blumenthal. It's not like the enemy----
    General Milley. No, that's right. We could easily let 
people know.
    Secretary Esper. Right. Completely agree.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Sullivan is going to ask questions now.
    Senator Sullivan [presiding]. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your exceptional 
service. I appreciated our meetings yesterday. I think both of 
you are doing an excellent job for our Nation.
    General Milley, I wanted to just get a little bit more. You 
have stated publicly--you stated in our classified hearing on 
the Soleimani strike, which I think was not only 
constitutional, but in the Nation's interest--you mentioned 
about your duty, how you saw that strike after you read the 
intel. As we all know, General Soleimani wasn't in Iraq on 
vacation, he was there targeting the killing of more American 
servicemembers, which he has a long history of doing. Almost 
half the servicemembers in Iraq at the time were Alaskan-based 
forces, so this was something that particularly of interest to 
me.
    Can you succinctly say what you've said otherwise--because 
I think it's very important to hear directly from you, someone 
with over 35 years of military experience, service to your 
country--about what you thought your duty was after reading the 
intel?
    General Milley. Well, what I had said publicly, and I 
reiterated it in classified sessions, was--and reiterated in 
more detail--was, I believe the intelligence was compelling. I 
believe it was imminent. Not only was Soleimani have a long 
track record, going all the way back to the Beirut bombing and 
being involved in that, but, more importantly, his command-and-
control role and what he was about to do. I believe that I, 
Secretary Esper, the President, and many, many others would 
have been culpably negligent had we not take the action we did, 
because I think many Americans would have died as a result. So, 
I believe it was the right thing to do then, and I believe it 
was the right thing to--I still believe that. I believe we 
contributed to reestablishing deterrence with aggressive action 
from Iran.
    Senator Sullivan. So, I appreciate that. I think 
reestablishing deterrence anywhere, in any theater, is actually 
really hard to do, and you've been able to do it, so far, and I 
appreciate that.
    Mr. Secretary, we had a good discussion yesterday on this 
issue of the DPRI [Defense Posture Realignment Initiative], and 
I'd like to get your views--you know, there was language in the 
NDAA from last year that, essentially, has the two of you 
focusing on the DPRI. The issue of, I think, the National 
Defense Strategy is warmly and strongly received here in the 
Senate, in a bipartisan way. But, if you look at our force 
posture, particularly in the Asia Pacific, it's stale. A lot of 
it exists, really, after World War II or the Korean War. How 
are you thinking about that, and how should we be thinking 
about that here in the Senate?
    Secretary Esper. Thank you, Senator. I do think we need to 
take a fresh look at our force posture in the Pacific. By the 
way, I think we need to take a fresh look at our force posture 
everywhere, which is why we're doing these COCOM reviews. So, 
I'll be working my way through these to look at just these 
things. We're--by the way, we're finding some things already 
that just don't make sense.
    But, with regard to INDOPACOM, absolutely, we should think 
about what it means to--if we have to face off against China in 
the year 2035 or 2049. DPRI is one example of something that 
was developed many, many years ago. I know it's a little bit 
tricky. There's a lot of diplomacy involved in this. But, I 
think that's something also we should take a look at to make 
sure that we are well postured, particularly our Marine 
capabilities, our Marine forces, to not just be able to respond 
flexibly, but also be able to train and sustain our forces in 
the region for an extended period in light of----
    Senator Sullivan. So, can I dig into that a little bit with 
you? The issue of training, I think, is a really important one, 
whether it's on Guam, whether it's other places--Okinawa, for 
example. We don't get the opportunity to do a lot of training 
in those places, and, I think, to have sustainable deployments, 
but also keeping our forces sharp, we need good training areas. 
Would you agree with that?
    Secretary Esper. We absolutely--I mean, training is the--
it's the lifeblood of a unit's effectiveness, his ability to 
train, maintain, and equipment their force.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, we look forward to working with 
both of you on that continued important reassessment that 
you're doing.
    The other issue that I know--I've been raising quite a long 
time--Mr. Secretary, you might remember, in your confirmation 
hearing, you mentioned that if the Air Force, in its upcoming 
OCONUS [outside the continental United States] decision on 
where to place the next squadrons of KC-46s, did it in an area 
that was co-located with over 100 fifth-generation fighters, 
that it would provide the United States with extreme strategic 
reach, and it would show that to our potential adversaries. The 
TRANSCOM Commander testified last week that one of the most 
stress-capable aspects and their number-one readiness concern 
was the air refueling fleet. My question to him, and to you, 
and the Secretary of the Air Force yesterday--having a 
deployment of KC-46s in the OCONUS bed-down in an area that can 
reach multiple COCOMs, like a place like Alaska, with the 100 
fifth-gen fighters--from your perspective, what message does 
that additionally send to our adversaries? You've already 
talked about the issue of extreme strategic reach when I asked 
that question earlier.
    Secretary Esper. Well, I do think two critical needs for 
our forces right now are to have that strategic lift, 
refueling, and sealift, by the way. But, the location of Alaska 
gives you great reach, in terms of whether you go across the 
Pole into Russia or toward China. When you couple it up with an 
amalgamation of forces, it does put the enemy in a different 
posture, your adversaries in a different posture, because you 
now have that reach, that lethality at hand, and ready to do 
what it might need to do, if called upon.
    Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you very much.
    General Milley. Senator, if I might.
    Senator Sullivan. General, please.
    General Milley. I also don't want any adversary to walk 
away thinking that the United States of America cannot project 
power because of stress on the tanker fleet. We can, and they 
should have no doubt about it. Yes, we're giving up 10 KC-10s, 
and 13 KC-135s, but we still have almost 500. We can get there, 
``the firstest with the mostest.'' And no one should doubt 
that.
    Senator Sullivan. But, certainly one of the best ways to 
relieve the stress is to have----
    General Milley. It is.
    Senator Sullivan.--tankers in places that can reach 
several----
    General Milley. It is.
    Senator Sullivan.--COCOMs.
    General Milley. But, we can get there.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    General Milley. I don't want anybody to think we can't.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. I appreciate 
it.
    Senator Sullivan. I know you're going to ask a question on 
the Arctic, so----
    Senator King. I am, as a matter of fact.
    Senator Sullivan. Excellent.
    Senator King. You left it for me.
    Secretary Esper, first, I want to thank you personally for 
the participation of the Department in the National Cyber 
Solarium Process. Over a year, we've worked very hard. Ken 
Rapuano and David Norquist made significant contributions in 
intellectual firepower and criticism and thoughtfulness. I just 
want to thank you for your authorization for that 
participation. It was very meaningful.
    Secretary Esper. Thank you, Senator. I'm very encouraged by 
that--by all that, too. It's--there's a lot good coming out of 
it.
    Senator King. Well, we'll be releasing our report next 
Wednesday, as a matter of fact, and----
    Secretary Esper. Oh, great.
    Senator King.--and I think it's a good piece of work, and, 
indeed, we've spent a whole session here and really haven't 
talked about cyber, which is a--an essential--that's not the 
right word--a very real domain of warfare today. That's what 
we'll be talking about extensively next week. So, I just wanted 
to thank you.
    Secretary Esper. Well, thanks, and we're in cyber 
competition, if not conflict, every single day.
    Senator King. Exactly. We're at war today.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator King. General Milley--I guess this is a question 
for both of you--I'm very concerned about a gap in defense 
against hypersonic weapons. Both of our principal adversaries, 
China and Russia, have developed these weapons, have actually 
deployed them, and this puts at risk our--particularly, our 
naval resources. Talk to me about what we're doing to counter 
that threat.
    Secretary Esper. Senator, as part of our hypersonics 
research, we are putting money into defensive systems. One of 
the early things that we know we need, that money is going 
directly into, is a low-Earth orbit (LEO) missile tracking 
system, if you will, that would be able to track hypersonic 
systems moving through the atmosphere or----
    Senator King. Because one of the problems with hypersonics 
is, they don't leave a radar signal. They move so fast, they 
create a plasma shield. So, we need the tracking.
    Secretary Esper. We've determined that you need a low---a 
LEO tracking system to do that. So, that's one of the 
priorities of our R&E [Research and Engineering] efforts to do 
that, and then, of course, you have to figure out the effectors 
by which you would knock one out of the sky, if you will. There 
are a variety of things that we're exploring. But, it is 
critical to have that defense, because it is such--the 
maneuverability, the speed, the effectiveness of these systems 
is remarkable.
    Senator King. Another----
    General Milley. Two things----
    Senator King. Yes, sir.
    General Milley.--Senator King, on that. One, on the 
defense, if it can be seen, it can be hit, and there is no 
defense against hypersonic. It goes 5 to 10 times the speed of 
sound. You're not going to defend against it. So, what you have 
to do is be invisible. There's all kinds of techniques and 
procedures that we're working on in order to make our forces 
very difficult to see, from an acquisition standpoint, of enemy 
radar. So, that's on the defense.
    On the other part, you're not going to shoot the arrow. 
Those things are going so fast, you're not going to get it.
    Senator King. Right.
    General Milley. You've got to shoot the archer. You've got 
to go deep downtown, and you've got to get on the offense. If 
you want to defeat hypersonics, you've got to go to the source, 
the launch pads----
    Senator King. And you have--ISR in order to----
    General Milley. That's right.
    Senator King.--know where----
    General Milley. You've got to have the ISR to get in there. 
If you're launching hypersonics at the United States, then 
you're going to war with the United States, and you're going to 
pour it on, and pour it on with mass and firepower, and fast 
and hard.
    Senator King. But, I thought you made an important point 
earlier in the hearing, where you talked about ISR. We've sort 
of had a vacation on ISR.
    Secretary Esper. That's right.
    Senator King. Because we've been acting against enemies----
    Secretary Esper. That's right.
    Senator King.--that don't have any--that capacity. It's a 
whole different ball game when we're talking about a peer-state 
competitor.
    Secretary Esper. That's right.
    General Milley. And you want to invest in ISR that can 
penetrate----
    Secretary Esper. Right.
    General Milley.--the airspace of these great-power 
competitors.
    Secretary Esper. It's also why we talk--as I've laid out 
the shipbuilding principles, if you will, going forward, is 
to--and the Navy agrees with this--is a move away from very 
large platforms into smaller platforms, a more distributed 
force so that you complicate the enemy's plans, particularly 
with regard to the employment of hypersonics.
    Senator King. Well, you raised shipbuilding. We talk about 
the Indo-Pacific as being the most important region. We talk 
about the National Defense Strategy, and yet, the budget talks 
about knocking out four destroyers and, I think, an amphib in 
the future plan. How was that decision made? How firm is it? 
Can we revisit it? I want to get a little bit of thoughts on 
that.
    By the way----
    Secretary Esper. Yeah.
    Senator King.--one thought--the other thought is, you know, 
we're doing this recapitalization out of operating costs. In 
any other organization, you'd have a capital budget and a--and 
you're building 40-year--an asset--a Columbia submarine is a 
40-year asset, and yet we're building them out of cashflow 
instead of some kind of long-range attributing to the cost over 
the life of the object. But, to get back--talk to me about----
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator King.--the shipbuilding.
    Secretary Esper. Well, as I said earlier, I think we need--
to me, I don't focus as much of the number, but that number, 
355, is out there. I think we need to be--have a fleet larger 
than 355. My gut tells me that. I'm convinced of that.
    Senator King. Senator Purdue had a chart this morning at 
the Seapower Subcommittee that, if you saw it, the--it shows 
what China is doing--you'd feel vindicated.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. But, we do have a qualitative 
capability over them. There are some other things out there. 
But, nonetheless, it's--if it's not just capability and 
lethality, it's presence. You have to have the presence, and 
so, I do think we need to get on that path. I think there are a 
number of things that we need to do.
    First of all, I completely support what the CNO did. The 
CNO decided to reallocate $4 billion or so out of SCN and put 
it into O&M to get readiness up. We have a readiness challenge. 
It's been well documented.
    Senator King. The ship's no good if it's in the dock.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I think the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) said, last year, in 2019, due to 
maintenance challenges, the equivalent of 19 ships didn't go to 
sea, and so, we've got to fix the readiness challenge and then 
put more money into shipbuilding. If we can get the legislative 
approval change, Secretary Modly is digging in deep. He's doing 
what the Army and Air Force did to find $40 billion over 5 
years. That'll free up a good chunk of what they think they 
need, and then we've got to get this higher top-line moving in 
the right direction.
    Senator King. Well, but we also have to--I mean, what 
worries me about what you're talking about--and I'm sorry, I 
know I'm over time--but, I worry about--there's a--you can't 
turn the industrial base off and on with a switch. If we drive 
it down, and you have a loss of personnel, loss of welders, 
loss of skilled shipbuilders in Bath, Maine, or Pascagoula or 
Marinette, Wisconsin, you can't turn them back on.
    Secretary Esper. Completely agree, Senator. I--that's why I 
think we need to look more, particularly with large capital 
investments like ships, multiyear, and even--I think the Navy, 
we discussed yesterday, is, Can you multiyear O&M so that 
your--you don't have the same perturbations in your maintenance 
cycle?
    Senator King. Right.
    Secretary Esper. Because you can't afford to go--you know, 
take a ship out of maintenance and then have a month or 2-month 
gap, and I know they're struggling with this up in Groton right 
now, with the sub--with the maintenance up there. So, you've 
got to figure out a way to smooth that out so workers will be 
incentivized to stay in the trade.
    Senator King. Are you suggesting that consistent funding 
from Congress might be a benefit?
    [Laughter.]
    Senator King. I'm shocked.
    Secretary Esper. Consistent and timely.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    Senator Sullivan [presiding]. Senator Hawley.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Esper, General, thank you for being here. Thank 
you for your service.
    Mr. Secretary, let me start with you. In your confirmation 
testimony last summer, you wrote that we needed a distributed 
and resilient force posture in the Indo-Pacific. I'm concerned 
about the concentration of our forces currently in Japan and 
South Korea. Give me your assessment about our ability to 
compete effectively with China, given that concentration.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. What we--those forces are there 
for--you know, for a variety of reasons. I think Senator 
Sullivan mentioned it. You know, we have a presence that 
largely reflects where we've been for many, many years, and so, 
I do think we need to step back and look at that. I know 
Admiral Davidson is looking at that to make sure we have more 
distribution. I'm trying to get out there. I've traveled to the 
INDOPACOM two or three times now to visit nontraditional 
partners. I've been from Mongolia to Vietnam, I'll be going to 
Indonesia. I think there's much more ground we can cover and to 
build more relationships with more countries.
    Senator Hawley. You anticipate my next question, which is 
whether we can disperse U.S. Forces to other locations in the 
Pacific to improve survivability and reduce risk to operations. 
You think that we can?
    Secretary Esper. Improve survivability, but also grow more 
partners and more people, in terms of standing up and telling 
the Chinese they have to obey the international rules of order, 
and abide by that. That's going to take a lot of investment. 
So.
    Senator Hawley. What investment do we need to be able to 
disperse our forces along those lines?
    Secretary Esper. Well, I think we need to think creatively, 
Senator, about--you know, as you think through the war plans, 
how we might fight in the future, is--where do we need to be? 
Does it require MILCON, does it require--I'm--the Chairman and 
I are big believers in IMET [International Military Education 
and Training]. So, get more countries from the Indo-Pacific, 
even nontraditional partners, into our schoolhouses, grow that 
relationship over a career. There are a number of things that 
we should do that, by the way, the DOD is doing. We're 
committed to a 50 percent growth in IMET over 5 years.
    Senator Hawley. Just sticking with the question of 
investment. At your confirmation hearing, you said that you 
were open, in principle, to using something like EDI to 
accelerate investment in INDOPACOM. I don't see anything like 
that, however, in your budget. Why is that?
    Secretary Esper. The more I think about that--I mean, we've 
discussed this a lot, and sometimes I get concerned, if you 
bucket a certain amount of money for a certain region, it can 
be both limiting and--in other words, if you put so much money 
in there, people say, ``That's it, and that's all you need,'' 
or you get trapped by that fund. I actually appreciate the 
flexibility of putting more or less in, depending on how 
circumstances change. But, clearly, I think--and we're talking 
to the commander out there about, ``What are your investment 
plans, focusing them more, in terms of future presence, what do 
we need to do, where do we need to grow relationships?''
    Senator Hawley. EDI has been so successful in that theater 
and for our needs there. I continue to believe that something 
like that mechanism----
    Secretary Esper. The one fact--the only thing I'd say, 
Senator, is, sometimes it takes the pressure off of countries 
to invest their own dollars into supporting us and providing 
host-nation support. Because they see that fund out there, and 
they go after that instead of going to their parliaments and 
saying, ``How can we support the U.S. presence?''
    Senator Hawley. I just want to make sure that we are 
getting the resources we need to what is our priority theater, 
I believe, under the NDS, in a timely fashion, if we're going 
to be postured successfully. I mean, we are behind the curve, I 
think.
    Secretary Esper. I'm impatient. I think we can and should 
do more. That's why I'm trying to do these COCOM reviews to 
free up time, money, and manpower, to invest more into that 
future fight.
    Senator Hawley. I applaud your COCOM reviews, by the way, 
and let's talk for a second about AFRICOM. The AFRICOM 
Commander, General Townsend, recently testified that he thought 
our European allies could send more forces to West Africa and 
take over some of the missions currently being done by our 
forces, like airlift, for instance, and aerial refueling.
    Secretary Esper. Sure.
    Senator Hawley. Do you agree with that assessment?
    Secretary Esper. Absolutely, and I've talked to the allies 
about this, and we've talked a few times about aerial 
refueling. We provide that to the French for free, if you will, 
and that's one of the areas where I've talked to the French to 
say, ``Look, I'm having a problem with air refuelers right now. 
If somebody else can pick up that mission, that helps us all 
out a lot.'' That's part of the review, is looking at, How do 
we do the same mission, but maybe do it differently?
    Senator Hawley. Yeah. Well, this seems to me like a clear 
situation where we can and should expect our allies to do more. 
Again, I applaud your COCOM reviews.
    General Milley, let me switch topics. Let's talk about 
Iran. If Iran resumes provocations in coming months, what is 
your assessment of how many troops we can send to that theater 
without risking our situation in INDOPACOM, without undermining 
deterrence, if you like, in the Indo-Pacific?
    General Milley. I don't think I could answer that in an 
open session. I'd rather come back to you in a classified 
session, point one.
    Point two, just to be clear, though, there is a significant 
amount of force in Indo-Pacific--300,000 troops, 7 aircraft 
carriers, the--I mean, there's a lot of force in the Pacific, 
and in Central Command, you're looking at about 70,000 troops 
currently, right now. There's an adequate amount of force in 
Central Command to maintain deterrence. If deterrence breaks 
down, we'll analyze the situation, and we'll do whatever is 
required to achieve whatever national security objectives are 
necessary, relative to Iran. I'd rather get back to you in 
classified session on exactly what that would be.
    Senator Hawley. You bet. I'll pursue that with you in a 
classified setting.
    My last question on this, Mr. Chairman, is just to your 
comments about the relative balance between CENTCOM and PACOM. 
Is it your sense that there's a little bit of slack, then, 
General, in INDOPACOM? I mean, is that--am I----
    General Milley. Well, I mean, again, it's a ``depends'' I 
mean, if you think that, you know, you're close to a war with 
Korea or China, then probably not, but--so, it depends on what 
the situation is in INDOPACOM at the moment in time. It--we 
will do whatever is required to achieve U.S. national security 
interests, no matter where it's at in the world, and if 
something were to happen, very significantly more than what's 
current in the Middle East, then decisions will be made by the 
President and Secretary of Defense to move the right amount of 
forces to achieve our objectives.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, General.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of the Chairman, let me 
recognize Senator Peters.
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Reed.
    To our--both the gentlemen, thank you for testimony here 
today, and your service.
    Secretary Esper, briefly, I'd like to discuss prescription 
drug prices under TRICARE. This is an issue that Senator Rounds 
and I have been working on, along with some of the other 
Members of the Committee here. This Committee previously 
authorized a pilot program that would lower the cost of 
prescription drugs for TRICARE beneficiaries, including 
servicemembers, their families, and our military retirees. I 
know that the Department has begun the process of preparing for 
this prescription drug parity pilot program, but it still has 
not begun. So, my question is, Can you commit to working to--
with us on action to lower the cost of prescription drugs for 
our servicemembers under TRICARE, and particularly expanding 
their opportunities to purchase these drugs?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. Without knowing--having too much 
detail, I'm always committed to improving quality and access.
    Senator Peters. Great.
    Secretary Esper, last week, Senator Cotton and I sent a 
letter urging you to establish a United States-Israel 
Operations Technology Working Group. This group would 
coordinate and canalize military research and development 
efforts between the United States and Israel, focusing on the 
shared threats that our countries face, and capitalizing on, 
clearly, the world's leading national security innovation base 
in both countries, both the United States and Israel. So, this 
is to both Secretary Esper and General Milley. What is your 
view on enhancing the security cooperation with Israel, 
particularly in the areas of technology research and 
development? How can we strengthen that between our two 
countries?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, without having seen your letter 
yet, I would tell you that, you know, we have a very good 
innovative base. They have a very good innovative base, and I 
think the more we can cooperate together as allies and partners 
to come up with common solutions, the better. We do a lot of 
work with them now on a number of things. Certainly, at the 
industrial level, they compete to against--against and with 
American companies. So, I think if there are ways to improve 
that, we should pursue it.
    General Milley. And we--as you know, we work very closely 
with Israel on a lot of areas, and specifically in R&D and S&T. 
In combat developments, for example, we have the active 
protective system on our armored vehicles. That's an Israeli-
produced system. We've looked at the Arrow for our ballistic 
missile defense system, and a wide variety of other systems. 
So, there's a--there's an exchange of ideas and knowledge, 
research, development between us and the Israelis on a regular 
basis.
    Senator Peters. Secretary Esper, on February 24th of this 
year, the DOD officially adopted a series of ethical principles 
for the military use of artificial intelligence. The principles 
were designed to complement existing ethical frameworks, and 
you structured the ethical framework around five specific areas 
for military use of AI: responsible, equitable, traceable, 
reliable, and governable. I've had longstanding concerns about 
the consequences of the United States and our allies adopting 
ethical standards without similar and equitable standards being 
adopted by our competitors and adversaries that operate under a 
different framework than we do. My question is, Is the U.S. 
placed at a competitive disadvantage at the tactical and 
operational level by adopting AI ethical standards not shared 
by our adversaries? And, if so, how do we compensate for that 
disadvantage?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. First of all, it's a lot of 
good work done by the Defense Industrial Board with a lot of 
outreach to a wide range of persons and organizations to 
develop these. I was briefed on them. I had a number of 
discussions with a lot of leaders about them. But, look, I 
think this is an area where we lead, and I think the 
principles, from what I've read and studied and learned, I 
think they put us in a leadership position. So, I think we are 
establishing the standard, if you will, and I think it will 
make us better. The more we can get other countries to come on 
board and align themselves to those, the better.
    Senator Peters. In the past, the U.S. has successfully used 
international agreements and arms control treaties to provide 
some stability, particularly with emerging technologies and in 
the attempt to minimize potential catastrophic mistakes that 
could occur. In terms of AR, are we at a stage where AI 
requires the equivalent of an arms control treaty to ensure the 
current rules-based international order? And, if so, how would 
that look?
    Secretary Esper. It's a good question, Senator. I'd have to 
think about it and get back to you and consult with people, and 
I just don't know. It's not something I would take off the 
table, but it's a fair question. Again, I think we want to 
develop some common standards, if you will, and I--we try to 
set the bar by my signing out those AI ethical principles and 
to set a high bar from the beginning, and urge others to come 
on board.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. No, we are not at a stage where Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) requires the equivalent of an arms control 
treaty to ensure maintenance of the current rules-based 
international order. It will likely be difficult to apply 
traditional arms control approaches to AI. AI is an enabling 
technology that is inherently ``dual-use,'' useful for both 
military and civilian applications. Depending on how one 
defines ``AI,'' it may very well become ubiquitous and manifest 
in multiple systems on every platform and vehicle, as well as 
in the devices carried by ordinary civilians and military 
personnel. AI does not involve objects such as missiles or 
warheads that can be readily counted, nor does it require 
analogs to the distinctive precursor chemicals or machinery 
that we monitor as part of our efforts to control the 
proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons.
    Although the Department of Defense (DoD) does not support 
negotiating an AI ``arms control treaty,'' we believe that it 
would be productive to begin with discussions about 
international norms and standards of behavior. DoD is committed 
to leading in military ethics and AI safety. To that end, we 
are working to ensure that we adopt AI-enabled capabilities in 
a manner consistent with American values, U.S. domestic law, 
and U.S. obligations under international law. For example, 
working with the Defense Innovation Board, which consulted with 
experts and stakeholders across DoD, academia, and the private 
sector, DoD developed a set of AI ethical principles. Those 
principles, which are consistent with the AI principles 
developed and unanimously endorsed by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), were adopted and 
promulgated as guidance for the Department of Defense in 
February 2020. Efforts such as these will allow DoD, along with 
like-minded allies and partners, to employ AI-enabled 
capabilities in a responsible manner that is consistent with 
our values and enhances compliance with the Law of War.

    Senator Peters. General Milley, any thoughts?
    General Milley. I think artificial intelligence, as I've 
testified before, is sort of the mother of all technologies out 
there. It's extraordinarily powerful, and there's no doubt in 
my mind that it's going to be used for military purposes in the 
not-too-distant future. There's a wide variety of ethical 
concerns with that. I don't know if arms control agreements are 
the right mechanism or not. But, all countries, not just the 
United States, are going to have to come to grips with the 
introduction of artificial intelligence for use in military 
operations. It is extremely powerful, and it's going to have to 
be dealt with.
    Senator Peters. Great.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    Senator Reed. On behalf of the Chairman, let me recognize 
Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'd like to thank both of the witnesses for appearing 
before the Committee today.
    I'd like to follow up on what my colleague, Mr. Hawley, 
touched on, which is the Indo-Pacific Strategy. I feel very 
strongly that this is a part of the world we need to spend more 
attention on. I have heard, from both of you, the emphasis on 
INDOPACOM and our role--and the importance of our role there. 
While I applaud the Department's messaging about prioritizing 
great-power competition in this region over other activities, I 
do remain concerned that we've not matched our rhetoric with 
our actions. How are we able to divert some $7 billion to 
border wall construction and yet we're not--the Pacific region 
is our main effort? And, you know, Secretary Esper, I agree 
with you that IMET is certainly very important. In fact, I 
recently met with General Aparit Kongsompong, who is the Thai 
Army leader, and he talked very fondly about how his time that 
he spent at U.S. training facilities. In fact, he said it was 
his joint experience, training at United States facilities, as 
that of General Andika, from Indonesia, that led them to form a 
friendship based on their experience in the United States, that 
then led to this recent agreement they just signed, 2 months 
ago, on information-sharing.
    But, I think it takes more than IMET. I think you need to 
put some MILCON in this. I think we need to look at staffing 
and resources increasing for the INDOPACOM in order to really 
deter Chinese aggression. So, I'd love to hear from both of you 
as to when we're going to see more of a plus-up in this region, 
beyond just talking about how great this is.
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I think the--first of all, you 
know I agree with the importance of INDOPACOM, and its--because 
it's number-one in our strategy, to say the least. But, if you 
look at the simple disposition of forces, INDOPACOM has five 
times as many forces as any other theater, over 350,000. The 
next-closest theater is 70,000. If you added up every other 
theater, INDOPACOM would still be twice as big as all of them, 
combined. So, we have a lot of forces in the theater. I think 
the challenge isn't necessarily putting more forces in, it's 
making sure that we look at our disposition on the ground and 
think, How do we use them more effectively to grow partners and 
allies, and how do we exercise with them, et cetera, et cetera? 
That's my quick assessment. I don't----
    Senator Duckworth. I mean, I don't disagree with you that 
it's not about--it's not just about the number of troops that 
are on the ground, it's about resourcing INDOPACOM so that they 
can go out--I think we need to be--you know, I mean, you're 
already talking about this--more basing agreements.
    Secretary Esper. Right.
    Senator Duckworth. I was very impressed with what was done 
in South Korea when we didn't have enough ammunition, and you 
guys, took that out of Hyde and plussed them up. But, the 
reason that you have more troops is because it's a larger 
geographic region than, say, CENTCOM is. You know, I'll--maybe 
AFRICOM would have more geographic area. But, the geography is 
different.
    General, you were going to----
    General Milley. Well, the--you're exactly right, the 
geography is completely different, the politics are different, 
the international politics, the threats are different, the 
allies are different. All of that is different, and you have to 
factor all of that in. But, in terms of main effort versus 
supporting efforts and economy-of-force efforts--in the NDS, 
the Central Command area, AFRICOM, and SOUTHCOM are all 
designated as economy of force, and you're familiar with that 
term from your military experience, and EUCOM is a supporting 
effort, and PACOM is, ``the main effort.'' It's all part of a 
globally integrated level of effort with all the resources the 
Department of Defense has.
    With respect to INDOPACOM, you know, the Secretary 
mentioned 350,000 troops. He's also got, you know, 200 ships, 7 
aircraft carriers. He's got three ARG/MEUs. He's got 1,600 
high-performance aircraft. This is a highly resourced--from a 
military standpoint, highly resourced theater. So, it's not so 
much the numbers of the ships, planes, trains, and automobiles 
sort of thing. It's how we use it, where we put it, and what 
our broader strategy is with respect to what we think is going 
to be the most significant adversary for the next 100 years, 
which is China, and the rise of China, how we, as a nation, 
deal with that. Military is one aspect of a much broader 
strategy that we've got to come to grips with.
    But, I do think that INDOPACOM is well resourced, from a 
departmental standpoint, in terms of military capability, right 
now.
    Senator Duckworth. But, the Chinese are really moving ahead 
of us----
    General Milley. They are.
    Senator Duckworth.--when it comes to basing issues there, 
and----
    General Milley. They are.
    Senator Duckworth.--we have to have more than a little 
toehold there in order to----
    General Milley. Sure.
    Senator Duckworth.--ensure freedom of navigation----
    General Milley. That's right, and access, basing, over-
flight, all of that stuff plays into it.
    Senator Duckworth. So, adjacent to this issue, I want to 
shift slightly to the other--if there was a bet on what I--
questions I was going to ask you, I'm sure this was one of the 
ones that would have come up, which is logistics. I'm deeply 
concerned about our ability to transport and sustain our forces 
overseas, especially in places like INDOPACOM. Contested 
logistics is something I believe we need to pay far more 
attention to. This year's cuts to the tanker fleet and anemic 
investment in sealift replacement and maintenance really worry 
me.
    Secretary Esper and General Milley, can you tell me how 
this year's Defense budget request preserves or improves our 
ability to transport and sustain our forces in a----
    Secretary Esper. Yeah.
    Senator Duckworth.--contested environment? The days that 
we're going not be able to send ships full of what we need 
without our enemy trying to attack, take the ship out, are 
behind us.
    Secretary Esper. Senator, you're exactly right. I don't 
know if you were here earlier, but I mentioned this. You know, 
I'm concerned that--two important things that often get 
overlooked because they're not sexy are things like airlift and 
aerial refueling and strategic sealift. You know, we've 
invested in two surge ships this year, but if you--I've had a 
lot of conversations with General Lyons--we need to do more, 
and we need to do more, soon. That's why we've talked a few 
times about the shipbuilding plan, but one of the things the 
shipbuilding plan doesn't incorporate is strategic lift, 
sealift. So, I sent a letter to the committees, and I said, 
when I look at the shipbuilding plan, I think we should factor 
in strategic sealift, because it also competes for budget 
dollars, and I--it's a critical factor. So, between that--I'm 
very concerned about the delays in the KC-46. I had the chance 
to crawl through one about a week--2 weeks ago, and look at the 
problems. We--so we're going to have to look restoring some--
maybe some 10s, some 135s, so we keep that--at least 479 
aircraft going. But, it's a very capable airplane, it's just 
going to take some time. But, the--those are critical things, 
particularly when you see the distances from CONUS or Alaska 
all the way into theater, into INDOPACOM theater, and then 
forward basing is another way you offset that, of course.
    Senator Duckworth. Yes. You're right, because it's not just 
about the sealift, it's--the tanker fleet, as you were 
mentioning----
    Secretary Esper. Right.
    Senator Duckworth.--but it's also fueling.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Duckworth. We've got to have forward fueling 
capability. We can't just be shipping our fuel there for 
everything that sucks gas. Right?
    Secretary Esper. That's right.
    General Milley. And you're right. You're over--we're over 
time, so I can get you an answer for the record, but----
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
    General Milley.--you're absolutely right to be concerned 
about the maritime sealift. We've given that up, as a nation, 
for the most part, over the last many, many years, and the 
tanker fleet and the airlift fleet.
    On the tankers, though, I just want to be clear again, you 
know, we've got almost 500 tankers, so, in this budget, there's 
10 KC-10s and 13 KC-135s. Yes, there's stress on the force. No 
question about it. You've heard from General Lyons and others. 
But, at the same time, I don't want people who are watching 
this, especially in certain countries, to think that the United 
States of America cannot project power overseas, when needed. 
We can, and we will, if required.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    General Milley. In an effort to better define future 
warfighting requirements, the Secretary of Defense has directed 
the development of a Joint Warfighting Concept against peer 
adversaries in the 2030 timeframe. A subset of this requirement 
is the development of a corresponding Joint Concept for 
Contested Logistics. Strategic Sealift requirements for 
projecting the Joint Force in contested, all-domain 
environments from the Homeland, through the approaches, and to 
the tactical edge are fundamental to the success of any future 
large-scale military operation. The outcomes of the Joint 
Warfighting Concept and Joint Concept for Contested Logistics 
in December 2020 will help to inform future Strategic Sealift 
force composition requirements and long-range shipbuilding 
plans for the Navy and the Secretary of Defense.
    In fiscal year 2021, TRANSCOM will invest $26.3 million of 
RDT&E funding towards Joint Deployment and Distribution 
challenges in a contested environment. These challenges include 
improvements to transportation and sustainment of our forces 
through cyber assurance, global posture, transportation 
capacity and fleet readiness. They plan to invest $30 million 
in fiscal year 2022. Additionally, the USTRANSCOM joint 
exercise program receives dedicated funding through the 
Combatant Commanders' Exercise Engagement and Training 
Transformation (CE2T2) program. For fiscal year 220, USTRANSCOM 
is allocated $31.3 million for six joint exercises.
    The Joint Exercise Transportation Program (JETP) is a sub-
program of CE2T2 that funds the strategic transportation of 
personnel and equipment to worldwide combatant command 
sponsored joint exercises. This program provides an opportunity 
to stress strategic transportation and C4I systems and evaluate 
their readiness and supportability across the full range of 
military operations. USTRANSCOM Service Components execute the 
majority of JETP funding to deploy and re-deploy units 
participating in CE2T2-funded joint exercises. In fiscal year 
2020 the JETP budget is $207.3 million.

    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Senator Reed. Gentlemen, let me thank you for your 
testimony, and thank you, particularly, for your service.
    On behalf of the Chairman, Chairman Inhofe, let me call the 
adjournment of the hearing.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    [Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

              Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
                             funding levels
    1. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the National 
Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission and senior Pentagon leadership have 
all endorsed 3 to 5 percent real annual growth to implement the 
strategy. Every year since the NDS was published in 2018, leadership 
has said the next budget will implement the NDS. Now we hear it won't 
be until fiscal year 2022. Has the U.S. military fully recovered from 
lack of funding that existed under the Budget Control Act, particularly 
from 2013 to 2017?
    Secretary Esper. The Department lost $400 billion in buying power 
from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2017. While the Congress has 
enacted funds for the Department at levels that reverse the loss in 
topline, the Department has not fully recovered from the lost buying 
power under the Budget Control Act.
    General Milley. The last four defense budgets have done much to 
address the shortfalls resulting from the lost buying power under the 
Budget Control Act, but readiness and modernization challenges remain. 
The Department requires sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely 
budget enactment to fully recover from the Budget Control Act and 
effectively compete in an era of great power competition.

    2. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how much 
money in dollars above inflation do you need over the next 5 years to 
implement the NDS with low risk?
    Secretary Esper. Three percent real annual growth over the Defense 
fiscal year 2021 topline established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 
2019 requires an additional $232 billion over the next 5 years. Five 
percent real annual growth would require an additional $395 billion 
over the next 5 years.
    General Milley. Three percent real annual growth over the Defense 
fiscal year 2021 topline established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 
2019 requires an additional $232 billion over the next 5 years. Five 
percent real annual growth would require an additional $395 billion 
over the next 5 years.
    electromagnetic spectrum: balancing military and commercial use
    3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, spectrum is critical to the 
execution of all DOD missions from radios to radars--including defense 
of the Homeland. In your February 26, 2020, testimony to the House 
Armed Services Committee (HASC), you commented on mid-band spectrum (3 
to 4.2 gigahertz): ``Private sector wants that. We need that . . . '' 
and ``We're willing to share it.'' Why does the military need to share 
bandwidth with U.S. 5G companies rather than just moving out of those 
bands altogether?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts 
operational missions, warfighting exercises, training, and testing in 
the 3.1-3.55 gigahertz (GHz) spectrum range using a variety of land, 
air, and sea weapons systems, and command and control platforms. These 
capabilities do not tune to other parts of the spectrum to accommodate 
vacating the 3.1-3.55 GHz band. Being that industry wants this band 
fast and DOD fully supports U.S. leadership in 5G and the economic 
potential, we are willing to share the band. To accelerate the 
availability of this mid-band spectrum for 5G, spectrum sharing is the 
only viable option. Modifying all the necessary DOD equipment to vacate 
a band is an undertaking that is enormously complex, costly and time-
intensive. DOD systems are optimized for the original frequency band 
they were developed to operate in and are fully integrated into the 
vehicle, ship, or aircraft. DOD originally selected the 3.1-3.55 GHz 
band for the operation of certain mission-critical capabilities such as 
radars for many reasons to include threats, the technical 
characteristics of this spectrum, regulatory considerations and more. 
Today, there are a limited number of bands with similar physical 
characteristics for relocation and many of are either already intensely 
used or have been identified for study for reallocation. This further 
underscores that sharing is the most feasible option.

    4. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, do we have the technology to 
share?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) has the technology 
today, in varying stages of development, to enable us to share all or 
portions of the mid-band spectrum range. DOD, in partnership with 
stakeholders across industry and government, is already expanding the 
technological boundaries of sharing, including in the mid-band 5G 
spectrum of 3.55-3.65 gigahertz (GHz). This is an important air search 
radar spectrum band for the operational Navy. Since 2012, DOD, 
industry, the Federal Communications Commission and the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration have worked on a 
sharing solution based on advanced technology that allows commercial 
services to share 3.55-3.65 GHz without modifications to Navy 
capabilities.
    DOD also is assessing, as part of 5G experimentation with industry 
partners, the potential for dynamic spectrum sharing to enable co-
existence between radar systems and commercial 5G technology in mid-
band spectrum. This is part of an overall approach the Department has 
embraced to lean forward with smart technology and informed policy that 
protects our mission capabilities while allowing for sharing with 5G. 
The shift to a sharing and maneuver focus will align with efforts 
across DOD to achieve U.S. military readiness, integration across 
warfighting domains, and increased lethality of U.S. forces. DOD is 
ready to work through the machine learning and artificial intelligence 
analysis required to achieve effective machine-to-machine 
communications for near-real time sharing. These tools will improve 5G 
and enable military operations and 5G and beyond systems to cohabitate 
in congested spectrum. Overall, information technology modernization 
will better deconflict operations and enable more sharing in more 
bands, including those valuable for 5G.
          united states africa command (africom) troop levels
    5. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, do you agree 
that Africa is key terrain to implement the NDS given the intersection 
of Russian and Chinese influence as well as al Qaeda and ISIS threats?
    Secretary Esper. First, I want to clarify that National Defense 
Strategy (NDS) implementation is a Department of Defense-wide effort to 
improve lethality, expand and establish partnerships, and empower 
reforms. These efforts drive our engagements and force posture across 
the world, so yes, it will include parts of Africa as it is an emerging 
frontier for global power competition and an area plagued by 
transnational threats.
    Second, consistent with the NDS, the Department will emphasize 
relationships as key to achieving these goals. This means the 
Department will primarily work by, with, and through local partners and 
allies to combat transnational threats and minimize malign influence of 
non-African powers. The NDS reinforces partner-centric strategies and 
approaches to strengthen our partners' defense capabilities. The 
Department will continue to use a variety of tools to work closely with 
African and other international partners to achieve several policy 
goals including capacity-building programs, security assistance, 
military equipment sales, education, and exercises.
    General Milley. Africa is home to some of the fastest growing 
economies and populations in the world and sits at the crossroads of 
international commerce and trade. Africa is also a key nexus for many 
of the strategic challenges identified in the National Defense 
Strategy.
    Malign actors' coercive and exploitative activities undermine and 
threaten many African countries' stability. If left unimpeded, Russia 
and China threaten to erode United States influence and access in 
Africa over time.
    Al Qaeda and ISIS linked violent extremist networks are expanding 
in Africa at a rapid pace, due in large part to weak governance and 
disenfranchised populations. Most VEOs in Africa seek to strike at the 
United States in the region, and some aspire to strike the U.S. 
Homeland.
    The Department of Defense will remain engaged in Africa because 
America's future security, prosperity, and strategic access in times of 
crisis relies upon free, open, and secure sea and air lines of 
communication around Africa.
    Our efforts in Africa to address priority security challenges and 
compete with Russia and China will also require continued investments 
across the whole-of-government.

    6. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, as the 
threats grow in Africa, should we be looking at troop increases instead 
of troop cuts?
    Secretary Esper. The Department is evaluating United States Africa 
Command's force posture through the combatant command review process. 
The review process will ensure United States Africa Command is 
appropriately sized to enable United States war plans and contingency 
plans, compete with China and Russia through a whole-of-government 
approach, and degrade violent extremist organizations that have the 
capability and intent to target the Homeland. United States Africa 
Command is conducting a troop-to-task analysis to determine whether an 
increase or decrease is needed to meet the above objectives. These 
reviews are ongoing.
    General Milley. The United States Government's commitment to Africa 
is demonstrated across the spectrum of national power--including 
diplomatic, military and economic efforts.
    Persistent United States military presence is not the only measure 
of the Department of Defense's commitment in Africa, but we will 
continue to do our part.
    DOD's continued commitment in Africa is demonstrated through its 
counter-terrorism training and operations, military training exercises, 
dynamic force employment, intelligence sharing, crisis response, and 
emergency humanitarian assistance.
    While the results of the United States Africa Command review are 
not yet final, I am confident that the command will remain adequately 
resourced to accomplish its priority missions.

    7. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what are you 
doing to ensure that AFRICOM has the resources it needs to accomplish 
its mission and implement the NDS?
    Secretary Esper. The Department is evaluating United States Africa 
Command's force posture through the combatant command review process. 
The review process will ensure United States Africa Command is 
appropriately sized to enable United States war plans and contingency 
plans, compete with China and Russia through a whole-of-government 
approach, and degrade violent extremist organizations that have the 
capability and intent to target the Homeland. United States Africa 
Command is conducting a troop-to-task analysis to determine whether an 
increase or decrease is needed to meet the above objectives. These 
reviews are ongoing.
    General Milley. The Department of Defense is reviewing activities 
and resources across all combatant commands to ensure alignment with 
the National Defense Strategy. United States Africa Command has been 
the first to undergo this review.
    The purpose of these reviews is to rebalance and right-size to 
ensure DOD is aligned to most effectively meet the priorities of the 
National Defense Strategy, such as great power competition and 
countering violent extremist organizations that threaten the Homeland.
    While the results of the United States Africa Command review are 
not yet final, I am confident that the command will remain adequately 
resourced to accomplish its priority missions.
                       pentagon budgeting reform
    8. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, the Pentagon still uses systems 
designed decades ago to manage its processes--namely, the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system for developing its 
budget. Do you believe the current Pentagon budgeting system is 
flexible enough to implement the NDS?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense is reviewing activities 
and resources across all combatant commands to ensure alignment with 
the National Defense Strategy. United States Africa Command has been 
the first to undergo this review.
    The purpose of these reviews is to rebalance and right-size to 
ensure DOD is aligned to most effectively meet the priorities of the 
National Defense Strategy, such as great power competition and 
countering violent extremist organizations that threaten the Homeland.
    While the results of the United States Africa Command review are 
not yet final, I am confident that the command will remain adequately 
resourced to accomplish its priority missions.

    9. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, is it time to consider both 
fundamental and incremental changes to the PPBE process?
    Secretary Esper. The Department is constantly improving the way it 
conducts its PPBE process. This year, I have tasked my Chief Management 
Officer to conduct a consolidated program and budget review of the 
Defense Agencies. This review will provide a comprehensive review of 
the Fourth Estate and its contributions to the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS). All savings from this process will be invested to 
further the full implementation of the NDS for the Department.
                 china and posture in the indo-pacific
    10. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, General Wolters recently told 
this Committee that the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) fixed a 
lot of our posture problems in Europe. Do you agree we need that same 
focus now on posture in the Indo-Pacific?
    Secretary Esper. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funding has 
enabled the Department to increase our force presence in Europe, 
improve critical capabilities, establish pre-positioned equipment sets, 
and execute readiness-building exercises. All of these efforts have 
contributed greatly to United States European Command's warfighting 
capabilities and correcting posture problems in Europe. The United 
States must now focus on posture in the Indo-Pacific region and 
continue our efforts to broaden our posture across the Indo-Pacific 
region. Adapting our current posture that is concentrated in Northeast 
Asia to a more distributed laydown is an important element of our 
objective of denying adversaries sustained air and sea dominance in the 
region.

    11. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, is the posture we have today in 
the Indo-Pacific the posture we'll need in the future to deal with a 
China that is more and more aggressive?
    General Milley. In accordance with the NDS, DOD is focused on 
adapting to a battlefield where US operations will be challenged in all 
domains--air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace--with increasing speed 
and reach. If left unaddressed, these trends would erode our military 
advantage and challenge our ability to deter aggression.
    To counter these trends, DOD is emphasizing investments in 
capabilities and posture to be able to deploy, survive, operate, and 
maneuver while under attack. These include: survivable and resilient 
communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
systems; survivable long-range strike platforms and munitions; cost-
effective missile defenses capable of defeating sophisticated air, 
cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats; and smaller, more dispersed, 
geographically diverse and resilient bases that incorporate active and 
passive defenses, promote interoperability and cooperation with allies 
and partners and enhance logistics flexibility and resilience.

    12. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, you mentioned in your 
testimony that funding like EDI can reduce the willingness of allies to 
meet burden sharing commitments. Isn't it true that EDI investments 
totaling over $20 billion have coincided with significant increases in 
defense spending across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
alliance, including over $100 billion in new defense spending since 
2016?
    Secretary Esper. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) improves the 
readiness, responsiveness, lethality, and resiliency of United States 
forces in Europe in order to strengthen our deterrence posture and 
enhance our defense capabilities. It is indicative of the ironclad U.S. 
commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but I 
continue to make clear to Allies that EDI, in and of itself, will not 
maintain the world's strongest military alliance. NATO Allies have 
responded to the call for increased burden sharing with sustained 
increases in defense spending. Defense spending across European Allies 
and Canada increased in real terms in 2019 by 4.6 percent, the fifth 
consecutive year of growth. By the end of 2020, European Allies will 
have invested $130 billion more since 2016, and the accumulated 
increase by the end of 2024 will be $400 billion.

    13. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in your 
testimony, you both referred to the number of forces assigned to United 
States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)--300,000 in 1 instance and 
350,000 in another. How many forces are assigned to INDOPACOM?
    Secretary Esper. There are 300,780 military personnel assigned to 
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
    General Milley. There are 300,780 military.

    14. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how many 
civilian personnel are assigned to INDOPACOM?
    Secretary Esper. There are 53,972 government civilians & 
contractors assigned to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
    General Milley. There are 53,972 GS & contractor.

    15. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, please 
detail the number of forces currently assigned to INDOPACOM by location 
(i.e. in foreign countries, U.S. states, and U.S. territories).
    Secretary Esper. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command forces are spread across 
44 Foreign Countries, all 50 States and Washington, DC and 4 U.S. 
Territories.
    General Milley. Forces are spread across 44 Foreign Countries, all 
50 States and Washington DC and 4 U.S. Territories.

    16. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how many 
forces assigned to INDOPACOM are stationed west of the International 
Date Line and how many forces assigned to INDOPACOM are stationed east 
of the International Date Line?
    Secretary Esper. There are 110,458 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command 
personnel west of the International Dateline. There are 244,294 
personnel east of the International Dateline.
    General Milley. West: 110,458. East: 244,294

    17. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in each of 
the last three annual DEPORDs/GFMAPs (including the current), how many 
forces assigned to INDOPACOM were allocated to other combatant commands 
(COCOMs)?
    Secretary Esper. [Deleted.]
    General Milley. [Deleted.]

    18. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, please consider the example of 
denying a fait accompli in a Taiwan scenario. Given the tyranny of 
distance you referenced in your testimony, would you agree that the 
responsiveness of forces assigned to INDOPACOM in such a scenario would 
vary significantly based in part on their location in the INDOPACOM 
area of responsibility (AOR)?
    Secretary Esper. The location of U.S. forces within the U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) is a 
critical element of any response to a regional crisis or contingency. 
Our regional force posture has shifted our approach to warfighting to a 
posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, 
and politically sustainable. In particular, the Department's Global 
Operating Model is designed to orient activities against the 
adversary's theory of victory--particularly a fait accompli scenario. 
The mix of activities in the contact and blunt layers is designed to 
focus the Department's military operations, especially in concert with 
allies and partners, to prevent adversary activities that may seek to 
achieve a fait accompli. Our effective operation in the contact and 
blunt layers of the Global Operating Model, as implemented in the 
USINDOPACOM AOR, is a combination of combat-credible forward forces 
deployed to the region (including in Guam, Korea, and Japan) and U.S. 
operations conducted at greater distance. Our responsiveness is also 
contingent upon the continued prioritization of investments in the 
logistics backbone of operations--including prepositioned forward 
stocks, munitions, strategic mobility assets, and maintenance.

    19. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, as one example, in the context 
of such scenario, would you consider ships stationed on the West Coast 
of the United States to be part of the contact, blunt, or surge layer 
of the Global Operating Model described in the NDS?
    Secretary Esper. Through the layers of the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy's (NDS) Global Operating Model, the Department seeks to 
identify the general attributes and key functions U.S. forces must be 
capable of performing to advance NDS objectives, and specifically the 
requirement to arrest the erosion of military advantage against our 
primary competitors in key theaters. For example, U.S. forces in the 
blunt layer must be combat credible and positioned to ensure they can 
help delay, degrade, or deny an armed attack by a U.S. competitor for 
limited objectives. In the scenario provided, the ship's capabilities 
and mission are the critical factors determining which layer of the 
Global Operating Model they support.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                            spectrum sharing
    20. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in your 
HASC testimony on February 26, 2020, you said the Department is willing 
to share spectrum with 5G networks in the ``Mid-Band'' (3 to 4.2 
gigahertz). Can you describe some of the ways that the Department 
relies on spectrum to support warfighter requirements?
    Secretary Esper. Spectrum is imperative to Department of Defense 
(DOD) operations. DOD must have the ability to gain and maintain an 
advantage in the electromagnetic spectrum when and where it is needed. 
To its meet national security and homeland defense missions, DOD relies 
on spectrum-dependent systems to provide command and control; voice and 
data communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR); advanced threat detection and targeting systems; electronic 
attack and electronic protection; and battlefield situational awareness 
and protection (e.g., air traffic, weather, counter unmanned aerial 
systems or UAS). Without spectrum access, DOD is unable to train and 
equip its forces nor meet operational mission requirements. DOD has 
several types of important capabilities in the 3.1-3.55 GHz frequency 
range including major weapons systems. These include shipboard and 
ground based radars supporting multiple strategic and tactical 
ballistic missile defense missions, systems providing counter-mortar 
weapons and counter-air and UAS capabilities for homeland defense and 
critical site protection, and airborne command and control. The 
Department also relies on the use of airborne radars in this band to 
provide intelligence and protection of national security events.
    General Milley. To meet national security and homeland defense 
missions, DOD relies on spectrum-dependent systems to provide command 
and control; voice and data communications; intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR); advanced threat detection and targeting 
systems; cyber; electronic attack and electronic protection; and 
battlefield situational awareness and protection (e.g., air traffic, 
weather, counter unmanned aerial systems or UAS). Without spectrum 
access, the Department is unable to train and equip its forces nor meet 
its operational mission requirements.
    The White House, DOD, DOC and FCC have formed a task force to 
develop the details of a nationwide spectrum sharing solution by August 
1, 2020. The collaborative agreement will enable sharing in the 3450-
3550 MHz range, providing 100 MHz of nearly contiguous access across 
the Nation to enable America to lead the world in 5G development.

    21. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what are 
some of the future spectrum warfighter requirements that will be 
essential to competing with Russia and China on a future battlefield?
    Secretary Esper. Military operations will see the integration of 
all domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) and the widespread use 
of all domain sensors, radars, and cloud-based systems leveraging 
advanced quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and machine 
learning for near real-time assessment and decision making. The 
military will significantly expand the number of autonomous air and 
ground systems that operate at extended distances for longer periods of 
time, providing persistent and high-quality situational awareness, 
tracking, guidance, and force. Winning in the future battlefield 
requires the ability to see and strike adversaries first while 
preventing adversaries from detecting the Department's presence.
    This will be accomplished by interconnecting our geographically 
dispersed heterogeneous systems, which are often on-the-move, through 
the effective and efficient use of spectrum. Future spectrum 
requirements are shaped by overarching new capability requirements that 
include increased operational agility; expanded throughput via 
traditional line-of-sight radio frequency and data links that are on 
platforms; smart and adaptive global distribution networks; expanded 
space-based capabilities, and increased use of commercial off-the-shelf 
technologies. In addition, to keep pace with the rapid dispersion of 
technology and new concepts of warfare and competition, the Department 
is developing Dynamic Spectrum Utilization tools and methods to allow 
access to the spectrum regardless of adversary attempts to deny access.
    General Milley. Military operations will see the integration of all 
domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) and the widespread use of 
sensors, radars, and cloud-based systems leveraging advanced quantum 
computing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning for near real-
time assessment and decision making. The military will significantly 
expand the number of autonomous air and ground systems that operate at 
extended distances for longer periods of time, providing persistent and 
high-quality situational awareness, tracking, guidance, and force 
employment. Winning in the future battlefield requires the ability to 
see and strike adversaries first, while preventing adversaries from 
detecting DOD's presence.
    This will be accomplished by interconnecting our geographically 
dispersed heterogeneous systems, which are often on-the-move, through 
the effective and efficient use of spectrum. Future spectrum 
requirements are shaped by next-generation capabilities that include 
increased operational agility, expanded throughput via traditional 
line-of-sight RF and data links that are on platform. Additionally, 
they include smart and adaptive global distribution networks, expanded 
space-based capabilities, and increased use of commercial off-the-shelf 
technologies. Finally, to keep pace with the rapid dispersion of 
technology and new concepts of warfare and competition, we are 
developing Dynamic Spectrum Utilization tools and methods. These will 
allow DOD to maximize the use of available spectrum to exploit 
battlefield opportunities while preventing interference to other 
authorized users.

    22. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what help 
is needed from Congress in this area?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) appreciates the 
Committee's continued support of our 5G plans, including our engagement 
as part of a ``whole-of-government'' approach to make the President's 
5G goals a reality. A specific area in which Congress could assist is 
spectrum information technology (IT) modernization, as proposed in 
Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), section 
214. This provision will modernize the Department's spectrum IT 
infrastructure, standardize modeling and simulation tools, standardize 
spectrum data, and allow interoperability between DOD, Federal users 
and national regulators (Federal Communications Commission and the 
National Telecommunications & Information Administration). This support 
will accelerate spectrum-repurposing decisions, resulting in an 
improved ability to deconflict operations and enable more sharing, 
including for 5G and beyond. This aligns with the greater reliance on 
sharing as part of a ``whole-of-government'' approach enables us to 
gain flexibility to be resilient against coercive,
    General Milley. DOD appreciates SASC's continued support of our 5G 
plans, including our engagement as part of a ``whole-of-government'' 
approach to make the President's 5G goals a reality. The U.S. has great 
momentum and SASC's continued support of the National Spectrum IT 
Modernization initiative will enable interoperability between DOD, 
Federal users and national regulators (Federal Communications 
Commission and the National Telecommunications & Information 
Administration), accelerate spectrum-repurposing decisions, resulting 
in an improved ability to deconflict operations and enable more 
sharing, including for 5G and beyond. A specific area in which Congress 
could assist is to increase funding in DOD's RDT&E activities, 
specifically its recently established Next Generation Information 
Communications Technology Program (Early-stage R&D program). This 
program comprises a new initiative known as ``5G to Next G.'' DOD's 
current efforts are focused on developing 5G-enabled military 
applications and spectrum sharing between national 5G and military 
systems. The new program would add a focus on technologies beyond 5G, 
working with agencies such as the National Science Foundation and 
National Institute of Standards and Technology on millimeter-wave 
technology, multi-antenna systems, dynamic spatial spectrum reuse, and 
``special/spectral/network security techniques.'' DOD's operations have 
become increasingly dependent on electromagnetic spectrum access across 
all domains. To improve national security readiness, effectiveness, and 
efficiency, Congress must encourage coordination across all federal 
agencies. We have lost our edge in this critical domain and need to 
quickly restore readiness in the electromagnetic spectrum to ensure we 
can execute the National Defense Strategy.

    23. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, if DOD was 
required to ``vacate'' or leave that band of the spectrum instead of 
sharing, what are the potential dollar costs to the military?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) cannot vacate the 
spectrum, because there is no comparable spectrum or technology to 
which military systems can transition that is as mission effective as 
this band. As a consequence, spectrum sharing is the only viable option 
at this time to accelerate the availability of this band for commercial 
5G systems. As part of our proactive engagement in ensuring that mid-
band spectrum is available to meet national 5G priorities for the U.S., 
DOD is studying the issue of dollar costs if comparable spectrum were 
available. That study is expected to be out later this year.
    General Milley. Currently the DOD cannot vacate this band of 
spectrum due to weapons systems and our National Security in the near 
term. For instance, we have nearly 100 Aegis ships, each with an Aegis 
radar at the cost of $1 billion each. We also have a fleet of AWACs 
aircraft in this band of spectrum. These two platforms make up a 
significant portion of our National and Homeland defense. There are 
many other radar weaons systems that would be effected which is why our 
sharing strategy is so essential to our National Security and in the 
vital interest of our 5G efforts.
    I, collaborating directly with the White House Chief of Staff, will 
co-chair a steering group to identify a solution that allows commercial 
industry nationwide 5G access while preserving critical DOD readiness 
and operations. The steering group is scheduled to present results to 
the President by August 1, 2020.

    24. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how long 
would it take to move to a different area of the spectrum?
    Secretary Esper. Initial estimates for relocation timelines range 
from well over a decade to several decades, depending on the cost that 
would be acceptable and if comparable replacement spectrum were 
identified and made available, as required under current statutory 
safeguards.
    General Milley. In the immediate future, the White House has 
identified access to 100 MHz of contiguous mid-band spectrum as 
essential to the U.S. efforts to lead the world in 5G development. 
There will be a two-phase sharing plan to expedite commercial access. 
The short term solution will be sharing spectrum via adjustments to 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs.) The long term solution 
will include identifying comparable spectrum, and making modifications 
to DOD equipment and/or operating concepts to improve the sharing 
environment. The final plan is scheduled to be delivered to the White 
House by August 1, 2020 with an aim to announce the associated spectrum 
auction no later than October 1, 2020.
                   close combat lethality task force
    25. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper, one of Secretary Mattis' 
signature efforts was to create the Close Combat Lethality Task Force 
(CCLTF). The charter of this task force recognizes that, after WWII, 
close combat forces suffered 90 percent of all combat deaths, despite 
comprising only 4 percent of the total force. Senator Duckworth and I 
offered an amendment that was included in the Senate Report 
accompanying the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA), urging the department to continue its support of this task 
force and for its direct reporting relationship to the Secretary of 
Defense. Secretary Mattis called this task force his #2 priority, only 
behind the NDS. Will you give me your commitment to continue your 
direct oversight of this important task force, so that our ground 
combat forces, from all services, have a champion in its Secretary?
    Secretary Esper. The work of the Close Combat Lethality Task Force 
(CCLTF) is very important and having been an Infantryman myself the 
purpose of the task force is of vital importance to me. That is why I 
want to ensure this critical effort continues well into the future.
    I am focused on implementing the National Defense Strategy and 
efforts like the CCLTF are a key part of ensuring our Nation's 
readiness now and in the future. That is why I have asked the Secretary 
of the Army to explore how this successful endeavor can be improved and 
institutionalized. Our Army provides the majority of the close combat 
forces and in order to prevent duplicate efforts across the Department, 
I decided the Department of the Army would be the lead in formalizing 
the critical mission of the task force.
                           dod cyber strategy
    26. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, one of the 
five objectives in the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy is to deter, pre-empt 
and defeat malicious cyber activity against U.S. critical 
infrastructure. The National Guard and Reserve Components are uniquely 
positioned to respond to cyber incidents of national significance, yet 
they continue to experience difficulty in cyber recruitment and 
retention. Can you describe your cyber talent management strategy; any 
innovative efforts that DOD is using to recruit and retain National 
Guard and Reserve cyber forces?
    Secretary Esper. Similar to the Active Component, recruiting and 
retaining National Guard (NG) and Reserve personnel with cyber skills 
is challenging given the competition with other sectors and private 
industry. The Military Departments are working to attract and retain 
the best cyber talent by utilizing bonuses, direct commissioning, 
constructive credit, continuing education programs, and assignment 
incentive pay. The NG provides servicemembers the opportunity to 
continue their industry and government careers and competes to retain 
personnel with cyber skills. Continued congressional support for 
Department of Defense recruiting programs such as direct commissioning, 
training and education, retention pay, bonuses, and other incentives is 
critically important to recruiting and retaining NG and Reserve 
personnel with cyber skills.
    General Milley. There is a recognized nation-wide shortage of 
highly skilled cybersecurity professionals, and each of our DOD 
components, Regular and Reserve, are competing with external agencies 
and industry for the same small pool of talent. The Regular and Reserve 
components have been out in front addressing this issue and the 
National Guard is working to stay fully integrated with the solutions 
as we determine are successful methods of recruitment and retention.
    I'd like to thank congress for providing enhanced recruiting and 
retention authorities to both the Regular and Reserve components, and 
note that officer direct appointment authority and constructive service 
credit enhancements have created more agile military personnel 
programs. The military pay and incentive system has agility built into 
it as well. Continued Congressional support for Reserve Component 
(Guard and Reserve) parity with Regular component authorities for 
recruiting and retention programs such as direct commissioning, tuition 
assistance and educational benefits, retention pay, critical skills 
bonuses, and Tricare, among others, is critically important. Our 
strategy is to leverage all traditional and non-traditional recruiting 
methods to attract talent and then retain that talent through use of 
incentives, both monetary and non-monetary.
    While I believe we have the authorities we need to successfully 
recruit and retain cyber talent, we are closely watching market trends 
for talent in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning; there are 
early indicators that this may become an area where additional 
recruiting and retention authorities and/or special pay authorities are 
needed.

    Examples:
    With our Reserve component for example, in addition to traditional 
recruiting methods our reserve components have developed programs to 
leverage officers participating in Scholarship and Fellowship Programs. 
These programs include the Federal Executive Fellowship, SECDEF 
Executive Fellows, SECNAV tours, Industry Fellowships (e.g. Amazon, 
Apple, Microsoft, JP Morgan Chase), and universities (e.g. Harvard, 
MIT, CMU, Stanford). Our professionals build bridges with these 
officers to develop leads with promising candidates. We also seek both 
enlisted and officer candidates by liaising with regional colleges and 
universities offering information technology and cybersecurity 
certifications and degrees.
    Following the Defense Digital Services model, more often today we 
have software developers recruiting software developers and engineers 
recruiting engineers. In fact, we have a USMC reservist in one of our 
cyber units who works at Google full time as an engineer. Reserve 
component (Guard and Reserve) members are uniquely positioned in their 
civilian occupations and industries to recruit similarly talented and 
skilled individuals through business cards and LinkedIn profiles.
    Also, the National Guard Bureau consistent with their Cyber 
Strategy laid out in 2018, is establishing Cyber Workforce Forums 
(CWFs) to bring together representatives from the private sector, 
academia (including K-12), industry partners, and public organizations 
to create innovative solutions and improve management of the national 
cyber work force to meet both military and mission partner 
requirements. CWFs will be established at a variety of levels including 
state, regional and national levels and will necessitate states to 
facilitate interactions with partners. A robust and well integrated 
cyber workforce is a national asset vital for sustaining our economy by 
meeting both the Nation's defense and mission partner cyber security 
needs.
    Not only is our reserve component a cost-effective model, but it's 
filled with tremendously talented individuals, the vast majority of 
whom serve for less pay than they receive in their civilian positions. 
Understanding why they do this is key to both recruiting and retention. 
The Covid-19 pandemic has brought forth additional challenges that have 
highlighted the innovation of our professionals and provided new 
examples of agility that will help move us forward.
    For example, in April 2020, a Marine Corps Reserve cyber group in 
the 6th Communication Battalion, Force HQ Group, innovatively 
redesigned a full drill weekend to a virtual format in a secure Cloud 
environment, ensuring every element of training and mission tasks were 
completed. They culminated the training event with a Cyber Operator 
Competition scenario called Capture the Flag, which was a tremendous 
success. The feedback from reservists was very positive and has caused 
us to re-think some of the ways we're able to organize reserve training 
and drills in a more flexible manner that may also improve retention 
without expending any additional resources. We're taking a hard look at 
this and other examples, to find benchmark programs that continue to 
improve our ability to attract, recruit and retain talented 
professionals.

    27. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the 2018 
DOD Cyber Strategy refers to the integration of cyber and information 
operations as a line of effort. Some services have integrated their 
cyber forces into new information warfare commands. Can you describe 
the steps DOD has taken to integrate cyber, space, electromagnetic 
warfare, and information operations?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes the 
important developments on the global threat landscape, particularly 
involving China's and Russia's emphasis on domination in the 
information environment. DOD is undertaking several steps to address 
these threats effectively and to support the further integration of our 
military cyber, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and information 
operations. Among these efforts is a focus on designating a Principal 
Information Operations Advisor to oversee a cross-functional team, 
develop or update the DOD information operations strategy and conduct 
the first-ever information operations posture review, designate 
Information Operations Joint Providers and Information Operations Joint 
Force Trainers for the Department, develop and manage a joint lexicon 
for relevant information operations terms, and determine the relevant 
set of capabilities for these operations across domains. Other ongoing 
efforts include improving DOD organization, such as at the Military 
Department level; updating DOD doctrine, joint planning, and guidance, 
including by designating information as a joint function; identifying 
and addressing any gaps or seams in policies or authorities; and 
enhancing the Cyber Mission Force's ability to conduct integrated 
operations. DOD is continuing to assess the effectiveness of its 
current and planned efforts and to identify any additional steps that 
should be considered.
    General Milley. DOD is undertaking several steps to support further 
integration of cyber, electromagnetic spectrum operations, and 
information operations. Across the Joint Force, we're analyzing the 
successes of the Services, such as the Navy, Air Force, and Army, who 
have aligned many commands and organizations to fuse cyber, space, 
electromagnetic warfare, and information operations most effectively to 
gain and maintain information advantage and to increase lethality. 
Specifically, the Army's Multi-Domain Task Forces, the Navy's 10th 
Fleet, and the Air Force's 16th Air Force are examples of larger 
optimization and integration efforts. You have also seen the Department 
form the U.S. Space Force, and the Space Force will optimize its forces 
and organizations to support the Department and the National Defense 
Strategy most effectively. We are continuously innovating and seeking 
to optimize the warfighting capabilities delivered to the combatant 
commands. Lastly, my staff is reviewing the Department's and the Joint 
Staff's organization to determine how to evolve in this era of Great 
Power Competition most effectively, and evaluating the fusion of 
information warfare internally, across the U.S. Government, and with 
our U.S. and international partners.

    28. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, does this 
entail or should this entail a single organization and command 
structure across the department?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) is open to making 
adjustments to its organization or resource allocations to enable the 
necessary integration of cyber, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and 
information operations; however, any such decision is premature pending 
the results of ongoing DOD assessments, including the forthcoming 
information operations strategy and posture review. Presently, 
effective operational integration to enable simultaneous effects from 
the strategic to the tactical levels is occurring through established 
procedures across combatant commands, leveraging authorities delegated 
to multiple combatant commanders in their assigned mission areas. 
Current OSD and Joint Staff organizations and processes also regularly 
provide valuable support to enable this integration.
    General Milley. The Department recognizes the changing threat 
environment and is examining all options. We are driving toward 
operational integration from the strategic to the tactical level across 
combatant commands and leveraging authorities delegated to multiple 
combatant commanders in their assigned mission areas. Department of 
Defense and Joint Staff organizations are assessing ways to provide 
support to enable this integration further and simultaneously with the 
Department configuring a Principal Information Operations advisor and 
Cross Functional Team. Services are experimenting, innovating, and 
adapting the concepts to their own unique operating requirements. We 
expect our efforts with Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) 
and the associated joint concept of Information Advantage to result in 
a comparative advantage in all-domain operations. We will continue to 
engage with the combatant commands to identify gaps in information 
warfare capabilities and capacities and to collaborate with our allies 
and partners to accelerate delivery of effective and affordable 
solutions.
                      readiness and modernization
    29. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the 
personnel in the Armed Forces and the equipment utilized by those 
personnel have sustained a substantial strain from being at war for 20 
years. Please speak at the unclassified level about your modernization 
and readiness strategy to maintain a lethal force in a contested and 
disruptive battlefield in alignment with the NDS and subsequently your 
agency's objectives.
    Secretary Esper. Since the release of our National Defense Strategy 
(NDS), the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested in new equipment, 
improved operational readiness, and modernized our nuclear deterrent 
forces. For example, DOD is modernizing all three legs of the nuclear 
triad, modernizing our space capabilities, investing in missile defense 
to protect the Homeland, procuring advanced aircraft, developing next 
generation precision guided munitions across the services and 
modernizing our electronic warfare systems. DOD also continues to 
invest in advanced technologies that will help maintain tactical 
advantage, such as artificial intelligence, directed energy, and 
hypersonic weapons. DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget focused on the 
development of these crucial emerging technologies to expand our 
warfighting advantages over strategic competitors and enhance our 
fighting capabilities in the increasingly complex battlefield of the 
future.
    The Navy's strategy of sea control and implementation of 
distributed lethality as an operational and organizational principle 
for achieving and sustaining sea control at will is evident with their 
aggressive strategy of shipbuilding the next generation of submarines, 
aircraft carriers, and surface combatants. Specifically, the SSBN-826 
Columbia-class submarine, the Navy's Ohio-class ballistic missile 
submarine replacement; the on-going construction of three CVN-78 Gerald 
R. Ford-class nuclear powered aircraft carriers; the DDG-1000-class of 
guided missile destroyers to provide offensive, distributed, and 
precision firepower at long ranges; the SSN-774 Virginia-class fast-
attack submarine to be capable of targeting, controlling, and launching 
MK-48 torpedoes and Tomahawk land-attack missiles; the FFG(X) multi-
mission guided missile frigate, to maximize the Navy's small surface 
combatant survivability and capabilities in surface warfare, submarine 
warfare, electromagnetic maneuver warfare, and air warfare mission 
areas; and the FREEDOM and INDEPENDENCE variants of the Littoral Combat 
Ship to defeat asymmetric ``anti-access'' threats such as mines, quiet 
diesel submarines and fast surface craft. Sea control is the 
precondition for the Navy's surface warfare, submarine warfare, and air 
warfare operational areas, while distributed lethality reinforces fleet 
initiatives that drive collaboration and integration across warfighting 
domains. The Navy's distributed lethality requires increasing the 
offensive and defensive capability of surface forces, and guides their 
deliberate resource investment for modernization and for the future 
force, thus providing more capabilities across surface forces and 
yielding more options for geographic combatant commanders in peace and 
war.
    The Army's multi-domain operations uses calibrated force posture, 
multi-domain formations, and convergence as three key tenets to 
eliminate multiple layers of near peer stand-off in all domains--land, 
sea, air, space and cyberspace. Their strategy incorporates cross-
domain fires as an evolution of combined arms maneuver, where the 
combination of complementary effects complicates an enemy's ability to 
act, producing an overall effect greater than the sum of the individual 
parts. Multi-domain formations deliver cross-domain fire capabilities 
through surface warfare aviation platforms such as future vertical 
lift, ground combat platforms such as Paladin Integrated Management, 
and integrated air and missile defense systems. Success against 
significantly large and lethal near-peer enemy forces, will not rely 
exclusively on a technological advantage, but also on the superior 
execution of concurrent single-domain mission threads with the ability 
to refocus and execute converging new multi-domain mission threads with 
speed and agility. Space and cyberspace domains provide layered 
offensive and defensive capabilities to increase stand-off and provide 
gray-zone/hybrid capabilities between unconventional warfare and 
conventional surface warfare.
    The Joint Force has the necessary capability, capacity, and 
readiness to contend with today's threats at an acceptable level of 
operational risk, but our adversaries' demonstrated desire to contest 
U.S. military advantages will, if left unchecked, increase the risk to 
our national defense strategic objectives. In order to ensure the long-
term readiness of the Joint Force, we must continue to modernize and 
expand our margin of dominance, while balancing the risks to mission 
success and a service's force generation ability. The fiscal year 2021 
request reflects an increase in readiness funding from $114.5 billion 
in fiscal year 2018 to $130.4 billion, an increase of 14 percent over 
four years. Focused investment in readiness allowed the Department to 
halt readiness declines across the Joint Force and initiate readiness 
recovery that has provided demonstrable improvements. The Department is 
consistently improving readiness reporting to identify leading 
indicators and systemic issues preventing accelerated readiness 
recovery, and improve the linkage between resources and readiness 
outcomes to ensure effective allocation of Department funding. We are 
strengthening our warfighting approach, improving how we develop, 
posture, and employ the Joint Force to implement the NDS most 
effectively, while prioritizing modernization, future high-end 
readiness, and the development of new operating concepts.
    General Milley. The NDS provides the framework for the department's 
readiness and modernization strategy to deliver a ready, agile, and 
capable Joint Force that can compete, deter, and win across all domains 
today and in the future. President's Budget 2021 funds major readiness 
accounts to grow operational availability and recover from years of 
wartime operations and budget instability. We must be able to adapt 
quickly to the rapid evolution in advanced technologies to compete and 
win against potential adversaries. Our President's Budget 2021 request 
targets specific investments in readiness, modernization, leader 
development and support to our people and families to retain overmatch 
in an era of great power competition.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                                covid-19
    30. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, I wrote a letter to you 
concerning Coronavirus. Can I get an update on how you're educating the 
Force about the risks associated with COVID-19, communicating DOD's 
emergency and preparedness plan, and how that plan is being executed?
    Secretary Esper. The Department has issued a series of documents 
that provide force health protection guidance. This guidance provides 
information to the force on coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) risk, 
informs DOD Component plans, and communicates COVID-19 health 
protection measures and guides actions on medical treatment and 
laboratory diagnostic testing.
      Memorandum (dated January 30, 2020) addresses risk to 
personnel, individual prevention and protection measures, healthcare 
information, patient screening and isolation information, as well as 
information on diagnosis, treatment, and reportable medical events.
      Supplement 1 (dated February 7, 2020) directs 
identification, restriction of movement, and monitoring for 
servicemembers returning from mainland China.
      Supplement 2 (dated February 25, 2020) provides a risk-
based framework to guide commanders on implementing health protection 
measures based on their local circumstances. This document allows a 
tailored response to the local needs to ensure the protection of our 
force and their families. These plans can include preventive hygiene 
measures, meeting and event cancellations, or access restrictions, 
among other actions.
      Supplement 3 (dated March 10, 2020) provided guidance for 
use of personal protective equipment and implementation of non-materiel 
solutions during the COVID-19 outbreak (rescinded and superseded by 
Supplement 7).
      Supplement 4 (dated March 11, 2020) directs and 
recommends actions for all DOD travelers in alignment with CDC Travel 
Health Notices.
      Supplement 5 (dated April 7, 2020) serves as a COVID-19 
specific supplement to DOD policy on patient movement, the DOD Fire and 
Emergency Services Program, and public health and medical services as 
part of defense support of civil authorities providing best practices 
for the evaluation, treatment, and management of COVID-19 and 
associated patient movement guidance.
      Supplement 6 (dated April 7, 2020) provides laboratory 
diagnostic testing guidance to protect at-risk populations while 
maximizing critical testing capability and enabling optimal public 
health decision making.
      Supplement 7 (dated April 8, 2020) updates existing 
COVID-19 guidance for use of cloth face coverings in addition to 
personal protective equipment, and non-pharmaceutical interventions 
during the COVID-19 outbreak.
      Supplement 8 (dated April 13, 2020) provides guidance for 
protecting personnel in workplaces during the response to COVID-19 
including restricting workplace access, collecting information 
necessary to protect the workplace and provides a series of frequently 
asked questions and answers concerning Occupational Safety and Health 
issues.
                                housing
    31. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, what is the plan to address 
the three remaining provisions still missing from the Resident Bill of 
Rights?
    Secretary Esper. The remaining three rights--Maintenance History, 
Dispute Resolution, and Rent Withholding--will require more work, to 
include additional coordination, resolution of legal concerns, and 
determining underlying processes, before implementation. The Department 
remains fully committed to continuing to work with the Military Housing 
Privatization Initiative (MHPI) companies to ensure the benefits of 
these rights are fully available to servicemembers and their families 
residing in MHPI housing. However, implementing these three rights does 
not lend themselves to unilateral action by the Department. Agreement 
needs to be reached with the MHPI companies and their third party 
lenders to operationalize these rights, including making necessary 
changes to existing MHPI project legal documents. We are engaging with 
these parties now to obtain agreement on processes to implement the 
three rights.

    32. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, is this indicative of ongoing 
challenges in the implementation or identification of the most 
qualified office/individual to work the mechanics of those missing 
provisions?
    Secretary Esper. The delay is indicative of ongoing implementation 
challenges due to three remaining rights pertaining to legal matters 
that do not lend themselves to unilateral action by the Department. The 
Department is working to reach agreement with the Military Housing 
Privatization Initiative companies and their third party lenders to 
operationalize these rights.

    33. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, as you retrofit the military 
housing program, what are you doing to improve the fundamentals of 
DOD's business model in housing?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken a number 
of actions to improve DOD's business model for providing oversight of 
our housing program, to include:
      Establishing a Chief Housing Officer to provide overall 
Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) program oversight.
      Hiring additional housing-related staff to increase 
oversight and responsiveness to tenant concerns and increasing training 
for leadership and housing-related staff.
      Enhancing installation communication with tenants.
      Implementing measures set out in the Fiscal Year 2020 
National Defense Authorization Act, to include; hiring/identifying 
military tenant advocates; requiring MHPI landlords implement 
electronic work order systems to improve transparency and tracking of 
tenant requests for repairs; developing a comprehensive work order 
approach to evaluate property management performance and better 
incentivize MHPI landlords; and an improved dispute resolution process.
      Implementing a comprehensive work order approach to 
evaluate property management performance and better incentivize MHPI 
landlords.
      Improving policy and processes when residents raise 
health concerns that may be related to their housing.
      Reviewing the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) rate 
setting process to ensure BAH rates, which serve as the basis for MHPI 
housing rents and project revenue, appropriately reflect the local 
military housing market rents.

    34. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, how are you refocusing DOD and 
the housing industry to fix our housing issues?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a dual focus 
on ensuring a positive living experience for residents and financially 
viable projects that deliver safe, quality, well-maintained housing. 
During the past year, the Department has taken a number of actions to 
address Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) housing 
issues, to include increasing leadership engagement with MHPI 
landlords, hiring additional housing-related staff, making work order 
progress transparent and assessable to residents and housing staff, and 
increasing leadership and staff training. In addition, the Department 
has issued policy requiring that Military Departments revise 
performance fee metrics to better incentivize the privatization 
projects to improve conditions on the ground; and has required that 
Military Departments undertake reviews of their MHPI project business 
processes, as well as their internal processes, to identify where 
practices required improvement. Consistent with the Fiscal Year 2020 
National Defense Authorization Act, in February 2020 the Department 
designated a Chief Housing Officer (CHO) to provide oversight of the 
MHPI program. The CHO's responsibilities include leading DOD's efforts 
to work with MHPI landlords to improve housing conditions and address 
resident concerns; ensuring implementation the Tenant Bill of Rights 
and other MHPI requirements in the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA; and 
monitoring the long-term financial viability of the MHPI projects.

    35. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, how confident are you in the 
underlying structure of the proposed Global Household Good Contract 
(GHC) to coordinate and shift capacity requirements?
    Secretary Esper. While the Global Household Good Contract (GHC) 
will not be in place until the 2021 move season, implementing it offers 
the Department the opportunity to set terms and conditions that favor 
Department of Defense (DOD) families and an avenue to hold industry 
accountable. It's important to note that we have no formal contractual 
relationship with our disparate industry-base today; in addition to 
improving accountability, this construct provides industry with the 
rationale to invest in quality capacity to meet DOD's peak demand. 
Changing our relationship with industry is necessary to improve access 
to--and management of--quality capacity to meet our peak summer demand 
and enable DOD to affix the accountability and responsibility lacking 
in today's program. The current disaggregated program will never 
deliver the quality our families deserve or the accountability the 
Congress demands. Recent studies validate this approach. The Business 
Case Analysis U.S. Transportation Command submitted to the Defense 
Committees in January underscores the value of the GHC. I was similarly 
encouraged by the GAO's report on this subject--the GAO made sensible 
recommendations to improving the program, but recommended no changes to 
the Department's acquisition approach or timeline.

    36. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, I have concerns about (1) 
resiliency, (2) peak season transition phase, (3) system 
accountability, and (4) driver recruitment. Are we prepared to provide 
quality service to our military families this upcoming PCS season?
    Secretary Esper. This summer's permanent change of station (PCS) 
season will be particularly challenging due to the outbreak of COVID-19 
and the impacts on the household goods industry. We will continue to 
execute this season under the existing framework with the Global 
Household Goods Contract implementation after the completion of the 
peak season. The service personnel and logistics communities are 
working closely with U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and my 
staff to understand demand and capacity. With this understanding, we 
will appropriately review report dates and move schedules to meet 
service and servicemember requirements. USTRANSCOM continues to work 
closely with the moving industry to understand challenges and 
communicate the dynamic nature the Department's demand signal. With the 
Stop Move order remaining in place, the normal summer peak season will 
be approximately half over before we begin relocations on a large 
scale. As we resume travel and relocation, our main priority will be 
the safety of our members and their families.
    1.  Resiliency. The household goods relocation industry has been 
impacted by the COVID-19 outbreak with many States restricting 
operations and a significant drop in the number of military moves. As 
the outbreak reduces in severity and the military resumes moves on a 
larger scale, there may be some capacity issues but USTRANSCOM's 
engagement with industry indicates that with sufficient lead time and a 
ramp up period, industry can get `back to normal' capacity levels to 
support military moves.
    2.  Peak season transition phase. Once the stop move order is 
lifted, we expect to see a short ramp up period and then will have high 
volumes for several months due to the high number of moves that have 
been delayed. USTRANSCOM is communicating with the moving industry and 
services on a weekly basis to provide a consolidated view of Department 
of Defense demand as well as inform the Service's decisions on 
prioritizing and staggering PCSs to avoid exceeding capacity. Due to 
the late start of the peak season, we expect a higher number of movers 
to be moving in the early fall as the backlog is cleared.
    3.  System accountability. We are committed to ensuring that 
servicemembers and their families receive the support they need during 
the PCS process. Through our quality assurance inspections, 
servicemember counseling, and program management, we will do everything 
we can to increase the likelihood of a positive move experience.
    4.  Driver recruitment. The trucking industry as a whole has been 
significantly disrupted due to changing demand patterns and an overall 
decrease in commercial activity. Through timely communication with our 
industry partners, we are supporting their efforts to match demand with 
capacity. We expect industry will be able to react to that demand and 
deliver near historical capacity.
                   dod communication and transparency
    37. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, military families insist that 
DOD needs to improve how it educates and communicates with the force. 
This question extends beyond communication issues between families and 
housing companies, it's also about improving the culture of DOD, 
particularly how well it communicates and informs servicemembers and 
their families. Do I have your commitment to addressing those concerns?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, you have my commitment to address these 
concerns. As indicated in my letter to the SASC and HASC on day one, 
and as a personal challenge, I added a fourth line of effort of taking 
care of Service members and their families as part of our National 
Defense Strategy. We deliver critical family readiness information that 
helps our families live their best military lives through the 
Department's flagship program for supporting our people--Military 
OneSource--and I commit to continue using this and other platforms to 
communicate and inform families.
                              afghanistan
    38. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, could you please provide an 
assessment of how you think the recent peace deal with the Taliban will 
effect operations, troop levels, and future United States policy toward 
Afghanistan?
    Secretary Esper. Since the signing of the United States-Taliban 
Agreement on February 29, 2020, the United States has proceeded with a 
plan to reduce United States forces in Afghanistan to 8,600 in 135 
days. During this time period, the Department of Defense has remained 
focused on conducting two missions in Afghanistan: training, advising, 
and assisting the Afghan security forces and executing counterterrorism 
operations against ISIS-K, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups. 
Further implementation of the agreement will occur if the Taliban 
adhere to the conditions of the agreement, which will be assessed 
continually. Consistent with the 2017 South Asia Strategy, the best way 
to end the war in Afghanistan is a political settlement between all 
Afghans. The signing of the United States-Taliban Agreement and the 
release of the United States-Afghanistan Joint Declaration were the 
first steps in this process.

    39. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, what risks do we, the United 
States, assume in entering into this agreement?
    Secretary Esper. As with all agreements, there are risks. However, 
the United States has mitigated the risks to our national security 
interests in the United States-Taliban Agreement by embedding 
conditionality in the agreement. If the United States assesses that the 
Taliban is not complying with the terms, we could nullify the 
agreement. This could result in a resumption of offensive operations 
against the Taliban and halting, or potentially reversing, the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces. We continue to urge the Taliban to choose 
the path to peace.
                        russia-turkey relations
    40. Senator Tillis. General Milley, Russia-Turkey relations is in 
contention over provocative acts by Moscow against the Turkish 
military. How does that change the calculus of capability and capacity 
in the joint environment, particularly with NATO forces?
    General Milley. We deeply regret the loss of Turkish soldiers in 
Idlib due to pro-Regime air strikes. Idlib is a unique case. For 
political reasons, Turkey does not have air superiority in Idlib--pro-
regime forces do. Additionally, this is in many ways a proxy fight 
between pro-regime forces and Turkish Supported Opposition. For these 
reasons, we cannot draw real conclusions with respect to NATO 
capability and capacity from Syria. Russia continues to act as a 
destabilizing element in Syria and remains an unreliable partner. The 
conflict in Syria has highlighted the untrustworthiness of Russia to 
the entire NATO alliance.

    41. Senator Tillis. General Milley, what does this mean for 
regional focus and strategy?
    General Milley. Russia has proved to be an unreliable partner for 
Turkey in several regions. In Syria, Russo-Turkish friction reinforces 
the need for a political resolution under the auspices of UNSCR 2254. 
In Libya, Russian involvement is prolonging the conflict and preventing 
a diplomatic resolution. For Turkey and for our other Allies and 
Partners, Moscow's provocative acts underscore the unreliability of 
Russia as a partner. As the global ally and partner of choice, the 
United States will work through the UN, with NATO, and in other 
multilateral and bilateral fora to counter Russian aggression and 
malign influence.
                  leader development/talent management
    42. Senator Tillis. General Milley, in your testimony, you 
mentioned the leadership development aspect of maintaining our military 
competitive advantage. Within your Talent Management Enterprise, how 
are you maximizing the human talent in the joint force?
    General Milley. The Joints Chiefs and I have an ambitious vision to 
create a fully aligned Professional Military Education and Talent 
Management system that identifies, develops, and utilizes strategically 
minded, critically thinking, and creative joint warfighters skilled in 
the art of war and the practical and ethical application of lethal 
military power. Our intent is to produce leaders at all levels who can 
achieve intellectual overmatch against strategic competitors and 
adversaries. In the Talent Management space, this entails rewarding 
continuous intellectual development and growth; holding individuals 
accountable for academic performance in their records; targeting those 
who have performed well academically for follow-on assignments that 
hone newly acquired skills; and by better matching the cognitive 
abilities of individuals with appropriate PME opportunities and 
positions of responsibility.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                defense policy review initiative (dpri)
    43. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, how is your combatant 
commands review of INDOPACOM--and as a subset, DPRI--taking into 
consideration the criteria of strategic presence, training 
opportunities, host-nation support, cost, and potential for growth?
    Secretary Esper. The combatant command review for U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command (USINDOPACOM) has not yet commenced. The Department shares your 
appreciation for the importance of the criteria you outline. These, 
along with other critical posture criteria, will be a part of the 
overall review process calculus, ultimately guided by the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy and optimized within political, geographical, and 
budgetary constraints, all of which will best position our military 
forces to compete, deter, and, if needed, win in this theater.

    44. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, how would you optimize DOD's 
force posture in INDOPACOM?
    Secretary Esper. The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes the 
need to make investments that will solidify our competitive advantage 
and modernize how we operate, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. 
To that end, the Department continues to adapt our current posture that 
is concentrated in Northeast Asia to a posture that is more 
geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically 
sustainable. The Department also faces key deficits in resilient and 
agile logistics. The Department will make investments to prioritize 
prepositioned forward stocks and munitions and mobility assets, and 
will seek partner and allied support, to ensure logistics sustainment 
can be maintained while under persistent multi-domain attack.

    45. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, what specific changes would 
you potentially look to make?
    Secretary Esper. The Department seeks to transition from large, 
unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient basing that 
incorporates active and passive defenses. The most critical investments 
for increasing joint force lethality and resilience in the Indo-Pacific 
theaters include: survivable and resilient communications and 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; 
survivable long-range strike platforms and munitions; and cost-
effective missile defenses capable of engaging sophisticated air, 
cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats. In particular, the 
Department will have to make significant investments to maintain and 
extend the joint force's advantages in the undersea, air, space, and 
cyber domains.
                            missile defense
    46. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what are 
the strategic and tactical risks of waiting a decade to fill the twenty 
empty ground-based interception (GBI) silos in Missile Field 4 at Fort 
Greely, Alaska, as you work to field the Next Generation Interceptor 
(NGI)?
    Secretary Esper. The United States continues to strengthen its 
homeland missile defenses and is pursuing more advanced capabilities to 
stay ahead of rogue state threats and reduce the risk of attack. Today, 
the U.S. is defended by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system 
which includes 44 Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs). To improve the 
current GMD system, the Fiscal Year 2021 budget request includes funds 
for: Improvements to existing sensors; a new discrimination radar in 
Alaska; and refurbishing the COBRA DANE radar.
    The Department of Defense (DOD) is pursuing more advanced 
capabilities to continue providing effective protection for the Nation. 
First, it is modernizing the GMD system. This effort includes the 
development of a new interceptor to meet evolving missile threats--the 
Next Generation Interceptor (NGI). The Department is planning to field 
the NGI beginning in 2028 and will continue delivering new interceptors 
into the fleet until we meet the appropriate mix of 64 interceptors. 
Second, DOD is improving reliability and extending service life of the 
existing GMD system until replaced by the NGI by conducting a Service 
Life Extension Program (SLEP) with older GBIs and by continuing 
Stockpile Reliability Program (SRP) and Service Life Extension (SLE) 
testing to inform SLEP upgrade decisions. Third, to strengthen the 
defense of the Homeland, especially between now and when NGI becomes 
operational late in the decade, DOD is examining options for a layered 
homeland missile defense architecture. For example, the Missile Defense 
Agency will conduct a flight test later this year of the SM-3 Block IIA 
against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile-class target to determine 
its potential contribution as an additional layer for the homeland 
defense architecture. Within a layered defense architecture, the SM-3 
IIA could offer additional opportunities to defeat missile threats in 
the late mid-course phase to complement the existing GBIs. With these 
efforts, the U. S. will be postured to effectively meet the evolving 
missile threats to the Homeland.
    General Milley. As outlined in the 2019 Missile Defense Review, it 
is imperative that U.S. Homeland missile defenses outpace rogue state 
missile threats. Our missile defense posture includes active and 
passive defensive capabilities, as well as offensive options, that 
together comprise a comprehensive and layered missile defense 
architecture. I believe North Korea will continue to develop its 
intercontinental ballistic missile program to hold the U.S. Homeland at 
risk. Due to the uncertainty of how that threat will advance over the 
next decade, we must optimize our investment strategy to ensure that we 
can protect the Homeland against these potential rogue threats not only 
today, but also well into the future.

    47. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the 
planned NGI gives the Department the capabilities needed to defend 
against future rogue nation threats but not until a decade away in 
2030. In addition to fielding the NGI, would you prefer to see an 
interim solution--or an earlier version of NGI--fielded years sooner in 
order to boost the limited homeland missile defense capability?
    Secretary Esper. The Missile Defense Agency has worked with U.S. 
Northern Command and other Department of Defense (DOD) stakeholders to 
define the requirements for Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) that 
enable earliest possible fielding while still providing the needed 
capability to defend against the projected threats to the Homeland in 
2030 and beyond. NGI contract incentives have been included to 
incentivize delivery of NGI in less than the 10 years referenced above. 
To strengthen the defense of the Homeland between now and when NGI 
becomes operational late in the decade, DOD is examining options for a 
layered homeland missile defense architecture. Existing defensive 
systems, to include the Aegis Weapon System using the Standard Missile-
3 Block IIA missile and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system 
could offer additional opportunities to defeat limited missile threats 
and augment the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. Without 
sacrificing critical requirements that enable a credible homeland 
defense capability, any interim solution to replace the Ground-Based 
Interceptor would be on a similar timeline to NGI.
    General Milley. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system 
currently provides effective defense of the United States against rogue 
threats. We are implementing several measures that will bolster 
protection of the Homeland to include improvements to existing sensors, 
adding a new discrimination radar in Alaska, and refurbishing the COBRA 
DANE radar. We are also investigating the feasibility of further 
augmenting our current system with additional sensors and weapons that 
could possibly provide additional engagement opportunities against 
inbound threats. A layered architecture of sensors and interceptors, 
one that potentially includes the SM3-IIA and/or a modified THAAD 
interceptor, could complement existing Ground Based Interceptor 
capability to provide additional protection of the Homeland against a 
rogue nation ICBM attack.

    48. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, would you 
prefer to see more, but slightly less-capable, interceptors sooner, or 
more, perfectly-capable interceptors much later?
    Secretary Esper. The Department has coordinated with U.S. Northern 
Command to define the minimum set of Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) 
requirements to enable earliest possible fielding of NGI while still 
providing the needed capability to defend against the projected threats 
to the Homeland. Without sacrificing critical requirements that enable 
a credible homeland defense capability, any interim solution to replace 
the Ground-Based Interceptor would be on a similar timeline to NGI.
    General Milley. As the 2019 Missile Defense Review directs, I 
prefer to maintain a capability that continues to outpace the rogue 
missile threat against the Homeland. Ultimately, we must balance cost, 
schedule, technology, and performance trade-offs when developing an 
acquisition strategy with finite resources. That strategy must be able 
to address projected challenges in both capacity and capability in 
order to stay ahead of the threat. We assess that our chosen strategy 
best balances those risks over the next decade. It also important to 
note that our long-term strategy is dependent upon improvements in our 
terrestrial and space-based sensor portfolios to maximize our 
capability to defend against emerging threats in all phases of flight.
                         strategic arctic port
    49. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, a provision in the Senate-
passed fiscal year 2020 NDAA allows the Secretary of Defense to 
designate sites for a Strategic Arctic Port. What is the status on your 
decision to designate sites for a Strategic Arctic Port?
    Secretary Esper. The Department has initiated work on the Strategic 
Arctic Port assessment. That evaluation has not yet reached a point 
where I have been presented with a recommendation.

    50. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, how are you factoring the 
emergence of greater power competition from both Russia and China in 
the Arctic into your decision?
    Secretary Esper. The Department applies the guidance contained in 
the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the 2019 Arctic Strategy when 
evaluating Arctic-related issues associated with great power 
competition.
                         arctic communications
    51. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, in testimony this week, 
General Terrance O'Shaughnessy stated, ``Over the last year, our 
commands have worked alongside the military services and the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense to ensure that our warfighting requirements 
are met, with particular emphasis on improving joint domain awareness 
and communications. In order to reclaim our strategic advantage in the 
high north, it is critical that we improve our ability to detect and 
track surface vessels and aircraft in our Arctic approaches and 
establish more reliable secure communications for our joint force 
warfighters operating in the higher latitudes.'' What exactly are the 
military services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense doing in 
this regard and what specific progress are they each making?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently completed 
a Report on Arctic Capabilities and Resource Gaps that detailed issues 
related to domain awareness and communications.
    On Domain Awareness--DOD has the ability to sense and otherwise 
detect and track contacts in the region through a number of U.S. 
military installations and platforms. These capabilities are further 
bolstered by cooperation with allies and partners. DOD is researching 
options that will support enhanced domain awareness in the Arctic. For 
example, the Air Force is working with U.S. allies, partners, and the 
private sector to examine mutually beneficial partnerships to address 
common space challenges in the Arctic.
    On Communications--DOD has the ability to execute core 
communications requirements. DOD is working with U.S. interagency 
partners to address communications challenges in the Arctic, including 
through the Department of Homeland Security's Arctic Domain Awareness 
Center. Capability requirements in these areas may change as the Arctic 
region becomes more accessible.
                             arctic threats
    52. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what do 
you see as the key threats to U.S. interests and security in the Arctic 
region?
    Secretary Esper. Both Russia and China pose threats to United 
States interests and security in the Arctic. I have provided the 
Committee an intelligence assessment with additional classified 
details.
    General Milley. DOD seeks a secure and stable Arctic region where 
U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. Homeland is defended, 
and nations work cooperatively to address challenges. We currently 
assess the risk of conflict in the Arctic as minimal. However, DOD 
recognizes that Russia and China are actively challenging the Arctic 
rules-based order. Russia views itself as a polar great power and is 
the largest Arctic nation by landmass, population, and military 
presence above the Arctic Circle. It is recognized that Russia could 
attempt to use its military capabilities to deny access to disputed 
Arctic waters or resources.
    China is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may 
undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its 
predatory economic behavior globally may be repeated in the Arctic. 
Moreover, China is increasing its presence through economic outreach, 
investments in Arctic states' strategic sectors, and scientific 
activities.
    The Arctic is a rapidly evolving security environment in which the 
Joint Force must present a credible deterrent to conflict, maintaining 
its flexibility to respond promptly and effectively to contingencies in 
the region.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                            iran deterrence
    53. Senator Hawley. General Milley, what is the process used by the 
Joint Staff in its role as global integrator for determining the number 
and composition of U.S. military forces that can be sent to United 
States Central Command (CENTCOM) in a given period of time for the 
purpose of deterring Iranian aggression without undermining INDOPACOM's 
ability to deter Chinese aggression, EUCOM's ability to deter Russian 
aggression, or both?
    General Milley. The Global Force Management Process allows me to 
provide risk informed military advice to the Secretary of Defense for 
his decisions. This process solicits risk inputs from all stakeholders, 
so as a global integrator, I can fully understand not only the short-
term risks but longer term considerations as well.
    While the need to send forces to CENTCOM to support operations 
deterring Iranian aggressions was needed--this is temporal. Our focus 
is on near-peer competitors, specifically China and Russia. Part of our 
strategy is Dynamic Force Employment, which builds readiness over time 
while enabling rapid response as required.

    54. Senator Hawley. General Milley, if Iran resumes provocations in 
the coming months, how many troops can the United States deploy to the 
CENTCOM AOR for the purpose of deterring further Iranian aggression 
without undermining INDOPACOM's ability to deter Chinese aggression, 
EUCOM's ability to deter Russian aggression, or both?
    General Milley. There are adequate forces in the Central Command 
Area of Responsibility to deter Iran. However, if deterrence breaks 
down, I will analyze the situation and recommend to the Secretary any 
necessary actions to achieve the security objectives relative to Iran. 
These decisions may or may not include additional force allocation. 
Force posture is but one of the tools the Joint Force leverages to 
compete and achieve NDS Priorities. Within the construct of the NDS, 
the Joint Staff constantly evaluates the force posture within each 
combatant command and is prepared to recommend options for the 
Secretary based on the global threat situation, Commander's request, 
and Service considerations.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
   administration anti-union memo/delegation to secretary of defense
    55. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, the Administration recently 
issued a Memorandum, blatantly anti-union, purporting to authorize you 
to exempt the entire Department of Defense, and all its constituent 
parts, from collective bargaining requirements under the Federal 
Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. You testified to the House 
last week that you neither requested this authority nor knew it was 
coming. A significant portion of DOD's civilian workforce enjoys 
protections afforded by their ability to collectively bargain. To 
clarify again, did you request this authority, or know about it before 
you saw the Memorandum?
    Secretary Esper. I did not request this authority. The Presidential 
Memorandum delegates the President's authority to exempt certain 
agencies and subdivisions based on critera set forth in the statute. I 
assure you my approach should I choose to exercise this authority, will 
be deliberative, with full application of the statutory criteria to 
ensure no employees lose their rights to collective bargaining except 
under the narrow conditions set by Congress under the Federal Service 
Labor-Management Relations Statute.

    56. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, what is your view of the 
professionalism and quality of DOD's civilian workforce?
    Secretary Esper. I have a positive view of the professionalism and 
quality of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) civilian workforce. DOD 
civilian employees are high performing, and serve as an integral part 
of our National Defense Strategy. We cannot accomplish our mission 
without them.

    57. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, do you believe that DOD's 
civilian workforce contributes to the National Defense and enhances 
national security?
    Secretary Esper. Yes. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) civilian 
workforce contributes to the National Defense and enhances national 
security. DOD civilian employees are essential for DOD's warfighting 
success, working side-by-side with our military members to protect 
America from existing and emerging threats across every operating 
domain.

    58. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, there have been numerous 
disruptions to DOD's civilian workforce over the past decade--including 
furloughs, multiple pay freezes, and hiring freezes at all levels. Do 
you believe these disruptions have helped or hurt DOD in executing its 
mission?
    Secretary Esper. While furloughs, pay freezes, and hiring freezes 
have caused disruptions to the Department of Defense (DOD) civilian 
workforce over the past decade, my experience has been that the 
Department has effectively managed the workforce to successfully 
achieve DOD mission objectives.

    59. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, do you believe removing 
collective bargaining rights from those who have them now would be a 
disruption to their employment and to the execution of DOD's mission?
    Secretary Esper. An employee whose agency or subdivision is 
excluded based on the statutory criteria set forth in the Federal 
Service Labor Management Relations Statute would no longer be covered 
by the federal labor-management relations program. However, this will 
not cause a disruption to the employee's employment or the execution of 
the DOD mission.
              tenant bill of rights for privatized housing
    60. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, last week you finally approved 
your version of a Tenant Bill of Rights for families living in 
privatized housing. Yet you chose to omit three key tenets required in 
the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA. Your accompanying statement incorrectly 
claimed that the three rights related to dispute resolution, 
maintenance history, and withholding of rent ``were not anticipated by 
DOD.''
    In fact, back in May of last year, your own department shared with 
our Committee a working draft, which included a dispute resolution 
process and the ability to withhold rent. In June of last year, you 
were aware of the right to maintenance history once the Senate bill 
became public.
    Secretary Esper, is it true that you and DOD were in fact aware of 
these tenant rights, had them in your own working drafts, and were 
certainly aware of them after the Senate bill was publicly released in 
June of last year?
    Secretary Esper. The rights set out in the Fiscal Year 2020 
National Defense Authorization Act were far more prescriptive than 
originally set out in the Senate bill or incorporated into our working 
drafts. The requirements for the three remaining rights raised concerns 
that the Department is working through in coordination with the 
Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) companies, given that 
the MHPI companies and their third party lenders must agree to 
incorporate these rights and procedures into appropriate project legal 
documents. The Department will work with Congress as necessary to 
ensure these rights are provided to MHPI tenants. The Department is 
working with the MHPI project landlords on an approach to expedite 
provision of these remaining rights.

    61. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, do you agree that even if these 
three basic housing rights are not in your Bill of Rights, that they 
are still in fact now legal protections for military families and 
rights by law as codified by the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA?
    Secretary Esper. Legislation cannot alter the terms and conditions 
of previously executed legal agreements. The Military Housing 
Privatization Initiative (MHPI) companies must agree to incorporate the 
three remaining rights into existing MHPI project legal documents and, 
for the dispute resolution and rent withholding processes, the MHPI 
projects' third party lenders must approve those changes; the three 
remaining rights do not lend themselves to unilateral action by the 
Department. The Department of Defense is working the MHPI companies 
and, as necessary, will work with Congress to ensure the benefits of 
these rights are fully available to military members and their families 
who are tenants of MHPI housing. In the short term, the Department is 
leaning forward to put in place interim procedures to provide the 
benefit of these rights to tenants while we work to finalize necessary 
changes to the project legal agreements.
                       joint operational concepts
    62. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, section 1708 of the Fiscal Year 
2020 National Defense Authorization Act included a requirement that the 
Secretary of Defense provide a report to Congress on the implementation 
of the National Defense Strategy. The report must include an 
explanation of the joint operational concepts developed by the 
Department of Defense; the required force posture changes to implement 
the NDS; any necessary adjustments to program budgets; an assessment of 
personnel and organizational changes; and the resources necessary to 
implement operational concepts.
    In addition, the law requires that the Secretary of Defense provide 
for two independent studies on the development of joint operational 
concepts. A federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) 
will perform one study, and an independent, non-governmental 501 (c)(3) 
organization will perform the other study.
    The Committee understands that the Department of Defense has not 
made progress on fulfilling this congressional mandate.
    Secretary Esper, please provide a status update on what actions the 
Department has taken to date in order to comply with the reporting 
requirement in section 1708.
    Secretary Esper. Since the release of the National Defense Strategy 
(NDS), we have been making strides in aligning our posture, resources, 
and personnel with the NDS priorities. These efforts will be shaped by 
the development of our new Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC), which will 
greatly influence future force development and design. To date, the 
Joint Staff and Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 
(OUSD(P)) have had several conversations with the House Armed Services 
Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee professional staff 
members on section 1708. During these conversations, we agreed to 
provide periodic updates on the JWC development and NDS implementation 
beginning in May 2020, and to provide the final reports in early 2021. 
OUSD(P) and the Joint Staff have identified lead components for 
answering the reporting requirements, and have identified several 
potential federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) 
and non-FFRDC think tanks to meet the independent assessment 
requirements.

    63. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, which component within the 
Department have you chosen to be the lead for meeting the reporting 
requirement in section 1708?
    Secretary Esper. We have chosen the Office of the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy, working in close coordination with the Joint Staff 
and the other Office of the Secretary of Defense components, to be the 
lead component for meeting the section 1708 reporting requirements.

    64. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, have you determined which FFRDC 
and independent, non-governmental 501 (c)(3) organization will perform 
the independent studies mandated by the law?
    Secretary Esper. We have identified several potential federally 
funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) and non-FFRDC think 
tanks to perform the independent assessments required by section 1708. 
We have not yet put any single organization on contract to perform the 
assessments while we work with the House Armed Services Committee and 
Senate Armed Services Committee to delineate more clearly the specifics 
of the assessment requirements.
                         afghanistan agreement
    65. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, how is it that the 
implementation and monitoring documents that have been signed and 
communicated widely to members of the Taliban are classified Secret?
    Secretary Esper. I defer to the State Department on questions 
pertaining to negotiations with the Taliban and the associated 
documents.

    66. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, given the 
Taliban announcement of a resumption of violence against our Afghan 
partners, what expectations have we communicated to our Afghan Security 
Force partners with regard to conducting offensive operations going 
forward?
    Secretary Esper. We have made clear to the Taliban and our Afghan 
security force partners that we will continue to defend Afghan security 
forces against Taliban attacks, and Coalition forces continue to 
support our partners through the train, advise, and assist mission. 
Afghan security leaders have directed their forces to take appropriate 
measures to prevent and defend against Taliban attacks. Consistent with 
the United States-Taliban Agreement, the United States will continue 
its pause in offensive operations against the Taliban so long as the 
Taliban adhere to their end of the deal. If the United States 
Government assesses that the Taliban is not complying with the 
agreement, the Department has the authorities and capabilities to 
resume offensive operations against the Taliban.
    General Milley. We have made clear to the Taliban and our Afghan 
security force partners that we will continue to defend Afghan security 
forces against Taliban attacks and Coalition forces continue to support 
our partners through the train, advise, and assist mission. Afghan 
security leaders have directed their forces to take appropriate 
measures to prevent and defend against Taliban attacks. Per the United 
States-Taliban agreement, the United States is pausing offensive 
operations against the Taliban so long as they adhere to their end of 
the deal. If the United States Government assesses that the Taliban are 
not complying with the agreement, the Department has the authorities 
and capabilities to resume offensive attacks against the Taliban.

    67. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what support 
are U.S. and coalition military advisors and intelligence professionals 
authorized to provide for any such offensive operations?
    Secretary Esper. Under the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission, 
United States and Coalition forces provide training, advice, and 
assistance to our Afghan security force partners, focusing on 
leadership development and institutional capacity building, including 
advising Afghan forces on planning operations and providing enabler 
support to those operations. The agreement with the Taliban has not 
affected the Department's authorities used to provide such support. The 
United States continues to defend the ANDSF against Taliban offensive 
attacks.
    General Milley. Under the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission, United 
States and Coalition forces provide training, advising, and assistance 
to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), focusing on 
leadership development and institutional capacity building, including 
advising Afghan forces on planning operations and providing enabler 
support to those operations. The agreement with the Taliban has not 
resulted in any reduction in authorities for U.S. forces conducting 
Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL. The United States continues to defend the 
ANDSF against Taliban offensive attacks.

    68. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, given the 
sizeable air support we provide Afghan Security Forces, from moving 
personnel and cargo, to ISR, to close air support, what commitments 
have we made to our Afghan partners in terms of this support going 
forward?
    Secretary Esper. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in 
any reduction in operational authorities for United States Forces--
Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to provide those kinds of combat enabler support. 
As agreed upon in the United States-Afghanistan Joint Declaration: 
``The United States re-affirms its commitments regarding support for 
the Afghan security forces and other government institutions, including 
through ongoing efforts to enhance the ability of Afghan security 
forces to deter and respond to internal and external threats, 
consistent with its commitments under existing security agreements 
between the two governments. This commitment includes support to Afghan 
security forces to prevent al Qaeda, ISIS-K, and other international 
terrorist groups or individuals from using Afghan soil to threaten the 
United States and its allies.''
    General Milley. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in 
any reduction in operational authorities for Operation FREEDOM'S 
SENTINEL to provide those kinds of combat enabler support.

    69. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, more 
specifically, when will we be able to come to their aid and when will 
we be restricted from doing so under this agreement?
    Secretary Esper. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in 
any reduction in operational authorities for USFOR-A. We have 
reiterated our commitment to the ANDSF to defend them from attacks.
    General Milley. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in 
any reduction in operational authorities for Operation FREEDOM'S 
SENTINEL. It is at the discretion of the Commander USFOR-A to determine 
when to employ forces to come to the aid and defense of the ANDSF, and 
we have reiterated our commitment to the ANDSF to defend them from 
attacks.

    70. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, what is your understanding as to 
how the 14-month withdrawal timeline was reached?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense provided advice on the 
appropriate time and conditions for a safe and orderly withdrawal that 
protect our forces, but I defer to the State Department on questions 
pertaining to the specifics of negotiations with the Taliban.

    71. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, do you 
believe that 14 months is sufficient time to assess the seriousness 
with which the Taliban will address terrorist threats emanating from 
Afghanistan?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, I do. I have provided the Committee with an 
intelligence report with additional classified information regarding 
how the Department intends to assess this issue.
    General Milley. We have assessed that 14 months is sufficient to 
assess the Taliban's compliance with the agreement. That period can be 
extended or halted as necessary depending on compliance. The United 
States will closely monitor the Taliban's compliance with its 
counterterrorism commitments under the United States--Taliban agreement 
over the next 14 months and beyond.

    72. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, do you 
believe coalition forces will be able to both conduct the rigorous 
monitoring and verification needed and also carry out a full scale 
withdrawal?
    Secretary Esper. The United States Government has developed a 
robust process for monitoring implementation of the agreement and 
verifying Taliban compliance. The agreement is not based on trust; it 
is based on whether we can verify Taliban compliance. This process 
compiles information and intelligence from United States Forces-
Afghanistan and interagency partners to support monitoring and 
verification of the agreement.
    General Milley. The United States Government has developed a robust 
process for monitoring implementation of the agreement and verifying 
Taliban compliance. The agreement is not based on trust; it is based on 
whether we can verify Taliban compliance. This process compiles 
information and intelligence from Resolute Support and across the 
interagency to support monitoring and verification of the agreement. 
The process will adjust as forces are drawn down. Monitoring and 
verification is not limited to military forces. It is a whole-of-
government effort.
               acquisition and cross-servicing agreements
    73. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, oversight efforts by the 
Committee uncovered that the Department had not properly sought 
repayment from Saudi Arabia and UAE for approximately $300 million in 
aerial refueling support provided by the United States for operations 
in Yemen. I understand UAE has fully reimbursed DOD, but Saudi Arabia 
still owes approximately $67 million.
    Given the accounting errors the Committee uncovered, we asked the 
GAO to investigate the Department's broader provision of reimbursable 
support around the world. According to a GAO report released on March 
4, the Department has failed to secure reimbursement for more than $1 
billion in support provided to other nations.
    What steps will the Department be taking to recover the more than 
$1 billion it is owed by foreign partners?
    Secretary Esper. Since ceasing aerial refueling support to the 
Saudi-led Coalition operating in Yemen in November 2018, the Department 
has worked with both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to 
recoup the costs for our support. As indicated, the United Arab 
Emirates has paid in full. Saudi Arabia's costs for aerial refueling 
support are divided into two categories: Costs for flight hours and 
fuel costs. Saudi Arabia has paid 4 installments totaling $151.2 
million for costs for flight hours in Fiscal Years 2015-2017. However, 
Saudi Arabia has not yet paid a $6.3 million charge for the flight 
hours costs for Fiscal Year 2018. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has not 
paid for any of the fuel costs during Fiscal Years 2015-2018 because we 
have not yet invoiced Saudi Arabia for any of the fuel costs for Fiscal 
Years 2015-2018. The Department is preparing invoices for the fuel 
costs for submission to Saudi Arabia.
    The Office of the Secretary of Defense continues to work with the 
Military Departments to close its open ACSA transactions by making 
final payments and seeking final reimbursement for Logistic Support, 
Supplies, and Services provided by the Military Departments to 
international partners.

    74. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, how is the Department improving 
its accounting practices to ensure such oversights don't happen again 
in the future?
    Secretary Esper. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is 
assessing options to improve the accountability of Military Department 
execution and reconciliation of ACSA transactions and will provide me 
with recommendations for implementing new accounting oversight 
procedures.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                         collective bargaining
    75. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper, in New Hampshire and across 
the country, the DOD civilian workforce proudly supports our Nation's 
military and national security interests. The Department has 
historically had a productive relationship working with the labor 
unions that represent these dedicated employees. However, a January 29 
memo signed by President Trump authorized you to waive the collective 
bargaining rights of the nearly 750,000 civilian workers in the 
Department of Defense, citing the need for increased flexibility when 
carrying out DOD's national security mission. Do you plan to exercise 
this authority to exclude Defense civilians from the right to bargain 
collectively?
    Secretary Esper. Should I choose to exercise the authority 
delegated to me by the Presidential Memorandum, I assure you my 
approach will be deliberative, with full application of the statutory 
criteria to ensure no employees lose their rights to collective 
bargaining except under the narrow conditions set by Congress under the 
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.

    76. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper, under what circumstances 
would this flexibility be necessary for national security, and do you 
believe we are experiencing these circumstances now?
    Secretary Esper. The President has statutory authority to limit the 
scope of collective bargaining based on national security if specific 
statutory criteria are met. Every President, including former President 
Barack Obama, has exercised the authority to limit these rights since 
Congress granted Federal employees the right to collectively bargain. 
If I decide to exercise this authority as granted by the Presidential 
Memorandum, I will do so following the criteria under the law and with 
the same level of rigor that has been exercised in the past.
    If and when this authority is utilized, it will be exercised as 
outlined in the statute for those agencies and subdivisions that have a 
primary function of intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, 
or national security work; and where the provisions of the statute 
cannot be applied to that organization in a manner consistent with 
national security requirements and considerations.

    77. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper, if implemented, how could 
this departure from the long-standing practices and culture at DOD 
impact our Nation's military readiness?
    Secretary Esper. The Department respects the rights of its 
employees to collectively bargain under the law and is committed to 
maintaining productive labor-management relationships with its labor 
unions, some of which have existed for nearly 100 years and predate the 
establishment of the Department of Defense. Any decision to implement 
the authority granted by the Presidential Memorandum will not be a 
departure from our long-standing practice to carefully analyze where 
collective bargaining interferes with our national security, following 
the criteria that Congress has provided for the President. In no way 
will the Department implement this authority in a manner that 
negatively impacts our Nation's military readiness.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                           covid-19 readiness
    78. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, given the rapid spread of 
the 2019 Novel Coronavirus, I am deeply concerned about actions the 
Department of Defense is taking to protect U.S. servicemembers, 
personnel, and family members stationed at military installations 
globally. I am also concerned about the threat to the global supply 
chains that support our defense industrial base. Just today, F-35 
production in Japan was halted in Japan due concerns about COVID-19. 
Last week, I sent a letter to Under Secretary Donovan to request a 
briefing on the comprehensive DOD response to COVID-19 and an 
assessment of any impact on military readiness. But I was extremely 
disappointed--and frankly, horrified--by reporting earlier this week 
that indicated you warned American military commanders overseas ``not 
to surprise President Trump on the coronavirus.'' Did you, in fact, 
direct commanders not to make any decisions related to COVID-19 that 
might surprise the White House or run afoul of President Trump's 
messaging on this rapidly spreading disease?
    Secretary Esper. My direction to military commanders is outlined in 
the Department's top three priorities for dealing with COVID-19. First, 
we must protect our forces and their families. Second, we must maintain 
mission readiness. Third, we will continue to support the interagency 
whole-of-government approach to combating the virus. I will continue to 
ensure that commanders have the resources necessary to achieve the 
priorities outlined above.

    79. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, are you concerned that 
tying the hands of commanders will compromise their ability to protect 
Americans under their command?
    Secretary Esper. We will continue to empower commanders and take 
all necessary precautions to ensure that our servicemembers are safe 
and able to maintain a high state of readiness. To that end, I signed a 
memorandum on April 1, 2020 titled, ``Guidance for Commanders on the 
Implementation of the Risk-Based Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic,'' 
which empowers leaders at all echelons to take proactive steps to 
protect local Service members, civilians, and families. This includes 
the option to implement additional Force Protection Health Condition 
measures.

    80. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, what specific actions will 
you take if President Trump--or other Administration officials--make a 
decision related to COVID-19 that you fear could jeopardize the health 
and safety of American servicemembers and military families?
    Secretary Esper. My top priority is to protect our Service members, 
civilians, and their families. Accordingly, I have published 
comprehensive Force Health Protection Guidance with eight supplements 
to date. Additionally, the Department closely follows Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidance in order to combat and 
help stop the spread of COVID-19 in the Department of Defense and in 
our local communities.

    81. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, do commanders across 
military services have all the necessary authorities to best protect 
servicemembers and military families?
    Secretary Esper. Yes. COVID-19 is a dynamic and evolving pandemic 
which requires an equally dynamic response. Between guidance under my 
signature and that of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, we've set policy guidance across the spectrum 
of personnel, travel, health, and readiness, among others. We also 
published a memorandum reiterating processes to ensure Child 
Development Programs are taking appropriate actions to ensure safety of 
children. To date, we've published 31 guidance memos and are continuing 
to update, extend or draft new guidance as required.

    82. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, does United States 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) have all necessary authorities and 
resources to continue to serve as the global integrator for DOD efforts 
and entities?
    Secretary Esper. Yes. The published guidance for the Department 
provides U.S. Northern Command with the necessary policy guidance to 
perform their role as the Department's synchronizer for our COVID-19 
response efforts.

    83. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, I have seen reports that 
the American Federation of Teachers has urged the Department of Defense 
Education Activity (DODEA) to protect 700 teachers represented by the 
unions at schools on military installations globally. What are you 
doing to implement a comprehensive protocol to protect all Americans 
working on military installations threatened by COVID-19?
    Secretary Esper. All Department of Defense Education Activity 
schools are now closed out of an abundance of caution for COVID-19. Our 
protocol while in session, and even now that they are closed, is to 
follow the guidelines from their local military commanders. On April 1, 
2020 I signed a memorandum titled, ``Guidance for Commanders on the 
Implementation of the Risk-Based Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic.'' 
It states that COVID-19 impacts are different in the many places the 
Department operates. As a result, leaders at all echelons are expected 
to take proactive steps to protect local Service members, civilians, 
and families; assure the readiness of their units consistent with 
necessary force protection measures; and provide support to the U.S. 
Government's domestic and international responses to the pandemic. I 
further directed Commanders to take local force protection measures 
suitable to the needs of their organizations, as determined by their 
assessments and reflective of the health conditions of their 
surrounding communities and direction from Centers for Disease Control 
COVID-19 public health guidance.

    84. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, will you provide a 
briefing to members of this Committee on specific actions the 
Department is taking to prepare for COVID-19--specifically how you will 
tailor protective guidance for each area of responsibility, and 
military installation?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, the DepartmeoD COVID-19 Task Force will 
prepare a brief that includes an overview of our preparations and 
actions to date, to include our support through U.S. Northern Command 
to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-led whole-of-
government response, direction, policy, and support to services / 
components / commanders / servicemembers and their families, and 
medical, logistics and engineering support to FEMA and Health and Human 
Services.

    85. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, do Military Treatment 
Facilities have all the necessary equipment--including testing kits, 
supplies, and sterile spaces--to screen, diagnose, and treat all 
potential or confirmed COVID-19 cases?
    Secretary Esper. The Department is actively monitoring and ensuring 
necessary medical equipment is delivered to the military medical 
treatment facilities (MTFs) as the need arises. While currently, there 
are no shortages for screening, diagnosing and treating COVID-19 cases 
at the MTFs, the demand continues to evolve and expand. Additionally, 
the support through U.S. Northern Command to the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA)-led whole-of-government response will further 
increase demand for medical equipment and place added stress on the 
personal protective equipment supply chain. As a result, we will 
actively and continuously monitor and re-assess medical equipment and 
supplies at the MTFs.
                military housing--tenant bill of rights
    86. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA 
included urgently needed reforms to address the military housing 
scandal--and I would like to thank Chairman Inhofe and Ranking Member 
Reed for their leadership in conducting oversight hearings and 
championing critical provisions. However, we were all extremely 
disappointed that your proposed Bill of Rights does not go nearly far 
enough to protect our military families--it failed to include tenants' 
rights codified by Congress, and signed into law by the President. This 
Bill of Rights should have included three basic items: the right to 
dispute resolution, the ability to withhold rent, and access to a 
home's maintenance history. I fail to understand why the Bill of Rights 
omitted these key provisions--arguably, some of the most important to 
protect military families. Why did you inexplicably decide to drop 
these three crucial protections for military families, after sharing a 
draft Bill of Rights with this Committee that included these key 
protections back in May 2019?
    Secretary Esper. The rights set out in the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA 
were far more prescriptive than originally set out in the Senate bill 
or incorporated into our working drafts. The requirements for the three 
remaining rights raised concerns that the Department is working through 
in coordination with the Military Housing Privatization Initiative 
(MHPI) companies, given that the MHPI companies and their third party 
lenders must agree to incorporate these rights and procedures into 
appropriate project legal documents. The Department will work with 
Congress as necessary to ensure these rights are provided to MHPI 
tenants. The Department is working with the MHPI project landlords on 
an approach to expedite provision of these remaining rights.

    87. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, what legal action will you 
take in order to require companies to comply with these protections, as 
required by law?
    Secretary Esper. I expect the Military Departments to hold the 
Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) landlords accountable 
for abiding by the terms of their MHPI legal agreements; this includes 
the legal requirements for any of the Tenant Rights covered in the 
project legal agreements or in the tenant's rental agreement lease with 
the landlord, to include state or local tenant rights specific to the 
project's geographic location. If a project fails to abide by the terms 
of the project legal agreements, the existing deal structures provide 
the mechanisms for the Military Departments to hold the private-sector 
MHPI partners accountable. However, legislation cannot alter the terms 
and conditions of previously executed legal agreements and, therefore, 
the Department of Defense cannot impose a unilateral requirement for 
the MHPI Landlords to abide by requirements set out in the Fiscal Year 
2020 NDAA. The Department is diligently working solutions with the MHPI 
Landlords to resolve challenges posed by the three remaining tenant 
rights so we can expedite implementation of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA 
requirements.

    88. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, can you confirm that--
according to the law--military families have the right to dispute 
resolution, withhold rent, and access maintenance history And that 
private housing companies must legally comply with these requirements?
    Secretary Esper. Legislation cannot alter the terms and conditions 
of previously executed legal agreements. The Military Housing 
Privatization Initiative (MHPI) companies must agree to incorporate the 
three remaining rights into existing MHPI project legal documents and, 
for the dispute resolution and rent withholding processes, the MHPI 
projects' third party lenders must approve those changes; the three 
remaining rights do not lend themselves to unilateral action by the 
Department. The Department of Defense is working the MHPI companies 
and, as necessary, will work with Congress to ensure the benefits of 
these rights are fully available to military members and their families 
who are tenants of MHPI housing. In the short term, the Department is 
leaning forward to put in place interim procedures to provide the 
benefit of these rights to tenants while we work to finalize necessary 
changes to the project legal agreements.

    89. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, across the services, how 
many allegations of fraudulent activity by private contractors have 
been referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for criminal or civil 
investigation?
    Secretary Esper. The Air Force Office of Special Investigation has 
referred one Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) company, 
Balfour Beatty Communities (BBC), to the Department of Justice for 
investigation.

    90. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, has DOJ notified you that 
it has undertaken any civil or criminal investigations in response to 
your referrals?
    Secretary Esper. No.

    91. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, have the services stopped 
paying incentive fees to any contractor suspected of fraud, or referred 
to DOJ for investigations into potential fraud?
    Secretary Esper. The Departments of the Air Force and the Navy are 
withholding Performance Incentive Fees (PIFs) from all Balfour Beatty 
Communities (BBC) projects. In addition, the Air Force is withholding 
PIFs at four Hunt Military Community project sites and two Corvias 
Military Housing project sites. Reviews by the Army are ongoing but 
have not identified Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) 
project business anomalies indicative of potential fraud such that 
would justify withholding of PIFs.

    92. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, given this betrayal of 
military families, how will you work to restore their trust and assure 
them that your Department will recommit to ensuring that they have safe 
housing that is free from health hazards?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) focus has 
been, and continues to be, on corrective actions to enhance the 
Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) program, consistent 
with our commitment to ensure housing privatization projects provide 
safe, quality, well-maintained housing for military members and their 
families, and to rebuild trust with our military families. The recently 
released Tenant Bill of Rights and Tenant Responsibilities are visible 
and important commitments in DOD's larger effort to regain resident 
trust. This is just one of many completed and ongoing improvements to 
restore the trust of military families. Other completed actions include 
ensuring housing privatization project owners increase transparency and 
reporting of maintenance and repair work orders; revising project 
performance incentive fees; enhancing oversight and leadership 
engagement with the housing privatization project owners; increasing 
government housing staff and training; and improving leadership 
communication with residents.
 reduction in security cooperation funding and the importance of allies
    93. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, in your posture statement, 
you highlight that ``The United States' competitive advantage is not 
only a result of our unrivaled warfighters and state-of-the-art weapons 
and equipment, but also our unmatched network of alliances and 
partnerships.'' I agree completely and believe that security 
cooperation and interoperability built through deliberate efforts like 
EDI and NATO are essential to fulfilling our NDS. Despite the benefits 
of partnerships like this being clear in places like EUCOM, the 
President's budget request cuts security cooperation funding across all 
the COCOMs, and specifically within EUCOM by around 40 percent. 
Additionally, funding for EDI was cut by over $1 billion in this year's 
proposal.
    Secretary Esper, are you concerned about these drastic funding cuts 
and the ability to credibly deter Russian aggression and support our 
Eastern European allies?
    Secretary Esper. The Department has a range of security cooperation 
tools to support Allies and partners in the United States European 
Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). In fiscal year 2021, 
the ``National Defense Strategy Implementation (NDS-I) Account,'' 
previously the DSCA Security Cooperation Account, was created to 
reflect the role security cooperation plays in advancing the National 
Defense Strategy (NDS) by consolidating multiple funding lines to 
provide greater flexibility in executing programs based on NDS 
objectives. This consolidation will result in greater efficiencies and 
cost savings through increased scrutiny combined with active 
prioritization of security cooperation programs. In fiscal year 2021, 
the Department plans to allocate approximately $286 million of NDS-I 
Account funds to building partner capacity efforts in the USEUCOM AOR, 
which is largely consistent with fiscal year 2020 levels and reflects 
funding for validated requirements.
    Thanks to consistent congressional funding over the last several 
years, the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has reinvigorated 
United States defense posture in Europe to deter an increasingly malign 
Russia. EDI is designed to enhance the capability and readiness of 
United States Forces, NATO Allies, and regional partners for a faster 
response to any aggression in Europe and to transnational threats by a 
regional adversary against the territory of NATO Allies. The Department 
has made significant progress in EDI's five lines of effort: presence, 
exercises and training, prepositioning, infrastructure, and building 
partnership capacity. The planned reduction in EDI funds from fiscal 
year 2019 ($6.5 billion) to fiscal year 2021 ($4.5 billion) reflects 
the substantial progress the Department has made in establishing needed 
infrastructure, building Army and Air Force prepositioned equipment 
sets, and refining exercise scheduling. The proposed fiscal year 2021 
funding levels build on our prior year investments and effectively 
deter Russian aggression in Europe and maintain our EDI-funded 
rotational force presence across the eastern flank of NATO. Our 
European Allies and partners have steadily increased their defense 
spending, providing a more effective collective deterrent to Russian 
aggression, and they have more equally distributed the burden of 
European defense among all Allies and partners.

    94. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, how should our allies in 
Europe and elsewhere interpret this reduction in security cooperation 
funding?
    Secretary Esper. Our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) remains ironclad, and our Allies in Europe 
recognize this in our continued collective efforts to strengthen the 
Alliance. Our European Allies and partners do not see any decrease in 
United States commitment to Europe and NATO. Instead, Allies see our 
continued extensive security cooperation activities with them as a 
vital component of the reestablishment of a robust United States 
presence in Europe.

    95. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, how will these proposed 
cuts to security cooperation impact the Department of Defense's ability 
to ``strengthen allies and attract new partners,'' as you discuss in 
your posture statement?
    Secretary Esper. The new National Defense Strategy-Implementation 
account provides the Department greater flexibility in prioritizing and 
executing programs in accordance with National Defense Strategy 
objectives to build partner capacity sustainably and holistically. The 
Department prioritizes these initiatives based on a strategy-driven 
process to ensure security cooperation plays a critical role in 
advancing the National Defense Strategy's emphasis on strengthening 
alliances and attracting new partners.

    96. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, how does security 
cooperation--including joint exercises, subject matter exchanges, and 
other military-to-military engagements--contribute to a strong and 
peaceful Europe?
    General Milley. Security Cooperation activities build capability, 
capacity, and interoperability with our European allies that ensure we 
can fight and win against aggression in Europe. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the regular joint exercises that we conduct throughout 
Europe. These highly visible exercises deter our adversaries while 
simultaneously assuring our most vulnerable allies. Our training with 
allies and partners builds the mutual understanding and skills needed 
for us to work together, and grows our collective defense capacity, 
increasing the deterrent effect. The training effects are reinforced 
and institutionalized by our mil-to-mil engagements. These engagements 
build ties at all levels that establish personal relationships and 
trust necessary to be successful during a crisis situation. Security 
Cooperation activities produce real deterrence effects through actual 
capabilities and assures our allies of our commitment to their 
security. This creates the foundation of peace and stability in Europe.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                            missile defense
    97. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper, we have established that North 
Korean long-range ballistic missiles are a threat to the Homeland--of 
which Hawaii is part of. In spite of 4 years of authorizations and 3 
years of appropriations from Congress, and the Department's own 2019 
Missile Defense Review, you have zeroed out the Homeland Defense Radar-
Hawaii (HDR-H) for fiscal year 2021. The HDR-H contract has been let, 
the radar is being built. Fiscal year 2020 funds are currently being 
obligated for this radar. There are no known operational impediments to 
the Missile Defense Agency continuing their process to site the HDR-H. 
They have several sites where they will conduct environmental impact 
statements as part of that process. I need a commitment from you that 
you will not put a stoppage on the fiscal year 2020 funding for the 
HDR-H or terminate that contract.
    Secretary Esper. The Department is committed to continuing work to 
the extent possible on Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) efforts 
with Fiscal Year 2020 funding. As I committed during my testimony, the 
Department's priority has been to identify a suitable site upon which 
to build the HDR-H, and phasing the program in line with construction 
at that site. To this end, in October 2019, the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA) revisited the viability of fielding the HDR on Department of 
Defense property at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on Kauai, 
Hawaii, at locations not previously explored in the HDR-H siting 
analysis due to potential operational impacts. In January 2020, MDA 
conducted additional siting studies at PMRF and is in the process of 
analyzing data collected. MDA anticipates making a site viability 
determination in third quarter fiscal year 2020, which will allow for 
the official inclusion of PMRF into the Environmental Impact Statement. 
Initial analysis indicates potential viability of at least one site on 
PMRF. MDA is continuing siting analysis, advanced planning surveys and 
environmental efforts to determine a suitable site, and to minimize 
further delay if HDR-H is funded beyond fiscal year 2020.
            united nations convention on the law of the sea
    98. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper, when you were here for your 
confirmation hearing last July, I asked you about your advocacy for 
accession to the Law of the Sea Convention in regards to emerging 
maritime disputes such as the South China Sea and in the Arctic. You 
advised that you would review the issue. Now that you've been the 
Secretary for 8 months, do you support United States accession to the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?
    Secretary Esper. The United States does not have to be a party to 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea to recognize its provisions and 
exercise the rights and freedoms under the Convention. Since President 
Reagan's 1983 Statement on Ocean's Policy, the United States has 
recognized that the navigation and overflight provisions of the 
Convention reflect customary international law. The Department's 
commitment to the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight is 
evident in our practices. The Department's operations respect 
international law in all of its operations, including Freedom of 
Navigation Operations (FONOPs), and we expect others to do the same.
        decision regarding operational control of c-17 aircraft
    99. Senator Hirono. General Milley, in the Air Force posture 
hearing on Tuesday, the Air Force Chief of Staff mentioned that the 
decision for all C-17 strategic airlift assets be assigned operational 
control to TRANSCOM instead of to the COCOMs. What was the rationale 
behind that decision?
    General Milley. C-17s are a global strategic mobility asset and 
COCOMs have agreed that CDRUSTRANSCOM is in the best position to most 
effectively control the employment of these assets in support of global 
priorities. Accordingly, TRANSCOM's Operational Control (OPCON) of C-
17s allows agile support to all COCOMs and allows them to perform their 
mission while allowing TRANSCOM to support global requirements.

    100. Senator Hirono. General Milley, why weren't affected 
Congressional offices notified?
    General Milley. It is within the Secretary of Defense's purview to 
realign the Operational Control (OPCON) of forces from one combatant 
command to another. It should also be noted that in this instance, the 
change had no impact on force structure or basing, matters which often 
do require Congressional notification.
                        military family housing
    101. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the 
Military Family Housing Tenants Bill of Rights was directed in the 
Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA. While I laud your efforts to put something in 
place, the bill of rights you signed left out three of the required 
items: the right to dispute resolution, the ability to withhold rent, 
and access to a home's maintenance history. Can you explain the 
rationale and how you intend to fix the bill of rights as directed by 
this Congress?
    Secretary Esper. The Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense 
Authorization Act set out 18 rights of Military Housing Privatization 
Initiative (MHPI) tenants, 15 of which can be implemented without 
additional guidance or with development of policies, processes, and 
procedures within the control of the Department of Defense. The three 
remaining rights have financial implications and, therefore, can only 
be implemented if the MHPI project landlords and their third party 
lenders agree to modify existing project legal agreements. The 
Department is working with the project landlords on an approach to 
expedite provision of these remaining rights. For the short term, the 
Department is leaning forward to put in place interim procedures to 
provide the maximum benefit of these rights to tenants that we can now 
while working to finalize necessary changes to the project legal 
agreements. If we encounter a challenge that requires assistance from 
Congress, we will engage with the appropriate committees quickly.
    General Milley. The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA set out 18 rights of 
Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) tenants, 15 of which 
can be implemented without additional guidance or with development of 
policies, processes, and procedures within the control of DOD. The 
three remaining rights have financial implications and, therefore, can 
only be implemented if the MHPI project landlords and their third-party 
lenders agree to modify existing project legal agreements. The 
Department is working with the project landlords on an approach to 
expedite provision of these remaining rights. For the short term, the 
Department is leaning forward to put in place interim procedures to 
provide the maximum benefit of these rights to tenants now, while 
working to finalize necessary changes to the project legal agreements. 
If we encounter a challenge that requires assistance from Congress, we 
will engage with the appropriate committees quickly.
                 the close combat lethality task force
    102. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in March 
2018, then-Secretary of Defense Mattis established the Close Combat 
Lethality Task Force (CCLTF) in an effort to make combat units more 
lethal. He had concerns about the erosion of close combat capability 
relative to threats identified in the NDS. The Task Force recently 
fielded some new cutting edge capability in regards to training and 
night vision for Special Operations Forces and Army soldiers. How will 
the CCLTF remain a priority to you and an asset to the entire force if 
they report to the Secretary of the Army vice the Secretary of Defense 
as they support the NDS?
    Secretary Esper. I am focused on implementing the National Defense 
Strategy and efforts like the Close Combat Lethality Task Force are a 
key part of ensuring our Nation's readiness now and in the future. That 
is why I have asked the Secretary of the Army to explore how this 
successful endeavor can be improved and institutionalized. Our Army 
provides the majority of the close combat forces and in order to 
prevent duplicate efforts across the Department, I decided the 
Department of the Army would be the lead in formalizing the critical 
mission of the task force.
    General Milley. As the Secretary has said, the CCLTF is not going 
away. The Secretary of the Army is drafting a plan to institutionalize 
the CCLTF for the department.
    The Secretary of the Army has established and is leading a joint 
planning team with the USMC and SOCOM to ensure the work of CCLTF 
continues to serve the close combat formations, as it always has in the 
past.
                  compact of free association renewal
    103. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in 
testimony provided to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee, DOD testified that the Department strongly supports 
extending Compact financial assistance to the Freely Associated States, 
and that failing to do so could weaken the United States' position in 
the Indo-Pacific. I share the Department's assessment, and want to work 
with DOD to ensure that Compact assistance grants are extended past 
2023. What impacts on national security does the Department foresee if 
Compact financial assistance to the Freely Associated States is not 
extended beyond 2023?
    Secretary Esper. Failure to extend the economic provisions of the 
Compact Agreements has the potential to create an opening for China and 
other malign actors to exploit vulnerable Pacific island countries by 
replacing the economic and social support the United States is 
currently providing. The Compact States provide a strategic and 
logistical highway to the Pacific. If lapsed, China could seize the 
opportunity to bifurcate our sea lines of communication in the South 
Pacific, further weakening our national security interests. Without the 
financial assistance provided to these countries through the Compacts, 
the United States could face a requirement to reduce its footprint due 
to reduced access in places like Kwajalein Atoll or Palau. These 
reductions in capabilities would reduce our interoperability with 
allies and partners and directly impact operational plans and 
strategies.
    General Milley. Extending the economic provisions of the Compacts 
of Free Association (COFA) remain a priority. Extension demonstrates 
U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region and assures the Department 
of Defense maintains access to the land, waterways, and airspace of the 
Freely Associated States. The Freely Associated States provide a 
strategic and logistical highway to the Indo-Pacific, vital in the 
event of a significant military engagement in the region. While the 
immigration, defense, and foreign affairs provisions remain as long as 
the COFAs are in force, the economic provisions are due to expire in 
2023 for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federation States 
of Micronesia and 2024 for Palau. If the economic provisions expire, 
there is an opportunity for China, and other malign actors, to exploit 
vulnerable Pacific Island Countries. China could extend financial 
support and gain influence in absence of United States assistance. This 
would allow the PRC to divide United States sea lines of communication 
in the South Pacific, weakening our national security interests. 
Failure to extend the COFAs may require the United States to reduce its 
footprint by reducing access in places like Kwajalein Atoll, the 
location of our Ronald Reagan Test Center, or the planned construction 
of the Tactical Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar (TACMOR), which 
provides a High Frequency (HF) radar system for persistent, long-range, 
detect and track capability of air and surface targets. These two 
facilities are key to our military shaping in the Pacific. 
Additionally, if lapsed, the U.S. could lose its right to exclude 
foreign militaries' access to the Freely Associated States, severely 
impacting our Nation's national security.

    104. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper, what steps has DOD taken to 
date to work with the Department of State and the Department of the 
Interior, and the FAS to renew economic assistance under the Compacts 
of Free Association?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently 
working with the National Security Council staff and interagency 
counterparts to finalize the negotiating instructions to extend the 
economic provisions of the Compacts of Free Association. DOD 
representatives from the offices of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Policy and Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) have met with 
multiple offices in the Department of State and the three U.S. 
Ambassadors to the Freely Associated States to discuss renewal of 
economic assistance.

    105. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper, has DOD and its interagency 
partners set a timeline for Compact renewal prior to the end of Compact 
economic assistance?
    Secretary Esper. The economic provisions for the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia expire in 2023. 
The economic provisions for the Republic of Palau expire in 2024. The 
National Security Council staff has a goal of completing negotiations 
as soon as possible. We recognize the important role that Congress will 
play in this process and welcome the opportunity to work with Congress 
to secure long-term U.S. strategic interests in this vital region.

    106. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper, what additional steps need to 
be taken by DOD and its interagency partners before Congress can 
consider enacting legislation that would implement the renewal of the 
Compacts?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense is involved in the 
National Security Council staff's coordinated effort on this issue, 
along with the Department of the Interior, the Office of Management and 
the Budget, and the Department of State. Next steps are to finalize 
negotiating instructions so that the U.S. lead negotiator can begin 
negotiations with the Freely Associated States before taking the final 
agreement to Congress for vote and final passage.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                        space force organization
    107. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Esper, Space Force Vice-Commander, 
Lt. Gen. David Thompson, recently indicated that the U.S. Space Force 
will propose the consolidation of current space acquisition 
organizations under one entity called Space Systems Command. General 
Goldfein agreed emphatically that the Space Rapid Capabilities Office 
should remain an independent organization during yesterday's Air Force 
posture hearing. What consequences would such a consolidation have on 
the organization's ability to adapt and innovate?
    Secretary Esper. The Department is considering all options to 
streamline the Space Force's acquisition system, but we have not 
proposed legislative changes to the Space Rapid Capabilities Office 
(SpRCO) at this time. The Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO) was 
established in statute by Congress. Consistent with current law, the 
SpRCO reports to the Commander, U.S. Space Force (formerly Air Force 
Space Command). In the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization 
Act, Congress established the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Space Acquisition and Integration who will oversee and direct the 
SpRCO, along with the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and the 
Space Development Agency (SDA). We expect this change will go far to 
improve the integration and synchronization of space programs.
                          technology transfer
    108. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Esper, I was encouraged to see the 
types of investments the Fiscal Year 2021 President's Budget proposed 
in technologies of the future like Directed Energy, hypersonics, and 
Artificial Intelligence. As you know, investments like these are only 
of use to our servicemembers in the field if we are able to transition 
them out of the laboratories. What kind of investments does the budget 
make in our Nation's test and range infrastructure to speed up the tech 
transition process?
    Secretary Esper. It is essential that our training capabilities and 
our ranges support live, virtual and constructive (LVC) training with 
these new systems. For example, in fiscal year 2021, the Department has 
requested funding for spectrum awareness tools, prototyped an advanced 
air combat training system, fielded advanced electronic warfare 
replicators, and developed an automated spectrum access management tool 
largely funded by the Spectrum Access Research and Development Program. 
Additionally, the Department plans to field a 5G capability to select 
locations providing a virtual reality capability targeting the training 
audience. Key live ranges are investing in communication networks and 
security protocols to digitally connect ranges providing a larger 
geographic footprint for hypersonic platforms and extended range 
weapons. The Department is developing a training infrastructure 
strategy to identify current training gaps with corrective actions that 
will be reflected in future budgets. fiscal year 2021's investments 
coupled with the training strategy provides the baseline to incorporate 
new technologies into training.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                              coronavirus
    109. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, in response to the 
coronavirus, you have articulated three priorities: to protect our 
forces and their families, to safeguard our mission capabilities, and 
to support the efforts across federal agencies. You have also stated 
that NORTHCOM is the global integrator for all DOD efforts to combat 
the disease. I understand that you have indicated that DOD civilian and 
military leadership, including all the service secretaries and COCOM 
commanders, have worked together to ensure the Department is ready for 
short- and long-term scenarios, as well as domestic and international 
situations. A March 3, 2020, Star and Stripes report indicates that 
``[a]ll Army recruits entering basic training will be screen for 
coronavirus, a precaution to curtail the spread of the illness[.]'' A 
March 5, 2020, CNN report indicates that ``the coronavirus is now a 
particular concern for the US Navy, Air Force and Army who have 
implemented new screening procedures as the virus spreads.'' That 
report also indicated that the ``Navy [ . . . ] began screening for the 
coronavirus in the initial processing of recruits in January'' and that 
the ``Air Force is also screening recruits when they leave processing 
centers before they enter training.'' At this time, can you confirm 
that recruits for each of the military services are being screened for 
the coronavirus, and if not, do you believe it is appropriate to 
conduct such screening?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, the Military Departments are ``screening'' 
recruits via non-test based procedures or other methods to reduce the 
potential that COVID-19 infected recruits will enter the training 
pipeline. Surveillance testing is being examined and refined as a test-
based method in conjunction with social distancing, restriction of 
movement, and other procedures to achieve this end.

    110. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, the most recent unclassified 
Worldwide Threat Assessment by the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI), published in January 2019, observed, ``The growing 
proximity of humans and animals has increased the risk of disease 
transmission. The number of outbreaks has increased in part because 
pathogens originally found in animals have spread to human 
populations.'' The DNI also assessed that ``the United States and the 
world will remain vulnerable to the next flu pandemic or large-scale 
outbreak of a contagious disease that could lead to massive rates of 
death and disability, severely affect the world economy, strain 
international resources, and increase calls on the United States for 
support.'' Have you performed an assessment of the potential adverse 
impact to the readiness of U.S. forces in the event of the coronavirus 
outbreak being declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization 
(WHO), and if not, do you plan to conduct such an assessment?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) continually 
monitors and assesses the readiness of our military forces and their 
ability to support the priorities outlined in the National Defense 
Strategy across multiple lines of effort, to include personnel, 
training, equipment, and supply. Since the coronavirus outbreak was 
declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization, DOD has focused 
on providing military manpower and equipment--both capacity and 
capability--to state and local authorities to help combat COVID-19.
    The Department's participation and leadership in the Nation's 
efforts ensure that we are apprised of the most current information and 
able to adjust to emergent requirements. I have given the Department 
three priorities for our focused response to the pandemic: protecting 
our people and their families, maintaining military readiness, and 
supporting the whole-of-government interagency response. To do this, we 
must ensure that we take prudent measures to limit COVID-19's spread, 
while also ensuring the men and women of our All-Volunteer Force are 
trained and ready to defend this Nation.

    111. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, a March 5, 2020, Stars and 
Stripes report indicates, ``[Department of Defense Education Activity-
Europe] has canceled the first two weeks of its upcoming spring sports 
season due to concerns over the spread of the coronavirus.'' I 
understand that DODEA Schools in Korea, Italy, and Bahrain have 
initiated temporary closings. According to DODEA's website, ``DODEA 
operates 163 schools in 8 Districts located in 11 countries, 7 states, 
and 2 territories across 10 time zones.'' On its coronavirus website, 
DODEA says, ``[o]ur school nurses and staff will be working with 
students to promote good hygiene and to keep everyone healthy and safe. 
We also work with our custodial providers to ensure our schools receive 
thorough cleaning every day. Parents are asked for help in reinforcing 
healthy practices at home with children.'' Consistent with your three 
priorities in response to the coronavirus, what steps are specific 
DODEA schools are taking to protect DODEA students, personnel, and 
their families from the coronavirus?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense Educational Activity 
(DODEA) is an integral part of our mission. Quality education is a key 
factor in quality of life and servicemember retention of the most 
talented members of the force. At this time, all DODEA schools are 
closed as a result of Health Protection conditions on the installations 
DODEA serves, but the mission of DODEA continues. I am proud to say 
that all schools are providing continuity of education in an online 
environment. As teachers around the world continue their work online, 
our facilities and maintenance personnel continue to maintain our 
schools and DODEA will continue to work with Commands to ensure that 
when conditions allow it, schools are ready again to be central 
learning environments for our communities.

    112. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, what criteria are DODEA using 
to make decisions regarding school closures and activity cancellations 
in response to the coronavirus?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense Educational Activity 
(DODEA) has worked closely with installation commanders and public 
health officials as well as our host nation partners to make 
coordinated decisions about activity cancellations. These decisions 
have been based on a combination of Health Protection conditions on the 
base, host nation public health guidance and restrictions, and 
information about any cases in the community.

    113. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, what steps have you taken or 
do you plan to take to ensure that disruptions do not negatively affect 
students' academic progress?
    Secretary Esper. From Daegu, South Korea, which was the first 
Department of Defense Educational Activity (DODEA) school to close on 
February 20th, to Guantanamo Bay Cuba, which closed on March 25th, all 
DODEA schools have had continuity of education plans in place focused 
on a virtual learning platform within 4 school days of initial closure. 
DODEA has signed out thousands of computers and procured and 
distributed hundreds of internet hotspots for students needing 
connectivity. Students meet at least twice weekly with their teachers, 
and teachers are hosting office hours and providing assignments to 
students. Students with disabilities continue to be served in this 
model in the most comprehensive way possible, and DODEA has taken 
special consideration to ensure families are able to remain engaged. 
``Counselor Watch'' programs are designed to engage with families whose 
students are not accessing learning materials or are otherwise 
struggling in this new structure. DODEA teachers and leaders in the 
field continue to analyze and adjust the model to ensure student needs 
are met based on feedback from the community.

    114. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, what effect, if any, has the 
coronavirus had on DOD child care centers, and what is DOD's plan to 
address situations in which such facilities must close due to concern 
about the outbreak?
    Secretary Esper. The impact of coronavirus on Department of Defense 
child care programs is very fluid. We have experienced a number of our 
facilities being closed, especially at our OCONUS locations. Most of 
our child care programs that are open are supporting mission essential 
personnel only. Installation commanders, working with local public 
health professionals and senior leadership, have the authority to make 
these decisions based on the local situation. Facilities will reopen as 
local officials feel the timing is right to do so.

    115. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, in the event that a 
deployable vaccine to the coronavirus is developed, can you guarantee 
that all DOD military, DOD civilian personnel, and their families will 
receive a vaccination for free?
    Secretary Esper. If a vaccine for COVID-19 is approved by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, the vaccination will be 
considered a preventive service and covered at no co-pay or cost-
sharing for Department of Defense (DOD) beneficiaries who use network 
providers and network pharmacies. Health coverage for civilians that 
are not eligible DOD beneficiaries is available through the Federal 
Employee Health Benefits Program, which has different governing 
statutes, regulations, policies, and contracts.

    116. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, according to a March 3, 2020, 
Politico report, the Overseas Federation of Teachers says that teachers 
at DODEA schools in Italy and Bahrain that closed due to coronavirus 
concerns have nonetheless been required to report to school to 
supervise students' online learning. I am concerned that this puts 
educators' health and safety at risk and creates significant childcare 
challenges for their families. In areas where DODEA schools are closed, 
will you commit to allowing teachers and other school personnel to 
telework in order to protect their health and safety?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense Educational Activity 
(DODEA) prioritizes the health and safety of all employees. In the 
beginning of the continuity operations model in most schools, it was 
important to provide training and for teachers to be able to work 
together in small groups to engage in new online learning platforms. At 
that time, all civilian employees were still reporting to work on 
installations.

    117. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, have DODEA officials sought 
input from unions representing DODEA teachers and school staff on 
decisions related to closures, telework, and working conditions? Please 
describe which unions DODEA has consulted, the nature of DODEA 
outreach, and the specific feedback obtained from these stakeholders.
    Secretary Esper. At the headquarters-level, all unions are being 
sent government/Department-wide COVID-19 guidance from the Department 
of Defense, Office of Personnel Management, Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, etc. for informational purposes. The Department of 
Defense Educational Activity established a headquarters labor meeting 
to better keep national level union officials informed about component-
level responses and policy development regarding operational and 
personnel decisions and to allow them to comment on actions taken and 
planned. In this regard the following unions were invited to 
participate in component-level meetings: Federal Education Association 
(FEA); Federal Education Association-Stateside Region (FEASR); Overseas 
Federation of Teachers (OFT); Antilles Consolidated Education 
Association (ACEA); American Federation of Government Employees, Local 
1770; American Federation of Government Employees-Consolidated; and 
National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE). By way of specific 
feedback: FEA and OFT have submitted questions concerning the 
application of the Authorized Departure. At the Regional level and 
District levels, the unions have been very active in working with their 
Management counterparts (Directors for Student Excellence (DSEs) and 
Superintendents) to make and sustain the transition to the digital 
teaching platform. They have provided invaluable feedback from teachers 
and helped in communicating Management decisions to teachers. FEASR met 
with the DSEs to deliver a list of issues from teachers whose 
resolutions were intended to enhance mission delivery.
                         traumatic brain injury
    118. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, based on public reporting, 
there appears to have been significant difficulties encountered by DOD 
personnel tasked with efficiently assessing servicemembers who were 
exposed to blast during the Iranian missile strike on Al Assad air base 
on January 8, 2020, for potential traumatic brain injuries. Why is the 
Department not broadly leveraging technologies that quantitatively 
measure and record blast overpressure exposures?
    Secretary Esper. The Department is leveraging technology as much as 
possible to assist in evaluating Service members who may be involved in 
potentially concussive events. We are committed to further implementing 
our Comprehensive Strategy for Warfighter Brain Health which has 
numerous components that support a better understanding of brain 
exposures, to include blast overpressure, as well as monitoring and 
mitigating such exposures. As technology has evolved, we are working 
towards a blast monitoring program that is able to interface with our 
information technology systems in a seamless and secure fashion. The 
outcome will be a blast monitoring system that utilizes accurate data 
to record personnel level exposures and guides decisions aimed to 
reduce the effects of blast exposures.

    119. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, the Committee understands 
that such technologies have been fielded successfully in the combat 
environment as early as 2011 through the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency. In your opinion, are there strategies that Congress 
and this Committee can undertake to ensure that these technologies are 
more rapidly fielded?
    Secretary Esper. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) does not need any additional authorities at this time to field 
new technologies. If, in the future, DARPA becomes in need of any new 
authorities, the Department will engage and discuss with the Congress 
and the Senate Armed Services Committee on the best way forward.

    120. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, section 734 of the Fiscal 
Year 2018 NDAA mandated blast overpressure monitoring for 
servicemembers at risk of these exposures in training and operations. 
Can you provide an update on the progress of this congressionally 
mandated initiative, including the number and types of units/personnel 
that are bring monitoring by the 734 program, the amount and type of 
data collected, and any relevant findings related to blast overpressure 
exposure rates to date?
    Secretary Esper. We have incorporated the new legislation in the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020; section 
717 and section 742 into our longitudinal medical studies of blast 
overpressure in high overpressure weapon systems, which focuses on 
documenting blast overpressure data into a Service member's record as 
well as being able to retrieve that data when being evaluated for a 
potentially concussive event. There have been 58 units representing all 
the Services, outfitted with wearable blast gauges that are part of a 
pilot research surveillance project called CONQUER (COmbat in TraiNing 
QUerable Exposure Repository). The types of units include but are not 
limited to: special operation forces, snipers, breachers, explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel and infantry and artillery units. We 
have been able to collect blast overpressure information for shoulder 
mounted weapon systems, .50-caliber weapons, indirect fire systems and 
multiple breaching charges. We are working towards being able to 
provide mitigation strategies through analysis of this data. 
Additionally we are studying the health and performance effects from 
blast overpressure. We will translate this information as quickly as 
possible into our safety and training platforms so that we can maximize 
the readiness and effectiveness of our Warfighters.
                            white supremacy
    121. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, section 530 of the Fiscal 
Year 2020 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to ``study the 
feasibility of, in background investigations and security and 
suitability screenings of individuals who seek to enlist in the Armed 
Forces--(1) screening for extremist and gang-related activity; and (2) 
using the following resources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: 
(A) The Tattoo and Graffiti Identification Program and (B) The National 
Gang Intelligence Center.'' By no later than June 17, 2020, the 
Secretary must submit an unclassified report to Congress with his 
conclusions on this study. However, there is no explicit requirement 
that DOD include white supremacy extremism in this study. Given the 
threat posed by white supremacy extremism to our military and our 
country, do you believe that the Department should include white 
supremacy extremism in its upcoming study on its process for screening 
recruits to the Armed Forces pursuant to the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA?
    Secretary Esper. White supremacy extremism is an element of 
domestic extremism and will be included in our report.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                       space command headquarters
    122. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, please set forth the new site 
selection criteria for Space Command headquarters and explain how those 
criteria differ from the previous criteria.
    Secretary Esper. The Department of the Air Force is currently 
working to finalize screening and evaluation criteria to expand the 
number of cities and installations analyzed. The Department of the Air 
Force will consult with the Defense Committees on these criteria once I 
have had the opportunity to review them.

    123. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, please explain why any 
criteria have been changed in the site selection process for Space 
Command.
    Secretary Esper. I have asked the Department of the Air Force to 
take a different approach by breaking down the selection criteria into 
its foundational components and conducting a more holistic and 
iterative selection process that considers the concurrent establishment 
of the U.S. Space Force.

    124. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, please explain the problems 
with transparency you identified in your hearing testimony which led to 
your decision to re-open the site selection process for Space Command.
    Secretary Esper. Based upon feedback I received from members of 
Congress and my review of the process, the screening criteria were 
insufficient and resulted in a limited number of eligible locations 
without the data to support the exclusion of many others. Also, the 
initial criteria had not considered the impacts caused by the 
establishment of U.S. Space Force. Therefore, I asked the Department of 
the Air Force to take a different approach.

    125. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, please explain in detail the 
new process and timeline for the Space Command headquarters site 
selection.
    Secretary Esper. We will use a revised basing process that 
leverages best practices from the Department of the Air Force strategic 
basing process and the Army's recent Futures Command stationing action. 
This will expand the number of locations under consideration for the 
U.S. Space Command, and give eligible installations and communities an 
opportunity to provide input based on approved requirements and 
evaluation criteria. The Department of the Air Force will consult with 
the Defense Committees on their schedule and revised evaluation and 
screening criteria this spring. I anticipate a final decision sometime 
next year.

    126. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, you testified that the new 
process ``would allow all members to nominate locations'' for the 
headquarters of Space Command. Is that a change to the normal process 
for basing decisions?
    Secretary Esper. This is a modification to the Department of the 
Air Force basing process. Since U.S. Space Command is a combatant 
command with unique and complex warfighting requirements, I have asked 
the Department of the Air Force to revise its process for this action 
in a way that leverages best practices from the Department of the Air 
Force strategic basing process and the Army's recent Futures Command 
stationing action.

    127. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, did the sites previously 
identified as finalists for Space Command headquarters not satisfy the 
basing criteria and if so, in what ways?
    Secretary Esper. The six original candidate locations that the 
Secretary of the Air Force approved in May of 2019 met all basing 
criteria laid out in the original basing decision.
         report regarding condition of rotc facilities at hbcus
    128. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, what is the status of the 
report required by the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA regarding the current 
condition of facilities used by units of the Senior Reserve Officers' 
Training Corps at minority-serving institutions and when can Congress 
expect the report?
    Secretary Esper. Facilities used for Reserve Officer Training Corps 
(ROTC) purposes are all fully owned and operated by the universities 
and colleges that host our programs. Facility maintenance is managed by 
the host institution, as laid out in the Memorandum of Understanding 
each school signs when an ROTC program is established, and conditions 
vary greatly depending on multiple factors. The Department is exploring 
alternative means to meet this congressional reporting requirement 
because it does not have the authority to compel historically black 
colleges and universities to provide facility reports. As soon as a 
viable information source is determined, we will coordinate the data 
collection and transmit the report.
                        air force pilot academy
    129. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, is DOD committed to continuing 
and growing the Air Force's Pilot Academy program for JROTC students?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, the Air Force remains committed in Fiscal 
Year 2021 to providing funding for 400 scholarships which include 300 
Air Force Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (+AFJROTC) cadets, 20 
Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps, 20 Civil Air Patrol, and for 
the first time, 10 U.S. Air Force Academy cadets and 50 young people 
from affinity groups. The affinity group students will compete for 
slots through a collaborative effort between AFJROTC, Air Force 
Recruiting Service and several nation-wide ``affinity'' groups such as 
Women in Aviation (WIA) and the Organization of Black Airline Pilots 
(OBAP). In addition, the Flight Academy is included in Program 
Objective Memorandum 22 to ensure long-term stability and growth of 
this highly successful program. To date, 217 out of 270 (80 percent 
success rate) have earned their Private Pilot Certificate and all have 
earned College Credit. This program specifically targets the strategic 
imperative of a diverse fighting force directly linked to the National 
Defense Strategy.
             report regarding dod child development centers
    130. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, what is the status of the 
report the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA required to be provided by March 1, 
2020, regarding child development centers and when can Congress expect 
that report?
    Secretary Esper. An interim report was provided in February of this 
year, indicating that a final, comprehensive report would be submitted 
by June 1, 2020. The final report combines nine separate child care 
reports requested by the Congressional Defense and Appropriations 
committees.



                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
 FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 
                                PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 2020

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                              NAVY POSTURE

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, 
McSally, Scott, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, 
Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
    Let me apologize to my fellow Senators. You know, I had 
just gotten back from Iraq, Erbil, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, 
Mauritania, felt fine, but I hit the ground here and I got non-
contagious bronchitis. So anyway, it is much better today than 
it was yesterday. Much better, much better.
    The Committee today will receive testimony on the posture 
of the Department of the Navy and the fiscal year 2021.
    We welcome our guests today: the Acting Secretary of the 
Navy, Tom Modly; Admiral Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations; and 
David Berger, Commandant of the Navy. Thanks for coming. Thanks 
for your long-term service. We appreciate you very much.
    With the alarming speed of modernization of both 
conventional and nuclear forces, China and Russia present a 
credible threat. I always make reference to this because when 
we put this together, this was equal Democrats and Republicans, 
people who no one could question their capabilities, and so we 
have been trying to follow this. So I will make several 
references to this, as will other members. The major thing 
there is that China and Russia have passed us in areas that we 
did not want to be passed.
    I am encouraged by some of our witnesses' public statements 
and guidance and their subordinates related to reorienting to 
great power competition.
    Thanks to President Trump's leadership, we reset defense 
spending in 2017, and we are beginning to rebuild the military 
after many years of neglect. But the hole is deep and the work 
has just begun.
    I commend our witnesses for submitting a budget that 
continues to trend the funding in the readiness accounts that 
support today's Navy and Marine Corps. However, it is clear to 
me that the Department of the Navy's proposed budget is only 
sufficient to support a fleet of about 300 ships. That is 
clearly inadequate to the 355 as we find in the manual I just 
referred to.
    Along these lines, I must also point out that the 
Department has yet to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan, which 
by law was required to be submitted to Congress with the budget 
last month. The absence of this plan makes it impossible to 
understand how the Department plans to reach its goal and the 
national policy of a 355-ship Navy. We have got to be smart and 
not hasty as we modernize our military. I urge each of you to 
take a long view. Recent history should be our guide because 
without better acquisition performance, we will fall behind or 
further behind, I should say, China and Russia.
    Senator Reed?

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
join you in welcoming Acting Secretary Modly and Admiral 
Gilday, and General Berger to the Committee this morning to 
testify on the plans and programs of the Department of the Navy 
in our review of the fiscal year 2021 authorization request. I 
particularly want to welcome each of you to your first posture 
hearing before the Committee. We are grateful for your service, 
for the service of the men and women under your command, and 
for the support of all the Navy and Marine Corps families. So 
please express to these wonderful Americans.
    As the leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps, you face 
significant challenges as you strive to balance the need to 
support ongoing operations and sustain readiness with the need 
to modernize and keep the technological edge so critical to 
military success.
    In addition, because significant levels of funding are 
being transferred to build the wall on the southern border, you 
will have fewer resources for modernization.
    The Department of the Navy faces serious readiness problems 
caused by deferred maintenance, reduced steaming and flying 
hours, and canceled training and deployments. We remember too 
well the collisions of the McCain and Fitzgerald and the loss 
of life that resulted. I will be interested in hearing about 
the progress the Navy is making in continuing to implement 
changes that will ensure such incidents will not happen again.
    All areas of our naval forces are maintaining an extremely 
high operations tempo. Demand is overwhelming for attack 
submarines, air and missile defense cruisers, destroyers, and 
strike fighter inventories. The Navy is now in its eighth year 
of operating with fewer than the legally required 11 aircraft 
carriers. The Ford is listed in the Navy inventory, but that 
carrier is more than 5 years behind schedule and will not be 
ready to deploy for many, many months. In addition, during the 
next decade, the Navy will need to buy the new Columbia-class 
ballistic missile submarines to replace the Ohio-class 
submarines. This is an extremely expensive undertaking that is 
on a very tight schedule.
    The Navy is using authorities such as multiyear procurement 
authority to conduct modernization programs more efficiently. 
Congress has approved multiyear procurement authority for both 
attack submarines and Aegis destroyers. These vessels represent 
the largest inventory shortfall compared to the goals in the 
2016 Force Structure Assessment, with the actual Navy fleet 15 
boats below the attack submarine goal and 14 destroyers below 
the goal for large surface combatants.
    The Navy just recently signed the multiyear procurement 
contract for the block 5 of the Virginia-class attack 
submarine. This contract provides for buying nine boats of the 
5-year period, fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2023. The 
contract also provides an option to buy a 10th boat if the Navy 
has the resources and the contractors improve performance on 
the program. Yet, the fiscal year 2021 budget, which had the 
best opportunity for funding the 10th boat, did not exercise 
the option. I am concerned that the window of opportunity for 
buying a 10th boat could close if funds are not provided to the 
Navy this year to allow them that opportunity. I see that the 
number one item on the CNO's [Chief of Naval Operations] 
unfunded priority list is funding for the second Virginia-class 
submarine in fiscal year 2021, and I would obviously be 
interested in your thoughts on this issue.
    Modernizing ground vehicles remains a priority for the 
Marine Corps. The amphibious combat vehicle will provide 
increased force protection and enhanced lethality to our 
marines, and it will replace the aging inventory of assault 
amphibious vehicles. The Marine Corps is also partnering with 
the Army to develop the joint light tactical vehicle, or JLTV, 
to replace the Humvee, and they have targeted investments in 
the high mobility artillery rocket system, HIMARS, in order to 
provide marines with ground-based indirect fire support. I 
would welcome an update from our witnesses on how they are 
balancing the procurement of new systems while upgrading 
existing platforms to meet current operational needs.
    In 2016, Admiral Richardson released a Force Structure 
Assessment that identified a new force structure goal. We had 
been promised a new Force Structure Assessment by the end of 
2019 that would address implementation of the National Defense 
Strategy, but that has not arrived. I also understand that the 
Department has not provided the 30-year shipbuilding plan as 
required by law. I look forward to hearing when the Department 
will deliver these important documents.
    Again, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today, 
and I look forward to their testimony.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    We have opening statements. Your entire statement will be 
made a part of the record. We will start with Admiral Gilday. 
You are recognized.

  STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Admiral Gilday. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear today with Secretary Modly and General 
Berger. We are thankful for your enduring support of the Navy 
and Marine Corps team.
    Today, three carrier strike groups and two amphibious ready 
groups, along with 30 percent of our fleet, are deployed 
forward around the globe. Our Navy and Marine Corps team needs 
no permission to operate at sea, and their power does not rest 
in any single location, but rather in our ability to maneuver 
anytime and anywhere the seas reach operating across the 
spectrum of military operations.
    Without question, our sailors remain our most important 
asset. We have taken a hard look at what they need to be 
successful, the equipment and the training that they need to 
fight and win, as well as support required to take care of them 
and their families. Over the past 8 months, we have engaged in 
a deep examination of these issues.
    Our balanced approach in our budget submission this year 
provides a Navy ready to fight today while committing to the 
training and the maintenance and the modernization to provide a 
Navy that is ready to fight tomorrow.
    Naval power is critical to implementing the National 
Defense Strategy, but naval power is not just a function of 
fleet size. It is a combination of the readiness, the 
lethality, and the capacity of that fleet. Our number one 
priority remains the Columbia-class ballistic missile 
submarine. This request also heavily invests in our readiness 
accounts such as ship and aircraft maintenance and 
modernization, in manpower, in live virtual constructive 
training, in steaming days, and in flying hours. It invests in 
new systems to make our fleet more lethal, including increasing 
our weapons inventory, filling our magazines, bolstering the 
range and the speed of those weapons, exploring directed energy 
weapons, and incorporating new technologies like hypersonics. 
This request grows our fleet in size, generating sustainable, 
capable capacity.
    Importantly, naval power is not just determined by what we 
operate and fight with, but how we operate and fight. We are 
pursuing an integrated approach with the United States Marine 
Corps in fleet operations and exercises in war games and in 
experimentation. The net result we believe is integrated 
American naval power.
    I could not ask for a better partner, a better shipmate in 
this endeavor than General Berger.
    Thank you again for your support which has allowed us to 
make significant gains in readiness and lethality already. It 
also allows us to answer our nation's call every day. On behalf 
of your Active Duty, Reserve, and civilian sailors and their 
families who serve our nation, I thank you, and I look forward 
to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, 
and General Berger follows:]

  Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Thomas B. Modly, Admiral 
             Michael M. Gilday, and General David H. Berger
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the 
Committee, thank you for your bipartisan efforts to build the strength 
and readiness of our integrated naval force. As the nation's forward-
deployed, global maneuverable team, the entire Department of the Navy 
(DON)--sailors, marines and civilians--must be ready to respond as a 
single unit wherever and whenever there is need. We must deliver the 
personnel, platforms, and operational capability necessary to secure 
vital sea lanes, stand by our allies, and protect the American people.
    Accomplishing this in today's global strategic environment demands 
planning, clear-eyed assessments, and hard choices. We must design a 
future integrated naval force structure, advance our intellectual 
capacity and ethical excellence, and accelerate the digital 
modernization of our force. That's why this budget prioritizes a 
strategy-driven, balanced approach to investment, informed by 
relentless examination of our present capabilities and realities. It 
builds on prior investments while adjusting fire where necessary to 
deliver greater efficiency and effectiveness. It sustains the 
industrial base, and maintains our competitive advantage. Overall, this 
budget will deliver a more integrated, survivable, and affordable 
future force.
    Our testimony details the combined perspectives of the DON civilian 
and military leadership. We begin with the challenges we face, followed 
by our overall strategic vision, then the specific priorities of the 
Navy and Marine Corps to meet the requirements of this vision and 
execute the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which remains the 
guidepost for all of our decisions. The Department of the Navy sustains 
progress along each of the NDS lines of effort through adequate and 
timely funding from our partners in Congress. We are proud to work in 
partnership with this Committee in defense of our nation, and look 
forward to that work continuing.
                          the global challenge
    The reemergence of long-term great power competition, the evolving 
character of that competition, and the accelerating advancements in 
technology are spurring a period of transformation in the strategic 
environment, requiring us to adapt our integrated naval force design 
and operating concepts to new realities. As the National Defense 
Strategy states, ``there can be no complacency--we must make difficult 
choices and prioritize what is most important.''
    Thus far this century, terrorist groups and rogue states have 
dominated our perception of the threat environment. These threats were 
lethal, but did not pose an existential threat to our national 
security. China and Russia present a different challenge, as each 
continues to develop sophisticated military capabilities backed by 
sizable economies. Their investments in surface, air, and undersea 
platforms have significantly increased the potential for kinetic 
conflict, while the leadership of both nations demonstrate increasing 
contempt for international law and the rules-based order that ensures 
the prosperity and security of all nations.
    China's battle fleet has grown from 262 to 335 surface ships over 
the last decade, and China's commercial shipbuilding grew over 60 
percent year over year from 2007-2017. It continues to take coercive 
actions against its neighbors and violate international law in the 
South China Sea. Russia's irresponsible aggression continues on NATO's 
eastern and northern flanks as well as the Black Sea, the Arabian Gulf, 
and the broader Indo-Pacific. China also invests heavily in submarines 
with advanced stealth capabilities and the platforms and infrastructure 
needed to dominate the emerging Arctic.
    Meanwhile, warfare has evolved to new battlefields including 
cyberspace. China and other dangerous actors like Iran brazenly target 
the command, control, and communications (C3) systems and logistics 
networks on which our integrated naval force depends. China's nefarious 
activity also includes widespread cyber theft of intellectual property 
and sensitive information targeting our entire government, our allies, 
and our industry partners throughout the acquisition and supply chain.
    As we prepare for the maturing threat of great power competition, 
we must remain on high alert for the actions of malign regimes such as 
Iran, and the continual asymmetric threat to our people, allies, and 
interests posed by non-state actors such as ISIS. In a recent example 
highlighting the impact of our integrated naval force, 5th Fleet and 
CTF-51/5 responded to crisis earlier this year by securing the United 
States Embassy in Baghdad with the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground 
Task Force--Crisis Response--Central Command (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) and 
simultaneously coordinated additional naval support in theater. We 
stand ever-prepared to respond with every part of our integrated force 
to instability, terrorist threats, and rogue states throughout the 
world.
    Our integrated naval force also has a critical role in preserving 
the infrastructure and access that powers the increasingly 
interconnected and interdependent United States and global economies. 
Our nation's continued prosperity and economic growth increasingly 
depend on open and secure access to the sea lanes. Maritime traffic has 
increased four-fold over the last two decades, with 90 percent of all 
global goods transiting shipping lanes, including new trade routes 
opening through the Arctic. Meanwhile, the undersea cables that power 
the digital economy and the global communications framework represent 
an overlooked but critical point of vulnerability for
    American interests at home and abroad. Overall, the maritime system 
is more heavily used, more stressed, and more contested than ever 
before--and it has never been more important.
    A dominant naval force is central to the effective execution of the 
National Defense Strategy in a changing world. But as we address these 
external concerns, we must also confront our business process 
challenges. These include a shrinking industrial base and vulnerable 
supply chain, inefficiencies due to legacy business operations, and 
antiquated acquisition processes which together result in increased 
costs and delays for both new development and overall maintenance. 
Despite the best efforts of this Committee, we must also continually 
prepare for the challenge posed by funding uncertainty.
    Most importantly, we must never forget that our greatest resource 
is the men and women who wear the uniform, who comprise our civilian 
workforce, and the families that serve alongside them. We are committed 
to ensuring our sailors, marines, and civilians are trained and 
equipped to execute the mission and return home safely, and that their 
families are provided with the housing, medical attention, and 
education they need.
    As detailed in the following pages, our integrated naval force has 
made significant strides in addressing the external and internal 
challenges we face. But we can never be satisfied, and will always 
press forward with a sense of urgency to deliver the people, the 
platforms, and the capabilities necessary to protect the American 
people and our interests around the world.
       meeting the challenge with an agile integrated naval force
    To meet these challenges, the NDS requires a dominant, agile, 
accountable, and globally positioned integrated naval force. We will 
plan, resource, and execute the NDS with specific focus on the 
following:
Integration
    We must transform from our present two-service model into one true 
expeditionary force in readiness, with the Navy and Marine Corps 
operating together with integrated planning, design, training, and 
execution at every echelon and in every domain. This priority has been 
emphasized in messages to the fleet and planning documents by each 
member of DON leadership and is a guiding principle for every aspect of 
our planning and resourcing.
Velocity
    Our integrated naval force must maintain the readiness and 
lethality to respond anywhere at any time. We will achieve this through 
a global operating model that ensures the continual posture, presence, 
and readiness of our personnel and platforms. We will dominate the 
fight to get to the fight, with forward basing, distributed maritime 
capability, fully integrated logistics, and continual aviation 
readiness. We also must increase the speed at which we do everything 
across the Department to match the rapid changes and unpredictability 
of the future environment.
Collaboration
    A primary line of effort in the NDS is to build and maintain a 
robust constellation of allies and partners. Our integrated naval force 
is committed to training, operating, and learning alongside our allies 
and partners in every part of the world through every day interaction 
and regular operational exercises such as Trident Juncture, Talisman 
Saber and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). Afloat and ashore, our allies 
and partners are crucial force multipliers and enablers of our global 
reach, particularly in evolving regions such as the Indo-Pacific and 
the Arctic. We must also break down organizational silos across our own 
Department and build more collaborative relationships with the other 
Military Departments and the Interagency to support whole-of-government 
approaches to security that will become more prominent in the future.
Visibility
    While cutting edge ISR, cyber, aviation, and undersea assets ensure 
our global reach and awareness, there is no substitute for sustained 
presence and engagement. Through frequent port visits, stand-in forces, 
and Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), we will continue to 
demonstrate our enduring commitment to the defense of our people and 
interests, as well as our readiness and will to stand alongside our 
allies and partners. We will also focus on increasing transparency and 
information sharing in order to facilitate more rapid, and informed 
decisions.
Innovation
    We will transform the strategic space to our advantage through next 
generation research and development, industry partnerships, and naval 
education. We are embracing the challenge of next generation technology 
and determined to dominate the design, development and effective 
deployment of major technological breakthroughs such as hypersonic 
weapons. We are making the key investments and forging the key 
partnerships to own the next ``Sputnik Moment.'' We will become more 
comfortable with trying new ways of doing business, and more forgiving 
of incremental failures made in support of change and progress.
Adaptability
    Where we cannot change the strategic environment through 
innovation, we will adapt to it quickly and efficiently through agile 
thinking and nimble platforms. This will allow us to protect our people 
and interests through unpredictable shifting security environments, and 
ensure the broadest range of options are available to the Commander in 
Chief and the Secretary of Defense. We will invest in an adaptable 
force structure, foster adaptable approaches to problems, and nurture 
the development of adaptable people comfortable with uncertainty and 
unpredictability.
Humility
    We will address our challenges with a sense of humility, taking 
full account of the deficiencies we have, but with confidence that they 
can be corrected. We will be realistic in our planning and budgeting to 
assure we do not trade growth for readiness. We will not allow 
ourselves to build a hollow force, but we will be honest with the 
Congress and the American people about what we see the areas in which 
we need their full support in order to build the integrated naval force 
that is required to maintain the nation's security.
      gray hulls: building and maintaining the right capabilities
    In order to meet the many demands of the global strategic 
environment and ensure our warriors are always prepared to dominate the 
fight, we must design a future integrated naval force structure aligned 
to the threats we face, both today and in the future. This budget 
prioritizes the readiness of those platforms and systems that will 
enable the United States to maintain and expand its competitive edge 
over all adversaries while we examine ways to grow the fleet in a 
reasonable timeframe, all while remaining responsible stewards of 
American taxpayer dollars.
Divesting from 20th Century Legacy Systems
    In keeping with the Department of Defense-wide priority to 
modernize from low-value legacy systems to fund combat-overmatch 
lethality tuned to the challenge of great power competition, this 
budget divests from multiple legacy or surge-based capabilities that do 
not align with the requirements of the NDS. It shifts capabilities from 
a counterinsurgency focus to systems that enable our personnel to 
exploit positional advantage and defend key maritime terrain for 
persistent forward sea control and denial operations. This budget also 
aligns with Secretary Esper's commitment to become more of a ``fast 
follower'' of commercial technology, and to dominate the future 
development and employment of artificial intelligence (AI) and 
hypersonics funding.
Building to a 355 Navy
    Thanks to the bipartisan efforts of this Committee, the goal of a 
355 ship Navy is now the law of the land. We will be working with the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a consensus perspective 
on this future force structure through robust analysis and wargaming 
and the inclusion of expertise from our academic institutions (Naval 
War College, Naval Postgraduate School, Marine Corps University) and 
independent naval experts. This process will be iterative and 
continuous. In order to meet the nation's national security needs and 
remain within budget constraints, we must consider how to shift costs 
away from high-end platforms to a larger number of smaller, but still 
highly capable ships. Such a shift will allow broader presence, reduced 
manning, and longer reach through a significant increase in hypersonic 
weapons, greater stealth, and advanced anti-ISR capabilities.
    We are also considering how unmanned surface and subsurface 
platforms should figure into our force mix. These platforms will not 
only allow us to distribute and conceal lethality, but to do so at a 
reduced cost and greater integration and interdependency with the Joint 
Force. While some perspectives vary on the ultimate composition of this 
future force mix, there is clear agreement that certain new classes of 
ships that currently do not exist today must be designed and built 
rapidly in the next ten years. The exact mix will be the subject of 
continuous evaluation and analysis, but it will not impede our 
immediate investment in the development and initial production of these 
new vessels.
Fielding a Ready, Relevant, Responsive Integrated Naval Expeditionary 
        Force
    A key aspect of our transformation will be a shift to greater naval 
expeditionary force capabilities and a restoration of the Fleet Marine 
Force. The potential for rapid change in the global environment, 
particularly in the Indo-Pacific, demands a rebalance from the current 
Marine Corps force land and surge based posture to a more distributed, 
rapidly deployable and fully integrated force. This budget continues 
investment in key Marine Corps development programs such as the Ground 
Based Anti-Ship Missile, Ground Based Air Defense, CH-53K helicopter, 
and F-35B Joint Strike Fighter, supporting Marine Corps efforts to 
enhance Long Range/Precision Fires, Protected Mobility/Enhanced 
Maneuver, and Air Defense.
Generating Readiness and Sustainability
    This budget optimizes Marine Corps readiness to achieve 80 percent 
serviceability of reportable expeditionary equipment, and implements 
the Commandant's Infrastructure Reset Strategy so our warriors are 
always prepared and present to defend our people, our interests, and 
our allies. It sustains the shipyards and supporting industrial base to 
maximize repair and modernization capacity and minimize turnaround and 
downtime. To provide continual presence and readiness for the fleet, 
this budget funds 58 days underway while deployed and 24 days underway 
while non-deployed per quarter, with an increase of 6.5 percent over 
last year for ship operations funding. Leveraging private sector best 
practices through the Naval Sustainment Strategy, this budget continues 
to invest in Aircraft Depot Maintenance to achieve the goal of 80 
percent mission capable rates for strike fighter aircraft. This budget 
also increases the Flying Hour program by 5.8 percent and aligns the 
funding for air operations to the mission capable rates to ensure that 
all squadrons deploy combat-ready.
Producing Next Generation Superiority
    The Columbia-class submarine program enters the first year of 
incremental procurement funding for the lead ship, and this budget 
resources the program for on-track delivery to meet the first 
deployment in 2031, with a second ballistic missile submarine starting 
in fiscal year 2024 and serial production begins in fiscal year 2026, 
furthering the recapitalization of our Strategic Nuclear Deterrent.
    Additionally, we continue to resource the development of the Fast 
Frigate, and Future Large Surface Combatant, both of which will greatly 
enhance our distributed capabilities and forward deployed lethality. 
This budget also continues advanced capabilities in the F-35B and F-35C 
Joint Strike Fighter for both the Navy and Marine Corps. We also 
maintain investment in weapons development to provide for longer range 
and hypersonic weapons, with increasing investments in areas like 
Conventional Prompt Strike and our Standard Missile family. Finally, we 
will look to Congress for support in our effort to expand training and 
testing opportunities through range expansion aboard Naval Air Station 
Fallon in order to fully develop and train with these lethal 
capabilities.
             gray zones: winning the fight before the fight
    The future battlespace extends well beyond the field of kinetic 
action. Ensuring our warriors are the best equipped and prepared in the 
world starts with accelerating our digital modernization across the 
force, streamlining our business processes and maintaining the highest 
level of efficiency. Agile and accountable naval forces are impossible 
without agile and accountable business processes that support them. 
With the support of this budget submission, the following are just a 
few of the reforms we are implementing throughout our integrated naval 
force to dominate the future fight, from the E-Ring to the front lines.
Executing the Business Operations Plan
    The President's Budget Submission will allow us to accelerate our 
business process modernization across the naval enterprise through the 
use of advanced digital tools and technologies to substantially improve 
performance, speed, accuracy, and security. The DON Business Operations 
Plan (BOP) details the steps we are taking to transform our business 
operations in alignment with the NDS, with 6, 12, 18, and 24 month 
milestones to provide DON leadership the ability to better manage and 
monitor progress on the path to a more agile and accountable business 
enterprise. The plan provides clear direction for military and civilian 
leaders throughout the DON to maximize investments and effort in 
alignment with the NDS. It also provides greater transparency and 
oversight opportunities for our partners on this Committee as well as 
the American people.
Transforming the Digital Enterprise
    Information management is a core strategic function of the DoN. 
Cyber security, data strategy and analytics, AI, and quantum computing 
have all combined to create massive opportunities--as well as 
vulnerabilities--across our entire enterprise. A critical element of 
mission readiness is the ability of our personnel to have access to 
relevant, reliable, and secure global communications and information, 
at every echelon and in every domain. In fiscal year 2019 we 
consolidated information management functions in a restructured Office 
of the Chief Information Officer (CIO), driving transformation and 
operational capability through the following lines of effort:
      Modernize DON infrastructure from its current state of 
fragmented, non-performant, outdated, and indefensible architectures to 
a unified, logical, modern infrastructure capable of delivering an 
information advantage.
      Innovate operational capabilities through technologies 
like 5th Generation (5G) wireless and AI, and accelerate software 
development through Digital Innovation Centers, leveraging private 
sector and industry best practices to fuel our digital transformation.
      Defend networks and assets through continuous active 
monitoring across the enterprise to increase cyber situational 
awareness. We will institute a security culture where a personal 
commitment to cybersecurity is required to gain access to the network. 
We will transform from a compliance-centered culture to one of constant 
readiness, and we will work with our industry partners to secure naval 
information wherever it resides.
Managing Finance and Operationalizing the Audit
    We have completed the second full scope financial audit of the 
entire DoN, revealing more opportunities to improve our financial 
management and business processes as well as many other aspects of our 
enterprise. The financial audit is the lynchpin to both monitoring and 
catalyzing improved business operations performance. Our senior 
leadership has repeatedly emphasized to all personnel that active 
participation in the audit process is not just a financial exercise, 
but a management tool that must involve the combined effort of all of 
our personnel in order to identify ways to improve our organization's 
effectiveness and accountability.
    We are on track within the next two years to achieve qualified 
financial audit opinion for the Marine Corps, with an unqualified 
opinion the following year. This will make the Marine Corps the first 
military service in the Defense Department to receive such an opinion 
in the history of the United States. Achieving this for the Navy will 
be more challenging, but we continue to see improvements year to year. 
The DON has also conducted a Zero-Based Budget review designed to 
ensure alignment of goals and resources, achieve full value for every 
taxpayer dollar, and increase transparency in our resource allocation 
process. Finally, we have implemented Performance-to-Plan reviews that 
provided a fleet-focused and data-driven approach, accelerating 
readiness.
Modernizing Naval Supply Chain and Logistics
    Our integrated naval force requires unified logistics operations 
and secure, reliable supply chains in order to maintain the 
distributed, forward maneuverable force demanded by the global 
strategic environment. Through the audit and other reform efforts, we 
have identified multiple areas where our supply chain and logistics 
processes are disjointed and divided, with areas of poor visibility and 
accountability that impact our forward inventory and readiness.
    These efforts have also revealed areas where greater integration 
between the services is needed and where our multiple supply chains 
require consolidation and optimization. We are developing a long-term 
strategy to address these deficiencies, beginning with a new modern 
vision for future integrated naval logistics and supply chain 
management, and will proceed with executing reforms consistent with 
this vision this year.
                   gray matter: developing our people
    We cannot solely define American seapower by ship counts and high-
end systems. In the end, our core strength will always reside in the 
gray matter between the ears of our people as much as it does in the 
gray hulls out in our fleet. Recruiting, retaining, educating and 
caring for the best military and civilian force possible has always 
been and will always be our greatest edge against all competitors. We 
will meet this challenge through transformative investments in 
education, greater connections with partners and allies, a competitive 
human capital strategy, a recommitment to high quality housing for our 
naval families, and a determination to eliminate the scourge of sexual 
harassment and assault throughout our total force.
Prioritizing Learning as a Strategic Advantage
    As stated in the 2018 Education for Seapower (E4S) report, the 
intellectual capability of our Navy and Marine Corps team and our 
ability to operate as a continuous learning organization will serve as 
the enduring foundation of our credible deterrent to war. In the year 
since the E4S report was completed, we have established the office of 
the Chief Learning Officer (CLO) and moved quickly to introduce 
sweeping changes in the structure, integration, and prioritization of 
naval education. These changes include:
      U.S. Naval Community College--Our highest priority is to 
create a new United States Naval Community College (USNCC) that offers 
advanced, online technical and analytic education to our enlisted force 
in critical areas like IT, cyber, and data science. Free for every 
sailor and marine, the USNCC will fill a long-neglected gap in our 
educational continuum and provide a recruiting and retention incentive 
through degree-granting relationships with major four-year public and 
private universities across the nation.
      Naval Education Strategy 2020--Our recently released 
Naval Education Strategy 2020 is the first ever comprehensive education 
strategy for our integrated naval force. The strategy will lay out a 
clear road map to develop a lifelong learning continuum for our entire 
force, reform our personnel systems to better recognize and reward the 
value of education, and invest in our schools and education programs.
      Strategic Education Requirement for Flag and General 
Officers--The opportunity to wargame future scenarios and technologies, 
study naval strategy and debate alongside peers is vital experience for 
the leaders who will guide our integrated force through the future 
strategic landscape. That is why we are now requiring in-residence 
strategic studies graduate education for promotion to Flag or General 
Officer rank.
Recruiting, Curating and Retaining the Best Talent
    This budget provides the resources to fuel a new human capital 
strategy to better access and curate best-in-class talent for our Navy, 
Marine Corps, and civilian work force. We developed this strategy 
leveraging leading private sector business practices designed for the 
new economy. Initial pilot programs in support of this strategy will 
begin this year. The Navy's Sailor 2025 initiative and comparable 
initiatives in the Marine Corps have contributed to successful 
recruiting and retention in what should be a very challenging market.
    Through a combination of non-monetary, quality of life, and 
customer service programs, we are increasing our responsiveness to the 
needs of the individual warfighter and their family, making continued 
service a viable and attractive option. We are increasing avenues for 
civilians with prior service through the Targeted Reentry Program, and 
expanding opportunities to serve in meaningful civilian capacities. We 
are also increasing opportunities for our personnel to learn, operate, 
and innovate alongside partners in the private sector, across the joint 
force, and alongside our partners and allies.
Setting Our People Up for Success
    Through USMC Global Force Management, we will continue to field an 
elite Active and Reserve Marine force, maintaining a 1:2 deployment to 
dwell ratio while working towards a necessary 1:3 ratio to preserve 
constant readiness and availability of personnel while also reserving 
time for training, refitting and family support. This budget increases 
funding and training for Marine Forces Pacific in support of the 
Commandant's Planning Guidance and the NDS. The DON has also 
implemented over 100 of the recommendations from the Readiness Reform 
and Oversight Council (RROC) in order to maximize opportunities for our 
personnel to succeed. Among many other changes, we have increased 
opportunities for shipboard certification and skills enhancement, while 
adjusting manning schedules to maximize safety and improve quality of 
life and professional effectiveness for our personnel while underway.
Standing Up for Our Military Families
    Our people must be confident that their leadership will look out 
for their interests and advocate tirelessly for their safety and well-
being. Unfortunately, as Congress correctly identified last year, we 
have not always lived up to that responsibility, particularly with 
respect to our administration and oversight of the Military Privatized 
Housing Initiative (MPHI) program. We are committed to making sure we 
assess, monitor, and remediate issues of concern quickly and 
effectively through active and engaged leadership and reinforced 
Department-level oversight to restore the trust of our residents. Over 
the past year, Navy and Marine Corps leaders reached out to all of our 
sailors, marines, and their families to inquire about on-base housing 
concerns and offered home visits to better understand those concerns. 
We are also leveraging technologies such as an app for residents to 
report issues and track their resolution and an Electronic Data 
Warehouse that allows leaders at every level the opportunity to spot 
trends and issues quickly and effectively. This budget also provides 
resources for additional personnel to advocate for resident needs. In 
total, the Navy and Marine Corps housing programs are hiring 277 more 
housing management specialists, housing inspectors, quality assurance 
specialists, and project and business managers.
Combating Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment
    We are each determined to eliminate the scourges of sexual assault 
and sexual harassment from every part of our force. These behaviors 
stand as a betrayal of those who have stepped forward to serve and of 
every person who wears the uniform, military and civilian. Our Sexual 
Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) is coordinating 
education, outreach, care and prevention efforts across the force. We 
have reached out to university presidents and other civilian education 
leaders through our first annual symposium held at the U.S. Naval 
Academy in April 2019, as well as regional discussions in New York City 
in September 2019 and in Albuquerque, New Mexico in early February 
2020. We are examining new prevention and education efforts including a 
renewed focus on junior enlisted leaders and the role of alcohol in 
sexual assault and harassment. We will continue to work with this 
Committee to pursue and share the best practices and ideas, 
relentlessly pursuing a future where no sailor, marine, or civilian 
teammate ever has to fear for their own safety while protecting us all.
Building a Robust Constellation of Partners and Allies
    As extraordinary as the people of our integrated naval force are, 
we recognize that we cannot meet the global challenge alone. The 
strategic maritime defense partnerships we maintain with our partners 
and allies around the world extend the reach and power of our force, 
but more importantly they underscore the importance of cooperation and 
coordination in maintaining the rules-based international order that 
enables so much of our global prosperity and security. Our personnel 
regularly train and operate alongside their foreign counterparts, test 
the interoperability of our systems, and build our collective 
readiness. Operational exercises, international port calls, joint 
Marine force training, aviation training and other interactions all 
build the personal contact that generates understanding and respect 
across national and functional lines. Our personnel know that through 
their service they are front-line diplomats for our nation, promoting 
through their professionalism and dedication the connections that 
strengthen our collective security and cultivate shared ideals that 
send the message that the United States is a partner worth having.
                          u.s. navy priorities
    The President's fiscal year 2021 budget request seeks nearly $160 
billion for the U.S. Navy, an investment that will continue the 
momentum built since the release of the National Defense Strategy 
(NDS). The competition articulated in the NDS will continue for the 
foreseeable future and demands purposeful action over a long time 
horizon. As a result, consistent, sustained, and predictable funding is 
critical to ensure that taxpayer investments already made in the Navy 
are fully realized. We are grateful for the predictable funding we have 
received in recent years.
    We are proud of our intensely collaborative effort to deliver 
Integrated American Naval Power to the people we are sworn to defend. 
This integration will sustain the naval forces that our nation demands 
and our Joint Force expects. This integration will also place the 
United States in the best position to compete and win against the 
pacing threats we face.
    The guiding principle of the Navy's portion of this budget request 
is to deliver decisive naval power, blending readiness, lethality, and 
capacity together to create a naval force that is agile and ready to 
fight today while also committing to the training, maintenance, and 
modernization to ensure the Navy can fight and win tomorrow. This 
budget submission materially advances the efforts that fall under these 
three objectives.
Readiness
    The CNO's initial guidance to the Navy stated, ``Mission One for 
every Sailor is a ready Navy...a Navy ready to fight today.'' The Navy 
must be able to conduct prompt and sustained combat at sea, but current 
readiness also supports the indispensable roles the Navy performs on a 
daily basis: securing American commerce, which is more heavily entwined 
with the seas than ever; telegraphing resolve; and deterring conflict. 
These roles are enduring and timeless, but they are also deeply 
connected to the priorities articulated in the NDS.
    It is important to consider the historical context for this intense 
focus on readiness. The readiness landscape today differs significantly 
from twenty years ago. In 2000, the Navy had 318 battle force ships. 
Today, we have 293 after growing from a recent minimum of 271 battle 
force ships a few years ago. However, the number of deployed ships 
across the timespan from 2000 to today remained roughly constant. 
Today, we have 68 battle force ships deployed around the world. 
Sustaining this level requires many more than that number to deploy 
each year.
    These demands for naval forces have led us to forward deploy a 
greater proportion of the force and significantly increase the length 
of rotational deployments. The extended deployment of the Abraham 
Lincoln is an example of this trend: her 294-day deployment was the 
longest for an aircraft carrier since the mid-1970s. While her 
extension was the best decision we could offer to support the demand 
for forces, it does not come without consequences. When ships, 
aircraft, and submarines are deployed longer, they require more 
maintenance to return to sea as ready as they were before. Moreover, 
our statistics show that this relationship is sometimes non-linear: 
``surge'' deployments and heavier operational use can exponentially 
increase the time and cost required to recapitalize these valuable 
assets.
    Our approach to implementing the NDS has already led us to guard 
readiness more carefully by ruthlessly prioritizing requests for 
forces. The growth of the Navy over the past several years has also 
increased the denominator in the readiness equation, relieving some 
pressure on the force.
    Yet there is much more to do, and we are committed to finding and 
closing readiness gaps. The American taxpayer and the Congress have 
generously funded ships, submarines, and aircraft, and we owe it to the 
people we are sworn to protect and defend to be good stewards of those 
investments.
    We are committed to funding readiness at the maximum executable 
level. President's Budget 2021 makes a strong commitment to current 
readiness, acknowledging the sustained effort required to mitigate the 
effects of decades of intensive use of our ships, aircraft, and 
submarines. The funding requested for individual accounts such as Ship 
Depot Maintenance and Aircraft Depot Maintenance have increased over 
fiscal year 2020 enacted levels, reflecting purposeful choices about 
what we need to be ready today.
    The Navy is already moving aggressively to ensure these funds are 
well spent. No reform is too small. Our relentless pursuit of reform 
has already paid dividends: our achievement of 80 percent mission-
capable tactical aircraft this past year is one example. Acknowledging 
the challenges in depot-level maintenance and modernization, the CNO 
has directed Navy leaders to find the key levers of productivity that 
will allow us to deliver depot-level availabilities on time and in 
full. Although there is much to do, we are encouraged by the trends we 
are beginning to see. Our public shipyard workload has led us to 
increase hiring, increasing public shipyard end strength by 16 percent 
from 2013. We are working aggressively to improve estimates of the 
length of time our platforms need to be in maintenance, level-load 
depot-level maintenance across our network of industrial partners, 
better integrate different maintenance organizations within the Navy, 
and utilize predictive analytics. In concert with continued discipline 
in guarding readiness, we believe that we can deliver our platforms in 
maintenance on time and in full. We are also grateful for the strong 
support we received from Congress in our enacted 2020 budget for a 
pilot program for private contractor shipyard maintenance in the 
Pacific, and request that this pilot continue. We value our close 
partnership with industry and recognize that predictability on our part 
will help incentivize our partners to grow, providing critical capacity 
to complement the work in our public shipyards.
    President's Budget 2021 robustly funds ship and aircraft 
operations, another essential element of readiness. As previously 
mentioned, it provides for 58 underway days per quarter per ship and 
bolsters flying hours for our aircraft. This directly contributes to 
readiness by allowing our sailors to train to complex, high-end naval 
warfare scenarios at sea and creating the maritime expertise our nation 
expects. While there is no replacement for operating at sea, the Navy 
is working rapidly to integrate Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) 
training into the mix. LVC training allows units at all stages of force 
generation to maximize training for high-end warfare, and prevents the 
degradation of key warfighting competencies when platforms are 
undergoing maintenance.
    This budget request also recognizes the truth that we cannot 
neglect our shore infrastructure in favor of future force structure or 
other priorities without an impact to readiness. This year's budget 
requests the largest amount of funds for Navy shore infrastructure in 
the past four years, allowing us to create readiness at sea through 
increased readiness ashore. Congressional support for this request will 
also help the Navy meet its obligations to sailors and their families, 
increasing the quality of public-private venture housing through 
increased oversight funded by approximately $35 million each year of 
the FYDP, addressing perfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contamination 
with $44 million requested for clean-up programs, and rebuilding Navy 
facilities in the wake of recent natural disasters.
    Readiness at sea also depends land-based training ranges, 
especially for aviators and special warfare operators. These include 
the Navy's training center in Fallon, Nevada. Expansion of this range 
is critical to maintaining our readiness today as newer weapons, 
released from distances much greater than those of just a few years 
ago, require a larger safety zone around target areas. Expanding this 
range will allow us to send our sailors into combat fully prepared, 
providing realistic training and the skills they will need to win. We 
are committed to work with federal, state, tribal, and local partners 
to do so in a way that addresses the concerns of all.
    Finally, a ready Navy depends on our true asymmetric advantage: our 
people. President's Budget 2021 increases Active Duty manning to keep 
our human capital synchronized with our force structure, raising our 
end strength by 7,300 sailors. This reduces gaps and shortfalls at sea, 
directly contributing to readiness. Manning ships, aircraft, and 
submarines at sea remains a top priority, and we will continue to 
operate effectively and sustainably over time as the battle fleet 
grows. The budget also sustains the suite of efforts under the Sailor 
2025 initiative and continues to transform our Manpower, Personnel, 
Training and Education (MPT&E) system to provide auditable, responsive 
services to our sailors and responsibly reduce costs. It funds expanded 
educational efforts to obtain warfighting advantage. Recognizing our 
ethical obligation to create a strong, positive environment for our 
sailors, as well as the positive effect such an environment has on 
recruiting and retaining talent, we are committed to eliminating 
destructive behaviors such as sexual assault. We are focused on 
creating and sustaining a Culture of Excellence, where our sailors do 
not merely avoid doing what is wrong, but actively pursue what is 
right. The Culture of Excellence program also leverages predictive 
analytics to intervene before destructive behaviors occur, breaking the 
cycle of simply responding to events.
    We are witnessing very good trends in recruiting and retention. 
This has enabled us to fill gapped billets at sea, reducing them from 
6,500 in December 2018 to 4,900 in December 2019. We met our retention 
goals for all zones in 2019, retaining 76 percent of the force. We're 
reforming our recruiting efforts, saving millions of dollars by 
processing forms for new accessions using biometric signatures. Our 
recruiters are exceeding their goals: 2019 saw the Navy sign the 
second-largest number of Active Duty contracts, 40,756 new accessions, 
in the last 15 years. In an environment with low unemployment levels, 
these statistics are encouraging and demonstrate the America's young 
people see great value in joining the Navy team.
Lethality
    Deterring our competitors from malign activity requires fielding a 
forward-deployed, lethal naval force. Our competitors are heavily 
investing in technologies aimed at our naval forces. Across the Navy's 
Total Obligation Authority (TOA), the capability investments directly 
enhancing current and future lethality comprise approximately 21 
percent of the Navy's annual budget. This investment can be further 
sub-divided into future capability (811 percent) and modernization (810 
percent).
    Relative to the entire Navy budget, the value proposition of our 
modernization investments are often overlooked when compared with 
resources applied to major ship and aircraft procurement accounts. Each 
dollar is thoughtfully applied to specific key capabilities based upon 
a rigorous analysis of iterative wargames, exercises, and 
experimentation. Offensive and defensive modernization efforts enable 
our ships and aircraft to operate in the face of today's advanced anti-
ship and anti-aircraft systems.
    In particular, we increased our investments in directed energy and 
hypersonic weapons. In terms of directed energy, we request to apply 
$170.3 million in fiscal year 2021 to our directed energy programs, 
which will rapidly advance our ship's defensive capabilities. In terms 
of hypersonics, we request to increase our investments from $642 
million in fiscal year 2020 to $1.4 billion. President's Budget 2021 
continues our focus on developing long-range, offensive fires launched 
from ships, submarines, and aircraft, including: Conventional Prompt 
Strike, the Maritime Strike Tomahawk, Joint Standoff Weapon Extended 
Range (JSOW-ER), the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and the 
Standard Missile--(SM-) 6. We are moving quickly to extend the range of 
the carrier air wing with the rapid development of the MQ-25, the 
Navy's first unmanned carrier based aircraft. MQ-25 does more than 
extending our reach; it lays the foundation for integrating unmanned 
air power into our carrier fleet. The combined effects of these 
modernization efforts extends the lethal strike range of the CVW into 
denied areas while enabling the CVN to operate outside the threat 
ranges of adversary anti-ship missile threats.
    The fiscal year 2021 budget builds on the progress made in fiscal 
year 2020 to pursue a networked fleet by investing $82 million ($395 
million across the FYDP) in artificial intelligence and machine 
learning technologies that improve decision quality and speed in 
combat. This networked fleet requires a resilient operational 
architecture to integrate our command and control, sensors, shooters, 
and weapons. To accomplish this, we will leverage our work on the Navy 
Tactical Grid to build the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) 
alongside our Joint teammates. Protecting our networked forces requires 
building cyber resilience and security into our platforms from the 
beginning. To meet this need, the Navy will fund $4.17 billion across 
the FYDP to protect our operations, equipment, and industrial base from 
intrusions and ensure we have the means to fight through and recover 
from cyber-attacks. Meanwhile, we will integrate our cyber forces more 
closely with fleet operations to deliver catastrophic cyber effects as 
part of an integrated all-domain naval force.
    These investments all support a highly maneuverable fleet that 
controls the high-end fight. Nuclear powered aircraft carriers remain 
crucial to this effort and the Carrier Strike Group remains the 
cornerstone of the Navy's forward presence, sea control, and power 
projection capabilities. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN), 
associated air wing (CVW), surface combatants, and sub-surface 
combatants represent the most survivable and lethal maritime fighting 
force in the world, providing long-range kinetic and non-kinetic 
effects from distributed mobile platforms at sea without the need for 
foreign basing rights. The CVN and embarked CVW are vital to the 
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) operating concept, providing the 
flexibility and endurance to hold large swaths of land or sea at risk 
for extended periods of time. Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) represents a 
generational leap in the aircraft carrier's capacity to project power 
on a global scale. Ford-class carriers are designed to generate a 30 
percent higher sortie rate with a 20 percent smaller crew than a 
Nimitz-class carrier. This translates to $4 billion savings over the 
life of the program generating more decisive naval power. With the 
successful completion of CVN 78's Post Shakedown Availability and 
subsequent Independent Steaming Events, finishing our work and 
delivering this capability to the fleet as quickly and effectively as 
possible is one of DON's highest priorities. The Navy has learned with 
each test and is consistently bringing each of the innovative systems 
online. Ford is currently undergoing final air compatibility testing, 
bringing the entire carrier air wing onboard and progressing towards 
her maiden deployment. We will continue to learn, iterate and improve, 
driving down cost on each subsequent ship of her class. We are grateful 
for the Committee's support of the program with the historic two-
carrier award for CVN 80 and CVN 81 and are confident that the Ford-
class will provide the foundation for highly maneuverable and lethal 
combat power projection well into the second half of this century.
    Our naval logistics enterprise undergirds the effective employment 
of our forces in a dispersed, forward-deployed manner across the 
spectrum of conflict from daily operations into sustained major combat 
operations. Our logistics forces must provide forward-deployed repair 
and resupply as well as combat medical services to revive our forces on 
station. In addition, we will begin designing two new vessels, the Next 
Generation Medium Amphibious Ship and the Next Generation Medium 
Logistics Ship that will support our expeditionary forces operating in 
contested maritime spaces.
                                capacity
    To increase America's naval power, we will continue to build more 
ships, submarines, and aircraft. There has been a long-standing 
consensus across the government that the Navy needs to grow. We are 
focused on responsible growth, a rate of growth that ensures our 
ability to effectively maintain the fleet and to properly man, train, 
and equip that fleet.
    We appreciate the strong support from Congress for naval 
shipbuilding, funding last year's request for 12 ships. We reaffirm our 
commitment to reach the 355-ship goal in a reasonable and strategically 
relevant timeline, and to augment a future 355-ship Navy with 
developmental and unmanned vessels. The pace of growth will depend on 
both our ability to find savings within our own topline. While this 
budget request slows the growth to 355 slightly to ensure we properly 
maintain the fleet we have, we are seeking ways to support increased 
rates of growth in the coming years. The challenges extend beyond the 
shipbuilding accounts, as we must also consider what increases in 
operations and maintenance accounts will be required to continue the 
momentum we have built in regaining readiness. We cannot, and will not 
build a hollow force simply to reach the 355 ship number. Because of 
the rate of change in technology, we will continue to refine the 
required number of ships in an iterative fashion, in coordination with 
the Secretary of Defense, and as informed by wargaming and 
experimentation.
    The fiscal year 2021 budget requests $21 billion in ship 
construction for 8 battle force ships and plans to build 44 battle 
force ships (plus 17 unmanned ships) over the FYDP. This procurement 
includes one Columbia and one Virginia-class submarine each, two 
Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyer, one Guided Missile Frigate, one LPD 
Flight II, and two Towing, Salvage, and Rescue ships.
    Deterring a nuclear attack on the homeland remains the Navy's most 
sacred duty and our number one acquisition priority. President's Budget 
2021 fully funds the first year of construction of the lead ship of the 
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine. Over the FYDP, we plan to 
start construction on the second ship of the class in fiscal year 2024 
and, beyond the FYDP, to begin serial production in fiscal year 2026. 
The Columbia-class guarantees the most survivable leg of the nuclear 
triad remains on patrol into the 2080s, ensuring the secure second-
strike capability that is the foundation of strategic deterrence.
    This budget request also supports one additional Virginia-class 
submarine in fiscal year 2021, continuing the Block V multiyear 
contract awarded in December 2019, which will then procure two per year 
from fiscal year 2022 through the FYDP. Additionally, the Guided 
Missile Frigate [FFG(X)] program is proceeding well, and will provide 
the fleet with a lethal small surface combatant that is optimized 
towards distributed maritime operations. The Navy plans to award the 
lead ship of the class in July 2020 and the second ship of the class in 
fiscal year 2021.
    We are committed to experimenting with unmanned systems, moving 
them beyond their current conceptual stage, and continuously assessing 
how they should be counted within the battle force. While we do not 
count unmanned ships at present, we will continue to procure our large 
unmanned surface vessel, buying 10 over the FYDP. These ships are 
envisioned to host both sensors and weapons. This procurement will 
transition to SCN funding by fiscal year 2023. We will also procure 6 
extra-large unmanned undersea vehicles in the FYDP which will help 
provide solutions for specific fleet needs.
    This budget also procures 277 fixed and rotary wing aircraft 
(including 121 F-35C) and 25 unmanned aircraft across the FYDP. We are 
completing the acquisition of several type/model/series aircraft and 
continuing to purchase essential capabilities, such as the advanced 
early warning provided by the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and a new, flexible 
logistics capability in the CMV-22 Osprey.
    We in the Navy are honored to defend American prosperity and 
American values around the world every day. We are excited to be 
working closely with the Marine Corps to deliver Integrated American 
Naval Power to perform these critical and timeless roles. We are 
conscious that every tax dollar spent to increase readiness, lethality, 
and capacity represents more than buying power, but the trust and 
confidence of the American people. We do not take that trust lightly 
and will seek every means to spend those dollars in a deliberate, 
methodical, and responsible fashion, maximizing naval power to the 
fullest extent that those funds enable. Thank you for your strong 
support and continued partnership in providing and maintaining a Navy.
                      u.s. marine corps priorities
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and distinguished members of the 
Committee, this statement is my first report to Congress and represents 
my assessment of the current state of the Marine Corps and priorities 
for the future.
    The future operating environment will place heavy demands on our 
Nation's Naval Services, demands that the Marine Corps is not currently 
organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet. Modernizing the 
Marine Corps for the era of great power competition will require 
significant adjustments to long-term Service investments, new 
integrated naval warfighting organizations and concepts of employment, 
and better training and education for marines; changes that only 
Congress can help us realize. The fiscal year 2021 budget puts the 
Marine Corps on the path toward modernization, supports irreversible 
implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and sustains and 
builds our readiness to deter, fight, and win.
    My top priority as Commandant is to build the Marine Corps that 
will define integrated American naval power in 2030, even as it must 
remain ready to confront the challenges of today. I seek no additional 
resources for this effort. It is attainable with a stable budget and 
sustained by the leadership and oversight of Congress. Service 
modernization will require several years of dedicated analysis, 
wargaming, and experimentation on a level that we have not experienced 
in recent memory. We are committed to this effort and have already 
begun charting a new course. The Marine Corps is grateful to the 
Congress for its leadership and support during previous periods of 
modernization and seeks its continued support today.
    Before addressing the issues of force design, readiness, 
resourcing, and the latest fiscal year 2021 budget submission, it is 
important that I start with a few comments on our individual marines 
and the health of the Corps. I strongly believe that everything we do 
begins and ends with the individual marine--the heart and soul of our 
institution. On any given day, the vast majority of your 225,000 
marines, representing every state and territory, serve honorably and 
perform their duties at home and abroad in an exemplary manner. I am 
extremely proud to serve alongside them, and based on my discussions 
with members of this Committee, I know that my pride in them is shared. 
Regrettably, as several high profile incidents have revealed over the 
past several years, not all within your Marine Corps consistently 
adhere to our rigid standards, satisfy my expectations for professional 
behavior, or fulfill their obligations as marines. Addressing the 
corrosive effects of misconduct and criminality by this small yet 
destructive minority is a top priority, and I offer the following 
observations:
    The presence of the malignant individuals and sub-cultures within 
the institution produces a well-known and well-documented pattern of 
misogyny. A 2018 publicized report commissioned by my predecessor 
clearly supports these observations as facts. I have begun the process 
of exposing and eliminating these malignant subcultures from our ranks 
and will seek Congress' continued assistance to that end.
    Eradicating sexual harassment and sexual assault remains a 
challenge across the military and the Marine Corps. I acknowledge what 
many of you already suspect or know--after many years of trying, and 
despite our best efforts and intentions, remedial actions taken to date 
have not caused the desired outcomes. I seek to address this problem 
head on.
    There are some within our ranks who remain hesitant to accept 
gender-integrated training at our enlisted recruit depots. I would 
remind those marines that the Corps has conducted gender integrated 
training at Officer Candidates School for more than two decades, with 
outstanding results. I have every reason to believe that we can 
replicate that model in our enlisted recruit depots, and have already 
begun moving forward expeditiously, with the continued support of 
Congress. I understand the direction and the effort the Marine Corps 
must take to comply with the specified timelines for both MCRD Parris 
Island and MCRD San Diego in the 2020 NDAA that will meet the intent of 
Congress and the needs of the Marine Corps.
    The Marine Corps is a warfighting organization. We exist for that 
one purpose; to fight and to win. All that we do is standards-based in 
order to produce a premier expeditionary warfighting force for the 
Nation. In some occupational specialties within our Corps, there are 
legitimate operationally-derived physical requirements that every 
marine must meet. marines who meet these standards, regardless of 
biological sex or gender, will face no artificial barriers to their 
service or advancement.
    Appropriately addressing all of these issues becomes even more 
paramount as we design a future Marine Corps that is optimized to meet 
the challenges of 2030 and beyond. As we consider the skills, 
education, and capabilities required of the next generation of marines, 
we must be able to recruit and sustain a force that draws from 100 
percent of our Nation's collective reservoir of talent, innovation, 
creativity, and patriotism. I take it as a personal responsibility to 
do everything within my authority to ensure that the Marine Corps does 
not create any artificial barriers to service or advancement.
    Force Design is my top priority as stated in my Commandant's 
Planning Guidance. Over the next 3 to 5 months, we will continue to 
refine and deepen the analytical depth of our initial planning through 
an iterative process of wargaming, analysis, and experimentation. That 
work will directly support the redesign of our Corps. Our collective 
Fleet Marine Forces, as well as our HQMC organization and many of its 
processes, to include the existing Planning, Programming, Budgeting, 
and Execution (PPBE) process, require a comprehensive overhaul to 
create the necessary level of naval integration across the Department. 
Naval integration with the CNO's Staff, with the fleets, and within the 
Department remains a top priority for me, the CNO, and the Secretary.
    Thanks to your continued support, your Marine Corps remains the 
Nation's most ready force. We have made forces available for deployment 
to meet combatant commander requests around the globe, often on short 
notice. Those deployed Marine Units reinforce our commitment to U.S. 
allies and partners and serve to uphold the international rules-based 
order. Wherever deployed globally, your naval expeditionary forces 
facilitate conventional deterrence, prevent fait accompli scenarios 
from developing, and successfully compete against malign maritime gray 
zone activities to assure our allies and partners of our continued 
commitment. This will not change.
    With your support, over the previous two years we have been able to 
satisfy increased global force management demands, including those made 
on our legacy fixed-wing aircraft squadrons.
    However, we should be careful not to confuse availability with 
operational suitability. Readiness must be more than a mere measure of 
availability. True readiness, which we define as the readiness of a 
unit to be employed against a peer threat to achieve decisive tactical 
and operational outcomes, requires investment in modern capabilities 
commensurate with those of the threat. This will require a significant 
shift from our most recent fiscal year 2021 budget submission. I would 
also respectfully submit that it may require a reassessment of our 
existing processes and metrics for assessing unit readiness--true 
readiness as described above. Within the Marine Corps, I am sustaining 
and reinforcing initiatives started by my predecessors that will 
increase the realism of pre-deployment training to more closely align 
with scenarios identified in the NDS. In addition, following a path 
that I readily acknowledge has been charted over the course of decades 
by the Army, we have added an extensive program of force-on-force 
training to our long-standing live-fire combined arms training exercise 
program.
    With these goals in mind, over the coming months, we will make 
significant changes to the organization of our Training and Education 
Command, which will require the support and consent of civilian 
leadership for full implementation. Additionally, it is not lost upon 
me that our desert training facilities, superbly adapted as they have 
been to preparing for the challenges of the last three decades, are 
less than ideal for the kind of integrated naval training and 
experimentation that we need to prepare for great power competition in 
contested littoral environments. Identifying and developing first class 
littoral training areas will be one of my priorities going forward, for 
which I will ask your guidance and support.
    Regarding this fiscal year 2021 budget submission, I am well aware 
that our budget requests since the release of the NDS two years ago 
have changed only marginally year-to-year. While the cumulative impact 
of those marginal changes is in some cases substantial, many were 
budgetary actions that merely shifted funding within existing programs. 
This is not the kind of substantive change now needed, nor will it 
result in the premier naval expeditionary force required to implement 
the NDS and realize our evolving naval and joint concepts. In fact, our 
major programs of record prior to the formulation and release of the 
NDS--F-35, CH-53K, MV-22, ACV, and JLTV--have actually grown. As I 
stated in my Commandant's Planning Guidance, these and other programs--
all of which were constructed to support a long-standing but now 
obsolescent conception of large-scale amphibious forcible entry--
require a critical review. I expect that review will likely recommend 
major revisions and reductions to some of our major programs. We must 
then reinvest those resources into capabilities more relevant to the 
future security and warfighting environment, many of which we are 
developing but have yet to procure.
    This necessary divestment and subsequent reinvestment process is a 
complex effort, and one that prudence dictates be conducted in the most 
thoughtful and analytically defensible manner possible. While it may be 
shocking to some for a Service Chief to openly criticize existing 
programs and priorities, our shift to the future is in no way an 
indictment of previous decisions or conclusions of those who once sat 
at this table or of any who provided oversight in the past. The simple 
fact that the strategic environment has changed significantly and that 
we are now in an era of great power competition, mandates that we must 
make the necessary adjustments to our naval warfighting concepts and 
accompanying investment plans to create true readiness--operationally 
relevant and available naval forces that create overmatch over 
anticipated adversaries. I understand there are both structural 
impediments to change as well as strong interests resisting change; 
however, as I stated during my confirmation--I will always provide my 
best military advice and ultimately defer to and support the decisions 
of the civilian leadership within the Department and Congress.
    The timing of this fiscal year 2021 budget submission coincides 
with an inflection point for the Marine Corps. Subsequent annual 
submissions will reflect that significant change in focus, and indeed I 
anticipate there will be opportunities even during the execution of the 
fiscal year 2020 budget to make in-stride adjustments with the consent 
and support of Congress. Simply put, with peer competitors striving to 
supplant the role of U.S. military forces regionally and globally, we 
cannot afford to delay modernization when we see opportunities to make 
prudent adjustments from prior plans. If we are to avoid being 
outpaced, agility in reprogramming becomes an essential tool to apply 
where it makes sense to do so.
    This budget also supports our assertion that marine forces--
operating as part of an integrated naval force--must seamlessly 
integrate into and play a complementary role within a larger joint 
force. Over the next few years, we must strive to reduce duplication of 
warfighting capabilities to only those areas that make sense tactically 
and operationally. Marine Corps contributions should largely be unique, 
complementary, and tailorable to the joint mission.
    Beyond the issues germane to my role as Commandant of the Marine 
Corps--to organize, train, and equip Marine Corps forces in support of 
the fleets and combatant commanders--I offer the following observations 
as a senior naval officer and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Today's environment of renewed great power competition demands a 
truly integrated naval force; we no longer enjoy the luxuries of 
internal Service focus and inefficiency that the ``unipolar moment'' 
allowed. The imperative now to accelerate naval integration is driven 
not by historical example nor traditional bonds between our naval 
Services--it is driven by the global environment described in the 
National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Our ability 
to operate as an integrated naval expeditionary force within contested 
areas provides the joint force with an asymmetric advantage, an edge 
that we must preserve and strengthen in this era of great power 
competition.
    We need adequate numbers of naval platforms and surface combatants 
with the lethality to contribute to sea control and sea denial and 
appropriate defensive capabilities and sensors to operate in a 
distributed manner without imposing undue burdens on other platforms. 
Those platforms must also be affordable from both a procurement and 
sustainment perspective, as well as generate the kind of availability 
needed to meet future force generation requirements. Included in that 
future fleet must be adequate numbers of traditional amphibious ships 
as well as next generation amphibious ships that will enable the Fleet 
Commanders to employ the naval expeditionary force throughout a 
contested littoral area in a more distributed, lethal, and defensible 
manner.
    While our aspirations and expectations are great, I am certain that 
Congress expects nothing less from the Marine Corps. With your 
continued leadership and support, we will achieve our shared goals and 
modernize our warfighting capabilities and culture to best support the 
Navy, the Joint Force, and the Nation.
                           closing statement
    On behalf of our entire integrated naval force and every sailor, 
marine and civilian in the Department of the Navy, the three of us 
would like to once again thank the leadership and membership of this 
Committee for your attention, interest, and ongoing support of our men 
and women in uniform. We are also grateful to the Committee for the 
recent passage of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA). By passing this legislation you have enabled many of the 
priorities identified within this document, and you've sent a strong 
signal of support to our people--and a stern warning to our 
adversaries.
    We also appreciate the funding stability and predictability of the 
past several years. This has given our force the agility and 
flexibility necessary to address emerging threats and the needs of our 
integrated naval force, while shifting away from less beneficial and 
relevant spending. This stability has saved money for the American 
taxpayer. We owe it to them to ensure that every single dollar is 
invested in the most effective manner possible to fulfill our sacred 
oath.
    We urge the Committee to do everything possible to ensure continued 
funding stability so that we may implement the needed reforms and 
spending priorities discussed in this document to meet the great power 
challenge, protect the maritime commons, and stand in defense of the 
United States of America. On behalf of the world's finest marines and 
sailors, we thank you for your time and ongoing efforts, and we look 
forward to your questions.

    Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you, Admiral.
    Secretary Modly, I probably should have started with you, 
but you are recognized now.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS B. MODLY, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

    Secretary Modly. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished members of this Committee, thank you for your 
bipartisan efforts on behalf of the sailors, marines, and 
civilians of the Department of the Navy.
    It is an honor to be here today with Admiral Gilday and 
General Berger, both of whom have demonstrated a great 
commitment to each other and to each other's respective naval 
service as they worked collaboratively over the last several 
months to lead our integrated American naval force. Consistent 
with that spirit, we have taken a different approach to the 
written testimony this year by submitting one unified document 
instead of three separate documents, which you have seen.
    Staying ahead in today's rapidly changing global strategic 
environment demands that our naval forces commit to unified 
planning, clear-eyed assessments, and sometimes some very, very 
hard choices. In this process, we must harmonize competing 
priorities, sustain our critical industrial base, and not allow 
our maritime competitive advantage to erode relative to global 
competitors and, more accurately stated, aggressive adversaries 
who wish to hasten our decline as a global force for liberty 
and for decency.
    In the end, this budget submission is a manifestation of 
the hard choices we had to make this year, but it is centrally 
about the safety, security, and wellbeing of our sailors, 
marines, and their families. Ultimately I ask that you 
recognize that in this submission, we could not make trades 
that put our sailors and marines on platforms with equipment 
that are not ready for a fight, if a fight is what is going to 
be required of them.
    While this budget slows our trajectory to a force of 355 or 
more ships, it does not arrest that trajectory. You have my 
personal assurance that we are still deeply committed to 
building that larger, more capable, more distributed naval 
force within the strategically relevant time frame of no more 
than 10 years. I look forward to working with this Committee 
and the entire Congress in the coming months as we develop some 
realistic plans to do that.
    Our budget also demonstrates a clear commitment to the 
education of our people as we implement the recommendations of 
the Education for Seapower Study that I led as the Under 
Secretary of the Navy for the last 2 years. We are establishing 
a naval community college for our enlisted personnel as part of 
a bold and unified naval education strategy that recognizes 
that the intellectual and ethical development of our people is 
critical to our success as a naval force.
    We are also stepping up our efforts to meet our solemn 
commitment to our military families through significantly more 
engaged oversight and accountability of our public-private 
venture housing program.
    Finally, I would like this Committee to understand that as 
leaders of the Department of the Navy, we are both vocal and 
united in our determination to prevent sexual assault and 
sexual harassment throughout our force. Every sailor, marine, 
and Navy civilian deserve individual respect, dignity, and 
protection from this great naval institution. We have some work 
to do in this regard, but you have my personal commitment that 
we take it very, very seriously.
    We are grateful to the Congress for passing this year's 
NDAA which enables many of the priorities identified within 
this document. In passing this legislation, you have sent a 
strong signal of support to our people and a very, very stern 
warning to our adversaries.
    We also appreciate the funding stability and the 
predictability of the last several years. This has saved money 
for the American taxpayer and given our force the agility and 
flexibility to address emerging threats while investing in our 
integrated naval force.
    We urge the Committee to do what it can to continue the 
stability so that we can implement the reforms and investments 
required to meet great power challenges, protect the maritime 
commons, and defend the United States of America.
    Thank you for your time, and we look forward to your 
questions.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    General Berger?

 GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

    General Berger. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished members of this Committee, I appreciate the 
opportunity to testify on the posture of your Marine Corps and 
our priorities for the future. I am joined by the Sergeant 
Major of the Marine Corps behind me, Sergeant Major Black, and 
my wife Donna.
    I will start by echoing Secretary Modly and Admiral 
Gilday's thanks for timely funding, as well as your enduring 
commitment to the marines, sailors, and families through 
efforts like the hurricane recovery, which you authorized, 
provided for last year, and your revisions and oversight to our 
work on the public-private venture housing program which the 
Secretary mentioned. Your bipartisan support is critical to 
ensure that we continue to prioritize people as our greatest 
resource.
    Thanks to predictable funding over the last few years, the 
Marine Corps has made significant progress restoring both 
availability and readiness. We are now at an inflexion point. 
We have to pivot now toward modernization while sustaining the 
readiness that this Committee has worked hard to authorize and 
resource. This pivot in my opinion cannot wait until next year 
or the following. We must move now or risk overmatch in the 
future by an adversary, and that is a risk we will not take.
    As the National Defense Strategy directs and Secretary 
Modly recently emphasized in his first vector to all hands, we 
have to pursue urgent change at a significant scale. Marines 
have always sensed when it is time to move out smartly. We do 
not hesitate. This is that time.
    Realizing the bold direction of our strategic guidance 
requires acknowledging that there are fundamental changes in 
the operating environment and how we must organize, train, and 
equip the force. I am confident that most leaders recognize 
that significant change is required, yet the scope and the pace 
of that change is seemingly at odds with some historical 
resource allocations and some of our major acquisition programs 
which predate the National Defense Strategy.
    This budget submission marks the beginning of a focused 
effort to better align resources that you provide with 
strategic objectives. Our future budget submissions will build 
on those investments with informed recommendations for force 
design, modifications, and adjustments to our programs of 
record. Together in partnership with my battle buddy, Admiral 
Gilday, and under the direction of Secretary Modly, we are 
committed to delivering the integrated naval fleet marine 
forces your nation requires.
    As always, I welcome the opportunity to discuss our 
findings along the way, and we will keep each of you and your 
staffs informed as we progress. As always, we will be frugal 
with the resources we are given. We will ask for no more than 
we need. With Congress' commitment and support, we will ensure 
that your marines continue to have every advantage when we send 
them into harm's way.
    I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General.
    I was going to start off talking about the fact that we do 
not have the 30-year shipbuilding plan. I am sure somebody will 
do that. There are two things that I wanted to get to, though, 
and one obviously is--it would not be unexpected--the USS 
Gerald Ford. I think most of us around this table here have 
been down there, have walked it, understand it, but we are also 
fully aware that that ship--the original plan to deliver the 
ship was September of 2015. The ship was going to be delivered 
fully capable at the cost of $10.5 billion. Now the projected 
full delivery of the ship would be April of 2021, the cost 
being at $13.2 billion.
    Secretary Modly, today is your lucky day. You get to make 
the next prediction. I would like to have you kind of share 
with us where you think it is right now. It is my understanding 
that a lot of the things--it is not just the elevators--we talk 
about those--but also the catapults, arresting gear, the radar, 
and I understand now that the non-skid situation is taken care 
of from visiting with you in my office. But kind of go over 
where we are today, what your predictions are, and when this is 
going to happen.
    Secretary Modly. Senator, I appreciate the opportunity to 
talk about the Ford. I think the history that you laid out 
about the Ford is not a good history, and it is one that we 
should never allow to happen again. It is not the way that we 
should be delivering ships to the U.S. Navy.
    That being said, we are where we are with that ship. One of 
the first things I did as the Acting Secretary was to basically 
put the fleet on notice that it is all hands on deck to make 
that ship ready for sea and ready for a fight, if that is what 
we needed to do.
    So, we have taken several proactive steps over the last 
several months to get that ship ready. A lot of this work was 
going on already, but one of the main things we did is we moved 
the two-star admiral who is responsible for the PEO for all 
carriers. We moved him to Norfolk to basically be there. It is 
symbolic but it is more than symbolic. It requires a lot of 
attention to detail on many of the things that were lacking on 
the ship.
    I have been down there twice since I have been the Acting 
Secretary, once as a surprise on my second day just to see what 
it is like, and I did not want any admirals there with me. I 
walked around, talked to the crew, got a good sense for where 
the ship was. I also rode the ship in after their last short 
deployment where they went out and did aircraft compatibility 
testing.
    It has been night and day for me in terms of my perspective 
and my perception of what is happening with that ship. They 
have made substantial progress on the elevators. The elevators 
that are working and certified--I think there are four of 
those. They have done thousands and thousands of cycles with 
those with no problems. They launched close to a thousand 
aircraft and recovered them with no problems on the EMALS 
[electromagnetic aircraft launch system] either--so significant 
progress.
    The most encouraging thing to me walking around that ship 
is talking to the crew. The crew loves the ship. The way the 
crew and how their jobs have changed, several of them coming 
from the Nimitz-class carrier to this carrier--it has 
completely changed the way they do their work.
    Chairman Inhofe. I understand that, and I also talked to 
the crew. Those are their feelings exactly.
    I wanted to get one more thing in in my time here. In a 
recent interview, you stated, quote, I do not know if we are 
going to buy any of the Ford-class after the CVN 81, which 
would be the fourth one. We are certainly thinking about the 
possibility of other classes. Can you elaborate on that 
statement?
    Secretary Modly. Yes, sir. I think we have a duty to look 
at what will come after the Ford. The fact that we made a two-
carrier buy for the last two, it gives us some breathing room. 
It gives us a few years before we would have to award the next 
one, which would be in the 2027-2028 time frame.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. That answers the question.
    General Berger, on the CH-53K, which would be replacing the 
CH-53E, we are familiar with the cost of this thing and some of 
the overruns. I would kind of like to get an update in this 
brief period of time from you as to where we are, why it is 
really necessary, and just give us your opinion on that.
    General Berger. Thank you, sir.
    The requirement for a heavy lift helicopter remains valid, 
in fact probably more valid in the adversaries, the competitors 
that we need to face and where you want your forward marines. 
You have to have the ability to move that force around and its 
sustainment from ship to shore or shore to shore or back to 
ship again. We have a valid requirement.
    A year ago, the 53-K was in a different spot. We had both 
technical, as you know, engineering problems and cost problems. 
Today we are in a much better place engineering-wise, 
technologically. It looks like the 53-E on the outside, but 
like you know, you pop the hood, it is a completely different 
aircraft. Everything from the exhaust, gas recirculation, to 
the other 100-plus engineering challenges, we have either 
solved or Sikorsky has a solid path forward. So I am very 
confident that the aircraft is on the right trajectory. Now it 
is function of cost, as you pointed out, sir, both procurement 
and the cost to operate----
    Chairman Inhofe. Why does it cost more than an F-35?
    General Berger. Pardon me, sir?
    Chairman Inhofe. Never mind. No, I was making a comment 
that it costs more than an F-35. When you are talking to the 
general public, they do not know much about your--they know 
about the F-35. Go ahead. So why does it cost more than an F-
35?
    General Berger. It is a brand-new fly-by-wire aircraft.
    Chairman Inhofe. Very good. Thank you.
    Senator Reed?
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As I indicated in my opening comments, the Navy is 
critically short of attack submarines, 15 below the goal 
established previously and accepted by the Navy, and 14 
destroyers below that objective.
    Admiral Gilday, is there any chance that this demand will 
lessen over time or increase?
    Admiral Gilday. Senator, given the pace of the Chinese 
right now, I do not think that that threat is going to subside.
    I also think, particularly in the undersea, we have an 
advantage, a significant advantage, and so we want to maintain 
that overmatch. We do not want to take our foot off the pedal.
    Senator Reed. No. I appreciate that.
    I think also to, with respect to Russia, their 
sophistication undersea is another challenge. It is not just 
simply numbers. It is also more sophisticated vessels. Is that 
correct?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, much more sophisticated. As you 
know, the capabilities that we are putting into the Virginia-
class, the block 4's and the block 5's, are significant. They 
are a significant leap forward for the United States. Our 
intention is to continue to press with that technology and 
improve it.
    Senator Reed. Now, on the block 5 buy, there was a 9-ship 
commitment, plus an optional ship. One of the concerns I have 
is the window for this option will close very quickly and that 
this might be the best year to exercise the option. Can you 
comment on that? Because I see pressure not only in the 
construction of the additional block 5 vessels but from all we 
have talked about here before, the aircraft carriers, 
everything else, destroyers. This might be the best year. Is 
that right?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I believe so.
    In terms of the workforce, I was just up in Groton at 
Electric Boat a week or so ago, and I left that shipyard 
confident about the capability of that yard to produce boats at 
the rate of two a year. They are planning for the significant 
increase of the work when the Columbia build begins in earnest. 
But that is a passionate, well-trained workforce up there, and 
I think that they can handle two boats a year based on what I 
have seen.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
    Mr. Secretary and Admiral Gilday, the chairman alluded to 
this issue, but we are still awaiting these two significant 
reports, the Force Structure Assessment and also the 
shipbuilding plan. Based on Secretary Esper's testimony 
yesterday, I believe it is at his desk literally. We are 
waiting for that, and when will we get it?
    Secretary Modly. Yes, sir. I am very anxious to get over 
here and talk that through with the Committee. Secretary Esper 
wanted a little more time to digest it. It is informed by the 
2021 budget but also by the integrated Force Structure 
Assessment that Admiral Gilday and General Berger put together, 
and I think he just wanted more time to understand it. We will 
bring it over here as soon as he feels that he is ready to do 
that.
    Senator Reed. I think the Committee encouraged him to take 
adequate time but not a lot of time. So we hope that will be 
the case.
    General Berger, you have programs with the Army with 
respect to the JLTV, the joint light tactical vehicle. The Army 
is making some changes in the program. Are you adjusting to 
them, or how are you adjusting to them I should ask.
    General Berger. Senator, I am aware of the adjustments that 
they are making. We have not made any changes yet to our 
procurement, and if we did, it would be based on the Marine 
Corps' needs. But we are absolutely tracking the changes, the 
adjustments that they are making. So far, sir, I have seen it 
down in North Carolina where my son is. It is a phenomenal 
vehicle.
    Senator Reed. I have had the chance to look at it at the 
facility, and it is much more significantly--well, it is a good 
vehicle. I will stop right there.
    Secretary Modly, the Committee in the last few years has 
created the National Sea-based Deterrence Fund because we 
understand the industrial base is significant, and there are 
problems with the industrial base for every type of platform. 
We think that by going into the industrial base through the 
prime contractors not only can we increase quality, protect 
from cyber intrusion, but also generate savings from doing the 
work right the first time.
    Can you just briefly comment? I do not have much time.
    Secretary Modly. Senator, I agree. We have had some 
vulnerabilities in the supply chain across the entire Navy. It 
is a vulnerability that our adversaries have figured out, that 
is easy for them to get in, and they can piece information 
together, and they get a bigger picture even when a supplier 
may think that small piece of information is not relevant. So 
we are investing heavily in this. We are developing new 
strategies for how we do this, how perhaps we develop 
capabilities to perhaps create cloud areas for them that are 
secure. But it is a big concern of ours and we are addressing 
it.
    Senator Reed. In addition to that, it is a simple fact that 
quality construction at the sub prevents rework at the prime.
    Secretary Modly. Absolutely.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Wicker?
    Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
    I appreciate the service of all three of you. I know you 
have had to deal with a budget number that you did not arrive 
at yourselves, and I appreciate you doing that difficult task. 
We hope we can use our power of the purse here in this 
Committee and in the Congress to help you out on that.
    I think Ranking Member Reed expressed, with regard to the 
30-year shipbuilding plan, the sentiment of most people on this 
Committee that the Secretary should take enough time but not 
too much time. So I want to subscribe my views to what he said 
about that.
    Admiral Gilday, with regard to the submarines, let me make 
sure. You said that the threat will not diminish. Actually the 
threat is increasing, and you nodded. But that is correct. 
Right?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I agree.
    Senator Wicker. That is not only with regard to the 
specific question, Admiral, that Senator Reed asked about 
submarines, but it is actually across the entire fleet. Is that 
correct?
    Admiral Gilday. I would agree with that as well, sir.
    Senator Wicker. All right. Thank you very, very much.
    I appreciate the fact that the NDAA tasked the Navy last 
year to review alternative acquisition strategies. The Navy 
came back with a report that said significant savings could be 
achieved by procuring various combinations of amphibious ships.
    So let me ask you, Secretary Modly, and General Berger 
about these findings, particularly as they are related to the 
three LPDs and the LHA-9. Can you speak to the timeline for 
awarding the funding of these ships and what are the benefits 
of procuring these four ships together? Let me just get all my 
questions out there, and we will see what we can do in less 
than 3 minutes.
    What are the specific capabilities and what is the specific 
importance, General Berger, of the amphibious ships that I 
mentioned?
    General Berger. Sir, the amphibious ships capabilities-wise 
in the past, pretty conventional view of what they did in terms 
of the Navy, the force projecting the marines ashore. The way 
that we are going to need to operate in the future, even more 
challenging, and the role of the amphibious ship I think goes 
up. Why? Because in order to operate a force inside a contested 
area, at the unclass level, inside there, you have got to have 
the mobility and you need the ability to sustain that force for 
a long period of time in austere conditions and move that force 
around. Amphibious ships--people have spoke of them as sort of 
the Swiss Army knife. They are because you can move a force 
from the air, on the water. You got multiple means to do the 
job. So I think their value to the naval force and their value 
to the joint force goes up in the future.
    Secretary Modly. With respect to business considerations, 
Senator, we are looking at all types of options to be able to 
bundle our buys of ships in order to drive down the costs, 
provide more stability to the industrial base and that supplier 
base, which extends far beyond just the shipyards that are 
doing the primary construction. So I talked to Secretary Geurts 
about this this morning about how we might be doing this 
particularly in the amphib area, and we are going to be 
thinking about that and developing some plans to do that.
    Senator Wicker. Specifically the United States currently 
has four DDGs based in Rota, Spain. These platforms provide an 
advanced multi-mission defense capability. I think we are 
getting the right testimony with regard to the need there. Do 
we need the two additional DDGs in Rota, Spain? And tell us 
about the plans to accomplish that.
    Admiral Gilday. Senator, we support the two additional DDGs 
to Spain. Right now, we are working with United States European 
Command. They are putting together their strategic lay-down of 
the theater. So, when that is complete, you will be briefed up 
here in the Congress, and then in parallel, we will be moving 
through the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense coordinating with the Department of 
State and then finally the Government of Spain so they can line 
everything up to get additional DDGs at some point to Rota. But 
we are very supportive right now. Our assessment is that the 
Spanish want us there in greater numbers, and certainly the 
Commander of United States European Command does.
    Senator Wicker. Just briefly, General Wolters has testified 
that we actually have the infrastructure there at Rota that is 
able at this point to house the two additional destroyers. Is 
that correct, Admiral?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here, for your service, and thank 
you, General Berger, for your wife's presence here today. 
Donna's presence I think points to the importance of our 
military families and the service and sacrifice that they make 
so that we can be the greatest and strongest military force in 
the world.
    In that connection, I would just like to mention I did not 
have a chance to question General Milley or Secretary Esper 
yesterday about the tenant bill of rights for military housing 
which, frankly, is somewhat mystifying to me in failing to set 
forth three of the essential rights that we incorporated in the 
NDAA last year. I want to emphasize again the importance of 
military housing and raising it to the standards that we think 
are important. I am going to be submitting questions in writing 
to them. I do not want to take time on it this morning, but any 
responses in writing you have on that issue I would certainly 
welcome.
    General Berger, I appreciated your response to Senator 
Inhofe about the CH-53K, and I agree with you totally on the 
importance of this aircraft. In fact, as you may know, today 
literally marks the birthday of Connecticut's Sikorsky 
Engineering, which was established March 5, 1923. It has 
provided 97 years of capability for our nation's defense, 
including the CH-53K, which is a marvel of engineering.
    I want to suggest that the cost of each aircraft would come 
down if the pace of production is increased. If we go from 
seven to nine, which I would advocate, the cost per copy would 
come down. Would you agree with that point?
    General Berger. I would agree with the math, yes, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday, I want to thank you for your visit to 
Groton which was enormously meaningful and inspiring, and your 
very insightful questions--and I agree with you completely that 
we have one of the great, passionate, dedicated workforces in 
any engineering facility there at Groton.
    But I am deeply concerned by the graph that you and I saw 
of the worker demands, the production, and employment 
capabilities that we are going to see and the troughs, the deep 
dips in employment and particularly during 2023 to 2024. I 
would like to know what the Navy can do to mitigate those 
troughs. I know that time will not permit you to give a full 
answer, but I am going to ask for a full briefing. I asked for 
the charts and some of the underlying data while we were there, 
and I wonder if you could respond to that point.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes. I would just say with the lack of an 
additional submarine in fiscal year 2021, what we would do and 
we are doing right now is to take a look with Electric Boat at 
how we might be able to put some of their workforce that would 
otherwise potentially be furloughed to work whether that be at 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire in our facility up there or down at 
Newport News, Virginia.
    I will tell you this, that we believe that the defense 
industrial base, particularly the work that is being done with 
ships and submarines is absolutely the crown jewel in the 
defense industrial base. We want to work very closely to make 
sure that we do not hit a trough that we cannot recover from 
quickly because that industry just is not very elastic. We 
lived through this before, and we have to be more responsive.
    Senator Blumenthal. As you know, there has been a furlough 
of about 300 workers in the last few months, but that is 
minuscule compared to the thousands that we will see going down 
and then coming back in terms of the demands on that workforce. 
So the lack of that second submarine in 2021 is really going to 
be impactful. You are absolutely right. It is the crown jewel, 
and I think we are really playing with fire if we fail to make 
sure that workforce is sustained.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cotton?
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    General Berger, I want to return to the chairman's question 
about the 53 kilo. Given its costs, can you just tell us in a 
little more detail what is the long-term outlook for this 
helicopter?
    General Berger. Sir, our program of record is 200 aircraft. 
That is our requirement, and the two costs, as most folks in 
here are really well aware of, are the APOC, the individual 
cost upfront, and then the flyaway recurring cost. The math, as 
outlined accurately before--when we get on schedule for a buy 
and the learning curve continues up, then the cost starts to 
come down. But we have to close that gap because I owe you an 
honest answer that this is an aircraft that we can afford. This 
is an aircraft that we can sustain over the lifespan of it.
    So far, again, the engineering part I am very comfortable 
with. Now it is a function of closing the gap to where I can 
convince you that this is the best use of our resources for an 
aircraft we definitely need.
    Senator Cotton. So you are saying that you owe us an answer 
and you need to convince us. It does not sound like you are yet 
fully convinced yourself?
    General Berger. I think there is room still to close the 
gap, and Sikorsky agrees as well. The learning that happens on 
the first of anything, of course, they are going to drive down 
the cost just because they are going to produce it more 
efficiently and the engineering cost that is going to the first 
batch of research and engineering models is going to go down.
    Senator Cotton. When do you think we might get that answer?
    General Berger. The next contract is due to be awarded I 
think in the August-September time frame. We will know then.
    Senator Cotton. I want to turn to another item that was in 
the President's budget request, which I found interesting. You 
are going to buy Tomahawk missiles this year. Specifically, I 
see the Marine Corps in fiscal year 2019 asked for zero 
Tomahawk missiles. In fiscal year 2020, you asked for zero 
Tomahawk missiles, and in fiscal year 2021, you have requested 
48 Tomahawk missiles. I presume you are not planning to launch 
those off any of your amphibious ships. So could you tell us 
what you plan to do with those 48 Tomahawk missiles?
    General Berger. Yes, sir. Part of the homework that the 
Navy and Marine Corps have done over the past 6 months is how 
we think we are going to need to operate in the future as an 
integrated naval force. That means the Marine Corps assumes the 
role, which we have not had in the past 20 years, which is how 
do we contribute to sea control and sea denial. The Tomahawk 
missile is one of the tools that is going to allow us to do 
that.
    Now, it is much like the MQ-9 Reaper for us. It could be 
the answer. It could be the first step towards a longer-term 
answer 5, 6, 7 years from now. But what we need is long-range 
precision fires for a small unit, a series of units, that can 
from ship or from shore hold an adversary's naval force at 
risk, and that missile is going to help us do that.
    Senator Cotton. And is it safe to say that this decision is 
a result of our withdrawal from the Intermediate Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty that you can explore these options?
    General Berger. I would assume so. I had not linked the two 
together. We just knew we need long-range precision fires 
beyond the range that we were restricted to before. Yes.
    Senator Cotton. And most particularly in the western 
Pacific, given China's long-range precision fires since they 
were never a party to that INF Treaty?
    General Berger. Absolutely, yes.
    Senator Cotton. Okay. I am glad to see that you are 
exploring those options. I am sure a lot of your marines would 
think it would be awesome of you launched them from amphibious 
ships, but probably not what you have in mind. But obviously, 
we face a pretty significant fire power gap in the western 
Pacific given China is stockpiling thousands of missiles, and 
it is good to see your service beginning to address that. Thank 
you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, in a hearing like this, you always get comments and 
questions about things that are left out. I want to start with 
a compliment, the fact that you have increased the R&D budget, 
because we are in not only a competition of forces and ships 
and troops, but a competition of innovation. If we are going to 
stay ahead in terms of the technology of future conflicts, R&D 
is going to be critical. Directed energy I think is an 
enormously important potential part of our naval force. 
Hypersonics we have discussed, and I think that is something we 
are going to be discussing or I am going to be talking, 
Admiral, with you and your staff on in a classified setting. 
Unmanned craft. I mean, there is just a lot of new technology 
that has to be developed over the next several years, and I 
compliment the Secretary and the Department for putting some 
emphasis on R&D and innovation.
    Now, for the other side of the coin, I am concerned that we 
are talking about trying to get to a 350-ship Navy, or 
actually, Mr. Secretary, I think you have talked about a 390-
ship Navy. We are also talking about developing a new large 
surface combatant, and yet in the new FYDP, we are losing four 
destroyers, which are sort of the workhorse of the surface 
combatants. I am worried about a gap. I am worried about a 
fall-off not only in shipbuilding but in the industrial base. 
Can you speak to that concern?
    Secretary Modly. Senator, thanks for the question. I think 
one of problems we have this year is we have sort of a 
confluence of bad timing on a lot of different things. We 
started on this integrated Force Structure Assessment last 
summer. It was delivered to me in January, and it sort of came 
to me after we had already completed most of the work on the 
2021 budget submission.
    So what we found in this Force Structure Assessment is that 
there is a demand for a 355-plus type of scenario.
    Senator King. And part of that 355 are large surface 
combatants.
    Secretary Modly. Yes, they are.
    Senator King. Like DDGs.
    Secretary Modly. Yes, they are. Most of everything that we 
have right now is going to be part of it, but there are new 
things that General Berger alluded to, a new, smaller amphib, a 
new, smaller combat support vessel that can help support 
distributed maritime operations. Of course, the new frigate 
will be a key element of that strategy and in that new force 
structure, and then the unmanned platforms, both undersea and 
on the surface, will be part of that future force mix. We are 
just in process of trying to educate and help the Secretary 
understand what this might mean, and then we will move out with 
a strategy for how we get there. That is a challenge for us.
    But in any scenario, we are talking about a significant 
expansion in the size of the fleet, and we are looking at a 
flat top line, and that mathematical equation is difficult for 
us to bridge.
    Senator King. Well, one of the problems is that we are 
trying to recapitalize through operating budgets. Any other 
business in the world would say a 40-year asset like a 
Columbia-class submarine is a capital investment as opposed to 
a drain on current operating cash flow. It is the bulge in the 
process of the modernization and the rebuilding of the nuclear 
deterrent that is really causing a lot of this squeeze as I 
see. Admiral, do you agree with that assessment?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, I do. The Secretary has 
challenged us with finding $8 billion this year in our existing 
budget so that we can put that towards not only shipbuilding, 
but all the other pillars that support it, the manpower, the 
weapons, the training, et cetera, so that we can increase our 
numbers.
    With respect to the legacy ships that we are looking at 
decommissioning, we get to a point, sir, where the return on 
investment--we are just not going to get the return with 
respect to lethality, and some of these hulls are over 30 years 
old. So numbers are important, but in the end, we would rather 
have a ready, capable, lethal fleet over----
    Senator King. Of course. Lethality is the measure not 
absolute numbers. I understand that.
    By the way, if you are talking about decommissioning ships, 
give them a few more years. Then send them to Caribbean and 
Pacific where we can interdict some of these drug shipments. We 
are now interdicting 25 percent of the drug shipments we know 
of--we know of--and 75 percent are going by, even though we 
know they are there because of a lack of assets. So, if you got 
spare ships, Admiral, I know where you might want to send them.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, we are sending ships to Southern 
Command and in discussions right now about what those numbers 
ought to look like. In fact, we are deploying two littoral 
combat ships this year.
    Senator King. Because that is a war we are in right now and 
Americans are dying in that war.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Senator King. And I sincerely hope you and SOUTHCOM and the 
Coast Guard can really get together and make a dent in that 
traffic.
    I am out of time, General, but perhaps for the record, you 
could give me your thinking on the reduction of your end 
strength by 2,100 marines, given the demands on the Marine 
Corps. So, I will look for that. Thank you.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Rounds?
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
    General Berger, there have been reports that the Secretary 
of Defense will move the Close Combat Lethality Task Force from 
an element the director reports to him to one that reports to 
the Army. This is an organization that is examining the full 
range of capabilities from material solutions to physiological 
performance to improving policies in order to provide the 
overmatch to the 4 percent of the members of the joint force 
who have experienced 90 percent of our combat deaths since the 
end of the Second World War. This is obviously a joint problem, 
one that the Army, Special Operations Command, and the marines 
need to have full visibility on and where solutions need to be 
joint and Department-wide.
    Can you provide me with your best professional military 
advice on what about this move could work and what about this 
might not work for the Marine Corps?
    General Berger. Sir, I am very familiar with it.
    When it was initially stood up and since, it was run by a 
retired marine colonel, who I know really well, from Fallujah, 
Iraq. So for the Marine Corps, we have been involved in the 
task force from day one and still are.
    The move to shift it into the Army I am not concerned 
about. We work laterally on a lot of programs like the joint 
light tactical vehicle. It is not an issue at all. But parking 
it in a service is a good thing because they know how to run a 
program. They know how to resource it, and there are great 
working relationships between services already. We remain tied 
in on that task force. We have marines as part of that task 
force within the Army now. That will continue for all the 
reasons that you said. That is where the casualties occur.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, General.
    Today in the way that we fight our wars, the 
electromagnetic spectrum is essential in terms of how we do 
battle, and we use multiple parts of the spectrum. I want to 
refer to the Secretary's HASC testimony on February 26th. 
Secretary Esper said that the DOD [Department of Defense] is 
willing to share--and I emphasize share--spectrum with 5G 
networks in the mid-band range of 3 to 4.2 gigahertz.
    Secretary Modly, what systems does the Navy have that might 
be affected and how could sharing that spectrum space impact 
homeland defense? I would like to specifically point out we are 
talking about sharing and not vacating that space.
    Secretary Modly. Senator, it would have a profound impact 
on our Aegis system, and of course, we cannot abandon that 
spectrum. It would have profound negative implications for that 
system. So as the Secretary stated, we are willing to share it, 
but we have to be very protective of that because it is 
critical to our ability to defend ourselves as a nation.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I have nothing to more to add to the 
Secretary's comments. I completely agree. We need to protect 
that portion of the spectrum for Aegis for homeland defense.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Let me go back a little bit and talk about submarines. We 
have talked about building new submarines. I would like an 
update, if I could get it, with regard to the mid-life 
refueling on the submarines, the nuclear attack submarines, 
that we have right now. I want to point out--and I have done 
this in the past--we are talking about the USS Boise. Now I 
understand there are three more that are waiting at dock to be 
able to sequence into dry dock to be actually refueled and made 
available for service again. The need I believe is still there, 
and you can correct me if I am wrong, but with these particular 
submarines, we still want them. This could mean that the USS 
Boise may very well have been out of service for a period of 8 
years waiting for refueling before it is back in operation 
again.
    Can you tell me what we are doing to expedite the process 
to bring these submarines back on and where we are at in that 
process?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, we are going to begin maintenance on 
Boise this May and then we will get under contract for extended 
maintenance.
    At the time that these decisions were made on Boise, we had 
a capacity issue in our public yards, and so we started to then 
send some of that work to private yards. We are now at the 
point--and I know you are aware of this--in the public yards, 
we have increased that workforce by 10,000 workers in the past 
10 years and some 4,000 in the last 3 years I think, and so we 
have the capacity back. We are actually taking one of our 
availabilities from a private yard and now moving it back into 
the public yard.
    I do not want to imply that we are out of the woods yet. We 
are watching it very closely. I think we are in a better place 
now than we were 2 and 3 years ago.
    Senator Rounds. If I could say, we will not have the same 
problem with the next three in line that we had with the Boise?
    Admiral Gilday. We do not anticipate it, sir, but I will go 
back and take a look and we will brief you in more detail on 
what that lineup looks like and any challenges that we think we 
may face.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hirono?
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for visiting Hawaii, and 
I especially would like to thank your wife for the time that 
she spent with the family of the people who were shot at the 
shipyard and also the survivor. Please extend my thanks to her.
    Over the past few weeks, I have met with several of your 
colleagues, including Assistant Secretary Geurts--in fact, that 
was only 2 days ago I think or yesterday--to discuss the 
importance of modernizing our shipyards. Of course, the delay 
in repair and all of that was just touched upon by the admiral. 
I cannot overemphasize the importance of us continuing to go 
through with the modernization plan.
    Just to let everybody know, the Pearl Harbor Shipyard, 
which is one of the four public shipyards in our country, 
contributes nearly $1 billion to Hawaii's economy every year 
and employs close to 6,500 personnel, including nearly 1,000 
engineers. It is the largest employer of this kind in Hawaii.
    Due to the current inefficient arrangement at the shipyard, 
it is necessary that the optimization plan be implemented to 
provide much needed updates. I know you are very well aware we 
need a new dry dock and a production facility.
    Funding the critical shipyard modernization program will 
require a significant portion of the Navy's budget. Does the 
Navy's fiscal year 2021 budget fully fund the shipyard 
modernization plan so that it will be implemented on time? And 
I am talking about the four shipyards, not just the one in 
Hawaii.
    Secretary Modly. Yes, Senator. This is a high priority for 
us in the Navy, and it is a 20-year commitment of $23 billion I 
believe over 20 years. So as long as we are here, we will 
continue to push for this. We are sequencing in the work in the 
most logical possible way that we can to address the things 
that you mentioned, which is how the work flows through the 
shipyards to make sure that we do not do work now that then we 
are going to have to take out as part of the longer-term 
strategy. So, yes, it is funded. I believe we are spending 
almost $600 million on this this year, and that will continue.
    Senator Hirono. Is $600 million enough to keep to the 
timelines that we have for the modernization program?
    Secretary Modly. I believe it is. I think when we looked at 
this and we thought about the work and how we would push it 
through the four different yards, it made sense to do it in 
this way. Obviously, we would love to have more to be able to 
do more, but we also had to think about how we do not disrupt 
the current work that is in there at the same time.
    Senator Hirono. Now, of course, in Hawaii I would like to 
see some concrete actually being poured for the dry dock and 
the production facility sometime soon.
    Mr. Secretary, in conversations that I have had with 
subcontractors that support our shipbuilding programs, I have 
heard that the guidance associated with the cybersecurity 
maturity modernization certification, CMMC, has been somewhat 
confusing making it difficult for businesses and contractors to 
comply. What can you tell me about the current state of the 
CMMC framework? I am told by the subs that there are changing 
requirements that come down the pike and they do their best to 
try and comply, but with regard to the new one, which is the 
CMMC, what timelines are in place for educating, certifying, 
and auditing our defense industrial base, keeping in mind that 
there are thousands of suppliers? And I assume that all of them 
need to provide certification regarding the security 
requirements.
    Secretary Modly. Yes, Senator. That is a great question.
    If you would allow me to get you specifics on where we are 
on the implementation to that, I will do that.
    We have elevated our cybersecurity awareness to the highest 
levels in the Department with a new office there. I am sure 
they are monitoring this, and I can get you specific details.
    We understand there is pushback from the supplier base, 
particularly the smaller subs who see this as an additional 
cost for them, and we are trying to figure out ways that we can 
help them perhaps create some shared services for them that 
they could use at that level. But let me get you a specific 
answer.
    Senator Hirono. I think that is really important because we 
have literally, as I said, thousands and thousands of 
suppliers. I know there is always that weak link possibility if 
we do not provide them with the kind of support they need to 
comply.
    Last week, Admiral Aquilino--he is the Commander of PAC 
Fleet--issued guidance instructing Navy vessels departing from 
port visits to remain at sea for at least 14 days before 
pulling into another port in order to monitor sailors for 
coronavirus symptoms. This week, the 6th Fleet followed suit.
    How is the Navy preparing for coronavirus, and how do you 
anticipate that the virus will impact the Navy's ability to 
operate overseas? Admiral?
    Admiral Gilday. Senator, we are following the Department's 
guidance, which essentially tries to minimize contact, 
particularly in those areas where we know there is a heavy 
concentration of coronavirus. It manifests in different ways in 
different geographic locations. We are receiving excellent 
reporting from the World Health Organization through to CDC and 
down to the Department on specific areas. Italy and Bahrain are 
really good examples. The Korean Peninsula is another good 
example. We are trying to be preemptive and preventative in 
terms of limiting numbers of large gatherings as an example. On 
a day-to-day basis, we are making decisions on closing DOD 
schools based on what we are seeing in terms of caseloads at 
local hospitals.
    All of our medical personnel have been trained in the 
symptoms, and if they suspect that somebody does have corona, 
we test for it and then we send that off to a lab to be 
confirmed. But we also quarantine those people and their 
families until we ascertain whether or not they are actually 
infected.
    Senator Hirono. Do you have test kits?
    Admiral Gilday. No, we do not. We do not yet. But that is 
not just a problem for DOD. But I think that we are getting to 
a better place in terms of the production to allow us to be 
able to distribute those out to the force.
    Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence 
and allowing me to go over. I do have some other questions for 
the record. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being here today, and, 
Secretary, I will start with you.
    Many businesses across America depend on predictable 
shipbuilding requirements to maintain a trained workforce and 
develop manufacturing lines. You are probably not surprised to 
learn that in Iowa we do not build ships. We do not. But my 
landlocked home State of Iowa is part of the Navy's inventory 
and pipeline of talent, and Carver Pump, which I love to 
highlight, and its team of 110 hardworking Iowans supply pumps 
to almost every Navy ship in the Active fleet. They are being 
installed in many ships currently in production, and in total, 
Iowa is home to eight submarine industrial base suppliers. So 
we are very proud of that. While we are not providing the end 
product, the finished ship, we do have those suppliers.
    I do understand that the Navy must utilize its funds and 
invest in assets that reflect the NDS of today, the goals to 
modernize our fleet. How are those conversations going with 
industry to ensure that their production capabilities can meet 
the requirements in this new era of great power competition?
    Secretary Modly. Well, we have an amazing supplier base in 
the country, but it is under pressure to some extent, and so we 
have to ensure that we are maintaining a steady flow of work 
through them. The carrier program alone, if you look at the 
Ford program right now, employs almost 60,000 people across the 
United States in 46 different States, and so when you think 
about a program like that, not just the employment but the type 
of employment, this is all high technology. We are bringing in 
workers, young people, training them in a trade that they can 
continue to contribute to this process over time.
    We have to be really, really careful when we talk about 
decisions in this space because that national asset that they 
create is the ship that we see, but the national asset they 
contribute to is the national asset of manufacturing capability 
and high technology that exists in the country that follows 
them. So, we have to continue to worry about that and think 
about it.
    When I go out and speak to industry, what I find more often 
is that I find businesses that are not currently doing defense 
work that are really interested in doing defense work, and how 
do we make it easier for them to do that? And so we are working 
on that.
    Senator Ernst. Right, absolutely, and I do appreciate that.
    We look at examples like the Ford. We get very concerned 
about that because as Members of Congress, we are watching 
those taxpayer dollars. So, we are reliant on industry as well 
to make the recommendations to make sure we are producing the 
necessary requirements for our fleet but get it out in a timely 
manner, and on time, on target is always best. But always 
having those discussions with industry is important. So thank 
you for that.
    We are all familiar as well, Mr. Secretary, with this 
Committee's concern for the health and wellbeing of all of our 
service members. Last year, when Congress passed the NDAA for 
fiscal year 2020, we included a provision that directed the 
Department of Defense to document blast exposure history in the 
medical record of all service members.
    We have made significant improvements in this area on how 
we are treating, documenting, and understanding the effects and 
causes of traumatic brain injuries. The progress is 
encouraging. We still have more that we can do and where we can 
potentially negate the impact of TBIs.
    Can you maybe explain to this Committee what the Department 
of the Navy and the Marine Corps is doing to improve the 
understanding and prevention of traumatic brain injuries and 
specifically those coming from blast injuries?
    Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I can say about 80 percent of the 
TBI injuries that we see are off-duty related. Because military 
medicine has benefited greatly from what we have experienced 
from Iraq and Afghanistan, so we are able to return about 85 
percent of those sailors back to work just based on the high 
proficiency of our medical teams.
    Senator Ernst. Very good. I know that in SOF, we are 
actively baselining many of their members, which is something 
that we would love to do across the conventional forces as 
well.
    General Berger, would you like to address it, please?
    General Berger. Just three quick parts to that.
    First, the protect part, the equipment that we wear, the 
vehicles, the aircraft, a lot of improvement over the last 3 or 
4 years. We have a lot of room still to go there.
    Second is the detection part, which you mentioned. Really 
difficult, which relies wholly on baseline up front, which we 
do as well. All of us who have been to Iraq and Afghanistan in 
the last 6-7 years, all baselined. We did not do that the first 
deployment. I was not either. You have to do that because you 
cannot measure any change from that.
    The last part is the treatment, which the CNO mentioned, 
and it cannot stop initially. This is an enduring--the impact 
of that could be lifelong. So it is different than some other 
ailments, some other issues that we have. We have to treat it 
as a long-term issue.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
    General Berger, you are spot on. It does create 
complications further down the road especially if we are not 
treating that TBI.
    So thank you, gentlemen, very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Jones?
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to the witnesses for being here today and for 
your service.
    Secretary Modly, I want to ask you about the frigate. You 
mentioned the frigate as a key element in our future ship 
fleets. I have got folks down at Austal down in Alabama trying 
to put together a great design and compete for that contract, 
but it seems that the process timeline has been a little bit of 
a moving target. Can you tell us right now where we are in that 
process and the timeline for the frigate contract award?
    Secretary Modly. Senator, thanks for the question.
    The plan had been to award the contract sometime in the 
latter half of this fiscal year. I have asked Secretary Geurts 
to look at possibly pulling that forward if everything is done 
properly and everything is thoroughly vetted and evaluated, and 
so he is looking into that. So there is some possibility that 
we may pull that award a little bit sooner.
    Senator Jones. All right. Could you let me know if that is 
the case?
    Secretary Modly. Yes, sir.
    Senator Jones. I noticed in the FYDP that it includes only 
nine frigates, although originally there were going to be 10 in 
the first block. Does this mean that the total ship procurement 
is being reduced or just the procurement timeline?
    Secretary Modly. No, sir. I think this is part of the 
discussion that we have been talking about earlier about the 
new integrated Force Structure Assessment and how the frigate 
plays in that. Based on current plans and current thinking, 
this is where we are. But I anticipate as we look at this in 
more depth and the Secretary of Defense can get comfortable 
with it, we are going to look at ways to possibly purchase more 
of these over time. But right now, that is sort of where we are 
in terms of our thinking.
    Senator Jones. Okay. The total numbers have not changed, 
just in this first block. Is that a fair statement?
    Secretary Modly. No, sir. Nothing has changed.
    Senator Jones. All right. Thank you.
    Sticking with Austal for a minute, I would like to talk a 
little bit about the expeditionary fast transport, the EPF. Can 
you give me an idea, Admiral Gilday, where those are being used 
and how they are being used right now, the EPFs?
    Admiral Gilday. So those ships are great. We put adaptive 
force packages on them, and so some of them are highly 
classified missions. Others are to move troops or we just used 
two in an exercise called Pacific Partnership in the Indo-
Pacific where we used them for humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief.
    The two that we have in the budget--what we are trying to 
do with those ships is to give them the medical capability 
where they would actually have a 750-room hospital, as well as 
12 operating rooms. Because of the cubic space that you have in 
those ships, you can really do a lot with them, including their 
flight deck.
    Senator Jones. Well, I am asking because you got two in 
this budget, but the President just took away one that was set 
to be awarded I think in April of this year. It was a $260 
million contract again. I am curious as to if that particular 
ship could have been used the same way, why was it taken out?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I cannot tell you directly why it was 
taken out. I know that those decisions were made at a higher 
level based on strategic priorities, and so I just do not have 
the direct answer for you on the why.
    Senator Jones. All right. I may submit a question because 
Secretary Esper's answer was just not satisfactory yesterday, 
especially in light of your testimony today, and I want to 
emphasize again I just think taking the funds away from our 
sailors, soldiers, and airmen is just wrong. It hurts our men 
and women in uniform, and it quite frankly hurts my community 
in Mobile where we are taking away that because we got a lot of 
folks down there that are dependent on Austal and the ships 
that they build.
    Secretary Modly, let me just ask you real quick. You 
mentioned last week--I want to just talk about the 355 ships 
may no longer be the right number for our force, and you 
mentioned that it could be as high as 390. Can you kind of give 
me some ideas of where all this is coming from and how you are 
making those assessments and what you are looking for?
    Secretary Modly. Well, sir, it is strategy-based. It is 
based on the threat, what we see the threat that is emerging, 
how we would want to counter that threat not just in terms of a 
warfighting scenario but in terms of deterrence and presence. 
That is what is driving it.
    What is driving the change in the numbers is some of the 
things that I mentioned earlier in terms of the requirement for 
a new, smaller amphib, a new combat support vessel as well, 
possibly more frigates, as you mentioned earlier. That is where 
sort of the numbers are elevating when we start looking at the 
difference between this and the 2016 assessment.
    Senator Jones. All right. Are we going to be able to see 
that 30-year shipbuilding plan and Force Structure Assessment 
pretty soon?
    Secretary Modly. I hope so, sir. I have seen it. I just 
need to make sure the Secretary of Defense is comfortable with 
it.
    Senator Jones. Well, I would encourage you to try to get 
that to us as soon as possible, please. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Perdue?
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for being here.
    You know, these concerns and the wringing of the hands 
about this budget would have a whole lot more credibility if we 
had heard that when the three times in the last 50 years we had 
three Presidents in the late 1970s, in the mid-1990s, and just 
recently cut our military spending by 25 percent. That is what 
this is about. Today we are trying to recover. You have done a 
marvelous job in the Navy and the Marines getting our readiness 
back. I want to commend you guys for that. Today I want to talk 
about shipbuilding.
    When we get this budget, we are supposed to get a 
shipbuilding plan. Secretary Modly, when should we expect that?
    Secretary Modly. Sir, I am hoping to get it over here as 
soon as possible, but frankly, it is not my call. I am waiting 
for the Secretary of Defense to allow us to bring it over.
    Senator Perdue. I understand.
    Admiral Kilby, this week, yesterday, as a matter of fact, 
did a great job explaining his requirements, Admiral. He talked 
about four priorities: Columbia-class, readiness recovery, 
lethality, and capabilities we can afford. I respect that.
    The question that--I want to highlight the NDS. The 335-
ship number was developed in 2016, prior to the NDS. Is the 355 
number consistent with the NDS requirements put on the Navy and 
Marines?
    Admiral Gilday. It is low, sir.
    Senator Perdue. An honest man.
    Admiral Gilday. Thank you, sir.
    The short answer. Since the time that that assessment has 
been done and if you consider the fact that we are integrating 
much more closely with the Marine Corps and within the joint 
force, you have to consider not only what we are going to fight 
with, the capabilities, but also how we are going to fight. 
That is translated against a threat that has increasing 
capability into a larger number of ships, a larger number of 
more capable lethal ships.
    Senator Perdue. It has to do with several things. Right? 
What is your responsibility against emerging threats. You said 
that. How are you going to fight the force, and then what kind 
of lethality you have. So you are working on that we are not 
hamstrung by INF. We know that China--they out-stick us today. 
Is that fair?
    Admiral Gilday. In some areas, sir, yes.
    Senator Perdue. Secondly, they have about 350 boats today 
to our 296 by my math. I think that is correct. If you look at 
what they have said publicly, by 2030 they will have 425, and 
if that same gradient goes out, by 2034, which is our planning 
period behind the current shipbuilding plan, we would be at 355 
by 2034. That is the 2016 plan. That may change in the current 
shipbuilding plan I understand. We have an 80-boat shortage 
right now, and we have responsibilities in multiple AORs. They 
pretty much have one. Are you concerned that our shipbuilding 
plan is not going to be able to do what we need to do over that 
15-year period, particularly against the buildup that we see 
China--they deployed more boats in the last 30 months than they 
have in the last 30 years. We see their activity. They are 
telling us what they are doing.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So, it simply really comes down 
to our top line, and that is our biggest constraint in terms of 
growing a bigger Navy. Since I have been in uniform, the size 
of the United States Navy has been dwindling. Over the last few 
years, we have come up in numbers a bit, but not a lot. We 
believe, based on the NDS and for all the reasons we just 
stated, that it is time to reinvest in the naval force.
    Senator Perdue. And it would be one thing if we could fund 
it. What I am worried about--let us take submarines, for 
example. Your number one priority is Columbia-class. I am proud 
that Georgia hosts one of the two nuclear bases that hosts 
those. But we lost in the last decade 17,000 submarine vendors, 
down to 3,000 vendors. Even if we were to push the money toward 
this goal to get to where we need to be, can we rebuild the 
supply chain fast enough to accommodate that?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, based on what we know, we think we 
can. Based on what we are projecting in terms of submarines, as 
an example in terms of what we are procuring, that vendor 
infrastructure is in place to support that.
    Senator Perdue. Can I move on to one other thing? The Air 
Force is developing ABMS right now, and it looks like they have 
had one demonstration across the services. I think there is 
another one coming up in April. How involved is the Navy in 
looking at this from the service needs, as well as the data 
that the Navy will be creating? Obviously, as I understand 
this, this is a very classified development. Can you give us an 
update about the Navy's involvement and the Marines' 
involvement on that?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, so the problem set is that we have 
netted weapons and we have netted platforms and netted C2 
nodes, but we do not have a net. All the services have come 
together under a concept called joint all domain C2, and we are 
putting heat on it, a Manhattan Project like effort, so that we 
are not delivering this in the mid-2030s but in the 2020s. All 
the Joint Chiefs are flying out to Nellis in early April to 
take a look at this together to make sure we understand how we 
are going to get after it.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you so much. Thank you, sir.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Heinrich?
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
    Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, I am quite encouraged 
to see the priority that the Navy continues to place on 
hypersonic weapons. As you know, Sandia National Lab has played 
a critical role in developing this technology over a number of 
years now. How would you characterize the combined Navy and 
inter-service effort to transition hypersonic glide bodies out 
of the labs?
    Secretary Modly. Well, thank you for that question. I 
actually was in Sandi a few months ago and got to see what they 
are doing out there, and it is really amazing work. I am 
actually very encouraged about the fact that we are working 
together with the Air Force and the Army on this because it is 
an expensive proposition, and we need to pool our resources and 
our brain power to get after it. So I think that the progress 
is good.
    We have asked for a significant step up in funding this 
year in order to do this. As I look at the test schedule, it 
looks aggressive, but I think it is doable.
    So that is probably all that I can talk about in an open 
forum. I would be more than happy to come over and have our 
team brief you on how we are doing on that.
    Senator Heinrich. Would there be value in collocating the 
development and the production of those capabilities so that we 
could fully leverage synergies, expertise, and frankly shorten 
the feedback loop in that transition from development to 
production?
    Secretary Modly. Well, I think anything that we can do that 
can accelerate the process of getting these fielded would be 
important. I think one of the biggest challenges we have right 
now is not the technology and how to develop these missiles, 
but it is the production. How do we get this into scale over 
time? And that is a challenge because we do not have an 
industrial base that can really do that right now. So, we are 
looking at ways that can help accelerate that through some 
incentives, et cetera to put some funding out there so that we 
can accelerate the creation of the industrial capacity to 
produce at scale.
    Senator Heinrich. Well, I hope you will consider us a 
partner in that effort.
    I want to switch gears now to the Navy has been conducting 
live fire tests of its experimental electromagnetic railgun at 
White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico over the past year. But 
the fiscal year 2021 budget includes pretty minimal funding for 
this capability. What is the Navy's plan to continue developing 
this program and, for that matter, to mount it on a ship for 
at-sea testing as well? Admiral?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So the testing is going rather 
well. What I would like to do, sir, is come back to you in a 
classified setting and talk to you in more detail about where 
we are with that and where we want to go.
    Senator Heinrich. Okay. In this setting, can you comment on 
the resourcing in this particular budget?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, the resourcing right now we think is 
adequate based on the amount of effort that we have ongoing. 
So, we saw more money in the budget last year based on what we 
needed to do in terms of R&D, but we are more at a steady state 
at the moment going into 2021.
    Senator Heinrich. Okay.
    Let us talk Columbia-class for a moment. I think this 
Committee understands the importance of that modernization to 
the nuclear triad. What are your contingency plans if the Navy 
does not make the already very tight timeline for Columbia, and 
where would you accept risk?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, that would be best handled in a 
classified setting. I will say that we have had those 
discussions with the Secretary of Defense, and you cannot just 
consider one leg. You have to consider the triad and how you 
balance risk across that triad based on challenges you would 
face in the modernization efforts across each of those legs. We 
are having those discussions, sir.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Tillis?
    Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your service.
    General Berger, I will ask you just one detailed question. 
I got a few others hopefully I will have time to get to.
    With some of the military construction money--I think it 
was somewhere around $40 million--affecting Camp Lejeune as a 
result of the executive order, I understand there were two 
projects down there that have been pushed somewhat to the 
right. Can you give me the current status of those projects and 
whether or not we are in any critical timing in terms of 
backfilling the funding?
    General Berger. I am familiar with both projects. Both were 
deferred. We will have to postpone the second radio battalion 
building and the second project as well. Right now, not 
critical, but if they got pushed farther, then it would become 
a significant issue.
    Senator Tillis. If I could get just for the record specific 
dates on when that really hits the critical path, I would 
appreciate it. Then-Secretary Spencer assured me that it was 
not a challenge now, but it could be. I would like to know the 
specific timing. Thank you for that.
    Now, I have got something that would be for Admiral Gilday 
and you, General Berger, and maybe the Secretary as the 
tiebreaker, and it is the discussion we are having with FRC 
East [Fleet Readiness Center-East], getting the funding to be 
best prepared for the F-35. We have got a bit of a stalemate 
there. We made some progress with the security fence with the 
lift fan facility, but a lot of the infrastructure is sort of 
Navy-owned facility, marine requirement. Every time I ask a 
question about who is going to actually own that and how we are 
going to get the funding, I get you need to talk to the Navy or 
you need to talk to the marines. Do we have a definitive answer 
on that and where this sits on the priority list?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I can say that FRC--of our three, it 
is part of the optimization plan that we have, and we are 
putting money against all three of those facilities right now.
    With respect to the potential finger-pointing, I would like 
to get you a deeper brief on that. The Commandant and I, our 
staffs can come together, and if there is an issue, we will 
definitely resolve it.
    Senator Tillis. You answered my question before I asked it. 
What I would like to do, if we could, is just in a meeting, if 
we could get the stakeholders in the room and I can get a 
definitive readout, I would appreciate that. So I have your 
commitment to making sure that happens.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you very much.
    General Berger, you mentioned about some of the review that 
you are doing for the acquisition programs review. What is the 
current status of that? When should we see a report out?
    General Berger. We are done the first part of it, Senator. 
The next step is for me to explain where we stand with the 
chair and Ranking Members of the four Committees here, and I 
will do that this weekend next if we can get through the 
scheduling part of that.
    After that, then we will obviously go broader in terms of 
explaining the details. But it is important that I explain to 
those senior leaders in Congress first what the outcomes are. 
We are done the first part.
    Senator Tillis. Okay. Thank you.
    Because my time is going to expire here fairly quickly, I 
am going to submit some questions for the record about end 
strength, a few other questions. We will just look forward to 
hearing back from you.
    In my remaining time, I would like to talk about military 
housing. We have spent a lot of time and effort to make sure--
on the one hand, we were concerned with the nearly $40 million 
that is sliding to the right. On the other hand, we have 
succeeded in getting billions of dollars down to help with 
recovery.
    What is the status of that recovery, and specifically, how 
is the military housing situation? I will let you know and 
everybody else that I will be doing another town hall down 
there to hear directly from the military families. I think that 
is very helpful because for some strange reason, I announce it 
6 weeks in advance. All the service requests tend to be done by 
the time I get there. But I am hoping they are beginning to do 
it on a more consistent basis. So if I can get an update on 
both those projects, recovery with respect to Camp Lejeune 
broadly and then specifically for military housing.
    General Berger. Camp Lejeune broadly. First of all, the 
town halls are--you are spot on. Unannounced is better and you 
are going to get unfiltered kind of feedback from families, the 
way it should be, the way that we want them to be. So I thank 
you for that because it takes time.
    On the housing, there are about 520, give or take, empty 
family housing units at Camp Lejeune that the private partner 
owns. Some of them are reparable; some are not, and that is 
part of the discussion that goes on right now, not negotiation, 
but the dialogue between the Department and the vendor about 
what to do about the 500 vacant houses.
    There are about 15 families--I think 15--right now that 
remained in damaged homes at their choice. We offered to move 
them. They elected to stay there. The damage, in other words, 
from the hurricane--they were okay because they are going to 
move anyway, so they just stayed. So we allowed them the choice 
either way.
    The funding for the last two tranches of supplementals--all 
of the, I think, $837 million from last year put on contract. 
So far, I think about $157 million this year. We will be able 
to obligate all that you provided from the second tranche in 
this fiscal year. So I think by the end of this fiscal year, 
both tranches will be fully under contract.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you to the witnesses for your service.
    I wanted to just pick up on a point that Senator Perdue 
made a few minutes ago. He expressed some concern about hand-
wringing over the budget and said, you know, I wish I had seen 
concerns in the past when budgets were being cut, and look, to 
the extent that Congress has done bad things in budgets in the 
past, we need to own it. My first speech as a Senator in 
February 2013 was a speech on the floor saying we should not do 
the sequester and budget caps. It is a bad idea.
    I think the reason there is hand-wringing now is that 
Congress has learned our lesson and we are trying to do good 
budgets for the military, and what we are seeing is the drain 
of billions of dollars out of the budget for a non-military 
emergency at the southern border.
    Here is what we are doing within 1 year. Within the last 
year, the administration took first $6 billion, $3.5 billion 
from MILCON and $2.5 billion from other programs, into the 
counter-drug fund to use for the wall. So that was $6 billion 
out of the DOD budget.
    The administration has now announced another $3.8 billion 
that is being cannibalized out of various accounts, put into 
the counter-drug fund. So now that $9.8 billion.
    Yesterday Secretary Esper in the hearing announced that 
there will likely be another tranche taken from MILCON. It has 
been reported that would be $3.7 billion, but just round it 
down and say that number is too high. It looks like the total 
within a year will be $13 billion, more than a billion a month 
taken out of Congress' appropriated budget for your needs, for 
the nation's needs to use for a non-military emergency that is 
not mentioned in the National Defense Strategy.
    Let me just put that into context. What does $13 billion 
mean to seapower, to our Navy and Marines' $13 billion. It is 
one carrier or it is four Virginia-class subs. We are arguing 
about whether there should be a second sub this year. Thirteen 
billion bucks in a year is four subs. It is six destroyers. It 
is four amphibious assault ships. Senator Hirono asked about 
the shipyard industrial optimization plan. That 20-year plan is 
$26 billion. So the $13 billion would be half of the 20-year 
plan to modernize our shipyards.
    Or the other way to look at it is when you all submitted 
your budget this year, you submitted the amount of unfunded 
priorities you have. That total unfunded priority list for the 
DOD is $17 billion. Thirteen billion dollars in 1 year taken 
for a non-military emergency when your total unfunded priority 
list is $17 billion.
    I am going to state right now if there is a Democratic 
President who tries to take money out of the DOD for a non-
military emergency, I am going to say go get it through the 
appropriators. Do not ransack the Pentagon's budget for a non-
military emergency. I stood up against Democratic or Republican 
Presidents if I thought they were taking us to war without 
coming to Congress. I am going to stand up against the 
Democratic President who tries to raid the Pentagon budget for 
non-military emergencies.
    You are here saying we are trying to be focused on the 
National Defense Strategy. It is resource-tight environment. It 
is sort of hard to take that at face value when we are allowing 
$13 billion to walk out the door for a non-military emergency 
in 1 year.
    I want to offer you a compliment, General Berger. You made 
I think a challenging call but the right call recently when you 
announced that Confederate paraphernalia would be removed from 
Marine bases as just a good order and discipline. I saw that 
announcement and as a Virginian with a child in the Marines, I 
applaud that leadership move.
    Secretary Modly, I want to ask you to share a story that 
you shared with me with all my colleagues. Secretary Modly was 
in the Federated States of Micronesia recently, and this is a 
story about United States and China, what we are doing. 
Micronesia is a really important asset for us, where it is 
situated in the Pacific. Just share what is happening in terms 
of United States investment versus Chinese investment from your 
recent visit, if you would.
    Secretary Modly. Sir, thanks for remembering the story.
    I was there about a year ago, and I made a trip through 
several of the Pacific islands. I went to Micronesia and went 
to the far side of the island, and there was a Navy Seabee team 
there, a great group, 24 Seabees building a school for the 
local citizens there. Very traditional construction, concrete 
pilings, corrugated steel roof, plywood sides, making great 
relationships with the locals.
    As you leave this facility and you drive down the street, 
there is a big sign. Micronesian Agricultural Center being paid 
for and built by the People's Republic of China, and it just 
gave me the impression that in some of these areas where we 
have traditional long-term friendships with these nations who 
want us to be their partners and we are playing small ball.
    Senator Kaine. We removed all Peace Corps volunteers from 
Micronesia in 2017 and from Palau.
    Secretary Modly. Yes, sir. In the embassy building there, I 
saw a bunch of signs for the old Peace Corps, and I said why 
are these here? They said, well, we shut down the Peace Corps 
here. They had been there since the beginning of the Peace 
Corps, and people in Micronesia know Americans because of the 
Peace Corps.
    So it may not extend to the entire Pacific region, but it 
was an example to me of particularly how we need to step up our 
involvement there not just militarily, but in other ways.
    Senator Kaine. Thanks for sharing that story.
    Thanks, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Scott?
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    F*irst of all, I thank each of you for your service.
    Secretary Modly, thank you for engaging with us after the 
terrorist attack in Pensacola, trying to come up with the right 
plan to make sure this does not happen again. I will be talking 
on the floor today about the three individuals that lost their 
lives there, and it was devastating to them, their families, 
but also to that base and that community. But thank you for 
engaging with the sheriff and everybody down there.
    We had a hearing yesterday. Senator Ernst chaired a hearing 
on the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, and we 
talked about Pensacola and what can we do differently. My 
concern is that we went right back to normal work pretty fast. 
We talked about it. Twenty-one students got sent home for a 
variety of things, and we are now vetting differently. But 
should we have a complete reset of the program so we know it is 
not going to happen again? We got 850 Saudi students here and 
we want to build our relationship with Saudi Arabia. I talked 
to the Saudi Ambassador and said the worst thing for you would 
be if we had another instance like this soon. I mean, I think 
the American public would be up in arms. You cannot keep doing 
this.
    So I am working on a proposal with Senator Ernst that--and 
I would like to get you all's feedback, but how to vet the 
students, how to give them the right kind of visa, and make 
sure we are not doing programs here that we could do in another 
country less expensively and with less risk.
    So what do you all think about the fact that we still 
have--and we have--what--5,000 students from around the world 
there. But my focus right now, because of what happened at 
Pensacola, is the Saudi students. Very few were actually sent 
back. Are we really able to do a real vetting process of the 
ones we still have here? Are we vetting their families? How 
safe are our bases?
    When I was in the U.S. Navy, I never would have thought 
that there would have been any risk on the base I was on.
    Secretary Modly. Senator, thanks for the question.
    I think we are doing all we can I think to step up the 
vetting process for these students and to have a better sense 
for not just vetting them before they come in, but to develop 
some process in collaboration with those countries to perform 
more continuous vetting particularly of social media or some of 
the things they are doing that does not require us to do 
anything illegal to do that. We can monitor things that are in 
the public sphere. We just have not applied the resources to 
it, and we are looking at a variety of different ways that we 
can do that.
    One of the key elements I think also is part of the purpose 
of these programs is to bring these people in and have them 
understand us as a nation better. I do not think we are doing 
such a great job with certain countries in bringing them in, 
sponsoring them, having local families getting to know them, 
particularly with the Saudi students because there were so many 
of them. They were very insulated and not really a part of the 
broader community, and so we have to really focus on that as 
well.
    Senator Scott. So do you think you will be able to measure? 
Because that is what I have been told. I have been told that in 
many of these countries, like they said, you know, if it is an 
Italian student, that everybody get to know him and there are 
long-term relationships. But I have not talked to anybody in 
the military to date that says they have a long-term 
relationship with somebody that was a Saudi student. They might 
have it later if they are in the position of leadership, but 
based on the relationship as a Saudi student--I mean, I have 
not talked to anybody in the military that has one. So it makes 
you question why are we doing this and having this risk.
    How are you doing dealing with families that come? Are we 
vetting them, and are we continuing to vet them when they are 
here?
    Secretary Modly. I think that is all part of the process 
that we are doing in terms of getting a better understanding of 
who is coming in, what their backgrounds are, and just doing it 
a little bit more--a little deeper dive into that than we used 
to do.
    Senator Scott. Well, I look forward to working with you. We 
have been working with Senator Ernst and some others about 
coming up with a better way to do it to make sure these bases 
are safe. So thank you very much.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters?
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here today.
    General Berger, you have discussed the need for an 
appropriate balance between manned and unmanned systems, 
including incorporating unmanned aerial combat vehicles and 
low-cost attributable aircraft technologies into the Marine 
Corps. In a commentary you authored for War on the Rocks in 
December of 2019, you listed 11 naval expeditionary 
capabilities and capacities that support fleet operations, 
which the Marine Corps is under-invested in. Notably, that list 
started off with three different types of unmanned platforms 
for every physical domain in which you fight. I agree with your 
assessment and know that we will need a mix of fifth generation 
manned platforms like the F-35 that provide a stealth 
capability, along with an array of sensors teamed with unmanned 
systems that can address survivability challenges and further 
confound our adversary's decision-making through these new 
technologies working together.
    The Marine Corps stated requirements for the manned F-35 is 
certainly a matter of record, but I have not seen your 
requirements for lethal unmanned systems. Do you still intend 
to pursue a large number of lethal unmanned aerial systems per 
your Commandant's Plan and Guidance and recent public remarks? 
And if so, can we expect to see those desired capabilities 
articulated in the next Marine Corps aviation plan?
    General Berger. The homework that went behind what are we 
going to need in the future that we spoke of before that both 
the Navy and the Marine Corps have worked on for the past maybe 
8-9 months drove me towards that conclusion.
    Will see it in the next budget, and will we see it in the 
next AVPLAN, aviation plan? I do not know. I think yes, but the 
first step would be to figure out how you are going to fight 
and then reorganize the Marine Corps for that purpose, which we 
have to do, which is part of the rounds that I need to make to 
the senior congressional leadership to explain that part to 
them. I would hope that it is in the 2022 and 2023 budget, yes, 
sir.
    Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
    Secretary Modly, the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 2020 requires you as the Secretary of the Navy by 
January 31st of 2023 to--and I am quoting from the law--publish 
a military specification for a fluorine-free fire-fighting 
agent for use at all military installations and ensure that 
such agent is available for use by not later than October 1st 
of 2023. I would like to note that although it is October 1st 
of 2023, of course, you are free to publish it before that 
time, and we would encourage you to do that.
    It is my understanding that there are large-scale 
commercial airports around the world that have adopted PFAS-
free fire-fighting agents already. I recognize the military 
context is different and it is essential that we put the safety 
of our men and women first and foremost, number one. But I am 
optimistic the Navy will be able to find an appropriate 
solution given what is happening around the rest of the world.
    Could you provide us with an update on the progress towards 
publishing that specification and what work has been done to 
date on that effort?
    Secretary Modly. I share your optimism on that. I think we 
will figure this out. It is a global challenge, as you 
mentioned, in the United States specifically as well. All of 
our fire-fighting civilians, our fire-fighting folks use this 
material, and it is a challenge for us. However, there is a lot 
of attention in the scientific community looking at this. Our 
Office of Naval Research is looking at this, and I am confident 
we will come up with an answer on this. So far, we have not, 
and so particularly on our ships, we are continuing to use it. 
But my sense is that we will make progress on this and we will 
get an answer.
    Senator Peters. And I am sure you are working with our 
allies who are also actually deploying some of these agents. So 
I appreciate that.
    General Berger, last question. For the defense technology 
and innovation industrial base in this country in the remaining 
seconds here, what would be your message on the technologies 
and capabilities to pursue and invest in that you are going to 
want to require for the Marine Corps in the future?
    General Berger. First is the how part. I think we need to 
be better listeners than spend a year or two developing a 
detailed set of requirements and dump it on industry and then 
ask them, what do you think. That collaboration has to start 
from the very beginning, and it is much better than it was, I 
would say, 5 years ago.
    What do we need? We need, from the individual marine to the 
small unit, things that make them more survivable, more 
effective and lethal in a very austere environment without the 
big logistics tail behind them, which has been our challenge so 
far, because we assume that that logistics tail like the 
command and control, that the threat is going to go right after 
it. They are going to go after those two aspects of our 
warfighting capability. So, it has got to be tools that a 
marine can use forward, can fix forward, not call a contractor, 
but he can sustain them forward, he can repair them forward, 
and that is not so logistically burdensome that it is really 
difficult to keep that unit reinforced forward.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Sullivan?
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, it was great to see you three at the Army-Navy 
game. I was going to comment about the result when Senator Reed 
was here, but since he left, I thought I would leave it at 
that.
    General Berger, I want to compliment you on the 
Commandant's Plan and Guidance. I read every word of this. It 
is outstanding, innovative, bold. I want to thank you and your 
team for the exceptional work that you put into that.
    One topic I wanted to briefly discuss, General. I have had 
good discussions this week both in meetings and then in the 
hearing that the Secretary of Defense and Chairman had 
yesterday on the force posture that we have in the Asia-Pacific 
given the National Defense Strategy, including the DPRI that 
has been a subject of a lot of focus of the Marine Corps for I 
think 2 decades now. They are very focused on a broader 
strategic look that can sustain our force posture and strategy 
for the next 50 to 100 years, which I think is important. You 
may have seen in the NDAA that was just passed, 2019, there is 
a provision that says we need to do that as well. The Secretary 
of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The marines will be 
critical in that.
    Can you briefly comment on your thoughts on that?
    General Berger. Thanks, Senator.
    I do not want to speak for you, but I have heard you speak 
before that--and I have said the same--we are postured 
perfectly out there for another Korea in 1950.
    Senator Sullivan. Or the end of World War II, which is 
where our force posture----
    General Berger. That is exactly right. It was an ideal 
posture for that, not ideal for what the National Defense 
Strategy outlines as the major threats going forward in the 
Indo-Pacific. So, we have to adjust it. I do not see any 
alternative.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, the Secretary and the Chairman were 
very bullish on looking hard at this as well, and I know the 
Marine Corps has done some good work on this, and we want to 
help you--I mean, not help you, but work with you. This 
Committee has been very interested in this issue from Senator 
McCain to Senator Inhofe and myself. So, we will look forward 
to working you on that.
    I want to turn to the Arctic. Senator Kaine and I had a 
Readiness Subcommittee hearing this week, quite a good hearing. 
I want to compliment the Navy and the Marines on their recent 
Arctic expeditionary exercise out at Adak and Seward, difficult 
training. I know that was not easy. Crappy weather. But clearly 
the Arctic has become a theater of great power competition. I 
have a slide that I think some of you have seen. This is the 
Russian buildup in the region--and it is not just forces. It is 
ports and airfields and infrastructure to have force power 
projection. We do not really have much there.
    I want to give you sense of questions here, three 
questions, and then, Mr. Secretary, maybe you can take this on.
    You know, the DOD Arctic strategy says there should be 
FONOPs. I do not think we have the capability right now. We 
have two icebreakers. One is broken. The Russians have 54. 
There are also twice now mandates to look at strategic Arctic 
ports, which have kind of been ignored by the Pentagon, and 
General Neller had some plans in addition to what was going on 
in the region with regard to the Marines in the Arctic.
    Can the three of you just discuss these? Mr. Secretary, 
maybe we will start with you.
    Secretary Modly. Yes, Senator. Thanks.
    I recently within the last 2 weeks had a conversation with 
Secretary McCarthy and Secretary Barrett about how the Navy and 
the Army and the Air Force Departments can get together to come 
up with a combined strategy in terms of basing, presence, et 
cetera to address this Arctic challenge. Clearly your home 
State would be critical to this in terms of where it is 
strategically located. So we are developing this team now to 
take a look at this, and obviously, once we get that assembled, 
we would love to come over and talk to you about it.
    Senator Sullivan. Good. I appreciate your initiative on 
that. I got your note. So, thank you very much on that.
    Admiral, any thoughts on the FONOPs? We have talked about 
this before. I have a--I think I have mentioned it to you in 
hearings--but a proud history in my family, five uncles and 
great uncles who served in World War II, including my great 
uncle Tom who was a lieutenant in the Navy and did three 
Murmansk runs. I worry that we do not have that capability 
right now, no ice-hardened ships.
    Of course, this Committee has authorized the purchase of 
six polar class icebreakers, which is a start. But without any 
kind of strategic port--and we do not have anything near the 
Arctic. The closest thing is Anchorage. That is 1,500 nautical 
miles away. We cannot project power and we need to defend our 
strategic interests, particularly the Navy.
    What is your thought on that, sir?
    Admiral Gilday. My thought on that is that I think if we 
are going to talk about force structure, infrastructure in 
Alaska, I really think like DPRI it has got to be a subset of a 
broader INDOPACOM strategic lay-down.
    Senator Sullivan. I agree with that.
    Admiral Gilday. From a joint perspective, we are making the 
right decisions.
    Then secondly, with respect to operations in the Arctic, 
ICEX right now, two United States submarines, one British 
submarine, we are just on the tail end of an exercise with the 
Norwegians--the Navy and the Marine Corps--as well as another 
multinational exercise ongoing. We are seeing an increasing 
drum beat of operations in the high north. I think we need to 
continue that. I think that FONOPs will be important. I think 
that the Bering Strait will become as strategically as 
important as the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz at 
some point.
    Senator Sullivan. Putin certainly thinks so.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, based on what is going on with 
the icecap.
    So it is getting more focused, sir. I do think that taking 
a pause and looking at it strategically would be a good move.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Duckworth?
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Modly, I want to follow up on a conversation I 
had with General Lyons of TRANSCOM last week. When discussing 
sealift readiness, he stated that our current readiness level 
was lower than where it needed to be, but noted that TRANSCOM 
is working to recapitalize sealift capabilities. We agreed that 
while sealift is just one of the Navy's many requirements that 
you must balance, it is essential for TRANSCOM to be able to do 
its job and help get our forces to the fight when we need it.
    General Lyons raised a possibility with me of using the 
National Defense Sealift Fund to make progress towards our 
sealift recapitalization goals. But I believe that the Navy has 
not added anything to that fund since fiscal year 2019. Could 
you please share your view on reinvigorating the National 
Defense Sealift Fund? If you disagree with that approach, what 
would be the alternative approach of prioritizing 
recapitalization of sealift capabilities?
    Secretary Modly. Senator, I absolutely agree that we have 
to recapitalize our sealift capability. Where the funding comes 
from is the challenge for us. This is another one of these 
pressures that we have in the Department of the Navy 
particularly because we are reaching a point in history where 
we have to recapitalize our nuclear deterrent, at the same time 
recover from some pretty big holes in readiness, and also do 
this, which is to recapitalize our sealift. So we are making 
choices. We are making some trades, but we are going to need 
some help I think from a budget perspective to be able to do 
that as aggressively as I think the TRANSCOM Commander would 
want us to do.
    Senator Duckworth. What do you think about using the fund 
as an avenue for----
    Secretary Modly. Senator, I do not that the fund has 
funding. I do not know if it is similar to the Strategic 
Deterrence Fund that we have as well that is a fund that gives 
us some authorities but it does not really have any funding 
attached to it. So I will have to get back to you on that 
specifically in terms of what is there or what we need to put 
into it.
    Senator Duckworth. Okay. Thank you.
    I was disappointed that this year's budget baseline 
proposal omits key investments in sealift and logistics that we 
should be prioritizing now, and we sort of talked about this. 
As you said, there are a lot of unfunded priorities, but the 
list of unfunded priorities includes tens of millions of 
dollars for emergency repairs to sealift ships identified by 
TRANSCOM and advanced communications gear for the military 
sealift command ships.
    Then in your February 18 memo that kicked off the Navy's 
stem to stern comprehensive review, you highlighted naval 
logistics as an area that could be, quote, streamlined when 
searching for billions of dollars' worth of savings.
    So can you help me reconcile this? How can it be a priority 
but then you are talking about this where you can cut? Or am I 
misunderstanding what you mean by naval logistics would be 
streamlined? I mean, how do you plan to build up and sustain a 
growing fleet of ships without prioritizing a strong logistics 
network? Who picks up the slack?
    Secretary Modly. Well, Senator, I think that particular 
memo went out to the entire Department of the Navy to look at 
every possible way that we can look at doing things better and 
more efficiently. I do not think anyone would argue that our 
Department from a logistics and supply chain is world class 
with respect to cost, distribution, the business systems that 
support it. We have multiple redundant business systems, and 
every one of them takes a budget line every year. So, we have 
to think about how we can do this better, more efficiently, 
more closely approximate some of the advances that have been 
made in supply chain management in the commercial sector over 
the years, and that is what I was talking about when I talked 
about logistics. Logistics demands are going to keep going up. 
If we keep doing it the way we are doing it now, it is going to 
cost us way too much.
    Senator Duckworth. We understood and agreed with that. On 
the other hand, we need to make sure that we actually put 
further investments in our logistics capabilities. We are not 
talking with just sealift but also heavy lift aircraft. We also 
need to be talking about how we project fuel forward. 
Everything that sucks gas needs fuel. If we are going to be 
present in the Asia-Pacific region, then we need to be able to 
project into the region beyond the first 72 hours, and so that 
is a real concern that I have.
    Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Thank you for your 
service.
    General Berger, let me start by saying that I really want 
to applaud your decision to refocus the Marine Corps on the sea 
denial mission. So thank you for your leadership in that area. 
Thank you to you and your staff for keeping Congress informed 
and on board with this as you have led the Marines in this new 
direction. Thank you very much for that.
    Let us talk a little bit about Fort Leonard Wood in my home 
State, if we could for a second. General, Admiral Gilday, Fort 
Leonard Wood has had the opportunity to train many of your 
marines and sailors at its engineering, police, and CBRN 
schools. Can you give us a sense of how this opportunity for 
joint training has benefited your respective services both from 
a training and resource management standpoint?
    Admiral Gilday. Senator, not in detail except that I have 
not heard any problems.
    Senator Hawley. Well, that is good.
    Admiral Gilday. But I cannot comment on that training.
    General Berger. Just a couple words, sir.
    First, the Marine Corps is the smallest service, sir. We do 
not own all our schools. Most of our marines go to other 
service schools.
    The benefit in the particular case you are talking about is 
you are learning the trade to a military occupation, but it is 
a trade. You are learning alongside somebody you are probably 
going to serve with later on from another service. So, the 
benefits are, one, you do away with the myths. Two, there is 
some standardization in how engineers operate, how military 
police view a problem because you are operating side by side. 
You are not in four different schools doing it.
    I think for us there is an economic benefit. We cannot 
afford our own school. Two, the standardization thing is great, 
and three, it may be the only time, but if not, it is the first 
time they are going to operate alongside somebody from another 
service. So it tamps down all the myths about them.
    Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that. We are, 
obviously, very proud of Fort Leonard Wood and the work that 
they do there. I am glad that they are serving you well.
    General, back to sea denial, can you give us an update on 
your rogue fires and ground-based anti-ship missile programs in 
terms of where they are now and their timelines for fielding?
    General Berger. Both of the capabilities you speak of in 
war games and in simulation have proven--game-changer is 
probably an over-the-top characterization, but it definitely 
changes the calculus of an adversary because right now that 
capability is something we do not have, and posed with that, 
they have to act differently.
    Rogue fires in particular, on a great glide path. We are 
investing in it. Who knows if that is the solution 10 years 
from now, but we are going down that path right now.
    Ground-launched cruise missiles and everything long-range 
precision fires that is in a small enough format that a small 
marine unit can embark it, can use it, we are after it. Yes.
    Senator Hawley. Very good.
    From an ISR and C2 standpoint, what would you say, General, 
are the most important programs for ensuring that Marine Corps 
fire units have the targeting data they need to perform the sea 
denial mission?
    General Berger. Some will say--and I think there is logic 
to that--that they are kind of agnostic. I do not care where I 
get my fire data solution from or what ISR platform. I just 
need the data, and there is truth in that.
    On the other hand, we need organic naval ISR so that that 
expeditionary naval force that is operating either in EUCOM or 
in the first island chain or wherever has the means to pick up 
the targets forward in an expeditionary manner, and they got to 
be able to launch and recover from naval platforms, from shore, 
and they got to be small enough, if they are going to be 
embarked with us, that we can sustain them. Right now, we have 
used MQ-9's for the last year and a half in Helmand province in 
Afghanistan as a learning platform for us, how to close that 
kill chain organically.
    Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
    Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, I will come back to you. 
Admiral Davidson recently testified that about half of his 
attack submarine requirement--only half--is being met in the 
Indo-Pacific and a problem that he forecasts will worsen in the 
2020s as our attack submarines are retired faster than they are 
being replaced. Talk to us about this. How is the Navy planning 
to mitigate the anticipated shortfall here in the Indo-Pacific 
in particular?
    Admiral Gilday. Senator, we are buying submarines at the 
rate that both Electric Boat and Huntington-Ingalls can produce 
them. So we are buying at the maximum output right now with the 
exception of the fact that one submarine dropped from the 
budget in 2021.
    It really comes down to a ruthless prioritization. So we 
are meeting the Secretary of Defense's direction for the 
numbers of ready submarines to get to sea, and we have been 
doing that. Then it really comes down to prioritization 
principally between Russia and China in terms of how those 
submarines are then allocated across the combatant commanders 
and employed.
    Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you finally, Mr. Chairman, 
aside from growing the submarine force, are there other 
investments that are needed to extend our undersea warfare 
advantage?
    Admiral Gilday. Unmanned, and so we are making great gains 
in unmanned under the sea.
    Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    We thank all three of you for the time you spent with us. 
Excellent testimony.
    We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                      mcas cherry point & frc-east
    1. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, there appears to be some 
disagreement between the Navy and Marine Corps over who is responsible 
for paying to upgrade facilities at FRC-East [Fleet Readiness Center-
East]. I am concerned this argument is delaying progress. Which service 
is responsible for funding the needed construction and modernization 
efforts at FRC-East and how will you lead in the department to make 
sure that the necessary investments are made?
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy is working with the Marine Corps to solve 
this critical issue. The Navy's January 2018 Fleet Readiness Center 
(FRC) Infrastructure Optimization Plan (IOP) Report to Congress laid 
out a ten-year 8$3.5 billion Department of the Navy (DON) plan for both 
facility and equipment investments/improvements. The plan includes 
future projects for F-35 aircraft heavy maintenance: the modernization 
and restoration of two existing facilities at FRC-SW, a maintenance 
hangar at FRC-East, Cherry Point, NC, and a second phase project for 
this hangar. The Navy's Strike Fighter procurement plan is a mix of 4th 
and 5th generation Strike Fighters to provide complementary capacity 
and capability from our flight decks that is needed to meet the threat 
through the 2030s. The Navy plans to procure up to 273 F-35C aircraft. 
The USMC is transitioning to a 100 percent 5th generation aircraft 
fleet to support Marine Aviation operational needs. The USMC plans to 
procure up to 420 F-35B/C aircraft (F-35B: 353 / F-35C: 67). The Navy 
is working with the USMC to evaluate the appropriate service MILCON 
cost share based upon utilization and the best timing for these 
projects within the entire DON portfolio. In the interim, capacity is 
being expanded within existing FRC spaces to conduct required F-35 
maintenance. The Department of the Navy is committed to the success of 
the F-35 and has funded the F-35 Support Equipment Storage Facility, F-
35 Training and Simulator Facility, F-35 Flight Line Utilities 
Modernization Phase II, and F-35B Vertical Lift Fan Test Facility at 
MCAS Cherry Point.

    2. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, we've been at a costly stalemate 
with FRC-East, so I'd like to set up a meeting with the primary 
stakeholders from the Marine Corps and Navy to finally identify the 
sticking point on this.
    Admiral Gilday. The DON is optimizing F-35 depot maintenance as 
evidenced by the F-35 Lift Fan test facility at Cherry Point, NC. The 
Navy and Marine Corps stakeholders are currently meeting to discuss and 
resolve this issue. Once DON approves the plan, we will provide the 
Committee an update. We look forward to the opportunity to discuss FRC-
East and its support to Navy and Marine Corps aviation.
                  communication spectrum--5g networks
    3. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, Secretary Esper said, ``DOD is 
willing to share spectrum with 5G networks in the ``Mid-Band'' (3 to 
4.2 gigahertz). What systems does the Navy have that might be affected 
and how could it impact Homeland defense?
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy uses this frequency range for both Air 
Defense and Ballistic Missile Defense in support of maritime operations 
and homeland defense. There are at least nineteen USN/USMC 
capabilities, to include every major capital ship, that use this band 
in accordance with current spectrum allocation. We will work closely 
with DOD, FCC and industry on a sharing partnership that supports the 
Nation's 5G goals while also ensuring the hundreds of billions of 
dollars invested in national defense are not wasted. We can provide 
more details at a higher classification upon request.

    4. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, if DOD was required to 
``vacate'' or leave that band of the spectrum instead of sharing, what 
are the potential dollar costs to the military?'' How long would it 
take to move to a different area of the spectrum?
    Admiral Gilday. Moving capability from one band of the spectrum to 
another assumes that frequencies can be identified to relocate. There 
are at least nineteen USN/USMC capabilities, to include every major 
capital ship, that use S band and they are all highly-sophisticated 
weapon systems that took decades and hundreds of billions to develop. 
We would expect many decades and billions of dollars to re-engineer 
systems. We will work closely with DOD, FCC and industry on a sharing 
partnership that supports the Nation's 5G goals while also ensuring the 
hundreds of billions of dollars invested in national defense are not 
wasted. We can provide more details at a higher classification upon 
request.

    5. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, can you describe some of the 
ways that the Navy relies on spectrum to support warfighter 
requirements? What are some of the future spectrum warfighter 
requirements that will be essential to competing with Russia and China 
on a future battlefield?
    Admiral Gilday. DOD considers the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to 
be both a tool for communications, and a weapon to control our 
adversaries' use of the EMS. In other words, spectrum and its use is 
vital to the defense of our nation and national interests, and those of 
our allies. The Combat, Communications, Command and Control over 
spectrum is foundational to all aspects of warfighting. The Navy and 
Marine Corps use the EMS, from Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) to 
Extremely High Frequency (EHF) to detect, track and attack the 
adversary. The implementation of EMS via command and control supports 
our own national interest, and those of our coalition partners and 
their forces, to fight, spoof and otherwise manipulate our adversaries. 
The criticality of spectrum to Navy/DOD missions cannot be understated. 
As the United States pursues further sharing arrangements with the 
commercial world it is essential we have full Congressional support in 
protecting Defense only spectrum in order to ensure national security.
    Our Naval Forces' ability to support diverse operations and crises 
is dependent on their ability to use the EMS for offensive and 
defensive purposes, e.g., intelligence; communications; position, 
navigation, and timing; sensing; command and control (C2); cyber, 
electronic and kinetic attack; air, space and surface ranging; unmanned 
air systems (UAS) and unmanned surface vessels (USVs); data 
transmission and information storage and processing. The Navy and 
Marine Corps are deployed globally and rely on the electromagnetic 
spectrum to remain highly maneuverable, flexible, and tactically 
effective. The ability to access and maneuver in the EMS is a key 
enabler and underlying tenet of these concepts. Speed of command will 
differentiate between victory and defeat in future engagements by 
controlling the precise placement and timing of forces and effects. 
Using and controlling the Radio Frequency spectrum is a vital required 
condition to achieve speed of command in today's Information Warfare-
dominated word.
                      mcas cherry point & frc-east
    6. Senator Tillis. General Berger, there appears to be some 
disagreement between the Navy and Marine Corps over who is responsible 
for paying to upgrade facilities at FRC-East. I am concerned this 
argument is delaying progress. Which service is responsible for funding 
the needed construction and modernization efforts at FRC-East and how 
will you lead in the department to make sure that the necessary 
investments are made?
    General Berger. The Navy and Marine Corps are working together to 
solve this critical issue. The Navy's January 2018 Fleet Readiness 
Center (FRC) Infrastructure Optimization Plan (IOP) Report to Congress 
laid out a ten-year 8$3.5 billion Department of the Navy (DON) plan for 
both facility and equipment investments/improvements. The plan includes 
two unfunded projects for joint F-35 aircraft heavy maintenance: a 
maintenance hangar at FRC-East, Cherry Point, NC, and a second phase 
project for this hangar. We are evaluating the appropriate service 
MILCON cost share based upon utilization and the best timing for these 
projects within the entire DON portfolio. In the interim, capacity is 
being expanded within existing FRC spaces to conduct required F-35 
maintenance.

    7. Senator Tillis. General Berger, we've been at a costly stalemate 
with FRC-East, so I'd like to set up a meeting with the primary 
stakeholders from the Marine Corps and Navy to finally identify the 
sticking point on this.
    General Berger. We look forward to the opportunity to discuss FRC 
East and its support to Navy and Marine Corps aviation. My incoming 
Deputy Commandant for Aviation will be fully prepared to discuss this 
matter with you at your convenience.
                       usmc acquisition programs
    8. Senator Tillis. General Berger, in your written testimony you 
state that you're going to do a review of major acquisition programs 
like F-35, JLTV, ACV etc.--and that you expect that review will likely 
recommend major revisions and reductions to some of our major programs. 
Where are you with that review?
    General Berger. Phase II of our overall Force Design 2030 effort 
concluded in March of this year, and those findings and recommendations 
were publicly released shortly thereafter. While we will continue to 
refine some elements of our overall force with additional integrated 
planning teams, the vast majority of the focus will transition to a 
rigorous wargaming and experimentation phase (phase III) where we will 
further test our conclusions and recommendations. Based on the results 
of those Phase III efforts, we will have a much better understanding of 
the operationally suitable cuts that may be required to major 
acquisition programs such as the F-35B/C, CH-53K, ACV, and JLTV. Based 
on our initial findings, all of those capabilities are still required 
and will make the total force more ready; we simply might need fewer of 
them.

    9.Senator Tillis. General Berger, Marine Corps Air Station New 
River will be the home of over half of all the new CH-53Ks for the 
Marine Corps. I believe they just completed the log demo there and have 
the pilot training simulators installed as well. The CH-53E is an 
established aircraft but it is old and has maintenance challenges. 
Given the fact that your requirement for the CH-53K is 200 aircraft and 
yet you only have about 140 CH-53Es, how important is it for you and 
the Marine Corps to get these new CH-53Ks sooner rather than later?
    General Berger. As noted in my testimony before your Committee, and 
in your QFR, the existing program of record is for 200 aircraft. 
However, that requirement was anchored on an Active Duty force much 
larger than today's force: 202,000 marines with 27 Active component 
infantry battalions. Since the requirement for 200 CH-53Ks was 
initially established over two decades ago, the overall force structure 
has been reduced significantly. In 2010, we reduced the force to 24 
Active component infantry battalions, and as part of Force Design 2030, 
plan the reduction of three additional infantry battalions. With only 
21 Active component infantry battalions to support, the requirement for 
heavy-lift helicopters has decreased by three full squadrons, a total 
of 48 aircraft. If such a reduction is implemented, then the resultant 
152 aircraft capability will still exceed the current inventory of 8140 
CH-53Es. More importantly, these aircraft will relieve pressure on 
surface connectors--both land and sea--and provide a much needed 
upgrade to our future naval expeditionary forces--specifically the 
redesigned Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and new Marine Littoral 
Regiment.
                          usmc budget (pb-21)
    10. Senator Tillis. General Berger, in your written testimony you 
state that the timing of this POM (Program Objective Memorandum) 
submission coincides with an inflection point for the Marine Corps. 
Yet, looking over the Marine Corps' budget I really don't see much 
change. Why isn't there more significant change in President's Budget 
2021?
    General Berger. The Marine Corps' President's Budget 2021 budget 
request was submitted prior to the completion of our initial Force 
Design effort which just concluded in March 2020. The President's 
Budget 2022 budget request is informed by our initial Force Design 
conclusions as noted in our Force Design 2030 report and will reflect 
more significant changes related to new requirements to include 
capabilities such as Group 5 UAS and other unmanned capabilities.
                           usmc end strength
    11. Senator Tillis. General Berger, why didn't you inform the 
Congress of your plans to reduce end strength during the NDAA 
conference process? The ink on the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA has barely 
dried. We had plenty of time to adjust the numbers during conference 
negotiations.
    General Berger. At the time of Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA conference 
negotiations, the initial phases of our Force Design effort were 
underway yet had not been completed. As such, we were not prepared to 
provide concrete recommendations for a reduction in end strength, and 
needed additional time to ensure that any cut was grounded in a 
defensible analytic foundation.

    12. Senator Tillis. General Berger, in light of your plans for 
fiscal year 2020, why should we trust the end strength numbers you 
included in the fiscal year 2021 budget request?
    General Berger. The Marine Corps strives to maintain an open and 
transparent dialogue with Congress, providing the most accurate 
information it can in as timely a manner as possible. Congress can 
``trust'' our numbers because those are based on a solid analytic 
foundation, and informed by rigorous wargaming and experimentation. 
Over the next ten years, Congress can expect Marine Corps end strength 
to align with our ongoing Force Design effort, the initial stages of 
which were completed in early 2020. While this effort will be iterative 
and responsive to the rapidly evolving security environment, we are 
confident that further reductions to end strength will be required to 
enable investment in future capabilities. Moving forward, we will 
continue to update Congress on our Force Design progress and any 
required organizational changes to enable it.
                      camp lejeune toxic exposure
    13. Senator Tillis. General Berger, I understand that the Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has identified a 
number of buildings at Camp Lejeune that are still threatened by toxic 
chemical plumes with high detectable levels of the cancer causing TCE. 
During Hurricane Florence, TCE remediation was temporarily halted due 
to storm damage at the barracks at HP 57 in Hadnot Point. HP 57 houses 
female marines of child bearing age, and TCE is proven to cause fetal 
defects if pregnant women are exposed to it. Are there any current 
efforts underway to move female marines of child bearing age from the 
HP 57 barracks? If not, what steps are currently underway to ensure 
that remediation of TCE in this location does not occur again?
    General Berger. Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune does not plan 
to move female marines from HP57 because effective measures have been 
implemented to prevent vapor intrusion (VI). Beginning in 2007, MCB 
Camp Lejeune conducted a base-wide VI evaluation, including building 
HP57, in coordination with the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA) and the North Carolina Department of Environmental 
Quality (NCDEQ). The Marine Corps has shared this information with 
ATSDR for their ongoing MCB Camp Lejeune VI Public Health Assessment. 
ATSDR has assured us that if they identify any health risks they will 
immediately notify installation officials. To date, they have not done 
so. In 2014, testing indicated elevated contaminant vapors in a 
mechanical room at HP57. A prompt investigation determined that the 
vapors were coming from an uncapped sewer pipe which was promptly 
repaired. Since that repair, no air quality tests have detected TCE 
vapors from VI above residential indoor air screening levels. As a 
precautionary measure, MCB Camp Lejeune installed an active sewer 
venting system as a secondary engineering control. Based on historical 
test results, including test results prior to the installation of the 
active sewer venting system, MCB Camp Lejeune does not expect VI to 
occur at HP57 even during electrical interruptions as briefly occurred 
because of Hurricane Florence. The EPA and NCDEQ both concur with these 
primary and secondary engineering controls and agree that this approach 
protects human health.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
             southeast alaska acoustic measurement facility
    14. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Modly, the Southeast Alaska 
Acoustic Measurement Facility (SEAFAC) is the Navy's only West Coast 
asset for making high fidelity passive acoustic signature measurements. 
It is my understanding that the majority of the workforce for this 
facility does not live--full time--in Ketchikan, Alaska, and instead 
commutes--at cost to the Navy--to conduct operations at the facility. 
What is the Navy's rationale for this transient workforce and what is 
the yearly cost to the Navy?
    Secretary Modly. The SEAFAC Site Director and year-round operations 
and maintenance staff are local personnel who live in Ketchikan. The 
operations and maintenance crew consists of 16 personnel who work a 
standard workweek throughout the entire year at SEAFAC, ensuring the 
facility is updated, maintained, and ready to support acoustic tests. 
In an average year, approximately 10 acoustic trials are conducted. A 
typical trial lasts 72 hours, bringing the total average number of 
testing days at SEAFAC to approximately 30 days per year. When a test 
is scheduled, a trial analyst team of experts, assembled from across 
the NAVSEA organization, travels to SEAFAC to conduct around-the-clock 
operations for the duration of the trial. The trial analyst team 
consists of subject matter experts in sonar, acoustics, signal 
processing, submarine stealth, and other specialties. Following the 
test, the analyst team members return to their home laboratories where 
the computer infrastructure, advanced analysis tools, and other 
communication and support capabilities exist to analyze the data and 
produce products for the Fleet. The trial analyst team of subject 
matter experts is not required at SEAFAC other than during these tests, 
and they support similar testing at SEAFAC's sister facility, the South 
TOTO (Tongue of the Ocean) Acoustic Measurement Facility (STAFAC), 
located in the Bahamas, for Atlantic Fleet submarines. These experts 
also support a significant amount of work at Navy submarine bases, as 
well as two primary Navy laboratories, Naval Surface Warfare Center, 
Carderock Division, located at Bethesda, MD, and Submarine Base Bangor, 
in Silverdale, WA. The laboratories serve as home base for the trial 
analyst team. It is much more cost effective (estimated savings of 
$3.7M of travel costs annually) to have a nationally distributed team 
of experts supporting the Navy globally than to locate them all in 
Ketchikan, where they are only required 30 days per year.

    15. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Modly, has the Navy explored the 
possibility of local hires in Ketchikan to staff the facility? If so, 
what was the result? If not, why not?
    Secretary Modly. The year-round operations and maintenance 
personnel at SEAFAC have been local Ketchikan people since SEAFAC's 
construction in the 1990s. Throughout the life of SEAFAC, the Navy has 
been a strong advocate for using local Ketchikan personnel to a large 
extent and whenever possible. Contract actions for support of SEAFAC 
are always open for submittals from local entities, and they encourage 
the use of local personnel.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                          f/a-18 super hornets
    16. Senator Hawley. Secretary Modly, the fiscal year 2021 budget 
request includes funding for 24 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, but eliminates 
36 aircraft from future years, halting production in fiscal year 2022. 
As a result, the F/A-18 line could face a closure decision next year. 
What is the Navy's tactical aviation shortfall this year, and how would 
it be impacted if the Super Hornet line is closed after this year?
    Secretary Modly. The strike fighter inventory management modelling 
accounts for procurement block III Super Hornets and Joint Strike 
Fighter, service life modification of block III Super Hornets, 
maintenance repair, and projected aircraft utilization based on the 
optimized fleet response plan. Inventory modeling with President's 
Budget 2021 shows a maximum strike fighter shortfall of 58 aircraft in 
fiscal year 2021, with continual improvement throughout the future 
year's defense program. The Department of the Navy is committed to 
achieving a mix of 4th and 5th Generation assets by 2030 with the F/A-
18E/F and F-35C fleet while developing Next Generation Air Dominance to 
replace the F/A-18E/F as it reaches end of service life.

    17. Senator Hawley. Secretary Modly, what is the Navy's strategy 
for engaging our international partners and how that could help extend 
the F/A-18 production line?
    Secretary Modly. The Department of Navy (DON) actively engages with 
our international partners on F/A-18 opportunities. The DON is 
currently in formal strike-fighter competitions with the governments of 
Canada (88 aircraft), Finland (64 aircraft), Germany (90 or 45 
aircraft), India (57 aircraft) and Switzerland (40 aircraft). Formal 
international commitments are not expected prior to calendar year 2021, 
with deliveries in 2024 and beyond.

    18. Senator Hawley. Secretary Modly, as a complement to new 
production, the Navy also invested in the F/A-18E/F Service Life 
Modification (SLM) program to extend the Super Hornet fleet and 
maintain tactical aviation readiness. The SLM program will certainly 
yield positive results to lengthen the service life of aircraft. 
However, even successfully remanufactured aircraft inherently increase 
the average age of the tactical air force. Additionally, SLM relies on 
a production line of new Super Hornets for on-time parts and production 
expertise. Has the Navy assessed the impact of eliminating new Super 
Hornets on SLM cost or effectiveness or the long-term cost of 
sustaining an increasingly aging fleet, and if so, what is the Navy's 
assessment?
    Secretary Modly. The Service Life Modification (SLM) program 
supports Strike Fighter Inventory Management while a greater number of 
5th generation fighters join the Fleet. SLM is a standalone contract 
with dedicated programmatic, engineering, quality and touch labor 
resources (i.e. not shared with production), and does not negatively 
impact the production line. Production ceasing in fiscal year 2021 may 
present opportunities to acquire experienced touch labor to augment the 
SLM program. The Department of Navy has assessed the cost 
effectiveness, and recognizes the increased operating and sustainment 
cost associated with operating aging fleets. It has divested from 
legacy Hornets at the operational edge, with the Reserve component and 
Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center to follow in 2025. 
Currently, the Super Hornet is less expensive to procure and operate 
than the Joint Strike Fighter. However, it is expected that the cost 
per flight hour of 4th and 5th Gen platforms will equalize near the end 
of the Future Year Defense Program as a greater number of F-35C are 
operated in the fleet.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                           privatized housing
    19. Senator Reed. Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, and General 
Berger, regarding privatized homes that are ADA (Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990) compliant, my understanding is that roughly 
five percent of homes must be made accessible for ADA families. And if 
ADA families do not have an ADA home when they move to an installation, 
they are placed on a waiting list. Also, if a family moves into an ADA 
compliant home, they must sign a form saying they will vacate the home 
if a family requiring ADA compliance needs one. We have received 
reports of military families unable to move into an ADA home, instances 
of families who have not moved out when an incoming family requires an 
ADA home. Are you aware of any such instances? And if not, can you 
please look into it and report back to us?
    Secretary Modly. All but one of the Department of the Navy's (DON) 
privatized family housing business agreements include specific 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliance language to address 
alterations for ADA accommodation. In addition, all projects are 
required to comply with all Federal, state and municipal laws and 
certify compliance each year. The business agreement for Kingsville II 
does not currently include ADA language in the business agreement and 
will be updated when agreements are updated to incorporate NDAA 
changes. On Navy installations, some ADA families have not immediately 
moved into an ADA compliant home and have been put on a wait list. They 
are moved into an ADA home when one becomes available or when the 
property manager has modified a home to meet the needs of the family. 
CNIC has no record of families (non-ADA) occupying ADA homes failing to 
move when given proper notification within the lease agreement by the 
local property manager. For Marine Corps installations, Marine Corps 
Base Hawaii indicated that there have been instances when a non-ADA 
family was relocated at the PPV partner's expense in order to 
accommodate an ADA family. MCICOM has no record of this being an issue 
at any other installation. With the exception of MCB Hawaii, most 
Marine Corps installations do not require non-ADA families to sign a 
form prior to occupancy stating that they will vacate a home if it is 
required for an ADA family.
    Admiral Gilday. All but one of the Department of the Navy's (DON) 
privatized family housing business agreements include specific 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliance language to address 
alterations for ADA accommodation. In addition, all projects are 
required to comply with all Federal, state and municipal laws and 
certify compliance each year. The business agreement for Kingsville II 
does not currently include ADA language in the business agreement and 
will be updated when agreements are updated to incorporate NDAA 
changes. On Navy installations, some ADA families have not immediately 
moved into an ADA compliant home and have been put on a wait list. They 
are moved into an ADA home when one becomes available or when the 
property manager has modified a home to meet the needs of the family. 
CNIC has no record of families (non-ADA) occupying ADA homes failing to 
move when given proper notification within the lease agreement by the 
local property manager. For Marine Corps installations, Marine Corps 
Base Hawaii indicated that there have been instances when a non-ADA 
family was relocated at the PPV partner's expense in order to 
accommodate an ADA family. MCICOM has no record of this being an issue 
at any other installation. With the exception of MCB Hawaii, most 
Marine Corps installations do not require non-ADA families to sign a 
form prior to occupancy stating that they will vacate a home if it is 
required for an ADA family.
    General Berger. MCB Hawaii indicated there have been instances when 
a non-ADA family was relocated at the PPV partner's expense in order to 
accommodate an ADA family. MCB Hawaii does require that non-ADA 
families sign a form prior to occupancy stating that they will vacate a 
home if it is required for an ADA family. This has not been an issue at 
any of our other installations, thus most Marine Corps installations do 
not require non-ADA families to sign a form prior to occupying an ADA 
home. We will review current policies across our installations and 
ensure all are in compliance.
       operational energy alignment to national defense strategy
    20. Senator Reed. Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, and General 
Berger, according to the Navy's recently analysis sent to this 
Committee, a hybrid electric drive (HED) can reduce fuel use as much as 
37 percent compared to a ship without one. Another type of operational 
energy improvement called stern flaps, save the Navy $125 million per 
year. These and other types of operational energy improvements increase 
on-station time for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships and can help 
address the tyranny of distance fuel logistics problem in the Pacific. 
These are all aspects of the Navy's alignment with the National Defense 
Strategy. Can each of you please briefly talk about how operational 
energy improvements increase combat capability and lethality of the 
Navy and Marine Corps and what kind of other investments you all are 
making for ships and deployed forces?
    Secretary Modly. The Navy's warfighting strategy, aligned to the 
NDS, employs a Distributed Maritime Operations concept that increases 
the importance of forward logistics capability, platform endurance, and 
operational reach. Navy's operational energy improvements target 
technologies that extend energy supplies into contested environments 
and optimize energy use. The following investments enhance the naval 
operational energy network to enable distributed operations: The MQ-25A 
is a CVN-based unmanned aerial tanker that will extend the reach of the 
carrier strike group's air wing Afloat refueling projects, including 
the Seabased Petroleum Distribution System (SPDS) and Improved Modular 
Fuel Delivery System (IMFDS), will enable a more reliable and robust 
fuel distribution network, and provide options for getting fuel over 
the shore to marines. The Integrated Power and Energy Systems project 
is developing the next generation shipboard power and energy 
architecture and subsystems needed to optimize electrical energy 
distribution and enable future high energy weapons Advanced batteries 
and fuel cells are enabling more unmanned capabilities and extending 
reach and endurance of naval weapons systems The Mobility Fuels program 
continues to provide testing and certification capabilities to ensure 
the Navy has access to reliable sources of fuel worldwide Energy 
Command and Control tools, including the Global Energy Information 
System (GENISYS), the Replenishment at Sea Planner (RASP), and Maritime 
Tactical Command and Control (MTC2), will support tactical and campaign 
level energy management.
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy's warfighting strategy, aligned to the 
NDS, employs a Distributed Maritime Operations concept that increases 
the importance of forward logistics capability, platform endurance, and 
operational reach. Navy's operational energy improvements target 
technologies that extend energy supplies into contested environments 
and optimize energy use. The following investments enhance the naval 
operational energy network to enable distributed operations:
      The MQ-25A is a CVN-based unmanned aerial tanker that 
will extend the reach of the carrier strike group's air wing.
      Afloat refueling projects, including the Seabased 
Petroleum Distribution System (SPDS) and Improved Modular Fuel Delivery 
System (IMFDS), will enable a more reliable and robust fuel 
distribution network, and provide options for getting fuel over the 
shore to marines.
      The Integrated Power and Energy Systems project is 
developing the next generation shipboard power and energy architecture 
and subsystems needed to optimize electrical energy distribution and 
enable future high energy weapons.
      Advanced batteries and fuel cells are enabling more 
unmanned capabilities and extending reach and endurance of naval 
weapons systems.
      The Mobility Fuels program continues to provide testing 
and certification capabilities to ensure the Navy has access to 
reliable sources of fuel worldwide.
      Energy Command and Control tools, including the Global 
Energy Information System (GENISYS), the Replenishment at Sea Planner 
(RASP), and Maritime Tactical Command and Control (MTC2), will support 
tactical and campaign level energy management.
    General Berger. The Marine Corps is investing approximately $51 
million in fiscal year 2021 to address Operational Energy (OE) 
challenges, $18 million to increase future warfighting capability, and 
$33 million to enhance mission effectiveness of the current force. For 
example, we are investing in advanced power sources and new power 
generation and harvesting methods, with supporting research and 
development in renewable energy sources, mobile electric power, new 
advanced battery chemistries, and alternative energy sources (e.g. 
hydrogen fuel cells or aluminum based fuels). We are also seeking novel 
methods to execute bulk fuel distribution, for example, investing in 
manned and unmanned systems that expand the distribution network via 
low-cost, risk-worthy platforms, while enhancing network redundancy and 
inverting the energy cost curve. OE investments reduce both the 
footprint and logistics tail required to support forward forces--
essential if we are to realize the potential of Distributed Maritime 
Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
             portsmouth naval shipyard joint land use study
    21. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard and the town of Kittery, Maine recently unveiled a 
``Joint Land Use Study'' to address traffic and congestion issues as 
the shipyard continues to expand. How is the Navy involved in this 
process?
    Secretary Modly. The Kittery, Maine, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Joint Land Use Study (JLUS) is an opportunity for the Town of Kittery, 
the Southern Maine Planning and Development Commission (SMPDC) along 
with the States of Maine and New Hampshire, and the Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard (PNSY) to strengthen their current partnerships. This includes 
the ability to understand and address the issues impacting both the 
Navy and communities throughout the region, including traffic 
congestion. The JLUS also established a blueprint to support military 
readiness, community growth, and economic development. Extensive public 
outreach and engagement occurred throughout the JLUS planning process. 
The JLUS is a collaborative community planning effort between PNSY, 
state and federal officials, and various community stakeholders. 
Communication and coordination between the shipyard and the community 
are more robust through the study process. The process encourages them 
to act as a team to prevent or limit compatibility issues caused by 
future shipyard expansion or community growth. Kittery and the SMPDC 
sponsored the JLUS with funding support from the U.S. Department of 
Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment.
    Admiral Gilday. The Kittery, Maine, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Joint Land Use Study (JLUS) is an opportunity for the Town of Kittery, 
the Southern Maine Planning and Development Commission (SMPDC) along 
with the States of Maine and New Hampshire, and the Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard (PNSY) to strengthen their current partnerships. This includes 
the ability to understand and address the issues impacting both the 
Navy and communities throughout the region, including traffic 
congestion. The JLUS also established a blueprint to support military 
readiness, community growth, and economic development. Extensive public 
outreach and engagement occurred throughout the JLUS planning process. 
The JLUS is a collaborative community planning effort between PNSY, 
state and federal officials, and various community stakeholders. 
Communication and coordination between the shipyard and the community 
are more robust through the study process. The process encourages them 
to act as a team to prevent or limit compatibility issues caused by 
future shipyard expansion or community growth. Kittery and the SMPDC 
sponsored the JLUS with funding support from the U.S. Department of 
Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment.

    22. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, there is a 
military construction (MILCON) project in the fiscal year 2023 budget 
plan that would acquire the rail spur land near the Route 1 bypass and 
Route 103 heading towards the shipyard to temporarily hold supplies for 
the shipyard and create satellite parking. How will the Navy commit to 
ensuring the needs at the shipyard are addressed?
    Secretary Modly. Yes, the Navy has a requirement for the rail spur 
land near the Route 1 bypass and Route 103 heading towards the shipyard 
as a temporary holding space for supplies and to create satellite 
parking for the shipyard. No discussions have taken place between the 
Town of Kittery or any Joint Land Use Study committee stakeholders 
regarding any projects that would support any such initiatives. The 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) submitted a MILCON P-1170 project 
request for fiscal year 2022 that was not programmed. Following 
internal Navy processes, the project is being resubmitted for 
consideration in future Navy programming actions. The Navy will ensure 
the needs at the Shipyard are addressed through the Shipyard 
Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). SIOP is using a digital-
twin planning tool to help guide the Navy to final decisions for all 
projects needed to support an efficient shipyard configuration. The 
digital-twin effort at PNSY will be completed during the second quarter 
of fiscal year 2021, with an updated Area Development Plan expected to 
be completed by the third quarter of fiscal year 2022.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, the Navy has a requirement for the rail spur 
land near the Route 1 bypass and Route 103 heading towards the shipyard 
as a temporary holding space for supplies and to create satellite 
parking for the shipyard. No discussions have taken place between the 
Town of Kittery or any Joint Land Use Study committee stakeholders 
regarding any projects that would support any such initiatives. The 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) submitted a MILCON P-1170 project 
request for fiscal year 2022 that was not programmed. Following 
internal Navy processes, the project is being resubmitted for 
consideration in future Navy programming actions. The Navy will ensure 
the needs at the Shipyard are addressed through the Shipyard 
Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). SIOP is using a digital-
twin planning tool to help guide the Navy to final decisions for all 
projects needed to support an efficient shipyard configuration. The 
digital-twin effort at PNSY will be completed during the second quarter 
of fiscal year 2021, with an updated Area Development Plan expected to 
be completed by the third quarter of fiscal year 2022.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                             virginia-class
    23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, yesterday, Secretary 
Geurts testified before the Seapower Subcommittee that the Virginia-
class does not have an execution issue, and there's no concern about 
the contractor's ability to deliver--it is truly an affordability 
issue, which is why one Virginia-class submarine is the top priority on 
the Navy's unfunded requirements list. Do you agree with this 
assessment?
    Secretary Modly. Yes, this was not an execution issue. The 
construction schedules which had been lagging on Virginia-class 
submarines are stabilizing, and the Navy can execute a 2nd ship if it 
is funded in fiscal year 2021. During the budget process, strategic 
decisions had to be made across the entire Navy portfolio to balance 
requirements versus the top line budget. A second submarine is the 
Navy's next priority and, for that reason, is at the top of our 
unfunded priorities list.

    24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, why did the Navy budget 
request only include one submarine in fiscal year 2021, exacerbating 
the shortfall in fast-attack submarines?
    Secretary Modly. The Navy faces significant budgetary pressures, 
and funding for additional fast attack submarines must compete with 
other important demands, such as readiness and force level requirements 
of other classes of ships, including Columbia. Although SSN force 
structure remains below the Navy requirement, the Navy is able to 
manage force requirements to execute our required missions during this 
time, while expanding the industrial base to support growing a larger 
more lethal SSN force structure.

    25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, are you concerned about 
the potential harm to the submarine industrial base and workforce if 
only one Virginia-class submarine is funding?
    Secretary Modly. A healthy industrial base is critical to meeting 
the shipbuilding demand outlined in President's Budget 2021 and the 
Navy greatly appreciates the support Congress has given us to stabilize 
and enhance that industrial base and shipbuilding programs. The Navy 
must have a stable industrial base in order to not only ramp up for the 
future, but also to sustain the employment and the skill levels already 
in place. While it is imperative that the Navy retain and expand our 
competitive advantage and improve capacity and capability, the Navy 
faces budgetary limitations and competing priorities. The industrial 
base should not be harmed by funding only one submarine in fiscal year 
2021. However, maintaining the two per year build rate is the most 
effective way to stabilize the industrial base and increase SSN 
capacity. For this reason, the Virginia-class ship is the number one 
priority on the Unfunded Priority List. The Virginia-class Submarine 
(VCS) Block V Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) contract includes a priced 
option for one additional SSN with VPM executable in either fiscal year 
2021, fiscal year 2022, or fiscal year 2023. Additionally, as required 
by public law 115-232, the contract contains unpriced options for an 
additional ship in fiscal year 2022 and fiscal year 2023. The 
President's Budget 2021 request and prior year budgets (fiscal year 
2018 to fiscal year 2020) include funding to support critical spare 
materials for a tenth VCS Block V hull. Funding for these materials 
early in the MYP is critical to level loading supplier's work orders 
and serves to mitigate many impacts of procuring a single submarine in 
fiscal year 2021. If a tenth VCS Block V option is not exercised the 
material would be assigned to subsequent SSNs. Additionally, the Navy 
continues to implement the Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP), which 
coordinates the key actions required to accomplish integrated 
construction across the nuclear shipbuilding enterprise, including VCS, 
Columbia-class, and Ford-class. The IEP includes a substantial focus on 
meeting labor demands and both shipyards have contributed workforce 
acquisition and development strategies. The Navy will continue its 
efforts to sustain a viable submarine industrial base and its 
workforce.

    26. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Gilday,do you believe that our 
current pace of submarine construction is sufficient for the United 
States to maintain undersea dominance--particularly with regard to 
near-peer adversaries Russia and China?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, it is imperative that the Navy retain and 
expand our competitive advantage, both in capacity and capability. The 
Navy will continue to re-examine our force structure and Shipbuilding 
plans, improving SSN capacity where feasible given budgetary 
limitations and competing priorities. Of particular importance is to 
preserve our industrial base and establish an aggressive, forward-
looking, competitive posture. Virginia-class submarines use modular 
construction with an open architecture to enable capability 
improvements. Each successive submarine block continues to include 
capability enhancements keeping us ahead of the threat and restoring 
operational margin.
                  electric boat and groton work force
    27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, I would like a staff-level 
brief on Navy efforts to stabilize the submarine workforce, but 
specifically I'd like to know: When do you expect to have a contract in 
place for Electric Boat workers to help public shipyards with 
maintenance or other availabilities to ease the workforce dip?
    Secretary Modly. The Navy is evaluating all contract opportunities 
and structures for augmenting the nuclear ship maintenance workforce 
from private shipyards. Therefore, the Navy cannot provide specific 
information on the number people or the specific companies that would 
be involved. The Navy will reach out to your staff to schedule a 
briefing at the earliest opportunity.

    28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, how many workers will this 
help, and which public shipyards are participating?
    Secretary Modly. The Navy is evaluating all contact opportunities 
and structures for accomplishing the nuclear ship maintenance workload 
with our private industry partners. The Navy will reach out to your 
staff to schedule a briefing at the earliest opportunity.

    29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, what other policies or 
authorities are required in order to ease the trend of furloughs and 
new hires to stabilize the submarine industrial base workforce?
    Secretary Modly. A skilled, experienced industrial base workforce 
is key to the efficient construction and maintenance of submarines. The 
Navy closely oversees workload and workforce requirements necessary to 
meet submarine construction and maintenance schedules. As Columbia lead 
ship construction begins this year and ramps up to serial production in 
fiscal year 2026, the submarine construction workforce will need to 
expand from current levels. There are no new policies or authorities 
required however. The Columbia program will continue to benefit from 
authorities in the National Sea Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) to help 
level-load the industrial base and the associated workforce. NSBDF 
authorities of particular benefit to the workforce include: Economic 
Order Quantity in support of Multi-Program Material Procurement, 
Advance Construction, and Continuous Production which reduce 
construction schedule risk through consistent demand signals and level 
loading enabling construction efficiencies & facilities optimization. 
In addition, Congress has appropriated $573 million to the Virginia and 
Columbia programs since fiscal year 2018 for submarine industrial base 
expansion and risk reduction. These funds are critical for actively 
managing supply base risks and aiding with supplier development. An 
additional key enabler for de-risking the workforce and industrial base 
is the on-time award of the Build I contract (SSBN 826 and 827). The 
Department of Defense has submitted a legislative proposal requesting 
authority to award the incrementally funded Build I contract. In order 
to exercise the Build, I option on schedule, the authority to award the 
incrementally funded contract is required by October 2020. In the event 
of a fiscal year 2021 Continuing Resolution, an anomaly will be 
required, including new start language and incremental funding 
authority. Even with plans to mitigate workload shortfalls and manage 
green labor, peaks and valleys will continue to occur in the work force 
due to submarine construction and repair schedules. To address these 
near term ebbs, the Navy has assigned some submarine maintenance 
availabilities to private shipyards. The Navy will continue to evaluate 
future opportunities to help manage the workload in private shipyards 
and to ease the workload ramp to Columbia serial production.

    30. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, what is the plan for 
maintenance on the USS John Warner? When do you anticipate this 
maintenance availability will be awarded?
    Secretary Modly. The USS John Warner's Extended Drydocking Selected 
Restricted Availability is scheduled for accomplishment in fiscal year 
2023. As the Navy continues to balance its workload across the entire 
industrial base, it will continue to consider the available capacity 
within the public and private sectors. The Navy anticipates making a 
final decision by the end of the second quarter of calendar year 2021.
                          ch-53k funding cuts
    31. Senator Blumenthal. General Berger, would you support funding 
for 9 CH-53Ks in the fiscal year 2021 budget?
    General Berger. We budgeted for 7 aircraft in fiscal year 2021. If 
8$240 million of additional funding were made available to the Marine 
Corps, we would prefer to apply those resources toward higher Service 
acquisition priorities aligned to Force Design 2030 such as Group 5 
MALE UAS. We remain committed to the HMH program as articulated in the 
Force Design 2030 report, and think that our current pace for 
procurement remains appropriate.

    32. Senator Blumenthal. General Berger, What role does the CH53K 
play in the expeditionary advanced basing operations concept of 
employment, and supporting distributed maritime operations?
    General Berger. Beyond its traditional role as heavy-lift support, 
the CH-53K's exact function in our emerging naval concepts of 
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Base 
Operations (EABO) requires additional study. We aim to advance our 
understanding of the aircraft's role in DMO and EABO during rigorous 
experimentation and exercises as part of our ongoing Force Design 
effort. As noted in our Force Design 2030 report, we are confident that 
5 CH-53K squadrons will provide the modern heavy-lift capabilities that 
our stand-in naval forces require. We see the CH-53K as one of several 
key capabilities within a larger system of naval and joint capabilities 
whose role is largely dependent upon the presence or absence of other 
assets such as surface connectors, as well as the size and weight of 
our base firing elements--HIMARs, LW155, or future Rogue Fires. The CH-
53K has the ability to move more fuel, equipment, critical supplies, 
and marines at greater distances than any current rotorcraft; thus, 
should provide our forward deployed forces with a key capability for 
maritime gray zone competition against peer or near-peer adversaries. 
In addition, it will provide Fleet Commanders and ARG/MEU Commanders 
with a modern capability in support of our traditional crisis response 
role. As our EABO experimentation progresses, I will provide you and 
the Committee with updates, and look forward to discussing this program 
with you in the near future.
                  work force development funding cuts
    33. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, last year the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Development Account appropriated over 400 million 
for work force development across the Department of Defense. 
Additionally in support of the Columbia program, 123 million was 
appropriated for submarine industrial base expansion to ensure that 
second and third-tier contractors can meet increased production 
requirements. Can you provide this Committee an update on the funding 
provided last year to support supplier and work force development?
    Secretary Modly. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Development 
Account funds the recruitment, training, and retention of Department of 
Defense personnel. This fund does not provide funding to support 
private shipbuilder workforce development. The fiscal year 2020 
Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $8 million in the Industrial 
Base Analysis and Sustainment Support line for submarine workforce 
development. In previous years, the federal government provided 
assistance to benefit the submarine industrial base through Department 
of Labor grants to manufacturing workforce development programs. 
Programs in Connecticut and Rhode Island leveraged this funding to 
recruit and train the increasingly green force. Funding appropriated by 
Congress in fiscal year 2020 will be used to support similar programs. 
The fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act and the fiscal 
year 2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $123 million for 
submarine industrial base expansion and risk reduction. Similar to the 
fiscal year 2019 $225 million provided, the fiscal year 2020 funding 
will be applied to developing alternate source suppliers, developing 
strategic sourcing suppliers, and improving capacity and capability at 
existing suppliers. A separate brief will be provided with detailed 
information regarding funding appropriated for submarine supplier 
development.

    34. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, the Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Development Account in the fiscal year 2021 budget has been 
reduced by over \3/4\ from fiscal year 2020 enacted levels, from 400 
million to 92 million. Are you concerned about how this drop in funding 
will impact the sustainment of the industrial base and submarine 
construction schedules?
    Secretary Modly. The successful sustainment of the submarine 
industrial base and its associated weapons systems relies on a highly 
skilled and trained acquisition workforce, including the supporting 
personnel assigned to work directly with the acquisition workforce. The 
acquisition workforce, in coordination with our industry partners, 
plays an integral role in supporting and enabling submarine 
construction schedule efforts. The Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Development Account supports training and development of the 
acquisition workforce and is a critical element of both effective 
execution of the acquisition programs and ensuring a pipeline of 
qualified employees. The Navy faces significant budgetary pressures, 
and funding for training and development of the acquisition workforce 
must compete with other important demands such as readiness. However, 
the Navy is prioritizing efforts with the funding that remains to 
minimize impacts to the industrial base and submarine construction 
schedules. We are focusing on attracting talent to the civilian 
workforce--targeting critical skill gaps such as STEM and Information 
Technology--and continue to leverage section 1111 hiring authorities to 
hire highly qualified acquisition and technology experts with a focus 
on Submarine Supply Chain challenges. The Navy is also continuing to 
provide training to improve the understanding between industry and 
government relationships. Funding will also be set aside to support the 
congressional directives in prior NDAAs such as supporting program 
manager development, industry exchange programs, and increased 
experiential learning.

    35. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, as you know, Columbia 
construction begins this year. What still needs to be done to improve 
supplier and work force development?
    Secretary Modly. Since fiscal year 2018, Congress has appropriated 
$573 million for submarine industrial base expansion in the Virginia 
and Columbia funding lines. The Navy will continue to use these funds 
to actively manage supply base risk and aid with supplier development. 
As Columbia lead ship construction begins this year and ramps up to 
serial production in fiscal year 2026, the submarine construction 
workforce will need to expand from current levels. The Navy, through 
the various program offices, closely oversees workload and workforce 
requirements necessary to meet construction levels and schedules, 
including the shipbuilders' long-term, coordinated workforce 
development plans. Key aspects of these plans are to find a sufficient 
number of qualified workers and to manage and maximize the 
effectiveness of green labor. In recent years, the Federal Government 
has contributed to state and private investments in manufacturing 
workforce development programs. These programs have increased the 
qualified labor pool for the submarine industrial base and increased 
the preparedness of workers as they enter the workforce. Continued 
funding of these programs would be beneficial to the Navy and its 
partners.

    36. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, what is the impact of the 
Virginia-class ramp deduction from two to one this year in respect to 
ensuring we have the right trained and educated work force?
    Secretary Modly. A healthy industrial base is critical to meeting 
the shipbuilding demand outlined in in the fiscal year 2021 budget 
request, and the Navy greatly appreciates the support Congress has 
given us to stabilize and enhance that industrial base and shipbuilding 
programs. The Navy must have a stable industrial base and workforce in 
order to not only ramp up for the future, but also to sustain the 
employment and the skill levels already in place. While it is 
imperative that the Navy retain and expand our competitive advantage 
and improve capacity and capability, the Navy faces budgetary 
limitations and competing priorities. The industrial base and workforce 
should not be harmed by funding only one submarine in fiscal year 2021 
however, maintaining the two per year build rate is the most effective 
way to stabilize the industrial base and increase SSN capacity. For 
this reason, the Virginia-class ship is the number one priority on the 
Unfunded Priority List. The Virginia-class Submarine (VCS) Block V 
contract was structured to include a priced option for one additional 
SSN with VPM executable in either fiscal year 2021, fiscal year 2022, 
or fiscal year 2023. Additionally, as required by public law 115-232, 
the contract contains unpriced options for an additional ship in fiscal 
year 2022 and fiscal year 2023. The President's fiscal year 2021 budget 
request and prior year budgets (fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2020) 
include funding to support critical spare materials for a tenth VCS 
Block V hull. This material includes non-nuclear CFE components bought 
with two-year and one-year AP and non-nuclear EOQ material. Funding for 
these materials early in the MYP is critical to level loading 
supplier's work orders and serves to mitigate many impacts of procuring 
a single submarine in fiscal year 2021. If a tenth VCS Block V option 
is not exercised the material would be assigned to subsequent SSNs. 
Additionally, the Navy continues to implement the Integrated Enterprise 
Plan (IEP) which coordinates the key actions that are needed to 
accomplish integrated construction across the nuclear shipbuilding 
enterprise, including VCS, Columbia-class, and Ford-class. The IEP 
includes a substantial focus on meeting labor demands and both 
shipyards have contributed workforce acquisition and development 
strategies. These plans and strategies are tied directly to long-term 
submarine construction plans elsewhere in the IEP.

    37. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, what implications does 
this have for the delivery schedules of both Virginia and Columbia-
class over the FYDP?
    Secretary Modly. Procuring one Virginia-class submarine (VCS) in 
fiscal year 2021 has no impact on the delivery schedules of VCS and 
Columbia (CLB) over the FYDP. The shipbuilders are focusing on 
returning to a two per year VCS rate at a 6 month cadence. It is 
expected that VCS Block V construction start and deliveries would 
continue at a 6 month cadence independent of whether Block V included 
nine or ten submarines. CLB is the Navy's top acquisition priority and 
the Navy is working to ensure that the schedule for the CLB remains on 
track. The workforce and facilities being utilized by the CLB program 
are being established in concert with those of VCS, with some dedicated 
CLB portions. As such, any changes in the VCS program should not impact 
the CLB program.

    38. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, are there any additional 
policies or authorities that you need in order to ensure greater 
stability within the submarine industrial base and among our submarine 
workforce?
    Secretary Modly. There are no additional authorities needed to 
ensure greater stability within the submarine industrial base and among 
the submarine workforce. The Department greatly appreciates the 
authorities provided in the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund and the 
Congressional support provided in fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 
to expand the industrial base. Both have enabled savings and 
efficiencies and supported improving the health of the submarine 
industrial base. The Department does need Incremental Funding Authority 
to execute the Build I contract for SSBN 826 and SSBN 827, planned to 
be awarded in October 2020.
            reduced procurement and funding for shipbuilding
    39. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, in addition to being 
concerned about technological encroachment and competition by our 
adversaries, I am concerned that we are self-defeating at our current 
procurement and funding levels. The Navy's fiscal year 2021 budget 
requests the procurement of eight new ships, but this figure includes 
LPD-31, which Congress procured (i.e., authorized and appropriated 
procurement funding for) in fiscal year 2020. Excluding this ship, the 
Navy's proposed fiscal year 2021 budget requests the procurement of 
seven new ships rather than eight, which is less than the 10 ships that 
the Navy projected it would request under its fiscal year 2020 budget 
submission. This number is also significant because a rate of seven 
ships is less than the average ship procurement rate that would be 
needed over the long run, given current ship service lives, to achieve 
and maintain a 355-ship fleet. In funding dollars, the Navy is 
requesting a total of about $19.9 billion for its shipbuilding account 
for fiscal year 2021, about $3.9 billion (16.3 percent) less than the 
Navy requested for fiscal year 2020. How should this Committee 
interpret these trends?
    Secretary Modly. The Navy is committed to at least 355 ships. To 
get there, the composition of the fleet needs to change to have fewer 
large platform and more smaller platforms that are lightly manned, 
eventually moving to optionally manned. The fleet needs to have certain 
compositional characteristics, including distributed awareness, 
lethality, survivability, and sustainability, and move to a much more 
aggressive posture in terms of experimenting and prototyping and then 
quickly moved to production. Given the budget topline constraints, the 
fiscal year 2021 budget prioritizes a more capable and lethal force 
over a larger force that would be less capable, less ready and less 
lethal. It includes procurement of 44 battle force ships within the 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), and shows a realistic approach to 
planning the future force within projected budgets. The plan remains 
mindful of the need to keep the shipbuilding industrial base loaded at 
an effective level that encourages industry investment in capital 
improvements, capital expansion, and a properly sized world-class 
workforce.

    40. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Gilday, is this drawback in funding 
and production rate an indicator that the 355 ship, and 66 submarines 
target is no longer the goal of the U.S. Navy?
    Admiral Gilday. No. The Department of Defense remains committed to 
building a Navy of at least 355 ships (inclusive of 66 submarines). 
With flat budget toplines that do not increase with inflation, Navy had 
to prioritize funding the force most likely to win across the spectrum 
of conflict versus China and Russia. Risk was taken in capacity in 
order to prioritize readiness, lethality, and modernization. The fiscal 
year 2021 budget resources capable capacity growth for which attendant 
requirements to modernize, man, train, and operate can also be 
resourced.

    41. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, can you 
discuss what you believe the risk to the shipbuilding industrial base 
will be due to these cuts in production and funding?
    Secretary Modly. We tried to be very objective in terms of where we 
took the resources for the reprogramming, which resulted in some shifts 
to expected procurement dates. Funds were sourced from fiscal year 2020 
dollars that were determined to be either ahead of need or excess to 
need, in other words, not requested in the fiscal year 2020 budget by 
the Department. The sources were reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff who determined that this reprogramming was not of 
significant immediate strategic negative impact to the overall defense 
of the United States. A healthy industrial base, including shipyards 
and the associated workforce, is absolutely critical to our effort to 
get to 355 ships. With adequate resources, and with budget 
predictability and stability, the industrial base has the capacity and 
capability to support getting to 355 ships in 10 years.
    Admiral Gilday. We tried to be very objective in terms of where we 
took the resources for the reprogramming, which resulted in some shifts 
to expected procurement dates. Funds were sourced from fiscal year 2020 
dollars that were determined to be either ahead of need or excess to 
need, in other words, not requested in the fiscal year 2020 budget by 
the Department. The sources were reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff who determined that this reprogramming was not of 
significant immediate strategic negative impact to the overall defense 
of the United States. A healthy industrial base, including shipyards 
and the associated workforce, is absolutely critical to our effort to 
get to 355 ships. With adequate resources, and with budget 
predictability and stability, the industrial base has the capacity and 
capability to support getting to 355 ships in 10 years.

    42. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, what 
plans do you have to mitigate the negative impacts to the industrial 
base?
    Secretary Modly. The Navy is committed to at least 355 ships. To 
get there, the composition of the fleet needs to change to have fewer 
large platform and more smaller platforms that are lightly manned, 
eventually moving to optionally manned. The fleet needs to have certain 
compositional characteristics, including distributed awareness, 
lethality, survivability, and sustainability, and move to a much more 
aggressive posture in terms of experimenting and prototyping and then 
quickly moved to production. A healthy industrial base, including 
shipyards and the associated workforce, is critical to this effort. 
With adequate resources, and with budget predictability and stability, 
the industrial base has the capacity and capability to support getting 
to 355 ships in 10 years.
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy is committed to at least 355 ships. To get 
there, the composition of the fleet needs to change to have fewer large 
platform and more smaller platforms that are lightly manned, eventually 
moving to optionally manned. The fleet needs to have certain 
compositional characteristics, including distributed awareness, 
lethality, survivability, and sustainability, and move to a much more 
aggressive posture in terms of experimenting and prototyping and then 
quickly moved to production. A healthy industrial base, including 
shipyards and the associated workforce, is critical to this effort. 
With adequate resources, and with budget predictability and stability, 
the industrial base has the capacity and capability to support getting 
to 355 ships in 10 years.

    43. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, can you explain why LPD 31 
is accounted for in the fiscal year 2021 budget, despite being 
authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2020?
    Secretary Modly. The Navy is very appreciative of the strong 
Congressional support for shipbuilding. LPD 31 is an incrementally 
funded ship that received Advance Procurement funding in fiscal year 
2019. Congress appropriated the preliminary increment of full funding 
in fiscal year 2020. The Navy planned to procure LPD 31 in fiscal year 
2021, and has requested the preponderance of funding in fiscal year 
2021. Therefore, the Navy counted the ship in fiscal year 2021.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                          marine corps culture
    44. Senator Warren. General Berger, the Marine Corps University's 
Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning was tasked by your 
predecessor in July 2017 to conduct a study on Marine Corps culture in 
the wake of the Marines United scandal. The final report provided more 
details on gender bias and leadership in the Marine Corps and noted 
that ``[M]any women were unsurprised by the behavior of those on 
Marines United because they live out related struggles every day.'' 
Have you read this report in its entirety?
    General Berger. Yes--and as the Committee surely recognized in my 
official written statement, per that reports findings, I acknowledged a 
well-known malignant sub-culture of misogyny within our ranks that must 
be eradicated.

    45. Senator Warren. General Berger, what conclusions did you draw? 
What are the most important takeaways
    General Berger. I believe the most important takeaway is that the 
Marine Corps is a learning institution. Seen in context, this Report 
comprises the response by a Marine educational institution to a query 
asked by the Corps itself. While the report clearly indicated that our 
culture is flawed and imperfect, I am encouraged that marines felt free 
to offer their opinions without fear of repercussion, and with the hope 
that the institution would address its cultural challenges. The Corps 
must be prepared to ask itself whether its norms and culture serve the 
central purposes of the organization, including meeting its mission to 
train marines, and to matriculate them into a warrior culture that 
simultaneously exists within a civil society. Marine culture values 
honor and courage coupled with decisive action as well as flexibility 
in adjusting to any environment. Counter behaviors and cultures need to 
be called out, addressed, and eliminated. We continue to work to create 
the best warriors prepared to do combat for the Nation and who 
represent the best of the society they have sworn to defend. We cannot 
ignore strong signals of change nor be complacent when it comes to 
designing and preparing the force for the future. This is the force 
that will always adapt and overcome no matter the circumstances. Over 
the next 12 months, you will observe clear evidence of change within 
our manpower system as we modernize it in accordance with a more 
responsive and suitable talent management system. Those reforms will 
further seek to eliminate both conscious and unconscious bias from the 
system, further ensuring an equality of opportunity for all marines.

    46. Senator Warren. General Berger, do you believe that it should 
be required reading for all marines? Will you commit to adding the 
final report to your reading list?
    General Berger. I believe the report should be required reading for 
all senior Marine Corps leaders, both uniformed and civilian, and as a 
consequence, have directed as much. As with all of our educational 
products, the report will be made generally available to and through 
our educational system.

    47. Senator Warren. General Berger, the report lists a publication 
date of 30 March 2018, but it was not published on the CAOCL website 
until September 2019. Why was the public release delayed for a year and 
half?
    General Berger. Regrettably, I cannot comment with any precision as 
to why a report published in March 2018 was not immediately released to 
the public. Our internal review processes do not always prioritize 
correctly, nor move as fast as they should; however, fixing processes 
like these and fostering an environment of transparency are priorities 
of mine as Commandant.



                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
 FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 
                                PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2020

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                     UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m. in Room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(presiding) Chairman of the Committee.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer, 
Cotton, Ernst, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, 
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, and Manchin.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
    The Committee meets today to receive the testimony of the 
United States Central Command. I would like to welcome our 
witness, General Frank McKenzie, Commander of the United States 
Central Command.
    I want to add that immediately following this morning's 
open hearing, we will move to SVC-217 in the Senate Visitors 
Center for a closed session, which will be an opportunity for 
General McKenzie to answer some of the questions. You might 
make a note of questions that come along that are not 
appropriately answered in this setting so that we can do it 
later.
    I would like to begin by recognizing two United States 
marines, Gunner Sergeant Diego Pongo and Captain Moises Navas, 
who were killed earlier this week during a mission against the 
ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] stronghold in Iraq. I 
also want to recognize the two additional Americans who were 
killed yesterday, whose names have not yet been released. That 
was in a rocket attack in Taji. Their loss is a painful 
reminder that even where we have been successful, such as in 
destroying ISIS, the caliphate, we still have troops in harm's 
way. When Senator Rounds and I had the opportunity to meet with 
some of our troops 2 weeks ago in visiting Iraq, we had a 
chance to really talk over some of the things like this with 
them.
    General, later this month, you will be commemorating your 
1-year anniversary as CENTCOM Commander, and I sure you agree 
it has been a tough ride. Since May of 2019, we have seen Iran 
and its terrorist proxies escalate their asymmetric aggression 
against the United States and our partners throughout the 
region. In May, they hit our partners' oil tankers. In June, 
they downed an American drone. In September, they attacked 
Saudi oil facilities, threatening the global energy supply. 
Throughout this up-tick, President Trump announced new 
sanctions on Iran, bolstering protection for our troops in the 
region, but he sought to avoid a military escalation and even 
offered to negotiate with Tehran.
    Then in December, Iran's proxies killed a United States 
citizen and attacked the United States embassy in Baghdad. 
These actions crossed the President's redline, which we knew 
that by his very nature, he is going to adhere to his own 
redlines, unlike some others in the past, and the President 
responded by ordering a strike that ended up killing Soleimani.
    Iran countered by firing ballistic missiles that thankfully 
missed our troops in Iraq, though over 100 soldiers sustained 
concussions. Since then, the situation seems to have 
deescalated.
    Yet, despite the deployment of approximately 14,000 new 
troops to the region to deter Iran, your written testimony 
says--and I am quoting from your written testimony, General--
quote, ample intelligence exists indicating that Iran's regime 
desire to continue malign operations that threaten lives, and 
early media reports suggest that Iran-backed groups were 
responsible for yesterday's attack at Camp Taji.
    If the deployment of approximately 14,000 troops in the 
region will not deter them, I am sure a good question would be, 
what will deter them? We will have ample opportunity to respond 
to that question.
    I ask because this Committee's top priority is effective 
implementation of the National Defense Strategy, which says to 
focus on China and Russia as the central challenge to the 
United States prosperity and security and, as you highlight in 
your written statement, to accept greater risk in the CENTCOM 
AOR.
    Countering Iran is an important aspect of American 
credibility in the Middle East, and bolstering American 
credibility is vital to preventing our partners from looking 
toward China and Russia for their security needs.
    But every battalion that we send to the Middle East is a 
battalion that is not being sent to support other priorities in 
Europe and the Pacific. Moreover, this ramp-up in the Middle 
East comes while other priorities such as counterterrorism and 
security cooperation in Africa are being under-sourced.
    I hope you will address how these new deployments to the 
Middle East are changing Iran's behavior for the better. Or, if 
conflict with Iran remains likely in your view, we would like 
to know--you explain to us--what these new deployments are 
achieving.
    With that, I will turn to Senator Reed.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let 
me join you in welcoming General McKenzie back before the 
Committee, and we look forward to your testimony and our 
discussion. Thank you, General.
    Let me also join the Chairman in expressing my condolences 
for the loss of the three coalition personnel at Camp Taji last 
evening and two of whom were reported to be American personnel, 
and the death of the two marines conducting operations against 
ISIS in Iraq earlier this week. Our thoughts are with their 
families and those who were injured in those two incidents.
    The agreement between the United States and the Taliban, 
announced on February 29th, was a notable step toward bringing 
our nation's longest war to a close. It is important to keep in 
mind, however, that it is only a first step, and the path to 
long-term stability in Afghanistan will only be found through a 
negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan 
Government. With that in mind, I am concerned that we are not 
appropriately leveraging U.S. and coalition military presence 
to support a settlement that protects U.S. security interests 
primarily and values, including the hard-fought gains on issues 
in Afghanistan like women's rights and education. By announcing 
a timetable for the complete withdrawal of United States and 
international forces before inter-Afghan negotiations have even 
begun, I am concerned that we are in some respects undermining 
the Afghan Government and validating the Taliban's longstanding 
perception that they can wait us out.
    Despite the specific timeline contained in the agreement, 
some in the administration have said that the 14-month 
timetable is aspirational and that we will have ample time to 
assess the Taliban's intent and capability to uphold their 
security commitments. General McKenzie, I hope you will help us 
better understand how we intend to monitor and verify Taliban 
compliance. In particular, do you believe it will be possible 
for United States Forces to conduct the rigorous monitoring and 
evaluation necessary to ensure that terrorist threats will not 
re-emerge in Afghanistan, while simultaneously carrying out a 
full-scale withdrawal?
    I would also like to hear more about the commitments we 
have made to our Afghan partners and how our efforts to build 
credible security forces and institutions will be sustained. 
The Afghan Security Forces have been nearly completely built 
and funded by United States and coalition funds. Additionally, 
until the signing of the United States-Taliban agreement, the 
Afghan Security Forces also received robust advising and 
enabling support from United States and coalition forces on the 
ground and in the air. Even with a peace agreement, there is 
little to suggest that the Afghan economy will, within a 
foreseeable time frame, provide enough revenue to fully fund 
the country's security forces. Notably, the administration's 
fiscal year 2021 budget request contains funding for Afghan 
training and equipping programs that will extend well beyond 
the date of the planned departure of the last United States 
military personnel. It is important for this Committee to 
understand the plan to ensure those resources are invested in 
sustainable and responsible ways, especially given the 
likelihood of increased Taliban participation in the Afghan 
Government.
    Despite the focus of the National Defense Strategy on a 
more resource sustainable approach to the national security 
challenges in CENTCOM, we have deployed more than 14,000 troops 
to the region since May in response to malign Iranian activity. 
While I understand the need to ensure U.S. personnel, 
facilities, and key strategic interests are protected, I 
question the extent to which we can deter asymmetric attacks by 
Iran through the deployment of additional conventional United 
States military forces to the region. Indeed, the rocket attack 
on Camp Taji in Iraq last night, reportedly carried out by 
Iranian-backed militia, would seem to challenge the notion that 
we have reestablished deterrence with respect to Iran. Overall, 
I believe that the administration's so-called maximum pressure 
campaign has isolated us from our allies, given Iran a pretext 
to violate constraints placed on its nuclear program by the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and may in fact have 
increased the likelihood of conflict.
    The killing of the leaders of ISIS and al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula were significant counterterrorism operations, 
and the administration should be commended for those 
operations. But the Turkish incursion into northern Syria, 
fallout from the killing of General Soleimani, and political 
unrest in Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere have disrupted our 
efforts against ISIS. I remain concerned about the long-term 
disposition of the more than 10,000 ISIS fighters being held by 
the Syrian Democratic Forces, as well as the unknown number of 
internally displaced people that retain an allegiance to ISIS. 
General McKenzie, I look forward to an update on CENTCOM's 
operations to ensure these groups are not able to re-emerge.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    General McKenzie, we will recognize you for your opening 
statement. As you know, your entire statement will be made a 
part of the record.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL KENNETH F. McKENZIE, JR., USMC, COMMANDER, 
                 UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

    General McKenzie. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to provide 
an operational update and testimony in support of the fiscal 
year 2021 budget request pertaining to CENTCOM's area of 
responsibility (AOR).
    My senior enlisted leader, Fleet Master Chief Jamie Erdell 
of the Navy, is also with me here today, seated immediately 
behind me.
    I appreciate very much your remarks about the sacrifices of 
Captain Navas and Gunnery Sergeant Pongo, as well as Corporal 
Zavala, a marine who was killed in a vehicle rollover during an 
exercise in UAE [United Arab Emirates] just a couple of days 
ago. Additionally, the two United States servicemembers and the 
United Kingdom servicemember who died in the attack at Taji 
yesterday in Iraq--they will be remembered.
    Today there are nearly 90,000 men and women serving 
throughout the 20 nations comprising United States Central 
Command, as well as our headquarters in Tampa. I am proud of 
their remarkable dedication and humbled by their personal 
sacrifice, and it is my honor to serve with them. They are 
young Americans in the line of fire, working to prevent attacks 
on the Homeland, counter destabilizing regional influence, 
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
ensure the freedom of navigation through international 
waterways. Your annual and timely passage of both the National 
Defense Authorization Act and the Defense appropriations bills 
honors their courage and sacrifice, and I encourage you to 
maintain this tradition.
    Keeping a pledge from my confirmation hearing before you 
here in December 2018, I appear now and offer you my best 
military advice. While my written statement highlights several 
nations and areas of interest within the Central Command area 
of responsibility, my opening statement today will focus on 
Iran.
    The National Defense Strategy directs us to work with 
partners to deny the Iranian regime all paths to a nuclear 
weapon and to neutralize Iranian malign influence. This is no 
easy task. Iran's regime is persistent and resilient, growing 
its arsenal of ballistic missiles despite international 
condemnation. Iran remains the world's largest state sponsor of 
terrorism. Since May 2019, Iranian proxies and Shiite militia 
groups in Iraq have increased attacks on United States 
interests and conducted scores of aerial unmanned system 
reconnaissance flights near United States and Iraqi security 
force bases. The Iranian regime has attacked or seized foreign 
vessels in the Gulf, sponsored attacks by Houthi forces from 
Yemen into Saudi Arabia, continued the export of lethal aid to 
destabilizing groups throughout the region, and in September 
2019, carried out an unprecedented cruise missile and UAS 
attack against oil facilities in Saudi Arabia.
    In early January, Iran launched more than a dozen ballistic 
missiles in a deliberate attack against United States and 
coalition forces at two bases in Iraq. This state-sponsored 
missile strike crossed the threshold compared to previous 
attacks and has probably set a lower bar for future actions by 
the regime.
    Yesterday, hostile forces, most likely Shiite militia 
groups, launched more than a dozen rockets at United States and 
coalition forces at Camp Taji in Iraq, killing two United 
States and one British servicemember, as well as wounding 
several more. While we are still investigating the attack, I 
will note that the Iranian proxy group Kata'ib Hezbollah is the 
only group known to have previously conducted an indirect fire 
attack of this scale against United States and coalition forces 
in Iraq.
    While periods of decreased tension may provide the illusion 
of a return to normalcy, ample intelligence and indeed 
yesterday's actions indicate the Iranian regime's desire to 
continue malign activities that threaten lives, destabilize 
sovereign nations, threaten freedom of navigation, regional 
commerce, global energy supplies, and the global economy 
itself.
    At CENTCOM, we recognize that so long as the United States 
applies diplomatic and economic pressure, the joint force must 
be postured to deter Iran from employing the military element 
of power to counter our actions. Our presence sends a clear 
message about our capabilities and our will to defend partners 
and U.S. national interests. Going forward, it is CENTCOM's 
objective to posture forces in the region with the operational 
depth to achieve a consistent state of deterrence against Iran 
and to be adaptable to future Iranian threats.
    The Department's fiscal year 2021 budget supports CENTCOM's 
ability to keep our forces agile, lethal, and adaptable.
    As we work with our partners to safeguard our mutual 
interests, we do so with the knowledge that we are stronger 
together. Key to building and maintaining partnerships is the 
authorization, funding, and employment of security assistance 
programs. Additionally, the National Guard State Partnership 
Program cultivates relationships and improves interoperability 
with six nations across the CENTCOM AOR, with more applying for 
entry this year. Again, the 2021 budget supports building new 
partnerships and enabling the formation of an enduring Middle 
East coalition.
    As CENTCOM continues ongoing operations, we appreciate the 
efforts of our DOD [Department of Defense] civilian leadership. 
We acknowledge the teamwork of the interagency, and we thank 
the Members of Congress and your staffs, without whose 
consistent backing we would be unable to accomplish our 
mission. In order for America's armed forces to sustain all-
domain dominance, the Department requires your support, as well 
as predictable, adequate, and timely funding.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Committee Members, thank 
you again for all you do for our troops and families, and I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General McKenzie follows:]

         Prepared Statement by General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.
                              introduction
    When United States Central Command (CENTCOM) formed in the 1980s, 
the United States military trained and equipped to fight high-end 
warfare against the Soviet Union under conditions of limited 
communications and the routine employment of nuclear weapons. Times 
changed; the wall fell. The United States welcomed change in Russia 
while retooling heavy conventional forces to fight an 18-year 
protracted global counterterror campaign. Simultaneously the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, emerging from its 1979 revolution, embarked on a 
deliberate and extended campaign of terror and violence across the 
Middle East, directly engaging or sponsoring partners in a 40-year-long 
struggle against the U.S. and our allies.
    Today the rise, fall, and rise again of Russia; the continuing 
asymmetric campaign of violence and coercion by Iran; and the emergence 
of China as our pre-eminent economic and military power competitor 
signal that while the nature of war is unchanging, the character of war 
has evolved. CENTCOM acknowledges our nation does not have the luxury 
of a single strategic focus. The Joint Force must posture globally with 
the ability to balance multiple priorities and tasks, from combat with 
peer competitors to expeditionary counterterrorism operations, 
understanding that the nation's top defense priority must relentlessly 
focus on adversarial great powers that possess the power and means to 
destroy our country.
    While Iran lacks the capability to destroy us, its regime's hatred 
of the United States and growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, cyber 
reach, and depth and breadth of its terror networks clearly position it 
as a priority, although clearly and inarguably not the main one. The 
U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs the United States to work 
with partners to deny the Iranian regime all paths to a nuclear weapon 
and neutralize Iranian malign activity. While this is only one aspect 
of the NDS, it is directive for the Department of Defense and a key 
task for both CENTCOM and EUCOM.
    The current United States policy of maximum pressure against Iran 
is supported by the deterrence provided by our United States force 
presence, which helps to stabilize the region and acts as a 
counterbalance against the Iranian regime's overt and covert military 
responses. The ramifications of this policy have led to direct and 
indirect Iranian military threats and actions against United States 
interests in the region, and similar threats to U.S. national security 
interests globally. Iran's lack of effective economic or diplomatic 
levers to counter the United States maximum pressure campaign has 
caused it to resort to pursuing overt and covert military options 
against the U.S. and our partners. The Iranian regime's strategy seeks 
to undermine international and regional support for U.S. policies with 
attacks and threats against U.S. interests and those of our partners 
and allies.
    CENTCOM plans and executes missions across its area of 
responsibility (AOR), but embraces a global planning perspective 
supporting national objectives and the execution of global military 
campaigns. Adjustments in U.S. global force posture to support the NDS 
compels the U.S. to accept greater risk in the CENTCOM AOR. We 
recognize significant future conflicts will be trans-regional, cutting 
across multiple global combatant commands, and involving multiple 
domains. The ongoing global fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) and 
other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) provides a stark example 
of this threat.
    As CENTCOM approaches its missions, acknowledging priorities 
outlined in the NDS, we also remain keenly aware that our adversaries 
in the region retain a willingness to contest our actions. Iran's 
regime is not a peer competitor to the United States, but it does 
possess the ability to negatively affect global commerce, trade, and 
the world's energy supply. These malign actions, while not posing a 
direct threat to the U.S. Homeland, significantly threaten our national 
interests abroad, those of our allies and partners, and negatively 
affects the U.S. military's long-term posture as we react to immediate 
threats. During my year in command, I have observed multiple 
Congressional engagements to the CENTCOM AOR. Your oversight, 
partnership and advocacy, based on first-hand knowledge, lays the 
foundation for enduring success.
                           centcom priorities
    Deterring Iran. The long-term challenges we face in the CENTCOM AOR 
are the destabilizing and escalatory actions of the Iranian regime. The 
Iranian regime's quest for nuclear weapons, coupled with its hegemonic 
ambitions, misbehavior, and threats to the United States and its 
regional partners have been consistent elements of its policy for 
decades. Deterring Iran from its destructive and destabilizing 
activities in the military domain underpins everything we do, and is 
CENTCOM's top priority. Until such a time as the regime in Tehran 
decides to be a responsible member of the international community, 
CENTCOM must work to establish and maintain military deterrence with 
Iran, notably within the context of the ongoing economic and diplomatic 
maximum pressure campaign.
    Since May 2019, Iranian-supported groups in Iraq have attacked 
United States interests dozens of times and conducted scores of 
unmanned aerial system (UAS) reconnaissance flights near United States 
and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) bases. The Iranian regime has attacked 
or seized foreign vessels in the Gulf, facilitated attacks by Houthi 
forces from Yemen into Saudi Arabia, continued to export lethal aid to 
destabilizing groups throughout the region including those aiming to 
attack Israel, supported the Assad regime's brutal conflict against its 
own people, and carried out an unprecedented cruise missile and UAS 
attack in September against Saudi oil facilities that destabilized 
international energy markets. In early January, Iran launched more than 
a dozen ballistic missiles in a deliberate attack against United States 
and Coalition forces in Iraq. This state-sponsored missile attack, in 
response to the United States killing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani crossed a threshold 
compared to previous ``grey-zone'' attacks and may set a lower bar for 
future actions by the regime. While periods of decreased tension may 
provide the illusion of a return to normalcy, ample intelligence exists 
indicating the Iranian regime's desire to continue malign operations 
that threaten lives, disrupt the internal matters of sovereign nations, 
and threaten freedom of navigation, regional commerce, global energy 
supplies, and the global economy.
    CENTCOM recognizes that so long as the United States continues to 
apply diplomatic and economic pressure against Iran, the Joint Force 
must be postured to deter Iran from using the military element of power 
to counter our actions. While our steady-state posture does not require 
offensive forces in theater to achieve overmatch or unintentionally 
provoke Iran's regime, our presence sends a clear and unambiguous 
signal of our capabilities and, most importantly, the will to defend 
partners and United States national interests. This exemplifies the 
concept of deterrence.
    Deterrence is not a military concept, but a diplomatic and 
political construct obtained from the effect demonstrated capabilities 
have on the mind of a potential opponent. Deterrence can be contested--
Iran's regime retains the ability to interfere with our efforts to 
deter. Historically, Iran has never doubted the United States 
capability to respond, but frustrates our ability to do so by focusing 
on deniable, hard to attribute activities. Targeting the Kata'ib 
Hezbollah group and Soleimani clearly demonstrated United States will. 
Our posture--the bases, forces, and activities that we undertake--
maintains the other half of the deterrence equation: capability.
    Reduction of United States forces in the AOR combined with a 
perception of United States disinterest in the Middle East fueled 
thinking in Iran in the spring of 2019 that the United States was no 
longer committed to defending our national interests in the region. 
That misperception led directly to the cycle of escalation that crested 
in January 2020. In order to maintain the contested deterrence our 
recent military actions have re-established, Iran's regime must 
continue to see the United States has enough forward-deployed forces 
for a credible military capability, that we are willing to employ that 
capability for defense of U.S. interests with conviction, and any 
decision to contest our actions will not yield a positive outcome.
    Deterrence can be difficult to establish and measure, and costly to 
maintain. CENTCOM prosecutes numerous missions simultaneously, 
scattered across the breadth and depth of the region, all in areas 
suffused with Iranian-backed forces continuing their decades-long 
struggles against us. While the cost of regaining and maintaining 
deterrence is expensive, it is less expensive than the deployment of 
forces required to fight in full-scale conflict: the failure of 
deterrence. CENTCOM's objective is therefore to posture forces with 
operational depth in the region to achieve a sustained state of 
deterrence against Iran's regime without undue provocation, and to be 
adaptable to future Iranian threats while the United States maximum 
pressure campaign continues. In addition to posture, a key part of 
deterrence is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). 
While presence can fluctuate based on deterrence needs, consistent ISR 
is necessary to identify subtle changes that shape posture and ensure 
we align our presence appropriately.
    Negotiated Resolution of the Conflict in Afghanistan. All wars must 
have a political end. Reconciliation between the Taliban and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan represents the best 
option for bringing the 18-year-long fight in Afghanistan to a 
favorable conclusion, while meeting long-term United States security 
requirements. CENTCOM efforts support the United States South Asia 
Strategy and remain fully aligned with the efforts of United States 
Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Ambassador 
Zalmay Khalilzad.
    Our military mission in Afghanistan continues in support of our 
overriding national interest: preventing terrorist attacks against the 
Homeland from Afghanistan and Central Asia.
    Safeguarding this means we must remain focused on retaining a 
counterterrorism platform under any of the multiple political 
eventualities that may take shape. United States Forces-Afghanistan 
continues to examine efficiencies in force structure to reduce our 
military footprint and reduce costs while maintaining counterterrorism 
pressure on VEOs and provisioning the capability to do so in the 
future. We also continue to help the Afghanistan National Defense and 
Security Forces develop and refine their force generation processes for 
campaign sustainability. Without continued pressure, groups such as the 
Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K) will regain the ability to mount or 
sponsor a transnational terrorist attack within a few years. Your 
support to our critical authorities such as the Afghanistan Security 
Forces Funding, Commander's Emergency Response Program, Coalition 
Support Fund, and others have remained paramount during this 
transition.
    Maintaining Defeat-ISIS Campaign in Syria and Iraq. Similar to 
Afghanistan, most of the United States intelligence community predicts 
that without sustained pressure levied against it, ISIS has the 
potential to reconstitute in Iraq and Syria in short order, beyond the 
current capabilities of the United States to neutralize it without a 
capable, partnered ground force. Syria remains a dynamic situation with 
multiple parties and agendas involved. The Syrian regime, with support 
from Russia and Iran, continues to seek a military victory. We are 
seeing this play out in northwest Syria as the Assad regime, Russian, 
and Iranian campaign of violence has escalated since
    December, resulting in almost one million more displaced persons, 
innumerable people injured or killed, with many more in critical need 
of assistance, and dangerous clashes between our NATO ally Turkey and 
the Syrian regime. We likewise see the Assad regime continuing its use 
of chemical weapons in blatant violation of its commitments to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention--deterring this use in the future remains a 
CENTCOM priority. In eastern Syria, United States and Coalition forces 
under command of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve 
assist with ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS, including safeguarding 
energy sources to prevent their seizure by ISIS for revenue generation. 
Moving forward, we must continue our support to NATO ally Turkey and 
our D-ISIS partner force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while 
maintaining deconfliction with Russia, which, along with the Assad 
regime, aggressively challenges the Coalition mission in various ways.
    Despite the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October, ISIS remains 
a threat in Syria, with most of its activity focused on reestablishing 
networks; assassinating and intimidating local leaders and security 
forces; and extending its influence in rural areas throughout eastern 
Syria and Iraq.
    Iraq remains a strategic partner in the fight against ISIS and is 
key human and geographic terrain. We remain in Iraq at the request of 
the Government of Iraq (GoI) for one mission: the defeat of ISIS. 
Hindering our ability to work with the ISF toward this objective are 
rogue elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces more beholden to 
Iran's regime than the GoI. Some of these militias smuggle advanced 
weapons into Iraq from Iran, not to defend the country from ISIS, but 
to undermine existing security and threaten United States and Coalition 
forces partnered with the GoI. Given ISIS' demonstrated tenacity and 
ability to reconstitute, we cannot afford to divert focus from the D-
ISIS mission, understanding that the territorial defeat of ISIS does 
not mean the absence of ISIS. The years ahead will not be bloodless. 
Attacks may continue in the form of an insurgency, but the goal is to 
develop and enable the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to contain 
and defeat ISIS without external assistance.
    Countering the UAS Threat. In the aggregate, the U.S. maintains air 
dominance across the AOR but lacks a comprehensive joint solution to 
counter the growing Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) threat. Inexpensive 
and easy to proliferate, UASs provide adversaries the operational 
ability to surveil, target, and attack U.S. and partner facilities, 
providing the means to engage in mass-casualty or large-scale, critical 
infrastructure attacks with cheap, off-the-shelf technology while 
affording deniability and a disproportionately high return on 
investment.
    CENTCOM employs current systems and tactics to best equip and 
enable U.S. Forces to meet this challenge, but the growing threat posed 
by UASs, coupled with our lack of dependable, networked capabilities to 
counter them is the most concerning tactical development in the CENTCOM 
AOR since the rise of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Just as 
the IED threat galvanized operational, industrial and scientific 
communities in the U.S. toward the development of solutions like the 
Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP), we are fast approaching 
a juncture requiring a similar mobilization to counter the UAS threat. 
Your support and funding of Science and Technology is vital to our 
success in the Great Power Competition.
    Weaponization of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees. 
The manipulation or co-opting of IDPs and refugees by an adversary to 
gain a political, military, or economic advantage is not historically 
uncommon. However, in vast swaths of Syria and Iraq the systematic 
indoctrination of IDP and refugee camp populations who are hostages to 
the receipt of ISIS ideology is an alarming development with 
potentially generational implications.
    There is no known, successful methodology of de-radicalization for 
hard-core ISIS believers. This radicalized population currently numbers 
in the thousands and preys on the disenfranchised and weak IDP and 
refugee populations already highly susceptible to extremist 
indoctrination. The longer these IDPs remain in refugee camps, the more 
likely they are to become radicalized. While there is no military 
solution for de-radicalization, the military can set the conditions for 
stability and security necessary for these populations to return to 
their original homes and begin the process of regaining power over 
their own lives. The sheer number of IDPs and refugees presents a 
challenge to the timeline along which necessary levels of long-term 
stabilization can take root.
    Also concerning are near- and long-term implications of SDF 
detention facilities in Syria and the disposition of foreign-terrorist 
fighters (FTFs). While CENTCOM and our coalition partners are working 
to address and mitigate security challenges at the facilities, this 
serves only as a tactical-level band-aid, not a long-term solution. The 
United States can mitigate the risks associated with these populations 
by facilitating repatriations, training and equipping guard forces, and 
providing the funding required to improve prison infrastructure. 
Ultimately, the best way to alleviate this problem is to reduce the 
numbers of detainees through repatriation. The ISIS detainee and IDP 
populations represent more than 60 nations. While some countries have 
made efforts to reclaim their foreign fighters, full resolution 
requires a comprehensive diplomatic and international effort. This 
problem will not go away by ignoring it, and can only be addressed by 
the international community working together to accept its shared 
responsibilities.
    As noted, military solutions do not exist for the issues of de-
radicalization and repatriation of FTFs. They are international 
problems requiring international solutions. The longer these conditions 
persist; the IDP population becomes more and more ensconced in ISIS 
philosophy creating a petri dish of future terrorists. Action now by 
the international community is imperative to protect our Homeland and 
our allies. Left unchecked, these issues are a ticking time bomb with 
the potential to spark the resurgence of ISIS, despite the destruction 
of the physical caliphate we and our allies and partners have worked so 
hard to accomplish. Your support to increase Special Immigrant Visas in 
Afghanistan and stabilization funding is much appreciated by me, our 
troops, and our partners.
     basing and posture in the centcom area of responsibility (aor)
    Fragile security environments across the AOR reflect a variety of 
contributing factors, including heightened ethno-sectarian tensions, 
economic uncertainty, weak or corrupt governance, and exploitation by 
VEOs which have clearly indicated their desire and intent to attack the 
Homeland, United States interests abroad, and the interests of our 
partners and allies. At the same time, the AOR is growing increasingly 
crowded with external nation-states, such as a resurgent Russia and 
expansionist China, pursuing their own interests and attempting to 
shift historical alliances. These dynamics necessitate that CENTCOM 
explore options with regional partners to posture itself in depth 
across our AOR to create efficiencies, and increase strategic depth, 
resiliency and operational agility. With the enactment of the Fiscal 
Year 2020 NDAA, Section 1263, I look forward to the posture review and 
reporting back to Congress with the findings.
    Over the past year, CENTCOM has re-evaluated its posture, taking 
action to close, consolidate, or in some cases expand some of its air, 
land, and sea bases; as well as access, basing, and overflight rights 
with our partners. Some of these actions represent immediate, near-term 
adjustments for survivability and to improve our deterrence 
capabilities--like the buildup of Prince Sultan Air Base in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. Other decisions are driven by long- term efforts to 
achieve cost savings, and increase interoperability or partner burden 
sharing--like the establishment of CENTCOM Forward-Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. This forward deployed element assesses requirements and 
integrates U.S. Forces into an international collective defense effort.
    The Western Sustainment Network is a newly-created logistics system 
extending from the Red Sea and Mediterranean Ports to the Arabian Gulf, 
designed to mitigate the potential impact of chokepoint closures at the 
Bab Al Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz. To build sustainment depth over the 
last year, CENTCOM has increased deployment and redeployment traffic 
across the Arabian Peninsula, shipped ammunition to Kuwait from the Red 
Sea, negotiated movement of materiel and supplies across borders 
affected by the Gulf Rift, and developed the port of Duqm in Oman. 
Developing this operational depth enhances protection of critical 
infrastructure while providing reduced cost options for deployment and 
obviating the need to transit potentially contested maritime 
chokepoints. This network increases our agility, enables Dynamic Force 
Employment, and reduces deployment timelines in the event of a 
contingency, thereby reducing risk and providing additional strategic 
options. Taken together, the result is a tailored, responsive basing 
network, connected by dependable lines of communication with AOR-wide 
reach, supported by prepositioned equipment and supplies to facilitate 
the rapid movement and employment, of U.S., allied, and partner forces.
    Armed with the knowledge that resources are at a premium, and a 
pragmatic appreciation that each country is working through its own 
challenges with economic and social reforms, CENTCOM supports 
initiatives that approach defense from a cooperative perspective. This 
is the only practical way to approach the problem. The reality on the 
ground is that every partner country cannot afford to have their own 
Patriot battalion, nor should they; just like every U.S. combatant 
commander cannot retain their own heel-to-toe carrier strike group.
    The International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), which 
achieved initial operating capability in November 2019 and full 
operating capability in January 2020, provides an instructive example 
of this kind of regional cooperative effort. Participating nations 
include the United States, U.K., Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, and UAE, working together to support freedom of navigation and 
maritime domain awareness in the Strait of Hormuz and assist in 
attribution of malign actions in these vital waters. The vessels and 
aircraft of IMSC member nations provide vigilance, surveillance, and 
assurance, supporting the free flow of commerce through the critical 
choke points of the region.
    In the air domain, CENTCOM operates in an environment where our 
partners possess and operate the majority of air and ballistic missile 
defense capabilities in the theater. This compels CENTCOM to lead 
efforts to establish a framework to coalesce and optimize each Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) nation's individual ballistic missile defense 
capabilities into a regional, integrated air and missile defense 
construct to defend against the shared threat posed by Iran and the 
proxies it controls. Our GCC partners contribute to interoperability 
through purchase and use of Patriot, Theater High Altitude Air Defense, 
and the development of the GCC Ballistic Missile Early Warning System--
a collective system of systems across the Arabian Peninsula designed to 
establish an effective early warning and supporting architecture to 
benefit all GCC Partners. The Link-16 system provides a combined, 
integrated air picture through a shared network of sensors and systems 
across the AOR to receive, populate, and share information among 
partners. CENTCOM builds confidence and proficiency among our partners 
through combined, distributive IAMD exercises that leverage virtual and 
simulated technologies to bridge the geographic distances across the 
region.
    As we work with our partners along collaborative lines of effort to 
safeguard our mutual interests, we do so with the knowledge that we are 
stronger together, and our strategic strength has never rested on the 
volume of materiel we bring to the fight, but the partnerships and 
whole-of-government efforts no other country in the world can match. 
Key to building and maintaining these partnerships in the region is the 
enduring authorization, funding, and combined employment of the 
Department of State's (State) security assistance (SA) and DOD security 
cooperation (SC) and security assistance (SA) programs. The Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency administers the Department of State's 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, with our partners' capabilities, 
interoperability, and burden sharing. Foreign Military Sales in CENTCOM 
totaled nearly $23 billion in 2019, accounting for more than 42 percent 
of all FMS globally. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) 
cultivates relationships and improves interoperability with six nations 
across the CENTCOM AOR currently, with more considering entry.
    CENTCOM supports the execution of over $2 billion annually in SA 
funds, consisting of $1.7 billion in Department of State Foreign 
Military Financing to obtain articles, services, or training; $265 
million in Department of Defense Section 333 funds authorizing the U.S. 
to help partner nations build capacity; $17 million in Department of 
State International Military Education and Training (IMET) to improve 
interoperability and establish relationships with future leaders; $4 
million for the Counter Threat and Irregular Warfare Fellowship 
Program; and $3.6 million for the Wales Initiative Fund (WIF). Taken 
together, these State and DOD programs help maintain U.S. influence, 
improve our posture and interoperability with partners, and create 
opportunities to advance U.S. objectives. The State IMET, and DOD WIF 
and SPP programs in particular often yield a far greater return on 
investment compared to the resources allocated against them. On 
average, over 5,500 students receive U.S. military education and 
training through our SA and SC programs annually.
                               conclusion
    The U.S. must posture itself globally to contend with an array of 
security challenges detailed in the NDS. While Iran represents but one 
of those national security challenges, deterring the Iranian regime is 
the primary security challenge for CENTCOM and critical for ensuring 
the Department can focus on near peer competition rather than an 
expansion of conflict in the Middle East. The rapid escalation from 
grey-zone conflict to open, kinetic strikes between the United States 
and Iran in January of this year underscores the immediacy of this 
threat, and the need for vigilance paired with the proper capabilities 
on hand necessary to deter the Iranian regime.
    Readiness and capabilities allocated toward this mission are 
supportive of the NDS not only with regard to Iran, but also in the 
context of supporting great power competition as it manifests itself in 
the Middle East. As the United States reorients itself globally, our 
leadership, presence, and demonstration of commitment to our allies and 
partners in the region are crucial, now more than ever. We have an 
opportunity at this moment in history to establish the foundations of 
collective, effective collaborative security apparatuses throughout the 
region with the U.S. serving not as the core member, but a contributing 
member in a burden-sharing construct.
    For more than 37 years, the men and women of CENTCOM--about 90,000 
uniformed military and civilian strong today--have devoted themselves 
to securing United States national interests in the Middle East that 
help protect the Homeland. They operate in real time, against real 
enemies. Across 18 years of extended combat operations, the missions 
they have executed yielded tangible results. The steadfastness and 
sacrifice of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, 
civilians and their respective families--is both humbling and 
inspirational. Public support for our mission, troops, and families is 
precious and not taken for granted. Your communication with your 
constituents is key in maintaining public support that serves as the 
bedrock and fosters morale, enabling the mission going forward.
    As CENTCOM continues to fulfill its ongoing missions, we appreciate 
the efforts of our civilian leadership at the Department of Defense, 
acknowledge the teamwork of the interagency, and thank the members of 
Congress and their staffs, without whose consistent and timely support 
we would be unable to accomplish our mission.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General, very much.
    For any of the Members who came in a little bit late, we 
announced that we are going to have a closed session 
immediately following this in SVC-217.
    General McKenzie, in the past year, in response to the 
Iranian provocations, we have deployed some 14,000 additional 
troops to the regions,and you have indicated in your statement 
that more attacks from Iran are likely. If so, in what sense 
are these new deployments to the Middle East deterring--what 
level of deterrence do they provide? And is there another form 
of deterrence that might work?
    General McKenzie. Chairman, I believe that deterrence is 
borne of an appreciation in the mind of the adversary of both 
capability and will, and we, over the last few months, have 
demonstrated both of that. As a result of that, I believe we 
have reestablished a rough form of deterrence, what I would 
call contested deterrence, with Iran at the level of state-on-
state attacks. By that, I am referring to things like, 
obviously, attributable ballistic missile attacks from Iran 
launched against United States forces. They have stood their 
missiles down. They are no longer--I do not think that is an 
imminent threat.
    What has not been changed is their continuing desire to 
operate through their proxies indirectly against us, and that 
is a far more difficult area to deter because they believe they 
can generate a measure of non-attribution with those attacks. 
We would not agree because we believe eventually we will be 
able to distill who is behind these attacks going forward. So 
we are in a period where state-on-state I believe we have 
achieved deterrence, but with their proxy activities--and while 
they are principally in Iraq, they are not limited to Iraq, and 
there are other areas where they are active as well. That is 
the period that we are in now with Iran, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. I appreciate that.
    As it is right now, we have kind of a deal with the 
Taliban. We are bringing our troop level down from 12,000 to 
8,600, and they, in turn, have commitments to us. I would have 
two questions. Are they keeping their commitments? Does it 
appear that they are keeping their commitments to us, and if 
not, what would be the next step after our withdrawal down to 
8.6?
    General McKenzie. So, Chairman, obviously my answer will 
concentrate on the military equities because that is what I am 
knowledgeable about. But I would tell you in terms of what we 
see the Taliban doing militarily, they are honoring some, not 
all of their commitments.
    Let me give you an example. Attacks continue. Attacks 
continue at an unacceptably high rate across the country. Those 
attacks, although at a high rate, are not delivered into city 
centers, urban areas, or against coalition forces. Instead, the 
attacks are largely generated against Afghanistan outposts, 
checkpoints, and isolated combat units. So those attacks 
continue, and I would say that that level of attack by the 
Taliban is not consistent with an organization that intends to 
keep its word going forward. However, in other areas they have 
not attacked into the urban areas. They have not attacked 
coalition forces, so we have a pretty good picture of what the 
Taliban is doing and is not doing. We have very good ways----
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, we have a picture right now, but 
anticipating--let us say they do not keep them and they start 
going the other direction. What would be our action at that 
time?
    General McKenzie. Sir, so we are on a glide slope to go to 
8,600 U.S. Forces with our NATO partners in the country by the 
middle of the summer. At that level, we will still be able to 
pursue all of our objectives in Afghanistan.
    Chairman Inhofe. So if they do not and it becomes obvious 
they are not keeping their commitments, we would maintain the 
8.6 as opposed to going any lower.
    General McKenzie. Chairman, that would be not a military 
decision but a policy decision.
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, yes.
    General McKenzie. But we believe that we are going to have 
ample opportunity to see if they are going to keep their word. 
In some areas they are; in some areas they are not. I am 
troubled by these attacks that continue to occur. There are 
obviously some political things that have to go forward that I 
am not the best person to talk about in terms of the Afghan 
Government, prisoner releases, and things like that. All of 
those things have to occur in order to find a path forward.
    Chairman Inhofe. Let us go into Barzani. Senator Rounds and 
I had the opportunity to go through not just Iraq but Erbil and 
go up and spend time with him. Of course, there are kind of two 
groups they deal with--the Kurds are dealing with there, and 
one of them--a lot of people were upset and maybe I think 
misunderstood what the President was doing when he was talking 
about the Turks coming down into that area.
    But as far as the senior--that would be Masoud Barzani--he 
is one that a lot of people are saying or trying to project 
that he has passed a lot of things to his son and to, I guess, 
his nephew. It has been my opinion that he is still in charge, 
and I am not going to ask you whether you agree or disagree 
with that. But I got a very clear message when we spent most of 
a day with him up in Erbil, and he is very satisfied that we 
are keeping our commitments now.
    I really believe he is--I think we need to keep reminding 
people how many Kurds have lost their lives working with us.
    So would you agree that he is now in pretty good shape with 
the United States in terms of our keeping our commitments to 
him?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I could not agree with you more. I 
believe that is the case. As you know, we have a vision of a 
unified, single Iraq going forward and support that, and we 
believe he is a key element in that equation going forward.
    Chairman Inhofe. We are talking about the senior Barzani.
    General McKenzie. Sir, we are.
    Chairman Inhofe. I agree with you. Thank you.
    Senator Reed?
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Just to clarify a point that the Chairman has raised, the 
number that publicly has been released about the increase in 
forces in CENTCOM since approximately last May is about 14,000. 
Is that accurate?
    General McKenzie. Sir, it is a little less than that, and 
it varies as carriers come in. You know, when a carrier comes 
in, you are bringing 5,000 people in. Today I have actually two 
aircraft carriers in the theater. So the number is artificially 
a little higher. The number goes up and down.
    Senator Reed. But within a range of, say, 1,000 personnel?
    General McKenzie. I would say it is over 10,000.
    Senator Reed. I know you are working on attribution of the 
attack last evening at Camp Taji. Have you finished that 
attribution?
    General McKenzie. We are working it very hard right now in 
my headquarters as we speak now.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    With respect to the agreement between the Taliban and the 
United States, looking at the public documents that are 
available, there is no reference to a prohibition of violence 
by the Taliban against the Afghan Government. There is at least 
an interpretation that what they are doing now, attacks against 
Afghan personnel in or outside cities, is within the scope of 
the agreement, that we would continue to go forward. Is that 
accurate?
    General McKenzie. So when I have an opportunity to give 
advice on this subject--and I do have an opportunity to advise 
on this--I would not consider what the Taliban is doing as 
consistent with any path to going forward to come to a final 
end state agreement with the current Government of Afghanistan. 
Those attacks are going to have to come off considerably.
    But we are never going to be a bloodless state in 
Afghanistan. As you know, there are pockets in Afghanistan that 
probably still think the Russians are there. So it is never 
going to be perfect, but we need to get way below where we are 
now.
    Senator Reed. There is, though, a possibility that they 
could, at least until we withdraw, maintain their CT 
commitments but continue active operations against the Afghan 
Government. In fact, it could escalate to what would be either 
a major or a significant civil war in the country. Would we 
still be in the position or still be predisposed to depart?
    General McKenzie. Sir, just speaking looking at the 
military equity, it is difficult to see how if the Taliban is 
still pursuing large-scale operations against the Afghan 
Government, against Afghan Government forces, it would be 
possible for us to maintain a CT platform there without a 
significant presence. It is just hard to see how you would get 
to that level.
    Going smaller requires integration, requires intra-Afghan 
dialogue and some way forward involving both parties.
    Senator Reed. Implicit in what has been discussed by the 
administration about the arrangement is that the final 
departure will be conditions-based. But those conditions have 
not yet been specified. Would you decide the conditions, or how 
will those conditions be established?
    General McKenzie. So what would happen is General Miller 
through me--we would report the military conditions on the 
ground, and that would be an input into the larger element of 
that. But for military conditions, I think again we have got a 
very clear vision of what is happening there. Taliban attacks 
against the government would have to go down to a far lower 
level than they are now. That would be probably the principal 
thing. Intra-Afghan dialogue should ideally lead to some 
condition where the Taliban can never be part of some future 
Afghan military. That would be a matter for the Afghans, not 
for us. But it is hard to see how you can go forward without 
some intra-Afghan dialogue that takes you to that.
    Senator Reed. Well, just one point is it takes two sides to 
have a dialogue, and the current Government of Afghanistan is 
in some disarray. You have two individuals claiming that they 
are president. You have dual inaugurations. It is slightly 
outside your lane, but that is a complicating factor I think.
    General McKenzie. Sir, it is.
    Senator Reed. With respect to our involvement, even with an 
intra-Afghan dialogue and even on a sort of an optimistic 
thing, you would assume that if there is that dialogue, there 
will be some jointness in the government. Taliban elements 
coming into the government.
    It comes down to sustainability over the long run, and as 
you well know, their defense budget is about $6 billion a year. 
We and our coalition partners provide $4.5 billion a year. If 
we were to pull that money or decrease it significantly, their 
ability just to function as a military and police force in the 
nation would probably be gutted. Is that fair?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I would agree with that assessment.
    Senator Reed. We are going to be faced--this is the best 
scenario--with a government that might be Taliban, et cetera 
not fully consistent with all of our values and views, and we 
would still be asked and need to provide billions of dollars. 
Is that fair?
    General McKenzie. Sir, it would. But my advice--and 
obviously, many of those things are outside of my competence. 
My advice would be are we able to do the thing we are there to 
do, which is to prevent the generation of attacks against the 
United States and our Homeland and those of our allies from 
ISIS and al Qaeda, typically in eastern Afghanistan. Is what 
you have described going to yield that result? And that would 
be the basis for any advice that I would give.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General. Thank you for 
your service.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cotton?
    Senator Cotton. General, thanks for coming back. This is 
the first appearance since your troops killed Qassem Soleimani. 
I want to commend you for your role and their role in removing 
the world's worst terrorist mastermind from the face of the 
earth.
    Is it fair to say that Iran's leaders were somewhat 
chastened by the killing of Qassem Soleimani?
    General McKenzie. I think it is. Just a little earlier, we 
talked about capability and will. They have never doubted our 
capability. They often doubted our will, and I think that gave 
them something to think about.
    Senator Cotton. Back in the day in the 2000s, Qassem 
Soleimani traveled with extreme operational security. Is that 
correct?
    General McKenzie. That is correct.
    Senator Cotton. During much of the 20 teens, did he shed 
that operational security and travel more openly to the point 
of posting pictures of himself on social media?
    General McKenzie. Well, I think he communicated a lot to a 
lot of different people. I would just leave it at that.
    Senator Cotton. Suggesting that he felt a degree of 
impunity to travel around and wreck havoc against the United 
States, impunity that he did not have after all.
    Let us stay on Iran, and let us talk about coronavirus in 
particular. We obviously know that it has impacted some of the 
senior leaders in their regime. We have seen it on television 
news. Do you have an assessment of just how extensive it is 
among Iran's leadership?
    General McKenzie. Certainly. You know, we have seen public 
admissions of various senior leaders that are ill and a couple 
that have actually died. I think it is having an affect on how 
they make decisions, and I think it slows them down.
    There are a couple pressures on Iranian leadership right 
now. One is the outrage after the shoot-down of the aircraft 
after their attack on Al-Asad. That coupled with their 
inability to effectively respond to the coronavirus is, I 
think, inducing pressure on and inside the leadership. Of 
course, we watch that very closely. It is a very opaque state, 
very hard for us to see in there. But I believe the numbers are 
probably significantly under-reported in terms of coronavirus 
victims in Iran. So we look at that pretty hard going forward. 
Because the permeability and porousness of the borders, Iran 
sits in the middle of a theater. So their ability to pass that 
infection to other states is very worrisome.
    Senator Cotton. I suspect it actually may be the worst 
outbreak anywhere in the world, contrary to what Iranian media 
would say. Does that presumably apply to Iran's troops as well, 
both their regular military and IRGC troops, if their society 
is facing this wide-scale outbreak? Do you assess that their 
troops are as well?
    General McKenzie. I would say it is going to have some 
affect on the military instrument. We look at it as hard--we 
can talk a little bit more about this in closed session, sir, 
and I would like to do that. But we watch that very closely.
    Senator Cotton. What do you assess to be the impact of the 
oil price collapse over the last 4 days on Iran's Government 
and its military capabilities?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I think it probably hurts them. They 
are under grave pressure right now through a variety of 
economic instruments, you know, the sanctions that are applied 
against them. I do not think this particularly helps in any 
way. I think they have an active policy of trying to find ways 
to swap tankers around the do that, which is marginally 
successful. So I do not think it means anything good for them. 
Aside from that, I would just like a little more time to take a 
look at it. But I do not think it is a good thing for Iran.
    Senator Cotton. There has been some talk around the world 
about providing more humanitarian aid to Iran. Secretary Pompeo 
recently called for Iran to release all foreign national 
prisoners before our Nation provides them humanitarian aid. Do 
you think that is a reasonable step?
    General McKenzie. I defer to the Secretary of State on that 
one.
    Senator Cotton. What about coronavirus among our troops? 
What steps are we taking there?
    General McKenzie. In the theater right now, we have one 
contractor with symptoms. We have another person who actually 
picked it up at the airport after he returned from a trip 
outside the theater who is in quarantine as well. So we watch 
that very, very closely.
    Right now, we believe we have good precautions in place. We 
have cut back significantly on intra-theater travel. For 
example, someone in--pick a place--Kuwait who wanted to go to 
UAE maybe for a weekend of elective liberty--we do not do that 
anymore. So that travel is mission-essential only. Just 
yesterday, we put some restrictions in going into Bahrain as 
well from outside the theater.
    So what we are trying to do is maintain isolation so that 
we protect the critical functions that we have to do. There are 
some things where we just cannot accept the risk of an 
infection. So we look very hard at those things and try to 
maintain good physical separation.
    Senator Cotton. One final question. You say on page 9 of 
your written testimony that unmanned aircraft systems are, 
quote, the most concerning tactical development in the CENTCOM 
area of operations since the rise of the improvised explosive 
device. Anyone who knows what those improvised explosive 
devices did to our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan would find 
that a very troubling statement.
    We have spent billions of dollars in the Department of 
Defense on counter-drone systems. I am concerned that we are 
still under grave threat to them. But I am also encouraged to 
see that your command has been experimenting with so many new 
and more effective counter-drone systems. I am worried that 
they are not widely fielded yet. So I am just wondering if you 
could talk to us a little bit about whether your needs are 
being met and what this Committee could do to be more effective 
on counter-drone systems.
    General McKenzie. Sir, the Department is working very hard. 
As you know, executive sponsorship for this program has gone to 
the Army, which I think is good. It will focus it and be even 
more responsive to our requirements.
    I think the key thing is right now, we are simply at a 
stage in the development of these systems, and you see it in 
the back and forth of warfare where the advantage is with the 
operator and with the offense. We will catch up. It is going to 
take us a little time to do that, and really, it is what we 
would call the group 1 and group 2's that concern me the most, 
the small ones that you can go and buy at Costco, you know, 
duck tape a grenade or mortar bomb to and fly it into an 
objective. The larger ones--we have ways to deal with them 
because they are more like aircraft in a traditional way, 
although they are still very concerning.
    So we have not yet integrated a solution to this. The Army 
has a lot of great ideas, and there are a variety of other good 
things out there that are working. We just have not yet managed 
to bring it all together. We work this every day, and I believe 
the energy is there, but we are still solving the dynamic.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for being here, General, and thank you for your 
service over many, many years.
    You have not been here, as has been remarked, since the 
hearing on December 4th, 2018. So we are very glad to have you 
back. A lot has happened.
    Unfortunately, a lot of the information that this Committee 
receives is behind closed doors in a classified setting. 
Reference was just made to it by the Chairman to follow this 
meeting. I am very concerned that the American people, as well 
as servicemembers and military families, are lacking the kind 
of transparency and accountability that they really deserve and 
that is necessary for the American people to assess how we are 
doing in CENTCOM and other places around the world. I do not 
know whether you have any comments on that. But the over-
classification, the excessive secrecy denies the American 
people the opportunity to know about the brave and dedicated 
service of the troops in your command and what they have 
accomplished, as well as the challenges going forward.
    I might just also say that your testimony today at 15 pages 
is considerably shorter than the more than 40 pages of written 
testimony that your predecessor, General Votel, provided. I am 
not judging the quality by the quantity of pages, but I wonder 
whether you have any plans to submit additional comments or 
background that would elaborate on some of the conclusions, 
particularly as to the issue that Senator Cotton just raised 
which I think is very important, unmanned aerial aircraft, and 
the threat they pose, analogous to the IEDs [Improvised 
Explosive Devices] which were easy to make, proliferated in the 
region, caused more than 50 percent of the deaths and a major 
part of our casualties. I can see the same happening with these 
off-the-shelf kind of items that similarly pose a threat of 
many repeated small-scale attacks on our troops or 
Afghanistan's.
    Let me just ask you on the issue of transparency, I am at a 
loss to know why the annexes to our agreement have not been 
made public. Obviously, they are known to the Taliban. Is there 
any reason why we cannot make them public so the American 
people can see them?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I am going to defer that to the 
Department of State. They are actually the classifying 
authority in this case. So I would defer to them.
    Senator Blumenthal. In your military opinion, just from a 
military standpoint--I realize there may be other factors--do 
you see any obstacle to making them public?
    General McKenzie. So obviously as I work the military side 
of the problem, I have visibility with the annexes. They are 
useful for me to have. But I would defer the question to wider 
publication to the Secretary of State.
    Senator Blumenthal. I know you are deferring the ultimate 
decision, and I apologize for belaboring this point. But 
strictly from the readiness, the preparedness, the 
effectiveness, and the ability to accomplish missions in the 
field, I am at a loss to see any reason why they cannot be made 
public.
    General McKenzie. So from a purely military perspective, 
that is correct. But there are other issues beyond the military 
that need to be considered, and I would not be competent to 
pass judgment on that.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Let me ask you in terms of COVID-19 and its impact on Iran, 
is it likely that the crippling effect of this disease on 
certainly the political structure, the economy, and possibly 
the military are delaying any reprisals for the killing of 
Soleimani?
    General McKenzie. Sir, we spent a lot of time talking about 
that very point, and the short answer is I just do not know. I 
would tell you that totalitarian, authoritarian regimes, when 
they are under extreme pressure, typically react by looking to 
an external threat. There is very little evidence in the 
history of warfare of a regime that has a crippling internal 
problem that decides to focus on solving the crippling internal 
problem that is the source of all their problems rather than 
looking for something to unify the masses of its people against 
an external target. So I am informed by that view, and that I 
think is a possibility.
    They are fractured now, and they are having difficulty 
dealing with a number of things. So I think it probably makes 
them, in terms of decision-making, more dangerous rather than 
less dangerous. But that is just my assessment. There are 
competing views from smarter people than me on Iran.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, I thank you for that very well 
informed assessment and appreciate your being here. Thank you, 
General.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, thank you for being. Thank you for your service.
    I want to take this opportunity at the outset to extend 
again my sincerest condolences to the families of those four 
American heroes and I think a British ally who have given their 
lives in Iraq since last Sunday. Thank you for all that you are 
doing.
    Can I come back to this question of deterrence that the 
chairman and Senator Reed both raised with you? You mentioned 
that we are having some issue with establishing deterrence 
against asymmetric aggression. So can I just ask you about the 
strategy for deterring Iranian asymmetric aggression? What is 
your thinking on that to date and where are we with it 
strategically?
    General McKenzie. So ultimately you want to convince the 
ultimate source of the aggression that the object they pursue 
is too costly to pursue. So when you think about that, you 
think about going to the source. So you really look to Iran. 
Iran needs to understand that we hold them ultimately 
responsible for SMG [sub-machine gun] attacks in Iraq. There is 
a relationship. The Shiite militia groups in Iraq and other 
proxies across the region--and there are other places across 
the region where they are active--they are not entities unto 
themselves. They all have some form of causal relationship with 
Iran, and so I think the best way to convince Iran to cease 
giving orders to those activities is to convey to them it is 
not going to get them what they want and may, in fact, have 
significant consequences for them.
    There is one element that the command and control between 
Iran and their Shiite militias groups in Iraq in particular but 
others as well--it is not perfect. It is not 1.0. It is not 
like our chain of command where I am pretty confident if I give 
an order, it is going to be followed. That is not the way it 
works, as you know, with those groups. There is a gap there 
between intent and execution. So it is not perfect control. But 
I think the key thing is if you want to stop attacks in the 
gray zone, you need to convince the ultimate person behind 
those attacks that it is not in their long-term interest to 
continue them.
    Senator Hawley. Let me come back to this question about the 
pretty sizable conventional force buildup that we have had in 
CENTCOM since last May. If that has so far not succeeded in 
deterring these asymmetrical attacks, what in your judgment is 
it going to take? Do we need additional, in your judgment, 
conventional forces? I mean, how do we go about practically 
reaching this asymmetrical deterrence question?
    General McKenzie. So you may ultimately live with a low 
level of proxy attacks in the region. You may not be able to 
completely do away with that. I would tell you certainly I 
would believe a redline for the United States is going to be 
the death of U.S. servicemembers or those of our partners and 
allies. So that is a redline.
    As you know, there have been a variety of attacks over the 
last month where we had no casualties, small, low level 
attacks. Of course, the attack yesterday is a tragedy.
    I believe that the way to actually deter those in the long 
term is to convince the source of those attacks that they are 
not going to reach their object through those attacks. Let me 
give you an example.
    In Iraq, I think an Iranian goal is to eject the United 
States from Iraq as part of a larger view that they want us to 
leave the theater. Iraq is a good place to start because there 
are certain political constructs in place there that would aid 
them. So they were fairly quiet for a while as they pursued the 
political track.
    Now, I only can talk about the military side of it, but I 
believe ultimately we are going to be able to reach a situation 
with the Government of Iraq where we remain and will not leave. 
That is my judgment, I could be wrong. Again, it is ultimately 
not a military decision. So I think when Iran realizes that--
and I think maybe they have--then their attacks will begin to--
they have sort of laid their attacks low. Now they will begin 
to pick up a little bit.
    Senator Hawley. If we are going to have to live with some 
continuing asymmetrical threat--that is just part of what it 
means to be in the theater. Let us talk about the 14,000 troops 
or so. You said maybe it was closer to 10,000 who have been 
sent to theater since May. In your judgment, how long should we 
expect that troop buildup to need to last in theater? Is this 
something you think is going to need to continue on a 
relatively permanent basis? Give me your assessment about that.
    General McKenzie. Senator, I think so long as we continue a 
maximum pressure campaign against Iran that places diplomatic 
and economic pressure against them, it is in our best interest 
to convince Iran that activities they carry out in the military 
domain--because that is really the only way they have to 
operate. They have no really effective way to operate against 
us diplomatically or economically. Therefore, there response 
almost by definition has to be in the military domain. What 
these forces do and what CENTCOM's objective is is to convince 
Iran it is not in their best interest to act out either 
directly or indirectly through proxies or by state actions 
against us to try to reset the balance of the maximum pressure 
campaign.
    So that gets to your question of how long. My answer would 
be so long as the maximum pressure campaign continues.
    Senator Hawley. Talk to us about the tradeoffs involved 
here from a National Defense Strategy perspective where we 
think about, again as the Chairman mentioned, about the shift 
to INDOPACOM as the pacing theater. We have this threat in 
CENTCOM. I mean, what is this going to mean? If we have to 
sustain the conventional troop buildup in CENTCOM, what will 
this mean for other NDS priorities?
    General McKenzie. Sir, actually the conventional troop 
buildup in CENTCOM, to include the ships and airplanes, is a 
fairly small fraction of the total United States military. In 
my last job, I was the Director of the Joint Staff, and before 
that, I was the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy. So I am 
intimately familiar with the NDS, and I am a believer in the 
NDS. I recognize that in the long term, we need to be postured 
against China and we need to be postured against Russia. 
However, being a global power requires you to be able to do 
several things at once, and these are not binary choices.
    Again, we have chosen to execute a maximum pressure 
campaign against Iran that was not in the NDS. That came along 
after the NDS was written. The NDS actually I believe is 
analytically broad enough to accommodate what we are doing 
against Iran while maintaining pressure against the real 
existential threats that we face.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, General.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thanks, General McKenzie.
    Just to follow up on a point with Senator Hawley, did I 
understand your point to be that Iran really does not believe 
it has a response to the maximum pressure campaign other than a 
military response? They do not really have diplomatic pressure 
levers, and they do not have an economic pressure level of any 
kind.
    General McKenzie. Senator, from where I sit, that is my 
judgment.
    Senator Kaine. So the Iranian activities that are military 
in nature are directly connected to the maximum pressure 
campaign. I would agree with you on that.
    One of the activities that interested me was the joint 
naval drill by Iran, Russia, and China in the Gulf of Oman 
recently. Had Iran, Russia, and China done joint exercises of 
that kind together in the past, as far as you know?
    General McKenzie. They have done bilateral exercises. I 
think it is the first time they have done an exercise of that 
nature, although, Senator, it would tell you it is not an 
exercise in the way that we would do an exercise with NATO or 
we would do an exercise in the theater.
    Senator Kaine. Not as full scale.
    General McKenzie. Yes, sir. That would be an understatement 
actually.
    Senator Kaine. But in CENTCOM and more generally, we should 
be very, very attentive to instances where our adversaries are 
doing anything in combination.
    General McKenzie. Senator, you are absolutely right.
    Senator Kaine. Many of us on the Committee are about the 
ability to handle the mining of the Straits of Hormuz. A couple 
years ago in the NDAA, we had an amendment that required the 
Navy to halt decommissioning of older Avenger-class 
minesweepers because we were worried about this. What is your 
view of our current capacity to handle the mining of the 
straits or to stop scuttling of ships that would block freedom 
of navigation through the straits?
    General McKenzie. Senator, today we have four minesweepers 
in the AOR. The British, our coalition partners, have four 
minesweepers in the AOR, and I have four minesweeping 
helicopters. There are a variety of other things that we can 
employ as well.
    Should the straits be mined, it would take us a while to 
clear that channel. It would depend on were we clearing them 
under conditions of drifting mines that were placed out there, 
which is the least attributable and probably the most likely 
way Iran might choose to act in that waterway, or would it be 
as a condition of a larger war, in which case we would not 
begin to do that clearing until we could guarantee the safety 
of these vessels, which are not really capable of defending 
themselves? So we have the capability to clear the strait. The 
time it would take would be dependent on the Iranian action 
that was the precursor for it.
    Senator Kaine. I see.
    One more question about Iran. I have not seen the answer to 
this. Is there an assessment that the coronavirus spike in Iran 
is driven by like a lot of back and forth travel between Iran 
and China, or what is the assessment about why Iran has become 
an epicenter, say, along with Italy outside of China?
    General McKenzie. There is a lot of travel between Iran and 
China. But I would not go beyond that. I am just not enough of 
an expert to tell you.
    Senator Kaine. Got it. Okay.
    A question on Afghanistan. What is your current assessment 
of kind of in the mil-to-mil space the helpfulness of Pakistan 
and us doing the work we need to do in Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. Sure. So I maintain a close relationship 
with General Bajwa, the Chief of Army Staff. We talk 
frequently. I have been to visit him a couple of times in 
Pakistan. Their support has been very important in directing 
the Taliban to come to negotiations, and their continued 
support is going to be very important as we go through this 
difficult period of deciding is the Taliban actually serious 
about this and are they going to live up to their commitments.
    Senator Kaine. Do you see that level of United States and 
Pakistan cooperation on the mil-to-mil side with the 
Afghanistan mission sort of getting better? It has always been 
good? I mean, how would you assess it kind of historically?
    General McKenzie. So we have always had at U.S. Central 
Command--and I have about 10 years of experience in this 
organization. We have always seen a relationship with Pakistan 
as critical. Whether at the political level, there is turmoil, 
up and down, we always try to keep the military channel open. 
There are good reasons to do that, to prevent fratricide, to 
prevent miscalculation, and things like that. So we work very 
hard to keep that channel open.
    Senator Kaine. Let me ask one last question, and it seems 
like it is kind of outside of your area of authority. It is 
about Venezuela, but it deals with a partner in CENTCOM, the 
UAE. We do a lot of work together with UAE. But the UAE 
together with India, Turkey, Russia have assisted the Maduro 
regime in avoiding United States sanctions. Have you ever 
interacted with UAE about their interaction with the Maduro 
regime in Venezuela?
    General McKenzie. Senator, I have not.
    Senator Kaine. All right. I appreciate it. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    General McKenzie, thank you so much for your service to our 
Nation, and I echo the thoughts and prayers from the rest of my 
colleagues on the losses that we have had in the recent week. 
So please extend that to those families, if you would, sir.
    I do take very seriously Congress' role in authorizing the 
use of military force. We have to ensure that our troops have 
the correct authorities to do the missions that we ask them to 
do. Now, there has been a lot of debate, not just within this 
Committee, but with a number of our colleagues outside of this 
Committee about repealing an AUMF and maybe putting a new one 
in place.
    Can you tell us what the operational impact would be of 
repealing either the 2001 or 2002 AUMF [Authorized Use of 
Military Force]? And in your view, do you believe a new 
authorization for the use of military force is necessary to 
adequately cover down and conduct operations in your AO?
    General McKenzie. Ma'am, many of those questions are above 
my level of competence. But I would tell you I believe I have 
the authorities I need now to execute operations in CENTCOM.
    Senator Ernst. Utilizing the current AUMF----
    General McKenzie. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Ernst.--you are able to operate.
    General McKenzie. That is correct.
    Senator Ernst. Well, I appreciate that. Again, the debate 
that we have has been pretty extensive on what we could do with 
or without that AUMF. So thank you for that feedback. That is a 
debate for us, but we do need that input to know whether you 
are able to adequately operate.
    Moving on to a different topic with our special operators, 
The Washington Post had an article on the 5th of March that 
stated, quote, a new network of special operations forces will 
serve as the backbone of a smaller United States military 
mission in Afghanistan. End quote. Of course, the purpose of 
our special operations network is to continue rooting out ISIS 
in that area and apply pressure to the Taliban if they fail to 
live up to their end of the peace agreement.
    So what can you tell us about this new special operations 
network?
    General McKenzie. Ma'am, I begin by saying I do not think 
it is actually new. I think it is the way we have done business 
for quite a while in Afghanistan. We have embedded CT forces 
that operate against that specific mission, have done it for 
many years, and it would be the way that we would go forward.
    It is important to understand that for special operations 
forces to be most effective, they need to operate within a 
conventional force structure, and that provides the ecosystem 
that they use to move around. If they get in trouble, there is 
someone that can come to help them. So we always tend to think 
in that way, not only there but in other places across the 
theater as well. Special operations forces are vitally 
important to us, but they exist best when they are flourished 
within a network of U.S. conventional forces and then a host 
nation force as well.
    Senator Ernst. Which, yes, was going to be my next question 
about the conventional forces. So I was just trying to 
understand within this article what was new about what they 
were being required to do.
    General McKenzie. Ma'am, I often take up with The 
Washington Post articles to understand exactly what it is they 
are saying. In this case, I do not see anything particularly 
new.
    Senator Ernst. Okay, outstanding.
    Of course, then our special operators--will they need to 
maintain different strategic locations than where they are now, 
or will they largely remain in place?
    General McKenzie. It will depend on if we go to the force 
level that I have been told to go to, 8,600. We have a good 
lay-down for that. Going below that level would require 
guidance to me and it would depend on the permissiveness of the 
environment. If you go lower and go to fewer bases, typically 
you are going to do it because the security situation is 
permissive. You do not have to defend yourself against Taliban 
attacks even as you are executing operations against ISIS and 
al Qaeda. So it would be strictly dependent on the overall 
permissiveness of the situation, and those days are still ahead 
of us. We have a variety of ways for looking at that, and we 
will look at that very closely as we go ahead.
    Senator Ernst. Wonderful. A number of us did travel to 
Afghanistan prior to Thanksgiving, and we were able to visit 
some of the commando training with the Afghan forces. Do you 
feel that they are now getting to a point where they will be 
able to nest with great capability with our special operators 
on the ground?
    General McKenzie. We have made great strides with the 
commando forces in Afghanistan. Your sense is exactly right.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, sir. I appreciate it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I have realized that the questions I am about to embark 
upon are more policy and that your job is executing policy, but 
I just want to get some of your thoughts.
    In your testimony on page 4, you said, since May 2019, Iran 
supported groups in Iraq, have attacked United States interests 
dozens of times, conducted scores of unmanned aerial system 
reconnaissance flights. They have attacked and seized foreign 
vessel in the Gulf. You go on to list all the things Iran is 
doing. I think you testified in response to Senator Hawley's 
question that they are not being deterred in the asymmetric 
area, in the proxy area. It has always been a proxy war. I 
mean, that is what it has always been.
    Here is my problem. In 2017, we left the JCPOA [Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action], which they were abiding by. All 
intelligence unequivocally said that Iran was in compliance 
with all the provisions of the JCPOA. We put on the maximum 
pressure campaign, but as you have testified, it does not seem 
to be working because they are still doing what they were doing 
before.
    The major difference today is--and I do not want to get 
into classified material, but Iran is significantly closer to 
break-out to a bomb than they were when we left the agreement 
in--I think it was 2018. I do not get it. It is exactly what 
many of us were worried before the JCPOA. You have got a malign 
Iran acting irresponsibly throughout the region getting close 
to a nuclear weapon. Help me out here. I do not really 
understand it. They are still doing it, and we probably will 
find out that the attack last night was a Shiite militia 
supported by Iran. I mean, I think that is probably where the 
evidence is going to head. I do not have any intelligence on 
that, but I am speculating. Give me some thoughts.
    General McKenzie. Senator, so the maximum pressure 
campaign, in terms of its effect on the Iranian economy, there 
are other people----
    Senator King. Well, there is no question it has had an 
effect on the Iranian economy, but it has not had any effect on 
the activity we were hoping to deter. You have testified to 
that.
    General McKenzie. I would argue actually, as a result of 
the buildup in Iranian activity over the course of the summer, 
the establishment of the International Maritime Security 
construct actually shifts--the Straits of Hormuz are no longer 
harassed. They are passing without any problem at all back and 
forth not because we are taking actions aimed directly at Iran, 
but rather because we and an international coalition are 
shining a spotlight when that activity occurs. So the activity 
is not occurring.
    Senator King. Interesting you mentioned the international 
coalition. I completely agree with you, which we blew up when 
we left the JCPOA. The international coalition that put that 
agreement in place did not agree with our decision. We took it 
unilaterally, but that is another discussion.
    Again, do you believe that they are being deterred from 
their proxy attacks throughout the region?
    General McKenzie. I believe that we are deterring them from 
state-on-state attacks.
    Senator King. But that is not the issue. It has not been a 
state-on-state situation. The attacks have always been through 
proxies.
    General McKenzie. Sir, actually on January the 7th, we had 
a clear state-on-state attack.
    Senator King. After we killed Soleimani. Correct? That was 
the missile attack.
    General McKenzie. That is the missile attack.
    Senator King. Yes, okay. But we killed Soleimani and then 
they responded. But historically the attacks have always been 
through proxies, and my point is they are still doing it. The 
only difference is they are also headed toward a nuclear 
weapon, and I do not get how that is in the best interest of 
the United States or the region.
    Senator King. Sir, I understand your argument. Many of 
those issues are not CENTCOM issues.
    I would tell you that I come back to what I think my 
military task is. As the maximum pressure campaign continues, 
my military task is to prevent Iran from taking actions 
directly or indirectly that would challenge the activities that 
are ongoing.
    Senator King. I appreciate that, and you are doing an 
excellent job. It is a tragedy what happened yesterday and the 
last week to our troops. I think everyone here recognizes that.
    Just in a few seconds left, is there a plan B if the 
Taliban does not abide by this agreement in Afghanistan? In 
other words, do they believe that we are going to leave come 
hell or high water, or do they still have some worry that we 
are going to stay there if they do not act right? Because as 
you testified, they are doing plenty of attacks right now. I 
worry that after 17, 18, 19 years, we are going to end up 
exactly where we were in 2001 with the Taliban in charge of the 
country and open season for terrorists.
    General McKenzie. Senator, I had the opportunity to give 
advice on the plan that we are executing now, and my advice was 
to proceed with it. The principal reason that I supported it 
was the conditionality that is inherent in it. So we are going 
to have an opportunity to see what the Taliban do.
    Senator King. Do we know what the conditions are?
    General McKenzie. Sir, on the military side, I know very 
clearly what the conditions----
    Senator King. Do we? Does the American public know?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I am not sure that I would be the 
one to answer that.
    Senator King. Well, thank you for your testimony. I 
appreciate it. Again, I understand your job is to execute 
policy, but you are the nearest thing we have to a policymaker 
on this issue here this morning. I appreciate your candid 
answers to my questions.
    General McKenzie. Thank you, sir.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cramer?
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, General, for your service and for being here. I 
too express my condolences to you and to the families for the 
loss of your/our two soldiers and, of course, our friend from 
the United Kingdom.
    General, this year, of course, the Air Force is asking us 
in their budget proposal to divest in critical ISR assets and a 
way to allow for more room to invest in new technologies and 
future ISR assets. I am very aware of the critical role that 
these ISR assets, some of these legacy assets have played in 
CENTCOM, including some from my home State of North Dakota. I 
would like your take on, first of all, what the Department of 
Defense and/or the Air Force have told you to expect with 
regard to meeting your ISR obligations or requirements if this 
fiscal year 2021 budget is enacted.
    General McKenzie. Thank you, sir. I actually possess most 
of the ISR assets the Department has, and I am cognizant of 
that. At the same time, as we were talking just a few minutes 
ago, as for the former Director of the Joint Staff and the J-5, 
I am very much aware of the need to prepare and turn to face 
the threat from China and the threat from Russia. Those are 
existential threats and we need to capitalize. We need to 
invest. We need to move in that direction.
    For me, it actually comes down to a platform, and that 
platform is the MQ-9. That is the platform of choice in the 
CENTCOM AOR. It is a platform that can gather intelligence. It 
can strike. It can do all kinds of things. It is a jack of all 
trades. I would prefer that the Air Force not divest of that 
resource right now to the degree that they are doing. I 
acknowledge that the Air Force has some tough decisions to make 
as they take a look at the future of the China threat. The MQ-9 
is not necessarily a platform that is useful in a dense air 
defense environment. I recognize that. But for right now and 
for the threats that to me are much closer actually than the 
longer-term threats of China that are deeper and graver, I 
favor retaining those assets as long as possible.
    Senator Cramer. I appreciate your answer, and I agree. The 
MQ-9 is really quite a remarkable asset. We are just trying to 
assess the risk and whether the risk is worth it and how we 
transition because I also agree that we need to get to another 
place.
    With that in mind, I want to transition then in the 
discussion to the Space Force. Of course, we understand that 
many of the new technologies we are talking about would be 
space assets. I am just wondering, first of all, are you 
expecting to get some benefit in CENTCOM from space, ISR 
assets? I would expect the answer would be yes. But then the 
question becomes the gap between here and there and the risk in 
the middle of it. Are we preparing to adequately mitigate that 
risk?
    General McKenzie. Senator, I use space assets every day, 
every hour in U.S. Central Command, and they provide unique 
capabilities. The total ISR picture is best built when it is 
complemented by air-breathing platforms as well. But for all of 
my life and particularly in U.S. Central Command, we cannot 
survive without space assets.
    Senator Cramer. I think you have answered my questions, 
including a couple that I have not asked yet. So I appreciate 
that and appreciate the time and am happy to yield back some 
time.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hirono?
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, as long as we are on the subject of ISR, are your 
general ISR requirements being met?
    General McKenzie. Yes, they are.
    Senator Hirono. Are you able to leverage the ISR capacity 
of partners and allies in the region?
    General McKenzie. I am able to leverage both partners in 
the region and partners and allies out of the region that 
deploy into the region.
    Senator Hirono. Regarding the peace agreement with the 
Taliban, you had testified on March 10th, not too long ago, 
before the House Armed Services Committee that the U.S. had not 
developed military plans for the full withdrawal. Based on what 
you testified today and also how you testified before that you 
did not have much confidence that the Taliban would honor its 
commitments, so at this rate are we ever going to meet the 
timeline of complete withdrawal by the end of the year?
    General McKenzie. Senator, that will be a condition----
    Senator Hirono. By the end of the year or pretty much in 
any foreseeable future.
    General McKenzie. I am confident we are going to go to 
8,600 by the middle of the summer. I think a decision to go 
below that level is a political not a military decision. I will 
have an opportunity to give a recommendation on that and then 
will be directed what to do.
    Senator Hirono. There are not very many indications that 
the Taliban is going to stop pursuing its attacks. So as you 
say, they would have to decrease those attacks against Afghan 
forces substantially before we would go much below the 8,600 
troops. It seems to me that we are going to be in Afghanistan a 
long, long time. We certainly cannot predict when we are going 
to be out of there, and this war has already cost us $2 
trillion, killed more than 3,500 Americans and coalition 
troops. So this is a really troubling area of the world. The 
entire Middle East is.
    So you would agree the stability, such as it can be, in the 
Middle East is a good thing for the United States.
    General McKenzie. Senator, I would agree.
    Senator Hirono. Yes. Meanwhile, Senator King had pointed 
out that Iran is pursuing its nuclear ambitions and that they 
could very well have a nuclear weapon. Would Iran having a 
nuclear weapon not add to the instability of the region? Would 
it not encourage other countries in the region to also develop 
nuclear weapons that would end up being an even more unstable 
region than we currently have?
    General McKenzie. Senator, my understanding of the object 
of our policy is to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear 
weapon.
    Senator Hirono. Well, they are going ahead with it from 
what we can see, and our departure from JCPOA has only hastened 
that situation. I think all around, the impact of our 
withdrawal from the JCPOA is certainly being manifested.
    I have a question about China and Russia. As they continue 
to make significant investments in the area of your 
responsibility, so they are cultivating relationships and 
providing financial support. In particular, China has invested 
an estimated $200 billion--$200 billion--in the Middle East in 
the past 15 years, and both Russia and China continue to 
develop relationships with leaders in the region such as Syrian 
President Bashar Assad.
    What risk does the United States face as Russia and China 
increase investments and influence in your area of 
responsibility, knowing full well that Russia and China are our 
near-peer competitors?
    General McKenzie. Senator, I think the greatest risk, 
although it is in the future, is from China, and you noted very 
correctly they are leading with their economics. Although they 
have established a significant military presence in Djibouti, 
their military presence throughout the rest of the theater is 
actually quite small. But I think we are seeing the leading 
edge of economic in-roads.
    I think Russia is a little more complicated. They are not 
spending as much money. We see more Russian military 
deployments, but I think it is harder for them to sustain, with 
the exception of Syria.
    Senator Hirono. So what can we do? What are we doing? 
Because China really employs a whole-of-government approach to 
what they are doing not only in this area of the world, but 
clearly in the Indo-Pacific area. So what are we doing? Are we 
pursuing a whole-of-government approach to counter particularly 
China's activities in both regions?
    General McKenzie. Senator, again, this is not an area of my 
particular expertise. But I believe we are looking at whole-of-
government responses to China in the AOR and in the bridge 
really between CENTCOM and USAFRICOM, which is where their road 
actually takes them as well.
    Senator Hirono. That may sound reassuring, but you know, I 
really question whether or not we are pursuing the kind of 
whole-of-government approach that China is.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters?
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, thank you for being here and your testimony here 
today. I would also like to join my colleagues in offering my 
sincere condolences to the loved ones and families of those 
members who we lost recently.
    You have command in a very dangerous region. Over the past 
several months, our servicemembers and installations have 
suffered several rocket attacks. I am concerned about the 
serious miscommunication to the American people and, quite 
frankly, to the men in uniform and their families about the 
damage assessment following an attack in January that we had 
against our facilities. We were initially told that there were 
no injuries. Then we were told about a dozen soldiers suffered 
traumatic brain injuries. Then several dozen--the latest 
reports show that more than 100 troops have been diagnosed with 
a brain injury from this attack, many of whom were transferred 
out of country for treatment.
    My question to you, sir, is how did this miscommunication 
occur? Was CENTCOM forced to give a rushed assessment, or did 
the White House make an announcement without having any facts?
    General McKenzie. Senator, thank you for the question. I 
actually would like to talk about that.
    I am solely and completely responsible for the first 
notification that there were no casualties. I am the officer 
who gave that report based on my assessment of what happened at 
Al-Asad. There was no pressure on me to give that report. That 
was we thought in the immediate hours after the attack because 
it was not evident to us that there had been concussion 
injuries. Maybe if we were smarter, we would have picked up on 
that, but there were no kinetic injuries. No one was bleeding. 
No bones were broken. So it was out assessment and the 
assessment of my commanders on the ground. But I am the single 
person who passed that report. So I bear total responsibility 
for that with no one else.
    So, therefore, after that, concussions presented 
themselves. TBI [traumatic brain injury] presented itself. As 
you know, Senator, that is not an injury like a broken arm or a 
broken leg that can be immediately diagnosed on the spot. These 
injuries come back and forth. Sometimes they manifest 
themselves over time. Sometimes it takes months to do that.
    Two things I can tell you. I was never under any pressure 
from anyone at any time to shade this reporting. The Secretary 
of Defense never said anything to me about it. The Chairman 
never said anything to me about it. The President never said 
anything to me about it. We were driven solely by medical 
diagnosis on scene. So that is one point.
    The second point is I am completely confident that every 
American service man or woman that was at Al-Asad got the very 
best medical treatment that really our system can provide, and 
so the numbers changed. So they did as people were presented, 
as people were evaluated, I took the trouble to actually dig 
into what is called the MACE-2, which is the clinical tool that 
is given on site to develop some of the initial indications of 
are you concussed and what is it. It is a pretty good tool. I 
wanted to make sure I understood it fully and the difficulty of 
administering it.
    You are right. One hundred ten people were diagnosed. We 
evacuated 35 of them out of the theater to Landstuhl. A further 
28 have come back to the United States. Some people have gone 
back to duty. We continue to take a look at that.
    I would never minimize the significance of traumatic brain 
injury. I mean, just the description of the injury itself is 
concerning. We still have a lot to learn about it, but I 
believe that people that were injured and received injuries of 
that nature at Al-Asad have gotten very good medical treatment 
as a result of it.
    Senator Peters. Well, thank you for that answer, and you 
have answered some of my next question. The President said--I 
think he said, quote, they had headaches, a couple of other 
things, but I would say and I can report it is not very 
serious. End of quote. That is what we heard from the President 
that they had headaches.
    The question to you. There are hundreds of thousands of 
U.S. military veterans that are suffering from TBI, as you are 
well aware. Do you agree that those injuries are serious and 
not merely headaches?
    General McKenzie. I believe any injury to the brain is a 
serious injury.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    General, in your written statement, you assert despite the 
death of Baghdadi in October, ISIS remains a threat in Syria 
and most of its activities focused on reestablishing networks, 
assassinating and intimidating local leaders and security 
forces and extending its influence in rural areas throughout 
Syria and Iraq. You state, similar to Afghanistan, most of the 
United States intelligence community predicts that without 
sustained pressure, ISIS has the potential to reconstitute 
itself in both Iraq and Syria.
    The President seems to have a different view and says that 
basically--well, he takes credit for 100 percent defeat of ISIS 
and used that as justification to withdraw troops from Syria 
back in October of 2019.
    My question to you as commander, because there is 
inconsistency in what we are hearing from the President and 
from you, how do you navigate between the Department of Defense 
and the IC's [Intelligence Community] very ominous assessment 
of the ISIS threat with the President's more optimistic 
assessment?
    General McKenzie. I will tell you based on guidance that I 
have been given, which came from the Secretary of Defense, we 
have repositioned ourselves in eastern Syria, what we call the 
Eastern Syria Security Area, where we are carrying on 
operations against ISIS with our SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] 
partners. Those operations are actually very effective, and I 
think as long as we maintain pressure on them, we will be at a 
place where it is going to be difficult for them to generate 
and deliver external attack plotting, external attack plotting 
meaning attacks against the United States or Europe. As long as 
we have the ability to do that--and we do have the ability to 
do that now both with the forces that are there and the 
positions that we are in--we are going to be able to keep that 
pressure on.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blackburn?
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, thank you for being here, and I join with others 
in expressing our condolences to those last night, the two 
Americans and the Brit that we lost in the attacks.
    Just to be sure that we have got our notes right, it is not 
14,000 troops that were added. It was 10,000?
    General McKenzie. The number goes up and down based on--
forces flow in and out of the theater all the time. I would say 
the number is closer to 10,000. But it is difficult to put a 
single figure on it. When a carrier comes in, 5,000 people come 
in. That is roughly correct. I would not want to give you a 
single number.
    Senator Blackburn. All right. That is fair.
    Let us talk a little bit about what you are doing to deter 
gray zone attacks. I think that we need to hear a little bit 
from you on that, if you will.
    General McKenzie. Sure. As the maximum pressure campaign 
against Iran continues, they are unable to really respond 
economically or diplomatically, the two channels that we are 
using to place pressure on them. As they seek to find a way to 
respond, the only way that is left is the military component. 
The military component--they can do it one of two ways. They 
can do it directly, a state attack, and they have done that 
with the attack on Al-Asad, or they can do it indirectly, which 
the proxy attacks, gray zone attacks, as you indicate there.
    There is evidence over the course of the summer and the 
fall that Iran wanted to pursue those gray zone activities in 
order to force us to reconsider the maximum pressure campaign, 
in order to make us back off from that. Where we are right now 
is we believe as a result of the ballistic missile attack on 
Al-Asad, in the wake of that, rough state-on-state deterrence 
has been reestablished and that Iran does not seem to want to 
engage in another exchange of that nature because that would 
ultimately be a very bad outcome for them, and I think they 
recognize that.
    However, they are still of the opinion that they can pursue 
their objectives through attacks that they would hope would 
either be unattributable or be below the level where we will 
respond. That poses a very grave danger for them because I am 
not certain they do have an exact understanding of what our 
redlines are and where we are not going to be pushed. So we see 
that in Iraq. We also see it in other places in the theater. 
But we see it principally in Iraq because Iran is pursuing a 
dream of American ejection from the theater, and they would 
like for that to begin in Iraq. That is where we see it most 
readily.
    Senator Blackburn. Then let me ask you this. When we are 
talking about Iran, do you think they are more bold or less 
bold than they were a year ago?
    General McKenzie. So they were very bold in the late 
spring/early summer of 2019, and they were bold because they 
have never doubted our capability, but they doubt our will. So 
additionally in the spring and summer of 2019, the theater had 
been significantly drawn down in terms of capability. So they 
could observe that CENTCOM did not possess the forces that it 
had in the past. So a confluence of a judgment about our will 
and a judgment about our capability led them, to answer your 
question, to be pretty bold.
    I believe they are less bold now probably most 
significantly impacted by the death of Qassem Soleimani.
    Senator Blackburn. So then as we talk about their presence 
in Iraq and their goal of ejecting us from that theater, then 
outside of adding personnel, which I think it is fair to say 
you do not have the personnel to add, then what can we do in 
Iraq that is going to end up enhancing our force protection? 
How do we do that so that we keep Iran in a diminishing posture 
instead of a bolder posture?
    General McKenzie. First of all, you look to the source. If 
the source is Iran, to reestablish deterrence, you want to 
establish the idea in the mind of the opponent that the object 
they seek will be more painful than its attainment. So it is 
more painful to get there than it is to actually hold it, and 
so you do that by being very clear to them about things that we 
are going to tolerate and things that we are going to not 
tolerate. So that is one path.
    The other path at the same time----
    Senator Blackburn. So in other words, they have to see our 
will, or as my kids would say, put the hurt on them.
    General McKenzie. That is a very good way to state it, 
ma'am.
    Senator Blackburn. Yes, okay.
    General McKenzie. So meanwhile in Iraq, we are in Iraq at 
the invitation of the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government 
has responsibilities to provide protection for us. Actually 
practically the best way to get at this problem is to continue 
to work with our Iraqi hosts and partners to get after the SMG 
threat because it threatens them as well.
    Senator Blackburn. I yield back.
    Chairman Inhofe. General McKenzie, excellent testimony. We 
appreciate it very much. As we stated at the beginning of this 
hearing, we are going to go now down to SVC-217 for a closed 
session. We will see who shows up.
    We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:20 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                                lebanon
    1. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of 
Hezbollah's role in the new Lebanese Government?
    General McKenzie. Hezbollah possesses greater influence in the new 
government with a majority representation in the ruling coalition 
controlling/nominating the heads of the three major branches of 
government. Despite wielding this enhanced influence, Hezbollah almost 
certainly does not want to face public scrutiny for failed legislation 
or policies like the ongoing economic crisis.

    2. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, does Hezbollah have more or 
less influence than in previous governments?
    General McKenzie. Hezbollah has more influence in the new 
government and parliament compared to the previous government.

    3. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is the trend for the 
opinion of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) among the Lebanese 
population?
    General McKenzie. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are the most 
respected government entity inside Lebanon, viewed as an apolitical 
organization. The LAF are consistently viewed as the sole national 
defense force. While Hezbollah is a significant actor in the security 
spectrum, it is not considered an alternative to the LAF as a national 
defense force.

    4. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, is their credibility and 
favorability as an institution increasing or decreasing overall?
    General McKenzie. The Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) institutional 
credibility is unchanged in the wake of recent anti-government 
protests, which favorably showcased the LAF's non-partisan, apolitical 
standing.

    5. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, is their credibility and 
favorability as an institution increasing or decreasing vis-a-vis 
Hezbollah?
    General McKenzie. The Lebanese population does not typically view 
Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as competitors. Hezbollah 
is widely recognized as a sectarian political and militia entity, while 
the LAF is seen as a national, apolitical institution. Lebanese views 
on Hezbollah or the LAF almost certainly vary depending on religious 
sect and political alignment.

    6. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the 
performance of the Lebanese Armed Forces during the ongoing series of 
protests against the government?
    General McKenzie. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) forms the 
backbone of United States influence in Lebanon and hedges against 
Iranian, Russian, and all other malevolent interests in the country. 
The LAF performed well balancing the safety and security of the 
protesters as well as their demands to illustrate professional and 
neutral behavior, permitting democratic freedom of expression.

    7. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the 
Lebanese Armed Forces in light of the new Lebanese Government?
    General McKenzie. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) views itself as 
apolitical but prioritizes protecting the Lebanese people against all 
threats. In December 2019, LAF Chief of Defense (CHOO) Aoun openly 
opposed the government's lack of credible response to the anti-
government protests. The CHOO referred to the protests as a 
``revolution of the hungry.''

    8. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the 
LAF and their ability to maintain end use monitoring of United States 
assistance?
    General McKenzie. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) take end use 
monitoring responsibilities very seriously and have maintained 100 
percent accountability annually. Of the 4,529 items requiring annual 
inventory in Lebanon, only two were not physically observed in the past 
fiscal year. However, these two items were satisfactorily accounted for 
through accurate and up to date hand receipts while deployed at the 
time of inventory. Additionally, the LAF passed their last Compliance 
Assistance Visit with a ``satisfactory'' rating, which is the highest 
possible rating. The Office of Defense Cooperation Beirut and the LAF 
have an excellent relationship, with unhindered access for end use 
monitoring at any time.
                            egypt and sinai
    9. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the 
Egyptian Government's performance against the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist organizations in the Sinai?
    General McKenzie. The Egyptian Armed Forces have contained most of 
the ISIS-Sinai and other Violent Extreme Organizations violence in the 
northeastern Sinai Peninsula. Cairo has sustained counterterrorism 
operations despite consistent casualties, while beginning to implement 
limited reforms to address societal and economic grievances.

    10. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of 
the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and its role in supervising 
the implementation of the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli 
Treaty of Peace and working to prevent any violation of its terms?
    General McKenzie. For the past 40 years, the Multinational Force 
and Observers (MFO) is the only dedicated organization to monitor the 
Egypt-Israel treaty. Aside from treaty supervision, MFO's presence 
serves to reinforce the commitment of the international community in 
maintaining peace. The MFO also allows Egypt and Israel to discuss 
shared diplomatic, economic, and security interests in good faith.

    11. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of 
the value of MFO as a platform for communications between Egypt and 
Israel in the event that tensions increase between the two countries?
    General McKenzie. I defer to Ambassador Beecroft, Multinational 
Force and Observers' (MFO) Director General, on MFO's role in 
facilitating diplomatic communications between Egypt and Israel. I do 
believe that MFO symbolizes the international community's support for 
the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Task Force Sinai, the United 
States contribution to MFO, likewise sends a strong signal of the 
nation's support to Egypt and Israel.
                                 syria
    12. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of 
the situation in Idlib?
    General McKenzie. The cease fire in Idlib continues to hold but 
remains fragile. There is evidence that Syria, Russia, and Turkey 
continue to posture military forces and deploy additional troops to the 
area, signaling a potential resumption of hostilities in the future. We 
remain concerned about the large number of people who have been 
displaced in Northwest Syria due to the fighting and significant 
humanitarian need.

    13. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, do you see any evidence that 
Idlib could be a friction point between Russia and Turkey?
    General McKenzie. Russia likely seeks to avoid actions that would 
intentionally start a conflict with Turkey, preferring to engage 
diplomatically with Ankara and avoid a direct confrontation with NATO. 
Russia almost certainly will look to leverage it's diplomatic, 
economic, and security relationship with Turkey in order to maintain 
the Asad regime's control over Syrian territory.
                                 yemen
    14. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of 
the Houthi missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threat to United 
States personnel, citizens, and partners in the region?
    General McKenzie. Houthi missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles pose 
a significant threat to United States interests, citizens, and partners 
particularly as seen by the targeting of Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) civilian critical infrastructure to include airports.

    15. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your observation of 
the impact of Houthi missile and UAV threats to the utilization of Air 
and Missile Defense assets by partners in the region such as Saudi 
Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE)?
    General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

    16. Senator Inhofe. If the United States withdrew all support for 
the Saudi-led coalition, would the Houthi threat to United States 
personnel, citizens, and partners increase or decrease?
    General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

    17. Senator Inhofe. Is it possible for the Houthi missile and UAV 
systems to become a threat to Israel?
    General McKenzie. [Deleted.]
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                    prisoner release and the taliban
    18. Senator Cotton. General McKenzie, why would we want the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to release 
5,000 of 15,000 Taliban prisoners before we have a complete, confirmed 
peace deal--especially given the lack of reduction in violence since 
the agreement was announced?
    General McKenzie. The United States has no direct role in the 
release or reintegration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-
led effort we support the peace process and confidence building 
measures necessary to bring about a conclusion to this conflict.

    19. Senator Cotton. General McKenzie, what details can you provide 
about each of these prisoners. I understand that the response to this 
question may be classified.
    General McKenzie. The United States has no direct role in the 
release or reintegration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-
led effort we support the peace process and confidence building 
measures necessary to bring about a conclusion to this conflict.

    20. Senator Cotton. General McKenzie, what arrangements do we have 
to ensure that prisoners do not support al-Qaeda (AQ) or ISIS after 
they are released?
    General McKenzie. The United States has no direct role in the 
release or reintegration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-
led effort we support the peace process and confidence building 
measures necessary to bring about a conclusion to this conflict.

    21. Senator Cotton. General McKenzie, would prisoners be monitored 
after release, and how?
    General McKenzie. The United States has no direct role in the 
release or reintegration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-
led effort we support the peace process and confidence building 
measures necessary to bring about a conclusion to this conflict.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                       iran-deterrence strategies
    22. Senator Tillis. General McKenzie, you stated, ``The long-term 
challenges the United States faces in the CENTCOM (United States 
Central Command) AOR (area of responsibility) are the destabilizing and 
escalatory actions of the Iranian regime.'' Particularly, ``its 
hegemonic ambitions, misbehavior, and threat to the United States and 
its regional partners.'' What is a more effective strategy or response 
to Iran's defiance of our current economic and diplomatic strategies to 
CENTCOM's ``maximum pressure campaign?''
    General McKenzie. The Maximum Pressure Campaign is a whole of 
Government effort, led by the State Department at the direction of the 
President and focused on bringing diplomatic and economic pressure to 
bear on the Iranian regime; it is not a United States Central Command 
(USCENTCOM) campaign. USCENTCOM's efforts are concentrated on deterring 
Iran from responding militarily to the diplomatic and economic pressure 
against us or others in the region, and we will maintain our support to 
our regional partners and allies.

    23. Senator Tillis. General McKenzie, you stated, ``Our presence 
sends a clear and unambiguous message signal of our capabilities and 
most importantly, the will to defend partners and U.S. national 
interests. This exemplifies the concept of deterrence. Deterrence is 
diplomatic and political construct obtained from the effect 
demonstrated capabilities have on the mind of a potential opponent.'' 
What have we learned with respect to the ``mind of our opponents'' in 
the CENTCOM AOR, such that we can claim wins in CENTCOM's current 
deterrence philosophy?
    General McKenzie. I believe our resolve to directly respond to 
strikes by Iranian proxies against United States personnel and bases 
and strike against former IRGC-QF Commander Soleimani demonstrated to 
Iran our willingness to act in self-defense to defend our interests. 
Our ability to deter Tehran is dynamic and I remain concerned further 
force posture reductions in the region will only embolden the regime to 
take more aggressive actions in the region.

    24. Senator Tillis. General McKenzie, exactly how clear and 
unambiguous of a signal are we sending to our adversaries in the 
CENTCOM AOR?
    General McKenzie. Very clear. United States Central Command, as one 
element of the broader whole of United States Government approach to 
preserve and enhance the credibility and influence of the United States 
in the region, continues to send a clear message to our partners, 
competitors, and adversaries through consistent synchronization of 
information and actions including lethal and non-lethal operations 
across the U.S. Government. Through focused and integrated efforts to 
understand and engage key audiences, we are able to create, strengthen, 
and preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States 
Government interests, policies, plans, and strategic objectives.
             reduction of u.s. forces & regional stability
    25. Senator Tillis. General McKenzie, you stated, ``Reduction of 
United States Forces in the AOR combined with a perception of United 
States disinterest in the Middle East fueled thinking in Iran in the 
spring of 2019 that the United States was no longer committed to 
defensing our national interests in the region. That misconception led 
directly to the cycle of escalation that created in January 2020. How 
would shifting the balance of power in the CENTCOM AOR, by reducing 
United States Forces in Afghanistan, impact stability in the region?
    General McKenzie. I do not see reducing United States Forces in 
Afghanistan as negatively affecting stability in the region. First, we 
have been ordered to conduct an orderly withdrawal. Second, as we 
reduce our forces in Afghanistan we maintain the Counter Terrorism 
Platform which includes the whole ``ecosystem'' of enabling 
capabilities and factors in a capable Afghan National Security Forces 
necessary to continue our mission.
    weaponization of internally displaced persons (idp) and refugees
    26. Senator Tillis. General McKenzie, if given the proper 
resources, what initiative or type of task force would you stand up to 
develop a comprehensive diplomatic and international effort to mitigate 
or respond to the ISIS detainee and IDP hostage situation?
    General McKenzie. One of my top priorities is combatting the 
weaponization of internally displaced and refugee populations. The 
greatest concern in terms of potential radicalization is the population 
being held in the foreign annex of the Al Hol Internally Displaced 
Person (IDP) camp. The United States military does not currently have 
authority to access Al Hol or the foreign annex. Legally, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) can only provide security to facilitate a 
stable environment in support of UN and international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) efforts to support Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDP) needs within Syria. USAID is the lead for this mission with 
United States Central Command playing a supporting role.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
    27. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, The Trump Administration 
insisted that the world was safer in the aftermath of the strike on 
Qassem Soleimani. Reports from earlier this week indicated that the 
military had begun to drawdown troops the additional troops deployed to 
the Middle East just after the strike--indicating confidence that 
immediate tension in the region declined. But yesterday, 2 American 
servicemembers, and 1 servicemember from a coalition partner nation, 
were killed during a rocket attack in northern Iraq that also wounded 
12. I understand that investigations are ongoing, but it seems likely 
that an Iranian-backed Shiite milita group is responsible for these 
attacks. This kind of symbolic retribution from Iranian proxy forces is 
exactly what many feared. I understand that the Pentagon was in the 
process of bringing air defense systems and ballistic missile defense 
systems into Iraq to increase force protection measures against 
potential attacks by Iran and its proxy forces. Were these force 
protection measures too late?
    General McKenzie. In January, an Operational Needs Statement was 
submitted for additional Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar systems. 
The lack of immediate availability in the Army inventory required a 
prioritization of the assets already in theater, resulting in a number 
of systems that were remissioned from Afghanistan to Iraq. Some of 
these systems are still in transit while others have reached initial 
operational capability.

    28. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what additional force 
protection measures are you considering given the most recent attack?
    General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

    29. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what other advanced 
planning is ongoing to guard against additional strikes?
    General McKenzie. Over the last few months the U.S. has deployed 
additional capability into theater while realigning positioning to 
protect forces from a range oflikely threats. Concurrently we are 
working with our partners and allies to integrate existing assets 
across the peninsula to provide a more comprehensive defense of the 
region.

    30. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, we can all understand why 
additional United States troops were necessary due to increased 
tensions after the strike on Soleimani. But what threat assessment led 
to the decision to drawdown these additional troops?
    General McKenzie. There was no threat assessment that led to the 
drawdown nor was there any additional assessment requiring us to 
maintain greater force presence, it was a reduction that coincided with 
the original intent to reduce U.S troop presence.

    31. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, in the aftermath of the 
Soleimani strike, there was a symbolic vote within the Iraqi parliament 
to expel United States troops.
    General McKenzie, how did our military relationship with the Iraqis 
change in the aftermath of this strike?
    General McKenzie. The Coalition's presence in Iraq is based on 
formal, diplomatic requests and bilateral security agreements with 
Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Council of Representatives vote 
has not been implemented, and further legislation would be required to 
remove Coalition forces.
    [Deleted.]

    32. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, where do we stand in 
terms of our authority to keep American troops stationed in Iraq?
    General McKenzie. The authority for the American troop presence in 
Iraq remains unchanged. United States Forces are in Iraq at the 
invitation of the Government of Iraq, for the purpose of defending the 
United States, its coalition partners, and Iraq, from the continuing 
threat posed by ISIS. We remain focused on ensuring the lasting defeat 
of ISIS as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISP) regenerate the capacity to 
defeat the threat posed by ISIS. United States Forces continue to 
conduct operations pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force (AUMF), the 2002 AUMF, and the President's authority 
under Article II of the Constitution.
                         traumatic brain injury
    33. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, could you provide an 
update for this Committee on the status of the servicemembers suffering 
from Traumatic Brain Injury as a result of these attacks?
    General McKenzie. First, I would like to start out by saying that I 
am solely and completely responsible for the first notification that 
there were no casualties. I am the officer who gave that report based 
on my assessment of what happened at Al Asad. There was no pressure on 
me to give that report. That was what we thought in the immediate hours 
after the attack because it was not evident to us that there had been 
concussion injuries. You know maybe if we were smarter we would have 
picked up on that but there were not kinetic injuries, no one was 
bleeding, no bones were broken. So it was our assessment and the 
assessment of my commanders on the ground but I am the single person 
who passed that report. So I bear total responsibility for that with no 
one else. Second, to answer your question there were 110 people 
diagnosed. We evacuated 35 of them out of the theater to Landstuhl. A 
further 28 have come back to the United States and 75 servicemembers 
have returned to full duties within the U.S. Central Command Area of 
Responsibility. These servicemembers will be followed through the 
normal Periodic Health Assessment and Deployment Health Assessment 
processes. The medical status of the 28 servicemembers evacuated to the 
U.S. will be followed by their respective service headquarters.

    34. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what additional resources 
do you need for the servicemembers under your command in order to 
properly detect and treat traumatic brain injury?
    General McKenzie. Over the last several years the Department of 
Defense has made significant and needed strides in detecting and 
treating this often unseen injury. We need to continue ongoing research 
into a number of areas. First, we need improved capabilities to provide 
both the initial diagnosis and the ability to objectively return 
someone to duty. Once injured, diagnosis is currently based on the best 
available medical evidence, but still requires significant provider 
judgement. An objective test (laboratory test, handheld device, some 
other solution) would allow commanders to know who in the force 
requires rest or advanced treatment and who is ready to back to the 
fight. Improved capabilities to provide our personnel equipment and 
bunkers, which help, protect from incurring the injury.
              afghanistan & so-called ``peace agreement''
    35. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, reports indicate that 
nationwide violence--including deadly assaults against Afghan forces--
have actually increased since the so-called ``Peace Agreement'' between 
the United States and the Taliban. According to Afghan officials, the 
Taliban carried out at least 76 attacks across 24 Afghan provinces in 
the 4 days after the agreement was signed--and the US has conducted 
airstrikes in response. But the drawdown of US troops is already 
underway. Intra-Afghan negotiations between the Afghan Government and 
the Taliban were supposed to begin this Tuesday, March 10--but the 
prisoner exchange, renewed violence, and political disputes are proving 
difficult obstacles to these talks. And the agreement to remove all 
troops from Afghanistan within 14 months was brokered in exchange for a 
largely undisclosed and ill-defined set of counterterrorism actions. 
Given the uptick in Taliban violence in the aftermath of the peace 
agreement, are you concerned about force protection for our troops 
withdrawing from Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. Yes, I am concerned; therefore, the United States 
Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and Resolute Support (RS) started 
providing layered force protection to US and NATO bases and personnel 
in Afghanistan using a combination of manned and unmanned sensors, 
ground-based fire support systems, perimeter and ground defense area 
(GDA) patrols, and manned and unmanned combat air patrols. In addition, 
local-national partnered forces from the Afghan National Defense and 
Security Forces (ANDSF) provide an outer layer of security to these 
facilities.

    36. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what force protection 
measures are in place to ensure safety during withdrawal?
    General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

    37. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, administration officials 
are describing this withdrawal as ``conditions-based.'' What conditions 
would halt, reverse, or alter the 14-month timeline for withdrawal?
    General McKenzie. The conditions that would halt, reverse, or alter 
the 14-month timeline would include any attacks from the Taliban 
against United States or Coalition forces; failure of the Taliban to 
meet the conditions agreed to under the United States-Taliban Peace 
Deal; or increases in Taliban violence directed against the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan which are seen as destabilizing to Afghan 
governance. Conditions on the ground would include a continued 
increased level of violence against Coalition and Afghan National 
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF); lack of lntra-Afghan negotiations; 
Government of Afghanistan continued instability or a combination of 
these. It should also be noted that while the Commander on the ground 
and I will certainly make a recommendation, it is ultimately a 
political decision.

    38. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what metrics are you 
using to measure Taliban compliance with the agreement?
    General McKenzie. There are 14 key points laid out in the United 
States-Taliban Peace Deal, and these points will continually be 
assessed for compliance.

    39. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, General Milley has said 
that he does not see the renewed violence as a ``deal breaker.'' What 
would be a ``deal breaker'' for you?
    General McKenzie. Increased Taliban attacks against the Afghan 
National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are one of the conditions 
that would halt, reverse, or alter the 14-month timeline for 
withdrawal. The Taliban are trying to enter Intra-Afghan negotiations 
from a position of strength in order to push for maximum concessions 
from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during those 
talks.
    Examples of a ``deal breaker'' would include any attacks from the 
Taliban against United States or Coalition forces; failure of the 
Taliban to meet the conditions agreed to under the United States-
Taliban Peace Deal; or increases in Taliban violence directed against 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan which are seen as destabilizing to 
Afghan governance. Conditions on the ground would include a continued 
increased level of violence against Coalition and Afghan National 
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF); lack of lntra-Afghan negotiations; 
Government of
    Afghanistan continued instability or a combination of these. It 
should also be noted that while the Commander on the ground and I will 
certainly make a recommendation, it is ultimately a political decision.

    40. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, the United States-Taliban 
Agreement stipulated that intra-Afghan talks would begin this Tuesday, 
March 10. But talks are not scheduled. Will the United States continue 
to withdraw troops even if intra-Afghan negotiations do not occur?
    General McKenzie. Yes. General Miller has determined that he can 
complete the assigned Operation Freedom's Sentinel and Resolute Support 
Mission with 8,600 U.S. personnel. NATO and Coalition forces are also 
drawing down by roughly 25 percent. The current troop level reduction 
in Afghanistan does not affect our ability to maintain pressure on the 
Taliban to uphold the Peace Agreement.

    41. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, how is the political 
uncertainty within Afghanistan surrounding the presidential election 
results impacting the security and stability within Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. The presidential uncertainty does not in itself 
represent a serious threat to Afghan security. President Ghani's 
political opposition has not demonstrated willingness to challenge his 
victory through violence or large-scale demonstrations, and despite an 
ethnic component to the political impasse, Afghan security forces 
remain unified and loyal to Kabul. There are no indications of near-
term Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ethno-political 
fracture that the Taliban or other armed factions might exploit. 
Heightened political tensions in certain parts of the country have not 
demonstrably altered the years-long trends of violence and insecurity.

    42. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, public discussion of the 
prisoner exchange articulated in the peace agreement has been extremely 
conflicted, and President Ghani has flat-out rejected this exchange. 
Can you clarify the terms of this prisoner swap, and whether the United 
States military will play any role to facilitate the exchange?
    General McKenzie. The United States has no direct role in the 
release or reintegration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-
led effort we support the peace process and confidence building 
measures necessary to bring about a conclusion to this conflict.

    43. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, I read the classified 
annexes that accompany the peace agreement. Frankly, I was stunned by 
the lack of detail. The deal seems intentionally vague in terms of 
metrics for compliance and evaluating success. But I was even more 
shocked to learn that while these annexes are classified, and 
unavailable to the American people, the Taliban have read the secret 
annexes. Why does the Taliban have access to the annexes that accompany 
the peace deal, but the American people do not?
    General McKenzie. United States Central Command was not involved in 
the United States-Taliban Peace Deal negotiations, and therefore I 
recommend this question is referred to the State Department.

    44. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, will you work to provide 
more information to the American people about the terms and conditions 
of this agreement?
    General McKenzie. The State Department led the United States-
Taliban Peace Deal negotiations, and therefore I recommend this 
question is referred to the State Department.

    45. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, I understand that the 
Trump Administration has decided that the status of women and 
minorities is ``up to the Afghan people to decide.'' This seems like an 
abrupt reversal of almost two decades of United States policy, and 
approximately $137 billion invested in Afghanistan reconstruction 
efforts.
    General McKenzie. The State Department led the United States-
Taliban Peace Deal negotiations, and therefore I recommend this 
question is referred to the State Department.

    46. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, if women and minorities 
lose the rights they have gained--particularly with regard to educating 
women and girls in Afghanistan--how will this impact the security and 
stability of Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. United States and EU funding for Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are based on the 
recognition of the rights of minorities, women, and girls. If GIRoA 
does not live up to its agreements, there is a risk of losing foreign 
assistance and Afghan Security Force Funding, which could negatively 
affect Afghan security and stability.

    47. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, do you think that future 
funding for Afghanistan reconstruction efforts should be conditioned on 
commitments to protect the status of women and girls in Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. Reconstruction is outside my role as the United 
States Central Command Commander, and therefore I recommend this 
question is referred to the State Department and the United States 
Agency for International Development.

    48. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, given that the United 
States is withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, will our diplomats and 
other civilian employees need additional protection?
    General McKenzie. While specific questions on embassy security 
should be referred to the State Department, United States Central 
Command is committed in supporting security request made by the State 
Department to ensure the safety of our diplomats and civilian employees 
as the withdrawal occurs.

    49. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, in my questions for the 
record at your nomination hearing, I asked you ``how would a 
precipitous withdrawal of United States Forces from Afghanistan lead to 
attacks on the United States Homeland.'' You replied: ``Such a 
withdrawal of forces would be inherently destabilizing to Afghanistan 
and the region... Any withdrawal should be conditions-based and enable 
lasting effects to protect the Homeland and our vital national 
interests.'' Do you believe that the current withdrawal of forces is 
precipitous?
    General McKenzie. No. I do not believe that the current withdrawal 
of forces is precipitous. First, we have not been given guidance to 
execute a precipitous withdrawal; we have been ordered to conduct an 
orderly withdrawal. Second, as we reduce our forces in Afghanistan we 
maintain the forces necessary to pressure the Taliban should they 
decide not to abide by the terms of the U.S-Taliban Peace Deal. Third, 
we have been closely coordinating with both our Coalition partners and 
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during this 
drawdown so that neither Afghanistan nor the region is destabilized.

    50. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, is the current withdrawal 
``conditions-based,'' with clearly defined conditions?
    General McKenzie. Yes, the current withdrawal is ``condition-
based.'' The standard is that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe 
haven for terrorist to attack the United States, period and if any 
point in time it's completely conditions based we stop.

    51. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, does the current 
agreement with the Taliban, and plans for withdrawal, protect our vital 
national interests and minimize risk of attack on our Homeland?
    General McKenzie. Yes, the conditions of the withdrawal are that no 
terrorist organization can use Afghanistan to conduct attacks on the 
United States nor can the country of Afghanistan provide refuge to such 
organizations or people. As long as the Taliban meet the conditions 
outlined in the United States-Taliban Peace Deal, United States vital 
national interests will be protected.
                            syria withdrawal
    52. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, I was ashamed by the 
abrupt withdrawal of almost all 1,000 United States troops from Syria 
in October--even if the President later partially reversed course to 
keep some troops in Syria to secure oil fields to ensure the Kurds 
could continue earning oil revenue. But this abrupt withdrawal, and 
halfway reversal, posed real security risks to Kurdish troops and 
civilians. To what extent was the Islamic State able to exploit the 
vulnerabilities during this chaotic withdrawal period?
    General McKenzie. There was no noticeable increase in ISIS activity 
during the United States withdrawal period, likely due to continued 
United States and Coalition support to the Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF) and the SDF's focus on the D-ISIS mission.

    53. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, how has our military 
partnership with the Kurds been compromised since this withdrawal?
    General McKenzie. The relationship between the Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF) and United States Forces remains strong, especially in 
executing the D-ISIS fight despite the challenges by carrying out the 
partial withdrawal.

    54. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what is the United 
States' long-term strategy in Syria, and how does the current mission 
to protect oil revenue for the Kurds contributes to this overarching 
goal?
    General McKenzie. The United States is seeking to support our 
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in becoming self-sustaining in the 
counter ISIS fight as we pursue a political solution to the Syria 
conflict.

    55. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, I understand the Kurds 
are seeking to negotiate with the Assad regime via Moscow. Are you 
concerned that the United States has relinquished our diplomatic 
influence in shaping a political settlement in Syria?
    General McKenzie. Leaving diplomatic efforts to the State 
Department, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) continues to 
coordinate very closely with Ambassador Jeffrey on how best to 
militarily support United States objectives in Syria broadly and in the 
Eastern Syria Security Area more specifically.

    56. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, in northeastern Syria, 
there are prisons and detention camps with thousands of men, women, and 
children. While these camps house dangerous terrorists, they also house 
many innocent women and children, some of whom were living--against 
their will--under the ISIS reign of terror. Humanitarian groups working 
in Syria report that 94 percent of almost 70,000 detainees (68,744 
people) being held at the Al-Hol detention camp are women and children. 
How many of the detainees do you believe represent a security threat?
    General McKenzie. Al-Hol is an IDP camp managed by an NGO called 
Blumont through a contract with USAID. Al-Hol and other IDP camps are 
designed to house and care for IDPs; they are not detention centers. 
Al-Hol is separated into several annexes, one of which houses a more 
radicalized population. It is our belief that the greatest security 
threat emanates from the foreign annex in Al-Hol camp which holds 
approximately 9,600 radicalized persons.

    57. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, is the US military 
working to identify non-combatants, particularly children?
    General McKenzie. The United States military is not working to 
identify non-combatants in the prisons, as these individuals are being 
held by the Syrian Democratic Forces and are not under United States 
control. I recognize the threats posed in both of these situations 
which is why we have been working closely with Department of State and 
foreign governments to get detainees and refugees repatriated. Our 
forces are providing assistance to the SDF in the form of training and 
equipment to ensure detainees are held securely and properly treated.

    58. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, how do you think 
repatriation should be handled for any non-combatants?
    General McKenzie. It is in the best interest of all parties to get 
IDPs and refugees returned to their homes as quickly as the security 
situation permits. This is a regional and global problem that will 
continue to require a whole of USG effort to work with nations to 
repatriate their citizens as quickly as possible. As approximately 85 
percent of the population in Al-Hol is Syrian and Iraqi, it is 
important to have these populations returned home at the earliest safe 
opportunity as it will relieve pressure on the camps as we continue to 
work the more complicated repatriations.

    59. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, is the military 
facilitating the repatriation of women and children to home countries?
    General McKenzie. United States Central Command continues to 
support the Department of State in returning foreign fighters and their 
families to their country of origin.

    60. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, are you concerned with 
the potential for increased radicalization within these camps as we 
have seen before in places like Iraq?
    General McKenzie. Yes. Which is why it is so important that we get 
the people back to their homes and countries of origin as soon as the 
security situation permits. Radicalized ISIS supporters within camps 
such as Al-Hol in Northeast Syria remain a threat and a challenge. Many 
of the camp residents are family members-wives and children, generally-
of ISIS fighters. A large percentage of the children have witnessed-or 
participated in-acts of violence in support of the ``caliphate.''
    ISIS radicalization efforts will likely continue until residents 
can be returned to their homes or countries of origin while the 
hardcore ISIS cadre, regardless of their citizenship, are moved to a 
more secure environment.

    61. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what role is DOD playing 
to prevent this radicalization?
    General McKenzie. The Department of Defense is not tasked with the 
de-radicalization of civilians. We have demonstrated through our 
actions a compassion and kindness in the care and treatment of these 
populations. I recognize this is a critical effort to help prevent 
future fighters. While we are not in the camps, we help provide 
training to the SDF who provide security. We provide logistical support 
to enable the important work that is going on in the camps in support 
of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), and other Non-governmental 
Organizations (NGOs).
           turkish use of chemical weapons in syria offensive
    62. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, there were many media 
reports that Turkish proxies were deploying munitions loaded with white 
phosphorus, and that civilians and children in Ras al-Ain were 
suffering from chemical burns. The intentional use of this weapon 
against civilians undeniably constitutes a war crime, and is 
particularly alarming given the stated Turkish goals of ``demographic 
change.'' Have you been able to confirm these allegations of Turkish 
deployment of white phosphorus munitions?
    General McKenzie. We are unable to confirm or deny the use of white 
phosphorus munitions by Turkish forces at this time.

    63. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, have any United States 
origin defense articles been used in connection with the Turkish 
offensive in Syria--including with the use of chemical weapons? Was any 
such use in violation of the applicable end use agreements?
    General McKenzie. [Deleted.]
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                   ballistic missile threat from iran
    64. Senator Heinrich. General McKenzie, in the weeks since the 
Iranian attack on Al-Asad Air Base in Iraq, you've led an effort to 
increase air and missile defense capabilities in the region to protect 
our servicemen and women from the continuing threat of Iranian missile 
and drone attack. How are you working with the military services to 
transition proven systems that use directed energy and high-powered 
microwave technology to form part of a layered defense against these 
threats?
    General McKenzie. The decision to make the Army the Executive Agent 
(EA) for Counter UAS (CUAS) is significant. United States Central 
Command (USCENTCOM) directly coordinates and supports the EA through 
ensuring our requirements are captured and resourced as appropriate. 
USCENTCOM serves on the EA' s Board Advisory Council (BAC), currently 
in the process of down-selecting the ``best of breed'' systems and 
capabilities for further investment. Furthermore, USCENTCOM serves as 
the operational ``test-bed'' for counter-unmanned aircraft system 
fielding. Specifically, with the application of directed energy and 
high-powered microwave technology, USCENTCOM works with the Services to 
expedite the validation requirements for the employment of these new 
systems in an operating setting.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                               law of war
    65. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, President Trump threatened to 
destroy Iranian sites ``important to . . . the Iranian culture'' and 
threatened future retaliation in ``a disproportionate manner'' on 
January 4 and January 5, 2020. The Department of Defense (DOD) Law of 
War Manual states that ``[c]ultural property, the areas immediately 
surrounding it, and appliances in use for its protection should be 
safeguarded and respected.'' On January 6, 2020, Secretary Esper 
expressed that the United States ``follow[s] the laws of armed 
conflict.'' Do you agree with the DOD Law of War Manual and Secretary 
Esper's remark?
    General McKenzie. All United States Central Command operations are 
conducted in compliance with United States law, Department of Defense 
policy, and applicable international law, including the Law of War.

    66. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, with the caveat the United 
States reserves the right of self-defense, does the 2001 Authorization 
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) or the 2002 AUMF against Iraq give 
United States Central Command the authority to use military force 
against the government of Iran?
    General McKenzie. As stated most recently in the January 27, 2020 
Statement of Administration Policy regarding H.R. 2456, the 2002 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) has long been 
understood to authorize the use of force to address threats emanating 
from Iraq, including threats directed by Iran against United States 
Forces in Iraq and Syria. Iran conducts and directs the actions of 
several terrorist groups in Iraq, including Kata'ib Hezbollah. Iran and 
its proxies continue to plan and execute attacks against United States, 
Coalition, and Iraqi forces. The 2002 AUMF provides critical domestic 
legal authority for United States Forces to defend themselves, and our 
Coalition and Iraqi partners, against threats to, or stemming from, the 
territory of Iraq.

    67. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, former National Security 
Advisor and retired Army Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster recently 
observed at a public forum on March 3, 2020, ``I don't really care what 
international law said,'' regarding the killing of Iranian Major 
General Qasem Soleimani and that his killing was ``the righteous use of 
violence.'' In your experience, does the U.S. military regard 
international law as something that should generally be adhered to or 
disregarded?
    General McKenzie. It is long-standing Department of Defense policy 
that members of the U.S. Forces comply with the Law of War during all 
armed conflicts, and in all other military operations. The Law of War 
is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed 
hostilities, including all relevant international law binding upon the 
United States by treaty or as customary international law. The Uniform 
Code of Military Justice provides criminal sanctions for serious 
violations of the Law of War, and other relevant international law 
binding upon the United States. U.S. Forces comply with the Law of War 
and all other related international law binding upon the United States 
during the conduct of military operations as a matter of course, as a 
trained and disciplined armed force representing the United States and 
our values.
                                  iran
    68. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, recent reports indicated that 
between March 11, 2020 and March 13, 2020, two Americans and one 
coalition servicemember were killed and other United States personnel 
were wounded in two separate rocket attacks on Camp Taji, Iraq, and 
that these attacks were supposed to have been carried out by proxy 
groups backed by the Iranian Government. In a March 4, 2020, DOD Fiscal 
Year 2021 budget posture hearing, Secretary Esper and stated that the 
killing of Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani ``restored deterrence 
to a degree.'' In your view, how has the killing of Soleimani restored 
deterrence to further Iranian malign activities through its proxy 
forces?
    General McKenzie. I agree with the Secretary. Our actions have 
demonstrated our resolve to confront those that attack and kill 
Americans. However, I believe Iran is prepared to engage in escalatory 
action in Iraq to compel the departure of United States Forces.

    69. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, on December 5, 2019, I asked 
Lieutenant General David W. Allvin, USAF, Director for Strategy, Plans 
and Policy, Joint Staff the following question for the record: ``Would 
you say that the threat of Iran developing a nuclear weapon has 
increased, decreased, or remained relatively unchanged since the United 
States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)?'' 
On February 24, 2020, he responded: ``The threat of Iran developing a 
nuclear weapon clearly remains, based upon their capability and intent. 
Although Iran's recent violations of JCPOA restrictions incrementally 
increase its capability to pursue weapons-grade enriched uranium, we 
have seen no direct evidence to indicate the regime desires to pursue 
the development of a nuclear weapon.'' Do you agree with Lt. Gen. 
Allvin?
    General McKenzie. Yes, in my opinion the threat of Iran developing 
a nuclear weapon remains largely unchanged since the United States 
withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). There is 
no evidence the Iranian regime desires to pursue the development of a 
nuclear weapon. Should their decision calculus change, Tehran very 
likely retains the expertise and rudimentary production capabilities to 
restart processes essential to the development of a nuclear device, to 
include likely dual-purpose nuclear procurement and research 
activities.
                              afghanistan
    70. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, how many United States 
contractors are in Afghanistan as of the date of your hearing (March 
12, 2020)?
    General McKenzie. Nine thousand nine hundred seventy-four United 
States Department of Defense contractors are in Afghanistan. This is 
the contractor population accounted for in SPOT, the Department of 
Defense's program of record.

    71. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, assuming the Taliban 
implements its commitments to the February 29, 2020, United States-
Taliban agreement and the United States withdraws all of its forces 
along the 14-month timeline outlined in the agreement, how many United 
States military contractors will remain in Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

    72. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, what impact, if any, does the 
absence of the Afghan Government as a party to the United States-
Taliban agreement have on the prospect of the long-term success of the 
agreement?
    General McKenzie. The State Department led the United States-
Taliban Peace Deal negotiations, and therefore I recommend that this 
question be referred to the State Department because it concerns the 
substance of Intra-Afghan Negotiations.

    73. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, what is your understanding of 
the extent to which the withdrawal of United States Forces depends on 
the outcome of political settlement--or lack thereof--between the 
Afghan Government and the Taliban?
    General McKenzie. The current United States drawdown is independent 
of a political settlement between the Afghan Government and the 
Taliban. Any follow-on force reductions will not occur until we are 
ordered to do so.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                    iraqi security self-sufficiency
    74. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, your posture statement says, 
``Given ISIS' demonstrated tenacity and ability to reconstitute, we 
cannot afford to divert focus from the D-ISIS mission, understanding 
that the territorial defeat of ISIS does not mean the absence of ISIS. 
The years ahead will not be bloodless. Attacks may continue in the form 
of an insurgency, but the goal is to develop and enable the ability of 
the Iraqi Security Forces to contain and defeat ISIS without external 
assistance.'' When do you see us achieving this goal of enabling the 
Iraqi security forces to contain and defeat ISIS on their own?
    General McKenzie. Until recently, we were on a solid glide path for 
the Iraqi Security Forces to independently contain and defeat ISIS by 
early-to-mid year 2021. However, significant changes in the operational 
environment in Iraq created a pause in training and partnering 
operations due to a focus shift to force protection, impacts of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and disarray of the Iraqi Government have made it 
very difficult to identify when we can expect to achieve our Iraqi 
Security Forces goals at this time.

    75. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, is it realistic to expect the 
Iraqis to protect our national security interests when it comes to the 
ISIS threat?
    General McKenzie. Yes, I do think it is reasonable to expect the 
Iraqis to help meet our national security interests concerning the ISIS 
threat. They are our security partners to help defeat a common enemy, 
ISIS. However, the current challenges in the Iraqi Government including 
lack of a viable Prime Minister Candidate and Iranian influence in the 
Council of Representatives is currently hindering Iraqi support to our 
broader security interests.
                    afghan security self-sufficiency
    76. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, do you see the Afghan National 
Defense and Security Forces being able to handle their own security in 
the near future, and if so, when?
    General McKenzie. Yes. Assuming the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan and Taliban are able to reach a political 
settlement, the main threat to the Afghanistan National Defense and 
Security Forces - the Taliban - will be neutralized, and the remaining 
security threats will primarily consist of Violent Extremist 
Organizations such as ISIS-K and criminal organizations.

    77. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, if not, what will happen if 
the United States pulls all its troops out in 14 months, or on some 
other time frame, according to the February 29th agreement with the 
Taliban?
    General McKenzie. I do not deal in hypotheticals. Our withdrawal of 
forces is ultimately a political decision that we will execute if and 
when ordered. As I have stated previously, any withdrawal of U.S. 
Forces will be conditions-based to protect our national interests.

    78. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, how will we ensure that 
Afghanistan never again is host to terrorist groups who can launch 9/
11-style attacks on the United States, which is our mission in 
Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. First, by verifying that the Taliban fulfill 
their counter-terrorism commitments contained in the United States-
Taliban Peace Deal. Second, by continuing to develop the Afghan 
National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) capabilities so that the 
ANDSF matures into a sustainable professional force that is capable of 
managing terrorist threats within Afghanistan's borders. Third, by 
pursuing a counter-terrorism partnership and normalized security 
cooperation relationship with Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.
                           taliban agreement
    79. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, according to the agreement, if 
conditions are met, the U.S. is to withdraw all troops in the next 14 
months. You told the House Armed Services Committee that ``to date, 
Taliban attacks are higher than we believe are consistent with an idea 
to actually carry out this plan. Does the Taliban leadership have the 
ability to influence their entire organization in order to comply with 
the terms of the agreement?
    General McKenzie. Yes, I believe the Taliban leadership does have 
the influence to effectively command and control its fighters. This was 
evident during the seven-day Reduction in Violence (RiV) and previous 
local cease-fires, when the Taliban was able to enforce adherence to 
terms. The recent rise in violence is the result of a deliberate, 
publicly announced Taliban plan to resume violence against Afghan 
targets while refraining from attacks against Coalition forces. While 
not conducive to the eventual withdraw of troops, this resumption in 
violence should not be seen as the Taliban's inability to control its 
fighters, but as a matter of Taliban policy to pressure Kabul before 
and during Intra-Afghan Negotiations.
                           iran force posture
    80. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, your prepared statement says 
that we must posture the Joint Force to deter Iran from using its 
military to counter our diplomatic and economic sanctions, so long as 
those are in place. If those sanctions were to end, what posture would 
we need to have with regard to Iran, taking into account the elements 
of Iran's policy you listed, including its pursuit of nuclear weapons, 
regional ambitions, and threats to the United States and our partners?
    General McKenzie. U.S. posture in the region will depend upon the 
conditions that exist when the sanctions end. If the United States and 
Iran come to a broader diplomatic agreement that curbs Iran's nuclear 
weapon ambitions and malign actions across the Middle East, then our 
force posture may require Jess personnel, military capabilities, and 
basing. Should sanctions be removed with no fundamental change in 
Iranian behavior and/or calculus, or a change in United States 
strategic direction for the region, then we will be required to 
continue retaining sufficient posture in the region to deter Iranian 
aggression and assure our partners and allies.



   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
                 FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
                            DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 2020

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                              ARMY POSTURE

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM INHOFE, CHAIRMAN

    To receive testimony on the posture of the Department of 
the Army in review of the Defense Authorization Request for 
Fiscal Year 2021.
    The Committee is conducting this hearing to receive 
testimony on the posture of the U.S. Army and its fiscal year 
2021 budget request.
    We welcome the testimony of Ryan McCarthy, Secretary of the 
Army, and General James McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army, 
on these matters, and thank both for their distinguished 
service.
    Today, our Nation is facing an unprecedented health crisis. 
The entire Federal Government--including the Department of 
Defense and all of the Services--is working non-stop to halt 
the spread of the novel coronavirus and mitigate its effects.
    Of great concern to me today is how the Army is handling 
this emergency. First and foremost--how are our soldiers and 
their families being protected and taken care of?
    In addition, I want to better understand the operational 
effects, and what steps you are taking to minimize its impact 
to the national security missions of the Army.
    I commend you both, Secretary Esper, and the entire 
Department for taking every precaution to protect our 
servicemembers from COVID-19 so far--and I am confident that 
you will continue to prioritize the health and safety of our 
soldiers, as well as the success of our missions.
    While we are dealing with this enormous and urgent 
challenge, we've also got to keep an eye on our persistent 
national security objectives and challenges.
    The National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs our Nation's 
military to address the return of great power competition. This 
means we must be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat 
potential near-peer adversaries like China and Russia.
    For the Army to achieve that goal, our Army must be manned, 
trained, and equipped appropriately.
    The Army continues to make significant progress in 
rebuilding readiness across the force, but there is still much 
work to be done. Maximizing readiness, both tactical and 
strategic, is crucial for our Nation to maintain peace through 
strength.
    Russia and China have modernized both conventional and 
nuclear forces with alarming speed, and now present a credible 
regional threat to America and our allies--as well as an 
increasing threat around the world. In some areas, they have 
surpassed us.
    It's past time for action. After 3 years of significant 
increases in defense budgets thanks to President Trump, this 
year's defense topline falls well short of the 3 to 5 percent 
growth recommended by the National Defense Strategy Commission 
report. In fact, it represents a $15 billion decrease in 
purchasing power. This isn't your fault, but you will have to 
deal with the repercussions.
    This will mean homing in on top priorities--like readiness 
and modernization. Several of these priorities are housed at 
Fort Sill in Oklahoma, including Air and Missile Defense and 
Long-Range Precision Fire. In addition, any successful 
modernization strategy must focus on results. We cannot allow 
the past acquisition failures to be repeated.
    The Army recently undertook a second iteration of the 
detailed and exhaustive look at every single program to ensure 
that each supports the National Defense Strategy--an important 
task started by now-Secretary of Defense Esper.
    You have made hard decisions to prioritize programs that 
effectively implement the NDS. This resulted in reallocating 
funding for modernization efforts that will help the Army 
regain a qualitative and quantitative advantage over our 
adversaries.
    Continuing to make smart and informed choices will require 
an open and transparent dialog with Congress along the way. We 
look forward to working with you to make our shared 
modernization vision a reality as the Army reinvents itself to 
become a 21st century fighting force prepared for the more 
lethal and dynamic battlefields that define today's reality.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, RANKING MEMBER

    Our Nation is in the grips of an extraordinary and 
unprecedented crisis due to the novel coronavirus pandemic and 
the spread of COVID-19. Right now our most immediate concern is 
ensuring the public's safety by practicing social distancing 
and promoting vigorous personal hygiene, while taking care of 
those that have tested positive for the disease. At the same 
time, Congress must continue to do our job, and I thank the 
Chairman for ensuring this Committee performs its oversight 
function while we safeguard the health of the witnesses, our 
staff, the general public, and the Members of this Committee.
    In addition, I want to express the condolences of this 
Committee on the death of a defense contractor from COVID-19, 
as well as everyone who has lost a loved one during this 
pandemic. We are also keeping the servicemembers, dependents, 
civilians, and contractors who have been diagnosed with COVID-
19, as well as all Americans suffering from this disease, in 
our thoughts and prayers. As a Nation, we must do everything we 
can to stop the spread of COVID-19 and protect families, 
workers, and businesses.
    Before turning to the Army's Fiscal Year 2021 budget 
request, I want to commend the Army for their efforts to assist 
in the response to the novel coronavirus pandemic. The U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers is assisting the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) with the planning and construction of 
alternative medical facilities in New York. The Corps is also 
supporting planning missions for the New England region, 
Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Baltimore. In addition, the National 
Guard soldiers who have been called up for duty by the 
Governors have been instrumental in our response. They have 
provided logistics and transportation, support for medical-
testing facilities and State emergency operations centers, and 
special help with disinfecting and cleaning missions. 
Furthermore, the Department of Defense announced that 16 of the 
military's laboratories, many of which are Army medical 
facilities, will begin coronavirus testing for civilians. 
Finally, the Army has issued orders to hospital centers at Fort 
Carson, Fort Campbell, and Fort Hood to deploy units to Seattle 
and New York in order to provide medical support to civil 
authorities. On behalf the Committee, we thank you.
    While the Department of Defense, and the Army in 
particular, has been a strategic resource during the novel 
coronavirus outbreak, there are policy decisions that need to 
be immediately revisited. First, this pandemic will not be 
stopped by a wall on our Southern border. Right now our 
hospitals are contending with a shortage of ICU [intensive care 
unit] beds and will soon be at patient capacity in some areas. 
Our healthcare workers are in dire need of personal protective 
equipment for their own safety, and hospitals lack respirators 
and ventilators to treat patients. And yet, earlier this week 
the Army awarded a $524 million contract to replace additional 
sections of the border wall.
    To continue to funnel billions of dollars and military 
manpower to this project instead of providing resources to 
health care providers, first responders, and State and local 
governments as thousands of Americans fall ill and need urgent 
and immediate life-saving acute care is unconscionable. 
President Trump must immediately reorient all resources that 
have been diverted to the wall and make them available for 
Covid-19 support efforts.
    In addition, the Army has a long history of scientific 
excellence concerning biological agents, and much of that work 
occurs at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick. However, in 
recent years the Department of Defense has not prioritized this 
incredibly critical mission, and in fact has cut funding for 
the program in the Fiscal Year 2021 budget. We need to 
understand immediately what the Army plans do to ensure 
USAMRIID remains a world class institute, with a particular 
focus on how the Army plans to bring the new High Containment 
Laboratory, which is one of the world's most advanced 
facilities for dangerous pathogen research, on line in the 
quickest and safest manner possible.
    The President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2021 
includes $178 billion in funding for the Army. Of that amount, 
$150.3 billion is for base budget requirements, $2.8 billion 
for base budget requirements included in the Overseas 
Contingency Operations (OCO) account, and $24.9 billion for 
traditional OCO activities. The Army is reorienting budget 
resources to align with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and 
the national security challenges facing our country. For the 
second consecutive year, senior Army leadership scrutinized 
existing programs to determine which ones supported the Army's 
modernization priorities, and which programs should be reduced 
or canceled so that savings could be reinvested for other 
priorities. While this Committee may not agree with every 
budget decision made by the Army, and we will be closely 
scrutinizing their budget request, the Army did make tough 
decisions to prioritize funding for the future fight.
    However, implementing the NDS requires more than a 
reallocation of budget resources to engage in strategic 
competition against China and Russia. It will also require that 
the Army train for full spectrum operations and develop new 
warfighting concepts, as well as ensuring our soldiers have the 
equipment necessary for a high end fight.
    To support this effort, Army Futures Command, and the eight 
cross functional teams tasked with overseeing the Army's major 
modernization priorities, have transformed the processes by 
which warfighting capability is delivered to our soldiers. The 
Army has ramped up efforts to mature technology and build 
experimental prototypes, as well as conduct soldier touch 
points to provide feedback on the effectiveness of these new 
systems in the field. The Army is pursuing this overhaul of its 
acquisition process to ensure we keep pace with our near peer 
competitors by delivering cutting edge capabilities to the 
warfighter on an expeditated timeline.
    The fiscal year 2021 budget request funds 19 combat 
training center (CTC) rotations for brigade combat teams. These 
rotations are critical to ensuring our soldiers are properly 
trained and ready to fight. However, we will likely see 
significant negative impacts to readiness levels as training 
exercises are postponed due to the COVID-19 crisis. The Army 
has already made the decision to cancel three CTC rotations as 
a result of COVID-19, and they are currently evaluating future 
schedules. The safety of our troops must remain our highest 
priority, and the Committee will be closely monitoring this 
situation in the weeks and months ahead.
    Finally, the President's Budget requests an across-the-
board pay raise of 3 percent for all military personnel. 
However, the President has decided that civilians should only 
receive a 1 percent pay raise, and the budget freezes 
significant locality adjustments for civilians that would 
otherwise be due them under existing statute. At a time when we 
need civilians the most, this budget request sends the message 
that their work and contributions to our national defense are 
not valued, and it hinders the Army's ability to recruit the 
very best civilian workforce we need. If this pandemic has 
taught us anything it is the need for a strong and competent 
Federal workforce--which the President's budget does not 
support.
    Again, I want to thank the Chairman and our witnesses for 
their willingness to participate in this unusual hearing method 
during these unprecedented time. I look forward to working 
closely with the Army as we move forward. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    [The joint prepared statement by Secretary Ryan D. McCarthy 
and General James McConville to follow:]

      
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

    

    [Paper Hearing Questions for the record with answers 
supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
       budget and supporting the national defense strategy (nds)
    1. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McCarthy, because the NDS Commission 
advocates 3 to 5 percent real growth per year to implement the NDS 
while the Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request represents a $15 billion 
reduction in purchasing power, where were you forced to assume risk?
    Secretary McCarthy. If there was the 3 to 5 percent real budget 
growth as recommended in the NDS in the fiscal year 2021 topline, the 
Army would have been able to increase its investments in the critical 
legacy systems required to fight and win in the future against Russia 
or China. As there was a reduction in real buying power in fiscal year 
2021, the Army chose to fully fund our next generation modernization 
priorities at the cost of investing as we would have liked in those 
critical legacy platforms. For example, the Army reduced Joint Light 
Tactical Vehicle procurement by $1.3 billion over the FYDP which 
results in HMMWV's being in formations longer than if we had 3 to 5 
percent real budget growth. We also reduced investment in the Army 
Tactical Missile System Service Life Extension program by 8$600 million 
to shift resources to the Precision Strike Missile, which will replace 
the ATACMS round with enhanced performance. Additionally, the Army 
delayed procurement of the Enhanced Heavy Equipment Transporter (EHET) 
which means we'll be dependent on less capable heavy equipment movers 
for a longer period of time. In order to prioritize modernization 
investments, the Army assumed risk in endstrength by slowing the rate 
of growth toward our objective force endstrength levels. The Army must 
grow to both meet current combatant commander demand and resource the 
new structure required to fight and win in the future.
                           readiness concerns
    2. Senator Inhofe. General McConville, in the effort to meet NDS 
requirements, the Army successfully achieved in 2019 one of its stated 
2023 readiness objectives by having 66 percent of regular Army BCTs 
brigade combat teams] ready to ``fight tonight,'' allowing the Army to 
transition its focus from BCT readiness to ``strategic readiness.'' How 
does this budget invest in strategic readiness while also maintaining 
66 percent of regular Army BCTs and their supporting elements at the 
right readiness levels?
    General McConville. In fiscal year 2021, Army will maintain its 
current tactical readiness levels and seek to improve its strategic 
readiness. The Army training focus at the tactical level is on building 
highly trained and cohesive teams that are disciplined and fit. We are 
increasing our focus on individual and small unit readiness. Home 
Station Training and Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation levels of 
effort are consistent with recent years that enabled Army to achieve 
and maintain readiness goals. The Army fiscal year 2021 budget request 
supports 24 CTC rotations and home station training IAW Army training 
strategy. The Army is seeking to improve its global posture at the 
strategic level by positioning formations and equipment (APS) in key 
strategic locations to deter adversaries and assure partners; investing 
in its Organic Industrial Base (OIB); improving mobilization through 
MFGI investments and exercises; building proficiency through repetition 
in deploying/redeploying operations with Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) 
and Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDREs), sustaining its 
generating and operating forces; aligning APS & LOGCAP to NDS 
priorities; and, investing in the industrial base.
               modernization efforts (fort sill focused)
    3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McCarthy, because the U.S. Army's 
surface-to-surface fires are currently outranged and outgunned by many 
similar Russian and Chinese systems, the Long Range Precision Fires 
(LRPF) Cross Functional Team is working on programs to address these 
shortcomings. How will the Extended Range Cannon Artillery and the 
Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) programs help the joint force implement 
the NDS and regain a comparative advantage over Russian and Chinese 
competitors?
    Secretary McCarthy. The Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) 
system includes improving the self-propelled howitzer, projectiles, 
supercharge propellant, and course correcting fuzes for accurate fires 
at 70KM, almost twice the range of our current howitzers. These 
improvements will provide the division commander with a deep fires 
capability to shape the close fight in large scale combat operations, 
enabling combined arms overmatch. Fiscal year 2021 is an essential year 
to order long lead time parts to support final prototype development 
and building for delivery to the first battalion in fiscal year 2023. 
ERCA Prototype 0 is assembled and executed a successful live fire 
demonstration on March 6th, achieving 65KM in range with target hits. 
We continue efforts to achieve the 70KM range.
    The Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is the Long Range Precision 
Fires Army modernization priority program to replace the Army Tactical 
Missile System (ATACMS). PrSM will be fired from existing launcher 
platforms with greater range, lethality, survivability, and at a lower 
cost than ATACMS. PrSM will allow the operational force to neutralize 
enemy integrated air defense systems and long range artillery to enable 
cross domain maneuver. The accelerated program delivers a base missile 
with a range greater than 500KM in fiscal year 2023 (compared to the 
ATAMCS range of 160 KM), followed by technology spirals for emitting 
multi-domain targets, enhanced lethality, and extended range. PrSM has 
executed two successful flight tests since December, achieving target 
hits at 240KM and 180KM; the next flight test is planned for 30 April.
    4. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McCarthy, the Army currently lacks a 
reliable cruise missile defense capability which leaves the joint force 
vulnerable in some theaters. What is the Army's plan to defend against 
more advanced threats, such as hypersonic and supersonic cruise 
missiles, in the future?
    Secretary McCarthy. The best defense against hypersonic and 
supersonic cruise missiles is to have robust offensive and defensive 
capabilities. From an offensive perspective, we are placing significant 
emphasis and investment into our own hypersonic capability. The current 
schedule of delivering a road mobile prototype hypersonic battery in 
fiscal year 2023 remains in place. From a defensive perspective, we 
must also attack the munition once launched. The Missile Defense Agency 
is exploring defenses against hypersonic threats, and we are evaluating 
Patriot against the supersonic cruise missile threats. Supersonic 
threats are also an Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) 
objective requirement, while subsonic remains a threshold requirement.
    5. Senator Inhofe. General McConville, the Army is procuring two 
Iron Dome batteries in fiscal year 2020 as an interim solution for 
cruise missile defense. What efforts are underway to integrate the 
batteries into the Air & Missile Defense network and what is the plan 
for the associated force structure?
    General McConville. The Iron Dome is a combat proven system and the 
Army will field two interim, stand alone, batteries. Moving forward, 
the Army will hold a competition for an enduring solution, which is 
compatible with Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command 
System (IBCS), and allows all of industry to participate in a shoot off 
and best value competition. The Army is also going to a layered defense 
for air and missile defense. We see in the future the ability to tie 
every sensor to every shooter--multiple radars tied into the IBCS, 
which will be able to apply the appropriate shooter as a response based 
on the threat. That response could be a missile, a kinetic projectile, 
or high powered microwaves and directed energy systems. Based on the 
specific solution, the Army will design and develop the appropriate 
force structure
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                             modernization
    6. Senator Wicker. Secretary McCarthy, what steps are you taking to 
produce tangible results that will accelerate or enable greater 
defensive and offensive capabilities for directed energy weapons in the 
next 3 to 5 years?
    Secretary McCarthy. The Army is pursuing a variety of Directed 
Energy (DE) weapons, including high energy lasers and high power 
microwaves for maneuver unit and semi-fixed/fixed support. DE provides 
defensive capability against rocket, artillery, mortar, UAS, and 
rotary/fixed wing threats. The Army is prototyping a 50kW-class laser 
for a platoon of Stryker vehicles to be delivered no later than fiscal 
year 2022 for Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) and 
transition into a program of record. We are prototyping a 300kW-class 
laser in the new Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Energy Laser 
(IFPC-HEL) for fixed and semi-fixed locations. Directed Energy S&T 
efforts are funded through fiscal year 2022 to inform IFPC-HEL 
prototyping fielding in fiscal year 2024. The Army is also teaming with 
USAF for High Power Microwave (HPM) as electronic warfare paired with 
HEL for semi-fixed /fixed base support with prototyping by fiscal year 
2024.
    7. Senator Wicker. Secretary McCarthy, a recent study by the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) titled, ``Assessing the 
Affordability of the Army's Future Vertical Lift (FVL) Portfolio'' 
stated that affordability of the two FVL programs was feasible but 
would require strict program management and oversite. What is the Army 
doing to ensure continued affordability of the two programs?
    Secretary McCarthy. AFC, in consultation with ASA(ALT), are 
committed to requirements stability and preventing requirements creep. 
This team approach will identify appropriate trade space to ensure 
requirements are both achievable and affordable. The Army is conducting 
``fly before we buy'' prototyping efforts such as the successful Joint 
Multi Role Technology Demonstrator, Future Attack Reconnaissance 
Aircraft Competitive Prototype, the Future Tactical UAS demonstration, 
and Air Launched Effects early experimentation and prototyping. All 
four of these efforts will fly an air vehicle before we go final on 
requirements to ensure we have effective weapon systems. These efforts 
reduce risk, promote competition, and produce well informed, realistic, 
achievable, and affordable requirements. We have also reduced 
requirements creep by developing and implementing an Army Futures 
Command (AFC), Commanding General (CG) approved requirements 
prioritization methodology and scoring forum. This best practice has 
allowed the AFC CG to see how all in-development and in-progress 
requirements align to critical Army Senior Leader criteria and 
guidance. The results of this scoring shape the Army Capabilities 
Integration and Development System/Army Requirements Oversight Council 
(AROC) calendar for the Chief of Staff of the Army, Vice Chief of Staff 
of the Army, and AFC CG AROC decisions.
                                 cyber
    8. Senator Wicker. General McConville, does the consolidation of 
capabilities under Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) mean that cyberspace 
operations will be prioritized over other information capabilities, and 
if all of the information-related activities are already being utilized 
by commanders in the field, why consolidate the capabilities in one 
command?
    General McConville. No. The Army will deliver trained and ready 
forces with capabilities and capacity balanced to mission need. The 
consolidation of mission and capability is going to drive a Total Force 
for MDO including Information Warfare, of which Cyberspace Operations, 
Electronic Warfare, along with other capabilities, are subsets. 
Cyberspace operations and the employment of Cyber Operating Forces will 
remain a core mission for the command.
                          information warfare
    9. Senator Wicker. General McConville, do you feel that overtly 
announcing a move toward information warfare, which you have stated is 
key in the competition phase prior to conflict, overly militarizes the 
information element of national power, and does this send a negative 
signal to adversaries, which will then cause escalation of information 
warfare against, most-likely, non-military targets in the United 
States?
    General McConville. I do not. Russia and China are already 
contesting international norms and U.S. interests in Cyberspace and the 
Information Environment. Deliberately leveraging information and 
aspects of information inherent to military operations in concert with 
information efforts of other Federal Government departments and 
agencies adds to the effectiveness of the overall governmental effort. 
Our adversaries leverage information capabilities against U.S. military 
and non-military targets to seek advantage over the U.S. or limit our 
ability to counter their operations. Stating our intent to develop this 
capability establishes a check on adversaries' bold use of information 
against military and non-military targets.
                           strategic sealift
    10. Senator Wicker. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
U.S. Government's current approach to strategic sealift has yielded an 
aging and inactive government fleet that depends on a shrinking pool of 
merchant mariners and ships that have trouble getting underway. I'm 
concerned that a resilient maritime logistics strategy doesn't exist. 
Given that 90 percent of Army and Marine Corps equipment will travel by 
sea to a major conflict, is there sufficient sealift available now, and 
for the foreseeable future, to support combatant commander operational 
plans (OPLANS) per the National Defense Strategy?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The present assessment 
is that the current strategic sealift fleet is sufficient to meet the 
current demand, but by 2024, it will be inadequate without 
recapitalization efforts. USTRANSCOM and the Navy are using a three-
pronged strategy to recapitalize: (1) service life extensions when cost 
effective; (2) acquiring used vessels with congressional approval; and 
(3) building new vessels.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
                            partner training
    11. Senator Fischer. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, do 
you believe that the current mix of armored, infantry, and Stryker 
brigade combat teams is appropriately balanced between the Active Army 
and Army National Guard, and are there missions or platforms you 
believe should be shifted between the Active, Reserve, and Army 
National Guard to make the total force more aligned with the National 
Defense Strategy?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The current mixture of 
brigade combat teams between the Regular Army and Army National Guard 
is appropriately balanced to support the National Defense Strategy. 
When balancing brigade combat teams across components, the Army 
considers responsiveness to meet Combatant Commander requirements along 
with Title 10 and Title 32 Defense Support to Civil Authorities.
    12. Senator Fischer. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
Army recently announced the deployment of the 1st Security Force 
Assistance Brigade to Africa, the first such deployment to the 
continent. National Guard units are similarly conducting partner 
training in Africa, including units from the Nebraska National Guard 
partnered with Rwanda through the State Partnership Program. How is the 
Army working to enhance its partner training capacity to provide a 
better alternative to similar efforts by Russia and China?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. In Africa, the U.S. Army 
actively seeks to build partner networks through military and medical 
exercises, security cooperation, engagements including the African Land 
Forces Summit, and the State Partnership Program. The National Guard's 
State Partnership Program includes 14 other African nations partnered 
with U.S. States in addition to the Nebraska National Guard's 
partnership with Rwanda. The Army supports six U.S. DOD-directed 
operations in Africa and is deploying the 1st Security Force Assistance 
Brigade (SFAB) to assume the train, advise, and assist mission with our 
partners. The Army is also reviewing an increase in ally and partner 
Invitational-Professional Military Education (I-PME) participation by 
10 percent for fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022, and up to 50 
percent over fiscal year 2022to fiscal year 2025, and continues to 
utilize the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) to 
strengthen relationships and build capacity globally as a means to 
compete with Russia and China.
                             modernization
    13. Senator Fischer. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
what are your biggest modernization priorities, and what lessons have 
you learned from past Army acquisition efforts and from the other 
services that you are incorporating into your own modernization 
efforts?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is 2 years into 
a major transformation to ensure we are prepared for future conflict--
we are finishing what we started. The Army's modernization efforts are 
a continuation of its fiscal year 2019/fiscal year 2020 efforts. Fiscal 
year 2021 marks a pivotal year for Army modernization as we have 
matured our processes and established momentum across all 6 
modernization priorities: Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation 
Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Network, Air and Missile 
Defense, and Soldier Lethality. Army modernization is a holistic 
approach--changing doctrine for how we fight and equipping our 
formations with the best equipment possible--but also organizing and 
training the force differently, leading and managing people 
differently, and ensuring Army facilities and infrastructure support 
these changes. The establishment of Army Futures Command is enabling 
the Army to set priorities, efficiently resource, synchronize the 
execution of modernization efforts, and assess progress set forth by 
the framework within the published Army Modernization Strategy.
    The Army learned many lessons from past acquisition efforts. Three 
major lessons are: (1) the Army must understand and orient on the 
future threat; (2) the Army must understand what is technologically 
feasible for design and materiel solutions before developing a 
timeline; and (3) the Army must clearly prioritize desired capabilities 
and avoid requirements creep throughout the acquisition process. 
Additionally, we learned that joint programs are usually most 
successful when the requirements from the different services are common 
(i.e., JLTV)
    14. Senator Fischer. Secretary McCarthy, you were recently quoted 
saying that, ``as long as we can continue to work under these 
conditions, we can continue to proceed'' with the Army's modernization 
priorities. How much of an impact do you believe COVID-19 will have on 
the readiness and modernization of the Army?
    Secretary McCarthy. It is too early to determine the full extent of 
the impact COVID-19 will have on readiness and modernization, though we 
expect COVID-19 will impact several, if not many, programs. We are 
working with our industrial base partners to determine their ability to 
perform within the current COVID-19 environment, and we are assessing 
effects on the Army's ability to test, field, and train on systems. 
Whenever possible, we are seeking solutions to mitigate effects to 
preserve the readiness of the force. The health and safety of the 
workforce and soldiers is the Army's paramount concern.
    15. Senator Fischer. General McConville, you were recently quoted 
saying that some high-priority tests will continue while ``other ones 
will slow down.'' How are the decisions being made on which programs 
will proceed apace and which ones will be postponed amidst the 
pandemic?
    General McConville. The Army is closely monitoring the pandemic to 
ensure the health and well-being of our soldiers, civilians, families, 
and their communities. Army Futures Command is coordinating with 
ASA(ALT) and Army Test and Evaluation Command to determine which tests 
are most critical to meet current readiness requirements and critical 
developmental milestones. We are also working closely with FORSCOM to 
ensure necessary Soldier involvement in these events. Our current 
assessment, which will change as conditions change, is that 9 events 
will be canceled, 65 postponed, and 42 will continue as scheduled. In 
all cases, the decision to continue or delay an event is made by 
commanders and senior leaders at the 4-star or Assistant Secretary-
level after considering the risk as part of a cost-benefit analysis.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                          coronavirus phase iv
    16. Senator Cotton. Secretary McCarthy, does coronavirus make your 
Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) look any different, and where can we 
target more procurement dollars to best support both the National 
Defense Strategy and sustainment/recovery of the defense industrial 
base?
    Secretary McCarthy. It is too early to tell the long term impacts 
of COVID-19 and any adjustments that would need to be made to our UFR 
list. The Commands and the Army Staff are conducting a review and are 
updating the requirements as necessary.
                   coronavirus and defender-europe 20
    17. Senator Cotton. General McConville, coronavirus diminished 
DEFENDER-Europe 20--how can you backfill the training and deterrence 
value of that exercise, and what do you need from us to do it?
    General McConville. The purpose of DEFENDER-Europe 20 was to build 
strategic readiness by deploying a combat credible force to Europe in 
support of NATO and the U.S. National Defense Strategy. The exercise 
was modified in response to COVID-19, but the Army was still able to 
exercise its ability to coordinate large-scale movements with Allies 
and partners. Since January, the Army deployed approximately 6,000 
soldiers from the United States to Europe including a division 
headquarters and an armored brigade combat team. It has moved 
approximately 9,000 vehicles and pieces of equipment from Army 
Prepositioned Stocks and approximately 3,000 pieces of equipment via 
sea from the United States. In coordination with Allies and partners, 
it also completed movement of soldiers and equipment from multiple 
ports to training areas in Germany and Poland. The Army plans to 
continue its planned DEFENDER series exercises in Europe and the 
Pacific during fiscal year 2021 and beyond.
                 counter unmanned aerial systems (cuas)
    18. Senator Cotton. Secretary McCarthy, the Department of Defense 
has spent millions in research, development, test & engineering (RDT&E) 
in search of solutions that already exist in the private sector. Have 
you explored commercial, off-the-shelf capabilities like kinetic 
intercept for CUAS, and will you commit to using a commercial solution 
if an effective one exists for CUAS?
    Secretary McCarthy. Yes, we have and will continue to explore both 
commercial off the shelf and the development of systems based on new or 
emerging technologies. Filling a capability gap is a process. We first 
look at if there are Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures that can close 
the gap, and if none are adequate to fill the gap, we look to 
commercial off-the-shelf materiel solutions. If no commercial solution 
can address the gaps, we look to materiel solutions from other 
government or non-developmental items that can be modified to meet our 
needs. Our last resort is initiating a full development program. In 
that vein, we have fielded commercially viable capabilities. The Drone 
Defender; Mobile Low, Slow Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defense System 
(MLIDS); and Coyote systems are all examples of urgently fielded 
commercial CUAS systems.
               optionally manned fighting vehicle (omfv)
    19. Senator Cotton. General McConville, I understand the Army made 
a difficult decision to pause OMFV, and that you don't want adherence 
to a fielding date to drive poor decisions in development, as well as 
the need for industry to have inputs into what timeline is possible, 
but when do your troops need this very necessary capability?
    General McConville. The bottom line is that our troops need this as 
quickly as we can deliver the transformational capabilities they 
deserve. The Army remains committed to OMFV as Next Generation Combat 
Vehicles are our second highest modernization priority. We will field 
the Bradley replacement to support a Multi-Domain Operationally Ready 
force. Fortunately, we learned early in the process of developing the 
OMFV that industry could not deliver the requirements needed in the 
time we wanted. AFC published broad vehicle characteristics at 
industry's request, to allow for industry innovation and trade-space. 
These characteristics will be refined through a series of industry 
engagements, digital design competitions, and soldier touch points to 
inform and sharpen the OMFV prototypes for testing, before we establish 
the final vehicle requirements. This approach will enable us to explore 
the solution space in an environment of rapid and inexpensive learning, 
leading to requirements verification through physical prototypes, 
Soldier input, and testing.
                       long-range precision fires
    20. Senator Cotton. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, your 
opening statement highlights funding requests and capabilities for 
long-range precision fires. What is your vision for their integration 
into units inside and outside of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), as 
well as where you expect them to be postured in peacetime to support 
strategic deterrence?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We see these long range 
precision fires layered from the tactical to strategic level, and 
postured both CONUS and OCONUS to provide adequate response and 
deterrence value. Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) will provide 
the division commander with a deep fires capability to shape the close 
fight, while the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) allows the operational 
force to neutralize enemy integrated air defense systems and long range 
artillery to enable cross domain maneuver, and the Long Range 
Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) allows us to penetrate across the world in 
minutes instead of hours. These capabilities will be in traditional 
Army formations as well as Multi-Domain Task Forces that will have long 
range precision effects that can operate below the level of armed 
conflict, and long range precision fires for use during armed conflict.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                      covid-19 and u.s. leadership
    21. Senator Rounds. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in 
your opening statement, you said that the ``Army must continue to 
compete for and retain allies and partners, as our adversaries will 
attempt to do the same.'' The COVID-19 response requires almost 
unthinkable resources and a supreme commitment to the American people. 
However, the Army still must execute its many missions, even while 
supporting our citizens at home and expending great effort to protect 
our soldiers wherever they serve.
    I was concerned to see a Reuters story this week that stated the 
Russian military will send medical support to Italy and am curious to 
know what efforts the U.S. Army has taken--or is planning to take--to 
help our allies, even while the overwhelming majority of this 
government provides for the American people at home.
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We continue to provide 
an assessment to the SECDEF of available assets and capabilities that 
may be available to support our domestic or overseas responses. The 
commanders of USFK, USAREUR and USARAF have all demonstrated tremendous 
partnership in sharing information and force protections techniques 
with their host nations to control the spread of the virus within their 
areas of operations. We are in contact with our allied counterparts to 
discuss a coordinated response.
                          strategic readiness
    22. Senator Rounds. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, I 
had a very enjoyable and illuminating meeting with Lieutenant General 
Christopher Cavoli, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe, on March 
4. The DEFENDER-Europe 20 exercise, has been greatly curtailed, but one 
of its primary objectives is to demonstrate and learn lessons about the 
Army's strategic readiness to deploy capabilities, despite the presence 
of contested domains, and provide these capabilities to the right place 
at the right time. Can you discuss your assessment of the Army's 
current strategic readiness posture--and describe to the American 
people what is needed, and why it is needed, as the United States 
engages in a great power competition that characterizes the current and 
future operating environments?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Army strategic readiness 
incorporates assessments across manning, equipping, sustaining, 
training, installations, and capacity and capability to meet the 
requirements of the NDS. Army strategic readiness begins with a 
responsive force posture, the ability to mobilize and project power 
into contested environments, and the ability to sustain forces in 
large-scale combat operations. The Army's ability to continually 
generate and project ready formations (at scale) for the combatant 
commander is critical to the defense of our Nation and our interests 
worldwide. Recent events in the Middle East demonstrated how necessary 
strategic readiness is to allow the Army to be globally responsive with 
ready units. As the United States engages in great power competition, 
the Army must assure current and future readiness by: (1) balancing 
current global demand; (2) preparing forces for potential conflict; 
and, (3) modernizing the force to respond to future adversaries.
          secretary of the army's civil works responsibilities
    23. Senator Rounds. Secretary McCarthy, I want to thank you for the 
good job the Corps of Engineers has done managing the Missouri River, 
over the last year, under some very difficult conditions. I commend the 
outgoing Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant General Todd Semonite, for his 
energetic leadership across the Corps' many mission sets--including the 
current COVID-19 response, and Major General Scott Spellmon, for 
leading the Civil Works mission. Nevertheless, I would like your 
commitment to continue robust oversight of the Corps of Engineers--and 
to assuring that major progress on the snowpack monitoring system 
deployment is made this year. We are a nation facing many challenges 
right now, but a large portion of the safety, security, and economic 
well-being of the Missouri River basin states depends on you executing 
your Civil Works responsibilities in an exemplary manner. In addition 
to your commitment, I would appreciate it if you could describe the 
importance of this mission to your overall responsibilities as 
Secretary of the Army.
    Secretary McCarthy. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is committed 
to executing the snowpack monitoring efforts in the Upper Missouri 
River Basin. The Corps is working closely with several State partners, 
including Montana, Wyoming, and South Dakota, on initial equipment 
purchases. The Corps is also working closely with a larger five-State 
region, including Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Nebraska, to identify existing sites in the Mesonet environmental 
monitoring network for initial retrofits. Enhancing the Corps' and 
State partners' understanding of the extent and magnitude of the 
snowpack is important to safety, livelihood, and economic well-being of 
this region, and is a critical mission for the Corps and the Army Civil 
Works program.
                   title 32 and the covid-19 response
    24. Senator Rounds. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, it 
is vital during this time of the COVID-19 crisis that there be a great 
deal of uniformity in how our National Guard is activated across the 
Nation. There have been calls by numerous Governors advocating that 
these activations be made in a 502f status, so the activation is funded 
with Federal dollars, with the Governors retaining command and control. 
Our States do not possess the resources to address this unimaginable 
crisis without that kind of support from the Federal Government. Can 
you describe your perspective on this matter and how you will approach 
advising the President of the United States?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army National Guard 
(ARNG) has tremendous capabilities to support their states and 
Governors during crises. 32 USC 502(f) allows Governors to employ the 
ARNG with Federal funding. This is important as many states do not have 
the resources to fully mobilize their National Guard forces.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
               army integrated visual augmentation system
    25. Senator Ernst. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
Army is planning to invest $906 million in the development and fielding 
of the Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS) giving our soldiers 
tactical advantage over our adversaries on the battlefield and 
establishing deterrence through superior technology. What is your 
assessment of the progress of the program, and is it meeting your 
requirements?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The IVAS program is 
progressing exceptionally well. The partnership between the Army and 
Microsoft, and the speed with which engineers make refinement based on 
soldier feedback, has allowed us to take the IVAS program from Middle 
Tier Acquisition/Rapid Prototyping in November 2018 to delivering four 
capability sets within the next 27 months.
    26. Senator Ernst. General McConville, when will our soldiers start 
to receive and begin large-scale operational testing of IVAS?
    General McConville. The Army has scheduled Touch Points to provide 
an opportunity for soldiers to use the equipment in real world training 
and provide feedback to the engineers and developers. The IVAS Soldier 
Touch Point 3 is scheduled for fiscal year 2020 and Soldier Touch Point 
4 is scheduled for the spring fiscal year 2021. We will begin fielding 
IVAS to units in fiscal year 2021 to enable large-scale operational 
testing. Temporary closure of engineering and production facilities for 
the prototype systems, due to local responses to COVID-19, may cause 
delays. The initial fielding dates may shift from fiscal year 2021 to 
fiscal year 2022. We cannot assess the full impact until we know when 
the facilities will reopen.
                             modernization
    27. Senator Ernst. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, China 
and Russia are reaching parity with us in areas like field artillery 
and air defense artillery. I commend Futures Command for looking at 
ways to modernize, but want to emphasize the need to ensure our current 
systems are maintained and ready to support the warfighter. For 
example, some components of our field artillery systems--such as the 
breech on a howitzer--are legacy systems. How are you ensuring the 
required hardware and software updates, availability of parts, and ease 
of maintenance as you move forward with the artillery modernization 
process?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We will continue 
investments in upgrading and sustaining key systems in the near term--
such as our in howitzer fleet--to fill gaps until the technology is 
ready for our next generation systems. We made a conscious decision as 
part of the Paladin Integrated Management program to first replace the 
chassis to allow the system to keep pace with the Bradley and Abrams 
tank, without changing the turret, gun or breach. We are pursuing two 
lines of effort to further modernize the howitzer. The first is 
extending the range thru upgrading propellant, such as the Modular 
Artillery Charge System (MACS) Charge 5, which we have found adversely 
affects the reliability of the Paladin breech. We have initiated 
upgrades to the currently fielded Paladin breeches that are in the A6 
fleet and testing shows that the capability addresses the issues caused 
by the MACS Charge 5, with excellent results. In concert with these 
fixes, we are stocking up on breech parts at the unit level to minimize 
down-time for readily replaceable components. The second line of effort 
involves upgrades to the turret gun and breech via the Extended Range 
Cannon Artillery (ERCA) program. The combination of ERCA and upgrades 
to the breech will go far in establishing higher reliability as well as 
increasing standoff for our artillery systems.
    28. Senator Ernst. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, new 
systems like the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program have 
switched from a traditional hydraulic system to electric/high voltage. 
This requires highly trained contractors to make repairs on high level 
maintenance, not the typical soldier. How will you ensure the timely 
deployability and maintenance of modern systems writ-large when our 
warfighters are down range?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army fields most 
major systems with validated maintenance manuals and appropriate levels 
of maintenance (usually field level and depot level). Soldiers 
performing field level maintenance receive necessary training for the 
maintenance tasks they can perform at the unit level, frequently with 
assistance from Field Service Representatives. In cases where a 
capability is urgently fielded and organic maintenance expertise is not 
yet in place, the Army often employs Contractor Logistic Support.
    While the M109A7 has moved from a hydraulically operated turret to 
an electronically operated one, the performance of our soldier 
operators and maintainers has not diminished. Our soldiers who operate 
the howitzer continue to excel and exceed standards for their 
performance with the system. Maintainers have not missed a beat in 
maintaining the system, on the rare occasions when maintenance is 
required. Universally, comments from the 3 ABCTs fielded to date have 
shown nothing but praise for the electronic components of the howitzer.
                           hypersonic testing
    29. Senator Ernst. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, on 
March 19, DOD announced that the Army and Navy conducted a joint test 
of the Common-Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) at the Pacific Missile 
Range Facility in Kauai, Hawaii. The successful test marks a 
significant progress in the development of hypersonic technology and a 
step forward in the Army achieving long range precision fires. Can you 
provide an update on the Army's development on hypersonics, 
specifically on development timelines and key testing milestones?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is on track to 
deliver a road mobile prototype hypersonic battery in fiscal year 2023 
as part of the Joint Service Conventional Prompt Strike program. The 
fiscal year 2021 budget request fully funds the Long Range Hypersonic 
Weapon effort and the long-lead items necessary for the prototype and 
all associated flight tests, as well as initial unit fielding and 
training.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                  force modernization and end strength
    30. Senator Tillis. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
Marine Corps has seemingly continued business as usual during this time 
(COVID-19 Containment Phase). The Marine Corps Commandant announced his 
plans to move forward with force modernization by cutting infantry 
battalions, downsizing artillery batteries, and divesting of tanks, 
which inevitably shifts to the Army. Is the Army prepared or positioned 
to pick up those ground force capability gaps in its modernized force 
layout and how will this impact recruitment goals or demands for 
soldiers to fill ground combat arms military occupational specialties 
(MOSs) in the Army and the Army's end strength needs?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army designs its 
force size, structure, and capabilities to meet the requirements asked 
of us by the NDS, the CJCS, and Combatant Commanders. The Army will 
need to conduct a detailed assessment of the Marine Corps plan to 
determine capability and capacity mix across the services. The outcome 
of that assessment and associated decisions would inform possible 
changes to our recruitment goals and end-strength requirements.
                strategic power projection and readiness
    31. Senator Tillis. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, at 
Fort Bragg, a recent Army audit found its airfields as being the 
poorest infrastructure in the Army. These infrastructures serve as 
primary training air fields for USASOC [United States Army Special 
Operations Command], JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command], and 
others, including the Immediate Response Force. Is the Army adequately 
funding power projection and installation readiness, which also extends 
to rail, stationing requirements, and facility issues that undermine 
training and readiness?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Our fiscal year 2021 
budget submission addresses several strategic readiness requirements. 
The budget helps the Army increase Army power projection capabilities 
to support combatant commander and Dynamic Force Employment 
requirements. The Army has also designated 14x installations as 
Secondary Contingent Deployment Locations and 4x Mobilization Force 
Generation Installations being utilized; and we are working with the 
National Guard Bureau to improve states' pre-mobilization and unit 
movement support capabilities.
    Specifically, at Fort Bragg, since 2011 the Army has invested over 
$115 million to repair runways, aprons and airfield lighting systems at 
Pope Army Airfield (PAAF). In fiscal year 2020 we have an approved 
project of $25 million for airfield lighting repair and in the fiscal 
year 2021 budget, we plan to spend $65 million to repair the PAAF 
runway and Taxiways. Army Materiel Command is currently reviewing the 
full scope of additional requirements in support of this critical Power 
Projection platform as part of our comprehensive Facilities Investment 
Strategy.
                     personnel and family readiness
    32. Senator Tillis. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, last 
month, in previous posture hearings, I announced my plans to show up 
unannounced at military installations for a progress report on PPV 
[public-private venture] housing repairs and outstanding issues. Have 
you personally visited PPV housing units on any Army installation this 
year and can I get your help in ensuring Army families have quality/
safe housing and not subjected to unhealthy living conditions?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We have personally 
visited housing on Ft Bragg, Ft Carson, Fort Stewart, Fort Campbell, 
Fort Meade, Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, Fort Drum, Ft Belvoir and Hawaii, 
and you have our commitment that we will do everything within our power 
to ensure our People have safe, quality housing. The Army has 
implemented several fiscal year 2020 NDAA provisions and all require 
close coordination with privatized companies. The Army has implemented 
the requirement for a reliable, accessible online work order system; 
timelines for repair; and incentive fee policies; and are developing 
action plans for the remainder. The Army is also incorporating the 
fiscal year 2020 NDAA provisions into our Army Housing Campaign Plan to 
establish priorities for implementation and oversight.
                       dod coronavirus task force
    33. Senator Tillis. Secretary McCarthy, how is the DOD Coronavirus 
Taskforce taking steps to disseminate information through all service 
branches down to the unit level, and are you encountering any 
difficulties in enforcing consistency in responding to the COVID-19 
threat?
    Secretary McCarthy. Senior leaders across the Department of Defense 
communicate multiple times a day to synchronize our response to COVID-
19. Throughout the Army, we have multiple senior leader touch points 
and are publishing orders from HQDA down to the unit level. A key 
factor in mitigating the spread of the virus is ensuring personnel have 
the most up-to-date information on appropriate measures to prevent the 
further spread of COVID-19. The Department, Commanders, and leaders at 
all levels are taking positive action to educate the force and 
implement appropriate force protection measures.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senators Tillis and McSally
    34. Senators Tillis and McSally. Secretary McCarthy and General 
McConville, COVID-19 is a threat to the well-being of our troops and 
their families. During the March 24, 2020 DOD COVID-19 virtual town 
hall, it was recommended that servicemembers in the middle of a 
permanent change of duty station (PCS) should request their commanders 
put them into an awaiting transportation status, so they receive per 
diem and preserve their TLA/TLE [temporary lodging allowance/temporary 
lodging expense] entitlement. How are you handling the ``stop move 
order'' for all non-essential travel to limit the spread of the virus, 
and what measures are being taken to provide for servicemembers and 
their families caught up in the PCS process to avoid financial 
hardships?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. In response to the 
challenges soldiers and their families are facing during the stop 
movement order, the Army is adhering to DOD's guidance for non-
essential travel.
    Additionally, the Army, with DOD's support, has implemented a 
series of new entitlements. These new authorities are aimed at 
minimizing, to the greatest extent possible, the financial impacts of 
this unprecedented situation. These include Hardship Duty Pay for 
Restriction of Movement, (HDP-ROM), Isolation Allowance, temporary duty 
status, advanced PCS allowances, and Army Emergency Relief (AER) loans. 
Further, to provide soldiers the utmost support and flexibility, if a 
soldier is scheduled to PCS during this time and experiences hardship 
due to COVID19, they can request an extension--for up to 1 year--at 
their current duty station.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                      the future army--recruiting
    35. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in 
your joint testimony you mention ``the Army has overhauled its 
Recruiting and Marketing enterprise, exceeding revised end strength 
goals in fiscal year 2019, while simultaneously retaining quality 
soldiers.'' How is COVID-19 affecting the current recruiting efforts 
and what specific precautions do you have in place to protect 
recruiters as well as applicants?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. U.S. Army Recruiting 
Command is taking precautions to protect the health of the force and 
minimize exposure to coronavirus disease. As of March 18th, all 
recruiting stations within U.S. Army Recruiting Command are shifting to 
mobile and virtual Operations with the public to limit in-person 
contacts. These precautions allow our recruiting force the ability to 
continue to make solid contacts with those interested in joining the 
Army while protecting both the recruiters and the applicants. 
Recruiters remain accessible to those interested in a career with the 
U.S. Army by communicating through text, phone calls, direct messages, 
or video chat rather than face-to-face. Contracts/leads have decreased, 
but we do not attribute this to the shift to virtual recruiting. Many 
of our leads are generated from Recruiters attending events and larger 
gatherings and conducting high school visits. Due to COVID 19, all 
events have been canceled and we no longer have access to schools due 
to closures. Contract/leads from virtual recruiting, however, have 
increased.
    Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, USAREC was on pace to achieve 
its fiscal year 2020 accessions mission including a Delayed Entry Pool 
for fiscal year 2021 of 13,500. In an effort to protect the recruiting 
force and the Army's training base, USAREC has a goal to ship to half 
of the Army's training capacity. The determination of which future 
soldier will ship is dependent on the level of risk in the area in 
which each future soldier resides. As more and more areas become 
restricted, USAREC continues to analyze each individual situation in an 
effort to determine a safe to ship status. All Future Soldiers are 
being prescreened at 15 days, 72 hours and 24 hours prior to shipment 
for symptoms and potential exposure to COVID-19 to mitigate the spread 
of the disease. Additionally, they are screened again upon arrival at 
the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS). Depending on the 
level of risk in certain areas of country, recruiters are working with 
the Future Soldiers to either complete all necessary steps and MEPS 
processing so the Future Soldier can ship to basic training or the 
recruiter is working with the Future Soldier to reschedule them to ship 
at a later date. We are shipping from 218 stations.
    USAREC does not ship a certain number each month. Recruiting ebbs 
and flows based on the time of year. We typically see our highest 
number of shippers in June, July, and August, which have not yet been 
impacted by COVID 19. Prior to COVID 19, USAREC was on track to ship 
5,897 in March. We actually shipped 5,157. In order to minimize risk 
and exposure, our goal for April and May is to ship to half of the 
training capacity's base.
                      army force posture/structure
    36. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, to 
address potential great power threats, what types of force structure(s) 
are required for the Army to deter and, if necessary, defeat a near-
peer competitor like Russia and how is the Army changing its force 
posture to better support United States Indo-Pacific Command's 
(USINDOPACOM) efforts to compete with an increasingly aggressive and 
modernized Chinese military and how are these two efforts complementary 
and how are they different?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army will calibrate 
its force posture, develop new organizations, and field new 
capabilities to provide the necessary support to USINDOPACOM in order 
to deter competitors in the region.
                    fort wainwright suicide response
    37. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as 
you know Fort Wainwright is located in Fairbanks, Alaska and has 
experienced a concerning number of suicides over the last 18 months. 
What specific initiatives and projects have you taken this year and in 
coming years to enhance the morale, welfare, and recreation of soldiers 
stationed along the Arctic's front lines, especially at Fort Wainwright 
and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson? Please provide separately to my 
office the specifics for each initiative, the schedule for delivery, 
and the anticipated impact or benefit on morale, welfare, and 
recreation of soldiers.
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army established a 
Quality of Life Task Force to coordinate and synchronize the 
development and implementation of policies/projects to enhance the 
quality of life of our soldiers and families. Specific to Alaska, we 
have established an intensive outpatient behavioral health program, 
approved Remote and Austere Conditions Assignment Incentive Pay (RAC-
AIP), improved transportation and shuttle services, established more 
predictable training schedules, improved junior leader development on 
the risk reduction tools and engaging behavior skills training, and 
refreshed MWR facilities. We are also taking actions to increase 
effective command messaging, improve barracks living conditions, 
increase indoor recreational facilities for soldiers and families, and 
improve the dining facilities (hours, quality of food). As 
circumstances permit, I am prepared to brief you on specifics regarding 
scheduled delivery of each initiative.
                   long-range precision fire testing
    38. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as 
technology for long-range precision fire weaponry increases, the size 
of test ranges will also need to increase. How long do you think it 
will be until the current Army long-range precision fire ranges are 
outpaced by the range requirements of the weaponry being tested and to 
what extent are you considering JPARC-with it over 1 million cubic 
miles of training space--as a potential testing site for long-range 
precision fire weapons, to include hypersonics? Please elaborate.
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army uses the 
Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii and the Reagan Test Site in 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands for initial testing of 
developmental capabilities. Test demand at some point will exceed the 
capacity of these two ranges to handle the workload which will require 
additional ranges to support this mission. The Defense Test Resource 
Management Center is conducting a study to determine alternate options 
for all the Services including JPARC
                     multi-domain task force (mdtf)
    39. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
with the world-class training opportunities offered by the Joint 
Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) and the strategic platform offered 
for expeditionary forces such as the 4th Brigade Combat Team 25th 
infantry in Alaska, would you say that Alaska is a prime candidate for 
the stand-up of the U.S. Army's third Multi Domain Task Force? Why or 
why not? Please expand.
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is analyzing 
potential locations across the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility to 
station the third Multi Domain Task Force (MDTF) in support of 
INDOPACOM and USARPAC operational requirements. MDTF #3 will activate 
in 2022 and will serve as the second MDTF in support of INDOPACOM.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                     squad x robotics--fort benning
    40. Senator Perdue. General McConville and Secretary McCarthy, 
since 2018, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have worked with industry to 
enhance unit interoperability with unmanned systems and artificial 
intelligence (AI) through Squad X experiments, allowing Army and Marine 
Corps squad units to better utilize the capabilities of unmanned aerial 
systems (UAS) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) to track and engage 
hostile forces. While Squad X experiments have shown remarkable 
progress in developing these capabilities, monthly, large-scale 
experiments incorporating Army and Marine Corps leadership are 
necessary to ultimately field these capabilities on the battlefield. 
Collocating the unmatched resources and capabilities of the Army's 
Maneuver Center of Excellence with these squad-level robotics 
experiments will provide a long-term asymmetrical advantage for our 
warfighters and allow for the rapid build-test-build of AI capabilities 
that will greatly enhance small unit lethality. Additionally, 
overcoming advances our potential adversaries have made in their own 
squad-level robotics and AI development is crucial, and the Maneuver 
Center of Excellence is uniquely suited as an ideal location to develop 
and integrate the future of infantry squad-level robotics and AI 
capabilities. What role do the Squad X experiments play in increasing 
the lethality, maneuverability, and survivability of the squad unit, 
and how could collocating industry innovators with the warfighter at 
the Maneuver Center of Excellence best enable the future development of 
AI-supported robotics for Army squad units?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is aggressively 
pursuing manned-unmanned teaming and artificial intelligence (AI) 
through a number of promising programs and experiments. These programs 
and experiments link the Army to academic and industry leaders across 
America to capitalize on best-of-breed innovation in those fields. 
Examples include the Army AI Task Force (TF) and National Robotics 
Engineering Center at Carnegie Mellon University; Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology; and the University of Texas. Experiments like 
Squad X enable capability developers and Soldiers to explore new 
solutions in four key areas: precision engagement; non-kinetic 
engagement; squad sensing and threat detection; and squad autonomy. Co-
location of industry and academic innovators with warfighters can help 
accelerate the development of operationally relevant solutions to 
soldiers and units.
                   advanced battle management system
    41. Senator Perdue. General McConville, as you know, the new 
Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) conducted its first 
demonstration of capabilities in December, and the system is scheduled 
to hold another demonstration in June. You recently called ABMS ``Air 
Centric'' and not a universal solution to the problem of sharing data 
between platforms, units, and services. Additionally, Lieutenant 
General Eric Wesley, the Chief of the Army's Futures and Concepts 
Center, recently said, ``ABMS cannot be the sole solution, because it 
doesn't account for, in some cases, the scale or the unique 
requirements of all the other services.'' You have also noted that 
waiting for a future Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) system 
cannot mean setting aside current systems completely. How can upcoming 
ABMS field demonstrations address questions of scalability and the 
Army's unique needs for such a network that you and other senior Army 
leaders have voiced?
    General McConville. The goal is to allow us to see, understand, and 
act faster than our adversaries and to leverage the rest of the Joint 
Force to achieve overmatch. You will see a continuous series of 
experiments culminating in annual demonstrations to iterate, learn, and 
improve upon the previous year's outcome. Joint All-Domain Command & 
Control (JADC2) is an effort--actually a growing commitment--by the 
Joint community to develop a 21st century command and control 
capability that optimizes the contributions of the elements of the 
Joint Force, as well as those of our multinational partners. We are 
working closely with our sister Services and the Joint Staff to 
identify and achieve its full potential.
       joint surveillance and target attack radar system (jstars)
    42. Senator Perdue. General McConville, JSTARS aircraft continue to 
be active in executing the National Defense Strategy around the world. 
JSTARS aircraft were deployed for 18 straight years in the United 
States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) in 
support of overseas contingency operations. Following an increase in 
tensions with Iran in January, JSTARS aircraft returned to the 
USCENTCOM AOR. A JSTARS unit manned by the 116th Air Control Wing, 
based out of Robins Air Force Base, also forward-deployed to Germany 
this past fall. How does the forward deployment of JSTARS support Army 
readiness and lethality in response to regional and global threats?
    General McConville. The Army utilizes a wide range of Ground Moving 
Target Indicator (GMTI)/Synthetic Aperture RADAR (SAR) collection 
platforms and sensors to determine patterns of life, perform 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield, define the operational 
environment, and evaluate the threats in support of ground forces. The 
specific platform and sensor tasked depends on the mission, terrain, 
weather, region, and factors such as platform/sensor specifications and 
the Joint Commander's priorities. The combatant commanders' ability to 
access GMTI capability is integral to react to a dynamic and changing 
operating environment. This capability to collect GMTI data deep into 
enemy territory provides collection to support the combatant 
commanders' Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
            demolition of old martin army community hospital
    43. Senator Perdue. Secretary McCarthy, the old Martin Community 
Hospital (MACH) and associated facilities were replaced with a new 
hospital in 2014. In fiscal year 2015, Fort Benning included the old 
MACH facilities in their project for Army Installation Command's 
(IMCOM's) Facility Reduction Program (FRP). However, funding was 
redirected from the FRP for other Army priorities, and the old MACH has 
yet to be demolished. How would including the old MACH in the FRP allow 
for the most efficient use of Army resources while also providing 
better service to the soldiers and community at Fort Benning, and what 
resources and authorities does the Army need to complete demolition of 
the hospital and recapitalize the surrounding land for the base's use?
    Secretary McCarthy. Removal of the old MACH would clear a prime 
location that lies in the heart of the community hub of Fort Benning 
between the new hospital and the Commissary/PX/Dental Clinic. This 
location was identified in the garrison's master plan as the site of a 
transportation center that would link traffic and commuters from off 
post with an internal transportation system to circulate in the 
immediate vicinity as well as links to the primary cantonment areas. 
This hub would facilitate carpooling and relieve crowded traffic 
conditions along Marne Rd and across the entire Garrison. Once the old 
MACH is removed, the bulk of the work required would be ground work and 
paving. The Army has all the authorities/clearances needed to demolish 
the old MACH. The rough order of magnitude for demolition is $14 
million to $20 million.
                            port of savannah
    44. Senator Perdue. General McConville, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation recently announced the awarding of an additional $34.6 
million grant for critical infrastructure improvements at the Port of 
Savannah, building on the President's budget request of $93.6 million 
in Federal funding in support of the Savannah Harbor Expansion Project. 
The Port of Savannah is the third largest container port in North 
America and is a strategic seaport within the National Port Readiness 
Network. Your posture statement cites our Nation's ports as Strategic 
Power Projection platforms that are key components in maintaining the 
Army's strategic readiness. To what extent does the expansion of major 
commercial ports like the Port of Savannah improve the Army's 
readiness, and support the Army's mission, by quickly transporting 
large U.S. troop formations in times of war and national emergency?
    General McConville. The ability to project the force rapidly and at 
scale and sustain the force during conflicts are key measures of our 
strategic readiness. Sufficient ports for national defense enable the 
Army's ability to deploy in time to meet combatant commander 
requirements. I understand the Savannah Harbor Expansion Project will 
increase the shipping channel depth to accommodate the large container 
vessels transiting the Panama Canal. DOD will continue to rely on the 
Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off vessels from the U.S. Navy's 
Military Sealift Command and Fast Sealift Ship vessels from the 
Maritime Administration's Reserve Fleet. The current channel depth is 
sufficient for these vessels. The Army is very closely linked with 
USTRANSCOM and their periodic assessments of the existing Strategic 
Seaports, and their current assessment is that we have sufficient 
seaport capacity on each coast (East/West/Gulf) to meet the Army's 
rapid deployment needs
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martha McSally
                                covid-19
    45. Senator McSally. General McConville, given the Army's mission 
to organize, train, and equip soldiers, what efforts is the service 
taking to ensure it completes this vital mission while simultaneously 
working to combat the spread of COVID-19 within its ranks and do you 
foresee any impacts to readiness as a result of efforts to combat 
COVID-19 within the force?
    General McConville. It is too early to measure any significant 
impact to readiness, but the longer the pandemic lasts, the greater the 
possibility there will be a degradation in readiness. In an effort to 
protect the force, we have migrated to virtual recruiting efforts to 
sustain the Army's end-strength. Although modified for health 
protection measures, we are continuing initial entry training, and 
Commanders at all levels are assessing their local conditions and 
modifying training to minimize risk to our force while maximizing our 
readiness.
              family readiness--child development centers
    46. Senator McSally. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, I 
appreciate the value you placed on people being the greatest strength 
of the U.S. Army. I agree with the Army People Strategy that the 
``People First'' philosophy is critical when assessing readiness. In 
your statement, you assessed 5 Quality of Life priorities which 
included improving and adequately resourcing Child and Youth Services. 
When looking at this particular priority and family readiness, what was 
the process for assessing Child Development Centers (CDCs), 
specifically, how did you assess the current conditions or maintenance 
needs of each CDC and how did you assess the capability of the CDC to 
meet the demands and readiness needs of each community?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The quality of life for 
our soldiers, their families, and our civilian workforce is of utmost 
importance. Child and Youth Services, which incorporates our CDCs, is 
one of the five pillars of our Quality of Life campaign plan. As such, 
I'm prioritizing funding for our CDCs over the next 5 years. GEN Perna 
and Army Material Command hosted a Facility Investment Strategy Wargame 
in January to assess the condition of every Army facility, to include 
all 184 of our CDCs. We are now prioritizing these CDCs for renovation 
and increased maintenance (if needed). We've also identified those 
locations that need new CDC facilities due to deterioration or 
increased soldier and family demand. AMC is developing a plan to fix 
all of our CDC challenges over the next 10 years; we look forward to 
presenting that plan to Congress during upcoming sessions.
                        great power competition
    47. Senator McSally. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, you 
mention deterrence a few times in your statement--that the Army must 
``compete with and deter near-peer competitors'' or ``deter highly 
capable adversaries''. With the rise of emerging technologies such as 
AI, 5G, quantum information systems, biotechnologies etc, what does 
deterrence look like under great power competition, and how is the Army 
utilizing these technologies to create new deterrence mechanisms?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The strength of the NATO 
Alliance and our partners in Europe, our ability to integrate and 
conduct combined operations, and the ability of the U.S. Army to deploy 
significant forces in support of our Allies is the bedrock of our 
deterrence strategy. The Army conducts frequent rotation of forces in 
support of INDOPACOM and elements of our Multi-Domain Task Force will 
be incorporated into the Defender Pacific exercises to demonstrate U.S. 
capability and commitment to deterrence in the region. The Army is also 
planning to employ modernized capabilities such as those that you 
highlighted, as well as Long Range Precision Fires and Air and Missile 
Defense, in the Western Pacific to reinforce deterrence of Chinese 
aggression and coercion of regional states.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
                              efficiencies
    48. Senator Scott. Secretary McCarthy, the Department of the Army 
under Secretary Mark Esper made great strides in becoming more 
efficient and redirect spending for new priorities. What more do you 
see that can be done and what are the lessons learned that could be 
shared across the Pentagon?
    Secretary McCarthy. The Army continues to aggressively pursue 
reforms focusing on the divestment of lower priority programs and 
investment in higher priorities. Secretary Esper has worked with all 
the Military Services to establish a similar process focused on 
prioritizing spending. The Night Court process is being established 
across the other Services as well as other Department of Defense 
Agencies. The first 2 years of Army ``Night Court'' program reviews 
were driven top-down, resulting in over $30 billion realigned to our 
priorities; for the fiscal year 2021 budget, program managers led these 
fiscal reviews in a bottom up approach, resulting in another almost 
8$10 billion realigned over the FYDP to Army modernization and 
readiness priorities. We are also improving the way we do business--ex. 
the Command Accountability and Execution Review (CAER) shifted the 
culture toward commander and senior leader involvement in the 
stewardship of their fiscal resources, resulting in reduced O&M 
deobligations by 37 percent compared to historical norms, reducing lost 
purchasing power.
                                covid-19
    49. Senator Scott. Secretary McCarthy, as training continues, what 
precautions is the Army taking to prevent servicemembers from 
contracting the Coronavirus, as it continues to plague our country?
    Secretary McCarthy. We continue to train, but the Army has 
suspended or scaled back military exercises to include DEFENDER-Europe 
20 and combat training center rotations, implemented travel 
restrictions and quarantine policies, enhanced screening procedures for 
new recruits reporting to and processing thru basic training, and 
published screening and prevention guidance to include social 
distancing guidelines, management of movements, and workforce 
limitations.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                       joint warfighting concept
    50. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, the idea of Multi-Domain 
Operations (MDO), is still largely driven from within each service. How 
is the Army supporting a more Pentagon-wide approach that would pull 
together each military branch and develop tools that function across 
all services and is interoperability a consideration?
    General McConville. The Army is nested with the Joint Staff on the 
development of the Joint All Domain Operations concept and well as the 
development of the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system 
architecture. Each service has a portion the concept development and 
all efforts are nested and coordinated thru the Joint Staff.
                        multi-domain task force
    51. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, in October 2019, you 
mentioned support for Admiral Philip Davidson's request for the 
stationing of two Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) in USINDOPACOM, which 
were then listed on USINDOPACOM's Unfunded Priorities List for fiscal 
year 2021. When considering near-peer competition, where will the MDTFs 
mentioned in your posture statement be geographically focused and when 
can we expect to see them stood up?
    General McConville. The Army plans on three MDTFs, two focused on 
INDOPACOM and one on EUCOM. The first INDOPACOM focused MDTF will be 
activated by the end of fiscal year 2020 and the second will be 
activated by fiscal year 2023. The EUCOM MDTF is currently undergoing 
the OSD process for consideration of stationing units overseas.
    52. Senator Blackburn. Secretary McCarthy, I've had multiple 
conversations with military leaders about the importance of Multi-
Domain Task Forces, but this year we saw them on USINDOPACOM's unfunded 
priorities list. What specific, tangible investments will we see in 
fiscal year 2021 that the Army is delivering to strategic readiness, 
and are you building out a short, medium, and long-range plan?
    Secretary McCarthy. The Army is investing to improve its global 
posture by positioning formations and equipment (APS) in key strategic 
locations to deter adversaries and assure partners; investing in its 
Organic Industrial Base (OIB); improving mobilization through MFGI 
investments and exercises; building proficiency through repetition in 
deploying/redeploying operations with Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) 
and Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDREs); sustaining its 
generating and operating forces; and aligning APS & LOGCAP to NDS 
priorities. In fiscal year 2021, Army is investing in site surveys and 
studies to refine the short, medium, and long range plans for expanding 
Multi-Domain capabilities in USINDOPACOM out through 2030.
                               equipment
    53. Senator Blackburn. Secretary McCarthy, last year I had the 
opportunity to visit National Guard soldiers from the 278th Armored 
Cavalry Regiment serving a 9 month deployment in Poland and Ukraine. 
They were at times the most forward deployed unit of our total force if 
a conflict were to break out against Russia, but I often heard from 
these soldiers that their equipment was outdated and difficult to 
maintain. How are we ensuring that we maintain deployable and 
interoperable equipment and force structure across the Active and 
Reserve components?
    Secretary McCarthy. As the Army fields modernized equipment, the 
priority will be to those forces expected to make contact with an 
adversary first--regardless of component. Nevertheless, there are plans 
to continue to provide the Army National Guard with modernized 
equipment in parallel or before the Active Component. Examples of 
systems being fielded to the National Guard in parallel or before the 
Active Component include the AH-64E Apache to replace older model 
Apaches, UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters to replace older UH-60A models, 
the Next Gen Squad Weapon to replace some M4 rifles, IVAS to replace 
some of their current night vision devices, Stryker double-V hull A1s 
to replace flat bottom hull Strykers, the M1A2 SEP V3 and V2 Abrams 
tanks to replace older M1A1 AIM Abrams tanks, and the Soldier Borne 
Sensor and Short Range Reconnaissance UAVs to add capability at the 
small unit level.
                                 space
    54. Senator Blackburn. Secretary McCarthy, with the recent creation 
of the Army Satellite Operations Brigade, we see that the United States 
Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC) is making deliberate 
efforts to reorganize the force to support United States Space Command 
(USSPACECOM). What should we expect to see next from USASMDC, and how 
specifically does support of the newest combatant command fit in with 
Army's modernization priorities?
    Secretary McCarthy. The Army has emerged as the largest integrator 
of space capabilities in the DOD, and currently leverages space 
capabilities to enable ground combat operations. As the Army 
continuously updates its doctrine, organizational designs, training, 
and capabilities to conduct multi-domain operations, the employment of 
organic army space capabilities will be a decisive factor in 
competition, crisis, or conflict. We are working the merger with US 
Space Force and will divest assets over time. However, we must retain 
necessary organic space-related capabilities to balance space 
capabilities across the force and limit operational risk.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                                covid-19
    55. Senator Hawley. Secretary McCarthy, on March 12, a Chinese 
Foreign Ministry spokesman tweeted, ``It might be [sic] U.S. Army who 
brought the epidemic to Wuhan.'' How do you respond to the allegation 
that the U.S. Army may have been responsible for delivering the novel 
coronavirus to the Chinese city of Wuhan?
    Secretary McCarthy. There is no logical response to such an 
irrational accusation.
              general leonard wood army community hospital
    56. Senator Hawley. Secretary McCarthy, on January 16, 2020, I 
asked now-Under Secretary of the Army James McPherson about the Army's 
plans to rectify personnel shortages at the General Leonard Wood Army 
Community Hospital (GLWACH) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Mr. 
McPherson said that those personnel shortages were a result of the 
mishandling of personnel transfers by the Army and assured me that 
GLWACH would be ``fully staffed again'' by this coming summer. Can you 
confirm that the Army is still on track to have GLWACH fully staffed by 
this summer?
    Secretary McCarthy. MEDCOM will ensure GLWACH is staffed to 
required staffing levels pending any impact due to long-term COVID-19 
pandemic response, to include in place stop-move policies.
                        active protection system
    57. Senator Hawley. General McConville, the Army budget supports 
outfitting just four of the Army's 16 armored brigade combat teams 
(ABCTs) of M1 Abrams tanks with Active Protection System (APS) kits to 
defeat threats like rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank 
guided missiles (ATGMs). What is the level of risk assumed by not 
outfitting the remaining ABCTs, as well as the Army's Strykers, with 
APS kits, and what would be the impact on the Total Army Force's 
survivability if it received additional APS kits?
    General McConville. We have procured five brigades of installation 
kits and four brigades of Trophy Active Protection Systems (APS) for 
the Abrams tank. All systems will be installed by third quarter, fiscal 
year 2021, after which the Army has decision points for future APS 
systems. We are evaluating off-the-shelf systems such as Iron Fist-
Light for Bradley and continuing to look for appropriate solutions for 
Stryker. While additional APS sets would improve survivability, our 
future APS buys must be able to evolve with the threat and available 
technology. The Army will continue to request funding to proceed with 
technology maturation that addresses those future capabilities.
                          indo-pacific theater
    58. Senator Hawley. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
National Defense Strategy says that the Department of Defense will 
maintain combat-credible forward forces in order to deter enemy 
aggression, or if deterrence fails, blunt the enemy's attack until war-
winning surge forces arrive. Secretary McCarthy, you seemed to allude 
to this directive in your recent remarks that ``[a]ccess and presence 
are critical in order to deter conflict . . . being on the ground 
matters.'' What are the Army's most important posture requirements for 
the Indo-Pacific theater, and how will meeting those requirements 
support the Army's ability to blunt Chinese aggression, if deterrence 
fails?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army has an 
important role in the greater Indo-Pacific theater and requires access, 
presence, and posture to deter and defeat great power competitors in 
the INDOPACOM theater. The Indo-Pacific theater is a land force centric 
environment within a larger maritime theater where most of the regional 
militaries are land force centric. The Army can most effectively 
advance national interests and contribute to regional stability and the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts by establishing regional security 
partnerships in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. The U.S. Army 
envisions a robust and resilient presence through and with regional 
security partners and allies to deter aggression and set the conditions 
for the Joint Force to flow forces in the event of a crisis. If 
deterrence fails, the U.S. Army will be postured though expeditionary 
basing to rapidly transition to conflict, all the while providing 
theater-level protection and sustainment capabilities for the Joint 
Force in combat.
    59. Senator Hawley. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
Army's concept document, ``The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations--
2028,'' includes the following passage: ``Russia has increased its 
investments in anti-access and area denial capabilities and systems 
intended to deny the Joint Force entry into a contested area and set 
the conditions for a fait accompli attack.'' The multi-domain 
operations concept document subsequently defines a ``fait accompli'' as 
an ``attack . . . intended to achieve military and political objectives 
rapidly and then to quickly consolidate those gains so that any attempt 
to reverse the action by the U.S. would entail unacceptable cost and 
risk.'' It concludes that in order to ``provide a credible deterrent,'' 
Army forces must demonstrate the ``[a]bility to immediately deny a fait 
accompli attack.'' While the MDO concept document focuses on the threat 
of a Russian fait accompli, the Department of Defense's ``Indo-Pacific 
Strategy Report'' warns of the threat of a fait accompli in the Indo-
Pacific theater, as well. With that in mind, would you agree that China 
is investing in systems intended to deny the Joint Force entry into a 
contested area and set the conditions for a fait accompli attack, and 
if so, would you agree that in order to provide a credible deterrent 
against China, Army forces must demonstrate the ability to immediately 
deny a Chinese fait accompli attack?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Yes, it is clear that 
China is investing in weapon systems and force posture actions intended 
to increase their anti-access/area denial capabilities in the Pacific 
and deterrence is a critical component of our National Defense 
Strategy. The Army's Multi-Domain Operations concept was developed and 
matured over the course of several years as a result of significant 
analytical efforts to include wargames, exercises, and experiments. The 
Army is now applying the existing Multi-Domain Operations concept to 
the China scenario. As we do so, we will consider the capabilities and 
concepts of operations of potential adversaries and well as the 
operational environment. The Army will conduct a similarly detailed and 
robust analysis for the Asia-Pacific region as we have done for Europe 
and adapt our concepts as necessary.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
       u.s. army medical research institute of infectious disease
    60. Senator Reed. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in my 
opening statement, I raised concerns that the Department of Defense has 
not prioritized the mission performed by U.S. Army Medical Research 
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), and in fact, the 
Department has cut funding to the program. USAMRIID is at the forefront 
in research on COVID-19, and this Committee needs to understand 
immediately what the Army plans do to ensure USAMRIID remains a world 
class institute.
    I understand you have restricted funds for research in the current 
High Containment Facility at Fort Detrick. What are you doing to 
expeditiously fix this problem, and what specific actions is the Army 
taking in order to bring the New High Containment Facility at Fort 
Detrick online in order to replace the aging one?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army implemented an 
effective and responsive plan of action and milestones that returned 
USAMRIID to full operating capabilities in a timely manner. USAMRIID is 
now at Full Operational Capability (FOC). All work objectives in 
Biosafety Level (BSL)-2, BSL-3 and BSL-4 Federal Select Agent Program 
(FSAP)-registered space will commence to include priority work 
associated with multiple other DOD agencies and Cooperative and 
Development Research Agreement (CRADA) partners. Simultaneously, the 
Army conducted an extensive review of our medical research capabilities 
and is in the process of implementing changes that will facilitate the 
availability of these capabilities in the future.
         u.s. army corps of engineers and border wall contracts
    61. Senator Reed. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as I 
mentioned in my opening statement, this week the Army awarded a $524 
million contract for the Tucson Sector Barrier Wall Replacement 
Project. The United States is grappling with a global pandemic and 
COVID-19 infections have been in reported in all 50 States. Many of the 
hospital systems across our country may soon be at capacity, and a 
border wall with Mexico would not have stopped the spread of the novel 
coronavirus. Please explain why the Army is not redirecting all border 
wall funding toward COVID-19 support efforts?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Border Security remains 
an Administration priority and supporting this effort remains a 
directed mission for the Army. COVID-19 has caused all nations to 
reexamine their border policies as part of medically advised efforts to 
limit spread. As you have seen, the Army is aggressively responding to 
the COVID-19 crisis on a daily basis. As new requirements appear, the 
Army continues to coordinate closely with OSD to identify the best 
funding solution to address all mission requirements.
                   u.s. military academy and covid-19
    62. Senator Reed. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
U.S. Military Academy (USMA) has decided to extend the delay of the 
return of cadets to West Point until further notice due to the COVID-19 
crisis. The cadets are currently attending virtual classes and using 
remote learning platforms. Has USMA or senior Army leadership made any 
decision yet on whether or not the cadets will be allowed to return to 
finish the academic year?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We have not yet made a 
decision. LTG Williams is using a deliberate planning process with 
guidance from Army Senior Leaders to make decisions about the return of 
the Corps of Cadets, remainder of the academic year, graduation, the 
impacts to Cadet Summer Training, and entrance of the Class of 2024. 
The planning process weighs risk to the Academy Mission and risk to 
protecting the entire West Point Team. Right now, the Corps of Cadets 
continues to conduct remote education to minimize disruption to the 
academic year. We will continue to keep you informed as the situation 
and our planning efforts develop.
                      u.s. army corps of engineers
    63. Senator Reed. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) continues the planning and 
conversion of existing buildings into alternate medical care 
facilities, is USACE considering acquiring modular capabilities that 
exist within the industrial base, such as field hospital structures and 
medical shelters that are rapidly deployable to areas that may not have 
existing large capacity buildings?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. In support of FEMA 
Mission Assignments and as the COVID-19 situation develops, USACE is 
working with FEMA and Health and Human Services to rapidly respond to 
emerging needs. As part of this effort and the anticipated need to 
supply large scale temporary facilities to communities where suitable 
existing buildings might not be available, USACE has conducted market 
research to identify available modular facility manufacturers and to 
gain an understanding of their capabilities, manufacturing capacity and 
projected delivery timelines. These facilities could be contracted for 
by USACE or elsewhere within DOD as well as directly by FEMA or local 
Governments.
                   close combat lethality task force
    64. Senator Reed. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, former 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis established the Close Combat 
Lethality Task Force (CCLTF) during his tenure to dramatically improve 
the effectiveness and survivability of close combat formations through 
a combination of materiel and non-materiel means, including innovations 
in recruitment, retention, training, concepts of operation, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, and equipment. The CCLTF was designated as 
a direct report to the Secretary of Defense and as a Cross Functional 
Team (CFT) under section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for fiscal year 2017.
    Secretary Esper recently decided to reassign the CCLTF to the Army, 
ending its designation as a CFT under section 911. While the Army has 
indicated that they remain committed to the vision and success of the 
CCLTF, it remains to be seen if the Army will pursue both material and 
non-material initiatives to enable close combat lethality and 
survivability.
    What are your intentions regarding enduring support for the non-
materiel initiatives to greatly improve close combat lethality and 
survivability?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army will continue 
to develop, evaluate, recommend, and implement improvements to U.S. 
Squad-level infantry combat formations in order to ensure close combat 
overmatch against pacing threats, and strengthen the combat, lethality, 
survivability, resiliency, and readiness of infantry squads. This 
includes determining which material/non-material functions can 
transition from the CCLTF and to what command/agency. We will 
accomplish this analysis with the input of all stakeholders (USA, USMC, 
SOCOM, TRADOC, AFC, FORSCOM, and Congress). This will ensure we develop 
an executable plan that does not impede the progress made by the CCLTF 
and supporting agencies. Army and Marine efforts have been integrated 
since the inception of the Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF) 
and we plan to continue that model as the Army takes the lead. Both 
services will stay involved in the development and testing of new 
doctrine and concepts, as well as systems like the Integrated Visual 
Augmentation System and the Next Generation Squad Weapon.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                                covid-19
    65. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as 
you are aware, there is an urgent need for assistance in combatting the 
spread of COVID-19 across New Hampshire and across our Nation. Could 
you discuss what the Army is doing to fight the spread of this virus, 
and what the Army is doing to help treat patients infected with COVID-
19, including the use of field hospitals?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. As of 13 April, the U.S. 
Army is postured to support and decisively responding to requests for 
assistance. U.S. Army North has established its Joint Force Land 
Component Command headquarters in support of NORTHCOM and activated its 
ten Defense Coordinating Elements and four regional Task Force 
Headquarters in response to a request from FEMA. The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) have received 48 FEMA mission assignments totaling 
over $1.7 billion to provide initial planning and engineering support 
to address possible medical facility shortages in the U.S. due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. USACE, and their more than 15,000 personnel engaged 
in the effort, has completed over 1,000 Alternate Care Facility (ACF) 
site assessments and have 25 ACFs on contract across 14 states to 
include the Javits Center in New York and the Detroit Convention 
Center. More than 24,000 National Guard Soldiers have been activated in 
all states to provide support to State and local governments by 
delivering food and supplies, assisting at COVID-19 testing stations, 
and cleaning public buildings. Finally, the Army has deployed three 
hospitals to support known hot spots in New York and Washington, and 
deployed 14 Urban Augmentation Medical Task Forces (UAMTFs) providing 
critical capabilities and capacity that will ease the burden of the 
regional health systems.
               cold regions research and engineering lab
    66. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab in Hanover, New 
Hampshire, is a leader in solving strategically important problems 
faced when operating in cold weather environments such as the Artic. 
Could you discuss what the Army is doing in response to the 2019 
Department of Defense Arctic Strategy Published in in June 2019?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army has and 
continues to maintain a significant footprint in the Arctic and sub-
Arctic regions. In ensuring our Nation's defense, the Army trains, 
performs exercises, and operates in extreme cold weather environments 
to continue to meet its mission and the challenges of a changing 
region.
    We agree that the U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering 
Lab (CRREL) in Hanover, New Hampshire, is a leader in solving 
strategically important problems faced when operating in cold weather 
environments such as the Artic. CRREL continues to support the Army and 
the Nation in meeting the challenges we face in performing and 
sustaining operations and in maintaining a well-trained and ready 
force. We are asking them to focus on obtaining an awareness of the 
Arctic domain and sustaining all operations.
    The Army executes six Arctic exercises annually: Vigilant Shield 
and Arctic Edge; Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Guard; and Vibrant Response 
and Guardian Response. The Army is exploring funding options for cold 
weather clothing and equipment in the Fiscal Year Defense Program to 
support the five brigades that train for cold weather operations.
                guard and reserve military construction
    67. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
according to the 2014 Readiness Center Transformation Master Plan the 
National Guard needs over $1 billion dollars annually over the next 15 
years in order to meet 80 percent of the space requirements and 
increase their condition to fair. Could you please explain why our Army 
Reserve and National Guard facilities are continually funded 
disproportionately less than our Active Component and well below the 
amount required to adequately update them?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Over the last 3 fiscal 
years the ARNG portion as a percentage of the MILCON budget has 
increased from 11.9 percent in the fiscal year 2019 enacted to 27.2 
percent in fiscal year 2021 budget request. While this level of funding 
falls short of the $1 billion requirement laid out in the Army National 
Guard (ARNG) 2014 Readiness Center Transformation Master Plan it does, 
to the maximum extent possible in the current MILCON budget 
environment, allow the ARNG to program for the replacement of its 
highest priority Readiness Center projects. In regards to the U.S. Army 
Reserves, they also had an increase in requested funding when you 
compare the fiscal year 2019 enacted to the fiscal year 21 budget 
request (5 percent to 7.5 percent of the MILCON budget).
                active duty and reserve force structure
    68. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
could you explain why there is disparity between Active Duty and 
Reserve Component force structure? I understand, for example, that an 
Active Duty HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) battery 
consists of 27 systems, while a Reserve battery has only 16.
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The difference is based 
on modernization priorities and available systems. For example, all 
Active and Reserve Component Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rocket 
artillery battalions will consist of 27 systems by fiscal year 2026. As 
we modernize the Army, some units will be fielded with fewer or 
different systems until procurement of modernized systems become 
available. This is not just a difference between components, we have 
different mixes within each component while we are changing 
organizational designs and modernizing the Total Force.
                          border wall funding
    69. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McCarthy, last year the Department 
of Defense realigned $6 billion from its budget toward constructing a 
border wall along the United States' southern border with Mexico. More 
recently, the administration informed Congress that it was going to 
divert another $3.8 billion from the Pentagon to the border wall from 
various programs essential to supporting the National Defense Strategy. 
Can you discuss the impact of raiding military construction projects 
and various equipment and weapons systems accounts on the Army and its 
ability to support the NDS?
    Secretary McCarthy. I agree with the CJCS assessment that there is 
no significant, immediate, strategic negative impact to the overall 
defense of the United States of America.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
     u.s. army medical research & development support for covid-19
    70. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary McCarthy, I know that the Walter 
Reed Army Institute of Research has extensive experience studying both 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS), two high-profile coronaviruses that caused deadly 
outbreaks. Can you speak to how you are leveraging this experience to 
support your civilian counterparts, and elaborate on any additional 
interagency efforts by U.S. Army Medical Research and Development 
Command to support COVID-19 treatment and vaccine development?
    Secretary McCarthy. Medical Research and Development Command (MRDC) 
and its subordinate commands are working across a broad coalition of 
civilian entities and other Federal agencies to research, develop, and 
acquires treatments and vaccines. A few examples follow:
    a. MRDC is working closely with the Vaccine Research Center/
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID; Dr. 
Fauci) on shared vaccine concepts for COVID-19 including standardized 
test and evaluation parameters in both animal models and clinical 
trials;
    b. NIAID, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority 
(BARDA), and WRAIR are in discussion about tech insertion of vaccine 
and monoclonal antibody countermeasures developed by others into our 
combined test and evaluation competencies to speed the fielding of 
effective capabilities for prevention and treatment;
    c. MRDC is working closely with Harvard Medical School/Mass Gen 
Hospital/Beth Israel Deaconess Medical center on rapid animal model 
evaluation of COVID-19 medical countermeasures to prevent and treat 
COVID-19;
    d. MRDC has an agreement in place with Gilead for access to 
Remdesivir under an expanded access protocol to make investigational 
treatment available for servicemembers in locations where access to 
clinical trials is not feasible. Indication is for servicemembers with 
severe COVID-19 infection;
    e. MRDC has multiple cooperative research and development 
agreements in place and in process for development, testing, and 
evaluation of prevention, treatment, and diagnostic technologies 
emerging from industry, academia and USG partners. Key areas include 
therapeutic screening, vaccine human safety studies, improved rapid, 
high-throughput diagnostics tests, and point of care diagnostics.
    f. MRDC coordinates Medical Countermeasure (MCM) Research and 
Development (R&D) efforts through the U.S. Interagency MCM Task Force, 
led by HHS-BARDA.
             covid-19 and army readiness: travel suspension
    71. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
in recent guidance issued by the U.S. Army, you made the decision to 
suspend movement and delay travel of soldiers stationed in Italy and 
Korea, both of which have been identified by the Center for Disease 
Control as alert level three for COVID-19. Just yesterday, Secretary 
Esper issued a stop movement order to halt all travel and movement 
abroad for up to 60 days. How do you plan to keep these soldiers and 
their families healthy while mitigating any readiness degradation given 
these travel delay orders?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The No. 1 priority in 
this crisis is protecting our people. Although the stop move order will 
have effects on our force, it will significantly reduce the risk of 
infection or spread of the virus. We have adjusted numerous personnel 
policies and entitlements to ensure our soldiers and their families 
have the information, pay, and resources to get through this pandemic. 
Although we have curtailed training and exercises, Commanders at all 
levels will conduct training based within the published Army and CDC 
guidance to maintain our readiness.
              military exercise and training cancelations
    72. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
the Army recently canceled several major joint exercises in both 
USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM and rebranded them ``combined command post 
exercises.'' How does the canceling of these exercises impact the 
Army's ability to provide strategic deterrence to combatant commanders, 
and what metrics are you using to decide what training must continue, 
and what can be postponed?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. At the operational and 
strategic levels the Army has moved very quickly to respond to COVID-19 
in order to protect both the force and the Nation. The Army will 
continue to prioritize force protection in the current environment. 
Doing so will preserve current readiness and our ability to respond in 
crisis. We will continue to evaluate the need to scale back planned 
training based on a rigorous analysis of the risk to force. Commanders 
at all levels are assessing their local conditions and modifying 
training to minimize risk to our force while maximizing our readiness. 
Additionally, the Army has initiated planning on how to adjust our 
planned training and exercises through the remainder of the year when 
the conditions exist to execute. The longer the pandemic lasts, the 
greater the possibility there will be an impact to readiness, but to 
what degree is yet to be determined. As regular GFMAP rotations are 
postponed we are consuming readiness by not utilizing the BCTs/units 
that are/were prepared to deploy. The length of the delay in 
deployments for GFMAP rotations will determine--unit specific--what is 
needed to refresh training on prior to deployment.
             covid-19 and military-to-military partnerships
    73. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
given the cancelation of major joint exercises for the near future, 
what actions are you taking to ensure we maintain strong strategic 
military-to-military partnerships across the globe?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. While a number of major 
exercises have been canceled in the near-term, we remain committed to 
strengthening our partnerships, and building capacity and capability in 
the mid-and long-term. We are exploring positive actions allowing us to 
test our concept of Dynamic Force Employment. The Total Army is in 
continuous contact with allies and partners at multiple levels, and 
will continue to reassure them of our commitment. As the Army continues 
to support the U.S. Government response to COVID-19, Army Senior 
Leaders are in regular contact with allies and partners through phone 
calls and email to keep lines of communication open, share best 
practices and lessons learned, and discuss any impacts on strategic 
readiness. The Army has also directed the Multinational Fusion Cell 
within HQDA to seek COVID-19 SITREPs from their respective countries 
(Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, S. Korea, and New 
Zealand) and exchanges on the impact and actions being taken by their 
Armies.
                               __________
         Questions Submitted by Senators Blumenthal and Warren
                      covid-19 and army readiness
    74. Senators Blumenthal and Warren. General McConville, recent 
guidance issued by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) provided 
specific recommendations to effectively execute social distancing, and 
many U.S. cities have issued shelter-in-place orders to mitigate the 
spread of COVID-19. What guidance are you providing to your commanders 
to implement social distancing and other protective measures as 
recommended by the CDC in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19?
    General McConville. The Army has followed CDC and the Commander in 
Chief's guidance with respect to social distancing. This information 
was provided to the force via three Army Orders/FRAGOs (#7 published on 
14 Mar, #8 published on 15 Mar and # 11 published on 20 Mar). 
Additionally, the Army directed installations, camps, and posts to 
increase their Health Protection (HPCON) to protect our soldiers and 
their families, our civilians, and contractors and ensure we can 
continue our mission by minimizing the spread of COVID-19.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                          coronavirus response
    75. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
Army Garrison in Hawaii now has four diagnosed cases of COVID-19. Two 
individuals are assigned to Tripler Army Medical Center and cases on 
the island continue to increase every day. How have the Army, Army 
National Guard, and Tripler Army Medical Center prepared to respond to 
an uptick in coronavirus cases and assist the local civilian response?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The U.S. Army Pacific is 
taking all necessary actions to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in our 
formations through (but not limited to): maximizing telework, social 
distancing, reducing in-person meetings to six-persons or less and 
maximizing the use of video-teleconferencing, physical training is on 
an individual basis to prevent large groups of soldiers gathering in 
one place, and enforcing all post travel quarantine standards. In the 
last 48 hours, USARPAC, acting as the INDOPACOM TJFLCC, has issued our 
base Defense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA) in support of FEMA as 
the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for the COVID-19 response. The order 
includes directives for the INDOPACOM service components to begin 
planning to provide support to FEMA, including but not limited, to 
medical resources and sea and air lift. The Hawaii based Defense 
Coordinating Officer is in constant coordination with FEMA on emerging 
requirements. Today, the TJFLCC supported FEMA with a rotary wing 
mission to Maui that transported a team from the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers to execute site surveys for potential alternate medical care 
facilities. Over the next 72 hours, TJFLCC is collecting and validating 
names for the Title 10 DDSC and staff that will support the Dual Status 
Commander once designated.
    The Governor of Hawaii named Hawaii National Guard's Adjutant 
General, MG Kenneth S. Hara, as the overall incident Commander. MG Hara 
is also the Hawaii Emergency Management Director, and is in direct 
coordination with all levels of government in planning, coordinating, 
and responding to COVID-19 in the State of Hawaii. The Hawaii National 
Guard's (HING) Joint Staff has stood up a Joint Operations Center to 
manage the HING's response and is preparing to stand up the HING Joint 
Task Force and a Dual Status Command, if required. Currently, the HING 
has 146 soldiers and airmen on State Active Duty supporting contingency 
planning and operational planning (medical support, security, traffic 
control) and conducting Joint Reception Staging, Onward movement, and 
Integration (JRSOI). This includes a Ready Reaction Force and one (1) 
heavy lift aviation asset currently on standby, prepared to support the 
State as directed.
    Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) continues coronavirus 
preparedness and response efforts through close coordination with all 
military medical facilities on Oahu and the local community as an 
Active member in the Healthcare Association of Hawaii and statewide 
Emergency Management System. TAMC provides drive thru screening and 
testing on Fort Shafter Flats (Monday-Saturday) to improve access to 
care. TAMC's drive thru screening and testing eases the demand on 
TAMC's emergency Department. TAMC continues operational bed expansion 
planning to maximize capacity. The military medical facilities in the 
Hawaii Military Health system are identifying, credentialing, and 
training military medical professionals across the Joint
    Force with critical care and emergency medicine training to support 
an expected increased inpatient demand. TAMC and Regional Health 
Command--Pacific healthcare facility planners--are identifying military 
facilities on Oahu that can be repurposed for expanded COVID-19 patient 
treatment areas.
                        army role in the pacific
    76. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as 
you continue to pivot the Army toward the National Defense Strategy 
defined by great power competition, it is important for the United 
States to project strength, reassure our allies, and build partnerships 
in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in response to Chinese and North 
Korean activity. Your Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request specifically 
notes the importance of funding multi-lateral exercises to meet the 
goal of strengthening alliances and partnerships. What is the current 
status of targeted multi-lateral exercises in the Indo-Pacific region 
given the coronavirus pandemic?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. U.S. and partner nation 
responses to COVID-19 have unfortunately required the cancellation or 
postponement of a number of near-term exercises with our partners. 
Exercise TIGER LIGHTNING with Bangladesh has been postponed, as has a 
South Korean Army rotation to the National Training Center. Exercise 
COBRA GOLD with Thailand was completed prior to the declaration of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Planning conferences for exercises KEEN EDGE / 
ORIENT SHIED and YAMA SAKURA with Japan will continue on in a digital 
format. We remain in regular and close contact with our Indo-Pacific 
allies and partners on future exercises, as well as the broader U.S. 
commitment to the region.
                            military housing
    77. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy, you mention in your posture 
statement that you have ``brought Army leadership back into the housing 
equation, empowering tenants and holding partners accountable.'' Our 
people deserve safe, high quality housing. How is Army leadership 
working with privatized companies to provide safe, quality housing to 
our military families?
    Secretary McCarthy. The Army and its leaders are fully engaged. The 
Quality of Life (QOL) for our soldiers, families, and civilians is my 
top priority; safe and quality housing is integral to QOL efforts. 
Under the direction of GEN Perna at U.S. Army Materiel Command, the 
Army has taken the following steps to provide safe, quality housing to 
our military families:
      We are holding the privatized housing companies to 
account. We revised their Incentive Fee structure to place increased 
emphasis on maintenance quality, maintenance response times, and 
resident satisfaction.
      We've established processes to review all privatized 
housing company investment proposals, to ensure the right amount of 
money is being applied to fix the right problems (example--upgrading 
HVAC systems to prevent mold growth rather than just focusing on mold 
remediation).
      Finally, we've increased our holistic analysis of the 
financial conditions of all seven privatized companies to ensure they 
have the capital to either fix or fully renovate aging inventories. We 
are working with the administration to clarify OMB scoring rules, which 
would allow the Residential Community Initiative (RCI) companies access 
to more capital.
      In 2020, RCI Companies will invest $429 million in their 
inventories across our installations, building 106 new homes and 
renovating more than 1,100. More than $1B in RCI development funding is 
programmed through 2024.
                       child development centers
    78. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, I 
note the request for $65 million for new childcare facilities and 
playgrounds at Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter in Hawaii in the 
Army's Unfunded Priority List--since this is a readiness issue, I would 
have preferred to see them in the actual budget request. Access to 
safe, affordable childcare is an important quality of life issue for 
families. I added a provision to the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA to 
significantly reduce the lengthy hiring process for qualified childcare 
providers on military installations by expanding direct hire authority. 
Has the streamlined direct hiring process for childcare providers been 
effective without sacrificing any of the quality and background checks 
for applicants?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The direct hire 
authority authorized in the 2020 NDAA pertained to General Schedule 
(GS) employees. Almost 100 percent of Army child and youth staff are 
non-appropriated fund (NAF) employees. Current Army policy gives 
Garrison commanders direct recruitment authority for NAF positions, and 
may delegate that authority to any level of management deemed 
appropriate. The Army uses this authority to fill positions with highly 
qualified child care staff more efficiently than other recruitment 
systems. Since 2018, on-board staffing increased from 79 percent to 86 
percent (Oct 19) and is holding steady. An online NAF transfer system, 
the Child and Youth Employee Assistance Tool (CEAT), was launched in 
October 2019 to assist military spouses and civilian direct child care 
staff by allowing them to request a non-completive transfer at the same 
grade level/pay when PCSing to a new duty location. This tool reduces 
transfer time by 2 weeks. CEAT has placed 140 military spouses and 107 
NAF civilian staff since October 2019. The tool is being expanded to 
include all CYS staff (CY, and NF-3 and below pay bands) by Oct 20.
             women in military service to america memorial
    79. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA conference report directed the Secretary of the 
Army to establish a memorandum of understanding with the Women in 
Military Service for America Memorial Foundation, Inc., to define 
responsibilities and allocate resources for the operation and 
maintenance of the Women in Military Service for America Memorial and 
surrounding grounds. What progress has been made on this memorandum and 
are there any limiting factors?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. ANC and WIMSA have held 
multiple meetings over the last 3 months to develop the MOU as directed 
by the NDAA. A draft License agreement is currently being staffed to 
formalize WIMSA's occupancy on Federal land. Once this license is 
complete, the parties will finalize the MOU. These documents will 
establish and define each parties' responsibilities for operations and 
maintenance for the memorial.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
                           acquisition reform
    80. Senator King. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in 
your testimony on soldier lethality you referenced a departure from the 
traditional requirements process as you develop the Integrated Visual 
Augmentation System. While I am encouraged by the approach, what 
oversight have you built in to ensure that the Army avoids requirement 
creep with this evolving strategy?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. IVAS is one of the 
signature efforts under the Soldier Lethality Cross Functional Team 
(SL-CFT). The SL-CFT conducts quarterly touchpoints with the Secretary 
and Undersecretary of the Army, Chief and Vice Chief of Staff, the Army 
Acquisition Executive, the Commander of Army Futures Command, as well 
as the commanders of the other Army Major Commands. During those 
routine touchpoints, the SL-CFT Director and Program Executive Officer 
Soldier present any recommended requirements adjustments for Army 
Senior Leader decision. This rigorous process prevents requirements 
creep and ensures any changes to this high-priority program are 
approved at the appropriate level. We are ensuring IVAS meets the right 
requirements by deliberately running each IVAS Capability Set (CS) 
through Soldier Touch Points (STP). Soldier Touch Points (STPs) are 
designed to test and validate fight first capabilities in a tactical 
field environment. Each CS has multiple STPs where soldiers provide 
feedback on form, function and capability as they execute their 
tactical missions. Army Senior Leaders review the feedback from the 
STPs when making decisions on capability trades in order to impose 
rigor and accountability in the requirements decisionmaking process.
                               personnel
    81. Senator King. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, while 
I support your efforts in talent management and talent-based recruiting 
I would like to understand the Army's plan to target areas around the 
country to keep it a force that is representative of the United States 
as a whole? For example, with the many base closures in the New England 
region over the last 30 years much of the region has lost its 
connection to the military and has been a significant reduction in 
military accessions from that area and I would like to see that 
changed.
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. In October 2018 the Army 
began a process to prioritize our recruiting efforts and synchronize 
the Army's focus in twenty-two cities across the country to improve our 
connection to the country, and increase the diversity of the force by 
going into areas that we had not previously emphasized. Led by U.S. 
Army Training and Doctrine Command, we selected these twenty-two cities 
based upon their high population of qualified military applicants and 
low propensity to serve. The Focus 22 cities in the northeast region of 
the U.S. are Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore. 
Over the past 18 months, the Army has conducted hundreds of accessions 
events in these Focus 22 cities varying from key leader engagements 
with civic leaders, Meet Your Army events, teaming up with the NFL, 
MLB, and college sports, and participation in community events. We are 
supporting these accessions events with Army bands, drill teams, 
marksmanship units, and the Golden Knights, and more recently with our 
newly developed `e-Sports' and functional fitness teams. The 
collaboration of multiple Army organizations and the renewed focus to 
prioritize these communities has resulted in the Army reconnecting with 
the communities in these Focus 22 cities, which is contributing to 
meeting our accessions goals.
    82. Senator King. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, what 
plans does the Army have to combat the increasing numbers of Active and 
veteran suicides? Also, please summarize the standard process a soldier 
goes through when transitioning from Active Duty to veteran status, how 
that process helps the servicemember prepare for civilian life to 
include dealing with the mental and emotional stress of the transition, 
and where you think that process needs to improve.
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. One suicide is one too 
many. We are committed to significantly reducing suicides in the Army. 
We enhanced mandatory suicide prevention training for every soldier and 
Army civilian. We invested in resilience training and performance 
enhancement capabilities, which are available to each member of the 
Army Team. We also developed visibility tools to provide leaders with 
insight to develop targeted prevention and intervention plans to both 
identify and assist at-risk soldiers. All soldiers are required to 
attend the Transition Assistance Programs' initial counseling NLT 12 
months prior to their end of service date. In that 12 month period, 
they are assessed and determine (with the help of trained counselors) 
their best transition plan and career track to help them achieve their 
individual goals. They then follow that plan through a series of 
counseling gates like resume and budget development. Finally, NLT 3 
months prior to their end of service date, they sit with a counselor 
and conduct a final review of their transition preparation. If the 
soldier does not feel prepared for their transition off of Active Duty, 
or their Commander/counselor does not think they are prepared for their 
transition, the soldier receives a `warm hand-off' to the Veteran's 
Administrations (VA) or Department of Labor (DOL). On average, about 
100,000 soldiers a year go through this process. The hand-off to the 
VA/DOL is where can improve the most by confirming the hand-off and 
later obtaining a report on transition.
                            missile defense
    83. Senator King. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, what 
is the Army's strategy for developing the air and missile defense 
capabilities required to defend U.S. Forces against the increasing 
threat posed by cruise missiles and short and medium range ballistic 
missiles, also, how does the Army plan to address and defend against 
the emerging theater-level hypersonic weapon threats? Iran's attacks 
against the Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia last September and 
against U.S. Forces in Iraq in January should serve as a wake-up call 
for those threats.
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The best defense against 
hypersonic and supersonic cruise missiles is to have robust offensive 
and defensive capabilities. From an offensive perspective, we are 
placing significant emphasis and investment into our own hypersonic 
capability. The current schedule of delivering a road mobile prototype 
hypersonic battery in fiscal year 2023 remains in place. We must also 
attack the munition once launched. The Missile Defense Agency is 
exploring defenses against hypersonic threats, and we are evaluating 
Patriot against the supersonic cruise missile threats. Supersonic 
threats are also an Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) 
objective requirement, while subsonic remains a threshold requirement.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                     army test range infrastructure
    84. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McCarthy, I was encouraged to see 
the types of investments the Fiscal Year 2021 President's Budget 
proposed in Army modernization in technologies of the future like 
directed energy, hypersonics, and artificial intelligence. As you know, 
investments like these are only of use to our servicemembers in the 
field if we are able to transition them out of the laboratories. What 
kind of investments does the Army's budget make in our Nation's test 
and range infrastructure to speed up the tech transition process?
    Secretary McCarthy. Investments in Army test and range 
infrastructure are fully aligned to meet the demands of Army 
Modernization and enable the rapid transition of new technologies from 
the lab to the battlefield. Investments are underway in critical test 
range infrastructure, such as wireless and fiber optic networks. Major 
families of range instrumentation, including radar, telemetry, and 
optics, are being modernized to support hypersonics and long-range 
fires testing. New instrumentation and targets for directed energy 
testing are being built. Computing resources, tools, and techniques for 
testing artificial intelligence systems are being developed. 
Commensurate investments are underway to support all Army Modernization 
priorities.
                    army long range precision fires
    85. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McCarthy, over the past few years, 
the Army has tested capabilities for Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) 
at White Sands Missile Range. As you know, LRPFs are a critical part of 
the 2018 National Security Strategy's modernization goals. Of the $1.7 
billion in funding proposed in fiscal year 2021 for LRPFs, is any 
funding dedicated to testing and sustaining testing infrastructure or 
is this funding all research and development (R&D) and procurement and 
is the $1.7 billion sufficient to meet the Army's modernization 
timeline?
    Secretary McCarthy. Yes, I believe the $1.7 billion submitted as 
part of the President's budget to support the Long Range Precision 
Fires (LRPF) portfolio is sufficient to meet the Army's modernization 
timelines. Funding in the fiscal year 2021 budget requests does support 
tests and infrastructure activities across the LRPF portfolio. For 
example, $7.1 million is allocated to support Precision Strike Missile 
Engineering Development Flight Tests that are currently scheduled to 
occur in 3QFY21.
         army directed energy-maneuver short range air defense
    86. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McCarthy, the Army is testing its 
Directed Energy-Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (DE-MSHORAD) at White 
Sands Missile Range. How does DE-MSHORAD fit into the Army's overall 
directed energy program and what is the timeline for fielding this 
capability?
    Secretary McCarthy. Yes, DE-MSHORAD is part of the Army strategy 
for Air Defense support to maneuver units. The DE-MSHORAD capability is 
intended to protect Divisions and Brigade Combat Teams from Unmanned 
Aerial Systems, rotary-wing aircraft, and Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar 
threats. The Army is leveraging past S&T investments and the 
progression of the Multi-Mission High Energy Laser (MMHEL) Technology 
Maturation Initiative to rapidly prototype DE-MSHORAD systems and field 
to a platoon in 4QTRFY22. DE-MSHORAD is one of three directed energy 
efforts the Army is pursuing. The second is Indirect Fire Protection 
Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL), which will provide a 300 kW-
class laser system by fiscal year 2024. Finally, the third is the IFPC-
High Powered Microwave, which uses electrical pulses designed to 
disable/destroy electrical components of threat equipment, also to be 
delivered by fiscal year 2024.
    87. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McCarthy, what can this Committee 
do to better support the Army's Directed Energy programs?
    Secretary McCarthy. The Army is pursuing a variety of Directed 
Energy (DE) weapons, including both lasers and High Power Microwave 
(HPM) systems, to address near-peer threats as part of its 
modernization strategy. The Army has made Directed Energy a 
modernization priority in the Department and we would ask Congress to 
support our fiscal year 2021 budget request for all associated efforts. 
The Army Fiscal Year 2021 President's Budget Request for DE includes: 
DE-Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (DE-MSHORAD) demonstration for a 
down select in our competitive approach in fiscal year 2021 and the 
funds for three additional 50 kW-class lasers integrated onto Strykers 
to be delivered to a platoon (four vehicles) in fiscal year 2022; and 
the Indirect Fire Protection Capability-HEL (IFPC-HEL) funding for 300 
kW-class laser system design, integration, and demonstration in fiscal 
year 2022.
                          milcon cancellation
    88. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McCarthy, I am encouraged by the 
Army's investment R&D and procurement for next-generation weapon 
systems, but remained concerned that we are not sustaining the test 
infrastructure needed to rapidly field these capabilities.
    In fiscal year 2020, $40 million in military construction funding 
for an information systems facility at White Sands Missile Range was 
redirected to fund the President's ineffective border wall. Funding for 
that facility was not included in the Fiscal Year 2021 President's 
Budget. What is the plan to fund this critical facility?
    Secretary McCarthy. The Army continues to work with the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense on a viable strategy to fund all the military 
construction project that were deferred; this includes the information 
systems facility project at White Sands Missile Range.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                covid-19
    89. Senator Warren. General McConville, the Army has reportedly 
moved to virtual recruiting exclusively in order to protect recruiters 
and recruits from potentially COVID-19. What is your best assessment of 
the impact this will have on the Army's monthly recruiting goals?
    General McConville. As COVID-19 continues to impact the country, we 
are continuously assessing the environment to ensure we are making the 
necessary adjustment. USAREC was already focused on virtual recruiting 
as that is where today's youth market lives. Prior to COVID-19, digital 
and social media have been the top lead generating tools, producing 
50,000 leads ahead of last year.
    Army recruiters post career opportunities using online job 
postings, which has made it one of the largest lead production 
platforms. Virtual recruiting has produced a 40 percent increase in 
contracts from this time in fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2020. 
Further, 63 percent of all virtual recruiting contracts are quality 
applicants. While we are still analyzing virtual recruiting in today's 
environment, we are optimistic that we have put the conditions in place 
to ensure continued success in recruiting the force.
    In order to set conditions for when recruiting can turn to normal 
operations, USAREC recruiters will virtually process applicants using a 
``soft contract'' methodology.
    Recruiters will gather leads using 100 percent Virtual Prospecting 
to identify interested applicants. Once the applicant is contacted, if 
the applicant expresses an interest in receiving more information on 
career opportunities with the U.S. Army, the Recruiter will conduct a 
virtual Army interview (Facetime or Skype) to provide them more 
information. If the applicant is still interested the recruiter will 
administer the Pending Internet Computerized Adaptive Test (PiCAT), 
which is a Virtual ASVAB. The PiCAT score is now valid for 45 days 
increased from 30 days due to COVID-19.
    If the applicant achieves a PiCAT score that enables them to 
enlist, the recruiter will begin working with the applicant to 
virtually obtain all required documents. Further, recruiters now have 
the ability to virtual witness signing of Parental Consent Forms. The 
applicant will complete the Career Explorer app thus allowing 
Recruiters to build the applicant's record virtually. The recruiter 
will then generate a Temporary Reservation that guarantees the 
applicant their MOS and incentives for 45 days, which was increased 
from 7 days due to COVID-19. The applicant will then be considered a 
``soft contract.'' The determination of when to continue applicant 
processing is dependent on the level of risk in the area in which the 
applicant resides. Once an area is determined to be safe to continue 
processing, the applicant will be taken to a Military Entrance 
Processing Station (MEPs), which is part of Military Entrance 
Processing Command (MEPCOM), to continue processing of the Physical and 
Enlistment Contract. Once an applicant has been cleared by MEPs, the 
applicant will be given a report date for reporting to Basic Combat 
Training.
    The goal of the ``soft contract'' process is to enable USAREC to 
complete 90 percent of the applicant processing virtually to ensure the 
safety of the applicant and our recruiters. Further, we will be able to 
inform MEPCOM of ``soft contract'' applicant totals, so when recruiting 
operations return to normal, the processing will be in place to 
efficiently and effectively move applicants through the final stages of 
enlistment.
    90. Senator Warren. General McConville, what are the Army's 
contingency plans should it fail to meet its monthly recruiting goals?
    General McConville. In order to protect the Nation, we must first 
protect our force. We are prioritizing the health of the Army over any 
accessions goal. Army end strength is the cumulative product of 
accessions, retention, and attrition. If we are short on monthly 
recruiting (accessions) goals, we can adjust retention and attrition. 
For example, we are offering enlisted servicemembers the option to 
extend their current contract for a period of 3 months to 11 months 
under the Response to COVID Outbreak Extension (RCOE) policy. This new 
policy not only takes care of soldiers in a time of uncertainty, but we 
also expect it to bolster the Army's operating strength in the coming 
months. In addition, we are working to reduce soldier attrition from 
basic training.
    91. Senator Warren. General McConville, when do you expect to know 
if these contingency plans will need to be executed?
    General McConville. We are already starting to execute some of 
these contingency plans, partly because we know that retention and 
attrition management are crucial to maintaining the force that the 
Nation needs. We also monitor accessions results on a monthly basis. We 
will continue to evaluate the need for and potential timing of other 
personnel-related policies and levers that we may need to pull.
    92. Senator Warren. General McConville, are recruits being tested 
for COVID-19 before or after shipping out to basic training and what 
steps is the Army taking to ensure that the disease is not spreading 
amongst recruits and staff at recruit training facilities?
    General McConville. The Army is only shipping new recruits from 
areas of the country that are not high-risk; have been pre-screened; 
and exhibit no signs of COVID-19 to Army Training Centers. Trainees are 
continuously screened at each stage of the reception and transport 
process and then throughout their training. Upon arrival at an Army 
Training Center, trainees are screened before in-processing and enter 
into the 14-day restriction-of-movement / limited contact protocol 
where they complete administrative tasks and socially distanced 
academic training. Army Training Centers have implemented measures to 
maximize social distancing, limit the potential for spreading, and 
reduce risk. These measures include: filling classes to less than 50 
percent to maximize social distancing; adjusting POIs to reduce close-
proximity training (e.g., combatives training is postponed); reducing 
the size of groups (e.g., on bus transportation, in barracks and 
classrooms, etc.); maximizing the use of outdoor locations; modifying 
dining facility procedures; and continuously monitoring drill 
sergeants, cadre, and trainees for health issues and temperatures. 
Additionally, family days are canceled and graduations are closed to 
the public.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Gary C. Peters
               per-and polyfluoroalkyl substances (pfas)
    93. Senator Peters. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
Army is responsible for multiple PFAS contaminationsites in Michigan, 
including at Camp Grayling and the Grand Ledge Army Aviation Support 
Facility. How is the Army working to address PFAS contamination that it 
is responsible for, including how is the Army cooperating with State 
and local governments and impacted communities?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army has initiated 
response actions to assess the source and potential impacts of PFAS 
under the Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) at both Camp Grayling and Grand Ledge Army 
Aviation Support Facility (Grand Ledge). Drinking water has been 
sampled both on and off installation at Camp Grayling. There are 17 
drinking water wells above the EPA lifetime health advisory (HA) of 70 
parts per trillion, where the Army is providing bottled water and is in 
the process of providing whole-house filtration systems or connection 
to public drinking water systems. The Army has been collaborating with 
State and local health departments, Michigan's environmental regulator 
(Environment, Great Lakes and Energy (EGLE)), and the local county and 
city governments to coordinate Camp Grayling actions. The Army is 
meeting regularly with these stakeholders who freely share information 
among organizations, and with the general public through a series of 
joint public meetings. The Army is working closely with EGLE in an 
ongoing investigation to assess if PFAS from Army Guard activities at 
Grand Ledge has reached drinking water wells. Sampling has occurred 
both on and off the installation. There have been no drinking water 
wells found to exceed the lifetime HA on or around Grand Ledge.
                   optionally manned fighting vehicle
    94. Senator Peters. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, a 
January 16, 2020, the Army canceled the Optionally Manned Fighting 
Vehicle (OMFV) program. This was the Army's third attempt to replace 
the Bradley. OMFV is part of the Next Generation Combat Program, the 
Army's second modernization priority. What additional requirements or 
characteristics do you expect of OMFV that weren't included in the 
original program and what do you expect to be different in submissions 
from industry?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. OMFV characteristics 
will be refined through a series of industry engagements, digital 
design competitions, and soldier touch points to inform and sharpen 
OMFV final prototypes for testing yielding requirements for production. 
This approach will enable us to explore the solution space in an 
environment of rapid and inexpensive learning leading to verification 
through physical prototypes, soldier input, and testing. These 
encounters are also intended to challenge biases and confirm state-of-
the-art technologies available to support the ABCT commander on the 
modern battlefield. This approach will deliver innovation, maximize 
competition, and ultimately produce a vehicle that will dominate in 
multi-domain operations for generations. We are not releasing a 
prescribed set of requirements--we are describing the problem set and 
giving industry the freedom to be creative and innovative in its 
approach.
                         advanced combat engine
    95. Senator Peters. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in 
December 2019 the Army held a demonstration of the Advanced Powertrain 
Demonstrator, including the Advanced Combat Engine, at the Ground 
Vehicle Systems Center in Warren, Michigan. This demonstrator is 
developing capabilities which may be integrated into future systems the 
Army is developing, including those under the purview of the Next 
Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team. Can you please 
describe the need for the Army to improve its existing powertrain 
options, including the capability advantage offered by the Advanced 
Combat Engine over existing engines or commercial-off-the-shelf 
options?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army began 
development of an Advanced Combat Powertrain in 2015 based upon a 
market survey and analysis that showed available combat powertrains are 
not sufficient to meet anticipated requirements and that engines 
developed for commercial applications were not sufficient for military 
operating conditions without further development. Specifically, a gap 
in the market existed for combat vehicle platforms in the 45-60 ton 
weight range. Additional power was needed within the restricted under 
armor volume of combat vehicles to maintain pace with the force and 
provide electrical power to support protection, lethality, and 
communications systems. The Advanced Combat Powertrain, including the 
Advanced Combat Engine, has the objectives to improve the power density 
by 1.5 to 2.0x, increase fuel efficiency by 25 percent, increase 
electrical power available by 10x, increase mobility (range by an 
additional 100 miles, speed on grades by 50 percent and accelerate 30 
percent faster), and improved thermal management, with the Bradley 
powertrain as the baseline.
                          army in usindopacom
    96. Senator Peters. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
Army has begun expanding its role in the USINDOPACOM. Recently, 
Secretary McCarthy announced ``five-month extended rotations to 
countries like Thailand, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea'' and the 
first deployment of a Security Forces Assistance Brigade to 
USINDOPACOM. What long-term role do you envision for the U.S. Army in 
USINDOPACOM and what is the risk of an expanded role for the U.S Army 
in USINDOPACOM including the impact of shifting Army resources from 
more land-centric theatres like Europe and the Middle East?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army has an 
important role in the greater Indo-Pacific region based on the ideas of 
all-domain warfare and great power competition. The Indo-Pacific 
theater is a land force centric environment within a larger maritime 
theater where most of the regional militaries are land force centric. 
The Army can most effectively advance national interests and contribute 
to regional stability and the peaceful resolution of conflicts by 
establishing regional security partnerships in the South China Sea and 
Southeast Asia. The Army is currently exercising with regional security 
partners and plans to employ security force assistance formations. The 
Army must demonstrate the ability to converge warfighting capabilities 
across domains at scale to prevail in adversarial competition. The Army 
will globally posture forces in support of strategic priorities and 
joint force requirements.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senators Peters and Manchin
                           covid-19 response
    97. Senators Peters and Manchin. Secretary McCarthy and General 
McConville, there are more than 10,000 National Guard servicemembers 
responding to COVID-19, as of March 25, 2020. Guardsmen in several 
States have been moved to federally supported Title 32 orders. How is 
the Army ensuring that frontline National Guard servicemembers 
responding to this national emergency have access to the personal 
protective equipment (PPE) necessary to safely and effectively carry 
out their COVID-19 response mission and what is the Army's plan to 
ensure National Guard servicemembers who may have been exposed to the 
virus have access to unique healthcare service which may be required 
because of this virus?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We are concerned about 
the health and well-being of all of our soldiers. Our soldiers are 
executing missions in support of FEMA and HHS in coordination with 
their respective State Departments of Health. As a supporting entity to 
both HHS and FEMA, ARNG soldiers are being provided PPE by HHS in 
accordance with CDC guidelines. For the few states that are using CSTs 
to execute certain missions, those personnel have specialized PPE 
optimized for CBRNE environments. We have issued directives to 
Commanders to ensure that no soldiers are being asked to conduct any 
mission for which they are not properly equipped.
    ARNG soldiers that are federally funded under 502(f) authorities, 
while serving under the State orders and guidance are authorized and 
would receive medical care through Tricare. Army National Guard 
soldiers responding in a State Active Duty (SAD) must submit a State 
Workman's Compensation claim for medical care.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
                                covid-19
    98. Senator Manchin. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, we 
are all disappointed that key parts of DEFENDER-Europe 20 are being 
postponed or canceled due to COVID-19. Do you have any data at this 
time about both the financial and readiness impacts caused by these 
cancellations and postponements?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is moving very 
quickly to respond to the COVID-19 to protect both the force and the 
Nation. Due to parts of Defender and other events being postponed or 
canceled, we have funds that have not been executed. We are working to 
understand the financial impact once the accounting is complete. We 
have not seen significant impact to readiness yet, but are concerned 
the longer the pandemic lasts the greater the possibility there will be 
a degradation. We are continuing to train at lower levels and 
Commanders at all levels are assessing their local conditions and 
modifying training to minimize risk to our force while maximizing our 
readiness.
           integrated personnel and pay system--army (ipps-a)
    99. Senator Manchin. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
advanced testimony sent to this committee places an emphasis on the 
people that make up the Army. IPPS-A is one effort that is discussed as 
a way for the Army to refocus on its people. The IPPS-A fielding plan 
begins with the National Guard before moving on to the other 
components. With any type of app or software that stores personal data, 
it is vulnerable to cybersecurity issues. What measures are being taken 
by the Army and your partners to ensure the cybersecurity of this 
program?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Integrated Personnel 
and Pay System--Army (IPPS-A) Increment II has instituted both Army and 
Joint measures across its system design, development, testing, 
deployment, and sustainment lifecycles to continuously assess, test, 
and validate the cybersecurity controls implemented to protect the 
system. These measures are tested by the Systems Integrator (CACI), the 
Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), and DOD's Director Operational 
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). There are many Cybersecurity approvals, 
certifications, and tests that have been performed on the IPPS-A 
Increment II system. The IPPS-A Cybersecurity Strategy, Incident 
Response Team, Continuity of Operations Plan and the Cybersecurity 
service provider ensures that IPPS-A Increment II is employing a 
secure, defense-in-depth posture through the integration of people, 
technology, and operations.
                             reprogramming
    100. Senator Manchin. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
the National Guard is playing an ever-growing and vital role in the 
COVID-19 response. This is in addition to their already significant 
contributions to national security alongside their Active and Reserve 
Component counterparts. Many Members of Congress were frustrated by the 
recent reprogramming action which moved funds to go to the wall because 
of its significant impact to the Guard, particularly the National Guard 
and Reserve Equipment Account. Do you believe that the reprogramming of 
the $3.8 billion overall, and specifically the $600 million in Army-
impacted NGREA [National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account] funds, 
will affect the Army's ability to respond to the current crisis while 
continuing to safeguard our Nation's security?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. No, it will not impact 
the Army's current ability to respond to the COVID-19 crisis or 
safeguard our Nation's security. Congress has provided funding for our 
National Guard forces in the recent supplemental package which will 
enable the National Guard to respond to the current crisis.
                  concurrent and proportional fielding
    101. Senator Manchin. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
according to the testimony received by this committee prior to this 
hearing, readiness has been and still is the Army's top priority. 
Programs such as the UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopter, the Joint Light 
Tactical Vehicle, AH-64E Apache Helicopter, and many future programs 
and efforts are examples of ways the Army is working to do this while 
refocusing on great power competition. The National Guard represents 
approximately one-quarter of the total Army forces, both uniformed and 
civilian, and one-third of the total uniformed soldiers in the Army. 
The National Guard and Reserves combined represent over half of the 
Army's forces. When the National Guard and Reserve represent such a 
significant portion the Army's forces and capabilities and often 
perform the same missions, side-by-side with the Active Component, do 
you feel that they should be organized, equipped, and manned in the 
same manner as their Active Component counterparts?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army National Guard 
and Reserves are critical components of the Total Army Force. As the 
Army fields modernized equipment, the priority will be to those forces 
expected to make contact with an adversary first--regardless of 
component. Nevertheless, there are plans to continue to provide the 
Army National Guard with modernized equipment in parallel or before the 
Active Component. Examples of systems being fielded to the National 
Guard in parallel or before the Active Component include the AH-64E 
Apache to replace older model Apaches, UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters to 
replace older UH-60A models, the Next Gen Squad Weapon to replace some 
M4 rifles, IVAS to replace some of their current night vision devices, 
Stryker double-V hull A1s to replace flat bottom hull Strykers, the 
M1A2 SEP V3 and V2 Abrams tanks to replace older M1A1 AIM Abrams tanks, 
and the Soldier Borne Sensor and Short Range Reconnaissance UAVs to add 
capability at the small unit level.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
                          future vertical lift
    102. Senator Duckworth. Secretary McCarthy, Congress recently added 
$76 million to the fiscal year 2020 appropriations bill for the Future 
Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) program to reduce risk and 
accelerate delivery of the platform. Both platforms chosen in the 
recent downselect, the V-280 Valor and SB-1 Defiant, have significant 
test flight data from the technology demonstrator phase available for 
use. In your view, does the Army have enough flight data on these two 
platforms to alter or accelerate the competitive demonstration and risk 
reduction (CDRR) phase in order to field this platform earlier than 
projected and if additional resources were available, could the program 
absorb them in a productive manner this year?
    Secretary McCarthy. As you identified, the Army recently awarded 
two Competitive Demonstration and Risk Reduction (CD&R) OTA agreements, 
and initiated Phase I with fiscal year 2020 funding. Under these OTA's, 
the Army will be working with industry to refine the requirements and 
conceptual designs, through a digital engineering approach. This work 
with industry is vital to understanding the performance, cost, 
affordability, schedule risks, and trades needed to successfully 
execute the FLRAA program. The program is currently on schedule and the 
Army is not looking to accelerate it.
                    national guard full-time support
    103. Senator Duckworth. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
as of March 24, 2020, the National Guard activated over 9,000 Guardsman 
in support of COVID-19 efforts in the United States. I've long been 
concerned about Guard readiness and continue to be so as activation 
levels continue to rise. It is my understanding that full-time support 
(FTS) levels in the Air National Guard are around 80 percent yet the 
Army National Guard FTS level is only at 64 percent. Given the 
importance of the Army National Guard's role in supporting the Total 
Force, and in particular their critical role during the COVID-19 
crisis, would you support an increase in Guard FTS billets meets at 
least 80 percent of their validated requirements?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We are committed to 
maintaining readiness in the ARNG. We are tracking the status of ARNG 
FTS levels and the impact of FTS funding to ARNG readiness. This is an 
area we will review in our fiscal year 2022 budget.
                          covid-19 quarantine
    104. Senator Duckworth. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
I read several news article last week documenting the experiences of 
soldiers going through COVID-19 quarantine at Fort Bliss and Fort Bragg 
upon return from deployments to Afghanistan. I have to be frank, the 
descriptions I have read are not what I would expect from the Army. I 
get the sense that the Army's return from deployment quarantine 
planning was rushed and shoddy and may have compromised soldier safety 
and added to the worries of families awaiting the return of their loved 
ones. Will you commit to looking into reports that aspects of the 
return quarantine have been inadequately planned and haphazardly 
executed and communicating back to the Committee what you have found 
and how you plan to correct any deficiencies?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We have looked into all 
of these reports and have taken immediate action. In these cases, the 
commands immediately investigated and took corrective actions to remedy 
any deficiencies. Although we stood these facilities up quickly in 
response to the Army's order to house Active, National Guard, and US 
Army Reserve soldiers redeploying from Level 2 and 3 countries, we can 
assure you that the safety and comfort of our soldiers is our paramount 
concern. This does not absolve our Commanders of ensuring the health 
and welfare of our soldiers. In the case of Fort Bliss, the sites 
selected for our initial quarantine housing are three standard Army 
barracks on main Fort Bliss plus two training areas frequently used for 
post-mobilization training. Soldiers are housed in the barracks 
buildings; each room is 17' by 15' in size, and hosts 4 soldiers. These 
4 soldiers share a common area with kitchenette and bathroom (8 1/2' x 
15') with 4 soldiers in an adjoining 17' by 15' room. Soldiers are 
housed with other soldiers arriving on the same day and are separated 
from soldiers with different quarantine start dates to avoid 
commingling the distinct quarantine cohorts. The soldiers are allowed 
to move among their quarantine cohort, but we maintain each quarantine 
site in a manner designed to protect the safety of the force during 
their quarantine period. The command at the 1st Armored Division has 
made several improvements to our quarantine locations, including 
additional fitness facilities, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR), 
and Army and Air Force Exchange (AAFES) services. We encourage soldiers 
to raise concerns about their living conditions to the chain of 
command.
                              indo-pacific
    105. Senator Duckworth. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
the Army has made efforts in the last several months to bolster our 
military presence in the Indo-Pacific region. As you both look at the 
INDOPACIFIC region I would like to hear from each of you what your 
thoughts are on opportunities in the region. In the next year, what 
region, sub-region, or country should the Army's primary focus be on to 
further build partnerships and strengthen the position of free nations 
in the region.
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The U.S. Army is very 
committed to strengthening alliances and attracting new partners in the 
Indo-Pacific region. Since January 2020, we have been actively working 
to strengthen Army-to-Army relations with Indonesia and Thailand, and 
will continue to build on the success of recent engagements over the 
coming year. The U.S. Army is also committed to continuing our close 
relationship with the Philippine Army through engagements and 
exercises. Building partnerships is South Asia is also a priority of 
the Army, particularly with India and Bangladesh where we are working 
to expand the scope and scale of our exercises, and build 
interoperability and capacity through education, training, and security 
assistance. The Army will also maintain strong relationships with 
traditional allies and partners (Japan, South Korea, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Singapore) by enhancing interoperability and modernizing 
together through high-end exercises, security assistance, and armaments 
cooperation.
                        mobile long range fires
    106. Senator Duckworth. General McConville, I recently reviewed an 
Urgent Needs Statement from the 173d Airborne Brigade out of Italy. As 
you know the 173d is one of our premier light infantry units and, given 
its position in Europe, would likely be one of the first to respond to 
any crisis in Europe. They are outgunned and outranged against their 
potential Russian opponents and have requested the fielding of a light, 
wheeled mobile 105mm howitzer system. As I understand it, this request 
has not been acted on pending an Army wide review of long range 
precision fires systems. While I understand the need for measured 
decisionmaking regarding equipment it baffles me that when such a 
system is currently available the Army doesn't seem to be moving 
rapidly to field it to our forward deployed units who are in great need 
of more lethal and mobile fire support. Can you commit to me that you 
will take a look at this needs statement and consider the rapid 
fielding of such a system? I think it is critical that when we have the 
tools available we should get them into the warfighter's hands.
    General McConville. Yes, we review all urgent needs statement and 
you have our commitment to look into the specifics of this request.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                        army combat fitness test
    107. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
services were congressionally mandated to become gender integrated, and 
I believe the Army has made great progress in incorporating women into 
the ranks. I am concerned, however, that the Army's new Combat Fitness 
Test may have an unintended effect on women soldiers. The gender and 
age neutral physical standards don't account for the different 
advantages of pound for pound strength that mostly men benefit from, 
though the Army does take that into account at other times, such as 
when calculating combat load. How is the Army going to ensure that the 
new fitness standards don't reverse the gains the Army is making in 
gender integration?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army Combat Fitness 
Test (ACFT) is a predictor of a soldier's readiness for the demands of 
the modern battlefield. The assessment requires all soldiers, males and 
females, to meet basic minimum physical standards. These standards 
ensure that all soldiers are best prepared to survive and win on a 
gender-neutral battlefield. The ACFT drives balanced and focused 
physical training that will reduce overuse injuries and unplanned 
attrition. All research protocols to develop the ACFT reflected the 
Army's male to female ratio. An appropriate number of males and 
females, corresponding to the Army ratio, participated in ACFT event 
validation. Although the biological sex differences between males and 
females are unequivocal, there is no physiological reason any soldier 
cannot pass the ACFT at the Black, Gray, or Gold level with appropriate 
time, motivation, and training. Soldiers are improving their 
performance over time, with many soldiers, regardless of gender, 
achieving passing scores on each event of the ACFT at BCT and AIT. 
These results stem from appropriate physical training time and proper 
instruction. Army Senior Leaders will utilize the next year to 
determine how ACFT performance impacts personnel policies and we are 
conducting numerous internal training studies to optimize training 
opportunities for soldiers.
                                 people
    108. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in 
your opening statement submitted for the record, you stated that, ``One 
example of investments into our people are the five focused Quality of 
Life priorities, which include housing, both family and barracks, 
transforming healthcare, improving and adequately resourcing Child and 
Youth Services.'' In examining your budget documents, I noticed that 
while the total military child population and required child care 
spaces increased from fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2021, your 
request funds fewer Child Development Service spaces, resulting in a 
drop of 9 percent (78 percent in fiscal year 2020 to 69 percent in 
fiscal year 2021) of children able to access care. Can you explain how 
you are ``improving and adequately resourcing Child and Youth 
Services'' if you are funding them at lower levels in fiscal year 2021?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is taking steps 
to focus on investments in our people in various ways, to include 
utilizing the Unfunded Priority List (Unfunded Requirements) process 
authorized by Congress which includes three Child Development Centers 
in both Hawaii and Alaska. While the Army programs and builds increased 
capacity, the Army intends to retain a higher percentage of child care 
professionals by increasing pay to be competitive with civilian care 
providers and providing support through the Army Fee Assistance program 
which already covers 14,000 children. While the Army appreciates the 
$50 million support from Congress to support Child and Youth Services 
in the fiscal year 2020 Enacted Budget, we were not able to adjust the 
request in time to effect the Fiscal Year 2021 President's Budget. 
Additional emphasis is underway in the POM 22-26 development to improve 
and resource Child and Youth Services.
                                 depots
    109. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in 
your opening statement submitted for the record, you stated: 
``Moreover, the Army's Organic Industrial Base (OIB)--26 depots, 
arsenals and ammunition plants--manufacture, repair, upgrade and 
modernize the Army's equipment, and are absolutely critical to both 
Strategic and Tactical Readiness. We are optimizing the OIB to three 
primary end states: support current unit readiness across the force; 
maintain the ability to meet wartime surge requirements; and modernize 
and retool to sustain the next generation of Army equipment. Through 
implementation of Repair Cycle Float, a new methodology that links OIB 
production and workload to Army readiness, we will fundamentally change 
and improve the way we resource and manage these critical facilities.'' 
Anniston Army Depot is in Alabama. They have expressed to me a concern 
that they will soon have no workload to repair M1 tank turrets or 
conduct full assembly of the tank. What is the Army doing to ensure 
full weapon system repair and upgrade skills are workloaded and 
retained?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Our depot workload is a 
balance of modernization and sustainment requirements that meet the 
National Defense Strategy priorities. The current workload allows the 
Army to meet near-term readiness goals and the Organic Industrial Base 
to remain postured to surge in support of any contingency. We have the 
correct skills and workload to meet the Army's readiness requirements 
at Anniston Army Depot. OIB Sites have programs in place to cross-train 
personnel across multiple platforms, which enable us to maximize 
utilization of our current force, balance and retain skill sets and 
meet workload requirements, and ensure a breadth and depth of technical 
expertise is readily available. The skills required across our OIB 
sites are very dynamic and AMC is continuously evaluating them against 
the current force and future force requirements.
    The Army will continue to address weapons system repair and upgrade 
capability at the depots by requesting and obtaining access to 
technical data as weapon systems are upgraded and modernized. The Army 
will also continue to engage in Public-Private-Partnering agreements 
with the Original Equipment Manufacturers to ensure that the required 
skills sets are maintained at the depots and to maximize the 
capabilities with our long-standing industry partners.
                             army aviation
    110. Senator Jones. General McConville, the Army continues to 
report a critical shortage of pilots and stated that it will increase 
the pilot training throughput in fiscal year 2021. Do you have 
sufficient funds in the fiscal year 2020 President's Budget level to 
allow you to set the conditions in terms of additional instructor 
pilots and increased maintenance capability to accept additional 
students in fiscal year 2021?
    General McConville. Congress fully supported the requested aviation 
training budget for fiscal year 2020. The requested aviation training 
budget in fiscal year 2020 is not sufficient to increase the throughput 
of Aviator training. The Army is in the process of funding the final 
$122.6 million of an overall $331 million UFR. $171 million was funded 
in fiscal year 2019, $37.4 million was saved thru AH-64 modernization 
efforts at the training base, and the remainder will be funded in 
fiscal year 2020. This additional funding will enable the training base 
at Ft. Rucker to meet the required throughput of 1272 initial entry 
Aviators, and 1555 graduate Aviators to meet Army requirements. The 
increased throughput at the training base coupled with multiple 
retention efforts will address the current pilot shortage. We continue 
to assess the impacts of COVID-19 on our training infrastructure and 
ability to move students to training.
                            missile defense
    111. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
gentlemen, Alabama is the arguably the home of Army missile defense. 
Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler, USA met with my office just a couple 
weeks ago, and I'm excited with the progress the Space and Missile 
Defense Command is making in developing new systems and working to 
integrate them into existing formations across the Army. I am, however, 
concerned with the Army's missile defense capacity. According to your 
budget request, you are asking for $202 million to convert two Patriot 
battalions to the new Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command 
System (IBCS). I know that our Air Defenders are the most deployed 
units in the Department. Can you speak to the impact that this 
transition will have upon the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) for the rest 
of the Patriot units?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The impact of IBCS 
modernization on the OPTEMPO of the Patriot Force in fiscal year 2023 
and beyond will depend on the Geographic Combatant Commander demand for 
CONUS-Based Patriot Forces. This Patriot Force consists of 11 CONUS-
Based Battalions and 4 Forward Stationed Battalions. The Army planned 
for 2 Patriot Battalions in IBCS modernization while supporting up to 2 
Battalions Forward Deployed. If the deployed steady State exceeds 2 
Battalions, an impact to modernization and Deploy to Dwell will occur.

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
               integrated air and missile defense (iamd)
    1. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
Army has indicated that air and missile defense is a top modernization 
priority. What IAMD efforts are underway and how are they progressing?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army Integrated Air 
& Missile Defense system performed well in Collective Training, which 
concluded earlier this month. Due to COVID-19 impacts, 3d Battalion, 
43d Air Defense Artillery's upcoming Limited User Test (LUT) has been 
slightly extended to ensure the health and safety of our soldiers, but 
should not impact the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) 
scheduled 4QFY20. The baseline program integrates Sentinel radar and 
Patriot components and provides the open architecture upon which the 
Army will continue to expand, as a key contributor to Joint All-Domain 
Command & Control (JADC2). We are updating and finalizing the current 
software version prior to the LUT start date to ensure a successful 
test event. Finally, the Army is prioritizing follow-on weapon and 
sensor integration after the baseline Initial Operational Capability in 
2022. Those will be formally documented in a Capabilities Development 
Document Update (for Increment 3).

    2. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, can 
you update us on the Indirect Fire Protection Capability/Iron Dome way 
ahead?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army will receive 
the first battery of Iron Dome in December 2020 and the second battery 
in February 2021. Once we receive those two batteries, we will begin 
the required training of the soldiers who will man and operate them. 
Simultaneously, we will attempt to integrate the Iron Dome Systems into 
our Integrated Battle Command Systems (IBCS). Based on the technical 
data we have received, we believe that full integration of Iron Dome 
into the IBCS architecture will be challenging. We expect that we will 
end up with two very capable, but standalone, batteries. It is 
anticipated that the two Iron Dome Batteries will achieve full 
operational capability by the end of 4QFY21. The Army is currently 
executing a competitive solicitation for the Enduring Indirect Fire 
Protection Capability Increment Two solution (IFPC Inc 2). The IFPC Inc 
2 solicitation is open to all competitors to conduct U.S. Government 
and vendor models & simulations, hardware-in-the-loop activities, and a 
live-fire shoot-off demonstration in 3QFY21. As stated in our report to 
Congress on February 25, 2020, we do not intend to buy more stand-alone 
weapon systems that cannot be fully integrated with our Joint Air and 
Missile Defense capabilities. As such, I am prioritizing the use of the 
Fiscal Year 2021 funding toward achieving an enduring, integrated 
capability as quickly as possible.
                             arctic threats
    3. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
what do you see as the key threats to U.S. interests and security in 
the Arctic region, and what will the Army do specifically--as a part of 
the joint force--to help provide options to the President to help 
counter these threats?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Russia and China 
constitute the primary competitors to U.S. interests and security in 
the Arctic. Russia likely will continue its aggressive efforts to deny 
others access and/or presence in the Arctic region, both militarily and 
commercially. Russia seeks to secure Arctic mineral resources, control 
the Northern Sea Route, and extend the range of its strategic defenses. 
China, a self-declared ``near-Arctic'' State, is also keenly interested 
in the Arctic for its natural resources, possible shipping shortcuts, 
and scientific endeavors focused on global climate change. Beijing 
considers the Arctic an area of shared international interests versus 
one defined by the sovereignty of Arctic littoral states, thus allowing 
Beijing open access. As part of the joint force, the Army, in support 
of the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, participates in exercises 
and ensures it has major combat units ready for a variety of 
contingencies in the Artic. The Army provides forces for 12 Arctic 
exercises, many of which are conducted with allies, including three 
exercises that are conducted in Alaska: ARCTIC PEGASUS, ARCTIC EAGLE, 
and ARCTIC EDGE. The Army will continue to partner with the Joint Force 
to implement the Arctic Strategy and build the readiness needed to win 
in the Arctic.
               joint pacific alaska range complex (jparc)
    4. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, 
current and past military leaders have referred to JPARC as a ``crown 
jewel'' of training ranges due to its expansive space, varied terrain, 
and nearly limitless training potential. What are your own personal 
views on JPARC and what specific steps could be undertaken to maximize 
the utilization and training of this world-class training range?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Joint Pacific Alaska 
Range Complex (JPARC) provides training capabilities for multiple 
components and services to use for a variety of training from 
individual to pre-rotational Mission Readiness Exercises, to Joint All 
Domain Operations (JADO) coordinated by US INDO-PACOM. A broad concept 
to maximize the use of the JPARC would be to provide joint funding for 
large scale exercises in Alaska. This concept would provide the Joint 
Force with a training environment of sufficient scale and scope to 
exercise multi-domain opportunities by linking USN vessels, USAF 5th 
GEN fighters, and Army assets to achieve cross-domain effects in Cyber, 
Electronic warfare, space, offensive counter-air, and Long-Range 
Precision Fires (LRPF). These exercises would improve the Joint Force's 
abilities to operate, fight, and achieve a decisive edge the MDO 
environment; would replicate future combat operational environments; 
and enable a highly trained Joint Force capable of presenting multiple-
dilemmas to our Nation's adversaries in competition, crisis, and 
conflict.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                          army missile defense
    5. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the 
Army has made a concerted effort to integrate its missile defense 
capabilities. As the Army moves toward greater reliance on networks, 
it's clear that competitors will seek to disrupt, degrade, and defeat 
those networks. What is being done to mitigate those problems?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is pursuing a 
network modernization strategy, aligning internal science and 
technology efforts, and ensuring that the Integrated Battle Command 
System (IBCS will be designed to meet and maintain Cybersecurity 
defense standards. The network modernization strategy will deliver 
assured network transport, with multiple communication pathways, 
including leveraging military and commercial satellite services, 
increasing bandwidth and range through military and commercial 
satellite and terrestrial networks, incorporating more secure modems, 
updating gateway architecture, and integrating secure waveforms. The 
alignment is informing industry research and development efforts 
through threat-based market research and establishing cooperative 
research and development agreements to share threat data, while also 
driving network solutions to counter those threats. Finally, we are 
conducting biennial survivability and resilience exercises with the Air 
and Missile Defense architecture to ensure that we understand and 
correct potential and emerging cyber, electronic warfare, and position, 
navigation, and timing vulnerabilities.

    6. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, with 
a movement toward distributed operations, how can we ensure our forces 
are protected by air defense?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Air and missile defense 
(AMD) during distributed operations presents an inherently Joint 
challenge that requires contributions from all Services. The Army's AMD 
contribution primarily consists of THAAD, AN/TPY-2, Patriot, Avenger, 
as well as Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) units. The 
Army will field M-SHORAD and interim Indirect Fire Protection 
Capability (IFPC) in the FY21 to further expand Army AMD capability and 
capacity to support the Joint fight. The Army will field the IAMD 
Battle Command System (IBCS) in FY22 to improve interdependent AMD 
operations enabling tailorable and scalable force packages. 
Additionally, we utilize passive defense measures to mitigate the 
consequences of enemy attacks, as well as employ attack operations to 
attrit threat capability and capacity. Integration with Joint and 
Coalition forces is imperative to protect our forces and we will 
continue to work with our Allies and partners to support the AMD 
requirements of distributed operations.

    7. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, how 
much are you conferring with the other Services on working out 
disparities in common operating picture issues?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We routinely confer with 
our Service partners to resolve technical and operational Common 
Operating Picture (COP) issues at all levels--action officer to 
department headquarters. Global Command & Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) 
continues as the primary program of record providing the aggregated 
standard COP across Combatant Commands (CCMD) and the Joint Force. 
Near-term, we are increasing shared understanding of any potential COP 
issues by leveraging experimentation and routine touchpoints, such as 
the recently completed FY20 Joint All Domain Command and Control 
(JADC2) Experiments #1 and #2, Joint Warfighting Assessments, monthly 
Joint Staff (JS) led JADC2 Cross Functional Team CFT) engagements, and 
developing Joint Concepts for Command and Control (JCC2) in support of 
Multi Domain Operations.
                   close combat lethality task force
    8. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy, in March 2018, then-
Secretary James N. Mattis established the Close Combat Lethality Task 
Force in an effort to make combat units more lethal. He had concerns 
about the erosion of close combat capability relative to threats 
identified in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Can you tell me what 
the status of the close combat lethality task force is and if these 
efforts will continue in support of the NDS?
    Secretary McCarthy. The Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF) 
will continue efforts to develop, evaluate, recommend, and implement 
improvements to U.S. squad-level Infantry combat formations and Special 
Operations Force equivalents, to ensure close combat overmatch against 
pacing threats, and strengthen the combat lethality, survivability, 
resiliency, and readiness of our close combat forces. The Army is 
working closely with our partners in the Marine Corps and Special 
Operations Command to plan for governance and procedures that maintain 
the joint purpose of the CCLTF and ensure we continue to make advances 
in close combat lethality so that our close combat forces are well 
prepared to support the National Defense Strategy.

    9. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy, has a decision been made on 
whether the close combat lethality task force will report to the Army?
    Secretary McCarthy. Yes, on March 27th the Secretary of Defense 
delegated the authority for the CCLTF to the Army. We have initiated 
planning to ensure we continue to support our close combat forces. The 
Army is currently drafting a framework to establish a tri-service 
governance board between the U.S. Army, the USMC, and USSOCOM to 
provide oversight, guidance, and prioritization for initiatives 
supporting our men and women at the tip of the spear and build on the 
successes of the CCLTF. Concurrently, we are preparing an Army Execute 
Order that will position the CCLTF in an Army organization with optimal 
functional alignment for internal command and control, and assign roles 
and responsibilities for Army staff, commands, and organizations.
                               readiness
    10. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, how 
have you managed to create a balance between protecting the force from 
COVID-19 and readiness?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is carefully 
and deliberately balancing force protection with efforts to sustain 
readiness. We have initiated a planning process that frames the Army's 
actions, which include responding, recovering, and restoring 
capabilities. The Army has followed the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) and the Commander in Chief's guidance with respect to 
social distancing and other protocols. The Army provided this 
information to the force via Army Orders that have been published and 
updated since the crisis began. Additionally, the Army directed 
installations, camps, and posts to increase their Health Protection 
(HPCON) to protect our soldiers and their families, our DA civilians, 
and Contractors, and ensure we can continue our mission by minimizing 
the spread of COVID-19. It is too early to measure any significant 
impact to readiness, but the longer the pandemic lasts, the greater the 
possibility there could be a degradation to readiness. In an effort to 
protect the force, we have migrated to virtual recruiting to sustain 
the Army's end-strength. Although modified for health protection 
measures, we are continuing initial entry training, and Commanders at 
all levels are assessing their local conditions and modifying training 
to minimize risk to our force while maximizing our readiness.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                         defense health agency
    11. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy, do you think that continuing 
with the planned Defense Health Agency transition is prudent during the 
current COVID-19 health crisis? Please explain.
    Secretary McCarthy. No, I do not think we should continue with the 
planned transition during the current health crisis. Our Military 
Treatment Facilities and other medical structures are an integral part 
of our Army and are key to our ability to respond to national 
requirements. Effective alignment of authorities, roles, and 
responsibilities is necessary to allow for an optimal response. The 
Army was able to rapidly respond to the COVID-19 pandemic because of 
our unique medical structure. We have committed our ready medical 
personnel, Public Health Center, Army Medical Command, Medical Research 
and Development Command, as well as other medical capabilities to 
treatment, detection, and prevention efforts in support of the national 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic highlights 
that removing these key medical structures away from normal Service 
command and control alignment, will fracture our ability to respond.
                                 depots
    12. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in 
your response to my paper hearing question regarding Army depots, your 
response did not address how the Anniston Depot, which is designated as 
the Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence for combat vehicles 
(except Bradley), will retain the turret, full assembly, and full tank 
test skills without full overhaul and repair of the M1 Abrams tank. 
Will you ensure this is accomplished via the public-private-partnering?
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Yes, we will ensure the 
Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) will retain the turret, full assembly, and 
full tank test skills thru public-private-partnering. ANAD will 
continue to overhaul, repair, and fully assemble the M1 Abrams tanks to 
preserve skills and support fleet readiness. This will be accomplished 
thru public-private partnerships (P3), to include General Dynamics Land 
Systems (GDLS) and Honeywell, who have an enduring residence at ANAD. 
Under the P3 with GDLS, for example, the Repair Cycle Float (RCF) 
program is underway with PM Abrams M1A2 SEPv3modernization. To further 
ensure workforce skills retention, PM Abrams' modernization is ongoing 
at ANAD and expected to continue through FY26.
                              space force
    13. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy, in your response to Senator 
Blackburn's question about space, you stated, ``We are working the 
merger with US Space Force and will divest assets over time. However, 
we must retain necessary organic space-related capabilities to balance 
space capabilities across the force and limit operational risk.'' I 
understand that you can only speak for the Army, but can you explain 
what types of personnel/capabilities/units/equipment you are retaining, 
whether you plan to retain those indefinitely or just until the United 
States Space Force is fully established, and whether the other branches 
are taking a similar position?
    Secretary McCarthy. The Army intends to permanently retain our 
cadre of Army space professionals who understand both traditional Army 
operations and space, and who integrate appropriate space-enabled 
capabilities into Army plans, operations, concepts, and doctrine. We 
will also retain space-enabled capabilities integrated throughout Army 
formations, as they are essential to effective combat operations on 
land, and will continue to evolve these service-unique assets to enable 
multi-domain operations in the future. The Army will transfer 
identified capabilities on a schedule that ensures sustainment of the 
associated operational missions. We believe the Navy has taken a 
similar approach regarding retention of space expertise and service-
unique, space-enabled capabilities currently integrated in Navy 
systems.
 u.s. army medical research institute of infectious diseases (usamriid)
    14. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in 
your response to Senator Reed's question regarding USAMRIID, you 
mentioned that ``Simultaneously, the Army conducted an extensive review 
of our medical research capabilities and is in the process of 
implementing changes that will facilitate the availability of these 
capabilities in the future.'' Please provide specifics about the 
changes you referenced and what this committee can do to assist the 
implementation.
    Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. In February 2020, Army 
Futures Command (AFC) and U.S. Army Medical Research and Development 
Command (USAMRDC) collaborated to develop initial options to optimize 
structure for both USAMRIID and U.S. Medical Research Institute of 
Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) based on core mission, functions, and 
capabilities all tied to resources to enable their missions. In support 
of this effort, key Army Staff agencies enable the optimized structure 
of USAMRDC, specifically focusing on USAMRIID and USAMRICD, inclusive 
of their workforce, mission, and facilities. The Army is working to 
identify a core funding plan in balance with external customers; 
pursuing a comprehensive Health Affairs Medical Research and Response 
strategy to inform core roles and functions; and identifying future 
medical research structures with potential near-termmitigations. The 
Army needs relief from the statutory requirement to transition Medical 
Research and Development to the Defense Health Agency, however, to 
achieve optimization.
                                suicide
    15. Senator Jones. General McConville, I was intrigued by your 
response to Senator King's question regarding soldier and veteran 
suicide. You gave quite a thorough description of the transition 
process. Do you think the system for preventing suicide for soldiers, 
transitioning soldiers, and veterans needs to be improved? If so, how?
    General McConville. While we continue to invest in research and 
look to new or improved initiatives to increase individual resilience, 
coping, and communication skills, we must keep soldiers connected while 
in the Army and maintain that connection through the soldier's 
transition into Veterans Organizations' behavioral assets. Soldiers 
live in squads; squads are the building blocks of the Army's 
formations. If you drew a triangle and at the points are ``Leader,'' 
``Family,'' and ``Peers,'' this is the framework for how we need to get 
after the problem. In the Army's initiative ``This is My Squad,'' units 
focus on the positive aspects of a soldier's life and a greater 
emphasis on a collectivist culture, or a culture where the group is 
prioritized over the individual. By shifting soldiers' focus to shared 
experiences, they can form the unity needed to solve personal crises 
and combat misconduct. By engaging with fellow soldiers, squad leaders 
can also better detect personal dilemmas and crises. Leaders will 
interact with the soldiers in their squads and they will know those 
soldiers, their families, and their peers. By knowing our soldiers 
better, ourCommand Teams and Leaders can develop and adjust programs as 
required to prevent this unnecessary loss of life. Discussing and 
recognizing all lives are worth living should be part of initial entry 
training, in uniform, and especially during transition.